### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT JAC KSON A SS IG N E D O N BR IE FS F E BR U A RY 17, 200 6

BOB P ATT ERS ON, TR US TEE O F S HELBY CO UN TY, TEN NES SEE v. A . C . WH AR TON , JR ., MA YOR OF SHEL BY COU NTY , T ENN ESSE E

Direc t Appeal from the Chancer y Court for Shelby Cou nty No. CH-03-1736- 1 WalterL. Evan s, Chancellor

No. W2005-02494-C OA-R3-C V - F iled May 10, 2006

After the B oard of

CountyCommi ssioners for Shelby Countypassed t h e co u n ty ’s 2003–2004 budg et, t he Trustee of Shelby County filed sui t ag ainst the county may or pursuant to section 8-20- 101 et seq . o f the Te nn e sse e Cod e se e kin g a dd iti on a l pe rs on ne l a ndfu nd ing fo r h is d e pa rt me nt. Af te r e nte ri ng int o a

se ttl e me nt a g re e me nt w ith the c ou nty , th e tr us tee fi le d a mot ionse e kin g to
rec over his attorney ’s fee s at a rate of $250 per hour. The c ounty asserted that such fe es we re c apped at $100 per

hour pursua nt to a budg et re solution passed by the Board of CountyCommi ssioners. The trial court entered an order awarding the t rustee his attorney ’s fees at a rate of $250 per hour pursuant to section 8-20-107 of

the Tenne ssee Code. The county appea led ar g uing that the trial court did not have the discretion to a war d attorney ’s fee s in ex cess of the $100 per

hour limit pl ace d on such fe es by the c ou nty

le g isl a tiv e bo dy . We a ff ir m th e de c isi on of

the tr ia l c ou rt

.

Tenn. R. App . P . 3; Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Chancer y Court Affi rm ed

A L AN E. H I G H ERS , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which D AVI D R. F ARMER , J ., joined and H OL L Y M. K I RBY , J ., did not participate.

B r i a n L

. Ku h n , S h e l b y C o u n t y A t t o r n e y; R o b e r tB

. R o l w i n g , S e n i o r A s s i s t a n tC o u n t y A t t o r n e y, Memphis, TN, for A ppellant

J oeDa e L . J enkins, Memphis, TN, for A ppelleeT he st atuto ry s ch em e re l i ed o n b y t he T rustee p ro vid es a s fo l l o w s: 1

(a) W here any o ne (1) o f t he cl erks and m ast ers of t he chancery co urt , t he

co un t y cl erk s and t he clerks o f t he p ro b ate, cr im in a l, c i rcu i t an d sp ec i al co urts,

coun t y t r ust ees , re g ister s o f d e e d s, a n d sh e riff s c a n n o t p ro p e rly a n d e ff ic ie n tly

co nd uct t he af

f ai rs and t rans act t he b usi ness of such person’ s o f f i ce b y de vo t i ng
s uch pers on’ s en t i r e wor ki ng t i me t her et o, s uch per s on may empl oy s uch deput i es and a s s i s t ant s as may be ac t ual l y ne ces s ar y t o t he proper conduc t i ng of s uch p e rs o n ’s o ff

ic e in the fo llo w ing m a n n e r a n d un d e r th e fo llo w ing c o n d iti o n s, na m e ly:

. . . . (3 ) T h e c le rk s a n d m a ste rs o f t h e c h a n c e ry c o u rts, coun t y t r ust ees , co u n ty cl er k s a n d c l er k s of

t h e pr obat e cou r t s , a n d r eg i s t er s of dee ds may mak e appl i ca t i on t o t h e c h a n c e l l or

. . . h ol di n g c ou r t i n t h e i r c ou n t y by s w or n pe t i t i on as above s et fort h, s howi ng t he nec es s i t y for a deput y or deput i es or as s i s t ant s , t he numb er
r equ i r ed an d t h e s al ar y e ac h s h ou l d be pa i d.

