# Aruba - United States Department of State

- Aruba National Day Antony J. Blinken, Secretary of StateOn behalf of the United States of America, I congratulate the people of Aruba on the celebration of the 38th anniversary of your National Anthem and Flag Day.The United States remains steadfastly committed to our long-standing and enduring partnership with Aruba.  Strengthening educational and cultural bonds between our nations is a mutual priority, exemplified by our EducationUSA advising center and reinforced by the enduring friendships forged over shared values and generations of tourism and exchanges.  We take great pride in our collaborative endeavors aimed at dismantling transnational criminal networks, combating unlawful activities, and fostering a safe, stable, and successful Caribbean region.  We remain dedicated to partnering with Aruba to address the climate crisis and eagerly anticipate working together to support Aruba’s ambitious renewable energy objectives.  We would also like to extend our gratitude to the people of Aruba for warmly welcoming more than 1.5 million American tourists each year.On the occasion of Aruba’s National Anthem and Flag Day, the United States extends its heartfelt wishes for a happy and prosperous year for all Arubans.
- Press briefing with Todd D. Robinson, Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs Todd D.  Robinson, Assistant SecretaryBureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement AffairsMODERATOR:  Greetings to everyone from the U.S. Department of State’s Media Hub of the Americas in Miami, Florida.  I would like to welcome our participants who have dialed in from the United States and across the region.  This is an on-the-record press briefing with the Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs Todd D. Robinson. Assistant Secretary Robinson will discuss outcomes from Friday’s virtual ministerial to launch a Global Coalition to Address Synthetic Drug Threats as well as next steps for the global coalition.  This coalition seeks to unite countries worldwide in a concerted effort to prevent the illicit manufacture and trafficking of synthetic drugs, identify emerging drug trends, and respond effectively to their public health impacts. As a reminder, today’s briefing is on the record.  And with that, I will turn it over to Assistant Secretary Robinson. ASSISTANT SECRETARY ROBINSON:  Thank you for joining this call today and for the opportunity to discuss the collective efforts we have undertaken to confront the important issue of synthetic drugs. Last Friday, as you know, Secretary Blinken hosted a virtual ministerial to launch a Global Coalition to Address Synthetic Drug Threats.  Nearly 100 countries and international organizations participated in the launch, underscoring the shared concern about this public health and national security threat.  The coalition aims to unite countries worldwide in a concerted effort to combat the illicit manufacture and trafficking of synthetic drugs.  Together, we hope to strengthen efforts to prevent the production and trafficking of illicit synthetic drugs, identify emerging synthetic drug trends and use patterns, and promote efforts to respond effectively to the public health impacts they impose. Participants at the ministerial underscored the importance of sharing data and increasing efforts to mitigate the health impact of synthetic drug use.  As you all already know, synthetic drugs such as fentanyl and methamphetamine pose a grave risk to the health and security of our citizens here in the United States.  The consequences of these drugs are devastating as evidenced by the alarming statistics. In 2022, the CDC estimated that nearly 110,000 Americans lost their lives to drug overdoses.  Recognizing the gravity of this situation, the Biden administration is fully committed to preventing drug use and minimizing its negative impact.  We understand the importance of connecting individuals to treatment and supporting the more than 20 million Americans in recovery.  President Biden’s National Drug Control Strategy has allocated a substantial $24 billion dollars in this fiscal year to strengthen drug-related public health interventions.  These measures not only safeguard the health of our citizens, but also exemplify our dedication at home as we look to other nations to also take action. It is vital to note that these dangers are not limited to the United States.  More countries than ever are facing an increasing threat from synthetic drugs like tramadol, Captagon, MDMA, and Ketamine.  Criminals are constantly innovating to create new synthetic drugs, adjusting formulas to avoid international controls and domestic regulations, and creating new demand.   One staggering number to note:  Over the past decade, more than 1,100 new synthetic drugs were detected and reported by the United Nations.  Through the Global Coalition to Address Synthetic Drug Threats, we are harnessing international cooperation and shared knowledge to tackle this crisis head on.  By working together, we can more effectively disrupt the illicit synthetic drug supply chains, enhance our ability to identify and respond to emerging threats, and protect the lives and well-being of our own citizens and of people around the world. The United States has already been working with partners like Mexico, Canada, and other countries to drive urgent global action to disrupt the synthetic drug trade from beginning to end.  We are engaging with countries such as India to strengthen our partnerships on securing pharmaceutical and chemical supply chains to prevent criminal diversion of dual-use precursor chemicals, and we remain committed to engaging with the PRC to address the threat illicit synthetic drugs pose to our countries.  The Department of State also works within the UN, the Organization of American States, the G7, G20, and other organizations to improve the abilities of our countries to detect and disrupt the illicit manufacturing, diversion, and trafficking of precursor chemicals and finished drugs.   We have more important work to do, so in closing, let me express my gratitude to our international partners who have already joined us in this crucial endeavor.  The fight against synthetic drugs requires a global response, and we are confident that our collective efforts will yield significant results.  Together, we can create a safer and healthier future for our citizens and generations to come.   Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.   MODERATOR:  Thank you so much, Assistant Secretary.  We will now begin the question-and-answer portion of today’s briefing.  For those on the English line asking questions, please limit yourself to one question related to the topic of today’s briefing.  If you submitted your question in advance, I have incorporated the question into the queue.  Our first question today we received from Daniel – from Jim Carson of La Jornada in Mexico:  “What specific will be new out of this declaration?  Are you setting up a FinCEN-type structure to share information, do evaluations, and a secretariat, or is it simply a reiteration of past commitments without any specific additional actions?”   ASSISTANT SECRETARY ROBINSON:  Great question.  The first thing I would say is we are – we are building on what we have done in the past and what has been done by other countries in the past.  The coalition is intended to be an inclusive forum for sharing best practices and identifying areas for collaboration to improve the global response to public health and security threats posed by synthetic drugs.  We ask that countries commit to working collaboratively with other coalition member countries at both political and technical levels to develop a joint framework for addressing synthetic drugs and develop actions in line with that framework.  Thanks.   MODERATOR:  Thank you.  We received a question from journalist Fernando Morales from Red Salvadoreña de Medios in El Salvador: “El Salvador is a corridor for the transit of synthetic drugs like fentanyl.  How is work being done to prevent the trafficking of these narcotics?”   ASSISTANT SECRETARY ROBINSON:  I’m sorry.  Could you say that again?  MODERATOR:  Absolutely, Assistant Secretary.  “El Salvador is a corridor for the transit of synthetic drugs like fentanyl.  How is work being done to prevent the trafficking of these narcotics?&#8221; ASSISTANT SECRETARY ROBINSON:  Great question.  As our correspondent will note, the United States Government on several different levels is working with members of the civilian security forces in El Salvador and throughout the region – El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras – on things like investigations, going after the trafficking networks.  We have experts on the ground from DEA and the Department of Justice.   We also work on training.  As the correspondent will note, there is an International Law Enforcement Academy hosted by the Government of El Salvador where we can do training for police and prosecutors in the region on different techniques and modernized techniques for going after these networks.  So those are ways that we are – those are ways that we are trying to get after these – shut down these corridors.   MODERATOR:  Thank you, Assistant Secretary.  The next question will go to Jesús Esquivel from Proceso Magazine in Mexico.  Jesús, please unmute yourself.   QUESTION:  Hello.  Can you hear me?   MODERATOR:  Yes.  Please ask your question.  &#8212;    QUESTION:  Okay.  Yes.  Under Secretary, there has always been the accusations that the Mexican cartels are responsible for all the synthetic drugs in the United States, but as you probably know, the domestic cartels in the U.S. are also responsible for the distributions and sale of these drugs.   My question to you is:  What exactly or when exactly the U.S. Government for the first time is going to be exposing the domestic cartels in this problem and in the United States?  And also, if you think the accusations as – members of the U.S. Congress made to Mexico and threats that they probably going to invade Mexico to stop the drug trafficking, it will help in this global coalition in the case of – specifically of Mexico to cooperate with the U.S. Government?   ASSISTANT SECRETARY ROBINSON:  Thank you, Jesús.  Both good questions.  Look, first of all, I would – I would not exactly support the premise of your question.  We have never said that all of the fentanyl or synthetic opioids that are coming to the United States are coming from Mexico.  We know that this is a global – a global effort by cartels from different regions around the world, including criminals in the United States.  I don’t think the FBI or the Department of Justice or our local law enforcement authorities have been shy about exposing the criminal networks in the United States that are trafficking in these drugs.  I think they will continue to publicly expose them when available.  So that’s thing number one. Thing number two, we have – the United States has an excellent relationship with our counterparts in Mexico.  We are both working very close to go after the networks in Mexico, to increase our cooperation on both sides of our southwest border, your northern border.  And we are working together internationally to share our experiences with working together with other countries around the world.  I’m very proud of our relationship with our Mexican counterparts, and we’re going to continue to call on them as they call on us to work together to do more to stop – to stop this global trafficking of synthetic drugs. MODERATOR:  Thank you, Assistant Secretary Robison.  The next question will go to Adyr Corral from El Sol de Mexico.  Adyr, please unmute yourself.  Go ahead.  Adyr, can you hear us?   Okay, unfortunately we’re going to have to move on.  I see we have a submitted question in our Q&amp;A from Brendan O’Boyle from Reuters in Mexico City: “Thank you, Ambassador.  Within the coalition, where is there concern about fentanyl’s short-term spread geographically?  In Mexico, some experts have sounded alarm about fentanyl spreading in drug supply domestically, though data is scarce.  Have coalition partners in Mexico recognized domestic spread?” ASSISTANT SECRETARY ROBINSON:  I’m sorry, can you repeat that question again? MODERATOR:  Sure, sir.  “Thank you, Ambassador.  Within the coalition, where is there concern about fentanyl’s short-term spread geographically?  In Mexico, some experts have sounded the alarm about fentanyl spreading in the drug supply domestically, though data is scarce.  Have coalition partners in Mexico recognized domestic spread?” ASSISTANT SECRETARY ROBINSON:  The short answer is I believe the Government of Mexico has recognized the short-term spread of synthetic opioids.  We are – and – but there’s a very good relationship between our Office of National Drug Control Policy and the secretary for Health in Mexico.  They are working very closely together on campaigns to raise awareness about synthetic opioids and what can be done to avoid falling into – into that addiction.  So we feel like we have a burgeoning story to tell, a better story to tell as we go forward on our cooperation on the messaging against the domestic – in Mexico, the domestic spread of the – and growth of the use of synthetic opioids. MODERATOR:  Thank you, Assistant Secretary.  I’m told we’ve resolved the microphone issues with Adyr Corral, so we’ll go back to Adyr Corral from El Sol de Mexico.  Please unmute yourself. QUESTION:  Hi.  You can hear me? ASSISTANT SECRETARY ROBINSON:  Yes. MODERATOR:  We can hear you. QUESTION:  Ah, thank you very much.  Sorry for the problems.  I would like to ask the assistant secretary for a comment on the initiative to designate the fentanyl as a weapon of mass destruction in Congress.  How about that, Assistant Secretary? ASSISTANT SECRETARY ROBINSON:  Thank you, great question.  We have currently – the Department of Justice, DEA, FBI, Department of State – we feel like we have the authorities necessary to go after the networks that are trafficking in these drugs.  At the moment, we don’t see that classifying fentanyl as a weapon of mass destruction will give us any more authority than we already have to try to stop its trafficking.  So we feel pretty comfortable that we’re in a good place in terms of having the tools necessary to go after the drug and to go after the networks that are trafficking the drugs.  QUESTION:  Thank you very much.  MODERATOR:  Thank you, Assistant Secretary.  The next question was submitted in advance from Juan Silva from W Radio in Colombia:  “How do you assess the current situation in Colombia in terms of the fight against drugs?”  ASSISTANT SECRETARY ROBINSON:  Well, as the correspondent, as Juan will know, we have a very long, very strong, very deep relationship with Colombia and Colombia’s security forces that has developed over a number of years.  