GAO

United States General Accounting Office

Report to the Chairman and Ranking 

Minority Member, Committee on 

International Relations, House of 

Representatives

June 2000 FOREIGN 

ASSISTANCE

U.S. Bilateral Food 

Assistance to North 

Korea Had Mixed 

Results

GAO/NSIAD-00-175

Page 1 GAO/NSIAD-00-175 Foreign Assistance

Contents

Letter 3

Appendixes Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 52

Appendix II: Accountability Related Problems Raised by International 

Agencies and Nongovernmental Organizations 55

Appendix III: Comments From the U.S. Agency for International 

Development 59

Appendix IV: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments 64

Table Table 1: Comparison of Scheduled and Actual Food Aid Deliveries 

for the Bilateral Assistance Project, May 1999 to 

November 1999 33

Figures Figure 1: Province and Counties Where the Chinese Seed Potatoes

Were Planted 16

Figure 2: Type and Number of Food-for-Work Projects, Metric Tons

of Food Distributed, and Beneficiaries by North Korean 

Administrative Districts 28

Figure 3: Percentage Distribution of the 100,000 Metric Tons of 

Food Aid by Administrative District, August 1999 to 

May 2000 29

Figure 4: Percentage Distribution of the 100,000 Metric Tons of 

Food Aid by Type of Food-for-Work Project, August 1999 

to May 2000 30

Abbreviations

USAID U.S. Agency for International Development

USDA U.S. Department of Agriculture
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United States General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-285415 Letr

June 15, 2000

The Honorable Benjamin Gilman

Chairman

The Honorable Sam Gejdenson

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on International Relations

House of Representatives

Following North Korea’s agreement to provide the United States access to 

inspect a suspected underground nuclear facility at Kumchang-ni in March 

1999, the administration announced it would take a modest step to 

facilitate an improvement in relations with North Korea in the form of the 

first U.S. government-supported bilateral assistance project in North 

Korea. In April 1999, the United States, North Korea, and a consortium of 

U.S. private voluntary organizations (hereafter referred to as the 

Consortium1

) signed an agreement for the project.2 The Consortium had 

experience in managing food aid in North Korea. In the agreement, the 

Consortium committed to pay for and provide seed potatoes to North 

Korean farmers to increase the country’s potato production and the United 

States committed to provide 100,000 metric tons of emergency food aid for 

distribution to laborers participating in food-for-work projects. 

(In food-for- work projects, laborers and their families receive a food 

allotment for each day they work on a project.) The Consortium was to 

work collaboratively with its North Korean counterparts in implementing 

and monitoring both the potato production and the food-for-work 

components of the project. 

1

Consortium members include the Adventist Development and Relief Association, Amigos 

Internacionales, CARE, Catholic Relief Services, the Carter Center, Church World Service, 

the Latter Day Saints Charities, the Korean American Sharing Movement, and Mercy Corps 

International. CARE is the program coordinator and fiduciary agent for all Consortium 

activities; Catholic Relief Services manages food-for-work commodity related matters; the 

Carter Center manages agricultural issues; and Mercy Corps International serves as the 

chair of the board. As discussed later in this report, CARE plans to withdraw from the 

Consortium on June 30, 2000.

2

In providing emergency food aid, the term “bilateral” often refers to a program where the 

commodities are provided directly to the other government. However, in this case, the 

United States provided the commodities to CARE as the lead organization in the 

Consortium.
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According to U.S. officials, the food aid was provided for humanitarian 

purposes, reflected the modest progress that had been made in the 

relationship with North Korea, and could serve as a basis for possibly 

expanding the relationship with North Korea. North Korean officials were 

described by U.S. officials as having seen the project as a way to obtain 

needed food, as something received for allowing the United States to 

inspect the Kumchang-ni facility, and as a step toward normalizing relations 

with the United States. The Consortium saw the project as an opportunity 

to provide needed food aid to unemployed factory and agricultural workers 

through food-for-work programs and initiate a small pilot agricultural 

project that could help improve North Korea’s food security. 

Although it is well accepted that North Korea has a food shortage, U.S. 

provision of food aid has been controversial. The United States and North 

Korea do not have diplomatic relations, and the United States has serious 

concerns about North Korea’s nuclear weapons and missile capabilities. 

North Korea is also on the State Department’s list of state sponsors of 

international terrorism. In addition, there are differing views about who has 

benefited from the food assistance and whether the food has helped to 

maintain North Korea’s communist dictatorship.

As you requested, we examined (1) the objectives, accomplishments, key 

factors affecting performance, and monitoring effectiveness of the potato 

component of the bilateral aid project; (2) the objectives, 

accomplishments, key factors affecting performance, and monitoring 

effectiveness of the food-for-work component; and (3) the administration’s 

views on the project and plans for additional bilateral assistance to North 

Korea.

To address these issues, we collected and reviewed numerous U.S. 

government and Consortium project reports and related documentation, 

and we interviewed U.S. agency officials and Consortium managers and 

food aid monitors. We made repeated and extensive efforts to conduct 

fieldwork in North Korea, including sending two visa request letters to and 

holding four telephone discussions with North Korean officials over a 

period of 4 months. In addition, our visa requests received several U.S. 

congressional and executive branch endorsements. However, the North 

Korean government did not act on our requests. Although not able to travel 

to North Korea, we were able to conduct lengthy interviews with 

Consortium field managers and monitors who worked on the bilateral 

assistance project in North Korea. See appendix I for additional 

information on our scope and methodology.
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Results in Brief The potato component of the bilateral aid project sought to increase North 

Korean potato production by using 1,000 metric tons of imported Chinese 

and American seed potatoes to generate as much as several hundred 

thousand tons of potatoes over two growing seasons (1999 and 2000). The 

Consortium estimates that only about 3,000 metric tons of potatoes were 

produced during the first harvest (compared to a possible yield of about 

8,400 to 12,600 tons) and that most of these were in poor condition. The 

project produced substantially fewer potatoes than expected primarily 

because the seed potatoes were planted late in the first growing season, 

unusually bad weather struck close to the harvest time, and the North 

Korean government directed that the potatoes be planted in areas that were 

less than ideal. As a result of the weather, potatoes that were harvested 

were undersized and had a high moisture content. In addition, the 

Consortium and the Flood Damage Rehabilitation Committee did not 

collaborate on a second planting because the North Korean government no 

longer wanted assistance in the form of seed potatoes, but instead sought 

commercial potato propagation technology from the Consortium. 

According to a senior official of the U.S. Agency for International 

Development and Consortium managers, the Consortium did not fully 

monitor the seed potatoes provided to North Korea. For example, the 

Consortium did not have a potato specialist available in North Korea to 

advise officials on a regular basis nor at critical times in the project. As a 

result, when North Korean officials claimed that roughly one-third of the 

airlifted American potatoes were damaged upon arrival in North Korea, the 

Consortium could not credibly confirm or deny the finding. The potatoes 

were reportedly destroyed or fed to animals. Consortium staff were not 

provided an opportunity to verify their disposal.
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The food-for-work program sought to provide 100,000 metric tons of U.S. 

government-donated food to North Koreans in return for their work on 

agricultural and other infrastructure projects to benefit their communities, 

including the seed potato assistance project. The Consortium estimates 

that the food was distributed to nearly 2.7 million persons in 107 of 211 

North Korean counties and met a goal of providing at least 50 percent of the 

food to northeast provinces, which were considered the most in need of 

food. The food program supported work on 176 projects, such as raising 

the level of a river embankment to control future flooding. In addition, 

Consortium personnel and U.S. agency officials believe that the food aid 

and Consortium interaction with North Korean officials and food-for-work 

participants have improved North Korean perceptions of Americans and 

the United States. Key problems that negatively affected the distribution of 

the food aid were shipping and visa delays and disagreement between the 

Consortium and the Flood Damage Rehabilitation Committee over how the 

food should be used. As a result of these problems, and in an effort to 

ensure accountability, the Consortium found it necessary to redirect two 

shipments of commodities to the United Nations World Food Program in 

North Korea, and the U.S. Agency for International Development later 

arranged to temporarily store subsequent commodities in South Korea, 

where they were stored until the Consortium and Flood Damage 

Rehabilitation Committee agreed on food distribution plans. The terms of 

the project agreement3

 and North Korean actions made it difficult for the 

Consortium to effectively monitor the distribution of food aid. For 

example, the agreement provided that the Consortium might visit any 

project site, but the North Korean government had to be notified at least 

1 week in advance. Consortium staff told us they were not aware of any 

evidence of actual diversions of food aid, but several Consortium monitors 

indicated it is not likely they would be aware of diversions because of 

constraints on their monitoring.

3

The project agreement was titled Memorandum of Understanding Between the Flood 

Damage Rehabilitation Committee of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the 

Consortium of U.S. Private Voluntary Organizations with the Government of the United 

States of America. 
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U.S. officials said they currently have no plans for providing additional 

bilateral emergency assistance to North Korea. The U.S. Agency for 

International Development said the bilateral assistance project seemed to 

demonstrate that the North Korean government was not yet ready to 

engage in a way that would support success and that the United States 

would need to articulate expectations and commitments more clearly in 

any similar future program. Officials of the Department of Agriculture and 

the U.S. Agency for International Development recognized the Consortium 

efforts, but were critical of its management of the project. The 

administration continues to favor the World Food Program as the primary 

vehicle for distributing U.S. food donations to North Korea on the grounds 

that the program is better able to monitor the situation in North Korea. 

However, in previous work, we found that the World Food Program is 

limited in its ability to provide independent assurance that the food aid is 

reaching targeted beneficiaries.4

 Until North Korea is removed from the 

State Department’s list of terrorist nations, North Korea generally will not 

be eligible for nonemergency bilateral development assistance from the 

United States. According to State Department officials, if North Korea were 

to take actions that resulted in its being removed from the list, the 

provision of bilateral development assistance would nevertheless remain 

uncertain. A specific policy regarding conditions under which the 

administration would consider providing such assistance has not yet been 

developed.

In this report, we recommend that the Secretary of State, the Secretary of 

Agriculture, and the Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International 

Development take certain steps to improve the likelihood of success if the 

agencies decide to approve another bilateral food assistance project for 

North Korea. Agency officials generally agreed with or did not object to our 

conclusions and recommendations. 

Background North Korea is a highly centralized communist state under the rigid control 

of the ruling elite. Unlike most other communist states, North Korea has 

generally not opened itself to trade, investment, and exchange with the rest 

of the world. No comprehensive peace agreement has replaced the 1953 

armistice pact that ended the military hostilities of the Korean War. 

However, the United States remains committed to maintaining peace on the 

4

See Foreign Assistance: North Korea Restricts Food Aid Monitoring (GAO/NSIAD-00-35, 

Oct. 8, 1999).
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Korean Peninsula and currently has about 37,500 troops stationed in South 

Korea. During the past decade, U.S. policy toward North Korea has focused 

on trying to secure and verify North Korea’s ending its nuclear weapons 

and long-range missile-related activities, which are seen as a major threat 

to peace. Under a 1994 political agreement, known as the Agreed 

Framework, North Korea pledged to freeze its existing nuclear program 

and eventually to allow the International Atomic Energy Agency to carry 

out inspections designed to account for all of its nuclear material. In return, 

among other things, the United States agreed to create an international 

consortium of member countries to replace North Korea’s graphitemoderated reactors with light-water power plants. Other key provisions of 

the Agreed Framework include the progressive normalization of U.S.-North 

Korean political and economic relations and dialogue between North and 

South Korea. However, progress toward implementing the Agreed 

Framework has been slow and questions have remained about whether 

North Korea is clandestinely pursuing further development of its nuclear 

weapons capabilities.
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North Korea is normally not food self-sufficient. In the early 1990s, North 

Korea lost its concessionary trading relations with the former Soviet states 

and China. The loss of favorable terms of trade with these major trading 

partners, North Korea’s inefficient agricultural and economic policies, 

floods and droughts, and near total economic collapse transformed North 

Korea’s normal state of food import dependence into a serious 

humanitarian crisis. According to the Central Intelligence Agency, between 

1994 and 1998 widespread famine and disease killed hundreds of thousands 

of North Koreans. Other estimates of the deaths from famine and 

famine-related health problems range as high as 2.5 million persons.5

 North 

Korea issued its first appeal for foreign assistance in 1995. According to the 

U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), North Korea’s food situation has 

improved, but staple grain output remains more than 1 million tons below 

what the country needs to meet minimal demand. This situation may 

persist for the next several years and perhaps longer.6

5

See, for example, Andrew Natsios, “The Politics of Famine in North Korea,” United States 

Institute of Peace Special Report (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 2, 1999). Also, a nutritional study 

conducted by United Nations agencies in 1998 found that 62 percent of children under seven 

were malnourished and 65 percent had stunted growth and retarded development.