T E NN

. C O D E A NN

. § 8

- 2 0

- 1 0 1 (a)( 3 ) (20 0 2 & Sup p

. 2 0 0 5 ) ( em p hasi s ad d ed ). T he l egi sl at ure r eq ui res any o ne b ri ngi ng
a n a c tio n u n d e r the s ta tute to na m e the c o u n ty m a yo r a s the p a rty d e fen d a n t. See T E NN

. C O D E A NN

. § 8-20

- 1 0 2 (20 0 2 );

s ee al s o T E NN

. C O D E A NN . § 5 -6 -1 0 1 (d )( 1 ) (2 0 0 5 ) (r e n a m ing c o u n ty ex e c u tive s a s c o u n ty m a yo rs ).
-2- OP IN ION

I. F A C TUA L B ACKG ROUND AND P R OC EDU R A L H I S T ORY

I n Aug ust of 2003, the B oard of CountyCommi ssioners for Shelby Coun t y p as s ed a resolution approving the county ’s oper ating budg et for f iscal y ear 2003–2004. The re solution contained the following additional provision:

B E IT F UR TH ER R ESO L VE D, Th a t th e rate of c omp e ns a tio n p a id to atto rn e y s f

or the fi lin g or

arg uin g of

sa lary pe tit ion s b e lim ite d to $100.00 per hour . I n the eve nt of a sa lary petition the electe d officia l shall submit a mont hly report of l eg al fees i ncurr ed to the Chairman of the B udg et Commit tee of this Com mission.

Di ssatis fi e d w iththe a mou nts bu dg e te d f or his de pa rt me nt, B ob Pa tte rs on , Tr

us te e of She lby

Cou nty (her einaf ter “ Trustee ” or “ Appellee ”), f iled a petition ag ainst A.C. Wharton, Jr., May or of Shelby County(her einaf

ter “ County ” or “ Appellant”) , in the Chance ry Court o f Sh elby County . The Tr

ustee filed hi s petition pursuant to section 8-20-101 et seq . of the Te nnessee Code seeking authorization to em pl oyadd it io nal pers on nel , s ala ry in creas es f

or ex is ti ng pers on ne l, a

nd c e rt ain e mpl oye ebe ne fi ts fo r h i s d ep ar t m en t

. T h e c h a n c e r yco u rt s u b s eq u en t l y en t er ed a c o n s en to rd erm em o ri al i z i n g a 1 settlement enter ed into betwee n the parties.-3-

Shortlyafte r the e ntry

of the c onsent order , the Trustee filed a motion pursuant to section 8- 20-107 of the T ennesse e C ode asking that the attorne y ’s fe es he inc urre d in pursuing the action be paid out of his sa lary and labor acc ount. Acc ompany ing the motion was the aff idavit of the Trustee ’s attorney setting f o rt h l ega l expenses calculated at a r ate of $250 per hour . The County did not challeng e the number

of hours wor

ked by the Trustee ’s attorney , but it did a rg ue that the r esolution pa sse d b y its B oa rdof Cou nty Com mis sio ne rs c a

pp e d atto rn e y ’s fe e s at a

rate of $1 00 pe r hou r i n case s of this nature. The trial court subse q u en t l y enter ed an or der f inding that, while the hours expended by

the Trustee ’s attorne y

in pr osecuting the ca se we re r easona ble and ne cessa

ry , it did not ha ve the a uth ority

to e xce e d th e rate fo r atto rn e y ’s fe e s se t by the B oa rd of Cou nty Com mis sio ne rs

. There afte r, the Tr

ustee filed a

motion asking the c hance ry court to re consider its ruling

.
After conducting a he aring on the Trustee ’s motion, the chanc ellor ente red an order on Au g us t 26 , 2 00 5 g ranti ng the Tr us te e ’s mot ion a nd or de ri ng that th e Tr us te e ’s a tto rn e y

re c e ive his attorney ’s fe es at a

rate of $250 per

hour, or $17,458.60, t o b e deduc ted from the T rustee’ s salary and labor acc ount pur suant to se ction 8-20-107 of the Tenne ssee Code. The County timely filed a notice of a

ppeal to this Court.

II. I SS U E P R ESENTED

Did the trial court err by awa rding the Appellee his attorney ’s fe es at a rate of $250 per

hour when the A ppellant pre viouslypassed a budg et resolution capping attorney ’s fee s at $100 per hour in case s broug ht pursuant to section 8-20- 101 et seq . of the Te nnessee Code?

