alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 01-50294 

Summary Calendar

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

ALLAN HAWLEY

Defendant - Appellant

--------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. A-93-CR-62-ALL

--------------------

October 1, 2001

Before KING, Chief Judge, and DAVIS and JONES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Allan Hawley appeals the sentence imposed as a result of the

revocation of his supervised release. As there is no applicable

guideline, we will uphold a sentence for a revocation of

supervised release unless it is in violation of law or plainly

unreasonable. See United States v. Giddings, 37 F.3d 1091, 1093

(5th Cir. 1994). 

The 36-month sentence does not exceed the maximum authorized

sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). Contrary to Hawley’s

assertions, the entire record indicates that the district court
No. 01-50294

-2-

did consider the relevant sentencing factors in determining the

sentence for revocation of Hawley’s supervised release,

notwithstanding that the district court also considered that

Hawley had breached the trust placed in him by the Government. 

The sentence is not plainly unreasonable. See United States v.

Gonzalez, 250 F.3d 923, 925, 930 (5th Cir. 2001). The sentence

is AFFIRMED. 

Without opposition, the Government seeks to have the

appellee’s brief and appellant’s reply brief sealed because they

refer to matters contained in sealed portions of the record. 

Good cause having been shown for the request, the motion is

GRANTED.

AFFIRMED; MOTION GRANTED.
§ 8.53 Initiation of disciplinary proceedings. ( a ) *Receipt of information.* If an officer or employee of the Bureau has reason to believe that an attorney, certified public accountant, or enrolled practitioner has violated any of the provisions of this part or engaged in any disreputable conduct as defined in § 8.52, the employee shall promptly make a report thereof which will be forwarded to the Director of Practice. Any other person possessing information concerning violations or disreputable conduct may make a report thereof to the Director of Practice or to any officer or employee of the Bureau.
( b ) *Institution of proceeding.* When the Director of Practice has reason to believe that any attorney, certified public accountant, or enrolled practitioner has violated any provisions of the laws or regulations governing practice before the Bureau, he or she may reprimand the person or institute a proceeding for the disbarment or suspension of that person. The proceeding will be instituted by a complaint which names the respondent and is signed by the Director of Practice and filed in his or her office. Except in cases of willfulness, or when time, the nature of the proceeding, or the public interest does not permit, the Director of Practice may not institute a proceeding until he or she has called to the attention of the proposed respondent, in writing, facts or conduct which warrant institution of a proceeding, and has accorded the proposed respondent the opportuity to demonstrate or achieve compliance with all lawful requirements.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 11-7194

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

MARK E. PHILLIPS, a/k/a Mark L. Aaron,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

Maryland, at Baltimore. J. Frederick Motz, Senior District 

Judge. (1:05-cr-00165-JFM-1; 1:11-cv-00478-JFM)

Submitted: May 31, 2012 Decided: June 5, 2012

Before KING, DUNCAN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Mark E. Phillips, Appellant Pro Se. Richard Charles Kay, Allen 

F. Loucks, Assistant United States Attorneys, Baltimore, 

Maryland, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Mark E. Phillips seeks to appeal the district court’s 

order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West Supp. 2011) 

motion. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or 

judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2253(c)(1)(B) (2006). A certificate of appealability will not 

issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2006). When the 

district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies 

this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would 

find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional 

claims is debatable or wrong. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 

484 (2000); see Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336-38 

(2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural 

grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive 

procedural ruling is debatable, and that the motion states a 

debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. Slack, 

529 U.S. at 484-85. 

We have independently reviewed the record and conclude 

that Phillips has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, 

we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. 

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
3

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the

court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
#### The STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Christina TERRELL, Appellee.

No. 80-2430.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Dec. 1, 1981.

Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., and Steven R. Jacob, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellant.

Bennett H. Brummer, Public Defender, and Robin Greene, Asst. Public Defender, for appellee.

Before HUBBART, C. J., and SCHWARTZ and JORGENSON, JJ.

SCHWARTZ, Judge.

The defendant-appellee was charged with possession of a fire bomb in violation of Section 806.111, Florida Statutes (1979). The trial court granted her sworn motion to dismiss under Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.190(c)(4) and the state appeals. The order is manifestly erroneous and is reversed.

