IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

DIVISION II

MATTHEW MENZER, as Litigation Guardian No. 53972-1-II

Ad Litem of KJM, a minor,

Appellant,

v.

CATHOLIC HEALTH INITIATIVES, a UNPUBLISHED OPINION

foreign corporation; FRANCISCAN HEALTH

SYSTEM, a Washington corporation; and

SAINT JOSEPH MEDICAL CENTER,

Respondents.

SUTTON, J. — Matthew Menzer, as litigation guardian ad litem for KJM, a minor, sued 

Catholic Health Initiatives (CHI), Franciscan Health System (FHS), and Saint Joseph Medical 

Center (St. Joseph). CHI is the parent corporation of FHS and FHS owns St. Joseph. KJM alleged 

that CHI failed to adopt specific procedures requiring FHS and St. Joseph to screen newborns for 

a rare genetic disorder that KJM was later diagnosed with after his birth at St. Joseph. At the time 

of his birth, the Department of Health did not mandate this newborn screening test in acute care 

hospitals in Washington State although other states did. 

KJM claims that CHI, a corporate entity, owed him a duty because it directed health care 

decisions regarding his care and it directed health care decisions to its subsidiaries in other states’

hospitals throughout the United States. KJM argues that CHI meets the definition of a Washington 

“health care provider” because it employed one licensed doctor in Washington. KJM argues that

Filed

Washington State

Court of Appeals

Division Two

August 10, 2021
No. 53972-1-II

2

CHI can be sued for damages for injuries to KJM occurring as a result of health care under chapter 

7.70 RCW. Alternatively, if CHI is not a health care provider, KJM argues that we should expand 

RCW 7.70.020’s definition of health care provider to include “persons engaged in the healing 

arts,” which would then include CHI. KJM also argues that CHI, as a principal, is vicariously 

liable for FHS’s and St. Joseph’s actions based on their apparent authority to act for CHI. Thus, 

KJM argues that the superior court erred by granting summary judgment dismissal to CHI.

We hold that because CHI is not a health care provider under RCW 7.70.020, CHI does 

not owe a duty to KJM and even assuming a duty is owed, KJM fails to prove causation as a matter 

of law, and no duty exists under common law. We decline to expand the definition of health care 

provider and we hold that CHI is not vicariously liable for FHS or St. Joseph. We also decline 

KJM’s invitation to apply Washington’s definition of health care provider in a way that assumes 

CHI directed health care decisions in this matter as KJM provided no evidence that was the case. 

We affirm.

FACTS

I. BACKGROUND

A. CHI, FHS, AND ST. JOSEPH

CHI is a nonprofit parent corporation formed in 1996 and incorporated in Colorado. CHI’s 

purpose is to “promote and support, directly or indirectly, by donation, loan, or otherwise, the 

interests and purposes” of its “sponsored organizations.” Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 109-10. By 2005, 

CHI was the parent corporation of several subsidiary corporations that independently owned and 

operated hospitals in other states.
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CHI describes itself as a “national health care institution.” CP at 50. CHI’s mission, “[a]s 

one of the nation’s largest nonprofit health care systems,” is to “go beyond the provision of quality 

health care to help protect the vulnerable; to encourage participation in the political process; and 

to safeguard the environment.” CP at 278. CHI has 64 hospital facilities and 50 long-term care 

and residential-care facilities in 19 states.

FHS was formed in 1981. CHI was created when FHS and two other Catholic health care 

systems merged, but they continued to exist as separate subsidiary corporations. FHS owns and

operates St. Joseph. The FHS Board of Directors was the governing body for St. Joseph. FHS 

was responsible for appointing medical staff, approving clinical privileges for medical staff, 

ensuring St. Joseph and its staff carried out peer review activities and other quality assurance 

activities in accordance with RCW 70.41.200, approving contracts with physicians to perform 

specific activities, and providing general oversight and supervision of the hospital.

In August 2005, when KJM was born, no person employed by CHI had been granted 

privileges as a member of St. Joseph’s medical staff. In August 2005, the corporate operations of 

CHI and FHS were separate and distinct. Both St. Joseph and FHS were subject to oversight by 

the CHI Board of Directors, including subject to the approval of or removal by CHI.

