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HUMAN RIGHTS, CIVIL SOCIETY, AND DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE IN RUSSIA: CURRENT 

SITUATION AND PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND 

COOPERATION IN EUROPE 

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

FEBRUARY 8, 2006 

Printed for the use of the 

Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe 

[CSCE 109–2–7] 

( 

Available via http://www.csce.gov 
COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE 

LEGISLATIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS 

HOUSE SENATE 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey, 

Co-Chairman 

FRANK R. WOLF, Virginia 

JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania 

ROBERT B. ADERHOLT, Alabama 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

LOUISE McINTOSH SLAUGHTER, 

New York 

ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida 

MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina 

SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas, 

Chairman 

GORDON SMITH, Oregon 

SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia 

RICHARD BURR, North Carolina 

DAVID VITTER, Louisiana 

CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut 

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin 

HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, New York 

VACANT 

EXECUTIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS 

VACANT, Department of State 

VACANT, Department of Defense 

VACANT, Department of Commerce 

(II) 
HUMAN RIGHTS, CIVIL SOCIETY, AND DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE IN RUSSIA: CURRENT 

SITUATION AND PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE 

FEBRUARY 8, 2006 

COMMISSIONERS 

Page 

Hon. Sam Brownback, Chairman, Commission on Security 

and Cooperation in Europe ..................................................... 1 

Hon. Benjamin L. Cardin, Ranking Member, Commission 

on Security and Cooperation in Europe ................................. 3 

WITNESSES 

Barry Lowenkron, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, U.S. Department of State . 4 

Daniel Fried, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of European and 

Eurasian Affairs, U.S. Department of State ......................... 7 

Natalia Bourjaily, Vice President for Newly Independent 

States, International Center for Not-for-Profit Law ............. 18 

Allison Gill, Director, Moscow Office, Human Rights Watch .. 19 

Andrew Kuchins, Senior Associate, Russia and Eurasia Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace ........... 21 

Nicolai Petro, Professor of Political Science, University of 

Rhode Island ............................................................................ 25 

Andrei Piontkovsky, Senior Visiting Fellow, Hudson 

Institute .................................................................................... 30 

APPENDICES 

Prepared statement of Allison Gill ............................................ 36 

Prepared statement of Andrew Kuchins ................................... 41 

(III) 

(1) 

HUMAN RIGHTS, CIVIL SOCIETY, AND DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE IN RUSSIA: CURRENT 

SITUATION AND PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE 

February 8, 2006 

COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE

WASHINGTON, DC 

The hearing was held at 3:08 p.m. in room 226, Dirksen Senate 

Office Building, Washington, DC, Hon. Sam Brownback, Chairman, 

Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, presiding. 

Commissioners present: Hon. Sam Brownback, Chairman, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe; and Hon. Benjamin L. Cardin, Ranking Member, Commission on Security and 

Cooperation in Europe. 

Witnesses present: Barry Lowenkron, Assistant Secretary, Bureau 

of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, U.S. Department of State; 

Daniel Fried, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, U.S. Department of State; Natalia Bourjaily, Vice 

President for Newly Independent States, International Center for 

Not-for-Profit Law; Allison Gill, Director, Moscow Office, Human 

Rights Watch; Andrew Kuchins, Russia and Eurasia Program, Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; Nicolai 

Petro, Professor of Political Science, University of Rhode Island; 

and Andrei Piontkovsky, Senior Visiting Fellow, Hudson Institute. 

HON. SAM BROWNBACK, CHAIRMAN, 

COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE 

Mr. BROWNBACK. The hearing will come to order. 

I welcome everybody today to the hearing on Russia that’s being 

held by the Helsinki Commission. This is the latest of several hearings on the subject of human rights, civil society, and democratic 

governance in Russia under the Putin administration. 

As per the Commission’s mandate, we will examine today how 

Russia is complying with the core principles of the Helsinki Accords and subsequent OSCE documents. 

This hearing is being held at a time when many are deeply concerned by the downward trajectory of civil liberties and democratic 

governance under the Putin presidency. We intend to examine 

today some of the more recent events that have exacerbated this 

situation. 

There’s no question that there are many countries in the world 

where the human rights situation is much worse. But unlike Rus-
2 

sia, those countries are not longstanding members of the OSCE, 

the Council of Europe, and the G–8. 

Given Russia’s desire to play a constructive role on the world 

stage, the Putin administration will have to decide whether it intends to play by the rules that Russia adopted as governing principles for its own government and its civic institutions. Russia will 

have to demonstrate beyond rhetoric that it is committed to democratic governance, human rights, and the rule of law. 

That will mean, of course, competitive challenges to the existing 

power structure. It will mean allowing and promoting an open and 

pluralistic power center. And it will mean listening to the wisdom 

and wishes of the Russian people, not the other way around. 

These were the animating aspirations of the Russian people 

when they courageously gained their independence and became 

free from the communist leaders and their system. Instead, Russia 

today has simply become a stagnant autocracy, living on receipts 

from energy resources and cozying up to repressive, if not lethal, 

regimes from around the world. 

In the last few weeks, we have seen a spy scandal in Moscow, 

in which the Russian security services alleged that certain Russian 

NGOs are linked to alleged British intelligence activities. This 

smacks of tactics from the communist Brezhnev era and is clearly 

an attempt to justify recent promulgation of legislation that would 

restrict Russian and foreign NGO activity. 

NGO activity is at the heart of the human rights provisions of 

the Helsinki Accords, the right to know one’s rights and act upon 

them. The NGOs are the little battalions that empower the citizenry to participate actively in the political process on a day-to-day 

basis, keeping government open and responsive to its people. 

Today we will hear from administration witnesses who will discuss the response by the United States to the challenges faced by 

NGOs and to the overall decline in human rights protection in Russia today. 

We will also hear from a panel of experts who have been extensively engaged in these areas. 

There is considerably more cooperation in the past between the 

United States and Russia in areas of mutual interest, such as security and economics, and the world today is safer and better for it. 

But the question remains: Is Russia ultimately a reliable partner? 

It is an important question, and we hope to find some answers 

today, because the implications of President Putin’s policies extend 

well beyond Russia’s borders. How Russia acts and how the West 

responds send important signals to dictators in Belarus and in 

Uzbekistan, and even to Iran, where Russia and the West are intimately involved in trying to resolve tension over its nuclear ambitions. 

Earlier today, I spoke by phone to one of those in Russia who 

was not silent back in the 1970s when she fought for freedom and 

certainly would not be silent today. In fact, I asked Ludmilla 

Alexeeva if it would be wise for me to mention at this hearing 

today that we talked. After all, it is her organization, the Moscow 

Helsinki Group, that is being accused by Russian authorities of 

spying. 
3 

In the kind of spirit that has characterized her lifelong commitment to human rights, she said to me, ‘‘What can the authorities 

do that they haven’t done already?’’ 

I look forward to the statement of our witnesses. I have some 

questions to follow. And I want to applaud those NGOs in Russia 

and particularly those in Moscow. 

And as I spoke with her, I said: It’s relatively easy for me in 

Washington to talk about the need for human rights than individuals would be able to freely express themselves in Russia. It’s quite 

another thing for somebody in Moscow and an NGO to do the 

same. 

And I applaud her efforts. I applaud what she stands for. It reminds me of—I was at the Coretta Scott King funeral yesterday. 

And it’s one thing to talk about it now; it’s another thing to walk 

on the bridge in Selma going to Montgomery, as they did and as 

she has done in Russia. 

I look forward to the testimony. 

Congressman Cardin, if you have an opening statement? 

HON. BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, RANKING MEMBER, 

COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE 

Mr. CARDIN. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I sat right behind you yesterday at the Coretta Scott King funeral in Georgia. And you’re absolutely right to make that analogy. 

We were challenged then yesterday to make sure that we carry on 

the torch, carry on the work, what we do. 

And I think, in some way, the work of our Helsinki Commission 

does that. So I’m very proud to be part of the Helsinki Commission 

and the U.S. participation in the OSCE. 

I just want to concur in your opening statement, Mr. Chairman. 

I’m very troubled to see that Russia, the Kremlin, appears to use 

whatever means in order to stifle dissent, that Mr. Putin might 

make some flying statements about respect for civil liberties or democracy, but then you take a look at his actions and they’re extremely troublesome. 

His attacks on the NGOs have all of us concerned. And I must 

tell you, I am very troubled as to whether Russia is complying with 

their commitments given under the Helsinki Accords. 

So I think this hearing is particularly appropriate. Russia is a 

very important player internationally on the issues that you mentioned. And we need to be able to do everything we can to work 

with Russia in order to advance these mutual interests. 

But it is our responsibility as the Helsinki Commission to make 

sure that they’re adhering to the Helsinki commitments. And quite 

frankly, I have major reservations as to whether in fact they are 

doing that. 

I look forward to the testimony of our witnesses. 

Mr. BROWNBACK. Thank you, Congressman Cardin. 

I’m pleased to have our first panel of two assistant secretaries 

from the State Department. The State Department’s been quite 

outspoken about the need for Russia to adhere to its Helsinki commitments and for the benefit to Russia to move forward in its 

human rights. 
4 

Daniel Fried is the Assistant Secretary of State at the Bureau of 

European and Eurasian Affairs. And prior to the appointment to 

this post, Ambassador Fried served as special assistant to the 

president, senior director for European and Eurasian affairs at the 

National Security Council. He served as principal deputy special 

adviser to the secretary of state for the New Independent States 

and was our Ambassador to Poland from November 1997 until May 

2000. 

Our other witness is Barry F. Lowenkron. He’s the assistant secretary of state for the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and 

Labor. Prior to his appointment, he served as principal deputy director of policy planning for the Department of State. He’s held a 

variety of positions in the intelligence community, including national intelligence officer for Europe and special assistant to the director of the Central Intelligence Agency. 

Gentlemen, thank you very much for joining us today. And I 

don’t know if you have selected an order that you would like to go 

in. 

Dr. Lowenkron? 

HON. BARRY LOWENKRON, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU 

OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND LABOR, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Sec. LOWENKRON. Chairman Brownback, Congressman Cardin, 

let me begin by expressing my appreciation for the Commission’s 

pioneering work promoting respect for human rights and democratic principles throughout the Helsinki signatory states. 

I have a more detailed written statement, which, with your permission, I’d like to submit for the record. 

Mr. BROWNBACK. It will be in the record. 

Sec. LOWENKRON. Thank you. 

Mr. Chairman, I welcome this opportunity to share my thoughts 

about the Russian Federation’s new NGO legislation, the trajectory 

of democracy and civil society in Russia, and the way forward. 

The United States values a strong relationship with Russia. As 

President Bush has said, it is in our interest that Russia be a 

strong and valuable partner with the United States, but that we 

understand that, in the 21st century, strong countries are built by 

developing strong democracies. 

A flourishing civil society is essential to reaching democratic 

goals. The Bush administration shares the Commission’s concern 

that civil society in Russia is under increasing pressure. Raids on 

NGO offices, registration problems, visa problems for foreign 

NGOs, and intimidation of NGO leaders and staff have had a 

chilling effect. 

Secretary Rice asked me to deliver a clear message to the Russia 

government about our deepening concerns for NGOs. I visited Moscow January 17th through the 19th. Upon arrival, I was greeted 

with the news that the NGO law, quietly signed on January 10th 

by President Putin, had been published that very morning. 

Over the next 2 days, I met with Russian- and U.S.-based NGOs, 

including, Mr. Chairman, with Ludmilla Alexeyeva herself. I met 

with Duma committee chairpersons, officials from the Ministry of 

Foreign Affairs, the human rights ombudsman, the chair of the 
5 

presidential human rights council, and representatives of independent media. 

Although some of the more problematic elements were removed 

in the legislative process—and I would add in part due to concerns 

expressed by the United States, by European allies, and by Russian 

and foreign NGOs—key problems remain. 

Many provisions of the legislation are vague. What constitutes a 

threat to Russian sovereignty or extremist activity is not defined. 

NGOs’ financial records as well as current and planned activities 

are subject to examination. 

Officials could order an NGO to cease funding a program, to 

cease funding an individual, or to shut down completely. Religious 

groups that receive foreign funding may be subject to review, taxation and special registration considerations. 

The authorities have broad discretion to implement the new law. 

While punitive measures would be subject to court approval, this 

could entail lengthy, expensive litigation that could cripple an 

NGO. 

We have already registered our concerns at the OSCE Permanent Council on January 26th, when Ambassador Finley said that 

the law does not appear to meet OSCE commitments in the Copenhagen and Moscow documents. 

The new law will go into effect in April; already there are ominous signs. As justification for the new law, President Putin and 

other officials cited the spy rock case, following allegations by the 

FSB that British spies had been funding Russian NGOs. 

On January 24th, the Duma passed a resolution calling upon the 

committee on security to direct the FSB to report on political parties and organizations that receive foreign funding. 

On January 27th, the Ministry of Justice announced they were 

seeking to revoke the registration of the Russian Human Rights 

Research Center, an umbrella organization that includes the Moscow Helsinki Group, for allegedly failing to provide required documentation about its activities. 

On February 3rd, the executive director of the Russian-Chechen 

Friendship Society received a 2-year suspended sentence and 4 

years of probation for inciting ethnic hatred for publishing statements by Chechen separatist leaders. This conviction follows a series of repressive actions against the society. 

And just yesterday in his speech to the board of the FSB, President Putin said the following regarding NGOs. Quote, ‘‘The task 

that stands before the special services and all law enforcement 

agencies consists in creating the necessary conditions so that these 

organizations can operate efficiently. But at the same time, you 

must protect society from any attempts by foreign states to use 

these organizations for interfering in Russia’s internal affairs.’’ 

These and other developments, Mr. Chairman, suggest that the 

Russian Government harbors a deep mistrust of civil society, and 

especially of organizations that receive foreign funding and are engaged in politically sensitive activities, like human rights monitoring. 

Several Russian officials and lawmakers asserted to me that the 

law is necessary to clamp down on terrorist activity and money 

laundering. But what came through from further discussion was 
6 

their deep suspicion that Western states had manipulated election 

outcomes in Ukraine, Georgia and elsewhere by funding NGO activity. 

They see our promotion of democracy as part of a zero-sum game 

of geopolitical influence. I emphasized repeatedly that they were 

fundamentally mistaken about what happened in Ukraine and 

Georgia. 

Our NGO funding and activities there were fully in keeping with 

OSCE and other international standards and practices. Our assistance is designed to help ensure that elections are free and fair, not 

to pick winners or losers. 

Whenever NGOs are under siege, democracy is undermined. As 

I told my Russian interlocutors, NGOs can support governments, 

they can criticize governments, but NGOs should never be treated 

as enemies of governments. 

The NGO law is just one element of a broader pattern of restricting the space for independent views, consistent with the apparent 

aim of President Putin to concentrate power in the Kremlin and direct democracy from the top down. 

To those ends, the Kremlin has abolished direct elections of governors in favor of presidential nomination. This system in the current Russian context, where checks and balances are weak at best, 

limits government accountability to voters while further concentrating power in the executive branch. 