We feel like we are – we have developed into great partners.  Colombia has become a net exporter of security globally, and that is in large part due to the very strong relationship that has developed with the United States.   Today we continue in that effort.  There are areas where we are hoping to start working – new areas where we are starting to – we want to begin working with the Petro government, and we are in constant conversation with Petro and his team to figure out how we can best help them bring greater security and safety to communities in Colombia, and by doing so, help shut down the networks that are trafficking drugs north to the United States.  Thanks.  MODERATOR:  Thank you, Assistant Secretary.   Our next question we received from Eduard Ribas from EFE:  “What responsibility does China have on the trafficking of fentanyl precursors?  How can this coalition be successful without Chinese participation?”  ASSISTANT SECRETARY ROBINSON:  Well, I would say the – we know good things happen when China is involved in conversations like this.  You will recall in 2019 the Chinese Government scheduled fentanyl and made it much harder to get out of the country directly and be shipped directly to other countries.  And when they did that, the trafficking of fentanyl itself in the United States from China went to almost zero.  So we think that there’s a lot more that can be done by the PRC in terms of greater monitoring and labeling and information-sharing on the precursor chemicals that are leaving the PRC, and they – we invited them to join the coalition.  We expect at some point that they will take us up on our invitation because they want to be responsible, a responsible country in this effort.  And we all know that they play – that there are companies in China that play an important role in the distribution of the precursor chemicals that go into making these drugs.  Over.  MODERATOR:  Thank you, Assistant Secretary.  We have time for about two more questions.  One was submitted in advance from a journalist in Guyana regarding CARICOM, Denis Chabrol from Demarara Waves Online News:  “How badly are Caribbean Community (CARICOM) nations affected by synthetic drugs?”  ASSISTANT SECRETARY ROBINSON:  Thank you.  Again, this is a – that’s a great question.  I would say although we haven’t seen significant production in the Caribbean, it’s important to note that criminal chemists can easily synthesize fentanyl almost anywhere.  The Global Coalition to Address Synthetic Drug Threats will provide a foundation for developing and implementing effective, practical solutions to prevent the illicit manufacture and trafficking of synthetic drugs.  It will help detect emerging drug threats, and we hope it will help respond to the – to their public health impacts.  Over. MODERATOR:  Thank you.  I see in the chat the journalist had added:  “What do we expect from CARICOM and what assistance the U.S. can provide?” ASSISTANT SECRETARY ROBINSON:  Well, actually, I would turn it around.  The question should be:  What more can CARICOM countries do?  And I think, again, when we talk about things like exchanging information, when we talk about things like making sure that they are getting access, making sure their communities are getting access to the antidotes for overdoses, making sure that they are reporting to the international organizations that are collecting information that everybody else can use – those are the things that that we would hope we could get from countries that are involved in the global coalition.  And the United States and the international community will continue to help with training and equipping those police forces and prosecutors that are working on this issue.  Over. MODERATOR:  Thank you, Assistant Secretary.  We had a question from Martin Villena from Andina News Agency in Peru:  “Concerning the Global Coalition to Address Synthetic Drug Threats, does its launch also mean strengthening even more relations with countries such as Peru and Colombia, which face the issue and the related problems concerning cocaine productions in their territories?” ASSISTANT SECRETARY ROBINSON:  Well, we’re always working to strengthening – strengthening the relationship with our good friends in Peru and Colombia.  But in fact, again, we will – what the establishment of this coalition is looking to do is to have our friends from Peru and Colombia share their experiences with other countries around the world and help other countries who don’t have the expertise that our countries do, help them address the issues in their countries.  We have great relationships with our partners in Peru and Colombia; I don’t expect that will change.  But we will – in the establishment of this coalition, we will be asking them to do more to help on a global level.  Over.   MODERATOR:  Thank you, Assistant Secretary.  We received a question from Carrie Kahn with NPR:  “How do proposals from some Republicans in the United States urging military intervention to stop fentanyl trafficking in Mexico affect your plans to enlist global partners?” ASSISTANT SECRETARY ROBINSON:  Well, I would say we’re going to let Congress – the Senate and the House – develop and debate their own ideas.  We are going to – I am focused on working with our civilian security partners globally, making sure that they have the training, the equipment, the strategies; making sure they have access to the expertise necessary to focus on what is our responsibility, which is providing civilian security to our communities, both in the United States and around and world. MODERATOR:  Thank you, Assistant Secretary.  I believe we’ve gone through all the questions that we had today, so that will conclude today’s briefing.  I wanted to thank you for joining us today, as well as all of the journalists on the line for their questions.  If you have any follow-up questions about today’s briefing, you may contact the Miami Media Hub at MiamiHub@state.gov.  An English recording and transcript will be available for this briefing, as well as transcripts in Spanish and Brazilian Portuguese.  Thank you so much and have a good day. ASSISTANT SECRETARY ROBINSON:  Thanks.  Thanks, everybody. 
- Aruba HomeReportsOffice to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons2023 Trafficking in Persons Report&#8230;Aruba				hide	document.addEventListener("DOMContentLoaded", function(event) {	if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}});																						2023 Trafficking in Persons Report: Aruba																																																																																												 In this section										/																							ARUBA (Tier 2)*																																													ARUBA (Tier 2)*																															PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS:																																																																																		PROSECUTION																																																																																		PROTECTION																																																																																		PREVENTION																																																																																		TRAFFICKING PROFILE:																																																																																																								ARUBA (Tier 2)*				The Government of Aruba does not fully meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant efforts to do so.  The government demonstrated overall increasing efforts compared with the previous reporting period, considering the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, if any, on its anti-trafficking capacity; therefore Aruba was upgraded to Tier 2.  These efforts included identifying and providing support services to more trafficking victims; increasing screening of vulnerable populations, which led to nine potential victim referrals; and establishing a permanent contract for the Coordination Center on Human Trafficking and Migrant Smuggling (CMMA) project manager, increasing the role’s stability.  The government launched several awareness-raising campaigns, including a new academic curriculum for secondary students; it also increased staffing for the Human Trafficking and Migrant Smuggling Unit (UMM).  The government- funded and completed the renovation of an existing structure to create sleeping, living, and staff spaces at the site of its planned mixed-use shelter, but the shelter did not open in 2022.  However, the government did not meet the minimum standards in several key areas.  The government did not prosecute or convict any traffickers for the fourth consecutive year and lacked an effective protocol for victim referral and service provision.  Key anti-trafficking institutions did not coordinate fully, hindering the prosecution of trafficking crimes.																																					PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS:						    																																															Vigorously investigate and prosecute trafficking crimes and seek adequate penalties for convicted traffickers, which should involve significant prison terms.Proactively identify victims among all vulnerable groups, including women in commercial sex, detained migrants, domestic workers, and migrants working in construction, supermarkets, and retail.Train law enforcement officials, prosecutors, judges, coast guard officers, and labor inspectors on victim-centered and trauma-informed approaches to trafficking cases.Formalize and fund CMMA as a permanent institution.Decouple victim identification and assistance procedures from the investigation and prosecution of trafficking crimes and empower non-law enforcement officials to designate trafficking victims as such.Operationalize the multipurpose shelter for victims of crimes, including human trafficking.Establish comprehensive guidelines for victim identification, referral, and service provision.Improve coordination and information-sharing between law enforcement and prosecutors, and with anti-trafficking counterparts across the Kingdom of the Netherlands.Promote awareness of human trafficking, as distinct from migrant smuggling, through trafficking-specific materials and campaigns.																																												PROSECUTION						    																																															The government maintained uneven prosecution efforts.  Article 2:239 of the penal code criminalized sex trafficking and labor trafficking and prescribed penalties of up to eight years’ imprisonment or a fine for crimes involving a victim 16 years of age or older and up to 12 years’ imprisonment or a fine for those involving a victim younger than the age of 16.  These penalties were sufficiently stringent and, with respect to sex trafficking, commensurate with those prescribed for other serious crimes, such as kidnapping.  A draft amendment to increase the penalties prescribed in the anti-trafficking statute, drafted in 2020, remained pending at the end of the reporting period.In 2022, the government reported initiating three active investigations, all for sex trafficking, compared with one investigation in 2021; authorities continued to investigate one forced labor case, initiated in a previous reporting period.  The precision of government reporting improved in 2022, better distinguishing between initial reports of potential trafficking crimes (23 in 2022 and 17 in 2021), preliminary investigations (six in 2022 and seven in 2021), and active investigations (three in 2022 and one in 2021).  Officials did not report prosecuting or convicting any traffickers for the fourth consecutive year.  Authorities continued to prosecute one labor trafficking case involving two suspects, initiated in 2018; prosecutors reported an unresolved mutual legal assistance request to a foreign government prevented the case from progressing.  The government did not report investigating, prosecuting, or convicting any government employees complicit in trafficking crimes.  The government increased staffing from three to seven officers at its Human Trafficking and Migrant Smuggling Unit (UMM), a joint unit comprising law enforcement officials from the Aruban Police Force and the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee ; UMM led trafficking investigations in close coordination with the general prosecutor’s office.  A steering committee composed of senior police and prosecutors assessed the viability of potential investigations for all crimes and referred trafficking cases to the UMM for investigation; prior to steering committee referral, law enforcement could not actively investigate trafficking-related incidents unless a victim filed the initial report or was at risk of harm.  Another interdisciplinary police unit (JIUMM), composed of three officers, conducted passive, preliminary investigations into possible trafficking crimes, including tips from the hotline or other law enforcement entities, and presented them to the steering committee.  Observers reported the steering committee’s evaluation weighed official capacity limitations against the likelihood of eventual conviction, which disincentivized referral of trafficking cases, considered especially labor-intensive by prosecutors; the same observers expressed concern this process may have prevented the active investigation of trafficking cases during the reporting period.  JIUMM referred one preliminary investigation to the steering committee, compared with zero in 2021; the steering committee did not authorize JIUMM’s referral for active investigation.  However, UMM directly investigated three cases due to concerns for victim safety.  The public prosecutor’s office had an internal protocol for the prosecution of trafficking cases and designated one of its eight prosecutors to oversee trafficking cases.  Some observers suggested coordination challenges between the JIUMM, UMM, and national prosecutor’s office negatively impacted efforts to hold traffickers accountable.The government reported it trained law enforcement, labor inspectors, and border control officials on victim identification and referral.  While law enforcement and government officials with trafficking-specific assignments distinguished between human trafficking and migrant smuggling, observers expressed concern some non-specialized officials, such as frontline police officers, had an inadequate understanding of trafficking; across the government, Aruba addressed human trafficking and migrant smuggling via the same institutions, possibly contributing to conflation of the crimes.  Many officials carried “Quick Reference Cards” (QRCs), distributed at trafficking trainings, that included a list of trafficking indicators and CMMA’s contact information.  