United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 

05-1311, -1335 

DEPUY SPINE, INC. (formerly known as Depuy Acromed, Inc.) 

and BIEDERMANN MOTECH GMBH, 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

v. 

MEDTRONIC SOFAMOR DANEK, INC. 

(formerly known as Sofamor Danek Group, Inc.) 

and MEDTRONIC SOFAMOR DANEK USA, INC., 

Defendants-Cross Appellants. 

Kenneth R. Adamo, Jones Day, of Dallas, Texas, argued for plaintiffs-appellants. 

With him on the brief were Calvin P. Griffith, Robert C. Kahrl, and Patrick J. Norton, of 

Cleveland, Ohio; Gregory A. Castanias, of Washington, DC; and Brian J. Murray, of 

Chicago, Illinois. 

Dirk D. Thomas, Robins, Kaplan, Miller & Ciresi L.L.P, of Washington, DC, 

argued for defendants-cross appellants. With him on the brief were Robert A. Auchter

and André J. Bahou; and David E. Marder, of Boston, Massachusetts. 

Appealed from: United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts 

Senior Judge Edward F. Harrington 
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

 

 

05-1311, -1335 

DEPUY SPINE, INC. (formerly known as Depuy Acromed, Inc.) 

and BIEDERMANN MOTECH GMBH, 

 Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

v. 

MEDTRONIC SOFAMOR DANEK, INC. 

(formerly known as Sofamor Danek Group, Inc.) 

and MEDTRONIC SOFAMOR DANEK USA, INC., 

 Defendants-Cross Appellants. 

__________________________ 

DECIDED: November 20, 2006 

__________________________ 

Before NEWMAN, LINN, and PROST, Circuit Judges. 

LINN, Circuit Judge. 

 DePuy Spine, Inc. (formerly DePuy AcroMed, Inc.) and Biedermann Motech 

GmbH (collectively “DePuy”) appeal from grants of summary judgment that the Vertex® 

and bottom-loaded types of devices marketed by Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc. and 

Medtronic Sofamor Danek USA, Inc. (collectively “Medtronic”) do not infringe U.S. 

Patent No. 5,207,678 (’678 patent). DePuy Acromed, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, 

Inc., No. 01-10165-EFH (D. Mass. Apr. 14, 2003) (“All Models Order”); DePuy Acromed, 

Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., No. 01-10165-EFH (D. Mass. Feb. 24, 2004) 

(“Vertex Order”). Medtronic cross-appeals from the denial of its motion for judgment as 
a matter of law (JMOL) and the final judgment entered after a jury verdict finding that 

Medtronic’s MAS polyaxial pedicle screws infringe the ’678 patent by equivalents and 

awarding lost profit damages. DePuy Acromed, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 

No. 01-10165-EFH (D. Mass. Feb. 10, 2005). We conclude that the district court erred 

in granting summary judgment of non-infringement on the Vertex® model. We also

conclude that district court’s judgment of non-infringement for the bottom-loaded screw 

devices was proper and that it correctly determined that Medtronic was not entitled to

judgment as a matter of law on the issues of non-infringement or lost profit damages for 

the MAS polyaxial pedicle screws and correctly entered judgment of infringement as to 

the MAS device. Thus, we affirm-in-part, reverse-in-part, and remand. 

BACKGROUND 

DePuy Spine and Biedermann Motech are the exclusive licensee and assignee, 

respectively, of the ’678 patent. The ’678 patent involves pedicle screws and receiver

members used in spinal surgeries. Pedicle screws are implanted into the vertebrae 

during surgery. The head of each pedicle screw is connected to a receiver portion, and 

a threaded rod connects the receiver portions of several screws. Together, the screws, 

receiver portions, and rods are used to stabilize spinal column segments. 

In the prior art, it was difficult for surgeons to rigidly install the screws into

adjacent vertebrae in the exact positions needed to properly align the receiver portions

to receive the threaded rod. To overcome this problem, improved structures were 

developed that used a spherical screw head and a halved receiver portion with a 

spherical cavity. This allowed pivoted movement of the receiver portion much like a 

05-1311, -1335 2
ball-and-socket joint, but required precise machining of matching spherical portions of

different sizes and therefore resulted in high stocking costs. 

The ’678 patent attempts to reduce stocking costs for pedicle screws by using a 

uniform receiver portion that can be placed on different sizes of spherical heads. Claim

1 is representative of all claims on appeal: 

1. Device for stabilizing spinal column segments, comprising a pedicle

screw (1) having a threaded shaft portion (3) and a spherically-shaped 

head (4) at the end of said threaded shaft portion, a receiver member (5) 

flexibly connected to said head (4), said receiver member being provided 

with two holes for receiving a rod 916) [sic:(16)], a receiver chamber (7) 

being provided within said receiver member (5), the receiver chamber (7) 

having at one end thereof a bore (8) for passing the threaded shaft portion 

(3) therethrough and an inner hollow spherically-shaped portion (9) for 

receiving the head (4) of said screw (1), an opening (10) being provided 

opposite said bore (8) for inserting said screw (1), said device further 

comprising a compression member (18) for exerting a force onto said 

head (4) such that said head is pressed against the hollow sphericallyshaped portion (9). 