III

. D I S CUS S I ON
“At common law, a

party had no rig ht to the pay ment of i ts costs or i ts attorney s fee s.” Owen v. Stanley , 739 S.W .2d 782, 788 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987), overruled on othe r grounds by Matlock v. Sim pson , 9 02 S.W. 2d38 4, 38 6 ( Te nn . 1 99 5)

. A c ou rt ’s a uth ority to a wa rd c os ts i n a

pa rt ic ula r c a se d er i v es from leg islative enac tments. Owen , 7 39 S.W. 2da t 78 8; Person v. Fletcher , 5 8 2 S. W. 2d 765, 766 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1979). T hus, Tennesse e adhe res to the well-e stablished “American Rule,” which provide s that “litiga nts pay their own atto rn ey ’s fe es abse nt a statute or a n ag ree ment providing otherwise.” State v

. Brown & William son Tobac co Corp. , 18 S.W .3d 186, 194 (Tenn. 20 00 ); se e als o T

ay lor v . Fe ze ll , 158 S.W .3d 352, 359 (Tenn. 2005)

.
I n case s broug ht by a local officia l pur suant to se cti o n 8-20-101 et seq . of the Te nnessee Code, the leg islature provide s as follows: “The cost of all case s shall be paid out of t he fees of the of fi c e c oll e c te d by su c h off ic e rs , an d the y a nd e a c h of the m sha ll be a llo we d a c re dit fo r the sa me in settlement with the county trustee.” T EN N

. C ODE A NN . § 8-20-107 ( 2002). I n Jenkins v. Armstr ong , 211 S.W .2d 908, 910 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1947) (per curia m), this Court held t hat the leg al expenses incurre d by

an off icial when pursuing an action under the statutory scheme enac ted by the leg islature constituted a “ cost,” “ for none could contend that the petitioner c ould properly file and-4-

prosec ute towar d the re lief soug ht, without the employ ment of leg al assistance .” Rely ing on Jenk ins , we su bs e qu e ntl y

he ld a s f oll ow s:
Jenk ins v. Armstrong . . . is not authority for t h e i n s istence that the tr ia l jud g e m u s ta l l o w a f e e i n e v e r y

c a s e p r e s e n t e d b y

a c o u n ty officia l under T.C.A. § [8-20-101]. At most, said authority holds that the tr ia l ju dg e ha s discretion (if he sees fit to do so) to tax an attorney fee as part of the costs or (more rationally ) to de clar e an attorne y ’s fe e to b e a pr op e r e xpe ns e of

the of fi c e of the of fi c ia l inv olv e d to b e pa id as part of the expense of suc h office

. Cunnin gha m v . Moo re Coun ty , 604 S.W .2d 866, 869 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980) ( emphasis in orig inal);
se e als o M

ar sha ll v . Se v ie r Co unty , 6 39 S.W. 2d44 0, 44 3 ( Te nn

. Ct. Ap p. 19 82 ). As we state d in Cunningham , when attorney ’s fees are awarde d pursuant to s ection 8-20- 107 of the Te nnessee Code, the y are no t c ha

rg e d to the c ou nty or

its re pr e se ntativ e s d ir e c tly , b ut the y be c ome a

pr op e r e xpe ns e p a y ab le f r o m th e f u n d s ma d e a v a il ab le to th e c o u n ty o f f ic ial. S ee Sm ith v. Dun can , No. 01A01- 96 02 -C V- 00 07 7, 19 97 Te nn . A pp . L EX I S 14 2, a t *4 (T e nn . Ct . A pp . F e b. 28 , 1 99 7) ; Moore v. Cates , 8 32 S.W. 2d

57 0, 57 2 (T e nn . Ct . A pp . 1 99 2) ; Jo ne s v . M ank in , 1989 Tenn. App. L EXI S 325, at *31–32 (Te nn. Ct. App. May 5, 1989). Thus, this Court’ s previous interpre tation of section 8-20- 107 o f t h e Tennessee Code establishes that the leg islature has pr ovided for the allocation of attorney ’s fe es by

statute in case s of this nature.

