1 The rel evant porti ons of this st atute provi de as follo ws: (a) Voluntary dismissal; effect : 295 Ga. 574 FINAL C OPY S14F0321. REED v. REED. HUNSTEIN, Justice. We grante d the di scretionary appl ication of App ellant Stanley L. Reed (Husband) pu rsuant t o our Rule 34 (4) in this divorce and alimony case. We affirm the tria

l court’s order gra

nting a final divorc e betw een Hus band and Appellee Cynthia B. Re ed (Wife) under the right-for-any-rea son rule because, although the tria l court erred by not dism issing Husb and’s divorce complaint, the Wife’s c ounterc la im for divorce remaine d pending fo r indepe ndent adjudication

. On August 26, 2011, Husband, proceeding pro se, filed a complaint f

or divorce from Wife. On

October 3, 201 1, Wife respon ded to the c ompla int and filed a count ercla

im for divorce. On Februa ry 2, 2012 , Husba

nd filed a voluntary dismis sal of

his co mp laint pu

rsuant to OCGA § 9-11-41 (b), which he later ame nded, e xplaining

that the dismis sal wa s pursu ant to OCGA § 9-11-41 (a) (1). 1(1) By plaintiff; by stipul a tion . Subje ct to the pr ovisions of subsection

(e) of C ode Secti on 9-11-23, Code Sec tion 9-11-66 , and any statute , an actio n may

be dismissed by

the plainti ff, wi thout order or perm ission of co urt: (A) B y filing a writt en notice o f dism iss al at an y tim e before the first wi tness is sw orn; or (B) By

filing a stipula tion of dism iss al signed by

all parti es who have appea

red in the a ction. (2) By order of court . Excep t as provide d in paragr aph (1) of this subsection, an action

shall not be dismissed upon the plaintiff's motion except upon order of the cour

t and upon the

term s and conditi ons as the court deems proper. If a counterclaim has been plea ded by a defenda

nt prior to the ser vice upon him or her of the

plaintiff 's mo tion to dismis s, the action sha ll not be dism issed against the defendant 's objec tionunless t he counterc laim can rem ain pending f

or independ ent adjud

ication b y the court. (3) Effect

. A dismissal under this subsection is without prejudice, except that the filing of a second not ice of dismissal operates as an adjudica tion upon the m

erits. (b) Involuntary dismissal; effect thereof . F or failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or t o comp lywith this c hapter or any or der of court, a defendant may

move for dismissal of an action or of any claim against him. After

the plainti ff, in

an action t

ried by the court without a jury, has completed the pre sen tation of hi s evidence , the def endant, without waiving hi s right

to offer evidencein the even

t the m otion

is not granted, may

move f or dismissal on theground that upon the

facts an d the law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. The court as t rier of t he facts may then determine the facts and render j udgment agai nst the plaintiff or may decline to render

any j udgmen

t until the c lose of

all the e vidence. The eff

ect of dism

issals shal l be as fol lows: (1) A dis missa l for f ailure of the plainti ff to prose cute does no t operate as a n adjudica tionupon the m erits; and ( 2) An y o ther dism

issal under

this subsection

and any dis missa l not provide d for in this Code section, other than a dismis sal for la ck of jur isdiction or

for im proper ve nue or for lack of an indispensabl e party , does oper ate as an adjudica

tion upon t

h e merits unless the court in its order for dismissal specifies otherw ise.

