THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Supreme Court 

Richard J. Creswick, Petitioner, 

v. 

The University of South Carolina and Alan Wilson in his 

official capacity as Attorney General, Respondents. 

Appellate Case No. 2021-000833 

ORIGINAL JURISDICTION 

Opinion No. 28053 

Submitted August 11, 2021 – Filed August 17, 2021 

JUDGMENT DECLARED 

Richard A. Harpootlian and Christopher Phillip Kenney, 

of Richard A. Harpootlian, PA, of Columbia, for 

Petitioner. 

Vordman Carlisle Traywick III and Robert E. Stepp, of 

Robinson Gray Stepp & Laffitte, LLC, of Columbia, for 

Respondent University of South Carolina. 

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson, Solicitor 

General Robert D. Cook, and Deputy Solicitor General J. 

Emory Smith Jr., all of Columbia, for Respondent 

Attorney General Alan Wilson. 
PER CURIAM: Petitioner, a professor at the University of South Carolina (the 

University), seeks a declaration in this Court's original jurisdiction that Proviso 117.190 

of the 2021-2022 Appropriations Act1

 does not prohibit a universal mask mandate at the 

University and asks the Court for expedited consideration of this matter. Both the 

University2

 and the Attorney General agree with the requests for this Court's acceptance 

of this case in its original jurisdiction and expedited review. Because this matter involves 

a question of significant public interest that must be decided before classes resume this 

week, we accept the matter in our original jurisdiction and expedite its consideration. See 

Rule 245(a), SCACR (explaining this Court may hear matters in its original jurisdiction if 

the public interest is involved, or if special grounds of emergency or other good reasons 

exist); Key v. Currie, 305 S.C. 115, 116, 406 S.E.2d 356, 357 (1991) (holding only if an 

extraordinary reason, such as a question of significant public interest or an emergency, 

exists will this Court determine a matter in its original jurisdiction). We dispense with 

further briefing, find oral argument would not be helpful, and declare Proviso 117.190 

does not prohibit a universal mask mandate. 

On July 30, 2021, Dr. Harris Pastides, Interim President of the University, announced that 

face coverings would be required for all students, faculty, and staff at all times inside all 

University buildings except a student's own dorm room, a private office, and when eating 

inside campus dining facilities. On August 2, 2021, the Attorney General sent a letter to 

Dr. Pastides opining that the University's universal facemask mandate violated Proviso 

117.190. Accordingly, Dr. Pastides issued a statement on August 3, 2021, indicating that 

in light of the Attorney General's opinion, the University would not require facemasks 

except in the University's health care facilities and campus public transportation. 

However, the statement strongly encouraged the use of facemasks indoors unless in a 

student's own dorm room, in a private office, or eating inside campus dining facilities. 

Proviso 117.190 provides: 

(GP: Masks at Higher Education Facilities) A public institution of 

higher learning, including a technical college, may not use any funds 

appropriated or authorized pursuant to this act to require that its 

students have received the COVID-19 vaccination in order to be 

 

1 https://www.scstatehouse.gov/sess124_2021-

2022/appropriations2021/tap1b.htm#s117. 

2

 Although the University is named as a defendant in this lawsuit, it is not actually 

adverse to any of the parties and, in its return, states that it defers to this Courts’ 

interpretation of Proviso 117.190. 
present at the institution's facilities without being required to wear a 

facemask. This prohibition extends to the announcement or 

enforcement of any such policy. 

In his letter to Dr. Pastides, the Attorney General stated, 

With respect to masks, Proviso 117.190 is ambiguous, to be sure. One 

reasonable interpretation is to prohibit discrimination by requiring 

masks for the unvaccinated. Under this interpretation, a uniform mask 

requirement does not violate the proviso. Based upon this reading, we 

understand the University has now imposed a mask requirement 

"inside all campus buildings" with certain exceptions. 

Such a policy, however, is likely not consistent with the intent of the 

Legislature. It is our understanding that Proviso 117.190, while 

inartfully worded, was intended to prohibit the mandatory wearing of 

masks, as reflected in its use of the language "without being required 

to wear a facemask." Our state Supreme Court has advised that 

"courts are not confined to the literal meaning of a statute where the 

literal import contradicts the real purpose and intent of the 

lawmakers." Wade v. State, 348 S.C. 255, 259, 559 S.E.2d 843, 845 

(2002). Given the legislative intent, we are constrained to construe 

Proviso 117.190 as prohibiting a mask mandate such as the University 

has imposed. 

