# FILED
May 12, 1999 Cecil W. Crowson Appellate Cou rt Clerk IN THE COURT OF CR IMINAL A PPEALS OF TENN ESSEE AT NASHVILLE FEBRUARY

1999 SESSION

STATE OF TENN ESSEE, ) ) Appellee, ) C.C.A. No. 01C01-9803- CC-00133 ) ) Robertson County V. ) ) Honorable John H. Gasaw ay, III, Judge ) VENSON TERRELL TAYLOR, ) (Theft of Property Over $1,000.00) ) Appellant. )

FOR THE DEF ENDANT: FOR THE APPELLEE: JOE R. JOHNSON, II JOHN KNOX WALKUP Law Offices of Larry D. Wilks Attorney General & Repor ter 506 West Court Square Springfield, TN 37172 ELIZABETH H. MARNEY Assistant Attorney Gener al 425 Fifth Avenue North 2nd Floor, Cordell Hul l Building Nashville, TN 37243-0493 JOHN WESLEY CARNEY, JR. District Attorney General DENT MORRIS Assistant District A

ttorney General 500 South Main Street Springfield, TN 37172

OPINION FILED: ___________________
AFFIRMED
JOHN EVERETT WILLIA MS, Judge2 

### O P I N I O N The defendant, Venson Terrell Taylor, was found guilty by jury verdict of theft over one thousand dollars , and the Circuit Court in Robertson County sentenced him to six ye ars in the Tennessee Department of Cor rection. The trial court denied the defendant's motion for a new trial, and his subs equent appeal to this Court alleges insufficient evidence to support his conviction. W e AFFIRM the judgment of the trial court

.

BACKGROUND The defendant requested employmen t from Robert Neil Latham, who told the defendant that work might be available in the near future . Later that week, the defendant visited Latham's re sidence and offered to mow his y ard. Latham declined. Several days later, Latham found his residence's front door open. He discovered that sever

al firearms and a water j ug containing coins w ere missing. Latham valued the missing pr operty between $2100 and $2700.
At trial, Latham's neighbor , Ora Lee Jones, testified that t he defendant approached her at her residenc e on the day of the burglary and advised her that he was mowing Latham's yard. Several minut

es later, Jones observed a blue car, which had been parked wit h its trun k facing L atham's front po rch, leave Latham's residence. She observ ed the defendant in the vehicle.

Robertson Coun ty Deputy Sheriff Richard Head, af ter receiving a description of the vehicle, stopped and searched a vehicle driven by Derrick Dunn and occupied by the defendant. A water jug was in the trunk and quarters, some rolled in wrapper s, were under the passeng er seat where the defendant had been sitting. Dunn directed officers to the missing firearm s, which were stored in a building.3 Dunn pleaded guilty to b urglary of Latham’s res idence and testified at the defendant's trial. According to Dunn, on the day of the burg lary the defendant asked him for a ride to Latham 's house, where th e defendan t would be mowing. The defendant advised Dunn that Lath am had guns in his residence and asked if Dunn would like to make some money. Dunn backed his vehicle into Latham's driveway and parked the car. The defendant walked to another house, while Dunn entered the residence and ex ited with the guns and a water jug of coins.

When the defendant returned, the firearms were on the porch. Dunn had already loaded the jug. They wrapped the firearms in plastic, placed them in t he trunk, and drove from the res idence. Dunn and the defendant later r olled the quarters from the jug int o wrappers and placed the r olls in the vehicle.

The defendant testified tha t he advised Jones that he was at Latham's property. He and Dunn l eft when Latham's mower w ould not start. Dunn asked the defendant to help return some proper ty to Dunn's uncle. The defendant testified that he did not recog nize this property as firearms, because it w as wrapped in plastic. The d efendant later helped Dunn roll q uarters that the defendant allegedly thought belonged to Dunn’s child.

