alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Mike IVY v. STATE of Mississippi.

No. 48066.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

Oct. 7, 1974.

Johnston, Pritchard & Wright, Pasca-goula, for appellant.

A. F. Summer, Atty. Gen. by William D. Boerner, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, for appellee.

PATTERSON, Justice:

Mike Ivy and Clinton Smith were jointly indicted for the sale of a controlled substance without authority of law. The cases were severed and Ivy was convicted and sentenced to fifteen years in the state penitentiary by the Circuit Court of Jackson County.

The primary assignment of error is directed to the testimony of Smith, the co-in-dictee, who was called as a witness by the state. The pertinent portion of his testimony contended to have been grossly prejudicial to the appellant, follows:

> BY MR. LOCKARD: (Continuing)

> Q. Now, Mr. Smith, I believe you were joint indictee in this matter, were you not P

> A. Yes, sir, I was.

> Q. And you have been convicted—

> BY MR. WRIGHT: If the Court please, we now object and move for a mistrial.

> BY THE COURT: Objection will be overruled.

> *293BY MR. LOCKARD: (Continuing)

> Q. Mr. Smith, you have been sentenced, have you not ?

> A. Yes, sir, I have.

> 

> BY MR. WRIGHT: We renew our objection and make the same objection.

> BY THE COURT: Overruled.

The jury thus had before it evidence of the co-indictee’s conviction and sentence from which it could very likely conclude that Ivy was guilty because his associate and co-indictee was convicted and sentenced, or more modernly put, the jury could find that he was guilty by association.

We have consistently held evidence of this nature to be inimical to a fair trial. McCray v. State, 293 So.2d 807 (Miss.1974); Buckley v. State, 223 So.2d 524 (Miss.1969); State v. Thornhill, 251 Miss. 718, 171 So.2d 308 (1965); Pieper v. State, 242 Miss. 49, 134 So.2d 157 (1961), and Pickens v. State, 129 Miss. 191, 91 So. 906 (1922).

In Buckley, supra> we stated:

> The law is well settled in this state that where two or more persons are jointly indicted for the same offense but are separately tried, a judgment of conviction against one of them is not competent evidence on the trial of the other because such plea of guilty or conviction is no evidence of the guilt of the party being tried. . . .Not only was this testimony designed to lead the jury to believe that since Pitts had plead guilty to the charge, that his co-indictee, Buckley, was also guilty, but it was also designed to bolster the testimony of Pitts. . . .

223 So.2d at 528.

This rule is in accord with those of many other states. Indeed, it appears to be the uniform rule. *See*48 A.L.R.2d 1016 (1956).

These authorities remain applicable, requiring the case tQ be reversed and remanded for a new trial.

Reversed and Remanded.

GILLESPIE, C. J., and INZER, SUGG and WALKER, JJ., concur.
40658.

#### WHITTIER v. NATIONWIDE MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY.

Pannell, Judge.

1. The cardinal rule for the construction of a petition is to ascertain the intention of the pleader. *Cook v. Grimsley,*175 Ga. 138 (165 SE 30). Pleadings, on demurrer, are construed as a whole and given their natural intent. *Georgia Power*Co. *v. Leonard,*187 Ga. 608, 614 (4) (1 SE2d 579). The final test of the sufficiency of a petition is whether the defendant can admit all that is alleged and escape liability. *Pullman Palace Car Co. v. Martin,*92 Ga. 161, 164 (18 SE 364).

