Savage Wars of Peace:

Case Studies of 

Pacification

in the Philippines, 

1900–1902

Robert D. Ramsey III

The Long War Series

Occasional Paper 24

Combat Studies Institute Press

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

OP 24

Savage Wars of Peace:

Case Studies of 

Pacification

in the Philippines, 

1900–1902

Robert D. Ramsey III

Combat Studies Institute Press

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 

OOPP 24
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Ramsey, Robert D., 1946-

 Savage wars of peace : case studies of pacification in the Philippines, 1900-

1902 / Robert D. Ramsey III.

 p. cm. -- (Long war series occasional paper ; 24)

 Includes bibliographical references.

 1. Philippines--History--Philippine American War, 1899-1902. I. Title. II. 

Series.

 DS679.R36 2007

 959.9’031--dc22

 2007028938

F ro as le t yb eh S epu ri tn e edn tn fo D co mu e tn S.U ,s G . evo r emn tn P ri itn O gn ffice

I tn er en t: tskoob ro e P vog.opg. enoh : lot l f ree ( )668 -215 ;0081 D C a re ( a )202 -215 0081

Fa :x ( )202 -215 aM 4012 il: I potS DCC W , ihsa tgn no D , C -20402 1000

ISBN 978-0-16-078950-2

CSI Press publications cover a variety of military history 

topics. The views expressed in this CSI Press publication 

are those of the author(s) and not necessarily those of the 

Department of the Army or the Department of Defense. A 

full list of CSI Press publications, many of them available 

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official seal on any republication of this material without the expressed written 

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Official Editions only. The Superintendent of 

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requests that any reprinted edition clearly be labeled as a copy of the authentic 

work with a new ISBN.
iii

Foreword

Consider the following: The United States is engaged in what some 

political and media leaders call an immoral war, a war that did not have to 

be fought. After a relatively easy initial conquest, the US Army finds itself 

faced with armed resistance to US occupation. US strategic goals have 

changed since the war began; domestic political opposition increases as 

insurgent activities prolong the war. Insurgent leaders monitor US domestic politics and adjust their strategy accordingly. US Army Soldiers adapt 

to the uncertainty and employ novel techniques to complex military and 

nonmilitary problems in a land where they are strangers and about which 

they have little understanding. Does this sound familiar? It should, but 

this description does not depict events from 2003 to 2007 in the Middle 

East—it describes events from 1898 to 1902 in the Philippines.

Combat Studies Institute (CSI) is pleased to publish its 24th Long 

War Series Occasional Paper, Savage Wars of Peace: Case Studies of 

Pacification in the Philippines, 1900–1902, by CSI historian Robert 

Ramsey. In it he analyzes case studies from two key Philippine military 

districts and highlights several themes that are relevant to today’s ongoing 

operations in the Long War. Between 1899 and 1902 the US Army was 

successful in defeating Filipino resistance to American occupation using 

what military leaders at the time called a combination of attraction and 

coercion. However, success came only after initial setbacks, disappointments, and significant changes in leadership, military strategy, and political adaptation.

In the two regions of the Luzon Island analyzed in this occasional 

paper, Army leaders employed a mix of political and economic incentives, 

combined with military actions and strict martial law to subdue the resistance. The geographic isolation of the insurrectos on the Philippine archipelago was also an advantage for US forces. The capture of key insurrecto

leaders provided critical intelligence, and their post-capture pledge of support for the new government helped break the resistance by 1902.

This work highlights, among many other themes, the importance of perseverance, adaptability, and cultural understanding. Written at the request 

of the Command and General Staff College for use in their curriculum, 

we believe this occasional paper will be a valuable addition to the professional development of all Army leaders. CSI—The Past Is Prologue!

Timothy R. Reese

Colonel, Armor

Director, Combat Studies Institute

v

Acknowledgments

No one completes a project such as this by himself. Among those 

requiring special thanks are US Army Command and General Staff College 

faculty member Dennis K. Clark for suggesting this project; Combined 

Arms Research Library archivist Elizabeth Merrifield for gathering 

materials in a short time; Dr. William G. Robertson and COL Timothy R. 

Reese for supporting this effort and for reviewing the manuscript; Robin 

Kern for making the maps; and Betty Weigand for her attentive editing 

that produced a better product. Without the support and effort of those 

above, as well as others, I could not have completed this work in the time 

permitted. However, as always, responsibility for errors in fact or judgment 

rests with me alone.

vii

Contents

Page

Foreword ................................................................................................ iii

Acknowledgments ....................................................................................v

Chapter 1. The American Conquest of the Philippines, 1898–1900 .....1

The Philippines ....................................................................2

Filipinos ...............................................................................5

Filipino Revolutionaries or Insurrectos ...............................8

American Conquest of the Philippines ..............................11

Insurrectos Shift to Guerrilla Warfare ...............................23

Chapter 2. Pacification of the Ilocano Provinces: First District, 

Department of Northern Luzon, 1900–1901 ...............31

The Ilocos .......................................................................... 33

Ilocanos ..............................................................................36

Ilocano Insurrectos .............................................................39

American Military Operations ...........................................44

Situation in the Philippines, July 1901 ...............................63

Chapter 3. Pacification of the Tagalog Provinces: Second 

District, Department of Southern Luzon/

Third Separate Brigade, Department of North 

Philippines, 1900–1902 ...............................................71

Tagalog Provinces—Batangas, Laguna, and Tayabas ........73

Tagalogs ..............................................................................75

Tagalog Insurrectos ............................................................77

American Military Operations ...........................................80

Situation in the Philippines, July 1902 .............................102

Chapter 4. Observations ....................................................................111

Center of Gravity—Filipinos ...........................................114

Antagonists—Filipino Insurrectos ...................................115

Protagonists—American Army ........................................115

Insights of the American Counterinsurgency in the 

Philippines .................................................................117

Bibliography .....................................................................................125

Appendix A. Chronology......................................................................129

Appendix B. General Orders 100 [Lieber Code] .................................135

Appendix C. Proclamation Issued by Major General Arthur 

MacArthur on 20 December 1900 ............................159
viii

Page

Appendix D. Extract of Message from President Theodore 

Roosevelt to the US Army, 4 July 1902 .....................163

About the Author ..................................................................................167

Maps

1. The Philippines ..................................................................................3

2. Luzon ...............................................................................................15

3. The Ilocos in northwest Luzon ........................................................32

4. Tinio Brigade area of operations .....................................................41

5. First District, Department of Northern Luzon .................................46

6. Tagalog provinces in southwestern Luzon ......................................72

7. Department of Southern Luzon .......................................................81

8. Third Separate Brigade, Department of North Philippines .............96

Tables

1. 1902 Data on Ilocano Provinces ......................................................35

2. Division of the Philippines Data on Insurrectos, September 

to December 1900 ...........................................................................55

3. Division of the Philippines Statistics, 30 June 1901 .......................64

4. 1902 Data on Second District Provinces .........................................74


Chapter 1

The American Conquest of the Philippines, 1898–1900

What nation was ever able to write an accurate programme 

on the war upon which it was entering, much less decree 

in advance the scope of its results? Congress can declare 

war, but a higher power decrees its bounds and fixes its 

relations and responsibilities. The President can direct the 

movement of soldiers on the field and fleets upon the sea, 

but he can not foresee the close of such movements or 

prescribe their limits. He can not anticipate or avoid the 

consequences, but he must meet them. No accurate map 

of nations engaged in war can be traced until the war is 

over, nor can the measure of responsibility be fixed till the 

last gun is fired and the verdict embodied in the stipulation of peace.

President William McKinley, 16 February 18991

President McKinley made the above remarks in his defense of 

the United States (US) acquisition of the Philippines at the end of the 

Spanish–American War. US Secretary of State John Hay described the 

Spanish–American War as a brief, “splendid little war”2 fought primarily over events in Cuba. However, American naval action at Manila Bay 

required Army forces for service in the Philippines. A brief campaign by 

the newly raised American VIII Corps, working with local Filipino forces, 

defeated the Spanish in Manila by mid-August 1898. Uncertainty as to 

American objectives created tension for months with the Filipino revolutionary government whose goal was independence. When the United States 

purchased the Philippines from Spain in the Treaty of Paris of December 

1898, the Filipino revolutionaries hoped the US Senate would fail to ratify 

this unpopular treaty. Then, on 4 February 1899, war broke out between 

the American units in Manila and the Filipino forces surrounding the town. 

For the Filipino revolutionaries, the war would be two-phased: a brief conventional war of defeats followed by a protracted guerrilla war. For the 

American Army in the Philippines, it would become a 40-month struggle 

during which practically the entire US Army would see service.

This study will examine the attempts to pacify the Philippines by 

focusing on the actions in two American districts on the island of Luzon. To 

understand what American commanders confronted and their subsequent 

actions, it is necessary to look at the setting of each area, the population, 

the insurgent3 organization, and the American Army operations. This first 
chapter provides a brief background as context for the following two 

chapters. Chapter 2 focuses on the pacification of the Ilocano region in 

northwest Luzon, and chapter 3 focuses on the pacification of the Tagalog 

region in southwestern Luzon. In conclusion, chapter 4 provides an 

assessment of the two case studies. A chronology of events is provided in 

appendix A.

The Philippines

The Philippine archipelago—ceded by Spain after 330 years of occupation to the United States—lay off the coast of Southeast Asia. Its 3,141

islands were bounded by the Pacific Ocean to the east, Borneo and the 

Celebes Sea to the south, and the South China Sea to the west and north 

(see map 1).4 The size of the area was slightly less than the eastern half 

of the United States. The land area was greater than the size of the New 

England states, New York, and New Jersey combined. The two islands of 

Mindanao and Luzon made up almost 75 percent of the land area.5 Of volcanic origin and prone to earthquakes, the islands were mountainous with 

narrow coastal plains and interior valleys and plains. Although it varied by 

elevation, the vegetation was tropical with jungle, thick vegetation in lowlying swampy areas, and rice paddies in the plains. The archipelago had 

three seasons: dry and temperate from November to March, dry and hot 

from April to May, and rainy and humid from June to October. Typhoons 

were an annual occurrence. Diseases—malaria, dengue fever, dysentery, 

beriberi, smallpox, measles, leprosy—were common, particularly in the 

wet season, and periodic cholera epidemics occurred.6

Divided by ethnic, language, and religious differences, the Filipinos 

were not a homogenous people. The major ethnic groups were Negritos, 

Indonesians, Malayans, European mixed-blood mestizos, and Chinese. 

The Negritos, the initial inhabitants from New Guinea who lived in the 

mountains of most islands, had some 21 tribal names. The Indonesians, 

divided into 16 tribal groups, resided primarily on the island of Mindanao. 

The Malayans, by far the most numerous and most widespread throughout 

the archipelago, consisted of 47 tribes. Considered the “civilized races” by 

the Spanish, the Malayans were classified into several groups: Visayans—

2.6 million, Tagalogs—1.7 million, Bicols—518,000, Ilocanos—442,000, 

Pangasinans—366,000, Pampangos—338,000, Moros—268,000, and 

Cagayanes—166,000. European mestizos, small in number but strong 

in influence, were primarily descendants of Spaniards. A small but 

economically influential Chinese community of 38,000 resided in the 

islands. Filipinos had no common language. Less than 10 percent of the 

population spoke Spanish. In 1898, 27 dialects were identified of which the 
N

South

China

Sea

Sulu

Sea

Celebes

Sea

LUZON

SAMAR

PANAY

MINDANAO

PALAWAN

Jolo

Island

MARINDUQUE

MINDORO

MASBATE

LEYTE

CEBU

NEGROS

Manila

Scale

0 50 100

miles

Cebu

Iloilo

Legaspi

Zamboanga

N

South

China

Sea

Pacific

Ocean

Sulu

Sea

Celebes

Sea

LUZON

SAMAR

PANAY

MINDANAO

PALAWAN

Jolo

Island

MARINDUQUE

MINDORO

MASBATE

LEYTE

BOHOL

CEBU

NEGROS

Manila

Scale

0 50 100

miles

Scale

0 50 100

miles

Cebu

Iloilo

Legaspi

Zamboanga

Map 1. The Philippines.
principal ones were Tagalog, Bicol, Ilocano, Ibang, Pangasinan, Pampanga, 

and Bisaya.7 In 1902, Governor William H. Taft testified before a US 

Senate Committee that over 90 percent of Filipinos “speak a language that 

is confined to a narrow part of the territory of the islands [and it] prevents 

their communication with the government, with courts, with people from 

anywhere else except through somebody who speaks their own language 

and the Spanish language.”8

 The Spanish classified Filipinos as Christians 

or Roman Catholics; non-Christian or pagans, primarily the Negritos; 

and Moros or Muslims, located primarily in the southern Philippines.9

Roman Catholic Church records indicated 6.6 million Filipino members 

were organized into 746 regular parishes, 105 mission parishes, and 116 

missions. Only 150 regular parishes had native Filipino rather than Spanish 

clergy.10 While the Visayans and Tagalogs clearly formed the majority 

of the Filipinos, the various groups spoke different dialects, practiced 

different habits and customs, and during periods of rebellion the Spanish 

had mobilized some for use against the others. The term Filipino, like that 

of American, was an inaccurate indicator of a common race, language, or 

religion.

Discovered by Ferdinand Magellan in 1521 and named after Phillip 

II—ruler of Spain from 1556 to 1598, the Spanish settled the Philippines 

in 1565 and established their capital at Cebu on the island of Cebu. In 

1571, the capital was moved to Manila, which became the political, military, religious, and economic center of the islands. The Spanish focused on 

trade and conversion of the Filipinos to the Roman Catholic faith. Spanish 

officials and military forces remained small in number and closely tied to 

the clergy—Dominicans, Franciscans, and Augustinians—known as friars. Limited numbers required an indirect Spanish rule that permitted the 

development of a local ruling class based on land ownership and economic 

wealth. The Spanish clergy, often the only Spaniards that many Filipinos 

saw in their lifetime, gained unusual power through governmental and 

ecclesiastical duties at the local level. Towns consisted of a small center 

based on a church, government building, and homes of the local elite. By 

1898, the Spanish had organized the Philippines into 77 provinces. Barrios 

or pueblos, outlying smaller communities that were physically separate 

but administratively a part of the town, surrounded the town center. The 

Philippines had suffered neglect after Spain’s decline following the Seven 

Years’ War.11 Infrastructure remained basic. Manila and its harbor received 

limited resources. In the mid-1800s, Cebu, Iloilo, Zamboanga, and Legaspi 

joined Manila as authorized ports of trade. Coastal trade was permitted 

between these ports and the numerous islands. Roads were limited; trails 

were common. Both deteriorated during the rainy season. A single railroad 
line on Luzon ran north from Manila through the central Luzon plain to 

the Lingayen Gulf.

As a poor colony, agricultural products provided the mainstay of the 

Philippine economy. Rice, or palay, served as the chief food and principal 

crop. Different regions grew hemp or abaca, tobacco, sugar, copra, coffee, 

coconuts, chocolate, corn, wheat, indigo, sesame, peanuts, cotton, and 

grasses for fodder. These crops provided food; material and dyes for 

the local textile industry; oils from coconuts, castor beans, sesame, and 

peanuts; aromatic plants such as tobacco, coffee, chocolate, nutmeg, betel, 

cinnamon, and pepper; and grasses for fodder for carabaos,12 cattle, and 

horses. Minerals were limited both in quantity and quality. Local industries 

developed in various regions producing cloth, blankets, mats, and hats. 

Manila served as the center for the manufacture of cordage, the processing 

of tobacco, the refining of sugar, and the production of soap.13 By the 

late 1800s, abaca, tobacco, and sugar constituted the major Philippine 

exports. American demand for abaca or hemp, used for ropes and cordage, 

alternated with the demand for sugar as the primary export.14

Filipinos

As with other Spanish colonies, Filipino society consisted primarily 

of two classes: a small, powerful ruling group and everyone else—the 

poor, weak, uneducated, and economically dependent. At the top of the 

ruling class were the Spaniards or peninsulares and their Philippineborn descendants or insulares. Far below were the non-Spanish nativeborn Filipinos or indios. At the top of the local Filipino elite were local 

elected leaders or principales whose prestige came from political power, 

owners of large estates or hacenderos whose prestige came from economic 

wealth, and local political bosses or caciques. Local politics consisted 

of struggles within these groups for control of political patronage and 

access to economic opportunities. Family ties and business ventures 

solidified common interests. Society was built on personal relationships 

reinforced by economic dependence and social respect.15 A Chinese 

minority—merchants, artisans, and moneylenders—occupied a central 

position in the Filipino cash-crop economy at both the provincial and 

local levels. They constituted a special part of the Filipino elite. Mixedblood Chinese mestizos frequently owned land, lent money, and received 

special respect.16 For the poor, however, a strict patron-client relationship 

existed. They worked as farm hands, tenant farmers, or day laborers. The 

quality of their existence—family, social, economic, physical—depended 

on the relationship with their patron. Social mobility for most Filipinos 

was minimal.
Local leaders did not govern alone. They had to contend with the friars, normally peninsulares. Not only did the principales have to accept the 

open contempt that most friars had for Filipinos, but they were also limited 

by the friars’ special duties. The priest represented the church and the colonial government. In fact, the friars were an indispensable component of 

Spanish colonial rule. The priest was responsible for maintaining census 

and tax records, for supervising the selection of local officials and police, 

for reporting on the character and behavior of the natives, for reporting 

all acts of sedition, for public health measures, and for education. Priests 

held special powers and proved capable of either assisting or resisting the 

efforts of leaders.17

In the last half of the 19th century, an influential group became prominent. Members of the elite who had received some university education in 

the Philippines or abroad were known as ilustrados. This group embraced 

liberalism, reform, and greater involvement of Filipinos in the governing 

of the Philippines. When an 1872 revolt in Cavite was put down, several prominent ilustrados were exiled to Guam or the Marianas and three 

Filipino priests associated with liberal reform were executed. Begun by 

Filipino students and émigrés in Europe, the Propaganda Movement sought 

change through reform. Its goals included freedom of speech and association, Spanish and Filipino equality, equal opportunity between Spaniards 

and Filipinos for government positions, secularization of the clergy, a public school system separate from the clergy, and Philippine representation 

in the Spanish Parliament.18

Jose Rizal, the foremost member of the Propaganda Movement, was 

a wealthy Chinese mestizo from Laguna province. He began his medical 

studies in the Philippines, but completed his studies at the University of 

Madrid. Not just a physician, Rizal was a prominent writer, scholar, and 

scientist. His two novels—Noli Me Tangere or Touch Me Not published 

in 1886 and El Filibusterismo or The Reign of Greed published in 1891—

raised Filipino national consciousness. His books, banned by the clergy, 

were smuggled into the islands and widely read. Rizal returned to the 

Philippines in 1892 to resolve a family matter and to continue his reform 

efforts in the islands. In July, he created the Philippine League, a national, 

nonviolent, reform association. Spanish reaction was swift, and he was 

arrested and exiled to the island of Mindanao. In exile, Rizal watched the 

division of the national movement between ilustrados advocating peaceful 

reform and others advocating revolt and independence.19

On 7 July 1892, Andres Bonifacio, a self-educated man without formal power or influence, founded the Katipunan or “Highest and Most 

Honorable Society of the Sons of the Country” in the Tondo district of 
Manila. Its goal was independence from Spain. Organized similar to 

Masonic lodges, the Katipunan was a clandestine society with secret passwords, rituals, ranks, and colored hoods. Its members completed their 

initiation by signing a pacto de sangre (blood oath).20 Appealing primarily to the poverty-stricken and uneducated, by 1896 the Katipunan had 

spread to the provinces around Manila and had grown to 30,000 men and 

women, mostly Tagalogs. Bonifacio became president of the Katipunan

on 1 January 1896 and immediately began planning for an armed uprising 

that was to begin with a massacre of Spanish officials. When an informer 

told a Spanish friar about the existence of the Katipunan, Bonifacio took 

action.21

Fleeing to the hills, Bonifacio issued his grito de balintawak22 or “cry 

of Balintawak” that called all Filipinos to revolt. The Revolt of 1896 began 

with Bonifacio’s forces attacking Spanish military garrisons in Manila. 

Bonifacio quickly proved to be a poor military leader; his Katipunan forces 

had few successes against Spanish colonial forces. South of Manila in 

Cavite province, however, a 27-year-old former municipal captain of mixed 

Tagalog–Chinese blood from a family of modest landowners near Kawit 

and a member of the Katipunan since 1895, Emilio Aguinaldo y Famy initially defeated local Civil Guard and regular Spanish units. Although Rizal 

had no ties to the Katipunan, Spanish authorities arrested, tried, and executed him on 30 December, thus creating a martyr that inspired the rebels 

or insurrectos. A split between supporters of Bonifacio and Aguinaldo was 

resolved in March 1897 when Aguinaldo was elected Katipunan president 

and Bonifacio sidelined. Bonifacio withdrew his supporters to create a 

separate movement, but when fighting broke out between the two factions, 

Aguinaldo had Bonifacio arrested, tried, and executed on 10 May 1897. 

By then, persistent Spanish military operations conducted with locallyraised Filipino units from other provinces had destroyed the insurrecto

capability to conduct conventional operations. Aguinaldo shifted to guerrilla warfare and retreated from Cavite province into the mountains of 

Bulacan province.23

By June 1897, Aguinaldo had established himself at Biyak-na-Bato 

and issued a proclamation in Tagalog that summarized his political goals: 

expulsion of the friars and division of their property among the secular 

clergy; return to the original owners the lands seized by the friars; greater 

economic and political autonomy; freedom of the press; religious tolerance; 

and equitable treatment of Filipinos. Independence was not an overt objective. In August, armistice negotiations began with the new Spanish governor. On 14 December 1897, the Pact of Biyak-na-Bato ended the uprising. 

Aguinaldo, along with 27 companions, was exiled to Hong Kong with a 
payment of 800,000 Mexican pesos—400,000 paid immediately, 200,000 

when 700 firearms were surrendered, and 200,000 after the traditional 

singing of the Te Deum in Manila that marked the end of an insurrection. 

A general amnesty was to be declared and 900,000 Mexican pesos were to 

be paid as indemnity to Filipinos who had suffered damages. Although not 

specified in the pact, Aguinaldo expected the Spanish governor-general to 

enact limited reforms. However, he instituted few reforms, declared a general amnesty on 25 January 1898, and paid Aguinaldo his initial 400,000 

pesos, with another 200,000 pesos going to insurrecto leaders who had 

remained in the Philippines. On his arrival in Hong Kong on 31 December, 

Aguinaldo put his money in a bank and waited for a chance to renew the 

revolution. It came sooner than he could have imagined.24

Filipino Revolutionaries or Insurrectos

The declaration of war between the United States and Spain on 25 April 

1898 and the subsequent sinking of the Spanish fleet in Manila Bay by the 

American Asiatic Squadron commanded by Commodore George Dewey 

on 1 May provided the Filipino revolutionaries an unexpected opportunity. American consuls in the region made Dewey aware of the Filipino 

revolutionaries and a shortage of ground forces caused him to reach out to 

them. On 19 May, Aguinaldo returned to Cavite, conferred with Dewey, 

and shortly thereafter accepted the suggestion that he lead a rebellion 

against the Spanish garrison in Manila. Whether or not Dewey promised 

independence is uncertain, but he did provide limited arms and plenty of 

encouragement. “I permitted it as a good military act. The Filipinos were 

our friends, assisting us; they were doing our work. I believed then that 

they would be so thankful and delighted to get rid of the Spaniards that 

they would accept us with open arms,” Dewey testified before a Senate 

Committee in 1902. “I was waiting for troops to arrive, and I felt sure that 

the closer they [the Filipinos] invested the city the easier it would be when 

our troops arrived to march in.”25

While the Americans waited, the Filipino revolutionaries acted. By 

24 May 1898, Aguinaldo consolidated his control by declaring himself 

dictator until power could be handed over to a president and representative 

body. That day he issued a proclamation to the Filipino people declaring:

The great North American nation, the cradle of genuine 

liberty, and therefore the friend of our people, oppressed 

and enslaved by the tyranny and despotism of its rulers, 

has come to us manifesting a protection as decisive as it is 

undoubted disinterested toward our inhabitants, considering us as sufficiently civilized and capable of governing 
for ourselves our unfortunate country. In order to maintain this high estimate granted us by the generous North 

American nation we should abominate all those deeds 

which tend to lower this opinion, which are pillage, theft, 

and all sorts of crimes relating to persons or property, with 

the purpose of avoiding international conflicts during the 

period of our campaign.26

On 27 May 1898, an initial arms shipment paid for by an American consul 

general arrived—2,282 Remington rifles with ammunition. By the end of 

May, military operations began with the occupation of Cavite province 

and the investment of the Spanish garrison in Manila.27 Not only were the 

revolutionaries determined to besiege Manila, they planned to establish 

control over Luzon and the entire archipelago. Luzon, approximately the 

size of Ohio, was the immediate theater of operations. It held over half of 

the Filipino population—3.7 million. Different ethnic groups dominated 

various regions, but the Tagalogs, who lived around Manila and in southern Luzon, constituted the majority of the population on Luzon.28

Supported by his comrades from Hong Kong, by Apolinario Mabini—a 

political advisor, and by others on Luzon, Aguinaldo, building on his military success, began laying the foundation for Filipino civil government. 

On 12 June 1898, he declared the Philippines independent. Six days later, 

Aguinaldo established a local governmental structure and defined responsibilities for towns and provinces. He further differentiated their duties 

from those of the provincial military governors. On 20 June, Aguinaldo 

issued 45 rules for local elections, the police, the courts, and taxation. 

Understanding the local nature of Filipino politics, it was not surprising 

that Aguinaldo and his advisors began at the local level before addressing 

archipelago-wide issues. Acting as “president of the revolutionary government of the Philippines and general-in-chief of its army,” on 23 June 

Aguinaldo issued a decree written by Mabini that established the structure 

of the revolutionary government—the executive, the legislative, and the 

military and civil judiciary.29 Following up in mid-July, Aguinaldo formed 

his first cabinet on which Mariano Trias was Secretary of Finance.30 Well 

before the first American troops arrived on 30 June, control over most of 

Luzon had passed from the Spanish colonial authorities to the Filipino 

revolutionaries.

To mobilize the population in support of the revolutionary government required time, persuasion, and revolutionary discipline. The delayed 

arrival of the Americans, who were focused on Manila, provided that 

time. Establishing local governments and issuing proclamations helped 

persuade, if not establish control. As for discipline, Aguinaldo made clear 
10

on 15 July 1898 his determination that the population would support this 

effort:

All Filipinos must understand that they are now in the 

Katipunan, whether they want to be or not, and hence 

it is the duty of all to contribute life and property to the 

arduous enterprise of freeing the people, and he who 

disobeys must stand ready to receive the corresponding 

punishment. We can not free ourselves unless we move 

united in a single desire, and you must understand that 

I shall severely punish the man who causes discord and 

dispute.31

Even after Manila fell to the Americans on 13 August 1898, Filipino political organization and control continued to spread. A revolutionary congress with representatives from the provinces convened north of Manila at 

Malolos on 15 September to draft a constitution and to establish a government for the Philippines. By the end of November, a constitution modeled 

on that of France, Belgium, and several Latin American countries had been 

approved. During this period, the struggle between conservatives and radicals about the framework of the government and the policy to be followed 

with the United States dominated their agenda. Given the outcome with 

its limitation of franchise to the local elites, the revolutionary government 

proved, in the end, to be political rather than social in character. When it 

became clear in early January 1899 that the Americans planned to annex 

the Philippines, the struggle shifted to those who favored peace against 

those who favored war. Either way, the revolutionaries promulgated their 

constitution on 21 January, made Malolos their capital, and announced 

Aguinaldo as president. Based on attempts to understand American politics from newspaper accounts, the Filipinos placed their hopes in the antiimperialist movement in the United States. They firmly believed the US 

Senate would not ratify the peace treaty.32 For most Filipinos, Aguinaldo’s 

government was viewed as representing their interests and reflecting their 

society better than the Spanish ever had and better than Americans could.

Raising forces to besiege Manila had been the initial military task. The 

Spanish unintentionally assisted the revolutionaries in two ways: first, by 

focusing on the defense of Manila, which left isolated garrisons in the provinces to fall to local forces; and second, by creating a militia under former 

Katipunan members, arming and training those most dedicated to Spanish 

defeat. Late in May 1898, most of the militia around Manila defected to 

Aguinaldo and the Tagalog provinces to the south rose in revolt. Some 

12,000 to 14,000 Filipinos with Spanish military service eventually formed 
11

the core of the revolutionary army. To create an effective military force 

within the capabilities of Filipino society proved a challenge. Aguinaldo 

assigned military governors to each province and sent reliable supporters 

and military forces to consolidate his influence with local leaders.33 On 20 

June 1898, Aguinaldo created both a regular army—soon known as the 

Army of Liberation—and a revolutionary militia. Militia units varied and 

included the revolutionary militia or Sandatahan, town companies, and 

units of various sizes raised by local governments or influential persons. 

He followed on 30 July by having each Tagalog province raise a battalion 

of provincial troops to augment the three regular regiments that formed 

the nucleus of the regular army. Although organized along the lines of a 

modern regular army, the Army of Liberation remained a hodgepodge of 

units composed of volunteers, Katipunan members, Spanish colonial army 

veterans, and provincial forces whose loyalties lay with their personal 

commanders. Given its composition, shortage of time, and lack of military 

experience, the insurrecto regular army was ill-trained, poorly armed, and 

ill-disciplined. The effectiveness of the Army of Liberation would depend 

on the abilities of its soon-to-be opponent—the US Army.34

American Conquest of the Philippines

Sinking the Spanish fleet in Manila Bay and supporting Aguinaldo’s 

Filipinos had not secured Manila, much less the Philippines, for the 

United States. Following American military tradition, in April 1898 

Congress authorized both a volunteer army for the duration of the war to 

be raised and officered by the states and an expanded Regular Army of 

65,000 to fight the Spanish–American War. The initial call went out for 

125,000 volunteers. Faced with an unanticipated requirement for troops 

in the Philippines, the War Department issued a second call in May for an 

additional 75,000 volunteers. The basic unit was the infantry regiment—

1,350 officers and men organized into three battalions each with four 

companies of 108 personnel. On 12 May 1898, Major General Wesley 

Merritt, the second senior general of the US Army, received command of 

the Philippine expedition that was to be assembled and organized as VIII 

Corps at San Francisco.35 The War Department initially planned to provide 

5,000 state volunteers. Seeking an understanding of his mission, Merritt 

wrote President McKinley on 13 May: “I do not yet know whether it your 

desire to subdue and hold all of the Spanish territory in the islands, or 

merely seize and hold the capital.” He added, “It seems more than probable 

that we will have so-called insurgents to fight as well as the Spaniards, 

and upon the work to be accomplished will depend the ultimate strength 

and composition of the force.”McKinley replied on 19 May that the army 
12

of occupation had “the two-fold purpose of completing the reduction of 

Spanish power in that quarter and giving order and security to the islands 

while in the possession of the United States.”36 One historian summed up 

Merritt’s mission as:

Go to the Philippines, cooperate with the Navy, defeat the 

Spanish armed forces there, establish order and the sovereignty of the United States. Advise the Filipinos that 

the United States aims to protect, not fight them; follow 

existing laws as far as possible; take over public property, the collection of taxes and customs; open the ports 

to commerce.37

After an exchange with Commanding General of the Army Nelson A. 

Miles, Merritt’s request for 6,000 Regulars and 8,000 volunteers was modified to 13,000 state volunteers and 2,000 Regulars. Little was known about 

the Philippines or the Spanish forces and time was short. One confidential report from the Military Intelligence Division of the War Department 

proved to be nothing more that the entry on the Philippine Islands from the 

Encyclopedia Britannica.

38 Despite these and other problems, the mobilization of VIII Corps proved well organized. On 25 May 1898, the first of 

three VIII Corps contingents sailed from San Francisco.39

The first contingent of VIII Corps arrived at Manila on 30 June after 

stopping on the way to occupy Guam. Merritt arrived with the last contingent on 26 July. He found that roughly 13,000 Spanish soldiers in Manila 

were besieged by a larger Filipino Army of Liberation—just as Admiral 

Dewey40 had hoped. Discussions with Dewey provided Merritt a general 

understanding of the situation ashore, to include the relationship with 

America’s Filipino partners.41 Negotiations with Aguinaldo permitted VIII 

Corps to occupy a sector of the siege lines on 29 July. Given his immediate task of securing Manila, Merritt and others negotiated with Spanish 

Governor-General Dom Fermin Jaudenes y Alvarez seeking his surrender. 

Fearful of the Army of Liberation and seeking an honorable solution to his 

problem, Jaudenes agreed to surrender to the Americans after a sham battle if the Americans promised not to permit the Army of Liberation to enter 

Manila. Understanding that the Filipinos, who had besieged Manila with 

American encouragement and little material support for over 3 months, 

would be outraged, Merritt did not discuss it with them. On 13 August, 

supported by Dewey’s cruisers, VIII Corps attacked and occupied Manila 

with American losses of 17 killed in action (KIA) and 105 wounded in 

action (WIA). The next day, Jaudenes surrendered to the Americans. When 

the Army of Liberation tried to support the American assault by moving 
13

into Manila, American soldiers barred their entry. The Filipinos, surprised 

and confused by American actions, considered this betrayal a “stunning 

revelation of how little they were valued as allies.”42 It confirmed the concerns of many Filipinos as to just what the American objectives were in 

the Philippines. A second siege of Manila now occurred with the Army of 

Liberation surrounding American-occupied Manila. It differed from the 

first siege in that discussions between the Filipinos and the Americans 

continued, but a basic mistrust now existed.43

Now began a 4-month period of uncertainty—both for the Americans 

in the Philippines and for the Filipinos. No one knew what the status of the 

Philippines would be—independence, partial or complete occupation by 

the Americans, or re-occupation by the Spanish. Aguinaldo’s government 

knew its goal: independence, perhaps after a short period of American 

supervision. For the Americans, faced with an anti-imperialist movement 

in the United States and an uncertainty as to what value the Philippines 

might be 7,000 miles from its west coast, the final decision slowly evolved. 

In the meantime, things changed in Manila. With a month on the ground 

and Manila secured, Merritt asked to be relieved. With experience in the 

Philippines, he found himself a member of the American negotiating team 

at the peace conference in Paris. A week after his arrival in Manila, 61-

year old Major General Elwell S. Otis44 found himself Commander of VIII 

Corps, the Department of the Pacific, and the Philippines on 27 August 

1898. As a student of military service and the law, Otis brought unusual credentials to this position. Some would denigrate his strict attention to detail, 

his commanding from Manila, and his reliance on what the Filipinos in 

Manila told him, but no American commander had faced the civil-military 

challenges Otis did—far from home and with little guidance. Confined to 

Manila during this period, the Americans tried to maintain cordial relations 

with the Filipinos. In the countryside, Aguinaldo’s government continued 

to organize and mobilize the population. Few Filipinos saw an American 

during this time; most saw representatives of the Aguinaldo government. 

On 10 December 1898, the Treaty of Paris was signed ceding Cuba, Guam, 

and Puerto Rico to the United States. In addition, the United States bought 

the Philippines for $20 million. Eleven days later, President McKinley 

notified Otis that “the actual occupation and administration of the entire 

group of the Philippine Islands becomes immediately necessary” and that 

the military government is to be “extended with all possible dispatch to 

the whole ceded territory.” The task of the US Army in the Philippines 

was to “win the confidence, respect, and affection of the inhabitants of 

the Philippines” by proving “the mission of the United States is one of 

benevolent assimilation, substituting the mild sway of justice and right for 
14

arbitrary rule.”45 For Otis, besieged in Manila with 21,000 troops, these 

instructions exceeded his current capability. However, US Navy control 

of the seas permitted the movement of troops to the southern Philippines 

to relieve isolated Spanish garrisons. Although some of Aguinaldo’s supporters continued to hold out hope that the US Senate would fail to ratify 

the treaty,46 both sides began preparing for war as outbreaks of violence 

followed by negotiations became a common pattern along the siege lines 

of Manila.47

Unexpectedly, but predictably, war in the Philippines—a war of conquest to Filipinos, an insurrection to Americans—began late in the night 

of 4 February and into the morning of 5 February 1899. Both sides blamed 

the other as events spun out of control beginning a 9-month conventional 

war that would be followed by 31 months of guerrilla warfare. American 

attacks drove the Army of Liberation from its entrenchments around 

Manila. Surprisingly, Filipino marksmanship proved poor, offsetting the 

superiority of its smokeless powder Remington rifles. The American state 

volunteers were armed with black powder, shorter-range Springfield rifles 

while the Regulars were armed with smokeless powder Krag-Jorgensen 

rifles. Few American casualties and 3,000 Filipinos killed demonstrated 

the American lethality and the Filipino determination to resist. Filipino 

attempts to negotiate the next day were rejected by Otis. On 10 February 

1899, Major General Arthur MacArthur’s 2d Division attacked Caloocan, 

12 miles north of Manila along the railroad, capturing engines and railway 

cars (see map 2). A fierce street battle in Manila on 23 February ended 

Filipino resistance there. The Army of Liberation’s hold on Manila was 

broken. Bloodied but undefeated, it withdrew north of Manila and occupied strong, entrenched positions along the railroad. Aguinaldo made several adjustments to his forces. He appointed Mariano Trias, a Tagalog, 

to command Filipino forces in southern Luzon and Antonio Luna, an 

Ilocano, as Chief of Operations for the Army of Liberation operating north 

of Manila. In addition to reorganizing and centralizing his regular forces, 

Aguinaldo issued two decentralizing decrees. The first required all men 

from 16 to 59 years of age to join a local militia and to arm themselves 

with war bolos. The second established local guerrilla units based on towns 

and barrios.48 These attempts to improve the leadership of the Army of 

Liberation did not address its poor marksmanship, its limited firearms, its 

defective ammunition, its inability to maneuver, nor its ill-discipline. Luna 

attempted to bring discipline and subordination to the Army of Liberation, 

but his methods were ultimately disruptive. To Otis and many American 

commanders, Aguinaldo and the Tagalogs were the insurrectos, not the 

Filipinos.49
15

Facing threats from the north and south of Manila, Otis reorganized 

VIII Corps with a two-brigade 1st Division commanded by Major General 

Henry W. Lawton to defend in the south while MacArthur’s three-brigade, 

12,000-man 2d Division attacked north along the railroad to capture 

Malolos, the capital of the Philippine Republic, and to destroy the Army of 

Polillo

Islands

Lubang

Islands

Marinduque

Island

Pacific

Ocean

South

China

Sea

Manila

Bay

Tayabas

Bay

Lamon

Bay

San Miguel

Bay

Laoag

Vigan

San

Fernando

Tarlac

Manila

Batangas

Bangued

Palayan

Cabanatuan

Malolos

N

Scale

0 50

miles

CAGAYAN

ILOCOS

SUR

ABRA

ISABELA

LEPANTO

NUEVA

VIZCAYA

NI FAN

TA

BATANGAS

LA UNION

TAYABAS

Bontoc

Lipa Tayabas

ILOCOS

NORTE

Railroad

PAMPANGA

Dagupan

Province Boundary

Cavite

Biyak-na-Bato

NUEVA

ECIJA

TARLAC

BULACAN

PRINCIPE

PANGASINAN

ZA

MBALES

CAVITE

LAGUNA

Calumpit

San Fernando

BONTOC

BENGUET

BATAAN

Caloocan

Lingayen

Bay

Laguna

Bay

Polillo

Islands

Lubang

Islands

Marinduque

Island

Pacific

Ocean

South

China

Sea

Manila

Bay

Tayabas

Bay

Lamon

Bay

San Miguel

Bay

Laoag

Vigan

San

Fernando

Tarlac

Manila

Batangas

Bangued

Malolos

N

Scale

0 50

miles

Scale

0 50

miles

CAGAYAN

SUR

ABRA

ISABELA

LEPANTO

NUEVA

VIZCAYA

NI FAN

TA

BATANGAS

LA UNION

TAYABAS Tayabas

NORTE

Railroad

PAMPANGA

Dagupan

Province Boundary

Cavite

Biyak-na-Bato

NUEVA

ECIJA

TARLAC

BULACAN

PRINCIPE

PANGASINAN

ZA

MBALES

CAVITE

LAGUNA

Calumpit

San Fernando

BONTOC

BENGUET

BATAAN

Caloocan

Lingayen

Bay

Laguna Bay

ILOCOS

ILOCOS

Santa Cruz

Bayambang

Map 2. Luzon.
16

Liberation. MacArthur attacked on 25 March 1899 and captured Malolos 

on 31 March. The Army of Liberation suffered a series of defeats, but 

Luna withdrew each time burning towns as he retreated. MacArthur, in 

contrast, told his soldiers:

It is . . . one of the most important duties of American 

soldiers to assist in establishing friendly relations with the 

natives by kind and considerate treatment in all matters 

arising from personal contact. To exasperate individuals 

or to burn or loot unprotected houses or property is not 

only criminal in itself, but tends to impede the policy of 

the Untied States and to defeat the very purpose which the 

Army is here to accomplish.50

Lawton made a limited attack to the south, which convinced Aguinaldo 

that the next American thrust would be in the southern provinces. Luna 

then launched a series of attacks on the 2d Division on 10 and 11 April 

1899. These were repulsed. After Colonel J. Franklin Bell led the 2d 

Division scout unit on a reconnaissance that captured a critical bridge 

turning Luna’s position, MacArthur attacked on 24 April. Three days later, 

Calumpit fell. Final pushes were made on 4 May by MacArthur to San 

Fernando and to the south by Lawton. By then, the 2d Division had fought 

18 major engagements in its 40-mile advance along the railroad with combat losses of 53 KIA and 353 WIA. Its supply lines were a muddle and its 

units ravaged by illness. Even 1st Division’s month-long advance to the 

south halted because of logistics difficulties. Combat losses were 9 KIA 

and 35 WIA, and 515 fell to disease. Terrain and weather hindered the 

American advances as much or more than the insurrectos.