. . . 2 After Wife fi led a no tice of hearin g on her c ounterclaim, Husb and filed3

a motion s eeking a

dismis sal or c ontinuanc e, explain ing that h e had a lready voluntari ly dism

issed the caseand tha

t the trial c ourt did not have jur isdicti on

over the counterclaim . The court denied Husba nd’s moti on fo r dismi ssal or continuance. After a hea

ring, the court e ntered a tem

porary order awarding Wife onehalf of Husban d’s milit ary re tirem ent pay a nd attorne y fee s. Des pite Hus band’s continued motions and prote sts to the court tha t he had voluntarily dismissed his complaint, the cou

rt refuse d to dism iss Husba nd’s com plaint and entered a final order gra nting a di vorce be tween

the par ties on A pril 4, 201 3. In our order g

ranting H usband’s di screti onary a

pplica tion to appea l the judgme ntand dec ree of d ivorce, the Cour t direc ted thepartie s to addre ss

w hether a t imely objec tion was posed to t he volunta

ry dismissal of

the complaint, and if not , whet her thecourt e rre d i n failin g to dism iss the action, inclu ding the cou ntercl aim. 1. OCGA § 9-11-41 (a) (1) provides that a plaintiff may volu ntaril y dismis s his casewithout or der or permission of

the court by fil ing (1) a writ ten notice of dismissal at any time before the firs t witne ss is swor n or (2) a stipula tion

of dismissal si gned by all parti es who have appeared i n the ac tion

.4

A plainti ff ma

y also d ismiss his cas e by orde

r of the c ourt and upo n the terms and conditions that the court deem s proper. OC GA § 9- 11-41 (a) ( 2). Furthermore, “[i]f a

counter claim has been pleade d by a de fendant prior to the service upon him or he

r of the pl aintiff

's moti on to dism iss, the ac tion shal l not be dismissed against the de fendant's objection unle ss th e counterclaim can remain pending for

indepen dent

adjudic ation by

the cou rt.” I d. Thus, although

a plaintiff may volu ntarily dismiss his complaint, when a defe ndant has file d a counterclaim

or defe nsive ple adings se eking af firma tive or ot

he r relie f, dismissal of a pla intiff’s c ompla int requires mo re scrutiny. See Avnet, Inc. v. Wyl e Labo ratories, Inc. , 265 Ga. 716 (1) (461 SE2d 865) (1995); Moore v. Moore , 253 Ga . 211, 212 ( 317 SE2d 529) ( 1984). Merely filing a counter claim is insuffi cient t o prevent

the dism issal of the plainti ff’s compl aint an d the counter claim. Avnet , 265 Ga. at 718. In stead, a defenda ntmust object to the plaintiff’s v oluntary dismis sal, t

hereby providing notice to the plaintiff that he intends to pursue his counterclaim. D.P.S. Indus., Inc. v. Safeco Ins. Co. o f America , 210 Ga. A pp. 289, 29 0 (435 SE2d 762 ) (1993). A defe ndant’s fa

ilure to object to th e plaintiff’s dismissal will result in the dismis sal of bot

h the plainti ff’s complai nt and the def endan t’s co unter claim.5

Mize v . First C itize ns Bank &Trust Co

. , 297 Ga . App. 6, 7-8 (676 SE2d 402) (2009) (“‘a

defenda nt must object

to a plainti ff's volunta

ry dismissal, pursuant t o OCGA § 9-11-41, to preser ve a c ounterc laim

capa ble of ind epende nt adjudic ation, and to prov ide pla intiff with notice that it intends to pursue its counterclaim ’”); Hardwick-Mor rison Co. v. May land , 206 Ga. App. 426 (4 25 SE2d 416) (19 92); see also Newsom v. New som , 257 Ga . 238 (356 SE 2d 883) (1987). After the defen dant obj ects, the cou rt must then de term ine whe ther the counterclaim

or “the claim

seekin g . . . affirm ative relief can re main p ending for indepen dent

adjudic ation by

the court once the main claim has b een dismissed.” Avnet , 265 Ga. at 718. I f the counterclaim can remain pending for indepen dent adjudica t ion, then the

trial c ourt mus t dismi ss the pla intiff’s c ompla int and proceed with the

case on the defendan t’s counterclai m. See id.; Weaver v. Reed , 282 Ga. A

pp. 831, 83 3-834 (640 SE 2d 351) (2006). On the ot her hand, if the counterclaim

cannot rema

in pend ing for

indepen dent adj udication, the n the court may not dism iss the plaintiff ’s complaint ov er the def endant’ s objec tion. See OC GA § 9-11-4 1 (a) (2). In this case, we

