CROSSBOW AND GULF WAR COUNTER-SCUD EFFORTS: 

LESSONS FROM HISTORY 

by 

Colonel Mark E. Kipphut, USAF 

The Counterproliferation Papers 

Future Warfare Series No. 15 

USAF Counterproliferation Center

Air University 

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

Crossbow and Gulf War Counter-Scud Efforts: 

Lessons from History 

Lt Col Mark Kipphut, USAF 

February 2003 

The Counterproliferation Papers Series was established by the USAF 

Counterproliferation Center to provide information and analysis to assist 

the understanding of the U.S. national security policy-makers and USAF 

officers to help them better prepare to counter the threat from weapons of 

mass destruction. Copies of No. 15 and previous papers in this series are 

available from the USAF Counterproliferation Center, 325 Chennault 

Circle, Maxwell AFB AL 36112-6427. The fax number is (334) 953-

7530; phone (334) 953-7538. 

Counterproliferation Paper No. 15 

USAF Counterproliferation Center

Air University 

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 36112-6427

The internet address for the USAF Counterproliferation Center is: 

http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/awc-cps.htm

Contents 

Page 

Disclaimer................................................................................................... ii

The Author................................................................................................. iii

I. Introduction .............................................................................................1 

II. Crossbow Campaign ..............................................................................5 

III. The Great Scud Chase ........................................................................11 

IV. Future Considerations.........................................................................21 

V. Conclusions..........................................................................................27 

Notes..........................................................................................................29 
ii 

Disclaimer 

The views expressed in this publication are those of the author and do 

not reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Government, 

Department of Defense, or the USAF Counterproliferation Center. 
iii

The Author 

 Colonel Mark E. Kipphut (BA, The Citadel; MA, Embry-Riddle 

University), commander of the 30th Intelligence Squadron, Langley AFB, 

Virginia, is a career intelligence officer who has served at the strategic, 

operational, and tactical levels of warfare. He served as wing intelligence 

officer, 405th Tactical Training Wing, Luke AFB, Arizona; and 

intelligence officer and analyst, Headquarters TAC, where he wrote the 

first adversary tactics chapter for MCM 3-1. At Headquarters USAFE, he 

directed the command’s intelligence program before becoming a 

command presentations officer, oversaw the air and missile order of battle 

for the Defense Intelligence Agency, and directed the database for 

verifying the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty. After his 

reassignment to the Pentagon, he served as a staff officer in Checkmate’s 

Instant Thunder planning cell, as J-2 representative to the Joint Staff, and 

as J-2 planner for Joint Staff action planning in operations in Bosnia, 

Haiti, Kuwait, Somalia, and Iraq. Colonel Kipphut was the top graduate in 

the Air War Class of 1996. He also attended the Armed Forces Staff 

College and the Marine Corps Command and Staff College. 

Crossbow and Gulf War . . . 1 

Crossbow and Gulf War Counter-Scud Efforts: 

Lessons from History∗

Mark E. Kipphut 

I. Introduction 

As a result of Gulf War efforts countering Saddam Hussein’s shortrange ballistic missiles (SRBM), theater missile defense (TMD) has 

emerged as a leading doctrinal issue. Our inability to halt Scud attacks 

spurred a virtual cottage industry. Pundits and prognosticators of all 

shapes and sizes are offering insights into how we should best counter this 

“new” threat. The two distinctive TMD lessons that emerged from the 

Gulf War were (1) that missiles will play a significant role in future wars, 

and (2) that locating, targeting, and destroying mobile missile transportererector-launchers (TEL) is both time and resource intensive. Yet before 

the United States Air Force (USAF) develops new TMD doctrine, tactics, 

techniques, and procedures, it would serve us well to first reflect on the 

past. 

Background 

The Gulf War was not the first time airpower was required to counter 

enemy cruise or ballistic missile attacks. During World War II, Operation 

Crossbow, the Allied attempt to counter German V-1 and V-2 operations 

became the dominant focus shaping airpower employment during the 

critical spring and summer months of 1944. Unfortunately, Gulf planners 

did not learn Crossbow’s lessons, because, as this article shows, most of 

the challenges faced in World War II resurfaced during efforts to suppress 

Scuds during the Gulf War. 

Two factors inhibited Gulf War air planners from properly 

anticipating or countering the Iraqi Scud menace. First, Air Force officers 

are poor students of history. Our intellectual foundation tends to be based 

∗

 Originally published in Airpower Journal, Winter 1996. 
2 . . . Crossbow and Gulf War

on Jominian reductionism. Rather than properly studying history to gain a 

rich appreciation of the subtleties of war, we ransack the history record in 

search of principles that guarantee success. This “cookie-cutter” approach 

typically leads to dogmatic application, not strong doctrinal thought.1 

Before the USAF develops new TMD doctrine, tactics, techniques, and 

procedures, it would serve us well to first reflect on the past. 

To avoid this pitfall, the Air Force must reject its biases toward using 

history to discover the indisputable laws of war and instead adopt a 

Clausewitzian view that requires that history be properly studied to gain 

an appreciation of the physical and psychological factors governing 

conflict. This approach instructs us how to think, not how to act. For 

Clausewitz it was not a matter of “knowing that,” which is important, but 

of “knowing how to act,” which is critical!2

 The examination of history, 

therefore, yields no specific formula, no single guide for action; instead, it 

educates the warrior to find his way through the jungle of chance and 

uncertainty that characterizes the combat environment. 

The second inhibiting factor is the Air Force doctrinal bias for air 

superiority based on neutralizing manned fixed-wing aircraft. Airmen 

often proclaim that, first and foremost, the enemy’s air forces must be 

defeated by air supremacy—a war cannot be won without it.

3

 This belief 

suffers from “mirror-image” analysis. Because America relies on fixedwing aircraft as the primary means of waging air war, then these must be 

the only “things” that are really important. This is dogma, not doctrine. 

It ignores the trend within the third world, where ballistic missiles play 

an important role.4 The initial drafts of the latest Air Force doctrine are 

re-examining the restrictive definition of air superiority, but changing 

doctrine requires more than just new words; we must refocus our 

thinking!5 

Just seven days after D-day, a V-1 launched from France hit a 

railroad bridge in London. Thus, a new era in warfare was born—the 

employment of missiles against civilian and military targets. Iraqi use of 

Scuds during Desert Storm continued this trend.6

 Adolf Hitler and 

Saddam Hussein had similar purposes for launching their missiles. Each 

wanted to incite civilian terror to erode public support for the war effort 

and to provoke a reaction from his enemy that could fundamentally alter 
Crossbow and Gulf War . . . 3 

the war. Despite inaccuracy and small warheads, ballistic missiles can 

leverage an opponent and contribute to breaking the enemy’s will to fight. 

Hussein learned this during the savage Iran-Iraq war. In response to 

Iranian missile attacks against Baghdad, he ordered the launch of almost 

200 missiles at Iranian cities, primarily Tehran.7

 The Iraqi missile attacks 

caused little destruction, but each warhead had a psychological and 

political impact—the strikes boosting Iraqi morale while causing almost 

30 percent of Tehran’s population to flee the city. The threat of rocketing 

the Iranian capital with missiles capable of carrying chemical warheads is 

cited as a primary reason why Iran accepted a disadvantageous peace 

agreement. 

Despite the role ballistic missiles played in ending the Iran-Iraq war, 

coalition commanders and their staffs did not appropriately anticipate the 

impact that Scud attacks would have on their plans. They grossly 

underestimated political pressures and their impact on resource allocations 

as a result of the attacks on Israel. In both World War II and the Gulf 

War, airpower was the principal means employed to stop enemy missiles, 

and in each case the results were at best inconclusive, and at worst, 

absolute failures.8 
4 . . . Crossbow and Gulf War
Crossbow and Gulf War . . . 5 

II. Crossbow Campaign

Originally, Hitler had set the end of December 1943 as the target date 

for the start of the V-1 and V-2 assault.9 However, the effects of Allied air 

attacks and German developmental problems delayed the first attacks until 

D-day. The German objective was to attack the United Kingdom with 

approximately 94,000 tons of high explosives per month and by 1945 

German planners estimated they could strike southern England with one 

million tons of explosives per year. This would have equaled 60 percent 

of the total Allied Combined Bomber Offensive (CBO) tonnage dropped 

during 1944, the best year of the CBO! 

