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Special Report 208 September 2008

Special Report

© 2008 by the United States Institute of Peace. 

All rights reserved.

Contents 

Background 2

UN Efforts to Control the Gangs 3

The UN Offensive 4

Enablers and Recommendations: xx 

Mandate Enforcement 7

Conclusions 13

About the Report

The UN mission in Haiti’s successful campaign against the 

gangs of Port-au-Prince is an example of effective UN mandate 

enforcement against irregular armed forces that posed a deadly 

threat—in this case, to the Haitian government and the peace 

process. The Haiti mission’s action provides a model for other 

UN missions and for national governments that face a similar 

challenge from illegally armed groups. The report describes the 

conduct of military and police operations against the gangs and 

the overwhelmingly positive attitude of Haitian citizens toward 

the UN operation and its results. It also records the lessons 

learned and concludes with recommendations for other 

UN missions. 

The report is based on field research in Haiti in September 

2007 by a team composed of the authors along with Mark 

Kroeker, former senior police adviser at the UN Department of 

Peacekeeping Operations at UN headquarters in New York, and 

Victor Josey, police adviser at the Pearson Peacekeeping Center in 

Canada. Group Croissance, in cooperation with CHF International 

in Haiti, conducted the survey of Haitian attitudes. The United 

States Institute of Peace Haiti Working Group reviewed the report 

at a public forum on November 28, 2007. 

Michael Dziedzic and Robert Perito are senior program officers in 

the Center for Post-Conflict Peace and Stability Operations at the 

United States Institute of Peace. 

Michael Dziedzic and Robert M. Perito

Haiti

Confronting the Gangs of Port-au-Prince

Summary

•	 Although ostensibly criminal in nature, the gangs of Port-au-Prince were an inherently political phenomenon. Powerful elites from across the political spectrum exploited 

gangs as instruments of political warfare, providing them with arms, funding, and 

protection from arrest.

•	 Beginning in 2006 and reaching its culmination in February 2007, the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) conducted a series of successful military and police 

operations against armed gangs, based in sanctuaries in Cité Soleil and other urban 

slums, that had terrorized the populace. The campaign resulted in the arrest of principal gang leaders and some eight hundred of their followers. 

•	 UN operations followed a public announcement by Haiti’s president, René Préval, 

that the gangs must “surrender or die,” and a private request to the United Nations 

to take armed action. Préval’s call for action came after efforts to negotiate with the 

gangs proved futile.

•	 Antigang operations involved the Haiti National Police (HNP), the country’s only security force. HNP support for, and direct engagement in, these operations was essential 

to their success. Haitian police SWAT teams arrested most of the gang leaders.

•	 Although the UN assaults resulted in civilian casualties and extensive property 

damage, the great majority of Cité Soleil residents surveyed believed that the UN 

crackdown was justified. 

•	 If MINUSTAH had not been willing and able to confront the gang threat, the likely 

consequences would have been the collapse of the Préval administration and the 

failure of the UN mission. The United Nations must be capable of mounting assertive 

operations to enforce its mandates, and it can succeed in such operations under the 

proper conditions if it summons the necessary resolve. MINUSTAH’s success in confronting the gang threat suggests that the conditions needed for successful mandate 

enforcement include unity of effort among mission leadership, local buy-in and support, actionable intelligence to guide operations, effective employment of Formed 

Police Units (FPUs), integrated planning of military, police, and civilian assistance 

United States Institute of Peace www.usip.org
2

efforts to fill the void left by the displacement of illegal armed groups, and holistic 

reform of, and international support for, the legal system.

Background

During 2006, Haiti received a fresh start politically and economically. The international 

community welcomed the election of President René Préval and a new Haitian parliament, 

and the United Nations extended the mandate of the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti 

(MINUSTAH). The emergence of political détente among Haiti’s political factions was also 

accompanied by the first hints of economic recovery, an upsurge in overseas remittances, 

a marked increase in pledges of donor assistance, passage by the U.S. Congress of trade 

preferences, and Haiti’s return to regional institutions. 

But in the capital, Port-au-Prince, heavily armed gangs controlled the city’s sprawling 

slums, posing a potentially lethal threat to the country’s fragile recovery. By the end of 

2006, gangs were operating with flagrant impunity, from secure bases inside nearly inaccessible warrens of ramshackle structures made of plywood and corrugated metal. They 

carried out a campaign of kidnappings that touched every level of society and terrorized 

city residents. They also engaged in murder, rape, narcotics and weapons trafficking, and 

extortion. At the height of their power, the gangs in Cité Soleil, the city’s most notorious 

slum, attacked vehicles on the adjacent airport road and threatened Haiti’s principal port, 

petroleum storage facility, and industrial area, which were located nearby. Powerful gang 

leaders achieved celebrity status, appearing on television and flaunting their impunity. 

Gang leaders garnered popular support by distributing money and stolen merchandise to 

their followers, assisting the needy with handouts and payment of school fees, and providing entertainment by operating dance halls. 

The gangs were more than a match for the Haitian National Police (HNP), the country’s only security force. Understrength and ill equipped, with a legacy of corruption and 

general dysfunction, the HNP had been implicated in gang activities in the past and was 

thoroughly distrusted by the populace. Haiti’s nearly inoperative judicial system and antiquated penal facilities were also in no condition to rein in the gangs’ excesses. 

Although ostensibly criminal in nature, gangs were an inherently political phenomenon. Powerful elites from across the political spectrum, from former president JeanBertrand Aristide to the bourgeoisie, exploited gangs as instruments of political warfare, 

providing arms, funding, and protection from arrest. Aristide also saw the gangs as an 

armed counterweight to the former soldiers and the private security services that were in 

the pay of Haiti’s social and economic elites. As challenges arose to Aristide’s rule, the 

chimères, or “ghosts,” emerged from the slums to silence political opponents and prey 

on the general population in a futile attempt to retain power. After Aristide’s departure, 

the gangs captured control of Cité Soleil, converting the slum into the main source of 

insecurity for the capital.

The chimères were only the most recent manifestation of the traditional Haitian practice of creating paramilitary groups to serve as a counterweight to government security 

forces and to control the population. During his long and brutal dictatorial reign, Francois 

“Papa Doc” Duvalier created the Tontons Macoutes, a personally loyal force of armed thugs 

that was given complete immunity and allowed to murder and rape at will. Duvalier used 

this group to quash any challenge to his authority from the Haitian military and to intimidate and terrorize the population. After the coup that removed Aristide from power in 

1991, the Haitian military and its right-wing political ally, the Force for Haitian Advancement, created the attaches, a group of thugs responsible for the assassination of Haitian 

Justice Minister Guy Malary and other Aristide supporters. When lacking a patron, the 

chimères and their predecessors were able to “freelance,” selling their services to corrupt 

politicians, businesspeople, and the wealthy.

