California Border Alliance Group – Southwest Border HIDTA 

2005 ANNUAL REPORT 

I. Executive Summary 

The National HIDTA Program Office has directed the format and content of this Annual Report, 

to include specific data tables and performance measures, as well as excerpts from program 

documents and assessments, that reflect the impact and achievements of the California Border 

Alliance Group HIDTA funded initiatives during 2005. 

• The Major Mexican Traffickers Initiative – Imperial Valley Task Force’s wiretap 

investigations, supported extensively by the Imperial County District Attorney as well as 

SOD, resulted in the identification and designation of one new, previously 

unidentified CPOT organization, and identified another new Drug Trafficking 

Organization that is in the process of CPOT designation. 

• The Commercial Interdiction Unit’s Operation “Gear Grinder” dismantled the 

illicit steroid operations of eight Mexican pharmaceutical companies and the distribution 

network that supplied 85 percent of the total U.S. illicit anabolic steroid market. The 

fact that illicit steroids are essentially unavailable in the U.S. at this time is due to this 

remarkable investigation. 

• The Combined Border Prosecutions Initiative reviewed 5975 cases, and prosecuted 

5,366 individuals, of whom 4,633 were convicted and served time, removing drug 

offenders and smugglers from the streets, and providing a deterrent effect that raised the 

cost of doing business for DTO’s. The Prosecutions Initiative also obtained a total of 

246 wiretap orders, and 586 drug-related search warrants. 

• Progress was made in the organization and implementation of the San Diego Law 

Enforcement Coordination Center (LECC), a unique effort that will co-locate and 

commingle the HIDTA Intelligence Center, Federal, State and Local intelligence units, 

the San Diego Joint Terrorism Task Force and San Diego Terrorism Early Warning 

Group in a true all-source, all-crime, and homeland security fusion center. 

Concurrently, the Imperial Valley LECC has expanded to include all special 

enforcement teams in Imperial County with an on-site Federal, State, and local 

intelligence unit, enhanced by standardized a 800 MHz communications network 

and data systems connected between both counties, and the San Diego maritime 

Sector Command Center (Joint) run by the Coast Guard, Navy, and Harbor Police. 

• The National Methamphetamine & Chemicals Initiative, seeking to replicate the 

success achieved in the reduction of pseudoephedrine for methamphetamine 

manufacturing through cooperation with Canada, sponsored and managed a 

conference between U.S. Federal, State, and Local law enforcement and their 

counterparts in the Mexican Federal Government. The conference, originally 

scheduled for November, 2005, was rescheduled for May, 2006, and will be attended by 

1 
both the U.S. Attorney General and the Mexican Attorney General. One session of the 

conference will be a joint U.S.-Canada-Mexico meeting, including representation from 

the Canadian Parliament, to discuss international precursor control efforts. 

• The Operation Alliance Task Force (in San Diego) has formed a Tunnel Team to 

detect and investigate smuggling tunnels in the CBAG area, which continue to be 

discovered on a disturbingly regular basis and in increasingly sophisticated construction. 

Forty tunnels have been found since September 11, 2001, of which 21 were in 

California. 

•

• The Terrorism-Related Drug initiative achieved convictions in Operation Restore 

Justice (the Stinger Missile-for-Heroin case,) three of only a handful of convictions for 

material support to terrorism ever achieved. Also Daoud Ibrahim, (Operation Silk 

Road) has been designated as a CPOT Target. This has resulted in Ibrahim’s 

designation by The Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC) as a 

narcotics “kingpin.” 

• Through the National Marijuana Initiative, the establishment of priorities and 

order to domestic marijuana eradication efforts and an emphasis on investigations

that has resulted in seizures of over 1.3 million kilograms of high-grade marijuana and 

the actual dismantlement of 4 International and Multi-state DTO’s. 

• The co-location of over 600 agents and analysts, in the CBAG area, from over 

50 federal, state and local law enforcement agencies in task force environments and 

intelligence centers, enhancing coordination, cooperation, and information sharing. 

• The San Diego/Imperial County Narcotic Information Network (NIN) handled 

event deconfliction for 9,778 enforcement actions in San Diego and Imperial counties 

– resulting in 876 operational conflicts being avoided. Additionally, the NIN conducted 

80,591 database inquiries with a “hit” rate of just over 34 percent, or over 27,000 

instances of subject information sharing between task forces and agencies. 

• The San Diego Violent Crime Task Force – Fugitive Group arrested 2,242 felony 

fugitives, mostly drug-related and many of them violent offenders, removing them from 

America’s neighborhoods and streets. 

• CBAG initiatives seized over $1.22 Billion in drugs and cash/assets, removing 

drugs from the market, and proceeds from the DTO’s. 

• CBAG initiatives achieved a Return on Investment (ROI) of $137 in drugs and 

assets seized for every $1 in HIDTA funds allotted. 

2 
II. Introduction 

The Mission of the National HIDTA Program is to disrupt the market for illegal drugs in 

the United States by assisting federal, state, and local law enforcement entities 

participating in the HIDTA program to dismantle and disrupt drug trafficking 

organizations, with particular emphasis on drug trafficking regions that have harmful 

effects on other parts of the United States. 

The HIDTA Program views intelligence-driven task force development and supporting 

initiatives as the most effective approach to accomplishing this mission. A basic HIDTA 

tenet is that the ability of federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies within a 

HIDTA to counter drug trafficking is significantly improved when those agencies work 

together and share information. ONDCP requires each HIDTA Executive Board to 

establish an intelligence subsystem that provides actionable, accurate, detailed, and 

timely tactical, investigative, and strategic criminal intelligence to HIDTA initiatives, 

HIDTA participating agencies, and other law enforcement agencies as appropriate. The 

National HIDTA Program guidance establishes the intelligence subsystem as the primary 

subsystem for each HIDTA. 

The California Border Alliance Group (CBAG) is a Regional Partnership of the 

Southwest Border HIDTA, designated in 1990. The CBAG’s mission is to measurably 

reduce drug trafficking, thereby reducing the impact of illicit drugs in other areas of the 

country. To accomplish this mission, the CBAG assists in the coordination of joint 

operational and supporting initiatives to deter, disrupt, dismantle, and ultimately destroy 

the most significant Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTO’s), their supporting 

transportation and money laundering organizations. The CBAG also emphasizes efforts 

against methamphetamine manufacturing, precursor supply, and abuse through 

innovative enforcement operations and demand reduction programs utilizing a multiagency, joint concept of operations. 