51

Senior American field commanders, along with their state volunteer 

troops, were eager to press the fight now that war had begun. Otis, on 

the other hand, had a different perspective. His troops were limited in 

number; his requirements almost unlimited. The further he advanced, 

unless he destroyed the Army of Liberation in a single blow, the more 

troops he required. His state volunteers became eligible for mustering out 

on 11 April 1899.52 By mid-April with 26,000 soldiers, Otis could field no 

more than 16,000 for operations—5,000 garrisoned the Cavite naval base; 

5,000 assigned to provost duties in Manila, staff assignments, hospitalized, 

or imprisoned; and 1,000 occupying relieved Spanish garrisons in the 

southern Philippines.53 Logistics proved a challenge. Terrain, absence 

of maps, disease, and weather became major concerns. By 12 May the 

2d Division had 2,160 of its 4,800 soldiers, 45 percent, on sick report.54

Enemy forces still threatened Manila from both the north and the south. 
17

While American soldiers had shown an ability to attack and take Filipino 

entrenched positions with few losses, they had not destroyed the Army 

of Liberation. American commanders found that “climate and terrain, 

exhaustion, poor logistics, and miscommunication had denied them” what 

they so desperately sought—“a decisive battle.”55

During the spring fighting, a three-man Philippine Commission—

chaired by Dr. Jacob G. Schurman, President of Cornell University and 

working for the State Department—arrived on 4 March 1899. Dewey and 

Otis were to be commission members. Appointed by McKinley before 

hostilities began, its task was “to facilitate the most humane, pacific, and 

effective extension of authority throughout these islands, and to secure 

with the least possible delay, the benefits of a wise and generous protection 

of life and property to the inhabitants.”56 War now compromised its status. Otis, the governor-general, and Dewey were preoccupied with other 

matters. Through a series of hearings and contacts with the Filipinos, the 

Commission sought to understand the aspirations of the Filipinos. It then 

issued a widely circulated proclamation—printed in English, Spanish, and 

Tagalog—that became the first formal statement to Filipinos of the general principles by which the United States intended to govern the islands. 

Filipino leaders in Manila were generally satisfied. Aguinaldo requested a 

3-month cease-fire on 28 April to gather the Filipino Congress to discuss 

peace, but Otis denied it. The Commission opened a dialog with Filipinos 

that were not hostile to American rule. It widened the split in Aguinaldo’s 

government between those who supported peace and those who supported 

a war for independence. In frustration, Luna arrested the delegates authorized by the congress, cabinet, and president of the Philippine Republic to 

meet with the commission. Luna’s rift with Aguinaldo ended similar to that 

of Bonifacio in 1897. Aguinaldo summoned Luna to a meeting on 5 June 

at which Luna was assassinated. Despite these efforts, Schurman failed to 

coordinate his work with Otis, much less convince Otis of its importance.57

At the end of May, Otis telegraphed Secretary of War Russell A. Alger:

Have attended only few meetings . . . for lack of time. 

Recommendations . . . unknown to me until called upon 

to unite in proclamation publishing them. Declined, 

believing time not opportune. . . . Commission has been 

beneficial in gaining confidence of leading, well-disposed 

natives in beneficent intention of United States. Doubt if 

it has accomplished anything further. . . . Shall be no friction between commission and myself if I can avoid it.58

In the small area around Manila under American control, the commissioners agreed with Otis that benevolent pacification was working there. But 
18

Otis’s focus remained on the destruction of the Army of Liberation. The 

Commission concluded in its lengthy report that:

. . . after a careful consideration and study, it was the opinion of the Commission that the Philippine people were not 

capable of independent self-government, and that independence for which some of them said they were fighting 

was, in the opinion of the Commission, an ideal at present 

impossible, not only because of their unfitness for it, but 

because of their inability to preserve it among the nations 

even if it were granted.59

Marginalized by Otis and Dewey and working without any direct responsibilities, the Commission returned that summer to the United States, published its report, and disbanded.

During the summer of 1899 when a routine report would begin: “Rainy 

season. Little island campaigning possible in Luzon. . . . 12% sick,”60 Otis 

had time to focus on his numerous tasks—maintaining his current positions, 

rotating state volunteers home, building a new army with their replacements, preparing for a fall campaign to destroy the Army of Liberation, 

and instituting benevolent pacification measures in Manila and outlying 

islands. With limited resources, operations had gone well since February. 

However, by the end of September 1899 the American Army occupied 

only 120 of the 42,000 square miles of Luzon and controlled a small part 

of its population. As an American historian observed:

The Eighth Corps had an unprecedented task, for 

Americans had never before engaged in a colonial war of 

conquest. . . . Indian resistance was always on a smaller 

scale. . . . Once defeated, the Indians could be confined 

to reservations, but no Philippine reservation system was 

feasible. For pacification to succeed, the Army had not 

only to defeat Aguinaldo’s army but also to make the 

Filipinos want American rule or at least tolerate it peacefully. Yet the proper mix between coercion and benevolence was not easily discovered.61

Otis tested his initial benevolent assimilation measures through his military 

government in Manila. He saw his most important task as “simply to keep 

scrupulous faith with these people and teach them to trust us.”62 Building 

on experiences from the Indian wars, his policy reflected a benevolent 

paternalism combined with a firm-but-fair approach. It also reflected 

a progressive design for social-engineering—“bestow upon a grateful 

society a host of social, political, and economic reforms to produce a more 
19

efficient and honest government and a more modern, rational, and organized 

society”—that had its foundation in education.63 Otis tried to attract Filipino 

leaders who were open to American government by working closely with 

leaders in Manila. To provide guidance for his units in the more peaceful 

southern Philippines, on 8 August 1899 Otis issued General Orders 43 

that prescribed measures for creating local governments. Basically, local 

leaders were to be elected by voice vote by members of an open town 

meeting—a political system perhaps more suitable to New England than 

to Filipino towns. Commanders and their troops were reminded of their 

critical role if a policy of attraction was to work.64

While benevolent pacification occupied part of his time, Otis also 

focused on rebuilding his forces in preparation for his fall campaign. 

The state volunteers began rotating home in May and continued into the 

summer. Primarily to support operations in the Philippines, on 2 March 

Congress had authorized the War Department to maintain a Regular Army 

of 65,000 and a federally raised volunteer force of up to 35,000. The volunteers were to be organized into 25 infantry regiments numbered consecutively beginning with the 26th United States Volunteer (USV) Infantry 

Regiment. They were to serve until 30 June 1901. The volunteers of 1899 

were carefully selected—many were veterans of the Spanish–American 

War, were well trained and disciplined, and were led by Regular officers 

selected by the War Department. This conscious design was to combine the 

best of the state volunteers—aggressive fighting spirit, initiative, adaptability, esprit de corps—with the strengths of the Regulars—discipline, 

leadership, and training. By mid-August 1899 the 26th USV through 35th 

USV Infantry were filled, the 36th USV and 37th USV Infantry had been 

created in the Philippines from state volunteer veterans, and the 11thUSV 

Cavalry was raised. In August the 38th USV through 47th USV Infantry 

were recruited, followed in September by the Afro-American 48th USV 

and 49th USV Infantry.65 By the end of 1899, over half of the American 

Army in the Philippines would be USV infantry regiments.66

To augment American Army strength and to gain information on 

Filipinos, Otis began in early September to recruit Filipinos to work with 

American units. The Macabebes, members of a tribe often used by the 

Spanish to suppress rebellions, had a “reputation for cruelties and excesses 

when armed for service among their neighbors, and the fears entertained 

about them on this score were not long afterward realized.”67 They would 

introduce American soldiers to an interrogation technique known as the 

“water cure.” Lieutenant Matthew A. Batson,68 4th Cavalry, organized and 

trained the 1st Macabebe Scouts, a 110-man company armed with Krag 

rifles. Formed into four to six man teams, they proved useful as guides, 
20

scouts, and in reducing guerrilla attacks on American supply lines. The 2d 

Macabebe Scouts was organized on 21 September and the 3d Macabebe 

Scouts on 6 October. By the beginning of the November campaign, VIII 

Corps had raised its Filipino strength from zero to a five-company battalion commanded by Batson that included a small Filipino–American unit 

known as Lowe Scouts.69 Within a year, the scouts would include Tagalogs, 

Panpangans, and others. These indigenous forces augmented American 

troop strength that reached 29,000 troops organized into 15 Regular and 8 

USV regiments by the end of October.70

The Philippine Republic struggled during the summer of 1899 trying to maintain control given its series of demoralizing defeats and its 

internal struggle with a peace faction that sought negotiation with the 

Americans. Its power was limited to the reach of its officials and military 

commanders. The Army of Liberation—demoralized by American victories and racked by faction—numbered 4,000. The June 1899 assassination 

of Luna, approved by Aguinaldo, did not improve conditions. Aguinaldo 

focused his efforts to restore the spirit of the Army of Liberation, but the 

results were meager. The Army, even more than under Luna, remained a 

collection of units loyal to their commanders who argued with one another 

as often as they worked together. The officers remained independent and 

noncooperative. For the Americans, differentiating between the Army of 

Liberation and guerrilla forces under the command of regional commanders in areas under American control proved difficult.71

Otis devised a campaign plan to isolate and destroy the Philippine 

Republic and its Army of Liberation near Tarlac. As a diversion south of 

Manila, Brigadier General Theodore Schwan attacked Kawit, the home 

of Aguinaldo in Cavite province. To the north, MacArthur’s 2d Division 

fixed the Army of Liberation as the plan unfolded. On 9 October 1899, 

Brigadier General Samuel B.M. Young’s Cavalry Brigade led Lawton’s 

1st Division north along the eastern edge of the central Luzon plain. This 

movement was to prevent the Army of Liberation from escaping into the 

mountains of north-central Luzon and to establish a supply line for the 

1st Division. A practical concept on paper, it proved impossible to execute as planned. After only a short advance in 4 weeks time, Otis ordered 

the 2d Division to attack north on 5 November. Two days later, Brigadier 

General Loyd Wheaton landed on the southeast Lingayen coast to prevent the escape of any remnants of the Army of Liberation north into 

the Ilocos region of northwest Luzon. On the same day, Young—with a 

force of 1,100 composed of Macabebes, three troops of the 3d Cavalry, 

a battalion of the 22d Infantry, and an artillery battery—moved north. 

Nothing in his previous service had prepared Young for this demanding 
21

march through “tropical deluges, mud and water, the swimming, bridging and rafting of innumerable streams most of which were not on the 

map.”72 The 2d Division quickly overcame the initial resistance by the 

Army of Liberation and its remnants, to include Aguinaldo, fled to the 

northeast into the mountains of central and northwest Luzon. Some surrenders occurred. On 23 November MacArthur reported: “The so-called 

Filipino republic is destroyed. The congress is dissolved. The president 

of that body is now a prisoner in our hands. The president of the so-called 

republic is a fugitive, as are all the cabinet officers, excepting one in our 

hands. . . . The army itself as an organization has disappeared.”73 For the 

next 3 weeks, Young relentlessly pursued Aguinaldo up the coast into the 

Ilocos region. Several times Aguinaldo narrowly escaped capture. On 2 

December Aguinaldo’s rear guard sacrificed itself at Tirad Pass to permit 

his movement into the mountains of northwest Luzon. Young, with reinforcements from Wheaton, continued north occupying the Ilocano coastal 

provinces. His units reportedly destroyed the forces of Brigadier General 

Manuel Tinio, the Tagalog regional commander of the Ilocos region. On 12 

December Otis was able to report, “organized rebellion no longer exists, 

and troops pursuing robber bands. All important and threatened centers 

of population, north, occupied.”74 With the Army of Liberation and the 

government of the Philippine Republic seemingly destroyed, Aguinaldo in 

flight, and northern Luzon undergoing occupation by American forces,75

Otis decided to clear the Tagalog heartland in southern Luzon.

Just as he planned for the northern campaign, Otis wanted to isolate 

and destroy the Tagalog forces in southern Luzon by having Lawton’s 1st 

Division, commanded by Lieutenant General Trias, fix the Filipino forces 

south of Manila in Cavite province. Schwan’s brigade moved south along 

Laguna Bay and then to the west to envelop Trias. On 18 December 1899, 

in the midst of a typhoon, Lawton was killed in a skirmish at San Mateo. 

His replacement was Major General John C. Bates. On 4 January 1900 the 

Americans attacked south into Cavite. Schwan’s maneuver was successful, 

but after initial resistance, Trias’s forces had dispersed. Bates’ brigades 

continued south against scattered resistance. By the end of January, 

American forces overran and occupied the Tagalog provinces of Cavite, 

Laguna, Batangas, and Tayabas. During the month-long advance, Bates’ 

forces killed 180 insurgents and captured 154 rifles. Schwan’s brigade 

suffered light casualties—six KIA and five WIA.76 Brigadier General 

Miguel Malvar, Aguinaldo’s commander in Batangas, was reported to have 

had his unit “annihilated as an organized force.” The American officer 

making this report later commented, “We did not know it then, but the 

capture of rifles was the important thing, not the scatterment of Filipino 
22

organizations.”77 The Tagalog provinces had fallen quicker and easier than 

the Americans expected.78

By the end of January 1900, Otis commanded 63,000 troops—3 

cavalry regiments, 17 Regular infantry regiments, and 24 USV infantry 

regiments—that he could focus on the occupation and pacification of the 

Philippines.79 With no large units of insurrectos remaining, American 

troops were “distributed in small detachments and the work of organizing 

the country for peace was commenced.”80 At the end of March, the War 

Department dissolved the Department of the Pacific and established the 

Division of the Philippines commanded by Otis who continued to serve 

as military governor. Four departments were created within this division: 

Department of Northern Luzon commanded by MacArthur, Department 

of Southern Luzon commanded by Bates, Department of the Visayas 

commanded by Brigadier General Robert P. Hughes, and Department of 

Mindanao and Jolo commanded by Brigadier General William A. Kobbe.81

Each department was organized into districts, normally commanded by a 

brigadier general or colonel. Within each district in Luzon, normally at least 

a regiment occupied each province. With the war over, Otis focused his 

forces on benevolent pacification measures—local government, education, 

public works, and public health—to attract the support of the Filipinos. 

On the same day the Division of the Philippines was created, Otis issued 

General Orders 40 with new instructions for organizing local governments. 

Based on his experience in the Philippines and with the advice of Filipinos 

in Manila, this general order replaced the 1899 General Orders 43 with a 

modified version of the 1893 Spanish Maura Law. Franchise was reduced 

to the principales with the result that local governance remained in the 

hands of the elite.82 On 23 April, Otis followed with General Orders 58 

that established a new judicial code by amending the Spanish code for 

criminal procedures.83 Through his efforts at pacification and building on 

local laws and procedures, many Filipinos in Manila came to view Otis 

as an honest, fair, and capable administrator. However, security remained 

an issue. In the last 2 months of 1899, the Americans had fought 229 

engagements with the loss of 69 KIA and 302 WIA. The first 4 months of 

1900 saw 442 engagements with 130 KIA and 332 WIA. During those 6 

months, insurgent losses were 3,200 KIA, 700 WIA, and 2,900 captured.84

In April, Otis reported that the Division of the Philippines held 116 posts 

or stations in Filipino towns. Although only half of the estimated 35,000 

rifles held by the Filipino insurgents had been captured or surrendered, 

the security problem appeared normal. Otis stated that “we no longer deal 

with organized insurrection, but brigandage; to render every town secure 

against latter would require quarter million men; the war has increased 
23

brigandage in Luzon, though it has always prevailed in mountain sections, 

and in some of the islands much more than it does today.”85 Brigandage had 

been a chronic problem in the past; it would continue to be a problem that 

could be handled, but not eliminated. With the war over and pacification 

under way, Otis requested relief from command.86

Secretary of War Elihu Root approved Otis’s request. On 5 May 1900, 

54-year old MacArthur87 took command of the Division of the Philippines 

and assumed the duties of governor-general. Wheaton replaced MacArthur 

as commander of the Department of Northern Luzon. On his departure 

from the Philippines, Otis announced:

I am convinced from observation, investigation, and the 

expressed opinion of the educated men of the islands that 

the declared guerrilla warfare will cease within months, 

and that ladrone88 organizations or robbers in small bands 

who well know the legal penalties they invite will alone 

remain to terrorize the people. . . . The American soldier has the inclination and ability to crush it and will be 

successful.89

Published in May by Leslie’s Weekly, Otis responded to a question about 

when the war would be over by saying: “. . . the war in the Philippines 

is already over. . . . Luzon is pacified and there are only a few outlying 

districts where the natives are still terrified by the ladrones into a show 

of opposition to us. You will see that there will be no more fighting of 

any moment. What there is will be but little skirmishes which amount to 

nothing.”90 Time would tell just how accurate Otis’s assessment would be. 

However, the task of completing the pacification of the Philippines and 

its transition to civil government would fall on the officers and men under 

MacArthur’s command. To assist him in civil matters, the Secretary of 

War had appointed the Taft Commission. It would arrive in Manila within 

days.

Insurrectos Shift to Guerrilla Warfare

Forced to accept the superiority of American forces in conventional 

operations, Aguinaldo convened a council of war at Bayambang on 12 

November 1899 that led to a major change in strategy by the insurrectos. 

The remnants of the Army of Liberation were to disband and return to their 

provinces. Henceforth, the insurrectos would revert to guerrilla warfare. 

Employed against the Spanish in 1897, guerrilla units had assisted the 

Army of Liberation against the Americans. This shift required a decentralization and localization of operations. Guerrilla districts were created 
24

under a general officer who divided it into zones under the commands 

of majors or colonels. A local organizational structure with a linkage to 

local leaders had been created in 1898 when the revolutionary militia was 

formed and other local forces were required of each town.

The 1887 Spanish regulations provided guidance to the insurrectos for 

conducting guerrilla war. Guerrilla leaders were informed that:

The object of the guerrillas will be constantly to fight 

the Yankees in the towns occupied by them, attacking 

their convoys, inflicting all the injury they can upon their 

patrols, their spies and their small parties, surprising their 

detachments, destroying their columns when they pass by 

places favorable to our attacks, and inflicting exemplary 

punishment on traitors to prevent the people of the towns 

from unworthily selling themselves for the gold of the 

invader; but in addition they will protect the loyal inhabitants and will watch over their property and defend them 

from bandits and petty thieves.91

The guerrillas should make up for their small numbers by 

their ceaseless activity and their daring. They shall hide in 

the woods and in distant barrios and when least expected 

shall fall upon the enemy. . . . but they shall be careful to 

never rob their countrymen. We repeat that we must not 

give or accept combats with such a powerful foe if we 

have not the greatest chance of success . . . even as should 

we route him three times or five times, the question of our 

independence would not be solved. Let us wait for the 

deadly climate to decimate his files and never forget that 

our object is only to protract the state of war.92

The purpose of guerrilla warfare was not to win the war. It was to drag 

the war out to “wear the Americans down, relying on disease, terrain, 

and frustration to demoralize the soldiers.”93 Aguinaldo and his advisers placed their short-term hope on the anti-imperialist movement in the 

United States and the glowing descriptions of the heroic Philippine resistance in some American newspapers. Having as little understanding of 

the United States and its political system as Americans had of the Filipino 

situation, it is understandable that they “not unreasonably, placed undue 

importance . . . [on] them.”94 Consequently, for Aguinaldo the best case 

scenario was that Filipino guerrilla warfare, with the resulting American 

demoralization, would secure a victory of the Democratic candidate and 

anti-imperialist William Jennings Bryan in the upcoming November 1900 
25

presidential elections. Only time would tell both the accuracy and the wisdom of his strategy.95

What Otis and most American commanders saw as routine lawlessness was actually the beginnings of the Filipino version of low scale, organized guerrilla warfare. Even in early 1900 when the Americans became 

aware of Aguinaldo’s decision to go to guerrilla warfare, they failed to 

understand what it meant, what it looked like, or how it worked. They 

remained predisposed to view it as a ladrone problem. For the US Army 

this was understandable because:

. . . living among such a large, hostile, and culturally alien 

people was a new experience. The Indian campaigns were 

not analogous. In the Philippines the army never had the 

railroads, buffalo hunters, and the push of white settlement to uproot and degrade their primitive foe. The Indian 

wars were amateur melees compared with the insurrection 

waged in 1900.96

National figures like MacArthur and Aguinaldo would continue to provide guidance and inspiration, but guerrilla war became close, personal, 

and local. Filipino guerrilla leaders would come to the fore—Tinio, 

Malvar, Juan Villamor, Father Gregorio Aglipay, and Juan Cailles—to 

resist American occupation. How effectively the Americans responded 

depended on how quickly they understood the nature of the insurrecto 

threat and then on how quickly they developed effective countermeasures. 

As we will see in the next two chapters, this varied from place to place.
26

Notes

1. Graham A. Cosmas, An Army for Empire: The United States Army in the 

Spanish–American War (Shippensburg, PA: White Mane Publishing Company, 

Inc., 1994), 108–110.

2. Walter Millis, The Martial Spirit: A Study of Our War with Spain (New 

York, NY: Viking Press, 1965), 340. Secretary of State John Hay’s 27 July 1898 

letter to Theodore Roosevelt: “It has been a splendid little war; begun with the 

highest motives, carried on with magnificent intelligence and spirit, favored 

by that fortune which loves the brave. It is now to be concluded, I hope, with 

that fine good nature which is, after all, the distinguishing trait of our American 

character.”

3. During the Philippine War, the term “insurgents” or “insurrectos” was 

given to those resisting American government. It meant rebels. The term was not tied 

to guerrilla tactics. Filipino insurrectos fought conventionally and then switched 

to guerrilla warfare. Today the term “insurgent” has a different meaning.

4. Charles B. Elliott, The Philippines: To the End of the Military Regime

(Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill, 1917), 64. Most of the islands—seven-eighths—

were smaller than 640 acres. In a 1905 census, only 1,668 islands had been named. 

Today, most references indicate the Philippines have over 7,100 islands.

5. War Department, Bureau of Insular Affairs, A Pronouncing Gazetteer 

and Geographical Dictionary of the Philippine Islands, United States of America, 

with Maps, Charts, and Illustrations. Also the Law of Civil Government in the 

Philippine Islands Passed by Congress and Approved by the President July 1, 

1902 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1902), 1–5, 12–13, 81. 

Hereafter referred to as WD, BIA. This provides a summary of the information 

about the Philippines available to American officials in 1902.

6. US Congress, Senate, The People of the Philippines. Letter from the 

Secretary of War Transmitting an Article on the People of the Philippines Compiled 

in the Division of Insular Affairs of the War Department (Senate Document 218, 

56th Congress, 2d Session, 1901), 19.

7. WD, BIA, 63–68.

8. Statement of Governor William H. Taft, 31 January 1902. US Congress, 

Senate, Affairs in the Philippine Islands. Hearings before the Committee on 

the Philippines of the United States Senate (Senate Document 331, part 1, 57th 

Congress, 1st Session, 1902), 50.

9. Elliott, 86–87.

10. WD, BIA, 69.

11. Ronald E. Dolan, ed., Philippines: A Country Study (Washington, DC: 

Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, 1991), 5–9.

12. Filipino name for water buffalo.

13. WD, BIA, 70–76, 95–96.

14. Dolan, 10–11.

15. David J. Silbey, A War of Frontier and Empire: The Philippine–

American War, 1899–1902 (New York, NY: Hill and Wang, 2007), 11; Norman G. 

Owen, ed., Compadre Colonialism: Studies on the Philippines under American 
27

Rule (Ann Arbor, MI: Center for South and Southeast Studies, The University of 

Michigan, 1971), 1–9.

16. Dolan, 11–12.

17. Ibid., 12–14. In 1898 there were 2,150 schools teaching over 200,000 

Filipinos basic skills.

18. Ibid., 17–18.

19. Silbey, 12; Dolan, 18–20.

20. “In the name of the one true God and on my honor I swear to be faithful to the society called Katipunan or Complete Union, to defend it to the last 

drop of my blood, to implicitly obey its orders and to keep its secrets from any 

and all persons not members of the society. And if I fail in its orders to execute 

its justice may God punish my soul and may the brothers trample upon my body; 

in testimony of which I sign with my own blood.” Oaths and Form of Initiation 

of the Society Called Katipunan or K.K.K, US National Archives, History of the 

Philippine Insurrection against the United States, 1899–1903: and documents 

relating to the War Department project for publishing the history (Washington, 

DC: National Archives, 1968), translated 7 July 1900, roll 4. Microfilm. Hereafter 

referred to as USNA.

21. David F. Trask, The War with Spain in 1898 (New York, NY: Macmillan 

Publishing Company, Inc., 1981), 391–393; Dolan, 20–21.

22. Considered by many Filipinos as the beginning of the Philippine 

Revolution.

23. Trask, 393–395; Dolan, 20–22.

24. Trask, 395–397.

25. Ibid., 404.

26. Aguinaldo, Proclamation to the Philippine People, 24 May 1898. 

USNA, roll 1.

27. Trask, 405–407.

28. James H. Blount, The American Occupation of the Philippines, 1898–

1912 (New York, NY: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1912), 232; WD, BIA, 25–27.

29. Aguinaldo’s Proclamation of 18 June 1898, Establishing the Dictatorial 

Government; Aguinaldo’s Instructions Concerning the Management of the 

Provinces and Towns, 20 June 1898; and Aguinaldo’s Proclamation of 23 June 

1898, Establishing the Revolutionary Government, USNA, roll 1.

30. Trask, 407.

31. James A. LeRoy, The Americans in the Philippines: A History of the 

Conquest and First Years of Occupation with an Introductory Account of the 

Spanish Rule, 2 vols. (Boston, MA: The Riverside Press Cambridge, 1914), 

vol. I, fn., 286.

32. Ibid., vol. I, 280–306. In fact, they were almost right. It was ratified by 

a margin of one vote on 6 February 1899.

33. Companions of Aguinaldo in Hong Kong, General of Brigade Manuel 

Tinio was assigned the provinces of Ilocos Norte and Ilocos Sur and General 

of Brigade Miguel Malvar was assigned Batangas province. List of Officers 

Commanding Various Districts, 1898. USNA, roll 7.
28

34. Brian M. Linn, The Philippine War, 1899–1902 (Lawrence, KS: 

University of Kansas Press, 2000), 22; Brian M. Linn, The U.S. Army and 

Counterinsurgency in the Philippine War, 1899–1902 (Chapel Hill, NC: The 

University of North Carolina Press, 1989), 13–14; Trask, 405. Linn’s The 

Philippine War, 1899–1902 is the best book on military operations and The U.S. 

Army and Counterinsurgency in the Philippine War, 1899–1902 provides an indepth look at counterinsurgency operations in four districts in Luzon.

35. For details on the mobilization at San Francisco, see Stephen D. Coats, 

Gathering at the Golden Gate: Mobilizing for War in the Philippines, 1898 (Fort 

Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2006).

36. Trask, 383–384.

37. William T. Sexton, Soldiers in the Sun: An Adventure in Imperialism

(Freeport, NY: Books for Libraries Press, 1971), 19. This reprint of a 1939 book 

is one of the better early books on the Philippine War.

38. Brian M. Linn, “Intelligence and Low-intensity Conflict in the Philippine 

War, 1899–1902,” Intelligence and National Security, January 1991, 91.

39. For details on this period, see Trask, 369–390; Sexton, 17–25.

40. Dewey was promoted to admiral on 7 May 1898.

41. Dewey had been directed by Secretary of the Navy John D. Long not to 

ally himself formally with the Filipinos.

42. Linn, Philippine War, 8.

43. For details on this period, see Trask, 411–422; Sexton, 30–62; Linn, 

Philippine War, 3–25.

44. Major General Elwell S. Otis graduated from the University of 

Rochester and Harvard Law School. During the American Civil War, he joined 

the 140th New York Infantry Regiment in 1862 rising in rank from captain to 

lieutenant colonel with brevet ranks of colonel and brigadier general. Mustered 

out in 1864 after a head wound, he was insomnious the rest of his life. He entered 

the US Army in 1866 as a lieutenant colonel in the 22d Infantry. In 1880, he was 

promoted to colonel of the 20th Infantry and founded the School of Application 

for Infantry and Cavalry at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, where he served 4 years 

as commandant. After serving as chief of recruiting service from 1890 to 1893, 

Otis became a brigadier general and commanded the Department of Columbia 

and Department of Colorado. On 4 May 1898 he was appointed major general of 

volunteers and assigned to VIII Corps. Thomas F. Burdett, “A New Evaluation 

of General Otis’ Leadership in the Philippines,” Military Review, January 1975, 

79–80.

45. Linn, Philippine War, 30.

46. Ironically, the treaty was ratified by one vote on 6 February, just after 

hostilities commenced.

47. For details on this period, see Trask, 423–472; Sexton, 63–78; Linn, 

Philippine War, 26–64.

48. Linn, Philippine War, 58.

49. For details on this period, see Sexton, 79–102; Linn, Philippine War, 

42–64.
29

50. Linn, Philippine War, 105.

51. For details on this period, see Sexton 103–158; Linn, Philippine War, 

88–116.

52. The United States and Spain exchanged ratified copies of the peace 

treaty on 11 April 1899. This formally ended the war and the obligation of the 

state volunteer regiments in the Philippines.

53. Linn, Philippine War, 88–89.

54. Kenneth R. Young, The General’s General: The Life and Times of Arthur 

MacArthur (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994), 238.

55. Linn, Philippine War, 121.

56. John M. Gates, Schoolbooks and Krags: The United States Army in the 

Philippines, 1898–1902 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press Inc., 1973), 80.

57. Elliott, 473–477.

58. Telegram, Otis to Secretary of War Alger received 29 May 1899, in 

US Army, Adjutant General’s Office, Correspondence Relating to the War with 

Spain and Conditions Growing out of the Same Including the Insurrection in 

the Philippine Islands and the China Relief Expedition, Between the AdjutantGeneral of the Army and Military Commanders in the United States, Cuba, Porto 

Rico, China, and the Philippine Islands from April 15, 1898 to July 30, 1902 

(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1902), vol. II, 998.

59. Eliott, 475.

60. Telegram, Otis to Adjutant General, received 26 June 1899, US Army, 

Correspondence, vol. II, 1019.

61. Allan R. Millett and Peter Maslowski, For the Common Defense: A 

Military History of the United States of America (New York, NY: The Free Press, 

1994), 306.

62. Andrew J. Birtle, US Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency 

Operations Doctrine, 1860–1941 (Washington, DC: US Army Center of Military 

History, 1998), 119.

63. Ibid., 102.

64. For details see Gates, 54–75.

65. Linn, Philippine War, 125.

66. For details on this period, see Linn, Philippine War, 117–138.

67. LeRoy, vol. II, 123.

68. Edward M. Coffman, “Batson of the Philippine Scouts,” Parameters, 

1977, 68–72.

69. Linn, Philippine War, 128.

70. Telegram, Otis to Adjutant General, received 3 November 1899, US 

Army, Correspondence, vol. II, 1093–1094.

71. Linn, Philippine War, 136–138.

72. Ibid., 147.

73. John R.M. Taylor, The Philippine Insurrection Against the United 

States: A Compilation of Documents with Notes and Introduction, Volume II, May 

19, 1898 to July 4, 1902. vol. II, 12. This is a galley proof of an unpublished 

War Department manuscript in History of the Philippine Insurrection against the 
30

United States, 1899–1903: and documents relating to the War Department project for publishing the history (Washington, DC: National Archives, 1968), roll 9. 

Microfilm. Hereafter referred to as Taylor, USNA.

74. Telegram, Otis to Adjutant General, received 12 December 1899, US 

Army, Correspondence, vol. II, 1120.

75. For details on this period, see Sexton, 158–220; Linn, Philippine War, 

139–159.

76. Taylor, USNA, vol. II, 14, roll 9.

77. Linn, Philippine War, 165.

78. For details see Glenn A. May, Battle for Batangas: A Philippine Province 

at War (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1991), 91–162; Sexton, 221–231; 

Linn, Philippine War, 160–170.

79. Telegram, Otis to Adjutant General, received 6 February 1900, US 

Army, Correspondence, vol. II, 1142.

80. Elliott, 480.

81. Headquarters of the Army General Orders 38, 29 March 1900, US 

Army, Correspondence, vol. II, 1154–1155.

82. LeRoy, vol. II, 283–286.

83. Ibid., vol. II, 279–282.

84. Young, 252.

85. Telegram, Otis to Secretary of War Root, received 10 April 1900, US 

Army, Correspondence, vol. II, 1159.

86. For details, see Linn, Philippine War, 185–204.

87. Major General Arthur MacArthur, born in 1845, joined 24th Wisconsin 

Infantry at the beginning of the American Civil War, received Medal of Honor 

for actions at Missionary Ridge, brevet colonel at age 19, studied law after the 

Civil War; joined 13th Infantry in 1866 as second lieutenant, participated in 1885 

Geronimo campaign, lieutenant colonel in 1899, brigadier general volunteers 

at Manila, major general volunteers commanding 2d Division in Philippines, 

Commander, Division of the Philippines and Governor-General of the Philippines 

1900–1901. For a biography, see Kenneth R. Young, The General’s General: The 

Life and Times of Arthur MacArthur.

88. Thieves or outlaws.

89. Taylor, USNA, vol. II, 15, roll 9.

90. Sexton, 237.

91. Taylor, USNA, vol. II, 47, roll 9.

92. Sexton, 239.

93. Linn, “Intelligence,” 93.

94. Elliott, 459.

95. For details, see Sexton, 238–240.

96. Allan R. Millett, The General: Robert L. Bullard and Officership in 

the United States Army, 1881–1925 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1975), 

137–138.
31

Chapter 2

Pacification of the Ilocano Provinces: First District,

Department of Northern Luzon, 1900–1901

. . . you will establish civil government in the various 

towns on your line of march, giving at least one day to 

each town. . . . impress on the President and Council and 

leading people the necessity of a strong, well-organized 

Police Force, upon which they must mainly rely for 

protection. . . . See that they understand the necessity 

of protecting themselves against the small bands of 

Insurgents and Ladrones. . . . It is my desire that you use 

your best endeavors to facilitate tranquility and the return 

of the people to their peaceful avocations.

BG Samuel B.M. Young, 20 December 19001

On 18 November 1899, Brigadier General Samuel B.M. Young’s cavalry brigade—the remnants of an initial force of 1,100 composed of three 

troops of the 3d Cavalry, a battalion of the 22d Infantry, a mountain battery, and Macabebes—reached Rosario in southern La Union province in 

pursuit of Aguinaldo (see map 3). Without specific orders, Young turned 

north into the Ilocano provinces in search of Aguinaldo and his regional 

commander, Brigadier General Manuel Tinio. A request for assistance to 

Brigadier General Loyd Wheaton, who had landed on 7 November at San 

Fabian on the Lingayen Gulf to block Aguinaldo’s retreat to the northeast 

and who had attacked Tinio’s 1,200-man brigade entrenched at San Jacinto 

on 11 November, was refused as not authorized by orders. Undeterred, 

Young moved north, brushing aside attempts by Tinio to delay him. On 

26 November, Major Peyton C. March’s battalion of the 33d United States 

Volunteer (USV) Infantry caught up with Young who ordered March to 

move toward Candon to deny Aguinaldo an escape route into the mountains of Abra province through the Tirad Pass. On the same day, Young’s 

executive officer, Lieutenant Colonel James Parker, receiving assistance 

from the USS Oregon, accompanied a 201-man naval landing party ashore 

at Vigan, governmental center of the Ilocos. Greeted by Ilocanos with cries 

of “Long live the Americans! Death to the Tagalogs!” Parker thought the 

war was over. On 2 December, March’s battalion destroyed Aguinaldo’s 

rear guard at Tirad Pass, capturing Aguinaldo’s family and staff, but failing to capture him. Young halted south of Vigan on 3 December to gather 

his forces and to make a reconnaissance of the entrenched Tangadan Pass 

occupied by 700 insurrectos commanded by Blas Villamor and his cousin, 
32

N

0 25

Scale

miles

South

China

Sea

NUEVA

VIZCAYA

BENGUET

PANGASINAN

Lingayen

Gulf

LEPANTO

LA

UNION

San Fernando

Candon

Bauang

Santa Cruz

ILOCOS

NORTE

CAGAYAN

ABRA

Laoag

Bangued

Paoay

Badoc Batac

Sinait

Cabugao

Vigan

Villavieja

NUEVA

ECIJA

Balaoang

I

L

O

C

O

S

S

U

R

Abra

River

Laoag River

BONTOC

Dingras

Narvacan

Tagudin

Rosario

San Fabian

San Jacinto

Map 3. The Ilocos in northwest Luzon.
33

Juan Villamor. Young attacked the next day with 250 soldiers. Fortunately, 

Colonel Luther Hare, 33d USV Infantry, arrived with 270 men to assist 

in taking the position. Before dawn on 5 December, Parker, reinforced by 

225 soldiers from Major Marcus D. Cronin’s battalion of the 33d USV 

Infantry, was attacked in Vigan by 200 insurrectos armed with rifles and 

war bolos commanded by Jaoquin Alejandrino. A desperate 4-hour fight 

ensued. By dawn, the insurrectos withdrew with heavy losses. Arriving at 

Vigan the next day, Young directed Hare, with a battalion from both the 

33d USV Infantry and the 34th USV Infantry, to pursue and destroy Tinio. 

Hare moved on two axes into both Abra and Ilocos Norte provinces. The 

battalion of the 34th USV Infantry, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel 

Robert L. Howze, found Tinio near Dingras in Ilocos Norte and engaged 

him in a running battle that ended with the destruction and dispersion of 

the Tinio Brigade.2

In less than a month, Young’s forces overran the Ilocano provinces, 

fought multiple skirmishes, and destroyed or repulsed all resistance. Their 

focus had been on capturing Aguinaldo and destroying Tinio’s units. By 

mid-December, Young’s brigade found itself scattered here and there as 

the demands of the pursuit had demanded. Many units were worn down—

a battalion that started the campaign with over 400 troops finished with 

87 men fit for duty. Reinforcements were not available as Major General 

Elwell S. Otis shifted VIII Corps operations to the southern Tagalog provinces. Fortunately, the initial reception by the Ilocanos appeared friendly. 

Otis, along with many American officers, believed that resistance would 

cease when the Americans established local civil government. To pursue 

this program, on 20 December 1899, Otis assigned Young to command 

the newly established District of North-Western Luzon. Young’s orders, 

issued that day for the establishment of civil government, were to establish 

a local government, to explain American expectations as best he could, 

and then to remain available to provide assistance as necessary. To support pacification of the Ilocano provinces, Young initially had about 3,500 

men—3d US Cavalry, 33d USV Infantry, and a battalion from both the 

29th USV Infantry and 34th USV Infantry. The American occupation and 

pacification of the Ilocos was about to begin.3

The Ilocos

The Ilocos region, called Samtoy before the Spanish arrived, ran 

south from the northwest corner of Luzon along the South China Sea coast 

until it joined the central Luzon plain near the Lingayen Gulf. Mountains 

comprised 80 percent of the area. The heavily reefed coastline had no 

all-season harbors. A narrow lowland coastal strip was wedged between 
34

the South China Sea and the Gran Cordillera Central or Caraballo Norte 

mountain range. The coastal strip was rarely wider than 6 miles except 

in the northern region where in places it reached 12 miles in width. In 

the north, the Laoag River provided a wide, fertile alluvial plain, and the 

Abra (gorge in Spanish) River served as the main route into and out of 

the fertile inland river valleys of central Ilocos. Both were navigable by 

rafts. The weather could be described as 6 months of drought followed 

by 6 months of rain. Annual rainfall exceeded 100 inches. The southwest 

monsoon season precluded maintaining the weekly Manila–Vigan–Aparri 

postal steamer from June through September. A single wagon road, the 

Camino Real, ran along the coast connecting the major municipal centers 

from north to south. In the rainy season, the road deteriorated into a mud 

track with frequent washouts. A telegraph line ran along the road. Limited 

interior trails existed. The Ilocos was a harsh, demanding physical environment much of the year.4

The Malay settlement of the Philippines began in the Ilocos region. In 

1572 when Spanish conquistador Juan de Salcedo arrived, 68,000 heads of 

families lived in the region. At that time the major towns were Laoag and 

Vigan, the traditional capital. Salcedo faced stiff resistance from the indios

before conquering Samtoy. He died from disease in March 1576. The 

Spanish made Vigan the regional capital. The Ilocanos rebelled against 

Spanish colonial rule in 1589, 1661, 1762, 1788, and 1807. Each time they 

failed. Dividing the Ilocos region, the Spanish created Ilocos Norte and 

Ilocos Sur provinces in 1818. They then created Abra in 1846 and La Union 

in 1854. The Spanish also organized three mountain districts—Benguet in 

1846, Lepanto in 1852, and Bontoc in 1859. The Ilocos remained a loyal, 

peaceful region until 1898.5

With a population of half a million, almost all the inhabitants of the 

Ilocano provinces lived on the coastal lowlands or in the inland river valleys. Ilocanos comprised almost the entire population. The 1887 Spanish 

census listed only 15 Chinese and mestizos in Ilocos Norte and several 

thousand non-Ilocanos in Ilocos Sur—primarily in Vigan, the regional 

business and governmental center.6 In 1899, small Chinese communities 

of 50 in Abra, 320 in Ilocos Sur, and 150 in La Union were reported.7 In 

the mountains where the Spanish had left the various tribes ungoverned, 

the Igorots constituted the major group. In the Ilocos the predominant language was Ilocano. The Ilocos constituted an ethnically, linguistically, and 

culturally homogeneous region.

Each province was different. Measuring 79 miles north to south and 

slightly smaller than Rhode Island, Ilocos Norte was the most sparsely 
35

settled coastal province. It had greater distance between its towns and villages, particularly north of the Laoag River, than Ilocos Sur or La Union. 

Located 47 miles by road from Vigan, the capital and largest town, Laoag, 

had a population of 30,000. To the south of Laoag, the towns of Batac 

and Badoc supported a combined population of 29,000.8 Seventy miles 

long and 21 miles at its widest, Ilocos Sur was less than half the size 

of Ilocos Norte. With only one-third of its area considered coastal plain, 

Ilocos Sur had the densest population and largest number of towns and 

villages. Vigan, its capital, supported a population of 14,200. Its location 

and harbor with a roadstead made Vigan the economic and governmental 

center of the Ilocos. Centrally located, Vigan was 47 miles from Laoag and 

67 miles from San Fernando by road and 15 miles by river from Bangued. 

Both Narvacan and Candon were larger than Vigan, with populations 

exceeding 18,000.9 La Union was 51 miles north to south and 31 miles 

east to west. San Fernando, its capital, had an unprotected harbor with 

two anchorages and a population of 12,900. By road, San Fernando was 

67 miles from Vigan and 150 miles from Manila. Unlike the ethnically 

homogenous northern Ilocano provinces, a Pangasinan minority existed. 

Balaoang, the second largest town, had a population of 12,200.10 About 

the size of Ilocos Norte, Abra was the most mountainous, sparsely settled, 

and remote Ilocano province. It occupied an area 53 miles north to south 

and 57 miles east to west. Abra was accessible only by the Abra River, 

Luzon’s third longest river, or by remote mountain trails through passes 

such as Tarad and Tangadan. Rafting upstream required punting or towing 

by manpower from its banks. Abra’s capital, Bangued, with a population 

of 16,400 was 15 miles by river from Vigan. Primitive roads connected 

smaller settlements in the river valleys. Ilocano was spoken in the valleys 

and Igorot in the mountains of Abra.11 (See table 1.)

Agriculture, industry, and trade comprised the Ilocos economy. 