About the Institute

The United States Institute of Peace is an independent, 

nonpartisan institution established and funded by Congress. 

Its goals are to help prevent and resolve violent conflicts, 

promote post-conflict peacebuilding, and increase conflictmanagement tools, capacity, and intellectual capital worldwide. The Institute does this by empowering others with 

knowledge, skills, and resources, as well as by its direct 

involvement in conflict zones around the globe.

Board of Directors

J. Robinson West (Chair), Chairman, PFC Energy, Washington, 

D.C. • María Otero (Vice Chairman), President, ACCION International, Boston, Mass. • Holly J. Burkhalter, Vice President, 

Government Affairs, International Justice Mission, Washington, 

D.C. • Anne H. Cahn, Former Scholar in Residence, American 

University, Washington, D.C. • Chester A. Crocker, James R. 

Schlesinger Professor of Strategic Studies, School of Foreign 

Service, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C. 

• Laurie S. Fulton, Partner, Williams and Connolly, Washington, D.C. • Charles Horner, Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute, 

Washington, D.C. • Kathleen Martinez, Executive Director, 

World Institute on Disability • George E. Moose, Adjunct Professor of Practice, The George Washington University, Washington, D.C. • Jeremy A. Rabkin, Professor of Law, George Mason 

University, Fairfax, Va. • Ron Silver, Actor, Producer, Director, 

Primparous Productions, Inc. • Judy Van Rest, Executive Vice 

President, International Republican Institute, Washington, D.C. 

Members Ex Officio

David Kramer, Assistant Secretary of the Bureau of 

Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, Department of State 

• Christopher “Ryan” Henry, Principal Deputy Under Secretary for Policy, Department of Defense • Richard H. Solomon, 

President, United States Institute of Peace (nonvoting) 

• Frances C. Wilson, Lieutenant General, U.S. Marine Corps; 

President, National Defense University.

The views expressed in this report do not necessarily 

reflect the views of the United States Institute of Peace, 

which does not advocate specific policy positions.

To request permission to photocopy or reprint materials, 

e-mail: permissions@usip.org
3

UN Efforts to Control the Gangs

During 2006, MINUSTAH began to operate in a very deliberate fashion to limit the gangs’ 

ability to function. Gang leaders had garnered support from the local population not only 

through fear and intimidation but also by providing services and assistance unobtainable 

from the government. To counteract this, UN military units removed debris and piles of 

garbage to clear intersections and open roadways to access by armored vehicles and foot 

patrols. UN troops and police operated checkpoints and searched vehicles for arms and 

contraband. UN political affairs specialists and military civil affairs officers met with civil 

society groups and local residents to open a dialogue. UN military forces began working on quick-impact projects to build markets and improve sanitation. UN political and 

development projects were designed to show residents an alternative to relying on the 

gangs for influence and basic services. 

The MINUSTAH action to counter the gangs was implemented in a gradually escalating series of actions that began outside Cité Soleil, with gangs in other areas of Portau-Prince. The first area dealt with was Cité Militaire. Public order was restored using 

MINUSTAH military and police presence (Formed Police Units, or FPUs, and individual 

UN Police) along with the HNP, which made the actual arrests. MINUSTAH Civil Affairs 

followed up, and the situation was brought under control in 2006.

The UN containment strategy, which was conducted with considerable restraint, was 

designed to squeeze the gangs into increasingly smaller areas and deny them free access 

to other parts of the city to conduct kidnappings and other criminal activities. The flaw in 

the strategy was that patrols and checkpoints were abandoned at night due to concerns 

about the safety of UN forces. This was not without reason. On November 11, 2006, two 

Jordanian peacekeepers were ambushed and killed in the center of Cité Soleil, not far from 

the principal UN fortified position. 

UN operations against the gangs were accompanied by President Préval’s personal 

efforts to convince gang leaders to surrender their arms and participate in the United 

Nations’ Disarmament, Demobilization, and Rehabilitation Program. Préval met with gang 

leaders in the Presidential Palace to urge them to lay down their arms. He also provided 

financial inducements for cooperation. Unfortunately, Préval’s strategy of negotiation with 

the gangs while the United Nations applied pressure failed. In November, when UN troops 

and police deployed outside Port-au-Prince to provide logistical support and security for 

municipal and local elections, the number of kidnappings and other gang-related crimes 

skyrocketed. 

During December, gang members committed a series of particularly egregious crimes 

that mobilized public opinion against them. On December 11, a gunman ambushed a 

father driving his daughter to school, shooting the father and kidnapping the little girl. 

Two days later, gang members stopped a school bus and kidnapped seven children. In 

other incidents, a six-year-old boy was killed and a teenage female kidnap victim was 

raped, mutilated, and murdered. Sensational press coverage, popular revulsion, and a 

special empathy for child victims at Christmas generated demands that the United Nations 

and the Haitian government take action. So intense was the public reaction, UN officials 

feared that it might lead to mob violence against the government. 

The upsurge in the number of kidnappings and public demands for action produced a 

change of heart in President Préval. In a televised speech, he issued a public ultimatum 

to the gangs to “surrender or die.” His loss of patience may have been prompted in part 

by the murder of a friend’s kidnapped son. It may also have reflected the constant urgings 

by the head of MINUSTAH, Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) Ambassador Edmond Mulet, to move against the gangs. Mulet had lobbied over the preceding 

months for a more aggressive posture but had been restrained by the excessive caution 

of the UN force commander, restrictive caveats on his ability to use some military contingents, and by Préval’s reluctance to act. 

Gang leaders had garnered support 

from the local population not only 

through fear and intimidation but 

also by providing services and 

assistance unobtainable from 

the government.

Sensational press coverage, 

popular revulsion, and a special 

empathy for child victims at 

Christmas generated demands 

that the United Nations and the 

Haitian government take action.
4

The inability to curtail the spree of brazen kidnappings in 2006 had also placed 

MINUSTAH in serious jeopardy. Gangs and their benefactors were exploiting this to portray 

MINUSTAH in the media as a self-aggrandizing presence that was an affront to Haitian 

sovereignty and national pride. MINUSTAH’s continued viability was at risk. 

In December, therefore, the confluence of events produced something of a “perfect 

storm,” in which gang outrages coincided with popular demands for action and with a 

clear political signal that President Préval wanted the United Nations to crack down on 

the gangs. SRSG Mulet instructed the force commander and the UN Police commissioner 

to develop a plan to take down the gangs.

