United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Testimony 

Before the Committee on Science and 

Technology, House of Representatives

NEXT GENERATION AIR 

TRANSPORTATION 

SYSTEM 

Status of Key Issues 

Associated with the 

Transition to NextGen 

Statement of Gerald L. Dillingham, Ph.D. 

Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues 

For Release on Delivery

Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT 

Thursday, September 11, 2008 

 

GAO-08-1154T 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

September 11, 2008

NEXT GENERATION AIR TRANSPORTATION 

SYSTEM 

Status of Key Issues Associated with the Transition 

to NextGen Highlights of GAO-08-1154T, a testimony 

before the Committee on Science and 

Technology, House of Representatives 

To prepare for forecasted air traffic 

growth, the Federal Aviation

Administration (FAA), in 

partnership with other federal 

agencies and the aviation industry, 

is planning and implementing the 

Next Generation Air 

Transportation System (NextGen), 

a new, satellite-based air traffic

management system that is

expected to increase the safety and 

enhance the capacity of the air 

transport system. NextGen will 

replace the current radar-based air 

traffic control (ATC) system. 

Within FAA, the Air Traffic 

Organization (ATO) is responsible 

for implementing the transition to 

NextGen, and ATO’s Joint Planning

and Development Office (JPDO) is

coordinating efforts to plan for this 

transition, including developing a 

20-year research and development 

(R&D) agenda for NextGen. JPDO

has drafted three basic planning 

documents for NextGen—a 

Concept of Operations, an

Enterprise Architecture, and an 

Integrated Work Plan (IWP). 

This testimony responds to six 

questions about NextGen and 

JPDO raised by the House

Committee on Science and 

Technology, and addresses two

related challenges identified by

GAO. The statement is based on 

recent related GAO reports and

testimonies, including a report 

issued today that reflects GAO’s 

analysis of interviews with 25 key

NextGen stakeholders about 

progress and challenges involved in

the transition to NextGen. 

Have the Views of Industry and Air Traffic Controllers Been 

Adequately Incorporated in NextGen Planning Documents? FAA and 

JPDO have established mechanisms for obtaining stakeholder views. 

However, given the large number of NextGen stakeholders and the evolution 

of opportunities for participation in NextGen, we believe that stakeholders 

will continue to differ on how adequately their views have been incorporated 

in NextGen planning. 

Is the Current Version of IWP Sufficiently Detailed for Effective Use 

in Overseeing and Managing NextGen? No. The current version lacks 

some needed information, but the next version, to be released this month, is 

to contain more detail, including schedule information, and is automated and 

searchable, making it more user friendly and useful for oversight. 

How Confident Should Congress Be that IWP Will Provide a Sufficient 

Basis for Achieving NextGen’s Goals? The current plan does not provide 

a sufficient basis for Congress to be confident. The upcoming version will 

provide a firmer basis for confidence, but additional R&D issues that are not 

part of the plan will have to be addressed, including technology transfer 

issues. 

Can JPDO Continue to Be Viewed as an “Honest Broker” in Light of 

FAA’s Recent Restructuring? The restructuring made JPDO a component 

of ATO rather than an independent office, but other federal agencies are 

reportedly still cooperating with JPDO, suggesting that they continue to view 

it as an honest broker. However, it is too early to tell if the restructuring 

addresses stakeholders’ concerns about the fragmentation of management 

responsibility for NextGen activities. 

What Needs to Be Done to Move JPDO from Proposing R&D to 

Articulating a Clear R&D Program with Defined and Prioritized 

Tasks? The move is underway. JPDO needs to continue collaborating with 

its partner agencies to identify and prioritize R&D and leverage their R&D 

programs. It is too soon to assess the results of steps JPDO and the partner 

agencies have taken thus far. 

What Metrics Should Congress Use to Evaluate the Progress of 

NextGen? Schedule information in the upcoming version of IWP and cost 

information in the subsequent version will help provide Congress with metrics 

for evaluating NextGen’s progress. 

Additional Infrastructure and Human Capital Challenges Identified by 

GAO. NextGen’s implementation further depends on FAA’s reconfiguring 

and maintaining its ATC facilities, expanding runways, and hiring staff with 

the engineering and contract management skills needed to provide oversight. 

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on GAO-08-1154T. 

For more information, contact Gerald L. 

Dillingham at (202) 512-2834 or 

dillinghamg@gao.gov. 
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: 

I appreciate the opportunity to participate in today’s hearing to discuss the 

status of issues associated with the Next Generation Air Transportation 

System (NextGen)—the planned air traffic management system intended 

to address current and anticipated aviation congestion. Today, the nation’s 

air traffic control (ATC) system is experiencing some of the worst delays 

in recent times, with one in four flights delayed. Currently, the U.S. air 

transportation system handles roughly 50,000 flights over a 24-hour period. 

By 2025, air traffic is projected to double or triple, increasing to 100,000 to

150,000 flights every 24 hours. Stakeholders acknowledge that the current

air transportation system will not be able to meet these air traffic 

demands. 

