Filed 12/11/14 In re K.R. CA2/8 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

In re K.R., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. B252942

LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.
JESSICA P.,
Defendant and Appellant. (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. DK00111)

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Co urt of Los Angeles County. D. Zeke Zeidler, Judge. Affirmed.

M. Elizabeth Handy, under appointmen t by the Court of Appeal, for Appellant.

John F. Krattli, County Counsel, Dawyn R. Harrison, Assistant County Counsel, Jacklyn K. Louie, Deputy County Coun sel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

___________________ __________________2 Jessica P. (Mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s dispositional orders terminating jurisdiction and granting custody of two of her children, A.M. and K.R., to their respective fathers. We affirm the challenged orders.
FACTS Mother has four children: son M.P., born in 2003 with Luis P.; daughter A.M.,
born in 2005 with Ma uricio M.; daughter K.R., born in 2008 with William R.; and son B.P., born in 2012 with David P. In 2013, Mother lived with David and B.P. The older
children did not live with Mo ther as a result of a vol untary placement plan Mother
entered into in 2011. 1 M.P. lived with th e maternal grandmother and A.M. and K.R. lived with their respective fa thers. Each of the children visited with one another, generally at the maternal grandmother’s hom e, and K.R. had an extended visit with Mother and David for approximately two we eks in June and July of 2013. A petition under Welfar e and Institutions Code 2 section 300 was filed on July 24, 2013, alleging David hit A.M. with belts, f ondled K.R.’s vagina, and had a history of violent altercations with Mother in the pres ence of the children. It was further alleged that Mother knew about the abuse, but failed to protect the girls. The boys were alleged
to be at risk of harm due to David’s abus e and Mother’s failure to protect.

1 On July 25, 2011, DCFS received a referral for gene ral neglect and abuse. During the course of the investigation, the childre n’s social worker (CSW) observed M.P. and A.M. playing in the street while David sat on the porch drinking beer. The CSW also noted that two-year-old K.R. was wander ing around the house unsupervised while Mother, who was pregnant with B.P., slept on the couch. The home also lacked hot water. Mother agreed to allow K.R. and A.M. to live with th eir fathers while M.P. stayed with the maternal grandmother. As a result of Mother’s voluntary plan, the referral was closed and was never promoted to a case.

2 All further section references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise specified.3 The petition was precipitated by a call from the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD). On July 20, 2013,William brought K.R. to a LA PD station to report that David touched her vagina inside her underpants. K.R. told Willia m and his girlfriend that David touched her several times between April and Ju ly 2013. K.R. also reported she witnessed David choking Mother in April 2013. During the ensuing investigation, the Lo s Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) discovered that David had prior arrests for domestic abuse, battery, and possession of narcotics dating back to 1993. Both Davi d and Mother denied all of the allegations. When confronted by the CSW about the allegations, Mother said, “Supposedly my boyfriend David [P.] touched my daughter [K.R.] on her vagina but I don’t believe her! She came a month ago and said that David touched her through her panties. Her dad, William [R.] called me and to ld me that [K.R.] told him this.” In an interview on July 21, 2013, A.M. told the CSW that Da vid used to hit her with a belt when she stayed with Mother. She also witnessed Davi d choking Mother and on another occasion, beating Mother. A.M. denied Da vid touched her inappr opriately. A.M.
confirmed she felt safe in her father’s care. At the detention and arraignment hearing, the juvenile court found a prima facie showing had been made that the children were dependents described under section 300.
B.P. and M.P. were detained in shelter care 3 and A.M. and K.R. were released to their fathers. DCFS was ordered to provide fa mily reunification services and family maintenance services to all parties. Monitore d visits were granted to Mother and David. However, they were ordered not to visit th e children together and David was granted visits only with B.P. DCFS made its jurisdiction/dispositi on report on August 29, 2013, documenting
extensive interviews w ith the parties. In an August 23 interview, Moth er indicated she
believed K.R. lied about the sexual abuse be cause the accusation came two weeks after