The UN Offensive 

As early as August 2006, in response to intergang fighting that caused the deaths of 

twenty-two people, Sri Lankan UN military forces had occupied twenty static points in 

Martissant, a slum in southern Port-au-Prince with a long history of violence and gang 

rivalry. Over the succeeding months, MINUSTAH expanded its patrols, improved relations 

with the community, and established a central strongpoint at the junction of three main 

gang territories. Following President Préval’s call for action in November 2006, MINUSTAH Police Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) teams launched a series of joint arrest 

operations with their HNP counterparts. UN military forces provided the outer security 

cordon. The principal target was a gang leader known as “Roudy,” since MINUSTAH’s Joint 

Mission Analysis Center (JMAC) had the best information on him. These operations, which 

resulted in nearly a hundred arrests, provided valuable experience and served as a trial run 

for subsequent incursions into Cité Soleil.

In mid-December, the Haitian secretary of state for public security gave directions 

to arrest a notorious Cité Soleil-based gang leader known as “Belony.” JMAC focused its 

sources on this target, resulting in two operations to arrest him when he was outside 

Cité Soleil—one of which came within minutes of success. After these attempts failed, 

the director general of the HNP decided to go into Cité Soleil to get Belony. Since the 

UN Police and the HNP did not have the capacity for such an aggressive operation, they 

sought military support. After intervention by the SRSG, the force commander was persuaded to mount the operation. 

The initial incursion into Cité Soleil, mounted on December 22, was a police-led 

operation, but the threat had escalated well beyond the level previously encountered in 

Cité Militaire and Martissant. Belony’s compound was heavily fortified, and members of 

his gang were well armed; concrete walls and tank traps blocked all access routes. The 

United Nations expected to meet stiff resistance. The plan involved the police in the lead 

using a Chinese FPU, the Jordanian SWAT contingent, and the SWAT unit from the Haitian 

National Police. The Brazilian battalion was in a supporting role. The objective was to 

arrest Belony and rescue kidnap victims that the United Nations believed were being held 

at his headquarters in the Bois Neuf section of Cité Soleil. 

In the early morning hours of December 22, the Chinese FPU’s armored personnel carriers (APCs) turned into the narrow lanes leading to Belony’s compound and immediately 

were engaged by hostile fire. Unfortunately, military combat engineers had failed to 

remove tank traps, so the APCs were unable to reach the gang’s compound. The convoy 

made it to about sixty meters from its objective before being forced to retreat.

On December 28, MINUSTAH military and police forces, acting in support of the HNP, 

conducted a second assault, which destroyed part of the gang’s compound. Dismounted 

Bolivian Special Forces soldiers fired four rocket-propelled grenades into the building 

where Belony was believed to be, but he escaped. 

With the arrival of a new force commander in January 2007, MINUSTAH military forces 

mounted a concerted assault on the gangs on January 24. During the night, UN military 

forces led by the Brazilian battalion occupied a partially completed two-story concrete 
5

structure with faded blue walls, known locally as the “Blue House.” The building provided 

a commanding view into the compound of Evans, the most powerful gang leader in Cité 

Soleil. At sunrise, gang members saw UN soldiers on the rooftop of the Blue House and 

began an armed assault against the structure, sparking a firefight that lasted into the 

afternoon.

At that point, the International Committee of the Red Cross arranged a truce to 

evacuate the wounded. Evans exploited this by mobilizing neighborhood civilians to take 

to the streets with white flags to stage a “demonstration” against the United Nations. 

Faced with the choice of firing on unarmed civilians or suspending the operation, the UN 

military commander requested police assistance. Although MINUSTAH Police had not participated in planning the operation, the police commissioner had taken the precaution of 

placing an FPU on standby when he learned that the assault was underway. Within fifteen 

minutes, the FPU arrived, outfitted with nonlethal riot control capabilities, and safely 

cleared the streets of demonstrators. The UN military resumed the operation, eventually 

capturing the gang’s headquarters. Evans fled but was arrested in March in the southern 

coastal town of Les Cayes. 

Following this operation, UN military and police units working with the Haitian 

National Police moved neighborhood by neighborhood throughout Cité Soleil, arresting 

gang leaders or forcing them to flee. Once the United Nations established that it was prepared to use superior force, resistance from the gangs quickly diminished. Gang members 

deserted their leaders and sought to blend into the population. Haitian gangs proved to 

be collections of individuals who formed around brutal and charismatic leaders, unlike 

the hierarchical, tightly organized turf-based institutions found in the United States. By 

March 2007, the United Nations had regained control of Cité Soleil. Once the gangs had 

been flushed from their sanctuaries, with support from police-led operations by UN Police 

and the HNP, some eight hundred gang members were eventually arrested, and all but one 

gang leader was either apprehended or killed. 

The UN campaign against the gangs was not without costs for the residents of Cité 

Soleil. In a survey conducted by Group Croissance on behalf of the United States Institute 

of Peace in early 2008, 52 percent of respondents reported that family members, friends, 

or neighbors, including women and children, were killed or wounded during the fighting 

with the gangs. (These reports were anecdotal and could not be confirmed by official 

statistics or death certificates.)1 In the tightly crowded living areas in Cité Soleil, houses 

made of plywood, cardboard, and corrugated metal offered little protection from the military assault rifles and machine guns used by both sides. The gangs had little interest in 

imposing fire discipline, while the United Nations was attacking entrenched and heavily 

defended positions using the heavy machine guns on its APCs and the automatic weapons issued to its troops. Some of the respondents specified that casualties were inflicted 

by MINUSTAH, but most were uncertain about the source of the fire. All gave horrific 

descriptions of the fighting. Civilians were trapped in their homes or caught in cross fires, 

some buildings were crushed by UN vehicles or set aflame leaving residents homeless. UN 

troops used teargas in areas where civilians had no protection. Many said the damage to 

their homes and shops had not been repaired and that they were made homeless. Despite 

the casualties, material losses, and delays in making repairs 97 percent of respondents 

believed that the UN crackdown on the gangs was justified. 

The impact of the campaign against the gangs has been profound. Cité Soleil, which 

previously had been viewed by international organizations primarily through the narrow 

viewing slots of APCs, is now accessible to civilian assistance providers in soft-sided 

vehicles. The local population is able to move about freely, albeit with the continued 

presence of MINUSTAH military and police patrols, which are accompanied by a member 

of the HNP whenever possible. The community is no longer terrorized and intimidated. A 

survey conducted for the U.S. State Department’s Haiti Stabilization Initiative (HSI) in 

November 2007 found that 98 percent of Cité Soleil residents felt safer than they had 

six months earlier, and 85 percent reported that they could conduct their daily activities 

Once the United Nations established 

that it was prepared to use superior 

force, resistance from the gangs quickly 

diminished. Gang members deserted 

their leaders and sought to blend into 

the population.

Despite the casualties and material 

losses, 97 percent of respondents 

believed that the UN crackdown on 

the gangs was justified. 
6

without fear of intimidation or extortion.2 Harassing shots at UN strongpoints have virtually ceased. Kidnappings have dropped below 20 percent of their previous levels. Residents 

are reporting crimes to the police, and other violent crime has been substantially reduced. 