must first determine whether Wife objec ted to Husband’ s6

dismissal. Wife doe s not disput e that she did n ot file a forma l objec tion. Howeve r, “a defen dant ma y som etim es pres erve hi s counte rclai m through action s short of a fo rmal objection to a voluntary di smissal of the main claim.” Weaver , 282 Ga. App. at 832-8 33. After Husband filed his notice of dismissal, Wife filed a notice of hea ring clearly stating that a hea ring was to be he ld on Wife’s “Counterclaim for Divorce.” Wife also res ponded to Husband’ s motion f o r continua nce or di smissa

l stati ng that sh e tim ely fi led a c ounterc laim for di vorce that wa s “pending a djudica tion.” There after, Husband a gain fil ed a motion for co ntinuance, and W ife respond ed that she had filed a countercla im before he volunta

rily dis misse d his cla

ims. We find t

hat Wife clea rly put Husband on notice

that she intende d to pursue her count ercla im and did not consent to or acquiesce in h aving her cou nterclaim dismissed. See Southern Electronics Distrib. v. Mars h , 229 Ga . App. 82 1 (1) (495 SE2d 43) (1997) (the defenda nt’s fili ng of a

motion f or partia l summ ary judgment

after the filing of the plainti ff’s volunta

ry dismissal c learly put the plainti ff on notic e that the defenda ntintende d to pursuehis counterclaim and did not consent to having his counterclaim

dism issed) . Our fi nding com ports wit h our instruc tion that

the “‘counterclaim limitation on voluntary dismis sa ls [should be] liberally c onstr ue d7

so as to do s ubstantial ju stice.’” Moore , 253 Ga . at 212. Next, we mu st determine whe ther Wife’s counterclaim could rema in pendingfor independent adjudication. In her c ounterclaim, Wife sought a divorce from H

usband on th e ground tha

t the m arriag e was irretrievably broken,

see OCGA § 19-5-3 (13); retire ment p ay an d So cial Securit y bene fits from Husband; equitable di vision of property; alimony; hea lth insurance; and attorne

y fees. Thus, w e conc lude that Wife’s cou nterclaim was a complete claim which could be adjudicated without re gard to Husband’ s compl aint, a nd there fore, t

he trial court shou ld have dismissed Husb and’s claim. See OCGA § 9-11 -41 (a) (2); Weems v. W eems , 225 Ga . 19 (2) (165 SE2d 733) (19 69) (counterclaim for divorce, a lleging a

separa tion ca used by t he husban d’s aban donment and a prayer for alimony and property, was a complete claim). Although the tria l court di d not dism iss Husb an d’s com plaint a nd proceeded to enter a final ord er of divor ce between the par ties, we find t

hat any

error by the t rial c ourt in not di smissi ng Husband ’s com plaint w as of no consequence bec ause both Husband’s complaint and Wife’s c ounterclaim sought a divorce and the equitab le division of propert y. There fore, e ven if the trial court had properly dismissed Husba nd’s complaint, the tria

l court could8

have still proceeded to adjudic ate Wi fe’s co untercl aim a nd enter a final order of divorce. The result is th e same: an ac tion for div orce re maine d pending before the trial court, and the tria l court properly

exerc ised its jurisdic tion

to deci de the

case. 2. Husband argues that the trial court’s fin al dec ree of divorce was in

error on numerous grounds. He contends that the t r ial c ourt incorrectly d eter mined the m arriag e was i rretrievably broken rat

her tha n that Wi fe committedadulte ry; the trial c ourt’s aw ard of militar y pay to Wife, v i a Husband’s oral agreement at trial t o pay Wi fe 50%, was in error; the provision requirin g Husband to pay 50% of the p remium for Wife’s hea lth insu rance indefinitely

