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1

37–954 2008

[H.A.S.C. No. 110–48]

HEARING

ON

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT

FOR FISCAL YEAR 2008

AND

OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED

PROGRAMS

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

STRATEGIC FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING

ON

BUDGET REQUEST FOR MISSILE

DEFENSE PROGRAMS

HEARING HELD

MARCH 27, 2007

(II)

STRATEGIC FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE

ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California, Chairman

JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina

SILVESTRE REYES, Texas

RICK LARSEN, Washington

JIM COOPER, Tennessee

HANK JOHNSON, Georgia

DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa

TERRY EVERETT, Alabama

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas

MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama

FRANK ROSE, Professional Staff Member

KARI BINGEN, Professional Staff Member

CATERINA DUTTO, Staff Assistant

(III)

C O N T E N T S

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS

2007

Page

HEARING:

Tuesday, March 27, 2007, Fiscal Year 2008 National Defense Authorization

Act—Budget Request for Missile Defense Programs ........................................ 1

APPENDIX:

Tuesday, March 27, 2007 ........................................................................................ 35

TUESDAY, MARCH 27, 2007

FISCAL YEAR 2008 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT—

BUDGET REQUEST FOR MISSILE DEFENSE PROGRAMS

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Everett, Hon. Terry, a Representative from Alabama, Ranking Member, Strategic Forces Subcommittee .................................................................................. 3

Tauscher, Hon. Ellen O., a Representative from California, Chairman, Strategic Forces Subcommittee ..................................................................................... 1

WITNESSES

Campbell, Lt. Gen. Kevin T., Commanding General, U.S. Army Space and

Missile Defense Command/Army Forces Strategic Command, U.S. Army ...... 9

Green, Hon. Brian R., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategic

Capabilities, U.S. Department of Defense ......................................................... 13

McQueary, Dr. Charles E., Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, U.S.

Department of Defense ........................................................................................ 11

Obering, Lt. Gen. Henry A., III, Director, Missile Defense Agency, U.S. Air

Force ...................................................................................................................... 5

APPENDIX

PREPARED STATEMENTS:

Campbell, Lt. Gen. Kevin T. ............................................................................ 68

Green, Hon. Brian R. ....................................................................................... 94

McQueary, Dr. Charles E. ............................................................................... 88

Obering, Lt. Gen. Henry A., III ....................................................................... 39

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD:

[There were no Documents submitted.]

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD:

Mr. Everett ........................................................................................................ 118

Mr. Franks ........................................................................................................ 120

Ms. Tauscher ..................................................................................................... 109

(1)

FISCAL YEAR 2008 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT—BUDGET REQUEST FOR MISSILE DEFENSE

PROGRAMS

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, STRATEGIC FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE, Washington, DC, Tuesday, March 27, 2007.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:00 p.m., in room

2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ellen Tauscher (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, STRATEGIC

FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE

Ms. TAUSCHER. The committee will come to order.

The Strategic Forces Subcommittee meets this afternoon to receive testimony on the fiscal year 2008 budget request for missile

defense programs.

Our witnesses today include Lieutenant General Henry Obering,

director of the Missile Defense Agency (MDA); Lieutenant General

Kevin Campbell, commanding general, U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command; the Honorable James McQueary, Department of Defense (DOD) Director of Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E); and Mr. Brian Green, Deputy Assistant Secretary

of Defense for Strategic Capabilities.

Gentlemen, welcome, and thank you for the outstanding contributions that you and the people that serve with you make to the

security of our Nation. This subcommittee greatly appreciates your

efforts and dedication to your mission.

I would like to start by making it clear that this subcommittee

and the full committee have always expressed bipartisan support

for developing and deploying an effective missile defense system.

The protection of our Nation and the credibility of our last line of

defense against a missile strike is not a political issue. In the final

analysis, we as Congress and the Administration are all responsible for protecting the American people and our deployed forces

against missile threats.

Too often in the past, the Bush Administration has attempted to

rush the deployment of missile defense with overheated rhetoric

that had little to do with the actual maturity of various elements

of the missile defense system. That has served only to undermine

the end goal. Both Democrats and Republicans want these programs to succeed.

Like many of my colleagues, I voted for the National Missile Defense Act of 1999, which stated that, ‘‘It is the policy of the United

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States to deploy as soon as technologically possible an effective national missile defense system capable of defending the territory of

the United States against limited ballistic missile attack.’’ That

policy, which became law, continues to be my position.

We want a system, but we want that system to work. My colleagues and I will insist that missile defenses are adequately tested

before they are deployed. We will do so because we believe that effective missile defenses are an essential component to our country’s

over-arching defense and national security strategy.

Last year’s defense authorization bill provides us with a bipartisan way to proceed on missile defense. That language said that

DOD should place a high priority on fielding and testing near-term

missile defense systems such as the Ground-Based Mid-Course Defense (GMD) System, Terminal High Altitude Area Defense

(THAAD), Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD), and PATRIOT

PAC–3.

This approach makes sense. It focuses on deploying near-term capabilities against the real threats we face. To effectively defend the

American people and our homeland against a limited strike by a

rogue nation, we must thoroughly test the Ground-Based MidCourse Defense, GMD, System.

General Obering, I think that the Missile Defense Agency has

taken significant steps to improve its testing program over the past

several years. These changes paid off in September of 2006 when

the GMD system completed its first successful intercept test since

2002. But challenges remain with MDA’s test program.

In its 2006 annual report on the missile defense program, the

Government Accountability Office (GAO) stated, ‘‘The performance

of the ballistic missile defense system cannot yet be fully assessed

because there have been too few flight tests conducted to anchor

the models and simulations that predict overall system performance.’’

Dr. McQueary, I would like to hear your thoughts about GAO’s

conclusions and your assessments of MDA’s efforts to conduct additional end-to-end testing, a DOT&E recommendation. Furthermore,

I also appreciate your candid assessment of any possible limitations that you are experiencing in doing your job. Do your responsibilities for ensuring testing match your authorities? If not, what

additional authorities do you need?

General Obering, I would be interested in hearing how you plan

to address the concerns that have been raised about MDA’s testing

program by GAO and DOT&E. We also need to ensure that our

warfighters receive the capabilities and support they need to protect the American people, our deployed forces and our allies.

General Campbell, I would like to know whether you believe the

warfighter is playing a large enough role in setting the future priorities for the missile defense system. Furthermore, I would also

like to know if you think that MDA’s current organizational structure, with its focus on research and development, is structured appropriately to provide optimal support to the warfighter.

Finally, given the mutual threats we face, it is critical that we

work with our allies on missile defense systems. Over the past several years, there have been a number of success stories in this

area, such as our cooperation with Israel and Japan. In the fiscal

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year 2008 budget request, the Administration is requesting funds

to establish a GMD interceptor site in Europe.

I strongly support the need to work with our European allies on

missile defense, but I am concerned that the Bush Administration’s

current proposal to move forward with the proposed deployment on

a bilateral basis with Poland and the Czech Republic has not been

sufficiently coordinated with North Atlantic Treaty Organization

(NATO).

As vice chair of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, I take our

relationship with the Alliance very seriously. Over the past several

months, many European officials, including some from Poland and

the Czech Republic, have expressed concern that the Bush Administration’s proposal lacks a strong NATO foundation. I know that

sometimes it is faster to work with a coalition of the willing, but

such coalitions usually don’t have strong foundations.

Therefore, Mr. Green, the committee needs to know whether and

how the Administration plans to provide a stronger multilateral

foundation for its proposal.

On that note, let me turn the floor over to my very good friend,

the distinguished Ranking Member of the subcommittee, Mr. Everett of Alabama.

Mr. Everett, the floor is yours.

STATEMENT OF HON. TERRY EVERETT, A REPRESENTATIVE

FROM ALABAMA, RANKING MEMBER, STRATEGIC FORCES

SUBCOMMITTEE

Mr. EVERETT. I thank my chairman and colleague. I join you in

welcoming our guests also.

Let me join the chairman in thanking you for your leadership

and please extend our thanks to the many men and women in your

different organizations for their dedication, hard work and sacrifices that they are making on behalf of this Nation.

As we begin our discussion on our Nation’s missile defense posture and budget request, I will note that missile defense has not

always received bipartisan support. It has in the more recent hearings that we have had, particularly in this subcommittee and in

the House Armed Services full committee.

But in last year’s floor debate on the defense bill, an amendment

was offered to cut MDA’s budget by half. However, missile defense

has enjoyed bipartisan support, as I said, in this committee. I want

to personally thank the chairman for making her first subcommittee trip to Huntsville to focus on missile defense.

This subcommittee also has a strong history of working through

areas where we may disagree. We ask tough questions and approach issues with thought and rigor. We respect each other’s opinions and recognize that at the end of the day, we are here because

we believe we must do all we can to increase the Nation’s security.

In missile defense, it is important to reflect upon the events of

the last year. On July 4, North Korea launched six short- and medium-range ballistic missiles capable of reaching our foreign-deployed forces and allies, and one longer-range missile potentially

capable of reaching Hawaii and the Western U.S. Three months

later, North Korea tested a nuclear device.

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Iran continues to develop and test short- and medium-range ballistic missiles capable of reaching Israel and Europe. This includes

a space-launch vehicle that could provide a cover for developing a

longer-range missile. Iran has also continued efforts to enrich uranium in defiance of the United Nations (U.N.) Security Council.

Worldwide proliferation of missile technology also continues.

Last, two months ago, China conducted an anti-satellite test

using a medium-range ballistic missile. The threat is clearly at

hand. While I continue to support a measured approach to testing,

I strongly believe that we cannot afford to slow down the development and thwarting of those near-term missile defense elements

crucial to our Nation’s defense.

I also firmly believe that we must extend this protective coverage

to our allies and friends. This year’s Missile Defense Agency budget

request is $8.9 billion. That is a decrease from last year and already reflects a reduction of over $500 million. So the GroundBased Mid-Course Defense System in Alaska and California is a

flagship capability in our Nation’s national missile defense system.

I would like to note the breadth of our capabilities being funded

within MDA’s budget request: Aegis BMD, including work with

Japan, air development with Israel, THAAD, ground-based early

warning radar, a global command and control network, Federal

space programs, Airborne Laser (ABL) and Kinetic Energy Interceptor (KEI), and a test program consisting of 25 fly and ground

tests planned for fiscal year 2008.

General Obering, I would like to highlight a few specific areas

that I am interested in hearing about today. Last year, this committee exerted its long preference for building near-term missile

defense capabilities. Please describe how this year’s budget reflects

that congressional guidance. Also in last year’s bill, Congress provided resources for concurrent tests, training and operation. I look

forward to hearing how this is being funded.

General Campbell, I believe that this is the first time you have

appeared before us. Thank you for coming.

I would like you to describe your role as the Joint Functional

Component Commander (JFCC) for U.S. Stragegic Command

(STRATCOM), and your relationship with MDA and the services;

how you ensure that combatant commanders’ missile defense needs

are met. Pacific Command (PACCOM) and the U.S. Forces Korea

(USFK) commanders recently testified before the full committee

stating their need for more PATRIOT PAC–3 and Aegis BMD inventories and continued development of THAAD.

Dr. McQueary, I am interested in your assessment of MDA’s endto-end testing. What areas are progressing well and where do you

think they could have an improvement?

Last, Mr. Green, I am interested in hearing your perspective on

whether the events of the past year have modified our approach to

missile defense, and the status of our engagement with our international partners in cooperation on missile defense.

As the chairman has noted, the European missile defense site is

a key issue this year. We must understand how this site benefits

our security and what we are doing to engage our European

friends.

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Again, I want to thank you for taking time out of your busy

schedules to be with us today. I look forward to your testimony,

and I look forward to my chairman calling this hearing because

missile defense is one of the most important things that we do.

Thank you, Madam Chairman.

Ms. TAUSCHER. I thank the distinguished ranking member.

He is right. Last year there was an amendment offered on the

floor to significantly cut the MDA budget. I am happy to report

that he is right. It was defeated by a bipartisan effort. So I think

that there has been strong bipartisan support for a strong defensive missile shield.

Gentlemen, you have submitted very comprehensive testimony.

We appreciate that, but we would like to get to questions. If you

wouldn’t mind giving us a short summary, five minutes or less,

then we can move to questions. We would appreciate it. All of your

statements have been submitted to the record.

General Obering, please begin.

STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. HENRY A. OBERING, III, DIRECTOR,

MISSILE DEFENSE AGENCY, U.S. AIR FORCE

General OBERING. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman,

Congressman Everett and distinguished members of the committee.

As Congressman Everett stated, on July 4, 2006, North Korea

did launch seven missiles capable of striking our allies and our deployed forces in the Western Pacific, and also launched a Taepo

Dong 2 long-range missile believed to be capable of striking the

Western United States.

Had these launches taken place just three years earlier, we

would have had no capability to defend ourselves. This time, because of the efforts of thousands of Americans dedicated to this

program, the steadfast support of Congress, and an innovative acquisition strategy that we have been allowed to pursue, we were

able to provide the President with an option to activate an integrated missile defense system, a system that I am confident would

work effectively.

In November 2006 and January 2007, Iran demonstrated nearsimultaneous launches of almost a dozen ballistic missiles and

rockets. In fact, the number of foreign ballistic missile launches

this year is at a rate double that of last year. This reflects the determination of many countries to acquire these valuable weapons,

a value that is generated, by the way, by the historic lack of deployed defenses against them.

The consequences of this vulnerability are significant. A rogue

nation could use these weapons for coercion or intimidation. As

these missiles proliferate, access becomes easier and missile-capable terrorists could emerge.

Therefore, it is critical that we continue to develop, field and deploy missile defenses to de-value these weapons and protect ourselves, our allies and our friends. To address these threats, we are

requesting $8.9 billion in 2008, with more than 75 percent of these

funds, or $7.1 billion, going to near-term capabilities and the remainder, or $1.8 billion allocated to develop defenses against

threats that may loom tomorrow. If we get this balance wrong, we

will be unable to defend ourselves sooner or later.

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This budget reflects a three-part program strategy: to maintain

and sustain our initial capability; to close the gaps and improve

this capability; and to develop options for future uncertainties. First, we seek $5.9 billion to maintain and sustain an initial capability to defend the homeland against long-range threats and to

protect deployed forces, allies and friends against the shorter- to

medium-range threats. We intend to complete the fielding of up to

44 long-range interceptors in Alaska and California; deploy up to

132 sea-based interceptors on 18 Aegis ships; and deploy 2 mobile

terminal high altitude area defense units with 48 interceptors. Sustaining this capability is now approaching $1 billion a year.

To effectively utilize these capabilities, we need to expand our command, control, battle management and communications elements,

both at home and abroad. This element is the centerpiece of our

system and without it there is no integrated layer of defense. Second, we seek $1.6 billion to close the gaps and improve our

capability to keep pace with growing threats. This objective includes the fielding of 10 long-range interceptors and a mid-course

radar in Europe. We have entered into discussions with Poland and

the Czech Republic to host these assets. These countries represent

locations which maximize the coverage of Europe and the United

States against an Iranian threat.

At the same time, we have been engaged with our NATO partners and Russia to explain to NATO our missile defense plans and

the inability of these sites to threaten Russia’s strategic deterrent.

Another aspect of the effort to improve our defenses is the development of the land- and sea-based volume kill capability that can defeat the more complex threats that we believe will emerge from

North Korea and Iran.

Our multiple-kill vehicle (MKV) program will allow us to engage

multiple warheads and countermeasures from a single-threat missile with a single interceptor. Delivering this volume kill capability

to the warfighters and for all of our mid-course interceptors is one

of our top development priorities.

Finally, we request $1.4 billion for the third component of our

strategy to develop options for future threats. In this phase, defenses can destroy an enemy missile when it is most vulnerable.

The Airborne Laser is our primary boost-phase program, but we

are maintaining the option of using a Kinetic Energy Interceptor

as a boost-phase system if the Airborne Laser does not achieve its

knowledge points during testing.

In addition, we believe that persistent global detection and tracking will be required to deal with future uncertainties. Our space

tracking and surveillance system program and our advanced technology efforts are focused on support of this goal.

Next, I would like to discuss the underlying acquisition approach

that has allowed us to rapidly and effectively field a missile defense

capability where none existed before.

In January of 2002, based on our test results and the evolving

rogue nation threat, MDA was directed to deploy an integrated and

layered missile defense as quickly as possible. The Department’s

traditional acquisition process could not meet this task. In its

place, we instituted an evolutionary process called capabilitiesbased spiral development. This approach gives the agency the flexiVerDate 22-MAR-2001 08:55 Oct 03, 2008 Jkt 037954 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\110-48\086290.000 HAS2 PsN: HAS2
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bility to properly manage risk and therefore rapidly develop, test

and field capability to the warfighter, while continually upgrading

the system.

As a result, in just over 30 months, since June of 2004, we have

in place 17 long-range interceptors in Alaska and California. We

have modified 16 Aegis ships for missile tracking, with 7 of those

able to launch the 20 sea-based interceptors that we have fielded.