Aruban authorities participated in one multinational anti-trafficking operation, although the government did not report any arrests or victims identified in connection with the effort.																																												PROTECTION						    																																															The government increased protection efforts.  The government reported identifying six trafficking victims – four confirmed and one presumed sex trafficking victims and one presumed labor trafficking victim – in 2022, compared with one trafficking victim – a presumed labor trafficking victim – in 2021.  Of the six victims identified, all were foreign nationals: four Colombian women, one German woman, and one Colombian man.  The government classified victims as “potential,” “presumed,” or “confirmed” victims; potential victims were typically associated with early-stage investigations and could not access support services, which the government only provided to presumed or confirmed victims.  JIUMM and UMM could assign presumed status to potential victims; only UMM could confer confirmed status.  These entities screened nine individuals initially assessed as potential victims of trafficking in 2022; by comparison, they screened fourteen potential victims, seven of whom did not receive presumed status, in 2021.  The government reported civil society organizations facilitated the identification of and support for most victims in 2022; CMMA developed and implemented a new referral form to standardize this process.  Victims identified through civil society organizations could remain anonymous during the government’s preliminary investigation.  The government referred five victims to services in 2022, compared with one victim in 2021 and none in 2020.  CMMA furnished in-kind support and coordinated with civil society organizations to provide medical care, legal support, and social services for trafficking victims; the government maintained informal agreements with local NGOs and private sector accommodations to shelter adult and child trafficking victims.  Through these arrangements, the government could secure emergency short-term and, for adult female victims, longer-term shelter.  In 2022, the government provided short-term shelter for one adult female victim at a civil society facility.  The government drafted, but did not finalize in 2022, terms to formalize these agreements with shelter providers.  There were no trafficking-specific shelters and officials reported shelter restrictions sometimes made it difficult to place certain victims, such as those with drug dependencies.  Authorities could place unaccompanied child victims in foster care, and NGOs or local churches could accommodate adult male victims, although they did not do so in 2022.  Officials conducted risk assessments before deciding whether victims could leave shelters unchaperoned; they restricted victims’ movement if their lives were threatened.Authorities reported all five victims supported investigations into alleged trafficking crimes, compared with no victims participating in investigations or prosecutions in 2021.  The government tied victims’ status and access to services to the associated criminal case against a trafficker.  If prosecutors determined not to pursue trafficking charges, the government discontinued services for associated victims.  Observers expressed concern that the link between victim assistance and the status of criminal proceedings against traffickers limited victims’ access to critical services.  The government could deploy a multidisciplinary team of police, labor officers, immigration officials, and civil society representatives when investigations called for operations or site visits.  The anti-trafficking task force (TMMA) continued to provide law enforcement and social services officials with a checklist of the most common signs of trafficking, which they used in concert with the QRCs.  The government reported officials screened undocumented migrants, individuals in commercial sex, and other vulnerable groups for trafficking indicators; officials referred nine potential victims to JIUMM through screening efforts.  Observers, however, expressed concern migrant detention center staff and other officials were insufficiently equipped to identify trafficking.  The government had a basic victim referral mechanism; observers expressed concern the mechanism was unclear and could re-traumatize victims, citing an instance where a victim participating in a law enforcement investigation rescinded her support and left the country following repetitive interviews and frequent changes in housing.  CMMA reported it continued to draft a comprehensive SOP governing victim identification, referral, and service provision with the support of an international organization; it had not adopted the SOP by the end of the reporting period.  The government reported informally implementing some elements of the draft SOP; one identified victim benefited from a new 48-hour reflection period through this effort.  CMMA’s civil society working group met monthly throughout the reporting period.  The government reported it renovated an existing structure to create sleeping, living, and staff spaces at the site of its planned mixed-use shelter; the shelter did not open in 2022, pending furnishings for the renovated spaces and the construction of a second multi-purpose structure.The law provided foreign victims the same protections as Arubans.  The law authorized the extension of temporary residency status and work permit, valid for three to six months, for foreign victims on a case-by-case basis.  The government did not provide temporary residency to any victims in 2022 or 2021; under current policies, foreign victims not participating in the trials against traffickers returned to their home countries, except when a safe return was not possible.  The criminal code enabled victims to receive restitution during criminal proceedings or to file civil suits, to seek compensation not to exceed 50,000 florin ($27,780) for financial and emotional damages, although none did so in 2022.  The Bureau of Victim Assistance operated a hotline for potential victims of all crimes, including trafficking; the government reported fielding one trafficking-related call to the hotline, which led to the identification of one victim, compared with three calls in 2021 and eight in 2020.																																												PREVENTION						    																																															The government slightly increased prevention efforts.  The National Coordinator on Human Trafficking and Migrant Smuggling, a police official, continued to lead the government’s anti-trafficking efforts, with support from the TMMA and CMMA.  All three entities had dual responsibility for both anti-trafficking and anti-smuggling efforts.  The government did not allocate funding specifically for anti-trafficking efforts in its annual budget.  However, it financed anti-trafficking efforts by incorporating trafficking-specific initiatives into its proposals for long-term, Kingdom-funded projects on border control and mass migration; through these grants, the government reported securing approximately 685,000 florin ($380,040) for anti-trafficking initiatives through 2028.  Authorities continued to implement the 2018-2022 NAP with funding tied to Kingdom-wide projects.  The government drafted and proposed a 2023-2024 NAP; the Minister of Justice had not yet approved the draft plan at the end of the reporting period.  CMMA reported formalizing its project manager position, securing funding and a recurring two-year contract for its only dedicated staff member.  The CMMA’s proposal to formalize its own institutional status remained pending at the conclusion of the reporting period.  The national coordinator reported collaborating with national anti-trafficking coordinators from Curaçao, the Netherlands, and Sint Maarten to revise the MOU outlining coordinated anti-trafficking efforts across the Kingdom of the Netherlands; the governments did not finalize the draft MOU before the end of the reporting period.Officials raised awareness of human trafficking and the hotline in multiple languages via social media, posters, and flyers.  The government continued its 2021 awareness campaign to inform migrants of numerous risks, including trafficking.  The government produced a short curriculum on the risks of human trafficking, online sexual exploitation, and migrant smuggling for school-age children, which it distributed to secondary schools across Aruba.  CMMA launched a new website in 2022, created a new awareness and outreach program for individuals in commercial sex, and began producing a second short film on undocumented migrants’ vulnerability to trafficking; CMMA also coordinated with an international organization to host a trafficking awareness training for journalists to improve trafficking-related reporting in local media.  The government collaborated with an international organization to create a Spanish-language version of the QRC for distribution among vulnerable groups; it also began working on an English translation of the product.  The government provided trafficking-awareness training to government officials from law enforcement, the judiciary, and other ministries, as well as civil society; the CMMA also trained officials on the responsibilities of the CMMA, TMMA, and UMM.  The government primarily conducted virtual awareness-raising activities, including social media campaigns and webinars; it opened most of these events to officials from neighboring countries.Officials had procedures to screen adult entertainers and reported performing an unspecified number of inspections at adult entertainment venues in 2022.  Kingdom of the Netherlands policy required individuals on adult entertainment visas, primarily Colombian women, to meet with consular officers to ensure the applicants knew their rights and had a copy of their work agreement before picking up required documents at a Kingdom of the Netherlands embassy.  Upon arrival, such visa recipients normally received information about their rights, risks, and resources.  The government did not report efforts to reduce the demand for commercial sex acts.																																												TRAFFICKING PROFILE:						    																																															As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic and foreign victims in Aruba.  Traffickers exploit Venezuelan women in sex trafficking and foreign adults of all genders in forced labor in Aruba’s service and construction industries.  Arriving Venezuelans commonly overstay their visas or arrive irregularly, leaving many without valid documentation and a corresponding increased risk for trafficking.  Families, business owners, and criminals exploit some of these Venezuelans in forced labor in domestic service, construction, and commercial sex, respectively; many domestic workers live at their employer’s home, increasing their vulnerability to trafficking.  Supermarket managers subject PRC-national men and women to forced labor in grocery stores; business owners and families subject Indian men to forced labor in the retail sector and domestic service, respectively; and Arubans force Caribbean and South American women into domestic servitude.  Officials reported instances of forced criminality, in which traffickers compel victims to commit unlawful acts, such as robberies and drug-related crimes.  Women in regulated and unregulated commercial sex, domestic workers, and employees of small retail shops are most at risk of trafficking; bar owners rent lodging to women on adult entertainment visas at rates disproportionate to their earnings, increasing their vulnerability to exploitation.* Aruba is a semi-autonomous entity of the Kingdom of the Netherlands.  For the purpose of this report, Aruba is not a “country” to which the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking in the Trafficking Victims Protection Act apply.  This narrative reflects how Aruba would be assessed if it were a separate, independent country.  However, the Kingdom is an important contributor to the Government of Aruba’s anti-trafficking efforts.																																				    							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- Aruba: International School of Aruba: 2024 Special Needs Profile Office of Overseas SchoolsDownload the Special Needs Profile (Aruba- 2024 Special Needs- Aruba ) for this school to learn more about their capability to support students with exceptionalities.The International School of Aruba (ISA) is a nonprofit, coeducational, English-language, college preparatory day school, enrolling approximately 165 students from PK-3 through grade 12. The school’s purpose-built campus is located in the Wayaca residence area across from the airport. First languages of our students primarily include English, Dutch, Spanish, Hindi, and Papiamento.This is intended to provide general information. Prospective users of the schools may wish to inquire further of A/OPR/OS or contact the school directly for more specific and up-to-the-minute information. Information and statistics are current as of December 2023 and provided by the school.NOTE: School situations can change quickly, particularly as schools face cutbacks to learning support programs due to the pandemic, unrest, and economic uncertainty. For the most current information, work with the REO and school. Information in this document was collected by the Department of State’s Office of Overseas Schools directly from the school in December 2023 and shows the availability of services rather than an assessment of the quality of the services. The profile is intended as a jumping off point for a conversation with the REO and school to understand the best fit for your child. Definitions may vary school to school.&nbsp;
- Aruba National Day Antony J. Blinken, Secretary of StateOn behalf of the United States of America, I send best wishes to the people of Aruba on your celebration of the 37th anniversary of your National Anthem and Flag Day.The United States is committed to its long-standing and enduring partnership with Aruba.  We are proud of our work together to weaken transnational criminal networks, combat illicit activities, and support a safe, secure, and prosperous Caribbean region.  Building strong educational and cultural ties between our two nations is a shared priority, symbolized by our EducationUSA advising center and buttressed by the friendships built through generations of two-way tourism and common values.  We are committed to working together with Aruba to confront the climate crisis and look forward to collaborating through both public and private engagement to meet Aruba’s bold renewable energy goals.In recognition of Aruba’s National Anthem and Flag Day, the United States hopes for a happy and prosperous year to come for all Arubans.