Recognizing the need to transform the current system and to prepare for 

the forecasted growth in air traffic, Congress in 2003 mandated the 

creation of the Joint Planning and Development Office (JPDO)1

 to 

conceptualize and plan for NextGen. JPDO works in partnership with the 

Departments of Transportation, Commerce, Defense (DOD), and 

Homeland Security (DHS); the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA); the 

National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA); the White House 

Office of Science and Technology Policy; and the private sector. Housed 

within FAA—first as an independent office and now, following

restructuring, as a component of FAA’s Air Traffic Organization (ATO)—

JPDO is responsible for coordinating the related efforts of these partners 

to plan the transformation to NextGen. JPDO initially prepared three basic 

planning documents for NextGen—the Concept of Operations, Enterprise

Architecture, and Integrated Work Plan (IWP)—which, collectively, form 

the basis of the joint planning environment for NextGen. 

My statement today responds to the six questions you raised about 

NextGen and JPDO and addresses two related challenges that we have

identified in the course of our work—infrastructure issues associated with 

the configuration of ATC facilities and the capacity of airport runways and 

staffing issues related to FAA’s in-house technical expertise. Your six 

questions are as follows: 

 1

Vision 100—The Century of Aviation Reauthorization Act, Pub.L. No. 108-176, § 709.

Page 1 GAO-08-1154T 
1. Have the views of industry and active air traffic controllers been 

adequately incorporated in NextGen plans, such as those embodied in 

the Concept of Operations, Enterprise Architecture, and IWP?

2. Is the current version of IWP sufficiently detailed and prioritized for 

effective use in overseeing and managing the NextGen-related research 

of multiple agencies? 

3. How confident should Congress be that progress in meeting the 

research, development, and testing activities set out in IWP will 

provide a sufficient basis for achieving NextGen’s goals and timetable 

for quieter, cleaner, and more efficient air traffic operations? 

4. Can the other partner agencies continue to view JPDO as an “honest 

broker” in light of FAA’s recent restructuring action? 

5. What needs to be done to move JPDO from proposing research and 

development (R&D) for NextGen to articulating a clear R&D program 

with defined and prioritized tasks? 

6. What metrics should Congress use to evaluate the progress of the 

NextGen initiative? 

This statement is based on recent related GAO reports and testimonies, 

including a report to this committee and other congressional requesters 

we are issuing today.

2

 Our work on this most recent report included 

interviewing 25 key NextGen stakeholders about the progress of and 

challenges to planning for and achieving the transition to NextGen. We 

conducted this work in accordance with generally accepted government 

auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the 

 2

Next Generation Air Transportation System: Status of Systems Acquisition and the 

Transition to the Next Generation Air Transportation System, GAO-08-1078 (Washington, 

D.C.: Sept. 11, 2008); Aviation and the Environment: NextGen and Research and 

Development Are Keys to Reducing Emissions and Their Impact on Health and Climate,

GAO-08-706T (Washington, D.C.: May 6, 2008); Aviation and the Environment: FAA’s and 

NASA’s Research and Development Plans for Noise Reduction Are Aligned but the 

Prospects of Achieving Noise Reduction Goals Are Uncertain, GAO-08-384 (Washington,

D.C.: Feb. 15, 2008); Next Generation Air Transportation System: Status of the 

Transition to the Future Air Traffic Control System, GAO-07-784T (Washington, D.C.:

May 9, 2007); Joint Planning and Development Office: Progress and Key Issues in

Planning the Transition to the Next Generation Air Transportation System, 

GAO-07-693T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 29, 2007); and Federal Aviation Administration: 

Key Issues in Ensuring the Efficient Development and Safe Operation of the Next

Generation Air Transportation System, GAO-07-636T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 22, 2007).

Page 2 GAO-08-1154T 
work to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable 

basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We 

believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

NextGen is a multidecade, multiagency effort to transform the current 

ATC system to the next generation air transportation system by moving 

from relying largely on ground-based radars to using precision satellites; 

digital, networked communications; and an integrated weather system. 

Often characterized as “curb to curb,” NextGen involves every aspect of

air transportation, from arrival at the airport to departure from the 

destination airport, and it is expected to increase the safety and enhance 

the capacity of the air transport system. JPDO was charged with 

coordinating the research activities of the federal partner agencies with 

the goal of developing a 20-year R&D agenda for NextGen. FAA will play 

the central role in implementing NextGen, since it will be responsible for 

acquiring, integrating, and operating the new ATC systems. Industry 

stakeholders will also play a key role in implementing NextGen because 

they are expected to develop, finance, and operate many of the new 

NextGen systems that will need to be installed in aircraft. FAA plans to 

spend roughly $5.4 billion from fiscal years 2009 through 2013 on NextGen

development and capital costs. JPDO estimated that total federal spending

for NextGen may range from $15 billion to $22 billion through 2025. The 

agency also noted that it expects system users to incur $14 billion to 

$20 billion in costs to equip themselves with the advanced avionics 

necessary to realize the full benefits of some NextGen technologies. 

Background 

JPDO’s authorizing legislation requires the office to create an R&D plan 

for the transition to NextGen. This requirement led JPDO to develop initial 

versions of the Concept of Operations, Enterprise Architecture, and IWP.