2. Where a suit on account for a named sum has attached thereto and made a pari thereof as an exhibit a statement showing charges for “advances” and credits for commissions, and showing a “balance due Nationwide Mutual Insurance Companies as of February 8, 1962,” in the sum sued for, which statement of account is certified by a named person as “Accounts supervisor, Nationwide Insurance Companies” to be a true and accurate statement of the defendant’s “Career Plan Account,” and there is also attached to the petition and made a part thereof as an exhibit a letter signed by the defendant and addressed to several insurance companies, including the plaintiff, requesting that the defendant be “put on the career agent’s financing plan of the companies,” and indicating clearly that advances may be drawn against commissions, and that the commissions may be withheld by the companies and applied against the advances, and that the advances shall be *650a debt due by the defendant “to the companies,” and the defendant in said letter agrees to repay the excess of advances over commissions, and the letter shows that the plaintiff company is to make all advances and authorizes the other companies to pay the commissions earned by the defendant to the plaintiff, such a suit, with the exhibits attached, is sufficient to set forth a cause of action. It follows that the trial judge did not err in overruling the general demurrer interposed by the defendant. Those cases holding that, in the absence of an agreement, express or implied, the making of advances to a salesman against future commissions creates no legal obligation on his part to repay them, *Armstrong v. Security Life &c. Co.,*108 Ga. App. 293, 294 (132 SE2d 798), and cases cited, have no application to the present case where there appears to be an express agreement to repay the advances.

Decided April 30, 1964.

*Brannen, Clark & Hester, Eugene McCracken,*for plaintiff in error.

*Charles C. Martin,*contra.

3. Inasmuch as the trial judge and the parties treated the demurrer “the defendant demurs generally to plaintiff’s petition” as sufficient, and since the ruling of the trial judge in overruling the demurrer is affirmed on the merits of the petition, no ruling is made on the sufficiency of the demurrer to present a question for decision.

4. The only special demurrer to the petition on the ground that “the petition fails to show for what purpose the alleged advances were made to the defendant” is without .merit.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*Felton, C. J., and Frankum, J., concur.*
§ 596.505 Certain transactions related to stipends and scholarships authorized. ( a ) United States persons are authorized to engage in all financial transactions with respect to stipends and scholarships covering tuition and related educational, living and travel expenses provided by the Government of Syria to Syrian nationals who are enrolled as students in an accredited educational institution in the United States. Representations made by an accredited educational institution concerning the status of a student maybe relied upon in determining the applicability of this section.
( b ) Nothing in this section authorizes a transaction prohibited by § 596.504(a)(2).
[61 FR 67944, Dec. 26, 1996, as amended at 86 FR 27274, May 20, 2021]
Order entered March 1 4 , 2019

In The



## Court of Appeals

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

No. 05

- 19

- 00269

- CV

IN RE MICHAEL DWAYNE WILL IAMS, Rela t or

Original Proceeding from the County Criminal Court No. 10

Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. MA8359627



### O RDER

Before Justices Bridges, Osborne, and Carlyle

Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, we DENY relator’s petition for writ of

mandamus.

/s/ CORY L. CARLYLE

JUSTICE
#### Jesse K. COLLINS, Appellant, v. Alvin MILLER, Appellee.

No. 73-719.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

June 14, 1974.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.
#### Alex VAN DYKE v. COLFAX CREOSOTING COMPANY et al.

No. 55116.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Sept. 20, 1974.

In re: Colfax Creosoting Company, et al applying for certiorari, or writ of review to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, Parish of Rapides. 295 So.2d 589.

Writ denied. The judgment is correct.
HomeOffice of the SpokespersonPress Releases...Announcement of Visa Restrictions to Address Forced Assimilation in Tibet

# 									Announcement of Visa Restrictions to Address Forced Assimilation in Tibet							

Press Statement

Antony J. Blinken, Secretary of State

August 22, 2023

The State Department is taking steps to impose visa restrictions under the authority of Section 212(a)(3)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act on People’s Republic of China (PRC) officials for their involvement in the forcible assimilation of more than one million Tibetan children in government-run boarding schools.  These coercive policies seek to eliminate Tibet’s distinct linguistic, cultural, and religious traditions among younger generations of Tibetans.

We urge PRC authorities to end the coercion of Tibetan children into government-run boarding schools and to cease repressive assimilation policies, both in Tibet and throughout other parts of the PRC.  We will continue to work with our allies and partners to highlight these actions and promote accountability.

Tags

Bureau of East Asian and Pacific AffairsOffice of the SpokespersonTibetOffice of the U.S. Special Coordinator for Tibetan IssuesVisas

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#### Audrey V. McLEAN, Appellant-Cross Appellee, v. Ralph E. McLEAN, Jr., Appellee-Cross Appellant.