The motion stated only that the state would not call any expert witness at the trial who could testify that the object carried by Terrell was in fact a fire bomb. It did not even claim, much less demonstrate, that, as the rule requires, “the undisputed facts do not establish a prima facie case of guilt against the defendant.” The motion was therefore clearly insufficient and should have been summarily denied on its face. *State v. Pena-Salazar,*405 So.2d 254 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981); *State v. Sedlmayer,*375 So.2d 887 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979), and cases cited. Moreover, even the insufficient allegations of the motion were directly contradicted by the state’s traverse, which specifically stated that an appropriate expert witness was indeed available and would appear; Hence, the motion could not properly have been granted for this reason as well. *State v. Johnson,*398 So.2d 500 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981), and cases cited; Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.190(d).

We had thought that our countless recent reversals of orders granting “(c)(4)” motions would have impressed — upon trial counsel and trial courts alike1 — the very limited extent to which these motions are appropriate. Apparently that view was much too sanguine. Therefore we are once again required to and do reverse the order under review and remand the cause for reinstatement of the information and further consistent proceedings.

Reversed.

1

. We would have expected, also, appellate counsel to have recognized the requirements of our decisions and the rule, as they plainly apply *1216to this case, by candidly confessing error before us.
#### GENERAL AVIATION CORPORATION, a Florida corporation, Appellant, v. Mark ELLIOTT, a minor and E. B. Elliott, Jr., as the natural guardian of Mark Elliott, a minor, Appellees.

No. 74-453.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Dec. 31, 1974.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 22, 1975.

*221Carl H. Hoffman, Miami, and Gerald Jaski, Coral Gables, for appellant.

Bolles, Goodwin, Ryskamp & Welcher, Miami, for appellees.

Before PEARSON, HENDRY and NATHAN, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

This is an appeal from a summary judgment for a third party defendant in an action for a tort growing out of a contract. The appellant, General Aviation Corporation, was sued by the owner of an airplane alleging that General Aviation contracted for the use of that airplane which was subsequently demolished while in General Aviation’s custody. The plaintiff is not a party to this appeal. The appellant filed a third party complaint against Elliott, the appellee, alleging that Elliott, as bailee under a contract for instructional flying, was responsible for the loss of the plane. At the time of the contract, Elliott was a minor, and in this case, he raised as an affirmative defense his disaffirmance of the contract on the basis of his minority. See Sparr v. Florida Southern Ry. Co., 25 Fla. 185, 6 So. 60 (1889) and Hartman Auto Sales, Inc. v. Jaye, Fla.App.1968, 214 So.2d 97.

We agree with the trial court that the pleadings, deposition and affidavit on file affirmatively show that there is no genuine issue of material fact upon the third party claim and that the appellee was entitled to the summary final judgment as a matter of law.

General Aviation suggests (1) that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the minor’s contract was for necessaries, (2) that the evidence showed Elliott’s departure from the purpose of the contract, thereby rendering him liable even though he was a minor and (3) that Elliott was liable for the negligent operation of the aircraft despite his minority. The record does not raise an issue on any of these matters. It appears without genuine issue that the operation of the aircraft was within the scope of the oral bailment, a contract for hire. It further appears with issue of fact that the destruction of the aircraft was caused by the failure of the aircraft engine.

Affirmed.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 03-6726

CLARENCE BILLUPS,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

versus

J. P. LOFTON, Correctional Officer of

Department of Corrections, Supervisor of Paint

Crew; KENT GRANT, Safety Officer, Department

of Corrections; EARL BARKSDALE, Chief of

Security; LIEUTENANT THOMAS, Watch Commander,

Department of Corrections; ALTON BASKERVILLE,

Warden, Department of Corrections,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern

District of Virginia, at Alexandria. T. S. Ellis, III, District

Judge. (CA-03-420-AM)

Submitted: October 3, 2003 Decided: October 24, 2003

Before NIEMEYER, TRAXLER, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Clarence Billups, Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
2

PER CURIAM:

Clarence Billups appeals the district court’s order dismissing

his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) complaint as frivolous under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(b)(1) (2000). We have reviewed the record and find no

reversible error.

