# Indonesia - United States Department of State

- Indonesia HomeReportsBureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices&#8230;Indonesia				hide	document.addEventListener("DOMContentLoaded", function(event) {	if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}});																						Indonesia																																																																																												 In this section										/																							EXECUTIVE SUMMARY																																													EXECUTIVE SUMMARY																															Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person																																																									a. Arbitrary Deprivation of Life and Other Unlawful or Politically Motivated Killings																																																																											b. Disappearance																																																																											c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and Other Related Abuses																																																																			Prison and Detention Center Conditions																																																																																																																		d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention																																																																			Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees																																																																																																																		e. Denial of Fair Public Trial																																																																			Trial Procedures																																																								Political Prisoners and Detainees																																																																																																																		f. Transnational Repression																																																																											g. Property Seizure and Restitution																																																																											h. Arbitrary or Unlawful Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence																																																																											i. Conflict-related Abuse																																																																																	Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties																																																									a. Freedom of Expression, Including for Members of the Press and Other Media																																																																			Internet Freedom																																																																																																																		b. Freedoms of Peaceful Assembly and Association																																																																			Freedom of Peaceful Assembly																																																								Freedom of Association																																																																																																																		c. Freedom of Religion																																																																											d. Freedom of Movement and the Right to Leave the Country																																																																											e. Protection of Refugees																																																																											f. Status and Treatment of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)																																																																																	Section 3. Freedom to Participate in the Political Process																																																									Elections and Political Participation																																																																																	Section 4. Corruption in Government																															Section 5. Governmental Posture Towards International and Nongovernmental Monitoring and Investigation of Alleged Abuses of Human Rights																															Section 6. Discrimination and Societal Abuses																																																									Women																																																																											Systemic Racial or Ethnic Violence and Discrimination																																																																											Indigenous Peoples																																																																											Children																																																																											Antisemitism																																																																											Trafficking in Persons																																																																											Acts of Violence, Criminalization, and Other Abuses Based on Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity or Expression, or Sex Characteristics																																																																											Persons with Disabilities																																																																											Other Societal Violence or Discrimination																																																																																	Section 7. Worker Rights																																																									a. Freedom of Association and the Right to Collective Bargaining																																																																											b. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor																																																																											c. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment																																																																											d. Discrimination (see section 6)																																																																											e. Acceptable Conditions of Work																																																																																																							EXECUTIVE SUMMARY				Although there were no significant changes in the human rights situation in Indonesia during the year, the president acknowledged for the first time the state’s role in historic incidents of gross human rights violations that claimed the lives of hundreds of thousands of Indonesians between 1965 and 2003. The government also took greater steps to recognize Indigenous land rights.Significant human rights issues included credible reports of: arbitrary or unlawful killings; torture and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment by police; harsh and life-threatening prison conditions; arbitrary arrest or detention; serious problems with the independence of the judiciary; political prisoners; serious abuses in a conflict in Papua, Central Papua, Highland Papua, South Papua, Southwest Papua and West Papua Provinces (the Papua region), including unlawful civilian deaths or harm, torture, and physical abuses; serious restrictions on freedom of expression and media freedom, including unjustified arrests or prosecutions of journalists, censorship, and use of criminal libel laws; serious restrictions on internet freedom; substantial interference with the freedom of peaceful assembly and freedom of association; serious government corruption; extensive gender-based violence, including the practice of female genital mutilation/cutting; crimes involving violence or threats of violence targeting members of racial, ethnic, and religious minority groups, primarily Papuans; laws in Aceh Province criminalizing consensual same-sex sexual conduct between adults that were enforced; and crimes involving violence or threats of violence against lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, or intersex persons.The government did not systematically take credible steps to identify and punish officials who may have committed human rights abuses.Violence between government forces and separatist groups continued in the Papua region. There were numerous reports of abuses by nongovernmental groups, including armed groups, against civilians including unlawful or arbitrary killings, physical abuse, and destruction of property. The government investigated and prosecuted some of these. The violence displaced thousands of residents. Outside the Papua region, there were numerous reports of unknown actors using digital harassment and intimidation against human rights activists and academics who criticized government officials, discussed government corruption, or covered the violence in the Papua region.																														Section 1.													 Respect for the Integrity of the Person												    																						In the second half of the year, the government offered housing, cash assistance, and free medical services to several hundred victims of historical atrocities. This followed a June 27 speech in which President Jokowi proposed a program of nonjudicial redress measures for victims of 12 incidents of gross human rights violations between 1965 and 2003, including three that occurred during the decades-long conflict in Aceh. Activists welcomed the recognition of historic abuses and the proposal but criticized the lack of details. Moreover, the proposal did not address the de facto immunity enjoyed by alleged abusers, many of whom remained active in government service.																										a. Arbitrary Deprivation of Life and Other Unlawful or Politically Motivated Killings										There were numerous reports that security officials committed arbitrary or unlawful killings. Many of these reports related to counterinsurgency operations against armed separatist groups in the Papua region, who were also responsible for arbitrary and unlawful killings. The Commission for Disappeared and Victims of Violence (KontraS), a nongovernmental organization (NGO), counted 29 deaths and 41 casualties due to unlawful shootings by police between July 2022 and June 2023.In cases of alleged extrajudicial killings by government officials, police and the military often did not conduct investigations and when they did, failed to disclose their findings. Official statements related to abuse allegations sometimes contradicted NGO accounts, and the inaccessibility of areas where violence took place made confirming facts difficult.On February 13, General Ferdy Sambo, former head of Internal Affairs in the Indonesian National Police, was sentenced to death for murdering his aide, Brigadier Nofriansyah Yosua Hutabarat, and disguising it as a shootout. Sambo’s wife, Putri Candrawathi, was also sentenced to 20 years in prison for her role in the murder and cover-up. In August the Supreme Court commuted Sambo’s sentence to life imprisonment and reduced Candrawathi’s sentence to 10 years’ imprisonment. While Sambo’s motive was unclear, multiple media outlets reported Yosua was planning to reveal Sambo’s illegal activities, including running gambling rings.On September 5, a panel of judges in a military court acquitted Sergeant Vicente De Oliviara and Private Bahari Muhrim in the 2020 murder of two Papuans, Eden Bebari and Ronny Wandik. Acknowledging the evidence proved the defendants killed the victims, the judges determined the defendants had acted in self-defense. The verdict contradicted an earlier verdict in which two other members of the same unit were found guilty of murdering Bebari and Wandik and sentenced to six&#8217; and seven years’ imprisonment, respectively. The victims, university students ages 19 and 21, were killed by members of the Yonif Raider Udayana 900/SBW Unit near the Freeport gold mine. Authorities claimed the pair were part of an armed separatist criminal group and shot in a firefight, but Bebari’s father denied his son was a member of any such group or that the pair were found with firearms.The use of excessive force during arrests, interrogations, and detention resulted in many deaths. According to KontraS, police violence led to 187 deaths between July 2022 and June 2023.On June 30, Syamsuddin, a prisoner at Nunukan Correctional Facility, died after being assaulted by a prison guard, identified as M. According to the Nunukan Police Criminal Investigation Unit chief, M was found guilty based on closed-circuit television evidence and witness statements. The head of the prison security unit was indicted for negligence, but the case remained under investigation by Nunukan Attorney General Office Branch as of October.In August the Supreme Court sentenced two former police officers to two and one-half years’ imprisonment for their roles in the October 2022 Kanjuruhan stadium tragedy. Bambang Sidik Achmadi allegedly ordered police to fire tear gas into the stadium to deter fans from swarming the field after a soccer match, resulting in 135 deaths by stampede and asphyxiation; Wahyu Setyo Pranoto ignored regulations prohibiting the use of tear gas at soccer matches. In March three other defendants were found guilty of negligence by a lower court and received sentences between one year and 18 months in prison. Families and human rights groups criticized the sentences as too short and called for all personnel responsible for the incident to be held accountable.																																				b. Disappearance										There were no reports of disappearances by or on behalf of government authorities. The government and NGOs reported little progress in accounting for previous disappearances, including those during the country’s occupation of Timor-Leste, which became independent in 2002. NGOs noted many officials suspected of involvement in disappearances served in the government.																																				c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and Other Related Abuses										The constitution prohibited such practices. The law criminalized the use of violence or force by officials to elicit a confession, but no law specified or defined “torture.” Other laws, such as on witness and victim protection, included antitorture provisions. Officials faced imprisonment for a maximum of four years if they used violence or force illegally.NGOs made numerous reports of police and security forces using excessive force during detention and interrogation. KontraS reported 622 violent incidents involving the national police between July 2022 and June 2023, including 46 cases of arbitrary arrests and 33 cases of alleged torture. These actions resulted in 1,362 injuries and many deaths.Police and the military usually upheld procedures to address alleged torture. In cases of alleged torture and other abuse, police and the military typically conducted investigations but often did not publicly disclose either the fact or the findings of these internal investigations. Official statements related to abuse allegations sometimes contradicted NGO accounts, and the frequent inaccessibility of areas where violence took place made confirming facts difficult. NGOs and other observers criticized the short prison sentences often imposed by military courts in abuse cases involving civilians or actions by off-duty soldiers.Aceh Province had special authority to implement sharia regulations. Authorities there carried out public canings for violations of sharia in cases of sexual abuse, gambling, adultery, alcohol consumption, and sexual relations outside of marriage. Same-sex sexual conduct was a criminal offense in Aceh, punishable by caning; there were no known cases of punishment for this crime during the year. Sharia was not, by regulation, to be applied to non-Muslims, foreigners, or Muslims not resident in Aceh; however, it sometimes was. Non-Muslims in Aceh occasionally chose punishment under sharia because it was more expeditious and less expensive than secular procedures.Canings occurred in public spaces despite the governor’s 2018 order limiting them to prison facilities. Individuals sentenced to caning could receive up to 100 lashes for each crime for which they were convicted, depending on the crime and prison time served. On March 16, a man and woman accused of adultery were each lashed 100 times in front of the sharia police office in Lhokseumawe, Aceh.Security force impunity was a problem. Members of the army special forces’ Rose Team, involved in the kidnapping, torture, and killing of students in 1997-98, served as senior officials in the government despite being convicted and serving prison sentences for their involvement in these abuses. Some of those implicated in past abuses also received promotions or were given public awards and honors.																Prison and Detention Center Conditions						Conditions in the country’s 526 prisons and detention centers were often harsh and sometimes life threatening, due especially to overcrowding.Abusive Physical Conditions: Overcrowding was a serious problem, including at immigration detention centers. According to the Ministry of Law and Human Rights, as of August there were more than 228,000 prisoners and detainees in prisons and detention centers designed to hold a maximum of 128,656. Despite the release of nearly 50,000 detainees since September 2022, overcrowding posed hygiene and ventilation problems. The degree of overcrowding at facilities varied; minimum- and medium-security prisons were often the most overcrowded; maximum-security prisons tended to be at or below capacity.According to NGO observers, conditions in women’s prisons tended to be significantly better than in those for men. Women’s cellblocks within prisons that held prisoners of both genders, however, did not always grant women prisoners access to the same amenities, such as exercise facilities, as their male counterparts.NGOs noted authorities sometimes did not provide prisoners adequate medical care.International and local NGOs reported that in some cases prisoners did not have ready access to clean drinking water. There were widespread reports the government did not feed prisoners adequately; family members often provided supplementary food.Guards in detention facilities and prisons regularly extorted money from inmates. Inmates often bribed or paid corrections officers for favors, food, telephones, or narcotics. The use and production of illicit drugs in prisons were serious problems, with some drug networks basing operations within prisons.Administration: The law allowed prisoners and detainees to submit complaints to authorities without censorship and to request investigation of alleged deficiencies. Complaints were submitted to the Ministry of Law and Human Rights where they were investigated and were subject to independent judicial review.Independent Monitoring: Some NGOs received access to prisons after obtaining permission, including approval from police, attorneys general, courts, the Ministry of Home Affairs, and other agencies. NGOs reported authorities rarely permitted direct access to prisoners for interviews. There was no regular independent monitoring of prisons.																										d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention										The law prohibited arbitrary arrest and detention and provided for the right of any person to challenge the lawfulness of their arrest or detention in court. The government generally observed these requirements, but there were notable exceptions.																Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees						Security forces were required to produce warrants during an arrest. Exceptions applied, for example, if a suspect was caught in the act of committing a crime. The law allowed investigators to issue warrants, but at times authorities, especially police from the Criminal Investigation Department, made questionable arrests without warrants.On January 26, North Lampung police arrested “FR” at his home for alleged theft, but without a warrant. The next day his body was returned to his wife, allegedly without explanation, covered in bruises and with broken legs. Media reported the village government could not explain what led to his arrest because there was no record of an arrest warrant.By law suspects had the right to contact family promptly after arrest and to legal counsel of their choice at every stage of an investigation. Legal aid organizations reported numerous cases in which they had difficulty maintaining access to detainees, especially if physical or other abuse during or after the arrest was discovered or alleged when access was initially granted.Court officials were required to provide free legal counsel to all persons charged with offenses that carried the death penalty or imprisonment for 15 years or more, and to destitute defendants facing charges that carried a penalty of imprisonment for five years or more. State-funded legal resources were limited, however, and free counsel occasionally depended on the availability of pro bono lawyers. NGOs reported some police and prosecutors maintained “pocket lawyers” who could be called in to provide a pro forma defense for their clients.There was no system of bail; however, detainees could request a suspension of detention, which could be granted by investigators, prosecutors, or judges. Additionally, detainees could challenge their arrest and detention by petitioning for a pretrial hearing. The law required judges to begin pretrial hearings within three days of receipt of an application and render a decision within seven days after the beginning of the hearing. Some defense lawyers were reluctant to request these suspensions, as the paperwork their clients had to sign as a condition of release sometimes included language that could be interpreted as an admission of guilt.Lack of legal resources was particularly problematic for persons involved in land disputes. Local government officials and large landowners involved in land grabs reportedly accused community activists of crimes, hoping the resulting detentions or arrests and the community’s lack of legal and financial resources would hamper efforts to oppose the land grab.Arbitrary Arrest: There were reports of arbitrary arrests by police, primarily by the Criminal Investigation Department and the Mobile Brigade Corps, a police tactical unit tasked with counterterrorism, riot control, and high-risk law enforcement. There were multiple media and NGO reports of police temporarily detaining persons for criticizing the government, participating in peaceful demonstrations, other nonviolent activities, and property disputes. Reports of arbitrary arrest occurred across the country, but especially in the Papua region. Most of those detained in such cases were released within 24 hours.On May 21, a man named Fikri was wrongfully arrested and beaten on his way to buy food by members of the Cikeas Regiment 1 Mobile Brigade Corps. According to media reports, Fikri approached a crowd to see what was causing a commotion, only to find police and gang members brawling. Police mistook Fikri for a gang member and beat him until he was critically injured and required emergency care at the Bekasi Regency Regional Hospital. The family reported the incident to the Bekasi Regency Metro Police. The case continued as of December.Pretrial Detention: If convicted, time in pretrial detention was counted against the sentence. Media reported, however, cases in which suspects were detained longer than allowed by law, in some cases – especially of low-level crimes with sentences less than a year – resulting in immediate release of persons found guilty because the time served in pretrial detention equaled or exceeded their sentence. Terrorism suspects were governed by special rules. The government did not report the number of individuals in pretrial detention.																										e. Denial of Fair Public Trial										The law provided for an independent judiciary and the right to a fair public trial, but the judiciary was deeply and broadly corrupt and subject to influence from outside parties, including business interests, politicians, the security forces, and officials of the executive branch.Decentralization created difficulties for the enforcement of court orders, and at times local officials ignored them.Four district courts were authorized to adjudicate cases of systemic gross human rights violations upon recommendation of the National Human Rights Commission, but no such trials occurred during the year.Under the sharia court system in Aceh, 20 district religious courts and one court of appeals heard cases. The courts usually heard cases involving Muslims and based their judgments on decrees formulated by the local government rather than the national penal code.																Trial Procedures						The constitution provided for the right to a fair and public trial, but judicial corruption and misconduct hindered the enforcement of this right. The presumption of innocence was not always respected; some courts, for example, allowed the admission of forced confessions. Trials were not always timely; sharia court proceedings in Aceh and some military trials were not public.The law gave defendants the right to an attorney from the time of arrest and at every stage of investigation and trial. By law indigent defendants had the right to public legal assistance, although they were required to prove they had no funds for private legal assistance. NGOs reported, however, that defendants in many areas of the country did not have access to legal assistance due to the lack of legal aid organizations in those areas. Where they existed, their legal staffs were often too small to represent all indigent defendants. There were consequently numerous cases in which defendants faced trial without counsel. Defendants facing offenses that carried the death penalty or imprisonment for 15 years or more were required to have legal counsel; however, NGOs reported cases in which the legal counsel provided to these defendants was associated with the prosecution.Although suspects had the right to confront witnesses and call witnesses in their defense, judges could allow sworn affidavits when distance was excessive or the cost of transporting witnesses to the court was too expensive, hindering the possibility of cross-examination. Some courts limited the presentation of defense evidence.						