’678 patent, col. 4, ll. 9-24 (emphasis added). The highlighted limitations are at issue on 

appeal and are termed, respectively, as the “bore,” “spherically-shaped,” “opening,” 

“compression member,” and “pressed against” limitations. The invention is illustrated in

figures 1 through 3 of the ’678 patent, which are reproduced below: 

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On January 26, 2001, DePuy filed suit against Medtronic asserting infringement 

of the ’678 patent based on Medtronic’s MAS, Vertex®, M8, M10, and Sextant models

of polyaxial pedicle screws. The MAS and Vertex® models are assembled by placing 

the screw through a top opening in the receiver member and then securing the top with 

a crown. In the Vertex® model, the interior portion of the receiver member adjacent to 

the screw head is of an approximately conical shape; the same area in the MAS model 

is shaped like a portion of a toroid. The receiver portions for the MAS and Vertex® 

models are depicted below, with arrows indicating the relevant conical and toroidal 

portions. 

05-1311, -1335 4
MAS Model Vertex® Model 

The M8, M10, and Sextant models (“the bottom-loaded screw models”) are assembled 

by first inserting the crown and screw head into the bottom of the receiver member and 

then inserting a “snap ring.” The snap ring in the bottom-loaded screw models retains 

the screw head in a manner similar to how the conical or toroidal areas in the MAS and 

Vertex® models retain the screw head. In the bottom-loaded screw models, the screw 

head is too large to pass through the opening at the top of the receiver member. 

Medtronic filed three motions seeking summary judgment of non-infringement in 

January 2003. The first motion asserted that all models lacked the “compression 

member” limitation, and the second motion asserted that the Vertex® and MAS models

lacked the “spherically-shaped” limitation. Both motions were denied. All Models

Order, slip op. at 1. The third motion asserted that the bottom-loaded screw models did

not possess either the “bore” or “opening” limitations. The district court granted the third 

motion, concluding that the bottom-loaded screw models lacked the “bore” limitation 

literally and that the doctrine of equivalents could not be applied without vitiating that

limitation. Id., slip op. at 2-3. 

The court then conducted a hearing on claim construction and construed two 

terms at issue in this appeal. The court’s construction of those terms is contained in a 

05-1311, -1335 5
Memorandum Opinion and Order dated October 27, 2003. DePuy Acromed, Inc. v. 

Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., No. 01-10165-EFH (D. Mass. Oct. 27, 2003) (“Claim 

Construction Order”). The court construed the “spherically-shaped” limitation to mean 

“approximately spherical, such as a globe or basketball.” Id., slip op. at 17. The court

also construed the “compression member” limitation and held that it was not a meansplus-function claim limitation; instead, it construed that limitation “to require an 

intermediate piece (or member) that applies compression force to the head of the 

screw.” Id. 

Based on the court’s construction of the “spherically-shaped” limitation,

Medtronic filed a motion for summary judgment of non-infringement for the Vertex® 

model. Vertex Order, slip op. at 1. The court concluded that the Vertex® model did not 

literally infringe the ’678 patent because the inner hollow space of the receiver member 

had a conical shape that was not approximately spherical. Id., slip op. at 2. The court

also concluded that the Vertex® model did not infringe under the doctrine of

equivalents. Id., slip op. at 3. Citing Tronzo v. Biomet, Inc., 156 F.3d 1154 (Fed. Cir. 

1998), the court held that under the “all elements” rule, it could not find a conical shape 

to be equivalent to a spherical shape without reading the limitation out of the claim. Id., 

slip op. at 4. The court also found that the Vertex® model did not do “substantially the 

same thing” as the device in the ’678 patent because the screw head contacts an edge 

of the receiver member rather than a larger area. Id., slip op. at 5. 

The case proceeded to a jury trial on the MAS model. The jury verdict found that 

the MAS model infringed the ’678 patent under the doctrine of equivalents and awarded 

lost profits and reasonable royalty damages. Medtronic moved for judgment as a matter 

05-1311, -1335 6
of law that the MAS model did not infringe under the doctrine of equivalents and that 

DePuy was not entitled to lost profit damages; both motions were denied. 

On appeal, DePuy challenges the court’s finding that no issue of material fact 

exists as to whether the bottom-loaded screw and Vertex® models infringe the ’678 

patent and the court’s application of the “all elements” rule. On cross-appeal, Medtronic

challenges the court’s construction of the “compression member” limitation and the 

court’s denial of its motions for JMOL. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1295(a)(1). 

DISCUSSION 

I. Standard of Review 

This court reviews a district court’s grant of summary judgment of noninfringement de novo. Hilgraeve Corp. v. McAfee Assocs., Inc., 224 F.3d 1349, 1352 

(Fed. Cir. 2000). Summary judgment is proper only if there are no genuine issues of

material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ.