If achieved, this objective would certainly have altered the war, 

especially if one considers the small geographic nature of southern 

England. General Dwight D. Eisenhower concluded that: 

if the Germans had succeeded in perfecting and using these new 

weapons six months earlier, our invasion of Europe would have

been exceedingly difficult, perhaps impossible . . . if the 

Portsmouth-Southhampton area had been one of the principal 

targets, OVERLORD might have been written off (emphasis 

added).10 

Ultimately, due in part to Crossbow and other Allied operations, the 

Germans did not achieve their primary goals. Nevertheless, V-weapon 

suppression efforts had a tremendous impact on Allied air planning. 

Crossbow affected not only the conduct of the CBO, but also strained the 

resources supporting Operation Overlord. 

The Gulf War was not the first time airpower was required to counter 

enemy cruise or ballistic missile attacks. 

Despite the Allies’ best efforts, the Germans launched approximately 

15,500 V-1 and V-2 missiles between June 1944 and March 1945, forcing 

Eisenhower to direct that Crossbow take priority over all other Allied air 

operations, including those in support of the Normandy beachhead and the 

CBO.11 By the end of the war, suppression of V-weapons accounted for 

more than 69,000 strike sorties and almost 137,000 tons of munitions. 
6 . . . Crossbow and Gulf War

Clearly, the Germans had created a major diversion, and if this threat was 

not neutralized quickly, the continued diversion of scarce airpower 

resources away from the Normandy lodgment and CBO could have 

jeopardized the entire Allied war strategy. 

Allied Intelligence and Warning 

By late 1942, the frequency of reports concerning new German 

“secret weapons” was increasing; and in early 1943, the British 

government received “unambiguous warning” of German intentions to 

attack Britain using unmanned missiles, possibly with chemical, 

biological, or nuclear weapons. In response, Prime Minister Winston 

Churchill tasked a special panel to direct all V-weapon intelligence 

activities and to recommend countermeasures. In November 1943, based 

on the committee’s recommendations, the British War Cabinet directed an 

intensification of countermeasure efforts. 

Crossbow began in earnest in December 1943, and eventually 

included all Allied offensive and defensive V-weapon countermeasures.12

It was also in December that the British finally revealed to their American 

counterparts the full magnitude of the threat. Before then, American 

aircraft had flown missions against V-weapon targets without fully 

understanding why. This delay slowed the full coordination of Allied 

efforts to suppress the threat. 

Once all the critical details were disclosed, American leadership, both 

military and civilian, rapidly realized the potential impact of V-weapons 

employment. A conclusive estimate of German capabilities and intentions 

was sent to General Henry (“Hap”) Arnold and General George Marshall 

by Eisenhower in December 1943. It claimed that “the equivalent of at 

least a 2,000-ton bombing attack [could be achieved] in a period of 24 

hours.”13 This compares favorably with German planning that called for a 

maximum of just over 3,000 tons per day by mid-1944.14 

Crossbow Planning

The objectives of Crossbow were to “delay the beginning of attacks 

and to limit their intensity once begun.”15 Overall, the height of the 

campaign was from August 1943 until August 1944, as the Allies first 
Crossbow and Gulf War . . . 7

attempted to delay the introduction of V-weapons and then to suppress 

their use. Ironically, formally coordinated countermeasure plans were not 

developed and approved until after August 1944, when the threat had 

diminished. 

The Allies established a combined planning cell to determine the best 

strategy for reducing missile capabilities. This organization, dominated by 

British officers, directed Anglo-American operations against all elements 

of German long-range missile programs, including research facilities, 

manufacturing plants, storage sites, launch sites, and airborne intercept 

operations until July 1944. Throughout Crossbow, the British approach 

focused on the physical destruction of the launch sites, while the American 

approach was to destroy the broader V-weapons support infrastructure, 

focusing on production capabilities, logistical support facilities, and the 

electric grids supporting the launch sites. These disagreements were never 

fully resolved; in fact, there was no single target set whose destruction 

could have halted German missile operations. Crossbow’s success in 

delaying the introduction of V-weapons came from the cumulative effects 

of repeated operations against all elements of the “system.” 

Crossbow offensive operations can be divided into two phases: 

Crossbow I, April 1943 to early June 1944; and Crossbow II, mid-June 

1944 to May 1945. The first phase consisted of the initial identification of 

the V-weapons target set, primarily by aerial reconnaissance, and attacks 

against German-based research facilities plus the operational launch and 

support facilities being built in France. The second phase was more 

active, and arguably more critical, because it attempted to stop missile 

operations once strikes against England and other targets started. This 

phase broadened the focus of bombing to include supply sites, 

supporting infrastructure, and production facilities. In the end, the entire 

enemy V-weapon “system” was attacked—research and development 

facilities, manufacturing plants, transportation nodes, supporting electric 

grids, storage areas, and launch sites. 

Crossbow Results 

While the Allies succeeded in destroying or neutralizing all 

permanent V-weapon sites, the Germans displayed a capability to continue 

launch operations by limiting the signature of new, modified firing sites 
8 . . . Crossbow and Gulf War

that utilized small, simplified launchers protected by extensive 

camouflage, concealment, and deception (CC&D) techniques. The United 

States Strategic Bombing Survey (USSBS) concluded that air attack 

against the entire V-weapon “system” slowed the introduction of the V-1 

and V-2 by three to six months.16 Therefore, Crossbow achieved one of 

its stated objectives: “delaying the beginning of the attacks.” This 

allowed the Allies to execute Overlord before the full impact of Hitler’s 

“secret” weapons could be realized. Both General Eisenhower and 

General Bradley make this point in their autobiographies.17 Based on this 

judgment, Crossbow I can be labeled a qualified “success”; however, 

without question Crossbow II must be labeled a dismal failure. Airpower 

failed to achieve its objective of “limiting the intensity” of either the V-1 

or V-2 once German launch operations began.18 Despite the application of 

thousands of sorties against over 250 targets during the critical summer 

months of 1944, the Germans averaged just over 80 launches per day. 

German sources contend that they never failed to launch due to direct 

intervention by Allied airpower or a shortage in weapons.19 On the other 

hand, Allied leaders devoted a significant effort to suppressing the threat 

at the expense of other critical missions.20 

Crossbow Sortie Allocation 

Crossbow operations between August 1943 and April 1945 required 

68,913 strike sorties delivering 136,789 tons of munitions. They involved 

both strategic and tactical sorties.21 

Strategic Air Forces. Overall, strategic air forces flew 53 percent of 

all Crossbow sorties (36,795) and delivered 84 percent of all tonnage 

(114,790). This equates to 5.6 percent of all sorties and 6.8 percent of all 

tonnage delivered between 1939 and 1945. Between August 1943 and 

August 1944, Crossbow consumed 14 percent of all Allied strategic sorties 

and 16 percent of total tonnage. 

Tactical Air Forces. Tactical air forces flew 47 percent of all 

Crossbow sorties (32,091) while delivering only 16 percent of the total 

tonnage (21,999). From August 1943 to August 1944, tactical air forces 

devoted 17 percent of total sortie generation and 13 percent of total 
Crossbow and Gulf War . . . 9 

tonnage to Crossbow operations. Likewise, the RAF Fighter Command 

flew an additional 4,600 sorties, or 79 percent of all its offensive sortie 

generation, following the elimination of the strategic air threat to the 

United Kingdom, aimed at suppressing V-2 launch operations. Finally, 

Crossbow consumed 40 percent of reconnaissance sorties after 1943. 

Crossbow Observations 

The four major lessons airmen should derive from Crossbow are: 

• Attacking an enemy’s missile infrastructure can be effective 

as a long-term strategy, but such an approach is unlikely to have an 

immediate impact on stopping launch operations. 

• Effective attacks against small, mobile targets employing 

CC&D efforts requires real-time reconnaissance support; otherwise, 

targets are going to be difficult to find, if not impossible to attack. 

• Planning requires comprehensive intelligence support that 

extends well beyond simply focusing on the technical capabilities of 

an enemy system. The corollary is that operational plans must fully 

take into account enemy actions and reactions. 

• Political pressure can directly determine resource allocation. 