Political Prisoners and Detainees						NGOs estimated that as of September, there were 28 political prisoners from the Papua region, either awaiting trial or serving time after conviction under treason and conspiracy statutes, including for the display of banned separatist symbols.According to Amnesty International, authorities detained at least 63 Papuans between January and April for participating in peaceful protests; many were released without charge.In May the Jayapura court sentenced Victor Yeimo, spokesperson for the proindependence National Committee for West Papua, to eight months’ imprisonment for criminal conspiracy, incitement, and treason for alleged involvement in violent antiracism protests in Papua and West Papua Provinces in 2019. Yeimo delivered a speech at a peaceful protest on August 19, 2019, but declined to participate in a second protest on August 29, 2019, which turned violent. Media reported he had asked activists to cancel the event, but they moved forward despite his objections. In July the Papua High Court rejected Yeimo’s appeal and added four months to his sentence, bringing his prison term to 12 months. Yeimo’s lawyers reported he was arrested without a warrant and moved to the Mobile Brigade Corps’ detention center without notification to them. In 2021 the Jayapura court rejected a challenge to his detention based on these irregularities. NGOs alleged the charges against Yeimo were a baseless attempt to silence nonviolent advocacy for Papuan separatism.Local activists and family members generally were permitted to visit political prisoners, but authorities held some prisoners on islands far from their families.																										f. Transnational Repression										Not applicable.																																				g. Property Seizure and Restitution										An eminent domain law allowed the government to expropriate land for the public good, provided the government properly compensated owners. NGOs accused the government of abusing its authority to expropriate or facilitate private acquisition of land for development projects, often without fair compensation.Land access and ownership were major sources of conflict. According to a report released in January by the Agrarian Reform Consortium, a farmers’ advocacy group, 212 agrarian disputes across 34 provinces in 2022 covered approximately 3,800 square miles of land and affected more than 340,000 families. Police and military sometimes evicted those involved in land disputes without due process, often siding with business-related claimants over individuals or local communities.Contested administrative boundaries, especially in Kalimantan and the Papua regions where new provinces were created in 2022, contributed to overlapping licenses, ownership disputes, unmanaged extractive industries, and corruption.On September 11, thousands protested in front of the Batam Enterprise Agency in the Riau Islands in response to land clearance planned for the Rempang Eco City project, a government-supported industry, trade, and tourism initiative involving foreign investments that critics said was designed without meaningful local consultation. Protesters demanded a halt to the relocation of at least six villages and claimed the evictions were occurring without due process. The protest escalated into what onlookers described as a riot, resulting in the arrest of 43 persons accused of vandalism and committing violence against officers.																																				h. Arbitrary or Unlawful Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence										In December 2022 parliament passed a new criminal code criminalizing sexual intercourse outside of marriage and living together as husband and wife outside of marriage. Complaints could be filed only by a parent, spouse, or child of the accused. The government had until January 2026 to prepare implementation regulations, which could determine how the law would be enforced and to whom it would apply; the new code was not in effect as of December 31.The law required judicial warrants for searches except in cases involving subversion, economic crimes, and corruption. Authorities generally respected these requirements. The law also provided for searches without warrants when circumstances were “urgent and compelling.” Police throughout the country occasionally took actions without proper authority or violated individuals’ privacy.NGOs claimed security officials occasionally conducted warrantless surveillance on individuals and their residences and monitored telephone calls.In July Pekanbaru community police carried out “surveillance raids” of guesthouses to deter same-sex relationships, using their authority to uphold “public order.” Chief Zulfahmi Adrian acknowledged no lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, or intersex (LGBTQI+) persons were arrested but reported several unmarried heterosexual couples were. The December 2022 law raised concerns among heterosexuals and others who feared its use would legitimize such actions based on local norms.																																				i. Conflict-related Abuse										The Papua region was home to separatist movements advocating the creation of an independent state. The most well-known armed separatist group was the Free Papua Movement (Organisasi Papua Merdeka), which acknowledged carrying out hundreds of attacks on government officials and civilians since the 1970s. The government attempted to suppress these separatist movements primarily through a large military and police presence and through a “special autonomy” status granted to the region in 2002 and revised in 2021.Europe-based NGO Human Rights Monitor (HRM) reported a 30 percent increase in armed clashes and attacks in the first five months of the year, compared with the same period in 2022.On May 5, five UN special rapporteurs released a joint statement expressing serious concern regarding the deteriorating human rights situation in the Papua region. The statement cited the 2022 killings of five Indigenous Papuans and the shooting of one child and concern regarding the lack of an effective and prompt investigation. In the letter, the special rapporteurs referenced eight previous statements sent to the government since 2018 and their regret at the lack of investigations in response. They called on the government to conduct full and independent investigations into abuses to ensure those responsible, including military officials, would be held accountable.In August 2022 the president signed a decree establishing a team to pursue nonjudicial settlements for past violations or abuses of human rights, including in the Papua region, although activists warned this could lead to legal impunity for perpetrators. Members of the team traveled to the Papua region in November 2022 to identify potential recipients of government assistance but did not announce the settlement of any cases.Although transparent investigations of alleged abuses by government forces were uncommon, in January military court judges convicted a member of the military for participating in the August 2022 murder and “mutilation” of four Papuans in Mimika Regency, Central Papua Province, during an illegal weapons transaction, sentenced him to lifetime imprisonment, and discharged him from the army. The sentence was significantly harsher than the four-year sentence requested by the prosecutors.Critics claimed the 2022 creation of six new provinces from the former Papua Province strengthened central government control of development. Analysts believed the creation of new provinces would accelerate the issuance of licenses for resource extraction and could foster greater inequality, leading to increased violence. Government officials maintained the new provinces would allow for greater local control and distribution of development resources.Killings: Restrictions on independent press and NGOs in the Papua region and on visits by international investigators made it difficult to determine the authenticity of reports of, or to attribute responsibility for, killings there. The government and separatist groups often provided conflicting accounts concerning responsibility for killings. The Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project, a disaggregated international research NGO, reported 262 fatalities throughout the country from clashes and violence from January 1 to October 30; approximately two-thirds of the incidents occurred in the Papua region, in line with previous projections that violence in the region would rise significantly during the year.Most human rights organizations reported continued high levels of deadly clashes in the Papua region after incidents spiked in 2018 following large demonstrations. HRM reported three civilian deaths at the hands of security forces and 32 civilian deaths and 24 security force deaths in 25 clashes between security forces and armed separatists. The West Papua National Liberation Army (TPNPB) targeted non-Papuan migrants as well as Indigenous Papuans suspected of working with security forces. In August media reported TPNPB members killed a woman social activist on suspicion of providing intelligence to the military.Abductions: On February 7, armed Organisasi Papua Merdeka separatists attacked a private plane in the Nduga District, Highland Papua Province, and took the New Zealand citizen pilot hostage. Organisasi Papua Merdeka demanded recognition of Papuan independence as well direct talks with President Widodo in an interview with Australian press. In the interview, the group warned it would target foreigners in the Papua region. In August a journalist claiming direct contact with the group said they asserted they were holding the pilot and that he was safe and unharmed, although they offered no proof.In May the TPNPB reportedly abused six passengers of a plane that landed in Highland Papua Province before taking hostage four who were employees of a telecommunications company with a project in the region. After releasing the workers, the TPNPB spokesperson said the hostage-taking was to reassert their warning to non-Papuans traveling to the region.Physical Abuse, Punishment, and Torture: Human rights organizations and media reported security forces in the Papua region often used excessive force and physically abused persons in detention.Separatist forces publicly called for nonindigenous Papuans to leave the Papua region, and civilians targeted individuals deemed nonindigenous. Armed groups used social media to threaten migrants from other areas of the country who moved to parts of Papua.																																					Section 2.													 Respect for Civil Liberties												    																																																a. Freedom of Expression, Including for Members of the Press and Other Media										The constitution provided for freedom of expression, including for members of the press and other media. The law placed various restrictions on its exercise, including criminal penalties for defamation, hate speech, blasphemy, obscenity, and spreading false information. The Alliance of Independent Journalists recorded 64 incidents involving violations of journalists’ and media organizations’ rights between January and August. There were numerous reports of the law being used to limit criticism of the government.Freedom of Expression: The law criminalized obscenity, hate speech, and speech defaming a person’s character or reputation; insulting a religion; spreading false information; or advocating separatism.The Attorney General’s Office had the authority to monitor written material and to request a court order to ban written material. Spreading hate speech or false information was punishable by up to six years in prison. Language in the law banning obscenity was broadly applied to restrict speech deemed as offending local morals. Blasphemy was punishable for up to five years in prison but was usually prosecuted under the Electronic Information and Transactions law, which was often used to regulate online speech and carried a maximum six-year prison sentence. NGOs reported this law was also sometimes used to prosecute government critics.On September 19, Palembang District Court sentenced TikTok influencer Lina Luftiawati to two years in prison and fined her 250 million rupiah (IDR) ($16,400) for “inciting hatred” against religious groups by posting a video in which she said an Islamic prayer before eating pork, an act forbidden in Islam. The video garnered more than 13 million views within a week.Although the law permitted flying a flag symbolizing Papua’s cultural identity generally, a government regulation barring separatism specifically prohibited the display of the Morning Star flag in Papua, the Republic of South Maluku flag in Maluku, and the Free Aceh Movement Crescent Moon flag in Aceh.Violence and Harassment: From January to August, the Alliance of Independent Journalists reported 49 cases of violence against journalists that included doxing, physical assaults, and verbal intimidation and threats perpetrated by various actors, including government officials, police and security personnel, members of mass organizations, and the public.In May the North Jayapura Police closed their investigation into the detonation of a bomb outside the home of Papuan journalist Victor Mambor, which occurred on January 23, without notable results. Mambor reported on human rights abuses in the Papua region, advocated for press freedom in Papua, and criticized government policies. According to media reports, Mambor was only informed in October that the case had been closed through the National Human Rights Commission. NGOs and media organizations criticized the police investigation as inadequate and unprofessional and raised concerns regarding the safety and perpetuation of fear among journalists. In 2021 Mambor’s car was vandalized and his personal information was published online.In March at a public discussion hosted by the Indonesian Environmental Journalist Society on the future of the ecosystem and orangutan population in Batang Toru, four unidentified individuals attempted to intimidate attendees and shut down the event before they were escorted out by security. The discussion continued and highlighted a collaborative report by five media outlets concerning the impact of a hydroelectric dam in North Sumatra. The Alliance of Independent Journalists described the incident as an attack on freedom of the press and a violation of democratic principles.Members of the press occasionally faced harassment and threats when investigating cases involving the government, police, and businesses.On August 14, police assaulted journalists Awla Rajul and Agung Eko Sutrisno who were covering a protest related to a land dispute in the Dago Elos housing complex in Bandung. As the confrontation between protesters and police escalated, Rajul and Sutrisno sought refuge in a house; police pursued them and allegedly assaulted them and threatened them with death.Censorship or Content Restrictions for Members of the Press and Other Media, Including Online Media: The government sometimes used regional and national regulations, including those on blasphemy, hate speech, defamation, false information, and separatism, to restrict media. Obtaining permits for travel to the Papua region was difficult for foreign journalists, who reported bureaucratic delays or denials, ostensibly for safety reasons.NGOs reported journalistic self-censorship on controversial subjects, such as positive depictions of LGBTQI+ persons and school regulations requiring young women to wear the hijab. Some journalists said reporting on corruption and conflicts of interests involving political figures was not published. According to NGOs, journalists avoided such subjects due to fear of harassment and professional ostracism.As of July, journalism student Yolanda Agne, former editor in chief of the student magazine Lintas, had not been permitted to resume her studies at the Ambon Islamic State Institute after Lintas published an article regarding the prevalence of sexual harassment on campus in March 2022. The article alleged eight lecturers were responsible for abuse over a six-year period. According to media reports, when Agne refused to disclose the names of the victims to school officials, she was suspended from her studies, three months shy of graduation.Libel/Slander Laws: Criminal defamation provisions prohibited libel and slander, which were punishable with five-year prison terms. NGOs alleged government officials, including police and the judiciary, selectively used criminal defamation to intimidate individuals and restrict freedom of expression. Proving the truth of a statement was not a defense.The criminal defamation trial of Fatia Maulidiyanti, coordinator for KontraS, and Haris Azhar, executive director of the Lokataru Foundation, was underway as of December. The charges sprang from Maulidiyanti’s 2021 interview with Azhar, posted on YouTube, during which the two discussed NGO reports that government officials had an economic interest in the situation in Papua. Coordinating Minister of Maritime and Investment Affairs Luhut Pandjaitan filed charges against them the following month. Azhar and Maulidiyanti faced a potential sentence of four years if found guilty of defamation and six years if found guilty of disseminating “uncertain” news. The public and media were excluded from a June hearing when Luhut testified.National Security: The government used legal provisions barring advocacy of separatism to restrict the ability of individuals and media to advocate peacefully for self-determination or independence in different parts of the country.Nongovernmental Impact: Hardline Muslim groups sometimes intimidated perceived critics of Islam or groups considered heretical. There were multiple reports of harassment of Muslim families if daughters did not cover their hair. School officials sometimes intimated girls who did not want to comply with mandatory hijab uniform regulations or who wore their hijabs incorrectly. In an August incident, a teacher partially shaved the heads of 14 girls in Lamongan, East Java, because their bangs were showing.																Internet Freedom						The government at times disrupted access to the internet and blocked access to some online content.The law banned online crime broadly, including pornography, gambling, blackmail, false information, threats, hate speech, racist content, and defamation, and the government prosecuted individuals for online statements. Antipornography laws were occasionally used to threaten victims who did not realize partners had secretly filmed them and then posted the videos online. The law did not distinguish between those who were involved in pornographic production and those who disseminated material online, both of which were punishable with up to 12 years in prison.NGOs criticized the law’s vague and ambiguous provisions, which they noted had been misused by authorities and private individuals to silence and punish critics, leading to increased self-censorship by journalists and activists.SAFEnet, an NGO focused on internet freedom, said the government used its power to shut down the internet to restrict the open flow of information. SAFEnet detected at least 24 episodes of internet access disruption in the Papua region between January and June, rendering the internet effectively unusable. Human rights advocates said the internet shutdowns occurred during political protests against the government in the Papua region, some of which became violent. The Jakarta State Administrative Court ruled the government could block internet access during periods of social unrest.Human rights organizations reported progovernment hackers often used doxing, disruptions to online events, and hacking of social media accounts to threaten and intimidate government critics. SAFEnet reported that in 2022 activists experienced 302 digital attacks, a 56 percent increase from the previous year.On May 22, University of Indonesia student executive body chairperson Melki Sedek Huang alleged the organization’s Twitter (now X) account was hacked after they criticized President Widodo. According to Melki, all devices logged into their official Twitter account were locked out hours after the critique entitled “Jokowi Belongs to Political Parties, Not the Public.” Melki characterized the incident as a form of silencing public criticism but acknowledged they did not know if that was the case.NGOs and media reported paid groups of “cyberwarriors,” colloquially called “buzzers,” used bots and fake social media accounts to shape political discourse online. Researchers reported buzzers were frequently used by both pro and antigovernment groups. Student groups alleged the government directly financed some buzzer operations.In addition to requesting that internet service providers block access to content containing “prohibited electronic information,” such as pornography, radical religious content, extortion, “hoax news,” and hate speech, NGOs reported the Ministry of Communication and Information Technology also sometimes requested removal of content critical of the government or containing information related to LGBTQI+ matters. The ministry blocked LGBTQI+ dating apps. The government sometimes intervened with technology companies to remove content it deemed offensive or extremist from social media platforms, app stores, and other websites and revoked the licenses of those that did not promptly comply with government demands.																										b. Freedoms of Peaceful Assembly and Association										The constitution and law provided for the freedoms of peaceful assembly and association, but the government sometimes restricted these freedoms.																Freedom of Peaceful Assembly						The law provided for freedom of assembly, and outside the Papua region the government generally respected this right. The law required demonstrators to provide police with written notice three days before any planned demonstration and required police to issue a receipt for the written notification. This receipt acted as a de facto license for the demonstration.Police in the Papua region routinely refused to issue demonstration receipts, claiming the demonstrations would include calls for independence, an act prohibited by law. A Papua provincial police decree prohibited rallies by seven organizations labeled as proindependence, including the National Committee of West Papua, the United Liberation Movement for West Papua, and the Free Papua Movement. NGOs reported police routinely disrupted protests related to Papua across the country and arrested protesters.On August 12, the Jayapura district police arrested 21 members of the National Committee of West Papua for handing out flyers calling for a demonstration on August 15 to mark the anniversary of the 1962 New York Agreement, which led to what some Papuans described as the “forced” integration of Papua into Indonesia. Despite the arrests, demonstrators gathered in Sentani on August 15; Jayapura district police forcibly dispersed the crowd with a water cannon and beat 16 individuals, according to media reports.						Freedom of Association						The constitution and law provided for freedom of association, which the government generally respected. The regulations on registration of organizations were generally not onerous, although LGBTQI+ groups reported restrictions (see section 6).Foreign NGOs had to have a memorandum of understanding with a government ministry to register officially. Some organizations reported difficulties obtaining these memoranda and claimed the government withheld them to block their registration; they also blamed cumbersome bureaucracy within the Ministry of Law and Human Rights. Foreign NGOs operated in the country without registration, but they were unable to work directly with government programs.																										c. Freedom of Religion										See the Department of State’s International Religious Freedom Report at  https://www.state.gov/religiousfreedomreport/.																																				d. Freedom of Movement and the Right to Leave the Country										The law provided for freedom of internal movement and generally allowed for travel outside the country. The law gave the military broad powers, in a declared state of emergency, to limit land, air, and sea traffic. The government did not use these powers during the year.In-country Movement: The government imposed administrative hurdles for travel by NGOs, journalists, foreign diplomats, and others to the Papua region.																																				e. Protection of Refugees										The government cooperated with the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations in providing protection and assistance to refugees, returning refugees, or asylum seekers, as well as other persons of concern.Access to Asylum: UNHCR officials reported 11,592 refugees and asylum seekers in the country as of October. Most refugees were from Afghanistan and originally arrived 10 or more years ago. The country did not allow permanent local settlement or naturalization of asylum seekers or persons judged to be refugees. The government allowed refugees to settle temporarily while awaiting permanent resettlement. The law acknowledged UNHCR’s role in processing all refugee status determinations in the country. Regulations established a detailed refugee management process, outlining the specific responsibilities of national and subnational agencies from the time of refugee arrival to departure for resettlement or repatriation. While resettlement from the country increased, only 1,186 refugees departed for resettlement through October. In June refugees rallied in front of UNHCR offices in Jakarta calling for either citizenship or resettlement to another country. In December protests and online hate campaigns targeted Rohingya refugees who arrived by boat in Aceh Province.Freedom of Movement: Members of the Rohingya Muslim community claimed the government aggressively monitored them and restricted their freedom of movement.Employment: The government prohibited refugees from working, although it did not strictly enforce this prohibition.Access to Basic Services: The government did not prohibit refugees from accessing public elementary education, although many barriers prevented enrollment of more than a small number of refugee children, including lack of access to government-issued student identification numbers. Refugees were prohibited from obtaining secondary school diplomas or pursuing higher education. A small number of refugees enrolled in language and other classes in private, volunteer-run schools or in NGO-sponsored programs. Refugees had access to basic public health services through local health clinics, which the government subsidized. Treatment for more serious conditions or hospitalization, however, was not covered. Refugees and NGOs reported increasing mental health problems among long-term refugees.																																				