6

In December 1999, USDA estimated North Korea’s 1999 grain situation, without food aid, as 

771,000 tons below that needed to maintain the minimum daily caloric intake standards 

recommended by the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization. These standards 

were described as comparable to the activity level of a refugee—that is, not allowing for 

play, work, or any activity other than food gathering. The study projected that the food gap 

will widen during the next decade without external assistance and/or significant gains in 

agricultural performance. See: United States Department of Agriculture, Food Security 

Assessment (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 1999).
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The United States is the largest known contributor of food assistance to 

North Korea, according to a senior U.S. Agency for International 

Development (USAID) official.7

 Since 1995, the United States has 

contributed nearly $400 million in food commodities, most of which have 

been distributed through the United Nations World Food Program (the 

United States provides about 80 percent of World Food Program donations 

to North Korea). However, U.S. food assistance has been controversial 

because of differing views about how the food aid has been used and 

whether North Korea has been acting consistently with the terms of the 

Agreed Framework. According to critics of the food assistance policy, the 

food may be diverted for military use and not reach those civilians most in 

need; and North Korean officials endeavor to extort such aid, threatening 

to take provocative steps like exporting more North Korean ballistic 

missiles and related technologies to sensitive world areas unless the United 

States and others provide substantial aid. In addition, critics say that the 

food aid frees other resources for North Korea to divert to its weapons of 

mass destruction and conventional military programs, helps to perpetuate 

a repressive regime, and helps North Korea avoid needed agricultural, 

economic and political reforms. Proponents of the food aid justify it on 

humanitarian and other grounds.8

 They say that that starving people have 

been helped, food conditions have improved, and there is no evidence of a 

significant diversion of food aid. In addition, proponents say that aid can 

help open up North Korea’s economy and closed society to outside 

contacts and influences, promote the adoption of reformist, moderate 

policies by the government, and promote peace on the Korean peninsula.9

7

The official told us that China provides large amounts of food to North Korea, but the U.S. 

government does not know the quantity nor what mechanisms China uses to transfer the 

food. China may provide some grant aid to the government of North Korea and may provide 

some food in exchange for natural resources, such as timber.

8

See Korea: U.S.-South Korean Relations−Issues for Congress (CRS Issue Brief IB98045, 

Jan. 11, 2000).

9

See North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Program (CRS Issue Brief IB91141, Jan. 7, 2000).
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In August 1998, media reports revealed intelligence findings that North 

Korea was possibly constructing a nuclear installation at the Kumchang-ni 

underground facility. The administration responded to the disclosure by 

pressuring North Korea to allow the United States access to the facility and 

indicating that failure to do so would threaten the viability of the Agreed 

Framework. On March 16, 1999, the Secretary of State announced that the 

United States and North Korea had reached agreement on U.S. access to 

the site. According to the Secretary, the United States did not agree to 

compensate the North Koreans in return for access to the facility.10

However, the Secretary said, the United States did advise the North 

Koreans that removal of U.S. suspicions concerning Kumchang-ni would 

enable the United States to resume its relationship with North Korea as 

outlined in the Agreed Framework. Furthermore, the Secretary said, the 

United States had decided to take a step in the form of a bilateral pilot 

agricultural project. Subsequently, on April 17, 1999, the United States, 

North Korea, and the Consortium signed a project agreement in which the 

United States committed to providing food aid to North Korea and the 

Consortium agreed to provide seed potatoes to the North Koreans and to 

work collaboratively with North Korean counterparts in distributing the 

donated food. Although U.S. law generally precludes the United States 

from providing North Korea with regular development assistance so long as 

the State Department designates it as a terrorist nation,11 the United States 

can provide North Korea with emergency food assistance.12 U.S. officials 

have described U.S. involvement in this bilateral aid agreement as being 

consistent with the emergency food assistance authority.

The Consortium is a group of U.S. private voluntary organizations that, 

beginning in 1997, has received funding from the U.S. government to plan 

the distribution of and monitor a portion of U.S. donations provided 

through the World Food Program to North Korea in support of 

food-for-work projects. In 1999, when the bilateral project was initiated, the 

Consortium was composed of nine organizations that had agreed to 

10Other accounts have disputed this account. For example, according to a Congressional 

Research Service report, the United States and North Korean agreement provided for 

multiple U.S. inspections of the Kumchang-ni facility in return for at least 500,000 tons of 

new U.S. food aid for North Korea. See: North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Program (CRS 

Issue Brief IB91141, Jan. 7, 2000).

1122 U.S.C. 2371. On May 1, 2000, the State Department issued its latest list of terrorist 

nations, and North Korea was again included.

127 U.S.C. 1722(a).
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operate as a single entity in North Korea. Each member organization is 

represented on the Consortium’s board, which employs a two-thirds 

majority vote decisionmaking rule. The Consortium’s board delegated 

programmatic and operational oversight responsibilities for the bilateral 

aid project to a project management team composed of representatives 

from CARE, Catholic Relief Services, the Carter Center, and Mercy Corps 

International, each of whom had designated responsibilities. 

According to State Department officials, the North Korean government had 

expressed an interest in receiving potato production assistance13 during 

talks between the United States and North Korea in early 1999.14 U.S. 

officials advised the Consortium of the North Korean interest and 

encouraged the Consortium to undertake the potato production project. In 

late February 1999, U.S. government officials and Consortium members 

met at the Department of State to discuss the issue. The Consortium sent a 

technical feasibility team to North Korea for a study funded by the U.S. 

government. In mid-April, the Consortium and North Korean government 

negotiated the terms of the bilateral assistance project, and the agreement 

was signed by representatives of the Consortium, the United States, and 

North Korea on April 17, 1999. The North Korean government was 

represented by the Flood Damage Rehabilitation Committee.15 According 

to U.S. agency officials and Consortium managers, USAID budgeted 

$15 million for the bilateral food assistance project, the USDA 

$11.8 million, and the Consortium $0.6 million. The potato project cost 

13Although potatoes have reportedly been grown on the Korean peninsula since 1824, rice 

and corn are the principal food grains produced and consumed in North Korea. Rice is 

clearly the grain of choice for North Korean consumers. About 40,000 hectares of potatoes 

were planted in 1998 compared to 1.3 million total hectares that were under cultivation. An 

October 1999 Consortium report estimated that about 167,000 hectares were devoted to 

potatoes in 1999 and a target of 200,000 hectares was being mentioned for 2000. Average 

national yields for potato production are reported to be less than 10 metric tons per hectare 

compared to a world average of about 15 metric tons per hectare and more than 20 metric 

tons per hectare in South Korea.

14In 1997, North Korea’s leadership announced a national campaign to expand the 

production of potatoes as part of an effort to meet urgent food needs.

15According to a State Department official, the Flood Damage Rehabilitation Committee was 

originally formed by the North Korean government to coordinate the influx of foreign aid. 

The role of the committee has evolved so that it now also acts as an aid management 

organization—coordinating the distribution of food aid and the implementation of 

assistance projects. This official believes it is an independent government agency comprised 

of Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials and officials from other North Korean government 

bodies.
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approximately $1 million, of which the Consortium paid about 60 percent, 

according to Consortium and U.S. government figures.

Project to Increase 

Potato Production Was 

Unsuccessful

The potato component of the bilateral food aid project attempted to 

increase seed potato production on eight farms in North Korea and 

generate as much as several hundred thousand tons of potatoes over two 

growing seasons. The Consortium believes that only about 3,000 metric 

tons of potatoes were produced during the first harvest and that most of 

these were in poor condition. The project did not achieve its objective 

primarily because the seed potatoes were planted late in the growing 

season and unusually bad weather struck close to the harvest time. The 

second season’s planting did not proceed because the North Korean 

government no longer wanted seed potato assistance, but instead sought 

expensive potato propagation technology. The Consortium, while 

responsible for monitoring how the potato project was carried out, was not 

able to fully do so because of various constraints. 

The Potato Component 

Sought to Improve Food 

Production and Capability

The primary purposes of the potato component were to assist North 

Korean farmers to increase potato production16 over two growing seasons 

(in 1999 and 2000) and to allow North Korean scientists to assess new 

varieties of potatoes and relevant agricultural practices.17 Under the project 

agreement, the Consortium agreed to provide 900 metric tons of tested and 

certified Chinese variety seed potatoes. The potatoes were to be planted by 

farmers in Kangwon Province at elevations higher than 1,000 meters above 

sea level. The Consortium also agreed to provide 100 metric tons of several 

U.S. varieties of tested and certified seed potatoes for seed multiplication 

and variety trials by the North Korean Academy of Agricultural Sciences.18

16The potato is one of the world’s main food crops and considered an excellent food staple. 

According to the Consortium’s harvest assessment study, under average yield conditions, 

potatoes yield more protein per hectare than either wheat, rice, or corn and approximately 

equal the food energy from one hectare of rice. A medium-size potato of about 150 grams 

provides one-third of an adult’s daily requirement of vitamin C and significant quantities of 

vitamin B-1, niacin, and iron.

17The project was seen as an efficient way to reduce North Korea’s food deficit, since the 

country had an adequate knowledge base to expand food production with some technical 

assistance from the outside. 

18Since American potatoes had not been previously grown in North Korea, the Consortium 

understood that it was necessary that they undergo trials for a period of 2 years.
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Recognizing that the planting season was already underway in North Korea 

at the time the project agreement was signed, the Consortium agreed to 

undertake extraordinary efforts to deliver the 900 metric tons of certified 

seed potatoes to the China/North Korean border as close as possible to 

April 30, 1999. And it agreed to airlift the U.S. varieties to Pyongyang, the 

capital of North Korea, by the first part of May.

The project agreement did not state how many new potatoes the seed 

potatoes should produce during each of the two growing cycles. According 

to documents we reviewed, in early 1999 the State Department’s Office of 

Korean Affairs estimated that 1,000 metric tons of seed potatoes could be 

multiplied over two growing seasons to as much as 200,000 metric tons to 

375,000 metric tons. Its estimates were based in part on data obtained from 

private voluntary organizations that would later, as Consortium members, 

manage the potato project. The assumed seed potato yields per hectare19

were not always specified in State’s estimates. In mid-February 1999, a 

future Consortium member organization estimated that a yield of up to 25 

metric tons per hectare could be achieved in North Korea at the national 

level. In late February 1999, Consortium members told State that they 

assumed 1,000 metric tons of seed, planted on 500 hectares in the northeast 

provinces, could yield 40 metric tons per hectare or 20,000 metric tons of 

seeds during the first growing season. 

Under the project agreement, the Consortium was responsible for 

providing technical assistance, inland transportation costs, and adequate 

agricultural inputs such as fertilizer, fungicide, insecticide, and herbicide to 

support the first cycle of the potato program. The agreement also provided 

that the Consortium would employ monitors to help manage and monitor 

the potato program and food-for-work program and two agricultural 

specialists to support the potato initiative. Monitors could be granted visas 

for approximately 6 months, but agricultural specialists would be granted 

visas for only short stays. The Flood Damage Rehabilitation Committee 

would collaborate with the Consortium agricultural specialists during 

implementation of the project, and they would conduct field monitoring 

and ongoing evaluation. The Ministry of Agriculture and the Academy of 

Agricultural Sciences would be involved in the project activities, including 

the second cycle.

19One hectare equals 2.47 acres.
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Considerable Efforts Made 

but Final Results Were Poor

Despite an extremely tight deadline, Consortium efforts to supply seed 

potatoes to North Korea by the beginning of May were largely successful. 

All of the Chinese-origin potatoes were inspected, purchased, and delivered 

to the North Korean border by May 4. Difficult problems had to be 

overcome, including a shortage in railway cars for transporting the 

potatoes into North Korea. After shipping losses, 840 metric tons of three 

Chinese varieties were available for planting. Most of the potatoes were 

planted by mid-May. However, some were not planted until the latter part of 

May, and one parcel of 40 metric tons was not planted until June 18. The 

potatoes were planted on eight farms in three counties in Kangwon 

Province (see fig. 1). According to the Consortium, a scientist affiliated 

with the International Potato Center provided invaluable technical 

assistance to the Consortium’s efforts.20

20The International Potato Center, founded in 1971, is underwritten by numerous 

governments, multilateral institutions, and foundations. It works to enhance cultivation, 

yield, processing, and consumption of potatoes. Consortium managers said that the center 

participated in the feasibility study, assisted in identifying a procurement agent, carried out 

random testing of the Chinese potato varieties, and provided other technical assistance to 

the Consortium’s consultants. 
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Figure 1: Province and Counties Where the Chinese Seed Potatoes Were Planted

Source: GAO analysis of Consortium data.