We have upgraded three land-based early warning radars, delivered two transformer radars, and one massive sea-based X-band

radar, and fielded kinetic control capabilities in Hawaii, Alaska,

Colorado, Nebraska, Washington, D.C., and the United Kingdom.

Using capability-based acquisition, we have achieved in two and a

half years what would have taken two or three times longer with

the standard process.

The inclusion of U.S. Strategic Command and other combatant

commands in our development, test, and fielding activities has

been another key to our success. Our cooperation with these commands and the services is comprehensive and occurs at almost

every level. We work with them to define and prioritize new requirements as the system evolves. We have worked with the services to complete an element, transition, and transfer plan to allow

them sufficient lead time to budget for operations and support.

MDA’s cooperation with the warfighter was exemplified during

the North Korean ballistic missile launches this past summer.

MDA and the military operators worked side-by-side to transition

the system to operational alert. As a result, our country was able

to defend itself against a potential threat.

To verify the viability of our system, we have taken on the challenge of realistically testing an enormous, complex system that covers ten time zones and that intercepts warheads not only in the atmosphere, but in space. We have designed a test approach that not

only demonstrates the technical maturity of the system, but also

demonstrates its ability to provide warfighting capability.

Our test programs involve modeling simulations, numerous element and system ground tests and flights tests with the components operating together under conditions that are operationally

realistic. This testing has increased our confidence in the system.

In particular, this past September, we conducted a long-range

intercept flight test that involved the use of operational crews and

operational fire control and fielded software.

We also used operational sensors and an operational interceptor

launched from an operational missile field. Over the past year, the

Missile Defense Agency conducted more than 35 major tests, successfully meeting our primary test objectives on 14 of 15 flight

tests.

Overall, since 2001, we built a record of 24 successful hit-to-kill

engagements in 32 attempts. A critical aspect of our test program

has been the participation of the directorate of operational test and

evaluation in a combined test force. This force merges requirements

for both developmental and operational capability testing and

works daily with the independent operational test agencies to ensure that they concur with our objectives and processes.

We understand and embrace the importance of rigorous, realistic

testing, which is why more than 20 percent of our fiscal year 2008

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budget, over $2 billion, has been directed for this purpose. Our test

schedule remains very aggressive and is limited not by funding, but

by the capacity of our range infrastructure to conduct tests in rapid

succession, and by our ability to absorb and incorporate each test

lessons into succeeding tests.

For the remainder of this year, we plan to conduct two longrange intercept flight tests, four Aegis flight tests, three THAAD

flight tests, an Israel Arrow test and dozens of ground tests. As I

discussed earlier, the deployment of ground-based interceptors and

an associated mid-course radar in Europe is critical to the defense

of our allies and will help protect the United States from longrange tests from the Middle East.

We intend to deploy an initial capability by 2011. Japan remains

one of our closest partners in missile defense. In March of 2006, we

successfully flight-tested new nose-cone technologies developed in

cooperation with Japan. The Missile Defense Agency and the Japanese Ministry of Defense are agreed to co-develop a larger version

of our sea-based interceptor, which will improve our defensive capabilities against longer-range missiles.

The upgraded Royal Air Force Flyingdales Radar in the United

Kingdom will undergo operational testing this year and we are

working closely with Denmark to upgrade the Thule early warning

radar in Greenland. We also are continuing to work with Israel to

examine a number of options for them to improve their capability

to defeat longer-range missiles, as well as to develop new shorterrange missile defenses.

We have now signed cooperative agreements with Australia and

Italy, and begun discussions on missile defense collaboration with

many other nations.

I am proud that the Missile Defense Agency has provided this

Nation with a significant defensive capability within our fiscal constraints. Our acquisition flexibility has allowed us to implement

numerous cost-saving measures, such as infrastructure reductions,

support systems consolidation and program adjustment.

For example, we have reduced our infrastructure overhead by approximately $1.8 billion from fiscal year 2006 to 2011. More specifically, we saved enough funds from unneeded overhead reduction in

the Ground-Based Mid-Course Program alone to purchase four

more long-range interceptors.

In closing, I want to emphasize that the threat that we are facing from ballistic missiles is real and growing. Ballistic missile defense is expensive, but the cost pales in comparison to the enormous price that this Nation would pay in lives lost, property destruction and economic devastation from even a single missile attack.

The success that we have experienced in our test program indicates that there is absolutely no reason to slow down our efforts.

We have overcome test setbacks and technical hurdles, but thanks

to the support from Congress, we are succeeding in our mission.

As we look to the gathering clouds of ballistic missile threats on

the horizon, now is not the time to cut back on support for missile

defense, but to advance it.

Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. I would appreciate the

opportunity to answer your questions.

9

[The prepared statement of General Obering can be found in the

Appendix on page 39.]

Ms. TAUSCHER. Thank you, General Obering.

General Campbell, once again, your statement has been submitted to the record. If you could summarize, I would appreciate it.

Thank you.

STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. KEVIN T. CAMPBELL, COMMANDING

GENERAL, U.S. ARMY SPACE AND MISSILE DEFENSE COMMAND/ARMY FORCES STRATEGIC COMMAND, U.S. ARMY

General CAMPBELL. Madam Chairman, Congressman Everett,

distinguished members of the committee, thank you for your ongoing support of our warfighters and for the opportunity to appear

before this panel.

This committee has been a strong ally of the Army and the missile defense community. I will discuss the role of the warfighter in

operating the system and our role in the development process with

MDA.

In one of my roles, I serve as the Joint Functional Component

Command for integrated missile defense under the United States

Strategic Command, General James E. Cartwright. In this joint

role, I am responsible for directly supporting the command of the

United States Strategic Command to globally plan, integrate and

coordinate missile defense operations.

The Joint Functional Command operationalizes proven capabilities from the Missile Defense Agency, develops global missile defense plans in collaboration with the geographic combatant commanders, and we conduct cross-geographic combatant commander

exercises to ensure that commanders, staffs and missile defense

crews are prepared to employ the fielded ballistic missile defense

system.

In July 2006, we successfully placed today’s fielded capabilities

on alert in response to a credible threat from North Korea. Our response to this threat demonstrated our ability to operate the system on a sustained basis and dynamically plan, integrate, and coordinate military operations across three combatant command

headquarters, as well as other government agencies.

Specifically, the Joint Functional Command coordinated mission

activity across the combatant commands. And, Madam Chairman,

during your visit to the Joint Functional Command a few weeks

ago, you saw first-hand the maturity of that operation. Army forces

under Northern Command (NORTHCOM) operated the GroundBased Mid-Course fire control system.

Air forces under the control of STRATCOM operated long-range

and space-based sensors. The Navy forces under the operational

control of the United States Pacific Command operated Aegis longrange search and track radar systems in the Sea of Japan and the

Pacific Ocean.

And the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) oversaw the employment of the Cobra Dane radar at Shemya, Alaska. As was demonstrated this past summer, the joint team is trained and ready

and operating the Ground-Based Mid-Course System today. In my

view, our success during last summer’s contingency served as a tesVerDate 22-MAR-2001 08:55 Oct 03, 2008 Jkt 037954 PO 00000 Frm 00013 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\110-48\086290.000 HAS2 PsN: HAS2
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timony to the effectiveness of our warfighter exercise program, as

well as the Missile Defense Agency’s test program.

During the past 12 months, we have effectively planned and conducted 3 major combatant command-level exercises and participated in several Ground-Based Mid-Course System tests, both in

defining objective and crew-level direct participation. The exercises,

combined with the test participation with MDA, have enabled us

to improve our staffs’ and crews’ proficiency in operating a missile

defense system and increased our confidence in the effectiveness of

the fielded missile defense capabilities.

Lessons we learned during these activities we use to improve our

operating concepts for both the planning for and the execution of

the missile defense mission. We anticipate significant advancements in the Ground-Based Mid-Course System over the next four

years, with potential deployments to the European-based sites, deployments we see as essential for improving the defense of the

homeland and extending coverage to our forward-deployed forces

and allies.

We have initiated planning with the European Command

(USEUCOM) staff and intend on sending a joint team made up of

combatant command representatives, the Missile Defense Agency,

and others to work closely with European Command in developing

a concept of operations, a logistics plan, and an infrastructure plan.

As we look to the future, we will continue to advocate for system

improvements that narrow and close capability gaps and improve

system performance. U.S. Strategic Command has created the

warfighter involvement process, a disciplined methodology for capturing combatant commanders’ desired capability and delivering

them to the Missile Defense Agency. Annually, we provide MDA

our input in the form of a prioritized capability list.

This is a direct means for warfighters to influence and shape

both present and future missile defense capabilities. As examples

of our priorities, we have advocated for improvements in command

and control and further development of capabilities such as the

multiple-kill vehicle. It will provide us a range of capabilities for

meeting threat advancements.

I mentioned earlier that I have a joint role as Commander of the

JFCC. My other responsibility is the Army’s Senior Commander for

Space and Missile Defense. This entails ensuring our warfighters

are provided with enabling space and tactical defense capabilities

to defeat theater ballistic missiles. To enhance current capabilities,

the Army is continuing its transformation of air and missile defense forces to meet increasingly sophisticated and asymmetric

threat environments encountered by today’s warfighters.

Meeting the short-range ballistic and cruise missile threats continue to grow, especially in light of the ever-increasing proliferation

of missile defense technology. To address these threats, the Army

is transforming its air defense force from its current separate systems architecture to a component-based net-centric, integrated air

and missile defense system of systems that include such resources

as PATRIOT, the surface-launched medium-range advanced air-toair missile, and an elevated net sensor, and in the near term, the

Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense system.

11

This transformation of missile defense capabilities will allow

joint-force commanders to scale and tailor assets and forces based

upon the specific operating environment in which they are employed. With the help of this committee, we will continue forward

progress in developing, deploying and fielding an integrated missile

defense of our homeland, deployed forces, friends and allies.

I appreciate having the opportunity to speak on these important

matters, and ask that my written statement be submitted for the

record, and look forward to addressing any questions you or other

committee members may have.

[The prepared statement of General Campbell can be found in

the Appendix on page 68.]

Ms. TAUSCHER. Without objection. Thank you, General Campbell.

Dr. McQueary, welcome.

STATEMENT OF DR. CHARLES E. MCQUEARY, DIRECTOR,

OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT

OF DEFENSE

Dr. MCQUEARY. Thank you very much. It is a pleasure to be here

today to have a chance to give you an operational test and evaluation (OT&E) perspective on ballistic missile defense.

I will be very brief. I do have four quick points that I want to

make.

First, I want to review quickly what I believe the successes are

of this past year for ballistic missile defense systems (BMDS). Second, I would like to give you my current assessment of the capability of BMDS. And third, I would like to provide a status of recommendations in the fiscal year 2005 and fiscal year 2006 annual

reports published by us. And fourth, I will discuss the factors that

will limit our ability to be able to provide an aerial block-six assessment as required by the fiscal year 2006 National Defense Authorization Act.

I am going to summarize the first point about missile defense

and simply say missile defense had a very good year of testing, and

I will not go into the specifics because that information is included

in the record.

On the second assessment, I think it is worth saying a few words

about that. In the 2005 hearing, DOT&E reported that the integrated ground test results indicated the test bed had the potential

to defend against a limited attack under certain conditions.

However, the difficulties in the flight test program delayed confirmation of that capability. During the 2006 hearing, DOT&E reported that the results of the ground test demonstrated that integration, interoperability, tactics, doctrine and procedures were adequate to increase confidence in these aspects of the system.

The MDA testing program during 2005 was adequate and appropriate to the developmental maturity of BMDS. Today, I can state

that BMDS has demonstrated a limited capability against a simple

foreign threat. Coupled with the success of other element and level

testing and MDA’s integrated ground tests, the BMDS is definitely

maturing. My assessment is bolstered by the fact that MDA is increasing the operational realism of each successive test, and I think

that is a very crucial point.

12

Madam Chairman, in your invitation to address the committee,

you asked me to provide an assessment of MDA’s implementation

of the recommendations in the last two DOT&E annual reports.

That is what I want to quickly do now. There were 26 recommendations in the fiscal year 2005 annual report. Only four recommendations are still open, and MDA is acting on each of them.

Two involve ongoing data collection, and one involves a future test

schedule, and one deals with the test planning process.

There are 15 new recommendations in the fiscal year 2006 annual report. Many of these new recommendations involve demonstrations of specific capabilities during actual intercept tests.

MDA is actively considering these recommendations and has already added several to the test schedule.

As you know, I only advise MDA on its developmental test program. However, I am satisfied with MDA’s response to the recommendations in our annual reports, and I am pleased that General Obering and his staff recognize the value of our suggestions

and recommendations. A more capable MDS is our mutual goal.

And then the fourth item is, despite the successes, BMDS is still

maturing as a system, which makes it difficult for me to assess

block-six capability as required by the fiscal year 2006 National

Defense Authorization Act. First, to be confident in my assessment

of effectiveness, I need validated models and simulations for the

BMDS that only exists today because MDA doesn’t have enough

flight test data to anchor them.

I suspect General Obering and I will have a chance to comment

more upon that because I think that is a key point. MDA, the

multi-service BMDS operational test agency team, and DOT&E

personnel are working together to solve this problem. I am quite

pleased with the way that is progressing. However, there may be

insufficient time to fix this problem before we finalize the block-six

report, which we will finish at the end of this year.

While these models and simulations will be essential to proving

the operational capability of BMDS, we cannot use models and simulations as substitutes for live testing. Both General Obering and

I agree on this important issue. MDA’s testing must be sufficient

to have high confidence that the models and simulations are valid

representations of the actual performance and capabilities of

BMDS.

Second, I will have difficulty assessing suitability, whether reliability, maintainability, or availability of the system. BMDS has

not operated long enough to gather statistically significant data on

its RAM, reliability, availability and maintainability, although the

tests to date are very encouraging. MDA and the warfighters are

collecting the data, but the amount may be insufficient to reach

confident conclusions about the suitability, and this gets into statistics and things of that sort that I am alluding to.

So in conclusion, MDA expects a good year of its ground and

flight test programs. Individual element successes indicate their capabilities. Integrated ground testing of the BMDS is demonstrating

that the warfighters understand and can operate the system confidently and effectively. There is still a long way to go, but MDA’s

disciplined and principled approach to flight and ground tests is

starting to pay real dividends.

13

That concludes my remarks. Thank you for the opportunity to be

here.

[The prepared statement of Dr. McQueary can be found in the

Appendix on page 88.]

Ms. TAUSCHER. Thank you, Dr. McQueary.

Deputy Assistant Secretary Green, welcome back.

Secretary GREEN. Thank you.

Ms. TAUSCHER. It wasn’t too long ago that you were sitting on

this side of the table.

Secretary GREEN. I can’t help but notice that the view is different

from this side of the table. [Laughter.]

Ms. TAUSCHER. It is a little different from this side, too, but we

are happy to have you back, and thank you for your longstanding

service to the American people. If you could summarize your testimony, we would appreciate it. Your statement is in the record.

Please proceed.

STATEMENT OF HON. BRIAN R. GREEN, DEPUTY ASSISTANT

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR STRATEGIC CAPABILITIES,

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Secretary GREEN. Chairman Tauscher, Ranking Member Everett,

members of the subcommittee, it is a pleasure to appear before you

today to discuss the policy and strategic rationale underpinning the

fiscal year 2008 missile defense budget request. I would like to

thank the chairman and the ranking member and all the members

of the subcommittee for their support of missile defense.

Upon taking office in 2001, President Bush directed us to field

an initial missile defense capability by 2004 and to improve it over

time to meet the changing threat and to take advantage of emerging technology. He also directed us to extend the benefits of missile

defense to our friends and allies.

I would like to discuss today our progress in meeting this direction and focus on an effort that is key to enabling us to meet these

goals: the deployment of U.S. missile defenses in Europe. Missile

defense continues to be one of the Administration’s highest priorities, driven by rapidly evolving missile threats. Aggressive and unpredictable adversaries, such as Iran and North Korea, continue to

challenge our notions of deterrence and defense.

Surprise—strategic, tactical and technical—is an expected feature of the post-Cold War strategic environment. In this environment, we can no longer rely solely on offensive capabilities to deter

our adversaries, and must have other options, including an active,

layered defense that both reinforces deterrence and hedges against

its potential failure.

I am pleased to report that we have made substantial progress

and rapid progress in meeting the President’s direction to deploy

missile defense capabilities. We now have ground-based interceptors deployed in Alaska and California; sea-based interceptors deployed aboard the Aegis ships; more PATRIOT PAC–3 interceptors;

sensors on land and sea and in space; an evolving command and

control system; and trained warfighters on-station. My colleagues

seated with me at the table today, who represent the developers,

testers and warfighters, deserve the Nation’s gratitude.

