Communications and Integration Enhancements 

to Improve Homeland Security 

by 

Terrance W. Sando 

The Counterproliferation Papers 

Future Warfare Series No. 41 

USAF Counterproliferation Center

Air University 

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 

Communications and Integration Enhancements 

to Improve Homeland Security 

Terrance W. Sando 

July 2007 

The Counterproliferation Papers Series was established by the USAF 

Counterproliferation Center to provide information and analysis to assist 

the understanding of the U.S. national security policy-makers and USAF 

officers to help them better prepare to counter the threat from weapons of 

mass destruction. Copies of No. 41 and previous papers in this series are 

available from the USAF Counterproliferation Center, 325 Chennault 

Circle, Maxwell AFB AL 36112-6427. The fax number is (334) 953-

7530; phone (334) 953-7538. 

Counterproliferation Paper No. 41 

USAF Counterproliferation Center

Air University 

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 36112-6427

The Internet address for the USAF Counterproliferation Center is: 

http://cpc.au.af.mil/

Contents 

 Page 

Disclaimer................................................................................................... ii 

The Author................................................................................................. iii 

Executive Summary.....................................................................................v

Introduction..................................................................................................1 

Homeland Security – The Guard as Integrator............................................3 

9/11 Forced Policy and Organizational Changes.........................................5 

Department of Defense in Civil Support .....................................................9 

National Guard Structure...........................................................................10 

Impact of 9/11 on Department of Defense Activities................................12 

Situational Awareness and United States Joint Forces Command ............15 

54 Joint Force Headquarters-State Organizations .....................................17 

A Suggestion: Use the Domestic Event/Threat Conferencing System.....18 

Weapons of Mass Destruction-Civil Support Teams ................................22 

CBRNE Enhanced Response Force Packages (CERFP) ...........................24 

CERFP Search and Extraction Element ...........................................25 

CERFP Decontamination Element ...................................................25 

CERFP Medical Elements ................................................................26 

Guard Quick Response Forces...................................................................26 

National Guard Can Provide Forces and Situational Awareness in Crisis.....27 

Notes..........................................................................................................29 
ii 

Disclaimer 

The views expressed in this publication are those of the author and do 

not reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Government, 

Department of Defense, or the USAF Counterproliferation Center. 
iii 

The Author 

Colonel Terrance W. Sando is currently the Deputy Director Plans and 

Requirements (A5/8) at 1st Air Force/AFNORTH, Tyndall AFB FL. 

Previous assignments include serving as the National Guard Bureau 

(NGB) J8 Director of Requirements, NGB J7 Chief of Operational Plans 

and Joint Force Development working total force issues at Joint Staff and 

Headquarters level. In 2002, Colonel Sando was assigned by the Air 

National Guard to help stand-up United States Northern Command 

(USNORTHCOM) at Peterson AFB CO. Chosen as the first Domestic 

Events Officer to qualify and stand watch in the Cheyenne Mountain 

Operations Center as USNORTHCOM’s representative in NORAD’s 

Operations Center. He is a graduate of Squadron Officer School, Air 

Command and Staff College, and the Air War College. 

v 

Executive Summary 

This paper addresses specific and streamlined situational awareness 

recommendations that, when combined with National Guard capabilities, 

will greatly enhance U.S. Homeland Security responses. These 

technology enhancements and processes combined with the force 

capabilities that the National Guard has recently created, when integrated 

with other national capabilities, will greatly improve national coordination 

during responses to national disasters or potential terrorist attacks. These 

capabilities are especially critical in responding to potential mega-terror 

events for which the nation needs to prepare. Because of the sense of 

urgency generated from the attacks of September 11, 2001, a large amount 

of money has been spent to prepare the country for future terrorist attacks. 

Unfortunately, there has been too little attention given to ensure that the 

resulting system of systems is seamlessly tied together. 

The Department of Defense is one of many federal agencies and 

organizations responsible for Homeland Security. The military, being the 

lead for Homeland Defense, is supported by other agencies in defending 

against external threats and aggression. However, in most instances, the 

collaboration capabilities were specifically designed for military 

operations and there would be difficulty in switching them to also perform 

Homeland Security roles. 

In a budgetary environment, where demands and requirements are 

larger than the money appropriated to cover them, utilizing all the nation’s 

capabilities in the optimal way must be a top priority. The National Guard 

provides a cost-effective and responsive force that can utilize not only its 

manpower and resources, but also its positioning in local communities 

where it has been performing Homeland Security and Defense for over 

300 years. Building on this foundation is a force structure trained to 

respond to catastrophic events. The problem addressed here is how the 

nation can capitalize on the National Guard’s evolving capabilities to help 

bring the nation’s other agencies seamlessly into responses to natural 

disasters or terrorist attacks. 
vi 

The National Guard has been transformed from a strategic reserve in 

the days of the Cold War, into a fully operational force now active both in 

operations overseas and in protecting the U.S. homeland. This 

transformation has embedded capabilities that make the Guard a force 

multiplier in its homeland defense and civil support roles. Since the Al 

Qaeda attacks of September 11, 2001, the Guard has applied the lessons 

learned to provide capabilities that will allow U.S. responders to quickly 

and efficiently react to future catastrophic events. There are four National 

Guard capabilities that will be covered in this paper: 

• 54 Joint Force Headquarters-State Organizations; 

• 55 Weapons of Mass Destruction-Civil Support Teams (WMD-CST); 

• 17 Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield 

Explosive Enhanced Response Force Packages (CERFP); and 

• National Guard Quick Response Forces. 

The Joint Force Headquarters-State is the key component that provides 

a capability to report and support a local response in a state or territory. It is 

access to information at this state and local level that would enhance 

national decision makers in mitigating a catastrophic event. These 54 

headquarters are using the Joint Continental United States Communications 

Support Environment (JCCSE) program to build and support situational 

awareness. This is an information technology umbrella that can provide a 

common situational awareness to responders at all levels. 

The Guard has also dedicated forces to assist local responders in 

detecting and quantifying weapons of mass destruction effects. The 

primary capabilities in this capacity are the 55 Weapons of Mass DestructionCivil Support Teams (WMD-CSTs) and the 17 existing Chemical, 

Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosive (CBRNE) 

Enhanced Response Force Packages (CERFPs). This is a response capability 

that is enhanced by the National Guard’s forward presence in the local 

communities, and is a capability that can be deployed in a Title 32 or 10 

status, making it a highly flexible homeland security response tool. 