Agriculture provided the foundation. Although rice was the principal crop, 

Table 1. 1902 Data on Ilocano Provinces12

Province Ilocos Norte Ilocos Sur La Union Abra

Capital Laoag Vigan San Fernando Bangued

Area (sq mi) 1,300 490 900 1,500

Population 163,000 186,000 110,000 43,000

Towns / Villages or 

 Hamlets 15 / 119 22 / 587 14 / 240 11 / 68
36

corn, vegetables, sugar cane, peanuts, tobacco, chocolate, pineapples, 

oranges, lemons, indigo, and cotton were also grown. It was common to 

raise two crops of rice and corn each year. In Ilocos Norte, Laoag served 

as the main market place. As a product both for local consumption and 

for export, raising livestock—cattle, carabaos, horses, and swine—was a 

principal source of wealth in the coastal provinces. In La Union, the livestock 

numbered 21,200 carabaos, 8,200 cattle, 5,500 horses, and 2,800 swine. 

The forests of Ilocos Norte produced the best wood in the Philippines—to 

include oak and pine—for export to Manila. In the mountains of La Union, 

sibucao, a valuable dye, grew. Some fishing occurred along the coast. 

Although the region was poor, food was not a problem. Weaving locallygrown cotton into cloth became a cottage industry for women in Ilocos 

Norte, Ilocos Sur, and Abra. Few houses lacked a loom. In Ilocos Norte, 

Paoay enjoyed a reputation for producing “blankets of Ilocos.” Copper, 

iron, gold, and silver were available in the mountains of each province. 

In Abra, coal was available. In Ilocos Sur, Candon and Narvacan became 

trading centers with Igorots who worked copper. Most iron products were 

imported. Vigan and San Fernando were centers for importing European 

products. Vigan had the only carriage factory in the Ilocos.13 Eating locally 

raised foods, dressing in locally-homespun clothing, and living in houses 

built from locally grown materials, the Ilocanos were “literally selfsufficient in all local needs except iron.”14

Ilocanos

Like the rest of the Philippines, the Ilocano society was divided into 

a landed gentry, a very small merchant class, and the poor—the majority. 

The landed gentry did not own large estates, but they did control daily 

life and local government through a patron-client relationship among 

themselves with the elected principales and with their tenants. The tax 

system reinforced the patron-client relationship. Taxes were levied based 

on barangay—a dependence on a particular patron, not on residence. 

Local government dominated Ilocano politics. Spanish colonial authorities 

were few in number. Resident principales and ex-presidentes elected 

local leaders, in 1900 known as presidentes by both the insurrectos and 

the Americans. In most places, this position had been filled by members 

of a small number of families over the decades. When a principale

required something to be done, the natural, socially-, economically-, and 

culturally-driven response was to do it. For the poor Ilocanos, not to do so 

was unthinkable. Ilocano society was hierarchical, stable, and accepted. 

Known for their honesty and hard work, Ilocanos disliked other groups, 

particularly the Tagalogs and Igorots.15 Like most groups in the Philippines, 

the Ilocanos were a proud people “quick to avenge insults to personal or 
37

family honor, a characteristic which often determined decisions to resist or 

assist enemy occupation.”16

The persistent Spanish colonial presence throughout the Ilocos was 

the local priest, normally a Spanish friar. The ecclesiastical government for 

the Ilocos was established in Vigan. It was unusual in that both the peninsulare friars and the native clergy were Augustinians, but their bishop was 

from a different order. Beyond ecclesiastical duties, priests participated 

in local affairs. In addition to the duties required by the Spanish colonial 

government to maintain the tax rolls, oversee the selection of local leaders, 

monitor local government, and search out subversives, the clergy oversaw 

education. The primary purpose of education was to produce pious adults. 

Primary education, little more than learning to read and write in Spanish 

or Latin, was to be completed by age 9. Although required by law, public 

schools seldom existed in the Ilocos. Secondary education, a 5-year course 

taught by schools recognized by the Bureau of Public Instructions, was 

followed by an examination administered by a member of the University 

of Santo Tomas. The only secondary school in the Ilocos was in Vigan. 

As a minor seminary, it offered only the first 3 years of the 5-year course. 

To complete a degree, a student had to go to Manila or elsewhere. This 

restricted secondary education to the principales. Often the only local peninsulare, the priest had connections in Manila and in Madrid beyond the 

reach of local leaders, had better education and information about events 

outside the Philippines, and had duties that brought him into direct conflict 

with local leaders. Ilocano resentment over the way the clergy interfered in 

local affairs helped shape events in 1898.17

The term “towns” and their population numbers are misleading. A 

town or poblacion consisted of a few houses for the wealthy that were built 

of carved woodwork with mahogany floors resting on a plastered masonry 

or brick foundation and roofed with tile. They were located near a church 

and a public plaza or along a road near open markets. The only building 

of significance in these towns was the church, a massive brick or stone 

building with a tile or metal roof and thick walls. Adjoining the church 

and similarly built was a convento, the quarters of the local friar. A more 

apt description of a town would be a one-street village. The remainder of 

the population of the town resided in outlying barrios, some located miles 

away, and lived in wooden, thatched houses made from local, combustible, 

and renewable materials. Provincial capitals and a few commercial centers 

had a second residential or business avenue. Only capitals had municipal 

jails. In towns, prisoners were confined in leg irons and left to be fed by 

relatives. The only urban center in the Ilocos was Vigan. As the regional 

Spanish colonial governmental center for centuries, Vigan had grown into 
38

a 16-city-block town of cobblestone streets, grand houses, fine churches, 

schools, government buildings, and warehouses.18 As such, Vigan became 

the “political cockpit for all the friar-secular-Spanish-mestizo-indio factions of the period.”19

Considered one of the Philippines most loyal regions in the 19th century, the Ilocanos accepted the Spanish view that the 1896 Katipunan

uprising was a Tagalog revolt. They responded by providing a squadron of 

cavalry from Ilocos Norte and 600 infantrymen—300 from Ilocos Sur, 200 

from Abra, and 100 from La Union—to the Spanish colonial army fighting 

against Aguinaldo in 1897.20 After an inspection tour by Governor-General 

Primo de Rivera, and in recognition of Ilocano loyalty and support, the 

Spanish Queen bestowed the title Muy Noble y Leal or “Very Noble and 

Loyal” on Vigan.21 Despite the absence of Ilocano support for the Katipunan

rebellion, local mistrust caused the peninsulare clergy and Spanish officials 

in Vigan to seize on the revolt as an opportunity to purge elements of the 

community. The Ecclesiastical Notary and his representative were arrested 

and tortured. Because many priests saw the Katipunan as a military arm 

of Masonry, Ilocano Masons, many of them illustrados, along with members of the native clergy, found themselves targeted for arrest and torture. 

Afterward, the friars claimed they had preempted a revolt by their actions; 

others saw no revolt as an indication that no threat had ever existed. But 

that would change. The friar’s actions caused an Ilocano reaction. Soon 

thereafter, the Guardia de Honor, a lay-based religious sect in La Union, 

began meeting. On 25 March 1898 in Ilocos Sur, members of the Candon 

Katipunan revolted. Led by Fernando Guirnalda and Isabelo Abaya, it 

killed several members of the local clergy and declared the establishment 

of the Republic of Candon. Three days later, Spanish troops arrived, killed 

most of the rebels, and destroyed the newly declared republic. Guirnalda 

and Abaya escaped into the mountains not knowing that within months the 

Ilocos would be freed from Spanish rule.22

Manuel Tinio, a Tagalog, returned to his province of Nueva Ecija 

from Hong Kong in June 1898 to raise a force of insurrectos to destroy 

Spanish rule in the Ilocos. Six months earlier, as a 20-year old general 

and veteran of the Katipunan revolt, he accompanied Aguinaldo into 

exile. Beginning at San Fernando in La Union in July, Tinio overran the 

Ilocos from south to north in a 30-day campaign capturing over 3,000 

Spanish prisoners. On 13 August, the day the Americans attacked Manila, 

he entered Vigan. With the surrender of the last Spanish colonial troops in 

Ilocos Sur shortly thereafter, the Ilocos was freed from Spanish rule after 

330 years. The Ilocanos greeted Tinio as a liberator. He established the 

Tinio Brigade headquarters at Vigan. To oversee the implementation of 
39

the civil and military directives of Aguinaldo’s government, Tinio created 

three commands: 1st Zone commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Casimiro 

Tinio, consisting of La Union and the mountain districts of Beneguet and 

Amburayan; 2d Zone commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Blas Villamor, 

consisting of southern Ilocos Sur and Abra provinces and the mountain 

districts of Lepanto and Bontoc; and 3d Zone commanded by Lieutenant 

Colonel Irineo Guzman consisting of northern Ilocos Sur and Ilocos 

Norte provinces.23 As directed by Aguinaldo, Brigadier General Manuel 

Tinio spent the next 15 months working with Ilocano local leaders and 

developing both the Tinio Brigade and the Ilocano militias. When war 

with the Americans started, Tinio planned the defense of the Ilocos and 

had 636 entrenchments constructed at critical locations from La Union 

to Ilocos Norte. When Otis attacked north in the central Luzon plain in 

the fall of 1899, Tinio left subordinates to secure the Ilocos and moved 

with 1,200 men into La Union province to assist Aguinaldo escape. What 

followed was Young’s campaign into the Ilocos and the shattering of the 

Tinio Brigade.24

Ilocano Insurrectos

Brigadier General Manuel Tinio, the boy general and liberator of the 

Ilocos, had build a solid civil-military foundation between August 1898 

and November 1899, which supported the guerrilla warfare that followed. 

As Aguinaldo’s commander in the Ilocos, he had developed personal 

ties with Ilocano presidentes and had recruited Ilocanos into the Tinio 

Brigade. Through his zone commanders, he supervised the creation of the 

Sandatahan—the locally recruited, bolo-armed militia. When William B. 

Wilcox, a US Navy paymaster, visited Vigan in November 1898, he was 

struck by the youth of Tinio’s officers and by what they had accomplished 

militarily in just a few months—a 3,500-man regular brigade, a militia in 

every town, and a local defense force in almost every barrio. Although 

training was considered poor, the Tinio Brigade appeared well armed, supported by a large militia, and widely supported by the Ilocanos.25 Young’s 

advance into the Ilocos may have scattered Tinio’s conventional units, but 

it did not affect his hold on local leaders and their local militias.

However, tension between Tagalogs and Ilocanos had occurred. 

Personalities and past events raised questions of trust. Sanctioned by 

Aguinaldo, the assassination of Antonio Luna, the Ilocano commander 

of the Army of Liberation, reinforced the general Ilocano mistrust of 

Tagalogs. Father Gregorio Aglipay, an-excommunicated native priest 

from Ilocos Norte who had assumed the title Ecclesiastical Governor in 

the Ilocos when Tinio liberated the region and who had been appointed 
40

Vicar General of the Army of Liberation, accompanied Aguinaldo into 

the Ilocano provinces during his retreat into the mountains of northwest 

Luzon. Older than Tinio, a university graduate, an ordained priest, and a 

proud Ilocano patriot from humble beginnings, Aglipay found it impossible to take orders from the younger Tagalog university dropout. With no 

formal military commission other than Vicar General, Aglipay assumed 

the rank of lieutenant general. The personality conflict between Aglipay 

and Tinio became a public rivalry that continued throughout the insurrection. Unfortunately for the Americans, both shared a determination to resist 

the American occupation. At times they conferred, but Aglipay conducted 

guerrilla operations in Ilocos Norte independent of Tinio’s control.26

Shifting to guerrilla warfare required a reorganization of the Tinio 

Brigade and a decentralization of operations. In January 1900 Tinio 

established three units called lines that were commanded by commanders 

known as Jefes de Linea. The commands were the Ilocos Norte–Vigan 

Line which included Ilocos Norte and Ilocos Sur to south of Vigan; the 

Abra–Candon Line which included Abra and Ilocos Sur between Vigan 

and Candon; and the La Union–Santa Cruz Line which included La Union 

and Ilocos Sur to north of Santa Cruz (see map 4). Each line was divided 

into companies of 50 to 100 men commanded by Jefes de Guerrilla. Unit 

size depended on available firearms. Ilocos Norte had three companies—

not including Aglipay’s forces, Ilocos Sur had five companies, La Union 

had five companies, and Abra had three companies. The companies were 

numbered sequentially by province. For example, Ilocos Sur had companies 

Guerrilla Number 1 of Ilocos Sur through Guerrilla Number 5 of Ilocos 

Sur. In Ilocos Sur, the Jefe de Linea of the Ilocos Norte–Vigan Line 

commanded Guerrilla Numbers 1 and 2 of Ilocos Sur, the Jefe de Linea of 

the Abra–Candon Line commanded Guerrilla Numbers 3 and 4 of Ilocos 

Sur, and the Jefe de Linea of the La Union–Santa Cruz Line commanded 

Guerrilla Number 5 of Ilocos Sur. The companies were subdivided into 

destacamentos or detachments of 20 men or less. Each full-time guerrilla 

was armed with a rifle and about 100 rounds of ammunition. Some guerrilla 

detachments included a limited number of men armed with war bolos.27

Shortages of firearms and ammunition would plague the guerrillas.

Tinio appointed Lieutenant Colonel Vicente Salazar to command 

the Ilocos Norte–Vigan Line, Lieutenant Colonel Juan Villamor to 

command the Abra–Candon Line, and Lieutenant Colonel Juan Gutierrez 

to command the La Union–Santa Cruz Line.28 The line commanders had 

served with Tinio from the beginning. Juan Villamor, whose cousin Blas 

served as Tinio’s executive officer and now worked with Ilocanos on the 
41

Map 4. Tinio Brigade area of operations.

N

0 25

Scale

miles

South

China

Sea

NUEVA

VIZCAYA

BENGUET

PANGASINAN

Lingayen

Gulf

LEPANTO

LA

UNION

San Fernando

Candon

Bauang

Santa Cruz

CAGAYAN

ABRA

Laoag

Bangued

Paoay

Badoc Batac

Sinait

Cabugao

Vigan

Villavieja

NUEVA

ECIJA

Balaoang

I

L

O

C

O

S

S

U

R

Abra

River

BONTOC

Dingras

Narvacan

Tagudin

Rosario

San Fabian

San Jacinto

Tinio Brigade

Area of Operations

Zone Boundaries

1st Zone

2d Zone

3d Zone

Tinio Brigade

Area of Operations

Zone Boundaries

Tinio Brigade

Area of Operations

Zone Boundaries

Tinio Brigade

Area of Operations

Zone Boundaries

ILOCOS

NORTE

Laoag River
42

Abra–Ilocos Sur border, came from an influential extended family in Abra. 

Born in Abra, Juan Villamor, a former Spanish colonial officer, had been 

an early advocate of guerrilla warfare. Like Tinio, Gutierrez, a Tagalog, 

was engaged to a local woman. Major Isabelo Abaya, a leader of the 

3-day Candon Republic revolt in 1898 and member of one of Candon’s 

largest families, commanded Guerrilla Number 4 of Ilocos Sur.29 Most of 

the company and detachment commanders were members of the Ilocano 

land-owning class who shared strong family and economic ties and who 

enjoyed the support of extended Ilocano families. Few had previous 

military experience, but all commanded because of their local knowledge 

and influence.30

Given the critical role of the population in providing food, supplies, 

intelligence, and warning to the guerrillas, Tinio understood the key 

was controlling the presidentes and their local government, especially 

in towns garrisoned by the Americans. Before the Americans arrived, 

he had organized widespread local militias and emphasized to the presidentes the importance of supporting the local militia and nearby guerrilla 

units. Before the insurrection, local leaders had supported the militia for 

months with recruits, taxes, food, and supplies. Tinio tried to maintain 

popular support for resistance to the American occupation through patriotic appeals, through the local patron-client relationships in each town, 

and even through coercion when necessary.31 On 20 March 1900 Tinio 

issued a proclamation as Commander in Chief of Operations in the Region 

of Ilocos that reminded the population of its responsibilities to support the 

guerrillas and to resist the American occupation:

The following will be subject to summary judgment and 

penalty of death:

1. All local presidents and other civil authorities of 

towns and barrios, rancherias and other places of 

their jurisdiction who do not give immediate information to the camps within their jurisdiction at the 

moment they have information of the movements, 

plans, directions, and number of the enemy.

2. Those who, whatever be their age and sex, reveal to 

the enemy the camp, stopping places, movement and 

direction of the revolutionary soldiers.

3. Those who voluntarily offer themselves as guides to 

the enemy unless it is for the purpose of leading them 

from the true road.
43

4. Those who, of their own free will or not, capture revolutionary soldiers without being authorized to do so 

or who induce them to surrender to the enemy.32

The part-time local militia provided not only a reserve for the regular guerrilla units but, more importantly, it provided eyes and ears among the populace. It served as an important tool that could intimidate both by its mere 

presence and by taking action against traitors. Punishments for informers, 

designed to punish and to serve as an example for others, ranged from 

warnings and fines to whippings to death—buried alive, slashed to death 

by bolo, decapitation by bolo, or thrown alive into a well. Tinio stated, 

“Although I would regret to have to shed blood of my compatriots, I am 

disposed to take all the steps necessary to punish rigorously the traitors to 

the country.”33 A militia in every town and barrio served as an important 

insurrecto instrument of populace control. The militia served as an invisible police force.34

After mid-January 1900 Tinio’s insurrectos fought only as guerrillas. 

Tinio moved throughout the region inspecting, consulting, encouraging, 

and commanding his line and company commanders. By June 1900 he 

established a headquarters at what he called Santa Rosa, a location in the 

mountains along the Ilocos Sur–Ilocos Norte border north of Sinait in Ilocos 

Sur.35 Full-time guerrillas ambushed isolated American units, employed 

snipers as harassment, and occasionally attacked towns to inflict losses on 

American soldiers as a reminder to the Americans and to the Ilocanos that 

the war continued without respite. When attacked by the Americans, the 

guerrillas would flee to the nearest barrios, hide their weapons, and blend 

in with the other amigos or friends. Although the militia reinforced the 

guerrillas on occasion, its primary functions were intelligence, resupply, 

supporting taxation, and controlling the population. Overlooked by the 

Americans who searched for the guerrillas, the militia played a critical role 

in sustaining support for the guerrillas.36

Life as a full-time guerrilla was itinerant if not dangerous. Captured 

records indicated that in April 1900 Guerrilla Number 2 of La Union, 

commanded by Captain Aniceto Angeles, had 81 members—1 captain, 

4 lieutenants, 4 sergeants, 8 noncommissioned officers, 1 bugler, and 

63 men. Averaging 24 years of age, the insurrectos were all unmarried 

or widowers. All but two were farmers. They were armed with a mixed 

collection of 47 rifles, 33 bayonets, and 53 cartridges each. Except for 

19 days that no records were found, from 15 August 1900 to 20 April 

1901, the unit spent 103 out of 220 days in the mountains patrolling and 

scouting for Americans between Santa Cruz in southern Ilocos Sur and 
44

Dolores in Abra. It never spent more than 5 nights in the same place. 

Angeles commanded the Line once when his superiors left to meet with 

Tinio. Three times he gave up command because of sickness. During those 

9 months, the company joined other guerrilla units to attack Americans 

four times, was attacked by Americans four times, and withdrew ten times 

when warned by civilian scouts of the approach of American forces.37

Warnings of American movements were provided by rifle shots, runners, 

and even the ringing of church bells. Tinio noted that guerrillas were 

often saved by “the vigilance of the advance outposts which [civilian] . . . 

laborers make at a good distance from the camps, so that the presence of 

the enemy is known two or three kilometers away, as well as his direction 

and sometimes even his number.”38 These poorly armed, small groups of 

insurrectos were the full-time guerrilla adversaries of the Americans.

American Military Operations

In December 1899 Otis divided northern Luzon—30,000 square miles 

and nearly 2 million Filipinos—into three military districts: north, northwest, and central. To undertake the organization of civil government and 

to implement the pacification programs, Major General MacArthur commanded 25,000 American soldiers, half of all the forces in the Philippines.39

A daunting task with so few American troops, yet the destruction of 

Aguinaldo’s Tagalog-dominated revolutionary government and what was 

viewed as early support of American efforts raised optimistic assessments. 

Although security remained a problem, it was expected to be resolved 

by the establishment of local governments with local police forces. On 

29 March 1900 the War Department reorganized by creating the Division 

of the Philippines and the Department of Northern Luzon. The Department 

of Northern Luzon, headquartered in Manila, was divided into six military districts—First through Sixth.40 Three weeks later, Major General 

Wheaton replaced MacArthur who assumed command of the Division of 

the Philippines on 5 May. In his August annual report, Wheaton’s assessment was:

The natives, other than the Tagalo[g]s, are generally well 

disposed toward the American occupation, and if protected will aid in the establishing of such form of selfgovernment as they may be able to understand. The mass 

of Tagalo[g]s, when convinced that we are here to stay 

and that the authority of the United States is to be maintained will acquiesce, provided they are protected from 

the men who have dominated them as leaders of the 

insurrection.41
45

The Department of Northern Luzon statistics for the preceding 6 months 

had been favorable: 41 American KIA, 73 WIA, and 41 missing in action 

(MIA) or prisoner of war (POW) compared to over 1,000 insurrectos KIA 

and over 1,300 insurrectos and 3,400 rifles captured or surrendered.42

The Department of North-Western Luzon was reorganized in March 

as the First District, Department of Northern Luzon. It consisted of 8,000 

square miles and half a million people—almost one-quarter of the area 

and population in the Department of Northern Luzon—in the four Ilocano 

provinces of Ilocos Norte, Ilocos Sur, La Union, and Abra; and in the three 

mountain provinces of Benguet, Lepanto, and Bontoc. Other than a small 

garrison in Benguet, American units were stationed in the more populated 

Ilocano provinces.43 Brigadier General Young,44 a 60-year old cavalry veteran of the American Civil War, the Indian Wars, and the Cuban campaign, 

commanded First District from Vigan. His outstanding performance in the 

1899 fall campaign failed to change the fact that he had been counseled by 

Otis on his arrival in the Philippines for remarks critical of Otis and that he 

now served under Wheaton, a former subordinate.45 Blunt, outspoken, illtempered, and distrustful of his superiors, Young was an aggressive commander whose “major contribution to the pacification campaign was his 

recognition that the guerrilla war was a local war” and who “steadfastly 

supported his provincial commanders against his superiors and allowed 

them to develop their own counterinsurgency methods.”46 But that would 

come later. On 23 January 1900 Young reported, “My belief is that by 

keeping up a constant hunt after these murderers, thieves and robbers, the 

country can be cleared within two months.”47

Young garrisoned the provincial capitals and other towns as problems 

arose (see map 5). Lieutenant Colonel Howze, headquartered at Laoag, 

had a battalion of the 34th USV Infantry and two companies from the 12th 

Infantry to occupy Ilocos Norte. Colonel Hare, 33d USV Infantry, established his headquarters with one battalion at Bangued in Abra. Two battalions were stationed in Ilocos Sur. By March 1900 the 48th USV Infantry, 

commanded by Colonel William P. Duvall at San Fernando, was responsible for La Union. Troops from the 3d Cavalry worked with the commanders of the coastal provinces. Posts or stations—varying in strength from 

50 to 200 in Sinait to 1,000 men at Cabugao in northern Ilocos Sur and 

Candon in central Ilocos Sur—grew in number from 15 in January to 19 in 

March to 36 by April. As the number of posts increased, the size of posts 

shrank.48 Most American units would remain in the same area through 

February 1901 conducting a “war of garrison duty, daily patrols, and 

occasional expeditions.”49 On 1 August 1900 First District troop strength 

was reported as 3,693—923 in the 3d Cavalry, 583 with Howze in Ilocos 
46

Map 5. First District, Department of Northern Luzon.

N

0 25

Scale

miles

South

China

Sea

NUEVA

VIZCAYA

BENGUET

PANGASINAN

Lingayen

Gulf

LEPANTO

LA

UNION

San Fernando

Candon

Bauang

Santa Cruz

CAGAYAN

ABRA

Laoag

Bangued

Paoay

Badoc Batac

Sinait

Cabugao

Vigan

Villavieja

NUEVA

ECIJA

Balaoang

Abra

River

BONTOC

Dingras

Narvacan

Tagudin

Rosario

San Fabian

San Jacinto

ILOCOS

NORTE

Laoag River

48th USV

First District,

Department of

Northern Luzon

First District,

Department of

Northern Luzon

First District,

Department of

Northern Luzon

I

L

O

C

O

S

S

U

R

34th USV(-)

33d USV

First District
47

Norte, 940 with Hare in Ilocos Sur and Abra, and 1,247 with Duvall in La 

Union.50 Low troop strength, lack of intelligence, an unfriendly Ilocano 

populace, confusion over occupation policies, and the lure of capturing 

Aguinaldo or Tinio hindered pacification efforts.

Initial Operations

Young was fortunate to have outstanding subordinates who, within 

their limited resources, pushed Otis’s pacification program—establishing 

civil government, establishing schools, and improving public health. 

At district headquarters, Captain John G. Ballance, Chief Assistant and 

Advisor to the Military Governor, coordinated civil governmental and 

other pacification matters. By April, 63 towns had been organized under 

General Orders 43 with a presidente, a town council, and a police force. By 

June, 203 schools had 10,700 students, about one-quarter of the possible 

number of students.51 Young, a supporter of schools, requested special pay 

for the soldiers who taught arguing that “the benefits to the government 

from the knowledge of English that would be acquired by the natives 

would more than pay the expense.”52 Although increasing numbers were 

considered progress, basic problems remained. General Orders 43 was 

flawed. Taxing industry and trades, it was not designed for an agricultural 

economy. Local leaders and American post commanders had to cross 

cultural and linguistic barriers to work through an adjustment to duties 

and responsibilities unfamiliar to both. That took time, understanding, and 

a willingness by both parties to work together toward a common goal. 

From the Ilocano perspective, pacification programs “either ignored local 

customs or were pursued with more self-righteousness than tact.” From 

Young’s perspective, the Ilocanos were “densely ignorant and utterly unfit 

to exercise the right of suffrage.”53 Working across cultural barriers proved 

no easier in 1900 than it does today. 

For the insurrectos, hiding from the Americans often in plain sight and 

supported by the local leadership and the Ilocano populace, intelligence 

about American movements was excellent. In contrast, American intelligence was limited, at best. Lack of an understanding of Ilocano society, 

culture, and language, as well as the organization and intent of the guerrilla civil infrastructure, was further compounded by rumors, misinformation, and outright lies. In February 1900, an officer expressed a common 

American view when he wrote home:

As a rule the women and children hate the US soldiers and 

in their language, a kind of dog language, they frequently 

abuse us. They think we are very ignorant because we 

don’t understand them and because we catch their soldiers 
48

in civilian garb and turn them loose because we can’t prove 

who they are. We cannot have a spy and scouting system 

because our men are all large and they are small, coppered 

or brown color, and use an unpublished dog language and 

will under no circumstance reveal the whereabouts of any 

of their soldiers.54

Young complained on 25 March, “These people are very secretive and as 

they have no idea of truth, or honor as we understand the word, it is very difficult to find out the truth about anything.”55 Another officer explained, “To 

us the people were inarticulate; they did not speak Spanish and we could 

not speak their languages. They were, from secular custom, in the hands 

of the headmen, whom they obeyed unquestioning.”56 The parole policy 

compounded American frustration. In May, Young had been informed 

that crowded prisons in Manila required the parole of all captured insurrectos except for officers and others considered most important. Young 

responded, “I find it very injurious to our cause to release captured prisoners here. They invariably return to the insurgent bands or use their energies 

in giving aid to them. . . . Those who do not return directly to the mountain 

bands, act as spies, and disappear finally from our sight.”57 Despite these 

concerns of Young and others, the parole policy remained in effect: captured insurrectos were disarmed and released. Captured ladrones began 

confessing to being insurrectos to avoid punishment for their crimes. It 

would take a rebellion in Ilocos Norte and an investigation in La Union to 

provide the Americans a better understanding of the insurrectos. 

A major threat arose in Ilocos Norte that spring. Howze, the military 

governor, thought that American policies were working. Laoag’s civil 

government had an active police force. Guerrilla activity, nonexistent 

for 3 months, permitted his small force to focus on establishing a local 

government with five infantry companies stationed in five towns. In March 

1900 Howze reported a “strong undercurrent of bad spirit and preparations 

for a revolt.”58 Guerrilla activity increased with convoys attacked, telegraph 

lines cut, loyal Ilocanos threatened or killed, and reports of Ilocanos being 

tattooed with Katipunan symbols. Rumors persisted that Father Aglipay, 

working through the local clergy, had formed branches of the Katipunan in 

southern Ilocos Norte. Later, Howze reported that Aglipay had “appealed 

to the Catholic faith of the natives, calling on them to defend Catholicism 

against American religion. He is branding men and forcing them to serve 

him. He is making a great struggle which must be met.”59 When a patrol 

captured documents on 11 April confirming a planned provincial revolt at 

the end of April, Howze, with his few troops, acted. On 15 and 16 April, 

Howze sent detachments into the Badoc-Batac area, the center of Aglipay’s 
49

support, to disrupt activity by scattering insurrectos and inflicting losses. 

On the night of 16 April, 800 insurrectos, using civilians as shields, 

attacked the 30-man garrison at Batac numerous times in human waves 

and burned the town. By dawn, insurrecto losses were 180 KIA and 135 

POW. On the night of 17 April, a similar attack was repulsed in Laoag. In 

2 days, Howze’s forces had killed over 300 insurrectos with losses of 3 

KIA and 3 WIA. He reported, “Much of fighting hand to hand by fanatics 

worked up to a pitch by Padre Aglipay and General Tinio’s order. They 

were regular dervish charges. Slaughter terrible.”60 Howze made a 4-day 

offer of amnesty which brought in a couple hundred insurrectos. When 

his offer expired, Howze moved directly on Batac where he ravaged the 

countryside. On 24 April a cavalry troop cornered 300 insurrectos, killing 

125. Howze’s swift defeat of the Ilocos Norte revolt resulted from his 

prompt, decisive actions. The 520 insurrecto dead demoralized the guerrilla 

movement, undercut its popular support, and exposed its infrastructure.61

Howze intensified his pacification measures. However, southern Ilocos 

Norte, particularly the Badoc-Batac area, continued to support Aglipay’s 

insurrectos throughout the insurrection. 

In First District, La Union province had the most lawlessness in early 

1900. When Duvall took command in March, Otis had told him, “This, 

today, is the worst part of the Philippine islands.”62 No one guessed that 

when the presidente of Bauang turned the leader of the Guardia de Honor

sect, Crispulo Patajo, over to the Americans as an outlaw, he provided the 

Americans the key to understanding guerrilla organization in La Union. 

Interrogated by Lieutenant William T. Johnston, Patajo condemned the 

presidente and offered information about guerrilla units and their relationship to the towns that supported and protected them. With this insight into 

the guerrilla infrastructure, Duvall directed Johnston, assisted by Patajo, 

to investigate the local governments established by the Americans in La 

Union province. On 21 May Johnston’s report, “Investigation into the 

Methods Adopted by the Insurgents for Organizing and Maintaining a 

Guerrilla Force,” concluded that despite the destruction of the Army of 

Liberation, the insurrection was not over and that establishing local governments alone could not guarantee pacification. In Johnston’s words, this 

was “the first news that the insurrectos were actively at work organizing 

and the first indication that the American authorities had that the native 

officials of the towns and others were playing a double role.”63 Duvall 

ordered the destruction of the guerrilla bands and their infrastructure. To 

accomplish this, Duvall appointed Patajo chief of detectives in La Union 

and authorized him to recruit an unpaid64 400 to 500-man vigilante force 

raised from the Guardia de Honor. Duvall created an intelligence section 
50

headed by Johnston to receive information from the Guardia de Honor, 

from surrendered insurrectos who received freedom after identifying other 

insurrectos, and from American units. When visits by Blas Villamor and 

Tinio failed to reduce the influence of the Guardia de Honor in La Union 

province, a bounty was placed on Patajo’s head. When the Guardia de 

Honor secured a town, it gave control to loyal vigilantes while American 

forces swept the countryside for guerrillas. Peasants replaced the principales. Rallies provided opportunities for the populace to denounce insurrectos, confess misdeeds, embrace the American flag, and join the sect. 

Once purged, the town remained occupied. Although Duvall ignored 

Army policy by using what Otis called religious fanatics, Young supported 

him when inquiries came from Manila. Given an understanding of the 

local insurgent organization and through the use of a persecuted minority, 

Duvall had broken the linkage between the guerrillas and the towns and 

pushed the guerrillas away from the towns. Most of La Union province 

had been pacified by the end of May 1900.65

Shift in Focus: Battle for the Towns

By May 1900 Young had a better understanding of the resistance he 

confronted and he began to make district-wide changes. Building on the 

province intelligence section in La Union, Ballance became, in effect, the 

district intelligence officer. His duties included collecting and distributing 

military information and administering a network of paid informers. On 

22 May First District required all males to have registration certificates. 

Travel was restricted by a system of passes and reporting procedures. This 

was followed on 15 June by the publication of portions of General Orders 

100 (appendix B) to clarify the laws of war on the classification and treatment of war rebels, war traitors, spies, and prisoners of war. A proclamation prohibiting the provision of food, shelter, or information to the 

insurrectos was followed 10 days later with another prohibiting the possession or hiding of firearms. These two actions clarified to the Ilocanos 

what was legally permitted and what was not. Post commanders could 

now hold the guerrillas accountable, as well as the elected leaders and 

members of the populace who actively supported them.66 The laws of war, 

in theory at least, were to be as harsh as the coercion and suasion practiced 

by the insurrectos. A battle for control of the towns began. 

Governor-General MacArthur offered amnesty to the insurrectos in 

the Philippines on 21 June 1900. When his offered expired 90 days later, 

only 5,022 insurrectos had surrendered.67 He took this poor response as 

an indication that the war was far from over. This reinforced the conclusion of Johnston’s report which MacArthur called “altogether the best 

description which has reached this headquarters of the insurgent method 
51

for organizing and maintaining a guerrilla force.”68 MacArthur knew that 

Aguinaldo hoped that William Jennings Bryan would defeat President 

McKinley at the polls in November. He also knew that Aguinaldo had, in 

MacArthur’s words, “announced a primal and inflexible principle, to the 

effect that every native, without any exception, residing within the limits of the archipelago, owed active individual allegiance to the insurgent 

cause.”69 What he did not know was that on 8 July Aguinaldo ordered general attacks through the archipelago for the nights of 15 and 23 September 

and an uprising in Manila on 15 September. These attacks were ordered to 

affect the American presidential election.70

At the end of the rainy season, a new roughness began to appear 

throughout First District, whether from the frustrations of guerrilla war, 

from assassinations of loyal Ilocanos, or from doing so much with so little. 

On 16 August Howze notified his commander in Badoc, “I want you to 

take the most aggressive measures against the natives; clear up that situation even if you have to kill off a large part of the malcontents; do some 

terrorizing yourself.”71 Telegraph lines always were an easy target for the 

guerrillas and repair work always risky. In the fall, American reactions 

became more severe. In August the telegraph poles in La Union province 

were numbered so that each barrio knew what segment of the line it would 

be held accountable for if the wire was destroyed. By mid-September, 

Ilocos Sur commanders were ordered to “shoot all persons who may be 

found on the road between dark and daybreak, and that wherever the telegraph wire had been cut or pulled down, you cause all houses in the vicinity to be burned to the ground.” At the end of September, 3 days after 

3 miles of telegraph wire was pulled down between Batac and Badoc, 

it was reported: “There are no houses or inhabitants within three miles 

of the road between Batac and Badoc.” In mid-October Young ordered, 

“Shoot anyone you believe to be in any way connected with destruction 

of telegraph.” The next day Wheaton, referring to articles 82 and 84 of 

General Orders 100, noted, “Armed prowlers by whatever name they may 

be called . . . cutting the telegraph wire are not entitled to the privileges of 

prisoners of war.”72 Young supported harsher but legal measures in dealing 

with the insurrectos.

Manned by an understrength battalion of the 33d USV Infantry, Abra 

had been the most peaceful province in First District. Juan Villamor had 

used his time to establish a strong link between the guerrillas and the 

towns. He commanded two 50-man regular companies supported by a 

local militia with about 150 rifles. American concern began with the July 

election of officials in Bangued. Out of a population of 13,000, only 26 

registered to vote and only 21 voted. March, the military governor, noted 
52

“civil government throughout this Province is more or less a farce.”73

When Villamor routed a unit of Native Scouts and killed its American 

officer on 28 August 1900, things became grim in Abra. Ten days later, 

Young reported “the insurrection has assumed such proportions in Abra 

that I do not consider it advisable to send out a detachment with less than 

one hundred rifles.”74 Conditions continued to deteriorate as supply rafts 

were ambushed along the Abra River and telegraph wires cut. Although 

Abra was becoming critical, insurrecto attacks had increased throughout 

First District in September. 

In August, Wheaton had forwarded MacArthur a report from a post 

commander in Ilocos Norte with the remark, “The situation now is this: 

There are not enough troops in the district to garrison the towns and protect the people who wish to be our friends; the troops are nearly worn out 

with the amount of work they have had; it is at present out of the question 

to undertake proper offensive measures. More troops are needed to garrison towns, protect the people, and take proper offensive measures.”75

In early September, Young reported all his provincial commanders independently concluded that the insurrectos were working in concert and the 

common conclusion was that Aguinaldo was the cause. Increased attacks 

throughout the district required reinforcements. He noted, “To abandon 

any territory that we are now occupying would be delivering up to insurgent for murder all natives that showed themselves friendly to us. If it is 

not considered advisable to send all the troops recommended, I request 

that two regiments be sent here to relieve the strain on the troops of this 

district, so as to give them rest.”76 Young was concerned, if not alarmed.

Increased insurrecto activity prior to the election and the situation in 

Abra brought reinforcements. From 20 September to 25 October 1900, 

17 engagements occurred in First District.77 On 25 October a 60-man 

American force attacked over 600 entrenched insurrectos commanded by 

Juan and Blas Villamor. The Americans suffered their worst defeat in First 

District during the insurrection—5 KIA, 14 WIA, and 8 POWs.78 From 

September through November, US losses in First District were 50 percent greater than for the remainder of the pacification period—December 

1900 to May 1901.79 Troop strength increased to 4,900 in October and to 

5,900 in November. It was augmented by 250 Native Scouts.80 By the end 

of November, the 5th Infantry, commanded by Colonel Richard Comba, 

occupied Abra with two battalions under orders from Young to “utilize 

the most severe measures known to the laws of war.”81 With a 50-percent 

increase in troop strength in 2 months, Young garrisoned additional towns 

and began aggressive operations throughout the district. 

In addition to the battle for towns, a battle for rice began. Many fields lay 
53

fallow, not having been planted because of military operations. In addition, 

three-quarters of the livestock in Ilocos Sur had died.82 By November First 

District began to focus on crop destruction in areas of insurrecto activity. 

Crops and foodstuffs—not just buildings—owned by known supporters 

of the insurrectos were destroyed or confiscated. In Ilocos Norte, Howze 

directed his post commanders to “warn [civic officials] that the feeding, 

sheltering and harboring of the Insurrecto element must at once cease, or 

the vicinity will be laid to waste, even to the extend of destroying their 

crops. . . . The most drastic measures will be resorted to in order to put 

an end to disturbances in this province.”83 Ilocos Norte barrio presidentes

were also warned that if the presence of insurrectos was not “immediately” 

reported—immediately defined as within 1 hour for each 5 kilometers 

from the nearest American post—their barrios would be “absolutely 

destroyed.”84 If the control of the population could not be wrestled from 

the insurrectos, at least the food available could be restricted.

After almost a year of guerrilla warfare designed to wear down 

American resolve to affect the presidential election, the re-election of 

President William McKinley on 14 November destroyed the foundation 

on which Aguinaldo had based his strategy. The Americans would stay, 

at least for 4 more years. The cumulative effect of intensified pacification programs, increased military actions, harsher measures, and the election demoralized many Ilocanos. Greater numbers cooperated with the 

Americans. To counter this trend, Aguinaldo informed his followers on 

15 November that they had “to learn the verb ‘dukutar’ [murder or assassinate] so as to put it immediately in practice.”85 Terror, sustained by killing collaborators, was to become a more prominent role in maintaining 

the support of local leaders and the population. After a series of murders 

in Vigan, Young assigned Johnston and Patajo, now the First District chief 

of detectives, the task of cleansing insurrecto influence from the local barrios.86 When 1,173 bolo men attempted to surrender on 30 November to 

the post commander at Santa Cruz in Ilocos Sur, the commander, unprepared to care for so many prisoners, asked them to return later. Two days 

later, 2,180 insurrectos surrendered—the largest surrender in First District 

since 200 had surrendered in April 1900 in response to Howze’s amnesty 

in Ilocos Norte.87 MacArthur reported to the War Department:

Two thousand one hundred and eighty Katipunan insurrectos . . . bolo men, came from mountains and surrendered to Gen. Samuel B.M. Young to-day at Santa Maria. 

[They] renounced insurrection and swore allegiance to the 

United States. The oath was administered by the padre at 

the church with impressive religious ceremonies. General 
54

Young attributes the surrender to President’s reelection and 

vigorous prosecution of the war. Although no rifles surrendered, this is important as indicating a reaction among 

the people of Ilocos Sur. . . . Everything to be pushed as 

vigorously as possible for the next thirty days.88

To discourage surrenders, the first article of Tinio’s 21 December proclamation informed his soldiers that any who were guilty of the following 

would be punished with death: 

1. Those who abandon their assigned posts with or without their arms, whether in the field or in barracks.

2. Those who by reason of any dispersion by an accident of war do not present themselves within a period 

of three days to the detachment nearest to the place 

where it occurred or to the commanding . . . [official] 

in the town where he may be located and make an 

explanation.89

Despite Tinio’s proclamation, insurrecto surrenders continued in the Ilocos 

throughout the winter of 1900–1901.

December 1900 was a month of change throughout the Philippines. 

Throughout his command of First District, Young advocated harsher, legal 

actions against the insurrectos and their supporters. Always outspoken, for 

the first time on 11 December he attacked Army policy as being based on 

a misunderstanding of the natives and he recommended harsher, European 

methods. Young believed it was necessary to “inspire rebellious Asiatics, 

individually and collectively, with a greater fear of the reigning government than they had of the rebels.”90 His 28 December report repeated the 

theme:

I have been in Indian campaigns when it took over one 

hundred soldiers to capture each Indian; but the problem 

here is more difficult on account of the inbred treachery 

of these people, their great number, and the impossibility 

of recognizing the actively bad from those only passively 

so. If it was deemed advisable to pursue the methods of 

European nations in arms in suppressing rebellions among 

Asiatics, the insurrection could have been easily put down 

a month a go. Even now, although the seeds of rebellion 

have permeated all classes, such methods would soon put 

an end to all active insurrection.91

Young, as directed, explained what he meant by European methods on 

17 January 1901.92 Wheaton’s endorsement agreed that the methods 
55

described by Young would “speedily end resistance,” but that the “vagaries 

of impracticable public sentiment, which considers war as an affair to be 

waged for sentimental reasons, will prevent the adoption of many of the 

ways enlightened nations have found to be necessary in dealing with races 

that have no idea of gratitude, honor, or the sanctity of an oath, and have 

a contempt for a government which they do not fear.”93 Young’s European 

methods were not adopted, but MacArthur did undertake a harsher 

campaign.