CHI “did not have any involvement in the clinical decision-making or treatment of patients 

at St. Joseph.” CP at 102. When KJM was born at St. Joseph in August 2005, CHI employed 46 

people who “[had] an office, workspace, or were otherwise associated with working in Washington 

State.” CP at 103.

Of the CHI employees who were associated with working in Washington State, Dr. 

Gregory Semerdjian was the only one who was “a licensed health care provider.” CP at 103. Dr. 
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Semerdjian was CHI’s Vice President of Medical Operations, a member of the Clinical Services 

Group, and a member of CHI’s Physician Leadership Council. He attended the 2004 Genetics 

Advisory Summit and the 2005 meeting of the Genetics Advisory Committee. Dr. Semerdjian did 

not provide health care services to KJM. Dr. Semerdjian has not practiced clinical medicine since 

1991. Dr. Semerdjian was employed as a remote Vice President of Medical Operations to work 

with rural hospitals in North Dakota, Minnesota, Kansas, and Kentucky, not in Washington State. 

He did reside in Tacoma, Washington, but his work required him to travel out of state to the 

facilities CHI assigned him. He had a cubicle in an office space owned by FHS, but he did not 

work with any FHS facilities, or work at St. Joseph, and had no role related to making health care 

decisions about KJM.

B. SUPPLEMENTAL NEWBORN SCREENING AND KJM’S BIRTH

In August 2005, KJM was born at St. Joseph in Tacoma. At that time, St. Joseph did not 

include a newborn screening test for Glutaric Acidemia type 1 (GA-1) in its supplemental newborn 

screening (SNS) panel. The pediatrician who attended to KJM at St. Joseph was not named in the 

lawsuit, but could have ordered individual genetic testing if necessary. No other acute care 

hospitals licensed in Washington State offered the test at that time. The Department of Health 

required acute care hospitals in the state to conduct newborn screening for nine genetic disorders 

in August 2005, but did not mandate newborn screening for metabolic disorders such as GA-1. 

KJM was diagnosed with GA-1 when he was 11 months old. By the time he was diagnosed, 

KJM had developed brain damage due to GA-1. KJM’s mother said she would have gotten the 

additional screening test at St. Joseph if it had been offered.
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Prior to KJM’s birth, other states1had mandated testing for GA-1 in the SNS panel. In 

2005, hospitals in Colorado and Pennsylvania voluntarily included the GA-1 test in their SNS 

panel despite it not being mandatory in those states.

KJM’s mother noticed the CHI logo on the admission paperwork she filled out upon 

arriving at St. Joseph to give birth, which was “important” to her.

C. CHI’S KNOWLEDGE OF SNS

Dr. John Anderson, CHI’s Chief Medical Officer from 2004 to 2008, explained that CHI’s 

Clinical Services Group did not have a pediatrician because CHI did not include a children’s 

hospital; the hospitals in its subsidiaries provided adult care. CHI provided best practice resources 

in the form of “practice bundles” to its subsidiaries. “Practice bundles” include all of the resources 

that would be necessary to implement a practice change, but they do not mandate a particular 

course of testing or treatment.2 Dr. Anderson explained that SNS was not a priority at that time. 

CHI did not provide a practice bundle to its subsidiaries relating to SNS. Baylor University’s 

Institute for Metabolic Disease, the institution Anderson previously worked at, ensured that all of 

its hospitals offered SNS before any state mandate.

 

1 These states include: Iowa, Minnesota, Oregon, Idaho, Maryland, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, 

Missouri, and South Dakota.

2 Wash. Court of Appeals, Div. II oral argument, Matthew Menzer as Litigation Guardian ad Litem

of KJM v. Catholic Health Initiatives, No. 53972-1-II (May 20, 2021), at 12 min., 41 sec. through 

14 min., 44 sec. (on file with court). KJM has not pointed to any evidence in this record that 

contradicts this explanation of practice bundles, nor has KJM provided evidence in this record to 

contradict the assertion that a practice bundle does not mandate particular testing or treatment.
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II. PROCEDURE

In March 2017, KJM filed a negligence suit against FHS d/b/a/ St. Joseph for alleged 

negligence in August 2005, and it alleged that FHS owned and operated St. Joseph. Later, KJM 

amended his complaint to allege that CHI owed an independent duty to KJM for its failure to 

conduct SNS tests that he alleged would have detected GA-1 and for its failure to inform KJM’s 

parents of the material facts relating to KJM’s care and treatment. CHI denied that it employed or 

credentialed medical providers at St. Joseph and denied it owed a duty to KJM.