Building upon these Guard capabilities and using information that can 

enhance the situational awareness of all responders to a national security 

crisis in the U.S. homeland will allow national decision makers to 

formulate well-educated, timely response decisions. 
1 

Communications and Integration 

Enhancements to Improve Homeland Security

Terrance W. Sando 

Introduction 

Defining and developing the strategy and capabilities for defending 

the homeland in-depth is one of the most pressing needs of the United 

States. It is a complex and perplexing problem that is exacerbated by the 

asymmetric threats that non-state actors, who are becoming more 

prominent, are posing to our nation’s interests. This has become even 

more relevant since the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. This 

attack on America, when coupled with the proliferation of weapons of 

mass destruction, brought home the reality of our nation’s vulnerability to 

asymmetric threats. The potential to threaten the population of the United 

States and the homeland directly has been the stimulus to seek viable 

solutions to defend against this shift in warfare. The ability to adapt our 

nation’s response to prevent or mitigate a catastrophic mega-terror event is 

our most urgent priority. This type of warfare will demand an in-depth 

knowledge of consequence management technology and mitigation. 

Determining the proper balance between the Department of Defense and 

other government agencies will have a significant impact on the overall 

effectiveness and efficiency of national response efforts. 

To complicate matters, the definition of homeland security is more 

than just being able to respond to terrorist attack; it also covers natural and 

man-made disasters like Hurricane Katrina. Being able to respond and 

manage such a diverse portfolio of events in a cost-effective and timely 

manner will tax the country’s resources. Generally, events begin at the 

local level and may quickly overextend the local response capabilities, 

quickly creating the need for an additional state- or national-level 

response. This shift to higher levels of response can create problems of 

cohesion of efforts and giving all players a common and timely situational 

awareness. 
2 . . . Communications and Integration Enhancements to Improve Homeland Security

Standardizing and expanding the warning and communication of 

events needs to be given a high priority. Simple solutions such as 

augmenting 24-hour news sources with more specific and useful 

information from the National Guard event reporting at the state and 

territory level would provide national decision makers the fidelity of 

information needed to effectively respond to catastrophic events. 

Homeland security missions present significant challenges, one of the most 

important being how to support the requirement to plan and execute 

operations within complex, civil-military, multi-echelon, intergovernmental 

and interagency environment. To do this, those executing response 

operations will need continuous situational awareness to facilitate 

collaboration at the national, state, and local level in order to respond 

effectively to incidents. 

In our inventory of current shortfalls, one needs to seek better 

answers to a number of key questions: 

• What are the capabilities and expertise available to respond to 

events? 

• What are the current information technology infrastructure 

capabilities? 

• How are those engaged in interagency, intergovernmental, and 

intragovernmental responses going to communicate and maintain 

situational awareness in a timely manner? 

• Does a mega-terror chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and 

high-yield explosive (CBRNE) event need a dedicated 

collaboration capability? 

National response planning is based on escalating response 

capabilities from local to state to national levels. In a tiered response to 

incidents, with most emergencies happening at the local level, the Guard 

will usually be called after local responders find they need additional help. 

As such, Guard units will likely be the first military responders in the 

majority of instances. This is because the governor will employ his/her 

Guard assets in State Active Duty or Title 32 status as soon as a military 

capability is needed to augment civilian emergency response capabilities. 

This makes the National Guard, working under the state governor, the 

initial and primary military unit, to be utilized in emergencies. 
Communications and Integration Enhancements to Improve Homeland Security . . . 3 

Many agencies have their own communications and operating 

procedures that support homeland security, but it is the lack of 

standardization and commonality that has hindered the efforts of many of 

these agencies to provide a common operating picture that can give the 

national decision makers relatively accurate and complete information 

needed for rapid assessments when responding to events. 

This paper advocates that the Department of Defense component most 

involved in homeland security activities, the National Guard, should also 

be the key player in providing timely information to the national 

leadership during a major disaster event. Guardsmen, because of their 

presence in each state and territory, can rapidly define an event and deploy 

a capability to deal with a broad spectrum of incidents. Because of these 

capabilities and their 50-state presence, it is the most cost-effective means 

of taking a lead role in homeland security event response. 

Homeland Security – The Guard as Integrator 

Go into any joint operations center or joint intelligence center today 

and you will see one of the 24-hour news channels on a TV screen. Fox 

News Channel and CNN tend to be the favorites. In many instances the 

media is the primary means of warning of unusual activities or attacks 

happening around the world. These news sources are especially prevalent 

in centers that support homeland security. It is interesting that the private 

sector, using corporate practices, is more competent than the U.S. 

Government with its massive information technology infrastructure. 

However, if we elect to continue using the commercial sector for warnings 

and alerts, we still need to harness that information more rapidly and to 

combine it with additional data in order to turn it into information on 

which decisions and actions are based. In our effort to prepare for the 

worst-case scenario, a catastrophic terrorist attack, we especially will need 

to prioritize and channel critical resources and capabilities very quickly. 

There was a definite information shortfall on September 11, 2001. We 

as a nation were looking outward and were caught off guard when the attack 

came on our own soil. The nation’s military was collecting and collating a 

large amount of technical intelligence from a host of sensors that monitor 

activities of our peer competitor: the Former Soviet Union and its main 
4 . . . Communications and Integration Enhancements to Improve Homeland Security

successor, Russia. The North American Aerospace Defense Command, a 

binational command between the United States and Canada, was responsible 

for protecting North America from missile and air attack that day. It was a 

job that had been carried out for over four decades with a perfect record. 

Any potential threats were scrutinized and assessed by decision makers who 

were provided high fidelity information in a timely manner. 

The U.S. homeland defense system worked flawlessly until it was 

confronted with an asymmetric threat that taxed the system beyond its 

limits. Many of the capabilities that had been developed for preventing a 

nuclear attack during the height of the Cold War had been degraded as 

part of the peace dividend of the early 1990s. The threat of Soviet 

bombers diminished significantly as the Cold War ended, and the North 

American Aerospace Defense Command alert sites were significantly 

reduced from a Cold War high of 26.1

Dedicated radars for air defense had also been drastically reduced, 

leaving us mostly dependent upon onboard transponders in the aircraft for 

gauging their locations. Defense radars were mainly looking outward for 

external threats, making identification of potential internal threats difficult. 

By September 11, 2001, there were only seven aircraft alert sites left in the 

United States, each with two fighter aircraft on alert.2

On 9/11 the two most prominent information sources were Fox News 

and CNN which provided footage that was real-time or near real-time on 

the three airliner crashes that reached their targets, and in reporting the 

fourth airliner crash short of its intended target. National decision makers 

were using this televised information to formulate their crisis responses. 

Was the coverage that day a paradigm shift for decision makers at all 

levels of our nation’s government or just an anomaly because of the 

severity of the attacks? 