The CBAG area of responsibility encompasses San Diego and Imperial Counties, 

California, and extends north 65 miles from the international border with the Republic of 

Mexico to the Orange and Riverside County lines, from the Pacific Ocean on the west 

140 miles east to the Arizona State line, and includes the seven Ports of Entry at San 

3 
Ysidro, Otay Mesa, Otay East, Tecate, Calexico West, Calexico East, and Andrade. The 

geographic location is truly unique: terrain that ranges from seaports and beaches to 

deserts, with forested mountains in between, yet home to the largest bi-national 

metropolis in the world. From west to east, a two-hour drive beginning at the 

International Airport on the Pacific Rim harbor of the seventh most populous city in the 

Nation, leads through extensive urban, suburban, and rural communities, and then across 

mountain passes at 4,000 feet elevation. Continuing eastbound along the U.S.-Mexico 

border, one passes through incredibly rugged desert mountains before descending into 

deserts and below-sea-level irrigated agricultural areas of the Imperial Valley, through 

sand dunes, and on to the Colorado River at Yuma, Arizona. Less than two freeway hours 

to the north of San Diego is the Los Angeles metropolitan area, a major distribution 

center for drugs (and illegal aliens) smuggled from Mexico. 

The California Border Alliance Group (CBAG) measurably impacted drug trafficking in 

2005, through the disruption and dismantlement of drug trafficking organizations, the 

indictment and arrest of key cartel members, the seizure and removal from the 

marketplace of hundreds of tons of illegal drugs and chemical precursors, and the 

enhancement of cooperation and coordination among federal, state, local, and 

international law enforcement efforts throughout the region. These impacts go beyond 

mere outputs of data, but are reflected in documented changes to the nature of the threat 

and the methods of drug trafficking organizations. Major Mexican DTO’s are being 

dismantled or displaced, smugglers are forced to explore alternate means such as tunnels, 

and clandestine lab operators have been forced from their traditional operating areas and 

methods, all impacting the cost of doing business. The following CBAG highlights 

illustrate this success: 

• To maximize results, the CBAG facilitates cooperation and joint efforts between 

various law enforcement organizations. There were over 50 federal, state and local law 

enforcement agencies participating in the CBAG regional and national law enforcement 

initiatives and task forces. With support from the CBAG’s Intelligence Support Center, 

regional initiatives continue to make significant progress in identifying, investigating and 

dismantling or disrupting the area’s most dangerous and prolific DTOs, drug dealers, 

money launderers, weapons traffickers, and violent criminals. 

 

• Illicit drugs are extremely profitable for the illegal organizations that traffic them. 

During CY 2005, over $1.22 Billion dollars in illicit drug products and proceeds were 

permanently removed from the profit sheets of regional DTOs. 

• Fighting the battle against illicit drug trafficking can be costly. However, every 

CBAG budget dollar spent in support of law enforcement, prosecution and investigative 

support activities, contributed to removing $132 in illicit drugs from the market and 

seizing $4.00 of drug-related assets. Thus, CBAG initiatives achieved a remarkable 

combined Return-on-Investment (ROI) of $137 for every $1 of HIDTA funds invested. 

• HIDTA’s mission is to disrupt and dismantle DTOs. At the beginning of 2005, 

CBAG initiatives identified 93 DTOs and targeted 78. By the end of year, 64% of 

4 
targeted DTOs, and money-laundering organizations were disrupted. In addition, 18 

DTOs were totally dismantled, a significant achievement. 

• The CBAG strives to investigate larger, more complex DTOs where the greatest 

positive impact can be achieved. Disrupting or dismantling a large, complex DTO 

generally takes longer than stopping a street level operation, but doing so can 

substantially reduce the illicit drug marketplace. As illustrated by the statistical measures 

contained throughout this Annual Report, during CY 2005, the CBAG initiatives targeted 

more complex cases involving larger DTOs. More specifically, they initiated 10 

OCDETF cases, for a total of 40 open during the year, of which 26 were Consolidated 

Priority Organization Targets (CPOTs.) 

The CBAG continues to play an important role in assisting the law enforcement, 

prosecution and investigative support initiatives with their information sharing and 

training needs. 

III. National HIDTA Goals 

The HIDTA Program goals are to: 

1. Disrupt the market for illegal drugs by dismantling or disrupting drug trafficking 

and/or money laundering organizations; and 

2. Improve the efficiency and effectiveness of HIDTA initiatives. 

The CBAG 2005 Strategy addressed the HIDTA Program Goals with the following 

Desired Outcomes or objectives: 

• Goal 1: Disrupt the market for illegal drugs by dismantling or disrupting drug 

trafficking and/or money laundering organizations

• Desired Outcome: Disruption and dismantlement of significant DTOs.

• Expected output: Dismantle 3 secondary DTO’s or transportation groups. 

• Expected output: Disrupt 1 MDTO, demonstrated by the shifting of operating 

areas, new communications methods, or more difficult smuggling methods. 

• Significant progress in the identification and dismantlement of 

methamphetamine manufacturing and distribution organizations, and 

precursor suppliers. 

• Indictment and arrest of significant leadership members of Mexican Drug 

Trafficking Organizations. 

• Desired Outcome: Increase in the cost for drug traffickers doing business. 

• Expected output: Increase drug seizures in east San Diego County and the 

Imperial Valley between the Ports of Entry. 

• Continued significant maritime investigations and seizures of cocaine and 

other drugs enroute to Mexico for further shipment to the U.S., and direct 

maritime shipments to the U.S. West Coast. 

• Expected Output: Significant drug seizures (on the order of 120 tons of 

marijuana, 3 tons of cocaine, 1⁄2 ton of methamphetamine, and 100 pounds of 

5 
heroin) resulting in a reduction of drugs available on the streets of America, 

and financial impact on trafficking organizations. 