Perhaps most indicative of the change in orientation of the population, the inhabitants 

of Cité Soleil even volunteered information to police that led to the arrest of gang leaders 

and confiscation of arms caches in the aftermath of the February 2007 campaign. 

Sentiment toward MINUSTAH has improved dramatically as a result of the crackdown on 

gangs. In the United States Institute of Peace survey, 67 percent of those polled credited 

the UN mission for the improvement in their security situation, and 17 percent attributed 

the improvement to President Préval.3 Despite a legacy of distrust in the capacity of state 

institutions to protect or serve the local people, both the Institute and HSI found that 

the overwhelming majority of Cité Soleil residents would like to see the HNP patrolling in 

their neighborhoods more often.4 Perhaps in anticipation of a more robust HNP presence, 

both surveys also found that almost three-fourths of Cité Soleil residents expect to be more 

secure in the months ahead.5

Ultimately, sustainability will depend on the ability of Haitian institutions, with continued assistance from MINUSTAH, to fill the space vacated by the gangs. In particular, this 

entails delivering essential government services, asserting the rule of law, and generating 

opportunities for employment. When asked if their living conditions had improved (i.e., 

education, health, water, sanitation, trash collection) since the crackdown on the gangs, 

78 percent of Cité Soleil residents said that they had.6 Reinforcing this finding, the HSI 

survey found that 89 percent of residents felt that the Préval government is doing all it 

can to provide services to the community.7 As MINUSTAH and the Haitian government 

implement these programs, it will be important to keep focused on the overarching goal 

of preventing the reemergence of the nexus between gangs and political elites whose 

interests are served by instability and lawlessness. 

The ability of legitimate, elected government officials to maintain the support of the 

local population will ultimately determine whether gangs cease to be a principal agent 

of political warfare in Haiti. At the moment, there is reason for optimism. In the United 

States Institute of Peace survey, when asked if they would be willing to testify in court if 

they were to be a victim of gang violence, only 32 percent said no.8 The HSI survey found 

that 42 percent of residents were willing to take the risk of collaborating with local and 

international efforts to promote peace in the community, compared with 32 percent who 

were not.9 Another hopeful sign is that Cité Soleil remained calm during the food riots 

that erupted in April 2008 and caused the collapse of the government of Prime Minister 

Jacques-Edouard Alexis.

Although MINUSTAH has set the stage for success with the campaign against the 

gangs, other agents of political violence remain. These include linkages between the same 

political elites (who manipulated the gangs) and drug traffickers and private security 

companies. Many of the same methods and capabilities that resulted in effective mandate 

enforcement against the gangs may be required to confront these threats as well.

The conclusions to be drawn from the UN mission in Haiti are twofold. First, if MINUSTAH had not been willing and able to confront the gang threat emanating predominantly 

but not exclusively from Cité Soleil, the mission would likely have been doomed to fail. 

The mission’s survival and success hinged on evicting the gangs from Cité Soleil and 

other slums and arresting their leaders. The lesson, therefore, is that the United Nations 

must be capable of mounting assertive operations to defend and enforce its mandates. 

The second lesson is that the United Nations has the means to succeed in these efforts, 

given the proper conditions, if it can summon the necessary will. The enablers that had 

to be in place for MINUSTAH to confront the gang threat effectively are discussed below, 

along with recommendations for what can be done to replicate these conditions on 

other missions.

The ability of legitimate, elected 

government officials to maintain 

the support of the local population 

will ultimately determine whether 

gangs cease to be a principal agent 

of political warfare in Haiti.
7

Enablers and Recommendations: Mandate Enforcement

Enabler: Mission Leadership and Unity of Effort

When the authors asked HNP Director General Mario Andrésol what lesson he derived from 

the December 21-22 police-led operation into Cité Soleil, he said it was not the type of 

operation that police could carry out alone. Peace enforcement or mandate enforcement 

cannot be conducted effectively if the military contingent is not adequately engaged. 

Missions challenged by violent, heavily armed obstructionist elements need a competent, 

courageous, and cohesive leadership team. They also require an empowering mandate, 

and well-trained military and police forces willing to respond to the SRSG’s directions for 

enforcing the mandate. Mission leaders need to be action oriented, strategic, and willing 

to support each other as the situation dictates. This is especially true for the military 

force commander and the police commissioner, who may not be accustomed to working 

operationally with those outside their own professional hierarchies.

After the arrival of a new force commander in January 2007, the situation improved 

dramatically. The leadership team (SRSG, principal deputy special representative of 

the secretary-general [PDSRSG], force commander, and police commissioner) displayed 

remarkable cohesion and unity of effort. This served as the indispensable enabler of the 

campaign against the gangs. 

Recommendation: Select senior mission leaders judiciously. It is imperative that the UN 

Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) select its senior mission leaders 

judiciously. The first two candidates to replace the departing force commander were 

rejected by DPKO. During the selection process, issues such as attitudes toward potential 

mandate enforcement scenarios and willingness to work in support of other mission 

elements should be thoroughly probed. Careful attention must be given, as it was with 

MINUSTAH, to the “chemistry” and synergy of the various personalities thrust into highly 

challenging, politically explosive environments. It should also be clear to all decision 

makers that failure to support SRSG decisions is cause for swift removal. 

Enabler: Troop Contributing Countries Willing and Able to Use Force

MINUSTAH’s Force Commander was limited in his ability to employ his forces freely in 

operations against the gangs owing to various national caveats that precluded such use. 

Avoiding crippling may not be possible until the Department of Peacekeeping Operations 

is provided with sufficient contributions from Member States to allow it to reject offers 

from countries with prohibitively restrictive caveats.

Recommendation: Disallow caveats against use of force by recipients of peacekeeping capacity 

building initiatives. The Global Peace Operations Initiative funded by the U.S. government, 

and similar peacekeeping capacity-building initiatives, should make it a requirement that 

recipients of assistance not impose caveats that prohibit use of force by units that receive 

this aid.

Enabler: Local Buy-in and Support

Owing to the political implications of acting against the gangs of Cité Soleil, MINUSTAH 

calculated that an essential precondition was the election of a president endowed with 

the legitimacy to act. Thus, MINUSTAH’s success in nurturing a free, fair, and democratic 

electoral process was critically important. President Préval also needed to explore a negotiated resolution as his initial option. After his “outreach” to the gangs demonstrably failed, 

the kidnapping of schoolchildren provided the final trigger, and he gave MINUSTAH the 

green light to wage the antigang campaign after the December municipal elections. The 

senior leadership of the HNP was also fully supportive. 

