290 [80 Op. Att’y

1

 You also posed a second question, about the consequences if the

bill were applicable and yet the Maryland Stadium Authority failed to

enforce it. In light of our answer to your first question, we need not

consider the second.

STADIUM AUTHORITY

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION ) STATUTORY BAR TO TEAMS

COMPOSED OF TOO FEW PLAYERS WITH RECENT

MAJOR LEAGUE EXPERIENCE DOES NOT APPLY WHEN

THERE IS NO PLAYERS’ STRIKE

May 12, 1995

Mr. Richard A. Montgomery, III

Deputy Legislative Officer

On behalf of the Administration, you have requested our

opinion concerning Chapter 6 (Senate Bill 719) of the Laws of

Maryland 1995, “Professional Baseball ) Camden Yards.” Pointing

out that the law was enacted in the midst of the major league

baseball strike, you ask whether the law’s prohibition on the use of

Camden Yards by teams with too many new players must be

applied, although the strike is now over.

For the reasons stated below, we conclude that Chapter 6 is not

applicable to games played when there is no baseball strike.1

I

Background

Senate Bill 719 was signed into law on March 27, 1995. As an

emergency measure, the bill became effective immediately. At that

time, the union representing major league baseball players was on

strike, and the team owners had announced an intention to play a full

schedule with “replacement players” ) former major league players,
Gen. 290] 291

2

 With the important exception of the Baltimore Orioles, the teams

had already fielded replacement players during spring training.

3

 The union did so after a federal court found that the owners had

engaged in unfair labor practices. The owners and the union have not

reached a collective bargaining agreement, however, and the strike could

conceivably be resumed at some point in the future.

4

 The Tigers and Orioles have a three-game series at Camden

Yards beginning May 16, 1995.

minor league players, semi-professional players, and anyone else

who could be signed to fill out a roster.2 

Chapter 6 amended the law governing the Maryland Stadium

Authority by imposing the following prohibition: “Notwithstanding

any other provision of this subtitle, the Authority shall prohibit a

major league professional baseball team from playing baseball in a

stadium in Camden Yards if fewer than 75% of the players on the

team’s current 40-player major league roster were on the 40-player

major league roster of a professional team in major league baseball

at any time in the preceding calendar year.” §13-723(b) of the

Financial Institutions (“FI”) Article, Maryland Code. 

In early April, after Chapter 6 became effective, the players’

union called off the strike.3 The Orioles and the rest of the major

league teams are playing their regularly scheduled games. Each

team has filled its roster with what it considers the best available

players.

According to at least one press report, the Detroit Tigers have

so many players without the requisite major league experience that

the team fails to meet the criterion in FI §13-723(b). We do not

know whether this report is accurate. For purposes of this opinion,

however, we shall simply assume that it is and proceed to the legal

question: Does FI §13-723(b) require the Stadium Authority to bar

the Tigers from playing in Oriole Park at Camden Yards?4
292 [80 Op. Att’y

II

Interpretation of Chapter 6

In interpreting Chapter 6, we apply the principles of statutory

construction frequently reiterated by the Court of Appeals: 

In analyzing a statute, we must always be

cognizant of the fundamental principle that

statutory construction is approached from a

commonsensical perspective. Thus, we seek

to avoid constructions that are illogical,

unreasonable, or inconsistent with common

sense. Furthermore, we do not read statutory

language in isolation or out of context but

construe it in light of the legislature’s general

purpose and in the context of the statute as a

whole. Context may include related statutes,

pertinent legislative history and other material

that fairly bears on the fundamental issue of

legislative purpose or goal.

Frost v. State, 336 Md. 125, 137-38, 647 A.2d 106 (1994) (internal

quotations, brackets, and citations omitted). The Court’s rejection

of an unyielding “plain meaning rule” is especially pertinent to our

interpretation of our Chapter 6: “Even where the language of a

statute is plain and unambiguous, we may look elsewhere to divine

legislative intent; the plain meaning rule is not rigid and does not

require us to read legislative provisions in rote fashion and in

isolation.” Blaine v. Blaine, 336 Md. 49, 64, 646 A.2d 413 (1994).

The preamble to Chapter 6 mentions “replacement players” )

a term not used in the text of the statute but clearly meaning players

signed to replace those on strike. Referring to a poll of Orioles’

season ticket holders, the preamble cites overwhelming opposition

to “the idea of the Orioles using replacement players instead of the

current Orioles.” The preamble also notes poll results indicating that

“the overwhelming majority of season ticket holders believe that

major league professional baseball should cancel the upcoming

season rather than play with replacement players if fewer than 75%

of the team’s baseball players were baseball players on a major

league professional baseball team in 1994.” Thus, the preamble

unmistakably links the “75%” threshold in the text of the statute to

the public’s distaste for replacement players and so to the strike
Gen. 290] 293

5

 For example, in a letter of advice written while the bill was

pending, our office observed that, “[a]s major league players have struck

in a dispute with team owners, the enactment of State legislation affecting

the use of replacement players at Camden Yards raises the issue of

whether the matter has been pre-empted by the [National Labor] Relations

Act.” Letter to Delegate Samuel I. Rosenberg and Senator John A. Pica,

Jr., from Assistant Attorney General Richard E. Israel at 2 (February 21,

1995).

itself. Another paragraph of the preamble refers to certain losses at

the University of Maryland’s parking garages from “an extended

strike.”

The preamble is clear evidence that, in passing FI §13-723(b),

the General Assembly’s objective was to prevent the use of Camden

Yards by teams fielding replacement players during a strike.

Although a preamble is not a part of the statute itself, it is voted on

as part of the bill and can be amended (indeed, was amended in

Chapter 6), and the Court of Appeals gives a preamble considerable

weight as evidence of the legislative objective. See, e.g., Parrison

v. State, 335 Md. 554, 559, 644 A.2d 537 (1994); McAlear v.

McAlear, 298 Md. 320, 344 n.26, 469 A.2d 1256 (1984); Dillon v.

State, 277 Md. 571, 583, 357 A.2d 360 (1976).

Other material in the legislative history confirms this objective.

In their bill analyses of Senate Bill 719, the jurisdictional

committees noted as “background” to the bill the following: “Major

league baseball players have been on strike since the middle of last

season. The players’ union and owners continue to talk without

result.... The Orioles’ owner is not in favor of replacement players.

However, other teams are accepting replacement players at their

spring training.” The bill file also contains much other material

reflecting the obvious point that Chapter 6 was enacted against the

background of the strike and was intended solely to deal with one

potential aspect of the strike, the use of replacement players.5
294 [80 Op. Att’y

III

Conclusion

It would be inconsistent with the General Assembly’s

objective, and with common sense, to construe Chapter 6 as

applying when a team is not using replacement players in lieu of

striking players. The General Assembly never intended this bill to

bar from Camden Yards a team that simply has an unusually high

number of rookies, when there is no strike. 

Thus, it is our opinion that Chapter 6 does not apply to games

involving the Detroit Tigers (or any other team) when there is no

strike by major league baseball players. 

J. Joseph Curran, Jr.

Attorney General

Jack Schwartz

Chief Counsel

 Opinions & Advice