Electoral and political party law amendments billed as intended 

to strengthen nationwide political parties in the longer term could 

nonetheless reduce the ability of opposition parties to compete in 

elections. There have been harassments and prosecutions of rivals. 

Let me be clear. Our concern is not whether this or that oligarch 

gains or loses power, but whether the Russian Government is selectively enforcing the law as a political weapon. 

Cases such as those of Mikhail Trepashkin, Valentin Danilov, 

and others also raise concerns about the political nature of prosecutions, respect for human rights, and the independence of the judiciary. 

The Kremlin also has acted to limit critical voices in the media. 

The government has decreased the diversity of the broadcast 

media, particularly television, the main source of news for the majority of Russians. 

All independent, nationwide television stations have been taken 

over either by the state or by state-friendly organizations. Due to 

government pressure on the media, self-censorship remains a serious problem. 

Mr. Chairman, though the current trajectory is discouraging, 

President Bush and Secretary Rice remain firmly committed to 

Russia’s democratic development. With Congress’s help, we will 

continue robust and open support for programs fostering civil society, for free, fair, transparent, and competitive elections, and democratic governance. 

And we will continue to work with other democracies to send a 

strong message: that we expect Russia to respect fundamental freedoms of expression, association and assembly. 

Mr. Chairman, a personal observation, if I may. Assistant Secretary Fried and I have been colleagues for decades. We served to-
7 

gether in the State Department during the dark days of Solidarity’s 

repression. We also served together later on, when the darkness 

began to lift in the Gorbachev years, leading to the end of the Cold 

War. 

As discouraging as the current trends may seem, today’s Russia 

is not the Soviet Union. The space for individual freedoms is immeasurably larger today than anyone could have imagined in Soviet days. We work in partnership with Russia, but partners who 

respect one another should speak frankly to each other when they 

disagree. 

The path to democracy is seldom linear; we must not give up on 

democracy in Russia or break faith with the NGOs working, despite setbacks, to realize democracy’s promise. 

My DRL team and I look forward to working closely with you, 

and the members of the Commission, and your expert Commission 

staff. 

Once again, Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you and the Commission for its far-reaching contributions to the cause of human 

rights and democracy. Thank you. 

Mr. BROWNBACK. Thank you. That was an excellent statement, 

and I particularly appreciate the last thought of that, as well. 

I remember traveling in the Soviet Union years ago as a young 

man, and the oppressiveness and then the shift. But still it is 

something we should speak candidly, and I think it clearly in the 

best future interest of Russia that we speak, as well. 

Mr. Fried? 

HON. DANIEL FRIED, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF EUROPEAN AND EURASIAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 

STATE 

Sec. FRIED. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Congressman Cardin, for 

your leadership in organizing today’s meeting. 

I’m honored to be with you today to discuss Russia’s efforts at 

sustaining its democratic and human rights reforms and to discuss 

the state of democracy and human rights in Russia and U.S.-Russian relations. 

I associate myself with everything that my colleague and old 

friend, Barry Lowenkron, has said in outlining the challenges Russia faces in realizing its potential to become a modern democracy 

and to meet its international commitments on human rights. 

Russia’s path toward internal reform and the development of democracy is at the heart of its relationship with the world, including 

the United States. We cannot and we do not separate Russia’s internal development from Russia’s external relations, including with 

us. 

The United States seeks a robust partnership with Russia that 

strengthens our cooperation in as many areas as possible on issues 

that matter to us and where our interests coincide; at the same 

time, as friends, we cannot and do not avoid frank discussions 

about the areas where we disagree. 

The United States has had, at various times in the past, a principally adversarial relationship with Russia. Especially since 1991, 

we have sought to build partnerships on the basis of underlying 

values which we assumed were shared. 
8 

What is called for now in our relations with Russia is an approach that could be described as constructive cooperation wherever possible to address the common threats and challenges facing 

us, while being realistic and candid about those areas where we 

disagree and particularly where our values diverge. 

Allow me to review briefly both sets of issues which characterize 

this important and often challenging relationship. 

The United States and Russia share a broad strategic agenda 

that has produced a number of important successes since 2001 that 

have advanced our national security and foreign policy interests. 

And, Mr. Chairman, you referred to some of these in the statement you made at the beginning. 

These successes demonstrate the importance of our relations 

with Russia. Let me cite a few examples. The U.S.-Russia Working 

Group on Counterterrorism, now led on the U.S. side by Undersecretary Nick Burns, has provided a critical channel for dialogue and 

cooperation with Russia on counterterrorism for 51⁄2 years. 

Ongoing cooperation on nonproliferation of conventional arms 

and WMDs, counter-narcotics, and cooperative threat reduction efforts, including the redirection of the work on chemical and biological weapons expects, has allowed us to address these critical global 

threats. 

We’re pursuing vital and energetic cooperation on anti-moneylaundering initiatives. We’re making progress towards settlement 

of the Nagorno-Karabakh frozen conflict, thanks in large measure 

to the helpful role played by Russia. 

We’re collaborating well in the Balkans, despite some differences 

of initial assumptions, including by working together in the Contact Group on the final settlement for Kosovo’s future status. 

We’re cooperating well on Afghanistan, in which Russia, as the 

largest creditor, recently announced its intention to forgive 100 percent of Afghanistan’s debt within the context of the Paris Club. We 

cooperate on Iraqi reconstruction, and most recently on Iran. 

Though we have not always seen eye-to-eye with Russia on how 

to proceed in Iran, recent Russian efforts, especially the Russian 

decision to support referral of Iran to the U.N. Security Council, 

have been constructive. We will continue to cooperate closely to advance a shared objective that Iran not achieve the capability to develop nuclear weapons. 

There exists considerable potential for greater progress in these 

and other areas where we share overlapping interests. These areas 

include, among others, Russia’s WTO accession (where we are making progress in concert with other WTO members), cooperation in 

the NATO-Russia Council (where we have also made progress in 

developing NATO’s military relations with Russia, but where potential is far from realized.) 

Greater integration of Russia with the international community 

is in everyone’s interest, though of course it brings with it obligations and responsibilities. 

A second area, Mr. Chairman, is areas of concern, and we are 

concerned by Russia’s policy in some areas, especially regarding 

Russia’s relations with many of the nations of Eastern Europe and 

Eurasia and, as my colleague said, Russia’s backsliding on democracy. 
9 

It is in these areas especially where we continue to address our 

concerns clearly and directly to our Russian friends in a spirit of 

respect and candor. 

Russia’s relations with Eurasian and Eastern European countries 

present us with opportunities and challenges, particularly in the 

wake of the transformational developments that have unfolded in 

Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan. Partly as a result of these 

events, many Russians now view U.S. involvement in the region 

with growing wariness and, quite frankly, increasingly in zero-sum 

terms. 

On visits to Moscow, one can sense Russian public and official 

concern about the prospect of more so-called ‘‘colored’’ revolutions 

and the fear that these would undermine regional stability and 

Russia’s security and economic interests. 

This Russian view of American policy toward the region is misplaced. The United States does not regard this region as a venue 

for competition, nor do we believe the United States and Russian 

interests are in conflict there. We believe it is in Russia’s interests, 

as well as our own, to have stable and prospering democracies developing on its borders, which would naturally lead to these countries maintaining good ties with Russia. 

Failed states and authoritarian regimes along Russia’s periphery, 

which alienate their own people, do nothing for regional stability, 

security or prosperity; indeed, such states are a threat to regional 

stability. 

It would surely be better for Central Asia and Eastern Europe 

if Uzbekistan and Belarus, for example, were moving in a reformist 

rather than an increasingly repressive direction. The United States 

certainly supports economic and political reforms in these countries, and we would hope that Russia would as well. 

The recent gas dispute between Russia and Ukraine, in which 

Gazprom reduced the flow temporarily to Ukraine on New Year’s 

Day, raised questions about Russia’s intentions and created a climate of mistrust. 

As Secretary Rice noted recently, Russia needs to ‘‘demonstrate 

that it is prepared to act—as an energy supplier in a responsible 

way.’’ This includes greater transparency and openness, not using 

energy resources as a political tool, and structuring contracts in 

ways that do not foster corruption but transparency. Transparency 

in the energy sector is needed from other countries in the region, 

too. In addition, persistent tensions with Georgia and recent Russian suggestions that the unfolding process for resolution of Kosovo 

status could set principles and precedents for resolution of frozen 

conflicts in Georgia and Moldova have raised questions about Russia’s commitment to the territorial integrity of these countries. 

It does not, frankly, make sense for Russia to support separatist 

regimes in the breakaway Georgian provinces of South Ossetia and 

Abkhazia. This leads to the very instability that concerns Russia. 

A successful, reforming, stable Georgia ought to be in Russia’s interests. 

A failed Georgia—and the prospect of a failed Georgia was very 

real before the Rose Revolution of 2003—could likely become a 

haven for more and more aggressive organized crime and terrorists 

that could directly threaten Russia. 
10 

The United States has and will continue to encourage Russia and 

Georgia to work together to advance solutions to these frozen conflicts in ways that respect the territorial integrity of Georgia and 

the legitimate interests of the people of Abkhazia and South 

Ossetia. 

Assistant Secretary Lowenkron has shared with you our ongoing 

humanitarian and human rights concerns, and as well as concerns 

about terrorism in Chechnya and in the North Caucasus. The situation in Chechnya has been for some time one of the principle 

sources of instability, abuses and violence elsewhere in the North 

Caucasus, a development in no one’s interest. 

President Putin, in his press conference last week, said, ‘‘Today 

the situations in some other regions of the North Caucasus concern 

us even more than that in Chechnya.’’ 

We continue to look for ways to support an end to the humanitarian crisis and foster a genuine political dialogue in Chechnya, 

which are critical to bringing lasting stability and respecting the 

territorial integrity of Russia. We hope that last November’s parliamentary election in Chechnya could be a step in that direction. 

In particular, we’re looking at new ways to expand our assistance 

programs in the region and at other ways to reduce the sources of 

violence and instability; ultimately, however, it is the Russian Government that must develop new ways for addressing problems in 

the region. We are prepared to be a partner with them and the peoples of the region in that process. 

The lack of progress on the development of democracy in Russia 

is another area of concern for the United States that my colleague 

has addressed. The United States supports the objective of Russia’s 

development into a strong, prosperous, democratic country. 

It is in that spirit that we press Russian officials at all levels, 

publicly and privately, and speak to Russian civil society about the 

importance of human rights and democracy. 

As friends, we are frank in our meetings, making clear that a 

commitment to shared values, most importantly those of democracy 

and human rights, is the foundation for a successful relationship. 

As Secretary Rice said in Moscow in May 2005, ‘‘For the U.S.- 

Russia relationship to deepen, and for Russia to gain its full potential, there needs to be greater democratic development.’’ 

This has been an uneven process in Russia. As Barry Lowenkron 

has said, Russia is not the Soviet Union. The country has experienced great change in the past 15 years, including progress toward 

respect for human rights and the rule of law. 

Regrettably, recent developments suggest that the Russian Government’s commitment to internationally recognized human rights, 

including democratic norms, media freedom, and the rule of law 

has deteriorated. The NGO legislation signed into law and the 

charges made against NGOs in connection with the alleged spying 

cases are recent examples. 

In response to these problems, the United States is engaged in 

active efforts to support Russia’s transition, over the medium to 

long term, into a genuine democratic state, with features common 

to all democracies. 

We are working with our European partners to deliver a consistent message to the Russian Government to live up to its inter-
11 

national commitments to democracy and human rights and to help 

Russians, including those representing Russian civil society, in exercising those rights. 

In engaging the Russian Government in supporting civil society, 

we hope to: promote free and fair elections; broaden access to information; strengthen judicial integrity and independence; eliminate 

corruption and increase transparency; foster greater capacity for 

citizens to hold their government accountable; maintain lifelines of 

support to key human rights groups; increase exchanges in both directions; and provide Russia’s youth with opportunities to learn 

democratic skills and values. 

As the Secretary said recently in response to a question at 

Georgetown University, we will work ‘‘with those in Russia who 

from below are pressuring for a democratic path—and that means 

nongovernmental organizations, it means university people, it 

means all of the Russians who themselves want a more democratic 

future.’’ 

The Secretary also noted that we need to ‘‘keep open for Russia 

a path toward a democratic West.’’ 

As Russia begins its work as chairman of the G–8, we are committed to supporting Russia in advancing its proposed agenda dealing with energy security, infectious disease, and education, as well 

as continuing G–8 priorities, such as counter-proliferation and 

counterterrorism. 

But as the Secretary said on January 18th at Georgetown, referring to Russia’s chairmanship of the G–8 this year, ‘‘Certain obligations and certain expectations come with being the chair of an organization that is avowedly of industrialized democracies.’’ 

And so we will encourage the Russian Government to demonstrate to its G–8 partners and the world its commitment to the 

values of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law, common 

to all industrialized democracies through practical and real 

progress. 

Mr. Chairman, in his September 2005 speech before the United 

Nations, President Bush said, ‘‘The work of democracy is larger 

than holding a fair election; it requires building the institutions 

that sustain freedom—Democratic nations uphold the rule of law, 

impose limits on the power of the state—Democratic nations protect private property, free speech, and religious expression. Democratic nations grow in strength because they reward and respect 

the creative gifts of their people. And democratic nations contribute 

to peace and stability, because they seek national greatness in the 

achievements of their citizens, not the conquest of their neighbors.’’ 

Clearly, Russia has much more to do in these areas to fully secure the benefits of democracy for its people. We will continue to 

work with Russia to advance democracy and, when necessary, in a 

constructive spirit, to bring shortcomings and concerns to their attention. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Congressman Cardin, for your attention and this opportunity. 

Mr. BROWNBACK. Thank you, gentlemen both. Appreciate it very 

much. 

We’ve got a time clock. We’ll turn it at seven minutes, and we 

might bounce back and forth on a question session. If we don’t, 
12 

then somebody—let me know when that time period’s up so we can 

move forward. 

Gentlemen, I want to both thank you in the outset for your careers given to this region of the world. I too quickly introduced you, 

but each of you has had a long and distinguished career in dealing 

with Eastern Europe, Russia, the former Soviet Union, the region. 

And I deeply appreciate what you’ve done. 

And I hope you have some sense of pride, too, of what you’ve 

seen taking place, what you’ve been a part of. And yet what we’re 

seeing right now is a regression from that, and so it troubles all 

of us when that takes place. 

Mr. Lowenkron, let me ask you first. I take it from what you’re 

getting from the Russians is the lesson they got out of these different color revolutions is destroy these smaller organizations before they get you, is what the lesson that they’ve learned, and 

that’s why they’re going at them. Is that accurate? 

Sec. LOWENKRON. It’s accurate in the context of a fundamental 

misreading on their part of what happened in these elections. In 

their view—I’ll put it bluntly—American money beat Russian 

money, and American money was quicker and more clever, because 

they used NGOs. 

One Russian once told me that we refer to what happened in the 

Orange Revolution as our 9/11. And I spend conversation after conversation—— 

Mr. BROWNBACK. Explain that to me. Why is this a 9/11? 

