### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT KNOXVI LLE A ssi gne d on Br ie fs N ove m be r 29, 200 5
ROB ERT MIC HAE L WINT ERS v. S TAT E OF TEN NES SEE

Direc t Appeal from the Cr im inal Cou rt for Ham ilton Coun ty

No. 253857 Rebec ca Ster n, Jud ge

No. E2005-01349-CC A-R3- P C - F iled Dece m ber 20, 2005

Th e pe tit ion e r, Robert Mi cha e l Win te rs , a pp e a ls the su mma

ry dis mis sa l of

his pe tit ionfo r p os tconviction re lief. The sing le issue on appe al is whether the petition was ti mely filed. The judg ment is affirme d. Tenn. R. App . P . 3; Judgme nt of th e Trial Court is Aff irm ed

G AR Y R. W ADE , P.J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which J OS EP H M. T I PTON and T HOMAS T. W O O D A LL , J J ., joined.
Robert Winters, Cli fton, Tenne ssee, pr o se.
Paul G. Summers, A ttorney Gene ral & Reporter ; and Renee W. Turner, Assistant Attorney Gene ral for the a ppellee, State of

Tenne ssee.
OP IN ION

I n 2000, the petitioner wa s convicted of first deg ree preme ditated murder , felony murder, and
a g g r a v a t e d r o b b e r y a s t h e r e s u l to f t h e s h o o t i n g d e a t h o f

V e r n i s e S h e f

f i e l d , w h o w a s k i l l e d b y a single g unshot wound to the head. The trial court imposed c oncurr ent sentenc es of life and twelve y ear s for the f

irst deg ree preme ditated murder and agg ravated robbery

convictions, respe ctively . On direc t appea l, this court reve rsed the c onviction for first deg ree preme ditated murder but affirmed the convictions for a g g ravated robbe ry and fe lony

murder. State v. Winters, 137 S.W.3d 641 (Tenn. Cr im. Ap p. 20 03 ). On Ma rc h 2 2, 20 04 , o ur

su prem e cou rt de nie d a

pp lic a tio n f

or pe rm iss ionto appea l. On April 20, 2005, the pe titioner filed a pe ti t i o n for post-conviction relief. While the petitioner acknowledg ed in the petit ion that more than one y ear had passed since the final ac tion of
ou r s up re me c ou rt , he e xpla ine d tha t hi s ta rd ine ss w a s th e re su lt o f h is t ri a l c ou ns e l' s f

a ilu re " to f

ull y g ive all prope r docume ntation for further a ppeals or revie w." The petitioner alleg ed, among other g rounds, that he had been denied the eff ective assistance of counsel at trial. His primary assertion-2-

was that h i s t ri al counse l was def icient by rec ommending that he re ject the state ' s offe r of a

plea
a g re e me nt i nv olv ing a fi ft e e n- y e ar se nte nc e
. Th e pe tit ion e r a sse rt e d th a t he ha d b e e n d ill ig e nt i n h is pr e pa ratio ns fo r f

ili ng the po st- c on vic tio n p e tit ion a nd sp e c if ic a lly blame d his f

a ilu re to t ime ly

fi le
on "hi s p revi ou s at to rney[ who ] has been qu it e un wi ll in g to p rov id e hi s p aper wor k. "

On Ma y 9, 20 05 , th e po st- c on vic tio n c ou rt ru le d th a t th e pe tit ion wa s b arr e d b y the statut e of limitations. The trial court pointed out that neither ignorance of the s tatute of limitations nor the failure on the part of trial counse l to provide a c opy of his fi le qualified a s exceptions to the rule. Br own v. State, 928 S.W.2d 453, 455 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996); State v. Phil lips, 904 S .W.2d 123, 124 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995)

. The post-conviction court also ruled that it had no authority to gr ant the petitioner a n extension of tim e within which to file the pe tition for post-conviction relief

. I n th is a pp e a l, the pe tit ion e r a

rg ue s th a t hi s p e tit ionsh ou ld b e c on sid e re d ti me ly fi le d b e c aus e he believe d April 22, 2004, to be the date our supreme court denied his application for pe rmission to appea l

. I t is his pos ition that if allowed to proce ed on his claims, which include ineffe ctive assistance of counse l, newly discovere d evidenc e, prose cut o ri al vindictiveness, er roneous jury instructions, and the admission of fa lse evidenc e at t ri al , h e would be e ntitled to relief. I n an acc ompany ing a ffidavit, the pe titione r s t at es t h at he had not rec eived a ny notice fr om his prior counsel or the supreme c ourt cler k reg arding the final a ction of our supre me court and contende d that the state wo uldno t su ff

e r p re jud ic e if he we re g rante d a n e xce pti on to the statut e of lim itatio ns
. Th e orig ina l Post- Con vic tio n Pr oc e du re Ac t of 19 67 didno t in c lud e a