3 Although M.P. lived with the maternal grandmot her and she indicated she was willing to accept both M.P. and B.P. into her home, maternal grandmother’s home was not initially approved becau se she had a previous referral against her.4 Mother refused William’s request to keep K.R. for a longer pe riod of time and to reunite with him. William told her she was going to regret not keeping K.R. and not leaving David. David denied any se xual or physical abuse, also asserting the accusations stemmed from William. However, he belie ved William was motivated to coach K.R.
because he wanted full custod y and child support from Moth er. David observed that K.R. was always with Mother, even when Mother was asleep or showering. He also stated, “She [K.R.] tends to lie a lot. She lies about everything.” Both Mother and David indicated it was suspicious that William allowe d K.R. to stay with them for two weeks during June and July after the a lleged abuse began in April. In an August 26, 2013 interview, K.R. confirmed, “David is my mom’s husband and he touched my ‘panito’ 4 with his fingers.” She also reported he touched her over her clothing and tried to kiss her on the mouth, bu t she said no, “because you don’t do that.” K.R. also reported seeing Da vid and Mother fighting and hitting each other. William stated he waited approximately two weeks before reporting the abuse to the police
because he “wanted to make su re first.” When William conf ronted Mother about it, she told him they were all lies. However, Willia m and his girlfriend confirmed the story with K.R. using a doll. K.R. was interviewed over several days in September 2013 by a forensic case worker pursuant to court order. During this time, forensic interviewer confirmed K.R.
knew the difference between what is true and wh at is not. K.R. then reiterated that David
tried to kiss her on the mouth a nd touched her va gina. In addition, K.R. confirmed that David put his hands around Mother’s neck , hit her “many times,” and hit B.P. DCFS noted some discrepancies in Willia m and K.R.’s story regarding how and
when the sexual abuse was disclosed. Willia m stated K.R. initially told the babysitter about the abuse and the babysitter reported it to him. The babysitter, however, denied K.R. disclosed any abuse to her. Also, Willia m provided inconsistent dates as to when K.R. first disclosed the sexual abuse, when he questioned Mother, and when he reported

4 K.R. identified her vagina as “panito” and her buttocks as “nalgas.”5 the abuse to the police. K.R.’s story alte rnated between David touching her over her panties and under her panties. As to the domestic violence allegati ons, DCFS noted that A.M. and K.R. consistently described incidents of domestic violence between Mother and David. In her interview, A.M. described how David hit her w ith a belt: “I was crying, I forgot why but I was crying really hard and my mom was inside with David in the room. Then he hit me with the belt on my bottom.” Although Moth er witnessed the incident, “[s]he didn’t do anything.” A.M. further recounted that Da vid “hits my mom, one day he choked her. I don’t remember why he choke d her, but he put her on th e wall and my mom went down and she was crying. That night, my mom wa s crying a lot. My brother [M.P.] was there
but he was outside and I told him. David said that he was going to call the police so they can take my mom but I said that it was Davi d that was supposed to go with the police.”
A.M.’s father indicated he wanted to reta in custody of A.M. a nd was unaware of any abuse. Although both Mother and David deny any domestic violence occurred, DCFS noted that David’s record showed past incide nts of a violent nature. Additionally, other family members, including the ot her fathers, described David as violent or unpleasant. The children all reported that they were relu ctant to have contact with David. The CSW concluded, “Desp ite the inconsistencies in [William’s] accounts of the child [K.R.’s] disclosure, the child maintains that [David] was fondling her vagina on a regular basis and also reported that [David] attempted to kiss the ch ild in the mouth. Nonetheless, the mother and [David] uphold that all the allegations have been fabricated by [William] who is seeking to gain fu ll custody of the child [K.R.].” At the adjudication hearing on Novemb er 15, 2013, the juvenile court heard testimony from the CSW, K.R., and A.M., whic h conformed to the information provided in the DCFS reports. It also received stip ulated testimony from Mother that she separated from David on the day of the detention hearin g. She initially lived with the maternal grandmother, but then moved in with her fri ends once the maternal grandmother’s home became a placement option. Mother also would have testified she was currently6 participating in individual co unseling and parenting. She wo uld have denied that K.R. told her David touched her inappropr iately or tried to kiss her. The juvenile court adjudge d the children to be depende nts under section 300 and found by clear and convincing evidence that substantial dange r existed to their physical
and emotional health. As to A.M. and K.R., jurisdiction was terminated with custody orders granting legal a nd physical custody to their respec tive fathers. Weekly monitored visits were granted to Mother as to all th e children. However, Mother and David were not to visit together. No reunif ication services were offered to David as to M.P. and B.P. Mother was provided reunificati on services for B.P. and M.P. and individual counseling
was ordered for M.P. as needed. The cour t further ordered K.R. to attend counseling until a therapist indicated it was no longer need ed. The court indicated Mother was not granted services as to K.R. and A.M. because K.R. and A.M. were safely in the care of another parent. In any case, the juvenile co urt noted that Mother would receive services in B.P. and M.P.’s case. Twice monthly sibl ing visitation was also ordered. The court expressly noted and overruled Mother’s objection to the di spositional order terminating jurisdiction as to K.R. Mo ther’s counsel argued the DC FS reports showed William did not adequately protect K.R., there remained a substantial risk to K.R., and jurisdiction
should be maintain ed to ensure her safety. Mother timely appealed.
DISCUSSION Mother does not dispute the juvenile court’s findings. She only challenges the juvenile court’s dispositional orders relating to K.R. and A.M. According to Mother,
substantial evidence demonstrates a need for continued jurisdic tion over both girls, particularly since the court maintained jurisdiction over B.P. and M.P. Additionally, Mother argues it is in the child ren’s best interests to preser ve the family with Mother. County Counsel filed a respondent’s brief c ontending the juvenile c ourt’s orders as to A.M. were proper, but it took no position on the court’s orde rs as to K.R. since DCFS recommended continued jurisdicti on over K.R. William also filed a respondent’s brief, arguing substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s orders as to K.R. Because the7 girls are differently situated, we separately a ddress whether the court’s orders as to each of them were proper. I. Applicable Law and Standard of Review Mother assumes the juvenile court a pplied section 361.2, subdivision (b)(1) 5 when it granted custody of the girls to their father s and terminated jurisdiction. William agrees
with Mother that section 361.2 applies because “[K.R.] was technically living with Father [William] at the time the procee dings were initiated in juven ile court, however there was no custody order in place with e ither the family law court or the juvenile court. [K.R.] had overnight visitation with Mother, in the home she resided in with David, and [K.R.] was abused during such visitation in Mother and David’s home. Thus, the incidents which brought this matter to th e attention of the juvenile court occurred during a time when [K.R.] was ‘residing with Mother an d David, not Father [William].” County
Counsel likewise cites to sections 361.2 and 362.4 6 as the governing law in this case. The juvenile court, however, did not referenc e section 361.2 or 362. 4 in its orders.