• Goal 2: Improve the efficiency and effectiveness of HIDTA initiatives

• Desired Outcome: Improved ability of the HIDTA to counter drug trafficking. 

• Enhanced and institutionalized coordination and cooperation among 

intelligence, interdiction and investigations in the Imperial Valley based on 

the new HIDTA Law Enforcement Coordination center. 

• Expected output: Increased coordination of the Commercial Interdiction Unit 

with other airport and commercial shipping / parcel express teams nationwide. 

• Desired Outcome: Fully coordinated counter-drug investigations and interdiction 

operations along the California-Mexico border and with the Los Angeles and 

Arizona HIDTA regions. 

• Expected Output: Increased participation and capability the Imperial Valley 

Drug Coalition Law Enforcement Coordination Center. 

• Expected Output: Expanded operations for the Marine Task Force. 

• Expected Output: NIN support / participation embedded in the Law 

Enforcement Coordination Center and selected task forces. 

• Desired Outcome: Improved intelligence support to the region and other 

HIDTAs. 

• Expected output: Expanded NIN connectivity with other HIDTAs. 

• Expected output: NIN connectivity with national and other HIDTA 

intelligence centers, and with RISSes, JDIGs, NDIC, and EPIC. 

• Expected output: Increased use of the NIN by CBAG member agencies, task 

forces, and non-CBAG agencies. 

IV. Summary of Threat Assessment for Budget Year 2005 

Both San Diego and Imperial Counties have large Mexican cities and infrastructure directly to 

the south. Tijuana’s population is officially reported as 1.5 million, but estimates run as high as 

2 million; it is Mexico’s third largest, and fastest-growing, city. Mexicali, which borders 

Imperial County, is the capital of Baja California Norte and has a population of close to 1 

million. Although the 140-mile border facing the CBAG is only 7% of the entire U.S.-Mexican 

border, it is home to 60% of the entire Southwest Border population. The CBAG area of 

responsibility not only has five of the busiest land Ports of Entry to contend with, but also 

international airports and seaports, urban, rural and designated wilderness areas, oceans to 

mountains to deserts. The threats range from smuggling to production to consumption of 

cocaine, methamphetamine, heroin, marijuana, and precursor chemicals, and from Major Drug 

Trafficking Organizations and money laundering to street gangs and drug abusers. The Port of 

San Diego is the 24th ranked container port in the nation. It remains one of the most active transit 

areas for drugs and illegal aliens moving north, and for drug proceeds traveling south, in addition 

to intra-regional threats posed by drug-related crime, illegal drug use, street gangs, and 

clandestine labs. 

6 
The battle for control of the Tijuana-Mexicali smuggling corridor in Mexico continued through 

2005. The Arellano Felix Organization has been extraordinarily hard hit by unprecedented 

enforcement operations by the Government of Mexico, especially through cooperative efforts 

with U.S. law enforcement in Operation “United Eagles,” and by competing DTO’s. While it 

appears that the Zambada-Garcia Organization has secured Mexicali for the time being, 

temporary alliances between erstwhile imprisoned rivals such as Osiel-Cardenas and Benjamin 

Arellano-Felix complicate the picture, while others such as Chapo Guzman and Vincente 

Carillos-Fuentes’s organizations jockey for position throughout Mexico. The struggle for 

control of the Tijuana and Mexicali plazas has predictably resulted in significant violence in Baja 

California Norte, with more than 800 drug-related killings over the last three years. 

V. HIDTA Strategy Summary 

Each agency has its own strategies, requirements, and missions. The CBAG Executive 

Committee, through subcommittees, coordinates the integration and synchronization of efforts to 

reduce drug trafficking, eliminate unnecessary duplication, and improve the direction, 

production, and systematic sharing of intelligence. 

The Executive Committee monitors the implementation of this strategy to ensure the joint efforts 

of the CBAG produce the desired impact within the border-wide Strategy implemented by the 

Southwest Border HIDTA Executive Board. The CBAG Executive Committee provides a 

coordination umbrella over networked joint task forces, the intelligence center, task forces not 

funded by CBAG, and single agency task forces and narcotics units within the CBAG area of 

responsibility. The Committee is formed of 16 Members/Officers, 8 Federal and 8 State/local, 

with the chair and vice-chair rotating between Federal and State/local yearly. The Chair and 

Vice Chair of the CBAG are also members of the Southwest Border HIDTA Executive Board. 

An Intelligence Subcommittee, co-chaired by Federal and State/local representatives, provides 

guidance and oversight to the Intelligence Support Center (the San Diego/Imperial County 

Regional Narcotic Information Network or NIN) and develops intelligence policies for the 

approval of the CBAG Executive Committee. A Fiscal Subcommittee, composed of equal 

representation from Federal and State/local agencies, assesses budget and reprogramming 

requests, and makes recommendations for Executive Committee action and approval. 

The CBAG Director, selected by the Executive Committee and approved by ONDCP, provides 

day-to-day coordination and programmatic and fiscal accountability critical to the CBAG. The 

Director is responsible for developing draft proposals of the Threat Assessment, Strategy, 

Initiatives, Budgets, and Annual Report for decisions by the CBAG Executive Committee. The 

Director is also responsible for the management of the CBAG Staff, which includes Budget, 

Program Analysis, Network Administration, Demand Reduction, and Training and Equipment 

Coordination. 

To accomplish its mission, the CBAG coordinates intelligence-driven, joint, multi-agency 

coordinated initiatives, which are organized into five mutually supporting subsystems. The 

emphasis is on seamless mutual support between intelligence, interdictors, investigators and 

prosecutors, with cross-attachment and collocation of enforcement groups with responsibility for 

differing operational methods, target regions and target levels of investigation. The flow of 

7 
information, both intelligence and investigative/operational, is critical to comprehensive success 

against the widely varying drug threats in the region. 

VI. HIDTA Performance Measures 

This Annual Report section is dedicated to reporting the performance measures set for the 

HIDTA initiatives during the previous year, and evaluating whether these targets were 

accomplished efficiently and effectively. 