MacArthur’s Campaign Measures

As governor-general, MacArthur commanded the Division of the 

Philippines from Manila. Of the 77 provinces that his four departments 

governed, only 43 were in insurrection; the remaining 34 provinces, 44 

percent, remained peaceful.94 Thus, military and civil matters demanded 

his attention. The arrival of William H. Taft’s Commission in the summer 

of 1900 had created some jurisdictional issues that the War Department 

resolved in MacArthur’s favor.95 Working with the governor-general, 

Taft often suggested harsher measures than MacArthur took. But by 

December 1900 things had changed. McKinley had been re-elected, 

American troop strength had reached 69,420,96 department commanders 

were recommending harsher measures, and insurrecto activities from 

September to December (see table 2) indicated a weakness that had to 

be exploited before the USV infantry regiments were shipped home in 

the spring for discharge on 30 June 1901.97 The number of insurrectos

captured and surrendered was up significantly. The engagements initiated 

by the insurrectos were down 50 percent. MacArthur decided to undertake 

a new, sterner pacification campaign.

SeptemberOctober Insurrectos NovemberDecember

978 KIA 707

205 WIA 389

613 POW 1,434

54 Surrendered 2,534

424 Arms Captured 486

18 Arms Surrendered 47

52 / 241 Attacks / Engagements 27 / 198

Table 2. Division of the Philippines Data on Insurrectos, 

September to December 190098
56

On 19 December MacArthur issued instructions for the campaign to 

his department commanders convinced that “one of the most effective 

means of prolonging the struggle, now left in the hands of the insurgent 

leaders, is the organized system by which supplies and information are 

sent to them from occupied towns.” MacArthur stated the purpose of his 

campaign was “to interrupt, and if possible, completely destroy this system.”99 Filipinos not actively supporting the Americans were to be considered as enemies and the excuse of fear was no longer acceptable to the 

Americans. MacArthur stated:

In carrying out this policy, it is safe to assume that all 

prominent families, that have not by some public action or 

declaration committed themselves to American interests, 

are, either willingly, or under compulsion, engaged in, or 

at all events, know those, who are employed in this business; and, as a consequence, if not principals themselves, 

they are accessories to the entire transaction [and] . . . 

whatever action is necessary the more drastic the application the better, provided only that unnecessary hardships 

and personal indignities shall not be imposed upon persons arrested, and that the laws of war [General Orders 

100] are not violated in . . . the treatment of prisoners.”100

Active civilian supporters of the insurrectos were to be arrested and tried. 

District commanders were informed of new rules of evidence: “In case 

it is impossible to find convincing proof that they (peaceful inhabitants) 

have been assisting the enemy, but there is a suspicion amounting to moral 

certainty, that such is the case, they will be arrested and a report . . . with 

recommendations” submitted.101 Military provost courts could now try 

civilians and sentence the guilty to punishments ranging from fines to 

imprisonment. MacArthur’s next step was to educate the Filipinos on their 

duties and responsibilities.

The principal objective of MacArthur’s 20 December proclamation to the Filipino people, published in English, Spanish, and Tagalog 

(appendix C), was “to instruct all classes throughout the archipelago as 

to the requirements of the laws of war in respect of the particulars herein 

referred to, and to advise all concerned of the purpose to exact, in the 

future, precise compliance therewith.”102 Explaining that the rules of law 

required the population to obey strictly the occupying power in exchange 

for protection, any hostile actions taken by civilians would make them, 

by definition, war rebels or war traitors, depending on the nature of their 

acts. Insurrectos that served as guerrillas—unless they were uniformed, 
57

formally organized, and full-time serving—lost their legal status as prisoners of war when captured. They, along with war rebels and war traitors, 

were liable to prosecution for crimes. For the first time, Filipinos were 

told of their legal status under General Orders 100 and of the clear intent 

of the Americans to hold them accountable. MacArthur intended that the 

Filipinos would no longer see American benevolent pacification as weakness.103 The policy of attraction was to be stiffened by a policy of coercion 

for those who supported the insurrectos. 

In his 28 December cable to the War Department, MacArthur summed 

up his actions and highlighted several issues of concern:

Progress of pacification apparent to me, but . . . very 

slow. . . . I have therefore initiated a more rigid policy 

by issue of proclamation, enjoining precise observance of 

laws of war, with special reference to sending supplies 

and information to enemy in field, from towns occupied 

by our troops, and also warning leaders that intimidation 

of natives, by kidnapping or assassination, must sooner or 

later lead to . . . trial for felonious crimes. . . . Would like 

to emphasize new policy by deporting to Guam at early 

date a few prominent leaders now in my hands. . . . ProAmerican natives Manila, with chief justice at the head, 

have organized party, which apparently has some elements 

of cohesion and usefulness. . . . It is difficult to convince 

people, especially natives, that any of the volunteers will 

be replaced.104

After receiving authorization, on 7 January 1901 MacArthur ordered the 

deportation of 26 Filipino leaders to Guam.105 MacArthur then issued 

orders that captured insurrectos would no longer be disarmed, administered 

an oath of allegiance, and released; they would be imprisoned until the 

end of hostilities. Only insurrectos who voluntarily surrendered would be 

disarmed, administered an oath, and released.106 In addition to MacArthur’s 

actions, the establishment of the Federal Party in Manila provided a proAmerican Filipino alternative to Aguinaldo. In the first months of 1901, the 

federalistas actively supported American occupation by holding meetings 

and rallies, by organizing local chapters throughout the archipelago, and 

by directly contacting guerrilla leaders about surrender.107 In just 3 months, 

250 local chapters were organized with over 150,000 members by June.108

To offset the anticipated shortfall of troops when the USV regiments 

departed, MacArthur increased the recruitment of native auxiliaries. He 

also revived his dormant June 1900 local police program. By mid-June 
58

1901 the native police numbered 6,000; 40 percent had firearms. He 

increased the Native Scouts from 1,400 on 1 January 1901 to 5,400 by 

mid-June.109 During the first half of 1901, MacArthur’s subordinates took 

the war to the insurrectos with new tools and a new vigor.

First District Pacification of the Ilocos—Spring 1901

By January First District had about 6,000 personnel—52 infantry 

companies, 12 troops of cavalry, and 11 companies of Native Scouts—

occupying 59 posts.110 Twelve troops of the 3d Cavalry, commanded by 

Colonel Wirt Davis, operated in the three coastal provinces. In Ilocos 

Norte, Colonel L.W.V. Kennon had 10 infantry companies from his 34th 

USV Infantry, minus a battalion, and 4 cavalry troops. In Ilocos Sur, 

Colonel Marcus D. Cronin commanded the 33d USV Infantry with 10 

infantry companies and 5 cavalry troops; Colonel Duvall remained in La 

Union with 10 infantry companies and 3 cavalry troops from his 48th 

USV Infantry and 2 infantry companies in Benguet province; Colonel 

Comba governed Abra with 19 infantry companies and Lepanto with 1 

infantry company from his two battalions of the 5th Infantry and with 

those of Colonel William R. Groves’ 36th USV Infantry. Captain John 

F. Green commanded 11 companies of the First District Native Scouts.111

Rotation of volunteer regiments began immediately. The 36th USV 

Infantry departed for the United States in mid-January, leaving only the 

5th Infantry with two battalions in Abra. In February, both the 33d USV 

Infantry and the 34th USV Infantry departed after being replaced by the 

1,256-man 20th Infantry, commanded by Colonel William McCaskey.112

These forces, most in the field since October, continued to conduct sweeps 

and local patrols. Columns converged on suspected insurrecto locations, 

but they infrequently met resistance. At most, they usually found only food 

storehouses, supply caches, or empty camps. However, the cumulative 

effect of these operations left the guerrillas harried, hungry, sick, and 

exhausted. The initiative in the field had shifted to Young’s forces.

Not only were the guerrilla bands under increased pressure, but in 

accordance with MacArthur’s program, the infrastructure in the towns 

received special attention. Federalistas conducted pro-American rallies 

and organized chapters in First District towns—in Ilocos Sur the rallies 

varied in size from 700 to 2,200 participants. Surrenders continued during the first months of 1901 as the support of the insurrection began to 

weaken. Ilocanos swore oaths of allegiance in ceremonies in which the 

clergy now played a prominent role. With more pro-American Ilocanos, 

intelligence about guerrilla bands and its support infrastructure improved. 

Civilians supporting the insurrectos were arrested and tried by provost 

courts. In January and February 1901 there were more provost court trials 
59

in First District than during all of 1900.113 Cronin, military governor in 

Ilocos Sur, declared: “My intention has always been to work by pressure 

upon officials by tracing all insurgent movements, and punishing, through 

military court, all aiding insurgents even by not notifying us. The officials soon learn that an investigation may be postponed but never abandoned.”114 Veterans with La Union pacification experience brought special 

skills and insights to other First District provinces. After completing his 

work in Vigan, Johnston was directed to investigate towns in Ilocos Sur 

“with a view to breaking up the secret support which had been rendered 

by these towns to the insurgents.”115 Patajo continued his work as chief 

of detectives in both Ilocos Sur and Abra provinces. Another La Union 

veteran conducted a special investigation in Ilocos Norte that produced a 

census and map of the district, along with information implicating officials 

in Badoc that permitted the post commander to cleanse the local government by the arrest or dismissal of officials and to destroy the local guerrilla 

organization by the end of February. Working on the rift between Tinio 

and Aglipay supporters in Ilocos Norte, officials friendly to Tinio were 

appointed as presidentes in towns supportive of Aglipay.116 The result was 

the exposure and arrest of Aglipay supporters. By the time Young relinquished command of First District on 19 February, the linkage between the 

towns and the guerrillas was being broken and the insurrectos in the field 

were under constant pressure. 

Young’s replacement, Brigadier General J. Franklin Bell,117 a 45-

year old cavalry officer with extensive Philippine experience, assumed 

command of First District on 28 February 1901. He arrived in Vigan on 

9 March at the conclusion of an inspection tour of La Union and southern 

Ilocos Sur provinces. Satisfied that Duvall had La Union province under 

control, Bell had discovered that Ilocos Sur south of Candon had never 

been garrisoned and the situation there “could hardly be more unfavorable.”118 Concluding that the “only way to prevent insurgents from drawing supplies from [these] towns is to garrison them,” Bell immediately 

created a new subdistrict in southern Ilocos Sur commanded by Major 

Sedgwick Rice, 48th USV Infantry, whose task was to destroy the local 

guerrilla forces. Duvall commanded this new subdistrict.119 With 50 men, 

Patajo arrived to assist. He recruited an additional 150 men locally, primarily Igorots. Exploiting the antagonism between the Igorots and the 

insurrectos, American units secured the towns while Igorots hunted the 

insurrectos. On 15 April Lieutenant Colonel Juan Gutierrez, commander 

of the La Union–Santa Cruz Line, was captured by the Igorots. His cooperation with the Americans permitted the pacification of southern Ilocos 

Sur in just 5 weeks.120 Bell concluded in his initial assessment on 15 March 
60

that “there are now in the district sufficient troops to carry out the same 

policy pursued in the Third District121 in the past, and from what I have 

seen since my arrival here I am convinced more than ever that it is the 

only policy which will succeed in pacifying the district.”122 Bell continued 

Young’s vigorous pressure on the infrastructure in the towns and on the 

guerrillas in the field.

Operations by the Villamors in Abra presented Bell his most difficult 

problem. From 21 March to 7 April, Bell personally inspected Abra, now 

commanded by Major William C.H. Bowen, 5th Infantry. Bell visited all 

towns of importance and corresponded directly with the Villamors seeking 

their surrender. When they refused to surrender, on 9 April Bell forbade all 

travel and trade into and out of Abra. Then he intensified military operations. Bell had concluded:

People who have been living under a reign of such abject 

terror that they have not talked much yet, but when they 

find that they will be protected, and begin to acquire some 

confidence in us, we will begin to get more assistance, and 

all the deviltry which has occurred will begin to unfold 

itself. For these reasons, I am preparing, and expect to 

hunt these outlaws like bandits, which they apparently are, 

without exception; I have given orders that all common 

soldiers presenting themselves be received kindly, paid 

for their guns, and released at once, knowing full well if 

complicity in crimes should be subsequently developed, 

they can be re-arrested.123

To provide forces to accomplish his aim, Bell reinforced Bowen with a 

battalion of the 7th Infantry on 24 April and five companies from the 48th 

USV Infantry the next day. Bowen later reported:

During the insurrection the province suffered severely; 

every man was either an active insurrector or sympathizer, 

the consequence being that property had been destroyed 

right and left; whole villages had been burned, the storehouses and crops had been destroyed, and the entire province was as devoid of food products as was the valley 

of the Shenandoah after Sheridan’s raid during the civil 

war. The jurisdictions . . . of Pilar and Villavieja had been 

depopulated and this portion of the province had been 

absolutely destroyed.124

Military operations in Abra reached an intensity not experienced in the 

other Ilocano provinces.
61

On 25 March Tinio held a council of war in Abra with his subordinate commanders—the Villamors from Abra, Alejandrino from Ilocos Sur, 

Salazar from Ilocos Norte, and Gutierrez from La Union. Father Aglipay, 

negotiating with the Americans in Ilocos Norte at the time, did not attend. 

Although the situation was unfavorable, they agreed that “the final action 

of the Tinio Brigade should depend upon the decision of the Honorable 

President [Aguinaldo].”125 Repeated appeals from federalistas and family 

members, along with the capture of Aguinaldo on 23 March and his 19 

April appeal for his followers to accept peace under American occupation 

eventually had an effect on these guerrilla leaders.

In the meantime, Bell prepared to increase pressure on the insurrectos

throughout the district. On 12 April he proposed an even harsher action—

one rarely used and then only as a local punishment—to his provincial 

commanders:

The guerrilla warfare is continued by the substantial aid 

and comfort given to the insurrectos by the same people 

whom we are protecting and who are enjoying a certain 

amount of prosperity due to our magnanimity. They have 

never felt the full hardship of War and their professions 

of a desire for peace are merely words and do not come 

from a full realization of the discomforts and horror of 

a war that is waged in earnest and with full vigor. It is 

confidently believed that if the people realize what war 

is, they will exert themselves to stop the system of aid 

and contributions to the insurgents by the non-combatants 

and thus bring hostilities to a close. It is believed that the 

time has now come to adopt such measures with those 

so-called ‘Amigos’ as to cause them to feel the absolute 

necessity of using their active influences in suppressing 

the insurrection as well as to stop all possible sources of 

aid. With that object in view, it is contemplated to cause 

all the people of the barrios to move into towns with all 

their supplies and not return to them without written permission from the military authorities. Any person found 

in the barrios ordered to be abandoned, after ten days’ 

notice, will be treated as insurgents. It is also proposed to 

have all ports of the district closed. Your views as to the 

practicality of carrying out each of the above measures 

in your province is desired. In view of a possibility of a 

shortage of supplies it is very desirable to have the people 

bring everything with them.126
62

Two days later orders were issued to evacuate Villavieja in Abra within 

10 days or it would be burned to the ground. The inhabitants were granted 

a 6-day extension on 24 April. On 21 April the barrios of four towns in 

Ilocos Sur were issued similar orders with a 12-day limit.127 Before the 

deadlines arrived, the insurrection in First District ended. 

Young’s pacification policies, continued and intensified by Bell, culminated in a series of surrenders of major guerrilla leaders during the last 

week of April. The re-election of McKinley, the creation of pro-American 

federalistas, and the capture of Aguinaldo with his appeal for peace all 

affected the support of the populace and the resolve of the guerrilla leaders. But it was the constant military pressure on the populace in the towns 

and on the guerrillas in the field that proved decisive in First District. 

On 27 April Father Aglipay, after weeks of negotiations, surrendered to 

McCaskey at Laoag. That same day, the Villamors agreed to surrender to 

Bowen at Bangued. Three days later Blas and Juan Villamor with 36 officers surrendered and took the oath of allegiance. Tinio sent Bell a letter 

discussing surrender on 27 April. Bell said Tinio’s courier “stated it was 

difficult for them to get food and very dangerous, all towns being occupied 

and no food left in barrios; also that the Igorrotes [sic] had turned against 

them in favor of the Americans.”128 On 30 April Tinio agreed to surrender, and the next day he formally surrendered at Sinait with Alejandrino, 

Salazar, 25 officers, and 350 riflemen with weapons.129 On 30 April Bell 

reported, “The insurrection is now at an end in this district, all the several 

commands of the insurgents having surrendered.”130 Bell suspended hostilities throughout the district on 1 May to permit the remaining insurrectos

to surrender peacefully. No fighting occurred after that day. Bell decided 

not to prosecute any of the guerrilla leaders for their wartime activities 

and encouraged their participation in the American occupational government. First District American total casualties after 1 March had been one 

WIA.131

The final pacification of First District had been 17 months in the making. It was one of the most difficult yet most complete in the Philippines. 

Young, supporting and supported by capable regimental commanders, 

conducted an effective campaign that has been described as “far less centralized than it was regionalized.”132 Assisted by Native Scouts, Patajo’s 

men, Igorot tribesmen, and local police, the First District’s final campaign 

that began in the fall of 1900 had been, by the standards of the day, legal, 

“harsh, but . . . effective.”133 Young laid the foundation, provided a decentralized command climate, obtained reinforcements, and, by the time of 

his departure in February, had seized the initiative from the insurrectos

in the towns and in the mountains. Once in command, Bell “was willing 
63

and able to escalate the war to a level that the revolutionary leaders found 

intolerable, and once they surrendered, he was able to reconcile them to 

American rule.”134

Situation in the Philippines, July 1901

By 1 April 1901 MacArthur believed that “the insurrection was rapidly approaching complete collapse.”135 Aguinaldo had been captured and 

insurrectos were surrendering in increasing numbers throughout the archipelago. From less than 500 insurrectos surrendering in all the Philippines 

during the last quarter of 1900, the numbers increased to 900 in January, 

750 in February, 7,000 in March, over 6,000 in April, and remained between 

1,000 and 2,000 through July. The firearms surrendered followed a similar 

trend—August to December 1900 less than 200, January and February 

1901 a total of 1,800, March to May over 7,500. By April contacts with 

insurrectos had dropped to less than a third of that in early 1901.136 In addition, important guerrilla leaders were surrendering.

The impact of the Federal Party in reaching out to guerrilla leaders to 

surrender and to work peacefully with the Americans was important. The 

first major surrender occurred 15 March when Lieutenant General Mariano 

Trias, Aguinaldo’s commander in southern Luzon, surrendered to the 4th 

Infantry in Cavite province. Two weeks later he addressed a letter to his 

former comrades encouraging their surrender. The capture of Aguinaldo in 

mid-March and the publication of his April peace appeal increased surrenders. MacArthur had added to the beginning of Aguinaldo’s statement: “In 

order to signalize such an important step in the pacification of the country, 

1,000 prisoners will, upon taking the oath of allegiance, be released and 

sent to their homes.”137 Upon Tinio’s surrender, Bell forwarded a message from Tinio to Aguinaldo. “After having read your proclamation, and 

observed the situation and the desires of the Ilocano people, I have thought 

it convenient to give up my arms. By so doing, I believe I do my duty as 

a soldier and a citizen.”138 MacArthur ordered the release of another 1,000 

prisoners. When two prominent guerrilla leaders surrendered in northern 

Luzon, MacArthur released an additional 500 prisoners. The last major 

leader to surrender was Brigadier General Juan Cailles in Laguna province 

of southern Luzon. Cailles surrendered at Santa Cruz on 24 June with 600 

men and 386 rifles.139 On 21 June MacArthur issued a general amnesty to 

all insurrectos. 

As his term as governor-general of the Philippines and commanding 

general of the Division of the Philippines came to an end, MacArthur stated 

in June: “The armed insurrection is almost entirely suppressed. At the present 

writing there is no embodied rebel force in all [North] Luzon. . . . In the 
64

Department of Southern Luzon, disorders still continue in several provinces 

but in such progressively diminishing force as to encourage the hope that all 

will be pacified at an early date.”140 During his tenure, American forces had 

fought 1,026 engagements with insurrectos. The results of those contacts 

and his campaign begun in December 1900 are shown in table 3. With the 

departure of the USV infantry regiments, the troop strength assigned to the 

Philippines on 30 June was down to 42,169 of which 5,573 were serving 

in the China Relief Expedition. With the surrender of the major insurrecto

leaders and their men, the level of violence throughout the archipelago 

dropped dramatically. In February the Taft Commission had authorized the 

establishment of provincial governments with civilian governors elected 

by the inhabitants. By July, 22 provinces had civil governors and 55 still 

had military governors. However, those 22 provinces contained almost 50 

percent of the population.141 On 4 July 1901 when William H. Taft assumed 

duties as Governor of the Philippines and 59-year old Major General Adna 

R. Chaffee142 assumed command of the Division of the Philippines, the 

Philippines were deemed ready for civil government, not military law. Less 

than 2 weeks later, on 17 July, continued violence in Batangas province 

on southern Luzon and on the islands of Cebu and Bohol caused military 

control to be reinstated in those places.143 The Philippine insurrection was 

not finished.

Table 3. Division of the Philippines Statistics, 30 June 1901144

American Division of the Philippines 

5 May 1900–30 June 1901 Insurrectos

245 KIA 3,854

490 WIA 1,193

118 POW 6,572

20 MIA / Surrendered 23,095

424 Arms Captured 4,871

18 Arms Surrendered 10,822
65

Notes

1. William H. Scott, Ilocano Responses to American Aggression 1900–

1901 (Quezon City, PI: New Day Publishers, 1986), 25–26.

2. Orlina A. Ochosa, The Tinio Brigade: Anti-American Resistance in the 

Ilocos Provinces, 1899–1901 (Quezon City, PI: New Day Publishers, 1989), 77–

93; Brian M. Linn, The Philippine War, 1899–1902 (Lawrence, KS: University of 

Kansas Press, 2000), 150–159. 

3. Brian M. Linn, The U.S. Army and Counterinsurgency in the Philippine 

War, 1899–1902 (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 1989), 

32–33.

4. Linn, U.S. Army, 30; Scott, 1–5; Ochosa, 1.

5. Ochosa, 1–4.

6. Scott, 6.

7. F.G. Verea, Guide for the Americans in the Philippines, translated by 

F.C. Fisher (Manila: n.p., 1899), 103, 119, 137.

8. War Department, Bureau of Insular Affairs, A Pronouncing Gazetteer 

and Geographical Dictionary of the Philippine Islands, United States of America, 

with Maps, Charts, and Illustrations. Also the Law of Civil Government in the 

Philippine Islands Passed by Congress and Approved by the President July 1, 

1902 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1902), 537–540. Hereafter 

referred to as WD, BIA; Scott, 5; Verea, 117–118.

9. WD, BIA, 541–543; Scott, 5; Verea, 119–120.

10. WD, BIA, 906–907; Verea, 137–138.

11. WD, BIA, 267–269, Verea, 103.

12. WD, BIA, 267–269, 537–539, 541–543, 906–907.

13. Scott, 5–6; WD, BIA, 269, 540, 543–544, 908.

14. Scott, 7.

15. Ibid., 5–10.

16. Ibid., 6.

17. Ibid., 9–12.

18. Ibid., 7–9.

19. Ibid., 8.

20. Ochosa, 7.

21. Scott, 15.

22. Ochosa, 10; Scott, 13–16.

23. Ochosa, 33.

24. Ochosa, 18–39, Scott, 17–22.

25. Linn, U.S. Army, 31.

26. Scott, 20–21.

27. Ochosa, 108–109.

28. Scott, 64.

29. Linn, U.S. Army, 39.

30. Brian M. Linn, “Provincial Pacification in the Philippines, 1900–

1901: The First District Department of Northern Luzon,” Military Affairs,

April 1987, 63.
66

31. Linn, U.S. Army, 37.

32. Proclamation of Manuel Tinio, 20 March 1900, History of the Philippine 

Insurrection against the United States, 1899–1903: and documents relating to the 

War Department project for publishing the history (Washington, DC: National 

Archives, 1968), roll 8. Microfilm. Hereafter referred to as USNA.

33. Scott, 57.

34. Linn, U.S. Army, 40.

35. Scott, 60.

36. Linn, U.S. Army, 40–41.

37. Scott, 45–47.

38. Ibid., 52.

39. Linn, Philippine War, 255.

40. WD, BIA, 138.

41. Quoted in Linn, Philippine War, 256–257.

42. Linn, Philippine War, 257.

43. Linn, U.S. Army, 30.

44. Brigadier General Samuel Baldwin Marks Young, born in Pennsylvania 

in 1840, private 12th Pennsylvania Infantry 1861, captain 4th Pennsylvania 

Cavalry 1861, colonel 1864, brevet brigadier general 1865, second lieutenant 12th 

Infantry 1866, captain 8th Cavalry 1866, service on southwest frontier 1866–79, 3 

brevets for gallantry and meritorious service, member organizing faculty School 

of Application of Infantry and Cavalry 1882, major 3d Cavalry 1883, lieutenant 

colonel 4th Cavalry 1892, colonel 3d Cavalry 1897, brigadier general 1898, major 

general volunteers Cuba 1898, brigadier general brigade and district commander 

Philippines 1899–1901, promoted to major general in February 1901.

45. Linn, U.S. Army, 33–34.

46. Linn, “Provincial Pacification in the Philippines,” 64.

47. Scott, 26–27.

48. Ibid., 29.

49. Brian M. Linn, “Pacification in Northwestern Luzon: An American 

Regiment in the Philippine–American War, 1899–1901,” Pilipinas, December 

1982, 15.

50. Report, First District, Department of Northern Luzon, 30 April 1901, 

in War Department, Annual Report of Major General Arthur MacArthur, United 

States Army, Commanding, Division of the Philippines, Military Governor in the 

Philippine Island (Manila, PI, 1901), Appendix A, 4–5. Hereafter referred to as 

WD, Annual Report MacArthur.

51. Linn, U.S. Army, 33–34.

52. Scott, 39.

53. Linn, U.S. Army, 36.

54. Quoted in Brian M. Linn, “Intelligence and Low-intensity Conflict in 

the Philippine War, 1899–1902,” Intelligence and National Security, January 

1991, 95.

55. Quoted in Scott, 69.

56. John R.M. Taylor, The Philippine Insurrection Against the United 
67

States: A Compilation of Documents with Notes and Introduction, Volume II, May 

19, 1898 to July 4, 1902, vol. II, 28. This is a galley proof of an unpublished 

War Department manuscript in History of the Philippine Insurrection against the 

United States, 1899–1903: and documents relating to the War Department project for publishing the history (Washington, DC: National Archives, 1968), roll 9. 

Microfilm. Hereafter referred to as Taylor, USNA.

57. Quoted in Scott, 58.

58. Linn, U.S. Army, 47.

59. Ibid., 48.

60. Ibid., 49.

61. Linn, U.S. Army, 45–46; Linn, “Provincial Pacification in the 

Philippines,” 64–65.

62. Linn, U.S. Army, 43.

63. Ibid., 44.

64. They received 30 pesos reward for each weapon captured.

65. Linn, U.S. Army, 41–45; Linn, “Provincial Pacification in the 

Philippines,” 64.

66. Linn, U.S. Army, 49–50.

67. Taylor, USNA, vol. II, 16, roll 8.

68. John M. Gates, Schoolbooks and Krags: The United States Army in the 

Philippines, 1898–1902 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press Inc., 1973), 195.

69. WD, Annual Report MacArthur, vol. I, 4.

70. Taylor, USNA, vol. II, 31, roll 8.

71. Scott, 29.

72. Ibid., 31.

73. Linn, U.S. Army, 53.

74. Ibid.

75. Facts About the Filipinos, USNA, 12–13, roll 8.

76. Ibid., 17, roll 8.

77. Linn, “Pacification in Northwest Luzon,” 17.

78. Linn, U.S. Army, 53; Scott, 193.

79. Linn, U.S. Army, 52.

80. Ibid., 54.

81. Linn, “Provincial Pacification in the Philippines,” 65.

82. Scott, 162.

83. Linn, U.S. Army, 58.

84. Scott, 33.

85. Taylor, USNA, vol. II, 35.

86. Quoted in Linn, U.S. Army, 54.

87. Scott, 161.

88. Telegram, MacArthur to Adjutant General, received 3 December 1900, 

in US Army, Adjutant General’s Office, Correspondence Relating to the War 

with Spain and Conditions Growing out of the Same Including the Insurrection 

in the Philippine Islands and the China Relief Expedition, Between the AdjutantGeneral of the Army and Military Commanders in the United States, Cuba, Porto 
68

Rico, China, and the Philippine Islands from April 15, 1898 to July 30, 1902 

(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1902), vol. II, 1232.

89. Quoted in Scott, 99.

90. Linn, U.S. Army, 53–54.

91. Quoted in Facts About the Filipinos, USNA, 47, roll 8.

92. Facts About the Filipinos, USNA, 48–49, roll 8. Young’s explanation 

of what he meant by European methods was received by the War Department on 

18 March 1901. Young thought Europeans had: 1. Given military commanders 

supreme authority in a rebellious country, with full power to suspend or change 

all laws, appoint all officers, and have full control of all receipts and expenditure 

of money. 2. Full censorship of the press, and removed from the country any 

press agent whose presence was deemed harmful. 3. Recognized that Asiatics 

have no idea of gratitude, honor, or the sanctity of an oath, and in all dealings with 

them to treat them accordingly. 4. Recognized that they were fighting a people 

the mass of who were worse than ordinary savages, and were not entitled to the 

benefits of G.O. 100, A.C.O. 1863. 5. Inspired rebellious Asiatics, individually 

and collectively, with a greater fear of the reigning government than they had 

of the rebels. 6. Retaliated in kind on their rebellious subjects for every murder 

and assassination of person because of their being friendly to the reigning government. 7. Authorized the military commander to punish by death summarily 

or by means of drumhead court-martial, provost or summary courts, all spies, 

murderers, assassins, and persons caught with arms after having taken the oath of 

allegiance. 8. Deported all persons caught with arms in their hands, all leaders, 

civil or military, whose presence in the rebellious country was deemed prejudicial 

to the permanent sovereignty of the reigning power. 9. Confiscated all real and 

personal property of every insurgent and their aiders and abettors. 10. Divided the 

rebellious country into zones, concentrating the people of each zone into circumscribed places, and placed them under absolute military control. 11. Laid waste 

the country used as hiding-places and rendezvous for insurgents, their aiders and 

abettors. 12. Appointed only residents of the reigning country to judicial and other 

high positions in the rebellious country. 13. Given the preference to honorably 

discharged soldiers, who were competent, in appointment to all positions. 14. 

Made the military commander the judge, that the condition in any part of the 

country rendered it available to establish civil government.

93. Facts About the Filipinos, USNA, 50, roll 8.

94. Linn, Philippine War, 185.

95. Rowland T. Berthoff, “Taft and MacArthur, 1900–1901: A Study in 

Civil-Military Relations,” World Politics, January 1953, 196–213.

96. Taylor, USNA, vol. II, 22, roll 9.

97. War Department notified MacArthur on 11 December 1900 that the 

USV regiments would depart.

98. Facts About the Filipinos, USNA, 28, roll 8.

99. Quoted in Facts About the Filipinos, USNA, 38, roll 8.

100. Ibid., 39.

101. Ibid., 39.
69

102. Ibid., 36.

103. Gates, 208.

104. Telegram, MacArthur to Adjutant General, received 25 December 1901, 

US Army, Correspondence, vol. II, 1237–1238.

105. Taylor, USNA, vol. II, 20, roll 9.

106. WD, Annual Report MacArthur, vol. I, 16.

107. Linn, U.S. Army, 53–54.

108. Gates, 229.

109. Ibid., 213–214.

110. Scott, 29.

111. Ochosa, 199.

112. Report, First District, Department of Northern Luzon, 30 April 1901, in 

WD, Annual Report MacArthur, Appendix A, 15, 18.

113. Linn, U.S. Army, 55.

114. Quoted in Linn, U.S. Army, 56.

115. Linn, U.S. Army, 55.

116. Ibid., 56.

117. Brigadier General James Franklin Bell, born in Kentucky in 1856, West 

Point graduate 1878, second lieutenant 9th Cavalry 1878, transferred 7th Cavalry 

1878, served Fort Buford 1882–86, professor of military science and tactics 

at Southern Illinois University 1886–89, studied law and admitted to bar, first 

lieutenant 1890, adjutant 7th Cavalry at Fort Riley 1891–94, aide commander 

Department of California 1894–97, Fort Apache 1897–98, major of volunteers 

and engineer officer to VIII Corps 1898, Department of the Pacific chief of military information 1898, captain 1899, major of volunteers 1899 and acting judge 

advocate 2d Division, colonel of volunteers and commander 36th USV July 

1899, Medal of Honor September 1899, brigadier general volunteers December 

1899, commanded 4th Brigade of 2d Division 1900, provost marshal of Manila 

1900–1901, promoted captain to brigadier general February 1901, commanded 

2d District Department of Northern Luzon February 1901, commanded Third 

Separate Brigade Department of Luzon November 1901–02, commandant Army 

Service Schools at Fort Leavenworth 1902–06, major general 1907, US Army 

chief of staff 1906–10, died on Active Duty in 1919.

118. Report, First District, Department of Northern Luzon, 30 April 1901, in 

WD, Annual Report MacArthur, Appendix A, 18.

119. Quoted in Ochosa, 202.

120. Linn, U.S. Army, 60.

121. Strict measures employed in central Luzon by Brigadier General “HellRoaring” Jacob H. Smith.

122. Quoted in Ochosa, 204.

123. Report, First District, Department of Northern Luzon, 30 April 1901, in 

WD, Annual Report MacArthur, Appendix A, 23.

124. Quoted in Linn, U.S. Army, 60.

125. Ochosa, 207.

126. Quoted in Scott, 143.
70

127. Ibid., 144.

128. Report, First District, Department of Northern Luzon, 30 April 1901, in 

WD, Annual Report MacArthur, Appendix A, 28.

129. Ochosa, 211.

130. Report, First District, Department of Northern Luzon, 30 April 1901, in 

WD, Annual Report MacArthur, Appendix A, 30.

131. Linn, “Provincial Pacification in the Philippines,” 65.

132. Linn, U.S. Army, 61.

133. Linn, “Provincial Pacification in the Philippines,” 65.

134. Linn, U.S. Army, 59.

135. WD, Annual Report MacArthur, vol. I, 30.

136. Gates, 230–231.

137. Facts About the Filipinos, USNA, 103, roll 8.

138. Ibid., 107.

139. Ibid., 113.

140. William T. Sexton, Soldiers in the Sun: An Adventure in Imperialism

(Freeport, NY: Books for Libraries Press, 1971), 267.

141. Ibid., 266–267.

142. Major General Adna R. Chaffee born in Ohio in 1842, enlisted 6th 

Cavalry 1861, sergeant 1862, first sergeant September 1862, second lieutenant 1863, twice wounded, brevet captain, first lieutenant 1865, captain 1867, 

Indian Wars 1867–94, brevet major 1868, brevet lieutenant colonel 1882, major 

9th Cavalry 1888, instructor Infantry and Cavalry School at Fort Leavenworth 

1894–96, lieutenant colonel 3d Cavalry 1897, commandant Cavalry School at 

Fort Riley 1897–98, brigadier general volunteers 1898, major general volunteers 

July 1898, brigade commander Santiago Cuba, chief of staff to governor of Cuba 

1898–1900, colonel 8th Cavalry, commander American contingent of relief force 

during Boxer Rebellion in China 1900–1901, promoted colonel to major general 

1901, commander Philippines July 1901–October 1902.

143. Act No. 173, 17 July 1901, in Statement of Governor William H. 

Taft, 31 January 1902. US Congress, Senate, Affairs in the Philippine Islands. 

Hearings before the Committee on the Philippines of the United States Senate

(Senate Document 331, part 1, 57th Congress, 1st Session, 1902), 130–131.

144. WD, Annual Report MacArthur, vol I, 21.
71

Chapter 3

Pacification of the Tagalog Provinces: Second District, 

Department of Southern Luzon/Third Separate Brigade, 

Department of North Philippines, 1900–1902

The trouble . . . is not our lack of military power exerted 

against a foe that will face us, on any terms they might 

choose. The great problem is to meet and overcome the 

foe that will not, as a foe, face us. The strength of the latter 

should not be underestimated. It is a very powerful foe in 

a military sense: that is, it wears out our troops chasing a 

phantom, for, even when parties of armed insurrectos are 

certainly and definitely located, the facility with which 

they can perform the chameleon act, by throwing away 

their arms under the bushes or grass . . . and blandly greeting us as good amigos, utterly defeats our best trained and 

most skillfully conducted operations, or at least that is 

likely to be the result, and generally it is so. . . . They still 

have the same appreciation of their incapacity to meet its 

military power, but they have learned what they did not 

know, that it can be evaded, and how this can be done. I 

say this with profound regret.

Colonel William E. Birkhimer, 22 October 19001

On 4 January 1900 Major General John C. Bates’ 8,000-man 1st 

Division attacked south from Manila to conquer the Tagalog provinces of 

southwestern Luzon. The 1st Brigade, commanded by Brigadier General 

Loyd Wheaton, consisted of four regiments—4th Infantry, 28th United 

States Volunteer (USV) Infantry, 38th USV Infantry, and 45th USV 

Infantry—with cavalry and artillery detachments. Its task was to fix the 

forces of Lieutenant General Mariano Trias, Aguinaldo’s commander in 

southern Luzon, in Cavite province. The 2,500-man 2d Brigade, commanded by Brigadier General Theodore Schwan, had the 30th USV 

Infantry and 46th USV Infantry, nine troops of cavalry, two companies 

of Macabebe scouts, and artillery and engineer detachments. Its task was 

to move south along Laguna Bay and then turn to the west to encircle 

Trias’s insurrectos. The 37th USV Infantry and 39th USV Infantry were 

the division reserve. Two days into Schwan’s movement, Wheaton’s 28th 

USV Infantry attacked south and within 48 hours had scattered the insurrectos in Cavite who, instead of continuing to fight as expected, dispersed 
72

into hiding. When Schwan completed his envelopment, the insurrectos

were gone. With the rapid conquest of Cavite, Bates ordered 2d Brigade 

to Batangas and Laguna provinces and the 39th USV Infantry, reinforced 

by a 37th USV Infantry battalion, to move to Batangas to capture Santo 

Tomas, the headquarters of Brigadier General Miguel Malvar (see map 

6). On 9 January the 39th USV Infantry fought a sharp engagement with 

less than 1,000 of Malvar’s insurrectos at an entrenched position along a 

river near Santo Tomas, killing 24 and capturing 60 insurrectos. Joined 

by Schwan’s 38th USV Infantry, the 39th USV Infantry continued south 

through Lipa to Rosario freeing 170 Spanish prisoners and capturing 

20,000 pesos, gaining some notoriety in the process. On 12 January Bates 

reorganized assigning Wheaton the 46th USV Infantry and responsibility 

for Batangas province west of Lake Taal and providing Schwan the 38th 

USV Infantry and 39th USV Infantry and responsibility for Batangas east 

of Lake Taal. 1st and 2d Brigade units linked up on 19 January to defeat 

a 1,000-man entrenched insurrecto force at Taal. After eastern Batangas 

was overrun, Schwan turned 2d Brigade east to Tayabas province and then 

north to Laguna province. By early February, the heartland of the Tagalog 

rebellion had been conquered by the 1st Division.2

Map 6. Tagalog provinces in southwestern Luzon.

N

Manila

Lipa

San Pablo

Trece Martires

BATANGAS

CAVITE

Tagaytay

Lucena

Maricaban

Island

Batangas

Bay

South

China

Sea

Balayan

Bay Tayabas

Bay

Manila

Bay

Lamon

Bay

LAGUNA

TAYABAS

Santa Cruz

Scale

0 10

miles

Loboo

Batangas

Taal

San Jose

Tiaong

Santo Tomas

Lian

Balayan

Paete

Lake

Taal

Bauan

Tayabas

Mabitac

Lucban

Calamba

Cavite

Rosario

Laguna Siniloan

Bay
73

The campaign had been quicker, easier, and less costly than anticipated. In a month’s time, all insurrecto units that fought had been defeated 

and seemingly destroyed. 1st Division overran Cavite, Batangas, Laguna, 

and Tayabas provinces. With the military campaign won, American units 

occupied towns to begin the transition to local civil government. Unlike in 

the Ilocos, the initial reception by the Tagalog population was unfriendly, 

if not hostile. For the Americans in the five infantry regiments—28th USV, 

30th USV, 37th USV, 38th USV, and 39th USV—that occupied Batangas, 

Laguna, and Tayabas provinces, “it would soon become apparent that 

occupation and pacification were very different problems.”3

Tagalog Provinces—Batangas, Laguna, and Tayabas

Excluding the peninsula of southern Tayabas province, the heart of 

this Tagalog area in southwestern Luzon was approximately 70 miles east 

to west and 35 miles north to south. It consisted of 4,200 square miles. To 

the north were the mountains in southwestern Cavite province and Laguna 

Bay; to the east was the Pacific Ocean; to the south were the Balayan, 

Batangas, and Tayabas Bays; and to the west was the South China Sea. 

Batangas and Tayabas had good seaports. Located in the center of Batangas 

province was Lake Taal, an 18-by-13-mile lake with an active volcano in 

its center. The entire region was generally rugged with numerous ravines, 

canyons, rivers, and streams. It became mountainous in Batangas west of 

Lake Taal, in southeast Batangas, in the region along the provincial boundaries, and in eastern Tayabas. Areas along the coasts, on the southern shore 

of Laguna Bay, and east of Lake Taal in Batangas supported agriculture. 

Old military roads and telegraph lines along the southern shore of Laguna 

Bay and east of Lake Taal into southern Batangas and Tayabas connected 

the provincial capitals. In Batangas province, Rosario and Lipa were 

important road junctions connecting with the other provinces. Although it 

rained throughout the year in the mountains to the east, the region experienced a dry season from mid-November to April. The military roads 

generally sustained loaded wagons in the rainy season, while local roads 

between towns often deteriorated.4 Chronic diseases—malaria, small pox, 

typhoid fever, dysentery, measles, to name but a few—made this region 

among the unhealthiest in the world.5 The physical geography made this 

difficult terrain in which to conduct counterguerrilla operations.

Settled originally by Malays who arrived from Borneo, the region was 

one of the first on Luzon to be developed by the Spanish after their arrival 

in the 1750s. The provinces of Batangas, Laguna, and Tayabas were established in the mid-18th century. The population of these three provinces 

was almost 600,000 by the time of the American occupation. The Tagalogs 
74

were the largest ethnic group on Luzon. Tagalog was the predominate language; Spanish was spoken by an educated minority, and along the Pacific 

Ocean coast in eastern Tayabas, Bicol was spoken.6 A small Chinese merchant class existed. Even more than the Ilocos, the provinces were ethnically, linguistically, culturally, and politically one in their support for the 

insurrection.