- Telephonic Press Briefing on Food Security across Latin America with Jose Fernandez, Under Secretary of State for Economic Growth, Energy, and the Environment Jose W. Fernandez, Under Secretary for Economic Growth, Energy, and the EnvironmentModerator:  Greetings to everyone from the U.S. Department of State’s Media Hub of the Americas in Miami, Florida.  I would like to welcome our participants who have dialed in from the United States and across the region.  This is an on-the-record press briefing with Jose Fernandez, Under Secretary of State for Economic Growth, Energy, and the Environment.  Under Secretary Fernandez will discuss food security in Latin America.  He will give opening remarks and take questions from participating journalists.  And with that, I’ll turn it over to Under Secretary Fernandez.  Under Secretary Fernandez:  Thank you.  Thank you, Kristina.  Good afternoon, everyone.  Buenas tardes.  Boa tarde.  It’s a pleasure to be here.  Let me just make a couple of remarks early on, and then I’ll be delighted to take questions.Look, let’s start with where we’ve been in the last five years.  In the last five years, the number of people that have been living in acute foot insecurity has increased from 100 million to about 160 million.  And this is in large part because of climate, conflict, COVID, and increased demand.  But the world food organizations’ project the conflict in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine will push more than an additional 40 million people into food insecurity.  Prior to the – to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, we had a number of initiatives that were starting to make  we were hopefully making a dent on food insecurity – climate-smart agriculture.  We have agriculture innovation missions for climate.  We have our Feed the Future program and we have a number of other programs.  But what’s happened now is because of the war in Ukraine, right now Russia’s military forces have occupied some of Ukraine’s most productive farmland.  They’ve planted explosives throughout the fields.  They’ve destroyed and stolen vital agricultural infrastructure.  We now have a naval blockade and a threat of further attacks that are preventing crops from being exported.  And so we now have a situation where 20 million tons are trapped in silos and ships in Ukraine.  And as I said earlier, there are credible reports that Russia is pilfering Ukraine’s grain exports to sell for its own profit.  So not only are they destroying the agricultural infrastructure, but they’re taking the exports that could have been sold by Ukraine and selling them for their own profit, and those that they cannot sell, they are  on Ukraine’s coast.  What this does is it means that millions of people that are far from Ukraine, people around the world, especially in Latin America but also in the Middle Eastern region and Africa, are at risk of food security – insecurity.  So what are we doing?  Well, we can go into this a little bit more, but we’ve provided already $2.8 billion – $2.8 billion to food security.  Plus, there also a supplemental additional aid of five and a half billion dollars that we are projecting.  Second, there’s also – in countries such as Brazil, I know there’s a concern with fertilizer, and we’re working with other countries to mitigate the shortage in fertilizer.  President Biden has announced a $500 million investment to increase U.S. fertilizer production, to increase capacity.  We are continuing – this is number three.  We are continuing to work through our initiative, Feed the Future, which is providing about a billion dollars a year in food aid, increasing our agricultural capacity and resilience.  We’re also providing additional assistance to cushion the shocks of this crisis in the most vulnerable populations.  We’re working diplomatically with our allies and partners on improving food security and trying to mitigate the consequences of Putin’s invasion.On that score, I do want to remind you that on May 18th, we hosted the Global security – Food Security Call to Action.  We had countries and regional organizations take steps, and they pledged $215* in new emergency food assistance, largely to African countries, bringing the total U.S. funding for emergency food assistance to the $2.8 billion that I just mentioned, and for countries in Africa, the Middle East, and Latin – and South America and Central America.  Now what is happening is this week, tomorrow I believe, we have a – we are supporting the German-led Global Alliance for Food Security to meet on donor responses and to coordinate additional actions to increase global food security.  We have approximately 40 countries represented by foreign ministers coming as well as a number of UN crisis groups.So tomorrow Secretary Blinken will head to Germany to join foreign ministers for the Berlin ministerial conference on June 24th.  And what he’s going to do, the Secretary will work with his counterparts to address food insecurity – food insecurity stemming not just from Russia’s unprovoked and brutal war against Ukraine, but also the effect of other conflicts.  And so we’re doing all we can.  We are well aware of the crisis that has been created because of the shortage of food around the world, and we will continue to do what we can to help countries around the world to meet this need.So with that, let me just, Kristina, ask you to just ask our colleagues if they have any questions.  Moderator:  Thank you, Under Secretary.  We will now begin the question and answer portion of today’s call.Our first question will go to Claudia Torrens from Associated Press.  The question is:  “Food insecurity is tied to migration.  Tell us which areas are most concerning to you within Latin America when it comes to food insecurity.”Under Secretary Fernandez:  Look, there are a number of countries that are affected by food insecurity.  Obviously, the one that we hear about more here in the U.S. are our neighbors in Central America.  But it is a – no country is immune from food insecurity.  We’ve seen over the years how different crops are affected.  I would say food insecurity continues to be a problem, continues to be something we’re concerned about and we’re working to mitigate in Central America, but also countries that can ill afford it – Venezuela, for example.  That just adds to the woes that the population there is feeling.Moderator:  Thank you.  We will now go to Philippe Buteau.  Operator, please open line 22.Question:  Hello?Moderator:  Yes, please go ahead.Question:  Thank you, Under Secretary.  My question is:  Would the State Department consider working with the Millennium Challenge Corporation to grant to the governments of developing countries or to stop the food insecurity problem?Under Secretary Fernandez:  Yeah, thank you for the question.  Look, the Millennium Challenge Corporation, we’re very proud of it.  It’s a program that was started by the first – by – I’m sorry, by President Bush, and it does good work all around the world.  We cooperate with the MCC.  We work with them jointly.  But keep in mind that the Millennium Challenge Corporation works with countries to ascertain the needs.  So they would have – the countries working together with the MCC would have to come up with a plan, and of course we would – and I have in the past personally worked with the MCC to try and help implement the projects, the programs that have done a lot of good around the world, and we continue to support it.Moderator:  Thank you.  The next question goes to Bertha Becerra from El Sol de Mexico.  The question is:  “Given the situation in Eastern Europe due to the war conflict, since both nations are producers of grains and fertilizer, what measures are taken so that more grains and oil  do not become more expensive in our hemisphere?”  Under Secretary Fernandez:  Sorry, you could – could you repeat the – what?Moderator:  What measures – yes.  “What measures are taken so that more grains and oil  do not become more expensive in our hemisphere?”  Under Secretary Fernandez:  Look, let’s start from the beginning.  We – it’s the – this is because of the Russian Government has tried to deflect responsibility for its actions by blaming everyone but Russia for the worsening crisis in the global food system.  It’s part of their disinformation campaign.  Start from the basics.  Okay.  And this goes – this will answer your question, I hope.Russia is using food as a weapon.  It’s using food as a weapon by blocking the export of foodstuffs from Russia – from Ukraine’s ports.  We are not sanctioning – now, this is not an opinion.  This is in black and white.  You take a look at General License No. 6.  The U.S. is not sanctioning exports of Russian grain, agricultural commodities, fertilizer, and medicines.  In fact, it explicitly – black and white – exempts those agricultural commodities, as were mentioned, from sanction.  So the first thing that needs to happen for us to be able to start reducing the consequences of the worsening crisis in the global food system is for Russia to stop the invasion.  That is the most important thing that needs to be done.  What are we in the U.S. doing to help mitigate the food security crisis?  Number one – and I mentioned some of this in my beginning talk – we are a leader, and have been – this is way before the Russia-Ukraine conflict – we’ve been a leader in addressing food insecurity, and in fact we have committed to work with Congress to invest more than 11 billion – $11 billion over the next three years to address food insecurity.  Since the war began, we have provided – we’ve announced $2.8 billion, as I mentioned, in humanitarian aid assistance.  We’ve got the American farmers that are doing more to expand their agricultural production.  We’ve got the Feed the Future program that has been around since 2007 at the State Department to provide additional foodstuffs to needed areas.  So we are continuing to do what we can, and in fact we believe that we lead the world in providing food security assistance.  But at the end of the day, we need the invasion to end and we need Russia to stop blocking, as I said at the beginning, more than 20 million tons of foodstuffs in the ports and silos in Ukraine.  Moderator:  Thank you.  The next question was sent by Everardo Martinez from El Heraldo.   subsidies which will help people with more purchasing power instead of subsidies only for diesel and food? Under Secretary Fernandez:  Subsidies for – Kristina, repeat that, please.  I’m sorry, I was hoping you could – yeah. Moderator:  “In Mexico, would you recommend passing gasoline subsidies instead of subsidies only for diesel and food?”  Under Secretary Fernandez:  Well, I – one thing I’ve learned in life is not to provide unrequested consejos to other countries.  I couldn’t answer that.  That’s really a question for the Mexican Government to provide, but it underscores the fact that in Mexico, as throughout Latin America, you are seeing the effects of the invasion on the people that are most needed – that are most – neediest.  But I can’t comment on that.  I’m sorry.    Moderator:  Thank you.  We have one question from Anna Ramdass from Trinidad Express in Trinidad and Tobago.  The question is as follows.  “What assistance, if any, will be given to Latin American and Caribbean countries in particular to assist with food security?  Trinidad and Tobago and other small nations are experiencing high prices in wheat, leading to increased prices to an already burdened population.”Under Secretary Fernandez:  Yeah, look, as I mentioned at the beginning, we have a number of programs.  We have the food security program.  We’ve provided over – we’ve provided just since the war began in February more than $2.8 billion in humanitarian food assistance.  Some of that is going to Latin America.  We are also working with countries.  I have personally been involved with Brazil to try and support their production of fertilizer.  We’ve provided $500 million of assistance to our farmers so that they can increase the production of fertilizer, some of which can be exported.  Over the next three years, we’ve committed to invest more than $11 billion to address food insecurity.  This is something we’ve been doing for a long time, and we will continue to do all we can to ameliorate the situation.  Again, a situation that Latin America did not create, but Latin America as well as many countries around the world that are really far away from Ukraine are feeling right now.  Moderator:  Thank you.  We have time for one more question.  The question comes from Adela de Coriat from La Estrella de Panama.  The question is:  “Will the United States enter a recession in 2023?  How much longer are we going to have escalated oil prices and how does this intercede in the food chain, especially in Latin American countries?”  Under Secretary Fernandez:  Increasing food prices and oil prices affect agriculture, obviously.  