We review dismissals under § 1915A de novo. See Veney v.

Wyche, 293 F.3d 726, 730 (4th Cir. 2002). The district court

dismissed Billups’s § 1983 complaint as frivolous because it had

previously dismissed a claim filed by him based on the same issues

and brought against the same defendants. See Billups v. Lofton,

03-CV-71 (E.D. Va. Feb 3, 2003). Billups did not appeal the

disposition of this earlier dismissal.

We find that Billups’s § 1983 claim is barred by the

applicable two-year statute of limitations for personal injury

actions in Virginia. See Harvey v. Horan, 278 F.3d 370, 384 (4th

Cir. 2002); see also VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-243. Moreover, his claims

of negligence on the part of the defendants do not support recovery

under § 1983. See Baynard v. Malone, 268 F.3d 228, 236 (4th Cir.

2001); see also Grayson v. Peed, 195 F.3d 692, 695 (4th Cir. 1999).

Thus, we find that the district court’s dismissal under

§ 1915A(b)(1) was proper, and we affirm the district court’s order

on the modified grounds noted herein. We also deny Billups’s

motions for oral argument and for appointment of counsel. We

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions
3

are adequately presented in the materials before the court and

argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
I

104TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION H. R. 286

To prohibit States and localities from receiving certain Federal economic

development assistance if the State or locality provides improper incentives for location of businesses or organizations within the State or

locality.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

JANUARY 4, 1995

Mr. JACOBS introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee

on Banking and Financial Services and, in addition, to the Committee

on Transportation and Infrastructure, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions

as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned

A BILL

To prohibit States and localities from receiving certain Federal economic development assistance if the State or locality provides improper incentives for location of businesses or organizations within the State or locality.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. PROHIBITION OF ASSISTANCE.

4 No State or political subdivision of a State may be

5 provided assistance under title I of the Housing and Com6 munity Development Act of 1974 or the Public Works and
2

•HR 286 IH

1 Economic Development Act of 1965 if such State or politi2 cal subdivision (or any instrumentality thereof) offers, per3 mits, or grants any tax abatement, money payment, or

4 payment of property (real or chattel) to any commercial

5 or nonprofit organization or governmental entity in order

6 to induce the location, retention, or expansion of such or7 ganization or entity within the State or political subdivi8 sion.

9 SEC. 2. EXCEPTION FOR ENTERPRISE ZONES.

10 The prohibition under section 1 shall not apply to any

11 abatement or payment offered, permitted, or granted

12 under State law in connection with any tax enterprise zone

13 established under State law.

Æ
# Eswatini

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# Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

August 19, 2016

No. 04

- 16

- 00308

- CV

IN THE INTEREST OF S.A.W., A CHILD

,

From the 216th Judicial District Court, Gillespie County, Texas

Trial Court No. 12167 Honorable N. Keith Williams, Judge Presiding



### O R D E R

On June 22, 2016, appellee filed a motion to compel, requesting this court to order appellant to request the entire reporter’s record or designate a list of issues to be appealed in compliance with Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 34.6(c). On June 30, 20 16, appellant filed a response to appellee’s motion, stating he is appealing “the trial court’s findings and rational for those findings.” After reviewing the motion and response

, we ordered the court reporter to prepare on or before September 5, 2016 a r eporter’s record of all the trial proceedings. We also ordered appellant to file his brief thirty days after the date the reporter’s record from the trial court’s proceeding was filed.

On August 15, 2016, the court reporter filed the reporter’s record of the trial proceedings. Accordingly, we ORDER appellant to file his brief in this court on or before September 14,

2016

.

We order the clerk of this court to serve a copy of this order on all counsel and court

reporter.

_________________________________ Marialyn Barnard, Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said

court on this 19th day of August, 2016

.