CHI moved for summary judgment dismissal of KJM’s claims against it because it did not 

employ or credential any licensed health care provider at St. Joseph—who allegedly caused 

damages to KJM. CHI argued that (1) CHI was not a health care provider as defined in RCW 

7.70.020, nor was any employee of CHI involved in KJM’s care and treatment, (2) no common

law duty exists, and (3) CHI was not vicariously liable for FHS or St. Joseph under the corporate 

medical negligence doctrine.

KJM argued in response that CHI is a health care provider under Washington law that owes 

a duty to the participants in its system because CHI was “registered to do business in Washington 

as a corporation whose purpose was to ‘provide, conduct, and administer health care and related 

services,’ in Washington.” CP at 251 (boldface type omitted). KJM also argued that CHI had a 

common-law duty to patients of its health care system and CHI had voluntarily assumed a duty 

owed to KJM. In opposition to CHI’s motion for summary judgment KJM filed the declaration of 

its expert, Dr. Leslie Selbovitz. She was the Chief Medical Officer and Senior Vice President for 

Medical Affairs at Milford Regional Medical Center in Milford, Massachusetts. She stated that 
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“KJM was not diagnosed until after he was approximately 11[ ]months old which was too late, as 

by then he had suffered brain damage.” CP at 675. 

The superior court ruled that CHI did not owe KJM a duty under RCW 7.70.030 because 

CHI was not a health care provider as defined in RCW 7.70.020. KJM filed a motion for 

reconsideration which the superior court denied. In its order denying KJM’s motion for 

reconsideration, the superior court reiterated its ruling on summary judgment regarding CHI:

It is not enough to allege CHI was negligent. It is fundamental that an action 

for negligence does not lie unless the defendant owes a duty . . . to [the] plaintiff. 

McCluskey v. Handorff-Sherman, 125 Wn.2d 1, 6, 882 P.2d 157 [] (1994). [KJM] 

has failed to articulate why CHI had a duty to [KJM] here.

CP at 1490.

KJM appeals the superior court’s orders granting summary judgment and denying

reconsideration, the final judgment of dismissal of CHI with prejudice, the order dismissing the 

remaining defendants,3and the order striking the trial date.

ANALYSIS

I. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

“The standard of review of a summary judgment dismissal is de novo.” Collins v. Juergens 

Chiropractic, PLLC, 13 Wn. App. 2d 782, 792, 467 P.3d 126 (2020). “We review all evidence 

and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Collins, 13 Wn. 

App. 2d at 792. “We may affirm an order granting summary judgment if there are no genuine 

issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” CR 56(c); 

 

3 KJM voluntarily dismissed his claims without prejudice against FHS and St. Joseph pursuant to 

CR 41(a)(1)(A).
No. 53972-1-II

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Collins, 13 Wn. App. 2d at 792. “A genuine issue of material fact exists where reasonable minds 

could differ on the facts controlling the outcome of the litigation.” Collins, 13 Wn. App. 2d at 

792. 

“The party moving for summary judgment has the initial burden to show there is no genuine 

issue of material fact.” Collins, 13 Wn. App. 2d at 792. “A moving defendant can meet this burden 

by showing that there is an absence of evidence to support the plaintiff’s claim.” Collins, 13 Wn. 

App. 2d at 792. “Once the defendant has made such a showing, the burden shifts to the plaintiff . 

. . to present specific facts that show a genuine issue of material fact.” Collins, 13 Wn. App. 2d at 

792. “Summary judgment is appropriate if a plaintiff fails to show sufficient evidence to create a 

question of fact regarding an essential element on which he or she will have the burden of proof at 

trial.” Collins, 13 Wn. App. 2d at 792. 

II. NO DUTY OWED TO KJM

KJM argues that CHI qualifies as a health care provider under RCW 7.70.020 because it 

employs Dr. Semerdjian, a physician licensed in Washington. KJM argues that CHI, as a health 

care provider, owed him a duty to act reasonably because it is a corporate health system with 

superior knowledge, resources, and control over the local hospital, St. Joseph, where KJM received 

care. We disagree. We hold that CHI is not a health care provider as defined in RCW 7.70.020. 