I n those instances w herea statute or ag ree ment betwee n the parties provides for an aw ard of
a tto rn e y ’s fe e s b y

the tr ia l c ou rt , th e app e llate c ou rt s o f thi s st a te ha ve he ld that th e de c isi on a s to whether to awar d such fe es and the pr oper amount to be give n lies within the sound discretion of the trial court. See Aaron v . Aaron , 9 09 S.W. 2d40 8, 41 1 ( Te nn . 1 99 5) ; Hou ghl and v . Ho ughl

and , 844 S.W. 2d61 9, 62 3 ( Te nn . Ct . A pp . 1 99 2) . Wh e n r e vie wi ng su c h de c isi on s, “ the app e llate c ou rt wi ll not interfer e ex ce p t u p o n a clea r showing of an a

buse of discr etion.” Aaron , 909 S.W .2d at 411 (c i t i n g S to r ey v. S to r ey , 8 35 S.W. 2d59 3, 59 7 ( Te nn . Ct . A pp . 1 99 2) ; Crouch v. Crou ch , 385 S.W .2d 288, 293 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1964)) ; se e als o T ay lor v . Fe ze ll , 1 5 8 S.W .3d 352, 359 (Tenn. 2005). When eva luating disc retionar y d ec i sions under this standard of revie w, we a

re mindful of t h e f o l l o wi n g:

Th e dis c re tio na ry natur e of the de c isi on do e s not shi e ld i t c omp le te ly from appe llate re view but does result i n subjecting it to less rig orous appellate scrutiny

. See Tenne ssee De p't of Health v. Frisbee , 1 998 Tenn. App. L

EXI S 14, No. 01 A01-9511-CH- 00540, 1998 WL 4718, at *2 (T enn. Ct. App. J an. 9, 1998) ( No Tenn. R. App. P. 11
ap p l i c a t i o n f

i l e d) ; B IF v. Service Constr. C o. , 1988 Tenn. App. LEXI S 43 0 , No. 87-136- II , 1988 WL 72409, at *2 (Te nn. Ct. App. J uly 13, 1988) (No Tenn. R. A pp. P. 11 application filed) . Be cause , by their very

nature , discretionary

decisions involve a c hoice a mong acc eptable a lternatives, r eviewing courts will not sec ond-g uess a tria l-5- c ou rt ’s e xer c ise of its dis c re tio n s imp ly be c a us e the tr ia l c ou rt

c ho se an alternative that the a

ppellate c ourts wo u l d not have c hosen. See Ove rstreet v. Shoney’s, I nc. , 4 S.W .3d 694, 708 (Tenn . Ct. App. 1999). Discre tionary decisions require consc ientious judgment. See BIF v . Servic e Constr. Co. , 1 9 8 8 T e n n

. A p p

. LE X I S 4 3 0 , 1 9 8 8 WL 724 0 9 , at *2. They

must take the applica

ble law into ac count and must also be consistent with the facts befor e the court. See O verstree t v. Shoney ’s, Inc

. , 4 S.W .3d at 694. Appellate c ourts will set aside a discretionary

decision only

when the trial court has misconstrued or mis app lie d th e c on tr oll ing le g a l princ ipl e s o r h a s a c te d in c on sis te ntl y w ith th e s u b s tan ti a l w e ig h t o f th e e v id e n c e. S ee Overstreet v. Shoney’ s, Inc. , 4 S.W .3d at 695. Thus, a tria l co u rt ’s discre tionary decision should be re viewed to de termine: (1) whether the fa ctual basis for th e decision is supported by the evidenc e, (2) whether the trial court identifie d and applied the applicable leg al principles, a nd (3 ) w he the r the tr ia l c ou rt ’s de c isi on is within the rang e of a c c e pta ble alternatives. See BIF v. Service Constr. C o. , 1 9 8 8 T e n n

. A p p

. LE X IS 43 0, 19 88 WL

72 40 9, a t *3 . A pp e llate c ou rt s sh ou ld p e rm it a discretionary

decision to stand if re asonable judicial minds can diffe r conce rning its soundness. See O verstree t v. Shoney ’s, Inc

. , 4 S.W .3d at 695.

Whit e v. V

anderbilt Un iv. , 21 S.W .3d 215, 222–23 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999) ( footnote omitted).