The Concept of Operations is the fundamental planning document from 

which the other two documents flow. Version 2 of the Concept of 

Operations, issued in June 2007, describes how the NextGen system is 

envisioned to operate in 2025. Version 2 of the Enterprise Architecture, 

issued in July 2007, is a technical description of the NextGen system, akin 

to blueprints for a building. The Enterprise Architecture provides a means 

for coordinating among the partner agencies and private sector 

manufacturers, aligning relevant R&D activities, and integrating 

equipment. Version 0.2 of IWP describes the integrated framework needed 

to transition to NextGen from the current system to the end state and will 

continually be refined and enhanced to reflect current priorities, budgets,

Page 3 GAO-08-1154T 
and programs. It is JPDO’s plan for achieving NextGen. Version 1.0 of IWP 

is scheduled to be released at the end of this month. 

JPDO, FAA, and industry stakeholders have different perspectives on 

whether the views of industry and air traffic controllers have been 

adequately incorporated in NextGen planning. JPDO’s organizational 

structure and processes provide for industry representatives and, to a 

lesser extent, air traffic controllers to participate in NextGen planning, but

nearly all the industry stakeholders we spoke with questioned both the 

meaningfulness of their involvement and the usefulness of the NextGen 

planning documents. Furthermore, active air traffic controllers maintain 

that they have not participated in NextGen development activities. 

According to FAA, however, their involvement will increase as NextGen 

efforts shift from planning to implementation. 

Have the Views of 

Industry and Air 

Traffic Controllers 

Been Adequately 

Incorporated in

NextGen Planning 

Documents? 

JPDO includes several organizations with industry participants, and 

industry representatives have reviewed and provided input to key JPDO 

planning documents. For example, JPDO’s NextGen Institute serves as a 

vehicle for incorporating the expertise of industry, state and local 

governments, and academia into the NextGen planning process. 

Additionally, the Institute Management Council, composed of top officials 

and representatives from the aviation community, including air traffic 

controllers, oversees the policies, recommendations, and products of the 

Institute and provides a means for advancing consensus positions on 

critical NextGen issues. JPDO also includes nine working groups,3

 through 

which federal and private sector stakeholders come together to plan for 

and coordinate the development of NextGen technologies. JDPO created 

the working groups in early 2007 to replace its integrated product teams 

and, in part, to address concerns expressed by stakeholders about their 

participation. Unlike the previous teams, which were chaired by a 

representative from a federal agency, the working groups, which have the 

same members as the previous teams, are jointly led by government and 

industry officials. (See table 1.) JPDO expected the working groups to be 

more efficient and output- or product-focused than the integrated product 

teams. Currently, 265 industry representatives participate in JPDO. In 

addition, JPDO provided a draft of the Concept of Operations and IWP to

industry representatives for review and comment. For example, version 

 3

The nine working groups are Airport, Security, Air Navigation Services, Aircraft, 

Net-centric Operations, Safety, Environment, Weather, and Global Harmonization. 

Page 4 GAO-08-1154T 
0.2 of IWP was circulated to stakeholders and, according to a senior JPDO 

official, the office received about 1,100 stakeholder comments, which were 

addressed and incorporated in version 1.0 of the document. 

Table 1: JPDO’s Working Groups, Strategies, and Agency and Industry Leads

Working group Strategy Agency lead Industry lead

Airport Develop airport infrastructure to 

meet future demand 

FAA Trillion Aviation

Security Establish an effective security

system without limiting mobility 

or civil liberties

DHS Global Initiative

Air Navigation 

Services 

Develop air traffic management 

and air traffic control procedures 

for safe and efficient flight 

operations 

FAA Computer

Sciences 

Corporation 

Aircraft Develop plans and

recommendations for the 

performance, function, and 

capabilities of aircraft that will

enable NextGen operations 

FAA Boeing

Net-Centric 

Operations 

Develop a robust, globally 

interconnected network in which 

information is shared in a timely 

and consistent way among 

aviation users 

DOD Boeing

Safety Establish a comprehensive and 

proactive approach to safety 

FAA Boeing

Environment Develop environmental

protection that allows sustained 

aviation growth

FAA Aerospace

Industries 

Association 

Weather Develop a systemwide capability 

to reduce weather impacts 

Department of 

Commerce 

National Business 

Aviation 

Association 

Global 

Harmonization

Harmonize equipment and 

operations globally 

FAA Lockheed Martin

Sources: GAO and JPDO. 

With these efforts, JPDO has sought to obtain participation from industry 

stakeholders and air traffic controllers in its planning activities, and we 

have reported that many stakeholders felt they did have an opportunity to 

participate.4

 In fact, one industry stakeholder group told us that it worked 

 4

GAO-08-1078. 

Page 5 GAO-08-1154T 
closely with JPDO to help revise an early version of the Concept of 

Operations. However, other stakeholders said they frequently attended 

meetings, but were frustrated by a lack of tangible products being 

developed and a lack of progress being made during these meetings. 

Furthermore, 13 of 15 stakeholders who discussed the issue stated that 

they did not feel that their level of participation in either JPDO’s planning 

for or FAA’s implementation of NextGen allowed for sufficient or 

meaningful input toward decision making. Some stakeholders expressed 

concern that JPDO and FAA did not include their input in planning 

documents and other products. In their view, critical issues they raised are 

not being addressed or incorporated in NextGen plans. In particular, some 

stakeholders noted that planning documents were drafted by JPDO staff 

and then provided to them for review and comment. This approach, one 

industry stakeholder noted, did not take full advantage of stakeholders’ 

capabilities. Others were critical of FAA’s decision-making structure for 

implementing NextGen and indicated they felt that FAA and JPDO should 

lay out the broad plans and schedules for NextGen and then obtain 

industry input on the best ways to accomplish the technical changes for 

NextGen. Another stakeholder indicated it had the opportunity to provide 

input to FAA on decisions such as the deployment of ADS-B technology, 

but did not feel its input was considered by the agency. Still others felt that 

FAA provided sufficient briefings on NextGen activities, but allowed no 

opportunity for their input or comments. 