P. 56(c); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986). 

Claim construction is an issue of law, see Markman v. Westview Instruments, 

Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 970-71 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996), that we 

review de novo. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en

banc); Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1456 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en

banc). Infringement, whether literal or under the doctrine of equivalents, is a question of 

fact. Ferguson Beauregard v. Mega Sys., Inc., 350 F.3d 1327, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 

The determination of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents is limited by two 

primary legal doctrines, prosecution history estoppel and the “all elements” rule, the 

05-1311, -1335 7
applications of which are questions of law. Seachange Int’l, Inc. v. C-COR, Inc., 413 

F.3d 1361, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 

“We review the district court’s denial of a motion for JMOL without deference,

applying the same standard employed by the district court.” Honeywell, Int’l Inc. v.

Hamilton Sundstrand Corp., 370 F.3d 1131, 1139 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (en banc). Federal 

Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a)(1) provides that a court may grant a motion for JMOL only 

where “there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for [the 

non-movant].” Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(1). 

“Whether lost profits are legally compensable in a particular situation is a 

question of law that we review de novo.” Poly-America, L.P. v. GSE Lining Tech., Inc., 

383 F.3d 1303, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 

Interpretation of contract terms is a matter not unique to our exclusive jurisdiction 

and is therefore reviewed under regional circuit law. See Sun Studs, Inc. v. Applied 

Theory Assocs., Inc., 772 F.2d 1557, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1985). The First Circuit treats 

interpretation of contract terms as a legal question reviewed de novo, unless there is

such ambiguity in the language as to create a question of fact. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v.

Greenwich Ins. Co., 417 F.3d 193, 196-97 (1st Cir. 2005). Whether ambiguity exists is

considered a question of law. Id.

II. Vertex® Model 

DePuy argues that the district court improperly granted summary judgment of 

non-infringement on the Vertex® model because a genuine issue of material fact exists

on both literal infringement and infringement under the doctrine of equivalents. With

05-1311, -1335 8
respect to the doctrine of equivalents, DePuy argues that the court erred in applying 

both the “all elements” rule and the function-way-result test. 

Medtronic counters that the receiver member of the Vertex® device has a 

conically-shaped hollow portion, rather than a spherically-shaped portion, and therefore 

does not literally infringe. Medtronic also counters that the court properly applied the

relevant law in examining infringement by equivalents. Alternatively, Medtronic 

counters that even if a “spherically-shaped” equivalent is present in the Vertex® model,

the Vertex® model does not meet the “pressed against” limitation because the screw 

head rests against an edge of the equivalent and not against the actual sphericallyshaped portion equivalent. We will begin our analysis with Medtronic’s alternative 

argument. 

A. “Spherically-Shaped” and “Pressed Against”

Claim 1 recites that the screw “head is pressed against the hollow sphericallyshaped portion.” The court construed “spherically-shaped” to mean “approximately 

spherical, such as a globe or a basketball.” The parties do not dispute this construction 

on appeal. The parties dispute, however, whether the “pressed against” limitation 

requires that the screw head engage the entire spherically-shaped portion or whether it 

is enough that the head engage just the “edge” of the spherically-shaped portion. 

In determining the meaning of the disputed claim limitation, we look principally to 

the intrinsic evidence of record, examining the claim language itself, the written 

description, and the prosecution history, if in evidence. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312-

17. First, the claim language does not indicate that “hollow spherically-shaped portion”

must be limited so as not to include the edge of that portion, nor does it indicate how 

05-1311, -1335 9
much of the hollow spherically-shaped portion must be “pressed against” the screw

head. Claim 4, which depends from claim 1, requires that “the radii of the hollow 

spherically-shaped portions (9, 19) and of the spherically-shaped screw head (4) [be] 

substantially equal.” ’678 patent, col. 4, ll. 37-40. That implies that independent claim 1 

must be broad enough to read on a device with components of unequal radii that

nonetheless are pressed against each other. If the screw head has a smaller radius 

than the hollow spherically-shaped portion, the only part of the spherically-shaped 

portion against which the screw head would be pressed would be the edge of the hollow 

spherically-shaped portion. 

Second, the specification does not indicate that the “hollow spherically-shaped 

portion” must be limited to exclude the edge of that portion or that “pressed against” 

requires a certain amount of contact between the spherically-shaped portion and the

screw head. In the absence of a stated reason to exclude the edge, it would ordinarily

and customarily be understood that the referenced portion includes any and all parts of

the structure. Similarly, in the absence of a stated reason to require a certain amount of

contact, it would ordinarily and customarily be understood that the referenced portion is

pressed against a screw head when any amount of that portion presses against the

screw head. Figures 1 and 2 of the ’678 patent depict hollow spherically-shaped portion

9 in crosshatching that appears to include the edge of the portion. The corresponding

description of that portion does not exclude the edge, noting that “[a] portion 9 in the

form of a hollow spherical segment is provided in the interior immediately adjacent to 

the bore.” ’678 patent, col. 2, ll. 21-23. That description indicates that the relevant

portion extends all the way to the bore, which necessarily implies that it includes the 

05-1311, -1335 10
edge. Further, the description does not indicate how much of the spherically-shaped 

portion presses against the screw head; rather, it notes only that there is “contact” 

between the components. Id., col. 2, ll. 33-34. The prosecution history provides no 

further guidance. 