With the advent of 24-hour news channels, a major commitment of 

resources was made by CNN and then Fox News in an effort to increase 

viewer loyalty. Resources drove these organizations to become 

sophisticated in their ability to find and report breaking news in shorter 

and shorter reporting cycles. These news channels had perfected the 

observe, orient, decide, and act (OODA) loop when it came to news 

reporting. Constant news coverage wasn’t a new phenomenon, but instead 

was one that had matured and become more competitive. Using the World 

Trade Center attacks as an example, the first bombing in 1993, was widely 
Communications and Integration Enhancements to Improve Homeland Security . . . 5 

reported on by CNN. By September 11, 2001, both Fox News and CNN 

were able to provide useful needed coverage and had developed a loyal 

following, including in its audience the U.S. military operations and 

intelligence centers. Clearly, it is vital to maintain and upgrade a 24-hour 

news service in military warning and decision-making processes. This is 

required, if we are to build full situational awareness in such crisis events. 

Without accurate and timely information, many lives could be lost and 

responses may be ineffective. 

One roadblock to progress is the number of players in disaster relief 

and the differing processes and procedures each follow. This is a barrier to 

the effective processing and synthesizing of information. Having a 

streamlined information-sharing process directed by a lead organization 

that can both provide vital communications networks, and a robust 

capability to mitigate unfolding events in a timely manner, will be vital to 

the success of future national disaster responses. 

The National Guard is positioned to be such a lead agency. With its 

forward presence in all the states and territories, its information will 

complement that of the 24-hour news channels in providing enhanced 

information for decision makers. It also has invested in a command and 

control infrastructure that should be used by national leadership. The 

following pages will detail processes and capabilities that are in place 

today that need to be fully utilized to better prepare for any attack or 

natural disaster on the homeland. 

9/11 Forced Policy and Organizational Changes 

The Al Qaeda September 11, 2001, terrorist attack and its immediate 

aftermath forced a review of U.S. national security policy and the most 

sweeping governmental changes since the inception of the Cold War. 

Most notable was the consolidation of several organizations into the 

Department of Homeland Security, a cabinet department, which is 

responsible for all functions related to Homeland Security. With 

approximately 184,000 employees, it is the third largest cabinet 

department in the United States federal government after the Department 

of Defense and Department of Veterans Affairs.3

 This massive 

reorganization was a huge undertaking that has created short-term 
6 . . . Communications and Integration Enhancements to Improve Homeland Security

problems that need to be surmounted in order to provide the efficiencies 

that were the purported basis for the consolidation. The combining of so 

many different cultures and processes is one of the leading causes of the 

lack of centralized communications that prevents a common operating 

picture of developing events. This oftentimes results in national 

leadership getting confusing and conflicting situational information. Let’s 

put the urgency of why this system needs to be addressed into context. 

Homeland security is the nation’s number one priority and it requires 

an extensive national effort. The homeland, in the strategic context, is 

described as the physical region that includes the continental United 

States, Hawaii, Alaska, U.S. territories and possessions along with the 

corresponding airspace and territorial waters. Three regional commands 

are involved in protecting this area: Pacific Command, Southern 

Command, and Northern Command. The defense of Hawaii and our 

territories and possessions in the Pacific is the responsibility of U.S. 

Pacific Command. The defense of Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands 

is the responsibility of U.S. Southern Command. Northern Command is 

responsible for the continental United States and Alaska, along with the 

adjoining air, land, and sea approaches. Just like the Department of 

Homeland Security there is no single Department of Defense organization 

responsible for providing military situational awareness for events as they 

happen. Unless fixed, this will cause decision makers to act with far less 

complete information than they will need and delay timely, wellcoordinated responses. 

To preserve the freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution of the 

United States, the nation must have a homeland that is secure from threats 

and violence, including terrorism. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 

created the Department of Homeland Security. This act established the 

authority to direct efforts to protect against attacks at home and to develop 

the National Strategy for Homeland Security which compliments the 

National Security Strategy of the United States by providing a 

comprehensive framework for organizing the efforts of federal, state, 

local, and private organizations whose primary functions are often 

unrelated to national security. Critical to understanding the overall 

relationship is an understanding of the distinction between the role that 

Department of Defense plays with respect to securing the nation and 

homeland security, and the policy in the National Strategy for Homeland 
Communications and Integration Enhancements to Improve Homeland Security . . . 7

Security, which has the Department of Homeland Security as the lead. 

Homeland Security at the national level focuses on disasters and terrorist 

threats. The Department of Defense focus in supporting Homeland 

Security is broader.4

 Department of Defense is lead for Homeland 

Defense, but has equities and responsibilities in Homeland Security, Civil 

Support, and Emergency Preparedness (see Figure 1). Let us look now at 

the details of the Department of Defense strategy and focus in these roles. 

Homeland Security

Homeland Defense Civil Support

Emergency 

Preparedness

1 2

3

4

6 7

5

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

DoD Role

Clarifying the Paradigm with Examples

Ballistic Missile Defense 

of North America

DoD Support for Natural 

Disaster Relief

Maritime Security

CBRNE Consequence 

Management

Mobile Redundant 

Command Centers

Aviation Support to 

Secret Service for COG

Airport Security (TSA)

Figure 1. Clarifying the Paradigm with Examples 

The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America, dated 

March 2005, addresses our changing security environment. The U.S. 

military predominates in the world in traditional forms of warfare. 

Potential adversaries accordingly shift away from challenging the United 

States through traditional military action and adopt asymmetric 

capabilities and methods. These days, an array of traditional, irregular, 

catastrophic, and disruptive capabilities and methods threaten U.S. 
8 . . . Communications and Integration Enhancements to Improve Homeland Security

interests.5

 Even though these categories overlap, the one that we need to 

be most concerned about for homeland security is the catastrophic 

challenge. In the face of American dominance in traditional forms of 

warfare, some hostile forces continue seeking to acquire catastrophic 

capabilities, particularly weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and mass 

effect (WME). Porous international borders, weak international controls, 

and easy access to information related technologies facilitate these efforts. 

Particularly troublesome is the nexus of transnational terrorists and 

problem states that possess or seek weapons of mass destruction, which 

increases the risk of such attacks against the United States. 

The Department of Defense supports the National Strategy for 

Homeland Security through two distinct but interrelated mission areas: 

homeland defense and civil support. Homeland defense is the protection 

of U.S. sovereignty, territory, domestic population, and critical 

infrastructure against external threats and aggression or other threats as 

directed by the President.6 The Department of Defense is responsible for 

homeland defense and is the lead or primary agency. The Department of 

Defense conducts homeland defense missions whenever the President, 

exercising his constitutional authority as Commander in Chief, authorizes 

military actions. Missions such as defending against an invasion of the 

United States, utilizing air and missile defenses are good examples. 