Missions challenged by violent, heavily 

armed obstructionist elements need a 

competent, courageous, and cohesive 

leadership team. They also require an 

empowering mandate, and well-trained 

military and police forces willing to 

respond to the SRSG’s direction for 

enforcing the mandate.
Recommendation: Develop doctrine for mandate enforcement. The recently promulgated UN 

capstone doctrine for peacekeeping recognizes that when “‘the lingering forces of war 

and violence threaten a fragile peace or continue to prey upon a vulnerable population’ 

the mission may have to use force preemptively to implement its mandate and to protect 

civilians.”10 Although the doctrine regards peacekeeping and peace enforcement as 

distinct activities, equating the latter to war, it does recognize the need for mandate 

enforcement when missions are threatened by violent obstruction from illegal armed 

groups. In the discussion of impartiality, the capstone doctrine advises that “Just as a 

good referee is impartial but will penalize infractions, so a peacekeeping operation should 

not condone actions by the parties that violate the undertakings of the peace process or 

the international norms and principles that a UN peacekeeping operation upholds.”11

Beyond the recognition that mandate enforcement is an essential component of peacekeeping, however, there are no guidelines or precepts to suggest how this most daunting 

of peacekeeping tasks should be conducted. After examining doctrine produced by Britain, 

France, India, and the United States, William Durch finds that there is a growing convergence around the notion of blending counterinsurgency principles with the core peacekeeping concepts as a basis for mandate enforcement.12 DPKO should work to complement 

its existing capstone doctrine by establishing doctrine for field operations that specifies 

when and how to defend and enforce its mandates. As a fundamental imperative, mission 

leadership should be guided by the principle that it will actively support the efforts of 

those who support the mandate, and actively oppose those who seek to obstruct it—

especially those who engage in violence.

Enabler: Intelligence-Based Operations

Missions challenged by illegal armed groups cannot afford to adopt a totally reactive 

posture. The only way to confront violent threats to the mission mandate effectively is 

to obtain the intelligence that will enable the mission to seize the initiative when the 

proper conditions have been met and mount intelligence-led operations against appropriate targets. MINUSTAH’S JMAC has established the gold standard for intelligence support 

for planning and execution of operations mounted to defend and enforce the mandate. A 

significant contribution to the success of MINUSTAH’S antigang campaign was validated, 

real-time tactical intelligence provided by JMAC. Raw information comes to peacekeeping 

missions in huge amounts without validation or verification. This is especially the case 

when the environment is unstable and when crises abound. The foundation for JMAC’s 

success was rigorous source management and evaluation, coupled with a systematic effort 

to pool all sources of information available to the mission. 

MINUSTAH does not possess any technical means of intelligence collection. JMAC was 

effective because the mission leadership insisted on the participation of all mission elements (military contingents, police officers, civil affairs, UN Security, political advisers, 

et al.) and on unified situational analysis. Another vital factor is the ability of the JMAC 

chief to transmit assessments, unfiltered, to the SRSG. The JMAC chief played a major role 

in the mission’s decision-making process, alongside the force commander and the police 

commissioner. JMAC’s weekly assessments laid the foundation for the campaign against 

the gangs.

In Cité Soleil, the primary operational objectives were to assert control over the 

neighborhoods that gangs were terrorizing, free kidnap victims, and arrest gang leaders. 

To displace the gangs and minimize civilian casualties, MINUSTAH’s military and police 

commanders required solid situational awareness. JMAC provided sophisticated target 

packages detailing the obstacles that UN forces would encounter (e.g., tank traps and 

areas of fierce resistance), along with photos for the identification of gang leaders. To 

free kidnap victims or apprehend gang leaders, they needed actionable intelligence. Realtime tactical intelligence about the locations of gang leaders or concentrations of gang 

members allowed MINUSTAH to mount intelligence-led operations to arrest them. The HNP 

also provided intelligence that led to the May 2007 capture of the notorious gang leader Ti 

8

The foundation for JMAC’s success 

was rigorous source management 

and evaluation, coupled with a systematic effort to pool all sources of 

information available to the mission.
Will in Gonaives. These were crucial components of the mission’s ability to evict the gangs 

from their strongholds in Cité Soleil and other neighborhoods, round up or kill all but one 

of the gang leaders, and arrest some eight hundred of their henchmen. 

Recommendation: Invest in JMAC capacity building. JMAC must be fully resourced doctrinally 

and procedurally standardized, and professionalized as a UN peacekeeping mission 

component. DPKO should capture the processes, policies, precepts, and information 

collection plans that were key to JMAC’s success in Haiti and strive to replicate these 

on other missions that are threatened by illegal armed groups. To be effective against 

illicit power structures that exploit political violence, informal sources of power, 

and subterranean money flows requires a sophisticated information collection plan 

aimed at understanding the local political economy and its role in obstructing the 

mission’s mandate. A vital strategic function of all JMACs should be to provide mission 

leadership with an understanding of the vulnerabilities of networks that support violent 

obstructionists. The SRSG should provide the JMAC with the priorities for the mission 

collection plan based on the nature of the threat to the mission (e.g., whether to focus 

on strategic or tactical concerns). The JMAC should then establish an integrated collection 

plan for use by military and police contingents.

Commendably, DPKO has undertaken an analysis of the JMAC in Haiti to identify the 

building blocks of its success. It has also taken the initiative to create a unit in its 

Situation Center to manage JMACs globally. This unit should be empowered to develop 

doctrine, standardize JMAC procedures, assist with new mission start-up, and troubleshoot 

JMACs in the field.

In addition to these essential steps, the staffing of JMACs must be professionalized. 

This would entail establishing permanent UN positions for JMAC chief, deputy, and head 

of source management in all field missions, as well as for the staff of the JMAC unit in the 

secretariat. Either the JMAC chief or the deputy should be a well-established specialist in 

the conflict that the mandate is addressing.

Enabler: Integrated Planning

In quasianarchic conditions, whether at the outset of a mission or when confronted by 

violent obstructionism from political-criminal power structures, integrated planning is a 

crucial component of success. Over time, MINUSTAH recognized the need to carry out this 

three-pronged strategy: 

1. Ensure the immediate tactical and long-term institutional superiority of law 

enforcement, using a combination of international military and police and HNP 

forces.

2. Provide an immediate peace dividend through a rapid influx of international 

humanitarian and development assistance (e.g., quick-impact projects).

3. Help state institutions provide public utilities, government services, public safety, 

and the rule of law to fill the void left by displacement of the gangs, and lay the 

foundation for legitimate job creation.