A number of stakeholders also expressed concerns about the usefulness of 

JPDO’s three planning documents and of FAA’s implementation plan for 

NextGen (a document previously known as the Operational Evolution 

Partnership and now called the NextGen Implementation Plan). Nineteen

of 21 industry stakeholders who discussed the issue said that these 

planning documents lack the information that industry participants need

for successful planning. Many of the stakeholders we interviewed said that 

while the planning documents provide a high-level view of NextGen 

benefits, they do not provide specific details such as a catalog of critical 

needs, clearly defined and prioritized intermediate objectives, and a 

structured plan for achieving tangible results. According to stakeholders 

who manufacture aviation equipment, the plans lack specific details to 

inform them about the types of technology they need to design for 

NextGen or to provide insights to market, build, and install systems that 

support NextGen. Some industry stakeholders further noted that the 

current planning does not identify all of the key research for NextGen, 

establish priorities for R&D, or show how to obtain those results. In 

addition, several stakeholders characterized the documents as long and

confusing—qualities that detracted from their usefulness. We agree that 

Page 6 GAO-08-1154T 
the latest publicly available versions of these documents lack information 

that various stakeholders need. For example, the documents do not 

include key elements such as scenarios illustrating NextGen operations; a 

summary of NextGen’s operational impact on users and other 

stakeholders; and an analysis of the benefits, alternatives, and trade-offs 

that were considered for NextGen. Our review of the upcoming version of 

IWP confirmed that it is to have information that is lacking in the current 

document. According to JPDO and FAA officials, it includes schedule 

information that has been updated to reflect newly available information, 

coordination with FAA’s schedule and plans, and revisions in response to 

public comments received on the previous version. In addition, a senior 

JPDO official noted and we agree that these documents are not the 

appropriate place for some of the detailed information stakeholders would 

like and need, such as specific information on the types of technology 

stakeholders need to design or install. 

Active air traffic controllers are represented on JPDO’s Institute 

Management Council, and other controllers and aviation technicians 

participate in certain JPDO efforts. However, stakeholders from the 

National Air Traffic Controllers Association—an FAA employee union—

have indicated that although the union participates in FAA meetings and 

briefings related to NextGen, it does so as a recipient of information rather 

than an equal party in the development of NextGen. Technicians in 

another FAA employee union—the Professional Aviation Safety 

Specialists—have indicated that they do not participate in NextGen 

planning or development activities. Although air traffic controllers and 

technicians will be responsible for a major part of the installation, 

operations, and maintenance of the systems that NextGen will comprise, 

our work has shown that these stakeholders have not fully participated in

the development of NextGen. Insufficient participation on the part of these 

employees could delay the certification and integration of new systems 

and result in increased costs, as we have seen in previous ATC 

modernization efforts. 

FAA officials, however, note that both unions are represented on its NextGen

Management Board, a decision-making body for resolving emerging NextGen

implementation issues. Furthermore, FAA has indicated that air traffic 

controllers, pilots, and airline operations center personnel will be a part of the

extended team that is directly involved in the planning and execution of a

gradual rollout of NextGen technologies and procedures in a Florida 

Page 7 GAO-08-1154T 
demonstration. In addition, according to FAA, these stakeholders will

continue to be heavily involved in NextGen throughout its life cycle through

their participation on advisory committees such as RTCA,5

 the Air Traffic 

Management Advisory Committee,6

 the Performance-Based Operations

Aviation Rulemaking Committee,7

 and the Research, Engineering and

Development Advisory Committee.8

FAA and JPDO have established mechanisms for obtaining stakeholder 

views. However, given the large number of NextGen stakeholders and the 

evolution of opportunities for participation in NextGen, we believe that 

stakeholders will continue to differ on how adequately their views have 

been incorporated in NextGen planning. 

Our work indicates that the current version of the IWP lacks critical 

information and is not sufficiently “user friendly” to be effectively used to 

oversee and manage NextGen activities. For instance, 19 of the 21 

stakeholders who discussed the issue said that the planning documents 

did not provide specific details such as a catalog of critical needs, clearly

defined and prioritized intermediate objectives, and a structured plan for 

achieving tangible results. However, the next version of the plan, to be

released at the end of September, is to have further details and research 

priorities that should be useful for NextGen oversight. According to senior 

JPDO officials, this next version will identify the specific operational 

improvements and capabilities that NextGen will incorporate and will 

show what policies, research, and other activities are needed to enable

those improvements and capabilities, when they are needed, and what 

entities are responsible for them. Moreover, this version includes schedule 

information that has been updated to reflect newly available information, 

Is the Current Version 

of IWP Sufficiently 

Detailed for Effective 

Use in Overseeing and 

Managing NextGen? 

 5

Once called the Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics, RTCA is a private, not-forprofit corporation that develops consensus-based performance standards for ATC systems.

