UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 13-4429

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

TREMAINE KENDRICK JETER, a/k/a Toby,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

South Carolina, at Spartanburg. G. Ross Anderson, Jr., Senior 

District Judge. (7:02-cr-00248-GRA-17)

Submitted: January 22, 2014 Decided: February 6, 2014

Before MOTZ and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior 

Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

David W. Plowden, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Greenville, 

South Carolina, for Appellant. Elizabeth Jean Howard, Assistant 

United States Attorney, Greenville, South Carolina, for 

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Tremaine Jeter appeals the district court’s judgment 

sentencing him to twenty-two months’ imprisonment after 

revocation of his supervised release. On appeal, Jeter’s 

counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 

U.S. 738 (1967), questioning whether Jeter’s revocation sentence 

is plainly unreasonable. Although notified of his right to file 

a supplemental brief, Jeter has not done so. We affirm.

The district court has broad discretion to impose a 

sentence upon revoking a defendant’s supervised release. United 

States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 547 (4th Cir. 2010). Thus, we

will affirm a sentence imposed after revocation of supervised 

release if it is within the governing statutory range and is not 

plainly unreasonable. United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 

439-40 (4th Cir. 2006). “[W]e follow generally the procedural 

and substantive considerations that we employ in our review of

original sentences, . . . with some necessary modifications to 

take into account the unique nature of supervised release 

revocation sentences.” Id. at 438-39.

A sentence is procedurally reasonable if the district 

court has considered the Policy Statements contained in Chapter 

Seven of the Guidelines and the applicable 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) 

(2012) factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) (2012), 

Crudup, 461 F.3d at 440, and has adequately explained the 
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sentence chosen, though it need not explain the sentence in as 

much detail as when imposing the original sentence. Thompson, 

595 F.3d at 547. A sentence is substantively reasonable if the 

district court states a proper basis for its imposition of a 

sentence up to the statutory maximum. Crudup, 461 F.3d at 440.

The district court based the sentence imposed on Jeter 

in part on the seriousness of the offense that led to the 

revocation of Jeter’s supervised release and the need to provide 

just punishment, factors derived from § 3553(a)(2)(A), which are

not factors that the district court is authorized to consider 

when revoking a term of supervised release under § 3583(e). 

However, “a district court’s reference to the § 3553(a)(2)(A) 

sentencing considerations, without more, [does not]

automatically render a revocation sentence unreasonable.” 

United States v. Webb, __ F.3d __, __, 2013 WL 6671392, at *3 

(4th Cir. Dec. 19, 2013). We conclude that the district court’s 

consideration of these factors was substantially in conjunction 

with the enumerated § 3553(a) factors and, therefore, that its 

sentence was not plainly unreasonable. Id. In addition, we 

conclude that the district court sufficiently stated its reasons 

for imposing its release revocation sentence, which was below 

the statutory maximum term of imprisonment. 

In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record 

in this case and have found no meritorious grounds for appeal. 
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We therefore affirm the district court’s revocation judgment. 

This court requires that counsel inform Jeter, in writing, of 

the right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for 

further review. If Jeter requests that a petition be filed, but 

counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then 

counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from 

representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof 

was served on Jeter.

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and 

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 

before this court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process.

AFFIRMED