Chonnae County

170 metric tons seed 

potatoes

Popdong County

190 metric tons seed 

potatoes

Sepo County

480 metric tons seed 

potatoes

North Pyongan

Kangwon

Yanggang

Chagang

South Pyongan

South Hwanghae

Nampo City

South Hamgyong

North Hamgyong

Kaesong City

North Hwanghae

Pyongyang City

Yellow Sea

Sea of Japan

China

Japan

North Korea

South Korea

Seoul

Pusan

Pyongyang

Demarcation

Line
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The Consortium also rapidly procured 100 metric tons of American seed 

potatoes from Colorado, but was only able to provide one variety. 

According to a Consortium manager, other available varieties had not been 

tested for blight and testing them would have meant missing the project 

agreement deadline for shipping the potatoes to North Korea. Given that 

the project agreement was not signed until the planting season was already 

underway, the Consortium had agreed to air freight the potatoes. However, 

it was not able to pay or find a donor to cover the cost. USAID then agreed 

to pay the cost, which was $290,000. When the potatoes arrived in North 

Korea on April 29, North Korean officials told the Consortium that 

35 metric tons of the potatoes were damaged or diseased. According to a 

Consortium consultant, the seeds were reportedly destroyed in mid-May. 

The remaining potatoes were distributed by May 11 to 12 test sites operated 

by the Academy of Agricultural Sciences, according to a Consortium 

consultant. About 16 metric tons were distributed in northern highland 

areas and planted in mid-May. The remaining 49 metric tons were planted in 

test plots in the south and western coastal potato areas, but not until midJuly, the time for a second crop planting. 

At the suggestion of a Consortium consultant, the Consortium agreed to 

modify the project by providing the cooperative farms with extra quantities 

of fertilizer that could be used on their other crops, and these non-potato 

crops reportedly benefited from the change. The purpose was to remove 

the temptation of the farmers to use the fertilizer that was intended for the 

seed potatoes on other more important crops such as rice and corn and to 

ensure that any losses that the farms might incur if the seed potato harvest 

was poor would be compensated by the increased production of the other 

crops. In addition, it increased the long-term development impact of the 

project by allowing the farmers to choose how to use the additional 

fertilizer and by promoting crop diversification. The cost to the Consortium 

of the extra fertilizer was $50,000.

Consortium staffing problems had some adverse consequences for project 

performance. The Consortium did not have an agronomist or a potato 

specialist in North Korea to manage the potato project and consult with 

local counterparts for most of April through July, which included certain 

key times. According to the Consortium, North Korea refused to accept a 

permanent agronomist during negotiations of the project agreement; 

however, the project agreement did allow for short-term visits by 

consulting specialists. The Consortium wanted to have an agronomist there 

at the start of the project and at other key times, such as when fungicides 

and pesticides were applied. A Consortium manager said that finding 
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appropriate expertise on short notice and during the planting season was 

difficult. Two Consortium consultants reported to Consortium 

management that failure to staff a full-time agricultural specialist limited 

the Consortium’s ability to establish relationships with North Korean 

counterparts, which was one of the goals of the project agreement. In 

addition, the Consortium did not have a specialist available to provide 

instruction on the safe use of the fungicide and pesticide; such instruction 

was integral to the technical assistance that the Consortium was to 

provide. A Consortium consultant secured the agreement of a Ministry of 

Agriculture technician to provide courses in the safe handling of these 

materials, but the Consortium did not verify that the training actually 

occurred, according to the consultant.

The Consortium arranged for a mid-term crop evaluation in July 1999 by a 

consultant who was an experienced potato horticulturist. The consultant 

told us that although the potatoes had been planted late in all counties and 

therefore were not in as good condition as might otherwise have been the 

case, they nonetheless looked quite good. He told us that he had expected 

actual yields of about 20 to 30 tons per hectare. This suggested a possible 

total yield ranging between 8,400 to 12,600 metric tons.21

Consortium consultants estimate that only about 3,000 metric tons of the 

Chinese potatoes were harvested compared to the mid-harvest expected 

yield of 8,400 to 12,600 metric tons and that only 190 to 210 metric tons 

were retained as seeds for planting in 2000. Regarding the American seed 

potatoes planted at lower elevations, Consortium agricultural consultants 

reported a near total crop failure. Regarding potatoes planted at higher 

elevations, the consultants said the Academy of Agriculture Sciences had 

estimated yields of about 20 metric tons per hectare.

If the potato yields had been as expected, the Consortium could have faced 

a serious problem in storing some of the potatoes for use as seed in 2000. 

For example, according to the Consortium’s agricultural consultant’s

mid-term assessment, the three counties where the potatoes were grown 

did not have facilities for storing the potatoes, and they had limited time to 

build storage sites. He recommended that the Consortium consider 

immediate assistance for the building of facilities. The Consortium’s 

logistical consultant was also critical of the Consortium’s performance on 

this matter. He noted that storage had been raised as an issue in the April 

21The Chinese potatoes were planted on 420 hectares.
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report by the Consortium’s feasibility team, and he said the Consortium and 

the farms should have had construction of storage facilities well underway 

before the planned harvest of the potatoes in August 1999. 

In spite of the disappointing harvest yield, the Consortium was prepared to 

participate in the planned second planting cycle. In September 1999, the 

Consortium presented a proposal to the North Korean government that 

included, among other things, additional support for producing seed 

potatoes. The proposal called for project approval by mid-October and the 

procurement of potato seeds and other inputs beginning in December 1999. 

However, talks between the Consortium and North Korea continued into 

March 2000, and ended without an agreement. According to a Consortium 

manager, the North Koreans were no longer interested in pursuing the seed 

potatoes. In addition, the North Koreans wanted the Consortium to supply 

a commercial potato propagation technology costing between $350,000 to 

$500,000, according to Consortium managers. This was more than the 

Consortium was prepared to spend. The Consortium had offered, as part of 

its proposal, to provide a less expensive version of the propagation 

technology, but the offer was not of sufficient interest to the North Korean 

government.22

Poor Results Were Primarily 

Due to a Late Start and Bad 

Weather

The potato project did not achieve expected yields in part because the 

potatoes were planted late in the growing season. The sowing started late 

because the project got off to a late start. According to a State Department 

official, North Korean officials presented the idea of a potato project to 

them in early 1999. U.S. officials met with private voluntary organizations, 

including Consortium members, on February 24, 1999. These dates were 

late relative to the planning of a new crop for the spring of 1999. Around the 

world, farmers typically make spring planting decisions in the preceding 

fall. The actual project agreement was not signed until April 17, 1999, which 

was about the time the seed potatoes should have been planted. According 

to a Consortium report, the potatoes were planted some 5 to 6 weeks after 

optimal dates. The late start increased the risk of damage from heavy rains 

and high temperatures that normally occur in Kangwon Province during 

July and August. According to the Consortium’s April 1999 technical 

feasibility study, the main concern echoed by all of the North Korean 

officials with whom the team met was the lateness of the season and how 

22Consortium managers said the more expensive commercial-grade potato propagation 

technology was recently provided to North Korea by World Vision International. 
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this would affect the success of the project as measured by total potato 

yield. Local officials told the Consortium that the weather in Kangwon is 

hot and humid during the months of July and August and that insects and 

diseases are a serious problem as a result.

The Consortium’s harvest study team wrote that the crop prospects took a 

sharp downward trend with the arrival of Typhoon Olga23 on August 3, 

1999. All eight farms where the seed potatoes were planted were seriously 

affected by the resulting high temperatures and rainfall during the August 3 

to 13 period, according to the team’s report.24 The yields for the Chinese 

potatoes ranged from about 5 to 7.4 metric tons per hectare, as compared 

to 18 to 20 metric tons per hectare for the local North Korean varieties of 

potatoes that had been planted much earlier. In addition, potatoes that 

were harvested were undersized and had a high moisture content, which 

raised concern that storage losses would be unusually high. The report also 

cited the results of an Italian nongovernmental organization involved in 

potato development on other farms in Kangwon Province and in South 

Hwanghae Province. These potatoes were planted earlier than Consortium 

potatoes, and harvesting was completed by early August, with reported 

yields of 20 to 22 metric tons per hectare.

The late start may also have affected the quality of the seed potatoes that 

were purchased for the project and support for the project by relevant 

parties in North Korea. The Consortium, with the collaboration of a 

scientist affiliated with the Beijing branch office of the International Potato 

Center, procured what the Consortium states were high quality seed 

potatoes. According to the Consortium’s managers, the scientist facilitated 

the selection of the Chinese seed potatoes and provided documentation 

concerning their quality. However, a Consortium consultant who prepared 

a mid-term assessment of the crop and later participated in the harvest 

study assessment concluded that most high quality seed had already been 

purchased by others, since the planting season was already underway. In 

his mid-term assessment, he said that most of the Chinese potatoes that 

23According to South Korean and wire media sources and the United Nations Office for the 

Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Typhoon Olga left about 35 dead and about 24,000 

homeless in South Korea, and it flooded 30,000 to 36,000 hectares of South Korean farmland.

24According to a Consortium report, the severe weather was a 1-in-5 to a 1-in-25 year event. 

The Consortium was aware, however, that Kangwon province was subject to tropical 

weather patterns in the summer, and the Consortium told us it did have climate data 

showing unusual weather patterns in the area of the potato project since 1994.
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had been purchased for the project would not under normal conditions 

have been grown as a seed crop, but rather grown for table consumption. 

More recently, he told us that although he did not have an opportunity to 

inspect the seed potatoes before planting, based on his knowledge of seed 

potato production and certification procedures in China and his inspection 

of the plants, he continues to doubt the quality of many of the Chinese seed 

potatoes. 

According to the harvest report, with seed of unknown potential arriving 

late, Academy of Agricultural Sciences staff and the Ministry of Agriculture 

were skeptical about the project. This was understandable, the report said, 

since the Academy’s 1999 research program had already been determined 

and the Ministry of Agriculture’s annual planning process, which largely 

determines the year’s cropping program on cooperative farms, had been 

completed at least 4 months earlier. Although farm managers had been told 

of a likely potato project, details were vague. As a result, the report said, 

the farms did not commit first-class land to the project, with one exception.

Consortium managers had been concerned about the implications of a late 

start from the time that State solicited their participation in February 1999. 

Consortium officials told us they realized that the time line for 

implementation would require an extraordinary effort on everyone’s part. 

Consortium managers decided to accept the risk because opportunities for 

initiatives with a development component in North Korea were limited.25

Every emergency response effort involves risks of some sort, they said, and 

they wanted to seize upon the opportunity that had been presented.26

However, not all Consortium members favored the project. One member, 

Amigos Internacionales, felt strongly that the project’s prospects for 

success were poor and advised the Consortium to seek North Korean 

agreement to postpone the startup to the year 2000. This organization’s 

representative also expressed his views to senior U.S. government officials. 

25Although U.S. government officials were present during Consortium negotiations with the 

North Korean government, it was a Consortium decision to proceed with the project.

26For example, one member organization hoped the pilot potato project might lead to 

projects involving other crops for improving North Korea’s food security. Another member 

organization said the project provided an opportunity for involvement at the community 

level. Still, another member organization said it felt it could not continue sending food aid 

without also providing assistance to help North Korea reduce its dependency. Another 

member said that development assistance cannot be provided to North Korea without a 

better environment, and it hoped the potato project would help promote normalization of 

relations with North Korea.
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In addition to the late start, the seed potatoes were not planted in ideal 

locations. Potatoes are known as a cool weather crop that grow best in 

drier, high altitude areas. Consortium managers and other U.S. officials told 

us that much of North Korea’s potato production is concentrated in North 

Korea’s three mountainous northeastern provinces. The Consortium sent a 

team to North Korea, from March 27 through April 6, 1999, to determine the 

feasibility of initiating a seed potato project. The Consortium had planned 

to plant the bulk of the seed potatoes in those provinces. However, North 

Korean officials told the feasibility team that the potatoes were to be 

planted in the southern part of North Korea, in Kangwon province. 

Consortium agricultural consultants concluded that the warm tropical 

climate in the summer and disease conditions in this location made it less 

suitable for seed production. Consortium staff also concluded that 

Kangwon province lacked adequate storage. However, according to records 

we reviewed, the feasibility team was told that failure to accept the North 

Korean government’s request that the potatoes be planted in Kangwon 

would jeopardize agreements between the U.S. government and North 

Korea. Although the Consortium realized that planting the seed potatoes in 

Kangown Province might not achieve the seed potato production goals 

outlined in State Department and Consortium planning papers, it 

concluded the project still could contribute to North Korea’s food security. 

Performance Monitoring 

Was Not Adequate

The Consortium did not adequately monitor the potato component of the 

food aid project. The project agreement provided that the Consortium 

would employ a number of monitors to manage the potato and food-forwork program and two agricultural specialists to support the potato 

initiative. The Flood Damage Rehabilitation Committee would collaborate 

with the Consortium agricultural specialists during the implementation, 

and they would conduct field monitoring and ongoing evaluation. However, 

the Consortium did not arrange for an agronomist to be in North Korea to 

advise North Korean officials when the imported seed potatoes arrived.27

As a result, when the American seed potatoes arrived and North Korean 

officials concluded that roughly one-third of the potatoes were diseased or 

damaged, the Consortium did not have an expert present to confirm or 

deny the finding. The North Koreans reportedly destroyed these potatoes 

and did so without inviting any Consortium staff to verify the destruction. 