6

The Air Traffic Management Advisory Committee, a component of RTCA, provides FAA 

with consensus-based, recommended investment priorities that are expected to improve 

the safety, capacity, and efficiency of the air transportation system. 

7

The Performance-Based Operations Aviation Rulemaking Committee was established by 

FAA to provide a forum for the U.S. aviation community to discuss, prioritize, and resolve 

issues; provide direction for U.S. flight operations criteria; and produce U.S. consensus

positions for global harmonization. 

8

The Research, Engineering and Development Advisory Committee advises the FAA 

Administrator on R&D issues and coordinates FAA’s research, engineering, and 

development activities with industry and other government agencies. 

Page 8 GAO-08-1154T 
coordination with FAA schedules and plans, and public comments 

received on the previous version, according to JPDO and FAA officials. 

Our review of the upcoming version—which is an automated, searchable, 

user-friendly database—verified that it will have the capability to track 

dates and identify programs that are behind schedule, making it useful, but 

not sufficient, for oversight. 

Senior JPDO officials expect subsequent versions of IWP to include cost 

information and more detail on which programs are responsible for 

completing particular actions. We believe that JPDO’s upcoming version of 

the work plan shows progress in providing needed details and making the 

document more useful than earlier versions. With cost information, 

subsequent versions of the plan should be even more useful for NextGen 

oversight. 

The research, development, and testing activities set out in the current 

IWP do not provide a sufficient basis for Congress to be confident that the 

goals of NextGen will be achieved. However, the enhanced information 

that is planned for inclusion in the upcoming version will provide a firmer 

basis for congressional confidence. The current plan can best be viewed as 

a necessary but not a sufficient step in the planning and early 

implementation of NextGen. However, additional issues that are not part 

of the current plan will have to be addressed to achieve NextGen goals, 

such as obtaining the necessary funding, establishing the infrastructure to 

support the scope of needed R&D, and filling the gap that may exist 

between basic research and the research needed to bring technologies far 

enough along for transfer to industry for further development. 

How Confident 

Should Congress Be 

that IWP Will Provide 

a Sufficient Basis for 

Achieving NextGen’s 

Goals? 

JPDO and FAA have determined that research gaps now exist because of

cuts in NASA’s aeronautical research funding and NextGen’s expanded 

research requirements. In the past, NASA performed a significant portion

of aeronautics R&D. However, NASA’s aeronautic research budget 

declined from about $959 million in fiscal year 2004 to $511 million in 

fiscal year 2008. While NASA still plans to focus some of its research on 

NextGen needs, the agency has moved toward a focus on fundamental 

research and away from developmental work and demonstration projects. 

As a result, in some cases, NASA’s research focuses on developing 

technologies to a lower—and therefore less readily adopted—maturity 

level than in the past. 

Budget requests for FAA have increased to help provide the needed R&D 

funding for NextGen. According to FAA, the agency will spend an 

Page 9 GAO-08-1154T 
estimated $740 million on NextGen-related R&D during fiscal years 2009 

through 2013. The administration’s proposed budget for fiscal year 2009 

requests $56.5 million for FAA R&D to support the integration and 

implementation of NextGen programs, a substantial increase over the

$24.3 million authorized for fiscal year 2008. The actual and projected 

increase in FAA’s overall R&D funding reflects the expected increases in 

NextGen research funding. (See fig. 1.) In addition, increased funding for 

NextGen R&D is contained in proposed legislation to reauthorize FAA, 

although that legislation has not been enacted. 

Figure 1: FAA’s R&D Budget for Fiscal Years 2006 through 2008 and Proposed 

Budget through Fiscal Year 2013, in Constant 2008 Dollars 

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

400

450

2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

Dollars in millions

Source: GAO analysis.

Fiscal year

If FAA is authorized to receive increased R&D funding for NextGen, some 

observers believe that the agency lacks the R&D infrastructure to 

adequately address the developmental research needed for NextGen. 

According to a draft report by the Research, Engineering and Development 

Advisory Committee, establishing the infrastructure within FAA to 

conduct the necessary R&D could delay the implementation of NextGen 

by 5 years. Unless an adequate R&D infrastructure is in place as funds 

become available, the implementation of NextGen could be delayed. 

Page 10 GAO-08-1154T 
One critical area in which an R&D gap has been identified is the 

environmental impact of aviation. According to a JPDO analysis, 

environmental impacts will be the primary constraint on the capacity and 

flexibility of the national airspace system unless these impacts are 

managed and mitigated. FAA’s Continuous Lower Energy, Emissions, and 

Noise (CLEEN) initiative, in which NASA would participate as an adviser, 

is intended to address the gap between NASA’s fundamental research in 

noise reduction and the need for near-term demonstrations of technology.

This program would establish a research consortium of government, 

industry, and academic participants that would allow for the maturation of 

these technologies via demonstration projects.9

 In proposed legislation 

reauthorizing FAA, $111 million for fiscal years 2008 through 2011 may be

used for a new FAA program to reduce aviation noise and emissions.10 This 

program would, over the next 10 years, facilitate the development, 

maturation, and certification of improved airframe technologies. 