A. Performance Measures for Goal 1: Disrupt the market for illegal drugs by 

dismantling or disrupting drug trafficking and/or money laundering organizations

1. Core Table 1—Cost per DTO Disrupted or Dismantled By Year—Table 1 

is a core table that illustrates the number of DTOs identified, targeted, 

disrupted and dismantled, coupled with a simple cost analysis of the outcomes 

as expressed in budget dollars. The desired outcome is to identify, target, and 

disrupt or dismantle DTOs. 

Table 1:Percentage of DTOs and MLOs Dismantled and Disrupted for Year 2005 at SWBCalifornia Border Alliance Group 

 DTOs 

Identified # Targeted # Disrupted % of Targeted Disrupted # Dismantled % of Targeted Dismantled 

Begin 2005 

During 

2005 93 78 50 64% 18 23% 

Total 2005 93 78 50 64% 18 23% 

2. Core Table 2—Percentage of DTOs Disrupted or Dismantled by Scope, 

2004—Table 2 is a core table that presents the DTOs identified and targeted 

according to their operational scope (i.e., international, multi-state, local) and 

calculates the percent disrupted and dismantled according to each type. The 

desired outcome is to identify, target, and disrupt or dismantle DTOs. 

Table 2: Percentage of DTOs and MLOs Disrupted or Dismantled by Scope for Year 2005, at SWBCalifornia Border Alliance Group (All DTOs; MLOs included) 

Scope # Identified # Targeted # Disrupted

% of 

Targeted 

Disrupted 

# 

Dismantled

% of 

Targeted 

Dismantled 

Total Disrupted 

or Dismantled 

Total % 

Disrupted or 

Dismantled 

International 69 49 36 73% 11 22% 47 95% 

Multi-state 13 21 12 57% 3 14% 15 71% 

Local 11 8 2 25% 4 50% 6 75% 

Total 93 78 50 64% 18 34% 68 87% 

8 
3. Core Table 3—Percentage of Money Laundering Organizations 

Disrupted or Dismantled by Scope, 2004—Table 3 is a core table that 

addresses performance targets for money laundering DTOs targeted, disrupted 

and dismantled. The desired outcome is to identify, target, and disrupt or 

dismantle DTOs. 

Table 3: Percentage of Money Laundering Organizations Disrupted or Dismantled by Scope for Year 2005, at SWB-California 

Border Alliance Group 

Scope # Identified # Targeted # Disrupted

% of 

Targeted 

Disrupted 

# 

Dismantled

% of 

Targeted 

Dismantled 

Total Disrupted 

or Dismantled 

Total % 

Disrupted or 

Dismantled 

International 110 25 25 100% 0 0% 25 100% 

Multi-state 0 0 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 

Local 0 0 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 

Total 110 25 25 0 0% 25 25% 

4. Core Table 4—Operational Scope of All DTO Cases Initiated, 2004—

Table 4 is a core table that presents the characteristics of the HIDTA case 

workload by quantifying the number of cases opened and the number of 

CPOT, RPOT, and OCDETF cases, respectively. 

Table 4: Operational Scope of All DTO and MLO Cases Initiated for Year 2005, at SWB-California 

Border Alliance Group 

 # CPOT Cases # RPOT Cases # OCDETF Cases % OCDETF of Total DTOs 

Targeted 

International 6 1 10 13% 

Multi-state 0 0 0 0% 

Local 0 0 0 0% 

Total 6 1 10 13% 

The CBAG measurably impacted drug trafficking in San Diego and Imperial Counties. 68 of 93 

identified Drug Trafficking Organizations and supporting gangs (73 percent) were disrupted or

dismantled by CBAG initiatives, task forces, and member agencies this year. Significant 

progress in the disruption of major drug trafficking organizations has been achieved through the 

efforts of multi-agency joint task forces and initiatives, which have utilized historical conspiracy 

cases, sophisticated investigative methods, and coordinated interdiction efforts. Just a few 

examples follow: 

The Major Mexican Traffickers Task Force continues to focus on the AFO. However, the Task 

Force in the past year demonstrated an ability to respond to other traffickers moving into AFO 

territory. In the past year, investigations have been initiated on Zambada, Esparragoza, and the 

9 
Nacho Coronel Organizations: in all 10 OCDETF investigations targeting organizations or cells 

linked to CPOT organizations were initiated in 2005. 

The task force has increased emphasis on identifying U.S. based command and control elements 

for the Mexican CPOT organizations, efforts to address the drug related kidnappings spilling 

over the border, and interaction with Mexican authorities, both through Resolution-6 and through 

the Border Liaison. Several major cases involving international-level DTO’s have achieved 

highly significant milestones in 2005, with arrests, indictments and extraditions of key cartel 

personnel being achieved. The CBAG’s 2002 CPOT project (accomplished in 2004 due to the 

late transmission of the supplemental funding) by the Major Mexican Traffickers Initiative and 

the DEA, FBI, IRS, U.S. Marshals and other agencies, Operation United Eagles, working with 

specially-trained Mexican AFI agents, resulted in the arrests of key members of Mexican cartels 

throughout Mexico. Information from the MMTF has led to the arrest of three AFO fugitives in 

Mexico. Furthermore, two individuals directly linked to AFO were arrested by the Major 

Mexican Traffickers TF in support of a Boston OCDETF case. 

The Imperial Valley Task Force of the Major Mexican Traffickers Initiative initiated over 40 

investigations, and arrested 41 members of Mexican DTO’s during the year. Two significant 

OCDETF investigations targeting significant Mexican cocaine smuggling and distribution 

organizations (one a newly-designated CPOT and the other pending designation) have involved 

over 100 wire intercepts and coordination with other law enforcement agencies throughout the 

United States and Mexico. These investigations have revealed that the organizations distribute 

over 2000 kilograms of cocaine on a monthly basis throughout the United States and Canada. 

The coordination of these investigations has also included providing numerous wire intercept 

leads to offices in Los Angeles, Oakland, Riverside, San Diego, New York, Atlanta, and Yuma, 

AZ. 