Sec. LOWENKRON. It’s a 9/11, because it was a wake-up call. It 

was a wake-up call to Russia that said that the United States, the 

West, the United States had found a very clever tactic to advance 

what they call a geopolitical gain to continue to weaken Russia and 

to advance Western interests in the region. 

And the tactic was not the military; the tactic was money funneled through nongovernmental organizations. And I had spent a 

great deal of time disabusing them of that notion, telling them, as 

the secretary said, democracy cannot be imposed. 

What we do is, in a very transparent way and with full adherence to OSCE principles, we support those indigenous voices that 

want help to have a level playing field when it comes to elections. 

I would hasten to add that, of all the rhetoric and all the speeches that have come out of Moscow on this issue, personally speaking 

the one that I found was the most damning was the one in which 

President Putin said he who pays the piper calls the tune, because 

it sets in motion this mindset American money is paying the piper 

and so the tune is anti-Russian, pro-U.S., pro-West. 

Mr. BROWNBACK. And so the key is to shut the outside money 

from coming into any NGO organizations, and therefore they will 

win election after election? 

Sec. LOWENKRON. The key is, as far as they believe, is to ensure 

that they can see every dime, every dollar, every euro, every bit of 

currency that comes into Russia, every single program, and that 

they have the right to question the ends of these—the objectives of 

these funds, they have the right to tell Russian NGOs, ‘‘You are 

not allowed to participate in this political activity.’’ 

And they have broad categories, such as threats to the sovereignty of Russia or to its culture or extremist activity, to shut it 
13 

down. And it’s for this purpose that they’re hiring nearly 1,000 individuals who are going to work in the Ministry of Justice to scrub 

all of the NGOs. 

One Russian official said: Take heart of the fact that, at the end 

of the day, this organization will be inefficient. But my response 

was, as inefficient as it is, it will bollix up the work of NGOs and 

it will cast a pall and create a chilling environment for their work. 

Mr. BROWNBACK. So is this—and either gentleman—is this just 

simply an organization, a political structure, a political power 

structure in search of maintaining its own power now that we’re 

seeing operating in Russia? 

Sec. LOWENKRON. Well, Mr. Chairman, in my view what it is, it’s 

at the core a sense that democracy can be imposed from the top. 

So President Putin and the presidential administration can say, 

‘‘These are good NGOs; these are bad NGOs. This is the proper 

civil society; this is civil society beyond the pale.’’ 

They’ve even created structures that will give them, quote, unquote, ‘‘constructive criticism.’’ So it’s a fundamental misreading of 

how democracies nourish, nurture, sustain and protect fundamental freedoms. 

Mr. BROWNBACK. Mr. Fried? 

Sec. FRIED. I think also that the Russians have a misperception 

of what it would mean to have more successfully reforming democratic neighbors. Many Russians seem to look upon the prospect of 

democratic nations on their borders with concern, as if this would 

mean—— 

Mr. BROWNBACK. Many Russians, you’re not talking about Russian officials? You’re talking about the Russian people. 

Sec. FRIED. Russian officials and some Russians in the media. 

And I don’t know what category to put that in. 

Mr. BROWNBACK. But what about the Russian public? Are you 

saying the Russian public? 

Sec. FRIED. That’s an interesting question. And there are indications that the Russian public has come to associate events like the 

Orange Revolution with the weakening of Russian power, that it 

isn’t just officialdom, that people are responding to what they hear 

in the official media. 

And it may be Russians—it’s not for me to speak for them, but 

it seems to me that there is a sense in Russia that they have been 

weakened and that somehow the democratic transformations that 

started in Eastern Europe in 1989 and have continued throughout 

Eurasia have weakened Russia 

Instead of giving Russia great opportunities to shed itself of the 

communist legacy and join Europe and the West as a successful democracy, these changes have weakened Russia. And therefore, 

many Russians look upon these changes in zero-sum terms; a gain 

for democracy must be a defeat for Russia. 

That is a fundamental—in my view, that is a fundamentally 

wrong assessment. I think it is certainly in Russia’s interests to 

have successful reforming countries on its borders, but many Russians don’t see it that way. 

And in this, I regret that the Russian Government is creating the 

impression that having democratic and reformist governments in 
14 

Ukraine and Georgia is somehow inimical to Russia’s interests. I 

believe it is not. 

Mr. BROWNBACK. So that somehow it’s better what is happening 

in Uzbekistan than what is happening in the Ukraine? 

Sec. FRIED. I don’t want to speak too much for the Russians, but 

I noted with some dismay that Russia appeared to be very supportive of Karimov after the shootings in Andijan and after the 

wave of repression in Uzbekistan that accompanied and followed 

those shootings. 

I certainly think it would be better for Russia were Uzbekistan 

moving in a reformist direction. I think repression in Uzbekistan 

will ultimately lead to the very instability Russia worries about, 

whereas reform, economic and political, will lead to lasting stability. 

I think reform and democracy in Eurasia is in Russia’s interests. 

I regret that not all—I regret that many in Russia don’t seem to 

see it that way. 

Mr. BROWNBACK. Congressman Cardin? 

Mr. CARDIN. Let me follow up this line on the NGOs, because I 

think this is very, very disturbing. It seems like Russia is interpreting the threat to Russian sovereignty or extreme activity as 

supporting interests that are against the elections of the current 

regime more so than anything else. So it really seems very frightening. 

And the concerns about extremist activities or about spying, et 

cetera, appears from what you’re saying to be ways to justify internationally their strategies to stop NGOs from operating independently within the Russian Federation. 

And I think this directly is in violation of the Helsinki Accords. 

I asked staff to give me the section, and principle seven is the right 

to know one’s rights and act upon them. And this has been used 

to allow NGOs to operate within the member states of the OSCE. 

So it seems to me that this is a clear violation. 

And I just want to get your views on it. And if you agree, then 

it seems to me, Mr. Chairman, we might want to see, particularly 

in the parliamentary assembly, raising these issues in order to try 

to elevate corrective action within the Russian Federation. 

Sec. LOWENKRON. Just the other day, President Putin made a 

statement about the OSCE which I found distressing, because it 

gives us all a sense for the magnitude of the problem. He said, and 

I quote, ‘‘It is completely wrong in our opinion to make the OSCE 

a warder keeping guard over the post-Soviet space. It has not been 

formed for this purpose.’’ 

Now, I enjoy history, but I do not appreciate revisiting history 

that’s already been settled. And OSCE and CSCE have roots that 

go back to when we began our government careers. 

And what happens in these countries is a legitimate issue for 

OSCE members to raise. I recall the debates on whether or not to 

allow, at that time, the Soviet Union to have an OSCE or a CSCE 

conference on the human dimension in Moscow, which then happened in 1991. 

Well, they made commitments in 1990 in Copenhagen and in 

1991 at Moscow, commitments to honor the freedom of NGOs, the 

right to assemble, the right to establish contacts and connections 
15 

with foreign NGOs, the right to solicit funding, and the right to advance these democratic principles. 

And so I do think, as Ambassador Finley pointed out, that this 

NGO law stands in contrast to the spirit, if not to the actual letter, 

of these various documents. 

And what we will do, what Ambassador Burns will do in Moscow 

is doing what we will do here, is, as the Russian Government proceeds to implement this law, we will have to pay very close attention to ensure that it is transparent, that it is fair, and when issues 

come up that highlight whether or not it’s capriciously applied or 

used as a political weapon, we absolutely have to raise it. 

Mr. CARDIN. Let me just point out, this is not the first OSCE 

issue we’re having with Russia within the last year or so. Their response on election monitoring has been very, very distressing. 

The way that they’ve gone about negotiating the adoption of 

budgets within the OSCE is very upsetting, and the list goes on, 

and on, and on. And every time we seem to be getting progress, it’s 

Russia standing out there causing us a real problem. 

And I do think we need to develop strategies that use our bilateral opportunities to stress the importance of the OSCE process 

with Russia. And Russia wants to become a democratic state. Then 

living up to its commitments within OSCE and stop badmouthing 

an organization that has the credibility on these subjects would be 

very helpful to the Russian Federation, and working constructively. 

We all understand trying to negotiate from strength in your relationship with other countries, but I think the way the Russian Federation is going about it within the OSCE is very counterproductive. And I would hope that we would use our opportunities 

in our bilateral and other regional organizations to strengthen our 

resolve within OSCE. 

Sec. FRIED. Congressman, I agree. And I’d like to say that we 

have done exactly that. We’re working bilaterally with the Russians and enjoyed a measure of success, at least as judged by the 

relatively better OSCE ministerial in Ljubljana last December. Relatively better, that is better than the previous one in Sofia or the 

one in Maastricht the year before. 

We did defend the rights and prerogatives of ODIHR, the OSCE’s 

election monitoring outfit. We defended them successfully, and 

we’ve made very clear to the Russians that we would so. 

By working with our allies and by being straightforward with the 

Russians, we managed to have a better outcome than many expected. We will have to continue to work with the Russians and 

with our allies to see to it that OSCE’s ability to carry out its core 

functions, among which is election monitoring, is maintained. 

Mr. CARDIN. We’ve all had discussions with the chair in office. 

We’ve had discussions with the staff at OSCE, and we’re sure we’re 

not violating any confidences to say that this is shared not just by 

the United States but by the member states of OSCE. 

So I think we can get support from the countries that participate 

in OSCE to really hold Russia to making progress. And it may be 

that a way to do it is exactly what you are suggesting, in the way 

they implement this law, to work with the Russian authority, to 

make sure there’s transparency. 
16 

I think transparency is going to be the key. And not that there 

is reason to be optimistic that they’ll use an open process, but that 

probably is our best strategy at this particular moment, unless you 

have other strategies that we could be hopeful about. 

Sec. LOWENKRON. Congressmen, if I could just add two things. 

First of all, we will also rely on the help of our allies and friends. 

Chancellor Merkel made a very strong statement publicly in support of NGOs when she was in Moscow before I arrived. 

And my second point is the voice of the Congress, working with 

the Duma and the leadership in the Duma, to explain—to work 

with them and say: This is what NGOs do, and NGOs are not the 

front lines of a campaign to undermine Russia’s fundamental interests. I think that’s critical. 

Mr. CARDIN. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. BROWNBACK. Should we be backing away from meetings that 

Russia is hosting, as the chair of the G–8, as a statement of our 

displeasure with what the trajectory of what Russia is on, gentlemen? 

Sec. FRIED. I don’t think so, Mr. Chairman. I think that we 

should work with the Russians, cooperating where we can and 

speaking frankly about problems where we see them. I appreciate 

that many thoughtful, serious people have raised questions of the 

kind you’ve just raised. 

But the question, it seems to me, is not one that we should debate ourselves but a question we should put to the Russians. That 

is to say, what kind of G–8 summit do they want to have this coming summer? What do they want the world to see? What kind of 

impression do they want to make? 

Russia is going to be in the spotlight because of its presidency 

this year of the G–8. What do they want the world to take away 

from it? This is for them to decide, because it is they who will either answer to the world for the problems or help put together a 

summit which successfully addresses a lot of these problems. 

Mr. BROWNBACK. Is there something we will raise at the G–8 

this summer, if the trajectory we’re on continues? 

Sec. FRIED. I think that our dialogue about democracy is going 

to continue with the Russians. And I think that they understand 

perfectly well that the world is going to be watching how they implement their commitments to democracy and the rule of law. I 

don’t think there’s any question about that. 

Mr. BROWNBACK. I would note to both of you, I’ve traveled this 

region extensively, for as far as the former Soviet Union, Central 

Asian region, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan. I’ve been to Georgia, Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan. 

And my experience in that region is that these NGOs, they’re the 

seed of the expansion of freedom for the people. They’re the seed. 

And I could have told you five years ago which ones of these countries would act this way now and which ones wouldn’t, by whether 

there was any seed there. 

And there was seed in Georgia, and there wasn’t in Uzbekistan. 

And you could pretty easily see it. I’d go and travel, and I’d ask 

to meet with NGOs and groups. And you would see a bunch of 

them in Georgia, and you would see zero in Uzbekistan. 
17 

And freedom can’t grow in a vacuum, and it doesn’t grow overnight. It needs fertile field and it needs seed. And these private 

NGO groups, many of them very small, operating off of very small 

budgets, but were nonetheless a conscience of the people and towards the nation. And they’re allowed to flourish. 

My real problem here is, is I think the Russian Government sees 

it the same way, so they’re taking the seed out of the ground. And 

that is the wrong way to progress as a civil society, and as a democracy, and as a country, for its own future, because I believe 

strongly that Georgia and Ukraine are on a far better trajectory to 

grow as nations than where Uzbekistan is right now. 

And for the good of the people, I think you can easily see that 

this is the case. And certainly, for the course of history, I think you 

can easily see that this is a better course to go. 

And I really fear for Russia itself, that it’s pulling the very seed 

out that would cause it to prosper and to progress as a great nation, continue as a great nation in the future, if they do this. 

I really think they’re reading this situation wrong and are doing 

it in harm to themselves. I couldn’t agree with you more that this 

is not a zero-sum game whatsoever; this is in their own best interest. But we will see how they proceed. 

Gentlemen, thank you very much. And as I mentioned, thank 

you for your distinguished careers and commitments to the expansion of freedom and the service of mankind. 

We have a second panel of experts that I’ll call forward. 

Natalia Bourjaily is vice president for the Newly Independent 

States at the International Center for Not-for-Profit Law, ICNL. 

ICNL promotes the legal framework for the freedom of association 

in civil society worldwide. 

Allison Gill is the director of the Moscow Office for Human 

Rights Watch. Before taking her present position, she was a researcher at the Human Rights Watch office in Uzbekistan. Prior to 

her position in the former Soviet Union, Ms. Gill worked with the 

International Rescue Committee in Pakistan and Afghanistan. 

We’ll also hear from Andrew Kuchins. He’s returned to Russia to 

the Russia and Eurasian Program at the Carnegie Endowment for 

International Peace. After a 21⁄2 year stint as director of the Carnegie Moscow Center. 

Nicolai Petro is a professor of political science at the University 

of Rhode Island. He’s served as special assistant for policy in the 

Office of Soviet Union Affairs at the U.S. Department of State, and 

as temporary political attache at the U.S. Eembassy in Moscow. 

And Andrei Piontkovsky, doctor, visiting senior fellow at the 

Hudson Institute in Washington, DC, and executive director of the 

Strategic Studies Center in Moscow. He’s a weekly columnist at the 

Novaya Gazetta newspaper in Moscow, and his commentary can be 

heard regularly on BBC World Service and National Public Radio. 

This is quite a distinguished panel. I’m delighted to have all of 

you present and here with us. 

I am going to run the time clock, if I could, at a 5-minute basis. 

We will take all of your written testimony into the record, and 

what I would prefer each of you to do would be to summarize the 

points that you would like to have made. 
18 

It’s not a hard time on 5 minutes. We can go over some, but I 

would like to get mostly a summary so we can go through a depth 

of questions. And your full testimony will be included in the record. 

And let’s see, we will start—I believe we’ve got on the record, Ms. 

Bourjaily, that we would start with you, if that’s OK. 