14

We are also making progress in missile defense cooperation with

our allies and friends. Today, 15 countries, including 9 NATO countries alone, are engaged in missile defense efforts of some kind,

whether by hosting key facilities or assets on their territory, or actively discussing this possibility; pursuing R&D programs; or signing cooperative agreements with the U.S. for maintaining capabilities. In addition to the U.S., the list includes Australia, the Czech

Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Israel, India, Japan,

the Netherlands, Poland, Taiwan and the U.K.

In January of this year, President Bush directed us to proceed

with negotiations to base U.S. long-range missile defenses in Europe. These defenses are intended to counter the increasing Middle

Eastern missile threat. Our intelligence community (IC) assesses

that Iran would be able to develop an Intercontinental Ballistic

Missile (ICBM) capability before 2015 if it chose to do so, and we

must start now in order to address this threat in a timely manner.

Current plans call for basing in Poland 10 ground-based interceptors, similar to those currently deployed in Alaska and California,

and a mid-course radar in the Czech Republic. An existing radar

at the Reagan Test Range will be refurbished and moved to the

Czech Republic for use as the European mid-course radar.

Negotiations are ongoing and pending a successful outcome, work

is planned to begin at the sites in 2008. These missile defense assets would be integrated with existing radars in Flyingdales,

United Kingdom and Thule, Greenland, as well as the U.S.

Ground-Based Mid-Course System.

The deployment of U.S. missile defense assets in Europe has

many benefits. It would be capable of intercepting not only intercontinental ballistic missiles, but also intermediate-range ballistic

missiles launched out of the Middle East. The U.S. goal is to optimize defensive coverage of both Europe and the United States.

They would provide a second layer of defense for the United States.

With the protection afforded by these U.S. defensive capabilities

in Europe, NATO member states could resist attempts by hostile

states to intimidate or coerce the Alliance or its members from taking actions in the coalition. Strengthening our European allies and

the NATO Alliance in turn enhances U.S. security. Such defenses

would provide additional decision space for national leaders, including the President, for example, by allowing them to delay or defer

resorting to offensive responses to an attack.

Missile defenses provide another avenue for burden-sharing and

strengthening relationships with important allies. When negotiations are successfully concluded, Poland and the Czech Republic

would be providing a significant contribution to the collective security of the NATO Alliance by hosting the missile defense (MD) assets.

I also want to comment briefly on benefits derived specifically

from the basing mode that we have chosen to pursue, that is,

ground-basing interceptors in silos. Many of our missile defense

systems such as Aegis and PAC–3 are mobile or transportable. The

advantage of mobility is flexibility. We can move assets into place

as circumstances warrant. But there is also an important advantage to ground-based silos. That advantage is permanence. If we

15

field long-range interceptors in silos in Europe, we will have the capability that is always there, before and during a crisis.

Both our allies and potential adversaries will know with certainty that a missile defense capability is in place. These missile

defense assets will then be able to both assure allies and deter and

dissuade adversaries at all times once they are fielded.

Providing Russia with transparency and predictability in their

missile defense policy plans and programs is certainly in the interest of the United States. As General Obering indicated, we have

been and will continue to keep Russia informed about the status

of our programs and decisions. We will also continue to explore the

possibility of additional confidence-building measures and seek opportunities to cooperate with Russia on missile defense in the future.

I mentioned previously that a European interceptor site will provide long-range missile defense coverage to many NATO allies.

Missile defense has been a topic of discussion and debate at NATO

for quite some time, and the U.S. plan to begin fielding missile defense elements in Europe has served to focus and intensify these

discussions.

The Alliance has already taken several important steps demonstrating its support for missile defense, with its active layered

theater ballistic missile defense, or ALT–BMD program, the Alliance has decided to develop the capability to defend its deployed

forces from shorter-range missile attack. The program office established in 2005 is headed by a Frenchman and his deputy is an

American.

Recognizing that there is also a growing threat to NATO territory, the Alliance agreed at the 2002 Prague summit to initiate a

NATO missile defense feasibility study to examine the defense of

Alliance territory and population centers from ballistic missile attack. This study was completed and presented to the 2006 Riga

summit. At Riga, the Alliance endorsed the study’s conclusion that

defense of Alliance territory and population centers is technically

feasible.

Although the Alliance has yet to make the collective decision to

pursue a continental defense, a number of individual allies have

demonstrated support for long-range missile defense. For example,

Poland and the Czech Republic have expressed interest in hosting

long-range missile defense assets. The United Kingdom has agreed

to an upgrade of the Flyingdales early warning radar, and Denmark has agreed to a similar upgrade of the early warning radar

at Thule, Greenland.

In conclusion, we have made great progress in meeting the goals

that the President set for us over four years ago, and we continue

to press forward with the proposed deployment of U.S. missile defenses in Europe.

Thank you for your attention and the opportunity to appear before you today. I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of Secretary Green can be found in the

Appendix on page 94.]

Ms. TAUSCHER. Thank you, Mr. Green.

General Obering, senior Administration officials have said that

because the threats we face today are unpredictable, the United

16

States needs combat systems that can quickly adapt to new

threats. With regard to missile defense, isn’t there an inherent

flexibility in having mobile missile defense platforms that can move

to where the threats are?

And furthermore, given the tight fiscal environment we will find

ourselves in in the next coming years, doesn’t it make sense to develop a missile defense system that we could use in multiple areas

of the world? And to take it just a step further, don’t mobile systems provide a better bang for the buck?

General OBERING. Madam Chairman, actually what we are developing and deploying and fielding takes heavily into account that

mobile capability that you talked about. It is true that the flexibility of mobile forces is very attractive, and that is why we have invested a considerable amount of money in that in systems such as

the THAAD, the Aegis, et cetera.

Now, these systems, though, are to work in conjunction with

typically fixed-based sensors and assets that we can take advantage of in a more expeditious manner, that typically you have more

room for performance. For example, carrying around a groundbased mid-course interceptor on a ship would not be very practical.

So the range and the reach that you get with those land-based,

fixed-silo interceptors is very, very crucial to that overall integrated

capability.

We are in fact, as I said, investing in the more mobile systems.

That is one of the reasons why we have invested as we have in our

larger version of the Standard Missile–3 (SM–3) that we are codeveloping with Japan. That will have a long-range intercept capability. It will have a much smaller defended-area footprint than a

land-based interceptor, but it does provide that flexibility.

But this works in combination, as Brian Green said. There is a

persistence to land-based assets that you like to blend with the mobile-based assets, so that allows you to surge in certain areas

where you may need to, but it also gives you a 24/7 capability that

often is more expensive when you use mobile assets. That is the

case. We went through a cost-benefit analysis and we looked at the

different alternatives for, for example, a European site for extension of coverage to allies and friends.

The most effective would be the land-based interceptors that we

talked about. They could be surged by the shorter-range, and in

fact shorter-range defenses could also be able to interlace with that

to provide full coverage of all of our allies and friends in the European area. So we think that we are actually following that advice.

Ms. TAUSCHER. What about mobile KEI?

General OBERING. Mobile KEI is an option that we are still pursuing. That is the option, as I mentioned, to the Airborne Laser.

It is the option, as opposed to the primary program, because in the

boost phase, the Airborne Laser is much more flexible. It can defeat all ranges of missiles. The KEI would be limited to just the

lower range. So we are trying to maintain that option in our program.

Ms. TAUSCHER. Thank you, General.

Secretary Green, I listened to your testimony very clearly, and I

don’t dispute that there is support in Europe and certainly bilateral

support among the allies that you mentioned who, coincidentally,

17

are NATO, to working on a cooperative missile defense system. But

my concern is that the Administration has made a decision to conduct the deployment through these bilateral channels, not through

NATO.

I would like to, if you could tell us why there is no NATO platform negotiation. We are just consulting with NATO, if I understand the terminology that is being used. Why aren’t we looking for

a NATO endorsement, so to speak, of deployment? If not, why not?

Secretary GREEN. I guess I would make a couple of observations.

First, NATO as an Alliance develops very few of its own capabilities. Most of its capabilities are actually developed by individual

nations or smaller groupings within NATO that develop a particular capability, and then offer those capabilities in the context of the

NATO Alliance. So the bilateral approach here is very common in

NATO and I think a reasonable one in this circumstance.

Second, I would note that NATO is a consensus organization,

which means that we would have to try to achieve unanimity within the NATO context to get NATO to actually endorse a U.S. effort.

I think it is fair to say that there is strong support in NATO and

that that support is growing over time, but to achieve unanimity

in any organization, much less one as diverse, as you know, with

you having a prominent position at the NATO and Congress, getting unanimity in any organization like NATO is a very difficult

challenge. In essence, what such an approach would do would allow

any one nation within NATO to veto a U.S. initiative that we believe is very important to U.S. national security, in addition to European security. I think we would be very reluctant to go down that

path.

We certainly have a strong NATO foundation for this effort. We

have consulted extensively with our NATO allies, both in the

NATO context, the North Atlantic Council, and bilaterally with our

NATO allies. Those consultations continue at a very high pace. We

had General Obering over in NATO just last month. He is going

over again next month. We have a Missile Defense Agency policy

team over in Europe this week. Our under secretary is over in Europe this week talking about missile defense with our NATO allies.

So this is, I think, a strong foundation and one on which we are

building.

Ms. TAUSCHER. I understand your point. Let me just tell you that

my concern is that it is easy to pick off a NATO ally or two almost

anytime you want to, and getting to 26 is very difficult, although

we did do it successfully when they took over for the United States

specifically in Afghanistan. But we do have also I think a very well

developed commitment to interoperability. We do have a preeminence in this technology and in this science.

So it would seem to me that I would feel a lot more comfortable

if the Administration was negotiating directly with NATO. It is

tough to get to 26, I understand that, but in the end it seems to

me that that is really what we want to be doing. We want to have

a NATO framework. We want to have clearly the opportunity to

have interoperability. We don’t want there to be a sense that we

picked off some closer friends perhaps and got some easier, closer

allies to agree, but then perhaps there is a competing system out

there that could cause us some problems later on.

18

So as one member and as the chairman, I would much prefer

that we had a sense that this was a NATO framework that we

were operating in, and not just a bilateral.

I am happy to yield time, as much as you would like to consume,

to the Ranking Member, Mr. Everett.

Mr. EVERETT. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman.

Ms. TAUSCHER. You are welcome.

Mr. EVERETT. So much, and so little time.

General Obering, let’s talk a little bit, and perhaps some background to bring up ABL. Some of our members may have followed

it from the very beginning. Having visited, I understand it is a very

complicated piece of equipment. Would you describe where we

started with ABL?

And with the distinguished chairman of the Budget Committee

here, I am not going to pretend that we are not over-costs on the

ABL. We certainly do not have the aircraft for the amount of

money that was originally projected.

However, I would point out the ABL is not alone in that situation. Just about everything that we have done in the procurement

and development has gone over budget and over time. But if you

will start and just very briefly describe what the original concept

of ABL was, and where we are at this point, including the latest

test we had last week.

General OBERING. Yes, sir. First of all, what I will do is I will

roll back about three or four years ago. At that point, the Airborne

Laser was being approached in a classic acquisition program fashion, sir. There were requirements that they were trying to strive

to meet. They had to think through supportability, maintainability—all of what we call the entities associated with a major acquisition program.

There was only one problem with that. They had not balanced

the resources to focus effectively on what was the critical contribution that they make to a missile defense system. That critical contribution is to be able to use the power of light, directed energy,

at the speed of light, to destroy ballistic missiles very, very rapidly.

And so they were out of balance in terms of how they had focused

on that task.

What my predecessor and I did, General Kadish, is we restructured that program to use the knowledge-based, knowledge-point

approach to refocus the program on being able to accomplish its

major contribution to the system. So we laid out, along with the

program manager, the phases that we wanted to see from that program.

The first one was that we consider terminating the program unless they could generate, first, light from that laser, from the highenergy laser. It was in a 747 mockup on the ground that had all

the constraints of the 747, and we told them that they had to do

that. They achieved that milestone in November of 2004. Since

then, they lased over 70 times with that laser.

Another key knowledge point was to be able to use an optical fire

control train within the aircraft to be able to control the beam

while it is being fired. So we set up a series of flight tests with an

optical bench on the aircraft. It had its first flight back in December of 2004 and achieved that knowledge point.

19

Now, since that time, if I can fast forward a little bit, they have

been making tremendous and very steady progress. It has been

tough, but they have been making great progress. The next major

knowledge points that they are to achieve is there are actually

three lasers on board the aircraft.

There is a tracking laser that is used to provide precise tracking

information into that fire control system; there is an atmospheric

compensation laser that goes out and measures the distortion in

the atmosphere and feeds that information back so that the mirrors

on board the aircraft can deform, so that when the high-energy

beam hits, it leaves the aircraft deformed and uses the atmosphere

as eyeglasses lenses, so to speak, to refocus the beam on the target.

We have now installed the tracking laser and the atmospheric

compensation laser on the aircraft. It has been back in flight now

for the last several weeks. It is achieving the knowledge points in

terms of being able to track that tracking laser, and we anticipate

here in the next two weeks it will be able to fire the atmospheric

compensation laser out the nose.

So we did use the tracking laser this past week to track a target

75 kilometers away and we are now assessing that and moving toward the knowledge points that we hope to finish achieving this

summer. So that program has come a tremendously long way. It offers promise for the future in terms of directed energy and being

able to use directed energy as a weapon on a large scale.

So a lot of lessons learned that we are learning from this program can be applied to many other directed energy programs

should the Department choose to go that way for the future. We

are not out of the woods yet. We still have to reach the knowledge

points that I talked about this summer.

We will then take the program, the aircraft back down after the

flight test. We will open it up and we will put the high-energy laser

on the aircraft and get back into the air next year, and look for a

shoot-down of a boosting missile in 2009.

Mr. EVERETT. There are benefits to ABL that we can’t go into in

this setting. I would appreciate the opportunity, and perhaps the

chairman, at some point in time I might meet with you all to talk

about that.

In staging the ABL, I assume that you could take three aircraft

and operate 24/7 in those three aircraft. I understand the 747 has

long legs on it, but is there a staging problem to be able to actually

operate 24/7 with three aircraft?

General OBERING. No, sir. In fact it would operate not unlike

what we do now with the aerial controlled aircraft, the AWACS, or

with the Joint Stars aircraft. That concept of operations (CONOPS)

is fairly well defined. Actually, the program office has been working

with air combat command to go through and look at those

CONOPS and they have been very well engaged on that. So this

idea of full deployment when you have indications and warnings to

be able to set up an orbit, all of that has been thought through.

As you say, this is not something that you would have flying 24

hours, 7 days a week. It goes back, Madam Chairman, to your comment about flexibility and mobility assets. So we don’t expect 24/

7 coverage from those types of assets, but we do expect that we can

20

use them in indications and warnings, and scenarios at surge, and

that is exactly the way that we would envision ABL being used.

Mr. EVERETT. And KEI, could you bring us up on KEI?

General OBERING. KEI was the product of a Defense Science

Board recommendation to the Missile Defense Agency back in 2002

that because the Airborne Laser was very technically challenging,

that there was needed an alternative to it. So they recommended

a Kinetic Energy Interceptor program. That is what we have been

embarked on for the past several years.

It has also made great progress. It achieved its knowledge points.

Of course the contribution it gives to the ballistic missile defense

system is not directed energy, but very rapid acceleration. So if we

can demonstrate a very rapidly accelerating booster flight, then

that is the technical hurdle that we are after with that program.

I am happy to say that they have had successful fires of the first

stage and the second stage of that interceptor.

We are going to continue that fire program this year, and go for

the first flight of that booster in the fourth quarter of 2008. So it

offers an alternative should the Airborne Laser not prove out technically or prove out to be too operationally unsuitable or

unaffordable in the long run. That is also part of our knowledge

point in designs. So we are still maintaining that option, as I mentioned earlier, for the KEI program.

Mr. EVERETT. Briefly, General Obering, how much does MDA invest in testing? What percentage of the MDA’s overall budget is for

testing?

General OBERING. There is about 20 percent. It is about $2 billion a year in 2008 budget. It is a significant portion because obviously these are very complex systems. They span many time zones.

We have to use range assets that can operate in the atmosphere

as well as in space over long ranges. So these are very expensive

tests, but we are investing heavily in them.

Mr. EVERETT. General Campbell, how does the budget request reflect STRATCOM’s prioritized capabilities list?

General CAMPBELL. Congressman Everett, based on what we

have given MDA in terms of priorities, right now he is meeting

those key capabilities that we have asked him to field in the upgrades to the existing system. So as best we can tell right now, it

seems appropriately balanced between development and sustaining

those elements that have already been fielded.

Mr. EVERETT. Thank you.

Madam Chairman, I am going to wait for a second round. Thank

you.

Ms. TAUSCHER. Thank you, sir.

I will yield five minutes to the gentleman from Washington, Mr.

Larsen.

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you, Madam Chairman.

First off, General Obering, good to see you again.

This first question is about space tracking. To the extent you can

answer the question, there are $331 million or so in the budget for

space tracking for the first two demonstrations. There is also

money in for follow-on satellites, presumably for a 2016 or so

launch.