The CLEEN program would be a step toward further maturing emissions 

and noise reduction technologies, but experts agree that the proposed 

funding is insufficient to achieve needed emissions reductions. While 

acknowledging that CLEEN would help bridge the gap between NASA’s 

R&D and manufacturers’ eventual incorporation of technologies into 

aircraft designs, aeronautics industry representatives and experts we 

consulted said that the program’s funding levels may not be sufficient to 

attain the goals specified in the proposal. According to these experts, the 

proposed funding levels would allow for the further development of one or 

possibly two projects. Moreover, in one expert’s view, the funding for 

these projects may be sufficient to develop the technology only to the level 

that achieves an emissions-reduction goal in testing, not to the level 

required for the technology to be incorporated into a new engine design. 

Although we believe that this level of funding is a step in the right 

direction, additional funds would permit the agency to “buy down” R&D 

risks—that is, the more projects that can be funded, the greater the chance

that at least one of the projects will yield a product for the next stage of 

development. FAA recognizes the implications of the proposed funding 

structure for CLEEN and characterizes the program as a “pilot.” 

We are guardedly optimistic that the NextGen goals and timetable for 

quieter, cleaner, and more efficient air traffic operations can be achieved.

 9

GAO-08-384. 

10H.R. 2881, § 505. 

Page 11 GAO-08-1154T 
The administration has requested increased funding for NextGen R&D and 

FAA and JPDO recognize the need to establish an R&D infrastructure and 

fill any gaps that may exist between basic research and the transfer to 

industry for further development. 

Prior to May 2008, when FAA restructured ATO, JPDO reported directly to 

both the Chief Operating Officer (COO) of ATO and the FAA 

Administrator. Figure 2 shows FAA’s management structure as of 

November 2007, with the shaded boxes showing offices with 

responsibilities for NextGen activities. We expressed concerns about this 

dual reporting status, suggesting that it might keep JPDO from interacting 

on an equal footing with ATO and the other partner federal agencies.11 We 

recognized that JPDO needed to counter the perception that it was a proxy 

for ATO and, as such, was not able to act as an “honest broker” between 

ATO and the partner federal agencies, but we also understood that JPDO 

must continue to work with ATO and its partner agencies in a partnership 

in which ATO is the lead implementer of NextGen. Therefore, we reported 

that it was important for JPDO to have some independence from ATO and 

pointed out that, to address this issue, the JPDO Director could report 

directly to the FAA Administrator. We observed that such a change could 

also lessen what some stakeholders perceived as unnecessary bureaucracy 

and red tape associated with decision making and other JPDO and 

NextGen processes. 

Can JPDO Continue 

to Be Viewed as an 

“Honest Broker” in 

Light of FAA’s Recent 

Restructuring? 

 11GAO, Responses to Questions for the Record; Hearing on the Future of Air Traffic 

Control Modernization, GAO-07-928R (Washington, D.C.: May 30, 2007). 

Page 12 GAO-08-1154T 
Figure 2: FAA Organization, November 2007 

Assistant 

Administrator for

Civil Rights

Chief Counsel

Assistant 

Administrator for

Government and

Industry Affairs

Assistant 

Administrator for

Communications

Assistant

Administrator

for Information

Services

Assistant

Administrator for

Human Resource

Management

Associate

Administrator

for Commercial

Space

Transportation

Associate

Administrator

for Airports

Assistant

Administrator

for Regions

and Center

Operations

Assistant

Administrator for

Aviation Policy,

Planning and

Environment

Associate

Administrator

for Aviation

Safety

Assistant

Administrator

for Security and

Hazardous

Materials

Assistant

Administrator

for International

Aviation

Assistant

Administrator

for Financial

Services

Vice President

for Acquisition

and Business

Services

Vice President

for

Communications

Services

Vice President

for En Route and

Oceanic

Services

Vice President

for Finance

Services

Vice President

for Operations

Planning

Services

Vice President

for System

Operations

Services

Vice President

for Safety

Services

Vice President

for Terminal

Services

Vice President

for Technical

Operations

Services

Chief Operating

Officer, Air Traffic

Organization

(ATO)

Source: FAA.

Deputy

Administrator

Administrator

Joint Planning

and Development

Office (JPDO)

Offices with responsibilities for NextGen-related activities

Page 13 GAO-08-1154T 
Since ATO was reorganized in May 2008, JPDO has been housed within the 

new NextGen and Operations Planning Office and reports through the 

Senior Vice President for NextGen and Operations Planning only to ATO’s 

COO. (See fig. 3.) Now that JPDO is no longer a separate, independent 

office within FAA and no longer reports directly to the FAA Administrator, 

its organizational position within FAA has declined. Nonetheless, we 

believe that it is too early to tell whether JPDO will be able to act as an 

“honest broker” between FAA and the other federal partner agencies. 

Currently, according to a senior JPDO official, JPDO’s partner agencies are 

cooperating with JPDO, indicating that the office is apparently maintaining 

its status as an honest broker. 

Page 14 GAO-08-1154T 
Figure 3: ATO Organization, July 2008 

Chief Operating

Officer, Air Traffic

Organization

Administrator

Senior Vice

President

Finance

Senior Vice

President Strategy

and Performance

Vice President

Communications

Vice President

Safety

Vice President

Acquisitions and

Business

Senior Vice

President

Operations

Vice President

Technical

Training

Vice President

Service Center

Vice President

Terminal

Vice President

Technical

Operations

Vice President

System

Operations

Vice President

En Route and

Oceanic

Senior Vice

President NextGen

and Operations

Planning

System

Engineering

and Safety

Modeling and

Simulation

Research and

Technology

Development

WJHTC Test

and Evaluation

Administration

Financial

Operations

OEP

Integration and

Implementation

Aviation

Weather

Joint Planning

and Development

Source: FAA.