We further hold that CHI had no employment relationships with any licensed health care providers 

who did make health care decisions regarding KJM at St. Joseph, particularly related to what 

screening tests for newborns were required to be given in August 2005, and thus, CHI did not owe 

KJM a duty. 
No. 53972-1-II

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A. LEGAL PRINCIPLES

1. Statutory Interpretation

We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo. Jametsky v. Olsen, 179 Wn.2d 

756, 761, 317 P.3d 1003 (2014). Our goal when interpreting a statute is to “ascertain and carry 

out the legislature’s intent.” Jametsky, 179 Wn.2d at 762. We give effect to the plain meaning of 

the statute as “derived from the context of the entire act as well as any ‘related statutes which 

disclose legislative intent about the provision in question.’” Jametsky, 179 Wn.2d at 762 (quoting

Dep’t of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, LLC, 146 Wn.2d 1, 11, 43 P.3d 4 (2002)). If a statute’s 

meaning is plain on its face, we give effect to that meaning as an expression of legislative intent. 

Blomstrom v. Tripp, 189 Wn.2d 379, 390, 402 P.3d 831 (2017).

2. Duty under Chapter 7.70 RCW

To prevail in a negligence claim, a plaintiff must establish “duty, breach, and resultant 

injury; and the breach of duty must also be shown to be the proximate cause of the injury.” Hartley 

v. State, 103 Wn.2d 768, 777, 698 P.2d 77 (1985). To prove proximate cause, a plaintiff must 

prove cause in fact and legal causation. Hartley, 103 Wn.2d at 777. 

Our supreme court has held, “‘[W]henever an injury occurs as a result of health care, the 

action for damages for that injury is governed exclusively by RCW 7.70.’” Fast v. Kennewick 

Pub. Hosp. Dist., 187 Wn.2d 27, 34, 384 P.3d 232 (2016) (alteration in original) (quoting Branom 

v. State, 94 Wn. App. 964, 969, 974 P.2d 335 (1999)).

Under RCW 7.70.030(1), a plaintiff can only recover damages from a health care related 

injury if he or she can prove that the “injury resulted from the failure of a health care provider to 

follow the accepted standard of care.” Actions under chapter 7.70 RCW are all predicated on an 
No. 53972-1-II

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act or omission of a health care provider. Thus, under Fast, chapter RCW 7.70 is KJM’s exclusive 

remedy for alleged damages regarding his birth at St. Joseph and the alleged failure to provide 

genetic testing in August 2005. 187 Wn.2d at 34. There is no remedy at common law for KJM’s 

injuries.

To determine when chapter 7.70 applies, Washington courts look to the definition of 

“health care provider” under RCW 7.70.020 which is defined as either:

(1) A person licensed by this state to provide health care or related services 

including, but not limited to, an acupuncturist or acupuncture and Eastern medicine 

practitioner, a physician, osteopathic physician, dentist, nurse, optometrist, 

podiatric physician and surgeon, chiropractor, physical therapist, psychologist, 

pharmacist, optician, physician assistant, midwife, osteopathic physician’s 

assistant, nurse practitioner, or physician’s trained mobile intensive care paramedic, 

including, in the event such person is deceased, his or her estate or personal 

representative;

(2) An employee or agent of a person described in part (1) above, acting in the 

course and scope of his [or her] employment, including, in the event such employee 

or agent is deceased, his or her estate or personal representative; or

(3) An entity, whether or not incorporated, facility, or institution employing one or 

more persons described in part (1) above, including, but not limited to, a hospital, 

clinic, health maintenance organization, or nursing home; or an officer, director, 

employee, or agent thereof acting in the course and scope of his or her employment, 

including in the event such officer, director, employee, or agent is deceased, his or 

her estate or personal representative.

(Emphasis added.)

“Health care” is defined as:

“[T]he process in which [the physician] was utilizing the skills which he had been 

taught in examining, diagnosing, treating or caring for the plaintiff as his patient.”
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Reagan v Newton, 7 Wn. App. 2d 781, 791, 436 P.3d 411 (2019), review denied, 193 Wn.2d 1030 

(2019) (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Beggs v. Dep’t of Soc. 