It affects the price of fuel needed to transport food.  It affects the cost of fertilizers.  It has an effect on food prices.  We – President Biden has taken a number of steps to lower gas prices to U.S. families, but also to reduce the prices around the world.  The President has announced the release of a record 1 million barrels per day from our strategic petroleum reserve, which has been critical.  And lead oil market analysts will tell you this has been critical in keeping this from rising even more.  A couple of months ago, he rallied international partners to join the United States by releasing a combined 240 million barrels of oil on the market.  We’ve also expanded access to biofuels like E15.  This is gasoline that uses 15 percent of ethanol.  Increasing supply lowers prices.  And we’re also engaging with oil and refining companies to ask them to work with the administration to bring forth concrete solutions that increase refinery capacity and output.  The other thing to keep in mind is our oil and gas industry is – has continued to improve production.  Right now, more than 50 percent of the gas that’s imported into Europe comes from the United States.  This is something that was not – did not take place until earlier this year, and it was a result of our gas producers just ramping up production in order to make up for the loss of gas from Russia.  Just already in the first year of this administration, okay, just in the first year of the Biden administration, the U.S. has produced more oil than it did under the first two years of the prior administration.  And so we are ramping up production.  We are working with countries around the world to increase their production.  And we believe that it’s having some effect.  But again, we’ve also known, Kristina, that this – Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was not going to be painless.  We’re all feeling it.  We in the U.S. are feeling it at the gas pump.  In Latin America that’s also being felt and it has knock-on effects on inflation and also on fertilizer prices.  So we are – we’ve always known this was not going to be painless and we’re feeling the pain, but we’re doing all we can to reduce that pain on the continent and also to – frankly, to increase the costs to Putin, to do all we can.  Thank you.   Moderator:  Thank you.  Before concluding today’s call, I’d like to pass the word back to Under Secretary Fernandez for closing remarks.  Under Secretary Fernandez:  Thank you.  Look, thank you very much for this opportunity and I hope we can do this more in the future.  I think let’s keep something in mind.  The reason we thought it was important to have this conversation is that there’s a lot of misinformation on – coming from Russia on the causes of the food insecurity  not just in Latin America, but around the world, and it’s being used for many reasons.  Something to keep in mind:  When you look at food insecurity, first of all, we were in a difficult situation at the beginning of the year, but then Russia invaded Ukraine.  It invaded Ukraine.  It captured Ukrainian farmland.  It put landmines on the Ukrainian fields.  It has bombed Ukrainian agricultural plants and silos.  It is now blocking ports – 20 to 25 million tons of food right now are being blocked by Putin.  And he’s saying that if we want that food to be released, we’ve got to cut our sanctions.  So he’s basically blackmailing people around the world who need this food today.  And then to add insult to injury, Russia is stealing, pilfering the exports from Ukraine and selling it for its own benefit.  So we wanted to make it clear that these are the reasons why the – why the food prices have skyrocketed in the last few months, that were also – I want to make it clear that we are doing all we can to help with the food insecure around the world with billions of dollars of aid, and we will continue to do that.  And then the last thing to stress is we do not have sanctions on food, on medicine or on fertilizer.  In fact, they are explicitly – black and white – excluded from our sanctions.  Russia is selling lots of oil and gas around the world.  It could do the same thing for food if that’s what it wanted to do, but it’s not doing that because it’s holding the food insecure populations of the world hostage as we speak.  Thank you. Moderator:  That concludes today’s call.  I want to thank Under Secretary Fernandez for joining us and thank all of our callers for participating.  If you have any questions about today’s call, you may contact the Miami Media Hub at MiamiHub@state.gov.  Thank you and have a good day. 
- Additional $314 Million for U.S. Humanitarian Response to the Venezuela Regional Crisis Office of the SpokespersonPresident Biden announced at the Ninth Summit of the Americas nearly $314 million in new humanitarian, health, economic, and development assistance for Venezuelan refugees and vulnerable migrants across the hemisphere.  This assistance includes nearly $103 million from the State Department’s Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM) and over $171 million from the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance to support vulnerable Venezuelans inside Venezuela and those who have sought refuge throughout Latin America and the Caribbean as well as $40 million in development funding through USAID.Nearly $103 Million in Department of State Humanitarian AssistanceThis new funding through PRM supports a wide range of life-saving humanitarian programs for Venezuelan refugees and migrants, such as emergency shelter; access to health care; water, sanitation, and hygiene supplies; increased access to education; support for livelihoods; COVID-19 support, and protection for vulnerable groups including survivors of gender-based violence, children and adolescents, LGBTQI+ persons, and indigenous people in seventeen countries including Argentina, Aruba, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Curacao, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guyana, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, and Venezuela. $171 Million in USAID Humanitarian AssistanceThis new funding through USAID will provide humanitarian relief for vulnerable Venezuelans in Venezuela and emergency food assistance for Venezuelan migrants and refugees in Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru. Venezuela Regional Refugee and Migrant ResponseMore than 6.1 million people have fled Venezuela since 2015, making it the largest external displacement of persons in the Hemisphere’s history. Of those, more than 5 million have sought refuge throughout Latin America and the Caribbean. Many are in urgent need of humanitarian assistance such as access to shelter, education, health, and in some cases, international protection.  The COVID-19 pandemic has exacerbated these needs and increased the vulnerability of Venezuelan refugees and migrants, along with the host communities that have welcomed them, throughout the region.PRM leads in providing U.S. humanitarian assistance, protection, and solutions for refugees, asylum seekers, migrants in situations of vulnerability, and stateless persons and works in close coordination with USAID. PRM’s response, through the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR), the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), and other international and nongovernmental organization partners has been a comprehensive approach with programs targeted to the country-specific challenges faced by Venezuelan refugees and migrants.PRM’s Regional Refugee Coordinators located in Colombia, Ecuador, and Panama coordinate humanitarian diplomacy; liaise with national and local government officials, civil society, donor country representatives, UN officials, and aid recipients; and monitor and evaluate PRM-funded programs in the region.
- Telephonic Press Briefing with Juan Gonzalez, National Security Council Senior Director for the Western Hemisphere and Brian A. Nichols, Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs, Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs Brian A. Nichols, Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere AffairsBureau of Western Hemisphere AffairsJuan Gonzalez, National Security Council Senior Director for the Western Hemisphere&nbsp;Moderator:  Greetings to everyone from the U.S. Department of State Media Hub of the Americas in Miami, Florida.  I would like to welcome our participants who have dialed in from the United States and across the region.  This is an on-the-record press briefing with NSC Senior Director for the Western Hemisphere Juan Gonzalez and Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs Brian Nichols.Senior Director Gonzalez and Assistant Secretary Nichols will discuss the upcoming 9th Summit of the Americas.  They each will give opening remarks and take questions from participating journalists.And with that, I’ll turn it over to NSC Senior Director Juan Gonzalez.Mr. Gonzalez:  Good afternoon, everybody, and it’s always a privilege to share a stage with our senior diplomat for the Western Hemisphere, Brian Nichols, who has been a partner through and through.  I would like to start by, I think, first welcoming you all to the call and for your patience as we head toward what we know will be an incredible Summit of the Americas next week.  You know that the President, as you know, incredibly values personal engagement and looks forward to speaking with and engaging with the leaders and other representatives that will be attending.  The President is very much looking to hosting the 9th summit representatives from government, civil society, and the private sector to advance our common goals and find common ground.The President specifically really sees an opportunity for leaders and key stakeholders to come together to address some of the core challenging challenges facing the people of the hemisphere, including economic prosperity, climate change, the migration crisis, and the COVID-19 pandemic.  No other part of the world impacts the security and prosperity of the United States more directly than the Western Hemisphere, and that is why the President has consistently said that he sees the objective of U.S. policy to advance a vision of a region that is secure, middle class, and democratic as something that is fundamentally in the national security interest of the United States.  But of course, we are joined with the hemisphere not just by geography but our economic ties, democratic principles, cultural connections, and familial bonds.First, look, there’s 28 years have passed since the United States has hosted the 1st Summit of the Americas, and we’re obviously living in very different times.  Today we have the – we’re meeting against the backdrop of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, a region that is still reeling from the impact of the pandemic, the lasting socioeconomic impacts of the pandemic and obviously the inflationary impacts of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.  And in a time when even before the pandemic there were ongoing protests by populations throughout the hemisphere that were really starting to question the value of democracy.So against that backdrop, the President has really challenged the U.S. Government and engaged with partners to try to develop an ambitious agenda for the summit.  And the United States will announce some key actions that we intend to accomplish along five specific areas for the summit.  Without going into too much detail or getting out ahead of the President, I’ll go through them very quickly.The first is our economic agenda, recognizing the connection between the region’s success and that of our own.  As I had mentioned, the President will use the summit to align regional leaders, the private sector, and civil society behind a new and ambitious economic agenda that builds upon our existing free trade agreements in the hemisphere to really help address some of the dislocations of trade, but addressing issues of equity and equality, supporting the global energy transition, the adoption of technology.  Health and health security systems are going to be fundamental, I think, that taking very concrete steps at the summit to make sure that we’re moving forward to build upon our existing free trade agreements.Also developing – we’re updating tools that we’ve had.  We have, obviously, a multilateral system that was developed decades ago, and we need new tools to really help a predominantly middle-income region address some – a once-in-a-century economic crisis that has been the pandemic.  So that’s something that I think we’re very much looking forward to the President announcing.The other is health, as a top national security priority for this administration to ensure that millions don’t continue to die from the COVID-19 pandemic.  