Each province differed from the others. With its 1,110 square miles, 

Batangas province was about half the size of Delaware. It had a population 

three times that of Tayabas and almost twice that of Laguna. Two-thirds of 

the population lived south and east of Lake Taal. The town of Batangas, 

a seaport provincial capital with a population of 35,500, was 33 miles by 

road from Calamba on Laguna Bay to its north and 59 miles from Manila. 

Lipa, the largest and wealthiest town, had a population of 43,000. Taal, 

the original Malay settlement and an early Spanish town on Balayan Bay, 

had a population of 22,000. Laguna formed a U-shaped 750-square mile 

province along the southern coast of Laguna Bay. Located on Laguna Bay, 

Santa Cruz, the provincial capital with a population of 13,000, was 47 

miles by road from the town of Batangas and 52 miles from Manila. San 

Pablo, the biggest Laguna town with 19,000 inhabitants, was an important 

road center. Tayabas, the largest province with 2,300 square miles, was 

roughly the size of Delaware. Located at an important road center, the 

town of Tayabas, the capital and largest town, had a population of 16,000. 

It was 39 miles from the town of Batangas and 7 miles from Lucban, the 

second largest town with 13,000 inhabitants. Each province was accessible by road. Batangas and Tayabas provinces were accessible by sea and 

Laguna by Laguna Bay7 (see table 4).

As part of the provinces called by one American commander the “most 

Table 4. 1902 Data on Second District Provinces8

Province Batangas Laguna Tayabas

Capital Batangas Santa Cruz Tayabas 

Area (sq mi) 1,110 750 2,300

Population 312,000 170,000 110,000

Towns / Villages or 

Hamlets 22 / 727 33 / 415 23 / 430
75

thickly settled and richest in southern Luzon,”9 the economy of the region 

was primarily agricultural and supplemented by fishing and some cottage industry. Rice, sugar cane, coffee, hemp, corn, chocolate, coconuts, 

tobacco, indigo, and vegetables were grown. Common fruits included mangos, bananas, oranges, lemons, and pineapples. Laguna province, known 

as the garden of the Philippines, had a climate and soil that permitted it to 

grow every tropical plant and tree known in the archipelago. Batangas was 

one of the most fertile and well-cultivated provinces in the archipelago. 

Coffee had been a major export from Batangas until insects and parasitic 

fungi attacked the coffee plants in 1889. Coffee production dropped from 

6.5 million kilograms in 1888 to 1.4 million in 1892 and was replaced by 

sugar as the major cash crop.10 Raising livestock—horses, cattle, carabaos, 

sheep, and goats—was widespread, particularly in Batangas and Laguna 

which had 147,000 and 45,000 head of livestock, respectively. Surrounded 

by the sea and Laguna Bay, fishing provided additional food for many 

inhabitants. All three provinces produced lumber for local building and 

furniture needs, even the least forested Laguna. Tayabas province exported 

some lumber. Weaving was the major cottage industry. Most women had 

looms in their homes where they wove cloth from silk, cotton, and hemp. 

Extracting oil from coconuts was another cottage industry in Laguna and 

Tayabas provinces, and in Laguna province they made bolos. This fertile 

region produced food in excess of its needs and provided the basic materials required for housing and clothing its inhabitants.11

Tagalogs

Like the rest of the Philippines, society in these provinces was divided 

between the few that had and the many that had not. In wealthy Batangas, 

the economic elite comprised less than 3 percent of the population.12 It 

consisted primarily of owners of large parcels of land and of successful 

merchants. Most had completed secondary school. In 1891, Batangas had 

seven 5-year secondary schools. Many secondary school graduates—92 

by 1896—attended university in Manila.13 A few even studied in Europe. 

The economic elite in Batangas, Hispanicized and Spanish speaking, 

made their fortunes from coffee and sugar. An American officer described 

Lipa in Batangas, a town of 40,000 that had about a dozen millionaires at 

one time, as “about the richest, most enlightened and best blooded town 

in the islands.” Defined by a 9-mile by 10-mile rectangle, the town consisted of 45 barrios. Five families owned three-quarters of the land outside 

the city limits.14 At the time, the town of Batangas, the principal port of 

Batangas, had over 30 men wealthy enough to own a 2,000 peso home; 

Lipa, by comparison, had 54.15 This wealth, education, and refinement 
76

made it “almost unbelievable” to one historian that “a large segment of 

the American press would portray Filipinos as uniformly backward and 

benighted and the Philippine economy as uniformly stagnant and underdeveloped.”16 Perhaps the press saw the overwhelming majority, not this 

minority.

As throughout the Philippines, local political power rested in the hands 

of the current presidente or mayor and the municipal council. Selection was 

not a simple process. The principales—current and past town officials—

were eligible to vote for the presidente and the council. They were often not 

the economic elite and vice versa. In 1892 in the Batangas town of Santo 

Tomas, only 85 principales—52 current and 33 former officials—were 

eligible to vote from a population of 10,000. From those eligible, only 13 

were allowed to vote: the incumbent and 12 principales chosen by lot—6 

from those currently serving and 6 from those who had served. Factions 

of the wealthy, parish priests, and others of local influence who used 

persuasion and other well-known means to advance their interests lobbied 

the voters. After the vote, a list was prepared for the Spanish governorgeneral in Manila that specified three names for presidente: the person 

who received the highest number of votes, the candidate with the second 

highest vote, and the incumbent. Then the 13 voters elected 4 members 

for the municipal council. A list of elected council members was also 

sent to the governor-general for approval. After months of delay in which 

the governor-general investigated the candidates, he would announce his 

selection. It appeared that the person with the most votes usually was 

confirmed. But a result of this process was to reinforce divisive tendencies 

among the local ruling families. Competition, rather than cooperation, 

became the norm among the elite.17

The Tagalog provinces had been the center of agitation for a greater 

Filipino participation in governing the Philippines during the last half of 

the 19th century. Laguna province, the birthplace of Jose Rizal, the leader 

of the reformist Propaganda Movement who was executed in 1896, was 

a center for nationalist and anti-Spanish activity. A series of revolts in the 

region began in 1872 failed, but discontent continued.18 In 1896 the region 

responded to the Katipunan call-to-arms of Bonifacio and Aguinaldo. 

Miguel Malvar of Batangas and Juan Cailles of Laguna were among the 

elite who rallied to fight in support of the Katipunan cause. After the 

Spanish reconquered the provinces in 1897, local conditions became worse 

as “agricultural collapse led . . . to widespread malnutrition, and malnutrition, in turn contributed to the declining health of the populace.”19 On the 

return of Aguinaldo in 1898, the Tagalog provinces again rose in revolt 

and ousted the Spanish. Aguinaldo appointed Brigadier General Malvar 
77

as his commander in Batangas province, and later, Brigadier General 

Cailles as commander in Laguna and Tayabas provinces. As directed by 

Aguinaldo’s government, they worked for over a year to build local military forces and militia. They linked those forces directly to the local elite 

in the towns who strongly supported the Tagalog cause. Sporadic fights 

in 1899 with the Americans along Laguna Bay occurred, but the primary 

focus remained the organization and defense of their provinces. Malvar, 

for example, made several defense plans for Batangas and defensive positions were prepared. However, the basic assumption for each plan was that 

the Americans would attack from the sea. When the Americans attacked 

from the north out of Cavite province in January 1900, Malvar’s forces 

were in the wrong place. Their hasty attempts to contest the American 

advance failed, and in early February the insurrectos reorganized for guerrilla warfare.20

Tagalog Insurrectos

After the Americans overran southwestern Luzon, Trias directed his 

subordinates—Cailles in Laguna and Tayabas provinces and Malvar in 

Batangas province—to conduct guerrilla or ambush warfare. Trias had two 

outstanding guerrilla leaders. Both proved “capable, intelligent, and ruthless.”21 Cailles, son of a French father and Anglo-Indian mother, was born 

in Laguna province. A schoolteacher in Cavite province in 1896, he commanded a unit of the Katipunan during the revolt. On Aguinaldo’s return 

in 1898, he served with the forces besieging Manila. Appointed brigadier 

general and governor of Laguna in 1899 at age 33, he had about a year to 

develop his local forces and their support system before the Americans 

arrived. Malvar, a successful landowner, businessman, and princiaplia

from Santo Tomas in Batangas, had fought with Aguinaldo in 1896–97 and 

had accompanied him to Hong Kong. On return to the Philippines, Malvar 

became a brigadier general and the provincial commander for Batangas in 

1898. Cailles and Malvar established firm control on the civil and military 

leaders in their provinces.22

Building on the support of the local Tagalog elite and the established 

militias in each town, Malvar and Cailles moved about their provinces in 

early 1900 establishing full-time guerrilla units raised and supported by 

each town. Malvar operated from a base in the mountains near the junction of where the three provinces came together to the west of Tiaong 

in Tayabas. Cailles operated in southern and eastern Laguna province. 

They selected officers with family, personal, or business ties to the local 

elite and often with similar ties to their provincial chief. They encouraged, supported, and reminded local civil leaders of their duties. In the fall, 
78

Malvar clarified the organization and responsibilities in his proclamation 

“Guerrilla Warfare Instructions.” In addition to its local militia, each town 

had a full-time guerrilla column armed with all the local firearms. The 

armed insurrectos were to hide and to harass the Americans by ambush 

and by disruption of their logistics and communications. The column was 

stationed in the town and surrounding barrios from which it drew recruits, 

food, supplies, and money. Local leaders worked directly with the guerrilla commander providing logistics, intelligence, and, at times, the local 

militia. Both the civil officials and military commanders were encouraged 

not to become a hindrance to one another. A typical column had 50 to 

60 insurrectos and 20 to 30 firearms. Both Cailles and Malvar stressed 

firepower instead of numbers. Malvar limited the number of bolo men in 

his full-time units to no more than 30 percent. Weapons, limited in quantity and generally poorly maintained, restricted the size of the guerrilla 

units; but, a shortage of ammunition proved a bigger problem. Cailles, for 

example, had only 20 rounds per firearm at one time. With the American 

naval blockade in effect, the insurrectos were forced to manufacture their 

own ammunition, often of poor quality. However, even with these severe 

restrictions, the guerrillas were able to maintain control of the towns and 

to continue to harass American occupation forces.23

Initially all Tagalogs, not just the local leaders, were forbidden under 

penalty of death from any cooperation with the Americans. In fact, the 

Americans found many towns empty when they arrived. By the summer of 1900, pressure in American occupied towns caused this policy to 

change. Local leaders were permitted to work with the Americans as long 

as they continued their active support of the insurrectos. A system of parallel or shadow government evolved in which local leaders outwardly met 

the requirements of the American post commanders while continuing to 

support their local militia and guerrilla columns. In some places, guerrilla leaders met with local leaders to identify nominees to fill positions 

in the American local government. As a result, the leaders of the local 

American government were usually active civil or military leaders in the 

insurrection.24 The support of the guerrillas and the militia—collecting 

taxes, providing food, gathering intelligence, and hiding insurrectos and 

weapons—continued undetected in American-occupied towns for over a 

year. Although inability to communicate and lack of cultural understanding compounded the American problem, the insurrectos in the Tagalog 

provinces found it “relatively easy . . . to mislead an army that was devoting so much of its attention to chasing the enemy’s . . . [armed insurrectos] 

and so little to understanding the nature of the conflict.”25

Unlike other places in the Philippines, the revolutionary infrastructure 
79

in the Tagalog provinces—resting on its dedicated local leadership—proved 

“the best organized and best led, and had the most popular support of 

any on the island.”26 When voluntary support wavered, coercion—varying 

in extremity from warnings to fines to arson to death—was common. 

Insurrectos attacked American supporters or Americanistas and their 

property. Both Malvar and Cailles encouraged the frequent and systematic 

use of coercion. Cailles deliberately publicized his actions as a warning 

to others. Although the exact number of assassinations is disputed, it was 

frequent enough to make the threat credible to the population.27 Cailles 

instructions meant that:

Indeed any native found rendering voluntary service to 

the Americans without contributing a large portion of his 

compensation to the insurrection, and any native who 

showed any friendship for Americans, or was suspected 

of being a spy for them, was, regardless of sex, marked 

for secret assassination by the insurgents or their emissaries. It was therefore not astonishing that the natives of this 

district with few exceptions rendered implicit obedience 

to the insurgent government.28

Even as late as the fall of 1901, an American officer wrote that the Tagalog 

insurrectos have the “aid of every inhabitant of the country for information, etc. They continue to dominate the inhabitants and compel their aid, 

active or passive, for the simple reason that their punishments for failure 

to comply are much more than any practiced by us, or permitted to us 

under the laws of civilized warfare.”29 Popular support for the insurrection, reinforced as necessary by coercion, sustained the Tagalog resistance 

in southwestern Luzon longer than anywhere else on Luzon.

Cailles and Malvar skillfully organized and guided guerrilla operations in their provinces. By attacking isolated American detachments, the 

insurrectos reinforced the American tendency to focus on the guerrillas. 

By avoiding battle, they frustrated the American desire for a quick, final 

end to the resistance. When guerrillas did strike, they struck quickly and 

then dispersed rapidly. An American officer complained:

. . . this country offers so many hiding places that the insurgents do not have to go far to obtain perfect concealment. 

And as a rule, after leaving the scene of combat they conceal their weapons and appear as innocent amigos. Most 

of them live at home and work at their ordinary vocation, 

those who are not at home live in houses already occupied 

by their friends and all appears to be one family in each 
80

house. All this makes it almost impossible to find any particular band that had committed a certain depredation.30

At the same time, the insurrectos denied the Americans control of the population and of the countryside. Both Malvar and Cailles understood that 

the military activity of their militia and guerrilla forces was less important 

than their local political and psychological presence. As long as the militia 

existed, the Americans could not establish loyal civil government nor win 

the support of the population. An American commander noted, “I owe it 

to our rebel enemy to say that, from their standpoint, I regard their scheme 

of warfare as nearly perfect. In the facility with which they can play the 

insurrecto–amigo act, they have an immense advantage. Their facilities 

for recruitment and their plans for receiving money and supplies are not to 

be despised.”31 Isolated physically in small garrisons and living amongst 

a large, hostile, alien Tagalog population, the Americans were unaware of 

things hiding in plain sight. For example, an American report stated that 

Malvar:

Goes about the country with an indian shirt and trousers 

cut off or rolled up to the knees and if captured will affect 

being a very simple, inoffensive and ignorant native who 

knows nothing and will give a wrong name. . . . He passed 

through American troops with a rooster under his arm, 

and has ridden a carabao through Santo Tomas and Lipa, 

stopping at Lipa to talk to the Presidente without being 

detected.32

Both Malvar and Cailles had close calls, but they were never captured. 

Each time they escaped it added to their mystique with their supporters. 

The same held true for the insurrectos living amongst the local populace. 

For the Americans in the Tagalog region, most insurrectos—guerrillas and 

civilian supporters—remained undetectable for over a year.

American Military Operations

The 1st Division oversaw the initial occupation of the Tagalog provinces. On 10 April 1900 the 1st Division was disestablished and replaced 

by the Department of Southern Luzon. The Department of Southern Luzon 

included an area of 10,000 square miles and a population of 1.2 million on 

southern Luzon and roughly the same size area with a smaller population 

on the islands of Marinduque, Masbate, Mindoro, and Samar. The department was divided into four districts—First through Fourth. Major General 

Bates,33 a 60-year old Regular officer and the former commander of the 1st 

Division, commanded the Department of Southern Luzon. Having earned 

his rank by “the iron law of seniority,” Bates proved to be a mediocre, 
81

methodical commander. He did not adjust to the guerrilla warfare in southern Luzon nor did he encourage his subordinates to do so.34

Second District, Department of Southern Luzon, consisted of the 

provinces of Batangas, Laguna, and Tayabas (see map 7). The former 1st 

Brigade commander, Brigadier General Wheaton, commanded Second 

District until 16 April when he departed to replace Major General Arthur 

MacArthur as commander of the Department of Northern Luzon. Colonel 

William E. Birkhimer, the intelligent, hard-charging commander of the 

28th USV Infantry, served as the acting district commander until the 

arrival of 63-year old Brigadier General Robert H. Hall35 who assumed 

command on 28 June. Sixteen months from retirement when he took command, Hall proved to be an indifferent commander in dealing with the 

insurrectos. Hall’s apathy and Bates conservatism created a command climate in Second District not conducive to innovative pacification measures 

in the towns.36 Destroying armed insurrectos dominated their attention.

With 5,000 of the 11,000 American troops in the Department of 

Southern Luzon, Second District was the most strongly garrisoned district. Even so, the troop strength was inadequate to garrison the towns 

and to establish control of the countryside. Colonel George S. Anderson, 

commanding the 38th USV Infantry, garrisoned southwestern Batangas 

Map 7. Department of Southern Luzon.

Manila N

Lipa

San Pablo

Trece Martires

BATANGAS

CAVITE

Tagaytay

Lucena

Maricaban

Island

Batangas

Bay

South

China

Sea

Balayan

Bay Tayabas

Bay

Manila

Bay

Lamon

Bay

LAGUNA

TAYABAS

Santa Cruz

Scale

0 10

miles

Loboo

Batangas

Taal

San Jose

Tiaong

Santo Tomas

Lian

Balayan

Paete

Lake

Taal

Bauan

Tayabas

Mabitac

Lucban

Calamba

Cavite

Rosario

Laguna Siniloan

Bay

First

District

Second

District
82

province. The 28th USV Infantry, commanded by Birkhimer, controlled 

southeastern Batangas province. Colonel Robert L. Bullard’s 39th USV 

Infantry initially occupied four towns in north-central Batangas and eastern Laguna province. Colonel Cornelius Gardener’s 30th USV Infantry 

controlled Tayabas province. One of two infantry regiments raised in the 

Philippines from state volunteer veterans in 1899, the 37th USV Infantry, 

commanded by Colonel Benjamin F. Cheatham, controlled northeast 

Laguna and parts of northern Tayabas.37 Troops from the 6th Cavalry and 

the 11th USV Cavalry worked with the regimental commanders.

Although the population remained sullen and uncooperative, contact with 

armed insurrectos rarely occurred. In mid-February Wheaton had predicted 

that “although the predatory bands into which . . . the insurgent forces 

have degenerated are giving occasional trouble, these, I trust and believe, 

will be extirpated in short order. The pacification of the territory . . . will 

then be complete.”38 Destroying the armed insurrectos through aggressive 

operations would pacify the region and provide a secure environment for 

the establishment of local civil government and other pacification measures. 

In April Wheaton reminded his commanders:

The importance of the greatest practicable activity in 

scouting the country and exterminating all hostile bands 

is urged. All concentration or organization of guerrilla 

bands will be prevented when it is known that such effort 

is being made. The greatest severity consistent with the 

laws of war is enjoined when armed parties of hostiles are 

encountered.39

In June Birkhimer stressed the importance of “killing armed insurrectos 

and ladrones and showing all people by our armed presence everywhere, 

that we are masters of the country and intend to remain so.”40 This reinforced the emphasis on military operations directed against the armed 

insurrectos. Local patrols and larger operations were constant; however, 

contact with the insurrectos was infrequent. From March to May only 

11 engagements, most initiated by the insurrectos, took place in Second 

District with American casualties of one KIA and two WIA.41 The insurrectos appeared weak and disorganized throughout the district.

Initial Operations

Although attempts to establish local governments in the spring of 

1900 were hampered by basic flaws in General Orders 40 and 43, the principal obstacle remained the refusal of the local principales to work with 

the American post commanders. In fact, most of the population fled the 

towns when the Americans arrived. By March they were returning to their 
83

homes. Birkhimer maintained, “We must take care of the good and law 

abiding people who are now coming back and quieting down on their little 

farms all about, else we will lose that confidence in us that sound policy 

requires we should inspire and pursue.”42 The difficulty of doing this, given 

the support for the insurrectos in every town and the established insurrecto

infrastructure, was not to be understood by Second District commanders 

for almost a year. 

Part of the reason was the apparent ease with which Gardener reported 

pacification of Tayabas province. A staunch believer in pacification and in 

trusting the Tagalogs to work in good faith with the Americans, Gardener 

believed that “mere pills will be more effective than bullets.” Within 6 

months, Gardener established schools in each garrisoned town. In April he 

insisted that his post commanders establish a local government with a local 

police force. Reports of difficulties did not deter him. Major Matthew F. 

Steele, commander at Lucban, wrote he did “not expect a single person to 

vote” for the reason that “the edge of the bolo and the hand of an assassin 

are the price they would pay for taking that oath and holding office under 

American rule.”43 After repeated failures in Lucban, Gardener suggested 

that Steele do what he had done—lock the local leaders in a room until they 

established a government. When Steele tried this, the locals first elected 

an insurrecto leader in the local jail. Then they elected their three greatest opponents. The next time he tried, they fled and hid in a nearby town. 

Finally, Steele just appointed a local leader who then appealed directly to 

Bates who responded: “It is not the desire of the Department Commander 

that friendly natives should be placed in jeopardy by assuming office when 

we cannot assure their immunity from those who are still antagonistic; 

such offices should be assumed voluntarily.”44 After a frustrating 8-month 

effort, in December Steele wrote Gardener:

I have tried every argument to persuade various citizens 

to accept the office of [presidente] . . . without success. 

They are all afraid of [assassination]. . . . Every principal 

man in Lucban has some property . . . [outside the town] 

and they all claim they would not be able to visit [it] . . . 

if they accepted the office. And they claim . . . that the 

insurgents would take away and destroy all their rice and 

other things . . . [outside the town]. They all say but for 

this they would gladly accept the office and they hope 

the conditions will soon be such that they can accept this 

office without risk to their lives and property.45

Despite this lack of security for local officials, Gardener reported the province peaceful. Incidents of lawlessness were attributed to local ladrones 
84

or to insurrectos from neighboring provinces, but never to insurrectos in 

Tayabas. Perhaps not surprisingly, Gardener reported Tayabas as ready 

for civil government in September.46 The other Second District regimental 

commanders were not as optimistic as Gardener, did not share his trust of 

Tagalogs, and did not have the pacification successes Gardener reported. 

In fact, most would have agreed with a captain who wrote “This business 

of fighting and civilizing and educating at the same time doesn’t mix very 

well. Peace is needed first.”47

Peace did not come to southwestern Luzon in the summer of 1900. 

With the onset of the rainy season, Malvar and Cailles increased guerrilla 

attacks on isolated American detachments throughout each of the provinces. Cheatham reported that in Laguna province there was “renewed 

activity among the insurgents, taxes are being collected and soldiers 

impressed, the towns that are not occupied by the Americans and were 

full of men a month ago are now practically deserted except for women 

and children.” In southeastern Batangas, Birkhimer added, “we control 

within the lines of our bayonets, but no further.” Between June and August 

engagements increased by over 400 percent from the preceding 3 months. 

Despite higher insurrecto losses, the 54 actions inflicted losses of 12 KIA 

and 28 WIA on the Americans.48

The increased tempo of operations could not have come at a worse 

time for the Americans. Worn by constant patrolling and incessant military 

operations and with the onset of the rainy season, sick rates climbed: 25 

percent for the 37th USV Infantry in Laguna province and 30 percent for 

both the 30th USV Infantry in Tayabas province and for the 39th USV 

Infantry in central Batangas. Some garrisons were particularly unhealthy. 

At one time, the post at Paete in Laguna province had only 30 soldiers fit 

for duty out of 101 assigned. At Tiaong in northwest Tayabas province, 

an infantry company had less than 10 men fit for duty, which meant many 

of the sick remained on duty.49 Disease alone created half-strength companies. Out of an assigned strength of 49 officers and 1,230 soldiers, the 

39th USV Infantry had 24 officers and 720 soldiers fit for duty that summer. During its tour in the Philippines, the 39th USV Infantry had 13 KIA 

and 30 WIA and 111 deaths from disease.50 Throughout the Philippines in 

1900, three times as many soldiers died from disease than were killed or 

died of wounds. In fact, dysentery alone killed as many soldiers as the total 

wounded. From January through July, out of 995 American deaths, 654 

died from disease. Almost twice as many soldiers, 1,560, were shipped 

to the United States: 1,147 for medical treatment, 303 for disability discharges, and 110 as insane.51 Inadequate medical care and a shortage of 

medicine meant that the sick tended to stay sick or got worse while the 
85

healthy—overworked and lacking rest from troop shortages and increased 

insurrecto activity—became ill. At the beginning of July, Hall assumed 

command of Second District from Birkhimer. Faced with a declining troop 

strength and increased insurrecto activity, he changed the policy of constant military activity to one of responding to known insurrecto threats. 

Soldiers would remain in garrison, performing local security and pacification duties, until they had intelligence about an insurrecto activity or location. Then they would react.52

The frustration of combating guerrilla warfare, of operating in a hostile 

alien population, and of conducting innumerable operations—for example, 

a hike of 120 miles in 7 days—in pursuit of a phantom foe that struck when 

and where it desired took its toll. Many American soldiers—predisposed by 

the attitudes of the time to view Filipinos as inferior—“came in time to view 

them as savages and to hate them—combatants and noncombatants alike.”53

Anderson in southeastern Batangas wrote, “They are rank barbarians, 

not much above our better class of indians.”54 At times, both Americans 

and insurrectos resorted to harsh, even illegal, actions. Despite repeated 

prohibitions, unofficial American interrogation techniques included the water 

cure and the rope cure. At the same time, official military measures became 

harsher—sometimes intentionally and sometimes inadvertently. In July, 

commenting on sweeps to round up Tagalog suspects, Birkhimer noted:

. . . we do not know insurrectos and bad men from good 

ones, so we are often compelled to arrest all alike and 

bring them in here to be sorted out; in this way the good 

are temporarily inconvenienced, but only temporarily. 

But even this evil has a good side: the people find that the 

United States authorities are liable to overhaul them at 

any moment and it has a salutary, lasting effect.55

Few Tagalogs shared his assessment. Once the distinction between potential friend and definite enemy no longer mattered, indiscriminate arrests led 

to other indiscriminate actions like the destruction of property. In the summer of 1900 it became common in the Tagalog provinces for Americans 

to burn houses that insurrectos had fired from, that were used to store 

supplies for the insurrectos, and that happened to be near destroyed telegraph lines. Although initially Gardener and Birkhimer protested these 

actions as counterproductive, they became common. Cheatham encouraged his troops searching for Cailles “to burn freely and kill every man 

who runs.”56 Anderson recommended “a thorough destruction of all stores 

that may serve as subsistence to the Insurgent Army.”57

The Americans did have some successes. An informer warned the 
86

post commander at Taal in Batangas province of an imminent insurrecto

attack. The post commander took no precautions, and Malvar and 400 

insurrectos attacked a small garrison on 16 July. Six Americans were 

wounded. Birkhimer reacted promptly and cornered part of the insurrectos

the next day. On one of those rare opportunities where an insurrecto force 

stayed and fought, the Americans were able to attack with the support of 

the river gunboat Villalobos and killed 38 insurrectos. An officer hailed 

Birkhimer as “the champion insurrecto exterminator in the islands.”58

Hall even recommended him for a brevet to brigadier general. Cheatham 

had one success against Cailles after searching most of the summer. On 5 

August a detachment from the 37th USV Infantry and 11th USV Cavalry, 

led by a native guide, discovered Cailles’ camp. In the ensuing fight, five 

insurrectos were killed and eight rifles captured. More importantly, the 

Americans captured the papers and correspondence of Cailles.59

Despite these successes by the Americans in southern Luzon, things 

did not improve during the summer. Bates summarized the situation on 

15 August in his annual report:

I cannot recommend the reduction of the forces in this 

command by so much as a single soldier. . . . A single battalion can today march from one end of this department 

to the other without encountering enough resistance from 

the enemy to impede seriously its progress, but small parties of troops cannot leave the garrisoned posts without 

incurring a danger of attack. . . . The insurrectos, after 

making an attack, disperse, assume civilian garb, and conceal themselves among the peaceful inhabitations, often 

taking up their residence and continuing their conspiracy 

in towns occupied by our troops, where they terrorize the 

mass of inhabitants by threatening condign punishment 

to those who display friendship toward Americans. When 

captured and again set free, they have shown their lack 

of appreciation of the policy of magnanimity by again 

appearing in arms against us at the first opportunity. The 

necessity of ferreting out, running down, and punishing this hostile minority . . . and our moral obligation to 

protect our friends render it necessary to have troops stationed at all places where civil government is established; 

for the absence of troops means the presence of anarchy. 

It will doubtless be a long time before any diminution can 

be made in all of the garrisons of this department.60
87

Pacification was not working. Lack of security was considered the problem. Destroying the armed insurrectos, not the support infrastructure, 

remained the solution.

Following Aguinaldo’s instructions, Malvar and Cailles supplemented 

their routine sniping and harassment of American forces by increased 

attacks during the fall of 1900 with 10 attacks in September and 11 in 

October.61 A couple of battles were fought on terms favorable to the insurrectos. On 17 September an American officer with just 2 days in the 

Philippines attacked a large force of insurrectos entrenched at Mabitac in 

Laguna province. What followed was the worst American defeat on Luzon 

during the insurrection. MacArthur reported to the War Department:

Capt. David D. Mitchell, Fifteenth Infantry, 90 men, 

Company L, Fifteenth Infantry, from Siniloan, Laguna 

Province, attacked insurgent General Cailles, who had 

800 men in position at Mavitac, same province. Desperate 

fight ensued, which was pushed from the front with great 

pertinacity by Mitchell across causeway and through 

water waist deep; cooperative attack under Capt. Georg 

F. Cooke, Fifteenth Infantry, with 40 men, Company 

K, Fifteenth Infantry, and 10 men, Company B, Thirtyseventh Infantry, US Volunteers; could not reach enemy’s 

position because of high water in arm of lake, which could 

not be crossed; entire country was afloat in consequence 

rains; this very much impeded offensive action. After 

hour twenty minutes’ fighting command withdrew to 

Siniloan. . . . [next day] insurgents had escaped . . . most 

of them no doubt going back into contiguous barrios to 

appear for time being, or until called into fight again, 

as peaceful amigos. . . . [American force of 4 officers 

and 130 soldiers lost 2 officers and 22 men KIA and 1 

officer and 18 men WIA]. . . . Thirty-three per cent is 

profoundly impressive loss and indicates stubbornness of 

fight, fearless leadership of officers and splendid response 

of men. Insurgent loss, as far as known, 10 killed, 20 

wounded.62

Despite the praise for his officers and men in his telegram, MacArthur 

told Commissioner William H. Taft that Mitchell would have faced courtmartial if he had lived. The next day, Cailles returned the bodies of eight 

Americans with all their personal effects.63 Another sustained fight occurred 
88

in northwest Batangas province where over 400 insurrectos attacked a 21-

man American detachment on 21 October. During a 4-hour fight in which 

the insurrectos held the high ground, many insurrectos fired black-powder 

weapons that offset their tactical advantage and permitted the Americans 

to locate their positions. The Americans lost 2 KIA and 4 WIA to an estimated 100 insurrecto casualties.64 In mid-October Bates expressed a concern with American reports of enemy actions throughout his department. 

He directed, “The use of the word ‘Ambushed’ or ‘Ambuscade’ is wrong, 

in that it indicates lack of precaution on the part of our officers and men, 

which is not the case. The use of these words is therefore liable to misapprehension and criticism, and should be avoided.” He suggested that 

“attacked” was the appropriate term unless the soldiers were actually surprised by a lack of proper precautions.65 Predictably, insurrecto ambushes 

decreased, but their attacks increased.

Throughout the fall, American operations against the guerrillas forced 

some bands away from the towns, but they did not reduce insurrecto

support from nor grip on the population. On 27 October Malvar issued a 

proclamation providing detailed instructions to both his guerrilla leaders 

and to the local leaders on their duties and responsibilities to one another 

in resisting the American occupation.66 Cailles instructed his commanders 

on 15 November that:

The foundation of your methods will be to protect our 

friends and punish traitors of all kinds. If any citizen 

accepts office from the enemy, that will cause his condemnation to death, the destruction of his house and the 

confiscation of his property, which will be delivered to the 

treasury for the support of the revolution. If on account of 

any obstacle, you are not able to carry out these orders, 

or if any of the people protect the traitor, thus showing 

respect for his illegitimate authority, you will destroy 

their houses without hesitation or delay, and you will take 

no care to stop the spread of the fire. You will be responsible to me alone, and then only for lack of zeal in obeying me.67

Before December, to include MacArthur’s June to September amnesty 

offer, only 30 insurrectos had surrendered in the entire Department of 

Southern Luzon.68 This strong indication of the solidarity of the Tagalog 

population and the dedication of the guerrillas meant that pacification—

the destruction of the guerrillas and the support of the population—had 

failed in southern Luzon.
89

MacArthur’s Campaign Measures

Although the re-election of McKinley had little effect on the insurrectos in the Department of Southern Luzon, MacArthur’s new campaign that 

began in late December to separate the guerrillas from their support in the 

towns had an effect throughout the Philippines in 1901. The declaration 

of martial law under General Orders 100 (see appendix B), the proclamation to the Filipino populace explaining its obligations as noncombatants 

under military law and the American intent to strictly enforce military law 

(see appendix C), the establishment of provost courts to try civilian supporters of the guerrillas, the establishment of a local police, the increase 

of Filipino auxiliaries, the imprisonment of POWs for the duration of the 

insurrection, and the establishment of the pro-American Federal Party 

seriously challenged the insurrectos in southern Luzon where American 

troop levels remained constant at the beginning of 1901 as Regulars—1st 

and 6th Cavalry and 4th, 8th, 21st, and 30th Infantry—began replacing the 

USV regiments that had been in place for over a year.69

Bates and Hall had resisted arming Tagalogs from the beginning of 

their commands. Despite MacArthur’s directives and successes elsewhere, 

their resistance continued. Little was accomplished in Second District, 

beyond the actions of a few post commanders, in creating a local police 

force until mid-1901 when the provinces shifted from military to civilian 

control.70 Bates and Hall continued to resist the recruitment of native auxiliaries. Concerns of loyalty and a scarcity of potential recruits meant that 

neither scout units nor other irregular forces, common in other parts of the 

Philippines, were used in Second District. In fact, Tagalog units recruited 

from outside the district were not used until June 1901.71 No action had 

been taken on Birkhimer’s summer of 1900 recommendation to form a 

district intelligence section to collect, analyze, and distribute information. 

As a result, intelligence collection and sharing within the department and 

district remained sporadic and fragmented.72 However, the Division of 

Military Information in Manila, created in December by MacArthur, provided in February 1901 all post commanders a comprehensive list of 560 

guerrilla leaders in the Tagalog provinces identified from the 22 December 

1900 capture of the papers of Trias in Cavite province.73 The department 

and district commanders provided no guidance or program for local commanders in pursuing MacArthur’s goal of separating the guerrillas from 

their infrastructure in the towns. Garrison commanders continued to struggle with the problems of local civil government in towns controlled by the 

insurrecto infrastructure.

The Federal Party pursued the surrender of insurrecto leaders through 
90

discussions and appeals beginning in February 1901. Responding to this 

serious threat on 28 February, Cailles directed that all federalistas and 

others seeking peace should be immediately shot without trial:

When any agent of the Federal Party or any of its adherents can not be captured through being constantly with the 

enemy, or guarded by him the heads of the pueblos and 

the commander of columns will procure the execution of 

this agent even within the American lines by using for 

the purpose persons of known decision and of patriotism 

worthy of all praise.74

The first and biggest success of the Federal Party came when Trias, the 

commander for southern Luzon, surrendered after negotiations with the 

federalistas. Two weeks later, Trias addressed an appeal to his former 

insurrecto leaders in southern Luzon to surrender.75 MacArthur reported 

to Washington: 

Mariano Trias, only lieutenant-general insurgent army, 

surrendered March 15 . . . with 9 officers, 199 well-armed 

men. Trias immediately took oath of allegiance presence 

several thousand natives; most auspicious event indicates 

final stage armed insurrection. Prestige Trias Southern 

Luzon equal that Aguinaldo.76

The insurrecto cause suffered a greater setback days afterward with the 

capture of Aguinaldo by the Americans. In April, Aguinaldo made a similar appeal for his followers to accept American government.

Reorganization and New Commanders

Malvar and Cailles responded to the decapitation of the insurrecto

cause by meeting with guerrilla leaders in early April. On reconfirming 

their determination to continue their resistance and never to surrender, 

Malvar issued a proclamation on 12 April addressed to his “Brothers and 

Companions in the Strife” that announced, in accordance with a June 1900 

decree, that he was replacing Trias as leader of the insurrection in southern 

Luzon. He appealed for the support of all Tagalogs, not just the local elite. 

On 28 April, Malvar issued 20 regulations that thoroughly reorganized 

the insurrecto movement in southern Luzon. Designed to improve guerrilla operations, to encourage resupply and recruitment, and to eliminate 

conflict between civilians and the guerrillas, these comprehensive regulations included reorganization of the guerrilla bands with an emphasis on 

ambush and protracted war, creation of a reserve supported by a draft of 

1 man for every 100 men, imposition of a head tax on every person, and 
91

commissioning of any man able to raise and lead a guerrilla unit. Early in 

1901 Malvar had divided Batangas province into three zones. Cailles now 

established local commanders for Laguna and Tayabas provinces. They 

both worked to strengthen the insurrectos in Tayabas where the guerrillas, 

nominally commanded by Colonel Eustacio Maloles, Malvar’s brother-inlaw, were fragmented, disorganized, and ineffective. The insurrecto civil 

infrastructure in Tayabas proved stronger than its guerrilla organization.77

From February 1900 to January 1901, there were only 19 engagements in 

Tayabas province.78 Despite the setbacks of March and April, the insurrectos in the Tagalog provinces appeared determined and were reorganizing 

to continue the struggle indefinitely.

The American departmental and district commanders changed at about 

this same time. Hall, the district commander, had requested relief in March. 

On 10 April the First District—basically Cavite province—and the Second 

District were reorganized as the First District, Department of Southern 

Luzon (see map 7). Brigadier General Samuel S. Sumner,79 the 59-year 

old district commander in Cavite where Trias’s surrender had practically 

ended resistance, assumed command of the combined district. A month 

later, Brigadier General James F. Wade, an old cavalryman, replaced Bates 

as commander of the Department of Southern Luzon. Although Wade may 

have understood the problem of guerrilla war in the Philippines somewhat 

better than Bates, he operated in the same mode as Bates.80 Although the 

Wade-Sumner team would continue the uninspired, ineffectual civil governmental policies of their predecessors, Sumner proved to be more astute 

and involved in counterguerrilla operations than Hall had been.81

Sumner ordered 1,000 soldiers from Cavite as reinforcements for an 

offensive against Cailles and Malvar that began 23 May and continued 

until 1 July. He hoped that, as in Cavite province, a concentrated military 

effort would force them to surrender.82 In mid-April Cailles had sworn 

never to surrender “while life lasts.” On 26 April Cailles narrowly escaped 

death or capture, but in the process lost his personal effects, correspondence, and most of his staff. His entire infrastructure in Laguna province 

was compromised. Cailles suspended operations and asked for a meeting 

to negotiate with the Americans and the federalistas. Wade told Sumner 

to inform Cailles “that operations will not be suspended for one moment, 

that the time for conferences has gone by, and that no propositions from 

General Cailles will be entertained except unconditional surrender.”83

Rebuffed, Cailles intensified his efforts against the Americans. In May a 

federalista agent from Trias to Cailles received the same request for suspension of operations and negotiations. Sumner again refused. At the end 

of May, Wade reported:
92

Captain Davis struck the trail of Cailles. . . . He is said 

to have forty cavalry and fifty infantry, fully equipped. 

Cailles is very sick, and is being carried in a hammock. 

This information, obtained from captured soldier of the 

enemy, was confirmed by the inhabitants of house where 

he stops and by the natives along his trail. Cailles’s force 

is scattered completely in the mountains, and all trace of 

him is lost.84

However, the tempo of operations had its effect. On 24 June Cailles 

surrendered in Laguna province. MacArthur reported to Washington: 

“General Cailles surrendered to-day Santa Cruz, Luzon, 386 rifles, 4,000 

rounds ammunition, about 600 officers, men; has taken oath of allegiance; 

very important, as it is most probable pacification all southern Luzon 

will follow quickly.”85 Cailles, the ultimate “I-will-never-be-taken-alive” 

insurrecto leader, received $5,000 in gold for his weapons. In a short time, 

he would be appointed civil governor of Laguna province and become a 

ruthlessly effective Americanista in hunting down his former comrades.86

Nevertheless, MacArthur’s hope for the quick pacification of southern 

Luzon proved false. On 13 July, in open letters to Aguinaldo and Trias, 

Malvar declared himself commander of all insurrectos and urged all 

Filipinos to oppose the Americans.87

Sumner’s military operations against Malvar yielded a different result 

in Batangas province. His sweeps produced minimal results. On 10 June 

insurrectos near Lipa overwhelmed a detachment of the 21st Infantry, killing two officers, one soldier, and one Filipino scout and wounding two 

soldiers. This reverse startled Sumner. A week later Sumner reported:

The operations of this command have demonstrated that 

a well organized force of considerable strength control 

this country and are paid and subsisted by the inhabitants. 

General Malvar exercises supreme command. . . . While 

we have found several of his camps and destroyed them, 

it has been impossible to overtake this force or damage it 

to any extent. It has been found almost impossible to gain 

any information owing to fear or sympathy of natives. . . . 

They pay a regular tax and every barrio is a supply depot 

for the insurrectos whose homes and relatives are in their 

midst.88

He requested reinforcements and recommended harsher measures against 

noncombatants. Specifically Sumner advocated the arrest of all men, 

requiring them to surrender weapons and to provide information about the 
93

insurrectos. Failure to comply would mean imprisonment for the duration 

of the insurrection and the exile of local leaders outside the Philippines. 

He further advocated the burning and destruction of property to “bring a 

speedy end to the present unsettled and dangerous condition of affairs” 

in Batangas.89 Wade responded by providing the reinforcements, but they 

were delayed until mid-July and included all the infantry requested but 

none of the cavalry. The recommendations for dealing with the populace 

were not approved. Wade’s constraints restricted Sumner’s effectiveness 

in pressuring the guerrilla bands and in cutting off their support from 

the populace. On 2 August Sumner submitted a bleak assessment. It was 

impossible to get reliable information, useless to pursue guerrillas who 

refuse to fight, and dangerous to move detachments. Malvar remained in 

control of the province. Sumner added his soldiers were “paralyzed for 

want of accurate information. They wander about the country, to the great 

detriment of their health, without any adequate result to find perhaps on 

their return that they were on the opposite of the hill, or quietly looking at 

them from some barrio.”90 Admitting that “the amount of country actually 

controlled by us is about as much as can be covered by the fire from our 

guns,” Sumner recommended the creation of a bureau of information, the 

destruction of all barrios used by the insurrectos, the destruction of all 

supplies in the countryside, the closing of all ports in Batangas and Laguna 

provinces, and the deportation to Guam of supporters of the insurrectos. 