For the foregoing reasons, we find Medtronic’s argument unpersuasive, and we 

conclude that “hollow spherically-shaped portion” includes the edge of that portion and

that the screw head is “pressed against” the “hollow spherically-shaped portion” if it 

presses against all or any part of that portion—including the edge. 

B. Conical Walls 

The district court found that there was not a genuine issue of material fact as to 

literal infringement because the shape of the inner hollow space in the Vertex® model is 

conical, with “angular rather than spherical” walls. Vertex Order, slip op. at 2-3. The 

court also found that even if a portion of the shape is spherical, that spherically-shaped 

portion does not contact the head of the screw. Id., slip op. at 3. 

On appeal, DePuy points to two comparisons as evincing a question of fact 

regarding a spherically-shaped portion in the Vertex® model. First, DePuy points to 

pictures of a basketball and a selected portion of the basketball, which DePuy submitted 

as exhibits before the district court. DePuy argues that the picture of the selected 

portion demonstrates that a thin slice of a sphere creates a profile that appears conical.

Depictions of those exhibits are shown below: 

05-1311, -1335 11
Second, DePuy points to a comparison of a cross section of the Vertex® model and 

Figure 3 of the ’678 patent. That comparison is shown in the following figures, with

arrows added to indicate the relevant conical and spherical walls: 

Spherical wall 

Conical wall 

Vertex® Model Figure 3 of the ’678 Patent 

DePuy argues that, like the selected portion of the basketball, the Vertex® model could 

be viewed as possessing a spherically-shaped portion that appears conical in profile. 

Although these comparisons do highlight that at varying degrees of magnification 

or abstraction a curved surface can appear angular, they do not create a genuine issue

of material fact as to whether the Vertex® model possesses the “spherically-shaped” 

limitation. DePuy points to no evidence that specifically identifies a region in the 

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Vertex® model as “spherical.” Indeed, DePuy’s expert acknowledged that the 

engineering drawing of the Vertex® model shows a “conically-shaped” hollow portion,

and that a photomicrograph of the Vertex® receiver shows a ledge—not a sphere—

even if it contains some rounding at the edges. At best, these declarations identify a

conical or ledge structure; they do not constitute evidence of a portion that meets the 

literal terms “approximately spherical, such as a globe or a basketball.” Therefore, the 

district court did not err in concluding that there was no genuine issue of material fact as

to literal infringement. 

C. Doctrine of Equivalents 

The district court determined that it “cannot find that the cylindrical-conical shape 

of [the Vertex® model’s] receiver member is equivalent to the spherically-shaped 

portion disclosed in the ’678 patent.” Vertex Order, slip op. at 4. The court first applied 

the “all elements” rule and concluded that, as in Tronzo, treating a conical shape as the 

equivalent of a spherical shape would vitiate the “spherically-shaped” limitation. Id. The 

court also applied the function-way-result test and determined that, because the screw

head in the Vertex® model “is merely pressed against an edge or lip on the receiver

member,” the Vertex® model does not do “substantially the same thing” as the device 

in the ’678 patent. Id., slip op. at 5. 

Under the doctrine of equivalents, “a product or process that does not literally

infringe upon the express terms of a patent claim may nonetheless be found to infringe 

if there is ‘equivalence’ between the elements of the accused product or process and 

the claimed elements of the patented invention.” Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis

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Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 21 (1997) (citing Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods.

Co., 339 U.S. 605, 609 (1950)). The doctrine recognizes that 

[t]he language in the patent claims may not capture every nuance of the 

invention or describe with complete precision the range of its novelty. If

patents were always interpreted by their literal terms, their value would be 

greatly diminished. Unimportant and insubstantial substitutes for certain 

elements could defeat the patent, and its value to inventors could be 

destroyed by simple acts of copying. 

Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 731 (2002); 

Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 605 (“[T]o permit imitation of a patented invention which does

not copy every literal detail would be to convert the protection of the patent grant into a 

hollow and useless thing.”). 

One limit on the doctrine of equivalents is the “all elements” rule. The “all 

elements” rule attempts to balance the doctrine of equivalents with the basic patent law 

principle that claim language defines the scope of an invention and every limitation is

material. 

Each element contained in a patent claim is deemed material to defining 

the scope of the patented invention, and thus the doctrine of equivalents 

must be applied to individual elements of the claim, not to the invention as

a whole. It is important to ensure that the application of the doctrine, even 

as to an individual element, is not allowed such broad play as to effectively

eliminate that element in its entirety. 

Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 29. Thus, as a practical matter, the “all elements” rule 

informs a doctrine of equivalents analysis by requiring that equivalence be assessed on 

a limitation-by-limitation basis, rather than from the perspective of the invention as a 

whole, and that no limitation be read completely out of the claim. Freedman Seating 

Co. v. Am. Seating Co., 420 F.3d 1350, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 

05-1311, -1335 14
 In Warner-Jenkinson, the Supreme Court provided guidance for determining 

when resort to the doctrine of equivalents is precluded as a matter of law. First, the 

Court noted that “[w]here the evidence is such that no reasonable jury could determine

two elements to be equivalent, district courts are obliged to grant partial or complete 

summary judgment.” Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 39 n.8 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56;

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986)). Second, the Court noted that 

“under the particular facts of a case, . . . if a theory of equivalence would entirely vitiate 

a particular claim element, partial or complete judgment should be rendered by the 

court.” Id. at 39 n.8. 

Informed by this guidance, we have held that in certain instances, the “all 

elements” rule forecloses resort to the doctrine of equivalents because, on the facts or

theories presented in a case, a limitation would be read completely out of the claim—

i.e., the limitation would be effectively removed or “vitiated.” For instance, we have

concluded that in some cases, the evidence was such that no reasonable jury could 

determine a proffered equivalent to be insubstantially different from the claimed 

limitation. See, e.g., Freedman Seating, 420 F.3d at 1361 (holding that a limitation was

vitiated in part because the structural difference in the accused device “is not a ‘subtle 

difference in degree,’ but rather ‘a clear, substantial difference or difference in kind’” 

(internal citation omitted)); Ethicon, 149 F.3d 1309, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (holding that

the “all elements” rule barred application of the doctrine of equivalents because, on the

facts presented, no reasonable jury could find the differences to be insubstantial). We 

have also concluded that in some cases, the patentee’s theory of equivalence was 

legally insufficient because, rather than demonstrate an insubstantial difference 

05-1311, -1335 15
between a limitation and an element in the accused device, the theory effectively 

eliminated a limitation in its entirety. See, e.g., Tronzo, 156 F.3d at 1160 (holding that 

the patentee’s theory of equivalence—that “any shape would be equivalent to the 

conical limitation”—would write such a limitation out of the claims (emphasis in 

original)); Forest Labs., Inc. v. Abbot Labs., 239 F.3d 1305, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2001) 

(holding that the patentee’s theory of equivalence—that a limitation on the percentages 

of water in a composition was “irrelevant” when compared to the accused composition—

vitiated such a limitation). Thus, the “all elements” rule generally is not met—and 

therefore a claim limitation can be said to be vitiated—if the theory or evidence of

equivalence is legally incapable of establishing that the differences between the 

limitation in the claim and the accused device are insubstantial; i.e., if the theory or

evidence is so legally insufficient as to warrant a holding of non-infringement as a 

matter of law. Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 39 n.8; Metro. R.R. Co. v. Moore, 121 

U.S. 558, 569 (1887) (“Strictly speaking, evidence is said to be insufficient in law only in 

those cases where there is a total absence of such proof, either as to its quantity or

kind, as in the particular case some rule of law requires as essential to the 

establishment of the fact.”); see also Sage Prods., Inc. v. Devon Indus., Inc., 126 F.3d 

1420, 1425-26, 1429-30 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 

Our decision in Sage Products, decided shortly after Warner-Jenkinson, 

illustrates the genesis of such an analysis. For one invention in that case, we held that 

resort to the doctrine of equivalents was foreclosed because no reasonable jury could 

find that the differences in the accused device were insubstantial. Sage Products, 126 

F.3d at 1423-26. In considering equivalence, we noted the simplicity of the structure, 

05-1311, -1335 16
the specificity and narrowness of the claim, and the foreseeability of variations at the 

time the claim was filed. Id. at 1425 (“No subtlety of language or complexity of the 

technology, nor any subsequent change in the state of the art, such as later-developed 

technology, obfuscated the significance of this limitation at the time of its 

incorporation.”). Because under these particular facts, no reasonable jury could find

that the differences in the accused device were insubstantial, we concluded that a

finding of infringement by equivalents would effectively remove the relevant limitations

from the claim and affirmed the district court’s summary judgment of non-infringement. 

Id. at 1425-26. 

For a second invention at issue in Sage Products, we held that the doctrine of 

equivalents was foreclosed because the patentee’s theory of infringement was 

improper. Id. at 1429-30. In considering equivalence for a means-plus-function 

limitation, we noted that the claimed function included the ability to control access by

moving between open and closed positions. Id. at 1428-29. The accused product used 

a permanently locking lid that could not move back to an open position. Id. at 1427. 

We noted that the patentee’s theory of equivalence—that a permanently locking lid is

equivalent to an openable lid—was unsustainable in that it did not offer a “function 

equivalent to that expressly recited in the claimed element.” Id. at 1429. Because that

theory could not support a conclusion of equivalence regardless of the evidence, we 

concluded that the theory was legally insufficient, declined to apply the doctrine of 

equivalents, and affirmed the court’s summary judgment of non-infringement. Id. at

1429-30. 