21

The question I have, it is an obvious one. We have not yet

launched the first two, the experimentals. Are you fairly confident

that those are going to work as you would hope so that you ought

to be asking for money for the next two, for 2016? Can you talk

a little bit about your relative confidence in that? It seems we are

getting ahead of ourselves on the second two, if you don’t know

about the first two yet.

General OBERING. Actually, we have the two demonstration satellites that you talked about that are going to go up later this year.

Now, we believe that we will learn a lot from that. The purpose,

by the way, for the rest of the committee, the purpose of these satellites is can we provide a precise-enough track from space to be

able to engage an enemy missile on that track alone.

Of course, that goes back to Madam Chairman’s comment about

flexibility and mobility. That gives us the ability to have persistence, in this case, global protection in tracking. That is what we

hope to learn from. Now, with any system, there is infrastructure

to support those demonstration satellites, so we have to operate

those.

We are going to experiment with those and we have to have the

command and control capabilities. All of that is included in that

budget request. We also want to begin to take lessons learned from

this as we go along, to be able to feed that into the follow-on system that you talked about.

Unfortunately, spacecraft in my mind still take too long to develop, but that is the cycle that we are in. So even though it sounds

like a long time from now to 2016, it is not. In space terms, that

is virtually around the corner. So we are going to be using a lot

of the folks that will be gaining that knowledge, and being able to

incorporate that into some of our system engineering planning and

early architecture work for that system.

Mr. LARSEN. Thanks for that answer. I will probably have some

follow-up.

I want to get to General Campbell with some questions about

Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS), if I may.

General, good to see you again. It was a pleasure to visit you

down in Alabama.

With regards to MEADS, I just had a few questions. After I got

back from the trip to Huntsville, some questions came to mind, and

I delivered them for the record, and got some answers back. I had

some follow-ups on that. One of the questions I had was of the

management challenges and management structure to the MEADS

program and what that has meant for its implementation.

The answer that I got back was that now the German and

Italian counterparts are meeting next month to discuss the

MEADS design and development program process and some of the

issues related to that. It struck my mind, is that an indication that

there are changes that do need to take place? Or is this just a

checking-in with each other to make sure things are moving forward? What is the progress of this relationship with the Germans

and Italians in implementing MEADS?

General CAMPBELL. Sir, I am not the developer of the program,

but from what I understand, if we look at schedule and budget, I

have not observed any outstanding problems. The measure of sucVerDate 22-MAR-2001 08:55 Oct 03, 2008 Jkt 037954 PO 00000 Frm 00025 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\110-48\086290.000 HAS2 PsN: HAS2
22

cess for us, from the warfighter’s perspective, will they equip us as

they promised?

Right now, the first unit equipped stands for fiscal year 2015. I

am told that they are still going to meet that timeline. So if there

are internal management problems, at least at the present time it

has not affected the delivery dates of first unit equipped.

Mr. LARSEN. Okay. I will just ask this question for the record,

if you have an answer for this one as well we will go with that.

Another question I had about any specific recommendations, and a

response came back that NATO MEADS management agency intends to increase its oversight and management activities of the

MEADS contractor team in the coming months to ensure the upcoming P.R. scheduled for third quarter stays on schedule.

I am all for oversight. It indicates to me that it looks like there

is a need for increased oversight. Otherwise, the recommendation

probably wouldn’t have come up. Are you aware of why we need

to increase management and oversight within the U.S. contractor

team?

General CAMPBELL. Sir, I am not aware, so we will take that for

the record.

Mr. LARSEN. I appreciate that.

Dr. McQueary, as the test and evaluation person here, are you

looking at MEADS or are you looking at the MDA side of the

house?

Dr. MCQUEARY. We are looking at MDA, but I would also hasten

to say we try to stay abreast of what is going on with the components that are currently in MDA, or will be eventually included in

MDA. My personal knowledge of MEADS is not sufficient that I

could give you any further insight, but I would be happy to look

further into it and provide information if that would be helpful.

Mr. LARSEN. Yes. I will get back to you on that. Thank you very

much.

Thank you, Madam Chairman.

Ms. TAUSCHER. Mr. Larsen, would you like a question on the

record for Dr. McQueary on MEADS?

Mr. LARSEN. Yes, I would.

Ms. TAUSCHER. Excellent. Thank you.

At this time, I am very happy to yield five minutes to the gentleman from Arizona, Mr. Franks.

Mr. FRANKS. Thank you, Madam Chair. Thank you very much.

And thank you, gentlemen, for all that you do for this country.

General Obering, I have not had a chance to publicly congratulate you on some of the successful tests that you had with the ABL

here recently. I think that is a milestone and a great credit to all

the work that you do.

Having said that, the distinguished ranking member has covered

that to a large degree, but I think that this is a very, very important program in that it has so many other applications for the future, even beyond missile defense.

Related to space-based defenses, we last seriously looked at that

around 20 years ago. Since then, a lot of things have changed. The

Soviet Union and the United States were really the only main players in space at that time, but that environment has changed. The

threats have changed. The capabilities have changed, and just the

23

use of space has changed since then. I believe that it is very appropriate for us to begin to refocus on those concepts in the environment that we are in today.

General OBERING. Sir, as you may know, we have included a very small amount of money, about $10 million in our 2008 request out

of the $8.9 billion request. But we think that it is prudent to begin

to lay the foundation for experimentation and to answer some questions that obviously need to be raised if the United States opts to

pursue that direction.

The policy foundation for this was laid out in the national space

policy that was signed out last year. What we are trying to do from

an MDA perspective and a developer’s perspective is to try to inform the debate that we know should occur and will occur regarding those capabilities. As you say, much has changed, but we also

need to understand what is left to be addressed and what are the

questions surrounding that.

So this very small amount of money is to allow us to begin interaction with industry, to begin to exchange concepts, to understand

where we are with the maturation of components that could be

used in this regard. The vast majority of what we would need to

do in this regard, in this experimentation, does not even involve

launching anything into space.

We can answer that here on the ground with models and simulations, that type of thing. That is the kind of activity that we think

would be pretty well covered in a budget request to make sure that

we fully inform the Hill of what we think is important.

Again, it goes back to the flexibility that Madam Chairman

talked about, that gives you flexibility for future uncertainties because we don’t know what threats we may face in 15 or 20 years.

As I stated earlier, unfortunately in space terms, that is not a very

long time. So being able to inform us to date is one of the reasons

why we included that money in our budget request.

Mr. FRANKS. Thank you, General. Just to be very candid with you, the $10 million is not a large

amount given the size of the Department of Defense spending.

Given the nature of what you are studying, it seems very prudent

to move forward with that. From our perspective, it seems that

that amount should be increased. I would like to see us have the

capability not 20 years from now, but in the near future when we

are seeing some of these emerging threats occur, to be able to have

space-based defensive interceptors.

With that said, there is a lot of discussion, as you know, about

even cutting missile defense so that we can focus more on Iraq and

Afghanistan, which are certainly on record as believing that we absolutely must prevail in those theaters. But having said that, I

think it is important not to leave out the other potential threats

that are ahead of us.

I wonder if you could explain, from your own perspective, what

threats you think are out there related perhaps to China or Iran,

that might be critical for us to have some progress with the space

test bed and the space-based defense in general.

General OBERING. First of all, we know a couple of things. We

know we are going to be surprised. We know that. We have been

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prised in the future. As an example, just a month or so before the

North Koreans launched the Taepo Dong 1 in 1998, the experts

were predicting that that wouldn’t occur for five to eight years. So

that was a surprise that really caught a lot of folks off-hand.

We don’t know what is going to happen with respect to the maturation of the rogue nation threats—North Korea, Iran, and potentially others. We also don’t know necessarily where the access of

attack may come from 15 or 20 years from now, and being able to

try to understand and guess that, and then get defenses in place

for us enough at a terrestrial base.

We are seeing right now some of the engagement with our allies

in terms of locations or sites for missile defense purposes on territory. We know that that engagement takes a while to be able to

accomplish. Having the flexibility to be able to move to space where

you do have that freedom of action is something that I think could

be generated in order to address those future uncertainties.

I can’t predict what those future threats may be. If I could, I

could save the American people an awful lot of money, but I can’t

do that. So what we think is that it is prudent that you keep your

options open and not foreclose on those options prematurely or not

even embark at all. So that is the rationale behind our thinking of

keeping this balance.

By the way, that applies to not just the space test bed, but also

to anything we are doing with respect to future capabilities. If we

had singularly focused on just near-term capabilities back in the

mid–1990’s, there would not have been a system to turn on last

summer when the North Koreans launched those missiles. There

would have been no activation of any operational Ground-Based

Mid-Course Defense Program because it probably would not have

been in place.

And so, when we fielded the dozens and dozens of phone calls

that we received from the media and from other organizations

about what can we do to protect the United States, it was a good

thing we had an answer ready—yes, we do have a system that

could be activated.

Mr. FRANKS. Thank you again.

Thank you, Madam Chair.

Ms. TAUSCHER. Mr. Franks, you are welcome.

Dr. McQueary, over the past several years, ODT&E has played

an increasingly larger role in the missile defense testing system.

That said, I understand that ODT&E, and you actually mentioned

it in your testimony, your existing authorities with regard to the

missile defense testing program are primarily advisory. And you

state that to be correct.

For the record, could you state what ODT&E’s specific authorities are with regard to the missile defense testing program? For example, if ODT&E believes that a certain missile defense element

is not working properly, do you currently have the authority to

order further evaluation of that element?

And could you just give us a compare-and-contrast of what authorities you currently possess with other major defense programs,

versus what your authorities are for MDA?

Dr. MCQUEARY. Thank you. If I don’t get all of that, please come

back.

25

Specifically, the authorities were given to us by the Congress in

the fiscal year 2002 National Defense Appropriation Act (NDAA),

which was to provide an overall assessment. So that is the role, the

designated responsibility that we have. We were also given the responsibility to look at operationally realistic tests in the fiscal year

2005 NDAA. And then finally, we were asked to do the block assessment in the fiscal year 2006 NDAA.

Ms. TAUSCHER. Is this kind of a transactional thing? It is almost

as if you don’t have broad powers. You have almost a transactional

per system, per designation of a certain block to do your ODT&E

work.

Dr. MCQUEARY. That is the nature of the language.

However, let me say this, and I think this is a really important

point. In the time period that I personally have been in the job, for

eight months—and so I am sort of the youngest one here in terms

of time on the job, not in terms of calendar age—but my interaction

with General Obering and his staff has been nothing short of outstanding in terms of the relationship, the willingness to listen to

us, the willingness to work with us in order to be able to make sure

that we can get the information necessary to provide you, and the

Secretary of Defense, the necessary assessments that we can,

which really focuses on the effectiveness of the system and suitability of the system. I touched upon those things in my comments.

So from the standpoint of our ability to do the job, I don’t have

any shortcomings in order to be able to do that. With that being

said, however, I would say that is highly dependent upon the nature and characteristics of the people who are in the leadership

roles, because it did not work quite as well as that under previous

leadership, as you may know and others certainly know.

Ms. TAUSCHER. We are all happy to have General Obering here.

Dr. MCQUEARY. We are all happy to have General Obering here

for a lot of good reasons. He has been very forthcoming in every

regard. So from that standpoint, I don’t feel that there is any shortcomings in our ability to provide you the assessments, and I certainly have not felt any pressures coming from anyone to provide

other than forthright, candid assessments for the system.

Ms. TAUSCHER. Could you just briefly compare-and-contrast the

scope of your authority in other kinds of major defense programs

versus your MDA?

Dr. MCQUEARY. Particularly with the AK–1 programs, and then

there are programs that Congress would designate as wishing to

have OT&E have the oversight responsibility on. The things that

we would do there is provide the final reports on whether a system

is operationally effective, and suitable.

We would participate during the decision process as to whether

the initial production done on the system. We would provide reports. We don’t actually make the decision, but we provide information. And then finally, a major responsibility that we have for the

larger programs is providing the beyond a low-rate initial production report, which is the basis for the authorization to go forward

to full-scale production.

We don’t have those authorizations here, but quite frankly, MDA

is a different kind of a program in the sense that it is made up of

systems that are relatively mature; systems that are new. So I beVerDate 22-MAR-2001 08:55 Oct 03, 2008 Jkt 037954 PO 00000 Frm 00029 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\110-48\086290.000 HAS2 PsN: HAS2
26

lieve that under the circumstances that we have, that this is a

great opportunity for the country to explore alternative ways of acquisition reform as long as this continues to work.

If I may, one other point and I will stop. I think a high mark

in looking back over the history is when they had the two Fairers

and MDA had the two Fairers. What the program did then was

stop, take a look at what needed to be done, brought in outside advisers, didn’t go forward until there was a clear understanding, and

that was reported to the Congress and to the Secretary of Defense

as to what needed to be done.

I think that is a hallmark of this program, in being able to stop.

Because if you have problems, you don’t want to just keep going

forward. You want to stop and find out because it is important to

look at the data and react to that.

Ms. TAUSCHER. Thank you, Dr. McQueary.

Mr. Everett, for a second round of questions?

Mr. EVERETT. Thank you, Madam Chairman.

In regards to General Obering, who is a native of Birmingham,

Alabama——

Ms. TAUSCHER. A favorite son. [Laughter.]

Mr. EVERETT [continuing]. And General Campbell, being in

Huntsville permanently in June, and my great friend Bud Cramer,

who represents Huntsville, and then there is staff in L.A., which

is Lower Alabama——

[Laughter.]

We are going to fix these missile defense problems. [Laughter.]

General Obering, you and I have had this discussion before, but

will the decisions on ABL and KEI be delayed until ABL’s test shot

is completed? I believe that test is in 2009. If it is delayed longer

than that will you do away with one of the programs?

General OBERING. If the Airborne Laser is meeting its knowledge

points and is doing so in a fashion that we believe is conducive to

continuing the program, as I said, and that means affordability and

everything else, then we would not pursue the KEI as a boostphase defense program.

On the other hand, if the Airborne Laser does not meet the

knowledge points or we believe has a severe schedule risk in doing

so, then we would have to exercise the KEI option as the boostphase defense. So we will not proceed with both of those programs

beyond the boost phase for a boost-phase capability. There may be

some aspects of the KEI program that are very attractive in terms

of that high-acceleration booster that may be incorporated downstream in our silo-based capabilities, but for a boost-phased defense

program, we would only carry one of those forward.

Mr. EVERETT. Have we redefined the mission of KEI?

General OBERING. We have not redefined the mission in terms of

the contribution of that to the system otherwise. It is still looking

at being the alternative for Airborne Laser if it does not succeed

as a boost-phase capability. But what is interesting, and it came

after the fact, frankly, is that with a very high acceleration booster

that could be made available in the mid-course role as well, it becomes—think of it more as a utility player, having a pitcher for example, that is a very, very good at pitching, but also can play in

other positions in the outfield.

27

So that is something that would not be the same cost. Obviously,

it would be a much reduced program to be able to do that for the

future.

Mr. EVERETT. Dr. McQueary, I believe General Obering said he

was paying about 20 percent of his budget on testing.

Was that correct, General Obering?

General OBERING. Yes, sir.

Mr. EVERETT. Is that enough money? Is that enough resources to

do the testing we need?

Dr. MCQUEARY. I am not in a position to judge the amount of the

money. I am in a much better position to judge the test program

that has been put together, and I assume General Obering and his

folks have put together a very convincing story as to how much it

costs to do that.

I do believe the test program is a very viable test program. I

have looked at the program, as I indicated, after the restructuring

took place. As I indicated in my remarks, the emphasis is on continually increasing the space in which we are working, and I think

that is extremely important.

I do believe that the manner in which they put the program together to give time between tests to thoroughly analyze the information that is gathered from a test, which can be measured in

probably billions of digits if you wish to. It is very important to do

that. It is important to know what was wrong from the previous

test before going on to the next one.

So I think they have put together a very careful and principled

test program. As long as it continues to be as successful as it has,

I think the country can look forward to a very successful program.

Mr. EVERETT. Sounds like an A-plus to me. [Laughter.]

General OBERING. Could I make a comment, if that is possible,

please?

Mr. EVERETT. Absolutely.

General OBERING. I want to comment on what Dr. McQueary

said about engagement and tie it back to something you said,

Madam Chairman.

There is this perspective out there that in the manner in which

MDA does business, even structurally, forgetting personalities, that

we don’t somehow pay enough attention to OT&E or that they don’t

have enough authority, so to speak, within our context.

I would say almost the opposite is the case, because what happened is a lot of what happened in the standard acquisition processes. If you stop and think about the timeframes that many of

those were grown in, it is where we had large-scale developments,

then we had long production runs. Once that program was out the

door in that production run, it was gone and you were spending a

lot of money on those production rates.

So the whole construct is that the testers had to be the final step

of approval before that occurred, and therefore incurred a lot of expense on the part of the government. We are actually engaging

them on a much more regular basis and a much longer continuous

basis. So this idea of spiral development, one of the aspects of that

is spiral testing. So there is not a point at which we say, off you

go. We are continually coming back to them and working with

them as we go through the maturation of the process.

