If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to 

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

UNPUBLISHED

October 07, 2024

9:46 AM

In re M. ZAMORA, Minor.

No. 370062

Genesee Circuit Court

Family Division

LC No. 20-136976-NA

Before: BORRELLO, P.J., and MURRAY and LETICA, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Respondent-mother appeals as of right the order of the trial court terminating her parental 

rights to her minor child pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) (conditions that led to adjudication 

continue to exist), (g) (failure to provide proper care or custody), and (j) (reasonable likelihood 

that child will be harmed if returned to parent).

1

 For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In October 2020, the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) filed a petition 

to remove the child from the care of respondent-mother. The petition was authorized. The child, 

at roughly two weeks old, was ultimately placed in the care of a relative. In September 2021, 

respondent-mother pleaded no contest to the allegations that she had tested positive for 

methamphetamine the day before the birth of her child and that the child was born presumptively 

positive for methamphetamine. Although respondent-mother participated in some of the ordered 

services and demonstrated a pattern of increasingly longer periods of sobriety, she ultimately 

relapsed several times throughout the proceedings. Access to parenting time during this period 

was progressively limited from an “open-door policy” with the child’s relative placement to 

supervised visits at the DHHS office as a result of respondent-mother’s inconsistency with 

attendance. During the course of the proceedings, respondent-mother was unable to secure stable 

 

1 During these proceedings, the trial court also terminated the parental rights of the child's unknown 

father. The father is not a party to this appeal.
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housing, or a job. She mostly lived with her mother but had a history of getting kicked out of her 

mother’s house and experiencing periods of homelessness and incarceration. Respondent-mother 

never provided proof of employment throughout the proceedings, only verifying that she received 

about $1,400 monthly from Social Security. DHHS indicated that it was not confident that 

respondent-mother’s Social Security income was sufficient to support both the respondent-mother 

and the child. At an October 2022 hearing, DHHS informed the presiding referee that respondentmother had recently been sentenced to 17 to 120 months’ imprisonment for a probation violation 

for methamphetamine use. The referee suspended respondent-mother’s parenting time, changed 

the permanency plan to adoption, and ordered the filing of a termination petition. After being 

released from incarceration in March 2023, a termination petition was filed for respondent-mother 

and any known or unknown fathers in April 2023. Despite several requests by respondent-mother 

to reinstate parenting time, her requests were denied due to the pending termination hearing. The 

termination hearing for respondent-mother was adjourned until November 2023 as DHHS had 

difficulty obtaining relevant records.2In November 2023, the parties agreed to start the hearing 

without the records and to continue it in January 2024, giving DHHS more time to obtain the 

records. In December 2023, respondent-mother relapsed, leading to the adjournment of her 

termination hearing until February 2024.

At the February 2024 termination hearing, a caseworker testified about respondentmother’s December 2023 arrests for methamphetamine use. Although respondent-mother was, 

again, completing her service plan, the DHHS worker testified that respondent-mother had not 

seen the child in a year and a half, that they lacked a bond, that respondent-mother had not rectified 

her substance abuse addiction, and that she did not believe that respondent-mother would do so in 

the “near future.”

The relative placement testified that she was a stay-at-home mom, that she gave her 

“undivided attention” to the child, that the child was over three years old at the time of the hearing, 

that her family had raised the child “just like another one of the kids at the house,” and that the 

child had a bond with her and the family. The relative placement also testified that the child had 

begun to demonstrate some developmental delays and that she ensured that he received all 

necessary care.

The relative placement and DHHS worker opined that termination of respondent-mother’s 

parental rights was in the best interests of the child because respondent-mother had not resolved 

her struggle with addiction and returning the child to respondent-mother’s care could place the 

child at risk of harm. Respondent-mother admitted to her struggle with substance abuse. 

Respondent-mother testified that she received $1,480 per month from Social Security, that she 

lived with her mom, and that there was enough room in their house for the child.

The trial court found that DHHS had established by clear and convincing evidence that 

termination of respondent-mother’s parental rights was appropriate under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), 

 

2The parental rights of any known or unknown father were terminated at an August 2023 hearing, 

which was adjourned due to the absence of records.
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(g), and (j) and that termination of respondent-mother’s parental rights was in the child’s best 

interests.

II. STATUTORY GROUNDS

In her appeal, respondent-mother argues that the trial court clearly erred in finding that 

DHHS had established statutory grounds for termination of her parental rights. 

“We review for clear error the trial court’s decision that statutory grounds for termination 

have been proven by clear and convincing evidence . . . .” In re Lombard, ___ Mich App ___, 

___; ___ NW3d ___ (2024) (Docket No. 367714); slip op at 4. “A trial court’s decision is clearly 

erroneous if although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is 

left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” Id. (quotation marks and 

citations omitted).