NATALIA BOURJAILY, VICE PRESIDENT FOR NEWLY 

INDEPENDENT STATES, INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR 

NOT-FOR-PROFIT LAW 

Ms. BOURJAILY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I would like to thank the Commission for this opportunity. I 

would also like to thank the Commission, the State Department, 

the USAID, and our courageous Russian NGOs who have been 

working with us on NGO law. 

I understand that other panelists will provide with background 

on democratic developments in Russia. I have been asked to focus 

on NGO law. 

We’re currently in the process of finalizing the comprehensive 

analysis of the NGO law. But this afternoon, I would like to address only four key issues: its extensive reporting requirements for 

all NGOs; excessive governmental control over activities of NGOs; 

broad list of reasons for denial of registration of NGOs; and also, 

issues of monitoring and implementation. 

Let me take next 3 minutes to explain. 

The new law requires all NGOs to report on intended use of 

money, how you use the money, and also on beneficiaries. Then 

your reporting requirements are going to affect not only human 

rights groups but all NGOs, if you imagine abused women seeking 

assistance from NGOs knowing that these NGOs will have to provide their name to the government authorities. 

And yet, if NGOs fail to provide the required information, they 

can be terminated. 

To make matters worse, the government can prohibit funding of 

any activities for very broad reasons, for example, if they can see 

that activities are contradictory or a threat for Russia’s cultural 

heritage or unique character. 

Second, the government has overly broad authority to control 

NGOs. Using but one example, government officials can participate 

in any internal meeting or event conducted by an NGO. 

Mr. BROWNBACK. They can participate in any meeting under this 

law? 

Ms. BOURJAILY. They have the authority. They can decide in 

which meeting to participate, and they have the right to participate 

in any internal meeting or event. 

Suppose, for example, a Russian NGO wants to plan next advocacy campaign. The government can sit in the planning meeting. 

That’s making it virtually impossible to carry over the activities. 

And this is the definite intrusion of the government into their private space. 

The Council of Europe, in its opinion on the draft NGO law, has 

stated that government has only authority to review activities and 

to request documents when there’s valid reason exist to believe 

that the NGO in question does not comply with existing legislation. 
19 

And this recommendation clearly has not been met in the adopted 

law. 

Third, denials of registration. There’s a broad list of reasons 

which are not very well-defined. Some of these reasons are if the 

goals of established of the following NGO are contradictory to or 

create a threat to unique character, cultural heritage, and national 

interest of the Russian Federation. 

That’s the same argument I had presented earlier in regards to 

reporting requirements. And my colleagues and I are still in the 

process of trying to interpret, trying to define what these terms actually mean. 

The fourth and the last issue is monitoring and implementation. 

Some have asked: Why are we concerned about the law, even 

though it’s not yet been enforced? The first reason is that several 

provisions in this law are raising red flags. 

ICNL has been assisting with the NGO legislation in over 90 

countries, and several countries have used very similar provisions, 

misusing, abusing them to restrain civil society. 

That said, this will be my last point. I agree that it is important 

to monitor the implementation of the law. Some have told us that 

the law will not have negative effect on Russian civil society. 

Let’s see. Indeed, we call upon Russian Government to establish 

a joint nonpartisan body which would include all interested parties 

to monitor the implementation of the new law. And perhaps there 

will be no problems with it, and perhaps there will be problems. 

And then we will see how the Russian Government is going to deal 

with this problem. 

Thank you. 

Mr. BROWNBACK. Thank you very much. 

Ms. Gill? 

ALLISON GILL, DIRECTOR, MOSCOW OFFICE, 

HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH 

Ms. GILL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Russia’s NGO law follows moves in other countries in the region 

to restrict or tightly regulate civil society, which have in turn come 

in the wake of the colored revolutions throughout the region. 

Many now wonder what impact the Russian law will have in 

practice. I would like to look back, in a way, and offer a glimpse 

of how similar regulations have been put into practice in 

Uzbekistan, where regulations have been used to silence civil society. 

The law should also be set in a broader Russian context, so, time 

permitting, I would like to look at how the law is just the latest 

piece of the Kremlin’s agenda to dismantle or control all institutions that check or balance the government’s power. 

Although the new Russian NGO law does not come into effect 

until April, we don’t have to look far to see the possible implications of such restrictions on NGOs. 

I come to my work in our Moscow office after 2 years of working 

in Uzbekistan; I’m afraid my experience there is going to be all too 

relevant. Uzbekistan bears the dubious distinction of being at the 

vanguard of efforts to stifle civil society in the region. 
20 

To be sure, there are very important differences between 

Uzbekistan and Russia: their governments, their level of oppression, their civil societies. But the Uzbek experience offers us specific and relevant examples of how an NGO law that purports to 

merely regulate NGOs can, in fact, be used to punish and control 

them. 

Whereas the Kremlin’s moves to remove checks and balances to 

its power are more recent, in Uzbekistan the government has a 

long record of formal and informal censorship of the media, intimidating independent activists, restricting public demonstrations, and 

banning political parties that are not loyal to the government. 

The regulations in Uzbekistan were changed in broad terms in 

late 2003. And they granted the Ministry of Justice broad authority 

to make registration decisions, and they gave the ministry sole 

power to decide whether an organization’s activities correspond to 

the goals outlined in the organization’s own charter, which essentially gave the ministry an effective veto over activities and organizations that they find undesirable. 

Other regulations require international NGOs to receive advanced permission for all their activities from the ministry and, 

like the Russian law, allow ministry officials to attend all NGO 

events. 

In addition, the government imposed complicated regulations for 

banking and financial operations, and gave oversight of grants 

from international NGOs to local Uzbek partners to a secret government commission. 

Although the Uzbek Government made assurances that these 

regulations would not affect international NGO operations, the assurances were quickly proven empty. 

I’d like to highlight just a few examples of how administrative 

regulations that could appear benign on their face were used as a 

backbone of a government campaign to silence the NGO sector in 

Uzbekistan. And I should note at the outset that, as far as this 

campaign involves international as opposed to local NGOs, U.S. 

NGOs have been the main target so far of the Uzbek Government. 

The first test of the new Uzbek regulations occurred in March 

2004, several months after Georgia’s Rose Revolution. At that time, 

the Uzbek government refused to reregister the Open Society Institute for renting an office space without the proper zoning permits 

and other allegations, including damaging the country’s image in 

the international sphere. 

Since then, the government has conducted extensive, time-consuming audits of most major international organizations operating 

in the country. After the completion of each audit, the ministry 

issues findings of all violations of the laws and, if the government 

is unhappy with the organization’s efforts to correct the violations, 

it can sue in the courts for suspension or liquidation of the organization. 

The audits demand significant time and resources in order to 

prepare and respond adequately. They can drag on for months, 

leaving organizations unsure of their fate, complicating decisions 

about staffing and whether to invest further program resources in 

the country, and paralyzing the organization’s substantive work. 
21 

Although the regulations on their face appear to be benign administrative rules that should not affect NGOs’ primary work, their 

arbitrary punitive implementation has produced a stranglehold on 

civil society. 

Never mind that the government’s venue of choice, the Uzbek 

civil courts, have no jurisdiction over these disputes or that, in 

some cases, the government prepares its court case before even receiving a response from the organizations about any efforts to correct violations, in a system where checks and balances have been 

dismantled or indeed never existed, and in an atmosphere of clear 

government animosity toward civil society, the government wins 

every time. 

Just running through a few examples. In the past year in 

Uzbekistan, the government has liquidated Internews Network, a 

media support organization funded by the United States, for, 

among other reasons, failure to register changing its logo and have 

appropriate licenses for some of its programs. Two local staff of 

Internews were convicted of related criminal charges. 

On the basis of complaints from the Ministry of Justice, the 

Uzbek courts ordered the suspension of IREX, an educational exchange organization, and Freedom House, a human rights organization, for providing Internet services without a license and failure 

to receive permission from the Ministry of Justice before conducting internal meetings or trainings. 

Again, the Ministry of Justice has requested the Uzbek prosecutor’s office to open criminal investigations at staff who work at 

these organizations. 

The picture for local organizations is at once more simple and 

even more dire. The government just denies registrations to groups 

it finds threatening or forces registered groups to close. 

I would like to emphasize that, in Uzbekistan, the regulations for 

the most part read well on paper and thorough formal safeguards 

are in place: The Ministry of Justice must provide written explanations for its decisions within reasonable time periods; organizations are granted 30 days to correct violations after receiving warnings; and the ministry’s decisions to deny registration or take other 

action may be appealed in the courts. 

However, again, in a system of unchecked government power, 

these safeguards are rendered meaningless. 

I’ll end there. And the rest of my testimony’s in writing. 

Mr. BROWNBACK. Yes, thank you. And I appreciate those 

thoughts from your experience in Uzbekistan. 

Mr. Kuchins? 

ANDREW KUCHINS, RUSSIA AND EURASIA PROGRAM, SENIOR 

ASSOCIATE, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL 

PEACE 

Mr. KUCHINS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to address the Commission on this important topic today. 

As you mentioned, I’ve just returned from a 21⁄2 year stint in 

Moscow, where I was the director of the Carnegie Moscow Center, 

a leading and very pivotal NGO in Russia. My tenure in Moscow 

began with the Yukos affair, and it concluded with the battle over 

the recently signed legislation regulating NGOs in Russia. 
22 

Mr. BROWNBACK. I’m glad to get you out of there. 

Mr. KUCHINS. It feels good to be back in from the cold. My 

friends joke with me that, ‘‘Andy, you know, since you arrived in 

Moscow, you know, democracy and civil society, things haven’t been 

going very well.’’ [Laughter.] 

For the record, I accept the correlation, but I do not take any responsibility for causation. [Laughter.] 

For those of us concerned about civil society and democratic governance, there’s no question in my mind that the trend in the last 

few years has been in the wrong direction. And, unfortunately, I do 

not expect that to change in the near future. 

We now have a lot of data to help answer the famous question: 

Who is Mr. Putin? And while Mr. Putin continuously claims to support civil society and democracy, virtually all the evidence of the 

past 6 years speaks to the contrary. 

It’s true that he inherited at best a very weakly institutionalized 

system of democratic governance. But as weak and deformed as 

Russian democracy was during the Yeltsin period, there were competitive and pluralistic aspects to it that could have been nurtured 

and strengthened. 

Instead, President Putin has consistently and systematically 

eliminated competition among independent, contending political 

forces and centralized more and more political authority in the office of the presidential administration. If Mr. Putin does believe in 

democratic governance as he contends, he has a very odd way of 

expressing it, it seems to me. 

Now, supporters of Mr. Putin argue that many of the measures 

he has initiated in recent years are not undemocratic; in a number 

of cases, in and of themselves, that’s true. 

But what cannot be denied, in my view, is that the net result of 

these and other measures is that the hyper-presidential system 

consolidated during Mr. Putin’s presidency has nearly virtually 

eliminated all existing and potential independent centers of power 

or, as we like to say, checks and balances. 

The form of democracy is there, but the essential content of pluralism and competition are not. 

Why is the near-term outlook, in my view, bleak? I think the answer is pretty simple: Mr. Putin, as he has stated on a number of 

occasions, including last week’s lengthy press conference, believes 

that highly centralized political authority, something he once described as part of Russia’s DNA, is most appropriate for Russia’s 

current stage of social, economic and political development. Anything else, in his view, as well as that of his closest advisers, supposedly risk anarchy, even state collapse. 

With a constitutionally mandated transfer of power scheduled for 

2008, Mr. Putin and his team do not want to leave anything to 

chance. And the inability of the Kuchma administration to successfully manage the Ukrainian presidential election at the end of 2004 

in Ukraine, resulting the so-called Orange Revolution, deeply shook 

the Kremlin, which had invested tremendous political and financial 

resources into the election of its favored candidate, Mr. 

Yanukovych. 

This event further alerted the Kremlin leadership, already inclined to centralize and control as much as possible, to the danger 
23 

of allowing civil society, particularly organizations supported by 

foreign financing, to play a role in national politics. 

It was the view that foreign-supported NGOs that played a key 

role in rallying Yushchenko supporters and eventually overturning 

the presidential elections in Ukraine. This only strengthened the 

view of the Putin administration that it needed to further weaken 

civil society in Russia to ensure that nothing of this nature could 

happen in 2008. 

In my view, the chances of any colored revolution taking place 

in Russia in the upcoming electoral cycle are slim to none. But the 

prevailing mentality in the Kremlin is that nothing can be left to 

chance. That is the inspiration for the new legislation regulating 

NGOs that Mr. Putin signed last month. 

It’s true that the final legislation is a considerable improvement 

on the initial draft law, but the key is that what really matters is 

how it’s going to be implemented, as has already been discussed. 

And as with the selective application of law in the Yukos case, we 

can expect that the new NGO law will be very selectively applied 

to shut down NGOs considered against the interests of the Kremlin. 

The legislation will also likely push organizations to further selfcensor their statements and activities. 

So today we are face to face with a very negative trend for democracy and civil society in Russia, and this trend is accelerating 

precisely as Russia takes over the chair of the G–8 and soon the 

Council of Europe in May. This is a double irony. 

Membership criteria were bent in both institutions to let Russia 

in. The calculation was that, through membership, Russia could be 

socialized to take measures to strengthen its adherence to democratic values and practice and respect for human rights. 

At the risk of sounding like one of those old Sovietologist dogs 

that Mr. Putin referred to in his press conference last week, Russia 

simply does not meet the criteria, to the extent that such criteria 

exists for membership in the G–8. 

It’s obviously not a mature democracy, but rather an increasingly 

authoritarian state with only the trappings of democracy. Still, I do 

not advocate throwing Russia out of the G–8 or boycotting the St. 

Petersburg meeting. 

But for me, if the first draft of the NGO legislation had been 

passed, that would have been the final blow. Of course, I had rather sort of a personal interest there. 

I think Mr. Putin understood this risk, and he pulled back from 

the brink. But we should expect that the Kremlin will continue to 

test the limits as we approach the 2008 elections in Russia. 

The United States needs to clarify where the red lines are with 

Russia, and I admit that’s easier said than done. If you’ll allow me 

1 other minute, I might say a couple of things—— 

Mr. BROWNBACK. Please. 

Mr. KUCHINS [continuing]. About what the Russians refer as 

‘‘chto delat’’ what is to be done. 

There is clearly no magic bullet in our policy toolkit for the promotion of democracy, civil society, and human rights in Russia. 

And just as obviously, our leverage today with Russia is far less 

than the 1990s, when the Russian economy was weak. 
24 

Nevertheless, I think there are some things that we can do. 

When Russian democracy, civil society, and human rights are being 

attacked, this is clearly not the time to reduce U.S. Government, 

as well as private funding, for these goals. 

And I acknowledge that, although dependence on foreign funding 

is a real problem for Russian NGOs, and particularly human rights 

NGOs, the U.S. Government and major U.S. private foundations 

should quickly make a statement by significantly increasing their 

support for these essential organizations in 2006 and beyond. 

Second, I think we need to increase our support for a variety of 

exchange programs that strengthen the connectivity of our two societies. The most important area is in education, from high school 

to graduate programs. From the standpoint of democracy assistance, I think you get the greatest long-term benefit, with support 

from more Russian youth, to have the opportunity to live and study 

in the United States. 

Finally, a word about our public voice. This is clearly important. 