Wade acted on none of his recommendations.91

What Sumner and Wade did not realize was that their operations had 

made life harder for the guerrilla bands that were pushed further into the 

countryside. Malvar had appointed Lieutenant Colonel Pedro Caballes to 

command guerrillas in Laguna province. By September Caballes had 12 

detachments with 750 rifles.92 Later that fall he reported to Malvar:

General, I cannot regulate the towns in my jurisdiction, 

because the traitor Cailles is always hunting for me with 

a force of American soldiers. . . . there are one hundred 

towns which do not want more war, and will tranquilly 

recognize the supreme authority of the United States. For 

the rest, the traitor Cailles, who is trying to catch me, is 

putting municipal officers in the towns of this province in 

order to establish a civil government.93

In Laguna province, which had been placed under civilian control in July, 

Cailles worked for the Americans to break the linkage between the towns 

and the guerrillas. In Batangas province, under military control after 17 July, 

Wade had not supported Sumner’s measures to pressure the populace 
94

and local leaders. Relying on the assessments of local commanders and 

lacking an independent information section at district or department, Wade 

and Sumner had little understanding of the decline in guerrilla and civilian 

morale that American patrolling and operations caused.94

Sumner correctly assessed that Malvar could not mass forces for any 

length of time, nor would he. Malvar’s policy was described by Sumner 

as “one of negative opposition as far as our Government is concerned, and 

a reign of terror as far as the natives.”95 On 4 September Sumner wrote 

Wade that “what the troops need is accurate information, if this could be 

obtained their work would be effective, and an end would be put to this irritating and troublesome rebellion in a short time.”96 After no response from 

Wade on his recommendation for a properly staffed and resourced district 

bureau of information, Sumner reported on 28 September the establishment in his district of “a system of general information between posts and 

these Headquarters as will enable Post Commanders to act promptly and 

intelligently on receipt of news.”97 That same day, Major General Adna R. 

Chaffee, commander of the Division of the Philippines and subordinate 

of Governor Taft since 4 July, issued General Orders 294 that required 

all post and field commanders to appoint an intelligence officer and to 

submit all military information through their commands to the Division 

of Military Information in Manila where the data would be collated, analyzed, and developed into information for units being assigned to areas 

with which they have no previous experience.98

Things would change dramatically in the Philippines in September 

and October. Chaffee reported to the War Department on 2 September:

The disturbance in Wade’s Department has contracted 

practically to Batangas Province, but here no serious 

impression has been made on Malvar’s party, generally 

supposed to be from five hundred to six hundred strong 

scattered in the mountains and brush. Small parties have 

been struck, some surrenders made, but nothing done yet 

to press Malvar hard enough to get a squeal out of him, 

except that he asserts as do others who know him, that 

have come in, that he will never surrender. Campaigning 

there now is very difficult and while I have urged Wade 

and Sumner to be active and to give Malvar no rest, it 

results mainly in filling our hospitals with sick men, principally bowel cases.99

On 28 September Sumner wrote, “There are few means at hand to impress 

these people with the disadvantage of warfare unless we burn the barrios, 
95

destroy the food, and subject them to personal torture which is inhuman 

and unwise.”100 Appearing to reverse his call for harsher methods, Sumner’s 

timing could not have been worse. On that day, an insurrecto attack 

destroyed all but 4 of the 74-man American garrison at Balangiga on the 

island of Samar—44 killed, 22 wounded, and 4 missing. This “massacre” 

served as a call for the prompt destruction of the insurrection on Samar 

and in Batangas province.101

Chaffee, a cavalryman who had risen from the ranks during the 

American Civil War, had little regard for civilians in general and for 

Governor Taft in particular. In early October, President Theodore Roosevelt 

cabled Chaffee: “I am deeply chagrined, to use the mildest possible term, 

over the trouble between yourself and Taft. I wish you to see him personally and to spare no effort to secure prompt and friendly agreements 

in regard to the differences between you.”102 For his part, Taft regularly 

wrote to the Secretary of War Elihu Root expressing his views of Chaffee, 

just as he had expressed his views of Governor-General MacArthur. On 

14 October Taft wrote Root that Chaffee was not committed to pacification and that Chaffee believed the only way to achieve peace was to pin 

down the Filipinos “with bayonets for ten years until they submit.”103 Taft 

further opined, “General Wade is incompetent and General Sumner who 

is under him is not very much better.”104 Despite their disagreements, Taft 

and Chaffee agreed that the insurrection on Samar and in Batangas had 

to be destroyed, that it required harsh measures, and that new commanders were needed. In early November, Taft approved a law that made it 

illegal to advocate Philippine independence.105 As requested by Chaffee 

on 9 November, the War Department reorganized the Division of the 

Philippines into two departments. Major General Wheaton commanded the 

Department of North Philippines which included Luzon and Wade departed 

to command the Department of South Philippines.106 The Department of 

North Philippines was divided into seven separate brigades—First through 

Seventh. The Third Separate Brigade encompassed Batangas, Laguna, 

western Tayabas, and the island of Mindoro107 (see map 8).

Third Separate Brigade Pacification of Southwestern Luzon, 

December 1901–April 1902

Chaffee began preparations for the campaign in southern Luzon. 

In Manila he met with members of the Federal Party on 12 November. 

Committees were appointed to approach Malvar and his commanders 

seeking surrender. A deadline of 31 December was placed on these efforts 

to negotiate.108 A week later, Chaffee selected Brigadier General J. Franklin 

Bell,109 the experienced and capable commander of the First District of the 
96

Department of Northern Luzon, to command the Third Separate Brigade. 

Sumner departed to command the First Separate Brigade. As of 1 December 

the Division of the Philippines had 37,349 American soldiers assigned, 

down from 48,000 in July.110 To increase native troops, in September 

Chaffee had established the Philippine Scouts from existing native scout 

units. The Philippine Scouts were recruited for 3 years, organized into 104-

man companies, and commanded by an American lieutenant. Over 3,000 

strong when created, the Scouts consisted of 34 companies—13 Ilocano, 

11 Macabebe, 4 Tagalog, 4 Cagayan, and 2 Bicol. Six companies had been 

assigned to southern Luzon.111 Chaffee assigned the Third Separate Brigade 

7,600 American soldiers—1st and 6th Cavalry; 8th, 20th, 21st, 28th, and 

30th Infantry; and 680 Philippine Scouts—companies of Macabebes, 

Ilocanos, and Tagalogs.112

After taking 2 weeks to assess the situation, Bell assumed command of 

the Third Separate Brigade on 30 November. Building on his experience 

as regimental commander in central Luzon, provost marshal in Manila, 

and district commander in the Ilocos, Bell developed a campaign plan that 

addressed the specific situation in his new area of operations. In a lengthy 

meeting on 1 December, Bell explained to the officers of the brigade 

Map 8. Third Separate Brigade, Department of North Philippines.

N

Manila

Lipa

San Pablo

Trece Martires

BATANGAS

CAVITE

Tagaytay

Lucena

Maricaban

Island

Batangas

Bay

South

China

Sea

Balayan

Bay Tayabas

Bay

Manila

Bay

Lamon

Bay

LAGUNA

TAYABAS

Santa Cruz

Scale

0 10

miles

Loboo

Batangas

Taal

San Jose

Tiaong

Santo Tomas

Lian

Balayan

Paete

Lake

Taal

Bauan

Tayabas

Mabitac

Lucban

Calamba

Cavite

Rosario

Laguna Siniloan

Bay
97

assembled in the town of Batangas what he intended to do and why. Bell 

said, “We have only one purpose, and that is to force the insurgents and 

those in active sympathy with them to want peace. In accomplishing this we 

must pay particular attention to the attitude of principales who live in the 

towns under our protection and are the eyes and ears and business agents 

of insurgents outside.” Bell emphasized, “we must make the principales 

the object of our especial study and effort.” He added, “We owe the Pacific 

people protection and must adopt some way of demonstrating our ability 

to give it. We must then show our intention to punish insurgents and those 

who aid and assist them.” He explained that leniency had not worked, 

that “all the people of Batangas can have peace whenever they want it, 

and it should be our mission to make them want it as soon as we can by 

legitimate methods.” Bell later distributed copies of General Orders 100 

(appendix A) to each post commander stating, “we shall hereafter conduct 

war in accordance with that order.” Although drastic measures would be 

required, Bell explained it was not necessary that they be implemented in 

a harsh, humiliating, or overbearing manner. In dealing with the populace, 

Bell wanted his soldiers to be “considerate and courteous in manner, but 

firm and relentless in action” while letting “acts, not words, convey your 

meaning.” He summarized, “By cruel outrages and inhuman expedients, 

insurgents have created a reign of terror . . . which intimidates the people 

against giving any assistance, but by legitimate means we must produce 

sufficient fear of our power to at least prevent their helping insurgents.” 

Bell continued, “It is my purpose, by giving them proper protection, to turn 

the inhabitants against the insurrection and secure their earnest and loyal 

assistance in efforts to re-establish peace.” Bell ended the meeting, “As 

soon as I have studied the situation a few days, I shall begin the issuance 

of definite written instructions.”113

Although military operations continued during December, Bell 

focused his attention on setting the conditions for a counterguerrilla effort 

that would begin 1 January 1902. On 3 December he established a brigade 

intelligence officer and appointed six officers with Ilocos experience—

three from the 3d Cavalry and three from the 20th Infantry—to conduct 

provost courts. Their task was to investigate the insurrecto infrastructure 

in the towns, to gather intelligence, and to prosecute those who supported 

the guerrillas.114 Two days later detailed instructions for provost courts 

and information collection were provided to all post commanders.115 At 

the end of December, a brigade prison had been established at the town of 

Batangas.116

At the same time, Bell provided his policies with detailed guidance 

to his post commanders in a series of telegraphic circulars. Of the 38 
98

circulars issued during the campaign, the 22 issued in December set the 

conditions and focus of the campaign that ensued. On 8 December post 

commanders were ordered to establish a zone of protection within the 

physical limits of each town to house the population from the countryside that had until 25 December to move there with all their property and 

foodstuffs. After 25 December all persons outside the zones of protection were to be considered hostile and all properties outside the zones of 

protection liable to confiscation or destruction. Bell’s stated purpose was 

to “put an end to enforced contributions, now levied by insurgents . . . 

by means of intimidation and assassination” and to “furnish protection 

to inhabitants . . . against the depredations of armed insurgents.” On the 

establishment of peace, the populace would be encouraged and assisted 

in returning to their homes.117 The next day, Bell explained in detail his 

policy “that will as soon as possible make the people want peace and 

want it badly.” Emphasizing provisions from General Orders 100, Bell 

addressed his expectations of local leaders and the actions to be taken if 

they were not met.

The only acceptable and convincing evidence of the real 

sentiments of either individuals or town councils should 

be such acts publicly performed as must inevitably commit them irrevocably to the side of the Americans by 

arousing the animosity and opposition of the insurgent 

element. Such acts are reliable evidence, but mere words 

are worthless. . . . Neutrality should not be tolerated. Every 

inhabitant of this Brigade should either be an active friend 

or be classed as an enemy.118

Provost courts dealt with disloyal inhabitants. Police no longer received pay 

without demonstrated public support for the Americans. On 13 December 

Bell stressed that the illegal status of guerrillas, their active supporters, 

and their “flagrant violations of the laws of war” left him no option but the 

enforcement of the strictest punishments permitted under General Orders 

100. Bell threatened to execute insurrecto POWs if Americans or their 

supporters were assassinated.119 Assassinations ceased at once. Along with 

the circulars addressing keeping food out of the hands of insurrectos, Bell 

established his basic plan for dealing with the infrastructure—concentrating 

the population into zones of protection secured by American forces, 

pressuring local leaders to take actions in support of the Americans, and 

controlling food supplies.

Continuing to emphasize the provisions of General Orders 100, Bell 

further tightened his hold on the population at the end of December. Post 
99

commanders were directed to sweep the areas around their towns from 26 

to 31 December to collect all foodstuffs for feeding the inhabitants of their 

zones of protection, if necessary.120 On 21 December all traffic outside the 

towns was forbidden effective 1 January 1902.121 Two days later, the arrest 

of local leaders not actively supporting the Americans was directed as a 

means to prosecute the guilty and to intimidate the neutral.122 The activities 

of the population were further restricted on 24 December when a curfew 

was established and activities curtailed—for example, cockfighting was 

forbidden and markets suspected of collecting funds for the insurrectos

closed.123 That same day, local Tagalog leaders received additional duties 

for reporting insurrecto activity and supporting the Americans. Failure 

meant appearance before a provost court.124 Bell reminded his commanders on 24 December that the “primary and most important object of all our 

operations in this brigade is to obtain possession of the arms now in the 

hands of insurgents and disloyal persons, and incidentally to capture as 

many insurgents as possible.”125 Surrendered firearms—each worth a 30-

peso reward—increased at the end of December. Bell proscribed bolos on 

28 December.126 At the end of December, Bell summarized the activities of 

December for his post commanders:

The purpose of the preceding telegraphic circulars of 

instruction has been to place the burden of the war on the 

disloyal and to so discipline them that they will become 

anxious to aid and assist the government in putting an end 

to the insurrection and in securing the re-establishment 

of civil government. Their provisions are based upon the 

assumption that, with very few exceptions, practically the 

whole population has been hostile to us at heart. In order 

to combat such a population, it is necessary to make the 

state of war insupportable, and there is no more efficacious 

way of accomplishing this than by keeping the minds of 

the people in such a state of anxiety and apprehension that 

living under such conditions will become unbearable.127

With the population concentrated and controlled, the local leadership torn 

between loyalty to the guerrillas and intense, personal pressure from the 

Americans, and the constant efforts by post commanders and provost 

courts to ferret out the local infrastructure, the Americans began to receive 

information, support, and weapons in some towns.

On 27 December Bell provided Wheaton an assessment of his upcoming operation. Convinced that within 2 months no insurrection would 

exist in his area of operations, Bell expressed that his “only fear” was that 
100

the insurrectos would bury their weapons and scatter. His control of the 

population and the towns would not permit them to remain in his area of 

operations. Bell planned to take about half of his troops, divide them into 

columns of 50 men each, and sweep areas of known insurrecto activity. 

He acknowledged:

. . . no such strength is necessary to cope with all the 

insurgents in the Philippine Islands, but the country is 

indescribably rough and badly cut up, the ravines and 

mountains. I take so large a command for the purpose of 

thoroughly searching each ravine, valley, and mountain 

peak for insurgents and for food, expecting to destroy 

everything I find outside of towns, all able-bodied men 

will be killed or captured. Old men, women and children 

will be sent to towns. This movement begins January 1, 

by which time I hope to have nearly all the food supply 

in the towns.128

Beginning with the Loboo Mountains in southeast Batangas, Bell planned 

next to move to Lake Taal to clear western Batangas, and then to concentrate his forces east of Lipa. That would be followed by operations into 

the mountains north of Lipa along the tri-province border where Malvar 

normally operated and finally by a move into the mountains along the 

southern Batangas–Tayabas boundary. Bell planned to accompany his 

troops during these operations. With the population concentrated and 

travel restricted, Bell was confident the insurrectos would be on the run 

and could not stand the strain and lack of food for more than 2 months. Not 

optimistic about the on-going efforts of the Federal Party negotiators, Bell 

reminded Wheaton that their passes expired on 31 December.129

Beginning on 1 January 1902, initial operations in the Loboo 

Mountains by two columns of 1,800 Americans yielded little contact and 

killed only 9 insurrectos, but caused significant destruction of supplies in 

just a week. Besides burning over 6,000 structures, the Americans captured or destroyed over 1,400 tons of rice, hundreds of bushels of corn, 

hundreds of hogs and chickens, and over 200 carabaos, 800 cattle, and 

680 horses.130 Bell then sent them back into the Loboo Mountains with 

instructions that their “common object [was] the complete clearing out of 

every vestige of animal life and every particle of food supply found within 

the region.”131 After 10 January Bell reported that the Americans faced “no 

armed encounter worthy of record.”132 In one area after another, the insurgents were kept constantly on the move. On 13 January Colonel Anastacio 

Marasigan surrendered at Taal with 21 officers, 245 insurrectos, and 219 
101

rifles.133 The cumulative effect of these sweeps was the end of guerrilla 

activity near Lake Taal in early January and near the town of Batangas in 

late January. In early February the insurrecto battalion in Lipa surrendered 

and the key leaders were cooperative with the Americans by the end of 

the month.134 Even Cailles organized volunteers from Laguna province to 

accompany American units into the mountains.135 Cut off from the population and fleeing widespread American operations, insurrectos began surrendering individually and in small units. Military operations continued to 

sweep areas of known guerrilla activity through March and into April.

Work among the towns continued in concert with military operations. 

The majority of Bell’s eight telegraphic circulars in January focused on 

ensuring adequate food for the zones of protection and on preventing food 

from falling into the hands of the insurrectos. To prevent an outbreak 

of small pox, Bell instituted an immunization program in the zones of 

protection.136 Bell recalled veterans from the Ilocos region to help destroy 

the infrastructure in the towns. Crispulo Patajo, Bell’s former chief of 

detectives in the First District of the Department of Northern Luzon, 

served in Batangas as his chief of scouts. William T. Johnston, promoted 

to captain, was assigned provost court duty and sent to Lipa, which Bell 

called “the worst town in the brigade.” Within 2 weeks, Johnston cleaned 

out the insurrecto infrastructure there. His investigation revealed “that 

all the influential people . . . had been all the time actively engaged in 

assisting and prolonging the insurrection.” He arrested 172 tax collectors 

and agreed to release one for every two rifles surrendered. Those not 

released were imprisoned for the duration. A local volunteer unit was 

formed to act as guides for the Americans. Johnston forced the principales

to sign a letter renouncing their past actions and promising support for 

Americans. He then sent that letter to Manila where it was publicized 

as a voluntary action.137 Johnston obtained similar results at Tiaong in 

Gardener’s civilian-governed Tayabas province. He reported that within 

days “complete information of all the insurgent bands operating in that 

entire region was secured and turned over to the different commanding 

officers where it would be of most service. . . . [and] each surrounding 

garrison in Tayabas and Laguna was ordered to Tiaong to inform themselves 

as to the conditions found and to receive instruction as to the methods 

used in procuring the information and breaking up the organizations.”138

The discovery of organized insurrecto support in Tayabas caused Bell to 

recommend the ports of Tayabas province be closed just as the ports of 

Laguna and Batangas had been closed on 10 December.139 The American 

pressure continued against increasingly smaller and smaller numbers of 

insurrectos.
102

Finally, on 16 April, Malvar surrendered “without escort, without 

arms, and without guides.”140 He gave as the reasons for his surrender “the 

measures of General Bell . . . reconcentration, the complete cleaning up of 

food supplies outside the towns, and persecution of the insurgent soldier 

by the people, the search for myself by the people, and the demoralization 

of my troops.”141 On 6 May Malvar issued his last manifesto, “I proclaim 

and make known by means of this edict to all concerned that the war carried on against the authority of the Untied States by the Filipino people, 

has ended.”142 Ten days later in his last telegraphic circular Bell said, “In 

view of the fact that all insurgents have now surrendered in Batangas and 

Laguna, it is desired to put a complete end to every war measure heretofore authorized and enforced and to re-establish a feeling of security 

and tranquility among the people as rapidly as possible.”143 On 23 June 

control of Batangas province was transferred from military to civilian 

government.144

Well-conceived, carefully planned, vigorously executed, and tightly 

controlled, Bell’s campaign plan worked. Between 1 December 1901 

and 30 April 1902, Bell’s Third Separate Brigade killed 210 insurrectos, 

wounded 139, and captured 899 along with 629 rifles. During the same 

time, 2,973 insurrectos surrendered with 2,264 firearms.145 More importantly, it destroyed the linkage between the guerrillas in the field and the 

infrastructure in the town. This permitted the destruction of the insurrecto support system and made the guerrilla units vulnerable to sustained 

American military action. However, the countryside was devastated. 

Concentrating the population into makeshift zones of protection for over 

4 months created unhealthy conditions and made the transmission of communicable diseases among the populace easier. A higher civilian death rate 

resulted.146 For all concerned—civilians, insurrectos, and Americans—the 

campaign in southwestern Luzon proved “by far the longest, most costly, 

and most difficult pacification campaign in Luzon.”147

Situation in the Philippines, July 1902

On 4 July 1902, President Roosevelt declared the end of the Philippine 

Insurrection. He granted amnesty to all Filipinos who took the oath of 

allegiance and established civil government throughout regions of 

the archipelago not inhabited by the Moro tribes.148 On that same day, 

Roosevelt issued thanks to the US Army for its service in the Philippines 

(see appendix D). Roosevelt described the 40-month insurrection that had 

involved virtually the entire US Army and numerous volunteer regiments 

as a “peculiarly difficult and trying” task. To “crush out a general system 

of guerrilla warfare conducted among a people speaking unknown 
103

tongues, from whom it was almost impossible to obtain the information 

necessary for successful pursuit or to guard against surprise and ambush” 

had not been easy.149 The war in the Philippines was costly to all. Of the 

126,500 Americans who served, 4,200 died (a death rate of 32:1,000) and 

over 2,800 were wounded—a total casualty rate of 5.5 percent. Financial 

costs totaled over $400 million or 20 times the original purchase price 

for the Philippines. The insurrectos lost 16,000 to 20,000 killed and 

about 34,000 Filipinos died as a direct result of the war. Another 200,000 

noncombatants died in a cholera epidemic at the end of the war. These 

civilian losses would be equivalent to the United States losing 1 million 

out of a population of 250 million from war deaths and over 8 million from 

disease. This little known war was more than an insignificant skirmish for 

all those involved.150
104

Notes

1. Quoted in Glenn A. May, Battle for Batangas: A Philippine Province at 

War (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1991), 161.

2. Brain M. Linn, The Philippine War, 1899–1902 (Lawrence, KS: 

University of Kansas Press, 2000), 160–169; May, Batangas, 95–126.

3. Brian M. Linn, The U.S. Army and Counterinsurgency in the Philippine 

War, 1899–1902 (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 1989), 

122–123.

4. War Department, Bureau of Insular Affairs, A Pronouncing Gazetteer 

and Geographical Dictionary of the Philippine Islands, United States of America, 

with Maps, Charts, and Illustrations. Also the Law of Civil Government in the 

Philippine Islands Passed by Congress and Approved by the President July 1, 

1902 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1902), 345–346, 572, 882–

883. Hereafter referred to as WD, BIA.

5. May, Batangas, 25. Morbidity in Batangas—37.2:1,000—was greater 

than twice the morbidity rate in the United States and twice that of Europe. In 

1883 and 1889, cholera epidemics raised the rates to 75:1,000 and over 80:1,000. 

Of the places that kept data at the time, only India, Singapore, and the Philippines 

competed for the unhealthiest place on earth. Climate, disease, poor sanitation, 

and nutritional deficiency were all factors in the morbidity rate.

6. WD, BIA, 344, 571, 882.

7. Ibid., 344–347, 571–574, 882–885.

8. Ibid.

9. Brigadier General James F. Wade quoted in Linn, U.S. Army, 120.

10. May, Batangas, 10.

11. Glenn A. May, “Filipino Resistance to American Occupation: Batangas, 

1899–1902,” Pacific Historical Review, November 1979, 533; WD, BIA, 348–

349, 574–575, 885–886.

12. May, “Filipino Resistance,” 533.

13. May, Batangas, 28.

14. Charles J. Crane, The Experiences of a Colonel of Infantry (New York, 

NY: The Knickerbocker Press, 1923), 335.

15. May, Batangas, 9.

16. Ibid., 12.

17. Ibid., 31–34.

18. John R.M. Taylor, The Philippine Insurrection Against the United 

States: A Compilation of Documents with Notes and Introduction, Volume II, May 

19, 1898 to July 4, 1902, vol. II, 23. This is a galley proof of an unpublished 

War Department manuscript in History of the Philippine Insurrection against the 

United States, 1899–1903: and documents relating to the War Department project for publishing the history (Washington, DC: National Archives, 1968), roll 9. 

Microfilm. Hereafter referred to as Taylor, USNA.

19. May, Batangas, 61.

20. For details, see May, Batangas, 36–87.
105

21. Linn, U.S. Army, 129.

22. Linn, Philippine War, 287; Linn, U.S. Army, 129–130.

23. Linn, U.S. Army, 131–132; May, Batangas, 165, 169–170.

24. Linn, U.S. Army, 135–136.

25. May, Batangas, 192.

26. Linn, U.S. Army, 137.

27. Linn, Philippine War, 289.

28. Taylor, USNA, vol. II, 24, roll 9.

29. Quoted in Linn, U.S. Army, 135.

30. Lieutenant Colonel Charles J. Crane, 14 November 1900, quoted in 

Linn, U.S. Army, 133.

31. Colonel William E. Birkhimer, 15 July 1900, quoted in Linn, U.S. Army, 

137–138.

32. Quoted in May, Batangas, 166.

33. Major General John C. Bates, born in Missouri in 1842, attended 

Washington University of St. Louis, first lieutenant 11th Infantry 1861, during the 

American Civil War served in Army of the Potomac at Antietam, Fredericksburg, 

Chancellorsville, and Gettysburg, aide to General Meade, captain 1863, brevets 

to major and lieutenant colonel, 20th Infantry 1866, served on Indian frontier in 

20th and 2d Infantry 1866–98, major 1882, lieutenant colonel 1886, colonel 1892, 

brigadier general volunteers and brigade commander in Cuba 1898, major general 

volunteers and division commander in Cuba 1898, Philippines 1899, commander 

1st Division 1900, commander Department of Southern Luzon 1900–1901, brigadier general February 1901, major general July 1902.

34. WD, BIA, 138–139; Linn, Philippine War, 277.

35. Brigadier General Robert H. Hall, graduated West Point 1860, 2d lieutenant 10th Infantry, 20 battles during American Civil War, served in the west, 

7 years adjutant of the Military Academy, major 1883, lieutenant colonel 1888, 

colonel 1893, brigadier general volunteers 1898, commanded 3d Brigade of 2d 

Division Philippines, 1899.

36. Linn, U.S. Army, 123; May, Batangas, 134.

37. Allan R. Millett, The General: Robert L. Bullard and Officership in the 

United States Army, 1881–1925 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1975), 137; 

Linn, Philippine War, 286; Linn, U.S. Army, 123.

38. Quoted in May, Batangas, 133.

39. Ibid., 134.

40. Quoted in Linn, U.S. Army, 123.

41. Ibid., 129.

42. Ibid., 123.

43. Ibid., 125.

44. Ibid., 126.

45. Ibid.

46. Linn, Philippine War, 289–290.

47. Ibid., 211.

48. Linn, U.S. Army, 129.
106

49. Ibid., 128–129.

50. Millett, 143.

51. James A. LeRoy, The Americans in the Philippines: A History of the 

Conquest and First Years of Occupation with an Introductory Account of the 

Spanish Rule, 2 vols. (Boston, MA: The Riverside Press Cambridge, 1914), vol. 

II, 219–221.

52. May, Batangas, 137.

53. Ibid., 146.

54. Quoted in May, Batangas, 147.

55. Quoted in Linn, U.S. Army, 139.

56. Ibid.

57. Ibid., 140.

58. Quoted in May, Batangas, 152.

59. May, Batangas, 151–152; Linn, U.S. Army, 138.

60. Quoted in LeRoy, vol. II, 216.

61. Linn, U.S. Army, 143.

62. Telegram, MacArthur to War Department, received 19 September 1900, 

in US Army, Adjutant General’s Office, Correspondence Relating to the War with 

Spain and Conditions Growing out of the Same Including the Insurrection in 

the Philippine Islands and the China Relief Expedition, Between the AdjutantGeneral of the Army and Military Commanders in the United States, Cuba, Porto 

Rico, China, and the Philippine Islands from April 15, 1898 to July 30, 1902 

(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1902), vol. II, 1211.

63. Linn, U.S. Army, 138; William T. Sexton, Soldiers in the Sun: An 

Adventure in Imperialism (Freeport, NY: Books for Libraries Press, 1971), 

249–250.

64. May, Batangas, 152.

65. Ibid., 150–151.

66. Linn, U.S. Army, 131–132; May, Batangas, 169–170.

67. Taylor, USNA, vol. II, 53, roll 9.

68. Millett, 148.

69. Linn, U.S. Army, 143.

70. Ibid., 127.

71. Ibid., 141.

72. Ibid., 142.

73. Ibid., 146. 

74. Taylor, USNA, vol. II, 54, roll 9.

75. Facts About the Filipinos in History of the Philippine Insurrection 

against the United States, 1899–1903: and documents relating to the War 

Department project for publishing the history (Washington, DC: National 

Archives, 1968), 93–95, roll 8. Microfilm. Hereafter referred to as USNA.

76. Telegram, MacArthur to War Department, received 16 March 1901, US 

Army, Correspondence, vol. II, 1259.

77. Linn, U.S. Army, 149–150; May, Batangas, 213–216.

78. Linn, U.S. Army, 143.
107

79. Brigadier General Samuel S. Sumner, son of American Civil War major 

general; 19-year old cavalry second lieutenant 1861, three brevets for bravery 

during Civil War, captain 1865, Indian campaigns, major 1879, lieutenant colonel 

1891, colonel 1896, San Juan Hill Cuba 1898, brigadier general February 1901, 

commander First District Department of Southern Luzon 1901.

80. Linn, U.S. Army, 143; May, Batangas, 222–224.

81. Linn, U.S. Army, 146.

82. May, Batangas, 225.

83. Quoted in Facts About the Filipinos, USNA, 112, roll 8.

84. Ibid., 113.

85. Telegram, MacArthur to War Department, received 24 June 1901, US 

Army, Correspondence, vol. II, 1288.

86. Linn, Philippine War, 297.

87. Linn, U.S. Army, 149.

88. Quoted in May, Batangas, 227–228.

89. Ibid., 229.

90. Brian M. Linn, “Intelligence and Low-intensity Conflict in the Philippine 

War, 1899–1902,” Intelligence and National Security, January 1991, 102.

91. May, Batangas, 226–230.

92. Taylor, USNA, vol. II, 55, roll 9.

93. John M. Gates, Schoolbooks and Krags: The United States Army in the 

Philippines, 1898–1902 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press Inc., 1973), 242.

94. May, Batangas, 231–232.

95. Quoted in Linn, U.S. Army, 151.

96. Quoted in Linn, “Intelligence,” 90.

97. Ibid., 102.

98. Ibid., 103.

99. Quoted in May, Batangas, 235.

100. Quoted in Linn, U.S. Army, 152.

101. For accounts of the pacification of Samar, see Linn, Philippine War, 

306–321; Sexton, 268–276; Stuart C. Miller, “Benevolent Assimilation”: The 

American Conquest of the Philippines, 1899–1903 (New Haven, CT: Yale 

University Press, 1982), 219–252; Leon Wolfe, Little Brown Brother: How the 

United States Purchased and Pacified the Philippine Islands at the Century’s Turn

(Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1961), 354–359.

102. Telegram, Roosevelt to Chaffee, sent 8 October 1901, US Army, 

Correspondence, vol. II, 1297.

103. John M. Gates, The U.S. Army and Irregular Warfare. Chapter V, 3, 

online, available at http://www.wooster.edu/history/jgates/book-contents.html.

104. May, Batangas, 238.

105. Richard E. Welch, Response to Imperialism: The United States and the 

Philippine–American War, 1899–1902 (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North 

Carolina Press, 1979), 41.

106. War Department, General Orders 148, dated 9 November 1901, US 

Army, Correspondence, vol. II, 1302.
108

107. War Department, Annual Report of Major General Adna R. Chaffee, 

United States Army, Commanding the Division of the Philippines, September 30, 

1902 (Manila, PI, 1902), 7. Hereafter referred to as WD, Annual Report Chaffee.

108. Taylor, USNA, vol. II, 23, roll 9.

109. Brigadier General James Franklin Bell, born in Kentucky in 1856, West 

Point graduate 1878, second lieutenant 9th Cavalry 1878, transferred 7th Cavalry 

1878, served Fort Buford 1882–86, professor of military science and tactics 

at Southern Illinois University 1886–89, studied law and admitted to bar, first 

lieutenant 1890, adjutant 7th Cavalry at Fort Riley 1891–94, aide commander 

Department of California 1894–97, Fort Apache 1897–98, major of volunteers 

and engineer officer to VIII Corps 1898, Department of the Pacific chief of military information 1898, captain 1899, major of volunteers 1899 and acting judge 

advocate 2d Division, colonel of volunteers and commander 36th USV July 

1899, Medal of Honor September 1899, brigadier general volunteers December 

1899, commanded 4th Brigade of 2d Division 1900, provost marshal of Manila 

1900–1901, promoted captain to brigadier general February 1901, commanded 

2d District Department of Northern Luzon February 1901, commanded Third 

Separate Brigade Department of Luzon November 1901–02, commandant Army 

Service Schools at Fort Leavenworth 1902–06, major general 1907, US Army 

chief of staff 1906–10, died on Active Duty in 1919.

110. Gates, Schoolbooks, 241.

111. WD, Annual Report Chaffee, 30–31.

112. Linn, U.S. Army, 152.

113. Transcript from meeting 1 December 1901, in Milton F. Davis, compiler. Telegraphic Circulars and General Orders, Regulating Campaign Against 

Insurgents and Proclamations and Circular Letters, Relating to Reconstruction 

after Close of War in the Provinces of Batangas, Laguna and Mindoro, Philippine 

Islands, Issued by Brigadier General J. Franklin Bell, U.S. Army, Commanding 

Brigade, from December 1st, 1901, to December 1st, 1902 (Batangas, Batangas 

Province, PI: Headquarters Third Separate Brigade, December 1902), i–x.

114. US Congress, Senate, Affairs in the Philippine Islands. Hearings before 

the Committee on the Philippines of the United States Senate, General Orders 1, 

Third Separate Brigade, 3 December 1901 (Senate Document 331, part 2, 57th 

Congress, 1st Session, 1902), 1642–1643.

115. Ibid., General Orders 2, Third Separate Brigade, 5 December 1901, 

1643.

116. Ibid., General Orders 5, Third Separate Brigade, 28 December 1901, 

1646.

117. Davis, Telegraphic Circular No. 2, 8 December 1901, 1–2.

118. Ibid., Telegraphic Circular No. 3, 9 December 1901, 2–6.

119. Ibid., Telegraphic Circular No. 5, 13 December 1901, 7–9.

120. Ibid., Telegraphic Circular No. 10, 20 December 1901, 11–12.

121. Ibid., Telegraphic Circular No. 14, 21 December 1901, 13–14.

122. Ibid., Telegraphic Circular No. 18, 23 December 1910, 16–17.

123. Ibid., Telegraphic Circular No. 19, 24 December 1901, 17–18.
109

124. Ibid., Telegraphic Circular No. 20, 24 December 1901, 19–20.

125. Ibid., Telegraphic Circular No. 21, 24 December 1901, 20–21.

126. Ibid., Telegraphic Circular No. 23, 28 December 1901, 22–23.

127. Ibid., Telegraphic Circular No. 22, 24 December 1901, 21–22.

128. US Congress, Affairs in the Philippine Islands, Telegram, Bell to 

Wheaton, 26 December 1901, 1691.

129. Ibid., Telegram, Bell to Wheaton, 26 December 1901, 1690–1692.

130. May, Batangas, 255.

131. Linn, U.S. Army, 157.

132. Taylor, USNA, vol. II, 26, roll 9.

133. US Congress, Affairs in the Philippine Islands, Telegram, Wheaton to 

Chaffee, 14 January 1902, 1700.

134. May, “Filipino Resistance,” 550.

135. Linn, U.S. Army, 158.

136. Davis, Telegraph, Bell to All Station Commanders, 16 January 1902, 

33–34.

137. Linn, U.S. Army, 156.

138. Linn, “Intelligence,” 107.

139. Taylor, USNA, vol. II, 26, roll 9.

140. Russell Roth, Muddy Glory: America’s ‘Indian Wars’ in the Philippines, 

1899–1935 (W. Hanover, MA: The Christopher Publishing House, 1981), 88.

141. Linn, U.S. Army, 159.

142. Roth, 88.

143. Davis, Telegraphic Circular No. 38, 16 May 1902, 32.

144. WD, Annual Report Chaffee, 12.

145. Linn, U.S. Army, 159.

146. Glenn A. May, “The ‘Zones’ of Batangas,” Philippine Studies 29, 1981, 

95.

147. Linn, U.S. Army, 160.

148. Sexton, 284. Pacification of the Moros in the southern Philippines would 

take several years.

149. Headquarters of the Army, General Orders No. 66, 4 July 1902, US 

Army, Correspondence, vol. II, 1352.

150. Welch, 42. Gates, US Army and Irregular Warfare, chapter 3, 1. The 

cholera epidemic appears to have originated in India and reached Manila in March 

1902. It took about 2 months for it to break out in Batangas province. See John M. 

Gates, “War-Related Deaths in the Philippines, 1898–1902,” Pacific Historical 

Review, November 1983, 375–376.

111

Chapter 4

Observations

The condition of our military forces there might be 

compared to that of a blind giant. The troops were more 

than able to annihilate, to completely smash anything that 

could be brought against them in the shape of military 

force on the part of the insurgents; but it was almost 

impossible to get information in regard to those people. 

The natives were afraid to give us any information 

because if they did they were boloed. . . . It was a very 

embarrassing situation. . . . the island was practically in 

the possession of a blind giant; strong, but unable to see 

where to strike.

Colonel Arthur L. Wagner1

The metaphor of the US Army in the Philippines as a blind giant aptly 

describes most armies that face armed resistance in an occupied alien 

country. Then, as now, being blind creates a “very embarrassing situation.” 

Overcoming language and cultural barriers proved a necessity for the 

Americans to begin to comprehend their situation. At a minimum, it required 

a willingness by some of the population to work with the Americans and a 

willingness by the Americans to trust some of the natives. This took time 

to develop. Where either was missing, the Americans remained blind. In 

February 1899, the month war began in the Philippines, Rudyard Kipling 

penned a description of what he thought Americans needed to understand 

about their undertaking in the Philippines in a poem: 

The White Man’s Burden2

The United States and the Philippine Islands

Take up the White Man’s burden—

Send forth the best ye breed—

Go bind your sons to exile

To serve your captives’ need;

To wait in heavy harness,

	 On fluttered folk and wild—

Your new-caught, sullen peoples,

Half-devil and half-child.

Take up the White Man’s burden—

In patience to abide,
112

To veil the threat of terror

And check the show of pride;

By open speech and simple,

An hundred times made plain

To seek another’s profit,

And work another’s gain.

Take up the White Man’s burden—

The savage wars of peace—

Fill full the mouth of Famine

And bid the sickness cease;

And when your goal is nearest

The end for others sought,

Watch sloth and heathen Folly

Bring all your hopes to nought.

Take up the White Man’s burden—

No tawdry rule of kings,

But toil of serf and sweeper—

The tale of common things.

The ports ye shall not enter,

The roads ye shall not tread,

Go mark them with your living,

And mark them with your dead.

Take up the White Man’s burden—

And reap his old reward:

The blame of those ye better,

The hate of those ye guard—

The cry of hosts ye humour

(Ah, slowly!) toward the light—

“Why brought he us from bondage,

Our loved Egyptian night?”

Take up the White Man’s burden—

Ye dare not stoop to less—

Nor call too loud on Freedom

To cloke your weariness;

By all ye cry or whisper,

By all ye leave or do,

The silent, sullen peoples

Shall weigh your gods and you.

Take up the White Man’s burden—

Have done with childish days—
113

The lightly proferred laurel,

The easy, ungrudged praise.

Comes now, to search your manhood

Through all the thankless years

Cold, edged with dear-bought wisdom,

The judgment of your peers!

The burden of occupation and colonial rule described by Kipling had no 

simple, short-term, or doctrinal solution. In the Philippines, a solution 

required an understanding of the local situation to develop effective measures for gaining support of the population and for destroying the armed 

insurrectos. That proved no easy task.

After the war, the American Army remained blind about its 40-month 

Philippine experience. Brigadier General James L. Collins, Jr., a former 

Army chief of military history, believed that if there had been organized 

material on the Philippine Insurrection, “we could have saved ourselves 

a good deal of time and effort in Vietnam.”3 In fact, Captain John R.M. 

Taylor, 14th Infantry, had written a five-volume official history on the

Philippine experience—two volumes of history and three volumes of documents. Taylor finished a review of the galley proofs of The Philippine 

Insurrection Against the United States: A Compilation of Documents with 

Notes and Introduction in 1906. However, the Bureau of Insular Affairs 

failed to publish it for political reasons.4 Other than William T. Sexton’s 

pre-World War II Soldiers in the Sun and John M. Gates’ Schoolbooks and 

Krags: The United States Army in the Philippines, 1898–1902 (1973), the 

few works on the Philippine War viewed it through the prism of Vietnam. 

Recently, historian Brian M. Linn has enhanced our understanding of the 

war in the Philippines through meticulous research and publication of articles and two outstanding books—The U.S. Army and Counterinsurgency in 

the Philippine War, 1899–1902 (1989) and The Philippine War, 1899–1902

(2000). Linn’s works, supplemented by regional studies such as Glenn A. 

May’s Battle for Batangas: A Philippine Province at War (1991), help fill

the blind spot about the war in the Philippines.

Before comparing the two case studies—the Ilocos region and the 

Tagalog provinces in Second District, Department of Southern Luzon—it 

is important to remember the following. First, only 43 of 77 provinces 

in the Philippines resisted American occupation.5 This meant from 

the beginning that the policy of benevolent assimilation or attraction 

applied in many parts of the Philippines. It worked in the regions without 

insurrectos. At any rate, in insurrecto areas, the policy of attraction proved 

inadequate without an accompanying policy of coercion to break the 
114

linkage between the insurrecto support base of the towns and the guerrillas 

in the field. Although many commanders recommended a harsher policy,

Major General MacArthur did not declare martial law under General 

Orders 100 (appendix B) or establish firmer measures until December

1900. Even then, the understanding of his intent and the support for his 

programs varied among commanders. Second, these two military districts, 

comprised of seven provinces, were the most difficult to pacify on Luzon.

The decentralized nature of the resistance and the regional differences in 

the Philippines, almost by definition, made each insurrecto challenge and 

each American response dependent on local conditions. Because no single, 

simple solution existed to solve the numerous local issues generated by the 

war, local leaders on both sides played a critical role in its outcome. Third, 

both case studies presented the perspective of the district commander by 

focusing on his understanding of the situation, his interaction with superiors 

and subordinates, and his effectiveness against his adversaries—military 

and civilian.