statut e of lim itatio ns
. On J uly 1, 1986, the Gene ral Asse mbly adopted a

three -y ear

statute of limitations. S ee T enn. Code Ann. § 40-30-102 ( repe aled 1995) . I n 1995, our l egi slature pa ssed the new Post-Convi ction Pr oc e d u r e A c t , w h i c h i s ap p l i c ab l e t o a l l p e t i t i o n s f i l e d a f t e r M a y 1 0 , 1 9 9 5 , a n d p r ov ide s, in pe rt ine nt p art , a s f

oll ow s: (a) Ex cept a s provided in subsections (b) and (c) , a per son in custody under
a se nte nc e of

a c ou rt of thi s st a te mus t pe tit ionfo r p os t- c on vic tio n r e lie f un de r this pa rt wi thi n o ne (1 ) y e ar o f the date of the fi na l a c tio n of th e hig he st s ta te app e llate court to which a n appeal is taken or, if no appe al is taken, within one (1) y ear of the date on which the judgme nt be came final, or consideration of such petition shall be barr ed. The statute of limit ations shall not be tolled f or any rea son, includin g any tolling or saving provision otherwise a vailable at law or e qui t y
. T i m e i s of the
essenc e of the rig ht to file a petition for post-c onviction relief or motion to reopen established by

this chapter, and the one-y ear limit ations period is an element of the ri g ht t o f ile su c h a n a c tio n a nd is a

c on dit ion up on its e xer c ise . E xce pt a s sp e c if ic a lly provided in s u b s ec t i o n s (b) a nd (c) , the rig ht to file a petition for post-c onviction relief or a motion to reope n under this c hapter shall be exti ng uished upo n the expiration of the limit ations period.I n 2003, t h e Pos t

- Conv i ct i on Proc edu r e Act wa s r en u mber ed wi t h i n t h e Code. I t n ow appe ar s a t s ec t i on s 40- 1 30- 101 t h r ou g h 40- 30- 122.
-3- Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 30-102(a ) (2003) (empha sis added). 1

Rul e 2( G) of

the Te nn e sse e Rul e s o f P os t- Con vic tio n Pr oc e du re g ov e rn s f ili ng s: Papers r equire d or permitted to be file d by the rules of

post-conviction proce dure, when filed by an attorney or a pro se petitioner who is not incarc erated,
are fi le d w he n r e c e ive d b y the c le rk of c ou rt

. I f pape rs re quired or pe rmitted to be filed by these rules are prepa red by or on behalf of a pr o se petitioner incar cer ated in a corr ectional fac ility and ar e not re ceive d by the c le rk of the c ou rt un til a ft e r the tim e fi xedfo r f ili ng , f ili ng sh a ll b e tim e ly

if the pape rs we re de liv e re d to the app ro pria te ind ivi du a l a t th e c or re c tio na l f

a c ili ty within the time f

ix ed for filing.

. . . Should timeliness of filing or ser vice be come a n iss ue , the b urde n is on the pr o s e pe tition e r t o e sta bli sh c omp lia nc e wi th this provision. Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 28 § 2(G) (empha sis added). Similarly , T en n essee Rule of Criminal Procedure 49 (c ) p ro vid e s, in p e rt ine nt p art , a s f oll ow s:
I f pape rs re quired or pe rmitted t o be filed pur suant to the rules of c riminal p r o c e d u r e ar e p r e p a

r e d b y o r o n b e h a lf

o f a p r o s e li ti g a n t i n c arc era ted i n a c or re c tio na l f

a c ili ty a ndare no t re c e ive d by the c le rk of the c ou rt un til a ft e r the tim e fi xedfo r f

ili ng , f ili ng sh a ll b e tim e ly

if the pa pe rs we re de liv e re d to th e app ro pria te i n d i v i d u al at t h e c o rr ec t i o n al fa ci l i t y wi t h i n t h e t i m e f

i x ed fo r f i l i n g. Tenn. R. Crim. P. 49(c) (e mphasis added)

. Tenne ssee Code A n n o tated sec tion 40-30-102 establishes whe n a court may consider a petition filed outside the statutory limit ations period: (b ) N o c ou rt

sh a ll ha ve jurisd ic tio n to con sid e r a pe tit ion fi le d af te r s uc h ti me un le ss: (1) The claim in the petition is based upon a final ruling of an a ppellate c ourt establishing a constitutional rig ht that w as not rec og nized as exi sting at the time of trial, if re trospective a

pplication of that rig ht is required. . . . ; (2) T h e cl aim in the petition is based upon new sc ientific evide nce establishing that such petitio n er i s actua lly innocent of the offe nse or of fense s for which the pe titioner was convic ted; or (3) The claim asserted in the petition s ee ks relief from a se ntence that was enhanc ed bec ause of

a pre vious conviction and such conviction in the case in which-4-

the claim is asserted was not a g uiltyplea with an a g ree d sentenc e, and theprevious conviction has subseque ntly been he ld to be invalid.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 30-102(b) (2003).