28

So that is why it is different. I can see how people get the impression that they do, but it really is a strong engagement that we

have with them, and they are fully integrated into all of our processes.

Mr. EVERETT. Thank you.

Madam Chairman, I may have some questions for the record, but

I am going to rest for the time being.

Ms. TAUSCHER. Certainly. Yes, sir.

Before I yield to Mr. Larsen, I think, General Obering, you bring

up a very important point because I think that in the paradigm

change to spiral development, what is obvious is that you have a

very good colleague here in Dr. McQueary. I think that there is certainly a sense that I have that there was a lingering question as

to the kinds of operational tests and ground testing and flight testing and other things in this new paradigm of spiral development.

When you say ‘‘spiral testing,’’ my head starts spinning a little

bit more than I think it is meant to, but I think that what is important here is that you have a 20 percent budget of a very large

budget, that is including testing. What is tough and difficult for

some people to understand and is a challenge that I think you are

going to have to repeatedly explain is that that is a very big number. It is a very big number for a deployed system.

The truth is that on the one hand, I think that you are trying

to get credit, as you should, for having a lot of money for testing

during a time when you have had criticism for not testing enough.

The truth is some people will look at you and say, well, what are

you testing a deployed system for? That is a lot of money to be

spending on a system you have deployed.

So I think the challenge you have, and this is true for everything

that is new, is that when you break a paradigm and you do something new, you constantly have to bring people back to a sense that

things have to be looked at through the paradigm differently, and

that you have challenges to do that.

One of the reasons why I think this has been a very good hearing

to have all of you here, and we appreciate that, is that I think that

we are fleshing out some of these things, and I think we are getting a better sense for the fact that you can’t use old modeling contexts for this. Once you do, you find yourself in terrain that causes

a lack of understanding and maybe undue criticism.

I am happy to yield five minutes to the gentleman from Washington, Mr. Larsen.

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. I know you

weren’t saying this. I am perfectly comfortable with your testing.

[Laughter.]

When I got on this subcommittee a couple of years ago, it seemed

like we were moving far ahead of what we were able to do. General

Obering and staff began to break down their testing regimen a little better into a walk, then run, process. I think the result has

been a lot more confidence.

I have a question, and this may be more of a future question, but

it has to do with the concept of operations, and specifically ABL,

but it can even be applied to other assets within the MDA realm.

Assuming that at some point in the future, lasing works just as we

want it to work. And then we have it on the aircraft. Who owns

29

that asset? Does that become an MDA asset? Or does the Air Force

get that asset?

In the context of that question, I want to ask you about, getting

back to Chairwoman Tauscher’s first question about addressing

mobility of assets in Europe, why choose a ground-based system

versus land, mobile or even sea-mobile assets for protection. Who

owns these assets? Who makes the decision on their deployment?

Because we are still sort of in that testing stage, but we are in an

operational phase as well. Who says we need three aircraft to go

up in the air? Who says we need to send three Aegis destroyers to

place X to take care of this?

General OBERING. Okay. I will try to break that down, and then

General Campbell may want to add something here.

First of all, when we get a component or element of the system

to a level of maturation that can be operated and supported by a

service, typically a lead service is designated and we transfer operations and support responsibilities to that lead service. And then

that asset is actually owned in that parlance, for operational purposes, about deciding if it is mobile, where it goes, that is usually

owned by the combatant commander who provides that operational

control.

What we do, again, is develop them to a state of maturity, and

then transition those. Lead service designation, for example, has

been made for our forward-deployed radar, for our upgraded early

warning radars. We anticipate that it will be made soon for the

massive sea-based X-Band Radar. We are getting indications that

the Navy will do that. So that is the idea of transitioning and

transfer of operations and support.

Now, from an ownership perspective in terms of ongoing sustaining engineering, ongoing development of the asset, we perceive

MDA to still be in that role and that responsibility. There is a key

reason for that. As I said earlier, we are building an integrated,

layered system. We want to make sure that that integration and

that layering continues into the future as we continue to upgrade

and modify the components. And so we think it is important that

MDA stays in that role as the sustaining engineer, so to speak, and

the configuration manager of that asset.

Mr. LARSEN. Let me ask this: Does that mean that we will be

digging through the Navy budget, and the Air Force budget, and

the Army budget as the operational control of these assets moves

to either the services or to combatant commands?

General OBERING. It means that they will probably execute that

into their O&M lines.

Mr. LARSEN. O&M?

General OBERING. Yes, sir. That is where it would be. It would

not be in any RDT&E line or anything like that.

Mr. LARSEN. Can you address your thoughts with regard to Europe and missile-based, land-based, sea-based?

General OBERING. Yes, sir. I will. The idea in the mission to extend, and it is important to remember we have a significant number of deployed forces in the European theater, and Americans

frankly are living there as well. So in addition to providing protection for our deployed forces and our allies and our friends, a third

site in the European area would also provide protection for the U.S.

30

homeland as well. It provides redundancy over a majority of the

homeland. So that is the ‘‘why’’ we think this is important.

The ‘‘when’’ is urgent because we can’t judge the Iranian threat,

but we know that it is emerging and most of the ‘‘experts’’ believe

that it will be sometime before 2015 that this will occur. I don’t

know how accurate that is, but I do know that we have to use some

criteria.

But when we went through the analysis that says, what should

we use for this protection, we looked at land-based. We looked at

mobile sea-based and mobile land-based assets. The analysis shows

that for the window of vulnerability, so to speak, for the urgency

of this, for the coverage that you get, and for the cost-effectiveness,

the land-based silos are the right way to go to be able to provide

that coverage.

As I mentioned earlier, that doesn’t mean that later they can’t

be augmented by these more mobile assets, but we are a long way

from having that capability to be able to cover. In addition, just

from a numbers game, it doesn’t pan out because to provide the

same coverage that you would need to provide——

Mr. LARSEN. That number is in terms of missiles or in terms of

budget?

General OBERING. In terms of actual interceptors. For example,

to provide the same coverage that you get with these land-based

silo missiles, you would need a number of ships around the clock

24/7 to provide that persistent coverage, and then you need a number of ships just like it is typically three to one of Airborne Laser

to one orbit.

It is the same type of thing for a ship. So now you are tying up

anywhere from 12 to 15 ships, depending on the locations, to do

this mission. It is not very cost- or operationally effective. The

shorter-range coverage that would be provided by, for example, a

modified and much improved THAAD missile, the definitive footprint is much, much smaller, and there are problems there with respect to some of where it does the intercepts for the long-range. I

can’t go into any more detail than that.

Suffice it to say, we looked at all those options when we went

through this analysis, and the location in terms of the Czech Republic and Poland, as well as the methodology by which we are

doing this, was optimized.

Mr. LARSEN. Yes.

General CAMPBELL. Congressman Larsen, may I add? On the

concept of operations, the Missile Defense Agency will develop a

concept usually at the platform level, how that particular platform

works. As we see the capability develop and we understand the

operational parameters, then we work to integrate it into an overarching concept that spans across the combatant commanders.

As to specific ownership, that may be situationally dependent.

We don’t get hung-up on who owns it. We are going to move the

asset to where it needs to be employed, and then command and

control it in the most effective way. So it could be any combatant

commander who ends up controlling that global asset.

Ms. TAUSCHER. Thank you, Mr. Larsen.

Mr. Franks for five minutes.

Mr. FRANKS. Thank you, Madam Chair.

31

Madam Chair, I don’t usually skip over general officers here in

asking questions, but when there is that second round, sometimes

someone gets the chance, and Mr. Green this is mine here.

Mr. Green, I am going, if it is all right, to develop Mr. Larsen’s

question just a little bit because I think it is of critical import. General Craddock recently provided our subcommittee with written

testimony to the effect that legislative support for the European interceptor site, and let me just quote him, ‘‘would yield a significant

increase in the capabilities of combatant commands to effect

change and achieve goals throughout the area of responsibility.’’

Now, I have to take some issue, very respectfully, with the Chair

related to some of our discussions with allies there, whether it be

the Czech Republic or Poland, in placing a third site or a European

site there. It seems to me that the primary players or decisionmakers should be those allies and what is best for this country.

That should transcend any considerations that NATO might have.

I certainly don’t want to put you in a position of dealing with a

policy question like that, but do you agree with General Craddock’s

assessment of the absolute importance of funding a European interceptor site in enhancing the defense of the U.S. homeland in particular?

Secretary GREEN. I certainly agree that this system will play a

very important role in enhancing the defense of the United States

and enhancing the defense of our European allies and NATO. I

think the two are inextricably linked. As you improve the defense

of our NATO allies and our European allies, you enhance the security of the United States and vice versa. So I don’t think it is possible to tease them apart.

Certainly, the principal reason that we deploy missile defenses is

that it provides warfighter benefit. The fact that General Craddock

is a strong supporter of this I think speaks volumes for the importance of the European site.

Mr. FRANKS. Let me just ask you, what do you consider to be

your greatest obstacle to achieving progress in the area of the European interceptor site?

Secretary GREEN. Well, first of all, I think we are confident of

success. So in that sense, I would hesitate to identify any single obstacle as the principal obstacle. Obviously, there are a series of negotiations through which we have to proceed and we never take

those for granted. We are confident of success, but we have to sit

down with our Czech allies and our Polish allies and work through

the issues that arise there.

Again, we are very confident of success there. Obviously, we have

to persuade Congress that this is a good idea, and that we have

our justification properly aligned, and that Congress understands

the value of this. Again, we are going to pursue this in the NATO

context. We continue to do that and we will do that very vigorously.

So I wouldn’t identify any one obstacle as the main obstacle.

There are always discussions to be had, and issues to be worked

through, but again, we are very confident of that.

Mr. FRANKS. What you said very diplomatically is if anything

goes wrong, Congress will be the culprit. Right? [Laughter.]

Secretary GREEN. I simply noted that Congress is a key player

in this. [Laughter.]

32

Mr. FRANKS. I thank you, Mr. Green.

General Campbell, I guess I would ask you one of these broad

questions. Sometimes it is impossible for those of us even on a

panel like this to have anywhere near the technical and situational

understanding that all of you have. There is no question that when

you put on the uniform like that that your primary consideration

has to be human freedom and what is best for this country.

Given that, given that your motivations are there, your knowledge base is very important. So let me just ask you a pretty

straightforward, simple, easy, almost impossible to answer question. If we could solve any one problem for missile defense capability for this country in general, what do you think is the most important challenge that we face to develop a multi-layered missile

defense capability for this country?

General CAMPBELL. I think you actually gave me the answer in

your question, and that is you want to make this a complex problem for our enemies. The way we do that is we deploy and employ

a multi-layered system. That is as simple as I can say it. I think

that complicates their problem.

The other side of this is in terms of expanding it to allies and

friends. I think the broader the missile defense, you may then enable those countries to invest in other capabilities where we are

lacking. It may be chemical defense or chemical detection. So with

us expanding the system, we probably open the door for other allies

and friends to help us and help themselves.

Mr. FRANKS. Thank you very much. After this, the chair may

never let me ask another question, so I will thank all of you.

Ms. TAUSCHER. Of course I will let you ask a question, Mr.

Franks, but I do have a question for you.

General Craddock’s comments, were they done in his capacity as

the regional combatant commander for Europe? Or as the Supreme

Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR)? I would assume it was European Command (EUCOM) commander.

Mr. FRANKS. If you are asking me, I haven’t the slightest idea.

[Laughter.]

Ms. TAUSCHER. Well, when you have somebody that is dualhatted as General Craddock is, my assumption is that he was

speaking as the EUCOM commander. The truth is that he is dualhatted and he has another job, which is the Supreme Allied Commander of Europe, and that is the capacity that I want him to

begin to negotiate for everyone, for a NATO-fundamental treatment

for missile defense.

You can have as much time as you may consume in the next

hearing, Mr. Franks.

Mr. FRANKS. Thank you, ma’am. [Laughter.]

Ms. TAUSCHER. That was not a trick.

Mr. FRANKS. I was more concerned with the veracity of his statement than the hat he was wearing.

Ms. TAUSCHER. Lieutenant General Campbell, today we have

talked a little bit about the emerging missile defense threats from

Iran. That said, Iran currently has the largest short- and mediumrange missile force in the Middle East. Lieutenant General Campbell, can you tell me whether you believe we have a sufficient number of missile defense capabilities to defend our deployed forces and

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allies in the Central Command (CENTCOM) Area of Responsibility

(AOR) against the current Iranian missile threat?

General CAMPBELL. Madam Chairman, I think we have sufficient

forces to defend those priority assets that the commander designates in that particular theater. Could we cover every possible

population center and every host nation asset? The answer to that

would be no, today.

Now, with the addition of THAAD, and we add those layers to

the defense, and the Aegis BMD, then I think we are going to have

a capability that can protect many more assets in the theater. I

think if you looked inside any theater, you would probably get the

same response from that commander, that those assets we designate as critical to the warfighter and those selected population

centers, we can protect those.

Ms. TAUSCHER. Do we have the capability to support Aegis BMD

operations in CENTCOM AOR?

General CAMPBELL. I don’t think I can answer for CENTCOM,

but you could deploy the ship into CENTCOM today. I think that

ship in fact has deployed into CENTCOM already on a tour.

Ms. TAUSCHER. Into the second carrier battle group.

And what about PACCOM AOR? Do we currently have enough?

General CAMPBELL. Again, if we look at the defended asset list,

we have recently deployed additional PAC–3 units to Okinawa. We

have thickened the defense on the Korean Peninsula. I would think

if you asked the combatant commander of PACCOM and the commander of United States Forces Korea (USFK), he might answer

no, that he would like more protection, but in terms of critical asset

list, I think today that we have that in place.

Ms. TAUSCHER. Mr. Everett, do you have any further questions?

Mr. EVERETT. Madam Chairman, I do not, and I appreciate you

calling the meeting. I would like one final comment to the panel,

and that is that the continued strong support we have for DMD full

funding to include Aegis, BMD, PATRIOT, PAC–3 and the upgrade

of 2’s to 3’s, THAAD, C2BMC, and the supporting defense. And

thank you and your leadership for calling this meeting again.

Ms. TAUSCHER. Thank you, Mr. Everett.

I thank the members for attending.

Gentlemen, thank you very much for not only your significant

service to the country, but your willingness to come to the hearing

to give us your opinions, to give us very thoughtful statements

ahead of time.

I would be remiss if I didn’t thank the very seriously hardworking staff that you have sitting directly behind you taking copious notes to everything that we are saying. We see many of them

in meetings with you. They are apparently very hardworking and

indefatigable. We thank them for their hard work and service to

the country.

Mr. EVERETT. I just want to thank you for mentioning to the

panel, for thanking them for getting the statements in on time. I

just left an intel meeting where our good friend Silvestre Reyes

told the panel, he says, for the last time, to get those statements

in one time so we can structure the meeting. So I want to thank

you for bringing that up.

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Ms. TAUSCHER. I thank the ranking member. I think one of the

reasons why we are able to do that is because we have a very significantly hardworking professional staff on both the subcommittee

and the committee. I want to thank them for their very hard work

and their support.

Thank you all very much for attending this hearing.

The hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 4:43 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

A P P E N D I X

MARCH 27, 2007

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

MARCH 27, 2007

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QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. TAUSCHER

Ms. TAUSCHER. The Administration has made cooperation with friends and allies

a key element of the missile defense program. That said, I understand that sharing

classified information and technology with allies remains a key challenge. To what

extent is National Disclosure Policy preventing us from sharing missile defense information and technology with allies? What needs to be done to fix this? Are legislative changes required?

Secretary GREEN. As you note, the Administration places a priority on cooperation

with friends and allies to address the growing ballistic missile threat. However, before the Department can offer to sell any missile defense system to a foreign country, or to release performance related data in support of a potential sale, it must

complete three reviews. First, critical technologies must be reviewed to ensure that

appropriate technology security measures are established prior to an affirmative decision for release. Second the release of classified military information and technical

data must be approved by the interagency National Disclosure Policy Committee.

Third, DoD must assess whether there are any Missile Technology Control Regime

compliance issues. While this process may at times be challenging, it is serving its

intended purpose of ensuring valuable U.S. technology does not end up in the wrong

hands or is not used for purposes at odds with U.S. interests.

As previously conveyed in DoD’s response to your recent letter concerning release

of THAAD performance data to Israel, these processes are well established with respect to export of missile defense systems and supportive of our goals with regard

to cooperation, and we believe that no legislative changes are required.

Ms. TAUSCHER. The FY08 budget request includes funding for two additional

GMD intercept tests. How many GMD tests can the program effectively execute in

a given year? If Congress provided funds for an additional GMD flight test in FY08,

would that be useful?

General OBERING. The GMD flight test program has been sized for two system

level flight tests annually for several reasons.

• Due to the complexity of integrating new assets with existing assets and new

software with existing software, verifying the software and asset test readiness,

managing risk, and executing pre-mission system level testing and checkout,

pre-test preparation time is continually increasing. • The process of mission planning, conducting the test, analyzing the data and

incorporating the lessons learned into the next test takes around 6 months.