That is why the United States has donated now nearly 70 million vaccines to the hemisphere without any strings attached, and at the summit the President will also launch an effort to promote health systems and health security in the region to prepare for future pandemics, strengthen the region’s health systems, and bolster health security supply chains.The President will also announce a new partnership on climate and energy with Caribbean nations and will ask the Vice President to lead this effort just as he did as vice president with the Caribbean Energy Security Initiative in 2013.  The focus is on responding to the increasing climate energy challenges facing our Caribbean partners.And we have also on food security and its effects on vulnerable populations.  This is a regional priority and directly linked to our cooperative efforts on migration and ensuring an equitable and sustainable-driven economic pandemic recovery in the hemisphere.  We have invested in key social safety nets to help reduce poverty and food shocks in the region through Feed the Future and other agricultural programs.  The United States is proud to contribute more funding for migration and food security needs that will improve the quality of life for people across the region.And of course, closely tied to the economic agenda and everything else that I mentioned is really addressing the historic migration crisis in a way that is unprecedented for the United States and for the region, recognizing that migration is a symptom of a much broader challenge brought on by the economic and security challenges that the hemisphere has been facing for the last couple years.Now, for the last couple of months the President has and the Secretary of State and Secretary of Homeland Security, the Vice President, and others have been all-hands-on-deck to mobilize leaders around a bold new plan centered on responsibility sharing and economic support for countries that have been most impacted by refugee and migration flows.  On the margins of the summit, the President will join other heads of state to sign a migration declaration, sending a strong signal of unity and resolve to bring the regional migration crisis under control.While, again, I’m not going to get into the specifics of the deliverables that you can expect from the President, what I can tell you is that we’re looking forward to having you all join us and learn from him directly at the summit.  I’d just like to note that the five action areas I just talked about are different than the five political commitments, which have been a function of the Summit Implementation Review Group process that are also going to be at the core of what comes out of the summit.  And there’s also an overlap here significantly with what the President’s announcing with the political commitments, particularly in areas of democracy, governance, climate, energy, health, and digitalization.And that concludes, I think, the main points.  I will now pass the conversation to my colleague, Assistant Secretary of State for the Western Hemisphere Brian Nichols, who will speak to the collaborative work that the region’s governments will commit to and which are currently being finalized at the Summit Implementation Review Group.  Thanks.Assistant Secretary Nichols:  Thanks so much, Juan, and it’s a great pleasure to work with you on this, and so your energy, creativity, and drive to help our hemisphere.  I’d also like to recognize the great work that our senior advisors Chris Dodd and Debbie Mucarsel-Powell have been working on as well as our summit coordinator Kevin O’Reilly, who is in L.A. now working on the final negotiations for the Summit Implementation Review Group.Before I take your questions, I’d like to briefly preview what you can expect in terms of the political commitments from the 9th Summit of the Americas, as Juan said.  The United States is hosting the summit one week from today in Los Angeles, California, and we’re focusing on how we’ll deliver for average people in our region.  Juan talked about the action that our President is taking in five key areas.  Some of those are similar to the political commitments that I will discuss, but the difference is that those actions are the U.S. priorities for the region and things that President Biden is specifically going to deliver.From June 8th to 10th, the heads of state and government from across the Americas will come together to adopt five leader-level political commitments which will set forth our mandate for building a sustainable, resilient, and equitable future by proposing and implementing actions under the summit’s five political commitments: democratic governance, health and resilience, the clean energy transition, our green future, and digital transformation.  Our region’s leaders and stakeholders can improve the lives of the people of our hemisphere in a demonstrable and meaningful way.First, on democratic governance, the United States knows we all have to work – we all have work to do on building strong and inclusive democracies in the hemisphere, including here at home.  At the summit, our collective action can demonstrate our commitment to enhancing transparent and accountable governments that deliver democracy to the people of the Americas.To this end, we will adopt a Plan of Action that calls for reaffirming our commitment to the Inter-American Democratic Charter, including establishing mechanisms to address new challenges to democracy; supporting the work of electoral observation missions, following up on our commitment at the 8th Summit of the Americas to promote transparency, accountability, and combat corruption; enhancing protections of human rights defenders, environmental defenders, members of the press, and whistleblowers; increasing the participation of civil society, private sector, and new stakeholders in democratic processes and decision-making.  These are just a few of the ways in which we’re working to bolster democratic governance as a region and build on the commitment we made 20 years ago when we adopted the Inter-American Democratic Charter.Second, on health and pandemic resilience, the United States will propose that the hemisphere’s leaders take a whole-of-government approach to address systemic health issues by agreeing to draft an action plan on health and resilience to be implemented by 10th summit.  Components of the action plan will include: expanding quality people- and community-centered health services, strengthening of educational and training programs in the field of medicine, public health, nutrition, and biomedical science research; and examining financial systems to more efficiently, effectively, sustainably, equitably, and transparently improve public financing related to health systems.Third, on the clean energy transition, we will discuss implementation of renewable energy goals and ways that the hemisphere can share technical knowledge and best practices to put the Americas at the forefront of the global clean energy transition.  These include:  collaborating with the private sector and other stakeholders to identify opportunities for manufacture or trade in clean energy goods and services; fostering the enabling conditions for the scale-up of renewable energy; and advancing sustainable, attainable, and responsible mining sector principles and securing the integration of mineral supply chains in our hemisphere.Fourth, on climate change, our hemisphere will build our longstanding commitments on climate resilience and sustainability to strengthen the hemisphere’s resilience and adaptive capacity to withstand the impacts of climate change and extreme weather events.  Our regional political commitment on our green future will include measures such as:  advancing the Glasgow Leaders Declaration on Forest and Land Use to halt and reverse deforestation; decreasing the amount of carbon emitted from land use activities and increasing carbon storage; harnessing the role of oceans and other bodies of water to mitigate climate change, as well as combatting ocean plastic pollution; accelerating climate change adaption and resilience by implementing national adaption plans or strategies.Fifth and finally, on digital transformation, leaders will identify shared priorities and commit to specific actions building digital ecosystems.  This first-ever regional agenda for digital transformation creates a framework for governments and stakeholders to collaboratively create the jobs and industries of the future based on interoperable, resilient, secure, and reliable telecommunications networks which will drive innovation and expand access to goods, services, and information in new ways.These include:  promoting policies to expand the internet access, particularly in historically marginalized communities, and drive digital innovation and social inclusion through increased access to digital government services; expanding digital technology’s role in promoting quality education, digital literacy, and digital citizenry; increasing a regulatory harmonization in areas like spectrum management and digital trade.We look forward to sharing more details on these political commitments at the summit.  And both Juan and I will now take your questions.  Thank you.Moderator:  Thank you.  We will now begin the question-and-answer portion of today’s call.Our first question was submitted by Mark Stevenson from the Associated Press.  And the question is:  “Have Nicaragua, Venezuela, Mexico, or Cuba been confirmed as attending the Americas Summit, and who will they be sending?”Mr. Gonzalez:  So I’m happy to take that one.  So we still have some final considerations, but we will, I think, inform people publicly soon about the final invitation list.  I think what’s really important for us in terms of the summit is why we are gathering, and that is to focus on our collective responsibilities to forge a more inclusive and prosperous future for the hemisphere.  So we’ve not been so focused on the – on who is and is not invited, and more really on the outcomes that we want to achieve at the summit.Moderator:  Thank you.  Our next question will go to David Alandete.  Operator, please open line 95.  David.Question:  Yes.  Can you hear me?Moderator:  Yes, please go ahead.Question:  Can you hear me now?Moderator:  Yes, go ahead.Question:  Sorry about that.  So yeah, I have two questions.  One of them is like besides the fact that some details are still being finalized, I wanted to ask Mr. Gonzalez if in any case the option of inviting someone from the Cuban regime is still on the table, if it’s something that is being debated.  It’s something like quite important from the point of view of the whole continent.And the second one is like the presence of Venezuela.  Could you explain how Mr. Guaido is invited, and when is he going to address the other leaders if he – or what is the nature of his invitation to the summit?  Thank you so much.Mr. Gonzalez:  Thanks.  So I mean, again, I’m not going to enter the details, but what I’ll say is that we have just had very respectful and active conversations with Mexico and the Mexican president’s request that Cuba attend the summit.  The United States and Mexico have really partnered very closely on a number of issues, and the approach that we’ve taken is to talk with the leaders of the region, talk to Mexico.  But again, I’ll go back to the previous answer where I’ll just say that we’re still having some final considerations.  And then as soon as we &#8212; as soon as the White House makes a final decision on final invites, that’s something that we’ll be happy to brief folks and to provide our rationale.  Thanks.Moderator:  Thank you.  Our next question was submitted by Jason Calderon from NTN 24.  The questions is:  “What does the document for the Regional Migration Pact that President Joe Biden will propose as the main objective of the Summit of the Americas include?  And what is in the &#8212; what is new in this proposal?”Mr. Gonzalez:  Yes, I can – so I’ll take the first part, and then Assistant Secretary Nichols has also been engaged on this.  We’ll invite him to say &#8212; to speak to this as well.So look, while migration is, first, an important topic that’ll be discussed at the summit, it’s one of the several focus areas, all of which are important to the hemisphere.  But I think the key here is – point here is that irregular migration is a regional problem that touches nearly every country in the region, and often a symptom of other challenges that I’ve mentioned facing Latin America and the Caribbean.So what we are hoping to do is – and have been, as I mentioned, engaging on this very actively with our regional counterparts is to look at the regional challenge from the context of responsibility sharing and the need to provide economic support to countries to have been impacted by refugee and migration flows, but also the importance of avenues and in-country processing avenues, expanding refugee protections, and also addressing, I think, some of the core drivers of migration, which are lack of economic opportunities and insecurity.I will say also there is just a robust initiative to combat smuggling in there as well.  