f. Status and Treatment of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)										The government collected data on displacement caused by natural hazards and conflict through the National Disaster Management Authority, although the lack of systematic monitoring of return and resettlement conditions made it difficult to estimate reliably the total number of IDPs. The Internal Displacement Monitoring Center reported there were 308,000 IDPs due to disasters and 71,000 IDPs due to violence as of December 2022. HRM reported an estimated 60,000 IDPs across the Papua region, most without access to humanitarian aid. HRM reported the significant rise in armed clashes and attacks in the first five months of the year made it increasingly difficult for IDPs to return home.For further information about IDPs in the country, please see the materials of the Internal Displacement Monitoring Center at  https://www.internal-displacement.org .																																					Section 3.													 Freedom to Participate in the Political Process												    																						The constitution and law provided citizens the ability to choose their government in free and fair periodic elections held by secret ballot and based on universal and equal suffrage.																										Elections and Political Participation										Abuses or Irregularities in Recent Elections: National elections in 2019 were widely reported to be fair and free of abuses and irregularities.Participation of Women and Members of Marginalized or Vulnerable Groups: Barriers to women’s political participation included the high cost of running political campaigns and the voting system, which tended to place men first on ballots.The National Commission on Human Rights stated access to polling places was a problem for some groups, especially persons with diminished mobility and agricultural workers. Sick voters could request a voting commissioner collect their ballots, but the same service was not available to persons with disabilities. Voting accessibility was difficult for agricultural workers, particularly on palm oil plantations, who were often in remote areas without regular transportation services. Their ability to vote usually depended on the initiative of their employer, who could ask the General Elections Commission to send a voting commissioner to the plantation to collect workers’ ballots.																																					Section 4.													 Corruption in Government												    																						The law provided criminal penalties for official corruption, but government efforts to enforce the law were insufficient. There were numerous reports of government corruption. Despite the arrest and conviction of many high-profile and high-ranking officials, there was a widespread perception that corruption was endemic. NGOs claimed corruption was one cause of human rights abuses, with economically powerful interests using corrupt government officials to harass and intimidate activists and groups that might threaten their businesses.Corruption: The Corruption Eradication Commission investigated and prosecuted many officials suspected of corruption at all levels of government. High-profile cases involved large-scale government procurement or construction programs and implicated legislators, governors, regents, judges, police, and civil servants. In the first half of the year, the commission recovered more than 16.27 trillion IDR ($1.1 billion) of state funds, conducted 73 investigations, initiated 52 prosecutions, and obtained convictions in 63 cases.In April the NGO Indonesia Corruption Watch reported several Corruption Eradication Commission investigations were politically motivated, undermining public trust in the agency. Many NGOs and activists maintained the commission acted on behalf of members of the governing coalition to undermine opposition presidential candidates ahead of 2024 general elections.On October 19, former Papua Province Governor Lukas Enembe was convicted of corruption and sentenced to eight years in prison for receiving more than 46.8 billion IDR ($3.07 million) in kickbacks and gratuities for infrastructure projects between April 2013 and January 2023. Accusations included channelling large amounts of Special Autonomy funds for the construction of a church in exchange for kickbacks, the transfer of tens of millions of dollars to overseas casinos, and other misuses of public funds.On November 8, the Central Jakarta District Court sentenced former Minister of Communications and Informatics Johnny Plate to 15 years in prison for corruption related to the construction of communications towers intended to bring the internet to thousands of remote villages. The court also ordered Plate to pay a fine of 1 billion IDR ($65,600) or spend an additional six months in jail and to repay the state 15.5 billion IDR ($1.02 million), the amount of state funds he received through illicit activity.According to NGOs and media reports, police commonly demanded bribes ranging from minor payoffs in traffic cases to large amounts in criminal investigations.Bribes and extortion influenced prosecution, conviction, and sentencing in civil and criminal cases. Anti-corruption NGOs accused key individuals in the justice system of accepting bribes and condoning suspected corruption. Legal aid organizations reported cases often moved very slowly unless a bribe was paid, and in some cases, prosecutors demanded payments from defendants to ensure a less zealous prosecution or to make a case disappear.For additional information about corruption in the country, please see the Department of State’s Investment Climate Statement for Indonesia, and the Department of State’s International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, which includes information on financial crimes.																											Section 5.													 Governmental Posture Towards International and Nongovernmental Monitoring and Investigation of Alleged Abuses of Human Rights												    																						Domestic and international human rights organizations generally operated without government restriction, except in the Papua region, investigating and publishing findings on human rights cases and advocating improvements to the government’s human rights performance. Government representatives were generally willing to meet with local NGOs, respond to their inquiries, and at times acted in response to NGO concerns.Retribution against Human Rights Defenders: Human rights defenders were occasionally victims of violence, threats, and harassment, in most cases from nongovernmental actors. Amnesty International recorded 35 cases of physical and digital attacks targeting 150 human rights defenders or organizations during 2022.On March 24, environmental activist Heri Budiawan, known as Budi Pego, was imprisoned for an additional three years and two months in Banyuwangi, East Java, for “crimes against state security” for allegedly spreading communist ideology during a peaceful demonstration against a gold mine in Tumpang Pitu in 2017. Budi Pego was originally sentenced to 10 months’ imprisonment in January 2018 after a hammer and sickle symbol was allegedly displayed during the peaceful protest. Budi denied knowing who had painted the hammer and sickle, and NGOs criticized the conviction as a means of silencing human rights defenders who tried to protect local communities and the environment. While Budi was serving his sentence in 2018, both sides filed appeals. After Budi’s release the Supreme Court increased his sentence to four years. Budi did not, however, receive a copy of the verdict, a prerequisite for execution of a court ruling, and authorities did not take further action until March, when Budi was returned to prison.The United Nations or Other International Bodies: The government generally permitted UN officials to monitor the human rights situation in the country, except in the Papua region. Security forces and intelligence agencies, however, tended to regard foreign human rights observers with suspicion, especially those in the Papua region, where their operations were restricted. NGOs pressed the government to allow representatives of the Office of the UN High Commissioner on Human Rights to visit the region to assess the human rights situation there.Government Human Rights Bodies: Many independent agencies addressed human rights problems, including the Office of the National Ombudsman, the National Commission on Violence against Women, and the National Human Rights Commission. The government was not required to adopt their recommendations and at times avoided doing so. Some agencies, including the Human Rights and Violence against Women Commissions, could refer cases to police or prosecutors.																											Section 6.													 Discrimination and Societal Abuses												    																																																Women										Rape and Domestic Violence: The law prohibited rape, domestic abuse, and other forms of sexual or gender-based violence. The law, adopted in 2022, defined rape only as forced penetration of sexual organs but otherwise strengthened the legal framework and improved survivors’ ability to see justice. For example, filing a case required only a single (vice two previously) witness or other corroboration, such as medical evidence, to support a survivor’s testimony. Rape was punishable by four to 14 years in prison and a substantial fine. The law included rights to respectful treatment during investigation and court proceedings, protection from alleged perpetrators, restitution, and recovery services.While the government imprisoned some perpetrators of rape and attempted rape, it did not enforce the law effectively; sentences were often light, and many convicted rapists received the minimum sentence. Marital rape was not a specific criminal offense in law but was covered under “forced sexual intercourse” in national legislation on domestic violence and could be punished with criminal penalties.The National Commission on Violence against Women documented a significant rise in reports of gender-based violence in 2022, compared with pre-COVID-19 reports. The commission attributed the increase in part to survivors’ growing confidence in the legal system following passage of the Anti-Sexual Violence Law in 2022. Nonetheless, civil society activists underscored that many cases went unreported, as many victims did not report abuse because of fear of social stigma, shame, and lack of support from friends and family.Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting (FGM/C): FGM/C occurred regularly; 55 percent of women between the ages of 15 and 64 acknowledged being circumcised, according to an August report from the UN Population Fund. With 1.3 million girls being cut every year, the country represented 30 percent of girls at risk globally. The fund estimated 21 percent of FGM/C practices were type I as categorized by the World Health Organization, also known as a clitoridectomy (partial or total removal of the clitoris or prepuce). The second most common practice was type IV, which included other harmful procedures to the female genitalia, including pricking, piercing, incising, scraping or cauterization. While no national law explicitly prohibited FGM/C, the Ministry of Women’s Empowerment and Child Protection led official efforts to prevent the practice.Other Forms of Gender-based Violence or Harassment: The law prohibiting indecent public acts served as the basis for criminal complaints stemming from sexual harassment and was effectively enforced. Violations were punishable by imprisonment of up to two years and eight months and a small fine. The law recognized and detailed punishments for a variety of crimes, including physical and nonphysical sexual harassment, online gender-based violence, forced contraception, forced marriage, sexual exploitation, and online sexual violence. Civil society and NGOs reported sexual harassment was a problem countrywide. In 2022 the Coalition of Safe Public Space released a survey indicating four out of five women in the country experienced sexual harassment in public spaces.Discrimination: The law provided the same legal status and rights for women and men in family, labor, property, and nationality law but did not grant widows equal inheritance rights. The law was generally enforced effectively.Women faced discrimination in the workplace, both in hiring and in gaining fair compensation. A gender wage gap persisted, and women earned 30 percent less than men. The law stated women’s work outside the home was not to conflict with their role in improving family welfare and educating the younger generation and designated the man as the head of the household. There were no legal restrictions against women in employment. Some activists said that in manufacturing, employers relegated women to lower paying, lower-level jobs. Jobs traditionally associated with women were significantly undervalued and unregulated. NGOs reported discriminatory behavior toward domestic workers was rampant.Divorce was available to both men and women. The law required a divorced woman to wait 40 days before remarrying; a man could remarry immediately.The National Commission on Violence against Women viewed many local laws and policies as discriminatory. These included “morality laws” and antiprostitution regulations.Although the federal government sought to prohibit mandatory wearing of the hijab, it did not have jurisdiction over uniforms in elementary and secondary schools. Some provincial and district governments required hijabs as part of the school uniform; students who objected were often bullied or humiliated. Muslim parents emphasized pressure for such rules stemmed from the community, rather than religious leaders, noting the Indonesian Ulema Council had consistently stated the Quran did not require women to wear headscarves. Some observers viewed pressure to wear a hijab as a sign of diminishing gender equality, since a woman could be denied an education or a job if she chose not to wear one.Reproductive Rights: There were no reports of coerced abortion or involuntary sterilization on the part of government authorities.The law recognized the basic right of couples and individuals to decide the number, spacing, and timing of their children, but various regulations undercut its effective implementation for women. The law required the government to provide information and education in accordance with religious or moral norms, and NGOs reported some government officials attempted to restrict the provision of reproductive health information on those grounds.While condoms were widely available, unmarried women reported difficulties obtaining other forms of birth control through health-care systems. Media and NGOs reported such women were stigmatized, including by health-care staff who repeatedly asked about marital status and sometimes turned away unmarried women seeking routine procedures such as pap smears.NGOs reported reproductive health services were not consistently provided to survivors of sexual violence. NGOs reported rape survivors sometimes experienced difficulties obtaining emergency contraceptives from medical providers and postexposure prophylaxis was not always available.According to 2020 World Bank data, the maternal mortality rate was 173 per 100,000 live births, down from 299 in 2000. The Ministry of Health and NGOs identified several factors contributing to the high maternal mortality rate, including lack of training for midwives and traditional birth attendants, lack of access to basic and comprehensive emergency obstetric care, and limited availability of essential maternal and neonatal medications. Hospitals and health centers did not always properly manage complicated procedures, and financial barriers and the limited availability of qualified health personnel caused problems for referrals in case of complications. A woman’s economic status, level of education, and age at marriage also affected maternal mortality.NGOs reported that social stigma and bullying of female students related to menstruation occurred, and that they had inadequate access to menstrual education, hygiene products, and hygienic facilities at schools. This lack frequently resulted in absenteeism during menstruation.																																				Systemic Racial or Ethnic Violence and Discrimination										The law contained provisions specifically aimed at eliminating racial and ethnic discrimination, providing criminal penalties for individuals who discriminated on ethnic/racial grounds, as well as sentencing enhancements for violent actions that included a racial or ethnic motivation. The government did not always enforce the law effectively. Public officials frequently spoke to the importance of tolerance and diversity in a multiethnic country, but discriminatory practices often went unpunished. The law defined hate speech as spreading hate against a race, tribe, religion, or group. The government generally applied hate speech law in cases related to race.NGOs reported persons of Melanesian descent, predominantly from the Papua region, faced widespread discrimination throughout the country. Persons of Melanesian descent often faced police abuse.Papuan activists emphasized that although the Papua region was rich in natural resources, the local Melanesian population historically had not fully benefitted from these resources and much of the local economy was long controlled by non-Melanesians. Statistics Indonesia, a government agency, reported that in 2021 the Papua region had the lowest Human Development Index and highest poverty rate of the country’s then 34 provinces. While the special autonomy status of the then provinces of Papua and West Papua included an increase in the yearly allocation of government funds to 2.25 percent of the national budget, opponents claimed the economic benefits of this increase would disproportionately benefit non-Melanesians.Migrant workers were often subjected to police extortion and societal discrimination.																																				Indigenous Peoples										The government viewed most citizens as “Indigenous” but recognized the existence of several “isolated traditional communities” and their right to participate fully in political and social life. The Indigenous Peoples’ Alliance of the Archipelago estimated between 50 million and 70 million Indigenous persons were in the country. These communities included the Dayak tribes of Kalimantan, families living as sea nomads, and the 312 officially recognized Indigenous groups in Papua. Indigenous persons, most notably those from the Papua region, were subjected to discrimination.There was some improvement in respect for Indigenous persons’ traditional land rights, although access to ancestral lands was a major source of tension throughout the country. The government, often in collusion with local military and police units, failed to prevent companies from encroaching on Indigenous groups’ land. Central and local government officials were also alleged to have extracted kickbacks from mining and plantation companies in exchange for land access at the expense of Indigenous groups.Mining and logging activities, many of them illegal, posed significant social, economic, and legal problems for Indigenous communities. Melanesians in Papua cited racism and discrimination as drivers of violence and economic inequality in the region.The government recognized hutan adat (customary forest rights) for 141 communities, covering approximately 943 square miles of customary forest. The nonprofit Ancestral Domain Registration Agency, however, estimated customary forest rights could be claimed over more than 80,500 square miles of forested land. In September the government officially recognized the rights of 15 Indigenous Dayak communities to 270 square miles of customary forests in Kalimantan, the largest cluster of customary forests ever recognized by the state. In October 2022 the government officially granted 155 square miles of hutan adat rights in eastern Papua to seven Papuan Indigenous groups for the first time.Nevertheless, large corporations and the government displaced individuals from ancestral lands. The International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs reported 19 cases of expropriation of Indigenous territories in 2022 and disputes over Indigenous territories spanning approximately 2,300 square miles. NGOs described systematic efforts to undermine Indigenous communities’ customary rights. The Pargamanan-Bintang Maria people and 23 neighboring Batak Toba communities in North Sumatra remained, even after decades, in conflict with the paper company Toba Pulp Lestari over land claims. Although the government recognized the customary forest rights of six Batak Toba communities, it had not verified the claims of the Pargamanan people, who claimed 40 percent of their land was under Toba Pulp Lestari occupation.																																				Children										Birth Registration: The law prohibited fees for legal identity documents issued by the civil registry. Nevertheless, NGOs reported that in some districts local authorities did not provide free birth certificates. Lack of registration could result in denial of public services, such as school enrollment.Education: Although the constitution stated the government had to provide tuition-free education up to grade nine, it did not bar fees charged for schoolbooks, uniforms, transportation, and other nontuition costs. The Ministry of Education and Culture, representing public and private schools, and the Ministry of Religious Affairs for Islamic schools and madrassahs, operated a system giving students from low-income families a financial grant for their educational needs. Nonetheless, high poverty rates nationwide put education out of reach for many children.Child Abuse: The law prohibited child abuse, but NGOs criticized the slow police response to such allegations. The National Strategy to Abolish Violence Against Children laid out a roadmap through 2024 to strengthen efforts to prevent and respond to forms of violence against children.Child, Early, and Forced Marriage: The legal minimum marriage age was 21 without parental permission and 19 with parental permission. Exceptions to the minimum age requirements were allowed with court approval. The courts officially permitted more than 50,000 child marriages, down from 59,000 in 2021, with approximately one-third due to pregnancy.The main drivers of early marriage were poverty, cultural tradition, religious norms, and lack of sexual reproductive health education. The National Commission on Violence Against Women reported that some of these child marriages involved the victims of sexual abuse marrying their abusers.Sexual Exploitation of Children: The law forbade consensual sex outside of marriage with girls younger than 15. It did not address heterosexual conduct between women and boys but prohibited same-sex sexual conduct between adults and minors.The law prohibited the commercial sexual exploitation of children and the use of children in illicit activities and was enforced. It also prohibited child pornography and prescribed a maximum sentence of 12 years and a substantial fine for producing or trading in child pornography.Observers agreed there were tens of thousands of children involved in commercial sexual activity.																																				Antisemitism										The country’s Jewish population was extremely small, estimated at approximately 200. There were no significant reports of antisemitism, but studies in recent years indicated a high level of antisemitic sentiment, often linked with strong pro-Palestine and anti-Israel sentiment.In March the soccer world’s governing body FIFA moved the Men’s Under-20 World Cup, scheduled for May, out of the country after political and religious leaders called for banning the participation of the Israeli team.Demonstrations against Israel were common following the onset of the war in Gaza and included a few examples of high-profile antisemitic statements.																																				Trafficking in Persons										See the Department of State’s Trafficking in Persons Report at  https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/.																																				