To be effective, such a strategy requires effective integration of military, police, and 

civilian assistance efforts. There was a tendency, however, toward segregated and uncoordinated planning. Integrated planning is an alien concept for most military and police 

forces and development agencies. MINUSTAH’s senior leadership insisted that planning 

be consolidated and that differences be settled at the PDSRSG or SRSG level. This is a 

key lesson. Not only does the safety of the forces involved depend on shared planning, 

the effectiveness of tactical operations hinges on it. To displace heavily armed gangs 

from their strongholds and arrest gang leaders required mutual support by the military 

and police contingents. The military contingent’s firepower and armor were needed to 

overcome the aggressive and organized resistance of the gangs. Police, prepared to use 

force as necessary to apprehend gangsters, played a supporting role in these opera9

After operations by the military contingent had successfully dislodged 

the gangs from their neighborhoods, 

MINUSTAH police, supported by military units that provided an outer 

cordon of security, led operations to 

arrest them.
10

tions. When the principal task was to arrest gang members, the HNP was the executive 

enforcement institution for that purpose, supported by the UN Police with its FPUs. HNP 

Director General Andrésol instructed his SWAT team to respond to MINUSTAH requests 

to launch no-notice operations and to inform him as soon as possible afterward. Since 

executive authority rested with the HNP, the outcome of police-led operations depended 

on the HNP’s performing its functions effectively. After mounting a successful operation, 

MINUSTAH recognized the central role of the HNP in achieving the objectives, including 

any arrests made. 

After operations by the military contingent had successfully dislodged the gangs from 

their neighborhoods, MINUSTAH police, supported by military units that provided an outer 

cordon of security, led operations to arrest them. Ideally, military and police planners 

should use a common planning template, with the resulting operational plans then consolidated into a single document. MINUSTAH did not achieve this ideal, but the parallel 

planning processes used by military and police planners did involve coordination and the 

airing of differences. Depending on the nature of the operation (military- or police-led), 

each contingent was assigned responsibilities and formulated its plans separately. If differences arose between the two plans and could not be resolved, they were referred to 

the PDSRSG or SRSG for a decision. 

There were three exceptions to the general practice of integrated planning, which 

illustrate the consequences of lapses in planning. First, the military operation into Cité 

Soleil in January 2007 was conducted without police involvement or input. When the 

gang leader organized an unarmed demonstration during a truce called to evacuate the 

wounded, the force commander asked for police assistance. The risk of civilian casualties 

had been the primary concern in planning this operation, yet no plans were in place for 

this contingency. Fortunately, the police commissioner had placed an FPU on alert when 

he learned of the operation, and was quickly able to clear the streets. 

The second failure to integrate planning was associated with the conduct of operations 

throughout February to clear gangs, neighborhood by neighborhood, from Cité Soleil. 

These were treated as solely military operations, without the need for integrated planning 

with the police. One of the consequences was that military units would capture supposed 

gang members and turn them over to the HNP without proper attention to the collection 

of evidence. The ability to obtain court convictions in these cases may be hampered by a 

dearth of admissible evidence.

The third breakdown in integrated planning involved civilian assistance efforts. After 

the gangs had been successfully driven out of Cité Soleil, the emphasis switched to providing a peace dividend. Quick-impact projects were needed to fill the vacuum in the wake 

of the gangs’ removal with government services and short-term employment. The Brazilian military used its own personnel, equipment, and funds to distribute food rations as 

an interim measure and conduct cleanup projects, including refurbishing the city hall so 

that authorities could assume their functions. The impact was magnified by the Brazilian 

military’s emphasis on community involvement, turning projects into street parties complete with music and refreshments. The force commander was quick to call on Civil Affairs 

and the DSRSG for Development for “pacification” projects once the kinetic phase was 

concluded. In spite of the SRSG’s efforts to include immediate civilian assistance projects 

in the advance planning process, no source of funding had been identified. Humanitarian relief agencies were reluctant to jeopardize their “humanitarian space” (or ability to 

access needy populations) by associating their assistance efforts with use of force against 

illegal armed groups. Developmental agencies lacked the agility to respond in a timely 

manner to the immediate operational requirements posed by mandate enforcement. As a 

result, MINUSTAH experienced a serious gap in launching civilian activities to provide a 

peace dividend by restoring public services (e.g., health care, education, water, sewage), 

extending state authority, and creating employment. The SRSG for the UN Mission in 

Kosovo (200x-200x), Soren Jessen Petersen, points out that the peace dividend gap is a 

systemic problem not isolated to Haiti. In his estimation, developmental assistance too 

often tends to be “too little, too late, too uncoordinated, and too unstrategic.”13

The Brazilian military used its own 

personnel, equipment, and funds to 

distribute food rations as an interim 

measure and conduct cleanup projects, 

including refurbishing the city hall so 

that authorities could assume 

their functions.
11

Recommendation: Establish procedures for integrated mission operational planning. Coordination between military and police components should always take place on major 

operations so that the need for police support (crowd and riot control or evidence 

collection) can be anticipated and planned for. If assistance from civilians is required to 

provide immediate humanitarian relief, funding for quick-impact projects should also be 

planned well in advance. Details about specific dates and locations of military operations 

need not be divulged, but the required resources need to be mobilized within identified 

time frames. This requires that operational planning be done holistically, supported by 

a dedicated planning architecture. The Best Practices Unit should work with interested 

partners to develop integrated planning procedures, and structures for making integrated 

mission operational plans in the field. Successful examples to consider would be the 

integrated plan for the elections in Haiti, and the UNMIK operation to take over the 

Zvecan lead smelter in 2000.

Recommendation: Provide flexible funding from peacekeeping assessments to support mandate 

enforcement. Flexible funding for projects to provide immediate humanitarian relief and to 

promote employment and public services to replace the patronage doled out by gangs, 

militias, and other illicit armed groups should be available through UN peacekeeping 

assessments. The rationale for this is captured in a MINUSTAH report on “Re-orienting DDR 

to Community Violence Reduction (CVR) in Haiti (September 2007)”:

While MINUSTAH is not a developmental agency, its security efforts to stabilize neighborhoods need to be accompanied by parallel efforts to promote economic recovery 

and employment creation at the community level. Assessed funding will be used to 

finance well-designed projects in vulnerable neighborhoods pending the development 

of mid- to long-term projects to be funded by the Government and/or bilateral and 

multilateral agencies.14

MINUSTAH has provided a valuable innovation for future peace missions with its CVR 

program that involves use of assessed funds to undertake activities intended to provide 

a peace dividend in communities where MINUSTAH has taken assertive action to counter 

gang influence. It began with Security Council resolution 1743, which urged MINUSTAH to 

reorient resources that had been devoted to disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration to “community violence reduction.” MINUSTAH developed a mechanism to provide 

labor-intensive projects in violence-affected areas to address the gap between security 

operations and the arrival of humanitarian and development assistance. Of the $3.47 million budgeted for CVR, $2.19 million was allocated to labor-intensive projects, providing 

a valuable stabilization tool for areas affected by gang violence. 

The operation against the gangs in Cité Soleil also demonstrated that the need to fund 

quick-impact projects is not confined to the first year of a mission. Field missions should 

be afforded ample flexibility to support the political and strategic goals of the SRSG in 

dealing with illegal armed groups beyond the first few years of an operation. 