Additional funding for more than two system level flights tests in a year, if provided by the Congress, would not be useful because trying to add the tests would

significantly increase both schedule and program risk for the reasons stated above.

Ms. TAUSCHER. In the FY08 budget request, MDA is proposing that the United

States deploy ten ground-based interceptors in Europe. Why does MDA only plan

ten missiles in Europe? What analysis was done to support a decision to move forward with ten GBIs instead of 5, 30, or 40 GBIs?

General OBERING. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the

committee files.]

Ms. TAUSCHER. In its March 2007 report, ‘‘Missile Defense Acquisition Strategy

Generates Results but Delivers Less at a Higher Cost,’’ GAO stated that using research and development funds to purchase fielded assets reduces cost transparency

because these dollars are not covered by the full-funding policy for procurement.

GAO therefore recommended that the Secretary of Defense request and use procurement funds, rather than RDT&E funds, to acquire fielded assets. This would require

MDA to request money in full for the purchase of assets and produce an enhanced

audit trail. In response to their recommendations, DOD responded that its flexible

approach is appropriate because in an uncertain threat environment, MDA must be

able to accelerate or modify development of BMDS elements as may be required.

The Department further asserted that without this flexibility, the continuous development of missile defense assets would be inhibited. Please explain the effect that

fully funding the manufacture of fielded assets, such as interceptors and their subsequent upgrades, would reduce the Missile Defense Agency’s flexibility to address

new threats?

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General OBERING. The Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) is a single, integrated development program that provides layered defenses for the United States,

our deployed forces, friends and allies against ballistic missiles of all ranges in all

phases of flight. In 2002 the Department recognized that this complex and technically challenging mission required innovative approaches for developing and acquiring missile defenses and charged the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) with implementing a capabilities based requirements process to accomplish this mission.

A key advantage of the capabilities based approach is that it provides MDA with

the ability to make knowledge-based decisions and incrementally fund and field increments of capability that best support fielding missile defense assets responsive

to the threat. This flexible approach ultimately results in a reduced cycle time that

enables MDA to quickly deliver a militarily useful missile defense capability to the

warfighter.

The use of procurement funding would seriously hinder this approach as a viable

development and acquisition strategy by lengthening this cycle time and thereby

eroding the Agency’s ability to provide a timely response to current and evolving

ballistic missile threats. Analysis of data compiled by GAO in its March 2006 report

Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Major Weapons Programs shows that

the average major defense acquisition program has a cycle time of six years between

program start and authorization for production. So if MDA had been pursuing a traditional acquisition program since 2002 with a requirement to use procurement

funding for fielded assets, the nation would likely have no missile defense capability

today. Instead, for the first time in its history, the United States has a missile defense capability composed of numerous ground- and sea-based interceptors as well

as fixed and transportable radars, all integrated through a battle management command and control system. Imposing the full funding policy on the BMDS would force

the cancellation of most of the Agency’s development efforts as well as delays in

fielding of near-term programs currently resourced in the FY08 President’s Budget

request. These are the assets we can least afford to delay. The current capabilities

based approach using RDT&E funds mitigates this issue and provides the Agency

with the flexibility to develop and field missile defense assets in the shortest possible time.

The ballistic missile threats of today and tomorrow are both uncertain and evolving. In this environment, the traditional approach to acquiring defense assets with

procurement funds conflicts with the urgent need to develop and field missile defenses quickly. MDA has proven that missile defenses can be developed and fielded

in a more compressed timeframe as compared to the traditional acquisition approach. The Agency can also implement reporting that provides the level of transparency and accountability the Department of Defense and Congress have come to

expect. Continuing to use RDT&E funds in conjunction with a capabilities based approach will enable the Agency to continue developing and fielding missile defenses

in the shortest possible time, and thereby provide the warfighter with a faster and

more decisive response to the evolving ballistic missile threats. The use of procurement funds and use of the traditional acquisition process should be deferred until

substantial additional BMDS development has been completed.

Ms. TAUSCHER. ABL and KEI have been discussed as the two viable alternatives

to conduct boost-phase intercepts. In January 2005, MDA established ABL as the

primary boost phase defense element, but continued KEI’s development as risk mitigation. The Missile Defense Agency is considering a down select or source selection

that would decide whether ABL or KEI would be the BMDS boost phase capability.

A decision on both element’s futures was planned for 2008, but ABL recently announced that the lethality test that will demonstrate the element’s critical technologies has been delayed until 2009. Will the decision on ABL and KEI be delayed

until after ABL’s lethality test is completed? If ABL’s lethality test is delayed past

2009, will the agency continue to invest in both ABL and KEI?

General OBERING. The Airborne Laser is the primary Ballistic Missile Defense element being developed for providing a boost phase capability. As I stated in my written testimony, either ABL or the kinetic energy booster will be selected to provide

the primary boost phase capability before 2010 based upon information gathered

during initial testing.

Based on the Defense Science Board’s recommendation, we are considering KEI’s

booster development effort as an alternative boost phase capability in the event ABL

does not meet critical knowledge points in its test program. If the Airborne Laser

meets its knowledge points, and other factors are conducive to continuing the ABL

we will not pursue KEI as a boost phase defense segment within the Ballistic Missile Defense System.

The Airborne Laser is on track to conduct a lethal shoot down of a ballistic missile

target in 2009 and the Kinetic Energy Interceptor is on track to conduct a flight

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test of its high acceleration booster in 2008. Each test contributes essential knowledge about the technical feasibility of these approaches; knowledge that is required

to make an informed decision.

Ms. TAUSCHER. The ABL program experienced a number of technical problems

during Fiscal Year 2006 that may impact future decisions for the BMDS program.

The problems which were partially due to Beam Control/Fire Control software difficulties, but were also caused by integration and testing of the system including

unexpected hardware failure resulted in a 3-1/2 month delay in its ground test program. The program planned to demonstrate its critical technologies in 2008 during

a lethality demonstration. However, fiscal year 2006 delays have pushed the

planned lethality demonstration into 2009. Have all software problems been resolved? If not, what is the plan to correct all issues and will the corrective actions

further delay the lethality test planned for 2009.

General OBERING. All required software issues encountered during FY06 have

been fixed; however, as of May 21, not all software fixes have been tested in flight.

The two major issues encountered during ground test were the automated engagement sequence through propagation of the Surrogate High Energy Laser (SHEL)

and the ability to place the required energy on target, i.e. strehl. Both issues have

been addressed and have undergone regression testing on the ground. Final verification will occur during the on-going flight test program that is expected to be completed in July, 2007. The 2009 lethality test date was set based upon a joint contractor/program office schedule risk assessment that considered the time required to resolve known technical issues. Further delays to the 2009 lethality test are not anticipated at this time.

Ms. TAUSCHER. A recent end-to-end test conducted by the GMD system was successfully executed in September 2006 for one engagement scenario. According to

GMD personnel, the interceptor used in this test had been retrofitted with more reliable components. What modifications were made to the test interceptor prior to the

test? How similar is the test interceptor, including its booster and exoatmospheric

kill vehicle, to interceptors already emplaced in silos? Did the modification to the

test interceptor lead to any delays in the test? If so, how did the delay affect GMD’s

test schedule? Does MDA plan to retrofit all emplaced interceptors to the configuration of the test interceptor? If so, when will all retrofits be completed and at what

cost?

General OBERING. As components were being upgraded, they were added to the

test interceptor to flight test the upgrades prior to deployment to the field. The key

change was to retrofit the Polyacrylonitrile (PAN) Stage One booster nozzle with a

rayon nozzle, which was qualified and installed on the interceptor on June 8, 2006.

Interceptors began fielding with this nozzle following this successful flight test. The

FTG–02 test interceptor was also retrofitted with software upgrades in the

Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle (EKV) and Booster Avionics Module (BAM). Again,

these upgrades had completed ground testing before flight testing. Due to a suspect

potentiometer, the Stage 2 and 3 Thrust Vector Control Actuators were replaced

with a like unit which was not suspect.

One major goal of the GMD flight test program is to test operationally configured

GBI with as few changes as possible. The primary differences are instrumentation

to gather data from the test GBI and the addition of required range safety hardware, such as a flight termination system. The GBI used in FTG–02 did have some

hardware differences from the GBI which were emplaced at that point. The differences were the upgrades described above. These hardware upgrades began fielding this year, and the current fielding configuration matches (except for instrumentation and range safety test hardware) the GBI used in FTG–02. Software flown on

FTG–02 included enhanced capabilities for the EKV. These capabilities have begun

fielding and will be completed by June 2007.

Due to the overwhelming success of FT–1 in December 2005, the decision was

made to change FTG–02 into a full Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) test

including a threat-representative target. This increased test risk by adding significantly to the pool of assets required and to the overall test complexity. An additional

flight test was modified (FT–04–1) prior to FTG–02 from a radar check-out test to

a full BMDS system test with a simulated GBI. FT–04–1 was successfully conducted

on 23 Feb. 06 and served to reduce overall BMDS risk sufficiently to enable additional test objectives to be accomplished in FTG–02 well beyond those originally

planned. This contributed to the delay of FTG–02 and allowed sufficient time to incorporate several upgrades to the interceptor which also served to mitigate risk. The

success of FTG–02 enabled early demonstration of test objectives originally planned

for completion through FTG–04. Accordingly, additional BMDS sensors and test objectives have been included in FTG–04, thereby increasing the value of FTG–04 to

overall BMDS verification.

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MDA plans to take advantage of the periodic GBI maintenance activities referred

to as the GBI Refurbishment program to upgrade interceptors LDC 1–17 to the current configuration. The GBI Refurbishment program was modeled after the Intercontinental Ballistic Missile periodic maintenance, which removes each missile on

a rotation schedule and performs quality, shelf life and performance checks. The

GMD plan is to remove the first interceptor just short of the five year point. The

cost for the refurbishment program, to include both periodic maintenance and all

upgrades and improvements for the first 17 GBIs emplaced, is contained within the

2008 Presidents Budget and totals $72.5 million. MDA plans to complete the periodic maintenance and GBI retrofits in Fiscal Years 2009 and 2010. The EKV software upgrade for all emplaced interceptors will be completed by the end of June

2007 at a cost of $3.2M. All emplaced interceptors beyond LDC–17 already have

rayon Stage One nozzles and the other incremental improvements listed above.

Ms. TAUSCHER. The committee has been told that one of the key elements limiting

the current missile defense test program is the lack of infrastructure. What specific

actions can be taken to improve MDA’s testing infrastructure? What are the costs

associated with those steps?

General OBERING. MDA has made focused infrastructure investments to support

both flight and ground testing.

For flight test events, MDA has successfully integrated the service test ranges to

meet the test requirements of the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS). MDA

relies on the services to maintain the assets that fall under the Major Range and

Test Facility Base with oversight from the Department of Defense Test Resources

Management Center. Given the unique testing requirements and constraints, MDA

has limited influence on infrastructure at the ranges. To augment the capabilities

of the service test ranges, MDA has focused investments on mobile test assets and

upgrades to the MRTFB assets that directly support those requirements. MDA recently completed development of two transportable telemetry systems. One is landbased at the Naval Air Station, Whidbey Island; the other is hosted on the Pacific

Collector, an ocean going ship. Both assets provide a great deal of scenario flexibility. MDA is also developing a transportable S/X-band radar to further enhance our

data collection capability. For ground test events, MDA has developed dedicated labs

that provide element representations to support dedicated system-level testing.

MDA recently completed development of a dedicated C2BMC test lab and recently

initiated development of a test support capability to provide a more robust SBIRS

emulation in our ground testing. We are also developing plans to transition one of

the GMD tests labs to provide dedicated system-level test support. With these initiatives and investments, MDA is well-position to support future test requirements.

For ground test events, additional system test infrastructure would provide for a

more robust test capability, including Command, Control, Battle Management, and

Communications (C2BMC) infrastructure and a Ballistic Missile Defense System

(BMDS) test control center at the Missile Defense Integration and Operations Center (MDIOC). This would enable BMDS interoperability and performance testing of

the integrated BMDS without impacting concurrent system development and fielding activities.

While the President’s Budget fully supports MDA flight and ground testing, these

specific items would further improve MDA’s ability to robustly test the BMDS:

• System ground test infrastructure (C2BMC and test control center) at the

MDIOC ($10M)

• Dedicated mobile satellite communications shelter to support testing of deployed

test assets. ($10M)

• Upgrades to Vandenberg Air Force Base Range Safety and Telemetry infrastructure to support classified operations and higher data rates and integrate

secure communications throughout the base’s test facilities ($15M).

These areas will be given priority in our PBR–09 planning process.

Ms. TAUSCHER. One of the key limiting factors of MDA’s test program has been

the lack of sufficient number of missile defense targets. Do you currently have a sufficient amount of targets to execute your testing program? If not, what can we do

to improve the number of targets? Would additional funds in this area be helpful?

General OBERING. MDA Targets and Countermeasures Directorate (MDA/TC)

presently has a sufficient number of target vehicles to cover the current Ballistic

Missile Defense System (BMDS) test plan. However, MDA does not have the funding to provide spare targets in support of test plans.

The Flexible Target Family (FTF) provides greater performance capability, a reduced build time, a portfolio-wide systems engineering approach, and greater commonality of parts. In this way, the FTF offers assurance of having the target hardware needed to adjust to changing test requirements with minimum lead time.

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Building the Flexible Target Family (FTF) of interchangeable target components enhances the BMDS test program. A ready inventory of components common to a

number of target configurations that can be used by the BMDS test program would

implement significantly reduced turnaround times.

Additional funding of the FTF targets and countermeasures would allow greater

flexibility toward inventory-based procurement and management of targets to mix

and match to reduce lead time.

Ms. TAUSCHER. The committee has been informed that the Missile Defense Agency

plans to reduce the total number of THAAD flight tests by three. What were the

key reasons behind the decision to reduce the number of THAAD flight tests? What

are the risks associated with reducing the number of THAAD tests?

General OBERING. The philosophy of the THAAD flight test program is to conduct

tests of increasing complexity to demonstrate system performance and to provide

data to anchor system models and simulations. As successful flight tests are conducted, data analysis is performed, and confidence gained through success, the remaining flight test matrix is reviewed to ensure the data requirements are still

valid. There were three factors considered in reducing flight tests:

(1) Successes realized in the initial flight and ground tests has reduced risk for

the balance of planned tests.

(2) Successes created an opportunity to realize cost savings to mitigate unfavorable cost variances without compromising data collection to anchor models

and simulations.

(3) Reduced flight tests minimized cost and schedule risk given scarce range

and target resources.

In summary, all the flight test objectives of the deleted three flights were reallocated to remaining flights and will be demonstrated in those future missions.

Ms. TAUSCHER. I understand that THAAD’s performance could be enhanced/increased by adding a second-stage to the current interceptor. Have you done any

modeling examining the contribution that an upgraded THAAD could make to the

overall missile defense mission? Does MDA plan to put any money into exploring

this option? If not, why?

General OBERING. The Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) is an

emerging capability for area defense. The Agency has conducted analysis of

THAAD’s performance with a second-stage booster to the current interceptor for several scenarios to include the defense of Europe against an Iranian threat and the

defense of the DC area against a similar threat. Adding a second-stage to the

THAAD interceptor is only one of many enhancements to THAAD that the Department is considering. The Department has not made a decision on increasing the

robustness of the capability for regional defense. We are continuing to evaluate the

efficacy of ‘‘growth THAAD’’ capability to the BMDS as part of the MDA 2007 Summer Study. THAAD shows great promise, and its capability needs to be examined

further with regard to sensor and command and control networks to optimize the

design to meet BMDS performance requirements.

Ms. TAUSCHER. Is the SM–3 Block 1B missile capable of protecting the

Fylingdales radar from an intermediate range ballistic missile from Iran?

General OBERING. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the

committee files.]

Ms. TAUSCHER. According to MDA budget materials, the ABL will no longer be

described as part of the BMDS block structure organization, but as a capability investment designation. Why did MDA make this change? When does MDA expect to

have a deployable ABL capability?

General OBERING. Beginning with our FY08 President’s Budget request, MDA is

not associating a program with a specific block if the estimated schedule for that

program does not provide a missile defense capability until after the Block 2012

timeframe. Instead, these programs are considered to be capability investments that

will address threat maturation, uncertainty and surprise beyond the current FYDP.

This approach is a result of our continuing review of the BMDS block structure.

This approach is also responsive to GAO concerns. With respect to ABL, GAO has

noted that while the Agency has been including resources for ABL in the budget

breakdowns for various blocks, there were no plans for ABL to provide a missile defense capability within the timeframes for the blocks listed in the Agency’s FY08

budget request. Removing ABL from the block structure resolves this disconnect and

responds to the GAO’s concern.

MDA expects that ABL will have a deployable capability no earlier than 2017.

Pending successful completion of the lethal demonstration scheduled for 2009, the

ABL Tail 1 test asset could be used to provide a limited defensive capability if needed.