Acts of Violence, Criminalization, and Other Abuses Based on Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity or Expression, or Sex Characteristics										Criminalization: No national law criminalized consensual same-sex sexual conduct between adults; however, NGOs reported several cases where vaguely defined laws related to pornography and facilitation of prostitution were used to prosecute LGBTQI+ individuals. NGOs reported numerous local government regulations defined same-sex sexual conduct as a form of sexual deviance. Such local laws were rarely enforced.In July Garut Regency became the fifth local government to enact anti-LGBTQI+ legislation when Regent Rudy Gunawan signed a law creating a taskforce to prevent and monitor “immorality,” including same-sex relationships.Consensual same-sex sexual conduct was illegal in Aceh and punishable by a maximum of 100 lashes, a considerable fine, or a 100-month prison term. According to Aceh’s sharia agency chief, at least four witnesses were required to observe individuals engaging in consensual same-sex sexual conduct for them to be charged. NGOs reported that fear of prosecution under sharia in Aceh at times caused LGBTQI+ activists to flee the province, sometimes permanently.In July Pekanbaru community police carried out “surveillance raids” of guesthouses, seeking to deter same-sex relationships using their authority to uphold “public order.” Local police chief Zulfahmi Adrian acknowledged no LGBTQI+ persons were arrested and said it was difficult to uncover LGBTQI+ cases because there was no local prohibition against men or women sleeping in the same room or living in the same house.Violence and Harassment: Police corruption, bias, and violence caused LGBTQI+ persons to avoid interaction with police. Officials often ignored formal complaints by victims and affected persons, including refusing to investigate bullying directed at LGBTQI+ individuals. In criminal cases with LGBTQI+ victims, police investigated the cases reasonably well. According to media and NGO reports, local authorities harassed transgender persons, including by forcing them to conform to cultural standards of behavior associated with their biological sex or to pay bribes following detention. In many cases, officials failed to protect LGBTQI+ persons from societal abuse. After local media in Kupang, East Nusa Tenggara, published a story regarding an openly gay pastor, church leaders removed him from his position and allegedly kept him from pastoring in neighboring churches.Discrimination: National antidiscrimination law did not protect LGBTQI+ individuals, and discrimination against LGBTQI+ persons occurred. Transgender persons faced discrimination in employment and access to public services and health care.In January Medan Mayor Bobby Nasution characterized same-sex relationships as counter to national culture and proclaimed Medan an “anti-LGBT” city in public remarks.In July a police officer from the Civil Service Police Unit in Dharmasraya, West Sumatra Province, was fired on suspicion of being a lesbian. She was accused of acting immorally after a video of her hugging another woman was widely viewed on social media.Availability of Legal Gender Recognition: The country recognized “sex” rather than “gender” on official documents. Updating sex markers on legal documents was possible but required completed medical interventions including surgery and attestation by court order. Judges had the discretion to grant a court order. NGOs reported at least one case where the petitioner presented evidence of a medical sex change and the judge denied the request due to his self-described conservative values.Involuntary or Coercive Medical or Psychological Practices: No law or regulation prohibited or otherwise restricted so-called conversion therapy practices. According to activists, transgender individuals were at times subjected to “therapy” such as exorcism practices, religious camps, and other traumatic practices. Families often put LGBTQI+ children into therapy, confined them to their homes, or pressured them to marry persons of the opposite sex. No known forced medical procedures were performed on children or nonconsenting adult intersex persons.NGOs criticized a law in the city of Bogor, West Java, aimed at “rehabilitating” those perceived to suffer from abnormal sexual behavior, saying it violated rights and targeted LGBTQI+ individuals and communities.Restrictions of Freedom of Expression, Association, or Peaceful Assembly: Some LGBTQI+ advocacy groups reported that when attempting to register their organizations, they were unable to state explicitly that they were LGBTQI+ advocacy groups on their registration certificate. LGBTQI+ NGOs operated but reported licenses or permits required for public events were difficult to obtain. Some were pressured by police not to hold such events to avoid creating “social unrest.”Producing media depicting consensual same-sex sexual conduct – vaguely and broadly defined in the law – could be prosecuted as a crime. Penalties included potentially extremely large fines and imprisonment up to 15 years. NGOs reported that the Ministry of Communication and Information Technology sometimes requested removal of information related to LGBTQI+ matters from internet sites. Government bodies censored domestic and imported movies for depicting same-sex relationships and prohibited television programs from having LGBTQI+ content.In July organizers of ASEAN Queer Advocacy Week were forced to cancel a regional conference in Jakarta due to threats from various groups who urged the government to prohibit the event. The LGBTQI+ advocacy organization ASEAN SOGIE Caucus, in a since-deleted July 10 Instagram post, invited LGBTQI+ activists from other Southeast Asia countries to Jakarta in July for a week of discussion and advocacy. The post resulted in violent threats and a police memorandum ordering Jakarta hotels to report LGBTQI+-related gatherings. Anwar Abbas, deputy chairperson of Indonesian Ulema Council, urged the government not to grant permission to the event, claiming it would constitute “a violation of the constitution.” Similarly, the Nahdlatul Ulama National Board Chairman for Religious Affairs, KH Ahmad Fahrurrozi told media such events clearly violated the country’s religious and cultural norms. People’s Consultative Agency Deputy Chairperson Yandri Susanto also rejected the event and argued police should take necessary steps to ensure such events did not happen.Following the ASEAN Queer Advocacy Week incident, on July 26, an LGBTQI+ NGO consortium was reported to police for hosting a capacity-building workshop at a hotel. Police arrived and insisted on monitoring the event, although they allowed it to continue. Activists reported the police memorandum directing hotels to report LGBTQI+ meetings had a chilling effect on the LGBTQI+ community and many NGOs stopped gathering in public places.																																				Persons with Disabilities										Persons with disabilities were not able to access education, health services, public buildings, and transportation on an equal basis with others. The law mandated accessibility to public facilities for persons with disabilities. The law applied to education, employment, health services, transportation, and other state services but was seldom enforced. Comprehensive disability rights law provisions imposed criminal sanctions for violations of the rights of persons with disabilities. The law, however, was rarely enforced.There were no reliable data on the access of children with disabilities to education, but observers believed their attendance rate was lower than that of other children.Despite a government ban, NGOs reported that families, traditional healers, and staff in institutions shackled individuals with psychosocial disabilities, in some cases for years. The government prioritized elimination of this practice, although approximately 4,300 persons remained shackled as of June 2022, according to the Ministry of Health.																																				Other Societal Violence or Discrimination										Stigmatization of and discrimination against persons with HIV or AIDS were pervasive, despite government efforts to encourage tolerance. Societal tolerance varied widely, and official fear of a backlash from religious conservatives often resulted in muted prevention efforts. Societal barriers to accessing antiretroviral drugs and their expense put these drugs beyond the reach of many. Persons with HIV or AIDS reportedly faced employment discrimination. Closer collaboration between the Ministry of Health and NGOs increased the reach of the government’s AIDS and HIV awareness campaign; however, some clinics refused to provide services to persons with HIV or AIDS.																																					Section 7.													 Worker Rights												    																																																a. Freedom of Association and the Right to Collective Bargaining										The law, with restrictions, provided for the rights of workers to join independent unions, conduct legal strikes, and bargain collectively. The law prohibited antiunion discrimination.Private-sector workers had broad rights of association and formed and joined unions of their choice without previous authorization or excessive requirements. Although the constitution granted all citizens the right to join any professional organization of their choice, the law placed restrictions on civil servants’ right to organize. All were required to join a state-regulated employee association (KOPRI) with no right to strike. Efforts to organize other employee associations, for example, a teachers’ union, were rejected on the grounds that the teachers were civil servants, not “workers.” Employees of state-owned enterprises could form unions, but because the government treated most such enterprises as essential national interest entities, their right to strike was limited.The law stipulated that 10 or more workers had the right to form a union, with membership open to all workers, regardless of political affiliation, religion, ethnicity, or gender. The Ministry of Manpower recorded, rather than approved, the formation of a union, federation, or confederation and provided it with a registration number.The law allowed the government to petition the courts to dissolve a union if it conflicted with the constitution or the national ideology of Pancasila, which encompassed the principles of belief in one God, justice, unity, democracy, and social justice. Authorities could compel a union to dissolve if its leaders or members, in the name of the union, committed crimes against the security of the state, and they could receive a minimum of five years in prison. Once a union was dissolved, its leaders and members could not form another union for at least three years. The International Labor Organization was concerned that dissolving a union could be disproportionate to the seriousness of the violation.The law included restrictions on collective bargaining, including a requirement that a union or unions represent more than 50 percent of the company workforce or receive a vote of more than 50 percent of all workers to negotiate a collective labor agreement. Workers and employers had 30 days to conclude a collective labor agreement. Such agreements had a two-year lifespan that the parties could extend for one year. Unions noted the law allowed employers to delay the negotiation of collective labor agreements with few legal repercussions. The International Labor Organization noted the law allowed the presence of employers in trade unions’ voting procedures, which raised concerns of employer interference in union proceedings.The right to strike was legally restricted. By law workers had to give written notification to authorities and the employer seven days in advance for a strike to be legal. Before striking, workers were required to engage in mediation with the employer or risk having the strike declared illegal. In the case of an illegal strike, an employer could make two written requests within a period of seven days for workers to return. Workers who did not return to work after these requests were considered to have resigned. Unions noted that fulfilling the many legal requirements to strike made striking legally very difficult.All strikes at “enterprises that cater to the interests of the general public or at enterprises whose activities would endanger the safety of human life if discontinued” were deemed illegal. Regulations did not specify the types of enterprises affected, leaving this determination to the government’s discretion. Presidential and ministerial decrees enabled companies or industrial areas to request assistance from police and the military in the event of disruption of or threat to “national vital objects” in their jurisdiction. The International Labor Organization reported the definition of “national vital objects” imposed overly broad restrictions on legitimate trade union activity, including in export processing zones. Human rights activists and unions alleged the government labelled companies and economic areas as “national vital objects” to justify the use of security forces to restrict strike activity.On March 21, the government passed the Emergency Regulation in Lieu of Law, effectively resuscitating the 2020 Job Creation Law (aka Omnibus Law), which had been ruled conditionally unconstitutional for bypassing proper public consultation and other procedural requirements. Trade unions and other labor groups widely opposed the new law, which was viewed as eroding rights to freedom of association and collective bargaining, in particular by lifting limits to outsourcing and fixed term contracts.Under the new law, any business could hire outsourced contract labor without limitation. Firms could hire contract workers from multiple outsourcing companies, effectively making it impossible for workers to bargain collectively. The law also made contract terms the responsibility of the outsourcing company and allowed firms to offer fewer protections and lesser working conditions to outsourced workers than to direct hire workers. The law set only vague limits on the use of fixed-term contracts for outsourced workers, which, for example, could be used for any work that was “temporary” in nature or could be completed in “not too long a time.” Implementing regulations increased the maximum duration of fixed contracts from three to 10 years and did not limit their renewal.The law, moreover, did not provide adequate protection against nonrenewal of a contract for antiunion reasons and dissolved previous legal requirements for written contracts.The government did not effectively enforce provisions of the law protecting freedom of association or preventing antiunion discrimination. Bribery and judicial corruption in workers’ disputes occurred, resulting in unfavorable results for workers. While workers sometimes received severance pay or other compensation, they were rarely reinstated.Penalties for criminal violations of the law protecting freedom of association and the right to enter into collective labor agreements included a prison sentence and fines and were generally commensurate with similar crimes. Penalties, however, were rarely applied against violators. Enforcement of collective bargaining agreements varied based on the capacity and interest of individual regional governments.Several common practices undermined freedom of association. Antiunion intimidation most often took the form of termination, transfer, or filing of unjustified criminal charges. Unions alleged employers commonly reassigned labor leaders deemed to be problematic. Labor activists claimed companies orchestrated the formation of multiple unions, including “yellow” (employer-controlled) unions, to weaken legitimate unions. Some employers threatened employees who contacted union organizers. Companies often sued union leaders for losses suffered in strikes.Many strikes were unsanctioned, occurring after a failure to settle long-term grievances or when an employer refused to recognize a union. Unions reported employers also used the bureaucratic process required for a legal strike to obstruct unions’ right to strike. Unions noted employers’ delays in negotiating collective labor agreements contributed to strike activity and legal measures taken against union members in the event of a failed agreement negotiation.																																				b. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor										See the Department of State’s annual Trafficking in Persons Report at  https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/.																																				c. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment										See the Department of Labor’s Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor at  https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ilab/resources/reports/child-labor/findings/ .																																				d. Discrimination (see section 6)																																														e. Acceptable Conditions of Work										Wage and Hour Laws: Minimum wages varied throughout the country since provincial governors had authority to set a minimum wage floor and district heads had authority to set a higher rate. The minimum wage in 19 of 34 provinces was below the national poverty income level.Most workers were not covered by the minimum wage laws. Government regulations exempted employers in certain sectors, including small and medium enterprises and labor-intensive industries such as textiles, from minimum wage requirements. Guidelines based the minimum wage on economic conditions, with purchasing power parity, manpower absorption levels, and median wage key variables in the calculation. The implementing regulations required sectors exempt from minimum wage rules to pay workers at least 50 percent of the average public consumption or 25 percent above the poverty level of their province and make part-time workers eligible for hourly wages.For certain sectors, the overtime rate for work more than a 40-hour workweek was 1.5 times the normal hourly rate for the first hour and twice the hourly rate for additional overtime, with a maximum of four hours of overtime per day and a maximum of 18 hours per week. The law allowed certain businesses and jobs to be exempt from the 40-hour workweek, including those in the energy, agriculture, and fisheries sectors.Occupational Safety and Health: The law required most employers to provide a safe and healthy workplace; however, workers in the informal sector were not covered, including domestic workers. Inspectors did not actively identify unsafe conditions as their capacity to conduct inspections was limited by resources and training. Industry sources reported labor inspectors were often bribed to underreport or completely omit occupational safety and health (OSH) violations from their inspection reports. The government was in the process of creating a separate entity that conducted OSH inspections and improve the capacity of its inspectors. Workers could remove themselves from situations that endangered health or safety without jeopardy to their employment.On January 14, a protest over working conditions turned violent at the Chinese-owned PT Gunbuster Nickel Industry smelter in North Morowali, Central Sulawesi, resulting in the death of two workers. Three weeks earlier, two Indonesian workers were trapped and burned to death after an electrical short circuit started a fire at the smelter. The accident heightened dissatisfaction among local workers, who described poorer working conditions and lower pay compared with those of Chinese workers; at the time the company employed 11,000 Indonesian employees and 1,300 Chinese personnel. Before the protest, local workers belonging to the National Worker’s Union met with the company and presented eight demands, including the implementation of national OSH laws and the provision of personal protective equipment. After the company rejected the demands and fired the union members, the workers called for a strike for the period of January 11-14.Plantation agriculture workers often worked long hours without government-mandated health insurance benefits. They lacked proper protective gear and training in pesticide safety. Most plantation operators paid workers by the volume of crop harvested, which resulted in some workers receiving less than minimum wage and working extended hours to meet excessive volume targets. Gig workers were not protected under wage, work hours, and occupational safety and health regulations.Unions urged the government, especially the Ministry of Manpower, to do more to address the country’s poor worker safety record and lax enforcement of health and safety regulations, particularly in the construction sector. The government sometimes responded to workers’ OSH complaints.Wage, Hour, and OSH Enforcement: Authorities enforced labor regulations, including minimum wage regulations, only for workers in the formal sector. Local officials from the Ministry of Manpower were responsible for enforcing minimum wage, work hours, and OSH regulations. Penalties for violations included fines and imprisonment (for violation of the minimum wage law), which were generally commensurate with those for similar crimes. Government enforcement was inadequate, particularly at smaller companies and in foreign-owned enterprises, such as Chinese-owned mining sites, where reports of unsafe working conditions and concerns regarding wage payments were prevalent. Penalties were rarely applied even when violators were identified. Provincial and local officials often did not have the technical expertise needed to enforce labor law effectively and were often bribed not to enforce laws effectively. Inspectors had the authority to make unannounced inspections and could initiate sanctions in the formal sector. The number of inspectors employed by the Ministry of Manpower was inadequate to enforce compliance.The law did not mandate that employers provide domestic workers, who were considered part of the informal workplace, with a minimum wage, health insurance, freedom of association, the right to collective bargaining, an eight-hour workday, a weekly day of rest, vacation time, or safe work conditions. In August domestic workers’ unions went on a hunger strike in Jakarta and other cities throughout the country to urge parliament to pass legal protections for domestic workers.Workers in the informal sector (an estimated 60 percent of the labor force) did not receive the same protections or benefits as workers in the formal sector, in part because they had no legal work contract that labor inspectors could examine.																																				    							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Respect for the Integrity of the Person																																							a. Arbitrary Deprivation of Life and Other Unlawful or Politically Motivated Killings																																																						b. Disappearance																																																						c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and Other Related Abuses																																																				Prison and Detention Center Conditions																																																																																				d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention																																																				Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees																																																																																				e. Denial of Fair Public Trial																																																				Trial Procedures																																												Political Prisoners and Detainees																																																																																				f. Transnational Repression																																																						g. Property Seizure and Restitution																																																						h. Arbitrary or Unlawful Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence																																																						i. Conflict-related Abuse																																																			Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties																																							a. Freedom of Expression, Including for Members of the Press and Other Media																																																				Internet Freedom																																																																																				b. Freedoms of Peaceful Assembly and Association																																																				Freedom of Peaceful Assembly																																												Freedom of Association																																																																																				c. Freedom of Religion																																																						d. Freedom of Movement and the Right to Leave the Country																																																						e. Protection of Refugees																																																						f. Status and Treatment of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)																																																			Section 3. Freedom to Participate in the Political Process																																							Elections and Political Participation																																																			Section 4. Corruption in Government																Section 5. Governmental Posture Towards International and Nongovernmental Monitoring and Investigation of Alleged Abuses of Human Rights																Section 6. Discrimination and Societal Abuses																																							Women																																																						Systemic Racial or Ethnic Violence and Discrimination																																																						Indigenous Peoples																																																						Children																																																						Antisemitism																																																						Trafficking in Persons																																																						Acts of Violence, Criminalization, and Other Abuses Based on Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity or Expression, or Sex Characteristics																																																						Persons with Disabilities																																																						Other Societal Violence or Discrimination																																																			Section 7. Worker Rights																																							a. Freedom of Association and the Right to Collective Bargaining																																																						b. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor																																																						c. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment																																																						d. Discrimination (see section 6)																																																						e. Acceptable Conditions of Work																																																									Tags																					Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor																								Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs																								Indonesia
- Special Representative for Commercial and Business Affairs Morgenthau’s Travel to Singapore, Vietnam, and Indonesia Office of the SpokespersonU.S. Department of State Special Representative for Commercial and Business Affairs Sarah Morgenthau traveled to Singapore, Vietnam, and Indonesia from March 11 to 22 to highlight the positive impact of U.S. investment and American companies in Southeast Asia. U.S. companies hold more than $359 billion in direct investments across the region, which support more than three million American jobs.In Singapore, the Special Representative met with government officials and U.S. private sector leaders to discuss how to increase U.S. economic presence in the region and participated in a roundtable organized by The American Chamber of Commerce in Singapore.In Hanoi, Special Representative Morgenthau joined one of the largest-ever delegations of U.S. businesses to Vietnam.  The delegation, facilitated by the US-ASEAN Business Council, included 94 representatives from 49 U.S. companies.  The delegation also included President and Chair of the Export-Import Bank of the United States Reta Jo Lewis and U.S. Ambassador to Vietnam Marc Knapper.In Jakarta, the Special Representative joined U.S. Ambassador to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Yohannes Abraham to lead discussions on the importance of our shared commitment to an inclusive digital economy to ensure that benefits and opportunities flow to all people and all places.This trip highlighted the United States’ position as the largest foreign direct investor in Southeast Asia and our readiness to be ASEAN&#8217;s partner of choice.  Our shared future is bright.For further information please contact the Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs at EB-Press-Inquiry@state.gov.