5 Section 361.2, subdivision (a) provides th at when a court assumes jurisdiction of a minor, it must determine “whether there is a parent of the ch ild, with whom the child was not residing at the time that the events or conditions arose that br ought the child within the provisions of Section 300, who desires to assume cust ody of the child.” If so, the court must place the child with that parent un less it finds that doing so poses a risk of harm to the child. (§ 361.2, subd. (a).) Once the child has b een placed with the noncustodial parent, the court has three opti ons: (1) it may simply terminate jurisdiction and give the noncustodial pare nt legal and physical custody of the child with visitation rights to the other parent (§ 361.2, subd. (b )(1)); or (2) it may pla ce the child with the noncustodial parent and order a home vis it be conducted within three months to determine whether that parent should have permanent custody (§ 361 .2, subd. (b)(2)); or (3) it may order reunification services be provid ed to either or both parents and determine at a later hearing which parent, if either, shal l have custody of the child (§ 361.2, subd. (b)(3)).

6 Section 362.4 provides, in pertinent part, “[w]hen the juvenile court terminates its jurisdiction over a minor who has been adjudged a dependent child of the juvenile court prior to the minor’s attainment of the age of 18 years, and . . . an order has been entered with regard to the custody of that mino r, the juvenile court on its own motion, may issue . . . an order determining the custody of, or visitation with , the child. [¶ ] . . . [¶] If no action is filed or pending relating to the cust ody of the minor in th e superior court of8 By its own terms, the options outlined in section 361.2 govern only when the dependent child is placed with a parent “with whom the child was not residing at the time that the events or conditions arose that brought the child within the provisions of Section 300[.]” Here, the girls resided with their fathers at the time the proceedings were
initiated. K.R.’s two-week stay with Mother and David in June and July 2013 was merely an extended visit. Although Mother and William ag reed that no custody orders were issued by any court regarding K.R. and A.M., it is clear the gi rls lived with their fathers and, at a minimum, the fathers shared custody of the girls with Mother. Under the Welfare and Institutions Code, the residence of a minor is determined by the residence of the person who has custody of the child. (§ 17.1, subd. (b).) Unde r this scenario, the girls resided with their fathers prior to the proceedings and th erefore, could not have been placed under the terms of section 361.2. Although this case does not fit neatly within its parameters, we nevertheless believe the juvenile court derived its powers from sections 362 and 364. ( See In re A.L. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 138 [appl ying section 362 to adjudge a child a dependent of the court, but leaving her in parental cust ody as part of the dispositional order]; In re Gabriel
L. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 644 [applying secti on 364].) Section 362 permits a juvenile court to “make any and all reasonable orders for the care, supervisio n, custody, conduct, maintenance, and support of the child” if he or she is adjudged a dependent of the court under section 300. (§ 362, subd. (a).) Section 364 outlines the procedure when a court has determined that jurisdiction under secti on 300 is appropriate, but “the child is not removed from the physical custody of his or her parent or guardian . . . .” (§ 364, subd. (a).) “After hearing any evidence presen ted by the social worker, the parent, the guardian, or the child, the court shall de termine whether contin ued supervision is necessary. The court shall term inate its jurisdiction unless the social worker or his or her