Center of Gravity—Filipinos

Reinforced by cultural, social, economic, and political ties, the control of the population rested firmly in the hands of the local elite. As long

as the elite provided support—recruits, supplies, intelligence, taxes—the 

guerrillas were not destroyed. Local militias in each town and most barrios 

controlled the population merely by their presence. Guerrilla units might 

be dispersed, but were almost never destroyed. Recruits from the towns 

filled the losses. In both districts, the population was generally homogenous, Ilocano or Tagalog, providing few opportunities for the Americans 

to employ minority groups in a divide-and-conquer strategy. With over 

a year of local rule after the overthrow of the Spanish and before the 

Americans arrived, the population of both regions, primarily through their 

ruling elite, supported Filipino rule to foreign occupation. Language and 

cultural differences permeated all interaction with the Americans. Taylor 

emphasized this difficulty when he wrote:

Between the Malays of the Philippines and the American 

differences in manner of life and manner of thought will 

probably always run like a deep river, however often it 

may be bridged by a common education and by community of interest and in spite of the fact that the leaders among them have in the past looked for guidance to 

Europe and not Asia. . . . government has always been 

direct and personal; the ruler has always been considered 

rather the head of a family than the general manager of a 

corporation; and the Filipinos are Asiatics.6
115

Coercion and terror provided a credible deterrent to those who considered 

cooperating with the Americans. Nevertheless, the bottom line was that 

the insurrectos provided better security and a greater threat of harm than 

the Americans. In both case studies, the population followed the lead of 

the elite. When the elite faltered, support for the guerrillas dropped and 

some natives cooperated with the Americans. The Tagalog elite, long the 

cadre of revolution in southern Luzon, proved more dedicated to the insurrecto cause than the Ilocano elite. In both regions, after the surrender of 

the major guerrilla leaders, the local elite quickly accommodated itself to 

the Americans.7

Antagonists—Filipino Insurrectos

Following the directives of Aguinaldo’s government, the military commanders in the Ilocos and the Tagalog provinces organized regional military and local militia forces based on the towns. The local governments 

raised, housed, supplied, and maintained these units. Each of these efforts 

was decentralized and thus had a local and regional flavor. As long as the

linkage between the guerrillas in the field and the support infrastructure

in the towns existed, the guerrillas proved almost impossible to destroy. 

By avoiding combat with American units, the guerrillas were generally 

immune to American counterguerrilla efforts. Guerrilla leaders, selected 

not for their military skill but for their personal, family, and business 

ties to the local elite, maintained this link to their support infrastructure. 

Adopting guerrilla warfare as a strategy of last resort, Aguinaldo held out 

the possibility not of victory, but of wearing down the Americans and the 

election of a US president who supported Philippine independence. When 

President McKinley was re-elected in 1900, almost immediately in the 

Ilocos militias began to surrender. The activities of the Federal Party, in 

conjunction with MacArthur’s martial law and other measures, increased 

the strain on both the infrastructure in the towns and the guerrillas in the 

field. In the spring of 1900 when the capture of Aguinaldo followed the

surrender of Lieutenant General Trias, their direct appeals to the insurrecto leaders led to the surrender of all the major leaders in the Ilocos and 

negotiations with Brigadier General Cailles in the south. By the summer of 

1901, only Brigadier General Malvar continued to resist on Luzon. Many 

of the wartime commanders became leaders in the American government 

after the insurrection.8

Protagonists—American Army

American troops—with an average strength of 40,000 during the 

war—were always insufficient in number to garrison all the towns and

to conduct aggressive counterguerrilla operations. Initially, most units 
116

remained in the same province for over a year; many remained in the same 

town. This created familiarity with the local leaders and local conditions. 

Even so, armed with the confidence, can-do attitude, racism, and cultural

insensitivity of Americans of that time, soldiers and commanders found 

themselves blind in an alien and hostile environment where—

Few understood the local dialects or Spanish and they 

were thus dependent on unreliable translators of dubious 

loyalty. The soldiers had little respect for native culture or 

society; even those with the highest motives and best intentions sought to make over the Filipinos into little brown 

Americans. Often referring to their enemy as ladrones

or insurrectos (insurrectionists), they failed to detect the 

Filipinos’ passionate and often semi-mystical desire for 

independence. Lacking any empathy for indigenous traditions and customs, Americans interpreted all events in a 

narrow ethnocentric framework. Filipino devoutness was 

dismissed as superstitions, Filipino sports were banned 

as barbaric, Filipino emphasis on family connections was 

slighted in the interest of efficiency, and Filipino politeness and courtesy, manifest often in the desire to put 

information in the best possible light, was interpreted as 

dishonesty or shiftiness.9

The initial military response was to focus on the security problem—the 

armed insurrectos. By the summer of 1900, the Americans in La Union 

province had learned of the relationship between the guerrilla units in the 

field and their infrastructure in the towns, as well as the value of native

auxiliaries. Still, it took MacArthur’s campaign in December 1900 to provide the impetus and tools needed to attack that linkage using martial law, 

provost courts, imprisonments, native auxiliaries, and intelligence-driven 

attacks on the support infrastructure of the towns and at the same time push 

the guerrillas away from the towns by military operations. MacArthur’s 

program came after repeated calls for harsher measures from Brigadier 

General Young, Major General Wheaton, and others. By April 1901 this 

military program, combined with efforts by the Federal Party and the 

appeal of Aguinaldo to accept American rule, resulted in the surrender of 

Tinio, Juan Villamor, and Father Aglipay, ending the pacification of the

Ilocos. In the Tagalog provinces, the focus of department and district commanders remained on counterguerrilla operations, not the destruction of 

the infrastructure. After the general collapse of the insurrecto movement 

throughout the Philippines by the summer of 1901, American Army troop 

strength was reduced by about a third and troops were concentrated in 
117

troublesome regions. The infrastructure in the Tagalog region was never 

attacked until Brigadier General Bell’s pacification of Batangas began in

December 1901.

Insights of the American Counterinsurgency in the Philippines

The American approach to pacification evolved during the war. 

President McKinley’s policy of benevolent assimilation initially focused 

the military on civil-military actions to improve the lives of the Filipinos—

Governor Taft’s “little brown brothers.” In fact, most of what the Americans 

offered, short of independence, coincided with or exceeded the programs 

of the pre-war Filipino reformers and revolutionaries. At the end of hostilities from the American perspective and the beginning of guerrilla warfare 

from the insurrecto perspective in late 1899 and early 1900, the American 

Army initially began a bottom-up civil-military effort to establish local 

governments and to improve local educational, sanitary, and governmental 

functions. When the guerrilla or ladrone problem persisted, the American 

Army sought to do what it was trained to do—destroy the armed insurrectos. The civil-military effort and destroying the guerrillas proved more 

difficult than anticipated in both case studies. When an understanding

of the relationship between the guerrillas in the field and the infrastructure in the towns became known and martial law (General Orders 100) 

and new policies were established by MacArthur at the end of 1900, the 

focus shifted in the Ilocos to separating the guerrillas from the towns and 

destroying both the guerrilla bands and the infrastructure in the towns. 

With the techniques learned in La Union province, the reinforcements provided by Wheaton, the assistance of local auxiliaries, the leadership of 

Young and Bell, and the actions of provincial and post commanders, the 

destruction of the infrastructure and the guerrilla units in the Ilocos was 

well underway when resistance ended after the major guerrilla leaders surrendered. In the Tagalog region, this final phase did not occur until Bell’s

pacification campaign in 1901–02. These efforts took time to develop, and

they were affected by nonmilitary events—the American presidential election, the work of the Federal Party, and the surrender and appeals of major 

insurrecto leaders.

Nonmilitary factors proved as important as military operations. First, 

the geography of the archipelago made external resupply of the insurrectos difficult and denied them a nearby safe haven or sanctuary. The

American naval blockade made insurrecto resupply and coordination 

within and outside the archipelago difficult. Combined with the restriction

on firearms during the prewar Spanish period, a finite number of weapons

limited the insurrecto threat and made the capture of firearms a metric of
118

success in the end. Second, support in the United States for the effort in the 

Philippines remained strong throughout the war. However, political opposition in America stiffened the insurrecto resolve in their hope for the election of Democratic candidate William Jennings Bryan in 1900 who they 

believed would grant independence to the Philippines. The re-election of 

President McKinley undercut this insurrecto strategy and demoralized 

many insurrecto supporters. Third, the activities of the Filipino Federal 

Party as a pro-American alternative to the insurrectos were important in 

undercutting the support for the insurrectos and in negotiating the surrender of major insurrecto leaders. Finally, the willingness and ability to get 

captured and surrendered leaders—particularly Aguinaldo and Trias—to 

issue proclamations supporting the American occupation and encouraging 

their followers to surrender proved critical in the general collapse of the 

insurrection on Luzon by mid-1901.

Understanding the local situation was the critical problem faced by 

American commanders. Without the language skills or an appreciation 

of the need for cultural understanding, the Americans were, in Wagner’s 

words, blind. Naturally, they sought to apply American solutions to what 

they considered Filipino problems. In his 1902 annual report, Chaffee 

wrote of the need for language skills:

An important duty as yet not taken seriously by the 

officers of the Army serving in the Division, but which

ought not be longer neglected if they would meet to 

the full the demands which the situation requires and 

may be reasonably expected of them as enhancing the 

efficiency when serving here, is the acquirement of a

workable knowledge, both oral and written, of the native 

dialect where stationed. . . . I believe that the interests of 

the government are deeply involved in this matter. . . . I 

recommend . . . a bonus of two hundred dollars to each 

officer and intelligent enlisted man who shall attain a state

of proficiency in a native dialect, and one hundred dollars

additional for proficiency in Spanish.10

Long-term garrisoning of towns with American troops provided post commanders the opportunity to gain an understanding of their situation and 

their locale. It provided the opportunity to identify locals who might be 

willing to work with the Americans. In many parts of the Philippines, 

Filipinos worked with the Americans. The Macabebes served effectively 

as part of Major General Otis’s forces in the fall of 1899. But this willingness to work with the Americans did not generally exist in the Ilocos 
119

or the Tagalog regions. The chance arrest of the leader of the Guardia 

de Honor provided the Americans in the Ilocos both an understanding of 

the insurrecto intent and structure and a source of local auxiliaries better 

equipped to work among the population than the Americans were. Reliable 

intelligence and native forces with local knowledge were essential for the 

Americans to understand and to destroy the insurrectos in La Union province. When Colonel Duvall created a regimental or provincial intelligence 

section, he was able to develop actionable intelligence and attack local 

threats. Within a short time, the province was pacified by taking control of

the towns and isolating the guerrilla forces from their support system. Use 

of the Guardia, and later the Igorots in southern Ilocos Sur province, and 

the development of provincial and district intelligence sections facilitated 

pacification operations in other parts of the First District. In the Tagalog

region, the American department and district commanders resisted the use 

of native troops. They did not create a district or lower-level intelligence 

section until September 1901. Recruiting Tagalogs may have been difficult, but failure to trust the natives and the unwillingness to work with

what Otis called religious fanatics was the basic American problem. The 

“need for local auxiliaries, even if it means embracing rather unsavory 

allies” to gain situational awareness, reliable intelligence, and forces capable of working directly with the local populace appeared not to have been 

understood or accepted by the department or district commanders in the 

Tagalog provinces until Bell arrived.11

Finding a solution to the local insurrecto challenge varied from place to 

place, but the basic requirement became the separation of the guerrillas in 

the field from their support structure in the towns. In both the Ilocano and the 

Tagalog provinces, the policy of attraction with local government, police, 

education, and sanitation programs proved inadequate to this challenge. 

Attraction, without sanctions, did not work. Even after the relationship 

between the local elite in the towns and the guerrilla leaders in the field

become known, attempts by post, district, and department commanders to 

reconcile the legal constraints of attraction with the need to deal directly 

with noncombatants who supported the insurrectos was not resolved in an 

effective manner until MacArthur’s campaign to separate the guerrillas 

from the towns. MacArthur provided the legal tools—martial law, provost 

courts, revised rules of evidence, and imprisonment for the duration—

for those commanders who understood the importance of destroying the 

infrastructure and who had a willingness to take on this difficult task.

Encouraged by Young and Bell, the commanders in the Ilocos—post, 

province, and district—took the fight to the guerrillas in the field and to

the infrastructure in the towns. This two-pronged attack, combined with 
120

the presidential election, the efforts of the Federal Party, and the surrender 

and capture of major insurrecto leaders ended resistance in the Ilocos in 

April 1901. In fact, the insurrection on Luzon collapsed by the summer of 

1901 except in the Tagalog provinces where a direct focused attack on the 

infrastructure had not occurred. Lack of support for certain programs and 

lack of understanding of the importance or the manner in which to attack 

the infrastructure by department, district, and post commanders failed to 

separate the towns from the guerrillas. Bell, stressing the legality of his 

actions to his subordinates by repeated references to articles of General 

Orders 100 first employed in the American Civil War some 35 to 40 years

earlier, would force the Tagalog populace to choose between the Americans 

and the insurrectos. As a Philippine veteran noted, “The American soldier 

in officially sanctioned wrath is a thing so ugly and dangerous that it would

take a Kipling to describe him.”12 Bell was faced with a “classic Hobson’s 

choice” in which “A commander committed to quick victory often had 

to order actions that others might deem inhumane; one committed to 

upholding certain standards of military behavior, on the other hand, had 

to be willing to endure the consequences of continued stalemate.”13 With 

legal backgrounds, Otis, MacArthur, and Bell all sought effective but 

legal means for ending the insurrection. Ultimately, that required making 

the supporters of the guerrillas accountable for their roles in prolonging 

hostilities. Today many of the measures undertaken may appear harsh, but 

they were legal at the time and they were effective. When the insurrectos

were defeated and security established, attraction then became the most 

effective tool of pacification throughout the archipelago.

Understanding the insurrectos and having appropriate tools to 

attack required a willingness at the local level to attack that threat in an 

effective manner. This made a decentralized, locally-developed response 

necessary—just as the insurrectos had discovered when they went to 

guerrilla warfare. To work well, decentralized military operations required 

regimental commanders and below who were willing and able to learn 

by trial and error by adjusting to local conditions. From senior officers,

it required a willingness to listen and to support their commanders in the 

provinces and in the towns. Senior commanders familiar with General 

Orders 100 from the American Civil War brought their experiences to 

the Philippines. From the Indian Wars, senior commanders brought a 

willingness to conduct dispersed, small-unit operations that relied on 

the initiative, adaptability, and aggressiveness of their subordinates.14

In the Ilocos, Wheaton, Young, and Bell were strong advocates for their 

subordinates. Wheaton often forwarded reports from his post commanders 

to the division commander in Manila. Young repeatedly supported both 
121

Duvall and Lieutenant Colonel Howze—two of his most innovative and 

effective regimental commanders—when their actions were questioned 

by higher headquarters. Department and district commanders in the 

Tagalog provinces had decentralized their operations, but they were not 

as supportive or responsive to suggestions from their subordinates as 

indicated by Major Steele’s attempts to establish civil government in 

Lucban and Tayabas provinces. For effective commanders, guidance from 

the Division of the Philippines was treated as guidance—not as directive. 

In the field, the key remained “the ability of officers to construct pragmatic

pacification policies designed to meet the realities of the guerrilla war

in their towns, provinces and districts.”15 Local commanders adopted 

appropriate measures to the conditions as constrained or supported by their 

chain of command. Unconditional support of subordinates was the norm in 

the Ilocos. In comparison, until Bell’s campaign, support for subordinate 

recommendations was less common in the Tagalog region.

Just as many Americans did not initially understand the relationship 

between the guerrilla bands and the towns, many commanders found it 

frustrating to attempt to pursue civil affairs work in pursuit of the policy 

of attraction while chasing armed insurrectos and trying to create a secure 

environment. Some, such as Otis, MacArthur, and Gardener were strong 

advocates of the policy of attraction. Others, such as Bates, Wade, and 

Young were strong advocates of the policy of coercion. MacArthur and 

Bell eventually came to understood that attraction was necessary in the 

long term, but destruction of the guerrillas and their infrastructure was 

required first. One historian observed: “Within the army and the American

government there was no group of ‘experts’ with preconceived ideas on 

how to run a colonial government, and the very absence of this group 

made possible the successful pragmatic approach that the Americans did 

use.”16 Another suggested: “Indeed, the key to the Army’s success was its 

lack of adherence to rigid doctrines or theories and the willingness of its 

officers to experiment with novel pacification schemes.”17 Today, given a 

highly-trained professionalized military and its institutional reliance on 

military doctrine, one wonders if preconceived ideas are likely to lead to 

a doctrinal approach for a problem not addressed in doctrine or to a pragmatic approach for a unique problem.

A comparison of pacification of the Ilocos and the Tagalog provinces

has identified similarities and differences in approach and in result. A survey of other districts and different levels of command would provide additional insights and demonstrate a variety of approaches—successful and 

unsuccessful—to the challenges of pacification. As historian John Gates

noted:
122

The American pacification campaign in the Philippines

was important. An example of the successful evolution 

of a counter-guerrilla operation leading to the effective 

occupation of a vast and hostile territory, it was developed 

empirically with no pre-existing doctrine from which to 

draw. The army’s approach to the problem was notable 

for its diversity, including widespread civil affairs efforts, 

excellent propaganda, well-planned and executed military 

operations, effective isolation of the guerrilla, protection 

of the population, and the involvement of the inhabitants 

in programs designed for their own protection and the 

eventual establishment of peace.18

The study of the war in the Philippines “can offer great insight into the 

complexities of localized guerrilla war and indigenous resistance to 

foreign control. As the most successful counterinsurgency campaign in 

US history, it is the logical starting point for the systematic examination of 

military intervention, civic action, and pacification operations.”19 Perhaps, 

such a systematic examination might reduce our chances of being caught 

blind again in a similar embarrassing situation.
123

Notes

1. Testimony of Colonel Arthur L. Wagner, US Congress, Senate, Affairs in 

the Philippine Islands. Hearings before the Committee on the Philippines of the 

United States Senate (Senate Document 331, part 3, 57th Congress, 1st Session, 

1902), 2850–2851.

2. Rudyard Kipling, “The White Man’s Burden,” online at http://www.

fordham.edu/halsall/mod/Kipling.html.

3.	 John M. Gates, “The Official Historian and the Well-Placed Critic:

James A. LeRoy’s Assessment of John R.M. Taylor’s The Philippine Insurrection 

Against the United States,” The Public Historian, Summer 1985, 57.

4.	 For details see Gates, “Official Historian,” 57–67; John T. Farrell,

“An Abandoned Approach to Philippine History: John R.M. Taylor and the 

Philippine Insurrection Records,” The Catholic Historical Review, January 1954, 

385–407; “Introduction” in US National Archives, History of the Philippine 

Insurrection against the United States, 1899–1903: and documents relating to 

the War Department project for publishing the history (Washington, DC: National 

Archives, 1968), ii–xvi, roll 1. Microfilm. Hereafter referred to as USNA.

5. Brian M. Linn, The Philippine War, 1899–1902 (Lawrence, KS: 

University of Kansas Press, 2000), 185.

6. John R.M. Taylor, The Philippine Insurrection Against the United 

States: A Compilation of Documents with Notes and Introduction, Volume II, May 

19, 1898 to July 4, 1902, vol. II, 58. This is a galley proof of an unpublished 

War Department manuscript in History of the Philippine Insurrection against the 

United States, 1899–1903: and documents relating to the War Department project for publishing the history (Washington, DC: National Archives, 1968), roll 9. 

Microfilm. Hereafter referred to as Taylor, USNA.

7. Glenn A. May, Battle for Batangas: A Philippine Province at War (New 

Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1991), 275.

8. Ibid., 278.

9.	 Brian M. Linn, “Intelligence and Low-intensity Conflict in the Philippine

War, 1899–1902,” Intelligence and National Security, January 1991, 94–95.

10. War Department, Annual Report of Major General Adna R. Chaffee, 

United States Army, Commanding the Division of the Philippines, September 30, 

1902 (Manila, PI, 1902), 34.

11.	 Brian M. Linn, “The US Army and Nation Building and Pacification in

the Philippines,” in Armed Diplomacy: Two Centuries of American Campaigning 

(Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2003), 87.

12. Quoted in Leon Wolfe, Little Brown Brother: How the United States 

Purchased and Pacified the Philippine Islands at the Century’s Turn (Garden City, 

NY: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1961), 359.

13. May, Batangas, 229.

14. Andrew J. Birtle, US Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency 

Operations Doctrine, 1860–1941 (Washington, DC: US Army Center of Military 

History, 1998), 112–113.
124

15. Brian M. Linn, The U.S. Army and Counterinsurgency in the Philippine 

War, 1899–1902 (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 1989), 

168–169.

16. John M. Gates, Schoolbooks and Krags: The United States Army in the 

Philippines, 1898–1902 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press Inc., 1973), 285.

17. Linn, U.S. Army, 169.

18. Gates, Schoolbooks, 290.

19. Linn, Philippine War, 328.
125

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Trask, David F. The War with Spain in 1898. New York, NY: MacMillan Publishing 

Company, Inc., 1981.

Welch, Richard E. Response to Imperialism: The United States and the Philippine–

American War, 1899–1902. Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North 

Carolina Press, 1979.

Wolfe, Leon. Little Brown Brother: How the United States Purchased and Pacified 

the Philippine Islands at the Century’s Turn. Garden City, NY: Double 

and Company, Inc., 1961.

Young, Kenneth R. The General’s General: The Life and Times of Arthur 

MacArthur. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994.

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Berthoff, Rowland T. “Taft and MacArthur, 1900–1901: A Study in Civil-Military 

Relations.” World Politics, January 1953, 196–213.

Burdett, Thomas F. “A New Evaluation of General Otis’ Leadership in the 

Philippines.” Military Review, January 1975, 79–87.

Coffman, Edward M. “Batson of the Philippine Scouts.” Parameters 3, 1977, 

68–72.

Farrell, John T. “An Abandoned Approach to Philippine History: John R.M. 

Taylor and the Philippine Insurrection Records.” The Catholic Historical 

Review, January 1954, 385–407.

Gates, John M. “The Official Historian and the Well-Placed Critic: James A. 

LeRoy’s Assessment of John R.M. Taylor’s The Philippine Insurrection 

Against the United States.” The Public Historian, Summer 1985, 

57–67.

________. “The Pacification of the Philippines, 1898–1902,” in The American 

Military and the Far East: Proceedings of the Ninth Military History 

Symposium United States Air Force Academy, 1–3 October 1980, edited 

by Joe C. Dixon. Washington, DC: United States Air Force Academy and 

Office of Air Force History, 1980.

_____. “War-Related Deaths in the Philippines, 1898–1902.” Pacific Historical 

Review, November 1983, 367–378.

Linn, Brian M. “Intelligence and Low-intensity Conflict in the Philippine War, 

1899–1902.” Intelligence and National Security, January 1991, 90–114.

________. “Pacification in Northwestern Luzon: An American Regiment in the 

Philippine–American War, 1899–1901.” Pilipinas 3, December 1982, 

14–25.
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________. “Provincial Pacification in the Philippines, 1900–1901: The First 

District Department of Northern Luzon.” Military Affairs, April 1987, 

62–66.

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Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2003.

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1902.” Pacific Historical Review, November 1979, 531–556.

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the Response.” Pacific Historical Review, May 1974, 233–253.

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2007.

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Army.” Heritage Lecture No. 908. Delivered 18 June 2005. Published 

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of Armies of the United States in the Field, 24 April 1863.” Online. 

Available at http://www.usregulars.com/Lieber.html, accessed 30 May 

2007.
129

Appendix A

Chronology

1896

Aug	 	 Bonifacio led Katipunan revolt

1897

May	 	 Bonifacio executed

Aguinaldo became leader of Katipunan

Dec	 	 Pact of Biyak-na-Bato

	 	 Aguinaldo exiled to Hong Kong

1898

Mar	 Revolt at Candon in Ilocos Sur province suppressed by

Spanish forces

25 Apr		 United States declared war on Spain

Apr–May	 War Department raised state volunteer regiments and

increased Regular Army

1 May	 Battle of Manila Bay; Commodore Dewey sank Spanish

fleet

May	 	 Major General Merritt assigned command of VIII Corps

	 	 Aguinaldo returned to Philippines

Spanish garrison in Manila besieged by Aguinaldo’s

forces

Jun	 Aguinaldo consolidated power by assuming command of

revolutionary movement, by establishing local and

national governments, and by raising regular army

and local militias

Brigadier General Malvar assigned asmilitary commander

of Batangas province

30 Jun	 	 First contingent of VIII Corps arrived at Manila

15 Jul	 Aguinaldo issued proclamation that all Filipinos were

members of the Katipunan

26 Jul	 	 Last contingent of VIII Corps arrived in Manila

13 Aug		 Battle of Manila: VIII Corps occupied Manila

Brigadier General Tinio arrived in Vigan and cleared

Ilocos of Spanish forces
130

Brigadier General Tinio assigned as military commander

of Ilocos region

27 Aug	 Major General Otis replaced Major General Merritt as

commander of VIII Corps

Sep–Dec	 Filipinos held constitutional convention at Malolos

10 Dec	 	 Treaty of Paris signed by United States and Spain

1899

21 Jan	 Aguinaldo established government under constitution

with Malolos as capital

4/5 Feb	 Battle of Manila; Philippine war began

Feb	 	 US Senate ratified Treaty of Paris by one vote

Mar–May	 Major General Otis attacked north into central Luzon

plain

Mar	 	 Schurman Commission arrived

2 Mar War Department raised US (federal) volunteer regiments

and established 65,000-man Regular Army

31 Mar		 Malolos captured

11 Apr	 United States and Spain exchange ratified Treaty of Paris;

state volunteer regiments eligible for discharge

27 Apr		 Calumpit captured

Jun–Nov Major General Otis reconstituted VIII Corps during

summer monsoon and prepared for fall campaign

	 	 United States Volunteers and Regular regiments arrived

5 Jun	 	 Luna assassinated

Oct–Dec	 Major General Otis cleared northern Luzon

12 Nov	 Aguinaldo changed insurrecto strategy to guerrilla war;

dispersed Army of Liberation

23 Nov	 Major General MacArthur declared “so-called Filipino

republic is destroyed”

Dec	 	 Brigadier General Young occupied Ilocos region

1900

Jan	 Brigadier General Tinio reorganized forces in Ilocos for

guerrilla warfare
131

Major General Otis attacked south of Manila and occupied

Tagalog provinces

Jan–Feb	 VIII Corpsimplemented policy of benevolent assimilation

by establishing local governments

20 Mar	 Brigadier General Tinio issued proclamation promising to

punish those who worked with the Americans

29 Mar	 VIII Corps reorganized as Division of Philippines with

four departments:

	 Ilocos: Major General MacArthur department

commander and Brigadier General Young First

District Commander

	 Tagalog region: Major General Bates department

commander and Brigadier General Wheaton

Second District commander until 16August when

Colonel Birkhimer became acting commander

Mar–Apr	 Major General Otis issued general orders on local

government and on judicial system

Apr	 Father Aglipay’s revolt in Ilocos Norte province

suppressed

5 May Major General MacArthur replaced Major General Otis as

commander of the Division of the Philippines; Major

General Wheaton replaced Major General MacArthur

as commander of the Department of Northern Luzon

May La Union province pacified; Patajo and Guardia de Honor

worked with Americans

Taft Commission arrived

Jun–Sep	 Monsoon season: Lull in Ilocos; increased insurrecto

activity in Tagalog region

Jun	 Brigadier General Young issued general orders targeting

supporters of armed insurrectos

Major General MacArthur issued amnesty offer

Brigadier General Hall became commander of Second

District, Department of Southern Luzon

Jul	 Aguinaldo ordered increased attacks in the fall to affect

American presidential election

Sep–Oct	 Increased insurrecto attacks

17 Sep	 Brigadier General Cailles defeated American attack at

Mabitac in Laguna province
132

Oct	 Brigadier General Malvar reorganized both his guerrilla

units and the town support requirements

14 Nov President McKinley re-elected

2 Dec	 First large surrender of 2,180 militiamen at Santa Maria

in Ilocos Sur province

Dec	 Pro-American Federal Party established in Manila

19–20 Dec	 Major General MacArthur declared martial law; began

campaign focused on separating the towns from

the guerrillas; and issued proclamation to Filipinos

explaining their legal status under General Orders

100

21 Dec	 Brigadier GeneralTinio issued proclamation to discourage

surrenders

1901

Jan–Apr	 Major General MacArthur campaigned to separate the

towns from the guerrillas

Regulars replaced United States Volunteer regiments

Federal Party active in seeking surrender of insurrectos

7 Jan	 Major General MacArthur deported 26 insurrecto leaders

to Guam

Prisoners of war no longer released; imprisoned for the

duration of the insurrection

19 Feb	 Brigadier General Young promoted and reassigned

28 Feb	 Brigadier General Bell became commander of First

District, Department of Northern Luzon

Mar	 Lieutenant General Trias surrendered and Aguinaldo

captured

Apr	 Aguinaldo issued appeal for his followers to accept

American rule

Brigadier General Malvar issued proclamation assuming

command of the insurrectos in the Tagalog region

General collapse of insurrecto movement on Luzon

10 Apr	 Brigadier General Hall replaced by Brigadier General

Sumner who commanded a consolidated First District

that included the Tagalog provinces in Hall’s district

27 Apr	 Father Aglipay surrendered in Ilocos Norte province
133

30 Apr	 Juan and Blas Villamour surrendered in Abra province

1 May	 Brigadier General Tinio surrendered in Ilocos Sur

province

Brigadier General Bell declared First District pacified

May	 Major General Bates replaced by Major General Wade as

commander of Department of Southern Luzon

24 Jun	 Brigadier General Cailles surrendered in Laguna

province

4 Jul	 Governor Taft replaced Major General MacArthur as

governor-general; civil government established

Major General Chaffee assumed command of the Division

of the Philippines

Jul	 Brigadier General Malvar assumed command of

insurrectos and reorganized in the Tagalog provinces

17 Jul	 Batangas province and islands of Cebu and Bohol reverted

to military government

Sep	 Balangiga massacre on Samar

Nov	 Division of Philippines reorganized into Department of

North Philippines commanded by Major General

Wheaton and Department of South Philippines

commanded by Major GeneralWade; each department

organized into separate brigades

30 Nov Brigadier General Bell assumed command of Third

Separate Brigade

Dec	 Brigadier General Bell prepared for the pacification of

Batangas andLaguna provinces:meetings, telegraphic

circulars, zones of protection, pressure on towns and

on guerrillas

1902

Jan–Apr	 Brigadier General Bell conducted systematic campaign to

disarm and destroy armed insurrectos

10 Jan	 Third Separate Brigade’s last major contact with

insurrectos

13 Jan	 Third Separate Brigade’s first major surrender of

insurrectos

16 Apr	 Brigadier General Malvar surrendered
134

6 May	 Brigadier General Malvar issued proclamation declaring

the end of the insurrection

4 Jul	 President Roosevelt announced the end of the Philippine

Insurrection

President Roosevelt issued his thanks to the US Army
135

Appendix B

General Orders 100 [Lieber Code]

GENERAL ORDERS No. 100.

WAR DEPT., ADJT. GENERAL’S OFFICE,

Washington, April 24, 1863.

The following “Instructions for the Government of Armies of the 

United States in the Field,” prepared by Francis Lieber, LL.D., and revised 

by a board of officers, of which Maj. Gen. E.A. Hitchcock is president, 

having been approved by the President of the United States, he commands 

that they be published for the information of all concerned.

By order of the Secretary of War:

E.D. TOWNSEND,

Assistant Adjutant-General.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF ARMIES OF 

THE UNITED STATES IN THE FIELD.

SECTION I.—Martial law—Military jurisdiction—Military 

necessity—Retaliation.

1. A place, district, or country occupied by an enemy stands, in 

consequence of the occupation, under the martial law of the invading or 

occupying army, whether any proclamation declaring martial law, or any 

public warning to the inhabitants, has been issued or not. Martial law is the 

immediate and direct effect and consequence of occupation or conquest.

The presence of a hostile army proclaims its martial law.

2. Martial law does not cease during the hostile occupation, except 

by special proclamation, ordered by the commander-in-chief, or by special 

mention in the treaty of peace concluding the war, when the occupation of 

a place or territory continues beyond the conclusion of peace as one of the 

conditions of the same.

War Department, “General Orders No. 100, Instructions for the Government 

of Armies of the United States in the Field, 24 April 1863.” Document online, 

available at <http://www.usregulars.com/Lieber.html>, accessed 30 May 2007. 

Specific articles emphasized by Brigadier General J. Franklin Bell in his 1901–02 

Telegraphic Circulars to his subordinates in southwestern Luzon are highlighted 

in BOLD print.
136

3. Martial law in a hostile country consists in the suspension by 

the occupying military authority of the criminal and civil law, and of the 

domestic administration and government in the occupied place or territory, 

and in the substitution of military rule and force for the same, as well as 

in the dictation of general laws, as far as military necessity requires this 

suspension, substitution, or dictation.

The commander of the forces may proclaim that the administration of 

all civil and penal law shall continue either wholly or in part, as in times of 

peace, unless otherwise ordered by the military authority.

4. Martial law is simply military authority exercised in accordance 

with the laws and usages of war. Military oppression is not martial law; 

it is the abuse of the power which that law confers. As martial law is executed by military force, it is incumbent upon those who administer it to be 

strictly guided by the principles of justice, honor, and humanity—virtues 

adorning a soldier even more than other men, for the very reason that he 

possesses the power of his arms against the unarmed.

5. Martial law should be less stringent in places and countries fully 

occupied and fairly conquered. Much greater severity may be exercised in 

places or regions where actual hostilities exist or are expected and must 

be prepared for. Its most complete sway is allowed—even in the commander’s own country—when face to face with the enemy, because of the 

absolute necessities of the case, and of the paramount duty to defend the 

country against invasion.

To save the country is paramount to all other considerations.

6. All civil and penal law shall continue to take its usual course in 

the enemy’s places and territories under martial law, unless interrupted or 

stopped by order of the occupying military power; but all the functions 

of the hostile government—legislative, executive, or administrative—

whether of a general, provincial, or local character, cease under martial 

law, or continue only with the sanction, or, if deemed necessary, the participation of the occupier or invader.

7. Martial law extends to property, and to persons, whether they 

are subjects of the enemy or aliens to that government.

8. Consuls, among American and European nations, are not 

diplomatic agents. Nevertheless, their offices and persons will be subjected 

to martial law in cases of urgent necessity only; their property and business 

are not exempted. Any delinquency they commit against the established 

military rule may be punished as in the case of any other inhabitant, and such 

punishment furnishes no reasonable ground for international complaint.
137

9. The functions of ambassadors, ministers, or other diplomatic 

agents, accredited by neutral powers to the hostile government, cease, so 

far as regards the displaced government; but the conquering or occupying 

power usually recognizes them as temporarily accredited to itself.

10. Martial law affects chiefly the police and collection of public revenue and taxes, whether imposed by the expelled government or by the 

invader, and refers mainly to the support and efficiency of the Army, its 

safety, and the safety of its operations.

11. The law of war does not only disclaim all cruelty and bad faith 

concerning engagements concluded with the enemy during the war, but 

also the breaking of stipulations solemnly contracted by the belligerents 

in time of peace, and avowedly intended to remain in force in case of war 

between the contracting powers.

It disclaims all extortions and other transactions for individual gain; 

all acts of private revenge, or connivance at such acts.

Offenses to the contrary shall be severely punished, and especially so 

if committed by officers.

12. Whenever feasible, martial law is carried out in cases of individual offenders by military courts; but sentences of death shall be executed 

only with the approval of the chief executive, provided the urgency of the 

case does not require a speedier execution, and then only with the approval 

of the chief commander.

13. Military jurisdiction is of two kinds: First, that which is conferred 

and defined by statute; second, that which is derived from the common 

law of war. Military offenses under the statute law must be tried in the 

manner therein directed; but military offenses which do not come within 

the statute must be tried and punished under the common law of war. The 

character of the courts which exercise these jurisdictions depends upon the 

local laws of each particular country.

In the armies of the United States the first is exercised by courtsmartial; while cases which do not come within the Rules and Articles of 

War, or the jurisdiction conferred by statute on courts-martial, are tried by 

military commissions.

14. Military necessity, as understood by modern civilized nations, 

consists in the necessity of those measures which are indispensable for 

securing the ends of the war, and which are lawful according to the 

modern law and usages of war.

15. Military necessity admits of all direct destruction of life or limb 

of armed enemies, and of other persons whose destruction is incidentally 
138

unavoidable in the armed contests of the war; it allows of the capturing of 

every armed enemy, and every enemy of importance to the hostile government, or of peculiar danger to the captor; it allows of all destruction 

of property, and obstruction of the ways and channels of traffic, travel, 

or communication, and of all withholding of sustenance or means of life 

from the enemy; of the appropriation of whatever an enemy’s country 

affords necessary for the subsistence and safety of the Army, and of such 

deception as does not involve the breaking of good faith either positively 

pledged, regarding agreements entered into during the war, or supposed by 

the modern law of war to exist. Men who take up arms against one another 

in public war do not cease on this account to be moral beings, responsible 

to one another and to God.

16. Military necessity does not admit of cruelty—that is, the infliction of suffering for the sake of suffering or for revenge, nor of maiming or 

wounding except in fight, nor of torture to extort confessions. It does not 

admit of the use of poison in any way, nor of the wanton devastation of a 

district. It admits of deception, but disclaims acts of perfidy; and, in general, military necessity does not include any act of hostility which makes 

the return to peace unnecessarily difficult.

17. War is not carried on by arms alone. It is lawful to starve the 

hostile belligerent, armed or unarmed, so that it leads to the speedier 

subjection of the enemy.

18. When a commander of a besieged place expels the noncombatants, in order to lessen the number of those who consume his stock 

of provisions, it is lawful, though an extreme measure, to drive them back, 

so as to hasten on the surrender.

19. Commanders, whenever admissible, inform the enemy of their 

intention to bombard a place, so that the non-combatants, and especially 

the women and children, may be removed before the bombardment commences. But it is no infraction of the common law of war to omit thus to 

inform the enemy. Surprise may be a necessity.

20. Public war is a state of armed hostility between sovereign nations 

or governments. It is a law and requisite of civilized existence that men live 

in political, continuous societies, forming organized units, called states or 

nations, whose constituents bear, enjoy, and suffer, advance and retrograde 

together, in peace and in war.

21. The citizen or native of a hostile country is thus an enemy, 

as one of the constituents of the hostile state or nation, and as such is 

subjected to the hardships of the war.
139

22. Nevertheless, as civilization has advanced during the last 

centuries, so has likewise steadily advanced, especially in war on land, the 

distinction between the private individual belonging to a hostile country 

and the hostile country itself, with its men in arms. The principle has been 

more and more acknowledged that the unarmed citizen is to be spared in 

person, property, and honor as much as the exigencies of war will admit.

23. Private citizens are no longer murdered, enslaved, or carried off 

to distant parts, and the inoffensive individual is as little disturbed in his 

private relations as the commander of the hostile troops can afford to grant 

in the overruling demands of a vigorous war.

24. The almost universal rule in remote times was, and continues to 

be with barbarous armies, that the private individual of the hostile country 

is destined to suffer every privation of liberty and protection and every disruption of family ties. Protection was, and still is with uncivilized people, 

the exception.

25. In modern regular wars of the Europeans and their descendants 

in other portions of the globe, protection of the inoffensive citizen of the 

hostile country is the rule; privation and disturbance of private relations 

are the exceptions.

26. Commanding generals may cause the magistrates and civil 

officers of the hostile country to take the oath of temporary allegiance 

or an oath of fidelity to their own victorious government or rulers, 

and they may expel every one who declines to do so. But whether they 

do so or not, the people and their civil officers owe strict obedience to 

them as long as they hold sway over the district or country, at the peril 

of their lives.

27. The law of war can no more wholly dispense with retaliation than can the law of nations, of which it is a branch. Yet civilized 

nations acknowledge retaliation as the sternest feature of war. A reckless enemy often leaves to his opponent no other means of securing 

himself against the repetition of barbarous outrage.

28. Retaliation will therefore never be resorted to as a measure 

of mere revenge, but only as a means of protective retribution, and 

moreover cautiously and unavoidably—that is to say, retaliation shall 

only be resorted to after careful inquiry into the real occurrence and 

the character of the misdeeds that may demand retribution.

Unjust or inconsiderate retaliation removes the belligerents farther and farther from the mitigating rules of regular war, and by rapid 

steps leads them nearer to the internecine wars of savages.
140

29. Modern times are distinguished from earlier ages by the 

existence at one and the same time of many nations and great 

governments related to one another in close intercourse.

Peace is their normal condition; war is the exception. The ultimate 

object of all modern war is a renewed state of peace.

The more vigorously wars are pursued the better it is for humanity. Sharp wars are brief. 

30. Ever since the formation and coexistence of modern nations, and 

ever since wars have become great national wars, war has come to be 

acknowledged not to be its own end, but the means to obtain great ends of 

state, or to consist in defense against wrong; and no conventional restriction of the modes adopted to injure the enemy is any longer admitted; but 

the law of war imposes many limitations and restrictions on principles of 

justice, faith, and honor.

SECTION II.—Public and private property of the enemy—Protection of 

persons, and especially of women; of religion, the arts and sciences—

Punishment of crimes against the inhabitants of hostile countries.

31. A victorious army appropriates all public money, seizes all public 

movable property until further direction by its government, and sequesters 

for its own benefit or of that of its government all the revenues of real 

property belonging to the hostile government or nation. The title to such 

real property remains in abeyance during military occupation, and until 

the conquest is made complete.

32. A victorious army, by the martial power inherent in the same, 

may suspend, change, or abolish, as far as the martial power extends, the 

relations which arise from the services due, according to the existing laws 

of the invaded country, from one citizen, subject, or native of the same to 

another.

The commander of the army must leave it to the ultimate treaty of 

peace to settle the permanency of this change.

33. It is no longer considered lawful—on the contrary, it is held to 

be a serious breach of the law of war—to force the subjects of the enemy 

into the service of the victorious government, except the latter should proclaim, after a fair and complete conquest of the hostile country or district, 

that it is resolved to keep the country, district, or place permanently as its 

own and make it a portion of its own country.

34. As a general rule, the property belonging to churches, to 

hospitals, or other establishments of an exclusively charitable character, 
141

to establishments of education, or foundations for the promotion of 

knowledge, whether public schools, universities, academies of learning or 

observatories, museums of the fine arts, or of a scientific character—such 

property is not to be considered public property in the sense of paragraph 

31; but it may be taxed or used when the public service may require it.

35. Classical works of art, libraries, scientific collections, or precious 

instruments, such as astronomical telescopes, as well as hospitals, must be 

secured against all avoidable injury, even when they are contained in fortified places whilst besieged or bombarded.