- Department Press Briefing – March 20, 2024 HomeDepartment Press Briefing – March 20, 2024				hide		if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}																										Department Press Briefing – March 20, 2024																																																					March 20, 2024																																																								12:34 p.m. EDTMR PATEL: Good afternoon, everybody. Happy Wednesday. I don’t have anything off the top today. Shaun, go ahead.QUESTION: Sure. I guess starting with Gaza.MR PATEL: Sure.QUESTION: NSM-20 – follow up on that. I mean, there’s – the clock is ticking for a Israeli response, and not just Israel but – can you say what extent now has Israel submitted a response? Has there been any correspondence with the department?MR PATEL: So as I said yesterday, I’m just not going to speak to the specifics of any singular country at this moment. This is a broad memorandum touching various different corners of the world. And to take a step back, since the signing of the national security memorandum on February 8th, partner countries deemed to be in active armed conflict have 45 days to share letters of assurances. And upon receipt of each of those, the United States will assess whether or not a partner country – whether those assurances are credible and reliable.And so that work is ongoing, and implementation of that national security memorandum is ongoing, as is the assessment of those assurances from partner countries. So I just – I don’t – I’m not going to get into more specifics. I know Camilla asked about this yesterday.QUESTION: Right. The Secretary, of course – it’s been announced he’s going to continue on to Israel this week. Do you expect this to be a – to be one of the issues that’s raised, I mean, this response on NSM-20?MR PATEL: Well, we expect him to talk a wide – about a wide range of issues. The Secretary, as you note, is headed to Israel at the end of this week. He’s going to discuss with the Government of Israel, its leadership, the ongoing negotiations to secure the release of hostages. He’s going to discuss the need to defeat Hamas, including in Rafah, in a way that we believe will hopefully protect civilian populations, does not hinder the delivery of humanitarian assistance, and advances Israel’s overall security.He’s also going to discuss the United States and international efforts to dramatically increase and sustain delivery of humanitarian assistance to civilians, who are suffering from a lack of adequate food supplies. That’s obviously been a immense priority for us. And he’s also going to update Israeli leaders on his talks in the earlier part of this week with Arab leaders to build a lasting peace and security for Israelis, Palestinians, and the broader region.QUESTION: Just one for me before I pass it on, but the – Rafah, how much do you figure of that will be in the discussions? I mean, there’s – there have been calls from the U.S. quite explicitly to hold off without a plan for civilians in Rafah. Do you expect the Secretary to speak in depth about Rafah with the Israeli leaders?MR PATEL: I don’t have a percentage or an assessment to offer, Shaun. But we have been very clear that we believe that in order to undertake any kind of operation in Rafah, it would require a serious and significant plan, one that addresses the varying and complex humanitarian challenges that are posed in the Rafah region, talking specifically about more than 1 million people who are seeking refuge in the area, it continuing to be an area that is a conduit for the flow of humanitarian aid.So I have no doubt it will be one of the things that will be discussed, but also, as a reminder, National Security Advisor Sullivan spoke to this earlier in this week. We expect a team from Israel to meet with members of the interagency in the United States to also discuss ways in which we believe that Hamas can be defeated, but done so in a targeted and more precise manner, and hopefully does not impact or have any negative impact on Palestinian civilians.Daphne, go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you. Netanyahu has said that he will soon approve a plan for the evacuation of Palestinian civilians from fighting areas after having green-lit the military’s operational plans for Rafah. Has the U.S. seen any of these plans yet?MR PATEL: I have not seen – I don’t have any plan to read out or to offer an assessment on. But let me be very clear, and this has come up a couple of times this week: There should be no full-scale military operation in Rafah without a credible and executable plan to protect the civilian population. Part of that also, and this has been a – something that the Secretary has made clear and reiterated in some remarks he gave in Tokyo last year, that we do not support the forced displacement of Palestinians in Gaza to outside of Gaza. That’s not something that we would support or condone.QUESTION: And sorry, just not looking for any assessment, but have you actually received these plans from Israel?MR PATEL: I’m not aware. I’m not aware of that.QUESTION: And I have a few more on Haiti, but if you have &#8212;MR PATEL: Yes.QUESTION: Still on Rafah for one second?MR PATEL: Sure. Yeah, go ahead.QUESTION: Will the Secretary be in the conversations next week with administration officials with the Israelis who are coming here to discuss Rafah?MR PATEL: I don’t have – one, I don’t have specific scheduling to offer on, like, when those conversations will take place. Two, I don’t have an exact delegation makeup both from the United States side or the Israeli side. But what I can say is that I have no doubt the State Department will be deeply engaged in those conversations. I do not believe that they will be happening at the Secretary’s level, but of course we are deeply engaged on this issue from across the department.QUESTION: And just on Rafah generally, you guys have repeatedly talked about the importance of protecting the civilian population there. And given the outreach to Israel to discuss this plan in more detail, is the administration in a position where you guys would be willing to provide resources to Israel to actually protect the civilian population if they’re going to go ahead with this operation? Or is the onus on Israel to do that with their own resources?MR PATEL: I don’t want to get ahead of the – these conversations, Kylie. As you know, over the course of – since October 7th, but even prior to that, we have a longstanding relationship with Israel in terms of provisions of security assistance and things like that. What we hope to happen through this conversation is for there to be a clear and direct engagement on how they are thinking about this and offer some insight into advice on how we would approach this situation were we in that position.And so I don’t want to get ahead of that conversation, and if in the course of that it is determined that our Israeli partners need X, Y, and Z, that is of course a conversation that we’ll continue to have.QUESTION: Can I follow up?MR PATEL: Can I – then I’ll go to you. Go ahead, Camilla. Still on Gaza, I assume?QUESTION: (Off-mike.)MR PATEL: No? Okay, then go ahead, Said.QUESTION: First, I wanted to ask about a colleague of mine in Gaza. He’s in fact the bureau chief of Gaza for our newspaper, and the editor-in-chief for the electronic version. His name is Mahmoud Abu Awad Abu Musab, but I’ll send you his name and his picture. He was taken by the Israelis on Sunday night, Sunday or Monday morning, and we lost his whereabouts. We don’t know anything about him. Then there was a picture published with him stripped naked along with other men and so on.So my point is: When will the United States demand and say that this cannot keep on going, where journalists that are credentialed, that have worked there for year after year, decade after decade, well-known to the Israelis – well-known to the Israelis – why do they keep taking them, targeting them, killing them, imprisoning them? With impunity? Why is that not outrageous to you?MR PATEL: Said, when we talk about continuing to press Israel to enhance its mechanisms to better protect civilians, we of course are also talking about extending that to journalists as well. We are always concerned for the safety of journalists, especially in conflict zones, especially in somewhere like Gaza, where journalism plays a critical role. And as Secretary Blinken has said, journalists – including many Palestinians in Gaza – are doing extraordinary work under the most dangerous conditions. And we’ve been unequivocal here. We also have been clear and reiterated the fact that Israel needs to abide by international humanitarian law, especially as it conducts these operations. And that’s something we’ll continue to reiterate with them.QUESTION: Yeah, well, honestly, Vedant, this slap-on-the-wrist kind of language is not going – in any way, shape, or form – to sway the Israelis, or to pressure them, or to make them do stuff. You should – everybody believes that a civilized country like the United States of America, who is basically the umbilical cord for Israel to do everything under the sun, can stand and say: This should not go on.MR PATEL: We &#8212;QUESTION: This should not go on. Not just “we urge them not to harm them” and so on because this is obviously a systematic – I mean, when you – when 150 – I don’t know how many, 150 journalists are killed &#8212;MR PATEL: Said &#8212;QUESTION: &#8212; and imprisoned and taken, and so on, this is not just something that happens.MR PATEL: It doesn’t sound like you have a follow-up question, so let me just jump in and say from the President on down, we have reiterated that Israel needs to – it has a moral and strategic imperative to do more, and to do everything it can to work on and bolster its deconfliction mechanisms, to take additional steps to protect civilians and minimize civilian casualties. And that, of course, includes and extends to journalists, who we believe are doing important and vital work in the region.QUESTION: A couple of things on Rafah. It has been assessed that it is impossible to evacuate Gazans from Rafah – there’s about a hundred – 1.4 million and so on. And it seems that the United States is having meetings next week, or the administration will be having meetings with Ron Dermer and Hanegbi to discuss Rafah. So if you are convinced, and that’s what we get, at least the suggestion is that it is really very difficult, very – it’s impossible – why cannot this be made, like, restatement or the standard U.S. position? The standard U.S. position that Rafah should not be invaded?MR PATEL: Said, it is our position that such an operation should not and cannot be conducted without a credible and serious plan, a plan that needs to account for and address the varying humanitarian factors in the Rafah region: firstly, the more than 1 million people seeking refuge in the area; two, it continuing to be an area that is a conduit for humanitarian aid. It is out of serious concern for these two factors that we have not been unambiguous about our concerns as it relates to an operation in Rafah, and we’ll continue to have these conversations with our Israeli partners.Anything else?QUESTION: After weeks – my last one – after weeks of this Rafah dilemma has been going on, is there a conceivable way to remove such a huge amount of people and move them safely, in your view or anybody’s view?MR PATEL: When we’re talking about dealing with the more than one million people who are seeking refuge in Rafah, Said, we’re certainly not being prescriptive about how to go about and do that. And when it comes to the movement of the Palestinian people, especially those residing in Gaza, we’ve been very clear that the forcible movement or the forcible removal of them is certainly not something that we would support. But beyond that, I don’t have – we’re not aiming to be prescriptive here, Said. We’re going to continue to have these conversations with our Israeli partners on what we believe can hopefully be a path forward that will help defeat Hamas, but also be mindful of these varying humanitarian factors.On Gaza? Go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you. So you said that you expect Israel to act in line with international law. And last month you announced publicly that you are assessing whether or not Israel is complying with the international law and you’re also assessing the use of U.S. weapons in Israel’s war. Have you come to any conclusion, and do you have any expectation of that, how long it might take to – for this investigation?MR PATEL: I don’t have any updates – I don’t have any updates to offer in that space. When we talk about that ongoing work, we’re talking about it in the context of how this kind of work is ongoing in all conflict areas where we’re assessing the circumstances and anecdotes on the ground, and we’re assessing what is happening. And of course there are a number of vectors and a number of lines of efforts within the State Department to assess those kinds of things. We’ve talked about a couple of them from up here: processes like the Leahy process, the – processes like CHIRG. And some of that work is just going to continue, and I don’t have any update to offer on that.QUESTION: Just one more on that. Yesterday, Human Rights Watch and Oxfam said that they submitted a memorandum to the U.S. Government regarding Israel’s violations of international law, and this includes the misuse of U.S. weapons and blocking the U.S-funded humanitarian aid. Have you (inaudible) – what is your assessment of this report? Because this includes like serious allegations like use of white phosphorous in Lebanon, in Gaza, and attacking ambulances, hospitals, and blocking the U.S. humanitarian aid. Do you have any response?MR PATEL: I’ve seen the open-source reporting of it as it relates to the report. I don’t have any specific assessment to offer on that, specifically as it relates to the national security memorandum and its linkage to that report. And just speaking to Shaun’s question, the implementation of the NSM is ongoing, and so I don’t have anything else to offer on that.Anything else on Gaza before – I want to make sure &#8212;QUESTION: One more Gaza one? Yeah.MR PATEL: I mean, we can do as many as you want. I just want to stay on topic.On Gaza – can I do Camilla first because she &#8212;QUESTION: Yeah, of course. Yeah.MR PATEL: Go ahead.QUESTION: Just following up on Said’s question.MR PATEL: Yeah.QUESTION: You and Matt have stood at the podium and you have confirmed that there are incidents that are raised with the Israelis every time something happens in Gaza that you guys want answers on. Every time a journalist is subjected to inhumane treatment or there’s evidence of that, or a journalist is killed in Gaza, is this treated the same way where you go to the Israelis and you ask them what has happened? And is there a list of journalists that you guys have asked about, especially ones that are colleagues of ours in Gaza who are working with us on this story every day? And have you had any response from the Israelis on any individual case in regards to Gaza?MR PATEL: There are – there certainly are. There certainly are specific incidents, especially as it relates to journalists, in which we have asked our partners in the Government of Israel for more information.QUESTION: Have they given any &#8212;MR PATEL: And in instances we have gotten more information on the specifics to those circumstances or things of that nature. I’m not at liberty to speak to some of those given privacy concerns, but this is something that we raise, and we raise it as – at the seriousness that we raise others issues that we have concerns about and we’re seeking more information on.QUESTION: And would this be – for Said’s colleague, would this be a case in which you would raise it with the Israelis?MR PATEL: I’m not aware of the specifics around this case. I’m happy to check, but I don’t want to speak to something in that specificity that – when I don’t have information in front of me.QUESTION: Just for the record, if this were a CBS colleague in Gaza, we would be expecting that to be something that would make the list of things to be raised with the Israelis. And then I can turn to Haiti after Gaza.MR PATEL: Kylie.QUESTION: With regard to the ongoing operation on the largest hospital complex in Gaza, obviously it was the same location where the Israelis carried out another operation in November. So I just wonder, if they’re having to go back again, if there are concerns about the efficacy of their operations as they continue to go after what they say are terrorists in this hospital?MR PATEL: So I will let the Israelis speak to their own operation and how they’re conducting it as well as any assessment that they have made that would make – that goes into their reasoning for why they’re deciding to conduct such an operation. What I will just say is that there continues to be plenty of open-source reporting out there of Hamas using civilian institutions – like hospitals, like schools – as command and control nodes, as areas in which hostages are being held, as areas that lead into their tunnel networks. So that is not something that is surprising to us. There is a clear track record of that. But as it relates to this specific – this specific operation, I’ll defer to the – to our Israeli partners.QUESTION: Just one more on Gaza?MR PATEL: Yeah, go ahead.QUESTION: Realizing, of course, it relates to another country’s policies &#8212;MR PATEL: Yeah.QUESTION: &#8212; but do you have any comment on Canada saying they’re going to stop arms shipments to Israel?MR PATEL: That’s for our Canadian partners to speak to, and it’s a sovereign decision of theirs to make. The United States has been clear – you saw the President speak to this not too long ago – we continue to support Israel’s right to defend itself and have been clear that we must do so while also being very clear the moral and strategic imperative our partners in Israel have to protecting the lives of civilians. And our position hasn’t changed.QUESTION: And has there been discussion with the Canadians on this, on &#8212;MR PATEL: I – we talk to our Canadian partners all the time. I’m not aware of a specific conversation to read out though.On Gaza, Daphne?QUESTION: Haiti.MR PATEL: I want to make sure there’s – I think folks still have questions on Gaza, but then I will – we’ll have time to talk Haiti.Michel, go ahead.QUESTION: I have this and – maritime corridor, when will it be ready?MR PATEL: So that is something that we’re continuing to work on around the clock. Since the beginning of this conflict we have been leading efforts to get lifesaving humanitarian aid into Gaza to alleviate the suffering. You saw at State of the Union the President announced this undertaking that he has directed the U.S. military to establish, and so that work is happening. I don’t have any other details to offer. But on the construction or any updates on the pier itself – the temporary pier itself, rather – I’m sure my Department of Defense colleagues would be happy to speak to that.QUESTION: And on Secretary’s trip to the region &#8212;MR PATEL: Yeah.QUESTION: &#8212; will he be meeting Arab foreign ministers in Cairo tomorrow other than the Egyptian foreign minister?MR PATEL: I don’t want to get too much ahead of the Secretary’s schedule and will let his visit to the specific countries play out, but we fully expect him to engage with Arab leaders while he’s in the region.On Gaza, Nick? Okay. All right, anything else on Gaza? Okay. Camilla has been patiently waiting for Haiti. So go ahead – or Daphne, whoever wants to go.QUESTION: Thank you.MR PATEL: Yeah.QUESTION: Do you have any updates on Americans trying to leave Haiti? Are there any more U.S.