First, we must ensure, of course, that we keep our own democratic 

and human rights house in order, to ensure that we maintain our 

moral authority to speak on these issues. 

And, second, we must consistently apply the same standards to 

Russia as we do to other countries to ensure that we neither understate nor overstate the problem. 

Balancing public criticism by high-level U.S. Government officials with backchannel efforts to lobby the Russian Government 

will always present challenges. And while it’s important that the 

U.S. Government speak forthrightly at the highest levels about the 

deficiencies in Russian democracy where it sees them and policies 

toward civil society and human rights, this must be carefully calibrated in order to avoid the impression of piling on. 

A final comment, though, is that, given the importance of Russia 

for United States foreign policy interests, I think there’s no other 

country in the world, which if you looked at some of the key interests of the United States, has the potential to thwart or to promote 

those interests, I think we need to pay more attention to that. 

And one way of doing it is for a major policy address by a highlevel government official, preferably the president. Such a speech 

would force the U.S. policymaking apparatus to focus on the importance of the challenges Russia presents and to state as clearly as 

possible the essence of our goal. 

As an outside observer, I sense there’s some cognitive dissonance 

or tension within the U.S. Government between those concerned 

with the dangers of democratic backsliding and its implications for 

Russian foreign policy with those more inclined to emphasize how 

we advance our security and economic interests with Moscow. 

It’s incumbent upon us, I think, to synthesize these idealist and 

realist inclinations into a coherent policy strategy. Russia’s future 

remains too important for our near- and long-term interests to 

shirk such an effort, and it’s essential that our friends and colleagues in Russia understand this. 

Thank you very much. 

Mr. BROWNBACK. Thank you. 

Dr. Petro? 
25 

NICOLAI PETRO, PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, 

UNIVERSITY OF RHODE ISLAND 

Mr. PETRO. Mr. Chairman, distinguished Commissioners. My 

name is Nicolai Petro. I am professor of politics at the University 

of Rhode Island. During the past decade I have lived and worked 

in Russia, completing a book on democratic development and serving as civic affairs advisor to the mayor of Novgorod-the-Great. A 

decade before that, thanks to the Council on Foreign Relations, I 

had the privilege of serving in the State Department as special assistant for policy to the man who would later become our Ambassador to Moscow, Alexander Vershbow. 

I am honored to appear before you today, and will focus my remarks on the issue of democratic governance which has become 

such an apple of discord between Russia and the United States. 

You are all no doubt familiar with the view that President Putin 

is trying to destroy democracy in Russia, so I will get straight to 

my points. First, I question the accuracy of this view. Furthermore, 

I believe that its inaccuracy is leading to misjudgments about political trends inside Russia. Finally, I will mention a few areas where 

the United States and Russia could forge common ground on the 

issue of democratic governance. 

Russia’s record on democratic governance has been severely distorted in the mainstream press. Here is a simple reality check: 

Putin enjoys phenomenal popularity in a country where politicians 

get extremely low ratings. Why? Because under him real wages 

have risen 75 percent after inflation, poverty has been halved, and 

federal budget surpluses are running at 12 percent. It would be 

suspicious if Putin had anything less than a 70 percent approval 

rating. 

It is also said that his regime has turned back the clock on democracy. A March 2005 survey of attitudes toward democracy, however, shows that three times as many Russians feel that the country is more democratic today than it was under either Yeltsin or 

Gorbachev. The same percentage rate human rights conditions better under Putin than under Yeltsin. 

There is a troubling rift between Western and Russian perceptions of reality when it comes to democracy, and I suspect that the 

media plays a very large role in it. By focusing so much attention 

on Putin, it has forgotten about the rest of Russian society. The 

casual observer this gains the impression that the country is run 

entirely from the Kremlin; there is no independent media, the situation in Chechnya is deteriorating, the legal system is a joke, and 

civil society is under assault. 

Other charges are sometimes added, but addressing just these 

four should suffice to illustrate why Putin is credited by most Russians with improving human rights and democracy. 

The trend toward economic independence of the media has accelerated dramatically under Putin. Before coming to office just 10 

percent of local television stations were financially self-sufficient, 

that has risen to more than a third. Notably, this has occurred 

alongside annual growth rates in newspaper, journal and book production in Russia that exceed 10 percent. 

I draw your attention to these figures because they are so at 

odds with the general perception. Put another way: there is more 
26 

privately financed media in Russia under Putin than there has 

ever been in Russian history, both in absolute numbers and as a 

percentage of the whole. 

This is not magic. It is the power of capitalism—specifically ad- vertising—which has grown $2 billion in the last 2 years and is expected to increase 20 percent each year for the foreseeable future. 

Profit has done what no foreign assistance programs ever could— 

to create a wide variety of commercial programming and diversify 

the ownership of the Russian media. Today, among the 35 largest 

media holding companies on Russia only a handful are directly or 

indirectly managed by the state. This genie is long out of the bottle 

and the notion that the Kremlin could ever put it back, and restrict 

access to information, is simply too far fetched to be taken seriously. 

In 2005 dramatic changes have taken place in this tragically devastated region, renewing hope for peace and stability. 

First, more than seven thousand rebels have laid down their 

arms, many joining the pro-Moscow government to hunt down their 

former comrades. As a result, terrorist attacks within Chechnya 

have fallen four fold, and casualties among the Russian military 

have dwindled from 1,397 in 2000 to just 28 in 2005. Terrorist attacks and kidnappings have fallen at a similar rate over the past 

2 years, although sadly more than 1,800 cases remain unresolved. 

These are official Chechen government statistics; the human rights 

group ‘‘Memorial’’ gives somewhat higher numbers, but the trend 

they portray is exactly the same. 

Chechnya has become a much safer environment, and this has 

encouraged more than a quarter million refugees to return and 

open more than 30,000 new businesses. The State Bank of Russia 

has re-opened throughout the republic, as have the schools and 

universities. A significant portion of the municipal infrastructure of 

Grozny has been rebuilt and housing prices there have increased 

tenfold. 

The final piece in the Kremlin’s strategy for reintegrating 

Chechnya was the spectacularly uneventful election of a new, bicameral Chechen legislature. 355 candidates, including several 

former rebel commanders, competed for 58 seats. The stage is now 

set for an accord that will give Chechens extensive local autonomy 

within the Russian Federation, while providing a clear time table 

for federal reconstruction assistance. 

The region’s dramatic turnaround has been noted by European 

observers once sharply critical of Russia. Both Alvaro Gil Robles, 

Human Rights Commissioner for the Council of Europe, and Marc 

Franco, the head of the European Commission’s delegation to Russia, went out of their way this fall to applauded the Chechen government’s progress. Franco was even quoted in the Russian press 

as saying that ‘‘in the past the West had made some mistakes with 

respect to the Caucasus.’’ 

It is unfortunate that these efforts have received so little attention in the Western media, because it is very much in our national 

security interest to encourage Russia’s state-building efforts in the 

Caucasus. 

Historically Russians have had little faith in the judiciary. This 

too has begun to change under Putin. Thanks to a new Criminal 
27 

Code and Code of Criminal Procedures passed by parliament in 

2002, anyone arrested in Russia must be appear before a judge 

within 48 hours. Anyone accused must now be charged with a 

crime within 2 weeks, amended to 1 month for those suspected of 

having links to terrorism, or released. 

Two further signs of liberalization took place just this past 

month. First, the annual conference of chairs of regional courts proposed sweeping new reforms aimed at virtually eliminating closed 

judicial proceedings. Second, the State Duma passed in a first reading an important new initiative in defense of privacy rights. It establishes a federal agency to which a citizen can turn and demand 

an investigation to find out exactly what information the government is gathering about him, where this information is being kept, 

and what is in it. 

Putin’s expansion of the jury system nationwide has had a profound impact on a system that has traditionally favored the prosecution. Today juries acquit 20 percent of cases, and in 2005 Russia 

saw its highest acquittal rate ever. 

Under Chief Justice Valery Zorkin the Constitutional Court has 

set a more independent course than its predecessor, criticizing the 

December 2003 electoral law, striking down restrictions on media 

coverage of elections, and strengthening the rights of defendants 

and the role of juries.viii Last month Zorkin spoke out about the 

importance of ‘‘very solid, independent courts. If you do not have 

these sorts of courts then not only will citizens’ rights not be protected but also there will not be checks, or reins, if you like, on the 

executive.’’ In fact it has become commonplace for courts to hear 

cases on the constitutionality of state, local and municipal charters. 

I attribute the speed of some of these changes to the fact that 

the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg is the de facto 

final court of appeals for Russian civil cases. The dozen or so judgments against Russia rendered by this court in 2005 have received 

considerable publicity, with human rights violations getting the 

lion’s share of attention. It is worth noting, however, that 86 percent of the cases filed in Strasbourg seek to obtain financial compensation in suits that have already been won by plaintiffs in Russian courts. 

It should therefore come as no surprise that the number of citizens appealing to courts for redress of their grievances has shot up 

from 1 million under Yeltsin to 6 million under Putin, and that 

more than 70 percent of plaintiffs win the cases they bring against 

government authorities. In a word, the Russian legal system is fast 

becoming an important instrument in the defense of civil liberties. 

This brings me to the recently adopted amendments on non-governmental/non-commercial organizations (NGO/NCO), which have 

been described as extending government control, but were in fact 

designed to do just the opposite. 

Public activity requires no registration under Russian law. For 

specific types of organizations, however, such as trade unions, political parties, religious organizations and civic organizations, registration provides some tax benefits as well as limits on legal liability. The only category of public organizations for which these benefits had not yet been codified were noncommercial organizations. 

The amendments sought to bring these into conformity with exist-
28 

ing legislation by clarifying the state’s obligation toward noncommercial organizations. 

They stipulated, for example, that registration cannot be denied 

on the whim of local officials, but only if an organization’s statutes 

contradicted Russia’s constitution or laws, or if the organization 

was suspected of fraudulent or deceptive behavior (namely money 

laundering). Registration could be denied if documentation was 

missing or false, or if another organization claimed the same name, 

but could not be denied for any other reason that local authorities 

might deem ‘‘convenient.’’ Absent one of these specific reasons, it 

had to be granted within 30 days. 

The proposal strictly limited bureaucratic review of NCO activities to no more than once a year, and stipulated that any administrative actions had to be done under court supervision. The much 

touted issue of the closing of foreign organizations was clearly a red 

herring, since nothing in the proposed legislation gave bureaucrats 

the right to do this. 

As anyone who has read the Duma debates on this law knows, 

its authors, both prominent liberals, put these safeguards in place 

precisely to deprive local bureaucrats of any pretext for denying 

registration. They were able to convince a majority of their colleagues but not, apparently, many in the Western media. A public 

outcry ensued among foreign NGO supporters and several amendments were introduced, including one that allows new foreign 

NCOs to be denied registration if its goals ‘‘threaten the sovereignty, political independence, territorial inviolability, national 

unity and sovereignty, cultural heritage or national interests of the 

Russian Federation.’’ 

The initial version of the bill, the one that had provoked so much 

outcry, contained no such provision. It was added at the last 

minute, in reaction to Western criticisms of the law, an example of 

how ill-conceived and ill-informed human rights pressure can backfire. 

My conclusion overall conclusion from this review is that, while 

many problems still exist, the Russian political system is struggling to address them in a democratic manner. The political process 

works, and because it works we shouldn’t be treating it as if it 

were broken. 

Many Western observers seem honestly not to know the degree 

to which Russians are already using democratic institutions and 

debating issues in a variety of public arenas, including more than 

two dozen political debate programs that air every week on national television. Instead they attribute Putin’s popularity to the 

flummoxing of the ignorant masses by a state bent on suppressing 

dissent. This has led many in the West to see any strengthening 

of the Russian state as a bad thing. 

But every survey shows that this is not what Russians think. 

Having seen their life savings wiped out and the state abandon all 

pretence of caring for the poor and elderly, they now demand that 

it take more responsibility. Because they lack faith in Russia’s 

democratic institutions, Putin’s critics misperceive the driving force 

in Russian politics today: Putin isn’t forcing Russians into the arms 

of the state; rather, it is the people who are demanding that the 

state do more for them and become more accountable. 
29 

If I’m right, then it is not hard to understand why RussianAmerican relations have deteriorated under Putin. Most Americans 

instinctively view the growth of any state with some apprehension, 

while most Russians today view the return of the state with relief. 

This rift in perceptions is dangerous because, being rooted in abstract mental constructs, it is so easily taken to extremes, as when 

American pundits equate Putin with Stalin or Mussolini; or their 

Russian counterparts suggest that the West intentionally set out to 

impoverish Russia in the 1990s. After all, they say, how could such 

smart people ‘‘inadvertently’’ propose reforms that pushed forty 

percent of the population into poverty. 

In conclusion, let me suggest a few areas where we might find 

some common ground with Russia on the issue of democracy and 

civil society. 

First, let’s not equate the destruction of state institutions with 

greater freedom. The literature on civil society unequivocally shows 

that stable and respected state institutions are vital to the development of civil society. Analysts who argue that, by strengthening the 

state Putin ipso facto diminishes freedom, pit democracy against 

good government, a choice that Russian voters have always rejected. We can defuse extremist critiques of the West inside Russia 

by supporting the same model of civil society in Russia that one 

finds throughout Europe. Of course, one has to first acknowledge 

the good faith efforts of the Russian Government in this regard. 

Second, within Russia civic organizations need to assert themselves as truly independent actors. It is not healthy for Russian democracy that so many civic organizations subsist on foreign grants. 

By definition this makes them susceptible to foreign influence. 

Let’s get rid of this suspicion by encouraging Russian NGOs to 

wean themselves off foreign subsidies and orient themselves toward clearly defined domestic constituencies. A November 2005 

poll reveals the extent of the problem: only 13 percent of Russians 

know what an NGO is, and just 3% have personally encountered 

examples of NGO activity. Hard to develop much public support 

that way. Shifting from foreign to domestic financial support is the 

clearly way to go, and I applaud the recently passed NGO legislation precisely because it pushes civic organizations in this direction. 

Supporters of Russian democracy should also encourage Russian 

NGOs to think strategically about what role they intend to play in 

Russian society—eternal gadfly? Constructive critic? Supportive opposition? Those that wish to become authoritative voices in their 

own country would do well to take full advantage of institutions 

like the Social Chamber that provide them with a public forum. 

Finally, a change in the tone of our discourse could only help. No 

light is shed when a former CIA director remarks that ‘‘Russia, 

under Putin, is either already a fascist state, or close to becoming 

one,’’ or when a distinguished U.S. Senator chastises the U.S. Deputy Secretary of State saying: ‘‘You’re being silent on Russia. 

They’re bad guys.’’ 

A far more helpful approach would be to defer to the institutions 

of Russian democracy and to the wisdom of the Russian people, imperfect as they may be. Personally, I would limit my criticisms to 

preserving the established rules of the game, which serve political 
30 

competitiveness and the democratic transition of power. I have 

faith that the Russian people will do the rest. 