05-1311, -1335 17
It is important to note that when we have held that the doctrine of equivalents 

cannot be applied to an accused device because it “vitiates” a claim limitation, it was not

to hold that the doctrine is always foreclosed whenever a claim limitation does not

literally read on an element of an accused device; such an interpretation of the “all 

elements” rule would swallow the doctrine of equivalents entirely. See Ethicon, 149 

F.3d at 1316-17 (holding that a similar interpretation “would force the All Elements rule 

to swallow the doctrine of equivalents, reducing the application of the doctrine to nothing 

more than a repeated analysis of literal infringement” (footnote omitted)). “[A]ny 

analysis of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents necessarily deals with subject 

matter that is ‘beyond,’ ‘ignored’ by, and not included in the literal scope of a claim.” Id.

at 1317 (emphasis in original). A holding that the doctrine of equivalents cannot be 

applied to an accused device because it “vitiates” a claim limitation is nothing more than 

a conclusion that the evidence is such that no reasonable jury could conclude that an 

element of an accused device is equivalent to an element called for in the claim, or that 

the theory of equivalence to support the conclusion of infringement otherwise lacks legal 

sufficiency. 

Here, in applying the “all elements” rule, the district court relied solely on Tronzo

and concluded that “the cylindrical-conical shape of the [Vertex® model] cannot infringe 

the ’678 patent without reading out of the claim the express requirement that the screw

head be ‘pressed against the hollow, spherically-shaped portion.’” Vertex Order, slip 

op. at 4 (emphasis added). The court also noted that “permitting the cylindrical-conical 

shape of the [Vertex® model] to be considered equivalent to the spherical shape 

required by the ’678 patent vitiates the ’678 patent requirement that the spherically05-1311, -1335 18
shaped head . . . be pressed against an inner, hollow, spherically-shaped portion of the 

receiver member.” Id., slip op. at 4 n.3 (emphasis added). The district court also 

determined that this conclusion was supported by the function-way-result test because 

the conically-shaped portion of the Vertex® model and the “spherically-shaped” 

limitation of the claim do not “do ‘substantially the same thing.’” Id., slip op. at 5. 

We find no support in the present case for the district court’s conclusion that 

applying the doctrine of equivalents would vitiate or read out the “spherically-shaped”

limitation. Our decision in Tronzo is factually distinguishable.1

 In Tronzo, the invention

related to artificial hip sockets and the patent at issue was a continuation-in-part. 156 

F.3d at 1156-57. The independent claims that were added in the continuation covered

a prosthesis socket with no specific shape. Id. at 1157-58. Because the written 

description only disclosed a conical shape for the prosthesis and characterized other

shapes as “prior art” and “inferior” to a conical shape, we held that the independent

claims were unsupported by the written description, not entitled to the parent’s filing 

date, and thus invalid in view of intervening prior art. See id. at 1158-60. The only valid 

claims at issue in Tronzo were dependent claims that limited the prosthesis body to 

having “a generally conical outer surface.” The patentee attempted to prove 

infringement of an accused product with a hemispherical outer surface under the 

doctrine of equivalents because, “[a]ccording to the expert testimony, any shape would 

be equivalent to the conical limitation.” Id. at 1160 (emphasis in original). The theory of 

 1 As we noted in Optical Disc Corp. v. Del Mar Avionics, “Tronzo does not 

stand for the proposition that a claim limitation describing a specific shape of a claimed 

structure cannot be infringed under the doctrine of equivalents by a differently shaped 

structure.” 208 F.3d 1324, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2000). Instead, Tronzo is limited to the facts 

and theories of equivalence presented in that case. 

05-1311, -1335 19
equivalence, therefore, did not identify a specific element of the accused product as an 

equivalent to the “generally conical” limitation; rather, the patentee argued that any

shape would be equivalent to a conical shape, despite clear indications in the written 

description to the contrary. We concluded that such a theory was insufficient as a 

matter of law and thus “would write the ‘generally conical outer surface’ limitation out the 

claims.” Id. (citing Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 39 n.8). Accordingly, we reversed 

the finding of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents. Id. 

Here, unlike the patentee in Tronzo, DePuy did not propose that any shape 

would meet the “spherically-shaped” limitation. Rather, DePuy’s expert presented

particularized declarations demonstrating its theory that a specific element of the 

accused device—the hollow conically-shaped portion of the receiver member—was 

insubstantially different from the corresponding “spherically-shaped” limitation because

it supported the screw head, allowed for flexible movement, and—when the 

compression member is engaged—creates a rigid lock between the screw head and the 

receiver. Indeed, the expert expressly identified certain shapes that were different from 

the accused device but would not be capable of supporting the screw head, allowing 

flexible movement, and creating a rigid lock when the compression member is engaged. 

Also, unlike the patent at issue in Tronzo, the written description in the ’678 patent does 

not label other shapes as “prior art” and “inferior.” Thus, unlike the theory presented in 

Tronzo, DePuy’s theory of equivalence was not improper. 