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Ms. TAUSCHER. General Obering, you have stated that there is effective oversight

of the Missile Defense Agency, but that oversight is conducted at the ‘‘principal’’ not

the staff level. How can there be effective oversight at the principal level if their

staffs are not fully engaged in the process?

General OBERING. Remarks I have made on this point in various forums were

never meant to convey that support staff is not fully engaged in these matters. My

reference to involvement at the principal level was intended only to emphasize the

direct involvement of senior leaders in the Department on missile defense issues.

As a matter of routine, appropriate MDA staff is fully engaged with their counterparts in oversight offices such as AT&L, DOT&E and others. Furthermore, my staff

is equally engaged with all the major stakeholders in the BMDS program including

STRATCOM, the Combatant Commands, the Services. The contribution of staff is

invaluable both to supporting oversight of MDA and ensuring effective development

and fielding of missile defenses, and it was never my intention to suggest otherwise.

Ms. TAUSCHER. In 2002, former Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld exempted the Missile Defense Agency from the normal DOD requirements process. I understand that

STRATCOM and MDA have developed a new program called the Warfighter Involvement Program (WIP) to ensure warfighter views are incorporated into the missile defense development process. What are the key elements of the Warfighter Involvement Program? To date, are you satisfied with the Warfighter Involvement

Program? What happens if there’s a disagreement between STRATCOM and MDA

on an issue? How are differences resolved? Are there areas where the process could

be improved?

General CAMPBELL. U.S. Strategic Command developed the Warfighter Involvement Process (WIP) to provide Warfighters an input mechanism to the Missile Defense Agency’s (MDA) development process. The WIP is a collaborative forum between the Warfighters from the Combatant Commands to identify, analyze, and

prioritize capability needs for global missile defense. The products of the WIP include the Prioritized Capabilities List (PCL), designed as a vision document for overall capabilities needed for a missile defense system, and the Modification Request

List (MRL), designed as a document to express Warfighter desired modifications to

fielded systems.

To date, two versions of the PCL and one version of the MRL have been published. In response, MDA has acted upon a number of capability needs, within current fiscal constraints, to address Warfighters’ needs. MDA also plans to conduct detailed analysis this year to respond to the 2007 PCL, published earlier this year.

The WIP process, and MDA’s response to the Warfighter needs, is governed by the

Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Management Structure. This body provides the corporate governance to address pressing issues between the stakeholders.

The process was established two years ago and has taken hold. The Warfighter

and MDA are embracing the process and continue to make improvements. We are

making progress in institutionalizing the WIP to address evolving challenges of developing and deploying the BMDS capability.

Ms. TAUSCHER. The Missile Defense Agency is first and foremost a research and

development organization. However, over the past several years it has assumed a

number of other missions because the military services have generally been reluctant to assume responsibility for procuring, fielding, and sustaining missile defense

capabilities. General Campbell, in your view, is the Missile Defense Agency in its

present form organized appropriately to provide effective support to the warfighter?

Should we consider refocusing MDA’s mission from research and development to

combat support?

General CAMPBELL. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) has assumed additional

missions in recent years in response to Presidential direction to field an initial set

of missile defense capabilities. The Agency has satisfied this requirement by fielding

developmental assets and providing funding for their operation and sustainment.

The Warfighters and Services are working closely with MDA to provide the needed capability. MDA recently established the Warfighter Support Center at the Missile Defense Integration and Operations Center (MDIOC) in Colorado Springs, collocated with the Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense (JFCC–IMD). This new organization is already paying dividends with respect

to the deployed BMDS’ operation and sustainment. The Warfighter Support Center

provides timely and effective support to the Warfighter.

As for combat support, MDA has been aggressively supporting the Warfighter

mission areas by fielding new systems immediately through future upgrades and

spiral development. MDA is providing an equitable balance between providing the

initial support to transition capability to a Lead Service while continuing the research and development mission. There are no plans at this time to refocus MDA’s

mission from research and development to combat support.

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Ms. TAUSCHER. In 2002, the Unified Command Plan (UCP) assigned the U.S.

Strategic Command (STRATCOM) responsibility for planning, coordinating, and integrating global missile defense operations. That said, much has occurred since

then. Given the lessons we have learned since 2002, do you anticipate any changes

or revisions to the UCP with regard to missile defense? If so, what changes? Is it

possible that STRATCOM could potentially be assigned execution authority?

General CAMPBELL. Over the past four years, U.S. Strategic Command

(USSTRATCOM) has made great strides in taking global missile defense from vision

to reality. Two key significant milestones are the standing up of the Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense (JFCC–IMD) as well as

the fielding of a midcourse ballistic defense system capable of defeating North Korean intercontinental ballistic missiles threatening the United States. We have

learned that global missile defense is much more than just ballistic missile defense

and I envision a possible advocacy role for USSTRATCOM to develop desired capabilities and characteristics on behalf of all the Warfighters for cruise missile defense.

USSTRATCOM currently has execution responsibilities for aspects of ballistic

missile defense such as operating critical sensor and command and control capabilities in support of geographic combatant commanders defending their area of responsibility. As the ballistic missile defense system architecture continues to expand, we

will continue to assess how best to realize global missile defense and to provide support to regional combatant commanders.

Ms. TAUSCHER. Currently, all Aegis ships capable of conducting BMD operation

are assigned to the Pacific and I understand that Commander 7th Fleet is reluctant

to release any of these vessels to other theaters such as CENTCOM and EUCOM.

At the same time, the United States and its friends and allies face a growing threat

from Iranian short and medium range ballistic missiles. Is there currently a requirement to provide a permanent Aegis BMD engagement capability in the CENTCOM

AOR? If Commander 7th Fleet is reluctant to release Aegis BMD engagement ships

to other regions of the world, are there any plans upgrade additional Aegis ships

to support CENTCOM and EUCOM?

General CAMPBELL. There is currently not a requirement to provide a permanent

Aegis BMD engagement capability to the CENTCOM AOR, however, several Aegis

BMD ships have deployed to CENTCOM recently through the normal rotation of

forces assigned. When a requirement for BMD forces emerges in a particular theater, it will be articulated and evaluated through the existing request for forces process and a sourcing solution will be developed. Pacific Command, Pacific Fleet, and

Seventh Fleet fully support this process and are aware of the potential for providing

Aegis BMD capability outside the PACOM AOR.

It is important to note that Aegis BMD engagement capability is in the early

stages of fielding, and although the Navy is aggressively making ship conversions

and building missiles, we have a thin line of SM–3 capability for the near-term. The

current development program includes 16 Pacific-based ships and two Atlanticbased ships by 2009. These ships are deployable world-wide; however, response time

is situation dependent.

Ms. TAUSCHER. I understand that U.S. Strategic Command has recently completed

a Capabilities Mix Study that examined the missile defense requirements of the

combatant commanders. What did the Capabilities Mix Study have to say about

COCOM requirements for SM–3 and THAAD? According to the study, do we have

sufficient numbers of SM–3 and THAAD interceptors to meet current requirements?

General CAMPBELL. The Joint Capabilities Mix (JCM) Study is an iterative opportunity for the joint communities of interest (including COCOMs, Services and the

Missile Defense Agency) to explore weapons and sensor mixes to counter the expected threats in three major theaters of operation in future epics. JCM I concluded

in April 2006 and influenced MDA programmatic decisions to increase the number

of THAAD Firing Units and interceptors, increase SM–3 interceptors, and start the

Sea-Based Terminal program. JCM II has just concluded and results are being

staffed and briefed through the Joint Requirement Overview Council (JROC) process. The findings provide an initial recommendation of the minimum number of

upper-tier (THAAD and SM–3) interceptors needed for combat operations in 2015

for a near-simultaneous two MCO fight. Additional study will be required to further

refine the analysis; however, results from this study indicate that for certain contingencies there is a need for more upper-tier interceptors than are currently programmed.

Ms. TAUSCHER. In September 2006, GMD conducted a successful end-to-end test

for one engagement sequence resulting in an intercept. Independent test agencies

report that while this test was important it is not sufficient to provide high confidence in the models and simulations that predict BMDS performance. In addition,

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Operational Test Agency officials suggested that the WILMA model currently used

to predict BMDS performance does not have sufficient fidelity for BMDS performance analysis. The Missile Defense Agency is currently developing a replacement for

the WILMA model. In the opinion of the Office of the Director, Operational Test and

Evaluation, how many GMD tests are needed to have high confidence that GMD can

intercept intercontinental ballistic missiles? When will the development and testing

of the replacement for the WILMA model be completed? Until the new model is developed, what confidence does the Missile Defense Agency have in its ability to predict the performance of the BMDS?

Mr. MCQUEARY. Fiscal constraints will likely make it impossible to achieve statistical confidence in the operational effectiveness and suitability of the BMDS. For example, to achieve 80% confidence that an element can perform its mission successfully 80% of the time (80/80), the element would have to complete 10 consecutive,

successful flight tests using the same geometry, scenario, and hardware/software

configuration. For higher confidence/success, the number of consecutive, successful

tests is even higher: 90/80–13, 80/90–21, and 90/90–28. Therefore, assessing the

operational effectiveness and suitability for each element is going to be a combination of flight tests and modeling and simulation. If I have validated models and simulations, the currently planned flight test programs for Aegis BMD and THAAD

should be adequate for me to assess operational effectiveness and suitability for

their current spiral development phases. This assumes no further reductions in

their currently planned flight test programs. On the other hand, the current GMD

flight test program has not yet completed the quantity of flight tests of the THAAD

or Aegis BMD programs. It has had only one successful, operationally realistic demonstration of its ability to destroy a threat representative target. Many more flight

tests are needed to demonstrate repeatability and to anchor the models and simulations.

General Obering is following a prudent ‘‘test-analyze-fix-test’’ approach which,

when he finds problems, results in testing delays. For example, he delayed FTG–

03 to May 2007 to fix software and add test equipment to the kill vehicle. At the

same time, MDA must validate its models, a process directly related to flight testing. As a result, at this time it is impossible for me to estimate the number of successful flight tests I will need to assess GMD operational effectiveness and suitability.

The WILMA model replacement is one, but not the only, BMDS-level model needed for BMDS performance assessments. For the BMDS, there are BMDS-level models and there are element-level models. I need both, correctly and efficiently working

together, to accurately assess capability. Generally, the element-level models are

more mature, have detailed validation plans, and are progressing toward validation

through ground and flight testing. The BMDS-level models are not ready for use in

my assessments, but are scheduled to be ready to assess the FTG–04 pre- and posttest events and the Block 06 BMDS in the fall of 2007. I am working with MDA

to understand the details and the timelines associated with development, integration, and validation of the BMDS-level models. The only way MDA can validate that

these models accurately predict BMDS performance is to ‘‘anchor’’ them to flight test

data, and we are working together to achieve this goal.

Ms. TAUSCHER. The committee has been informed that the Missile Defense Agency

plans to reduce the total number of THAAD flight tests by three. What are the risks

associated with reducing the number of THAAD tests? Does DOT&E agree with the

decision to reduce the number of flight tests?

Mr. MCQUEARY. Following the completion of the Demonstration/Validation phase

in 1998, the THAAD program developed a set of critical factors (such as intercept

altitude and radar detection range) that should be tested at stressing values to validate system performance throughout the battlespace. THAAD’s new flight test program will examine as many critical factors as possible. The number of critical factors stressed during testing has remained about the same. However, the number of

times any critical factor is stressed during flight testing has been reduced by about

a third. Validation of models and simulations should still be possible with the reduced number of flights, but, because of the large number of critical factors tested

in relatively few flight tests, any single test failure would now jeopardize model validation.

Target availability issues would have caused significant problems for the THAAD

program without a flight test program redesign. DOT&E supports the decision to

reduce the number of flight tests, but cautions that any flight test failure will likely

require the program to add further testing.

Ms. TAUSCHER. The committee has been told that one of the key elements limiting

the current missile defense test program is the lack of infrastructure. What specific

actions can be taken to improve MDA’s testing infrastructure?

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Mr. MCQUEARY. There are two infrastructure issues that limit the current missile

defense test program: availability of targets and implementation of Concurrent Test,

Training, and Operations (CTTO). First, target availability and reliability is affecting flight test program schedules. For example, MDA was forced to change the

THAAD flight test program recently because of target issues. MDA is reengineering

its target program to resolve the reliability issues with the current targets, and increase emphasis on the timely development and procurement of targets and spares

to support all BMDS test programs. Additionally, the Flexible Target Family Program which consolidates management, design, and production of ballistic missile

targets utilizing retired Navy Trident C–4 boosters, will increase reliability, performance and throughput. Second, MDA and the warfighters are not able to concurrently test, train, and operate the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS), a procedure known as CTTO. Because the ability to conduct concurrent testing and operations is limited, the cost in resources and schedule is significant when testing must

be delayed while portions of the BMDS are ‘‘on alert’’. Training on the system is

limited by peacetime and safety constraints. MDA has funded its plan to establish

the BMDS architecture necessary to achieve CTTO.

Ms. TAUSCHER. The U.S. and Israel have a long and deep cooperation in missile

defense. Can you provide us an update on current U.S.-Israeli Cooperation? Are

there impediments standing in the way of increased cooperation?

Secretary GREEN. U.S.-Israeli missile defense cooperation has been extensive. In

the past, Israel has acquired PATRIOT systems, and we have cooperated to develop

the Arrow Weapon System (AWS). We continue to work together on the Arrow System Improvement Program to enhance the AWS operational capabilities. U.S. companies are also co-producing Arrow components under the Arrow Enhanced Component Production Process. We are also negotiating with Israel on David’s Sling, a new

cooperative development program to counter short-range ballistic missiles. We are

not aware of any impediments to increased cooperation. While, current laws and

regulations require all technology transfers to be scrutinized on a case-by-case basis,

such a review is consistent with U.S. national security interests.

Ms. TAUSCHER. In the FY08 budget request, MDA announced that it plans to replace the unitary warhead on the SM–3 Block IIA missile—which the United States

is co-developing with Japan—with the multiple kill vehicle (MKV). To what extent

did the Department of Defense consult with Japan before it made the decision to

replace the unitary warhead on the SM–3 Block IIA missile with the MKV? What

has been the Japanese response to the U.S. decision?

Secretary GREEN. The FY 2008 President’s Budget Request reflects the co-development with Japan of the SM–3 Block IIA with a unitary warhead. The Department

has not made the decision to change the Block IIA payload to a multiple kill vehicle

(MKV). The U.S. has raised the subject with Japan within the context of addressing

more complex threats and has asked the Japanese to participate in a joint analysis

to determine the efficacy of the MKV on the Block IIA. The Japanese are evaluating

whether and how to participate in the joint analysis.

Ms. TAUSCHER. Until recently, there had been strong public support in Poland and

the Czech Republic for deploying U.S. missile defense capabilities on their respective

territories. However, over the past several months, public support for the potential

deployment has begun to decrease. What have been the key reasons contributing to

the change in public opinion in Poland or the Czech Republic? What impact will this

have on our decision to move forward?

Secretary GREEN. While I do not want to speculate on what factors may be contributing to public opinion in Poland and the Czech Republic on this issue, it is clear

that the host governments are beginning to conduct public awareness campaigns to

enable their citizens to gain a better understanding of U.S. plans to base missile

defenses in their countries. We are complementing these efforts by engaging the

wider European community on our missile defense plans to communicate how our

efforts contribute to overall regional security.

The host nation governments continue to support U.S. missile defense basing

plans. We are moving forward with plans to complete negotiations on basing and

security agreements later this year. These negotiated agreements ultimately must

be approved by the parliaments of each country, and the U.S. remains attentive to

the level of public and parliamentary support.

Ms. TAUSCHER. In testimony before the committee, you stated: ‘‘NATO as an alliance develops very few of its own capabilities. Most of its capabilities are actually

developed by individual nations or smaller groupings with NATO that develop a

particular capabilities, and then offer those capabilities in the context the NATO alliance.’’ While that is true, don’t nations usually offer those capabilities in the context of an overarching NATO requirement? Is there currently a NATO requirement

for protection of Alliance territory and population centers?

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Secretary GREEN. NATO member countries develop and field capabilities to meet

a wide range of national security objectives. These capabilities are integrated into

NATO forces through a force planning process. Most NATO capabilities are built up

in this manner. However, should a capability gap or new mission area be identified,

NATO planners may ask members to fill the gap. NATO itself develops very few

of its own capabilities, Active Layered Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (ALTBMD)

being one example.

NATO completed a study in 2006 on the feasibility of a NATO defense for European population and territory from long range missile attack. This study concluded

that such a defense is feasible. As a result of the 2006 feasibility study, NATO is

currently assessing the political and military implications of such a defense. It recently modified this effort to account for the deployment of U.S. missile defense assets in Europe.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. EVERETT

Mr. EVERETT. Please address technology risk reduction activities for MDA’s two

boost phase defense programs—ABL and KEI. What are each programs critical technologies, what specific actions have been (and will be) taken to mature technologies

and retire risk, and what criteria will be used to evaluate and then down select from

among the two boost phase programs?