In his return, the Attorney General asserts this matter does not present a justiciable 

controversy. We reject this assertion. There is no question that the University 

withdrew its mask mandate based on the letter from the Attorney General, and the 

University has now clearly indicated it will defer to our interpretation of the 

proviso in question. Under these circumstances, this controversy is clearly 

justiciable. 

Contrary to the Attorney General's position that this matter presents a political 

question, we hold this action involves solely a question of statutory interpretation. 

The primary rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the 

intent of the General Assembly. S.C. Pub. Int. Found. v. Calhoun Cnty. Council, 

432 S.C. 492, 497, 854 S.E.2d 836, 838 (2021); Hodges v. Rainey, 341 S.C. 79, 85, 

533 S.E.2d 578, 581 (2000). The first question to be asked when interpreting a 

statute is whether the statute's meaning is clear on its face. Kennedy v. S.C. Ret. 

Sys., 345 S.C. 339, 346, 549 S.E.2d 243, 246 (2001). If a statute's language is 
plain, unambiguous, and conveys a clear and definite meaning, there is no need to 

employ the rules of statutory interpretation, and this Court must apply the statute 

according to its literal meaning. Miller v. Aiken, 364 S.C. 303, 307, 613 S.E.2d 

364, 366 (2005). Under the plain meaning rule, this Court has no right to search 

for or impose another meaning or resort to subtle or forced construction to change 

the scope of a clear and unambiguous statute. Town of Mt. Pleasant v. Roberts, 

393 S.C. 332, 342, 713 S.E.2d 278, 283 (2011); State v. Sweat, 386 S.C. 339, 350, 

688 S.E.2d 569, 575 (2010); Cain v. Nationwide Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 378 S.C. 

25, 29–30, 661 S.E.2d 349, 351–52 (2008). Only where the language of an act 

gives rise to doubt or uncertainty as to legislative intent may this Court search for 

that intent beyond the borders of the act itself. Smith v. Tiffany, 419 S.C. 548, 556, 

799 S.E.2d 479, 483 (2017). The best evidence of legislative intent is the text of 

the statute. Wade v. State, 348 S.C. 255, 259, 559 S.E.2d 843, 844 (2002); 

Hodges, 341 S.C. at 85, 533 S.E.2d at 581. 

The language of Proviso 117.190 is not ambiguous as to the point in question—

whether the proviso prohibits a universal mask mandate. Nothing in the proviso 

manifests the General Assembly's intent to prohibit all mask mandates at public 

institutions of higher learning. Instead, the proviso clearly prevents statesupported institutions of higher education from using funds from the 2021-2022 

appropriations to fund efforts requiring only unvaccinated individuals to wear 

facemasks. Nothing in the title or text of the proviso prohibits a universal mask 

mandate at a public institution of higher learning that applies to all students, 

faculty, and staff equally, whether vaccinated or unvaccinated. In fact, the proviso 

implicitly contemplates there could be a universal mask mandate, but its terms 

prohibit only discrimination against unvaccinated individuals by requiring them to 

wear masks when vaccinated individuals are exempt from that requirement. 

Despite the fact that the proviso is, as stated by the Attorney General, "inartfully 

worded" and "very poorly written," the proviso clearly does not not prohibit a 

universal mask mandate. 

Further, the Attorney General's contention that construing Proviso 117.190 along 

with other provisos concerning COVID-19 vaccinations and facemasks somehow 

evidences the legislative intent for Proviso 117.190 to prohibit universal mask 

mandates at state-funded colleges and universities is specious. We note Proviso 

1.108 demonstrates the General Assembly is capable of drafting a provision 

prohibiting all mask mandates by stating: 

(SDE: Mask Mandate Prohibition) No school district, or any of its 

schools may use any funds appropriated or authorized pursuant to this 
act to require that its students and/or employees wear a facemask at 

any of its education facilities. This prohibition extends to the 

announcement or enforcement of any such policy.3

(emphasis added). In contrast to Proviso 117.190, Proviso 1.108 clearly evinces 

the General Assembly's intent to prohibit the use of state funds to require any mask 

mandate in public K-12 schools. The fact that Proviso 117.190 uses different 

language than Proviso 1.108 leaves little doubt that Proviso 117.190 was not 

intended to prohibit all mask mandates at public institutions of higher education, 

but only, as its terms specifically provide, mask mandates for the unvaccinated. 