The district court also erred in concluding that no reasonable jury could find the 

conically-shaped portion to be an equivalent to the “spherically-shaped” limitation 

because it does not do “substantially the same thing.” The district court’s conclusion 

05-1311, -1335 20
rested solely on the fact that the screw head in the Vertex® model contacts an edge of

the hollow portion as opposed to pressing against a much larger area. Vertex Order, 

slip op. at 5. As discussed above, properly construed, the “hollow spherically-shaped 

portion” includes the edge of that portion. Because the screw head in the Vertex® 

model presses against an edge of a hollow conically-shaped portion argued to be an 

equivalent of the “spherically-shaped” limitation, a question of fact exists as to whether

the difference in the equivalent is substantial. 

Because DePuy’s theory of equivalence is not legally insufficient, and because 

we find that a question of fact exists as to whether the difference between the 

“spherically-shaped” limitation and the alleged equivalent is substantial, we hold that the

district court erred in granting summary judgment of non-infringement under the doctrine 

of equivalents for the Vertex® model. 

III. Bottom-Loaded Screw Models

DePuy argues that the district court erred in granting summary judgment of noninfringement for the bottom-loaded screw models because the court reached its 

determination without construing the “bore” limitation on which the decision was based. 

DePuy also argues that, to the extent a de facto construction was used in the court’s

analysis, the construction incorrectly added a process limitation to a product claim by

construing “passing” to mean that a screw shaft must move through the bore. DePuy

argues that “passing” means that the screw shaft is positioned to extend through the 

bore and does not imply movement. Alternatively, DePuy argues that even if “passing” 

does imply movement, the screw shaft moves through a snap ring element that meets 

the “bore” limitation literally or as an equivalent. 

05-1311, -1335 21
Medtronic counters that DePuy’s argument that “passing” means “extending” was

waived because it was first advanced on a motion for reconsideration and not originally

argued in opposition to Medtronic’s summary judgment motion. Medtronic also

counters that the district court correctly construed the “bore” limitation as requiring a 

bore that is part of the receiver chamber when a threaded screw shaft moves through it, 

and that such a construction does not import a process limitation into the claims. In

passing, Medtronic asserts that the district court recognized that the bottom-loaded 

screw models also lacked the “opening” limitation and that this limitation provides a 

further basis for affirming summary judgment of non-infringement. 

Although the district court quoted language from claim 1 of the ’678 patent that 

included the “opening” limitation, it is clear that the court based its conclusion on the 

“bore” limitation and not the “opening” limitation. See All Models Order, slip op. at 2 (“In 

particular, the defendant’s [bottom-loaded screw models] lack ‘. . . the receiver chamber 

(7) having at one end thereof a bore for passing the threaded shaft portion (3) 

therethrough.’”). Indeed, the entirety of the infringement analysis was focused on

whether the bottom-loaded screw models possessed the “bore” limitation: 

It is important to the Court’s conclusion that claim 1 requires the bore, 

through which the threaded shaft of the screw must pass, to be part of the 

receiver chamber . . . . Because Medtronic’s [bottom-loaded screw 

models] do not embody this limitation, they do not literally infringe claim 1.

Nor can infringement be found through application of the doctrine of

equivalents.” 

Id., slip op. at 2-3 (citations omitted). Thus, nothing in the district court’s summary 

judgment opinion addresses the “opening” limitation. However, “[w]e sit to review 

judgments, not opinions.” Stratoflex, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp., 713 F.2d 1530, 1540 (Fed. 

Cir. 1983). The issue was fully argued below and has been raised by Medrad on 

05-1311, -1335 22
appeal; we therefore may address the “opening” limitation. See Glaxo, Inc. v. 

Torpharm, Inc., 153 F.3d 1366, 1371-72 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“When a matter comes before 

an appellate court following summary judgment, the appellate court is free to adopt a 

ground advanced by the appellee in seeking summary judgment but not adopted by the 

trial court.”). 

The language of claim 1 of the ’678 patent claims a receiver member with a bore 

at one end and an opening “opposite said bore (8) for inserting said screw.” The claim 

language therefore identifies two clear requirements for the opening: (1) it must be 

physically located opposite from the bore and (2) it must be “for inserting said screw.” 

The specification indicates that the opening 10 and hollow cylindrical portion 11 must be 

of sufficient size to allow the screw head 4 to be inserted into the hollow sphericalsegment-shaped portion 9. ’678 patent, col. 2, ll. 21-34. Thus, when read in view of the 

specification, “for inserting said screw” is a functional limitation that requires that the 

opening be capable of inserting the screw. We therefore construe the “opening” 

limitation to mean that there must be an opening in the receiver member that is opposite 

the bore and is capable of inserting the screw. 

Medtronic asserts—and DePuy does not contest—that the aperture at the top of

the bottom-loaded screw models is not capable of inserting the screw because the 

diameter of that aperture is smaller than the diameter of the screw head. Medtronic 

argues that this aperture does not meet the requirements of the “opening” limitation.