General OBERING. ABL and KEI are important development efforts that leverage

technological progress to provide capability options to address future threats. To

minimize technology risks in development, these elements of the Ballistic Missile

Defense System must achieve specific knowledge points unique to that technology

before proceeding to the next acquisition phase. These planned events contribute essential knowledge about the technical feasibility of these approaches; knowledge

that is required to make an informed decision.

ABL is on track to conduct a lethal shootdown of a ballistic missile target in 2009.

The critical risks to be retired in order to develop an operational capability and relevant mitigation efforts underway are:

• Flight test of beam control and atmospheric compensation lasers against a cooperative airborne target. This risk will be mitigated by flight testing scheduled

to complete the summer of 2007. Once the high energy laser is installed on the

aircraft, ground and flight testing will continue in 2009.

• Integration of high energy laser modules with the modified Boeing 747 aircraft

in preparation of a lethal shoot-down of a ballistic missile target. This risk will

be mitigated by integration and test activities performed in the System Integration Laboratory (SIL), a 747–200 fuselage.

• Reliability of optical system performance, including compensation for atmospheric effects, aircraft induced optical jitter, and ensuring high beam quality in

an operational environment. This risk will be mitigated by hardware and software efforts to reduce optical jitter and improve beam control performance.

The KEI development effort has been restructured to focus on high-acceleration

booster component development and test. The critical risks to be retired are:

• Integrating high-energy propellants associated with smaller tactical missiles

into the larger configuration needed to achieve high performance, high maneuverability requirements.

• Demonstration of an integrated high-performance trapped-ball thrust vector

control system that increases mission flexibility.

In 2006, MDA conducted wind tunnel and other risk reduction tests to determine

KEI performance and assess trapped-ball thrust vector control of the first and second stage. Maturation of these technologies will continue with booster static fire

tests throughout 2007–2008. In 2008, a prototype 2-stage booster flight test will be

conducted to demonstrate technology readiness in a flight environment.

The Airborne Laser is on track to conduct a lethal shoot down of a ballistic missile

target in 2009 and the Kinetic Energy Interceptor is on track to conduct a flight

test of its high acceleration booster in 2008. Each test contributes essential knowledge about the technical feasibility of these approaches; knowledge that is required

to make an informed decision.

Mr. EVERETT. Please address technology risk reduction activities for MDA’s two

boost phase defense programs—ABL and KEI. What are each programs critical technologies, what specific actions have been (and will be) taken to mature technologies

and retire risk, and what criteria will be used to evaluate and then down select from

among the two boost phase programs?

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General CAMPBELL. The Airborne Laser (ABL) and Kinetic Energy Interceptor

(KEI) programs are important development efforts that leverage technological

progress to provide capability against future threats. To minimize technology risks

in development, these programs must achieve specific knowledge points before proceeding to the next acquisition phase. These knowledge points contribute essential

information about the technical feasibility of these approaches.

The ABL program is on track to conduct a lethal shootdown of a ballistic missile

target in 2009. The critical risks to be retired and ongoing mitigation efforts to develop an operational capability are:

• Flight testing of the beam control system to include the ability to compensate

for atmospheric effects. This risk will be mitigated by ongoing flight testing

scheduled to be completed by this summer. Once the high energy laser is installed on the aircraft, ground and flight testing will continue through 2009. • Integration of high energy laser modules in the modified 747—mitigated by integration and test activities performed in the System Integration Laboratory

(SIL), a 747–200 fuselage. • Reliability of optical system performance in an operational environment—mitigated by hardware and software efforts to reduce optical jitter and improve

beam control performance.

The KEI program has been restructured to focus on high-acceleration booster component development and testing to defer investments in weapon element development until after the critical knowledge points are achieved. The critical risk to be

retired is the integration of high-energy propellants associated with smaller tactical

missiles into the larger configuration needed to achieve the high performance and

high maneuverability for intercept of intercontinental ballistic missile threats. In

2006, the KEI program conducted wind tunnel and other risk reduction tests to determine energetic performance and assess thrust vector control operation of the first

and second stage. Maturation of these technologies will continue with booster static

fire tests throughout 2007 and 2008. In 2008, a prototype 2-stage booster flight test

will continue this maturation and risk reduction in a flight environment.

A boost phase decision will be made after the ABL and KEI programs complete

their respective knowledge points. In my discussions with Missile Defense Agency,

I understand that either ABL or KEI will be selected as the primary Ballistic Missile Defense boost phase program element before 2010.

Mr. EVERETT. The Missile Defense Agency is developing the Space Tracking and

Surveillance System (STSS), formerly known as SBIRS-Low, and has other activities ongoing in the space arena. How are your offices involved in coordinating

MDA’s space programs with the rest of the Department?

General OBERING. MDA incorporates existing Department space assets, like DSP/

SBIRS, into both the current operational BMDS, and future architecture decisions.

The STSS will rely on cues from DSP/SBIRS.

- MDA involves the Department in development activities to leverage expertise,

such as the Air Force Research Lab’s work on the NFIRE sensor payload.

- MDA’s STSS office is located at US Air Force’s Space and Missile Center in Los

Angeles to facilitate working level coordination with USAF space development activities.

- MDA has established a Space Experimentation Center in Colorado Springs from

which to operate MDA space assets, and to leverage data from Department space

programs.

- MDA conducts regular high level Boards of Directors meetings with the Services

to maintain mutual awareness of developmental and operational status—the DoD

Executive Agent for Space participates in this process.

- MDA has established a Transition and Transfer process to plan for Service operation of BMDS Elements, including STSS.

- Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) has been designated the lead Service component for STSS, and is incorporating STSS into their infrared satellite architecture.

Æ An Integrated Concept Team has been established to ensure AFSPC understanding of STSS capabilities, thereby allowing for a smoother transition once AFSPC

assumes operational control of STSS.

Æ AFSPC is using this information to budget for AFSPC support and manpower. Æ MDA is working with AFSPC to ensure suitable Operational Testing, and to ensure AFSPC understanding of STSS capabilities.

Mr. EVERETT. Additionally, please describe how MDA’s sensors could contribute

to providing space situational awareness?

General OBERING.

- Based on studies and sensor performance in ground tests, BMDS Block 2006 is

expected to be able to make contributions to space situational awareness (SSA),

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though it will not be able to fully meet AFSPC requirements, or be a substitute

or replacement for the planned Space Based Space Surveillance system (SBSS).

Æ Data collection for SSA is simpler than for BMDS operations, as the orbits of

space objects are generally much more stable than the track of a ballistic missile through space.

Æ BMDS Block 2006 likely to be able to make 10’s of observations per day, on

a non-interference basis with BMDS tasking.

Æ BMDS Block 2006 well suited to collecting information on many objects in low,

medium, geosynchronous and highly elliptical orbits.

- MDA also has three X-Band radars (AN/TPY–2, SBX, European Midcourse Radar)

that could contribute to space situational awareness.

Æ These radars are capable of providing track data on objects in Geosynchronous

Transfer Orbit (GTO) and Lower Earth Orbit (LEO).

Æ The radars do not currently have the necessary software to actively contribute

to space situational awareness.

Æ The planned upgrade to the European Midcourse Radar includes the capability

to perform the space situational awareness mission.

Æ This software functionality may be retrofitted on the AN/TPY–2 and SBX radars as a future capability.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FRANKS

Mr. FRANKS. Will the system proposed for deployment in Poland and the Czech

Republic be interoperable with NATO systems to include indigenous capabilities?

What is MDA doing to ensure interoperability?

General OBERING. The MDA has been working with NATO for over a decade to

develop strategies and standards to make interoperability between the NATO command and control (C2) systems and the US command, control, battle management,

and communications (C2BMC) system feasible. As the gateways to the weapon systems and sensor systems, the interoperability between the NATO C2 systems and

the C2BMC is essential. Since the C2BMC will be a critical element of the deployment in Poland and the Czech Republic, the cooperative work accomplished between

the United States and NATO such as agreement on Link-16 messages, joint range

extension protocol, and commonality of C2 architecture provides the foundation for

interoperability.

To ensure interoperability, the MDA has worked with the US Defense Information

Systems Agency (DISA) and with NATO counterparts to formalize agreements into

Military Standards (US) and Standardization Agreement (STANAG–NATO). In addition, the MDA has performed experiments with elements of NATO’s C2 systems

and plans to expand the types and functionality of experiments.

Mr. FRANKS. Will the system proposed for deployment in Poland and the Czech

Republic be interoperable with NATO systems to include indigenous capabilities?

What is MDA doing to ensure interoperability?

General CAMPBELL. The components of the Ballistic Missile Defense System to be

deployed in Poland and the Czech Republic will complement other NATO defense

systems and are consistent with the overall direction NATO is taking on missile defense.

As envisioned, the European components will enhance NATO security by providing many NATO allies with defensive coverage against a growing threat and by addressing a capability gap within the NATO system. NATO’s current missile defense

programs, and the future Active Layered Theater Ballistic Missile Defense

(ALTBMD), focus on short and medium-range threats while the focus of the new European component would be on long-range missiles fired from the Middle East.

The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) has been working with NATO for more than

10 years on interoperability between NATO command and control systems and U.S.

systems, and fully intends to ensure interoperability of the BMDS European component.

The U.S. is already engaged with key Allies in coalition operations involving theater missile defense assets. As the Ballistic Missile Defense System is deployed in

Europe, MDA will ensure the requisite technology is readily available to integrate

with Allies to provide layered missile defense capability. Enhancements to the current technical solutions are being examined and demonstrated by MDA and NATO

to increase interoperability opportunities. Together, the systems will provide a significant amount of opportunity for increased pre-crisis planning, shared situational

awareness, and information sharing. The Joint Functional Component Command for

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Integrated Missile Defense (JFCC–IMD) is actively working with the Allies to develop concepts and procedures for coalition operations for global missile defense.

Mr. FRANKS. What proportion of United States weapons systems or other actions

whose mission is to defend the United States homeland go through the full NATO

body, and therefore invite veto by one of the 26 NATO countries? How many bi-lateral agreements does the United States have in place with European nations that

are part of NATO? How many bi-lateral agreements for defense related assets does

the United States have world-wide?

Secretary GREEN. The Department of Defense knows of no U.S. systems for homeland defense or other actions related to the defense of the U.S. homeland that are

subject to NATO approval, including the deployment and employment of U.S. strategic deterrent forces. Each member country determines its own force structure capabilities and levels necessary to meet its national security objectives. NATO countries

may enter into bilateral or multilateral agreements to develop capabilities that can

be deployed under NATO sanctioned missions, but these cooperative developments

are not subject to NATO approval.

The U.S. has concluded a number of bilateral agreements with NATO Allies and

other countries worldwide. These agreements encompass the full range of operational, logistical, and materiel matters, and they support a number of U.S. strategic objectives, including the conduct of military operations, building foreign capacity,

and maintaining our global force posture.

In the area of missile defense, the U.S. has separate bilateral agreements with

the U.K. and Denmark to use sensors based in their countries in support of the strategic missile defense mission to defend U.S. territory. We have a bilateral agreement with Canada concerning the joint operation of the North American Aerospace

Defense Command. We have an agreement with Japan to co-develop a larger, more

capable version of the current sea-based midcourse interceptor that could provide

defense of portions of the U.S. homeland under certain scenarios. The U.S. has several bilateral agreements with Israel including cooperative developments of the

Arrow Weapon System to include co-production, Israeli Test Bed, David’s Sling

Weapon System and other Data Exchange Agreements on missile defense.

Mr. FRANKS. (1) What systems designed to intercept a ballistic missile in boost

phase are proving to be the most successful? (2) When is KEI scheduled to have a

full intercept test? (3) What would the mission of ABL actually look like?

General OBERING. (1) The Airborne Laser (ABL) and Kinetic Energy Interceptors

(KEI) Elements of the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) are important boost

phase development efforts that leverage technological progress to provide capability

options to address future threats. Both Elements have specific knowledge points

that must be achieved in order to demonstrate desired capability.

ABL and KEI are both on track to meet their critical knowledge points: KEI is

scheduled to flight test a prototype 2-stage booster in FY 2008; ABL is scheduled

to conduct a lethal shoot-down of a ballistic missile target in 2009. Over the past

two years, both Elements have made excellent progress in successfully achieving intermediate development milestones. Each successive capability demonstration contributes essential knowledge about the technical feasibility of these development efforts; knowledge that is required to make an informed decision.

Specific examples of ABL’s continuing success are: the demonstration of High Energy Laser operation on the ground; and the successful tracking of an airborne target from the ABL aircraft in flight.

Specific examples of KEI’s continuing success are: the ground test demonstrations

of booster energetic performance; and demonstrated trapped ball thrust vector control capability for both first and second stages that increases mission flexibility.

(2) Decisions about future flight tests, to include a full intercept test for KEI, will

be made based on knowledge gained from booster program progress up to the scheduled knowledge points in FY 2008 and 2009.

(3) Based on the Air Force Air Combat Command Concept of Operations signed

in March 2007, ABL will deploy from a Main Operating Base in the CONUS to a

Forward Operating Location (FOL). The ABL will deploy with all equipment and

sustainment supplies necessary for combat operations. ABL aircraft missions will

depart from the FOL to the threat region of interest and position in a Combat Air

Patrol (CAP) flight path. The CAP flight path is determined by an assigned area

of interest, enemy threats, and other specific mission objectives. ABL CAP mission

paths are dynamic in nature and may be repositioned based on intelligence updates

and a changing battlespace. ABL will fly one CAP, nominally 6 hours, refuel inflight, and then fly a second CAP before returning to the FOL. During these CAPs,

ABL will engage enemy missiles per Rules of Engagement that are defined during

mission planning.

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Mr. FRANKS. In 1998, a matter of weeks before the North Korean missile launch,

the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States warned

both of unexpected rogue state missile development, and of the threat of a ship

launched missile. A freighter could bring a SCUD or Shahab to 300 miles of a U.S.

coast. In the fall of 2001, former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld noted how a

rogue state had already tested a missile from a ship. What missile defense capabilities and systems (e.g., THAAD, SM–3, PAC–3, etc.) would be best suited to defend

all 50 states from such an attack?

General OBERING. Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), Aegis Ballistic

Missile Defense (BMD) Standard Missile (SM)–3 and Patriot Advanced Capability

(PAC)–3 each provide a capability to defend against a SCUD or Shahab launched

300 miles from the coastline of the United States. An integrated surveillance network of coastal based AN/TPY–2 class radars cued by overhead sensors would provide these weapon systems the tracking data needed to execute intercepts. Further

analysis and requirement definition is needed to determine the best mix of sensors

and interceptor systems needed to defend all 50 states from a ballistic missile

launched within 300 miles of the U.

Mr. FRANKS. In 1998, a matter of weeks before the North Korean missile launch,

the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States warned

both of unexpected rogue state missile development, and of the threat of a ship

launched missile. A freighter could bring a SCUD or Shahab to 300 miles of a U.S.

coast. In the fall of 2001, former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld noted how a

rogue state had already tested a missile from a ship. What missile defense capabilities and systems (e.g., THAAD, SM–3, PAC–3, etc.) would be best suited to defend

all 50 states from such an attack?

General CAMPBELL and Mr. MCQUEARY. There have been a number of studies conducted on this issue, including technology efforts from the Missile Defense Agency

(MDA) and Warfighter efforts from the U.S. Northern Command. A common theme

from these studies is the need for an effective indication and warning capability to

provide the necessary lead time to employ the requisite means against the potential

threat. The existing and programmed missile defense program elements (e.g. Aegis

Standard Missile-3, Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, and PATRIOT) provide

a diversity of missile defense capabilities against all ranges of threat (e.g. short- to

long-range ballistic missiles). However, most of the missile defense systems against

shorter range threats have limited defended areas, that range from city-block to

metropolitan areas; hence, the requisite number of elements to defend all 50 states

quickly outpaces the existing and planned inventory. Toward that end, the Department is exploring innovative methods to protect larger areas with fewer missile defense systems. Examples include an effective command and control architecture that

employs a diverse sensor networks and interceptors which have large kinematic

ranges.

Mr. FRANKS. What configuration of space-based interceptors would be necessary

to fulfill the United States policy, passed overwhelmingly by the United States Congress and signed by President Clinton in 1999, to defend against limited attacks,

whether ‘‘accidental, unauthorized, or deliberate,’’ originating from Russia or China?

What work is being done now to provide defense against such attacks, whether accidental, unauthorized, or deliberate?

Secretary GREEN. The U.S. missile defense program is not directed at either Russia or China. To address your question about space-based defenses, the Administration requested $10 million for FY 2008 to begin concept analysis and preparation

for small-scale space-based experiments. These experiments will provide real data

to answer a number of technical questions and help a future Administration make

a more informed decision on whether or not to develop this capability. This approach is consistent with Presidential direction, including the National Space Policy

and the National Policy on Ballistic Missile Defense.

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