27The Consortium’s field manager for a World Food Program-related project that overlapped 

with the bilateral assistance project was present at the airport to observe the arrival of the 

potatoes. 
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The Consortium told us that in hindsight it would have been important to 

have an American potato specialist on the plane to arrive with the airlifted 

American potatoes. At the time, however, they told us it was difficult to 

recruit a specialist and obtain a visa for travel to North Korea on short 

notice, and the Consortium was focused on moving the potatoes from 

China to the participating North Korean farms.

This problem might not have arisen if the Consortium had included 

instructional material, including photographs, with the airlifted American 

potatoes. According to the manager of the Colorado State Seed Potato 

Program, the American variety that was provided, Russet Nugget, can have 

superficial skin defects, such as particularly rough skin and cracks. These 

defects might have been misinterpreted by staff of the Academy of 

Agricultural Sciences as a sign of disease. The manager told us that he is 

confident that there was nothing wrong with the potatoes, since they were 

fully inspected, met all the tolerances for certification, and received a U.S. 

grade one rating for quality. In addition, he observed the loading of the 

potatoes on the plane and was impressed with how the carrier handled 

them. 

The Consortium did not try to send any monitors into North Korea until 

June 1999, and no monitors actually entered North Korea until July because 

of visa and other problems. By that time, the potatoes were well on their 

way to maturity. A Consortium manager told us that the Consortium was 

not able to complete assembling field staff for the bilateral assistance 

project until June 1999 and that in any case it was doubtful that the North 

Koreans would have approved of a field manager and a monitor going into 

North Korea for the sole purpose of monitoring the potato component. 

Although monitors arrived in July, they focused largely on the

food-for-work program. No monitor was assigned to regularly monitor 

progress on the potato component.28 (In its agreement with USDA, the 

Consortium had indicated that U.S. funds would be used to support a 

food-for-work monitor with potato experience who would oversee food-forwork projects undertaken to support the potato component.)

28The Consortium field manager did travel to one of the farms to observe the damage 

following Typhoon Olga. He said that he also tried to visit some of the other farms as well, 

but was denied access by the North Koreans on the grounds that there was too much storm 

damage to travel safely to the locations.
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With the support of North Korean officials, one of the Consortium’s 

consultants developed a monitoring form for the potatoes early in the 

program, but it was not fully used by the Consortium. The Consortium’s 

logistical consultant, who arranged the procurement and transportation of 

the Chinese potatoes and associated inputs for all of the potatoes, 

developed the form for monitoring potato production. He was in North 

Korea for a few periods between May and June 1999 and, though not a 

potato specialist, he had extensive experience in agriculture and rural 

development, including in North Korea. He worked directly with 

authorities from the Flood Damage Rehabilitation Committee and county 

agricultural offices to jointly develop and field test a simple form for 

monitoring and evaluating seed potato production at the eight different 

farms.29 According to the consultant, despite prior resistance, the Flood 

Damage Rehabilitation Committee took an enthusiastic lead in designing 

the information-gathering forms and providing the farms with instructions 

in their use.30 During the field testing of the monitoring forms, information 

was recorded for activities that had taken place during May and early June. 

However, he said, the Consortium’s subsequent consultants did not fully 

complete the monitoring form. As a result, he said, it was not known, for 

example, whether the farmers had received proper instruction in the use of 

the fungicide and pesticide. 

The Consortium did send agricultural specialists to North Korea to prepare 

mid-term harvest and postharvest assessments. They collected needed 

information on the mid-term development of the potato crops and the final 

results, as well as information and analysis relevant to the planned second 

cycle. As part of this process, the consultants held discussions with 

officials of the Ministry of Agriculture and the Academy of Agricultural 

Sciences and with farm managers at the eight cooperative farms involved in 

growing the Chinese potato seeds.

29This form was designed to record the receipt and use of Consortium supplied fertilizers 

and other inputs, document training in the safe use of pesticides and fungicides, and record 

the amount of harvested product. The forms were also designed to collect basic information 

on which crops the farmers chose for the additional fertilizer, how much fertilizer was 

applied to those crops, and with what results.

30According to the consultant, prior to the Consortium’s agreement to provide the farms with 

additional fertilizer for use on their other crops, the Flood Damage Rehabilitation 

Committee had resisted attempts to introduce monitoring and record-keeping 

arrangements. The Consortium insisted that the monitoring system be developed before the 

Consortium would approve the purchase of the additional fertilizer. 
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The Food Aid Was 

Distributed but There 

Were Planning and 

Monitoring Problems

The food-for-work component of the bilateral aid project sought to improve 

food security by providing U.S. government-donated emergency food 

assistance to North Koreans in return for their work on agricultural and 

other infrastructure projects. The Consortium estimates that the food was 

distributed to nearly 2.7 million persons in 110 of 211 North Korean 

counties and met a goal of providing at least 50 percent of the food to 

northeast provinces, which were considered the most in need of food in the 

country. The food supported work on 176 projects for improving the 

country’s agricultural infrastructure as well as for implementation of the 

seed potato project. In addition, Consortium personnel and U.S. agency 

officials believe that the food-for-work component has improved 

perceptions of Americans and the United States. Key problems that 

negatively affected the distribution of the food aid were shipping and visa 

delays and disagreement between the Consortium and the Flood Damage 

Rehabilitation Committee over how the food should be used. Some of these 

problems were associated with Consortium attempts to promote 

accountability. For example, to improve accountability, the Consortium 

redirected two shipments of commodities to the World Food Program, and 

USAID later arranged to store subsequent commodities in South Korea, 

from where they could be called forward once food distribution plans were 

in place. The terms of the project agreement and North Korean actions also 

made it difficult for the Consortium to effectively monitor the distribution 

of food aid. Consortium staff told us they were not aware of any evidence 

of diversions of food aid; however, several monitors indicated it is not 

likely they would be aware of diversions because of constraints on their 

monitoring.
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Food-for-Work Sought to 

Improve Short-term Food 

Security and North Korea’s 

Agricultural Infrastructure

The project agreement provided that the U.S. government would donate 

100,000 metric tons of emergency food aid to be used in food-for-work 

projects in North Korea. The food would be made available to workers 

participating in the projects and their families. (The project agreement did 

not specify that the targeted beneficiaries would be those workers, and 

their families, most in need of food aid.)31 The commodities would be used 

to directly support the seed potato project and to support agricultural 

infrastructure and other projects. Specific activities that might be 

supported included watershed management, irrigation construction, 

reforestation, land leveling, and building of access roads to agricultural 

areas.

Nearly 2.7 Million People 

Received Food and 176 

Projects Were Completed 

Between July 1999 and May 2000, 80,000 metric tons of yellow corn and 

20,000 metric tons of milled rice arrived in North Korean ports and were 

distributed throughout much of the country. The Consortium field team and 

the Flood Damage Rehabilitation Committee planned the distribution of 

the food aid for 176 projects in 107 of 211 counties or local districts. The 

Consortium estimated that nearly 900,000 North Koreans worked on the 

projects, and calculated that each laborer received 2 kilograms of food for 

each day worked. According to the Consortium, the projects’ duration 

rarely exceeded 60 days. Based on the assumption that each worker’s food 

was shared with two other adult family members,32 the Consortium 

estimated that nearly 2.7 million persons, or nearly 13 percent of the 

population,33 benefited from the food-for-work component of the bilateral 

assistance project.34

Figure 2 shows the distribution of the 100,000 metric tons by North Korea’s 

main administrative districts. As the figure shows, food-for-work projects 

31The Consortium was able to indirectly address this issue by securing agreement on a goal 

of locating at least half of the food-for-work projects in the northeast provinces, which are 

considered to be the areas most vulnerable to food insecurity in North Korea

32According to the Consortium, a one-third ration of rice equals about 2,400 calories and a 

one-third ration of corn equals about 2,335 calories.

33In July 1999, the CIA estimated North Korea’s population at 21.4 million people. 

34This figure may include double counting. According to the Consortium, it may have been 

possible for a worker to serve on more than one project during the year. However, the 

Consortium said, taking into account the size of counties, location of projects, and lack of 

transportation, it is unlikely that this would occur very often.
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were conducted in eight of North Korea’s nine provinces, as well as in 

Nampo City. Chagang Province, in the north central part of the country, did 

not have any projects. 
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Figure 2: Type and Number of Food-for-Work Projects, Metric Tons of Food Distributed, and Beneficiaries by North Korean 

Administrative Districts

Yanggang

Embankment: 4

Embankment/Excavation: 1

Reforestation: 3

Food: 2,605 metric tons

Beneficiaries: 68,238

South Hamgyong

Embankment: 3

Excavation: 24

Embankment/Excavation: 2

Fish Pond: 1

Reforestation: 10

Reservoir: 1

Soil Layover: 5

Food: 22,931 metric tons

Beneficiaries: 684,678

South Hwanghae

Embankment: 7

Excavation: 6

Embankment/Excavation: 1

Food: 8,678 metric tons

Beneficiaries: 217,392

South Pyongan

Embankment: 5

Excavation: 11

Embankment/Excavation: 2

Fish Pond: 1

Reforestation: 1

Food: 13,376 metric tons

Beneficiaries: 350,448

Kangwon

Potato Project: 3

Food: 2,000 metric tons

Beneficiaries: 30,042

Nampo City

Embankment: 1

Excavation: 3

Embankment/Excavation: 1

Fish Pond: 1

Food: 2,955 metric tons

Beneficiaries: 105,732

North Hamgyong

Embankment: 3

Excavation: 14

Fish Pond: 4

Reforestation: 16

Food: 24,535 metric tons

Beneficiaries: 680,268

North Hwanghae

Embankment: 7

Excavation: 5

Reforestation: 7

Soil Layover: 1

Food: 10,120 metric tons

Beneficiaries: 265,722

North Pyongan

Embankment: 11

Excavation: 6

Embankment/Excavation: 3

Reforestation: 2

Food: 12,478 metric tons

Beneficiaries: 295,071

Chagang

No Project Activity

Pyongyang City

No Project Activity

Kaesong City

No Project Activity
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Note: Administratively, North Korea is divided into nine provinces and three special cities. The latter are 

Pyongyang, Nampo, and Kaesong.

Source: GAO analysis of Consortium data.

As figure 3 shows, 24 percent of the food was distributed in North 

Hamgyong Province, 23 percent in South Hamgyong Province, and

3 percent in Yanggang Province. Thus, the goal of distributing at least 

50 percent of the food in the poorer northeastern provinces was achieved. 

Figure 4 shows that most of the projects supported by the U.S. donated 

commodities were for excavations, embankments, and reforestation. 

Figure 3: Percentage Distribution of the 100,000 Metric Tons of Food Aid by 

Administrative District, August 1999 to May 2000

Source: Consortium.

2% Kangwon

North Hamgyong

North Hwanghae

North Pyongan

3% Nampo

3% Yanggang

South Hwanghae

South Pyongan

24%

10%

13%

23%

9%

13%

South Hamgyong
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Figure 4: Percentage Distribution of the 100,000 Metric Tons of Food Aid by Type of 

Food-for-Work Project, August 1999 to May 2000

Source: Consortium.

1% Reservoir

Embankment

Embankment/Excavation

Excavation

2% Potato project support

Reforestation

23%

6%

38%

4%

23%

Fish pond

3% Soil layover
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According to Consortium staff, some of the food-for-work projects may not 

have a medium- or long-term impact on the country’s agricultural 

infrastructure and food security. As an example of a project that would 

probably have a medium-term or longer impact, one monitor referred to a 

river embankment project designed to guard against future flooding. He 

said that a project that included stonework on the walls and sod and trees 

on the top of the river bank would be more likely to hold up over time than 

a project that raised the height of the bank but did not include the other 

reinforcements. In general, Consortium staff felt most of the food-for-work 

projects would make a useful contribution provided that they received 

general maintenance.35 Consortium managers told us that the priority was 

on distributing food to hungry people and said infrastructure 

improvements could have been enhanced if additional resources for 

construction had been available, such as cement.