Enabler: FPUs

In antigang operations involving MINUSTAH Police, FPUs performed a range of pivotal and 

often decisive roles, including crowd and riot control, hard entry, and high-risk arrest. The 

military contingent’s initial foray into Cité Soleil on January 24 was placed in jeopardy 

when gang members organized a demonstration of unarmed civilians. An FPU with nonlethal riot control capabilities quickly dispersed the crowd. FPUs also played a decisive 

role in Gonaives after rioters threatened to overrun the police station there during a May 

24 protest of the government’s failure to confront a wave of murders perpetrated by the 

gang in that community. 

The forty-person SWAT team from Jordan that MINUSTAH incorporated within the FPU 

structure has been heavily employed in antigang operations. The vast majority of policeled operations involved the arrest of gang leaders or members as a prominent objective. 

Details about specific dates and 

locations of military operations need 

not be divulged, but the required 

resources need to be mobilized 

within identified time frames. This 

requires that operational planning 

be done holistically, supported by a 

dedicated planning architecture. 
12

FPUs were central to these highly successful operations, in particular the integrated use of 

MINUSTAH and PNH SWAT teams. Virtually all high-priority targets were brought to justice. 

For example, both the MINUSTAH and the HNP SWAT teams and an additional FPU platoon were assigned to Gonaives for two months to assist the FPU and other police assets 

assigned there in following up on the arrest of gang leader “Ti Will.” All but one of the 

thirty most-wanted gang leaders from Gonaives were apprehended in that period.

Recommendation: Establish common police and military doctrine for use of FPUs. Command 

and control issues are critically important. There needs to be a common understanding 

that police assets may be placed only temporarily under the tactical control of a military 

commander, for the finite duration of an operation (and, conversely, that military 

assets may be placed temporarily under tactical control of a police commander under 

appropriate circumstances). Permanent assignment of FPUs to the military commander for 

duty at static checkpoints is inappropriate and contrary to police doctrine. Among other 

consequences, this would invite force commanders to reassign their forces to other duties, 

leaving FPUs semipermanently deployed to an inappropriate function.

The other fundamental concept that all military and FPU commanders need to understand is that in a crowd- and riot-control situation, the FPU commander must have tactical control over all resources inside the boundary where the disturbance is taking place. 

The military commander who is supporting the FPU commander by providing an outer 

cordon of security has tactical control over troops outside the incident scene. Both must 

coordinate their efforts at an on-scene tactical control point. If the situation escalates 

to the point where tactical control of the scene of the riot must be passed to the military contingent commander, this is a determination to be made exclusively by the FPU 

commander. Once these basic principles have been universally adopted, they should be 

routinely practiced in exercises on mission.

Recommendation: The DPKO police division should regularly conduct command development 

seminars for FPU commanders and police commissioners. Command development seminars 

should be conducted at least every six months for newly arrived FPU commanders 

and those who are about to be deployed, to ensure that they acquire proficiency in 

planning for integrated operations involving their military counterparts and JMAC. Police 

commissioners or deputies and incoming or recently arrived force commanders and 

military planners should also be included.

Recommendation: Evaluate FPU proficiency. One of the FPUs assigned to MINUSTAH is recruited 

from an unarmed border police force. Thus, these personnel have no experience with the 

demanding tasks they will be expected to perform on mission, and no field experience in 

the use of force. This makes the unit risk averse and reluctant to perform anything beyond 

mundane tasks. DPKO has recently established standards for proficiency with lethal and 

less-than-lethal weapons and for the circumstances under which escalation in the use of 

force is warranted. Member states should suport DPKO’s efforts in developing evaluation 

teams to implement these standards expeditiously. FPU-contributing countries should 

request DPKO assistance in evaluating the proficiency of their units before deployment.

Recommendation: Provide FPUs with a SWAT capability where required for mandate enforcement.

The incorporation of a specialized SWAT capability with the standard FPU capacity for 

crowd and riot control has proved highly effective. If relevant to the mandate, and certainly in a mission where gangs or other agents of political violence are prevalent, a SWAT 

capability is essential.

Enabler: Police Reform

The police in Haiti do not enjoy a reputation for public service. Formerly, the Armed Forces 

of Haiti were responsible for policing, but their real function was to repress and exploit 

the masses. When President Jean-Bertrand Aristide was restored to office, he politicized 

DPKO has recently established 

standards for proficiency with 

lethal and less-than-lethal weapons 

and for the circumstances under 

which escalation in the use of force 

is warranted. Member states should 

support DPKO’s efforts in developing evaluation teams to implement 

these standards expeditiously.
13

and criminalized the HNP after the international community had invested immense effort 

in establishing it as a credible force. An essential step in changing the image of the HNP, 

therefore, is to provide safety and security in Cité Soleil as a public good.

The HNP presence in Cité Soleil throughout 2007 was minimal (some six officers per 

day). There should at least be one HNP officer per MINUSTAH military or police patrol, but 

the HNP fell well short of this requirement, owing to a lack of assigned personnel. Only 

two police were normally on duty to respond to criminal complaints for a population of 

approximately three hundred thousand. 

To be sustainable, MINUSTAH’s success depends on the success of HNP reform, as 

reflected in growing HNP capacity. As of July 2008, thirty-four HNP officers were deployed 

to Cité Soleil (about ten per shift). With a population of 300,000, this equates to a ratio 

of 1:8,800 inhabitants. For Haiti as a whole the figure is 1:1,300. A total of one hundred 

fifty to two hundred officers are possible by the end of the year which would begin to 

approximate the presence in other Haitian communities. The first phase of refurbishment 

of the main police station was nearing completion in July 2008. It will eventually be supported by two substations. The way the HNP performs its law enforcement duties will be 

the primary determinant of its relationship with the public. If it demonstrates the capacity 

to maintain public safety, then there will be a basis for establishing a mutually supportive 

relationship with civil society via community policing. MINUSTAH Police will have a decisive role to play as field trainers, mentors, and monitors of the HNP’s conduct.

Recommendation: Develop and maintain the civil society initiatives that will enable community 

policing. Community policing, with its neighborhood focus, group problem solving, and 

open participation, is right for Haiti and for policing in societies emerging from conflict. 

When fear has dominated the social fabric, the most effective means for building systemic 

crime resistance in neighborhoods are crime prevention, self-help, and neighborhood 

problem-solving initiatives. In virtually all cases, however, civil society will be weak or 

absent entirely. In Cité Soleil, civil society organizations have essentially been nonexistent. 

The newly installed municipal authorities initially took steps to create a public security 

committee from among the key stakeholders in the community. Such initiatives will have 

to be sustained, however, to provide the HNP with the relevant structures on which to 

base its community policing program. Best practices need to be developed to guide the 

process of generating nascent civil society structures that will provide the civilian entities 

that police need to work with in pursuit of a community policing model. 