Nos. 79-1680, 79-2256 and 80-176.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

June 10, 1980.

*916Bartel *&*Shuford and Stanley Jay Bartel, Miami, for Audrey V. McLean.

Frishman & Miller and Henry M. Cain, Coral Gables, for Ralph E. McLean, Jr.

Before BARKDULL, HUBBART and SCHWARTZ, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

No abuse of discretion has been demonstrated by either party in the trial court’s determinations (a) awarding two years of rehabilitative, rather than permanent alimony;1 (b) as to the amount of that alimony; (c) denying the wife’s claim to a “special equity” in the husband’s interest in the marital home; (d) fixing the amount of the wife’s attorney’s fees and ordering that the husband pay one-half of that sum and (e) allocating responsibility between the parties for the expenses of a child psychologist. *Canakaris v. Canakaris,*382 So.2d 1197 (Fla.1980); *Ingram*v. *Ingram,*379 So.2d 955 (Fla.1980); *Rosenberg v. Rosenberg,*371 So.2d 672 (Fla.1979), adopting dissenting opinion, 352 So.3d 867 (Fla.3d DCA 1977); *Herzog*v. *Herzog,*346 So.2d 56 (Fla. 1977); *Ball v. Ball,*335 So.2d 5 (Fla.1976); *Shaw v. Shaw,*334 So.2d 13 (Fla.1976); *Creel v. Creel,*378 So.2d 1251 (Fla.3d DCA 1979). The final judgment and the post-final judgment orders under review are therefore

Affirmed.

1

. We specifically note that this provision is subject to modification upon a timely and proper showing under Section 61.14, Florida Statutes (1979). *Cantor v. Cantor,*306 So.2d 596 (Fla.2d DCA 1975).
#### § 587.311 Property; property interest.

The terms *property* and *property interest* include money, checks, drafts, bullion, bank deposits, savings accounts, debts, indebtedness, obligations, notes, guarantees, debentures, stocks, bonds, coupons, any other financial instruments, bankers acceptances, mortgages, pledges, liens or other rights in the nature of security, warehouse receipts, bills of lading, trust receipts, bills of sale, any other evidences of title, ownership, or indebtedness, letters of credit and any documents relating to any rights or obligations thereunder, powers of attorney, goods, wares, merchandise, chattels, stocks on hand, ships, goods on ships, real estate mortgages, deeds of trust, vendors' sales agreements, land contracts, leaseholds, ground rents, real estate and any other interest therein, options, negotiable instruments, trade acceptances, royalties, book accounts, accounts payable, judgments, patents, trademarks or copyrights, insurance policies, safe deposit boxes and their contents, annuities, pooling agreements, services of any nature whatsoever, contracts of any nature whatsoever, and any other property, real, personal, or mixed, tangible or intangible, or interest or interests therein, present, future, or contingent.
# Azerbaijan

264 items

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        -    Department Press Briefing  		Department Press Briefing – December 14, 2023	  Matthew MillerDecember 14, 2023Washington, D.C. 
        -    Department Press Briefing  		Department Press Briefing – December 13, 2023	  Matthew MillerDecember 13, 2023 
        -    Department Press Briefing  		Department Press Briefing – December 6, 2023	  Matthew MillerDecember 6, 2023 
        -    Department Press Briefing  		Department Press Briefing – December 5, 2023	  Matthew MillerDecember 5, 2023 
        -    Media Note  		Assistant Secretary O’Brien’s Travel to Azerbaijan and Romania	  December 4, 2023 
        -    Readout  		Secretary Blinken’s Call with Azerbaijani President Aliyev	  November 27, 2023 
        -    Department Press Briefing  		Department Press Briefing – November 20, 2023	  Matthew MillerNovember 20, 2023 
        -    Department Press Briefing  		Department Press Briefing – November 16, 2023	  Matthew MillerNovember 16, 2023 

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#### Louisa Dele, respondent, *v.*Christian A. Bruning et al., appellants.

[Decided October 14th, 1929.]