The project agreement did not include an objective that the Consortium 

and North Koreans interact for the purpose of improving North Korean 

perceptions of the United States and its people. However, Consortium 

managers and field personnel and U.S. officials that we spoke with believe 

this has been an important benefit of the Consortium’s work. They note 

that North Korea has been a closed society for many decades and that it 

produces considerable anti-American propaganda, much of which 

concerns the Korean War. They further pointed out that in the absence of 

direct contact with Americans, and also because they are unable to access 

Western media, North Koreans lack outside information on which to base 

their attitudes towards the United States. The food-for-work projects 

provided an opportunity for a number of North Koreans to interact with the 

American monitors. For example, during the bilateral assistance project, 

monitors crisscrossed North Korea many times, with numerous visits to all 

but one of the provinces and to one of three special cities. According to the 

Consortium, field managers dealt with up to 500 county officials in the 

course of monitoring the food-for-work projects. Monitors said this type of 

35 The Consortium’s report on its World Food Program-related food-for-work project 

activities in North Korea immediately preceding the bilateral assistance project indicated 

that it was difficult to predict whether those projects would have a lasting effect and 

contribute to the long-term rehabilitation of the agricultural infrastructure. However, the 

Consortium said that with proper planning and yearly maintenance of embankments, salt 

pans, and care of the planted trees, some counties may be able to slow down the 

deterioration of their agricultural infrastructure and help protect against damage from 

future flooding. 
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interaction was one of the most valuable parts of their experience in North 

Korea.

The food-for-work projects may also have affected attitudes toward the 

United States as a result of containers in which the food was stored. The 

U.S. food aid was transported to storage sites and distribution centers in 

bags. On the outside of the bags were written the words “A Gift From the 

People of the United States” in both Korean and English. Once empty, these 

bags were considered a useful resource and are apparently reused for other 

purposes.

Timely Implementation Was 

Affected by Shipping and 

Visa Delays and by 

Disagreements Over Use of 

the Food

The planning for and distribution of the 100,000 metric tons of food aid did 

not occur in a timely and collaborative manner. The project agreement’s 

schedule for arrival of the food in North Korea was not fully met because of 

Consortium challenges, shipping and visa delays, and serious 

disagreements between the Consortium and the Flood Damage 

Rehabilitation Committee over how the food should be used. We are not 

able to describe whether any of the delays adversely affected the food 

needs of North Korean laborers and their families, because information 

was not available on this matter. However, Consortium managers told us 

that Flood Damage Rehabilitation Committee personnel put pressure on 

the Consortium field team whenever food shipments were late. As 

discussed below, though, the Flood Damage Rehabilitation Committee was 

itself partly responsible for the lateness.

Under the project agreement, the Consortium and the Flood Damage 

Rehabilitation Committee were to (1) jointly review and approve 

food-for-work project proposals and distribution/allocation plans and 

(2) monitor distributions and adherence to work goals and standards by 

conducting site visits. Although it was not addressed in the agreement, 

county officials were to propose projects to the Flood Damage 

Rehabilitation Committee, which would then present them to the 

Consortium. Individual project agreements would then be signed and 

approved by the Flood Damage Rehabilitation Committee, the Consortium, 

and the project holder. If the terms of the project agreement were not met, 

the Flood Damage Rehabilitation Committee and the Consortium would 

agree to reallocate food to other food-for-work projects undertaken within 

the geographic scope of the program. 

Table 1 shows the planned arrival times for the food aid, based on the 

project agreement, through the end of November 1999. As the table shows, 
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actual deliveries greatly lagged behind the planned schedule. For example, 

55,000 metric tons of commodities should have been delivered by the end 

of September 1999, but only 15,000 metric tons had been actually landed by 

that time. By early November 1999, the actual schedule matched the project 

agreement plan. 

Table 1: Comparison of Scheduled and Actual Food Aid Deliveries for the Bilateral Assistance Project, May 1999 to November 

1999 

a

Language in the project agreement characterized the scheduled delivery times as “notional.” 

According to a Consortium manager, when the agreement was negotiated the parties understood that 

this term meant the dates were flexible. However, the manager said, the Flood Damage Rehabilitation 

Committee subsequently took the position that the schedule was firm. The Consortium manager 

further said that when the agreement was signed, the Flood Damage Rehabilitation Committee clearly 

understood that it was not possible for U.S. agencies to meet the scheduled delivery time for the first 

shipment of the food aid. (Under the project agreement, U.S. agencies were responsible for shipping 

the commodities.)

b

Five thousand metric tons of bagged rice arrived in North Korea, but the Consortium re-consigned the 

food to the World Food Program because visas for its monitors had not been approved. See text for 

discussion.

c

Twenty thousand metric tons of bulk corn arrived in North Korea. However, the Consortium 

re-consigned 10,000 metric tons to the World Food Program because of disagreement with the Flood 

Damage Rehabilitation Committee over the use of the food. The remaining 10,000 tons were sent on 

to another North Korean port and not unloaded until early August 1999. See text for discussion.

Source: GAO analysis of Consortium data.

Project agreement notional schedulea Actual schedule

Date Tonnage delivered Cumulative tonnage Date Tonnage delivered Cumulative tonnage

May 1999 15,000 15,000 0 0

June 1999 0 15,000 June 18, 1999 0b 0

July 1999 0 15,000 July 19, 1999 10,000c 10,000

Aug. 1999 15,000 30,000 0 10,000

Sept. 1999 25,000 55,000 Sept. 4, 1999 5,000 15,000

Oct. 1999 15,000 70,000 Oct. 8-22, 1999 40,000 55,000

Nov. 7, 1999 15,000 70,000
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The project agreement called for the first shipment of food aid to be 

delivered in May 1999 in the amount of 15,000 metric tons. The date was not 

met due to shipping and visa delays and some staffing challenges. For 

example, on June 2, 1999, the Consortium requested that the North Korean 

government approve visas for three field staff (a field manager, senior food 

monitor, and monitor) to arrive in North Korea on June 15. The request was 

made nearly 2 weeks before the monitors requested entry into North Korea 

and the expected arrival of the ship a few days later, on June 18, 1999. 

However, North Korea did not approve the Consortium’s visa requests in 

time for the staff to arrive before the first food aid shipment. The 

Consortium needed to have its staff in North Korea prior to the arrival of 

food aid shipments so that the food aid distribution could be effectively 

planned and monitored. Because the visas were not approved and also 

because there was some potential damage to part of the cargo, the 

Consortium recommended that USAID re-consign36 the first shipment to 

the World Food Program. On June 22, 1999, the Consortium requested visas 

for six additional monitors. This request was made 3 weeks before the 

monitors’ scheduled entry. On July 2, the North Korean government 

advised the Consortium it was denying two visas on the grounds that the 

persons were not Americans. The Consortium was disappointed because it 

believed it had recruited a technically superior team and, during some of its 

previous work in North Korea, the Consortium had been allowed to include 

non-Americans on its food-monitoring staff. North Korea’s visa denials also 

meant additional time would be needed to find replacement staff (the 

Consortium told us that it had some difficulty in recruiting qualified 

personnel to implement the bilateral assistance project).37

When the Consortium’s advance team arrived in North Korea in mid-July 

1999 and began discussions on how the food aid would be distributed, 

additional delays resulted. Disagreement arose when the Flood Damage 

Rehabilitation Committee insisted all of the food should be used to support 

36According to the Consortium, re-consignment meant the transfer of legal title of the food 

to the World Food Program.

37The project agreement specified that the Consortium was supposed to request visas 

4 weeks in advance of the desired arrival dates. The Consortium’s June 2,1999, and 

June 22,1999, visa requests were made only 2 to 3 weeks in advance. However, according to 

a Consortium manager, when the project agreement was negotiated, Flood Damage 

Rehabilitation Committee officials understood that occasions would arise when the 

Consortium would need approvals on shorter notice. Moreover, the manager said, there had 

been occasions when the North Korean government approved visas with as little as a few 

days’ notice.
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agricultural activities related to potato production throughout the country, 

including weeding, fertilizer application, and harvesting. The Consortium 

considered this demand a serious problem, since the project agreement, in 

its view, indicated that only 2,000 metric tons of the commodities would be 

used to support the potato component of the bilateral assistance project. 

The balance was to be used for agricultural infrastructure projects. The 

Consortium was also concerned because the Flood Damage Rehabilitation 

Committee advised that unless the Consortium was ready to compromise, 

severe political consequences would result, and the monitors would be 

required to leave the country.

Consortium managers concluded that accepting the Flood Damage 

Rehabilitation Committee’s demand would erode the credibility of the 

food-for-work program. The second shipment of food (20,000 metric tons of 

corn) was expected to arrive shortly, so the Consortium re-consigned 

10,000 tons of the corn to the World Food Program’s operations in North 

Korea.38 After that corn was unloaded, the ship left for another North 

Korean port. On July 26, 1999, with the food distribution issue still 

unresolved, the Consortium chairman requested that the Flood Damage 

Rehabilitation Committee provide a proposed distribution plan to enable 

joint review, assessment, and approval prior to offloading the remaining 

10,000 metric tons of food. Without a plan, the chairman said, it would 

again be necessary to re-consign the food to the World Food Program.

The issue was resolved on July 28, 1999, when the Flood Damage 

Rehabilitation Committee provided the Consortium with a proposed food 

distribution plan for the 10,000 metric tons of commodities. The plan called 

for only 2,000 metric tons of the commodities to be used to support the 

seed potato component of the bilateral assistance project, as had been the 

Consortium’s understanding. The remaining 8,000 metric tons would be 

used to support agricultural infrastructure programs. The Flood Damage 

Rehabilitation Committee dropped its demand that additional amounts of 

the food be used to support potato production or seed protection activities. 

Consortium managers noted that food-for-work project proposals 

originated with local county officials, who then provided the proposals to 

the Flood Damage Rehabilitation Committee. The committee and the 

Consortium monitors would then evaluate the proposals. According to the 

38This and the earlier re-consigned commodities were repaid in full by the World Food 

Program when the team was able to assess and approve projects for initial distribution.
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Consortium managers, the Consortium could have been more effective in 

identifying North Korean needs and designing food-for-work projects if the 

Consortium had been allowed to work directly with local county officials 

when proposals were being developed. The Consortium had hoped that this 

kind of arrangement would have evolved during the course of the project. 

However, according to Consortium managers, central government officials 

did not facilitate this relationship.

Effective Monitoring Was 

Constrained

Effective monitoring was constrained by some of the terms of the project 

agreement,39 the project’s large scale, and by the Flood Damage 

Rehabilitation Committee’s unwillingness to actively support the 

monitoring process, according to the Consortium.40 According to the 

Consortium, the committee violated agreed upon procedures for planning 

the distribution of a September 1999 shipment of 5,000 metric tons of rice. 

Field managers and monitors were not aware of any evidence of actual 

diversions of food, but the issue remains in doubt because of constraints on 

the Consortium. Other international organizations and humanitarian 

agencies have experienced serious problems in monitoring assistance 

programs, and several nongovernmental organizations have withdrawn 

from North Korea. 

39Visits to the project sites were to be jointly planned and agreed upon 1 week in advance by 

the Flood Damage Rehabilitation Committee and Consortium. The Consortium might visit 

any project site as often as necessary for assessment and monitoring purposes. While 

accompanied by Flood Damage Rehabilitation Committee and local officials, the 

Consortium would be granted the possibility of on-the-spot visits to project sites, all related 

project areas, food distributions, local leaders and citizens and officials involved in the 

project. In case of doubt concerning the condition of the U.S. government donated 

commodities and their fitness for eventual consumption, the Flood Damage Rehabilitation 

Committee would consult with Consortium staff before taking any specific decision on the 

future use of such commodities.

40Consortium managers said that they had tried to maintain a high level of transparency 

regarding the issues that challenged the project, including briefings provided to U.S. 

agencies and congressional staff. 
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Some terms of the project agreement compromised the Consortium’s 

ability to adequately monitor and assure that the agreement was being 

properly implemented.41 For example, the agreement provided that the 

Consortium might visit any project site as often as necessary for 

assessment and monitoring purposes. However, it also stipulated that such 

visits would be agreed upon 1 week in advance by both the Consortium and 

its counterparts. Moreover, according to the agreement, Consortium 

monitors were not authorized to travel independently to any project site, 

food distribution center, or warehouse that held the U.S. 

government-donated commodities.42 (A USAID official described this as 

standard language for monitoring agreements in North Korea and said that 

similar conditions are imposed on the World Food Program.) Importantly, 

whether a visit to a site was necessary depended not only on the 

Consortium’s judgment, but also on Flood Damage Rehabilitation 

Committee agreement as well. 

The project agreement said that the Consortium would be granted the 

“possibility” of “on-the-spot” visits to project sites, all project-related areas, 

food distributions, local leaders, and citizens and officials involved in the 

project while accompanied by Flood Damage Rehabilitation Committee 

and local officials. A Consortium manager told us that during project visits, 

Consortium monitors were granted on-the-spot visits to the projects, 

distribution centers, project participants, and sometimes a laborer’s home. 

There were instances when Consortium requests were rejected by the 

Flood Damage Rehabilitation Committee or county officials, but often their 

requests were granted, according to the manager. According to a senior 

USAID official, the on-the-spot visits represented a new approach to 

monitoring negotiated by the Consortium and a measured step toward 

improved access. According to the Consortium, its ability to monitor the 

food-for-work projects was also enhanced by the recruitment of two 

monitors who were fluent Korean-language speakers.