Throughout Crossbow an extensive debate erupted over the best 

methods of neutralizing the threat. The British believed the destruction of 

the launch sites by heavy bombers would provide the best means to an 

end, while American airmen held the destruction of the supporting 

infrastructure by heavy or medium bombers would complement fighterbomber attacks against V-1 sites.22 These differences were never fully 

resolved, and only after extensive efforts failed to slow V-1 launch rates 

was the American approach finally accepted and implemented.23 

The lack of a unified approach also wasted time and resources. For 

example, even after Allied intelligence confirmed that the fixed V-1 and 

V-2 sites were neutralized in July 1944, political pressure by the British 

government required General Carl Spaatz to continue to send heavy 

bombers against them. Precious resources were used to attack militarily 

insignificant targets while the legitimate needs of the CBO and the battle 

in Northern France went unsatisfied. 
10 . . . Crossbow and Gulf War

Overall, while air attacks did delay the introduction of V-weapons, it 

did not seriously hinder or halt launch operations once they were initiated. 

It appears that the better approach would have been to adopt a strategy 

closer to American recommendations, augmented by additional defensive 

operations.24 Postwar analysis shows that the greatest impact on 

German efforts came from the indirect effects that bombing had on 

disrupting V-weapon production and distribution. Silencing V-weapons 

eventually required ground forces to overrun the launch sites. Against this 

backdrop, the focus shifts ahead nearly 50 years to examine the challenges 

posed by Iraqi ballistic missiles. 
Crossbow and Gulf War . . . 11 

III. The Great Scud Chase 

By the time the United Nations authorized the coalition to “use all 

necessary means” to evict Iraqi forces from Kuwait, Hussein had few 

strategic options remaining.25 One was Scud missile attacks against Israel 

to undermine the integrity of the coalition and to intimidate Saudi Arabia. 

Within 24 hours of the opening of Desert Storm, Iraq launched the first of 

at least 88 Scuds at Israel and the Arabian Peninsula.26 Just as in 

Crossbow, the coalition responded by diverting precious resources away 

from other areas to counter Scuds. Hussein, like Hitler, created a 

significant diversion. 

Approximately 4,750 anti-Scud sorties were planned, including the 

change or addition of 553 sorties.27 Daily Scud-hunting sorties numbered 

between 75 and 160, or about 5 percent of planned daily sorties. Overall, 

counter-Scud efforts represented between 2 and 5 percent of all 55,075 

offensive fixed-wing sorties generated by coalition airmen, 4 percent of 

all scheduled sorties, and 11.5 percent of all new sorties added to the 

daily air tasking order.28 The anti-Scud strategy had essentially three 

parts: (1) preplanned attacks against production, storage, and fixed sites; 

(2) 24-hour patrols to disrupt prelaunch activities; and (3) 24-hour patrols 

to attack launch sites after they fired their missiles.29 

Contrary to the postwar assessments of several authors, the existence 

and extent of Iraq’s ballistic missile programs were fairly well 

understood.30 Although, in retrospect, some U.S. prewar technical 

estimates were less than 100 percent accurate, the general capabilities of 

Iraqi missile programs were well documented.31 Additionally, Iraqi 

employment practices during its war with Iran were well understood by 

the U.S. intelligence community and the academic world.32 Had planners, 

both in Washington and in-theater, fully appreciated airpower’s limitations 

during Crossbow and better understood Hussein’s employment of ballistic 

missiles in the Iran-Iraq war, there would have been fewer surprises. 

Coalition Intelligence and Warning 

By 1990, Iraq had three mobile Scud or Scud-based variants in its 

inventory: the Soviet-supplied 160-mile-range SS-1 (Scud), plus two 

indigenous Scud variants, the 325-mile Al-Husayn and the 400-mile 
12 . . . Crossbow and Gulf War

Al-Hijarah.33 All were inaccurate and could only strike cities or other 

large-area targets. As a result, Iraqi Scuds were judged to be more of a 

psychological than a military threat. 

Although the absolute number of Scud missile airframes available to 

the Iraqis was unknown, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) had 

estimated that the Soviet Union delivered at least 600 missiles.34 

Postwar disclosures showed Baghdad had purchased around 800 

missiles, many of which had been utilized to build Iraqi extended-range 

Scuds.35 All Iraqi variants could be launched from either fixed sites or 

mobile launchers.36 

The Iraqis used well-known Soviet doctrine for the deployment and 

employment of their SRBMs.37 Iraqi missile crews required 60 to 90 

minutes to set up and launch a missile from a presurveyed site. Based on 

Soviet and Middle Eastern models, it was believed that the Iraqis would 

launch from concealed locations and minimize their exposure while 

moving to and from launch locations. This included launching under the 

cover of darkness or weather. 

Air Force officers are poor students of history. . . . Rather than properly 

studying history to gain a rich appreciation of the subtleties of war, we 

ransack the history record in search of principles that guarantee 

success. This “cookie cutter” approach typically leads to dogmatic 

application, not strong doctrinal thought. 

In an attempt to improve its capability to threaten Israel, Iraq 

constructed five fixed launching complexes in its western desert near 

the Jordanian border. These contained 28 launch positions, allowing 

the Al-Husayn missile to hit all major Israeli cities, nuclear facilities in the 

Negev desert, and Syria. The existence of these fixed launch sites led 

many planners to believe they had found their trump card: if these sites 

were destroyed, the threat to Israel would be diminished.38 This was 

shortsighted because it minimized the role of mobile Scud operations and 

discounted a demonstrated Iraqi capability during the Iran-Iraq war. 

In retrospect, the role the fixed sites played in Iraqi strategy is 

unclear. Iraq had the ability to target Israel using mobile launchers, and 

although the use of fixed sites may marginally improve accuracy, Scud 

missiles remained an area weapon. Therefore, there is a possibility that 
Crossbow and Gulf War . . . 13 

the fixed sites were an elaborate deception effort. Certainly the Iraqis, 

probably through their relationship with the Soviets, the masters of 

modern deception, considered using replicas to draw off enemy combat 

power. 

Postwar analysis shows that the Iraqis also relied on other types of 

deception. They employed elaborate high-fidelity decoys to complicate 

targeting and protect TELs. This also confused the battle damage 

assessment process.39 Planners should have anticipated Iraqi use of 

CC&D given the close Baghdad-Moscow relationship and Soviet 

doctrinal emphasis on active and passive deception techniques to protect 

high-value targets.40 

The number of Scud TELs in service at the time of the war remains a 

source of contention. The uncertainty over this issue is often cited as the 

reason why coalition forces could not stop launches.41 Prewar estimates 

and postwar analysis do not differ greatly. The lowest prewar count was 

12, while the upper estimate was 22.42 Postwar analysis places the number 

at 36 (33 operational), a number supported by the Gulf War Air Power 

Survey (GWAPS), the air warfare survey commissioned by the USAF.43 It 

was also believed before the war that Hussein’s “missile-men” had 

presurveyed a number of launch sites within Iraq and Kuwait to support 

launch operations against Saudi Arabia and Israel. 

Throughout the fall of 1990, estimates of the size and capabilities of 

the Iraqi SRBM force were under continual refinement as more 

information became available. DIA established a special Scud Cell at its 

Washington-based Joint Intelligence Center. This group identified (1) the 

prewar dispersal of missiles from their garrisons; (2) the likelihood that 

Iraqis would use darkness or poor weather to mask employment; and 

(3) expected employment strategies, including attacks against Israel. The 

culmination of this effort came in December 1990, when the cell provided 

Central Command (CENTCOM) and its air component, CENTAF, a full 

appraisal of the Iraqi Scud force, including the expected launch 

sequences, existence of presurveyed launch points in the western Iraqi 

desert, use of dispersed logistical support, and the correct size of the 

mobile launcher force.44 

Hussein stumbled onto a Clausewitzian approach, attacking Israel to 

provoke an Israeli counterstrike by overflying either Saudi Arabia or 

Jordan, or both. He reckoned Arab coalition members could never accept 
14 . . . Crossbow and Gulf War

alignment with Israel against another Arab state; thus, by striking at Israel, 

he indirectly targeted coalition unity.45 

Despite knowing this, U.S. military authorities throughout the Gulf 

were surprised by the amount of political pressure generated by the 

attacks. Many senior leaders admit they underestimated the Scud’s impact 

because of its notorious inaccuracy and small warhead.46 General H. 