Offices with responsibilities for NextGen-related activities

Page 15 GAO-08-1154T 
However, it is also too early to tell if ATO’s reorganization sufficiently 

addresses concerns that many industry stakeholders expressed about the 

adequacy of the previous organizational relationship between FAA and 

JPDO—when JPDO reported directly to both the COO and the 

Administrator—for the transition to NextGen. Proposed legislation 

reauthorizing FAA would address the earlier concern of stakeholders by 

designating the Director of JPDO as the Associate Administrator for the 

Next Generation Air Transportation System, appointed by and reporting 

directly to the Administrator.12 The proposed legislation would also 

address observations we have made about JPDO’s organizational 

placement within FAA. 

Finally, it is too early to tell if the reorganization of FAA’s management 

structure addresses concerns that stakeholders have expressed about the 

fragmentation of management responsibility for NextGen activities. 

Specifically, some industry stakeholders expressed frustration that a 

program as large and important as NextGen does not follow the industry 

practice of having one person authorized to make key decisions. They 

pointed out that although FAA’s COO is nominally in charge of FAA’s 

NextGen efforts, the COO must also manage the agency’s day-to-day air 

traffic operations and may therefore be unable to devote enough time and 

attention to managing NextGen. In addition, these stakeholders noted that 

many of NextGen’s capabilities span FAA operational units both within 

and outside ATO. The reorganization does not address concerns about this 

fragmentation, since other offices in ATO and FAA continue to have 

responsibility for parts of NextGen and the division of responsibility for 

NextGen efforts among them is not clear. A senior FAA official noted that

ATO executives are knowledgeable and supportive of the reorganization, 

but that the agency could better communicate the changes to stakeholders

outside of FAA. A focused outreach to industry stakeholders would help to 

get their buy-in and support of FAA’s efforts. 

 12H.R. 2881, § 202. 

Page 16 GAO-08-1154T 
To articulate a clear R&D program with defined and prioritized tasks, 

JPDO must continue to collaborate with its partner agencies—FAA, NASA, 

DOD, DHS, and Commerce—to identify and prioritize the R&D needed for 

NextGen. As it issues new versions of IWP, JPDO continues to update the 

R&D plans of the partner agencies. However, JPDO has not yet determined 

what NextGen R&D needs to be done first and at what cost to demonstrate 

and integrate NextGen technologies into the national airspace system. The 

next version of IWP, scheduled to be released later this month, is to 

identify the sequence of research activities that the partner agencies must 

complete before specific NextGen capabilities can be implemented. The 

plan should serve as a useful tool in prioritizing and tracking NextGen 

research. In addition, JPDO has worked with the Office of Management 

and Budget (OMB) to develop a process that allows OMB to identify 

NextGen-related research and acquisition projects across the partner 

agencies and consider NextGen as a unified, cross-agency program. Under 

this process, JPDO and its partner agencies can jointly present OMB with 

business cases for the partner agencies’ NextGen-related efforts, and these

business cases can be used as inputs to funding decisions for NextGen 

research and acquisitions across the agencies. 

What Needs to Be 

Done to Move JPDO 

from Proposing R&D 

to Articulating a Clear 

R&D Program with 

Defined and 

Prioritized Tasks? 

In addition, JPDO needs to continue to leverage the R&D programs of the 

partner agencies, which will conduct and define the research. For 

example, JPDO monitors NASA’s and FAA’s efforts to coordinate their 

research. NASA and FAA have developed a strategy to identify, conduct, 

and transfer to FAA the R&D needed for NextGen. The strategy establishes 

four “research transition teams”13 that align with JPDO’s planning 

framework and outlines how the two agencies will jointly develop 

research requirements—FAA will provide user requirements and NASA 

will conduct the research and provide an understanding of the engineering 

rationale for design decisions. In addition, the strategy calls for clearly 

defining metrics for evaluating the research. According to JPDO, as of 

August 2008, four teams had been established and have conducted initial

meetings. 

JPDO has begun to move from proposing research to articulating a defined 

and prioritized R&D program. In addition, JPDO, FAA, and NASA have 

established mechanisms, such as research transition teams, to define and

 13The four teams are organized along the framework for near-, mid-, and long-term research

goals established in JPDO’s IWP. The teams are Separation Management, Trajectory 

Management, Flow Contingency Management, and Capacity Management. 

Page 17 GAO-08-1154T 
prioritize R&D. We believe, however, that it is still too early to assess the 

adequacy of these efforts. 

Version 1.0 of IWP, scheduled to be released later this month, will provide 

a baseline for measuring NextGen progress. Congress can use the 

information contained in the plan to help evaluate whether the actions 

needed to achieve NextGen are on schedule and whether the specific 

operational improvements and capabilities that will make up NextGen are 

being accomplished. Specifically, subsequent versions of the plan will 

allow the development of metrics to show progress, by agency, in 

(1) achieving key activities and deploying technology, (2) issuing policies 

and guidance, and (3) prioritizing resources. 