The defendant denied that La tham refused his offer to mow the yard. He further testified that he called L atham regarding the yar d, instead of going to the residence. The defendant denied telli ng Dunn about the guns and know ing that Dunn had burglarized t he residence.
The defendant testified that Latham had promised t o provide the defendant with a car and nice s uits for an imminent job and that he an d Latham had ridden in Latham's truck a nd drank beer, during w hich time Latham drove by his residence. Latham denied both the alleged promise and the al leged trip.4 STANDA RD OF REVIEW The defendant submits that the evidence was insufficient as a matter o f law to sustain his con

viction. When an appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court must determine whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to th e prosecution, any ratio nal trier of fact could have found the essential elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); State v. Duncan , 698 S.W.2d 63, 67 (Tenn. 1985); Tenn. R. App. P. 13(e). This Court grants the appellee the strongest legitima te view of t he eviden ce and all reasona ble infe rences th at may be d rawn therefrom. See State v. Cabbage , 571 S.W.2d 832, 835 (Tenn. 1978).
The credibility of wi

tnesses, the weight of thei r testimony, and the reconciliation of conflicts in the evidence are matters entrusted exclusiv

ely to the trier of fact. See State v. Sheffield , 676 S.W.2d 542, 547 (Tenn. 1984); see also State v. Gentry , 881 S.W.2d 1, 3 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993). A jur y verdict for the state accredits the testimony of the state’s witnesses and resolves all conflicts in favor of the state. See State v. Willia ms , 657 S.W.2d 405, 410 (Tenn. 1983). A guilty verdic

t also replaces the defendant’s pr esumption of innocence with a presumption of guilt. See State v. Grace , 493 S.W.2d 474, 476 (Tenn. 1973). A defendant challenging the sufficienc y of the evidence carri es the burden of illustrating why the evidence insufficiently supports the verdict. See State v. Freeman , 943 S.W.2d 25, 29 (T enn. Crim. App. 1996).

ANAL YSIS “A person commits theft of property if, with intent to depri

ve the owner of property, the person know ingly obtains or ex

ercises control over

the property without the owner’s effective consent.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-14-1 03. Theft is “[a] Class D felony i f the value of the property . . . obtained is one thousand dollars ($1,000) or more b ut less than ten thousand dollar s ($10,000).” Tenn.5 Code Ann. § 39-14-105(3). Ther efore, this Court must determine if sufficient evidence existed for the trier of fact to conclude that the de fendant knowingly obtained or exercised co ntrol over Latham’s proper ty, that the defendant did not have Latham’s effective consent for that dominion, and that the defendant intended to permanently depri ve Latham of that property. We find sufficient evidence of each of these elements.

The trial court instruct

ed the jury to determine w hether Dunn was an accomplice in the alleged crime. That court further ins tructed the jury to determine whether sufficient ev idence “independently l[ed] to the conclusion that a crime was committed and that the defendant was involv ed in it.” In Tennessee, a felony convicti on may not be based solely on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice. See State v. Green , 915 S.W.2d 827, 830 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995). Although the defendant does not explicitl y invoke this tenet, his insufficiency of the evi dence argument necessarily questions whether the state pre sented s uffici ent inde penden t evidence corrobor ating Dun n’s testi mony, which constituted a lar

ge portion of the state’s cas e.
The evidence showed that Latham’s property was taken from his residence and that the defendant was at Latham’s residence, wi th neither Latham’s approval nor permi ssion, on the date of the crime. The defendant was in Dunn’s vehicle w

ith rolled coins, consi stent with the property taken from the residence, under his seat. The required corroborati ve evidence, whic

h may be worth little if consi dered on its own, must tend t o connect the defendant with the commission of the offense. See McKinney v. State , 552 S.W.2d 787, 789 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1977). The jury determines “the degree of ev idence necessary to corroborate the testimony of an accomplice.” State v. Billingsl ey , No. 01C01- 9506-CC-00166 (Tenn. Crim. Ap p. filed May 16, 1996, at Nas hville). We find no error in the trier of fact’ s assessing sufficient cor roborative evidence in this case.6 Although Dunn made false statements after his arrest and entered a pl ea agreement with the state, at least partially i n exchange for testimony against the defendant, the trier of fact credited Dunn’s testimony. Further, the trier of fact rejected the defendant’s testimony contrary to that of the w itnesses against him. We do not usurp the trier of fact’s responsibi lities: that entity d etermines the credibility of the w

itnesses and weighs t he evidence. This issue i s without merit.

CONCLUSION Based on the foregoing, the judgment below is AFFIRMED.

_____________________________ JOHN EVERETT W ILLIAMS, Judge

CONCUR:

_____________________________ DAVID G. HAYES, Jud ge

_____________________________ J. CURWOOD WITT, JR., Judge