Norman Schwarzkopf regarded the missiles as “militarily irrelevant.” His 

most senior airman and joint force air component commander (JFACC), 

Lieutenant General Charles Horner, thought the missiles were “lousy 

weapons.” His chief planner, Brigadier General Buster Glosson, believed 

they were “not militarily significant.”47 It was only after significant 

pressure was imposed from Washington that the commander in chief 

(CINC) of CENTCOM “got the message” and redirected his forces to 

attempt to stop, or at least try to suppress, missile launches.48 

Counter-Scud Planning 

To understand how coalition counter-Scud operations were 

conducted, it is necessary to first consider how the air campaign plans 

were derived and integrated into the CINC’s joint campaign. In August 

1990, President George Bush specified U.S. national objectives as: 

• Immediate, complete, and unconditional withdrawal of all 

Iraqi forces from Kuwait; 

• Restoration of Kuwait’s legitimate government; 

• Security and stability of Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf; 

and 

• Safety and protection of American citizens abroad.49

As the third policy objective implied, the president determined early 

on that, in addition to the restoration of Kuwait, U.S. forces would 

eliminate Hussein’s capability to continue to threaten the region. Implied 

was the destruction of Iraqi ballistic missiles and any program to mate 

them with weapon of mass destruction (WMD) warheads. This objective 

was central to all subsequent political and military strategies adopted 

throughout Desert Storm. 
Crossbow and Gulf War . . . 15 

To achieve the president’s objectives, General Schwarzkopf, in 

concert with Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, identified five primary 

operational objectives: 

• Neutralize the Iraqi national command and control system; 

• Eject Iraqi armed forces from Kuwait; 

• Destroy the Republican Guard; 

• Destroy Iraqi ballistic missile and nuclear, biological, and 

chemical (NBC) capability; and 

• Assist in the restoration of the legitimate government of 

Kuwait. 50

From these objectives, General Schwarzkopf refined his mission 

statement to include the need to “as early as possible, destroy Iraq’s 

ballistic missile and NBC capabilities.”51 He established the following as 

the focus for CENTCOM Operations Order 91-001, 17 January 1991, 

which directed combined military operations during Desert Storm: 

• Attack Iraqi politico-military leadership and command and 

control; 

• Gain and maintain air superiority; 

• Sever Iraqi supply lines; 

• Destroy nuclear, biological, and chemical production, storage, 

and delivery capabilities; 

• Destroy Republican Guard forces in the Kuwait theater; and 

• Liberate Kuwait City. 52

This demonstrates that General Schwarzkopf had little latitude 

concerning the reduction of Iraqi missile capabilities. Scuds, along with 

Iraq’s NBC program, were to be destroyed. By accomplishing this, it was 

assumed that the regional threat posed by Hussein would be eliminated 

and the “security and stability of Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf” 

would be maintained. General Schwarzkopf relied on airpower, under the 

direction of General Horner, to achieve this objective. General Horner, in 

turn, directed his staff to eliminate Iraqi Scud capabilities as quickly as 

possible during the opening phase of the air campaign. 
16 . . . Crossbow and Gulf War

Had planners, both in Washington and in-theater, fully appreciated 

airpower’s limitations during Crossbow and better understood Hussein’s 

employment of ballistic missiles in the Iran-Iraq war, there would have 

been fewer surprises. 

General Horner envisioned three counter-Scud objectives: (1) keep 

Israel out of the war; (2) destroy Iraq’s Scud-associated production 

facilities; and (3) find and destroy Scud TELs that threatened the Arabian 

Peninsula. Initially, only a few missions were planned against the western 

launch sites and a limited number of other missile production and support 

facilities. The following target sets were to “reduce [the] offensive threat 

to regional states and friendly forces”: 

• Fixed Scud launchers, 

• Ballistic missile support bases, 

• Known surveyed launch sites for mobile launchers, 

• Hardened aircraft shelters possibly hiding mobile launchers, 

and 

• SRBM research, development, and production facilities.53

However, when the war started and Iraq began launching missiles, 

counter-Scud efforts rapidly expanded and eventually consumed the daily 

sortie-generation equivalent of a fighter wing.54 

Iraq’s ballistic missile program was considered critical; however, due 

to assumptions made in Washington, and later retained by made in 

Washington, and later retained by theater planners, initial efforts focused 

solely on attacking the fixed sites in western Iraq and SRBM production 

and storage facilities.55 The hope was to neutralize the short-term threat to 

Israel and to eliminate the long-term threat to the region.56 The theater 

commanders and staffs recognized that the potential impact of the Iraqi 

mobile launcher targeting problem was too difficult to solve and that 

despite best efforts some TELs would escape to launch their missiles.57

Reflecting the views of Generals Schwarzkopf and Horner, planners 

regarded Iraqi Scuds as “nuisance weapons.” They believed the best 

strategy was for the coalition and Israel to absorb the attacks. In their 

view, to attempt to locate and destroy mobile TELs was sortie-intensive 

and counterproductive.58 Therefore, a prewar search-and-destroy scheme 
Crossbow and Gulf War . . . 17

for finding and attacking mobile Scuds was not devised.59 Only after 

Scuds were launched at Israel did the theater develop a counter-TEL 

strategy.60 

The low priority initially placed on counter-Scud efforts is reflected 

by the growth in the total number of SRBM targets. In August 1990, 24 

were identified, but by mid-January the number grew to 121.61 Postwar 

analysis concluded that by July 1992 there were at least 154 SRBMassociated targets located within Iraq, a 583 percent growth from August 

1990.62 This was the largest growth in any single strategic target category 

and it reflected the same phenomena as existed in Crossbow, when total 

targets grew from under 10 to over 100. 

Counter-Scud Operations

In the opening hours of Desert Storm, counter-Scud efforts 

progressed as planned; however, within hours of the first air attacks, 

Hussein initiated launches against Israel. These attacks revealed the true 

face of the threat—mobile launchers capable of moving quickly from 

hidden sites, firing, then hiding again before an air attack could be 

mounted.63 However, despite his best efforts, Hussein could not provoke 

an aggressive Israeli response. Tremendous political pressure was applied 

to Washington by Jerusalem, forcing significant diversions of air resources 

from other missions. General Horner remarked that the greatest pressure 

placed upon him during the war was to stop, or reduce, Scud launches. 

During the course of Desert Storm, the coalition scheduled and flew 

1,460 strikes against Scud-related targets.64 Fifty percent were directed 

against fixed launching sites or other “structures” (e.g., aircraft shelters, 

overpasses, etc.) suspected of hiding TELs.65 Of the remaining strikes, 30 

percent were directed against infrastructure or production facilities with 

only 15 percent conducted against exposed TELs. 

By the third day of the air war, coalition “hunter-killer” aircraft 

remained continuously airborne over suspected launch areas. 

Theoretically, these combat air patrols (CAP) could rapidly react to either 

airborne or ground-based queuing or targeting, although in practice this 

proved almost impossible. Counter-Scud sorties and strikes exceeded 

those generated for suppression of enemy air defense missions, destruction 

of military-associated production facilities, and the severing of the lines of 
18 . . . Crossbow and Gulf War

communications from Iraq to Kuwait.66 Only attacks against air bases and 

ground forces required a greater effort. 

Multiple strategies were used to deter launches. Aircraft flew along 

roads believed to support Scud movements and dropped bombs at 

predetermined intervals to disrupt movement or launch preparations. As 

the air war progressed, highway overpasses, culverts, bridges, and other 

suspected Scud hiding places were attacked using precision guided 

munitions, mainly laser-guided bombs. Entire areas were targeted with 

CBU-89 area denial mines to hamper the TELs’ mobility and deny them 

use of suspected assembly and launching areas. A key element in this 

strategy was the employment of British and U.S. special operations forces 

who provided vital targeting information for attacks on suspected Scud 

missile sites.67 

Counter-Scud Results

To judge the overall effectiveness of Gulf War counter-Scud efforts, 

we should return to the original objectives of the campaign: to destroy 

ballistic missile production facilities and their infrastructure, to reduce the 

postwar long-term regional threat, to destroy Iraqi launch capabilities, and 

to maintain Israel’s neutrality and minimize the impact on Gulf states.68

While on the surface it appears that the counter-Scud operations enjoyed 

some success in achieving these objectives, closer examination reveals 

several major shortcomings. 