41Under the project agreement, the Flood Damage Rehabilitation Committee was 

responsible for storing the food, keeping it separate from other food sources, preventing the 

unauthorized use of the food commodities, and ensuring that the commodities were 

distributed exclusively to workers engaged in the food-for-work activities. The agreement 

also provided that records at each warehouse would document the receipt, storage location, 

and distribution by shipment of all commodities. Such records would be made available for 

review by the Flood Damage Rehabilitation Committee and the Consortium. 

42The monitors were always accompanied by North Korean counterparts and usually had to 

rely on North Korean interpreters when speaking to persons in the food distribution chain 

or reviewing records.
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Without random and independent access, monitors had less assurance that 

work was being done as required and that all of the food was going to 

intended beneficiaries. This problem was accentuated by the large number 

of food-for-work projects (176) relative to the amount of food distributed 

(100,000 metric tons), the number of Consortium monitors (4 to 7), and the 

dispersal of project sites across much of North Korea (107 counties). As a 

result, monitors were not able to make frequent visits to each project site 

and associated food distribution centers. Consortium managers told us that 

monitors tried to visit each project three times: once for assessment and 

approval; once to monitor work in progress; and once to verify completion 

of the project. According to a Consortium manager, through April 25, 2000, 

the monitors averaged 2.7 visits per project. Consortium managers said that 

monitors frequently performed multiple activities during visits. For 

example, a monitor might visit the project site, interview a worker, go to a 

public distribution center where the food was distributed, observe a 

distribution if it occurred on the same day of the visit, and interview a 

project participant as he or she left the center. Monitors’ visits to project 

sites where work was underway or to food distribution centers where food 

was distributed lasted between 15 minutes to an hour because of their 

workload. 

Consortium managers said that to compensate for the lack of random 

access in North Korea, their monitoring activities exceeded those in other 

countries with food-for-work programs. They said that they continued to 

strive for higher standards of accountability in North Korea, including more 

frequent visits to project sites, warehouses, distributions, and project 

participants. In addition, they said that if they had had more staff and 

vehicles, they could have conducted more monitoring visits. Alternatively, 

they said, if the North Korean government had provided improved access, 

they could have developed a program based upon random visits that would 

have required fewer staff and resources and achieved a higher standard of 

technical assistance. 
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According to the Consortium, Flood Damage Rehabilitation Committee 

senior managers generally did not work in a collaborative way to facilitate 

the Consortium’s monitoring activities. For example, the Consortium said 

its relationship with managers had not become collaborative and was 

cooperative on only the most superficial level. The Consortium said 

monitors made trips to counties needlessly because the Flood Damage 

Rehabilitation Committee had not taken the time to find out if the project 

had been suspended or if they had no food to distribute. In addition, the 

Consortium said, the Flood Damage Rehabilitation Committee acted as 

though North Korea was entitled to the food.43 Consortium managers 

further emphasized that North Korea was a particularly challenging place 

for Consortium staff to work. For example, the government imposed 

additional restrictions on the staff’s activities. These included being 

required to live in segregated housing,44 apart from the community of other 

international aid workers, and generally requiring that the Consortium staff 

be accompanied at all times when leaving their residence.

43According to a document we reviewed, during September 1999 negotiations between the 

Consortium and Flood Damage Rehabilitation Committee concerning the planned second 

phase of the potato project, a Flood Damage Rehabilitation Committee official said U.S. 

support of the bilateral assistance project was viewed by North Korea as an “admission fee” 

for the United States to visit suspect North Korean nuclear sites.

44From July to December 1999, Consortium staff were housed in a government-run hotel in 

Pyongyang. From March to May 2000, they were housed in a government-run guest house 

outside of Pyongyang. 
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The Flood Damage Rehabilitation Committee violated agreed upon 

procedures for planning the distribution of a September 1999 shipment of 

5,000 metric tons of rice, according to the Consortium. The bulk of the rice 

was distributed without Consortium approval of the distribution plan, and 

about 296 metric tons of the rice were reportedly destroyed without 

Consortium verification.45 The Consortium chairman advised the Flood 

Damage Rehabilitation Committee that failure to uphold the agreed 

procedures was a serious breach of the project agreement. In replying, the 

Flood Damage Rehabilitation Committee said that the Consortium field 

manager’s refusal to sign the Flood Damage Rehabilitation Committee 

distribution plan for the rice was contradictory to the spirit of the political 

agreement between the United States and North Korea and the 

humanitarian nature of the project agreement. The Flood Damage 

Rehabilitation Committee said that the field manager, who had since left 

North Korea on scheduled leave, could not return. In October 1999, the 

Consortium chairman and its program coordinator traveled to North Korea 

to discuss the problem. State and USAID officials also visited North Korea 

at this time to review progress with U.S.-supported food aid programs, 

among other things. Because the Consortium and U.S. agencies continued 

to have concerns about assuring effective monitoring of the bilateral 

project’s food aid, USAID decided that the remaining shipments of the 

bilateral food aid to North Korea would be shipped to Pusan, South Korea, 

and held there until the Consortium and the Flood Damage Rehabilitation 

Committee had reached agreement on distribution plans for the food.46 A 

USAID and a State Department official advised the North Korean 

government of the decision. The added cost to the U.S. government of 

transshipping the food through Pusan was about $2.3 million.

Field managers and food monitors we spoke with said that they were not 

aware of any evidence of actual diversions of food aid, including diversions 

to the military and Communist party elite. However, several monitors said 

45Although not allowed to approve the distribution plan, Consortium staff were able to 

conduct monitoring visits to the participating projects.

46USAID told us that it is not uncommon for nongovernmental organizations that deliver U.S. 

food aid to face numerous monitoring and logistical challenges and personal safety 

constraints in delivering food. As examples of other countries and regions where problems 

have recently occurred, they cited the Balkans, Sierra Leone, and Sudan. We note, however, 

that the beneficiaries in each of these cases are mobile refugee populations in war- and civil 

strife-afflicted regions, unlike North Korea where there is neither war or civil strife but 

instead a strong central government, with food aid distributed through a state-controlled 

food distribution system, and where there are no mobile refugee populations. 
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that given constraints on their ability to monitor, it is not likely that they 

would be aware of diversions if the diversions were in fact occurring. 

According to a Consortium manager, it is difficult for any one in the 

Consortium to determine to what extent there may have been any food 

diversions. Based on his experience as a manager, he feels that significant 

diversions have not occurred. However, he said, without random access, 

the whole matter is called into question. Some monitors said that they 

believed the number of workers on the projects was inflated and that local 

officials were diverting food to other needy people in their counties. Some 

monitors said that they thought that one could conclude that worker 

numbers were not inflated if the monitoring showed the work had been 

completed. In addition, they said that they believed that there was 

sufficient observation of the food distributions to reasonably assume that 

the food went to the intended beneficiaries. Some of the monitors said they 

could not be sure one way or the other on these issues because of the 

constraints on the monitoring.

Other international organizations and humanitarian agencies have 

experienced serious monitoring problems operating in North Korea, and 

several nongovernmental organizations have withdrawn from the country 

because of accountability related issues. On December 11, 1999, a 

consensus statement was issued by 5 United Nations agencies and 16 other 

donor agencies and nongovernmental organizations in which they 

expressed concern about restrictive conditions in North Korea, noting that 

such conditions hindered the promotion of humanitarian principles and 

verification of humanitarian assistance. Organizations that have withdrawn 

include Medicins Sans Frontieres (MSF, Doctors Without Borders), Oxfam, 

and Action Against Hunger. In addition, one of the key Consortium 

members, CARE, announced that it will withdraw from the Consortium on 

June 30, 2000. (See app. II for additional information on the programs these 

organizations undertook and their reasons for withdrawing from North 

Korea.)

In commenting on a draft of this report, a USAID official said that the 

agency is confident that U.S. food aid is reaching intended beneficiaries 

and convinced that U.S. food aid has made a major difference in reducing 

malnutrition and saving lives. The official said evidence of this is from 

many monitoring visits by both the Consortium and the World Food 

Program. According to the official, although USAID’s knowledge of North 

Korea is less than perfect, it has no evidence of significant diversions of 

U.S. food aid. At the same time, he acknowledged that there have been 

serious concerns about food aid monitoring and general conditions for 
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program operations in North Korea, including on the part of the U.S. 

government. He said these concerns have been conveyed to the North 

Korean government many times, which has made some progress in 

addressing them. While also noting that some organizations have chosen to 

withdraw from North Korea, he said USAID believes it is important to point 

out that others have chosen to stay the course, feeling the continued 

provision of humanitarian assistance is important and to work for 

improved conditions.

Administration Has No 

Plans for Future 

Bilateral Assistance

The administration does not currently have plans for providing additional 

bilateral emergency assistance to North Korea. A senior USAID official told 

us that the bilateral assistance project seemed to demonstrate that the 

North Korean government was not yet ready to engage in a way that would 

support success. State, USAID, and USDA officials acknowledged the 

Consortium’s efforts to implement the project. In addition, USAID and 

USDA officials were critical of how it managed the project. The 

administration considers the first bilateral assistance project to have been 

a worthwhile experiment, but continues to favor the United Nations World 

Food Program as the primary vehicle for distributing U.S. food donations to 

North Korea. Regarding bilateral development assistance, the 

administration generally cannot provide such aid as long as North Korea is 

on the government’s list of terrorist nations. According to State Department 

officials, if North Korea were to take actions that resulted in its being 

removed from the list, the provision of bilateral development assistance 

would nevertheless remain uncertain. A specific policy regarding under 

what conditions the administration would consider providing such 

assistance has not yet been developed. 
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North Korea’s Lack of 

Cooperation

USAID, State, and USDA officials were critical of North Korea’s lack of 

cooperation during the negotiation and implementation of the bilateral 

assistance project agreement. According to USAID, North Korean officials 

were responsible for the large majority of the problems encountered during 

the project. A USAID official reported being told by a North Korean official, 

in October 1999, that North Korea was not interested in potatoes or the 

Consortium; the North Korean official reportedly said “just give us the 

food, you take the Consortium.” Similarly, a State official told us that the 

North Korean attitude during the project had been one of “just give us 

money or food, we don’t want your projects or your people.” According to 

another State official, North Korean officials wanted to lay down as many 

barriers to food monitoring as possible.47 According to a USDA official, the 

North Korean government had been confrontational at every step along the 

way of the project. Another USDA official noted that in North Korea the 

Consortium was forced to work with central government officials intent on 

maintaining an adversarial relationship.

In commenting on a draft of this report, a USAID official said that the 

project seemed to demonstrate that the North Korean government was not 

yet ready to engage in a way that would support success. That result is 

useful in its own right, the official said, and suggests we would need to 

articulate our expectations and commitments much more clearly if we 

were ever to consider something similar again.

The Consortium may also have been hampered by North Korea’s 

governmental structure. A senior State official told us that the structure is 

“stovepiped,” with separate agencies having their own communication 

channels to North Korea’s chief of state, Kim Jong-il. Given this 

arrangement, the official said, North Korean agencies may transmit to and 

receive back from the leadership conflicting information. Thus, the 

Ministry of Agriculture’s understanding of the bilateral project may have 

differed from the Flood Damage Rehabilitation Committee’s understanding. 

The State official also told us that the Consortium’s work with North 

Korean officials had been particularly frustrating, since the Consortium 

had to deal with lower-level officials in a North Korean bureaucracy that 

has strong competing interests.

47He attributed this in part to their being very suspicious of Americans.
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U.S. Officials Acknowledged 

the Consortium’s Efforts, 

but Were Critical of Its 

Management

Agency officials were pleased that the Consortium undertook the potato 

component of the project, and they appreciated the Consortium’s efforts to 

get the potatoes to North Korea in time. According to a State and a USAID 

official, the State Department initially encouraged the Consortium to 

undertake the potato component of the bilateral assistance project because 

it appeared to have a developmental component. In addition, the State 

Department was interested in providing the 100,000 metric tons of food aid 

bilaterally to see whether doing so might help improve relations with North 

Korea. (All previous U.S. food assistance to North Korea had been 

channeled through the World Food Program.) USAID officials told us that 

they believe the potato project was a worthwhile experiment, and they 

commended the Consortium for working hard and doing an impressive job 

in procuring and transporting the seed potatoes to North Korea. In their 

view, if the potato crops had not been damaged by the typhoon, yields 

would have been good, and the project would have been viewed favorably. 

USAID also noted that the bilateral project was not typical in the sense that 

U.S. government representatives were not present in-country to assist 

when problems arose with North Korean officials.