MCL 712A.19b(3) states, in relevant part:

The court may terminate a parent’s parental rights to a child if the court

finds, by clear and convincing evidence, 1 or more of the following:

* * *

(c) The parent was a respondent in a proceeding brought under this chapter, 

182 or more days have elapsed since the issuance of an initial dispositional order, 

and the court, by clear and convincing evidence, finds either of the following:

(i) The conditions that led to the adjudication continue to exist and there is 

no reasonable likelihood that the conditions will be rectified within a reasonable 

time considering the child’s age.

* * *

(g) The parent, although, in the court’s discretion, financially able to do so, 

fails to provide proper care or custody for the child and there is no reasonable 

expectation that the parent will be able to provide proper care and custody within a 

reasonable time considering the child’s age.

* * *

(j) There is a reasonable likelihood, based on the conduct or capacity of the 

child’s parent, that the child will be harmed if the child is returned to the home of 

the parent.

“Once a statutory basis for termination of parental rights has been demonstrated, the trial court 

must terminate parental rights if a preponderance of the evidence establishes that termination is in 

the best interests of the child.” In re Lombard, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 5.
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Based on our review of the record, we conclude that the trial court did not make a clear 

error in finding clear and convincing evidence that the conditions which led to the initial 

dispositional order continued to exist for more than 182 days. Additionally, we concur with the 

trial court’s findings that it was not reasonably likely for the conditions to be fixed within a 

reasonable time, considering the age of the child. MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i). “The conditions that 

led to adjudication continue to exist if ‘the totality of the evidence amply supports’ the finding that 

the parent has not achieved ‘any meaningful change in the conditions’ that led to the trial court 

assuming jurisdiction of the child.” In re Lombard, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 5, quoting In 

re Williams, 286 Mich App 253, 272; 779 NW2d 286 (2009). Determining whether a respondent 

is likely to rectify the conditions leading to adjudication within a reasonable time requires 

consideration of both how long the parent will take to improve the conditions and how long the 

child can wait for the improvements. In re Dahms, 187 Mich App 644, 648; 468 NW2d 315 

(1991).

The trial court determined that the issues that led to termination were primarily connected 

to substance abuse. The trial court found that these issues were still present at the time of the 

termination hearing, which took place more than two years after the initial decision, as respondentmother had been arrested for methamphetamine use between the first and second termination 

hearings. The trial court expressed concern that despite some periods of success, respondentmother’s overall progress was not sustainable, and the respondent-mother’s situation had not 

improved since the beginning of the case, even though the minor child was now over three years 

old.

The trial court’s findings are supported by the record. The caseworker’s testimony 

established that respondent-mother’s longest period of sobriety throughout the proceedings was 

just over a year. Respondent-mother had never provided financial support to the child, provided 

any care for the child, or obtained employment or stable housing. Respondent-mother also 

admitted that she continued to struggle with her addiction. Accordingly, the trial court did not 

clearly err when it found that there were grounds to terminate the respondent-mother’s parental 

rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i).3

III. BEST INTERESTS

Respondent-mother argues that the court did not make appropriate best-interests findings 

and failed to properly analyze the best-interests factors. She also contends that she still had a bond 

with the child, and that her requests to reinstate parenting time should not negate her ability to 

create a strong bond with the child. Additionally, she believes that the trial court gave improper 

weight to the fact that the child was placed with a relative.

This Court reviews “for clear error the trial court’s . . . determination that termination is in 

a child’s best interests.” In re Lombard, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 4. See MCR 3.977(K). 

This Court “review[s] for an abuse of discretion the trial court’s decision regarding the factors to 

 

3Because only one statutory ground need be established to terminate parental rights, MCL 

712A.19b(3);In re Lombard, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 1 n 1, we need not address the 

additional statutory grounds on which the trial court relied. 
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consider in making its best-interests determination, including the propriety of a guardianship.” Id. 

“An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court chooses an outcome falling outside the range 

of principled outcomes. An error of law, such as the application of the wrong legal standard, 

necessarily constitutes an abuse of discretion.” Id. (quotation marks and citations omitted).

“Once a statutory basis for termination of parental rights has been demonstrated, the trial 

court must terminate parental rights if a preponderance of the evidence establishes that termination 

is in the best interests of the child.” In re Lombard, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 5, citing MCL 

712A.19b(5). To determine whether termination is in the best interests of a child, 

the trial court should weigh all evidence available to it, considering a wide variety 

of factors that may include the child’s bond to the parent, the parent’s parenting 

ability, the child’s need for permanency, stability, and finality, the advantages of 

the foster home over the parent’s home, the length of time the child was in care, the 

likelihood that the child could be returned to the parent’s home in the foreseeable 

future, and the parent’s compliance with the case service plan. [Id. at ___; slip op 

at 5-6.]