*Mr. Alexander M. MacLeod,*for the respondent.

*Mr. Gustav A. Hunziher,*for the appellants.

Per Curiam.

The decree appealed from -will be affirmed, for the reasons stated in the opinion filed in the court below by Vice-Chancellor Lewis, and reported in *101 N. J. Eq. 58.*

*For affirmance*— Parker, Kalisoh, Black, Campbell, Lloyd, White, Van Buskirk, Kays, Heteield, Dear, JJ. 10.

*For reversal*— The Chief-Justice, Trenchard, Case, Bodine, McG-lennon, JJ. 5.
#### George Norman TERRY v. Louise TERRY.

No. 52940.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

Nov. 18, 1981.

Rehearing Denied Dec. 9, 1981.

Laurel G. Weir, Thomas L. Booker, Philadelphia, for appellant.

Martin & Jones, Robert D. Jones, Meridian, for appellee.

Appeal from Chancery Court, Lauderdale County; Michael Sullivan, Special Chancellor.

Before PATTERSON, C. J., and SUGG and LEE, JJ.

AFFIRMED.
Exhibit 32.1
                           CERTIFICATION  PURSUANT  TO
                            18  U.S.C.  SECTION  1350,
                             AS  ADOPTED  PURSUANT  TO
                 SECTION  906  OF  THE  SARBANES-OXLEY  ACT  OF  2002

In  connection  with  the  Quarterly  Report  of  B2Digital,Inc.,
(the  "Company")  on  Form  10-QSB  for the period ended June 30, 2004, as filed
with  the  Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"),
I,  Robert  Russell,  Chief  Executive  Officer  and  Marcia Pearlstein, Interim
Chief
Financial  Officer, of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350,
as  adopted  pursuant  to  Section  906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

     (1)  The Report fully  complies with the  requirements  of Section 13(a) or
15(d)  of  the  Securities  Exchange  Act  of  1934;  and

     (2)  The  information  contained  in the  Report  fairly  presents,  in all
material  respects,  the  financial  condition  and results of operations of the
Company.


                                  /s/  Robert  Russell
                                  -------------------------------------
                                  Robert  Russell
                                  Chief  Executive  Officer



                                  /s/  Marcia  Pearlstein
                                  -------------------------------------
                                  Marcia  Pearlstein
                                  Interim  Chief  Financial  Officer




Dated:  August  23,  2004

The foregoing certification is being furnished solely pursuant to Section 906 of
the  Sarbanes-Oxley  Act  of 2002 (Section 1350 of Chapter 63 of Title 18 of the
United  States  Code)  and  is  not  being  filed  as part of the Report or as a
separate  disclosure  document.
#### MEDSEN DEVELOPMENT, INC., Dolphin Construction Co., Inc., Steve Hessen, Individually, and Steve Hessen Construction Co., Inc., Appellants, v. George BRYANT and Cora Lee Bryant, his wife, Appellees.

No. 79-717.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Oct. 23, 1979.

Rehearing Denied Nov. 30, 1979.

Underwood, Gillis, Karcher, Reinert & Valle and Anthony Reinert, Miami, for appellants.

Feldman, Abramson, Smith & Magidson; Daniels & Hicks, Miami, for appellees.

*424Before PEARSON, KEHOE and SCHWARTZ, JJ.

SCHWARTZ, Judge.

The defendants below seek review, pursuant to Fla.R.App.P. 9.130(a)(3)(C)(iv), of a non-final order entering summary judgment against them on the issue of liability in a personal injury action. The basis of the ruling was the appellants’ asserted noncompliance with the registration provisions of the Fictitious Name Statute, Section 865.09, Fla.Stat. (1975). We reverse.

While the appellants may have employed what were arguably “fictitious” names in various aspects of their business dealings, the plaintiff alleged and demonstrated that they had committed the allegedly tortious acts for which they were sued while acting through the appropriate corporate or individual names and capacities in which they were specifically made parties-defendant below. Since this is true, their failure to register under Sec. 865.09, while perhaps wrongful in other contexts, was legally irrelevant to this one. As is stated in 57 Am.Jur.2d Name § 36 (1971):

> . there must be a violation of the statute in the particular contract or transaction, and if the person or partnership who may be within, but has not complied with, the statute, contracts not in the fictitious name or partnership designation, but individually, the contract or transaction is not rendered invalid and unenforceable by reason of such noncompliance.