What will happen ultimately when, in the not too distant future, 

a strong Russian state confronts an indigenously well funded civil 

society? Nothing much; just everyday politics. I am convinced that 

Russia is far enough along politically that this outcome is a foregone conclusion. The only question in my mind is whether Western 

political leaders will be wise enough to let it emerge on its own, 

or will delay it by trying to shape its development. 

Thank you for your kind attention. 

Mr. BROWNBACK. Thank you very much, as well. 

Mr. Piontkovsky, please? 

ANDREI PIONTKOVSKY, SENIOR VISITING FELLOW, 

HUDSON INSTITUTE 

Mr. PIONTKOVSKY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Most of the statistics presented just now by my esteemed colleague are correct, but there is an old saying that there are lies, 

outrageous lies, and statistics. 

I’ll comment only on the one remark stating that only a handful 

of media institutions are controlled by state. Yes, only handful. But 

this handful is three national state TV channels which are the only 

source of information for 90 percent of the Russian citizens and on 

which we’ll never, never hear any criticism of Mr. Putin. 

But I would like to devote the very limited time I have for very 

important question you, Mr. Chairman, asked Assistant Secretary 

Daniel Fried. Who (Russians, or rather Russian political elites) are 

indulging most in anti-Western and anti-American perceptions and 

sentiments. 

It’s a very important question for the future of our relationship. 

The serious Russian security experts are firmly convinced that, in 

this very dangerous 21st century, the basic strategic geopolitical interests of Russia coincide, rather than contradict each other, 

whether we talk about the challenges of Islamic radicalism or a rising China 

That’s why I am more troubled, not by the question of whether 

our regional governers elected or appointed by Mr. Putin, but this 

growing anti-American and anti-Western tendencies in our foreign 

policy rhetoric and sometimes in our foreign policy actions. 

Until recently, all opinion polls demonstrated that as in many 

other countries, these anti-American sentiments are more characteristic for high echelons of political elite, those people who 

areeal estate in the West, send their children to study at American 

universities, their wives to give birth in American clinics, and have 

their accounts in American banks. 

But approximately from late 2004, the massive indoctrination by 

these ‘‘handful’’ of media institution of perceptions of West generally and America in particular as a enemy resulted in these feelings penetration widely and deeply into Russian public consciousness and unconsciousness. 

It’s deplorable that this campaign was unleashed by famous 

statements of Mr. Putin in his address to the nation after the 

Beslan tragedy. There is a huge gap between Putin of 2001, who 

appeared on TV on 9.11 and said, ‘‘Americans, we are with you,’’ 
31 

and Putin on TV screens in September 2004 who said, I quote literally, because it’s very important ‘‘War is declared on us. In this 

war Islamic terrorists are just instruments in the hands of more 

dangerous, more powerful, more traditional enemies of Russia who 

still perceive nuclear Russia as a threat and try to weaken and dismantle it.’’ 

The worst thing of all is that Putin sincerely believes in this rubbish, that it’s not just rhetoric for internal political consumption. 

And this is a very serious problem for our relationship. 

As all of the panelists, I’m strongly against canceling of G–8 

meeting in Petersburg, especially because I think the potential of 

this institution is not used enough for raising very frank questions. 

And may I finish with one suggestion for President Bush as a 

member of this exclusive G–8 club. He should have asked this 

question long ago but it‘s not yet too late—‘‘Volodya, do you really 

believe that I’m sending terrorists to kill your children? If this is 

misunderstanding, please explain it to your people and stop your 

TV spin doctors propagating this outrageous lies about America 

standing behind the Islamic terrorists attacking Russia. But if you 

do believe in it, well in this case what are we doing together here 

and at our other summits. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. BROWNBACK. Thank you. 

And I want to thank all the panelists for the thoughtful comments that you put forward here. Russia’s central for us, the 

OSCE, because of what it does is it sends a signal to a lot of the— 

it sends a signal to the rest of the OSCE countries of what you can 

get away with or what you can’t get away with. 

And so what happens there we find will have iterations in various countries throughout the region, and so it’s very important 

that we shine a spotlight on it. 

Mr. Kuchins, you most recently came back from—or maybe (inaudible) region, but you were there for a couple of years. It seems 

like we’ve been on a steady deterioration line for the past couple 

of years, and I’ve been puzzled. 

Do the Russian people, do they support this? Dr. Petro, I would 

gather, would say, yes, that they do. And yet I’m putting it in the 

framework of if this happens here, if you’ve got a more centralized 

media, if you’ve got less freedoms that are taking place, if you see 

less organizations that most of the people here would say, ‘‘Now, 

wait a minute. This is not going the right direction, and I don’t 

support the government doing this.’’ 

Are we not seeing that take place in Russia? Are the people saying that and we don’t hear it? What’s been the reaction of the people? 

Mr. KUCHINS. It’s a perplexing paradox of Russia. As Dr. Petro 

suggested, Mr. Putin is popular. He’s genuinely popular. And there 

are understandable reasons for why he’s popular. 

Since he’s been president, the Russian economy has been growing 

robustly. His image as a leader is one that garners respect in the 

world. Russia is clearly viewed to be on the rise. And there are 

other reasons for that. 

The Russian people, we have to keep in mind, you know, what 

they experienced in the last 15 years or so: the collapse of the So-
32 

viet Union; your status being diminished from that of a superpower 

to initially a state that is disdained in the world; power plummeting very, very quickly; state authority over many institutions 

collapsing. 

And at the same—and this is at the precise time when Russia 

begins its experiment with democracy. So I’m afraid that, in the 

minds of a lot of the Russian people, the democracy has been associated with anarchy, state collapse, humiliation of the Russian people, et cetera. That’s a very unfortunate legacy that we have to deal 

with. 

There’s a major study at the University of Michigan called—it’s 

a study on world value systems. And Russians come out more or 

less at the median, the global median in their support of democracy. 

So I don’t think that the Russian people are fundamentally not 

supportive of democracy, but I think that it’s not such a high priority right now for the Russian people. 

Mr. BROWNBACK. And the hierarchical needs? 

Mr. KUCHINS. The hierarchical needs. There’s economic recovery. 

There’s building wealth. There’s getting rich. And at least for the 

time being, it seems to me that the Russian people are ready to 

trade off, to some extent, a truncation of political liberties and the 

organizational liberties—— 

Mr. BROWNBACK. If that’s what it takes to grow the economy? 

Mr. KUCHINS. To grow the economy and as long as their personal 

liberties are maintained. I think it’s very true that Russia today is 

freer probably than at any time it has been in its history, from the 

standpoint of individual freedoms, people’s freedom to start businesses, to make wealth, to travel, et cetera. That’s the priority 

right now. 

Now, the question is, for me, at one time do these political liberties, which have been shrunken—I don’t think you can make 

any—there’s not like there’s any argument there—at one point does 

that possibly, you know, come into conflict with individual liberties? 

The other thing that gives me hope, somewhat, for the future— 

and, again, I’m not very optimistic in the near term for Russian democracy, and it’s related to this point—that is that the middle class 

is growing. It’s been growing steadily. Incomes are growing. 

And I think, in the longer term, a larger middle class that has 

investments in property, that wants to defend those investments in 

property, that’s where you’re going to see, I think, more of the demand for less corrupt, more transparent, more effective state institutions. 

There have been some improvements in the legal system, as Dr. 

Petro suggested. But the demand has to come from below, and so 

far it’s not really there. And unfortunately my disappointment with 

Mr. Putin, especially in the last couple of years, is that his administration has not been really doing that much, in my view, to encourage that. And I’ll stop there. 

Mr. PETRO. Mr. Chairman? 

Mr. BROWNBACK. Dr. Petro? 

Mr. PETRO [Off-mike]. I agree with much of what Dr. Kuchins 

said. But I think one of the sources of misunderstanding [off-mike] 
33 

is over the role that the state plays in promoting stability, including democratic stability. 

And democracy in the abstract is something we can philosophize 

about. But democratic stability is filtered through the institutions 

of the state, which means it has to have parameters, it has to have 

definition. 

And I think that there is more faith in the institutions of the 

state than we commonly give—Russians have more faith in the institutions or that they are developing that faith than we have, 

frankly, than we have faith in Russian Government institutions. 

And I think that’s a fundamental divide. 

Mr. BROWNBACK. Mr. Petro, I want to ask—a statement was 

made that 90 percent of the media that the people receive is run 

by the state. Is that correct? 

Mr. PETRO. No. It refers to national television programming. But 

if you take into account all the sources of information that an individual has at their disposal, which I assume when we’re speaking 

about media it would have to include television, radio, the press 

that one could get, the Internet, and—well, those are the main 

sources—the availability of information is, well, certainly for people 

in big cities, limitless. 

Television, however, is basically state television on the three 

major national channels, not regional channels, which differ from 

region to region. In some regions, like my region, the region I’m 

most familiar with, in Novgorod (ph), there are five local regional 

channels. In Yekaterinburg, the third-largest city, there are 25 regional channels. So it differs and depends. 

Mr. BROWNBACK. But CBS, NBC, ABC, and FOX, the equivalents 

would be run by the state, the national network media? Is that correct? 

Mr. PETRO. Yes. Well, when you say ‘‘run,’’ there’s a corporation 

that is part of the management process. I don’t get the sense—and 

perhaps others can correct me—that there is that kind of direct— 

there’s no state agency that runs, except for RTR. 

But there is essentially a management structure and a corporate 

body of shareholders that run the different television programming, 

television companies. 

Mr. BROWNBACK. Mister—— 

Mr. PIONTKOVSKY. About managing (inaudible) the dismantling 

of NTV station was a very good lesson for most TV journalists, and 

self-censorship in these three main channel is working more efficiently than any official censorship now. 

Mr. BROWNBACK. That’s what it strikes me as taking place. 

Ms. Bourjaily, I want to—and I want to also—Ms. Gill, your experience is instructive, as well. You are concerned about the nature 

of the law that has passed on NGOs. Have you seen NGOs operate 

differently now since the passage of the law, in anticipation of its 

enforcement, in anticipation of what may follow? 

Ms. BOURJAILY. No, I do not. The only difference I see, and that 

basically throughout the sector, the NGO sector in Russia, that 

they are (inaudible) they are meeting, they are debating on what 

appropriate or how much information they will be willing to disclose to the government. 

And that’s the major difference. The law is not in effect yet. 
34 

Mr. BROWNBACK. So they are debating what they’re going to have 

to do, in anticipation of this, but the enforcement provisions 

haven’t taken place yet? 

Ms. BOURJAILY. Yes. And also, quite a few groups are very much 

concerned about the implementation. And I do know that there are 

quite specific discussions on the ground on how to set up some body 

which is going to monitor the implementation of the law. 

Mr. BROWNBACK. I have to tell you, when I would hear about 

this, and read about it, and look at it, and experience in the region, 

this really struck me as a regime attempting to preserve itself. And 

the way to do this is to hold fair elections but ahead of time clear 

the playing field off, so it all looks good, clean and fair when we 

have the actual vote taking place, but ahead of time—you know, 

I’m going to tie your legs together, I’m going to tie your arms together, and then we’ll have race, that it’s setting that up. 

And it’s a much more sophisticated technique to be able to say, 

‘‘I’ve got a democracy,’’ but this was not a fair operation in moving 

it forward. I mean, that’s what it struck me as at the time when 

I read about it. 

And it didn’t puzzle me, because you can kind of see, well, you 

know, generally politicians are into self-preservation, and groups 

are, as well. Being a politician, I understand self-preservation, but 

it’s not good for a system, it’s not good for a country, and it’s not 

good for competition taking place. 

Am I seeing the situation wrong? 

Ms. BOURJAILY. Mr. Chairman, I agree with you. As I mentioned 

in my presentation, there are quite a few provisions in the new law 

which raise red flags. And the same or very similar provisions have 

been misused and abused by other countries. 

So, again, we’ll only see, and the best way to reevaluate or evaluate the situation is based on the facts on how the law will actually 

be implemented. But there’s a threat, and I think that I share your 

understanding of the situation. 

Mr. BROWNBACK. Mr. Kuchins, you mentioned ways we should 

progress and proceed forward. All of you, I gather, suggest we don’t 

boycott the G–8 meeting, that that’s not the way to go in this process, unless somebody here disagrees with that. 

Does anybody else have specific suggestions to the U.S. Government, to the Congress of what we should be doing in sending a 

clear message to Russia about dismay on what’s taking place and 

the removal and the limitations of NGOs? 

Ms. Gill, did you have— 

Ms. GILL. I would highlight the fact that, because the law is not 

yet in force, and because some of the specific provisions of the law 

will only be later clarified when implementing regulations are 

passed, that the time to act is absolutely now, perhaps to be able 

to head off some of the worst-case scenarios. 

The United States needs to have a coordinated strategy, I would 

suggest, with its European allies. I think it’s pretty clear that, in 

some ways, this law is directed against U.S. influence and investment in monies in NGOs. So this is not a time to let Russia divide 

its allies. 

The United States and Europe should speak with one voice. They 

should speak loudly and clearly to President Putin that this issue 
35 

will not go away, this issue will not fall from the agenda. I think 

he perhaps hopes that, after an initial outcry, the law will be allowed to take sort of its effects under the radar. 

And I would emphasize what my colleague has pointed out as 

some of the law’s most pernicious provisions, and most of the work 

should be geared toward repealing those provisions or softening 

them, particularly the reporting provisions. 

Mr. BROWNBACK. OK. I thank you all very much. If you have 

other thoughts you’d like for us to consider or to put forward, I’d 

appreciate that a great deal. And I appreciate your expertise, appreciate your thoughts on this. 

And I appreciate your commitment to democracy building and 

civil society. It is key. It is critical. And what happens in Russia 

will be a model for much of the rest of the world, whether good or 

evil. We need it to progress in the right direction. 

Thank you very much. The hearing’s adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:56 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 
36 

A P P E N D I C E S 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ALLISON GILL, DIRECTOR, 

MOSCOW OFFICE, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH 

INTRODUCTION

On January 10 this year, President Putin signed into law new 

regulations on NGOs that increase government oversight of the 

registration, financing and activities of NGOs, with particularly onerous requirements for foreign NGOs. 

Russia’s NGO law follows moves in other countries in the region 

to restrict or more tightly regulate civil society, which in turn have 

come in the wake of the ‘colored revolutions’ in the region. Many 

now wonder what impact the Russian law will have in practice. I 

would like to first offer a glimpse of how similar regulations have 

been put into practice in one of these countries, Uzbekistan, where 

it was used to silence civil society. The law also should be set in 

the broader Russian context, so I will then look at the how the law 

is the latest piece of the Kremlin’s agenda to dismantle or control 

all institutions that check or balance the government’s power. 

THE FUTURE? 

Although the new Russian NGO law does not come into effect 

until April 10, we don’t have to look far to see the possible implications of such restrictions on NGOs. I come to Human Rights 

Watch’s Moscow office after two years in Uzbekistan where I fear 

my experience will be all too relevant to the situation now developing for Russia’s civil society. Uzbekistan bears the dubious distinction of being at the vanguard of efforts to stifle civil society in 

the region. 