First, postwar inspections showed that Iraq’s long-term ballistic 

missile program was not destroyed. Second, there is no technical evidence 

that a single TEL was actually destroyed during the war, despite the 

claims of some 100 “kills” by aircrews and special forces.69 Finally, fixed 

sites were neutralized, but it can be argued that these strikes were 

ineffective since the Iraqis relied exclusively on mobile launchers for 

employment. The exact impact of coalition operations against mobile 

systems is more problematic. Iraqi launch operations never stopped and 

only diminished somewhat over time, although during the last week of the 

war launch operations increased in tempo.70 At best, it can be said that 

counter-Scud efforts only maintained “pressure” on Iraqi missile 

operations and that Scud CAP operations apparently were successful at 

harassing but never halting Iraqi launch operations. 
Crossbow and Gulf War . . . 19 

The harsh reality is that airpower did not stop Scud employment. This 

failure can be attributed to multiple reasons, but the root causes can be 

traced to three primary planning issues.71 First was the low priority that 

planners placed on Scud suppression and the resulting failure to anticipate 

the political pressure generated by attacks on Israeli cities. Second was 

the false assumption that Iraq could significantly threaten Israel only from 

fixed sites. Finally, planners assumed that if required to find and destroy 

mobile Scuds, intelligence would provide adequate queuing for aircraft 

and that Iraqi CC&D would not complicate targeting. 

The first failure was predictable. The neutralization of Scuds was a 

low prewar priority for CENTCOM. This is reflected by senior leader 

comments and by how CENTCOM portrayed the SRBM threat in prewar 

exercises. Only seven Scud-associated facilities made CENTAF’s July 

1990 exercise Internal Look target list (of a total of 218), while none were 

on CENTCOM’s target list (of a total of 293).72 Later, during the early 

months of Desert Shield, the Scud threat was perceived as a distraction, 

and Scud attack facilities played only a minor role in the development of 

targeting strategies. The focus was on neutralizing fixed sites and 

destroying Scud garrisons, storage, and production facilities.73 No real 

thought was given to dealing with the mobile launchers, except to keep a 

few fighter-bombers on strip alert to attack launch preparations based on 

queuing by national or theater sensors. Planners assumed, incorrectly, that 

intelligence would provide one to three hours’ warning of launch 

preparations, which would allow coalition forces to locate and attack the 

launch site.74 This is a classic case of “wishing away” the threat. In 

December 1990, DIA provided guidance that (1) mobile Iraqi missile 

crews were dispersed and would not require more than 60 minutes to 

launch a missile, (2) the intelligence indicators that air planners were 

relying upon to identify and target launch sites would not exist, (3) the 

Iraqis were prepared to use presurveyed sites and were taking steps to 

enhance survivability, and (4) attacking mobile launch operations would 

be very difficult, if not impossible.75 

The second mistake was more damaging because it assumed away a 

proven enemy capability. During the Iran-Iraq war, Hussein demonstrated 

time and time again that he could hit Tehran with missiles launched from 

Iraqi territory.76 The distances from Iraqi border areas are the same as 

those from the western desert to Israeli cities, and therefore it should have 
20 . . . Crossbow and Gulf War

been apparent that Iraqi mobile launchers could be utilized to conduct 

operations against Israel. Instead, airmen became focused on the fixed 

sites. This, coupled with undervaluing the mobile threat, resulted in the 

failure to consider the need for round-the-clock Scud CAPs.77 

Finally, the final fundamental planning error was made when planners 

assumed decoys and other CC&D efforts would not greatly complicate 

targeting, thereby disregarding well-known maskirovka practices.78 This 

ignored evidence gathered during prewar Air Force and Navy tests 

designed to determine the degree of difficulty aircrews would face in 

finding and destroying highly mobile targets. During Desert Storm, over 

80 percent of the Scud launches occurred at night, and the lack of success 

in locating TELs during prelaunch and postlaunch operations reiterated 

the findings from Touted Gleem.79 This test aptly demonstrated the 

difficulty U.S. aircraft, such as the F-15E, would have in finding a fielddeployed TEL. 

These critical planning assumptions proved incorrect. Because of the 

earlier miscalculation of the nature of the Iraqi threat, General Horner had 

to divert significant numbers of sorties as well as other resources away 

from their planned missions to attempt to suppress the Scud threat. This 

diversion of resources, although not hindering the accomplishment of 

other missions due to the plethora of available aircraft, did fail to clearly 

and decisively accomplish any goals established for counter-Scud efforts. 

It can be argued that the Scud was Hussein’s most effective weapon. It 

drew off significant numbers of sorties from other missions and provided 

him with his only real offensive potential.80 
Crossbow and Gulf War . . . 21 

IV. Future Considerations 

Due to the growing proliferation of SRBMs, future Air Force leaders 

will face more challenges than their predecessors. Technological 

enhancements, combined with increased employment sophistication, will 

make future counterballistic and cruise missile operations more difficult 

and will likely require even more resources. Hitler and Hussein 

effectively tied up hundreds of aircraft and thousands of sorties with small 

numbers of launchers and missiles while retaining the capability to 

threaten allied unity and strategy. Ballistic missiles offer smaller, 

resource-constrained states a cost-effective alternative to fielding large 

manned air forces. The Department of Defense’s (DOD) final report on 

the Gulf War was clear on this point: 

Locating and destroying mobile missiles proved very difficult 

and required substantially more resources than planned. This 

could be a more serious problem in the future against an enemy 

with more accurate missiles or one who uses weapons of mass 

destruction (emphasis added).81 

It is imperative that DOD and the Air Force intensify efforts to 

develop doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures for neutralizing 

enemy ballistic missiles. Our aerospace control doctrinal concepts and 

definitions need to be expanded to include both the enemy’s aviation and 

missile assets. Countering ballistic missile operations must become 

integral to our planning efforts and exercise scenarios. Dedicated TMD 

exercises such as the Roving Sands series are a step forward, but greater 

emphasis must be placed on indoctrinating TMD principles and mind-set 

throughout U.S. forces.82 By examining and comparing World War II and 

Gulf War countermissile efforts, future planners can glean the following 

insights. 

First, planners must not allow themselves to become doctrinally 

constrained when developing air campaign concepts. Even after the full 

implications of German and Iraqi missile programs were known, theater 

leadership did not fully appreciate the magnitude of the threat until after 

enemy attacks began.83 Initial countermeasures in both wars mimicked 

our approaches to neutralizing traditional air force structures; that is, they 
22 . . . Crossbow and Gulf War

focused on destroying fixed installations, including production facilities, 

launch locations, and support infrastructure. Little thought was given to 

suppressing mobile launchers. Furthermore, General Schwarzkopf’s 

reluctance to employ special forces to enter Iraq to monitor Scud 

deployments significantly undercut his abilities to influence later enemy 

operations. 

Second, countering enemy ballistic missiles is time- and resourceintensive. Future joint force commanders must recognize that gaining 

control of the battlespace requires the elimination of both aircraft and 

missiles. Future missile suppression efforts will be as resource-intensive 

as past operations, perhaps more so. Roving Sands ‘95 demonstrated this 

tactic when ballistic missile attacks consumed 17 percent of all air efforts 

over the first five days. Despite this level of effort, friendly forces 

succeeded in reducing the enemy missile infrastructure by only 40 

percent.84 

Third, the Air Force must continue to widen its concept of air 

superiority to include remotely piloted vehicles and cruise and ballistic 

missiles. The Air Force must revise the belief, as articulated by some 

theorists, that without air superiority, “victory” is not possible.85 When 

Hitler unleashed his missile assault, the Allies had mastery of the 

European skies, yet his forces launched over 15,000 missiles. Almost 50 

years later, Iraq launched Scuds after losing air supremacy. Neither the 

Germans nor the Iraqis controlled the air, yet if the Germans had disrupted 

Overlord operations or the Iraqis had succeeded in hitting an Israeli city 

with a chemical warhead, either conflict would have changed 

fundamentally. 