But at the – at its core, what this is, is something that is unprecedented in that the leaders of the region that are either source, transit, or destination countries for migration are really coming together behind a plan that recognizes that the migration challenge is not one that is – that is at the U.S. border, but it’s one that is actually impacting all the countries in the Americas, and that we need to work together to address it in a way that treats migrants with dignity, invests in creating opportunities that would dissuade migrants from leaving their homes in the first place, and provide the protections that migrants deserve.Assistant Secretary Nichols:  Yeah, I’ll just add to that that this builds on Secretary Blinken’s participation in co-hosting of ministerial-level meetings in Colombia and Panama to talk about this unprecedented challenge globally.  There are more than 94 million people on the move as migrants.  This poses a challenge to nations around the world, but particularly in our own hemisphere.And this declaration is going to allow us to focus on promoting stabilization in communities that are hosting migrants; helping those communities and the migrants that they are hosting; ensuring things like access to legal documentation and public services; promoting pathways for legal, orderly migration when appropriate; to ensure ethical recruitment for employment, for example; promoting humane migration management; and a shared approach to mitigating and managing irregular migration.Those are some of the things that we’re focusing on.  And it builds on not only the ministerial meetings that have taken place, but the many agreements that have come both within our region and around the world to promote safe, orderly, humane migration.Moderator:  Thank you.  Our next question, we’ll go to Rafael Mathus from La Nacion.  Operator, please open line 30.Question:  Thank you very much for doing this call and for taking my question.  About the invitations for Cuba, Nicaragua, Venezuela, and so on, Juan, can you specifically say what are the final considerations of the government on this topic, because it has been discussed for several months now?  And what are your thoughts on the damage these issues are creating on both the summit and the agenda of the summit?  Thanks.Mr. Gonzalez:  Well, look, I mean, I’m not going to get into the specifics of the considerations because I think fundamentally what this administration has done, whether it’s on this topic or on any topic, is treated the countries of the region as our partners that – whose views we have to take into serious account.  And certainly with Mexico and with others that have expressed a view, we have tried to engage in a conversation and been very respectful of the different perspectives.  And ultimately, it’s something that as the host’s prerogative we’ll make the final decision, and we’ll announce that once the decision has been made.Is it a distraction from the summit itself?  Look, I don’t think so.  It’s hard to, I think, confirm anything until it actually happens.  But we are really confident that the summit will be well-attended, that our relationship with Mexico is – remains and will continue to remain positive.  We very much want President Lopez Obrador there.  The President of the United States very personally wants the President of Mexico there.  And that I think once folks see what is announced at the summit we’ll see that we’re really actually addressing, I think, what are rising to the challenge that is – that are many of the different economic, pandemic-related, and other challenges that the region is facing.  So I think we’ll let the results speak for themselves.Assistant Secretary Nichols:  Yeah, I’d just like to add that we’re very much focused on addressing the issues that affect people in their daily lives in our hemisphere.  We will have attendance from leaders throughout our hemisphere, but we’re also going to have attendance from private sector leaders and CEOs, from members of civil society, from youth from across the hemisphere.  They are coming together in an unprecedented way, literally thousands of people, to talk about the issues of concern that affect people in their daily lives.Can they get access to health care?  Can their kids get a good education?  Do they have the economic opportunities they need?  Are they able to benefit from broadband internet technology?  What are we doing to mitigate the shock caused by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and ensure people have reliable, affordable access to food?  And what are we doing to reorient supply chains to make sure that the disruptions that we’ve seen over the past few years are not repeated?  I think that’s what average people care about, and that’s what we’re focused on.Moderator:  Thank you.  We will now go to Raquel Krahenbul from TV Globo.  Operator, please open line 7.&nbsp;Question:  Yes, hello.  I am with Raquel.  She is just out of the room for one minute.  Can you please call on her in just another minute?Moderator:  Sure.  Operator, thank you.  We will now go to Priscilla Alvarez from CNN.  We go to line 61, please.Question:  Hi.  Can you hear me?Moderator:  Yes.  Please go ahead.Question:  Thank you for doing this.  You mention throughout the call that this is about creating regional partnership to address issues systemic to the hemisphere.  But if you are missing key partners like Mexico or Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, how do you – do you anticipate success or an outcome from this?  I mean, those are key partners.And then also you mentioned earlier, and I just want to clarify, the Mexican president’s request that Cuba attend the summit.  Is that currently the state of play with those discussions, whether Cuba attends, and no longer a discussion about Nicaragua and Venezuela?  Thank you.Mr. Gonzalez:  Sure.  I mean, I’ll be brief, and then Brian will have his views.Look, I mean, with Mexico and those others, we have made very clear that participation won’t impact cooperation or even a level of ambition certainly before – well before the summit.  On the issue of migration, we’ve had very close cooperation with Mexico, and that will continue to be the case.  And just again on the invitations, we’re just – we’re still looking through – it’s continuing to engage in conversations with different countries.  And once we make a final decision, we’ll make an announcement.Assistant Secretary Nichols:  I’ll just add that countries throughout our hemisphere have been playing an active role in the Summit Implementation Review Group negotiation of the five political commitments that will be approved at the summit, and that includes Mexico.  The engagement across many levels, from ambassadors and department representatives to the Organization of American States to senior ministry officials to foreign ministers, around the goals for this summit has been active and intense and very constructive.  And I think we’re going to leave this summit with an incredibly strong mandate from this hemisphere to work on the issues that matter to people.Moderator:  Thank you.  We will now go to Jaqueline Charles from The Miami Herald.  Operator, please open line 83.Question:  Hi, thank you.  In regards to Haiti, which today is undergoing multiple crises and we are seeing it playing itself out with the migration both at the land and the sea borders, what will be a specific message or focus as far as Haiti is concerned during this summit, and what can we expect as far as deliverables in regard to Haiti?Mr. Gonzalez:  Brian, do you want to take this?Assistant Secretary Nichols:  So we’re focused on a number of things that will benefit Haiti.  Access to health care is one.  Changes to the way that we approach our engagement on some economic issues to ensure that we’re leveraging all the tools that we can to support partner nations throughout our hemisphere, which will benefit Haiti.  Obviously, migration is an area where we have to do more to support and engage Haiti, and I think we’re going to have some interesting things in that area.And then more broadly, the commitments around democracy will benefit Haiti as it moves towards elections in the future, things like strengthening electoral oversight authorities in our hemisphere, support to candidates and political parties, respect for the role of ombudsmen and transparency-related authorities in country – all are directly applicable to Haiti.  And by taking those commitments and working them both bilaterally with Haiti among the countries of our hemisphere, multilaterally through the Organization of American States, through UN bodies, I think we’re going to be able to translate this into specific and concrete further assistance for the Haitian people who need it very much.Moderator:  Thank you.  We will now go to Beatriz Bulla from Estradao.  Operator, please open line 63.Question:  Hi, thank you all for doing this.  So I’d like to ask about the position of the Brazilian president, Jair Bolsonaro.  You mention that the summit will discuss the core challenges to the people of the hemisphere, and democracy is one of them.  I’ll like to ask if President Biden wants to raise concerns or express his confidence on the Brazilian electoral process, considering that President Bolsonaro has made some comments about the Brazilian electoral process, and also because last year when the NSA Jake Sullivan was here in Brazil with Bolsonaro, you – the U.S. expressed great confidence in the Brazilian institutions and society with Bolsonaro, the importance of not undermining trust in this process.  So is the Brazilian electoral – is it going to be a topic during the summit or during the bilateral meeting with Biden and Bolsonaro?Mr. Gonzalez:  So I’ll say the issue of the Brazilian elections is really up for the Brazilians to decide, and the United States does have confidence in Brazil’s electoral institutions, which have proved robust.  And – but the conversation with – between the President and President Bolsonaro is going to cover a wide range of topics that are bilateral and, frankly, global in nature given the importance of the U.S. relationship.  So whether it’s tackling food insecurity and economic response to the pandemic, health and health security, every single priority for the summit that we have are areas where Brazil plays an incredibly important role.  The topic of climate change as well is something that the President has made clear is a priority, is something that’s – so there is a very long list of issues that are going to be up for discussion between the President and President Bolsonaro.Moderator:  Thank you.  We have time for one last question.  The last question goes to Jorge Agobian from Voice of America.  Operator, please open line 48.Question:  Thank you so much for doing this.  We really appreciate it.  I have a question.  If the United States recognizes the government of Juan Guaido in Venezuela as the legit government of that country, why are there still additional considerations to be decided in this specific point?  And why haven’t they been invited to the summit, and how should it be interpreted?  Then, if they were not invited as the representative of Venezuelan government, if U.S. actually recognizes Guaido as the president?Mr. Gonzalez:  Thank you.  So the United States does continue to recognize interim President Juan Guaido as the legitimately elected president of the – of the national assembly, which was the last democratically elected institution in that country.  And we engage actively with him, with his ambassador and his government as well as the representatives of the unity platform and we’re actually supporting a dialogue that produces outcomes that lead to free and fair elections in the country.I’m not going to talk about the considerations with regard to invitations except to just underscore that there are – governments have different views on some of these topics, and we engage and consult with them.  And ultimately the host prerogative is important, but we also are wanting to facilitate a broad hemispheric discussion and want to make sure that we’re integrating all of the views of the members of the Organization of American States.  So again, we’re – for us, it’s most important that we’re gathering together and that the focus is on our collective responsibility to forge a more inclusive and prosperous future for the hemisphere, and that includes one for the people of Venezuela.Moderator:  That concludes today’s call.  I want to thank Senior Director Gonzalez and Assistant Secretary Nichols for joining us and thank all of our callers for participating.  If you have any questions about today’s call, you may contact the Miami Media Hub at MiamiHub@state.gov.  Thank you and have a good day.