___________________________________ Keith E. Hottle

Clerk of Court
§ 553.302 Blocked account; blocked property. The terms *blocked account* and *blocked property* mean any account or property subject to the prohibitions in § 553.201 held in the name of a person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to § 553.201, or in which such person has an interest, and with respect to which payments, transfers, exportations, withdrawals, or other dealings may not be made or effected except pursuant to a license or other authorization from OFAC expressly authorizing such action. Note 1 to § 553.302 .
*See* § 553.411 concerning the blocked status of property and interests in property of an entity that is directly or indirectly owned, whether individually or in the aggregate, 50 percent or more by one or more persons whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to § 553.201.
#### § 548.703 Penalty imposition.

If, after considering any written response to the Pre-Penalty Notice and any relevant facts, OFAC determines that there was a violation by the alleged violator named in the Pre-Penalty Notice and that a civil monetary penalty is appropriate, OFAC may issue a Penalty Notice to the violator containing a determination of the violation and the imposition of the monetary penalty. For additional details concerning issuance of a Penalty Notice, see appendix A to part 501 of this chapter. The issuance of the Penalty Notice shall constitute final agency action. The violator has the right to seek judicial review of that final agency action in federal district court.
#### § 583.102 Records and reports.

For provisions relating to required records and reports, see part 501, subpart C, of this chapter. Recordkeeping and reporting requirements imposed by part 501 of this chapter with respect to the prohibitions contained in this part are considered requirements arising pursuant to this part.
§ 582.203 Holding of funds in interest-bearing accounts; investment and reinvestment. ( a ) Except as provided in paragraph (e) or (f) of this section, or as otherwise directed or authorized by OFAC, any U.S. person holding funds, such as currency, bank deposits, or liquidated financial obligations, subject to § 582.201 shall hold or place such funds in a blocked interest-bearing account located in the United States.
( b ) ( 1 ) For purposes of this section, the term *blocked interest-bearing account* means a blocked account: ( i ) In a federally insured U.S. bank, thrift institution, or credit union, provided the funds are earning interest at rates that are commercially reasonable; or
( ii ) With a broker or dealer registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78a *et seq.*), provided the funds are invested in a money market fund or in U.S. Treasury bills.
( 2 ) Funds held or placed in a blocked account pursuant to paragraph (a) of this section may not be invested in instruments the maturity of which exceeds 180 days.
( c ) For purposes of this section, a rate is commercially reasonable if it is the rate currently offered to other depositors on deposits or instruments of comparable size and maturity.
( d ) For purposes of this section, if interest is credited to a separate blocked account or subaccount, the name of the account party on each account must be the same.
( e ) Blocked funds held in instruments the maturity of which exceeds 180 days at the time the funds become subject to § 582.201 may continue to be held until maturity in the original instrument, provided any interest, earnings, or other proceeds derived therefrom are paid into a blocked interest-bearing account in accordance with paragraph (a) or (f) of this section.
( f ) Blocked funds held in accounts or instruments outside the United States at the time the funds become subject to § 582.201 may continue to be held in the same type of accounts or instruments, provided the funds earn interest at rates that are commercially reasonable.
( g ) This section does not create an affirmative obligation for the holder of blocked tangible property, such as real or personal property, or of other blocked property, such as debt or equity securities, to sell or liquidate such property. However, OFAC may issue licenses permitting or directing such sales or liquidation in appropriate cases.
( h ) Funds subject to this section may not be held, invested, or reinvested in a manner that provides financial or economic benefit or access to any person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to § 582.201, nor may their holder cooperate in or facilitate the pledging or other attempted use as collateral of blocked funds or other assets.
Exhibit 23

CONSENT  OF  INDEPENDENT  CERTIFIED  PUBLIC  ACCOUNTANTS

       We  have  issued  our  report  dated  January  7,  2000, accompanying the
consolidated  financial  statements incorporated by reference or included in the
1999  Annual  Report  of  Harleysville National Corporation on Form 10-K for the
year  ended  December  31,  1999.  We  hereby  consent  to  the incorporation by
reference of said report in the Registration Statements of Harleysville National
Corporation  on Form S-3 (Registration No. 33-57790), on Forms S-8 (Registration
No.  33-69784  and  Registration  No.  33-17813)  and  on Form S-4 (Registration
Statement  No.  333-95983).



GRANT  THORNTON  LLP


Philadelphia,  Pennsylvania
March 24, 2000