To be sure, there are important differences between Uzbekistan 

and Russia, their governments, the level of repression, their civil 

societies. But the Uzbek experience offers us specific and relevant 

examples of how an NGO law that purports to merely regulate 

NGOs is in fact used to punish and control them. Whereas the 

Kremlin’s moves to remove checks and balances to its power are 

rather recent, in Uzbekistan, the government has a long record of 

formal and informal censorship of the media, intimidating independent civil society activists, severely restricting public demonstrations, and banning political parties that are not loyal to the 

government. 

Over the past two years, the environment for Uzbekistan’s fledgling civil society has grown even more hostile: the government 

tightened restrictions on local and international nongovernmental 

organizations, constantly harasses and arbitrarily detains human 

rights defenders and breaks up peaceful demonstrations. It has 

been particularly harsh with organizations whose work is designed 

to promote government transparency and accountability, such as 

local human rights organizations and international organizations 

such as the International Crisis Group and the Institute for War 

and Peace Reporting, whose staff were denied visas or accreditation 

necessary to work in Uzbekistan. 
37 

In late 2003, the government announced sweeping changes to the 

system of registration and oversight of international NGOs operating in Uzbekistan. The new regulations shifted authority over 

international NGOs from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which 

had performed a ministerial, administrative function, to the Ministry of Justice (MOJ). The regulations granted the MOJ broad authority to make registration decisions and gave the Ministry sole 

power to decide whether an organization’s activities correspond to 

the goals outlined in the organization’s own charter, giving the 

Ministry an effective veto over activities it finds undesirable. 

Other regulations require international NGOs to receive advance 

permission for all their activities from the Ministry and allow Ministry officials to attend all events. In addition, the government imposed complicated regulations for banking and financial operations 

and gave oversight of grants from international NGOs to local partners to a closed, or what is in effect secret government commission. 

The Uzbek government made assurances that these regulations 

would not affect INGO operations but instead were designed to 

help Uzbekistan comply with its international obligations to combat money laundering and the financing of terrorist organizations. 

These assurances were proven empty. I will highlight just a few examples of how administrative regulations that could appear benign 

on their face were used as the backbone of a government campaign 

to silence the NGO sector in Uzbekistan. 

The first test after the new regulations came into effect happened in March 2004, several months after the Rose Revolution. At 

that time the Uzbek government refused to re-register the Open 

Society Institute for, among other things, renting office in a space 

without the proper zoning permits and damaging the country’s 

image. Since then, the government has conducted extensive, timeconsuming audits of most major international organizations operating in the country. After the completion of each audit, the MOJ 

issues findings of all violations of the laws and, if the government 

is unhappy with the organization’s efforts to correct the violations, 

it can sue for suspension or liquidation of the organization. The audits demand significant time and resources in order to prepare and 

respond adequately; they can also drag on for months, leaving organizations unsure of their fate, complicating decisions about staffing 

and whether to invest further program resources; and paralyzing 

the organization’s substantive work. 

Although the regulations, on their face, appear to be benign administrative rules that should not affect NGOs’ substantive work, 

their arbitrary, punitive implementation has produced a stranglehold on civil society. Never mind that the government’s venue of 

choice, the civil court, has no jurisdiction over these disputes or 

that in some cases the government prepares its court case before 

receiving a response from the organization about its efforts to correct any violations. In a system where checks and balances have 

been dismantled or indeed never existed and in an atmosphere of 

clear government animosity toward civil society, the government 

wins every time. 

In the past year in Uzbekistan, the government liquidated 

Internews Network, a media support organization for, among other 

reasons, failure to have the appropriate licenses for some of its pro-
38 

grams and a failure to register a change in its logo. Two local staff 

members were also convicted of related criminal charges. On the 

basis of MOJ complaints Uzbek courts also ordered the suspension 

of IREX, an educational exchange organization and Freedom 

House, a human rights organization, for providing internet services 

without a license and failure to receive permission from the MOJ 

for conducting meetings and trainings. The MOJ requested the 

prosecutor’s office to open criminal investigations against staff at 

both these organizations. 

Where the MOJ cannot or chooses not to use the audit procedures to stop a foreign NGO’s activities, they can also deny visas 

and work accreditation to international staff, as has happened with 

IRI, ACCELS and the Eurasia Foundation. 

The picture for local organizations is at once more simple and 

even more dire. The government denies registration to groups it 

finds threatening, such as all but two human rights organizations, 

or forces registered groups to close. Local groups are also subject 

to requirements of receiving permission from the MOJ before conducting any activities, getting approval for participant lists and to 

intrusive audits. 

I would like to emphasize that in Uzbekistan, the regulations for 

the most part read well on paper and thorough formal safeguards 

are in place: the MOJ must provide written explanations for its decisions within reasonable time periods; organizations are granted 

30 days to correct violations after receiving warnings and the Ministry’s decisions to deny registration or take other action against an 

organization may be appealed in the courts. However, in a system 

of unchecked government power, these safeguards are rendered 

meaningless. 

In this atmosphere, local staff are frightened and become 

blacklisted after working with certain organizations. NGOs expend 

enormous time and resources simply to comply with the government’s reporting requirements, audits and allegations of violations, 

preventing them from conducting their substantive work. This robs 

NGOs of their crucial function of promoting government transparency and accountability and reduces the civil society sector to 

simply fighting to survive. 

THE RUSSIAN CONTEXT

While the situation in Russia is perhaps not as dire as that in 

Uzbekistan, the trend in Russia is profoundly negative. Many have 

viewed the new NGO law as a measure to prevent a ‘colored revolution’ in 2008. That may be the case, but it is important to bear 

in mind that the law’s antecedents predate the colored revolutions. 

The law represents only the latest assault on civil society in Russia. Since coming to power in 2000, President Putin has pursued 

a policy of a gradual but systematic crackdown to remove checks 

and balances on government’s power. Before Putin, Russia had a 

messy, flawed democracy to be sure, but a vibrant civil society had 

emerged and Russia had made real achievements in the areas of 

civic freedoms and human rights. The Putin government has systematically undermined all checks and balances on government 

power, and these achievements are now lost. 
39 

As soon as Putin took office, the government aggressively sought 

to assert control over the media. By 2003, Putin had achieved effective government control over all television and radio stations with 

a national reach, severely limiting critical debate in the country. 

Putin has also reigned in regional leaders, first appointing ‘‘super 

governors’’ creating new super administrative districts led by presidential appointees to sidestep regional governors and then backing 

legislation to strip governors of their seats in the Federation Council of parliament. After the Beslan massacre, direct elections of governors were scrapped altogether, giving Putin the power to nominate candidates. 

Putin has also worked to create a compliant Duma and to undermine the independence of the judiciary. 

It is in this context of government control over most aspects civil 

society and political life that we must view the new law on NGOs. 

Against this background, NGOs appear to be the latest target in 

the government’s efforts to remove checks and balances on its 

power. 

NGOs working on human rights issues, particularly the war in 

Chechnya, have long faced official interference that often keeps 

them from doing their substantive work. Such interference has only 

increased over the last year. These groups, the activists who lead 

them, and the people they work with increasingly face administrative and judicial harassment, and, in the most severe cases, persecution, threats, and physical attacks. 

The working environment for other NGOs has continued to deteriorate significantly. Government officials at both the federal and 

regional level stepped up their verbal attacks on these groups. In 

a few cases, officials used legislation that prohibits extremism to 

shut down NGOs while in others they selectively used registration 

procedures or audits to harass groups of which they disapproved. 

I will highlight two especially troubling aspect of the new law. 

First, the law requires all NGOs to submit reports on their activities to the government registration agency, but the specifics of 

this requirement will be defined only later in the implementing 

regulations. It is not as of yet clear whether NGOs will be required 

to report on their planned activities or only those they have already 

conducted or the degree of detail that will be required. 

Next, the new law has particularly onerous implications for 

international NGOs. It requires offices of foreign NGOs to inform 

the government registration office about their projects for the upcoming year, and about the money allotted for every specific 

project. Russian government officials will now have an unprecedented level of discretion in deciding what projects, or even parts 

of NGO projects, comply with Russia’s national interests, as required by the law. Officials from the registration office could prohibit foreign NGOs from implementing projects unless they have 

‘‘the aim of defending the constitutional system, morals, public 

health, rights and lawful interest of other people, guaranteeing defense capacity and security of the state.’’ If a foreign NGO implements a banned project, the registration office could close its offices 

in Russia. 

Defenders of the law argue that it is a series of benign administrative regulations and point to. However, when viewed in context, 
40 

the law gives rise to concern that the law restricts the abilities of 

NGOs to operate freely and can be implemented arbitrarily to silence NGOs and civil society activities the government finds undesirable. 

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

Recent developments in Russia highlight the worsening atmosphere for NGOs and perhaps give the flavor of the climate in which 

the new NGO law will be implemented. The law itself together 

with Putin’s statements questioning whose interests are served by 

NGOs, send a clear message to the security forces and other government agencies that NGOs should be regarded with suspicion 

rather than protected. 

At the end of January, the Russian Ministry of Justice (MOJ) 

filed a lawsuit to liquidate the Russian Research Center on Human 

Rights, an umbrella organization of twelve Russian human rights 

groups, including the Moscow Helsinki Group and the Union of Soldiers Mothers Committees. The MOJ claims that the group had 

failed to file reports of its activities for the past five years, a claim 

disputed by the group. 

Last week, a court in Nizhni Novgorod convicted Dmitrievskii 

Stanislav Dmitrievsky, executive director of the Russian-Chechen 

Friendship Society and editor of the organization’s newspaper on 

charges of ‘‘inciting racial hatred,’’ and gave him a two-year suspended sentence. The charges stem from the publication in the organization’s of two statements by Chechen rebel leaders Aslan 

Maskhadov calling for a negotiated end to the conflict and Akhmed 

Zakaev who called on Russian voters not to re-elect President 

Putin. 

The Russian-Chechen Friendship Society, which raises awareness about human rights abuses in Chechnya and helps victims 

seek justice, had previously faced pressure last year, when the 

Nizhny Novgorod department of justice tried unsuccessfully to liquidate it. The Nizhny Novgorod tax inspectorate has claimed that 

the organization owed one million rubles (about U.S. $35,000) in 

back taxes on a grant, which the inspectorate designated as ‘‘profit.’’ The organization is challenging the charges. 
41 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ANDREW KUCHINS, RUSSIA 

AND EURASIA PROGRAM, SENIOR ASSOCIATE, CARNEGIE 

ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE 

I first want to thank Mr. Chairman and the esteemed members 

of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe for the 

opportunity to discuss with you today the important topic of 

‘‘Human Rights, Civil Society, and Democratic Governance in Russia.’’—As you may know, I have just returned from a two and a 

half year stint in Moscow as the director of the Carnegie Moscow 

Center. My tenure in Moscow began with the Yukos affair and concluded with the battle over the recently signed legislation regulating NGOs in Russia. Friends often joked with me that upon my 

arrival in Moscow, things really went downhill for Russian democracy and civil society. Just for the record, I accept the correlation, 

not the causation! For those concerned in particular about civil society and democratic governance, there is no question in my mind 

that the trend in the last few years has been in the wrong direction, and unfortunately, I do not expect that to change in the near 

future. 

While Russia is no longer the ‘‘evil empire’’ as Ronald Reagan famously described the Soviet Union, Winston Churchill’s description 

of the country as a ‘‘riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma’’ 

remain relevant. Russian political culture is deliberately Byzantine; we foreigners are not supposed to understand what is being 

decided in the Kremlin and why. In fact, even for Russian citizens 

outside the Kremlin walls these deliberations are mysterious. Recall that Russia is a massive country with tremendous power highly concentrated in the capital of Moscow, and the center of Moscow 

is a medieval fortress. That fact alone speaks volumes about the 

non-transparent and centralized nature of Russian governance 

from the Tsars, to the Soviets, to the current day. 

MR. PUTIN AND RUSSIAN DEMOCRACY: NOT A PRETTY PICTURE

We now have a lot of data to help us answer the famous question, ‘‘Who is Mr. Putin?’’ While Mr. Putin continuously claims to 

support civil society and democracy, virtually all the evidence of 

the past six years speaks to the contrary. It is true that he inherited at best a very weakly institutionalized system of democratic 

governance in Moscow. But as weak and deformed as Russian democracy was during the Yeltsin period, there were competitive and 

pluralistic aspects to it that could have been nurtured and 

strengthened. Instead, President Putin has consistently and systematically eliminated competition among independent contending 

political forces and centralized, at least on paper, more and more 

political authority in the office of the Presidential administration. 

If Mr. Putin does believe in democratic governance as he contends, 

he has an odd way of expressing it. 

This is not a new story, but given our topic today, it is worth repeating, as it has great bearing on the potential in the near-term 

for Russian democracy. The legislative branch of government which 

served in the 1990s as a forum, albeit imperfect, for deliberation, 

debate, and development of law is now virtually subordinate to 

Presidential fiat. Federation Council members are appointed rather 
42 

than elected. The new fully proportional representative system in 

the Duma, combined with more restrictive electoral laws concerning party formation, will reduce the likelihood of real oppositional and new independent parties emerging. After the Yukos 

case, big business remains cowed and fearful of playing a more 

independent, let alone oppositional role. While a few print media 

outlets, one radio station, and the internet remain independent, the 

most important medium, national TV, has now lost all independence from the Presidential administration. Regional governors who 

were formerly elected are now appointed by the President and approved by extremely pliant regional legislatures. In response to the 

virtual elimination of opposition parties, independent media, and 

further concentration of executive power, Freedom House’s political 

rights rating of Russia in 2005 moved from ‘‘partly free’’ to ‘‘not 

free’’. 

Supporters of Mr. Putin argue that many of the measures he has 

initiated in recent years are not un-democratic. And it is true that 

in a number of leading democracies regional leaders are appointed 

by the central executive rather than popularly elected. It is also 

true, of course, that many mature democracies have parliament 

members selected only on the basis of party support in elections— 

or fully proportional representative systems. They will argue that 

many of the elected regional governors were deeply corrupt and/or 

inept. They will also argue that the oligarch-dominated political 

system was deeply corrupt as big business had, shall we say, a very 

liberal interpretation of ‘‘lobbying’’. And Mr. Putin’s supporters will 

be for the most part correct in all of these assertions. What cannot 

be denied, however, is that the net result of these and other measures is that the hyper-presidential system consolidated during Mr. 

Putin’s presidency has nearly eliminated all other existing and potential independent centers of power, or as we like to say, ‘‘checks 

and balances.’’ Under President Putin, political space in Russia has 

shrunk, and democracy has been truncated. Russia is, as my colleague Lilia Shevtsova describes it, an ‘‘imitation democracy’’ with 

imitation democratic institutions. The form of democracy is there, 

but the essential content of competition and pluralism are not. 

Supporters of Mr. Putin will also point to his consistently high 

personal approval and popularity ratings over the past six years to 

support the contention that democracy is not dying in Russia since 

their elected leader is very popular. It is true that Mr. Putin is 

genuinely popular, and there are understandable reasons for this. 