However, agency officials expressed concerns about the Consortium’s 

management. A USDA official told us that some of the problems faced by 

the Consortium were common to agricultural development projects, but 

that the Consortium had not communicated well among its members. One 

USAID official criticized the Consortium for having a bureaucratic and 

weak management framework and for lacking a strategy for operating in 

North Korea. For example, monitors did not know when it was appropriate 

to take a stand on issues when dealing with North Korean officials. As a 

result, the official said, the Consortium conveyed a lack of seriousness to 

North Korean officials. The official also criticized the Consortium for 

failing to have a technically qualified person present in North Korea when 

the U.S. seed potatoes arrived. Nonetheless, a senior USAID official said 

that the Consortium put forth an exceptional effort to make the project 

succeed and that many of the Consortium’s problems were the result of 

North Korean unwillingness to support the program as anticipated. The 

official said USAID would seek a role for the Consortium in any future U.S. 

assistance. 

Many Consortium personnel that we spoke with acknowledged 

weaknesses in the Consortium’s management of the bilateral assistance 

program. For example, the Consortium’s program coordinator in the United 

States told us that board members had different views on the Consortium’s 

priorities in North Korea. In the field, he said, the field manager was the 
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nominal leader. However, since monitors were hired and paid by individual 

Consortium members, the field manager’s authority was diminished. The 

most recent field leader told us that the project was managed by a 

committee in the United States and that this structure was unwieldy. In his 

view, one person needed to be in charge in the United States and available 

to quickly address field problems that needed a fast response. Some of the 

Consortium monitors also told us that they lacked sufficient guidance on 

how to conduct the monitoring. (Consortium managers told us that 

because they could not obtain visas for field staff for the duration of the 

project, they were limited in their ability to develop and draw upon 

institutional memory, for example, in training new monitors.) According to 

the Consortium’s first senior monitor, some monitors felt that as long as the 

work was done on food-for-work projects, it did not matter if the worker 

counts were accurate or not, while other monitors felt the actual number of 

workers should conform to the project’s original proposal. We believe this 

is an example of the need for Consortium management to provide better 

guidance to its monitors.

Consortium managers told us that their routine project assessment 

procedure included checks on the engineering viability of the proposed 

food-for-work projects. However, a Consortium manager also told us that, 

contrary to their grant agreement with USDA for the commodities received, 

they were not able to recruit a civil engineer to serve on their monitoring 

staff. A monitor told us his ability to assess proposed food-for-work 

projects was limited by a lack of engineering guidance. 

Administration Currently 

Favors the World Food 

Program for Channeling 

U.S. Food Aid

Agency officials told us that the first bilateral assistance project was an 

experiment, and that the administration currently has no plans for 

additional bilateral food assistance. A State Department official told us that 

the project was worth doing, but could not be called an unqualified 

success.48 In March 2000, a senior State Department official told the Senate 

Foreign Relations Committee, Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific 

Affairs, that the United States is not interested in replacing U.S. food aid 

commitments to the World Food Program with a bilateral assistance 

program. The official testified that the fundamental provision of food 

should be through the World Food Program. According to the official, 

48On a more positive note, the official said State believes the attitudes of North Korean 

officials were positively affected by the nongovernmental, Consortium staff who worked in 

North Korea.
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although World Food Program monitoring is not perfect, the program can 

monitor the provision of food, and few countries have that capacity on a 

bilateral basis. Although State is not interested in replacing its food aid 

commitments to the World Food Program with a bilateral assistance 

program, an official in State’s Office of Korea Affairs said State would 

consider the possibility of another bilateral project for North Korea if it 

appeared the proposed project would work. 

According to a USAID official’s assessment in fall 1999, the World Food 

Program was much better suited to manage and deliver food aid than the 

Consortium. He recommended that the government put the bilateral 

program on the shelf until stronger relations develop between the United 

States and North Korea. More recently, a USAID official told us that the 

World Food Program has several advantages over a bilateral program: 

(1) more equipment, systems, and monitors; (2) many of the program’s 

people have been there for longer periods of time and some are stationed in 

field offices; and (3) clear and consistent leadership in-country, based on a 

formal, multilateral relationship with the North Korean government. 

Although administration officials believe the World Food Program is better 

positioned than the Consortium to monitor the distribution of food aid, our 

1999 review of the World Food Program procedures for monitoring and 

reporting on U.S. government-donated food aid provided to North Korea 

found that the program is limited in its ability to provide independent 

assurance that the food aid is reaching targeted beneficiaries.49

Providing Bilateral 

Development Assistance to 

North Korea Would Require 

Progress on Other Issues

Under current law, North Korea generally is not eligible to receive bilateral 

development assistance because it is on the State Department’s list of 

terrorist nations. According to a State official, if North Korea were to take 

actions that resulted in its being removed from the list, the provision of 

bilateral development assistance would still remain uncertain. A specific 

policy regarding the conditions under which the administration would 

consider providing such assistance has not yet been developed. Such a 

policy might be linked to strategic and economic issues. For example, as 

previously discussed, the administration’s overall approach to North Korea 

has been dominated by broad security issues whereby the United States 

and its South Korean and Japanese allies continue to seek demonstrations 

of North Korea’s willingness to forgo nuclear weapons and long-range 

49Foreign Assistance: North Korea Restricts Food Aid Monitoring (GAO/NSIAD-00-35, Oct. 8, 

1999).
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missile programs. In addition, a senior USAID official told us that it would 

be unwise to provide development assistance to North Korea unless it 

reformed its economy. At the same time, State told us that no plans are 

being made for bilateral development assistance for the coming year.

Conclusions We believe the bilateral aid project offers a number of lessons learned for 

similar projects that the United States might consider for North Korea in 

the future. For example, the United States may have been premature in 

encouraging implementation of the potato component of the project. 

Prospects for the project’s success were reduced from the start. The State 

Department’s late invitation to the Consortium and the North Korean 

government’s subsequent redirection of the planting of the Chinese 

potatoes to areas less than ideal for seed potatoes pushed the potato 

harvest late into the region’s warm, rainy season. Even if the

Consortium-donated potatoes had not been destroyed by the typhoon, the 

late start and less than ideal location meant that seasonal rains and heat 

could have seriously affected the harvest yield and quality. Because the 

Consortium was not able to staff a full-time agricultural specialist incountry, it was limited in its ability to interact with the Ministry of 

Agriculture and the Academy of Agricultural Sciences. In addition, the 

Consortium lacked a qualified expert to challenge the North Korean 

conclusion that one-third of the American seed potatoes were damaged or 

diseased and, hence, had to be destroyed. 

The food-for-work component was adversely affected by North Korean 

actions that obstructed project management. The Consortium was not 

allowed to field a team in a timely manner, and the original Consortium 

field manager was not permitted to return to North Korea. Management 

and monitor continuity are important to effective distribution planning and 

monitoring of food aid. North Korean restrictions on the Consortium’s 

access to local county officials limited the team’s ability to respond more 

effectively to the emergency food aid and agricultural infrastructure needs 

of participating counties. Constraints on the Consortium’s monitoring of 

food aid distributions have raised questions about whether the food aid is 

reaching all of the intended beneficiaries. 

U.S. agency officials and Consortium management both report finding the 

Consortium management structure cumbersome, and both claim this was a 

constraint on the Consortium’s ability to implement the project effectively. 

For example, timely communication and decisionmaking amongst board 
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and management team members and guidance to monitors hired by these 

different organizations were seen as weak.

Recommendations The Department of State told us that no plans are currently being made for 

bilateral development assistance for the coming year. However, if State, 

USAID, and USDA decide to support another bilateral aid project designed 

to provide seed potatoes to North Korea, the Secretary of State, the USAID 

Administrator, and the Secretary of Agriculture should take steps to ensure 

that the project is started in a timely manner, the potatoes are planted in 

suitable locations, and that a potato specialist is available throughout the 

duration of the project to ensure effective monitoring and interaction with 

North Korea’s Ministry of Agriculture and Academy of Agricultural 

Sciences.

If the Department of State and USAID decide to approve another bilateral 

food-for-work program where the Consortium is responsible for 

implementing the program, the Secretary of State and the USAID 

Administrator should undertake efforts to secure improved cooperation 

from the North Korean government. More specifically, in negotiating future 

agreements with North Korea, they should seek agreement that

• the Consortium’s field manager and monitors will be provided visas for 

the duration of the program, 

• food aid shipments will not be landed in North Korea until the 

Consortium food aid monitors have arrived in-country and had time to 

conduct assessments and approve projects that will receive the food aid, 

• the Consortium personnel have greater access to local government 

officials for the purpose of cooperatively identifying and developing 

project proposals based on local needs and conditions, and

• the team is guaranteed access to project sites and associated food 

distribution centers on short-notice and provided schedules for 

distributing the food-for-work food aid.

In addition, the Secretary of State, the USAID Administrator, and the 

Secretary of Agriculture should assess the Consortium’s proposed 

management to determine whether it is adequate to the demands of 

implementing projects in North Korea. For example, a clear line of 

authority should be established between the project management in the 

United States and the team in the field and clear guidance provided to 

monitors on how to perform their role. 
B-285415

Page 49 GAO/NSIAD-00-175 Foreign Assistance

Agency Comments and 

Our Evaluation

We received written comments on a draft of this report from USAID (see 

app. III) and oral comments from State’s Deputy Director of the Office of 

Korean Affairs and from USDA’s Deputy Administrator for Export Credits. 

The agencies also provided technical comments, which we incorporated in 

the report as appropriate. We also obtained comments from Consortium 

representatives on the factual accuracy of those parts of the body of the 

report that are based on Consortium information, and we incorporated 

changes as appropriate. 

USAID said it generally accepted the findings of the report, agreed that our 

recommendations would result in improved monitoring and would seek to 

implement those recommendations if the administration considers a 

bilateral program in the future. USAID also provided general comments 

concerning U.S. food aid, the potato project, and Consortium efforts. 

USAID said it is confident that U.S. food aid is reaching intended 

beneficiaries, convinced that the aid has made a major difference in 

reducing malnutrition and saving lives in North Korea, and has no evidence 

of significant diversions of U.S. food aid. USAID believes the potato project 

was a worthwhile experiment and that with better weather the results 

would likely have been satisfactory. In addition, USAID said the project 

seemed to demonstrate that the North Korean government was not yet 

ready to engage in a way that would support success. Finally, USAID said it 

believes the Consortium put forth an exceptional effort to make the 

bilateral project succeed. USAID recognized that the Consortium had 

management problems and could have done better, but also believes that 

many of the Consortium’s problems were the result of North Korean 

unwillingness to support the program as expected. USAID said that it 

would seek a role for the Consortium in any future U.S. assistance to North 

Korea. 

State said that it did not object to our conclusions and recommendations.

USDA said they found our report to be reasonable and contained nothing 

unexpected given the difficult work environment in North Korea. USDA 

said that if another bilateral assistance project is done with North Korea, it 

hopes the project would reflect the recommendations in our report. In 

addition, USDA said it generally shared USAID’s views on our report.

As arranged with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents 

earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days after its 
B-285415

Page 50 GAO/NSIAD-00-175 Foreign Assistance

issue date. At that time we will send copies to interested congressional 

committees and the Honorable Madeline K. Albright, Secretary of State; the 

Honorable Dan Glickman, Secretary of Agriculture; and the Honorable J. 

Brady Anderson, Administrator of USAID. Copies will also be made 

available to others upon request.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me 

on (202) 512-4128. Other GAO contacts and staff acknowledgments are 

listed in appendix IV.

Susan S. Westin, Associate Director

International Affairs and Trade
Page 51 GAO/NSIAD-00-175 Foreign Assistance
Page 52 GAO/NSIAD-00-175 Foreign Assistance

Appendix I

Scope and Methodology ApendxiI

We obtained the information on the bilateral assistance project from the 

Consortium’s U.S.-based management, field management, and food aid 

monitors and from U.S. government officials in the Departments of 

Agriculture (USDA) and State and in the U.S. Agency for International 

Development (USAID). We interviewed the Consortium’s U.S.-based 

management and Consortium field managers, Consortium-contracted 

agricultural consultants, and most of the food aid monitors who have 

participated in the bilateral project. In addition, to put the Consortium’s 

experience with the bilateral project into context, we also interviewed 

several field managers and monitors employed by the Consortium in 

previous phases of its work in North Korea. We relied heavily on 

Consortium reports, documents, assessments, and data; the Consortium 

provided considerable information in response to our requests. Finally, 

early in our review we met in Washington, D.C., with the Consortium’s 

board of directors. We did not verify the accuracy of data provided by the 

Consortium and U.S. government agencies.