36. If such works of art, libraries, collections, or instruments belonging to a hostile nation or government, can be removed without injury, the 

ruler of the conquering state or nation may order them to be seized and 

removed for the benefit of the said nation. The ultimate ownership is to be 

settled by the ensuing treaty of peace.

In no case shall they be sold or given away, if captured by the armies 

of the United States, nor shall they ever be privately appropriated, or wantonly destroyed or injured.

37. The United States acknowledge and protect, in hostile countries occupied by them, religion and morality; strictly private property; the persons of the inhabitants, especially those of women; and 

the sacredness of domestic relations. Offenses to the contrary shall be 

rigorously punished.

This rule does not interfere with the right of the victorious invader 

to tax the people or their property, to levy forced loans, to billet soldiers, or to appropriate property, especially houses, lands, boats or 

ships, and the churches, for temporary and military uses.

38. Private property, unless forfeited by crimes or by offenses of 

the owner, can be seized only by way of military necessity, for the support or other benefit of the Army or of the United States.

If the owner has not fled, the commanding officer will cause 

receipts to be given, which may serve the spoliated owner to obtain 

indemnity.

39. The salaries of civil officers of the hostile government who remain 

in the invaded territory, and continue the work of their office, and can continue it according to the circumstances arising out of the war—such as 

judges, administrative or political officers, officers of city or communal 

governments—are paid from the public revenue of the invaded territory 

until the military government has reason wholly or partially to discontinue 
142

it. Salaries or incomes connected with purely honorary titles are always 

stopped.

40. There exists no law or body of authoritative rules of action 

between hostile armies, except that branch of the law of nature and nations 

which is called the law and usages of war on land.

41. All municipal law of the ground on which the armies stand, or 

of the countries to which they belong, is silent and of no effect between 

armies in the field.

42. Slavery, complicating and confounding the ideas of property (that 

is, of a thing), and of personality (that is, of humanity), exists according 

to municipal or local law only. The law of nature and nations has never 

acknowledged it. The digest of the Roman law enacts the early dictum 

of the pagan jurist, that “so far as the law of nature is concerned, all men 

are equal.” Fugitives escaping from a country in which they were slaves, 

villains, or serfs, into another country, have, for centuries past, been held 

free and acknowledged free by judicial decisions of European countries, 

even though the municipal law of the country in which the slave had taken 

refuge acknowledged slavery within its own dominions.

43. Therefore, in a war between the United States and a belligerent 

which admits of slavery, if a person held in bondage by that belligerent be 

captured by or come as a fugitive under the protection of the military forces 

of the United States, such person is immediately entitled to the rights and 

privileges of a freeman. To return such person into slavery would amount 

to enslaving a free person, and neither the United States nor any officer 

under their authority can enslave any human being. Moreover, a person so 

made free by the law of war is under the shield of the law of nations, and 

the former owner or State can have, by the law of postliminy, no belligerent lien or claim of service.

44. All wanton violence committed against persons in the invaded 

country, all destruction of property not commanded by the authorized officer, all robbery, all pillage or sacking, even after taking a place by main 

force, all rape, wounding, maiming, or killing of such inhabitants, are prohibited under the penalty of death, or such other severe punishment as may 

seem adequate for the gravity of the offense.

A soldier, officer, or private, in the act of committing such violence, 

and disobeying a superior ordering him to abstain from it, may be lawfully 

killed on the spot by such superior.

45. All captures and booty belong, according to the modern law of 

war, primarily to the government of the captor.
143

Prize money, whether on sea or land, can now only be claimed under 

local law. 

46. Neither officers nor soldiers are allowed to make use of their 

position or power in the hostile country for private gain, not even for commercial transactions otherwise legitimate. Offenses to the contrary committed by commissioned officers will be punished with cashiering or such 

other punishment as the nature of the offense may require; if by soldiers, 

they shall be punished according to the nature of the offense.

47. Crimes punishable by all penal codes, such as arson, murder, 

maiming, assaults, highway robbery, theft, burglary, fraud, forgery, and 

rape, if committed by an American soldier in a hostile country against its 

inhabitants, are not only punishable as at home, but in all cases in which 

death is not inflicted the severer punishment shall be preferred.

SECTION III.—Deserters—Prisoners of war—Hostages—Booty 

on the battle-field.

48. Deserters from the American Army, having entered the service 

of the enemy, suffer death if they fall again into the hands of the United 

States, whether by capture or being delivered up to the American Army; 

and if a deserter from the enemy, having taken service in the Army of the 

United States, is captured by the enemy, and punished by them with death 

or otherwise, it is not a breach against the law and usages of war, requiring 

redress or retaliation.

49. A prisoner of war is a public enemy armed or attached to 

the hostile army for active aid, who has fallen into the hands of the 

captor, either fighting or wounded, on the field or in the hospital, by 

individual surrender or by capitulation.

All soldiers, of whatever species of arms; all men who belong to 

the rising en masse of the hostile country; all those who are attached 

to the Army for its efficiency and promote directly the object of the 

war, except such as are hereinafter provided for; all disabled men or 

officers on the field or elsewhere, if captured; all enemies who have 

thrown away their arms and ask for quarter, are prisoners of war, 

and as such exposed to the inconveniences as well as entitled to the 

privileges of a prisoner of war.

50. Moreover, citizens who accompany an army for whatever purpose, such as sutlers, editors, or reporters of journals, or contractors, if 

captured, may be made prisoners of war and be detained as such.

The monarch and members of the hostile reigning family, male or 
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female, the chief, and chief officers of the hostile government, its diplomatic 

agents, and all persons who are of particular and singular use and benefit to 

the hostile army or its government, are, if captured on belligerent ground, 

and if unprovided with a safe-conduct granted by the captor’s government, 

prisoners of war.

51. If the people of that portion of an invaded country which is not 

yet occupied by the enemy, or of the whole country, at the approach of 

a hostile army, rise, under a duly authorized levy, en masse to resist the 

invader, they are now treated as public enemies, and, if captured, are prisoners of war.

52. No belligerent has the right to declare that he will treat every 

captured man in arms of a levy en masse as a brigand or bandit.

If, however, the people of a country, or any portion of the same, 

already occupied by an army, rise against it, they are violators of the 

laws of war and are not entitled to their protection.

53. The enemy’s chaplains, officers of the medical staff, apothecaries, 

hospital nurses, and servants, if they fall into the hands of the American 

Army, are not prisoners of war, unless the commander has reasons to retain 

them. In this latter case, or if, at their own desire, they are allowed to 

remain with their captured companions, they are treated as prisoners of 

war, and may be exchanged if the commander sees fit.

54. A hostage is a person accepted as a pledge for the fulfillment of 

an agreement concluded between belligerents during the war, or in consequence of a war. Hostages are rare in the present age.

55. If a hostage is accepted, he is treated like a prisoner of war, 

according to rank and condition, as circumstances may admit.

56. A prisoner of war is subject to no punishment for being a 

public enemy, nor is any revenge wreaked upon him by the intentional 

infliction of any suffering, or disgrace, by cruel imprisonment, want of 

food, by mutilation, death, or any other barbarity.

57. So soon as a man is armed by a sovereign government and takes 

the soldier’s oath of fidelity he is a belligerent; his killing, wounding, or 

other warlike acts are no individual crimes or offenses. No belligerent 

has a right to declare that enemies of a certain class, color, or condition, 

when properly organized as soldiers, will not be treated by him as public 

enemies.

58. The law of nations knows of no distinction of color, and if an 

enemy of the United States should enslave and sell any captured persons of 
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their Army, it would be a case for the severest retaliation, if not redressed 

upon complaint.

The United States cannot retaliate by enslavement; therefore death 

must be the retaliation for this crime against the law of nations. 

59. A prisoner of war remains answerable for his crimes committed against the captor’s army or people, committed before he 

was captured, and for which he has not been punished by his own 

authorities.

All prisoners of war are liable to the infliction of retaliatory 

measures.

60. It is against the usage of modern war to resolve, in hatred and 

revenge, to give no quarter. No body of troops has the right to declare that 

it will not give, and therefore will not expect, quarter; but a commander is 

permitted to direct his troops to give no quarter, in great straits, when his 

own salvation makes it impossible to cumber himself with prisoners.

61. Troops that give no quarter have no right to kill enemies 

already disabled on the ground, or prisoners captured by other 

troops.

62. All troops of the enemy known or discovered to give no quarter 

in general, or to any portion of the Army, receive none.

63. Troops who fight in the uniform of their enemies, without 

any plain, striking, and uniform mark of distinction of their own, can 

expect no quarter.

64. If American troops capture a train containing uniforms of the 

enemy, and the commander considers it advisable to distribute them for 

use among his men, some striking mark or sign must be adopted to distinguish the American soldier from the enemy.

65. The use of the enemy’s national standard, flag, or other emblem 

of nationality, for the purpose of deceiving the enemy in battle, is an act of 

perfidy by which they lose all claim to the protection of the laws of war.

66. Quarter having been given to an enemy by American troops, 

under a misapprehension of his true character, he may, nevertheless, be 

ordered to suffer death if, within three days after the battle, it be discovered that he belongs to a corps which gives no quarter.

67. The law of nations allows every sovereign government to make 

war upon another sovereign State, and, therefore, admits of no rules or 

laws different from those of regular warfare, regarding the treatment of 
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prisoners of war, although they may belong to the army of a government 

which the captor may consider as a wanton and unjust assailant.

68. Modern wars are not internecine wars, in which the killing of the 

enemy is the object. The destruction of the enemy in modern war, and, 

indeed, modern war itself, are means to obtain that object of the belligerent 

which lies beyond the war.

Unnecessary or revengeful destruction of life is not lawful.

69. Outposts, sentinels, or pickets are not to be fired upon, except to 

drive them in, or when a positive order, special or general, has been issued 

to that effect.

70. The use of poison in any manner, be it to poison wells, or food, 

or arms, is wholly excluded from modern warfare. He that uses it puts 

himself out of the pale of the law and usages of war.

71. Whoever intentionally inflicts additional wounds on an 

enemy already wholly disabled, or kills such an enemy, or who orders 

or encourages soldiers to do so, shall suffer death, if duly convicted, 

whether he belongs to the Army of the United States, or is an enemy 

captured after having committed his misdeed.

72. Money and other valuables on the person of a prisoner, such as 

watches or jewelry, as well as extra clothing, are regarded by the American 

Army as the private property of the prisoner, and the appropriation of such 

valuables or money is considered dishonorable, and is prohibited.

Nevertheless, if large sums are found upon the persons of prisoners, 

or in their possession, they shall be taken from them, and the surplus, after 

providing for their own support, appropriated for the use of the Army, 

under the direction of the commander, unless otherwise ordered by the 

Government. Nor can prisoners claim, as private property, large sums 

found and captured in their train, although they have been placed in the 

private luggage of the prisoners.

73. All officers, when captured, must surrender their side-arms to the 

captor. They may be restored to the prisoner in marked cases, by the commander, to signalize admiration of his distinguished bravery, or approbation of his humane treatment of prisoners before his capture. The captured 

officer to whom they may be restored cannot wear them during captivity.

74. A prisoner of war, being a public enemy, is the prisoner of the 

Government and not of the captor. No ransom can be paid by a prisoner of 

war to his individual captor, or to any officer in command. The Government 

alone releases captives, according to rules prescribed by itself.
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75. Prisoners of war are subject to confinement or imprisonment such 

as may be deemed necessary on account of safety, but they are to be subjected to no other intentional suffering or indignity. The confinement and 

mode of treating a prisoner may be varied during his captivity according 

to the demands of safety.

76. Prisoners of war shall be fed upon plain and wholesome food, 

whenever practicable, and treated with humanity.

They may be required to work for the benefit of the captor’s government, according to their rank and condition.

77. A prisoner of war who escapes may be shot, or otherwise killed, 

in his flight; but neither death nor any other punishment shall be inflicted 

upon him simply for his attempt to escape, which the law of war does not 

consider a crime. Stricter means of security shall be used after an unsuccessful attempt at escape.

If, however, a conspiracy is discovered, the purpose of which is a 

united or general escape, the conspirators may be rigorously punished, 

even with death; and capital punishment may also be inflicted upon prisoners of war discovered to have plotted rebellion against the authorities of 

the captors, whether in union with fellow-prisoners or other persons.

78. If prisoners of war, having given no pledge nor made any promise on their honor, forcibly or otherwise escape, and are captured again in 

battle, after having rejoined their own army, they shall not be punished for 

their escape, but shall be treated as simple prisoners of war, although they 

will be subjected to stricter confinement.

79. Every captured wounded enemy shall be medically treated, 

according to the ability of the medical staff.

80. Honorable men, when captured, will abstain from giving to the 

enemy information concerning their own army, and the modern law of 

war permits no longer the use of any violence against prisoners in order 

to extort the desired information, or to punish them for having given false 

information.

SECTION IV.—Partisans—Armed enemies not belonging to the hostile 

army—Scouts—Armed prowlers—War-rebels.

81. Partisans are soldiers armed and wearing the uniform of their 

army, but belonging to a corps which acts detached from the main body for 

the purpose of making inroads into the territory occupied by the enemy. If 

captured they are entitled to all the privileges of the prisoner of war.
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82. Men, or squads of men, who commit hostilities, whether by 

fighting, or inroads for destruction or plunder, or by raids of any kind, 

without commission, without being part and portion of the organized 

hostile army, and without sharing continuously in the war, but who do 

so with intermitting returns to their homes and avocations, or with the 

occasional assumption of the semblance of peaceful pursuits, divesting 

themselves of the character or appearance of soldiers—such men, or 

squads of men, are not public enemies, and therefore, if captured, are 

not entitled to the privileges of prisoners of war, but shall be treated 

summarily as highway robbers or pirates.

83. Scouts or single soldiers, if disguised in the dress of the country, 

or in the uniform of the army hostile to their own, employed in obtaining 

information, if found within or lurking about the lines of the captor, are 

treated as spies, and suffer death.

84. Armed prowlers, by whatever names they may be called, or 

persons of the enemy’s territory, who steal within the lines of the hostile army for the purpose of robbing, killing, or of destroying bridges, 

roads, or canals, or of robbing or destroying the mail, or of cutting 

the telegraph wires, are not entitled to the privileges of the prisoner of 

war.

85. War-rebels are persons within an occupied territory who 

rise in arms against the occupying or conquering army, or against 

the authorities established by the same. If captured, they may suffer 

death, whether they rise singly, in small or large bands, and whether 

called upon to do so by their own, but expelled, government or not. 

They are not prisoners of war; nor are they if discovered and secured 

before their conspiracy has matured to an actual rising or to armed 

violence.

SECTION V.—Safe-conduct—Spies—War-traitors—Captured 

messengers—Abuse of the flag of truce.

86. All intercourse between the territories occupied by belligerent 

armies, whether by traffic, by letter, by travel, or in any other way, ceases. 

This is the general rule, to be observed without special proclamation.

Exceptions to this rule, whether by safe-conduct or permission to trade 

on a small or large scale, or by exchanging mails, or by travel from one territory into the other, can take place only according to agreement approved 

by the Government or by the highest military authority.

Contraventions of this rule are highly punishable.
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87. Ambassadors, and all other diplomatic agents of neutral powers 

accredited to the enemy may receive safe-conducts through the territories 

occupied by the belligerents, unless there are military reasons to the contrary, and unless they may reach the place of their destination conveniently 

by another route. It implies no international affront if the safe-conduct is 

declined. Such passes are usually given by the supreme authority of the 

state and not by subordinate officers.

88. A spy is a person who secretly, in disguise or under false pretense, seeks information with the intention of communicating it to the 

enemy.

The spy is punishable with death by hanging by the neck, whether 

or not he succeed in obtaining the information or in conveying it to 

the enemy.

89. If a citizen of the United States obtains information in a legitimate manner and betrays it to the enemy, be he a military or civil officer, 

or a private citizen, he shall suffer death.

90. A traitor under the law of war, or a war-traitor, is a person in 

a place or district under martial law who, unauthorized by the military commander, gives information of any kind to the enemy, or holds 

intercourse with him.

91. The war-traitor is always severely punished. If his offense 

consists in betraying to the enemy anything concerning the condition, 

safety, operations, or plans of the troops holding or occupying the 

place or district, his punishment is death.

92. If the citizen or subject of a country or place invaded or conquered gives information to his own government, from which he is 

separated by the hostile army, or to the army of his government, he is 

a war-traitor, and death is the penalty of his offense.

93. All armies in the field stand in need of guides, and impress them 

if they cannot obtain them otherwise.

94. No person having been forced by the enemy to serve as guide is 

punishable for having done so.

95. If a citizen of a hostile and invaded district voluntarily serves as a 

guide to the enemy, or offers to do so, he is deemed a war-traitor and shall 

suffer death.

96. A citizen serving voluntarily as a guide against his own country commits treason, and will be dealt with according to the law of his 

country.
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97. Guides, when it is clearly proved that they have misled 

intentionally, may be put to death.

98. All unauthorized or secret communication with the enemy is 

considered treasonable by the law of war.

Foreign residents in an invaded or occupied territory or foreign 

visitors in the same can claim no immunity from this law. They may 

communicate with foreign parts or with the inhabitants of the hostile 

country, so far as the military authority permits, but no further. 

Instant expulsion from the occupied territory would be the very least 

punishment for the infraction of this rule.

99. A messenger carrying written dispatches or verbal messages from 

one portion of the army or from a besieged place to another portion of the 

same army or its government, if armed, and in the uniform of his army, and 

if captured while doing so in the territory occupied by the enemy, is treated 

by the captor as a prisoner of war. If not in uniform nor a soldier, the 

circumstances connected with his capture must determine the disposition 

that shall be made of him.

100. A messenger or agent who attempts to steal through the territory 

occupied by the enemy to further in any manner the interests of the enemy, 

if captured, is not entitled to the privileges of the prisoner of war, and may 

be dealt with according to the circumstances of the case.

101. While deception in war is admitted as a just and necessary means 

of hostility, and is consistent with honorable warfare, the common law of 

war allows even capital punishment for clandestine or treacherous attempts 

to injure an enemy, because they are so dangerous, and it is so difficult to 

guard against them.

102. The law of war, like the criminal law regarding other offenses, 

makes no difference on account of the difference of sexes, concerning the 

spy, the war-traitor, or the war-rebel.

103. Spies, war-traitors, and war-rebels are not exchanged according 

to the common law of war. The exchange of such persons would require a 

special cartel, authorized by the Government, or, at a great distance from 

it, by the chief commander of the army in the field.

104. A successful spy or war-traitor, safely returned to his own army, 

and afterward captured as an enemy, is not subject to punishment for his 

acts as a spy or war-traitor, but he may be held in closer custody as a 

person individually dangerous.
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SECTION VI.—Exchange of prisoners—Flags of 

truce—Flags of protection.

105. Exchanges of prisoners take place—number for number—rank 

for rank—wounded for wounded—with added condition for added 

condition—such, for instance, as not to serve for a certain period.

106. In exchanging prisoners of war, such numbers of persons of inferior rank may be substituted as an equivalent for one of superior rank as may 

be agreed upon by cartel, which requires the sanction of the Government, 

or of the commander of the army in the field.

107. A prisoner of war is in honor bound truly to state to the captor his 

rank; and he is not to assume a lower rank than belongs to him, in order to 

cause a more advantageous exchange, nor a higher rank, for the purpose 

of obtaining better treatment.

Offenses to the contrary have been justly punished by the commanders 

of released prisoners, and may be good cause for refusing to release such 

prisoners.

108. The surplus number of prisoners of war remaining after an 

exchange has taken place is sometimes released either for the payment of 

a stipulated sum of money, or, in urgent cases, of provision, clothing, or 

other necessaries.

Such arrangement, however, requires the sanction of the highest 

authority.

109. The exchange of prisoners of war is an act of convenience to 

both belligerents. If no general cartel has been concluded, it cannot be 

demanded by either of them. No belligerent is obliged to exchange prisoners of war.

A cartel is voidable as soon as either party has violated it.

110. No exchange of prisoners shall be made except after complete 

capture, and after an accurate account of them, and a list of the captured 

officers, has been taken.

111. The bearer of a flag of truce cannot insist upon being admitted. 

He must always be admitted with great caution. Unnecessary frequency is 

carefully to be avoided.

112. If the bearer of a flag of truce offer himself during an engagement, 

he can be admitted as a very rare exception only. It is no breach of good 

faith to retain such flag of truce, if admitted during the engagement. Firing 

is not required to cease on the appearance of a flag of truce in battle.
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113. If the bearer of a flag of truce, presenting himself during an 

engagement, is killed or wounded, it furnishes no ground of complaint 

whatever.

114. If it be discovered, and fairly proved, that a flag of truce has been 

abused for surreptitiously obtaining military knowledge, the bearer of the 

flag thus abusing his sacred character is deemed a spy.

So sacred is the character of a flag of truce, and so necessary is its 

sacredness, that while its abuse is an especially heinous offense, great caution is requisite, on the other hand, in convicting the bearer of a flag of 

truce as a spy.

115. It is customary to designate by certain flags (usually yellow) the 

hospitals in places which are shelled, so that the besieging enemy may 

avoid firing on them. The same has been done in battles when hospitals are 

situated within the field of the engagement.

116. Honorable belligerents often request that the hospitals within the 

territory of the enemy may be designated, so that they may be spared.

An honorable belligerent allows himself to be guided by flags or signals of protection as much as the contingencies and the necessities of the 

fight will permit.

117. It is justly considered an act of bad faith, of infamy or fiendishness, to deceive the enemy by flags of protection. Such act of bad faith 

may be good cause for refusing to respect such flags.

118. The besieging belligerent has sometimes requested the besieged 

to designate the buildings containing collections of works of art, scientific 

museums, astronomical observatories, or precious libraries, so that their 

destruction may be avoided as much as possible.

SECTION VII.—The parole.

119. Prisoners of war may be released from captivity by exchange, 

and, under certain circumstances, also by parole.

120. The term parole designates the pledge of individual good faith 

and honor to do, or to omit doing, certain acts after he who gives his 

parole shall have been dismissed, wholly or partially, from the power of 

the captor.

121. The pledge of the parole is always an individual, but not a private 

act.

122. The parole applies chiefly to prisoners of war whom the captor 

allows to return to their country, or to live in greater freedom within the 

captor’s country or territory, on conditions stated in the parole.
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123. Release of prisoners of war by exchange is the general rule; 

release by parole is the exception.

124. Breaking the parole is punished with death when the person 

breaking the parole is captured again.

Accurate lists, therefore, of the paroled persons must be kept by 

the belligerents.

125. When paroles are given and received there must be an exchange 

of two written documents, in which the name and rank of the paroled individuals are accurately and truthfully stated.

126. Commissioned officers only are allowed to give their parole, and 

they can give it only with the permission of their superior, as long as a 

superior in rank is within reach.

127. No non-commissioned officer or private can give his parole except 

through an officer. Individual paroles not given through an officer are not 

only void, but subject the individuals giving them to the punishment of 

death as deserters. The only admissible exception is where individuals, 

properly separated from their commands, have suffered long confinement 

without the possibility of being paroled through an officer.

128. No paroling on the battle-field; no paroling of entire bodies of 

troops after a battle; and no dismissal of large numbers of prisoners, with 

a general declaration that they are paroled, is permitted, or of any value.

129. In capitulations for the surrender of strong places or fortified 

camps the commanding officer, in cases of urgent necessity, may agree 

that the troops under his command shall not fight again during the war 

unless exchanged.

130. The usual pledge given in the parole is not to serve during the 

existing war unless exchanged.

This pledge refers only to the active service in the field against 

the paroling belligerent or his allies actively engaged in the same war. 

These cases of breaking the parole are patent acts, and can be visited 

with the punishment of death; but the pledge does not refer to internal 

service, such as recruiting or drilling the recruits, fortifying places 

not besieged, quelling civil commotions, fighting against belligerents 

unconnected with the paroling belligerents, or to civil or diplomatic 

service for which the paroled officer may be employed.

131. If the government does not approve of the parole, the paroled 

officer must return into captivity, and should the enemy refuse to receive 

him he is free of his parole.
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132. A belligerent government may declare, by a general order, 

whether it will allow paroling and on what conditions it will allow it. Such 

order is communicated to the enemy.

133. No prisoner of war can be forced by the hostile government to 

parole himself, and no government is obliged to parole prisoners of war 

or to parole all captured officers, if it paroles any. As the pledging of the 

parole is an individual act, so is paroling, on the other hand, an act of 

choice on the part of the belligerent.

134. The commander of an occupying army may require of the 

civil officers of the enemy, and of its citizens, any pledge he may consider necessary for the safety or security of his army, and upon their 

failure to give it he may arrest, confine, or detain them.

SECTION VIII.—Armistice—Capitulation.

135. An armistice is the cessation of active hostilities for a period 

agreed between belligerents. It must be agreed upon in writing and duly 

ratified by the highest authorities of the contending parties.

136. If an armistice be declared without conditions it extends no further than to require a total cessation of hostilities along the front of both 

belligerents.

If conditions be agreed upon, they should be clearly expressed, and 

must be rigidly adhered to by both parties. If either party violates any 

express condition, the armistice may be declared null and void by the 

other.

137. An armistice may be general, and valid for all points and lines of 

the belligerents; or special—that is, referring to certain troops or certain 

localities only. An armistice may be concluded for a definite time; or for 

an indefinite time, during which either belligerent may resume hostilities 

on giving the notice agreed upon to the other.

138. The motives which induce the one or the other belligerent to conclude an armistice, whether it be expected to be preliminary to a treaty of 

peace, or to prepare during the armistice for a more vigorous prosecution 

of the war, does in no way affect the character of the armistice itself.

139. An armistice is binding upon the belligerents from the day of the 

agreed commencement; but the officers of the armies are responsible from 

the day only when they receive official information of its existence.

140. Commanding officers have the right to conclude armistices binding on the district over which their command extends, but such armistice 

is subject to the ratification of the superior authority, and ceases so soon 
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as it is made known to the enemy that the armistice is not ratified, even if 

a certain time for the elapsing between giving notice of cessation and the 

resumption of hostilities should have been stipulated for.

141. It is incumbent upon the contracting parties of an armistice to 

stipulate what intercourse of persons or traffic between the inhabitants of 

the territories occupied by the hostile armies shall be allowed, if any.

If nothing is stipulated the intercourse remains suspended, as during 

actual hostilities.

142. An armistice is not a partial or a temporary peace; it is only 

the suspension of military operations to the extent agreed upon by the 

parties.

143. When an armistice is concluded between a fortified place and the 

army besieging it, it is agreed by all the authorities on this subject that the 

besieger must cease all extension, perfection, or advance of his attacking 

works as much so as from attacks by main force.

But as there is a difference of opinion among martial jurists whether the 

besieged have a right to repair breaches or to erect new works of defense 

within the place during an armistice, this point should be determined by 

express agreement between the parties.

144. So soon as a capitulation is signed the capitulator has no right 

to demolish, destroy, or injure the works, arms, stores, or ammunition in 

his possession, during the time which elapses between the signing and the 

execution of the capitulation, unless otherwise stipulated in the same.

145. When an armistice is clearly broken by one of the parties the 

other party is released from all obligation to observe it.

146. Prisoners taken in the act of breaking an armistice must be treated 

as prisoners of war, the officer alone being responsible who gives the order 

for such a violation of an armistice. The highest authority of the belligerent aggrieved may demand redress for the infraction of an armistice.

147. Belligerents sometimes conclude an armistice while their plenipotentiaries are met to discuss the conditions of a treaty of peace; but 

plenipotentiaries may meet without a preliminary armistice; in the latter 

case the war is carried on without any abatement.

SECTION IX.—Assassination.

148. The law of war does not allow proclaiming either an individual belonging to the hostile army, or a citizen, or a subject of the 

hostile government an outlaw, who may be slain without trial by any 
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captor, any more than the modern law of peace allows such international outlawry; on the contrary, it abhors such outrage. The sternest retaliation should follow the murder committed in consequence 

of such proclamation, made by whatever authority. Civilized nations 

look with horror upon offers of rewards for the assassination of enemies as relapses into barbarism.

SECTION X.—Insurrection—Civil war—Rebellion.

149. Insurrection is the rising of people in arms against their government, or portion of it, or against one or more of its laws, or against an 

officer or officers of the government. It may be confined to mere armed 

resistance, or it may have greater ends in view.

150. Civil war is war between two or more portions of a country or 

state, each contending for the mastery of the whole, and each claiming to 

be the legitimate government. The term is also sometimes applied to war 

of rebellion, when the rebellious provinces or portions of the state are contiguous to those containing the seat of government.

151. The term rebellion is applied to an insurrection of large extent, 

and is usually a war between the legitimate government of a country and 

portions of provinces of the same who seek to throw off their allegiance to 

it and set up a government of their own.

152. When humanity induces the adoption of the rules of regular war 

toward rebels, whether the adoption is partial or entire, it does in no way 

whatever imply a partial or complete acknowledgment of their government, if they have set up one, or of them, as an independent or sovereign 

power. Neutrals have no right to make the adoption of the rules of war by 

the assailed government toward rebels the ground of their own acknowledgment of the revolted people as an independent power.

153. Treating captured rebels as prisoners of war, exchanging them, 

concluding of cartels, capitulations, or other warlike agreements with them; 

addressing officers of a rebel army by the rank they may have in the same; 

accepting flags of truce; or, on the other hand, proclaiming martial law in 

their territory, or levying war taxes or forced loans, or doing any other act 

sanctioned or demanded by the law and usages of public war between sovereign belligerents, neither proves nor establishes an acknowledgment of 

the rebellious people, or of the government which they may have erected, 

as a public or sovereign power. Nor does the adoption of the rules of war 

toward rebels imply an engagement with them extending beyond the limits 

of these rules. It is victory in the field that ends the strife and settles the 

future relations between the contending parties.
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154. Treating in the field the rebellious enemy according to the law 

and usages of war has never prevented the legitimate government from 

trying the leaders of the rebellion or chief rebels for high treason, and from 

treating them accordingly, unless they are included in a general amnesty.

155. All enemies in regular war are divided into two general 

classes—that is to say, into combatants and non-combatants, or 

unarmed citizens of the hostile government.

The military commander of the legitimate government, in a war of 

rebellion, distinguishes between the loyal citizen in the revolted portion of the country and the disloyal citizen. The disloyal citizens may 

further be classified into those citizens known to sympathize with the 

rebellion without positively aiding it, and those who, without taking 

up arms, give positive aid and comfort to the rebellious enemy without 

being bodily forced thereto.

156. Common justice and plain expediency require that the military commander protect the manifestly loyal citizens in revolted territories against the hardships of the war as much as the common 

misfortune of all war admits.

The commander will throw the burden of the war, as much as lies 

within his power, on the disloyal citizens, of the revolted portion or 

province, subjecting them to a stricter police than the non-combatant 

enemies have to suffer in regular war; and if he deems it appropriate, 

or if his government demands of him that every citizen shall, by an 

oath of allegiance, or by some other manifest act, declare his fidelity 

to the legitimate government, he may expel, transfer, imprison, or fine 

the revolted citizens who refuse to pledge themselves anew as citizens 

obedient to the law and loyal to the government.

Whether it is expedient to do so, and whether reliance can be 

placed upon such oaths, the commander or his government have the 

right to decide.

157. Armed or unarmed resistance by citizens of the United States 

against the lawful movements of their troops is levying war against the 

United States, and is therefore treason.

159

Appendix C

Proclamation Issued by Major General Arthur MacArthur on 

20 December 1900

PROCLAMATION

OFFICE OF U.S. MILITARY GOVERNOR

IN THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS AND

HEADQUARTERS DIVISION OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Manila, P.I., December 10, 1900.

In the armed struggle against the sovereign power of the United States 

now in progress in these islands, frequent violations of important provisions of the laws of war have recently manifested themselves, rendering 

it imperative, while rejecting every consideration of belligerency of those 

opposing the Government in the sense in which the term belligerency is 

generally accepted and understood, to remind all concerned of the existence of these laws, that exemplary punishments attach to the infringment 

thereof, and that their strict observance is required not only by combatant forces, but as well by noncombatants, native or alien, residing within 

occupied places.

In pursuance of this purpose reference is made to the following provisions of the laws of war as most essential for consideration under present 

conditions:

I. A place, district, or country occupied in consequence of regular 

military operations by an organized combatant force stands, by reason of 

said occupation, under the martial law of the occupying army. The commanding general owes protection to all people residing within the places 

occupied, who perform with fidelity the duties imposed upon them, from 

which consideration results the obligation upon the part of the people and 

civil officials of the occupied territory of strict obedience to the commanding general of the occupying force.

The present necessity for allusion to the laws of war arises from the 

fact that many proclamations recently issued by insurgent commanders 

threaten punishment against all native inhabitants of occupied places who 

accept the reciprocal relations above described, and from the further fact 

Extract from Affairs in the Philippine Islands. Hearings before the Committee on the Philippines of the United States Senate. US Congress, Senate Document 331, Part 2, 57th Congress, 1st Session, 1902, pp 1944–1946.
160

that in prosecution of this policy the mandates of insurgent officers to 

kidnap and assassinate residents of occupied towns have been successfully executed. It can not, therefore, be too emphatically declared that all 

engaged in such transactions, from the authority making the proclamation 

to the parties of execution, are, collectively and individually, guilty of violation of the laws of war and must eventually answer for murder or such 

other crimes as may result from their unlawful actions.

Notice is accordingly given to insurgent leaders already committed 

to, or who may be contemplating such a system of war, that the practice thereof will necessarily terminate the possibility of those engaging 

therein returning to normal civic relations in the Philippines. That is to 

say, persons charged with violation of the laws of war above enumerated 

must sooner or later be tried for felonious crimes, with all the attending 

possibilities of conviction, or, as an only means of escape therefrom, must 

become fugitive criminals beyond the jurisdiction of the United States, 

which, in effect, means lifelong expatriation.

II. Persons residing within an occupied place who do things inimical 

to the interests of the occupying army are known as war rebels, or war 

traitors, according to the nature of their overt acts, and are punishable at 

the discretion of the tribunals of the occupying army. To comply with the 

demands of an expelled public enemy and make no report thereof creates 

the presumption that the act is voluntary and malicious. In such a case 

a plea of intimidation can rarely be accepted. The plain duty of people 

so threatened is to report the facts, which must, by reason of a common 

language, be of knowledge to a large part of the residential community, 

and thereby avert suspicion as to their own good faith and enable the commanding general to act efficiently in behalf of their protection. When, however, as is known to be the case in many places occupied by United States 

troops, secret committees are permitted to exist and to act in behalf of 

the so-called insurgent government by collecting supplies, recruiting men, 

and sending military information to the insurgent camps, it is not only 

difficult to afford adequate protection, but the well-disposed people who, 

from a sense of timidity or misplaced sympathy for neighbors, persist in 

screening these committees, in effect offer themselves as easy victims to 

be plundered and murdered, and also expose themselves to the danger of 

being classified and tried as war traitors against the United States. 

The principal object of this proclamation is to instruct all classes 

throughout the archipelago as to the requirement of the laws of war in 

respect to the particulars herein referred to, and to advise all concerned 

of the purpose to exact in the future precise compliance therewith. The 

practice of sending supplies to insurgent troops from places occupied by 
161

the United States, as is now the case, must cease. If contumacious or fainthearted persons continue to engage in this traffic, they must be prepared to 

answer for their actions under the penalties declared in this article.

III. The remarks embodied in the foregoing Article II apply with special force to the city of Manila, which is well known as a rendezvous from 

which an extensive correspondence is distributed to all parts of the archipelago by sympathizers with and by emissaries of the insurrection. All persons in Manila or elsewhere are again reminded that the entire archipelago, 

for the time being, is necessarily under the rigid restraints of martial law, 

and that any contributions of advice, information, or supplies, and all correspondence, the effect of which is to give aid, support, encouragement, 

or comfort to the armed opposition in the field are flagrant violations of 

American interests, and persons so engaged are warned to conform to the 

laws which apply to occupied places as herein set forth.

The newspapers and other periodicals of Manila, being of issue in 

an occupied place, are especially admonished that any article published 

in the midst of such martial environment which by any construction can 

be classed as seditious must be regarded as intended to injure the army of 

occupation, and as subjecting all connected with the publication to such 

punitive action as may be determined by the undersigned.

IV. Men who participate in hostilities without being part of a regularly 

organized force, and without sharing continuously in its operations, but 

who do so with intermittent returns to their homes and avocations, divest 

themselves of the character of soldiers, and if captured are not entitled to 

the privileges of prisoners of war.

It is well known that many of the occupied towns support and encourage men who habitually assume the semblance of peaceful pursuits, but 

who have arms hidden outside of the towns and periodically slip out to 

take part in guerrilla war.

The fact that such men have not heretofore been held responsible for 

their actions is simply an evidence of the solicitude of the United States 

to avoid all appearance of harshness in pacifying the islands, and not 

of any defect in the law itself. The people of the archipelago are now 

instructed as to the precise nature of the law applicable in such cases, and 

are warned to mistrust leaders who not only require soldiers to expose 

themselves to the ordinary vicissitudes of campaign, but insist upon duties 

that necessarily expose all who engage therein to the possibility of trial for 

a capital offense.

War in its earliest form was an act of violence which, from the very 

nature of primitive humanity and the forces employed, knew no bounds. 
162

Mankind, from the beginning of civilization, however, has tried to mitigate, 

and to escape, as far as possible, from the consequences of this barbarous 

conception of warlike action; and to that end conventions have been held 

from time to time for international discussion of the customs and usages of 

war, in the hope that some means might be devised to regulate by rule the 

beneficent instincts of humanity. As a consequence of such conferences, 

a code has slowly evolved which, although uncertain in many particulars, contains certain fundamental principles which have been accepted 

and are now insisted upon by the public opinion of the world. The articles 

discussed in this paper have been adopted by all civilized nations. Their 

careful perusal by the people, it is hoped, will induce all who are eager for 

the tranquillization of the archipelago to combine for mutual protection 

and united action in behalf of their own interests and the welfare of the 

country.

Arthur MacArthur,

Major-General, U.S.V.,

U.S. Military Governor in the Philippines.
163

Appendix D

Extract of Message from President Theodore Roosevelt to the 

US Army, 4 July 1902

War Department, Washington, July 4, 1902.

To the Army of the United States:

The President upon this anniversary of national independence wishes 

to express to the officers and enlisted men of the United States Army his 

deep appreciation of the service they have rendered to the country in the 

great and difficult undertakings which they have brought to a successful 

conclusion during the past year.

* * * * * * *

The President thanks the officers and enlisted men of the Army in the 

Philippines, both regulars and volunteers, for the courage and fortitude, 

the indomitable spirit and loyal devotion with which they have put down 

and ended the great insurrection which has raged throughout the archipelago against the lawful sovereignty and just authority of the United States. 

The task was peculiarly difficult and trying. They were required at first to 

overcome organized resistance of superior numbers, well equipped with 

modern arms of precision, intrenched in an unknown country of mountain 

defiles, jungles, and swamps, apparently capable of interminable defense. 

When this resistance had been overcome they were required to crush out 

a general system of guerrilla warfare conducted among a people speaking unknown tongues, from whom it was almost impossible to obtain the 

information necessary for successful pursuit or to guard against surprise 

and ambush.

The enemies by whom they were surrounded were regardless of all 

obligations of good faith and of all the limitations which humanity has 

imposed upon civilized warfare. Bound themselves by the laws of war, our 

soldiers were called upon to meet every device of unscrupulous treachery 

Headquarters of the Army, General Orders No. 66, 4 July 1902, in US Army, 

Adjutant General’s Office, Correspondence Relating to the War with Spain and 

Conditions Growing out of the Same Including the Insurrection in the Philippine 

Islands and the China Relief Expedition, Between the Adjutant-General of the 

Army and Military Commanders in the United States, Cuba, Porto Rico, China, 

and the Philippine Islands from April 15, 1898 to July 30, 1902 (Washington, DC: 

Government Printing Office, 1902), vol. II, 1352–1353.
164

and to contemplate without reprisal the infliction of barbarous cruelties 

upon their comrades and friendly natives. They were instructed, while 

punishing armed resistance, to conciliate the friendship of the peaceful, yet 

had to do with a population among whom it was impossible to distinguish 

friend from foe, and who in countless instances used a false appearance 

of friendship for ambush and assassination. They were obliged to deal 

with problems of communication and transportation in a country without roads and frequently made impassable by torrential rains. They were 

weakened by tropical heat and tropical disease. Widely scattered over a 

great archipelago, extending a thousand miles from north to south, the 

gravest responsibilities, involving the life or death of their commands, frequently devolved upon young and inexperienced officers beyond the reach 

of specific orders or advice.

Under all these adverse circumstances the Army of the Philippines has 

accomplished its task rapidly and completely. In more than two thousand 

combats, great and small, within three years, it has exhibited unvarying 

courage and resolution. Utilizing the lessons of the Indian wars, it has 

relentlessly followed the guerrilla bands to their fastnesses in mountain and 

jungle and crushed them. It has put an end to the vast system of intimidation and secret assassination by which the peaceful natives were prevented 

from taking a genuine part in government under American authority. It has 

captured or forced to surrender substantially all the leaders of the insurrection. It has submitted to no discouragement and halted at no obstacle. Its 

officers have shown high qualities of command, and its men have shown 

devotion and discipline. Its splendid virile energy has been accompanied 

by self-control, patience, and magnanimity. With surprisingly few individual exceptions its course has been characterized by humanity and kindness to the prisoner and the noncombatant. With admirable good temper, 

sympathy, and loyalty to American ideals its commanding generals have 

joined with civilian agents of the Government in healing the wounds of 

war and assuring to the people of the Philippines the blessings of peace 

and prosperity. Individual liberty, protection of personal rights, civil order, 

public instruction, and religious freedom have followed its footsteps. It 

has added honor to the flag which it defended, and has justified increased 

confidence in the future of the American people, whose soldiers do not 

shrink from labor or death, yet love liberty and peace.

The President feels that he expresses the sentiments of all the loyal 

people of the United States in doing honor to the whole Army which has 

joined in the performance and shares in the credit of these honorable 

services.
165

This general order will be read aloud at parade in every military post 

on the 4th day of July, 1902, or on the first day after it shall have been 

received.

Elihu Root, Secretary of War.

By command of Lieutenant-General Miles:

H.C. Corbin,

Adjutant-General, Major-General, U.S. Army.

167

About the Author

Robert D. Ramsey III retired from the US Army in 1993 after 24 years 

of service as an Infantry officer that included tours in Vietnam, Korea, and 

the Sinai. He earned an M.A. in history from Rice University. Mr. Ramsey 

taught military history for 3 years at the United States Military Academy 

and 6 years at the US Army Command and General Staff College. Mr. 

Ramsey is the author of Global War on Terrorism Occasional Paper 18, 

Advising Indigenous Forces: American Advisors in Korea, Vietnam, and 

El Salvador; and Occasional Paper 19, Advice for Advisors: Suggestions 

and Observations from Lawrence to the Present.


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