The homeland is confronted with a wide spectrum of potential threats 

on a daily basis. These range from traditional national security threats (air 

or ballistic missile attack) to law enforcement threats (drug and illegal 

smuggling). This spectrum is well-defined on both ends but is somewhat 

ambiguous in the center. It is this seam in the middle, where there is no 

clear line of responsibility for defending against threats, that 

responsibilities are not clearly defined. The lead agencies on either end 

are the Department of Defense and the Department of Homeland Security; 

the latter can be represented by any agencies within its five distinct 

directorates and two independent services – the Secret Service and Coast 

Guard (see Figure 2). Synchronization and integration of all instruments 

of national power is important to ensure successful planning and execution 

of homeland security. The Department of Defense is one of many federal 

agencies and organizations that is partly responsible for homeland 

security. It participates in interagency groups and processes, but is the 

principal or lead agency for homeland defense plans. It also works in 
Communications and Integration Enhancements to Improve Homeland Security . . . 9 

concert with other lead agencies in a supporting role for handling domestic 

incident management.

Spectrum of Threats to the Homeland

National 

Security 

Threats

Law 

Enforcement 

Threats

Military

Non-Military

“WAR”

Clearly military operations

Example: missile attack

“THE SEAM”

Not clearly military

Not clearly law enforcement

Example: maritime security

“CRIME”

Clearly law enforcement

Example: drug smuggling

Capabilities

Figure 2. The Seam 

Department of Defense in Civil Support 

For example, the Department of Defense’s role in the civil support 

mission area consists of support to United States civil authorities for 

domestic emergencies and for designated law enforcement within the 

scope of restrictions required by the Posse Comitatus Act and other 

support approved by the Secretary of Defense. The Secretary of Defense 

provides military assistance to United States civil authorities for domestic 

incidents as directed by the President and consistent with military 
10 . . . Communications and Integration Enhancements to Improve Homeland Security

readiness, Department of Defense directives, and the law.7

 Within these 

boundaries there are a number of factors to be considered when using 

active duty forces in this role. The primary one is the dilution of 

warfighting skills that would be a consequence of using vital training time 

devoted to maintaining the skills necessary to support civil authorities. 

One unique exception is the National Guard. The Guard isn’t restricted by 

the Posse Comitatus Act when in a state or Title 32 status, which allows it 

a broader spectrum of civil support participation. Guard units also have a 

Title 10 operational warfighting task as well as state/territory support to 

the governor for emergency tasking. 

National Guard Structure 

The National Guard Bureau, as a Joint Bureau, is the channel of 

communications between the Secretaries and Chiefs of the Army, Air 

Force, and all the states and territories on all matters pertaining to the 

National Guard. On behalf of the Secretary of the Army and the 

Secretary of the Air Force, the National Guard Bureau provides 

situational awareness on National Guard matters affecting homeland 

defense and defense support to civil authorities to the Office of the 

Secretary of Defense, the Combatant Commands, and the Joint Staff (see 

Figure 3). 

In accordance with direction from the Secretaries of the Army and 

the Air Force, the National Guard Bureau administers Department of 

Defense, Department of the Army, and Department of the Air Force 

policies, programs, and plans pertaining to National Guard matters, and 

facilitates the integration of federal and state activities. To the extent 

allowed by law, integration activities may include facilitation of mutual 

support among the states. The National Guard Bureau distributes and 

administers the budgets for the Army and Air National Guard. 
Communications and Integration Enhancements to Improve Homeland Security . . . 11 

President

SEC Defense Governors

SEC Army

Chief of Staff

SEC Air Force

Chief of Staff

Chief, NGB Adjutants

General

Vice CNGB, Director, 

ARNG 

Units

ANG 

Units

ANG

Vice CNGB, Director, 

ARNG

Director, Joint Staff 

NGB

Channel of 

Communications

Figure 3. The National Guard: Constitutionally Unique 

The main takeaway from this formal description is the great deal of 

latitude in how the National Guard can be used. It can interface and 

operate in all levels of response from the local to the national level. But, 

even more important, because of its access to information at all levels and 

its developing capabilities to respond to everything from a natural disaster 

to a catastrophic terrorist attack, the Guard should become the centerpiece 

for providing national decision makers the information needed to respond 

to events. Funding and implementing indigenous Guard abilities to define 

time-critical events is one way to greatly improve situational awareness 

during a homeland security crisis. A more detailed look at Guard 

capabilities that have recently been fielded will be covered after a look at 

how the Pentagon had to reinvent itself to adapt to events after the 

September 11, 2001, attacks. 
12 . . . Communications and Integration Enhancements to Improve Homeland Security

Impact of 9/11 on Department of Defense Activities 

The asymmetric threat environment resulting from the worldwide 

jihadist threats forced changes in the Department of Defense’s 

organization and emphasis on capabilities to prevent future attacks. A 

new command, U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM), was established 

October 1, 2002, to provide command and control of Department of 

Defense homeland defense efforts and to coordinate defense support of 

civil authorities. Northern Command defends America’s homeland – 

protecting our people, national power, and freedom of action.8

 Its area of 

responsibility includes defense of air, land, and sea approaches and 

encompasses the continental United States, Alaska, Canada, Mexico, and 

the surrounding water out to approximately 500 nautical miles. It also 

includes the Gulf of Mexico and the Straits of Florida. 

The command plans, organizes, and executes homeland defense and 

civil support missions, but has few permanently assigned forces. The 

command is assigned forces whenever necessary to execute missions, as 

ordered by the President and Secretary of Defense. Civil service 

employees and uniformed members representing all service branches work 

at U.S. Northern Command’s headquarters located at Peterson Air Force 

Base in Colorado Springs, Colorado.9

These missions present significant challenges, one of which is the 

requirement to plan and execute operations within a complex, civilmilitary, multi-echelon, intergovernmental and interagency environment. 

Another problem even more disconcerting is the lack of dedicated 

forces to address the broad spectrum of operations that the command is 

responsible to perform. When Northern Command opened, the command 

had about 150 personnel. Today, there are 1,200.10 This lack of personnel 

that is available to respond to events means that a slow response will be 

the best that can be achieved. This will be unacceptable in a catastrophic 

terrorist attack, especially one involving weapons of mass destruction 

where the loss of life is directly tied to an expeditious response. 

Northern Command’s civil support mission includes domestic disaster 

relief operations that occur during fires, hurricanes, floods, and 

earthquakes. Support also includes counter-drug operations and managing 

the consequences of a terrorist event employing a weapon of mass 
Communications and Integration Enhancements to Improve Homeland Security . . . 13 

destruction. The command provides assistance to a lead agency when 

tasked by Department of Defense. Per the Posse Comitatus Act, military 

forces can provide civil support, but cannot become directly involved in 

law enforcement. In providing civil support, Northern Command 

generally operates through established Joint Task Forces subordinate to 

the command. 