Fieldwork in North Korea was an integral part of the planned scope of the 

assignment. However, we were not able to obtain visas to conduct the 

overseas work. As a result, we were not able to secure the views of North 

Korean officials who participated in the negotiation and implementation of 

this bilateral project. We had planned on speaking with appropriate 

officials and other persons in the North Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 

the Ministry of Agriculture, the Flood Damage Rehabilitation Committee, 

the Academy for Agricultural Sciences, county governments, and 

participating county farms as well as with food-for-work project 

participants. In addition, we had planned on observing firsthand 

Consortium monitoring of select food-for-work projects. Though not able 

to travel to North Korea, we interviewed Consortium field managers and 

monitors, usually by phone.

Our efforts to secure visas for travel to North Korea included the following 

actions. We first applied to the North Korean government for visas on 

January 24, 2000. This visa request has still neither been approved nor 

denied. The Assistant Comptroller General for National Security and 

International Affairs sent two letters and held four separate phone 

discussions with North Korean officials over a period of 4 months 

concerning our visa requests. In addition, our requests received several 

congressional and executive branch endorsements. The Chairman and 

Ranking Minority Member of the House International Relations Committee 

co-authored and sent a visa request endorsement letter in February 2000, 

and Representative Tony Hall sent North Korean officials a visa request 
Appendix I

Scope and Methodology

Page 53 GAO/NSIAD-00-175 Foreign Assistance

endorsement letter in January 2000. Senior officials of the State 

Department’s Office of Korean Affairs told us that they discussed our 

request with North Korean counterparts over the phone in February 2000 

and April 2000 and in person during high-level bilateral negotiations in New 

York in March 2000.

To determine the objectives, accomplishments, key factors affecting 

performance, and monitoring effectiveness of the potato component of the 

bilateral aid project, we reviewed the project agreement, the Consortium’s 

commodity transfer agreements with USAID and USDA, and the 

Consortium’s potato project reports, and field staff correspondence with 

U.S.-based management. We interviewed Consortium-contracted logistical 

and agricultural consultants, interviewed the Consortium board, and 

frequently consulted with Consortium project managers. We also obtained 

the views of American potato scientists, the Colorado state potato 

inspection service official who inspected the American potatoes sent to 

North Korea, the Colorado farmer who grew the potatoes, and an 

operations representative present on the contracted flight that airlifted the 

American potatoes to North Korea. We also obtained the views of State, 

USAID, USDA, and intelligence officials.

To determine the objectives, accomplishments, key factors affecting 

performance, and monitoring effectiveness of the food-for-work 

component, we reviewed the project agreement, the Consortium’s 

commodity transfer agreements with USAID and USDA, and the 

Consortium’s food-for-work project reports, field staff reports to U.S.-based 

management, and food-for-work project data provided by the Consortium. 

We interviewed the Consortium board and frequently consulted with the 

Consortium’s U.S.-based project managers. We interviewed the Consortium 

field managers of the first half of the bilateral project, including the field 

manager and the senior food monitor. Because the North Korean 

government did not grant us visas, we conducted telephone interviews with 

the Consortium field managers and monitors working in North Korea while 

they were on scheduled leave in Beijing, China, in mid-April 2000. We also 

interviewed field managers and monitors who worked in North Korea 

during the July to December 1999 period but not during March to May 2000. 

All together, we interviewed all but one of the bilateral project’s food 

monitoring staff. We also obtained the views of State, USAID, USDA, and 

intelligence officials. 

To determine the administration’s views on the bilateral assistance project 

and its plans for additional bilateral assistance to North Korea, we 
Appendix I

Scope and Methodology

Page 54 GAO/NSIAD-00-175 Foreign Assistance

interviewed State, USAID, and USDA officials and reviewed recent 

Executive Branch testimony before Congress. 

We did our work from October 1999 through June 2000 in accordance with 

generally accepted government auditing standards.
Page 55 GAO/NSIAD-00-175 Foreign Assistance

Appendix II

Accountability Related Problems Raised by 

International Agencies and Nongovernmental 

Organizations ApendxiI

In September 1998, Medicins Sans Frontieres (MSF, Doctors Without 

Borders) ended its nutritional programs and withdrew from North Korea. 

According to a Medicines Sans Frontieres report, the organization left 

North Korea because (1) North Korean authorities prevented it from 

evaluating the impact of its assistance, (2) many hospitals inflated their 

registers with “fake malnourished” children, and (3) the central 

government attempted to cover up or deny the existence of the most 

malnourished children and denied Medicins Sans Frontieres access to 

them.

In the latter part of 1999, Oxfam of the United Kingdom decided to 

discontinue an assistance program for establishing a safe and adequate 

water supply in five cities, including the capital, Pyongyang. According to 

an Oxfam representative, Oxfam withdrew in spite of its belief that the 

public health situation remained very serious. Oxfam told us that it did so 

because North Korea had been extremely restrictive in setting the terms on 

which the organization could operate in the country (e.g., minimum staff), 

failed to honor the terms of a project agreement that affected the scope of 

the program and the way in which Oxfam could work, limited Oxfam’s 

access for assessment and monitoring, and was unwilling to sufficiently 

encourage the spread of good practices. The Oxfam representative noted 

that relevant technical staff in the ministries had welcomed Oxfam’s efforts 

to promote the spread of good health practices, but their political leaders 

had not acknowledged these efforts as significant or welcome. The latter 

judged Oxfam simply by the monetary value of its material inputs. The 

Oxfam representative further noted that a failure of humanitarian agencies 

and organizations to insist on minimum standards had direct implications 

for program effectiveness and undermined the efforts of those who were 

seeking to meet such standards.
Appendix II

Accountability Related Problems Raised by 

International Agencies and 

Nongovernmental Organizations

Page 56 GAO/NSIAD-00-175 Foreign Assistance

On December 11, 1999, a consensus statement was issued by 5 United 

Nations agencies and 16 other donor agencies and nongovernmental 

organizations in which they expressed concern about restrictive conditions 

in North Korea, noting that such conditions hindered the promotion of 

humanitarian principles and verification of humanitarian assistance. They 

declared their regret over Oxfam’s decision to withdraw from the country 

and said that they unanimously agree that, in spite of progress in certain 

areas during the past 2 years, the humanitarian crisis in North Korea was 

still ongoing. Malnutrition, safe water, adequate sanitation, and public 

health in general remained serious problems to be addressed. Programs in 

these areas continue to suffer from difficult operating conditions that limit 

and constrain implementation, accountability, verification, and access to 

the most vulnerable people. We believe, the agencies said, that only with 

adherence to these operating principles will we be able to work towards 

helping those in the greatest need with accountable assistance, and we 

remain committed to these objectives.1

1

CARE was one of the signers of the statement.
Appendix II

Accountability Related Problems Raised by 

International Agencies and 

Nongovernmental Organizations

Page 57 GAO/NSIAD-00-175 Foreign Assistance

On March 13, 2000, Action Against Hunger, a French humanitarian 

organization, withdrew from North Korea after having worked there since 

January 1998. Action had established a nutritional program in the province 

of North Hamgyong and operated a sub-office in the provincial capital, 

Chongjin. Action provided nutritional support for 1,442 nurseries and 1,098 

kindergartens and also operated sanitation and other programs. Action told 

us it was withdrawing because it was impossible to carry out an assistance 

program for the most vulnerable people suffering from malnutrition. 

Action’s officials characterized the decision as extremely difficult, since the 

organization was convinced that the majority of the country’s population 

was still having extreme difficulties in finding sufficient food for 

themselves and their families.2

 Action also criticized some international 

agencies for allocating massive aid to the country, but not insisting on 

reaching the most deprived populations. According to Action, the deprived 

populations were being sacrificed for a policy aimed at stabilizing the 

North Korean regime and limiting its military harmfulness. Action 

recommended that the international agencies seek the use of real 

vulnerability criteria on the distribution of aid to North Korea and pressure 

North Korea to allow direct access to beneficiaries.3

On April 4, 2000, one of the principal members of the Consortium, CARE, 

announced that it was withdrawing from the Consortium by June 30, 2000. 

In explaining its decision, CARE noted that agricultural harvests in North 

Korea had improved and economic production had begun to recover. CARE 

2

According to Action, the North Korean government channeled assistance via officially 

supported structures, and the most vulnerable populations were not accessible through 

these structures. As evidence, Action noted that its nutritionists had rarely seen evidence of 

malnutrition in the day nurseries; however, the October 1998 nutrition survey by the World 

Food Program, UNICEF, and the European Union had shown that nearly 16 percent of North 

Korean children were suffering from malnutrition. In addition, Action cited abandoned 

street children in rags and with sallow complexions who were seen everyday by Action’s 

humanitarian workers. It also cited an orphanage in the capital that Action had been able to 

visit where more than 20 percent of the children were undernourished. The most severe 

cases were children under the age of one, and a majority of these needed to be fed by 

nasal-gastric catheters and be re-hydrated or they would die within days. Action said it had 

offered to establish a therapeutic re-nutrition unit in the orphanage, but Korean authorities 

refused the offer in October 1999 without any meaningful explanation. Action had also 

proposed setting up a system for direct distribution of hot meals via soup kitchens in the 

streets of Chongjin. However, Korean authorities refused to accept the basic monitoring 

system Action insisted would be necessary to ensure that the program really benefited the 

intended groups of deprived people.

3

Action Against Hunger was one of the signers of the December 11, 1999, consensus 

statement discussed earlier.
Appendix II

Accountability Related Problems Raised by 

International Agencies and 

Nongovernmental Organizations

Page 58 GAO/NSIAD-00-175 Foreign Assistance

said that it was the appropriate time for the Consortium to move in the 

direction of sustainable rehabilitation and development programs in North 

Korea, including programs for food-for-work, agriculture, health, and water 

and sanitation. However, CARE said, for such programs to be effectively 

and efficiently implemented, it was necessary to have significantly higher 

access to people in need, including working more closely with 

communities to improve their capacity so that they could create lasting 

solutions to their problems. It also meant being able to identify the people 

in need, develop programs responsive to their needs, and monitor and 

evaluate the programs to ensure those needs were being successfully met. 

However, CARE said, despite a nearly 4-year dialogue with the North 

Korean government regarding the importance of access, transparency, and 

accountability, the operational environment had not progressed to a point 

where CARE felt it was possible to implement effective rehabilitation 

programs. CARE said its decision to withdraw had been made reluctantly, 

since life was still very difficult for many families in North Korea and 

humanitarian assistance was still needed.
Page 59 GAO/NSIAD-00-175 Foreign Assistance

Appendix III

Comments From the U.S. Agency for 

International Development ApendxiI

Note: GAO comments 

supplementing those in

the report text appear at 

the end of this appendix.

See pp. 41, 49.

See comment 1.
Appendix III

Comments From the U.S. Agency for 

International Development

Page 60 GAO/NSIAD-00-175 Foreign Assistance

See pp. 44, 49.

See p. 11.

See pp. 3, 11.

See p. 3.

See pp. 44, 49.
Appendix III

Comments From the U.S. Agency for 

International Development

Page 61 GAO/NSIAD-00-175 Foreign Assistance

See comment 2.

See p. 46.

See p. 40.

See p. 37.

See p. 33.

See comment 3.
Appendix III

Comments From the U.S. Agency for 

International Development

Page 62 GAO/NSIAD-00-175 Foreign Assistance

See comment 4.
Appendix III

Comments From the U.S. Agency for 

International Development

Page 63 GAO/NSIAD-00-175 Foreign Assistance

The following are GAO’s comments on USAID’s letter dated May 26, 2000.

GAO Comments 1. In its comments, USAID said that GAO presents the speculation that 

some of the food aid may be diverted and that the most needy North 

Korean people are being excluded from the receipt of food aid. We 

believe it is more accurate to say that GAO reported the views of others 

on whether food aid may have been diverted and most needy people 

excluded from food aid, noted constraints on monitoring that 

compromised the Consortium’s ability to adequately monitor and 

assure that the food aid was being properly distributed, and observed 

that the project agreement did not specify that the targeted 

beneficiaries would be workers, and their families, most in need of food 

aid. 

2. We modified our report to show that the feasibility team referred to the 

warm topical climate in the summer (see p. 22).

3. In our draft report we noted that Consortium staff told us they were not 

aware of any evidence of actual diversions of food aid. In addition, we 

cited the views of a Consortium manager who said it is difficult for any 

one in the Consortium to determine to what extent there may have 

been any food diversions. Based on his experience as a manager, he 

feels that significant diversions have not occurred. However, he said, 

without random access, the whole matter is uncertain. In addition, we 

have added other clarifying remarks provided by the Consortium (see 

pp. 38, 40-41). 

4. We noted USAID’s comments in the body of the report rather than 

appendix II (see pp. 41-42.)
Page 64 GAO/NSIAD-00-175 Foreign Assistance

Appendix IV

GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments ApendxiIV

GAO Contacts Phillip Thomas (202) 512-9892

Wayne Ferris (202) 512-5169

Acknowledgments In addition to those named above, Christian Hougen and Richard Seldin 

made key contributions to this report.

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