See also cases collected, Annotations, 45 A.L.R. 198, 240-244 (1926); 42 A.L.R.2d 516, 547 (1955). We believe this rule is properly applied to preclude the plaintiff’s successful reliance on Sec. 865.09 in order to bar a defense of this action.1

The order under review is therefore reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings consistent herewith.

Reversed and remanded.

1

. Our conclusion makes it unnecessary to consider either the substantive question of whether § 865.09 is applicable in tort actions at all, see 57 Am.Jur.2d Name § 32 (1971); *Sparks v.*Porter, 270 F.Supp. 953 (N.D.Fla.1967); or the procedural one of whether the issue was correctly disposed of on motion for summary judgment against the defendants without a prior specific order granting them time within which to comply with the statute. See *Chaikin v. Skolnick,*201 So.2d 588 (Fla. 3d DCA 1967); *Cor-Gal Builders, Inc.*v. *Southard,*136 So.2d 244 (Fla. 3d DCA 1962); compare *Clifford Ragsd6ale, Inc. v. Morganti, Inc.,*356 So.2d 1321 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978), cert. denied, 362 So.2d 1051 (Fla.1978).
Exhibit 32.1


                          CEO CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350


In  connection  with the  Quarterly  Report of  Emclaire  Financial  Corp.  (the
Corporation) on Form 10-Q for the period ending March 31, 2008 as filed with the
Securities  and Exchange  Commission on the date here (the Report),  I, David L.
Cox, Chief Executive Officer of the Corporation,  certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
ss.  1350,  as adopted  pursuant to ss. 906 of the  Sarbanes-Oxley  Act of 2002,
that:

     (1)  The Report fully  complies with the  requirements  of section 13(a) or
          15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     (2)  The  information  contained  in the  Report  fairly  presents,  in all
          material respects,  the consolidated financial condition and result of
          operations of the Corporation.



/s/  David L. Cox
-----------------
David L. Cox
Chairman of the Board,
President and Chief Executive Officer


May 14, 2008
- Bureau Operations
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# Bureau Operations

## 				Our Mission			

					The Bureau’s operational units and offices, including the Legislative Reference Unit, Congressional Correspondence Unit, and Congressional Travel Office, provide critical support to the Department’s on-going engagement with Congress, promote effective coordination, and facilitate Congressional oversight.				

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# Bureau of African Affairs Releases

2648 items

        -    Report  		2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Mauritania	  April 22, 2024 
        -    Report  		2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Eritrea	  April 22, 2024 
        -    Report  		2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Gabon	  April 22, 2024 
        -    Report  		2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Angola	  April 22, 2024 
        -    Report  		2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Niger	  April 22, 2024 
        -    Report  		2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Madagascar	  April 22, 2024 
        -    Report  		2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Democratic Republic of the Congo	  April 22, 2024 
        -    Report  		2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Cameroon	  April 22, 2024 
        -    Report  		2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Republic of the Congo	  April 22, 2024 
        -    Report  		2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Mozambique	  April 22, 2024 

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#### GALLOWS DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Appellant, v. Harold E. JOHNSON, Appellee.

No. 74-487.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

May 13, 1974.

Appeal dismissed.
<Page>

                                                                    EXHIBIT 32.1

    Certification of the Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer
            of Apogee Robotics, Inc. pursuant to Section 906 of the
                           Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002


                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-QSB of Apogee Robotics, Inc.
(the "Company") for the quarter ended September 30, 2005 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), the
undersigned Michael Anthony, Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer
of Apogee Robotics, Inc., certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as
adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

(1) the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

Dated: August 28, 2007


/s/ Michael Anthony
-------------------
Michael Anthony
Chief Executive Officer


/s/ Michael Anthony
-------------------
Michael Anthony
Chief Financial Officer