any county, the juvenile court order may be used as the sole basis for opening a file in the superior court of the county in which the parent, who has been given custody, resides. The court may direct the parent or the clerk of the juvenile court to transmit the order to the clerk of the superior court of the count y in which the order is to be filed.”9 department establishes by a pr eponderance of evidence th at the conditions still exist which would justify ini tial assumption of jurisdiction unde r Section 300, or that those conditions are likely to exist if supervision is withdrawn.” (§ 364, subd. (c).) When proceeding under section 364, th e juvenile court is not conc erned with reunification, but with determining whether continued supervisi on is necessary in the family home because the child is in placement with a parent a nd the existing custody arrangement is not disrupted. ( In re Gabriel L., supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at p. 650.) Whether we apply section 36 1.2 or sections 362 and 364, the standard of review is abuse of discretion. ( In re Gabriel L., supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at p. 647 [court’s
discretion under section 364 is similar to th e court’s broad discretion as to whether to
offer services under section 361.2 because in both situations the child is not in out-ofhome placement, but in placement with a pare nt.] Furthermore, the juvenile court’s factual findings are reviewed for s ubstantial evidence. (See, e.g., In re Austin P. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 1124, 1134 [appellate court reviewed record for substantial evidence indicating whether there was a need for continuing supervision].) This standard of review comports with the juvenile court’s “broad discretion to determine what would best serve and protect the child’s interest and to fashion a dispositional order in accordance with this discretion.” ( In re Jose M . (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 1098, 1103-1104; In re I.G. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 380, 386.) Thus, we may not reverse the juvenile court’s dispositiona l orders in the absence of a clear abuse of
discretion.
II. K.R. Mother contends the juvenile court erre d in terminating jurisdiction as to K.R.
because there was suffici ent evidence in the re cord to indicate that continued supervision
was needed to ensure K.R. wa s protected. In support of her position, Mother emphasized
William’s domestic abuse histor y, pointing to her own stat ements to DC FS describing how William hit her and abused alcohol during their relationship. The family entered into a voluntary family maintenance contra ct from December 2008 to November 2009 after Mother reported that William slapped Moth er. Mother reported it was an isolated10 incident and William denied it happened. Mother also high lights the inconsistencies in his story about learning of K.R.’s abuse as well as his delay in reporting it. Mother contends William may not be committed to cari ng for K.R. because he asked to extend
K.R.’s visit with her and he would often call Mother at 11 p.m., asking if she could take care of K.R. “because he wanted to go out an d have fun.” According to Mother, these, along with the fact that K.R. was four years old and had not yet started therapy, were all factors favoring continued jurisdiction over K. R. In short, “[t]he question remained whether William R. should have permanent cust ody of [K.R.] and the case closed before
it could be assured that William R. would fo llow through with th erapy, and [K.R.’s]
emotional health needs were known to the court.” We find the juvenile court acted within its broad discretion to terminate its jurisdiction over K.R. Mother and David were the sole cause of the dependency proceedings. There were no allegations relating to William. Instead, the jurisdiction/disposition report noted that an inspection of William’s one-bedroom home
with K.R. showed it to be in adequate condition, with working utilities, and appeared free of clutter. The inspector ob served sufficient food, toys, and clothing in the home. The CSW concluded, “At this tim e, the child appears stable in the care of her father.” K.R. also liked living with W illiam, stating, “It’s good, I sleep well.” William denied living with anyone else and ha ving any other children. Further, William completed parenting cla sses and counseling du e to the voluntary family maintenance contract in 2008 and 20 09. There is no indi cation that domestic
violence continues to be an issue for William. Mother’s suggestion that William is not committed to K.R. is belied by the fact that K.R. has lived with him since 2011 without any problems. William has provided for K.R. during this time and ensured she continued