Operation Alliance’s OCDETF Operation “Free Ride” investigation resulted in the disruption of 

the Jose Acevedo cocaine, methamphetamine DTO and the indictment of 11 individuals, and 

seizure of over 600 kilos of marijuana, 2 kilos of cocaine and $42,000 in cash. Certified 

undercover Operation “Road Kill” continues to infiltrate, disrupt and dismantle DTOs utilizing 

commercial and maritime smuggling routes, and resulted in the seizure of over 52,000 kilos of 

marijuana, 5 kilos of methamphetamine, $170,846 in cash, and 19 arrests. Operation Alliance 

also formed a joint Tunnel Task Force tasked with the discover and dismantlement of crossborder smuggling tunnels. One tunnel was discovered in 2005, but 7 have been discovered 

between July 2004 and January of 2006, including the longest and most sophisticated to date. 

The Commercial Interdiction Unit wrapped up Operation ‘Gear Grinder,” that targeted the eight 

largest anabolic steroid manufacturing companies in Mexico, which were responsible for the 

production and distribution of over 80% of the illicit supply of anabolic steroids in the United 

States, as well as hundreds of U.S. distributors and customers. Utilizing multiple Title III 

intercepts and support and coordination from other HIDTAs nationwide, this OCDETF case is 

the largest steroid enforcement operation in U.S. Law Enforcement history, and has had a 

worldwide impact. Since the take down of the principles in this case, almost no illicit steroids 

have been available on the U.S. market. Thirty-two defendants are indicted; several principals 

are cooperating and have shut down their commercial operations and/or are making cash 

retribution as part of plea agreements. Spin-off cases are proceeding into other supply chains 

10 
that are attempting to fill the void in domestic steroid supplies. 

Another Commercial Interdiction Unit case with nationwide effect is Operation “Jacket Racket,” 

which targets Colombian heroin, cocaine, and money-laundering cells in Europe and North 

America. Considered one of the largest heroin cases in DEA history, this OCDETF investigation 

has seized over 250 kilos of Colombian heroin since 2003, and has involved support and spin-off 

wiretaps in New York, New Jersey Los Angeles, Nicaragua, and Colombia. 

The San Diego Violent Crime Task Force (SDVCTF) continues to disrupt and dismantle street 

and drug gangs with both national and international impact. In June of 2005, the SDVCTFNorth County Gang TF concluded a two-year joint OCDETF case, Operation “Straight Flush” 

with Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE.) This gang/narcotics investigation was 

initiated in the Encinitas area and rapidly grew to one that encompassed international smuggling 

and nation-wide distribution. It subsequently resulted in arrests being made not only in San 

Diego, but in Illinois, Michigan, Missouri and Hawaii. To date, 32 federal indictments have been 

handed down in this case and a number of others have been submitted to the United States 

Attorney’s Office for review. 

The SDVCTF-San Diego Gang Group completed the prosecution phase of “Operation 

Skylight,” which targeted the Skyline Bloods street gang and its members responsible for the 

January 1, 2003, “Dr. J’s Market” shooting which led to the murder of 2 elderly female citizens. 

In 2005, all trials associated with Operation Skylight were completed, except one, which is 

currently scheduled for trial in the summer of 2006. In total, 11 subjects have been convicted to 

date. 

The SDVCTF Fugitive Task Force arrested 2,242 fugitives (felony) during the year. On 

September 19, 2005, the Fugitive Task Force attained the milestone of it’s 20,000th arrest. 

During the week of April 5-10, 2005, the Task Force participated in Operation Falcon, a US 

Marshal’s Service nationally coordinated fugitive sweep, and contributed 111 fugitives to the 

10,000 fugitives were arrested nationwide during the week. In September 2005, at the request of 

DEA-Boston, the Task Force located Sean Sakhorn, a documented gang member, wanted for 

trafficking guns and kilo quantities of cocaine. After fleeing Boston, he was arrested in mid-city 

San Diego. 

11 
5. Core Table 5—Drugs Removed from the Marketplace, 2004—Table 5 is a 

core table that quantifies the wholesale value of the drugs seized during the 

calendar year. The drug pricing is derived by using the midpoint of published 

wholesale price ranges for each drug type seized and reported. The desired 

outcome is to remove drugs and drug assets from the marketplace, thereby 

increasing the Return on Investment (ROI) for HIDTA budget dollars 

expended. 

Source: CBAG Initiative Reports. Although Domestic Marijuana seizures / eradication are

covered in Threat Specific Table 1, below, the actual value of the plants seized is highly 

significant and is reported in this table. The amount in Kilograms is derived from a conservative 

estimate of a half Kilo per plant, and the value applied is the average wholesale value for 

sinsemilla - $8,800 per Kilo. 

12 
6. Core Table 6—Return on Investment (ROI) for Drugs Removed from the 

Marketplace by Law Enforcement Initiatives, by Year—Table 6 is a core 

table that explores Return on Investment (ROI) for drugs removed, but does 

so directly as a performance target. The desired outcome is to remove drugs 

and drug assets from the marketplace, thereby increasing the Return on 

Investment (ROI) for HIDTA budget dollars expended. 

7. Core Table 7—Return on Investment (ROI) for Assets Removed from the 

Marketplace by Law Enforcement Initiatives, by Year—Table 7 is a core 

table that presents ROI Performance Targets and Measures for drug assets 

seized. The desired outcome is to remove drugs and drug assets from the 

marketplace, thereby increasing the Return on Investment (ROI) for HIDTA 

budget dollars expended. 

13 
8. Core Table 8—Total Return on Investment (ROI) for Drugs and Assets 

Removed from the Marketplace by Law Enforcement Initiatives, by 

Year—Table 8 is a core table that presents ROI Performance Targets and 

Measures combining the wholesale value for drugs seized, with the value for 

drug assets seized. The desired outcome is to permanently remove drugs and 

drug assets from the marketplace, thereby increasing the Return on Investment 

(ROI) for HIDTA budget dollars expended. 

9. Core Table 9—Prosecution Outputs and Outcomes, by Year—Table 9 is a 

core table that presents the baseline number of investigations handled in 2004 

and the actual number handled thereafter. The desired outcome is to 

investigate, arrest, and prosecute drug traffickers. The Table provides for 

year-by-year data for comparison purposes. 

The CBAG Prosecution Initiative provides prosecutions support to HIDTA task forces and 

participating agencies through the dedicated assignment and cross-designation of Assistant U.S. 