- Aruba HomeReportsOffice to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons2022 Trafficking in Persons Report&#8230;Aruba				hide	document.addEventListener("DOMContentLoaded", function(event) {	if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}});																						2022 Trafficking in Persons Report: Aruba																																																																																												 In this section										/																							Aruba (Tier 2 Watch List)																																													Aruba (Tier 2 Watch List)																															PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS:																																																																																		PROSECUTION																																																																																		PROTECTION																																																																																		PREVENTION																																																																																		TRAFFICKING PROFILE																																																																																																								Aruba (Tier 2 Watch List)				The Government of Aruba does not fully meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant efforts to do so. These efforts included identifying more potential victims, investigating more trafficking cases, and producing a new film-based awareness campaign illustrating undocumented migrants’ vulnerability to trafficking. However, the government did not demonstrate overall increasing efforts compared to the previous reporting period, even considering the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, if any, on its anti-trafficking capacity. The government did not prosecute or convict any traffickers for the third consecutive year, and officials sometimes relied on victims to self-identify as such, limiting their ability to hold traffickers accountable through criminal prosecution. Anti-trafficking efforts depended on ad hoc funding allotments, rather than a dedicated budget, limiting the long-term viability of key initiatives. In addition, working-level officials conflated trafficking in persons and migrant smuggling, hindering the effectiveness of prosecution, prevention, and protection efforts. Because the government has devoted sufficient resources to a written plan that, if implemented, would constitute significant efforts to meet the minimum standards, Aruba was granted a waiver per the Trafficking Victims Protection Act from an otherwise required downgrade to Tier 3. Therefore Aruba remained on Tier 2 Watch List for the third consecutive year.																																					PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS:						    																																															Vigorously investigate and prosecute alleged traffickers.Proactively identify victims among all vulnerable groups, including women in commercial sex, detained migrants, domestic workers, and migrants working in construction, supermarkets, and retail.Train law enforcement officials, prosecutors, judges, coast guard officers, and labor inspectors on victim-centered and trauma-informed approaches to trafficking cases.Establish dedicated funding for anti-trafficking efforts, including for full-time staff members.Decouple victim identification and assistance procedures from the investigation and prosecution of trafficking crimes and empower non-law enforcement officials to designate trafficking victims as such.Convict traffickers, as appropriate, and sentence them to significant prison terms.Complete the construction of the multipurpose shelter for victims of crimes, including human trafficking.Improve coordination and information-sharing with anti-trafficking counterparts across the Kingdom of the Netherlands.Increase referral of possible trafficking victims among Venezuelan migrants and refugees through consistent use of guidelines for proactive identification.Formalize agreements with local NGOs and private sector accommodations to shelter adult and child victims.Promote awareness of human trafficking, as distinct from migrant smuggling, through trafficking-specific materials and campaigns.																																												PROSECUTION						    																																															The government maintained prosecution efforts. Article 2:239 of the penal code criminalized sex trafficking and labor trafficking and prescribed penalties of up to eight years’ imprisonment or a fine for offenses involving a victim 16 years of age or older and up to 12 years’ imprisonment or a fine for those involving a victim younger than the age of 16. These penalties were sufficiently stringent and, with respect to sex trafficking, commensurate with those prescribed for other serious crimes, such as kidnapping. The government continued to revise a draft amendment to the anti-trafficking law, initiated during the previous reporting period, to increase penalties for trafficking offenses; the amendment remained pending at the end of the reporting period.Authorities reported conducting 17 preliminary trafficking investigations, compared with 13 preliminary investigations in 2020 and one investigation in 2019. Authorities ultimately halted or investigated, under related criminal statutes, nine preliminary trafficking investigations in 2021, compared with the same number of cases in 2020. The government sometimes halted investigations of potential trafficking crimes when victims did not self-identify as such and declined to participate. Officials did not report prosecuting or convicting any traffickers for the third consecutive year. In 2021, authorities continued to prosecute one case of labor trafficking involving two suspects, initiated in 2018. The government did not report investigating, prosecuting, or convicting any government employees complicit in trafficking offenses.The Human Trafficking and Migrant Smuggling Unit (UMM), a joint unit comprised of law enforcement officials from the Aruban Police Force and the Royal Dutch Military Police, led trafficking investigations. Another interdisciplinary unit (JIUMM) conducted preliminary reviews of possible trafficking crimes, such as tips from the hotline or civil society; it determined whether to refer cases to UMM for full investigation, refer them to other units for investigation under a different criminal statute, or close a case. JIUMM referred seven preliminary investigations to UMM for full investigation; by contrast, UMM conducted two full trafficking investigations in 2020. The government reported it provided basic trafficking-awareness training to law enforcement officials. While senior government officials distinguished between trafficking and migrant smuggling, observers expressed concern that non-specialized officials, such as law enforcement officers and prosecutors, did not have an adequate understanding of trafficking; across the government, Aruba addressed human trafficking and migrant smuggling via the same institutions, possibly contributing to conflation of the crimes. Many officials used “Quick Reference Cards” (QRCs), supplied by the Kingdom of the Netherlands and distributed at the conclusion of trafficking awareness trainings, that included relevant criminal articles; a list of trafficking indicators; standard operating procedures to use following identification of a potential trafficking case; and contact information to use when referring victims. Aruban authorities cooperated with international law enforcement agencies on two cases, including an international investigation initiated after Aruban officials fielded a trafficking report via a reporting hotline.																																												PROTECTION						    																																															The government slightly increased protection efforts. The government reported identifying seven potential trafficking victims—four potential sex trafficking victims and three potential labor trafficking victims—in 2021, compared with four victims in 2020, zero in 2019, two in 2018, and 71 in 2017. Of the seven potential victims identified, three were girls, two were women, and two were men; the government identified potential victims from Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Finland, and Venezuela. Authorities screened seven additional individuals for trafficking indicators, compared with 10 additional individuals in 2020, but determined them to be victims of other crimes. The government indicated an international organization identified four more trafficking victims, in addition to the seven government-identified potential victims. The government classified victims as “potential,” “presumed,” or “confirmed” victims. The government did not provide services to potential victims, who were typically associated with early-stage investigations; the government only provided care services to presumed or confirmed victims. However, the government tied victims’ status and access to services to the associated criminal case against a trafficker. If a prosecutor determined not to pursue trafficking charges, the government discontinued services for associated victims. Observers expressed concern that the link between victim assistance and the success of the criminal proceedings against traffickers limited victims’ access to critical services. JIUMM assigned one potential victim status as a “presumed victim” of labor trafficking, which made her eligible to receive services. The government reported referring one presumed victim to services in 2021, compared with referring no victims in 2020. The victim declined shelter but received basic care services and an informal stay of deportation; when prosecutors determined to pursue migrant smuggling charges, rather than human trafficking charges, the government phased out assistance. Multidisciplinary teams consisting of police, labor officers, immigration officials, and civil society representatives deployed when investigations called for raids or site visits. The government had an agreement with civil society organizations to facilitate the identification of trafficking victims among vulnerable migrant groups by allowing potential victims to remain anonymous and receive services from civil society organizations during the initial investigation; no victims used the anonymous self-reporting mechanism in 2021. The anti-trafficking task force (TMMA) continued to provide law enforcement and social services officials with a checklist of the most common signs of trafficking, which they used in concert with the government’s QRCs. The government reported officials screened undocumented migrants for trafficking indicators during detainment interviews. Observers, however, expressed concern detention center staff and other officials were insufficiently equipped to identify trafficking. The government reported it trained 320 detention center, Department of Integration and Management of Foreigners (DIMAS), immigration, and other officials to recognize trafficking indicators and refer victims. The government had a basic victim referral mechanism and worked with an international organization to draft an updated protocol, which remained unfinished at the end of the reporting period.CMMA established a working group with civil society actors to coordinate on victim identification and referral; the group met monthly during the reporting period. The government maintained informal agreements with local NGOs and private sector accommodations to shelter adult and child victims of trafficking. Through these arrangements, the government could secure emergency short-term shelter for victims and longer-term shelter for adult female victims, despite a lack of trafficking-specific shelters. Authorities could place unaccompanied child victims in foster care centers or foster homes, and civil society organizations or local churches could accommodate adult male victims. Officials conducted risk assessments before deciding whether victims could leave shelters unchaperoned; they restricted victims’ movement if their lives were threatened. The government reported it continued to work on a longstanding plan to expand shelter capacity for male victims and families via new facilities; in 2021, the government experienced delays in obtaining required permits for new structures but began renovating the site’s existing buildings. Authorities did not report any victims assisted the government in the prosecution of traffickers.Foreign victims were entitled to the same rights and protection as Arubans. The law authorized the extension of temporary immigration relief for foreign victims for three to six months on a case-by-case basis and allowed foreign victims to change employers if they were suspected of exploiting workers. Authorities did not report any victims received these benefits but indicated most foreign victims not participating in the trials against traffickers returned to their home countries, except when a safe return was not possible. The criminal code enabled victims to receive restitution during criminal proceedings or to file civil suits, to seek compensation not to exceed 50,000 florin ($28,090) for financial and emotional damages, although none did so in 2021. The Bureau of Victim Assistance operated a hotline for potential victims of all crimes, including trafficking; the government reported three trafficking-related calls to the hotline, compared with eight in 2020, leading to the identification of one potential victim; by contrast, the government identified two victims via the hotline in 2020.																																												PREVENTION						    																																															The government slightly increased prevention efforts, which remained modest. The National Coordinator on Human Trafficking and Migrant Smuggling continued to lead the government’s anti-trafficking efforts, with support from the TMMA and CMMA. All three entities had dual responsibility for both anti-trafficking and anti-smuggling efforts. Authorities continued to implement the 2018-2022 national action plan, which lacked dedicated resources for its implementation. Instead, authorities financed anti-trafficking activities via ad hoc allotments, including periodic infusions from the Kingdom of the Netherlands, which limited the capacity and stability of these efforts across prosecution, protection, and prevention. The government reported it funded the CMMA’s project manager, the entity’s only dedicated staff member, via a one-time funding extension granted by the Ministry of Justice (MOJ). The CMMA submitted a proposal to the MOJ to formalize its institutional status and obtain long-term funding for the project manager position; the proposal remained pending at the conclusion of the reporting period. The four Kingdom countries agreed to update an existing memorandum of understanding on human trafficking and migrant smuggling in 2022. &nbsp;Officials raised awareness of human trafficking and the hotline in multiple languages via social media, posters, and flyers. Authorities continued to utilize awareness materials produced in a 2011 campaign intended to inform migrants of numerous risks, including trafficking. The government applied for and received funding from the Netherlands for this campaign. In 2021, CMMA created and distributed a new short film about undocumented migrants’ vulnerability to trafficking via social media and its trafficking-awareness website. The government continued to administer the airport-based campaign supported by an international organization, although it noted border closures limited the campaign’s visibility. The government provided trafficking-awareness training to government officials from parliament, the ministry of finance, the judiciary, and the ministry of education, as well as civil society; the CMMA also trained officials on the responsibilities of the CMMA, TMMA, and UMM. In 2021, the government primarily conducted virtual awareness-raising activities, including social media campaigns and webinars. It opened some of these events to officials from neighboring countries. &nbsp;Officials had procedures to screen adult entertainers and performed inspections during the year once the government relaxed its pandemic mitigation measures, allowing adult entertainment venues to reopen; the government did not issue adult entertainment visas to foreigners in 2021. Normally, a Kingdom of the Netherlands policy required individuals on adult entertainment visas, primarily Colombian women, to meet with consular officers to ensure the applicants knew their rights and had a copy of their work agreement before picking up their in-flight letter at a Kingdom of the Netherlands embassy. Upon arrival, such visa recipients normally received information about their rights, risks, and resources. The government did not report efforts to reduce the demand for commercial sex acts.																																												TRAFFICKING PROFILE						    																																															As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic and foreign victims in Aruba. Traffickers exploit Venezuelan women in sex trafficking and foreign adults of all genders in forced labor in Aruba’s service and construction industries. Arriving Venezuelans commonly overstay their visas, leaving many with expired documentation and a corresponding increased risk for trafficking. Families, business owners, and criminals exploit some of these Venezuelans in forced labor in domestic service, construction, and commercial sex, respectively. Supermarket managers subject People’s Republic of China-national men and women to forced labor in grocery stores; business owners and families subject Indian men to forced labor in the retail sector and domestic service, respectively; and Arubans force Caribbean and South American women into domestic servitude. Officials reported increases in forced criminality, where traffickers compel victims to commit unlawful acts, such as robberies and drug-related offenses. Women in regulated and unregulated commercial sex, domestic workers, and employees of small retail shops are most at risk of trafficking.																																				    							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- Aruba National Day Antony J. Blinken, Secretary of StateOn behalf of the United States government, I congratulate the people of Aruba on your National Day celebrating the 36th anniversary of Aruba’s Status Aparte.We deeply value the strong ties between our two countries and commend Aruba’s steadfast support for Ukraine and readiness to take action with allies to protect and defend democracy.  The signing of Aruba’s historic energy deal with an American company for your transition to clean energy further highlights our shared vision for a more prosperous and sustainable future.  We welcome the opportunity to promote educational opportunities for Aruba’s youth at our EducationUSA Advising Center and to facilitate secure travel through a strong U.S. Customs and Border Protection program.In appreciation of the strong relationship that we share, I wish all Arubans a happy National Anthem and Flag Day.