& Health Servs., 171 Wn.2d 69, 79, 247 P.3d 421 (2011)). 

The question of who is a health care provider under RCW 7.70.020 determines whether a 

person or entity owes a duty to a patient under chapter 7.70 RCW. The statutory definition of 

“health care provider” includes persons “licensed by this state to provide health care or related 

services” and their employers. RCW 7.70.020(1), (3).

B. CHI DOES NOT MEET THE DEFINITION OF “HEALTH CARE PROVIDER” UNDER RCW 7.70.020

KJM argues that CHI should be considered a “health care provider” under RCW 

7.70.020(3) because it employs one physician licensed in Washington, Dr. Semerdjian. KJM also 

argues that there was a “nexus” between Dr. Semerdjian’s activities and KJM’s alleged injuries 

and Dr. Semerdjian “was directly involved in the CHI conduct that caused injury to KJM.” Br. of 

Appellant at 36-37. The record in this case does not support this assertion. We hold that under 

the plain language of RCW 7.70.020, CHI does not meet the definition of a health care provider 

as correctly determined by the superior court. 

Under a plain language analysis, “health care provider” is defined as persons “licensed by 

this state to provide health care or related services,” and their employers. RCW 7.70.020(1), (3). 

Employing a person who is licensed in Washington State, does not bring that entity, here CHI, 

under the definition of health care provider where the employee is not actively engaged in 

providing health care or related services in Washington State. To the extent that the plain language 

of the definition reaches Dr. Semerdjian under the plain language of the statute, CHI’s

corresponding duty is limited to its role as an employer. He was not providing health care to any 
No. 53972-1-II

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patients in Washington, he had not provided direct care to patients in Washington since 1991, and 

CHI employed no person who was providing healthcare to patients in Washington when KJM was 

injured in 2005. Thus, for purposes of this case, CHI was not acting as a health care provider

under the statute. 

There is no evidence in the record that Dr. Semerdjian has provided health care in 

Washington as a physician since 1991. Dr. Semerdjian was not employed or credentialed at St. 

Joseph or at any FHS facilities in August 2005. Further, CHI does not employ any physicians who 

are actively engaged in the provision of health care services in Washington. Under the plain 

language of RCW 7.70.020, CHI is not a health care provider because CHI does not employ anyone 

actively engaged in providing health care or related services in Washington State.

C. EXPANDED DEFINITION OF “HEALTH CARE PROVIDER” UNDER RCW 7.70.020

KJM alternatively asserts that we should expand the definition of health care provider to 

“construe chapter 7.70 RCW to govern all persons engaged in the healing arts,” arguing that to do 

so would serve public policy. Br. of Appellant at 29. KJM fails to cite authority to support this 

argument and we decline to expand the definition of health care provider in RCW 7.70.020 

contrary to the plain language of the statute and legislative intent.

1. Legal Principles

Preliminarily, RAP 10.3(a)(6) requires a party to cite supporting authority for its argument. 

We note that KJM fails to cite authority for its proposed expansion of the definition of health care 

provider. But we exercise our discretion under RAP 1.2(a) to address this issue.

Our goal in interpreting a statute is to “ascertain and carry out the legislature’s intent.” 

Jametsky, 179 Wn.2d at 762. We give effect to the plain meaning of the statute as “derived from 
No. 53972-1-II

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the context of the entire act as well as any ‘related statutes which disclose legislative intent about 

the provision in question.’” Jametsky, 179 Wn.2d at 762 (quoting Campbell, 146 Wn.2d at 11). 

If a statute’s meaning is plain on its face, we give effect to that meaning as an expression of 

legislative intent. Blomstrom, 189 Wn.2d at 390. We avoid construing a statute to lead to absurd 

results. Jespersen v. Clark County, 199 Wn. App. 568, 578, 399 P.3d 1209 (2017). We do not 

add words to a statute that are not there. Jespersen, 199 Wn. App. at 578.