I n this inst ance , we a re as k ed primarily to decide w hether

the cha ncellor ide ntified and
app lie d th e c or

re c t le g a l princ ipl e s w he n h e de c ide d to a wa rda tto rn e y ’s fe e s to the Tr us te e in e xce ss of the $1 00 pe r hour max im um se t by the Cou nty . O n a

pp e a l, the Cou nty

do e s n ot d isp ute that, pursuant to sec tion 8-20-107 of the Te nnessee Code and our c ase la w interpre ting that statute, attorney ’s fe es ar e re cover able by a county officia l as a “cost” in case s broug ht under sec tion 8-20- 101 et seq

. of the Tenne ssee Code. I nstead, it arg ues that the trial c ourt impermissiblyencr oache d upon the leg islative authority of the Boa rd of County Commi ssioners to a llocate funds to the various county departments throug h the budg etary proce ss. I n support of this posit ion, the Countyrelies on
se ve ra l c on sti tut ion a l a ndstatut ory pr ov isi on s. The County

points to the Tenne ssee Constit ution, whic h provides that “[t]he powers of the g overnme nt shall be divided into three distinct depa rtments: leg islative, executive, and judicial.” T EN N

. C O N ST . a

rt . 2 , § 1. F urthe r, the Cou nty re lie s o n th e se pa

ratio n o f p ow e rs do c tr ine fo un d in the Te nn e sse e Con sti tut ion , w hic h s ta te s th a t “ [n]o p e rs on or pe rs on s b e lon g ing to on e of the se departments shall ex erc ise any of the powe rs prope rly belong ing to e ither of the othe rs, except in the
c a s e s h e r e in d ir e c te d o r

p e r mitted.” T EN N

. C O N ST . art 2, § 2. “ Under Article V I I , § 1, of the Te nn e sse e Con sti tut ion , the c ou nty le g isl a tiv e bo dy is e le c te d to re pr e se nt the pe op le of the c ou nty and to ac t as the deliber ative body for c ounty

g overnme ntal purposes.” Stat e ex rel. Weave r v.-6-

Ay e rs , 756 S.W .2d 217, 222 (Tenn. 1988). The Te nnessee Gene ral Asse mbly rec og nizes that “[t ]he county leg islative body is e stablished as a basic leg islative unit of eac h county of this state.” T EN N

. C ODE A NN . § 5-5-101( a) ( 2005). The state l eg islature “ha s duly deleg ated to these bodies the authority to raise r evenue and appr opriate f unds for l o ca l g overnme ntal purposes.” Ay e rs , 756 S.W .2d at 222. The County notes that “[a]ll funds from whateve r source derive d . . . that are to be
us e d inthe op e ratio n a ndre sp e c tiv e pr og rams o f the va ri ou s d e pa

rt me nts

. . . o f c ou nty

g ov e rn me nts shall be ap p ro priated to such use by the county

leg islative bodies.” T EN N

. C ODE A NN . § 5-9-401 (2 00 5) . M or e ov e r, it is the du ty of the c ou nty le g isl a tiv e bo dy “ to a do pt a bu dg e t a ndapp ro pria te funds for the ensuing fiscal y ear .” T EN N

. C ODE A NN . § 5-9-404( a) ( 2005).
By awa rding the Trustee his attorney ’s fe es at a rate of $250 an hour, the County arg ues that the trial court erre d by

substitut ing its judg ment for that of the countyleg islative body , which exercised its budg etary

authority under the Tenne ssee Constitution and applicabl e s t at u t es and determined that a county

officia l should onlyrec over att o rn ey ’s fe es at the r ate of $100 per hour

. Conversely , the Trustee arg ues that our resolution of this case is controlled by ref ere nce to se ction 8-20-107 a nd this Court’s int erpr etation of the statute in Jenk ins as vesting t he trial court with the dis c re tio n to a wa

rda tto rn e y ’s fe e s and to s e t th e a mou nt o f s uc h f e e s in c a se s b ro ug ht p ur su a nt t o section 8-20- 101 et seq . of the Te nnessee Code.