An emergency must exceed the capabilities of local, state, and federal 

agencies before Northern Command becomes involved. In most cases, 

support will be limited, localized, and specific. When the scope of the 

disaster is reduced to the point that the lead agency can again assume full 

control and management without military assistance, Northern Command 

will exit, leaving the on-scene experts to finish the job.11

In general, Northern Command is mainly relegated to planning for 

contingences and how to augment other government agencies who are in 

the lead. These are many great Americans trying to do great things in 

defense of the homeland, but they operate with a short span of control and 

in a very constrained environment. Trying to get information to maintain 

situational awareness from so many different agencies is a tall order that 

requires the effective collaboration of all sources and means of 

communication. 

Being able to effectively support the need for collaboration in such a 

complex environment will entail a new construct which defines 

capabilities, vision, and implementation details. The operating 

environment will need to support continuous situational awareness and 

collaboration at the national, state, and local level in order to effectively 

respond to incidents. Collaborative capabilities can improve efficiency 

and common understanding during all phases of incident response. 

Effective collaboration will harness the interaction among all response 

participants and during time-compressed operations should streamline 

decision making, integrating cooperative efforts during any natural, 

terrorist, or other manmade events. 

To complicate matters, this collaboration effort designed to achieve 

decision superiority is being driven by the U.S. military to meet its own 

specific requirements as well as those at home. The problem is that other 

agencies that work outside of the military have also designed their systems 

without consulting the Department of Defense. What we have now is a 

collection of systems that are not fully capable of interfacing with each 
14 . . . Communications and Integration Enhancements to Improve Homeland Security

other. The need to collaborate is intuitive to all in the responsible agencies 

in the federal government. The problem is that a number of agencies in 

homeland security and other branches of government have developed their 

own collaboration processes. The resulting collection of stovepiped 

architectures each synthesize and prioritize information pertinent to their 

own agencies but do not always forward information needed by other 

agencies in order to build overall situational awareness. This shortfall 

could be critical in a future catastrophic terrorist attack. 

The recent inability to communicate between agencies in the 

aftermath of Hurricane Katrina might pale in comparison to a situation 

such as a weapon of mass destruction attack. The chaos in such an event 

would dictate a rapid assessment of the situation and a coordinated timely 

response. Where and who would be called to build the situational 

awareness brief for national decision makers? If the event was in a large 

city, much of the information will be derived from local and national news 

channels. This is a good queuing source but it doesn’t answer questions 

such as what forces are available to respond, what is the hot zone, and 

what facilities are nearby to help with consequence management. 

This type of attack is exactly why the National Guard is developing 

capabilities to enable a response anywhere across the country. Unlike 

Northern Command, the Guard has forces forward deployed in each state 

and territory that would be available to respond in a short time. One of the 

key Guard assets in this scenario that could be postured to provide answers 

to the previous questions are the Joint Force Headquarters, available in 

each state and territory. These 54 headquarters, pushing information to 

the central National Guard Bureau Joint Operations Center, would provide 

details of what type of attack has taken place by relaying information from 

local responders. It would then follow this initial information with the 

status of Guard response, and, if pushed out to all state and federal 

government agencies, will focus attention on the attack and also raise 

awareness for other potential attacks in case this was a diversion. This 

information, in most instances, will be provided by the 55 Weapons of 

Mass Destruction-Civil Support Teams (WMD-CSTs) that are being stood 

up in each state and territory. Having details such as the type of weapon 

used, how large of an area is contaminated, and a realistic estimation of 

casualty numbers will be priority information for the national leadership 

when formulating response actions. This rapid dissemination of on-site 
Communications and Integration Enhancements to Improve Homeland Security . . . 15 

information must become a priority across the interagency networks and 

would augment and complete the information that already may be 

available to those operations centers. 

Situational Awareness and United States 

Joint Forces Command 

The lead for military architecture is the U.S. Joint Forces Command, 

with its transformational Collaborative Information Environment 

becoming the standard. Collaboration capabilities can affect all aspects of 

joint operations. Although these capabilities can improve efficiency and 

common understanding during routine, peacetime interaction among 

participants, their potential value is most evident during time-compressed 

operations associated with combat and intense non-combat operations. 

These capabilities are important to Department of Defense efforts to 

transform the way we plan and execute joint operations. To accomplish 

this transformational task, we must improve collaboration among 

combatant commands, the armed services, agencies, and multinational 

partners. An environment of collaboration can enable and integrate such a 

cooperative effort among these organizations and help the joint force 

achieve decision superiority.12 This definition of collaboration for the 

military’s battlespace is also applicable for the other federal agencies that 

have to respond to homeland security events across the spectrum of 

operations. 

A collaborative environment is one in which participants share data, 

perceptions, ideas, information, knowledge, and concepts. Collaboration 

has been an inherent element of operations and warfare. Over time 

technology has increased our ability to collaborate. Today’s video, 

electronic mail, collaborative tools, secure voice, and data capabilities 

allow virtual meetings with a large number of participants to develop 

courses of action in the planning and execution of joint operations. 

Shared situational awareness and the ability to make better decisions 

faster then an adversary depend on a number of capabilities inherent in the 

system: 

• collaborative tools, 
16 . . . Communications and Integration Enhancements to Improve Homeland Security

• decision support tools, 

• a virtual information warehouse, 

• common operational pictures, 

• web-based enterprise portal, and 

• knowledge management. 

All of these systems are being refined and, most importantly, are 

being standardized to provide a near real-time environment that 

synthesizes all source information and then quickly translates it into 

knowledge that defines solutions that are actionable and relevant. This 

emerging collaboration capability with its revolutionary parallel, rather 

than serial, information processing was integral to National Guard 

planning in shaping the environment for mitigating homeland defense and 

civil support events. It resulted in the collaborative effort with Northern 

Command that established the Joint Continental United States 

Communications Support Environment (JCCSE) as the way ahead for the 

collaborative evolution of capabilities. 

This program was a result of recommendations of the Defense 

Science Board 2003 Summer Study on the Department of Defense’s Roles 

and Missions in Homeland Security. The Defense Science Board found 

that: “By nature, emergency response is local. Therefore, the national 

strategy for Homeland Security requires robust local, state, and regional 

preparedness. The Department of Defense has a forward deployed [an 

assertion clearly intended to address CONUS and territories, not 

OCONUS], community-based military force with long-standing, mature 

relationships with principal players in the domestic emergency response 

community that can be used for Homeland Defense and Defense Support 

to Civil Authorities missions. This resource is the National Guard.”13

On July 24, 2003, the Chief of the National Guard Bureau, 

Lieutentant General Blum, introduced a proposal to initiate a number of 

Guard capabilities to address the Defense Science Board’s study. The 

main ones that will be described form a thesis of this paper: 

• The Joint Force Headquarters-State Organizations; 

• Joint Continental United States Communications Support 

Environment Program; 
Communications and Integration Enhancements to Improve Homeland Security . . . 17

• Weapons of Mass Destruction-Civil Support Teams (WMD-CSTs); 

• Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-yield 

Explosive (CBRNE) Enhanced Response Force Packages 

(CERFPs); and 

• National Guard Quick and Rapid Reaction Force. 