-organized flights planned?MR PATEL: So as of March 20th, the U.S. Government is facilitating the safe departure of U.S. citizens from Port-au-Prince, Haiti. We are in the process of organizing government-chartered helicopter flights from Port-au-Prince to Santo Domingo in the Dominican Republic, where U.S. Government personnel are present to provide consular assistance. And from Santo Domingo, American citizens will be responsible for their own onward travel to the United States.I assume your next question is going to be is – will there be more of these, and that is going to depend on the demand, the situations on the ground, the reliability of commercial transportation. Our hope is to keep these options available for American citizens who need it, and the feasibility and the assessment of that work is going to be ongoing.QUESTION: And how many Americans are on the flights today?MR PATEL: So I – for operational security reasons, and they’re ongoing, I don’t want to speak with greater specificity. But we do expect these helicopter movements to make multiple trips in order to try and get as many American citizens as we can today, while also continuing to look at what options might be available and how – what options might be available for reoccurring movements in the days ahead and even beyond.QUESTION: Okay. And then just on that transition council, any update on its formation? And are you concerned by how long this is taking?MR PATEL: Well, certainly every day counts, and our hope is that conversations are continuing with the membership of the transitional presidential council. We understand that Haitian stakeholders are very closely finalizing membership and remain in active discussions with CARICOM. And we think that this needs to happen swiftly because it is clear to us that this Haitian-led process is key for paving the way for free and fair elections, as well as the deployment of the Multinational Security Support Mission as well.Anything else on Haiti? Yeah, go ahead, Camilla.QUESTION: Just on the helicopters.MR PATEL: YeahQUESTION: Granted that it’s a – sensitive security wise, but are you able to comment at all on, like, concerns around helicopters taking off from Port-au-Prince and back – going that particular route from the capital where there’s &#8212;MR PATEL: So let me just say broadly first, and you’ve heard me say this before, Haiti is a Level 4 Do Not Travels country. It’s been so since 2020. The violence on the ground in Port-au-Prince has been dire. The security situation is certainly one of high risk. But I will also just say that we would not conduct such an operation if we did not feel that it was safe to do so and that we did not have the expertise to conduct something like this. So I will just leave it at that given security concerns.And of course the situation on the ground is one of the biggest factors into determining the frequency at which we can do this and what other options might be available to American citizens, including potential commercial options.QUESTION: And can you give any update on numbers of Americans interested in getting assistance or departure &#8212;MR PATEL: So again, when – remember, when we’re talking about the crisis intake form, we’re talking about a wide population of American citizens. Some are interested in exploring departure options. Some just want to stay in touch with the United States of America or the embassy. Some want expertise advice on how they may be able to remain safe, and others may not be in a place for safe departure now but may be down the line. So it’s important we talk about this population in the broad sense that it is, but our – the number of Americans who have reached out to us through this form is approaching 1,600.QUESTION: Can I just ask a clarifying question on the &#8212;MR PATEL: Yeah.QUESTION: How we can discuss the movements given that they’re ongoing? So we can say that they’re ongoing today and then the department is exploring options for continuing them as soon as tomorrow? Is that accurate?MR PATEL: The – we are exploring what options are possible for continuing them. And should the circumstances be proper, it’s very likely that they will continue. But again, I want to take this one day at a time given the very fluid situation on the ground.QUESTION: One more clarification &#8212;MR PATEL: Yeah, yeah. Go ahead, Nick.QUESTION: Because you said we are in the process of organizing government-chartered helicopter flights. Have they already started or are they starting later today, or &#8212;MR PATEL: That is what I am intentionally being vague about given operational security. So hopefully we’ll have more for you later today, but again, this is – the safety and security of American citizens is – we have no higher priority than that, and so wanted to make sure that you all had clarity on what we were doing while also maintaining the security for this operation to be conducted.Anything else on Haiti before we close out? Okay, Alex, go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you, Vedant. A couple of separate topics. On Ukraine, a UN human rights report says that Russia is using fear to control occupied territories. Can I get a reaction?MR PATEL: Look, Alex, I have not seen that specific report, but it should be no surprise to anybody that the Russian Federation is using – partaking in repressive tactics to silence the voice of dissenters, to silence the voices of opposition. And again, when it comes to these territories, let me just be unequivocally clear: They are Ukraine, and we’ll continue to support our Ukrainian partners as they continue to defend and fight for their territorial integrity and sovereignty.QUESTION: Polish foreign minister today was quoted as saying that success in Ukraine against Russian occupation is a question of U.S. credibility. Do you agree with that assessment that U.S. credibility is at stake here?MR PATEL: I would – I think that when it comes to our credibility, you needn’t look any further than the immense support that the United States and its allies and partners have provided to our Ukrainian partners since February of 2022, and that work is going to continue and we’re going to continue to do so in close coordination with our allies and partners. It is because – of course, the courageousness and the heroism of the Ukrainian people, but also the convergence with our partners in Europe and others around the country that we have been able to continue to support Ukraine in the way that we have and it has been able to defend itself so fiercely.QUESTION: And I have a couple more on human rights, if I may. There were expectations that annual Human Rights Reports will be released either during or before democracy summit. Is there any reason for a delay?MR PATEL: I don’t have any scheduling items to offer. I have no doubt that we will share the Human Rights Report with you all at some point soon.QUESTION: And broadly speaking, I’ve seen this morning the White House’s fact sheet on the democracy summit. Why do you think it was a successful summit? There are reports out there that it was a low-key – outcome was not really comparable with the previous year. Is it a successful summit this year?MR PATEL: We certainly would say it was a successful summit, and I know that the Secretary really appreciated the opportunity to be there and appreciated the Republic of Korea for hosting. The – I will also add that, outside of the Secretary, there continue to be or have been senior officials in Korea continuing to participate in this summit, folks like Under Secretary Zeya. The Secretary, as you saw, Alex – I spoke a little bit about this earlier this week – had the opportunity to give a set of remarks on information integrity, which we think is one of the most critical aspects at the nexus of democracy when we’re talking about it, and I’m sure we’ll have more to share on this space going forward.QUESTION: (Off-mike.)MR PATEL: Go ahead – I’m going to work the room a little bit, Alex. Go ahead. Yeah.QUESTION: Thank you very much. La Repubblica today reported that Secretary Blinken blocked the release of a G7 statement condemning the presidential election in Russia. Can you confirm that? Can you explain the decision?MR PATEL: I have not seen that report and I don’t believe it to be true, and we have taken a number of steps in close coordination with our G7 partners as well as independently to hold the Russian Federation to account for its actions and its infringement on Ukrainian territorial integrity and sovereignty.QUESTION: And one more: On Monday, U.S. Ambassador to the UN Linda Thomas-Greenfield said that the United States stands ready to engage in bilateral arms control talks with China and Russia without any preconditions. Do you know if Washington has put forward any propositions to Moscow or Beijing?MR PATEL: I’m not aware of any meetings or engagements to read out, but I’m happy to check.Go ahead. Yeah, you. Yes. Yes.QUESTION: So recently Prime Minister Modi has visited the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh, and as a reaction, the Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Wang Wenbin has said that China “strongly deplores and firmly opposes” the Indian leader’s visit to east section of China-India boundary. I want to get your comment on that.And secondly, China’s encroachments into other lands have – it seems like have encroachments happening within the Indo-Pacific as well, particularly in places like Solomon Islands, and now we’re seeing all over Micronesia. It seems like the folks on the ground are demanding for a counter to China’s encroachments into their sovereign territories. Can I also get your comment on that as well?MR PATEL: So let me take your first question. The United States recognizes Arunachal Pradesh as Indian territory and we strongly oppose any unilateral attempts to advance territorial claims by incursions or encroachments, military or civilian, across the Line of Actual Control.I think I’m going to need you to repeat your second – your follow-up.QUESTION: So, very simply, Chinese encroachments into the Indo-Pacific has been very visible, especially in the past few months, and many folks within the Solomon Islands to Fiji all the way to places within the Micronesia have been demanding for a counter to the spread of Chinese influence in their area. A lot of them are also wondering what the U.S.’s position is on this.MR PATEL: Sure.QUESTION: And so what – can I get your comment please?MR PATEL: Yeah. So when we talk about the Indo-Pacific, you have to remember we’re talking about a significant portion of the world’s population. We’re talking about one of the fastest growing economies, and I can’t think of a more important place where we want to make sure that the rules-based international order, the UN Charter, all of those things are being respected and abided by, and that’s been one of our tenets of our engagements in the region. The Secretary was just there in Seoul for this Summit for Democracy in the Republic of Korea, where he had the opportunity to meet with not just his foreign minister counterparts but also President Yoon.And over the course of this administration, there’s a number of steps that we’ve taken to bolster our engagement in the Indo-Pacific region. I’d remind you that just last year President Biden hosted the first trilateral summit at Camp David with our Japanese counterparts and our ROK counterparts. We have upped our engagement in the Quad. Secretary Blinken has had the opportunity to engage with his Quad counterparts a number of times since just when I’ve been on this job, but even more when you look at since the beginning of this administration. So it’s going to – something that we’re going to continue to emphasize and play a focus on.Go ahead in the back. Yeah.QUESTION: Thank you so much. Yesterday, two U.S. retired generals – General Milley and McKenzie – testified at Congress about Afghanistan, and they said that they wanted 2,500 American troops in Afghanistan but the final decision was made by the President Biden and also State Department. And also I talked to some lawmakers, including Michael Waltz – they blamed President Biden and the State Department that made the final decision and the outcome was what we have seen in Afghanistan. So I would like to know what is the State Department’s reaction on that, and then if I may, I have another question too.MR PATEL: Okay. So I think it’s really important that we zoom out and widen the aperture to remember what it is that we’re exactly talking about, and we’re talking about the 20-year end of a complex war, America’s longest war. Thousands of troops were killed, many more thousands physically or mentally harmed, and we honor their service and mourn their losses and injuries with their families and loved ones. You have to remember that President Biden made the decision to end this war and has repeatedly said it was the right thing to do, and today our nation is stronger as a result.And as part of the robust, intense interagency process to end America’s longest war, the decision was made to keep an embassy and diplomatic presence in Kabul following the withdrawal of U.S. combatant troops. The embassy maintained an active emergency action committee planning process that convened repeatedly in 2021 to assess the situation on the ground. As many of you in this room so well know, embassies all around the world where we have diplomats maintain an EAC process, and a noncombatant evacuation operation was one of the tools available to an embassy, and Embassy Kabul was well versed in NEO planning. It had a plan and the generals testified to the existence of this plan yesterday. This is an entity that coordinated and met regularly. This kind of contingency and feasibility planning happens around the world.It’s also well documented that the U.S. did not want to publicly announce planning for or the start of a NEO so as to not weaken the position of the then Afghan government, potentially signaling a potential lack of faith. Again, our intention at the time was to keep open and operating Embassy Kabul, but by the summer of 2021, there was a task force stood up prepared to execute a NEO if and when it was called for.It’s also worth reminding and repeating that it was the previous administration that negotiated the Doha agreement with no subsequent plan for evacuating U.S. citizens or our Afghan allies and their families, and it was up to this administration, including from the garbled transition period, to do that. And in collaboration with our military colleagues, as the NEO was intended, we achieved the largest and most successful air lift in history, nearly 124,000 people on planes out of the country due to the Taliban’s overrunning of the city and the collapsing of the Afghan government.This occurred in a very fluid and dynamic and dangerous environment at the Kabul airport and included the death of 13 military colleagues of ours, hundreds of civilians, and injuries to many others, and those losses are tragic. Within weeks of the collapse of the Afghan government, the U.S. began relocation flights by continuing to protect Americans in harm’s way, as well as standing by our Afghan allies and their families.I’ll also note – and I know so many in this room are well aware of it – that Secretary Blinken also called for an after-action review to learn the important lessons and to fortify processes in how we respond to unexpected crises around the world and how we support American citizens and foreign nationals and others engaging with our diplomatic missions. This whole week I’ve been taking questions on places like Haiti, Sudan, Ukraine, Israel, Gaza – these are all places in which – where we have taken lessons from this after-action report and implemented them to further improve in the areas of communication, resources, preparedness, and that work will continue. We’re going to work to better inform our response in times of crisis, and we’ve already taken more than 40 concrete actions and identified additional steps to guide itself.We’re also going to continue to comply with the House and Senate Foreign Affairs Committee’s legitimate oversight of the Afghanistan war, building on the dozens of witness and hundreds and hundreds of hours of testimony, and the tens of thousands of pages of documents that we have already made available and will continue to make available.QUESTION: Yeah, thank you. So you talked about this previously as well. But I’m – so the Taliban announced reopening the schools for – only for boys again – a long story. So girls cannot go to school. I know – I’m aware that you have talked about this before. But my specific question for today is that: Is United States leverage declining over Taliban? If not, which kind of leverage is left to use in terms of convincing the Taliban to allow girls to go to school?MR PATEL: We continue to have a number of tools in our toolbelt at our disposal, and we have been clear that girls should have never been blocked from going to school in the first place. Advancing respect for the rights of Afghan women and girls is critical to U.S. efforts in Afghanistan.Shaun, I saw that you had your hand up.QUESTION: Sure, sure.MR PATEL: Then I’ll come back to you, Leah. I’m sorry.QUESTION: I’ll just (inaudible) very quickly, a few different topics.MR PATEL: Yeah.QUESTION: Indonesia. I saw there’s a statement from the Secretary this morning, but on Prabowo’s victory in the presidential race, of course it wasn’t so long ago that he wasn’t welcome in the United States due to human rights concerns. Are those going to figure into the relationship, do you think, with Indonesia, as he takes office?MR PATEL: So we extend our sincerest congratulation to the Indonesian president-elect, and we applaud, once again, the Indonesian people for the robust turnout and commitment to democracy and the rule of law. As close partners and friends under our comprehensive strategic partnership, we’re going to work hand in hand to better deliver for the future of our citizens, and we look forward to continuing to engage on that and partnering with the president-elect and his administration when they take office in October.QUESTION: Okay, and the rights concerns are not –MR PATEL: The is – look, just to take a bit of a step back, in any bilateral relationship that we have in countries around the world, we – when we have concerns about human rights or violations of other kinds, we raise those, and we raise those directly and candidly. And we’ll continue to do that when appropriate.QUESTION: Sure. I know also – a separate topic – I know probably from the podium you don’t want to engage too, too directly in campaign politics. But also regarding the previous administration, former President Trump has denounced the Australian ambassador here in the U.S., Kevin Rudd, saying that he should be – I think his term was, he’s not the brightest bulb or something. Is – does the U.S. have anything to say about that, and whether – about the relationship with Kevin Rudd (inaudible)?MR PATEL: Well, one of your colleagues just asked about the Indo-Pacific, and I would say that Australia is one of our most vital partners, not just when it comes to the Indo-Pacific but when we think about the world broadly. It is a country in which we share a number of likeminded points of view, and who also have done immense work to support our Ukrainian partners. And we’re going to continue to work closely and cooperate with them. I know Prime Minister Rudd, Ambassador Rudd, has been an important partner here in D.C. as ambassador, and I know folks around this building have enjoyed working with him and will continue to do so.QUESTION: Sure. Just &#8212;MR PATEL: Yeah.QUESTION: Completely different part of the world. A follow-up to the question I asked yesterday on Serbia-Kosovo. Do you by chance have anything more to say about that – basically whether there’s an agreement arranged by U.S. for euros rather than Serbian dinars to and from Serbia?MR PATEL: I don’t have any updates on the processes, Shaun, other than the concerns that we raised yesterday. And we’re going to continue to work through the EU-facilitated dialogue, and we’ll let the process go from there.Leah, go ahead.QUESTION: Thanks.MR PATEL: Yeah.QUESTION: Back to the Indo-Pacific.MR PATEL: Yeah.QUESTION: So on Monday the White House announced that President Biden will host the first trilateral U.S.-Japan-Philippines leaders summit on April 11th. Especially given China’s continued provocations in the South China Sea, could you talk a little bit about what the significance of this meeting will be and what signal it’s intended to send?MR PATEL: So you – this is happening on the margins of Prime Minister Kishida’s visit to the United States for his state visit, but the Secretary spent a lot of time talking about this in his trip to Manila. And part of it is when we talk about our approach to the Indo-Pacific, a big key piece of that is coordinating closely with our allies and investing in those allies and partnerships. And when it comes to Japan and the Philippines, they are some of our most key, integral, and vital partners in a number of areas – in addressing the climate crisis, security cooperation, economic cooperation, trade, and a number of other spaces. And we look forward to talking about and discussing a number of these issues, both bilaterally with them but also through this trilateral mechanism as well.Go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you. Today Mr. Donald Lu was appear in congressional committee, and a congressman asked a question about the release of Dr. Shakil Afridi, who helped CIA to kill Osama bin Laden. He was asking that – if Pakistan is going to swap Dr. Afridi with Dr. Aafia Siddiqui, who’s in the American jails. He couldn’t complete his answer because there were, like, many questions the congressmen were asking. So I’m – could you tell us that – is there any plan to swap Dr. Aafia Siddiqui with Dr. Shakil Afridi?MR PATEL: So I don’t have any updates as it relates to that. I didn’t catch that part of the hearing. But you have to remember that one of the – this department’s most important priorities is engaging with Congress on our foreign policy. This was a routine hearing, and Assistant Secretary Lu’s testimony provided insight on the U.S.-Pakistan bilateral relationship as a whole and a number of areas where we are hoping to deepen our collaboration. And I believe we – he spent a little bit of time talking about the U.S.-Pakistan Green Alliance framework, also bolstering respect for human rights. And so we’ll look forward to continuing to engage in these kinds of hearings.Okay. Thanks, everybody.(The briefing was concluded at 1:16 p.m.)# # #						Tags																					Afghanistan																								Australia																								China																								Haiti																								India																								Indonesia																								Israel																								Japan																								Kosovo																								Office of the Spokesperson																								Pakistan																								Palestinian Territories																								Philippines																								Russia																								Serbia																								Ukraine
- Congratulations to Indonesian President-Elect Subianto Antony J. Blinken, Secretary of StateWe extend our sincere congratulations to Indonesian President-elect Prabowo Subianto on his victory and once again applaud the Indonesian people for their robust turnout and commitment to democracy and the rule of law.The United States and Indonesia are celebrating 75 years of our diplomatic relationship grounded in democracy and pluralism.  As close partners and friends under our Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, we are working hand-in-hand to deliver a better future for our citizens.  We look forward to partnering closely with President-elect Subianto and his Administration when they take office in October.