As previously mentioned, the leg islature provides for the rec overy of “the c ost” incurr ed by a county officia l in bring ing an action pursuant to section 8-20-101 et seq . of the Te nnessee Code. T EN N

. C ODE A NN . § 8- 20 -1 07 (2 00 2) . We ha ve int e rp re te d th is d ir e c tiv e to m e a n th a t a tria l c ou rt , in i ts d isc re tio n, ma y

a wa rda c ou nty of fi c ia l hi s o r her

a tto rn e y ’s fe e s si nc e the y re pr e se nt a “nec essary

expense” in bring ing such ac tions. Je nkins v . Ar mstro ng , 211 S.W .2d 908, 910 (Tenn. Ct. Ap p. 19 47 ) ( pe r c uria m)

. Th e pa rt ie s d o n ot c ite to this Cou rt a ny a uth ority statin g that, w hil e a tr i al co u rt has the discr etion to awar d attorney ’s fe es under the statute at issue, it also has the discretion to s et t he amount of such fee s. L ikewise, our own independe nt resea rch ha s failed to find any authority direc tly addre ssing the issue pr esently befor e the Court. Howeve r, the County ’s arg ument that, while a tria l court has the disc retion to a war d attorney ’s fee s under the statute, it does
no t ha ve the di scr etion to se t th e a mou nt o f s uc h f e e s w he n a

c ou nty le g isl a tiv e bo dy

c ho os e s to imp os e a c ap o n atto rn e y ’s fe e s in its bu dg e t mu st f a il.

We be g in w ith the County ’s arg ument that, when a trial court sets attorney ’s fee s above an amount budg eted by

the county

leg islative body , a trial c ou rt is permitted to encr oach upon the pr ov ince of a le g isl a tiv e br a nc h o f g ov e rn me nt b y imp e rm iss ibl y

a me nd ing the Cou nty ’s bu dg e t. As the authorities re lied on by the County

demonstrate, the county g overnme nts of this state derive their budg etary

authority from the e nactments of the Tenne ssee Ge nera l Assembly in Title 5 of the Tenne ssee Code. See T EN N

. C ODE A NN . § 5-1-101 et seq . (2005). It is true that “[p] repa ring the county budg et is ess en t i al ly

a political proc ess intended to re flec t the desires of the county ’s residents.” Jo ne s v . M

ank in , 1989 Tenn. App. L EXI S 325, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 5, 1989) (no perm. a pp. filed). Pursuant to sec tion 8-20-101 et seq . of the T en n es see Code, how ever , “the judiciary is broug ht into the budge tary fray only in limi ted circ umstances.” Boarm an v. Jaynes , 109 S.W .3d 286, 291 (Tenn. 2003). “While the appellate courts of this state have repe atedly questioned-7-

the wisdom of interjec ting the judiciary into essentially political disputes,” Dornin g v. Bailey , No. M2004-02392-COA- R3-CV, 2006 Tenn. App. L EXI S 83, at *21–22 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 6, 2006) (citations omitted), it is the province of the leg islature to se t the public policy of this state, Cary v. Car y , 9 37 S.W. 2d77 7, 78 1 ( Te nn . 1 99 6) ; Fields v. Metro. Life Ins. Co. , 249 S.W . 798, 799–800 (T e nn . 1 92 2) ; Cav e nde r v . He witt , 2 39 S.W. 76 7, 76 8 (T e nn

. 19 21 ). Ou r s up re me c ou rt ha s u ph e ld the validi ty of t he sy stem promulg ated by the leg islature. Shelby County Civil S erv. Me rit Bd. v. Li v e ly , 6 92 S.W. 2d15 , 1 7 ( Te nn . 1 98 5) ; Hic kman v . W right , 210 S.W

. 447, 422–23 (Tenn. 1918)