Aerospace control infers denying enemy aviation and missile forces 

effective use of the environment, yet Air Force doctrine continues to focus 

on countering enemy air forces as the primary method of achieving 

aerospace control. To eliminate this deficiency, Air Force doctrine must 

be broadened to incorporate TMD as contributing to aerospace control, 

especially given the increasing role of ballistic missiles in the world today. 

The latest draft of Air Force doctrine is addressing this shortfall by 

expanding the definition of air and space control to include ballistic and 

cruise missiles. But the same draft goes on to state that: 
Crossbow and Gulf War . . . 23 

offensive operations are most effective when conducted against 

theater missiles before they are launched (emphasis added) . . . 

preemptive destruction of known missiles and launch facilities 

may greatly limit subsequent theater missile attacks against 

friendly forces.86 

This makes one wonder if the author is aware of the findings for 

either Crossbow or counter-Scud operations. Although advances in 

mating sensor and computer technology have reduced, if not eliminated, 

much of the enemy’s ability to hide ballistic missile TELs, the complete 

and rapid neutralization of enemy missile forces remains unlikely. 

Prelaunch suppression of individual mobile launchers will remain a 

difficult challenge until the advent of long-dwell, all-weather sensors that 

can monitor a force once it disperses. Until then, alas, most planners will 

probably continue to rely upon the path of doctrinal dogma: If it’s easiest 

to destroy aircraft on the ground, then the same must be true for ballistic 

missiles. 

Fourth, planners must be aware that political pressures will force 

resource diversions after a threat fully materializes. A “kitchen sink 

mentality” develops to achieve immediate results. Enhancements in 

telecommunications and real-time news reporting will increase the 

pressures placed on theater commanders to halt enemy missile launches. 

This pressure will be greatest when civilian populations are at risk or the 

integrity of a political coalition is threatened. Israel demonstrated 

restraint, but only after the U.S. maintained a 24-hour Scud CAP and the 

Israelis were allowed to nominate counter-Scud targets. Imagine the 

impact counter-Scud efforts would have had on mission accomplishment 

if the U.S. had gone to war sooner. Fewer available combat, especially 

PGM-capable, aircraft; the predictable expansion of the target base; and 

the strains due to unanticipated mission requirements could have doomed 

the war effort. 

Fifth, planning assumptions matter. Faulty assumptions will corrupt 

planning and can undermine a strategy. While developing the initial 

offensive air plans for Desert Storm, planners made several flawed 

assumptions about Iraqi Scud capabilities. Unfortunately, these were 

never adjusted, and they continued to provide the basis for TMD planning 

throughout Desert Shield and Desert Storm.87 A critical mistake was 
24 . . . Crossbow and Gulf War

made by not adjusting to new intelligence. During the six months 

preceding the war, new or updated intelligence regarding Iraqi SRBM 

capabilities was almost ignored. The result was that we were caught off 

guard when Hussein initiated an asymmetrical response to coalition air 

operations, forcing fundamental changes to the Desert Storm air 

execution. 

If the Air Force is to remain the leader in air and space power, it must 

require its members to become better students of history. 

Sixth, the application of airpower must support the attainment of 

operational and national objectives, not attempt to validate Air Force 

doctrine. Although this point may seem trivial, past experiences show 

airmen can allow preconceived views of airpower employment to override 

specific instruction from higher command authorities. Despite direction to 

the contrary, warriors in both wars resisted pursuing aggressive counterSRBM strategies until ordered because they regarded these weapons as 

having little military consequence. Resistance reinforces the perception 

that airpower is more interested in justifying its own doctrine and 

independence than winning the war. 

The political process will generate pressure to shift operational 

emphasis if tactical efforts are perceived to be either ineffective or not 

contributing to “ending the war.” The media-generated drama played out 

each time a Scud was launched is an example of what the future portends. 

Planners must remain intellectually agile enough to respond to a wide 

range of contingencies while developing the mental toughness to maintain 

focus on proper mission execution. Our natural tendency is to resist 

change, but only by developing the ability to embrace change will the 

military retain its relevance. Only through rigorous planning can we learn 

to better anticipate friendly as well as enemy reactions to our actions. 

Preparation and deliberate planning before a crisis occurs are essential 

keys in maintaining a decisive edge—acquiring lessons from history or 

conducting doctrinal reflection after the crisis starts is fruitless. 

Finally, future ballistic missile suppression operations will require 

dedicated, joint efforts to be effective. Joint doctrine acknowledges this, 

and Joint Pub 3-01.5, Doctrine for Joint Theater Missile Defense (JTMD),

highlights the requirement for effective JTMD operations to integrate both 
Crossbow and Gulf War . . . 25 

offensive and defensive approaches. This is similar in many respects to 

current counterair concepts to neutralize enemy fixed-wing airpower.88

 Intelligence integration using space-based, airborne, and surface-based 

systems is critical. Fundamentally, successful TMD requires a “family of 

systems” approach combined with joint war-fighting techniques. Airborne 

Scud CAPs remain the best response to enemy missile launch operations. 

Computer integration and logic-processing enhancements provide great 

promise for enhancing launch-point estimations and queuing for terminal 

attack operations. Finally, simulations and exercises remain critical in 

testing the synchronization between sensor and shooter links. Centralized 

command and control is also critical to integrate surface and air attacks 

against mobile launcher locations. Operational staffs must understand 

how to integrate airpower with operational fires to counter enemy SRBMs. 

Proven joint war-fighting concepts such as joint suppression of enemy air 

defenses (J-SEAD) provide excellent models for future planners. 
26 . . . Crossbow and Gulf War
Crossbow and Gulf War . . . 27 

V. Conclusions 

The conduct of war is an intellectual process. Fighting battles and 

linking success to achieve operational objectives remains more art than 

science.89 There are no absolute governing principles in war. Warfare is 

too complex, too nonlinear, to describe using a series of standardized 

doctrinal checklists. As Clausewitz observed over 175 years ago, the 

practice of war is an art requiring intellectual mastery, not mindless 

observance of a series of principles or application of formulae.90 Military 

action produces not a single enemy reaction, but dynamic interactions. 

Because war is a mixture of physical and psychological activities, a 

universal theory of war that attempts to provide strict guidelines is 

unattainable. Ultimately, the study of the theory of war “is meant to 

educate the mind of the future commander, or, more accurately, to guide 

him in his self-education, not accompany him to the battlefield, just as a 

wise teacher guides and stimulates the student’s intellectual development 

but is careful not to lead him by the hand for the rest of his life.”91

Therefore, the best path to understanding the future lies in mastering the 

past. If the Air Force is to remain the leader in air and space power, it 

must require its members to become better students of history. While not 

yielding specific doctrinal templates, history does provide fertile ground 

for developing judgment. If Air Force leadership and doctrine are to 

remain reliable and relevant to the future, our understanding of history 

must prove equally as sound. 

Prejudice against innovation is a typical characteristic of an Officer Corps which has 

grown up in a well-tried and proven system. 

 —Field Marshal Erwin Rommel
28 . . . Crossbow and Gulf War
Crossbow and Gulf War . . . 29 

NOTES 

1. An example of this approach was articulated by Col John Warden, USAF, 

Retired, a leading airpower theorist, in “The Enemy as a System.” Airpower Journal 9, 

no. 1 (Spring 1995): 41–45. 

2. Michael Howard, Clausewitz (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), 32. 

3. This position has been articulated by several theorists, including John Warden. 

The fundamental underpinnings are found in Air Force Manual 1-1, Basic Aerospace 

Doctrine of the United States Air Force, vol. 1 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing 

Office, 1992), 10–11. 

4. Many states already incorporate ballistic missiles in their inventories: China, 

Egypt, India, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Libya, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Syria, 

and Yemen. By 2000, over 20 states are projected to either have SRBMs or have the 

capability to produce them. Also, despite the reduction of Iraq’s ballistic missile program, 

Baghdad is still assessed to possess a limited number of ballistic missiles. John Harvey, 

“Regional Ballistic Missiles and Advanced Strike Aircraft— Comparing Military 

Effectiveness,” International Security 17, no. 2 (Fall 1992): 41; Thomas A. Keaney and 

Eliot A. Cohen, Gulf War Air Power Survey (GWAPS) Report, vol. 2, pt. 2, Effects and 

Effectiveness (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1993), 321; Secretary of 

Defense, Annual Report to the President and Congress (Washington, D.C.: Government 

Printing Office, January 1994), 51–56; and Robert M. Soofer, “Joint Theater Missile 

Defense Strategy,” Joint Forces Quarterly, Autumn 1995, 71. 