KJM asks us to expand the definition of a “health care provider” to include everyone 

“engaged in the healing arts” as does the language in RCW 4.24.290. We decline to do so. If the 

legislature had intended to include “all persons engaged in the healing arts” along with “person[s]

licensed by this state to provide health care or related services,” then presumably it would have 

done so. RCW 7.70.020(1).4 However, it did not. KJM’s proposed definition is not consistent 

with the plain language of the statute or legislative intent. We decline KJM’s invitation to expand 

the definition.

2. Public Policy Does Not Support KJM’s Claim

KJM next claims that “[i]f CHI is not subject to any negligence claim, there would be no 

way for the law of torts to encourage CHI to act reasonably or to hold it responsible when it 

unreasonably injures babies like KJM.” Br. of Appellant at 41-42. But this argument wrongly 

assumes that CHI owed KJM a duty and subsequently breached that duty. We held earlier that 

CHI did not owe KJM a duty. 

 

4 The Legislature most recently amended this statute in 2019 and did not expand the definition at 

that time.
No. 53972-1-II

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KJM also claims that without this expanded definition of health care provider to include 

CHI, he is left without any tort remedy here. But that is not accurate. Nothing in our analysis 

prevents a cause of action against individual health care providers, St. Joseph, or FHS.

Further, we agree with CHI that the corporate practice of medicine doctrine disfavors 

creating a duty for CHI in this case. Our supreme court has held that “[t]he corporate practice of 

medicine doctrine provides that, absent legislative authorization, a business entity may not employ 

medical professionals to practice their licensed profession.” Columbia Physical Therapy, Inc. v.

Benton Franklin Orthopedic Assocs., PLLC, 168 Wn.2d 421, 430, 228 P.3d 1260 (2010). KJM’s 

argument, that CHI exercised “complete corporate control over the policies and procedures of its 

Washington hospitals,” is at odds with the corporate structure of CHI, which left the health care 

decisions regarding KJM’s care and genetic testing to the licensed health care providers who 

provided KJM care and treatment at St. Joseph. Br. of Appellant at 37.

CHI did not mandate what newborn genetic screening tests KJM’s doctors or St. Joseph 

had to do in August 2005, and there is no evidence in the record that it did so. Providing specific 

practice bundles on patient care at the request of its subsidiaries did not result in CHI substituting 

its judgment for the clinical judgment of the licensed and credentialed health care providers 

working at the hospitals in its subsidiaries. The legislature has determined that licensed health 

care providers should make health care decisions with their patients and the provider owes a duty 

to the patient under chapter 7.70 RCW. Thus, for these reasons, public policy does not support 

imposing a duty on CHI in this case.
No. 53972-1-II

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D. NO FACTUAL OR LEGAL CAUSATION

Even assuming there is a duty owed by CHI to KJM, KJM fails to establish cause in fact 

or legal causation as a matter of law. KJM sued for damages for injuries resulting from CHI’s 

alleged failure to include SNS testing for specific metabolic and genetic disorders, including

GA-1, in the newborn tests offered to pediatric patients like KJM at St. Joseph. KJM also alleged 

that the defendants failed to consider other “best medical practices.” CP at 42. 

Cause in fact, or “but for” causation, refers to the “physical connection between an act and 

an injury.” Hartley, 103 Wn.2d at 778. KJM argues that a jury could find a nexus between Dr. 

Semerdjian’s activities and KJM’s injury because of the role that Dr. Semerdjian had within the 

CHI system. But KJM fails to establish any cause in fact linking Dr. Semerdjian’s activities to the 

health care decisions made by the licensed health care providers at St. Joseph which allegedly 

caused KJM’s damages. Further, as a matter of law, KJM also fails to establish legal causation. 

Dr. Semerdjian did not treat KJM in August 2005 at St. Joseph, nor was he involved in making 

any health care decisions related to KJM, including newborn genetic screening for KJM at St. 

Joseph. The record also shows that CHI did not make any health care decisions or direct the health 

care of the licensed health care providers who did treat KJM at St. Joseph and who made decisions 

related to the genetic screening of KJM at St. Joseph. 