.
Th e le g isl a ture, by ves ti ng the c ou rt s o f this state wi th the auth ority to o rd e r a

c ou nty leg islative body

to provide additional funding under se ction 8-20-101 et seq . of the Te nnessee Code, ha s a lr e a dy

pr ov ide d f

or th e ju di cia ry ’s lim ite d a bil ity to ame nda

c ou nty ’s bu dg e t. It st a nd s to
rea son that, by

providing for the a war d of attorne y ’s fe es in such ca ses, the leg islature intended f or the judiciary

to have the disc retion t o s et t he amount of suc h fee s, even if doing so would subvert the e ff orts o f the c ou nty

le g isl a tiv e bo dy in at te mpt ing to limi t atto rn e y ’s fe e s to a c e rt a in amou nt. Thus, vesting a trial c ourt with the discretion to se t the amount of attorney ’s fee s awa rded unde r the statut e a t is su e wo uldno mor e int e rf e re wi th a c ou nty ’s bu dg e tary a uth ority than the c ou rt ’s abil ity to o rd e r the c ou nty

le g isl a tiv e bo dy

to p ro vid e a dd iti on a l f

un din g fo r p e rs on ne l a ndthe ir sa lari e s. Our supre me court a dhere s to the view “that comity and coope ration among the bra nches of g overnme nt are benef

icial to all, and consistent with constitutional pri n cipl es, such pr actice s are desired and oug ht to be nurtured and maintained.” Sta te v . M all ar d , 40 S.W .3d 473, 4 81 (Tenn. 2 0 0 1 ). W hen adhe ring to this principle, however , the judicial bra nch of g overnme nt must not
surre nder e ntirely

its posi t i o n in our constitutional scheme. This Court, in addre ssing our constitutional dutyunder the doctrine of separ ation of powe rs, has stated:
[T] he sepa

ration o f p o w e r s doctrine, pr operly understood, imposes on the judicial bra nch not mere ly a negative duty

not to interfer e with the executive or leg islative branc hes, but a positive re sp onsi bi lity to pe rf orm it s o wn job e ff

ic ie ntl y . T his positive aspec t of separ ation of po we rs imp os e s o n c ou rt s a ff ir ma tiv e ob lig a tio ns to a sse rt a ndfu lly
e xer c ise the ir

po we rs , to op e rate e ff

ic ie ntl y by mod e rnstand ard s, to protec t their independe nt status, and to fend off l egis lative or
e xec uti ve a tte mpt s to e nc ro a c h u po n ju dic ia l pe ro g a tiv e s.
Ande rso n Cou nty Qua rte rly Ct. v . J udg e s o f t he 28 th J udic ial Cir c uit , 579 S.W .2d 875, 878 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1978) (citation omitted) (empha sis in orig inal). We are cog nizant of the fa ct that Title 5 and sec tion 8-20-101 et seq . of the Te nnessee Code contain no e x press leg islative p ro v i sion pr oh ibi tin g a

c ou nty le g isl a tiv e bo dy

fr om a do pti ng a

bu dg e t pr ov isi on c app ing a tto rn e y ’s fe e s in
case s of th is n a tu r e

. We a ls o , h o w e v e r , ar e mi n d f u l o f th e f

o ll o w in g : “ St a tu te s d o n o t e xis t in a vacuum, but must be re ad in re lationship to one another to ef fec tuate the intent of the statutory
s c h e me a s a

w h o le

. ” 8 2 C. J. S. Statutes § 351 ( 19 99 ); see also Te nn. E lec. Power Co. v. City of Chat tanooga , 114 S.W .2d 441, 444 (Tenn. 1937) (“A construction will be avoided, if possible, that would rende r one se ction of the a ct re pug nant t o an o t h er. O r one that would produce an absur d-8-

re su lt. ” (c itatio ns omi tte d) ); In r e E s t a t e of Luck , No. W2004-01554-COA-R3-CV, 2005 Te nn. App. LEXI S 332, at * 6 –7 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 7, 2005) (no perm. app. filed) ( stating that “we cannot r eview a

statute in a vac uum”).

I f a c ounty

leg islative bod ywer e able to adopt a budg et provision setting a cap on the
a tto rn e y ’s fe e s th a t a

c ou nty of fi c ia l c ou ld c oll e c t un de r the statut e , the c ou nty le g isl a tiv e bo dy c ou ld subvert the unde rlying g oal of the statutory scheme enac ted by the leg islature by

capping the fe es at an absur dly

low amount. I n turn, it is doubtful that any attorney would undertake re prese ntation of
a c ou nty of fi c ia l in su c h matte rs . T he c ou nty le g isl a tiv e bo dy

c ou ld, in e ff

e c t, e ns ur e that a

c ou nty officia l would be unable to av ai l h i m s el f or her self of the statutory protec tions afforde d by