5. Air Force Doctrine Document-1(AFDD-1), draft, “Air Force Basic Doctrine,” 

Air University, Maxwell AFB, Ala., 5 August 1995, 11. The authors correctly are 

expanding the definition of offensive counterair (OCA) to incorporate all enemy air and 

missile power, including fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles, cruise 

missiles, air defenses, and ballistic missiles. 

6. Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, eds., The Army Air Forces in World 

War II, vol. 3, Argument to V-E Day, 1944–1945 (1948; new imprint, Washington, D.C.: 

Office of Air Force History, 1983), 84. 

7. Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: Final Report to Congress (Washington, D.C.: 

Government Printing Office, 1992), 1. 

8. In both Crossbow and Desert Storm, planners employed both offensive and 

defensive missile countermeasures, although this paper only addresses offensive 

operations taken against enemy missiles. 
30 . . . Crossbow and Gulf War

9. The “V” designation originally meant Versuchmuster (experimental type), but 

was later interpreted as Vergeltungswaffe (vengeance weapon) by German propaganda 

services. 

10. Gen Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade (New York: Doubleday, 1948), 260. 

11. Craven and Cate, 527; and Richard Davis, Carl A. Spaatz and the Air War in 

Europe (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1992), 428. 

12. The focus of this article is on offensive countermeasures, but the Allies also 

poured a tremendous amount of resources into defensive measures; by the height of the 

V-1 assault, some 2,000 barrage balloons, 400 batteries of antiaircraft artillery, and 22 

squadrons were deployed to defend London. Jozef Garlinski, Hitler’s Last Weapons

(New York: Time Books, 1978), 162. 

13. Headquarters, European Theater of Operations, G-2, memorandum to the chief 

of staff, United States Army, providing all known details on German V-weapon 

programs, 13 December 1943, 4. 

14. United States Strategic Bombing Survey (USSBS), Military Analysis Division, 

V-Weapon (CROSSBOW) Campaign (Washington, D.C.: Military Analysis Division, 

1945), 4. 

15. Ibid., 2. 

16. Ibid. 

17. Eisenhower, 260; and Gen Omar Bradley, A General’s Life (New York: Simon 

& Schuster, 1983), 238. 

18. USSBS, V-Weapons (CROSSBOW) Campaign, 2. 

19. Phillip Henshall, Hitler’s Rocket Sites (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1985), 

187. 

20. Walter J. Boyne, Clash of Wings: World War II in the Air (New York: Simon 

& Schuster, 1994), 338. 

21. USSBS, V-Weapon (CROSSBOW) Campaign, 25–29. 

22. The British and Americans agreed that the “large” sites required attack by heavy 

bombers to be effective. 
Crossbow and Gulf War . . . 31 

23. The acceptance of the American approach came too late. By the time it was 

implemented, Allied ground forces had already broken out of the Normandy beachhead 

and were threatening German V-1 launch areas. 

24. Defensive operations were increasingly effective and by mid-August were 

successful in shooting down 74 percent of all V-1s crossing the coast. This improved to 

83 percent by September. F. H. Hinsley, British Intelligence in the Second World War, 

abridged edition (London: Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1984), 567. 

25. Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, 21. 

26. Gulf War Air Power Survey (GWAPS) Report: Summary Report (Washington, 

D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1993), 87. After the war, Iraq claimed it launched 93 

modified Scuds to UN authorities documenting and destroying Iraqi ballistic missile, 

nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons programs. 

27. “The Great Scud Chase” is a phrase immortalized by Gen Merrill McPeak, 

former Air Force chief of staff, at a news conference on 15 March 1991. 

28. GWAPS, vol. 1, pt. 2, Command and Control, 216–45. 

29. Ibid., 247. 

30. An example is found in GWAPS: Summary Report, 123–24. 

31. Thomas Christie and William Barlow, DESERT STORM Scud Campaign

(Washington, D.C.: Institute for Defense Analyses [IDA]), I-13. 

32. The best description of Iraqi and Iranian ballistic missile capabilities and 

employment practices was first published in 1990 in Anthony Cordesman and Abraham 

Wagner’s The Lessons of Modern War, vol. 2, The Iran-Iraq War (San Francisco: 

Westview Press, 1990). This book accompanied many CENTCOM and CENTAF staff 

officers to the gulf throughout the summer and fall of 1990. Unfortunately, most 

apparently did not read this book since it very accurately described what would become 

the cornerstone for Iraqi strategy and tactics. 

33. A third, longer-range variant, the 430-mile Al-Abbas, was not used during the 

war. Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, 13–14. 

34. GWAPS, vol. 1, pt. 1, Planning, 210–11. 

35. Richard Hallion, Storm over Iraq: Air Power and the Gulf War (Washington, 

D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1992), 178. In many cases,it required two or three 

basic Scud airframes to make a single Iraqi extended-range modified Scud missile. After 

the war, the UN Special Commission team responsible for the elimination of Iraq’s 
32 . . . Crossbow and Gulf War

weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programs verified the destruction of 

around 140 missiles. Altogether, the missiles destroyed by the UN, those fired during the 

Gulf War and the Iran-Iraq war, and those utilized to create extended-range Scud variants 

account for 570–640 Scud-B airframes. Due to the uncertainty in determining exactly 

how many Scud airframes the Iraqis had received, speculation continues that Iraq retains 

some 100–200 Scud-B airframes. GWAPS, vol. 2, pt. 2, Effects and Effectiveness, 321. 

36. Ibid., 320. 

37. The GWAPS concluded Iraqi Scud strategies remained uncertain in the months 

prior to the war. However, review of the Gulf War Collection, Air Force Historical 

Research Agency (AFHRA), Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, reveals multiple 

assessments were made by a variety of national and theater intelligence agencies 

concerning Iraqi basing and employment philosophies, including launching procedures 

and time requirements. Virtually all the assessments, especially those by Defense 

Intelligence Agency (DIA), stated there was little uncertainty that Hussein would employ 

ballistic missiles against regional population centers, including Israel, if coalition military 

action was taken to liberate Kuwait. The threat was taken so seriously that much of the 

discussion focused upon an Iraqi preemptive option. 

38. General Horner predicted to Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney in December 

1990 that the air campaign would “preclude” Iraqi missile attacks. GWAPS, vol. 2, pt. 1, 

Operations, 182. 

39. Air Force Intelligence Agency (AFIA/INID), Denial and Deception Digest, 91-

02, 12 February 1991; and Christie and Barlow, I-18. Air Force Historical Research 

Agency (AFHRA), Gulf War Collection. 

40. During the war, allied aircrews claimed some 80 mobile launcher kills, yet the 

postconflict Gulf War Air Power Survey (GWAPS) concluded there was no evidence the 

coalition destroyed any mobile launchers and most, if not all, of the kills were actually 

against high-fidelity decoys or other vehicles bearing a similar signature. GWAPS:

Summary Report, 83–90. 

41. For the two best examples of critics of the intelligence community who contend 

the underestimation of the number of mobile launchers constituted an intelligence 

“failure,” see Hallion, 179; and James A. Winnefeld, Preston Niblack, and Dana J. 

Johnson’s A League of Airmen: U.S. Air Power in the Gulf War (Santa Monica, Calif.: 

RAND, 1994), 132. These authors contend the number of launchers possessed by the 

Iraqis was closer to 225, but neither presents any evidence to support this contention. 

42. In addition to the initial estimates sanctioned by the U.S. intelligence 

community, several rumors were circulating around Washington during August 1990 

suggesting Iraq might possess several hundred, if not thousands, of mobile launchers. 

This highlights the difficulty planners can face during crisis periods in acquiring accurate 
Crossbow and Gulf War . . . 33 

and reliable information. Author’s interview with several members of Checkmate and 

the Black Hole, 25–29 March 1996 and 15 May 1996. 

43. Sources used include data acquired by the UN inspection teams, intelligence 

collected during the war, and defector reporting. The GWAPS concluded the Iraqis started 

the war with a total mobile launcher inventory in the high twenties to mid-thirties. Ibid., 

ix, GWAPS, vol. 2, pt. 2, Effects and Effectiveness, 320–22, and GWAPS: Summary 

Report, 87. 