Attorneys and Deputy District Attorneys to maximize felony prosecutions, ensure prosecution of 

drug couriers, provide tailored support to complex investigations, and enhance sentences. 

Provides prosecutors to the District Attorney’s Offices pursuant to Memoranda of Understanding 

between the United States Attorney and the San Diego County and Imperial County District 

14 
Attorneys, respectively. The District Attorneys prosecute drug cases where there is a nexus 

between the drug case and respective County (e.g. defendant is a resident of San Diego County, 

the load vehicle is registered in San Diego County, or the drugs were destined for delivery in San 

Diego County) with one exception. The federal government agrees that it will continue to 

prosecute all drug cases where a federal mandatory minimum sentence was involved, regardless 

of a nexus to San Diego. In short, it is a continuing partnership that recognizes this District's 

inseparable Federal-State concerns for border-related drug crime. It allows the United States 

Attorney to avoid expending prosecutorial resources on an excessive number of reactive border 

cases in order to permit focus of its limited resources on large scale drug trafficking and 

organization cases. Beyond smuggling prosecutions, the District Attorneys’ Offices have 

processed and supported hundreds of wiretaps, including over 100 intercepts supporting the 

Major Mexican Traffickers Initiative Imperial Valley TF investigation of a DTO subsequently 

designated as a CPOT. 

The DA’s Offices and the USAO often coordinate on cases generated from groups conducting 

OCDETF/HIDTA investigations. In 2005, a number of these cases involved the San Diego DA’s

Office and the USAO coordinating state/federal wiretaps targeting one DTO. For example, 

throughout 2005 and into the present, the Methamphetamine Enforcement Group has been 

involved in OCDETF Operation “Funk 49” – targeting a large methamphetamine and cocaine 

trafficking organization engaged in the importation and distribution of these drugs in San Diego 

and Orange County, California, from Tijuana and Guadalajara, Mexico. The DA’s Office and the 

USAO coordinated the execution of multiple wiretaps on telephones used by various members of 

the organization. And, the offices have shared the prosecution of individuals generated from 

these wires. To date, the USAO has indicted 23 individuals – 12 of the 23 are in the process of 

being prosecuted; 11 are charged in sealed indictments until the DA’s Office is prepared to take 

down it’s aspect of the case, which involves an investigation into approximately 13-18 additional 

individuals. Information obtained during “Funk 49” has led to significant drug, money and 

property seizures. 

10. Core Table 10—Value of Clandestine Methamphetamine Labs 

Dismantled in 2004, by Size – Table 10 is a core table that calculates the 

estimated value for a dismantled Clandestine Methamphetamine laboratory 

based on the wholesale price of an ounce of Methamphetamine in a HIDTA’s 

region. 

15 
The decrease in laboratory seizures this year (30 were seized during 2004) continues a general 

downward trend over the past several years, as significant methamphetamine production moves 

to Mexico. In CY 2004 a total of 431 kilograms of methamphetamine were seized at the 

U.S./Mexico Ports of Entry here in California. In 2005, over 801 kilos were seized. 

At the continued urging of the US Government, DEA and the National Methamphetamine

Chemicals Initiative/California Precursor Committee, law enforcement in Mexico is beginning to 

allocate the necessary resources to attack this much ignored enforcement problem. During the 

latter part of 2004, Mexico has begun to attempt to impact the massive amounts of 

methamphetamine being produced in Mexico, particularly in and around Guadalajara, Jalisco. 

A National meeting of the NMCI National meeting of the NMCI was held on June 15-16, 2005 

at Cincinnati, Ohio. Along with agenda items and resulting discussions; intelligence, trends, 

statistics and contacts were gathered and organized for every state in the country and compiled 

into a “Regional Reports” booklet that was provided to each attendee. As it is at all NMCI 

meetings, collection and reporting of national statistics via EPIC’s national Clan Lab Seizure 

System (CLSS) was urged and promoted. Also, at this meeting, two live database terminals were 

set-up and manned by EPIC personnel for demonstration and use by attendees. Further, in 

response to the nationwide reporting of Mexico as the overwhelming source for 

methamphetamine consumed in all regions of the U.S., the NMCI members decided to invite and 

engage the government of Mexico in the methamphetamine and precursor chemical control 

efforts, similar to those NMCI efforts so successful with Canada. Subsequently, invitations to 

the U.S. and Mexican Attorneys General were extended to attend the next NMCI meeting. That 

meeting is scheduled for May 16-17 in Dallas, Texas, and will be attended by the Director of 

16 
ONDCP, as well as the Attorneys General. 

The NMCI Website was promoted at all national NMCI, CPC, TPC, and MPC meetings and has 

received national and international (Canada, United Kingdom, Australia) attention and 

participation. There are currently 845 users from all meth/clan lab affected states and the website 

has been expanded to include additional trend and prosecution related material. In addition, a 

sub-site on the system continues to address drug endangered children’s (D.E.C.) issues and the 

user base expanded to not only regular NMCI Website users, but to social service workers, 

medical providers and D.E.C. prosecutors. 

11. Core Table 11—HIDTA Clandestine Laboratory Activities, 2004 - Table 

11 is a core table that reports the baseline number of suspicious precursor 

purchasers/essential chemical transactions, laboratory dump sites, and 

chemical/glassware seizures and requires the HIDTA to project how many of 

each will be identified in the upcoming year. 

 

17 
 

12. Threat Specific Table 1: Value of Outdoor Marijuana Plants — 

CBAG-SWB HIDTA Outdoor Marijuana Plants Eradicated 

 Mj Cost Plant $4,000 

Year # Plants on Federal Land 

Identified/Targeted 

# Plants on Non-Federal 

Land Identified/Targeted 

Total # Outdoor 

Marijuana Plants 

Eradicated 

Value of Outdoor 

Marijuana Plants 

Eradicated 

2004 110,000 197,395 307,395 $1,229,580,000 

2005 17,713 151,739 169,452 $677,808,000 

2006 $0 

2007 $0 

The National Marijuana Initiative (NMI), established in 2001, has brought federal, state and 

local agencies together with public lands agencies to combat a common drug problem, 

domestic marijuana cultivation. Many of the high impacted cultivation counties that have 

been plagued with supporting the eradication and investigations of marijuana trafficking have 

very limited budgets. Combining the HIDTA concept with these agencies affected as 

brought together the ability to better share and combine resources when needed. In 2005, the 

NMI contributed to record seizures of domestic marijuana and the dismantlement of 2 

international and 2 multi-state DTOs, utilizing wire intercept and financial investigations to 

attack the organizations. The NMI has contributed to better use of the HIDTA Intelligence 

Support Centers in support of drug investigations and the dismantlement of identified 

trafficking targets affecting HIDTAs in California, Oregon and Washington State. 