the leg islature in sec tion 8-20-101 et seq . of the Te nnessee Code. As a r esult, the judicial branc h of g overnme nt would be prevented from perf orming its function under the statutory scheme adopted by the le g isl a tur e a ndapp ro ve d b y ou r s up re me c ou rt . Wh ile we re c og nize the bu dg e tary a uth ority vested in the c ounty

leg islative bodies of this state by the Tenne ssee Gene ral Asse mbly , we c annot subscribe to a view that would enable a county leg islative body

to exercise that authority

in a manner that would subvert the r ole of the judicial branc h of g overnme nt in deciding case s under se ction 8- 20-101 et seq . of the Te nnessee Code.
Finally , the County

points to section 3.03 of the Shelby CountyCode, which provide s as fo llo ws : “ Con tr a c ts andpu rc ha se s o n b e ha lf of the She lby Cou nty

g ov e rn me nt s ha ll b e e nte re d in to b y th e c o u n ty may o r o r th e may o r ’ s d e s ig n e e

. ” T h e Co u n ty c o n te n d s th a t, p u r s u a n t to this C ode provision, the Trustee did not have the authority to enter into a c ontrac t with his attorney for leg al repr esentation. I n support of this positi on, the County cites to dec isions bythis Court ruling that of fi c ia ls a c tin g on be ha lf of the loc a l go ve rn me nt didno t ha ve the a uth ority to e nte r i nto c on tr a c ts
o n b ehalf of the loca l gove rnment. See Ston es River Utils., Inc. v. Metro. Gov’ t of Nashville & Da v ids on Co unty , 98 1 S.W. 2d17 5, 17 8 ( Te nn . Ct . A pp . 1 99 8) ; Napoleonic Prom otions, Inc. v. City of Me mphis , No. 02A01-9405- CV-00113, 1995 Tenn. A pp. LEXI S 417, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. J une 22, 1995).

Unlike the case s relied on by the County , the Trustee in the instant c ase did not seek to enter into a contra ct on beha lf of the County as a whole. I nstead, the Trustee , exercising his right to see k additional funding for his depa rtment under se ction 8-20-101 et seq

. of the Te nnessee Code, enter ed into a contra ct with his attorney . We have pr eviously established that county

officia ls are e ntitled to secur e lega l repr esentation in such ca ses. Se e Je nkins v . Ar mstro ng , 211 S.W .2d 908, 910 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1947). I f a c ounty officia l were require d to seek the a pproval of the county may or bef ore securing leg al repr esentation to pursue a cause of action under the statute, it would have a chilling
e ff e c t. B y wi thh old ing a sse nt t o a con tr a c t f or le g a l r e pr e se ntatio n, a

c ou nty ma y or c ou ld e ff e c tiv e ly
ensure that a county

officia l’s eff

orts in se eking additional personne l or funding wer e thwarted from the start, ther eby

subverting the g oal of the statutory scheme enac ted by the leg islature. More over, the po sit ionse t f

orth b y the Cou nty

wo uldraise se ri ou s is su e s r e la tin g to confl icts of int e re st g overne d by

the Tenne ssee Rules of Prof essional Responsibilit y

. Acc ording ly , we f ind the County ’s
arg ume nt i n th is r e g ardto b e wi tho ut m e ri t a s w e ll.-9- IV. C ONCL US I ON We hold that, in cases filed pur suant to section 8-20-101 et seq . of the Te nnessee Code, the trial court is vested not only with the discretion to awa rd attorne y ’s fe es, but also has the discretion to set the amount of such fee s. After revie wing the rec ord in this case , we c annot say that the trial court a bused its discret i o n in awar ding attorney ’s fe es to the Appe llee at a rate of $250 per

hour. Ac c or din g ly , w e a ff

ir m th e de c isi on of

the ch a nc e ry

c ou rt . Co sts of

thi s a pp e a l are to b e ta xedto the Ap pe lla nt, A. C. Wh art on , Jr. , M a y or of She lby Cou nty , f

or wh ic h e xec uti on may is su e if
n e c e s s ar y.

___________________________________ ALAN E. HI GHERS, J UDGE