44. These estimates are contained in the AFHRA, Gulf War Collection, CIS-37–

CIS-44. 

45. Michael Gordon and Bernard Trainor, The General’s War: The Inside Story of 

the Conflict in the Gulf (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 1995), 228–33. 

46. GWAPS, vol. 1, pt. 1, Planning, 103. 

47. Ibid., 103–4; and Gordon and Trainor, 229. 

48. Colin Powell with Joseph E. Persico, My American Journey (New York: 

Random House, 1995), 510–11. 

49. Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, 19. 

50. Ibid., 73. 

51. Ibid. 

52. Ibid., 74. 

53. GWAPS, vol. 1, pt. 1, Planning, 165–66. 

54. James Coyne, Air Power in the Gulf (Arlington, Va.: Air Force Association, 

1992), 55. 

55. Planners made the mistaken assumption during the construction of Instant 

Thunder, the predecessor to the Desert Storm air campaign, that if the fixed Scud sites 

were neutralized,the threat to Israel would be diminished. Theater planners later 

recognized the potential role mobile launchers could play but believed the resources 

necessary to reduce this threat would exceed expected gains. AFHRA, Gulf War 

Collection, Maxwell AFB, Ala., File CHSH-5 (Instant Thunder briefing), 8; and author’s 

interviews with former Black Hole planners, 15 May 1996. 

56. GWAPS: Summary Report, 43. 
34 . . . Crossbow and Gulf War

57. GWAPS, vol. 1, pt. 1, Planning, 166. 

58. AFHRA, Gulf War Collection, 17August 1990 CENTCOM/ CENTAF briefing 

to CJCS on the nature and capabilities of the Iraqi ballistic missile threat. 

59. Ibid.; GWAPS: Summary Report, 43. 

60. The degree to which Washington worried about Scuds more than theater 

leadership became evident in October when Joint Chiefs of Staff planners, at the 

insistence of Secretary Cheney, considered placing ground forces in suspected Scud 

launching areas that threatened Israel. Although discarded, this concept resurfaced in 

December. GWAPS, vol. 1, pt. 1, Planning, 103. 

61. Ibid., 214. 

62. Ibid., 219. 

63. Hallion, 186. 

64. GWAPS: Summary Report, 65. 

65. GWAPS, vol. 2, pt. 2, Effects and Effectiveness, 330. 

66. Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, 159. 

67. Douglas C. Waller, The Commandos (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), 

346–51. 

68. These are the measures employed by GWAPS to judge overall effectiveness. 

GWAPS: Summary Report, 78–90. 

69. Despite the lack of technical evidence, based on the number of attacks and 

analysis of postwar intelligence, it is likely a limited number of TELs were destroyed. 

GWAPS, vol. 2, pt. 2, Effects and Effectiveness, 340. Coalition crews reported destroying 

about 80 TELs and special forces another 20. Most reports probably reflected the results 

of a highly effective Iraqi CC&D effort and attacks against misfortunate Iraqi fuel tanker 

trucks that possessed “Scud-like” signatures. GWAPS: Summary Report, 83. 

70. GWAPS: Summary Report, 88; and Waller, 346–48. 

71. GWAPS, vol. 2, pt. 2, Effects and Effectiveness, 321–23. 

72. GWAPS: Summary Report, 32. 
Crossbow and Gulf War . . . 35 

73. AFHRA, Gulf War Collection, File CHSH-5, INSTANT THUNDER briefing 

to president. 

74. GWAPS: Summary Report, 79. 

75. AFHRA, Gulf War Collection, DIA message to USCINCCENT responding to 

CENTCOM’s request for information (RFI) concerning Iraqi Scud capabilities and 

operations, 7 December 1990. 

76. According to Iranian sources, 71 percent of the modified Scuds launched by 

Iraq during the “War of the Cities” fell on Tehran. GWAPS, vol. 2, pt. 2, Effects and 

Effectiveness, 319. 

77. Black Hole planners claimed they began to recognize the threat presented by 

mobile launchers, but considered the resource implications for utilizing Scud CAPs at the 

start of the air campaign as too high in comparison with anticipated results. Author’s 

interview with Black Hole planners, 15 May 1996; and GWAPS: Summary Report, 43. 

78. Maskirovka is the Soviet-developed practice of using the aggregate measures of 

camouflage, concealment, masking, and deception to mislead and complicate adversary 

efforts to understand and counter friendly plans and capabilities. The Iraqis adopted a 

series of active and passive protection efforts, combined with an aggressive security 

program, to complicate the adversary’s efforts to effectively target Iraqi military 

capabilities. Planners did not expect decoys to exist in such large numbers, nor did they 

expect the level of fidelity the Iraqis created. GWAPS, vol. 2, pt. 2, Effects and 

Effectiveness, 54–55; GWAPS: Summary Report, 79; and author’s interviews with 

Checkmate and Black Hole planners, 25–29 March 1996 and 15 May 1996. 

79. A prewar test, code-named Touted Gleem, demonstrated conclusively that F111F, F-15E, and LANTIRN-equipped F-16 fighters had less than a 50 percent chance of 

acquiring the Scud TEL even when the aircrews had precise target coordinates. TELs 

proved “virtually impossible to find” if the missile was not erect. This trend continued 

during the war when on 42 separate occasions, pilots visually observed a launch, yet in 

only eight cases were aircrews able to maintain visual to allow them to employ weapons. 

GWAPS, vol. 2, pt. 2, Effects and Effectiveness, 335. 

80. GWAPS, vol. 1, pt. 2, Command and Control, 190. 

81. Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, 188. 

82. Roving Sands is an annual Joint Staff-directed exercise focused on theater 

ballistic missile defense operations, including operations designed to offensively explore 

ways to neutralize enemy ballistic capabilities. 
36 . . . Crossbow and Gulf War

83. As late as February 1944, General Spaatz was convinced the V-weapons 

associated construction was a German hoax designed to cause panic and drain resources. 

Richard Davis, Carl A. Spaatz and the Air War in Europe (Washington, D.C.: 

Smithsonian Institution Press, 1992), 426–32. 

84. Ronald R. Fogleman, “Theater Ballistic Missile Defense,” Joint Forces 

Quarterly, Autumn 1995, 75–79. 

85. This is one of John Warden’s central themes in The Air Campaign: Planning for 

Combat (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1988). To disprove this 

theory, my faculty advisor was fond of saying, “Gee, I wish they would have told that to 

Ho Chi Minh.” 

86. AFDD-1, 12. 

87. Ibid., 321–22. 

88. Joint Pub 3-01.5 is composed of four integrated operations: passive missile 

defense, friendly efforts to minimize the effects of enemy missiles; active missile 

defense, intercept operations; attack operations, offensive efforts to neutralize enemy 

launch capabilities; and command, control, communications: computers, and intelligence 

capabilities to coordinate all friendly JTMD efforts. Joint Pub 3-01.5, Doctrine for Joint

Theater Missile Defense (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 30 March 

1994). 

89. Both Hitler and Hussein used ballistic missiles in an attempt to achieve their 

strategic aims; however, each executed poor employment strategy. Hitler failed because 

he focused on the wrong targets; had he attacked the English ports supporting the 

invasion instead of London, he could have disrupted the invasion. Hussein never 

attempted to launch a mass attack to maximize the shock effect of missiles. Had he struck 

Tel Aviv with a massed Scud attack, Israel probably would have had to respond 

militarily. 

90. Peter Paret, Clausewitz and the State (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976), 371. 

91. Ibid. 
Crossbow and Gulf War . . . 37

USAF Counterproliferation Center 

 The USAF Counterproliferation Center was established in 1999 to provide 

education and research to the present and future leaders of the USAF, to assist them in 

their activities to counter the threats posed by adversaries equipped with weapons of mass 

destruction 

Barry R. Schneider, Director 

USAF Counterproliferation Center 

325 Chennault Circle 

Maxwell AFB AL 36112-6427 

Email: Barry.Schneider@maxwell.af.mil

Jo Ann Eddy, Associate Editor 

The Counterproliferation Papers 

Email: JoAnn.Eddy@maxwell.af.mil

(334) 953-7538 (DSN 493-7538) 
38 . . . Crossbow and Gulf War