I n B ur fo rdv. Sta te , 8 45 S.W. 2d20 4, 20 8 ( Te nn . 199 2) , our su pr e me c ou rt he ld that in c e rt a in situatio ns app lic a tio n o f the statut e of lim it ati on s in a

po st- c on vic tio n p ro c e e din g mig ht v iol a te constitutional due proce ss. I n determining whe ther ther e has be en such a violation, the essential qu e sti on is w he the r the tim e perio d all owe d b y la w p ro vid e s th e pe tit ion e r a fair a ndre a so na

ble opportunity

to file suit. I d. I n Bu rf

o rd , t h e petiti oner c ould not have filed w ithin the three-y ear limit ation absent a

determination on his prior post-conviction petition. Our supre me court ruled that Bur ford was "c aug ht in a proce dural trap and unable to initiate litigation . . . despite the a pproac h of the three -y ear

limit ation." I d.

More r ece ntly , in Wi lliams v. S tate, 44 S.W.3d 464 (Tenn. 2001), our supr eme c ourt held that stric t app lic a tio n o f the statut e of lim itatio ns to c a se s in wh ic h a pe tit ion e r h a s b e e n u nil a te ra lly de prive d o f the op po rtun ity to se e k s e c on d- tie r r e vie w o f h is c on vic tio ns mig ht v iol a te du e pr oc e ss. I d. at 47 1. Willi a ms' s a tto rn e y fi le d a mot ion to w ith dr a w a s c ou ns e l so me nin e mon ths a ft e r h is convictions wer e af

firmed by this court. His motion included an asse rtion that he had timely sent a notification of the dispositi on of the a ppeal but later

learned that W i l l i am s did not rece ive the notification. Counsel then as k ed fo r addit ional time within which to file an applica tion for permission to appea l to the supreme c ourt. The r equest wa s denied a s untimely

. Wil liams then filed
a pr o s e pe tit ion fo r p os t- c on vic tio n re lie f ou tsi de the on e -y e ar statut e of lim itatio ns . O ur

su pr e me court rule d that "due proce ss considerations may have tolled the r

unning of the statute of limitations for f iling a post-c onviction petition" and r emande d the case "for an evidentiary hearing to de termine the circ umstances surr ounding [Wil liams's] filing of his post-conviction petition." I d. at 467.

I n Wil lia ms, ou r h ig h c ou rt e mph a size d that a n atto rn e y ' s mi sr e pr e se ntatio n, a s o pp os e d to
m er e n egl i gen ce , co u l d re s u l ti n d u e p ro ce s s t o l l i n g. I d

. at 4 6 8 -7 1

. I td et er m i n ed t h at "an at t o rn ey 's misrepre sentation . . . would also be bey ond a defe ndant' s control" and could pre clude the de fenda nt fr om i nd e pe nd e ntl y

se e kin g re lie f. I d. a t 46 9. Spe c if ic a lly , th e c ou rt

c on c lud e d th a t " [i]f Wi lli a ms was unde r the impression t h at a R u l e 11 application was pending during this ti me, then he w as prec luded from a cting pro se to pursue post-conviction re lief while pre sumably being repr esente d by cou n s el

. " I d. at 471. Our supr eme c ourt observe d that "[t]he question, then, is whether the appellee was, in fa ct, misled to believe that c ounsel was c ontinuing t h e appea ls process, ther eby
re qu ir ing the tol lin g of

the lim itatio ns pe ri od ." I d. Th e lim itatio ns pe ri odis t oll e d " du ri ng [the ] time when the [petitioner] was unable to se ek [post-conviction] relief." I d. at 464. Our supreme court denied the petitioner' s application for permission to appea l on March 22, 2004. Any

petition for pos t-conviction relief was, there fore , due to be filed on or bef ore Ma rch 22, 2005. The pe titioner' s signature on t h e p ro s e petiti on was notarized on Dece mber 30, 2004; ho we ve r, the pe tit ion e r d oe s n ot c la im to ha ve pr e se nte d the pe tit ionto the a tte sti ng no tary pu bli c for f iling. More over, unde r P ost-Conviction Procedur e R ule 2(G) and Tennessee Rule of Criminal-5-

Pr oc e du re 49 , th e fi lin g wo uldha ve be e n ti me ly on ly if the no tary

pu bli c we re the " app ro pria te individual at the corr ectional fac ility " to r ece ive it f or mailing. The petitioner did not alleg e that he intended for

the notary

to mail the petition at the time of his signing . Thus, the petition was untimely

. Furthermore , the petitioner has alleg ed none of the statutory exceptions to the one-y ear statute of limitations and it i s our view that none apply . See Te nn. Code An n. § 40-30-102( b) (2003). In conseque nce, the trial court pr operly dismiss ed the pe tition.

Acc ording ly , the judg ment is affirme d.

___________________________________ GARY R. WADE, PRES I DING JUDGE