As to the Attorney General's insistence that subsequent statements by individual 

legislators evidence the legislative intent to ban all masks mandates, this Court has 

held the Court may not look to the opinions of legislators or others concerned in 

the enactment of the law—expressed subsequent to enactment—to ascertain the 

intent of the legislature. Kennedy, 345 S.C. at 353–54, 549 S.E.2d at 250 (quoting 

Greenville Baseball, Inc. v. Bearden, 200 S.C. 363, 371, 20 S.E.2d 813, 817 

(1942)); Bowaters Carolina Corp. v. Smith, 257 S.C. 563, 572, 186 S.E.2d 761, 

764 (1972) (holding the testimony of members of the legislative delegation who 

authored the statute as to its meaning was inadmissible). It is well established that 

courts will disregard the subsequently expressed opinions of individual legislators 

as to the intent of the legislature as a whole when construing a statute. See, e.g.,

Bread Pol. Action Comm. v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 455 U.S. 577, 582 n.3 (1982) 

("[P]ost hoc observations by a single member of Congress carry little if any 

weight." (quoting Quern v. Mandley, 436 U.S. 725, 736 n.10 (1978))); Tenn. 

Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 193 (1978) (noting statements of Appropriations 

Committee members "represent only the personal views of these legislators," and, 

"however explicit, [they] cannot serve to change the legislative intent of Congress 

expressed before the Act's passage" (alteration in original) (quoting Reg'l Rail 

Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 132 (1974))); 419 U.S. at 132 (holding 

post-passage remarks of legislators cannot serve to change the legislative intent of 

Congress expressed before the Act's passage as those statements represent only the 

personal views of the legislators); Pa. Dep't of Pub. Welfare v. United States, 781 

F.2d 334, 341 n.10 (3d Cir. 1986) ("[A] post hoc statement of a single legislator, 

even of the bill's author, is not entitled to probative weight in the determination of 

legislative intent." (citations omitted)); Cummings v. Mickelson, 495 N.W.2d 493, 

 

3

https://www.scstatehouse.gov/query.php?search=DOC&searchtext=mask&catego

ry=BUDGET&year=2021&version_id=7&return_page=&version_title=Appropriat

ion%20Act&conid=36818960&result_pos=0&keyval=46115&numrows=10 
499 n.7 (S.D. 1993) (holding the views of individuals involved with the legislative 

process as to intent is of no assistance in construing statutory provisions because: 

(1) it is the intent of the legislature that is sought, not the intent of the individual 

members; and (2) it is "universally held" that "evidence of a . . . draftsman of a 

statute is not a competent aid to a court in construing a statute" (quoting Coop. 

Wool Growers of S.D. v. Bushfield, 8 N.W.2d 1, 3 (1943))); Cogan v. City of 

Wheeling, 274 S.E.2d 516, 518 (W. Va. 1981) (holding a court cannot consider the 

individual views of members of the legislature offered to prove the intent and 

meaning of a statute after its passage and after litigation has arisen over its 

meaning and intent). See generally Norman J. Singer & Shambie Singer, Statutes 

and Statutory Construction § 48.16 (7th ed. 2014) (citing cases in numerous 

jurisdictions holding courts should not consider testimony about legislative intent 

by members of the legislature that enacted a statute). Accordingly, even if the 

proviso were ambiguous, we would not consider any post-passage statements by 

individual legislators or groups of legislators as to the intent of the proviso. 

Because the language of the proviso is clear and unambiguous as to whether the 

proviso prohibits a universal mask mandate, we need not resort to rules of statutory 

construction to determine legislative intent. See Smith, 419 S.C. at 556, 799 S.E.2d 

at 483 (holding only where the language of a statute gives rise to doubt or 

uncertainty as to legislative intent may this Court search for that intent beyond the 

borders of the act itself); Miller, 364 S.C. at 307, 613 S.E.2d at 366 (holding where 

a statute's language is plain, unambiguous, and conveys a clear and definite 

meaning, there is no need to employ the rules of statutory interpretation, and this 

Court must apply the statute according to its literal meaning). We declare the 

terms of Proviso 117.190 clearly and unambiguously prohibit a state-supported 

institution of higher education from discriminating against unvaccinated students, 

faculty, and staff by requiring them to wear masks. The proviso does not prohibit a 

universal mask mandate.4 

JUDGMENT DECLARED. 

BEATTY, C.J., KITTREDGE, HEARN, FEW, and JAMES, JJ., concur. 

 

4

 In reaching this conclusion, we are simply construing the proviso as it is written. 

Our holding is not an approval or disapproval of a mandate, nor is it an approval or 

disapproval of an attempt by the General Assembly to prohibit a mandate.