KJM argues that CHI should have gone beyond the mandated screening on an institutional 

basis instead of a hospital-by-hospital basis because Baylor’s Institute for Metabolic Disease, the 

institution CHI’s Chief Medical Officer previously worked at, had ensured that all of its hospitals 

offered SNS before any state mandate. KJM does not cite anything that demonstrates that CHI 

had an obligation to adopt a similar SNS testing policy to that of Baylor’s; rather, he simply asserts 
No. 53972-1-II

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that CHI should have adopted a similar policy. This argument is cursory at best and does not 

establish a causal connection between the treatment KJM received and his injury, especially where 

there is no evidence that CHI could have mandated a particular course of testing or treatment under 

the established relationship between CHI and KJM’s health care providers. RAP 10.3(a)(6).

Because KJM fails to establish causation, and we can affirm on any grounds supported by 

the record, this additional basis supports summary judgment dismissal of KJM’s claims against 

CHI. See Port of Anacortes v. Frontier Indus., Inc., 9 Wn. App. 2d 885, 892, 447 P.3d 215 (2019),

review denied, 195 Wn.2d 1005 (2020).

E. CONCLUSION

KJM’s argument that CHI owes him a duty under chapter 7.70 RCW is contrary to the 

plain language of the statute and legislative intent. We hold that the superior court correctly ruled 

that CHI did not owe a duty to KJM under chapter 7.70 RCW, and thus, it properly granted 

summary judgment dismissal on this basis. 

III. VICARIOUS LIABILITY – APPARENT AUTHORITY

Finally, although not determinative of this appeal, KJM argues that CHI was vicariously 

liable for FHS and St. Joseph because they acted with apparent authority for CHI. Citing his 

mother’s declaration, KJM states that CHI’s name was printed on almost all of the medical records 

at St. Joseph’s related to KJM’s birth and newborn care. There is no evidence of apparent authority

of FHS or St. Joseph sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact even viewing the evidence 

in the light most favorable to KJM. Thus, we hold that CHI is not vicariously liable for FHS or 

St. Joseph.
No. 53972-1-II

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“Under apparent authority, an agent . . . binds a principal . . . if objective manifestations of 

the principal ‘cause the one claiming apparent authority to actually, or subjectively, believe that 

the agent has authority to act for the principal’ and such belief is objectively reasonable.’” Mohr 

v. Grantham, 172 Wn.2d 844, 860-61, 262 P.3d 490 (2011) (quoting King v. Riveland, 125 Wn.2d 

500, 507, 886 P.2d 160 (1994)). To recover under a theory of apparent agency, a plaintiff must 

show (1) conduct by the principal that would cause a reasonable person to believe that the agent 

was in fact an agent of the principal, and (2) reliance on that apparent agency relationship by the 

plaintiff. Wilson v. Grant, 162 Wn. App. 731, 744, 258 P.3d 689 (2011).

Here, KJM’s mother stated in her declaration that the CHI logo was on the admission 

paperwork she filled out at St. Joseph when she arrived at the hospital to give birth to KJM. She 

stated this logo appeared on other “medical records and other documents relating to KJM’s 

pediatric care after discharge.” CP at 990. Based on this evidence in the record, KJM’s mother 

had already selected St. Joseph as the hospital she intended to give birth at and only noted the CHI 

logo on the paperwork upon arrival and following discharge. KJM’s mother did not select St. 

Joseph because she thought that specific hospital was acting at CHI’s agent. KJM has not set forth 

any additional evidence that shows that FHS or St. Joseph had authority to act for CHI regarding 

the health care decisions of the licensed health care providers at St. Joseph who provided care and 

treatment to KJM, or that KJM’s mother thought FHS or St. Joseph were apparent agents of CHI.

Thus, we hold that CHI is not vicariously liable for FHS or St. Joseph under a theory of 

apparent authority, and KJM fails to present sufficient evidence to support this claim.
No. 53972-1-II

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CONCLUSION

We hold that because CHI is not a health care provider under RCW 7.70.020, CHI does 

not owe a duty to KJM and even assuming a duty is owed, KJM fails to prove causation as a matter 

of law, and no duty exists under common law. We decline to expand the definition of health care 

provider and we hold that CHI is not vicariously liable for FHS or St. Joseph. We also decline 

KJM’s invitation to apply Washington’s definition of health care provider in a way that assumes 

CHI directed health care decisions in this matter as KJM provided no evidence that was the case. 

We affirm. 

A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the 

Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 2.06.040, 

it is so ordered.

SUTTON, J.

We concur:

GLASGOW, A.C.J.

VELJACIC, J.