54 Joint Force Headquarters-State Organizations 

The key enabler to the Collaborative Information Environment 

required by the Department of Defense is the reorganization of the 

separate Army National Guard and Air National Guard Headquarters of 

the 54 states and territories into 54 Joint Force Headquarters-State 

organizations, each with a 24/7 joint operations center tailored to the needs 

of that particular state or territory. 

Joint Continental United States Communications Support 

Environment program is an umbrella concept that enables the reliable and 

timely flow of key information among all 54 Joint Operations Centers and 

the National Guard Bureau Joint Operations Center. It is a construct for a 

communications and information technology system that consolidates the 

National Guard’s geographically dispersed networks together in a 

communications bridge. Unfortunately, a construct doesn’t yet allow for 

the gathering or collection of intelligence, law enforcement information, 

or other data. Rather, it is a technical solution to a communications 

bottleneck. The Joint Continental United States Communications Support 

Environment program will focus on linking stakeholders to enable the 

reliable and timely flow of vital information that supports the spectrum of 

key information required for homeland defense, defense support to civil 

authorities, and other mission needs. This environment will provide 

valuable communications support to federal, state and territorial, local, 

tribal, and private-sector response efforts when responding to incidents. 

This will streamline efforts and promote a correlated unity of effort in 

emergency situations. 

An important aspect of the Joint Continental United States 

Communications Support Environment program system of systems is the 

Common Operating Picture, a database and visual reference that can be 
18 . . . Communications and Integration Enhancements to Improve Homeland Security

used for decision making. The information that can be derived from this 

Common Operating Picture is the key to effective response to any 

category of events. It compiles all of the military data, both Guard and 

Title 10, together with critical infrastructure, state, and local information 

that can be displayed for any type of event. The problem is that, so far, 

this information has not been mainlined for interagency use and no 

techniques and procedures have been developed to disseminate it for 

national leadership decision making. However, there is a possible wayahead to fix this problem. 

A Suggestion: Use the Domestic Event/Threat 

Conferencing System 

There is an effective model in place that has been used since the 

standup of U.S. Northern Command. It is the Domestic Event/Threat 

Conferencing System. This is a telephone conference call that is run 

through a Red Switch secure communications system that was developed 

in order to rapidly convey possible attack information to the President and 

Secretary of Defense. It mainly dealt with potential nuclear 

InterContinental Ballistic Missiles or strategic aviation attack, but also 

addressed other significant events. Because of the short flight times of 

InterContinental Ballistic Missiles, there were strict timelines and the 

requirement for unambiguous data. It was a North American Aerospace 

Defense Command responsibility and until recently the command center 

was located in Cheyenne Mountain Air Force Station. The United States 

developed a redundant system that utilized technical means mainly based 

on infrared detecting satellites and ground-based radars to give initial 

warning indicators.

After September 11, 2001, it became apparent that a similar process 

would need to be developed to deal with domestic attacks. It was during 

the critical time between the official standup of Northern Command and 

the growth phase until Initial Operational Capability of the command that 

the Cheyenne Mountain Operations Center had a Northern Command 

representative called the Domestic Events Officer assigned to perform 

24/7 operations to support Northern Command. It was during this critical 
Communications and Integration Enhancements to Improve Homeland Security . . . 19 

period while the command was trying to get its bearing, and an operations 

center was being built to support operations, that a procedure was 

developed to relay information on domestic activity. 

Because it was centered on supporting the North American Aerospace 

Defense Command during this period, the Domestic Event/Threat 

Conferencing system evolved from and mimicked the attack warning 

conferencing system. Its database and checklists were built from that 

perspective, but was not all-source, and mainly relied on open source 

materials for information. Still the process matured rapidly and was used 

successfully on occasions like the shuttle disaster and the G-8 conference. 

It was exercised daily on swing shift Command Center exercises. Again, 

the major shortfall was the lack of dedicated resources to provide 

indications and warning. The 24-hour news channels were the primary 

source of information and, because of that, it was mainly reactive. 

When the Joint Operations Center, which was originally called the 

Domestic Warning Center, was stood up in Building Two at Peterson Air 

Force Base, a separate operational concept was developed. Even though 

there was more manpower in the Domestic Warning Center to develop the 

needed situational awareness, they were not effective in supporting the 

Domestic Conferencing requirements. The synergies of both centers were 

not fully utilized and were hindered due to the separation of resources. 

Recently, the announcement was made that the two operations centers 

would be combined and that Cheyenne Mountain would become a warm 

backup. Hopefully, this will streamline and prioritize the dissemination of 

information to national decision makers. 

Even though this is a major improvement, it still doesn’t go far 

enough in the collaboration arena and still hasn’t developed the network 

needed to effectively monitor domestic activity. However, there is a 

solution in sight if only the National Guard structure and capabilities are 

capitalized on to provide decision makers with the solution for rapidly 

pushing and pulling domestic information. 

The National Guard has both federal and state responsibilities 

specified in the Constitution of the United States. Title 10 and 32 of the 

United States Code define the organized militia and how it supports the 

governors and the President in war and during domestic contingencies. 

The dual status of the National Guard enables response in either a State 

(Title 32) or Federal (Title 10) capacity (see Figure 4). 
20 . . . Communications and Integration Enhancements to Improve Homeland Security

Army 

& 

Air 

National 

Guard

Title 32

State 

Militia

Title 10

Federal 

Reserve

Warfight

Homeland Defense

Homeland Security

State Mission

Domestic Mission

Figure 4. The National Guard: Dual Status/Dual Mission 

In a tiered response to incidents, with all emergencies happening at 

the local level, the Guard will be the first military responders in most 

instances arriving after local responders have initiated their activities (see 

Figure 5). This is because the Governor will employ his/her Guard assets 

in State Active Duty or Title 32 status as soon as a military capability is 

needed to augment civilian emergency response capabilities. During 

overwhelming national emergencies the President can activate or 

federalize (Title 10) the Guard and still have the existing communications 

into the local responder’s networks. Since 9/11 there has been an ongoing 

transformation of the National Guard to enhance its capabilities to 

participate in both the expeditionary war fighting and homeland defense 

and civil support contingencies required by the Goldwater-Nichols Act. 