Furthermore, subsequent versions of IWP are expected to include cost 

information that decision makers can use to help understand the rationale 

for budget requests, monitor costs, and improve future cost estimates for 

acquisitions. This information will be helpful to decision makers when 

budget constraints do not allow all system acquisitions to be fully funded 

at planned and approved levels and they must decide which programs to 

fund and which to cut or delay according to their priorities. 

At this point, Mr. Chairman, I would like to briefly discuss two additional 

issues that present challenges to realizing the full potential of NextGen. 

The first, an infrastructure challenge, is to implement NextGen plans for a 

new configuration of ATC facilities and enhanced runway capacity. The 

second, a human capital challenge, is to ensure that FAA staff have the 

knowledge and skills needed to implement NextGen. 

What Metrics Should 

Congress Use to 

Evaluate the Progress 

of NextGen? 

Two Related 

Challenges 

To fully realize NextGen’s capabilities, a new configuration of ATC 

facilities and enhanced runway capacity will be required to go along with 

new technologies and procedures. According to a senior ATO official, the 

agency plans to report on the cost implications of reconfiguring its 

facilities in 2009. However, FAA has no comprehensive plan for 

reconfiguring its facilities. Until the cost analysis is completed and a plan 

for facilities reconfiguration has been developed, the configurations 

needed for NextGen cannot be implemented and potential savings that 

could help offset the cost of NextGen will not be realized. Some FAA 

officials have said that planned facility maintenance and construction 

based on the current ATC system are significant cost drivers that could, 

without reconfiguration, significantly increase the cost of NextGen. 

Additionally, some of the capacity and efficiency enhancements expected

Page 18 GAO-08-1154T 
from the implementation of NextGen maybe curtailed if the system’s 

infrastructure needs are not fully addressed. 

In the meantime, FAA faces an immediate task to maintain and repair 

existing facilities so that the current ATC system continues to operate 

safely and reliably. The agency is currently responsible for maintaining 

over 400 terminal facilities. While FAA has not assessed the physical 

condition of all of these facilities, the agency rated the average condition 

of 89 of them as “fair.” Based on its assessment of these 89 facilities, FAA 

estimated that a one-time cost to repair all 400 terminal facilities would 

range from $250 million to $350 million. Two FAA employee unions 

(NATCA and PASS) contend that many of the 400 facilities are 

deteriorating for lack of maintenance and that working conditions are 

unsafe because of leaking roofs, deteriorating walls and ceilings, and 

obsolete air-conditioning systems. According to FAA officials, while some 

of these facilities can accommodate NextGen’s new technologies and 

systems, many of them are not consistent with the configurations that will 

be needed under NextGen. Once FAA develops and implements a facility 

consolidation plan, the costs of facility repairs and maintenance may be 

reduced. In the meantime, FAA will have to manage its budgetary 

resources so that it can maintain legacy systems and legacy infrastructure 

while configuring the national airspace system to accommodate NextGen

technologies and operations. 

The transformation to NextGen will also depend on the ability of airports 

to handle greater capacity. While NextGen technologies and procedures 

will enhance this ability, new or expanded runways will likely be needed 

also to handle the expected increases in traffic. FAA has developed a 

rolling 10-year plan for capacity improvements at the nation’s 35 busiest 

airports, and some airports are building new runways. However, even with 

these planned runway improvements, FAA analyses indicate that 14 more 

airports will still need additional capacity. Moreover, without significant 

reductions in emissions and noise around some of the nation’s airports, 

efforts to expand their capacity could be stalled or the implementation of 

NextGen delayed. We believe that this is a significant issue that FAA and 

JPDO will have to address. 

To manage the implementation of NextGen, FAA will need staff with 

technical skills, such as systems engineering and contract management 

expertise. Because of the scope and complexity of the NextGen effort, the 

agency may not currently have the in-house expertise to manage the 

transition to NextGen without assistance. In November 2006, we 

recommended that FAA assess the technical and contract management 

Page 19 GAO-08-1154T 
skills FAA staff will need to define, implement, and integrate the numerous 

complex programs that will be involved in the transition to NextGen.14 In 

response to our recommendation, FAA contracted with the National 

Academy of Public Administration (NAPA) to determine the mix of skills 

and number of skilled persons, such as technical personnel and program 

managers, needed to implement NextGen and to compare those 

requirements with FAA’s current staff resources. NAPA expects to 

complete its assessment in September 2008. We believe this is a 

reasonable approach that should help FAA begin to address this issue, 

recognizing that once the right skills have been identified, it may take 

considerable time to select, hire, and integrate what FAA estimates could 

be 150 to 200 more staff. This situation could contribute to delaying the 

integration of new technologies and the transformation of the national

airspace system. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be pleased

to respond to any questions that you or other members of the Committee 

may have. 

For further information on this testimony, please contact Dr. Gerald L. 

Dillingham at (202) 512-2834 or dillinghamg@gao.gov. Individuals making 

key contributions to this testimony include Teresa Spisak, Kevin Egan, 

Bess Eisenstadt, Bert Japikse, Taylor Reeves, and Richard Scott. 

 14GAO, Next Generation Air Transportation System: Progress and Challenges Associated

with the Transformation of the National Airspace System, GAO-07-25 (Washington, D.C.: 

Nov. 13, 2006). 

Page 20 GAO-08-1154T 

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