to have visits with Mother and her siblings. He enrolled K.R. in preschool at Jefferson Elementary School and made an appointment for a mental health evaluation of K.R. As to the delay in reporting David’s abuse of K.R., William explained that he did not
want to make such serious accusations until he was sure they were true.11 Mother’s reliance on In re Austin P. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 1124, is misplaced. There, the non-custodial father took custody of his son under section 361.2 after he was
removed from the mother’s home. At the review hearing, the court refused to terminate jurisdiction, finding that continued superv ision was necessary for several reasons: the father knew his son was being abused but had taken no step s to protect him and without continuing jurisdiction, the boy’s safety could not be assured; father had sporadic contact with his son during the past 10 years and th e child was more bond ed with his mother; there was significant conflict between the pare nts; the social worker believed the boy needed both individual and conjoint therapy w ith each parent, which could occur only if the matter remained open; and the mother was making good progress with her reunification plan. ( Id. at p. 1134.) The father a ppealed, contending the dependency court should have terminated jurisdiction. The appellate court affirmed, finding substantial evidence to support a finding that continued supervision was necessary, thus precluding the termination of jurisdiction. ( Id. at p. 1135.) Contrary to Mother’s contention, si milar facts do not exist here. Unlike In re Austin P., there is no question as to K.R.’s safety because the conditions which justified assumption of jurisdiction unde r section 300 no longer exist since K.R. is no longer in contact with David. Moreover, there is no indication William is not willing or able to protect K.R. He reported the abuse soon afte r he learned about it and he did not allow
David contact with K.R. after the initiation of the proceedings. He also has an established bond with K.R., who likes living with him, a nd has provided an adequate home for her. Further, the juvenile court orde red individual counseling for K.R., not joint counseling with either parent. There is no indication William will not ensure K.R. receives counseling. He has already made an appointment for a mental health evaluation for K.R. While there may be evidence which shows continued supervision may be beneficial in this case, the juve nile court did not make an arbitrary, capricious, or patently
absurd determination in te rminating jurisdiction.12 III. A.M. Having determined that no abuse of discre tion occurred in term inating jurisdiction over K.R., we find even less reason to find the juvenile court abused its discretion in terminating jurisdiction over A.M. We are persuaded by the analysis in In re A.J . (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 525, which found the juvenile court properly exercised its discretion in terminating jurisdiction after placing the depe ndent child out of state with her biological and presumed father. The juvenile court’s finding that no protective issue existed which would warrant retaining juri sdiction was supported by substantial evidence. ( Id. at p. 536.) The juvenile court found the father to be a committed, responsible parent who could provide a stable, loving, and safe home for the child, and who had taken the necessary steps to see that th e child would receive all the se rvices, education, and health care that she needed. ( Id. at pp. 539-540.) A.M. has likewise been provided “a st able home and loving home” by her father, Mauricio, since 2011. She has an established bond with hi m and he wishes to retain custody of her. A.M. reports that Mauricio’s girlfriend, with whom they live, treats her well. The CSW noted that she appears to be well adjusted in Mauricio’s home. A.M. was not abused by David; therefore, she does not require therapy. There is nothing in the record to indicate A.M. require s continued supervision. Mother has not presented any evidence of a need for continued supervision, arguing instead that it is in A.M.’s best inte rest to maintain a re lationship with Mother and her siblings. It is clear, however, that Mauricio has provided ample opportunity for A.M. to continue a relationship with Mother and the siblings. He regularly brings A.M. to maternal grandmother’s home for visits. The juvenile court properly exercised its discretion when it terminated jurisdiction ove r A.M. after placing her with Mauricio.13 DISPOSITION The dispositional orders relating to A.M. and K.R. are affirmed.

BIGELOW, P.J.
We concur:

RUBIN, J.

FLIER, J.