- Under Secretary Zeya’s Travel to the Republic of Korea and Indonesia Office of the SpokespersonUnder Secretary of State for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights Uzra Zeya will travel to Seoul, Republic of Korea, and Jakarta, Indonesia, from March 16-22, to strengthen collaboration on democracy; support human rights and global humanitarian cooperation; and fight corruption and human trafficking.In Seoul, Under Secretary Zeya will join Secretary Blinken at the third Summit for Democracy, hosted by the Republic of Korea. She will give remarks at the Day 2 opening ceremony on March 19, underscoring the U.S. government’s commitment to supporting civil society and human rights defenders. In addition, the Under Secretary will give keynote remarks at an event, organized by the Governments of the Netherlands and Denmark, to highlight the importance of upholding information integrity online. She will open a hybrid side event, highlighting the importance of cross-sector partnerships to promote anti-corruption.While in Seoul, Under Secretary Zeya will meet with senior officials, civil society, and educators to deepen collaboration on advancing democracy and human rights, anti-trafficking efforts, and global humanitarian efforts.In Jakarta, Under Secretary Zeya will further advance bilateral cooperation under the U.S.-Indonesia Comprehensive Strategic Partnership announced by President Biden and President Widodo in November 2023. She will visit the American Space at Istiqlal Mosque and the St. Mary of the Assumption Cathedral to promote interfaith dialogue. The Under Secretary will also engage senior government officials and civil society leaders on our joint partnership to protect human rights for marginalized groups, combat human trafficking, and strengthen rule of law.For further information, please follow @UnderSecStateJ on X.
- Department Press Briefing – February 14, 2024 HomeDepartment Press Briefing – February 14, 2024				hide		if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}																										Department Press Briefing – February 14, 2024																																																					February 14, 2024																																																								MR MILLER: Good afternoon, everyone.QUESTION: Good afternoon.MR MILLER: Happy Valentine’s Day, especially Happy Valentine’s Day to those of you celebrating with us on a flight somewhere over the Atlantic tonight instead of with your significant others. I wish you peace and tranquility at home. With that, no Matt – Shaun, you want to go first?QUESTION: Sure. Happy Valentine’s Day to you.MR MILLER: Thank you. Thank you.QUESTION: I wanted to ask you about – to start off – the talks in Cairo that took place recently, that are (inaudible) in some form. I know there’s a limit to probably what you’re going to say about it, but do you have any assessment right now about how things stand? Is the U.S. still hopeful that there could be a deal for hostages and a pause in fighting?MR MILLER: As has always been the case, I don’t want to kind of give a day-by-day, step-by-step update or assessment on the talks, or the status of them, or where they might stand; but we continue to believe that it is possible to achieve a deal. We continue to believe it’s in the national security interest of the United States to achieve deal. And we believe it’s in the interest of both Israel and, of course, the Palestinian people. So we will continue to work to try an achieve an agreement that would not just secure the release of hostages, but, of course, enable – allow a pause that would enable the delivery of humanitarian assistance that would alleviate the suffering on the ground in Gaza.QUESTION: Sure. Not to jump around too much, but the – I was wondering if you could comment on today’s developments in Lebanon. There’s some strikes there from the Israeli side in particular. How dangerous is the situation in Lebanon? Do you have any reaction in particular to the use of force?MR MILLER: We continue to be concerned about escalation in Lebanon. As you know, it has been one of our primary objectives from the outset of this conflict to see that it not be widened, to see that it not be escalated in any way. That continues to be a primary national security objective of ours that we will continue to pursue. And we continue to believe that there is a diplomatic path forward, and we will continue to push forward to try to resolve this issue diplomatically so both Israelis and Lebanese can return to their homes.QUESTION: Is there active diplomacy in Lebanon right now?MR MILLER: There is active diplomacy. There has been active diplomacy on this question for some time. I, of course, am never going to get into the underlying details of those diplomatic conversations, but we continue to pursue diplomatic resolution of this situation.QUESTION: And just one more before I yield to somebody else. The – I’m sure you saw, and I believe the National Security Advisor was asked about it, but I wanted to ask you – the report from The Wall Street Journal on white phosphorus use in Lebanon. Is there anything you can say whether the State Department is actually looking into that?MR MILLER: So as I said yesterday, we do continue – we are reviewing reports of human rights violations and civilian harm incidents through the CHIRG process that we set up last August. I’m not going to comment on the specifics of any one incident. We take these on a case-by-case measure and assess them to see whether, number one, civilian harm actually occurred; and, two, to identify any appropriate policy responses if it has occurred, to mitigate such – to reduce the risks of such incidents happening in the future. But we are going to make it as a kind of blanket policy not to confirm specific incidents that may be under review.Said, go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you. I want to ask you a couple questions on Gaza, but first I wanted to ask you about what the Israelis did today – demolished a house for Fakhri Abu Diab – he’s an activist against demolition – to basically make room for a biblical theme park. Do you have any comment on that?MR MILLER: We condemn the demolition of Fakhri Abu Diab’s home. He is a community leader in East Jerusalem. We believe that demolition not only obviously damages his home, and his family, and the lives that they have built there, but the entire community who live in fear that their homes may be next. This has been their family home for generations. Part of the structure dates back to before 1967. He has been an outspoken community leader, including against demolitions, and now his family has been displaced.But I want to – I would also like to reiterate that the impact of these demolitions – this is obviously not the first – goes beyond just the impact on this individual family. These acts obstruct efforts to advance a durable and lasting peace and security that would benefit not just Palestinians, but Israelis; they damage Israel’s standing in the world; and they make it ultimately more difficult for us to accomplish all of the things we are trying to accomplish that would ultimately be in the interest of the Israeli people. And so we condemn them and we’ll urge them – continue to urge that they not continue.QUESTION: Well, Silwan is really adjacent to my neighborhood so I know – I know the area. I know how many people have lost their homes, how many homes have been demolished, but the Israelis seem to have a methodical plan forward, going forward. I know that you condemn, but do you condemn saying “or else,” for instance?MR MILLER: So &#8212;QUESTION: “You must stop this”? And you – they should not demolish anybody’s homes, not even for – as a form of collective punishment if someone has done something from the household.MR MILLER: So we condemn them, and let me tell you what we are offering as an alternative.So the Secretary has made clear that after conversations with others in the region that there is a path forward – an alternative path to the one that Israel has pursued to date – to provide lasting peace and security for Israel, and it would include the establishment of two states. And we will continue to pursue that path. And we have made clear and other countries in the region, including Saudi Arabia, have made clear that there are enormous benefits on offer for the Israeli people should they pursue that path, including in further integration with the region, including security guarantees.And so when it comes to all of these types of issues, what we will continue to lay out is the vision that we think is a better path – as I said, not just for the Palestinian people, but ultimately that provides greater security benefits for the Israeli people as well.QUESTION: Now, on the looming or the expected attack on Rafah, I know that the President, the Secretary of State, you from this podium many times, however, warned against such a storming of Rafah. But on the other hand, I mean, one reads reports and so on that okay, by not doing anything, or by not saying that there will be consequences if you do this, you’re basically green-lighting – essentially giving a green light to the Israelis to go ahead. I mean, we just – we don’t like it, but we’re not going to do anything about it.MR MILLER: I think that would be a significant misinterpretation of what we have said. We have made quite clear both publicly and privately that we cannot support any military operation in Rafah until such time as Israel has developed a humanitarian plan that can be executed, and that they have executed such a plan.So I know people like to jump ahead far into the process and talk about what-ifs, but we’re not at the what-if stage right now; we are at the making very clear to Israel what we expect stage, and we have seen the Government of Israel ask the military for such a plan. We haven’t seen that plan yet; we don’t know what it’ll contain; we don’t know if it will be executable, as we have said. So we will wait before offering any prejudgments about what will, or may, or might, or might not happen. We’re going to wait to see what that plan looks like and then engage directly with the Government of Israel about it.QUESTION: So you’re saying, yeah, you can do this, with the caveat that you have to make sure that the population, the civilian population, is not harmed or somehow moved from place to place. Now, remember, these people have already been moved there. They have been instructed by the Israelis to go to Rafah (inaudible).MR MILLER: You don’t have to tell me “remember;” I’ve said that myself from this podium.QUESTION: I remember. But this is the thing. I mean, it’s déjà vu all over again.MR MILLER: Which is why we have made clear that there has to be a plan &#8212;QUESTION: To quote Yogi Bera, “déjà vu all over again.”MR MILLER: Look, there are – there are Hamas – there are – as I’ve said yesterday, there are two things that are true in this situation, right. One, that there are Hamas battalions that operate in Rafah, that exist in Rafah, that continue to pose a threat to the national security of Israel, Hamas battalions, part of an organization that attacked Israel and has made clear they want to continue to attack Israel. At the same time – so I’d say as a first matter of course, Israel has the right to take military action against those Hamas battalions that pose a threat to it. At the same time, they have an obligation to make sure that they only do so in a way that puts civilian protection first. And that is what we have made clear to them, and so we will see the plan that they will develop, and I will wait and pass judgment until we see that.QUESTION: Okay.MR MILLER: Alex.QUESTION: (Inaudible) topics. I want to start with NATO, given the recent debate in this town. NATO today disclosed that its defense spending hit a high record – record high, 18 members &#8212;MR MILLER: Eighteen.QUESTION: &#8212; about to hit the 2 percent.MR MILLER: Up from 11 I believe, right?QUESTION: That was a target, not the goal – or they don’t owe anyone any money. But can you speak to this, the import of this development?MR MILLER: We think it’s incredibly important. So look, we have made clear that there are targets that NATO countries have agreed to, that they would spend 2 percent of their budgets on national security. We have made clear that we expect countries to meet that target. There is often this misnomer that countries pay money to the U.S. and they’re in arrears; that, of course, is not factually the case. It’s not factually how it works. But there are defense spending targets that they are supposed to meet. As the secretary general announced today, a record number of those countries are now meeting those targets – 18, almost two thirds of the Alliance. And we continue to see progress from other countries towards meeting those targets, and we will urge those who have not yet met them to continue to take steps to do so.But again, as I’ve said – as I said earlier this week, NATO is an Alliance that the American people derive tremendous benefit from, provides tremendous security to the United States. And that’s why we have seen durable, long-lasting, widespread support – not just in Congress, not just from leaders in Congress, but also from the American people, and we expect that to continue.QUESTION: Thank you. A couple questions on the sanctions. The U.S. took part today in Brussels at EU Sanctions Coordinators Forum. This is the first time, if I – as far as I follow. There are reports that EU, on its end, is considering secondary sanctions against Central Asia, Türkiye, and other countries, or companies based in those countries, in its next batch. I know you don’t telegraph your sanctions, but can you at least assure us that &#8212;MR MILLER: But would I do it in this case?QUESTION: At least assure us that you &#8212;MR MILLER: It’s okay.QUESTION: &#8212; will not – you will follow unless you – once they put it out, or is it part of the conversation?MR MILLER: Assure you that – assure you that what?QUESTION: That the U.S. will not lag behind when Europeans move forward with this?MR MILLER: I don’t think – if you look at the United States actions in this guard – in this regard, we have been a leader, we have been at the forefront at holding Russia accountable for its actions, and we will continue to be – to be a leader in this regard. But of course, as you I think knew by the way you framed your question, I am not going to preview any sanctions action that we may or may not take.QUESTION: And on that line, Putin today signed a confiscation law, which experts believe that further complicates – endangers, if you want – foreign investment, including Americans. And this is something we discussed in this room before, that State Department recently updated its Business Advisory for Burma. Why not impose a same advisory on Russia?MR MILLER: I just don’t have any update on where that stands.QUESTION: And one – my final question, if you don’t mind &#8212;MR MILLER: Yeah.QUESTION: &#8212; on Nagorno-Karabakh. Jake Sullivan today from White House podium announced that the conflict in itself – also support for the victims of the conflict – he said it’s part of the next package. Is the State Department looking for additional resources? I mean, in what form you are trying to get involved?MR MILLER: Additional resources in what – in what regard?QUESTION: In next package, he mentioned that the Congress should support supplemental, because it also covers, among other conflicts, he mentioned Nagorno-Karabakh. So what additional resources you are seeking right now?MR MILLER: So there are additional resources that were in the supplemental request for humanitarian assistance. I didn’t see all of the National Security Advisor’s remarks. I believe that’s what he was referring to, or I suspect – I should say – that’s what he was referring to. But there was humanitarian assistance contained in the supplemental request that we put forward and in the bill that was passed the Senate that would – could be used by the United States for humanitarian response to conflicts all around the world.QUESTION: Any update for me about additional efforts that U.S. wants to bring together the sides and to discuss the conflict? Anything about the next couple of days, weeks?MR MILLER: I do not have any schedule announcements for you. I know what you’re getting at, but I’m not going to bite, Alex.QUESTION: I want to go back to the Lebanese-Israeli border if you don’t mind.MR MILLER: Yeah.QUESTION: Yeah. It’s clear now that Hizballah – Hizballah announced a few days ago, a couple of days ago, that his war activities or military activities or engagement in this conflict is linked to the war and military activities in Gaza. If there is a humanitarian pause, he will pause; if there is end of the war, he will end his activities. Is it the same diplomatic approach you are applying to this conflict of the northern border, or you are trying to push Lebanon to distance itself from the conflict, regardless of what happened in Gaza?MR MILLER: We have had specific diplomatic engagements related to the situation at Israel’s northern border and to resolving that situation diplomatically beyond the efforts to secure a humanitarian pause. Now, that said, of course it is our assessment that achieving a humanitarian pause and an agreement to secure the release of hostages would help with the risk of escalation and help – might help lessen the risk of escalation. That’s one of the many reasons why we continue to pursue such an arrangement.QUESTION: Thank you.QUESTION: You touched on this yesterday, but with the Secretary heading to Munich, European security and the war in Ukraine a focus, does he find himself in a difficult negotiating position with aid, foreign aid, stalled in the House? And how does he plan to address this, and how confident are you that the aid will make its way through?MR MILLER: So it’s not really a question of a negotiating position. I will say that, when it comes to our European partners, they have stepped up and made contributions to Ukraine I don’t believe because the United States has made contributions to Ukraine’s defense but because they see it in their own independent national security interest, and they have made their own assessments that it is the right thing to do, both on the merits, and that it is in their – in the interest of their particular countries. So it’s not a question of the United States needing to negotiate with these countries, though we, of course, always are encouraging countries to do more if they can do more.But that said, we very much do want to see Congress act as quickly as possible to pass the supplemental. As you heard the President say yesterday, it’s not just in the interest of Ukraine, but, as I said, it’s in the interest of European countries. It’s in the interest of the United States, we believe, to do so. A lot of that money is spent here, helps develop the manufacturing base here in the United States.And so we will continue to push for the passage of the supplemental bill, and ultimately we think – as the President said, the world is watching. And certainly I’m sure that when we are in Munich we will hear directly from foreign leaders that they are watching very much what Congress does. We know the Ukrainian people are watching. And as the President said, history is watching as well.Go ahead.QUESTION: Yes. It’s on Pakistan elections, thank you. How is U.S. State Department tackling the pressure from some of the U.S. lawmakers who are asking the State Department not to accept the results of Pakistan election until and unless thoroughly allegations of rigging are investigated?MR MILLER: So we have called for those allegations to be investigated. We think that’s appropriate step to take. That’s – that is our response to questions of irregularities not just in Pakistan, but when we see them anywhere in the world. We think that they’re thoroughly investigated and resolved. And so that – we will continue to call for that. But at the same time, it’s clear that the elections in Pakistan were competitive, and we look forward to working with the government, once it’s formed, that the people of Pakistan elected.QUESTION: Can I just follow up?MR MILLER: Yeah, Shaun. Go ahead. And then I’ll come back.QUESTION: Sure, sure. Just on that – I mean, of course, as you’ve probably seen that there’s a coalition being formed in Pakistan that doesn’t include Imran Khan’s party – I know you’re probably loath to talk about the details of Pakistani politics, but – (laughter) &#8212;MR MILLER: You’ve noticed.QUESTION: Well, let me – but I want to &#8212;MR MILLER: To be fair, loath to talk about the internal details of politics in any country, but &#8212;QUESTION: Sure, sure, sure. But can I just ask you if the U.S. has an assessment on this, whether this is in keeping with democratic principles to have the largest winner being excluded from the emerging coalition?MR MILLER: Look, that is ultimately an internal matter. You see this in a number of countries that have parliamentary systems of government, where no country has – or – I’m sorry – where no party has established a majority you see the kind of coalitions that are formed. Ultimately that’s not a decision for the United States to make. It’s a decision for Pakistan to make.QUESTION: Follow-up, Matt.MR MILLER: I promised her I would come to her next, so &#8212;QUESTION: The Foreign Policy magazine &#8212;MR MILLER: In fact, I was calling on her before Shaun interrupted, so anyway. So – and now I interrupted you, so I apologize for that. Go ahead. (Laughter.)QUESTION: The Foreign Policy magazine published an investigative report last week which shows that a former drug trafficker, Mr. Bashir Noorzai, who was serving a lifetime prison here in United State, was later released to the Taliban in exchange for one U.S. citizen, now is started working closely with China in the mineral contract and doing money laundering for Taliban. What’s your reaction to Chinese for this kind of partnership with this former drug trafficker?MR MILLER: You know, I have not seen that report. Let me take it back and get you a comment on it.Now go ahead.QUESTION: Happy Valentine’s to you, Matt.MR MILLER: Thank you.QUESTION: My next couple of questions are in the backdrop of former U.S. ambassador Mr. Ryan Crocker, who I believe served in – with both the Republicans and Democrats, so very well-respected diplomat. Yesterday while speaking to Voice of America, he said that the Biden administration policy towards Afghanistan is not good and he said not much importance has been given to the country, plus the education part has been neglected by the government.In the backdrop of all this, I want to ask you: Now, when the PTI government is in a province which is right next to Afghanistan, is my assessment correct that in coming days we will – we are going to see Taliban further increasing as far as their strength is concerned, or no?MR MILLER: So I do not want to make any predictions based on – about what may happen in the future, nor get into a question involving an internal