The focus of a trial court’s best-interests determination must be “on the child rather than the 

parent.” In re Schadler, 315 Mich App 406, 411; 890 NW2d 676 (2016).

In the trial court’s assessment of the best-interests factors, the trial court found that 

respondent-mother had not complied with her service plan due to a series of relapses. Additionally,

the court determined that she did not have a bond with the child and had not shown that she could 

safely parent the child. The child’s well-being had been maintained by the relative placement 

during the proceedings, and the trial court properly concluded that the child could not be returned 

to respondent-mother’s care within a reasonable time. Respondent-mother claimed that she had a 

bond with the child based on her testimony regarding parenting time visits at a park “the summer 

before [she] was sent to prison.” However, a caseworker testified at the termination hearing that 

she had observed parenting time between the respondent-mother and the child on multiple 

occasions and that the child “very clearly didn’t have a bond with [respondent-mother].” The 

relative placement also testified that when she supervised respondent-mother’s parenting time, 

respondent-mother missed “probably two-thirds of the visits,” and the child did not know 

respondent-mother. “It is not for this Court to displace the trial court’s credibility determination.” 

In re HRC, 286 Mich App 444, 460; 781 NW2d 105 (2009). The record reveals that respondentmother never had a bond with the child, even before suspension of parenting time by the trial court. 

Caseworkers testified that the child had issues following respondent-mother’s visits, and 

respondent mother often missed scheduled visits. On this record, we conclude that the trial court 

did not clearly err in finding that respondent-mother lacked a bond with the child.

Respondent-mother argues that the trial court’s refusal to reinstate her parenting time made 

it difficult for her to form a strong bond with her child. Respondent-mother’s parenting time had 

been suspended after she violated her probation by using methamphetamine. Additionally, 

respondent-mother’s argument ignores statutes and case law which allow a court to suspend 

parenting time if it believes that even supervised visits could harm the child’s life, physical health, 

or mental well-being. MCL 712A.13a(13); see also In re Ott, 344 Mich App 723, 737-739; 2 

NW3d 120 (2022) (discussing suspension of parenting time, generally). Here, the trial court found 
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that continued parenting time would be harmful to the child when it suspended respondentmother’s parenting time. Based on the record evidence cited, the trial court’s decision to suspend 

parenting time was not an abuse of discretion. See In re Laster, 303 Mich App 485, 490; 845 

NW2d 540 (2013), superseded by statute on other grounds as recognized by In re Ott, 344 Mich 

App at 737-741.

Furthermore, trial courts may suspend the parenting time of a parent subject to a 

termination petition without further justification. In re Ott, 334 Mich App at 737 & n 7, citing 

MCL 712A.19b(4). At a permanency planning hearing following respondent-mother’s 

incarceration for methamphetamine use, DHHS recommended the filing of a termination petition. 

DHHS ultimately filed a petition to terminate respondent-mother’s parental rights. As respondentmother was subsequently subject to a pending termination hearing, the trial court needed no other 

justification to maintain the suspension of respondent-mother’s parenting time. See In re Ott, 334 

Mich App at 737.

Respondent-mother also argues that the trial court gave improper weight to the fact that the 

child was placed with a relative. A child’s placement with relatives weighs against termination 

and is a factor that the trial court must consider when making its best-interests determination. In 

re Mota, 334 Mich App 300, 321; 964 NW2d 881 (2020). The trial court recognized that the child 

had been living with relatives since he was two weeks old, and that the relatives had not hindered 

respondent-mother’s efforts to reunify with her child. The court also noted that the relatives had 

taken on the role of parents due to the mother’s inability to do so. However, the trial court found 

that the mother had not adequately addressed her substance abuse, secured stable housing, or 

financially supported the child during the three years he was in the relative’s care. Additionally, 

the court found that the child might have special needs, which the relatives were meeting. It was 

clear that the placement with the relatives was better for the child, as he had been with them for all 

but three weeks of his life, and it was unlikely that he would be returned to the mother’s care in 

the near future. In re Lombard, ___ Mich App ___; slip op at 4-5.

The trial court properly “weigh[ed] all evidence available to it” at the time, In re Lombard, 

___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 5, and did not clearly err when it properly considered the child’s 

placement with relatives in this case and determined that the termination of respondent-mother’s 

parental rights was nevertheless in the best interests of the child, see id. at ___; slip op at 6.

Affirmed.

/s/ Stephen L. Borrello 

/s/ Christopher M. Murray 

/s/ Anica Letica