Confirmed intelligence has been obtained, through the use of approved wire intercepts, that 

marijuana growers located in the west continue to be versed in other drug trafficking venues, 

alien smuggling and identification fraud.

Performance Measures for Goal 2: Improve the efficiency and effectiveness of 

HIDTA initiatives

1. Core Table 12—HIDTA Training Efficiency by Year and Type of 

Training – Table 12 is a core table that reports the number and type of 

training courses, hours, as well as the number of students who will attend 

those courses that are planned to be conducted by HIDTA staff or other 

sources. 

18 
2. Core Table 13—Percentage of HIDTA Initiatives Using Event and Case 

Deconfliction Services, by Year—Table 13 is a core table that quantifies the 

number of HIDTA initiatives using either event or case/subject deconfliction 

services. The desired outcome is to implement a system for real-time 

exchange of information. 

The Executive Committee requires that all HIDTA initiatives and participating agencies use and 

fully interact with the ISC. This is enforced by MOUs between the NIN and user agencies. The 

Intelligence Subcommittee is composed of members from the major federal, state and local law 

enforcement agencies in the CBAG area of responsibility, and as a result the committee members 

exert internal pressure on their own agencies/departments to provide pertinent information to the 

ISC. The role of the Intelligence Subcommittee is to provide direction, oversight and policy to 

the ISC. 

19 
3. Core Table 14—Percentage of Event and Case Deconflictions Submitted, 

by Year – Table 13 is a core table that reports the baseline number of 

submissions to the HIDTA for event and case/subject deconflictions. HIDTAs 

are to report the numbers actually submitted as compared to the baseline 

numbers. 

Source: San Diego/Imperial County NIN. 

The level of participation in subject and event deconfliction by CBAG Initiatives and San 

Diego/Imperial Counties agencies is impressive. What is not captured in this table is the rate of 

subject and event “hits.” Over 34% of subject inquiries, and 9% of critical event entries result in 

database hits. In real numbers, 876 possible operational conflicts between agencies have been 

prevented, and 27,400 pieces of information have been shared between agencies or initiatives. 

4. Core Table 15—Percentage of Investigations Provided Analytical 

Support, by Year—Table 15 is a core table that quantifies the amount of 

analytical support being provided by the HIDTA. The desired outcome is to 

implement a system for real-time exchange of information. 

These numbers includes cases receiving support at the Imperial Valley Law Enforcement 

Coordination Center (IV LECC) and Post-seizure case support provided by the California 

20 
Southwest Border Intelligence Group. Not included in this number are miscellaneous requests 

that ranged from requesting photos, phone toll analysis, and identifying subjects. During 

calendar year 2004, the IV LECC ISU alone handled 569 requests of this nature. 

Strategic publications include a monthly Spanish language translation entitled Articles of Interest 

in the Mexican Press, an annual narcotics drug price profile document, an annual Baja California 

law enforcement chart, and periodic trend reports about specific drugs or smuggling methods, as 

requested. The intelligence center also produces a Methamphetamine Semi-Annual Report, 

Trans-Border Trends, and the NIN Quarterly and Annual Reports, which contain specific reports 

on drugs and changing trends. 

The NIN has developed outstanding relationships between itself and other participating agencies’ 

and non-participating agencies’ intelligence groups. As an example, the Salifornia Southwest 

Border Intelligence Group has assigned an Intelligence Research Specialist part time to the 

HIDTA intelligence center. At the same time, the intelligence center has assigned a Criminal 

Intelligence Specialist to the ICE Intelligence Group. DEA has assigned a full time Intelligence 

Research Specialist to the intelligence center as well as a DEA Intelligence Supervisor at the 

LECC in Imperial, CA, while the NIN does have two Criminal Intelligence Specialists assigned 

to the DEA office in Carlsbad to fill the intelligence gap in that office. The San Diego Sheriff’s 

Department has an analyst assigned to the NIN. The U.S. Border Patrol has an agent from their 

Sector Intelligence Unit assigned to the NIN intelligence center in the LECC in Imperial, CA. 

Although the FBI did not have the resources to assign a full time analyst to the NIN in the past, 

there is now an FBI analyst to the Imperial Valley LECC ISU. There is a constant and 

continuing effort on the part of all intelligence activities in the CBAG area to contribute and 

participate in the HIDTA intelligence program where they can. 

5. Core Table 16—Percentage of HIDTA Initiative Investigations Referred 

to Other HIDTAs and Other Agencies, by Year—Table 16 is a core table 

that examines the extent to which information is shared within the law 

enforcement community. The table provides a means to account for 

investigations referred both to other HIDTAs as well as to outside agencies. 

The desired outcome is to implement a system for real-time exchange of 

information. 

Source: CBAG Initiative reports. Note: 1872 notifications and referrals of border seizures and 

21 
arrestees (which comprise many of the total investigations in column 1) to other regions of the 

country are made through the monthly “Intelligence Trends” and through direct notification by 

the ISC. 

VII. Conclusions 

2005 marks the second year that the CBAG has reported initiative operational targets and 

subsequent outcomes using the new Performance Management Process (PMP) efficiency and 

effectiveness performance measurement tables spread throughout this Annual Report. These 

graphic presentations illustrate how both CBAG goals are well on target. Clear evidence of 

successful initiative productivity is present throughout the report, and one must conclude the 

inescapable . . . drug availability is being reduced, DTOs are being disrupted or dismantled (Goal 

1), and these accomplishments are being done efficiently, effectively and at less budgetary cost 

through HIDTA sponsored training and information sharing (Goal 2). 