political party in Pakistan. But with respect to our policy in Afghanistan, I think you heard me speak to this yesterday. We have been very – have been quite clear about our policy in – as it regards to Pakistan, including through the adoption of a UN Security Council resolution just in December.QUESTION: And just &#8212;MR MILLER: Go ahead.QUESTION: Thanks &#8212;MR MILLER: You want one follow-up? Go ahead.QUESTION: One follow-up, please. There are quite a few citizens – U.S. citizens – right now on social media who criticize the Pakistan serving military generals, army chiefs; they curse at them. I tried to get a reaction from Global Engagement Center. What do you, as a State Department official – is it fair that the social media influencers just curse around at serving military? Does not – does that not affect the government relationship with each other? I &#8212;MR MILLER: I think if I started trying to comment on the random postings of citizens on social media, I would be up here for the rest of the day and probably the rest of the week, so I’m going to pass.Go ahead.QUESTION: Thanks, Matthew. House Intelligence Committee Chairman Mike Turner said that there’s information that’s been made to members of Congress regarding a serious national security threat. Is the State Department aware about this and – I’m – you’re probably going to say no, but is – what – do you know what is the threat?MR MILLER: So the National Security Advisor did just speak to this, and as he said, he has scheduled a meeting with Chairman Turner and other members of the House leadership, and it’s not appropriate to speak to the matter any further from – in a public setting, and so I will leave it at that for now.QUESTION: And following up on a question I asked yesterday regarding Ahlam Tamimi, who’s a terrorist wanted by the United States, did Secretary Blinken bring up that case in his meeting yesterday with King Abdullah?MR MILLER: I don’t have any further readouts, other than the note we issued publicly.QUESTION: And then finally, the House CCP Select Committee issued a report stating that some U.S. venture capital firms invested $3 billion into critical tech companies in China, some with ties to PLA and involved in genocide. What’s your reaction to that? And is the Biden – and has the Biden administration taken actions in the past to curb investments going into China, and does more need to be done?MR MILLER: So I have not seen that report, so I do not want to comment on the details of the report. But of course, there are U.S. statutes that prohibit the U.S. business – U.S. companies from doing business with companies that are engaged in genocide, and you – in addition to that, on a separate note, I will say that the U.S. has imposed a number of investment restrictions as it relates to China.Guita, go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you.QUESTION: Thank you. Matt, two natural gas pipelines blew up in Iran today, and the officials have called it a sabotage work. I was wondering if the Biden administration has any theory of its own on the cause of these explosions.MR MILLER: I’ve seen the reports, and I just don’t have any comment on them.QUESTION: When earlier one of the proxy groups of Iran attacked Tower 22 in Jordan, which led to the killing of three American servicemen, the Biden administration said that they were going to retaliate. Is it safe to assume that the retaliation will only be military or otherwise?MR MILLER: I don’t want to speak to that. The – we have made clear that some of our responses would be seen and some would be unseen, and I think I’ll leave it at that.Go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you very much. The Russian Ambassador Antonov said last week that he held meetings with U.S. officials, including at the State Department, and that he discussed with them the crash of the cargo plane, the Russian plane with Ukrainian prisoners of war, in the Belgorod region. And he said that U.S. officials showed interest in considering Russian proposals on investigating the incident.MR MILLER: I’m – sorry, go ahead. Didn’t mean &#8212;QUESTION: Can you confirm that the U.S. is ready to investigate the incident?MR MILLER: I cannot. I’m not aware of those meetings or able to comment on them in any regard. We obviously have an embassy in Moscow that does, at time, engage with the Russian Government, but I don’t have any readout of those meetings.QUESTION: And one more question on the same issue. Vedant said last week that the U.S. doesn’t consider Russian claims about the incident as credible. At the same time, New York – The New York Times reported last week that some U.S. officials admit that it was Ukraine that shot down the plane using a Patriot missile system.MR MILLER: I don’t – I seldom want to comment on claims made anonymously in any outlet, but we continue to engage with the Ukrainian Government about this question. We’ve seen their public comments, and we engage with them privately about it as well.Go ahead.QUESTION: Excuse me. During the hostage negotiations, like, we see there is some obstacles. Like, from your perspectives, which party is, like, more flexible for making these deals happen, like Hamas or Israel? Because what we see in the media – yeah – that, like, Hamas submitted a full proposal, but, like, we see Netanyahu is kind of a stubborn guy somehow. How do you assess this?And, like, last question, related to the Rafah. We see many protest in, like, Kerem Shalom border, like Israeli people preventing many aids to get in Rafah from their side. What is the action that you can take to facilitate this? Like, are you going to put some sanction? Like, what (inaudible) effort that you do to convince the Israeli Government to, like, let this protest stop and let this humanitarian aid get in the Rafah?MR MILLER: So with respect to the first one, I think the only way I’ll answer that is that in the response that you saw come back from Hamas to the proposal that was put forward by the Government of Israel and other countries, you saw a number of issues that were obvious nonstarters. For example, the status of al-Aqsa is not going to be resolved in a negotiation over hostages, and I will leave it at that.With respect to the second question, I will say we have seen the Government of Israel take steps to keep Kerem Shalom open. They declared the area around Kerem Shalom a military zone. The IDF has made – has moved forces in to police that crossing to ensure that it can stay open so much-needed humanitarian assistance, including humanitarian assistance that was supplied by the United States, can continue to flow into Rafah. And we think that’s important to do it. It is extremely unfortunate that, at times, that crossing has been blocked. We have engaged with the Israeli Government and made clear that it is the position of the United States that it ought to be – that it ought to remain open and they ought to take whatever steps they can to make sure that it remains open. And we’re glad that they have taken those steps.QUESTION: (Inaudible.)MR MILLER: Go ahead. Go. I’ll come to you next, Said.QUESTION: Thank you and good afternoon, sir.MR MILLER: Yeah.QUESTION: I have a couple questions on Gaza. It’s been over two weeks since Israeli forces attacked Hind Rajab’s family, killing her aunt, uncle, and cousins, leaving her trapped alone in her vehicle. We heard her pleas to the Red Crescent Society. Two medics were sent, all to be blown up, allegedly by Israeli forces. I wanted to ask about the status of the inquiry into this just because it seems if the Israeli Government, which seemingly does have a pretty sophisticated operation, is prioritizing this – if they don’t already know which soldiers to interview, for instance, they have Red Crescent calls, timestamps, the location of the Red Crescent staff to question and rely on, planning material to figure out who exactly to inquire with and to figure out who to hold accountable.So I want to first ask about the status of this investigation.MR MILLER: Sure. So I think that question is appropriately directed to the Government of Israel. I will say, on behalf of the United States, we have made clear to them that we want that incident to be investigated. They have told us they are investigating it. It’s our understanding that investigation is not yet complete. You should direct questions to them about where it stands. But we want to see it completed as soon as possible, and as I said from this podium several days ago, if accountability is appropriate, we want to be – we want to see accountability put in place.QUESTION: And then a follow-up to that before the second one. Just similarly, with regards to Al Jazeera cameraman Samer Abudaqa being left to bleed out while Israeli forces reportedly stopped medics from reaching him, I know that previously you have said there’s investigations into that. Is there any updates on that investigation?MR MILLER: I don’t have – I don’t have any update on that. Again, we press the Government of Israel on these matters but – and at times I have – I’m able to comment on specific incidents from here where we’ve gotten answers. But ultimately, those are questions better directed to the Government of Israel.QUESTION: Thank you. Okay, and then the last question.MR MILLER: Go ahead.QUESTION: As you’ve said repeatedly, the U.S. chose to be cautious as it suspended funding to UNRWA for allegations that 12 of its 30,000-person staff may have been involved in the atrocities on October 7th. And as you described yesterday, that’s kind of standard U.S. policy to have this type of caution with all sorts of entities. But as our colleagues have asked you over the please few months, there have been broad and specific human rights violations that we’ve been concerned about, human – attacks against hospitals and churches; targeting people with white flags, both Israeli hostages and Palestinians; torturing Palestinians; and now, of course, this attack on Hind Rajab’s family and then leaving her to die horribly.And so I’m wondering, on all this you’ve said we’re looking into it and Israel is investigating. But in each of these cases, the U.S. doesn’t seem to be as cautious with its money and support as it is with UNRWA. It’s to the point that the ICJ and the U.S. court both say Israel may be plausibly committing genocide. Still, U.S. money is coming while the U.S. shut off UNRWA funding immediately. So I’m just wondering if you could explain that sort of difference.MR MILLER: Let me say there is, I think, a false equivalency embedded in that question between members of a terrorist organization who went out and intentionally killed innocent civilians.QUESTION: Right, right.MR MILLER: This – no, that is the difference. When you have members of Hamas who participated in October 7th according to the allegations made by the Government of Israel, that I should say UNRWA itself found credible – those are allegations that UNRWA found credible of people intentionally participating in a terrorist action to murder civilians. That is different than a military campaign conducted in an environment where that terrorist organization hides behind human shields. And so we will continue to engage with the Government of Israel about how to minimize civilian casualties – there have been far too many over the course of this campaign – and how to prevent civilians from killed. But I think they are very different matters for the reasons I just articulated.Said.QUESTION: Just a follow-up to –MR MILLER: Let me – Said, go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you.MR MILLER: Because I’m going to have to – I’m going to have to wrap in a minute to go to a meeting, so &#8212;QUESTION: Thank you. Secretary Antony Blinken spoke yesterday about hostage diplomacy, and as an international security threat and so on. I want to ask you, the Israelis have arrested roughly 5,000 Palestinians from the West Bank – not in Gaza, from the West Bank. Almost none of them have been charged with anything since October. No charges. What do you call this? I mean, they come in the middle of the night. They take young men and women and so on. Many are children, as a matter of fact: 12, 13, 14 years old and so on. Isn’t this really something that a government, in this case, leveraging – leveraging the taking of people, incarcerating them out any charges, for maybe a future kind of a bargaining chip?MR MILLER: So I’ll say two things about that: number one, that we want to see due process for those individuals, as we want to see for anyone; and number two, we will continue to encourage Israel not to take any steps that can increase tensions in the West Bank.Let me go to Ksenija and then I’ll come back to you, and then I got to wrap because I do have a meeting. Sorry to – quick wrap today. Go ahead, Ksenija.QUESTION: Thank you so much, Matt. So we say in this room that the word of the United States matter. But despite this, Prime Minister of Kosovo Albin Kurti has not been responding to the words, as you’re aware, of the United States to suspend his decisions, unilateral decisions. Immediately you had even James O’Brien going on record yesterday (inaudible) is happening. So besides words, what other tools do you intend to use next to compel Kurti to stop with his unilateral actions given that, in the end of the day, this is a question that concern the U.S. taxpayer?MR MILLER: So I will say that we will continue to engage in diplomacy to resolve and – to resolve this matter, and we want both sides to return to the EU-facilitated dialogue. And beyond that, I don’t want to preview any specific steps from here.Shaun.QUESTION: And can you just say about &#8212;MR MILLER: Shaun – I’m going to – only because I have to wrap and I said, Shaun, I’d go to &#8212;QUESTION: Albania is tomorrow.MR MILLER: What’s that?QUESTION: Albania is tomorrow. I just want to ask if Secretary Blinken in Albania is going to talk to Prime Minister Edi Rama &#8212;MR MILLER: The &#8212;QUESTION: &#8212; about Kosovo issue in order &#8212;MR MILLER: So let me just say &#8212;QUESTION: &#8212; to compel him to reason with Kurti.MR MILLER: &#8212; whatever the Secretary is going to say to the prime minister, I think I’ll wait and let him say it privately to them. He does have a press conference in Albania afterwards where he’ll talk about that meeting, so please tune in to that.Shaun, go ahead and then I do have &#8212;QUESTION: Can I just follow up on a statement that you had earlier on the elections in Indonesia?MR MILLER: Yeah.QUESTION: I know it’s quite general, I know. In line with what you said about Pakistan – you’re not getting ahead of who is taking power – but Subianto has claimed victory in this. Of course, as you know, until recently he was barred from entering the United States on human rights ground – human rights grounds. I mean, that’s been resolved since. But do you think that there’s any lingering issue with – on human rights regarding a Subianto presidency?MR MILLER: So you’re right, we did say we would wait for the results to come in. It does appear that he’s received the most votes, but I don’t want to get ahead of the process that still needs to unfold, the official process in Indonesia. We are committed to the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership with Indonesia that we have had, and of course our 75 year diplomatic relationship with Indonesia, and we are prepared to work with whoever the Indonesian people choose as their democratically elected leader, whether it’s Subianto or – as it appears to be, President Subianto.QUESTION: Can I just very quickly &#8212;MR MILLER: Yeah.QUESTION: The other statement that you had on the call with the Algerian foreign minister. Do you know if there was discussion about the Security Council resolution that the Algerians are putting forward about a ceasefire? Did the Secretary say it’s not a good idea or some other message?MR MILLER: I don’t want to get into the private conversation other than what we already included in the readout.With that, sorry for the quick wrap but I do have to go, so wrap for today. Thanks, everyone.(The briefing was concluded at 1:35 p.m.)# # #						Tags																					Azerbaijan																								China																								Indonesia																								Israel																								Lebanon																								Office of the Spokesperson																								Pakistan																								Palestinian Territories																								Russia																								Ukraine
- Election in Indonesia Matthew Miller, Department SpokespersonWe congratulate the Indonesian people for their robust turnout in today’s election.  This vote was a testament to the durability and strength of the Indonesian people’s commitment to the democratic process and electoral institutions.  We look forward to the General Election Commission’s announcement of the official election results.This year, as we celebrate 75 years of U.S.-Indonesian diplomatic relations, we look forward to working with Indonesia’s next President-elect and government, as well as the legislative houses, on the shared priorities that benefit the people of both our countries, including addressing climate change, ensuring a prosperous and secure Indo-Pacific, and safeguarding international stability.The United States and Indonesia are close partners, guided by the principles set forth in our Comprehensive Strategic Partnership.  Together with Indonesia’s new administration, we will work to deliver a better future for our citizens and tackle the most pressing challenges of the 21st century.
- Deputy Secretary Verma’s Engagements in Indonesia Office of the SpokespersonThe below is attributable to Spokesperson Matthew Miller:Deputy Secretary of State Richard Verma met with Indonesian counterparts on February 1-2 in Jakarta, Indonesia, to further bilateral cooperation under the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (CSP) announced by President Biden and President Widodo in November 2023 at the White House.  In a meeting with Indonesian Vice Foreign Minister Pahala Mansury, the two officials celebrated 75 years of bilateral relations and the conclusion of negotiations on a CSP Plan of Action to guide bilateral engagements over the next five years.  The Deputy Secretary and Vice Foreign Minister also discussed economic cooperation and regional and global issues, including the situation in the Middle East and importance of global health security.  Deputy Secretary Verma highlighted the U.S. commitment to ASEAN and ASEAN centrality.Separately, the Deputy Secretary and Coordinating Minister for Maritime Affairs and Investment Luhut Binsar Pandjaitan discussed critical minerals cooperation and implementation of the Just Energy Transition Partnership, a landmark, long-term partnership that will mobilize over $20 billion in public and private financing to accelerate Indonesia’s clean-energy transition.   Deputy Secretary Verma and Deputy Coordinating Minister for Economic Affairs Dr. Edi Prio Pambudi discussed cooperation to build secure and resilient semiconductor supply chains, supporting Indonesia’s interest in joining the OECD, and shared initiatives under the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF).  Deputy Secretary Verma thanked Indonesia for supporting our 2023 APEC host year.In addition to bilateral meetings with senior Indonesian officials, the Deputy Secretary and Permanent Representatives discussed the U.S.-ASEAN Comprehensive Strategic Partnership and how to support the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific, including through the U.S. role as the region’s number one source of foreign direct investment.  The Deputy Secretary reaffirmed ASEAN centrality by emphasizing the importance of maintaining peace and stability in the South China Sea and thanked ASEAN members for continuing to press Burma’s military regime to implement the Five Point Consensus.While in Jakarta, Deputy Secretary Verma also led a public dialogue on the Indo-Pacific Strategy and expanded U.S. Comprehensive Strategic Partnerships with ASEAN and Indonesia at @america to an audience of Indonesian policy makers and youth.
- Deputy Secretary for Management and Resources Verma’s Trip to  Australia, Fiji, and Indonesia Office of the SpokespersonDeputy Secretary of State for Management and Resources Richard R. Verma will travel to Suva, Fiji; Canberra, Australia; Sydney, Australia; and Jakarta, Indonesia, from January 29 to February 2.  During his visit, Deputy Secretary Verma will focus on deepening critical relationships with U.S. allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific region.  He will also advance the United States affirmative vision for a secure and inclusive cyberspace while discussing efforts to meet demand for cyber and digital capacity building in the region.In Fiji and Australia, U.S. Ambassador at Large for Cyberspace and Digital Policy Nathaniel C. Fick will accompany Deputy Secretary Verma.  In Suva, they will meet with government officials and digital industry representatives to discuss secure and trusted information and communications technology infrastructure.In Canberra, Deputy Secretary Verma will meet with senior Australian officials to coordinate U.S.-Australia efforts in the Indo-Pacific, including on cyber initiatives.  The Deputy Secretary will also meet with U.S. Embassy staff to hear their perspectives on what is important to them, as well as the salient bilateral and regional issues.In Sydney, Deputy Secretary Verma and Ambassador Fick will meet with academic and private sector leaders to enhance cooperation on emerging technologies and advanced telecommunications for the benefit of the region.In Jakarta, following the recent upgrade of U.S.-Indonesia ties to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, Deputy Secretary Verma will meet senior Indonesian officials to discuss how to further capitalize on the strong U.S.-Indonesia partnership.  He will deliver remarks at U.S. Embassy Jakarta’s premier cultural center @america, highlighting the United States’ continuing commitment to the Indo-Pacific region as we commemorate the two-year anniversary of the Indo-Pacific Strategy.  He will also discuss our ongoing investment in Indonesia and the region’s success through initiatives such as the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF), the Millenium Challenge Corporation Compacts, and a range of projects funded by the Development Finance Corporation.Also, while in Jakarta, as part of the ongoing U.S. commitment as a Comprehensive Strategic Partner to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Deputy Secretary also will meet with several of the permanent representatives to ASEAN to highlight the U.S. support for the Laos Chair Year, including through cooperation on digital economy, artificial intelligence, and cyber issues and to reaffirm ASEAN centrality.
- Indonesian National Extradited from Singapore to Face Charges of Running Ponzi Scheme Targeting Indonesian and Indo-American Community For Immediate Release – November 10, 2023Click here to read more about this&nbsp;