was in error bec ause th e court orally announ ced at trial that it would limit insurance to th ree years; and the trial court’s finding that sexually explicit photos of Wife in Husband’ s possessi on violated her right to privacy and should be turned over to Wi fe was in error. The a ppella te rec ord contains no trans cript of the tria l court’s hearin g in this case. “[W]here an appeal is ta ken which draws in question the tra

nscript o f the ev idence

and procee dings, it shall be the duty of the appellan t to ha

ve the transcrip t prepared at the app ellant’s expens e.” OCGA§ 5-6-41 (c ); seealso OC GA § 5-6-42 (“Where there i s a tra

nscript o f2 Husband specific ally no ted in his am ended no t ice of appeal that the court repor ter’s inability

to com ply wi th his origina

l n otice of appeal to f

orward t he transcri ptto this Court was causing the parties de lay a

nd hardship. Accordi

ngly, he requestedthat the “required documents be forwarded to the Supreme Court w ithout delay.” See OC GA § 5-6- 37 (A not ice of ap peal “ shall state whether or not any transcri ptof evidence and proceedings is to be transmitted as a part of the re cord on appeal.”). In its lette r to this Cou rt forw arding the records f or appeal , the depu

ty clerk for Lowndes County stated that she w as s ending the a ppeal wit hout the transcri pts per Hu sband’s r

equest and that “ [h]e is awarethat the A ppeal is not

a[n] entire record bu

t wishes f

or the cour

ts to send it to the Appe al Courts a nyway.” Husband never sough

t to supplem

ent the re cord with

a transc ript of the

proceedings below. See OC GA § 5-6- 42 (“T he party having the r

esponsi bility of fi ling the transcri ptshall caus e it to be filed within 30 days after filing of the notice of appeal . . . unless th e time is extend ed.”). 9 evidence and proc eedings to be inc luded in t he rec ord on

appea l, the a

ppella nt shall cause

the tra nscript t o be prep ared a

nd filed a s provided byCode Sectio n 5-6-41.” ). Husband, as the appell ant her e, bea rs the burden o f showing error below. 2 Holme s v. Roberson- Holmes , 287 Ga. 358 (1) (695 SE 2d 586) (2010). “‘Inacco rdance

with the presum ption of the

regularity

of court proceedings, we must assum e in the

absenc e of a t

ranscri pt that t here w as suffic ient co mpete nt evidence to support the trial c ourt's findings.’” Id. at 361 (em phasis om

itted). Addition ally, Husband argu es that the tri al court’s award of alim ony to Wife was in error. How ever, a “trial court i s ‘given a wide la titude in fixing t

he amount of alim ony,’”

and with out the transcri

pt, weare a

ble to fi nd no abuse

of discre tion here. Hamm

ond v. Hamm

ond , 290 Ga. 518 , 519 (1) (72 2 SE2d 729)10

(2012). Husband’s addition al enum erati ons are without merit. Husband c ontends that because Wife remarried after the court issu edits fina l decre e of divorc e, the court’s finding that Wif

e should be n ame d as a benefici ary under the Hus band’s milit ary survivo r benefit plan and her entitlem ent to health insuranc e areinvalid. Howeve r, eve nts occu rring subse quent to t he issua nce of t he fina l decre e of divorce are not relevant to the proprietyof the decree. Finally , we findno abuse of discretio n in the court ’s award of attor ney fees to Wife. We “may affirm the judgm ent of

a lowe r court so long as it is right fo r

any reason.” Nat. Tax Funding, L.P. v. Harpa gon Co. , 277 Ga . 41, 45 (4 ) (586 SE2d 235) (2003). Accor dingly, we affirm the tr ial court’s fi nal judgme ntand decree of divorce even th ough it wa s error f or the c ou rt not to di smiss H usband’s complaint. Judgme nt affir

med. All the

Justice s concur . Decid ed July

11, 2014. Dome stic re lations. Lowndes Superior C ourt. Be fore Judge Horkan. Stanley L. Reed, pro se. Langdale Vallotton, Kath erine A. Gonos, Bren da M. Carver , for appellee.