* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of

law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of

orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and

conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

Filed 6/28/96TENTH CIRCUIT

SAMUEL GUTIERREZ,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

DEMING PUBLIC SCHOOLS,

Defendant-Appellee.

Case No. 95-2277

(D.C. CV 95-915 HB/LCS)

(District of New Mexico)

 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

 

Before BRORBY, EBEL, and HENRY, Circuit Judges.

 

Plaintiff-appellant Samuel Gutierrez appeals in forma pauperis from the dismissal

of his employment discrimination action against defendant-appellee Deming Public

Schools. Mr. Gutierrez alleges that the appellee denied him employment on the basis of

his sex and his disability. The issue on appeal is whether the district court erred in

dismissing these claims on the ground that Mr. Gutierrez failed to respond to the
1 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined that

oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P.

34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.

2 The Rules of the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico were

amended effective January 1, 1996. See D.N.M.LR-Civ. (1996). The relevant rule is now Rule

7.5(b), which for the purposes of this case has the same effect as the old Rule 7.8. See

D.N.M.LR-Civ. 7.5(b) (1996).

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorize the district courts to make local rules that

are consistent with Acts of Congress and the Federal Rules themselves. Fed. R. Civ. P. 83(a)(1).

2

appellee's motion to dismiss. We affirm.1

Mr. Gutierrez, a sometime substitute teacher in the Deming, New Mexico, school

system, filed this action pro se claiming that he was denied employment as a full-time

instructional assistant on the basis of his sex and his disability, which he characterized

as "Nervous Condition and Panic Disorder." Rec. doc. 1 (Charge of Discrimination). In

response, the appellee filed a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), asserting

that Mr. Gutierrez had failed to state a claim of discrimination upon which relief could

be granted. A copy of the motion to dismiss was served to Mr. Gutierrez on the date on

which it was filed, September 14, 1995. After Mr. Gutierrez failed to respond to the

motion, Deming Public Schools moved the court on November 2, 1995, to dismiss

pursuant to the applicable Local Rule, which stated that “[a] failure to file a brief . . . in

opposition to any motion shall constitute a consent to . . . grant the motion.” D.N.M.LRCiv. 7.8 (1992).2

The district court found that the appellee had informed Mr. Gutierrez by letter of

the appellee’s intent to seek dismissal for failure to respond to the motion dismiss. Rec.
3Under the amended rules, a response is now due within fourteen calendar days after

service of a motion. D.N.M.LR-Civ. 7.6(a) (1996). Applying either version of the rules, Mr.

Gutierrez’ case was not dismissed until well beyond the time allowed for filing a response.

3

doc. 7 at 1. Despite this notice, Mr. Gutierrez failed to respond. On November 22,

1995, the district court dismissed the action, holding that Mr. Gutierrez' "extended and

unexplained failure to respond to Defendant Deming Public School's Motion to Dismiss,

despite specific notice of his failure, constitutes a consent to entry of dismissal of his

claims . . . ." Id. at 2.

On appeal, Mr. Gutierrez reiterates his claims of discrimination and asserts that

"it wasn't mandatory to reply" to the motion to dismiss. Rec. doc. 8 at 1. Contrary to

this assertion, however, a response was required “within ten (10) days after service of

the motion.” D.N.M.LR-Civ. 7.5 (1992).3 According to our cases, only when the

district court has abused it discretion will we reverse its decision to dismiss an action for

failure to respond to a motion to dismiss. See Meade v. Grubbs, 841 F.2d 1512, 1520

n.5, 1522 (10th Cir. 1988). This court has previously identified three criteria to consider

in reviewing a dismissal for failure to file a response: "(1) the degree of actual prejudice

to the defendant; (2) the amount of interference with the judicial process; and (3) the

culpability of the litigant." Miller v. Department of Treasury, 934 F.2d 1161, 1162 (10th

Cir. 1991) (citing Hancock v. City of Oklahoma City, 857 F.2d 1394, 1396 (10th Cir.

1988)), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1111 (1992). In this case, Mr. Gutierrez' failure to

respond to the motion to dismiss, even after having been notified by the appellee that
4

such failure would result in dismissal of his claims, was further aggravated by his failure

to supply the court with any reason or excuse for this omission.

Mr. Gutierrez complains that he was denied his “day in court.” Aplt’s Br. at 3. 

But the record reflects that he chose himself not to respond to the appellee's motion to

dismiss. See Aple’s Br. at 5. The court cannot help litigants who completely and

without excuse fail to help themselves. We cannot conclude under these circumstances

that the court's order of dismissal was an abuse of its discretion.

The dismissal is AFFIRMED. The mandate shall issue forthwith.

Entered for the Court,

Robert H. Henry

Circuit Judge