The Russian economy has been growing at a robust rate of more 

than 6% a year during his tenure. Unlike the Yeltsin years when 

the Russian economy was in tatters, salaries and pensions are regularly paid—in fact incomes are rising quite rapidly, mostly due to 

high oil prices. He has also restored a higher level of decorum and 

consistently professional behavior to the office after the erratic and 

often absent Mr. Yeltsin. In March 2004 Mr. Putin could have promoted a truly free and fair democratic presidential election, and he 

still would have won by a large margin. Yet he chose not to, and 

instead the presidential election looked more like a farce with the 

cast of so-called opponents. 
43 

WHY THE PICTURE WILL GET DARKER

Why is the near-term outlook for democracy in Russia bleak? The 

answer is simple. Mr. Putin, as he has stated on a number of occasions including last week’s lengthy press conference, believes that 

highly centralized political authority—something he once described 

as ‘‘part of Russia’s DNA’’—is most appropriate for Russia’s current 

stage of social, economic, and political development. Anything else, 

in his view as well as that of his closest advisors, supposedly risks 

anarchy, even state collapse. With a constitutionally mandated 

transfer of power scheduled for 2008, Mr. Putin and his team do 

not want to leave anything to chance. Their self-named system of 

‘‘managed democracy’’ (long on management and short on democracy) will ensure that Mr. Putin’s appointed heir will win the election, or that, a more unlikely event, the constitution will be revised 

so that Mr. Putin may stay in power. Every indicator suggests that 

no independent political force will be allowed to emerge in the next 

two years to upset the Kremlin’s plan for the transfer of power. 

There is also no indication that the plan has been finalized, and 

political logic argues that it is in the interests of President Putin 

to keep the plans unknown. 

The inability of the Kuchma administration to successfully manage the Ukrainian presidential election at the end of 2004, resulting in the so-called ‘‘Orange Revolution’’, deeply shook the Kremlin, 

which had invested tremendous political and financial resources 

into the election of its favored candidate, Viktor Yanukovych. This 

event further alerted the Kremlin leadership, already inclined to 

centralize and control as much as possible, to the danger of allowing civil society and particularly organizations supported by foreign 

financing to play a role in national politics. In his annual presidential address to the Federal Assembly in spring 2004, Mr. Putin 

made some very threatening remarks about the civil society organizations in Russia acting, in his view, against state interests, especially those receiving foreign financing who ‘‘would not bite the 

hands that feed them.’’ While civil society was put on notice then, 

the Kremlin did not act immediately. But the view that it was foreign supported NGOs that played a key role in rallying Yushenko 

supporters and eventually overturning the presidential election results in Ukraine only strengthened the view of the Putin administration that it needed to further weaken civil society in Russia to 

ensure that could not happen in 2008. 

In my view the chances of any ‘‘colored revolution’’ taking place 

in Russia in the upcoming electoral cycle are slim to none, but the 

prevailing mentality in the Kremlin is that nothing can be left to 

chance. That is the inspiration for the new legislation regulating 

the non-governmental and non-commercial sector that Mr. Putin 

signed last month. It is true that the final legislation is a considerable improvement on the initial draft law, a draft that the Duma 

approved in its first reading by a vote of 370–18. According to the 

analysis of the International Center for Non-governmental Law, 

the first draft would have put Russia in a category with countries 

like China, Zimbabwe, and Egypt with their highly restrictive regulation of NGOs. Only after Mr. Putin was quietly but effectively 

lobbied by the US and European governments did he intervene to 
44 

call for a softening of the law. But while the new law is an improvement, it is principally better for foreign NGOs operating in 

Russia. And like any legislation in Russia, what really matters is 

how it will be implemented. As with the selective application of law 

in the Yukos case, we can expect that the new NGO law will be 

very selectively applied to shut down NGOs considered against the 

interests of the Kremlin. The legislation will also likely push organizations to further self-censor their statements and activities. 

ALL IS NOT LOST . . . 

Before saying a few words about policy recommendations and 

Russia’s status as chair of the G–8 now and beginning in May, the 

Council of Europe, let me point out a couple of perplexing paradoxes of current Russian realities. While the near-term future, the 

next few years does not appear promising for democracy and civil 

society, the current Russian polity, a throwback to Russia’s centuries-long tradition of centralized and authoritarian governance, 

does not appear sustainable for the longer term. It is an anachronism in an increasingly democratic and globalizing world. The 

‘‘power vertical’’ also too often results in an ineffective decisionmaking process prone to error. 

But the paradox lies in the fact that Russia for the last six years 

has become a less democratic state while incomes and the middle 

class have been growing. It is complicated to measure the size of 

the middle class in Russia, but today it is probably approaching 

30% of the population. Many observers, including myself, have 

been hopeful that a growing middle class over time will serve as 

the foundation for a more stable and democratic Russia. So far that 

is not happening. Why not? It is not because Russians are culturally undemocratic. The University of Michigan World Values 

Study indicates that Russians are at about the global median in 

support for democratic values. But today, after the difficult legacy 

of the 1990s, democracy is not such a high priority; Russians have 

been ready to trade off greater stability and order for less democracy. And the current government has encouraged the view that 

more democracy now will result in greater instability—that Russia 

is not ready for real democracy. But over time, as the middle class 

grows and there are more stakeholders in the economy with property to defend, the existing centralized and highly corrupt order 

will be less and less acceptable. This is a source of optimism. 

The other paradox to note is that while political freedoms have 

been systematically constrained, individual freedoms, for the most 

part, have become more entrenched with the Russian people. While 

the political revolution has stalled, as my colleague in Moscow 

Dmitri Trenin has put it, Russia has had a ‘‘revolution of money’’ 

for which there has been no thermidor. Russians are freer today 

probably than at any time in their history. They can buy and sell 

property. They are traveling the world in rapidly growing numbers. 

With a robustly growing economy they are experiencing a consumer 

boom. However, at some point further restrictions of political freedoms willerode individual freedoms, and I do not think this will be 

acceptable to Russians. This also makes me more optimistic about 

Russian democracy in the long run. 
45 

But today we are face to face with a very negative trend line for 

democracy and civil society in Russia. And this trend is accelerating precisely as Russia takes over the chair of the G–8 and 

soon the Council of Europe. This is a double irony. Membership criteria were bent in both institutions to let Russia in. The calculation 

was that through membership Russia could be ‘‘socialized’’ to take 

measures to strengthen its adherence to democratic values and 

practice and respect for human rights. At the risk of sounding like 

one of those old Sovietologist dogs that Mr. Putin referred to in his 

press conference last week, Russia simply does not meet the criteria, to the extent that such criteria exists, for membership in the 

G–8. This is obviously not a mature democracy, but rather an increasingly authoritarian state with only the trappings of democracy. Still, I do not advocate at this point throwing Russia out of 

the G–8. But if the first version of the NGO legislation had been 

approved and signed by the President, for me that would have been 

grounds for throwing Russia out and canceling the St. Petersburg 

meeting. I think Mr. Putin understood this risk and pulled back 

from the brink. We should expect that the Kremlin will continue 

to test the limits as we approach the 2008 elections. The U.S. needs 

to clarify where the red lines are with Russia, although admittedly 

that is easier said than done. However, I think the Bush administration did that quite effectively with the NGO legislation issue at 

the end of last year, and the message was effectively conveyed to 

the Russian leadership. 

FOREIGN POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF CURRENT TRENDS

There are also worrisome trends in Russian foreign policy that 

are related to some extent—it is difficult to calculate how much— 

to the authoritarian trend in Russian politics. There is no question 

that as Russian politics has become more authoritarian, Moscow’s 

relations with the West have cooled. This has been most noticeable 

in disputes over policies in the states on the territory of the former 

Soviet Union. The Ukrainian presidential elections were the biggest dispute in 2004, and the brutal repression of the Andijan riot 

in Uzbekistan was a major and indicative difference of viewpoint 

in 2005. 

In the second half of last year Uzbekistan asked the United 

States to abandon its military base there and then signed a security treaty with the Russian Federation. This event marked the 

first setback for the United States that redounded to the benefit of 

Russia in Eurasia after a virtual 20-year roll for the United States. 

But the larger point is that Russia has been consistently siding 

with regional authoritarian leaders like Karimov in Uzbekistan 

and Lukashenko in Belarus while opposing more democratically 

oriented leaders like Yushenko in Ukraine and Saakashvili in 

Georgia. 

As Russia’s ties with the West have cooled in the last few years, 

Moscow’s relationship with Beijing continues to deepen. The SinoRussian military exercises of last summer may not have carried 

much military significance, but they did reflect Russia’s frustration 

the West. The current Russian leadership has very little tolerance 

for what it perceives as excessive criticism and interference in its 

domestic affairs from the West. Suffice to say that there will be no 
46 

public hearings in China where one could hear criticism of Russian 

democracy, civil society, and human rights! 

I have dubbed this trend in Russian foreign policy ‘‘Authoritarians of the World Unite,’’ but I think the relationship between Russian domestic politics and its evolving foreign policy remains poorly 

understood despite its importance for near and long-term US foreign policy interests. In fact, I think Russia’s importance for US interests is underestimated in Washington, especially given our concerns about the proliferation of WMD, radical Islamic-inspired terrorism, and energy security. What other country can potentially 

promote or thwart our interests on all three of these first-order priorities to the extent that Russia can? 

It is true that we would have important business to pursue with 

Moscow on these and other issues even if Russia were to become 

a full-fledged authoritarian state. But I am also convinced that 

Washington and Moscow would find their interests in closer alignment if Russia were a more open and developed democracy. 

CHTO DELAT’? WHAT IS TO BE DONE? 

Obviously there is no magic bullet in our policy toolkit for the 

promotion of democracy, civil society, and human rights in Russia. 

Just as obviously, our leverage today with Russia is far less than 

the 1990s when the Russian economy was weak. The self-named 

ideology of the current Russian government is ‘‘sovereign democracy,’’ with the emphasis on sovereign. Part of the backlash we see 

today against foreigners emerges from the sense of humiliation and 

weakness that Russia experienced during the 1990s when foreign 

influences (the United States, the IMF, the World Bank, etc.) 

played an outsized role in Russian policymaking. In contemporary 

Russian political mythology, this period is likened to the Time of 

Troubles at the turn of the 17th century when Russia was internally weakened and for a short time Polish troops occupied Moscow. Last year, the old Soviet holiday of Revolution Day, November 

7, was finally replaced with a new holiday on November 4 which 

celebrates the eviction of Polish troops from Moscow nearly four 

hundred years ago. The message of this new holiday is that ‘‘Russia 

is for Russians!’’ 

Not surprisingly after the experience of the 1990s, there is an 

acute sensitivity among much of the Russian political elite to foreign influences. And with $60+/barrel oil prices fueling a virtual 

macroeconomic miracle, the Russian leadership is indeed feeling 

very confident. In addition to ‘‘sovereign democracy,’’ the other 

catch phrase in Moscow today is Russia’s status and future as an 

‘‘energy superpower.’’ The high oil price is the most important factor driving current realities in Russia today. International experience shows that sustained high oil prices will encourage neither democratization nor economic diversification in countries highly dependent on export of fossil fuels. This is not to say that we are 

powerless to promote democracy in Russia, but rather to be aware 

of our limitations and obstacles. 

Certainly Russia’s chairmanships of the G–8 and the Council of 

Europe offer us and our European partners a modicum of leverage. 

We have already seen this play out in the battle over the new NGO 

legislation. If Russia had not been assuming the chair of these 
47 

groups, I am pretty confident that a far more draconian piece of 

legislation would have been signed by President Putin. The U.S. 

and Europe need to speak in one voice and seek to draw as much 

attention as possible to Russia’s anomalous membership status, let 

alone chairmanship, of these groups at a time when democratic institutions and values are under attack. In particular, we should expect that the Russian government will seek to control and co-opt 

the civil society component of the G–8 meeting. We should take initiative to not let this happen by promoting a major gathering of 

Russian civil society and international civil society organizations at 

the time of the of the G–8. It is outrageous that in the first weeks 

of its G–8 chairmanship, the Russian government is attacking domestic NGOs, including an important umbrella organization, the 

Research Center for Human Rights. 

When Russian democracy, civil society, and human rights are 

being attacked, this is clearly NOT the time to reduce US government as well as private funding for these goals. Although dependence on foreign funding is a real problem for Russian human rights 

NGOs, the U.S. government and major U.S. private foundations 

should quickly make a statement by significantly increasing their 

support for these essential organizations in 2006 and beyond. Support for internships for young Russians in international NGOs 

abroad should also be encouraged. 

We need to increase our support for a variety of exchange programs that strengthen the connectivity of our two societies. The 

most important area is in education, from high school through 

graduate programs. From the standpoint of ‘‘democracy assistance,’’ 

I think you get the greatest long-term payoff with support for more 

Russian youth to have the opportunity to live and study in the U.S. 

Our public voice is important also. First we must ensure that we 

keep our own democratic and human rights house in order so that 

we maintain our moral authority to speak on these issues. Second, 

we must consistently apply the same standards to Russia as we do 

to other countries to ensure that we neither understate nor overstate the problem at hand. 

Balancing public criticism by high-level USG officials with backchannel efforts to lobby the Russian government will continue to 

present challenges. While it is important that the US government 

speak forthrightly at the highest levels about deficiencies of Russian democracy and policies towards civil society and human rights, 

this must be carefully calibrated in order to avoid the impression 

of ‘‘piling on’’. While we do not want to compromise our principles, 

we also do not want to lose the interest and attention of our interlocutors. Again, I think the Bush administration handled the balance of public criticism with intense back-channel discussions just 

right on the NGO legislation issue. President Bush raised the issue 

with President Putin when they met at the APEC meeting in South 

Korea, and this put the issue on the agenda for a series of State 

Department, NSC and other officials to express their concerns with 

Russian officials. 

We should also be able to de-link our concerns about backsliding 

on Russian democracy with other areas of national security and 

economic cooperation with the Russian Federation. In other words, 

yes we must try to work as closely with the Russians on, for exam-
48 

ple, closing down nuclear weapons programs in Iran and North 

Korea, but these policy goals should not prevent the US government, including Congress, from speaking forthrightly and continuing to promote democracy and civil society as well as defending 

those whose human and civil rights are being violated. 

Finally, I agree with my colleague Michael McFaul that it is time 

for a U.S. government official to make a major address about Russia and its importance for U.S. foreign policy. Probably the ideal 

candidate for the job is Secretary of State Rice. Russian political 

elites have simultaneously felt miffed at the perceived diminished 

priority Moscow holds for Washington and relieved that Washington may pay less attention to the systematic weakening of 

democratic institutions in Russia since it is bogged down in Iraq, 

rising energy prices, and nuclear challenges from Iran and North 

Korea. Such a speech would force the US policy-making apparatus 

to focus on the importance of the challenges Russia presents and 

to state as clearly as possible the essence of our goals. As an outside observer, I sense some cognitive dissonance or tension within 

the administration between those more concerned with the dangers 

of democratic backsliding and its implications for Russian foreign 

policy with those more inclined to emphasize how we advance our 

security and economic interests with Moscow. It is incumbent upon 

us to synthesize these ‘‘idealist’’ and ‘‘realist’’ inclinations into a coherent policy strategy. Russia’s future remains too important for 

our near and long-term interests to shirk such an effort, and it is 

essential that our friends and colleagues in Russia understand this. 

Æ 



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