Our regional response is based on Federal, State, and local agency cooperation and coordination. 

We are proud of the fact that this region was one of the first - if not the first - to form an 

integrated Federal, State, and local law enforcement drug task force in the early 1970’s. This 

task force set the tone for the level of cooperation that continues in our HIDTA region today. 

The CBAG Executive Committee realizes that our response to the border and the drug problem 

must be as comprehensive as resources will allow. There is no “magic solution.” Therefore, our 

regional strategy provides for a balanced mix of interdiction, investigations, prosecutions, 

intelligence and support initiatives that are continually adjusted to address changes in the threat 

and prioritized in a resource-constrained environment. 

VIII. Appendices 

A. Table of Organization for the HIDTA. 

B. Table listing composition of Executive Board showing local, state and federal 

affiliation. 

C. List of participating agencies. 

D. List of counties participating in the HIDTA 

E. Brief descriptions of CBAG Initiatives 

F. HIDTA PMP Matrix for year of Annual Report 

22 
Appendix A: CBAG Table of Organization

 CBAG EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE 

 NATIONAL

• SWBI - MAJOR MEXICAN TRAFFICKERS

• NATIONAL PUBLIC LANDS MARIJUANA INITIATIVE

• COMBINED NARCO-TERRORISM INITIATIVE 

REGIONAL / LOCAL

• IMPERIAL VALLEY DRUG COALITION (LECC)

• MARINE TASK FORCE

• COMMERCIAL INTERDICTION UNIT

• SAN DIEGO FINANCIAL TASK FORCE

• OPERATION ALLIANCE JOINT TASK FORCE

• SD VIOLENT CRIME TASK FORCE

• METHAMPHETAMINE INITIATIVE

• REGIONAL PRESCRIPTION DRUG TASK FORCE 

• SAN DIEGO/IMPERIAL NIN

• CA SWB INTELLIGENCE GROUP

• COMBINED PROSECUTIONS INITIATIVE

• SAN DIEGO

• IMPERIAL COUNTY 

• SAN DIEGO NTF PROSECUTIONS

• CBAG MANAGEMENT AND COORDINATION

• DEMAND REDUCTION INITIATIVE

• NATIONAL METHAPHETAMINE CHEMICAL INITIATIVE

• HIDTA INVESTIGATIVE NARCOTIC OPERATIONAL SUPPORT

• REGIONAL COMPUTER FORENSICS LAB

 JOINT TASK FORCES

 INTELLIGENCE CENTERS

PROSECUTIONS INITIATIVE

 INTEL SUB-COMMITTEE 

FISCAL SUB-COMMITTEE

SUPPORT INITIATIVES 

CBAG HIDTA DIRECTOR

23 
Appendix B – Executive Board Members

Executive Committee Membership: 8 Federal, 1 State, 7 Local. 

Members: 

Honorable Gilbert G. Otero, District Attorney, Imperial County – Chair 

Harold D. Carter, Sheriff, Coroner, Marshal, Imperial County Sheriff’s Department 

Michael Coleman, Special Agent in Charge, CA DOJ, Bureau of Narcotic Enforcement 

Honorable Bonnie M. Dumanis, District Attorney, San Diego County 

Dan Dzwilenski, Special Agent in Charge, Federal Bureau of Investigation 

Richard Emerson, Chief, Chula Vista Police Department 

John S. Fernandes, Special Agent in Charge, Drug Enforcement Administration – Vice Chair 

Darryl Griffen, Acting Chief, United States Border Patrol, San Diego Sector 

Kenneth Hines, Special Agent in Charge, IRS, Criminal Investigation, San Diego 

William B. Kolender, Sheriff, San Diego County Sheriff’s Department 

Honorable Carol C. Lam, United States Attorney, Southern District of California 

William M. Landsdowne, Chief, San Diego Police Department 

Raymond C. Loera, Chief of Police, El Centro Police Department 

Charles Strangfeld, Captain, United States Coast Guard 

Steven B. Stafford, Acting U.S. Marshal, United States Marshals Service 

Michael Unzueta, Special Agent in Charge, Bureau of Immigration & Enforcement 

Ex Officio: 

Adele Fasano, Director, Field Operations, U.S. Customs and Border Protection 

Richard Loesch, Colonel, California National Guard 

Karen Aumond, Director, California Department of Justice, WSIN 

Ugene Stephens, Director, SD/Imperial Counties NIN 

Jose D. Riojas, Brigadier General, Joint Task Force North 

24 
Appendix C – List of Participating Agencies

Federal: 

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, Civil Air Patrol, Drug Enforcement Administration, 

Federal Bureau of Investigation, Federal Communications Commission, Immigration and 

Naturalization Service, Internal Revenue Service, Naval Criminal Investigative Service, United 

States Attorney’s Office, United States Border Patrol, United States Bureau of Land 

Management, United States Coast Guard, United States Customs and Border Protection, United 

States Immigration and Customs Enforcement, United States Forest Service, United States 

Marshals Service, United States Postal Inspection Service, Department of Defense-Joint Task 

Force North 

State: 

California Department of Justice-Bureau of Narcotic Enforcement, California Department of 

Justice-Western States Information Network, California Department of Corrections, California 

Highway Patrol, California National Guard 

Local: 

Calipatria, Brawley, Calexico, Carlsbad, Chula Vista, Coronado, El Centro, Escondido, and 

Holtville Police Departments, Imperial County District Attorney’s Office, Imperial County 

Probation Department, Imperial County Sheriff’s Office, Imperial, National City, Oceanside, and 

San Diego Police Departments, San Diego District Attorney’s Office, San Diego County 

Sheriff’s Department, San Diego County Probation Dept, San Diego Harbor Police Department, 

Westmoreland Police Department. 

Other: 

San Diego County Prevention Coalition, National Institute of Justice-Border Research and 

Technology Center, San Diego County Board of Supervisors-Methamphetamine Strike Force 

In Total: 784 Federal, State, and local full-time and part-time personnel from 50 agencies, 

offices and coalitions participate in CBAG HIDTA Initiatives. 

25 
Appendix D – List of Counties Participating

San Diego County 

Imperial County 

26