This is an ongoing and substantial change to the National Guard and has 

resulted in this force being operationally focused, resulting in a ready, 

relevant, and accessible capability. This dual-use capability will come 
Communications and Integration Enhancements to Improve Homeland Security . . . 21 

with an additional cost in training and equipment expense. Because the 

Army and Air Force depend upon the Guard to support operations 

overseas, there will be a need to train replacement units as forces rotate 

through the expeditionary role. This will ultimately provide the nation 

with a broadly trained homeland security force, but it must be monitored 

closely to make sure that it doesn’t impact recruiting. 

Active Duty 

Forces

Other Military 

Resources Federalized NATIONAL GUARD

Department of Homeland PRESIDENT Security (FEMA) Federal Declaration

NATIONAL GUARD 

from Supporting States

STATE AGENCIES 

from Supporting States

NATIONAL GUARD

STATE EMERGENCY 

MANAGEMENT AGENCY

STATE AGENCIES

GOVERNOR 

State Declaration

Interstate Emergency 

Assistance Compacts

Local Civil Authorities 

Emergency Responders

DISASTER

NEARLY ALL MISSIONS ARE PERFORMED BELOW THIS LEVEL!

Figure 5. The National Guard: Tiered Response 

The Guard is stationed in 3,300 communities (54 states, territories, 

and D.C.), existing in 2,700 armories and 500 Air National Guard (ANG) 

facilities nationwide.14 It is this grassroots presence and proximity to local 

law enforcement, first responders, and local government agencies that 

needs to be used in supporting neighboring communities in times of crisis, 

both up and down the collaborative environment (see Figure 6). 
22 . . . Communications and Integration Enhancements to Improve Homeland Security

When You Call Out The Guard, You Call Out America

Figure 6. Approximately 3,300 National Guard Locations Nationwide 

In addition to situational awareness, National Guard forces also 

possess many of the key capabilities needed for homeland defense and 

civil support operations. These capabilities range from air defense, 

transportation, intelligence, communications, security, medical, and 

chemical decontamination expertise. A synopsis of developing National 

Guard capabilities follows. 

Weapons of Mass Destruction-Civil Support Teams 

The Guard has been shaping forces for Homeland Security since 

1999. This was the year that Congress funded the formation of Weapons 

of Mass Destruction-Civil Support Teams (WMD-CSTs) within the 

National Guard. Congress has authorized and funded 55 WMD-CSTs 
Communications and Integration Enhancements to Improve Homeland Security . . . 23 

which are designed to provide direct assistance to civilian emergency 

responders. 

Every state, territory, and the District of Columbia will have a team, 

with California having two teams, for a total of 55 to meet congressional 

intent and mandate.15 These teams are specially trained to provide 

expertise to first tier local responders in the event of a chemical, 

biological, radiological, nuclear, or high explosive attack on the homeland. 

These teams have proven to be very effective and all 55 teams will be 

certified by early 2007. 

A WMD-CST is composed of 22 people – seven officers and fifteen 

enlisted specialists that come from both the Army and Air National Guard. 

Teams are on standby 24/7 and can have an advanced echelon deployed 

within 90 minutes.16 Assigned vehicles consist of four unique capable 

platforms and two to four general purpose vehicles. The four specialized 

vehicles are a command vehicle, operations van, a communications 

vehicle called a Unified Command Suite which provides a broad range of 

communications capabilities including satellite communications, and an 

Analytical Laboratory System van which contains a full suite of analysis 

equipment to support the medical team. 

A WMD-CST normally deploys via surface travel out to 250 miles, 

but can be airlifted if distances are greater than that. The WMD-CST 

commander can advise the incident commander as to the type and level of 

hazard present, possible courses of action, and additional National Guard 

assets that are available. Typically, WMD-CSTs would be second 

responders in crises whereas local responders would be the first 

responders. 

The robust communications capability of the Unified Command Suite 

allows the WMD-CST to contact a wide range of technical experts as well 

as push incident status up channel to national decision makers. The New 

York National Guard’s 2nd Civil Support Team was the first organized 

unit of any military service or component to arrive at Ground Zero on the 

morning of September 11, 2001, sampling the air to ensure that no 

biological or chemical contaminants were present and providing critical 

communications capabilities.17

When requested by civil authorities and with the governor’s approval, 

the teams rapidly deploy to an actual or suspected domestic incident site, 

conduct identification of agents/substances, assess the potential effects of 
24 . . . Communications and Integration Enhancements to Improve Homeland Security

the weapons of mass destruction incident, advise local authorities on 

managing the results of the attack and assist with appropriate requests for 

additional support in order to minimize the impact on the civilian 

populace. The teams are equipped with a mobile laboratory capable of 

identifying chemical or biological materials, and with a sophisticated 

communications suite that can link the incident site with other local, state, 

and federal agencies and military headquarters. This combination of skill 

and equipment makes these teams decisive contributors to public order, 

stability of government, and public confidence in our national defense. 

The timely and effective response of these teams to the needs of the 

emergency response community has resulted in their acceptance as 

valuable and integral members of the first military response to terrorism.18

CBRNE Enhanced Response Force Packages 

(CERFPs) 

Although WMD-CSTs can bring a significant response capability to an 

incident or terrorist attack in America, they can’t do it all. They have 

limited abilities to treat casualties, decontaminate personnel, extract victims 

from rubble, and don’t have the depth to provide security. For these tasks, 

in the last two years the Guard has stood up a dozen Chemical, Biological, 

Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosive (CBRNE) Enhanced 

Response Force Packages (CERFPs). Congress in 2006 directed and 

funded an additional 5 such units to increase this response capability to 17 

teams, stationed strategically across the country. These CBRNE Enhanced 

Response Force Packages augment WMD-CSTs in response to weapons of 

mass destruction. They leverage existing warfighting units – medical, 

engineer, chemical, and other branches – and are given additional training 

and equipment to provide the weapons of mass destruction response 

capability that this country needs.19

The first dozen CBRNE Enhanced Response Force Packages were 

strategically positioned to cover all ten Federal Emergency Management 

Agency regions and provide the nation a weapon of mass destruction 

response. Each package has four capabilities: search and extraction, 

decontamination, medical, and command and control. The units have a 
Communications and Integration Enhancements to Improve Homeland Security . . . 25 

joint composition: an Army National Guard engineer battalion handles 

search and extraction, an Army Guard chemical battalion does the 

decontamination, and an Air Guard medical group provides the medical 

element.20 These CERFP teams will provide a follow-on phased 

capability that will mitigate the potential effects of a weapon of mass 

destruction incident that has been assessed by a WMD-CST. In the initial 

hours of an incident, a regional CBRNE Enhanced Response Force 

Package will deploy to the incident site and provide follow-on capability 

to locate and extract victims from a contaminated environment, perform 

medical triage and treatment, and then perform mass patient/casualty 

decontamination in support of civil first responders. 