Enabler: Criminal Justice System Reform

Some 90 percent of those in Haitian jails are awaiting trial, some having served more time 

incarcerated than they would have served had they been tried and convicted. In addition 

to the human rights consequences of this dysfunction, there is the risk that dangerous 

gang leaders will be able to bribe or intimidate a notoriously corrupt judicial system to 

win their release. The decrepit, overwhelmed, and understaffed prison system also creates 

considerable potential for escape. Another concern is that fair trials could result in the 

acquittal of many alleged gang members because of insufficient evidence to sustain a 

conviction. 

After being hamstrung by the lack of a mandate for criminal justice reform until passage 

of UN Security Council Resolution 1702 in August 2006, MINUSTAH has worked diligently 

to help Haitian authorities produce a reform plan for Haiti’s courts and penal system. The 

police reform plan was already adopted by the government in August 2006, with significant steps, such as vetting and restructuring, being undertaken thereafter. The lesson to 

be brought forward is that systematic reform of the criminal justice system should be 

rigorously and comprehensively pursued in the aftermath of any intervention. The corollary to this is that reform will likely take years to bear fruit, whereas immediate fixes are 

required when judges are incapable of confronting the threat from criminalized political 

elites and their agents of violence. Similarly, the inability of the prison system to keep 

When fear has dominated the social 

fabric, the most effective means for 

building systemic crime resistance 

in neighborhoods are crime prevention, self-help, and neighborhood 

problem-solving initiatives.

Systematic reform of the criminal 

justice system should be rigorously 

and comprehensively pursued in the 

aftermath of any intervention. The 

corollary is that reform will likely take 

years to bear fruit.
14

dangerous convicts in jail or prevent them from exploiting the prison system to continue 

carrying out their criminal enterprises also requires a more immediate and reliable solution. In both cases, the international community will likely need to provide a prompt and 

appropriate “patch” for the systemic defects in the local criminal justice system. 

Recommendation: Plan for holistic reform of the legal system. The need for peace missions to 

take a holistic approach to establishing the rule of law, including reform of the police, 

the judicial system and legal code, and the prison system, has been recognized and 

accepted for more than a decade. And yet, delay in providing a mandate for judicial and 

penal reform meant that planning was still in the approval process three years after the 

Haiti mission began. To enable missions to hit the ground running with holistic legal 

system reform, the Best Practices Unit should gather reform plans that have been used 

for police, the judiciary, the legal code, and the prison system in prior missions and work 

with interested partners to develop a generic and holistic reform plan with recommended 

procedures for implementing it. One of the central components of the plan should be to 

assess whether the existing legal system is part of the problem (requiring fundamental 

transformation and a prominent early role for international rule-of-law practitioners) or 

part of the solution to societal conflict (requiring capacity building and a less intrusive 

role for international personnel).

Recommendation: Establish special-crimes courts for politically charged cases. Waiting for 

reform programs to rectify profound systemic dysfunction in the judiciary is far too slow 

a process if a peace mission must deal with politically destabilizing crimes, including 

political assassinations, intercommunal violence, and political linkages to drug trafficking, 

kidnapping, and gang warfare. An immediate fix is required. The most effective solution 

is to establish a special court with original jurisdiction over politically sensitive cases. 

Depending on the extent to which the system has collapsed or is incapable of treating 

disenfranchised groups fairly, international judges and prosecutors may need to be part 

of the equation, as has been the case in Kosovo. There are well-intentioned judges 

in any system, however, and the number required for a special court is not large. The 

indispensable ingredient, besides overcoming local resistance from political actors with 

a stake in lawless rule, is generous international support. Among the forms of assistance 

likely to be required are a secure courthouse and collocated detention center, personal 

security for judges and their families, provisions for anonymity of judges, witness 

protection programs, forensics labs and forensic accountants, attractive salaries, and 

support from international judges and prosecutors. DPKO should be empowered to 

mobilize the relevant resources to meet each of these requirements.

Recommendation: Plan for rapid deployment of a maximum-security prison. The need for 

facilities to detain high-risk prisoners is not unique to MINUSTAH. It has been a major 

deficiency in numerous missions, most notably in Somalia, Kosovo, and East Timor, and 

will undoubtedly arise repeatedly in the future. DPKO should develop a capability for rapid 

construction of a maximum-security prison for dangerous prisoners, including an on-call 

roster of international corrections officials to establish the facility, and procedures for 

vetting and overseeing local corrections officials to manage it.

Conclusions

The campaign waged in Haiti by MINUSTAH in 2006 and early 2007 to confront the threat 

from urban gangs, especially those based in Cité Soleil, was vital for the defense and 

preservation of that mission’s mandate. The lessons from the resounding success achieved 

in Haiti should be captured and put into practice wherever missions are challenged by 

illegal armed groups. The conditions needed for successful mandate enforcement in Haiti 

included unity of effort among mission leadership; local buy-in and support; actionable 

intelligence to guide operations; effective employment of FPUs; integrated planning of 
15

military, police, and civilian assistance efforts to fill the void left by displacement of 

gangs; and holistic reform of, and international support for, the legal system. The experience in Haiti demonstrates that the United Nations must be capable of mounting assertive operations to defend and enforce its mandates, and that given the proper enabling 

conditions and the will to act, it is capable of doing so quite successfully.
United States 

Institute of Peace

1200 17th Street NW

Washington, DC 20036

www.usip.org

An online edition of this and related 

reports can be found on our Web site 

(www.usip.org), together with additional 

information on the subject.

Notes

1. CHF International, “Study on the United Nations Crackdown on Gangs in Haiti: Citizens Perspectives,” 

March 2008, 13.

2. The Impact of Peace and Stability on Living Conditions in Cité Soleil: A Survey of Residents Perception, 

Haiti Stabilization Initiative, February 2008, 8.

3. CHF International, “Study on the United Nations Crackdown on Gangs in Haiti,” 10.

4. United States Institute of Peace survey, 14; HSI survey, 9.

5. United States Institute of Peace survey, 32; HSI survey, 8.

6. United States Institute of Peace survey, 20.

7. HSI survey, 10.

8. United States Institute of Peace survey, 18.

9. HSI survey, 10.

10. United Nations, United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines, Capstone Doctrine Draft 

3. Section 70, 25. (New York: UN, 2008)

11. United Nations, United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines, Capstone Doctrine Draft 

3. Section 67, 25. (New York: UN, 2008)

12. William J. Durch, “Evolution of Doctrines for Peace Operations,” Presentation to the USIP workshop on 

“Enforcing UN Mandates Against Illegally Armed Groups,” July 18, 2008.

13. Remarks delivered at USIP on July 18 on “Enforcing UN Mandates Against Illegally Armed Groups.”

14. Reorienting DDR to Community Violence Reduction in Haiti (September 2007), 15.