CERFP Search and Extraction Element 

The Search and Extraction Elements are responsible for conducting 

casualty search and extraction at the incident site. Extraction levels of 

capability are defined as basic, light, medium, and heavy operations. The 

Search and Extraction Elements have received training in accordance with 

the National Fire Protection Association 1006 Standard for Rescue 

Technician Professional Qualifications. Special emphasis is on rescuer 

safety, breaching/breaking, debris lifting and moving, rigging techniques, 

and basic shoring concepts. This is the same type of training that civilian 

urban search and rescue teams receive, which minimizes integration of 

team members into operations. If the incident site is contaminated by 

radiation, the maximum exposure times will be calculated before sending 

personnel in to conduct searches. The exposure of rescue personnel will 

be monitored to reduce the risk that rescuers do not become casualties. 

CERFP Decontamination Elements 

The Decontamination Elements conduct ambulatory and nonambulatory patient decontamination. After the WMD-CST has conducted 

a sweep of the incident site and determined the type and level of 

contamination present, the area is cordoned off, if possible, and entry 

control points are established. Using this information, the 

Decontamination Element develops a decontamination action plan which 

includes the correct procedures and materials for the decontamination 

process. Lines are set up at entry control points to process patients coming 
26 . . . Communications and Integration Enhancements to Improve Homeland Security

out of the hot zone, ensuring that no contamination is spread outside the 

contaminated area. Injured patients are processed under the supervision of 

medical personnel to ensure that the decontamination procedure doesn’t 

cause further injury. 

CERFP Medical Elements 

The Medical Elements provide sophisticated and short duration, prehospital emergency medical treatment during a chemical, biological, 

radiological, nuclear, or high-yield explosive response at an incident site. 

This element works with decontamination and/or casualty extraction teams 

to provide medical triage, treatment, and stabilization prior to evacuation. 

It is capable of working in coordination with the Disaster Medical 

Assistance Team under the auspices of the National Disaster Medical 

System. The Medical Element is prepared to respond to a wide range of 

issues including physical injury caused by blast effect and collapsing 

structures, stress related issues, radiation exposure, and chemical and 

biological contamination. The goal of the team is to make sure that 

victims are thoroughly decontaminated and stabilized before being moved 

to permanent medical facilities. 

Guard Quick Response Forces 

A National Guard Quick Response Force will provide security for the 

WMD-CST and CBRNE Enhanced Response Force Package during an 

incident. This is a force that is available to be tasked in each state and 

territory, a ready combat arms force capable of responding at the request 

of the governor or the President. These forces are a critical element in the 

first line of counter-terrorism defense. The package is tailored to respond 

to an incident well ahead of federal assets and deploy with the capability 

to be self-sustaining for 48 hours. This is a unit consisting of 50 to 75 

personnel sent to the site within 4 hours, and a follow-on force of up to 

400 personnel capable of arriving within 24 hours.21 These forces are 

formed from current Guard units and personnel resources, keeping the 

costs for these capabilities low. The usual employment and organization 

for these forces are as a temporary task force. 
Communications and Integration Enhancements to Improve Homeland Security . . . 27

National Guard Can Provide Forces and 

Situational Awareness in Crises 

The National Guard has played a critical role in ensuring the nation’s 

security since its inception on December 13, 1636. It was on this date that 

the Massachusetts Bay Colony mandated that its militia companies be 

organized into the first three militia regiments in North America.22 It 

continues to transform as an organization in order to counter any terrorist 

threats that may arise, as well as stand ready to respond to other types of 

domestic emergencies. It maintains links to state and local emergency 

responders because the Guard is a part of the local community. If we take 

the National Guard’s preponderance of capabilities and the comprehensive 

collaborative environment that has been coordinated with U.S. Northern 

Command to its logical conclusion, then it is apparent that it should play a 

more pivotal role in providing the national decision makers the needed 

information for responding to a domestic event. The Guard’s dual status 

of national and local asset, and being located in the local community, 

allows it to provide a collaborative environment that can move critical 

information faster than any other agency; this fact cannot be stressed 

enough. Such a change will not be a panacea, but if given a larger role to 

play, the Guard using a Domestic Event Conferencing model would 

provide better situational awareness for decision makers than primary 

dependence on the 24-hour news channel as is now the case. This will be 

the beginning of an unambiguous domestic response capability 

comparable to that seen in the current military attack warning systems. 

The added benefit is that using Guard personnel and equipment would cost 

a fraction of what it otherwise would be for a dedicated active duty force. 

The National Guard can better protect the homeland and should be given 

this larger situational awareness enhancing role. It would be a bargain – 

the best and most cost-effective use of taxpayer dollars. 

29 

Notes 

1. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, The 9/11 

Commission Report, (New York, NY, W.W. Norton & Co., 2004), 16. 

2. Ibid., 17. 

3. United States Department of Homeland Security, Wikipedia, On-line, Internet, 5 

February 2007, available from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Department_ 

of_Homeland_Security. 

4. Joint Publication 3-26, Homeland Security, 2 August 2005, v. 

5. The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America, March 2005, 2. 

6. Joint Publication 3-26, Homeland Security, 2 August 2005, vi. 

7. Ibid. 

8. NORTHCOM Homepage Online, “About Us,” On-line, Internet, 5 February 

2007, available from http://www.northcom.mil. 

9. Ibid. 

10. “Now 1,200 strong, NORTHCOM marks 4th Anniversary,” The Colorado 

Springs Gazette, 1 October 2006, On-line, Internet, 19 June 2007, available from 

http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qn4191/ is_20061001/ai_n16804699. 

11. NORTHCOM Homepage Online. 

12. The Joint Warfighting Center Joint Doctrine Series, Pamphlet 5, 1 June 2004, 

Preface. 

13. Defense Science Board (2003) Summer Study on DoD’s Roles and Missions in 

Homeland Security. 

14. NGB Orientation Brief, May 2006, Slide 26. 

15. William Matthews, “Over Tasked?,” National Guard, November 2006, 26, Online, Internet, 19 June 2007, available from www.ngaus.org/ngaus/files/ccLibraryFiles/ 

Filename/000000002029/cst%20story.pdf?False. 

16. Ibid., 27. 
30 . . . Communications and Integration Enhancements to Improve Homeland Security

17. “The National Guard Transforming to an Operational Force,” Joint Force 

Quarterly, 4th Quarter 2006, 15. 

18. Ibid. 

19. H. Steven Blum, “Indelible Mark,” National Guard, September 2006, 45, Online, Internet, 19 June 2007, available from www.ngaus.org/content.asp?bid=5563. 

20. Matthews, “Over Tasked,” 28. 

21. Ibid. 

22. Charles Joseph Gross, The Air National Guard and the American Military 

Tradition, (Washington D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1995), 2.