DePuy appears to counter that the interior space of the receiver member—and not the 

top aperture—meets the requirement of the “opening” limitation. 

05-1311, -1335 23
We agree with Medtronic. DePuy’s theory of infringement argues that the snap 

ring in the bottom-loaded screw models satisfies the “bore” limitation. Once assembled,

the interior space of the receiver member is located next to such bore, not opposite to it. 

The only aperture that is opposite to the “bore” that DePuy advances is the aperture at 

the top of the receiver member. However, because it is uncontested that the screw

cannot be inserted through that aperture, it cannot meet the functional restriction of the 

“opening” limitation. Therefore, we conclude as a matter of law that the bottom-loaded 

screw models do not posses the “opening” limitation and affirm the district court’s 

summary judgment on that basis. Because we affirm summary judgment of no 

infringement on the basis of the “opening” limitation, we need not address DePuy’s

arguments with respect to the “bore” limitation. 

IV. MAS Model 

On cross-appeal, Medtronic argues that the district court erred in denying its

motion for JMOL of non-infringement of the MAS model because DePuy failed to offer

evidence that the MAS model possessed an equivalent to the “pressed against”

limitation that performed substantially the same function, in substantially the same way,

to achieve substantially the same result. Specifically, Medtronic acknowledges that 

DePuy offered function-way-result evidence related to the “hollow spherically-shaped

portion” limitation, but argues that no function-way-result evidence was offered 

demonstrating that pressing against an edge of a hollow portion is the equivalent of 

pressing against a hollow portion. Medtronic also argues that the court erred in denying

its motion because the jury’s finding of infringement by equivalence vitiated the 

“spherically-shaped” limitation. Medtronic argues that here, as in Tronzo, DePuy’s 

05-1311, -1335 24
expert offered a theory that “any shape” would meet the “spherically-shaped” limitation,

which reads “spherically-shaped” out of the claim. 

DePuy counters that it introduced expert testimony that the MAS device 

possessed an equivalent to the “spherically-shaped” limitation and that the screw head 

literally presses against that equivalent. DePuy also counters that its expert did not

testify to an “any shape will do” theory of equivalence. 

Medtronic’s arguments are unpersuasive. First, as discussed in Part II.A, supra, 

the proper construction of “hollow spherically-shaped portion” includes the edge of that

portion. There is no dispute that DePuy presented sufficient evidence that the MAS 

models possessed the “hollow spherically-shaped portion” or its equivalent. DePuy also

presented evidence that the MAS model literally meets the “pressed against” limitation 

when its expert testified that the screw head presses against an edge of a hollow 

spherically-shaped portion or the edge of an equivalent. That evidence, together with 

reasonable inferences in favor of the verdict, make clear that Medtronic was not entitled 

to judgment as a matter of law on this issue. 

Second, DePuy’s expert did not offer an “any shape will do” theory of 

equivalence similar to the theory offered in Tronzo. In Tronzo, the expert did not identify 

a specific element in the accused device that was an equivalent to the “generally

conical” limitation, but rather testified that any shape would be an equivalent to such a 

limitation. 156 F.3d at 1160. Here, DePuy’s expert testified that the specific hollow 

shape of the MAS model was equivalent to the “spherically-shaped” limitation according 

to the function-way-result test. The “any shape” testimony cited by Medtronic was a 

reference to earlier deposition testimony on cross-examination and ignores the 

05-1311, -1335 25
witness’s explanation on redirect. On redirect, the expert explained that at the 

deposition, he believed the question was directed to whether the “spherically-shaped”

limitation had to be literally present in an accused device. His answer reflected his

belief that an equivalent would meet the same limitation. Such an exchange at trial 

does not constitute an assertion or admission that “any shape” meets the “sphericallyshaped” limitation. Because DePuy did not offer a legally insufficient theory of 

equivalence, Medtronic is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law on this issue. 

V. All Accused Devices 

Finally, Medtronic argues that the district court failed to properly construe the 

“compression member” limitation as a means-plus-function limitation, and that under a 

proper construction, all three accused devices do not infringe. Relying on Mas-Hamilton 

Group v. Lagard, Inc., 156 F.3d 1206, 1213 (Fed. Cir. 1998), Medtronic argues on 

cross-appeal that “compression member” is properly construed as a means-plusfunction limitation despite the absence of the term “means” and that when the claims

are so construed, none of the accused structures infringe. Specifically, Medtronic

argues that claim 1 of the ’678 patent identifies “compression member” only in terms of 

function, not structure, and that no credible extrinsic evidence demonstrates that the 

term has a well-understood structural meaning in the relevant art. 

DePuy counters that the absence of the term “means” creates a presumption that

“compression member” is not a means-plus-function limitation, that all testifying

engineers recognized that the term “compression member” referred to a well-known

class of structures, that claim 1 itself imposes certain constraints on the structure of the 

compression member, and thus the district court’s construction was correct. 

05-1311, -1335 26
“Means-plus-function claiming applies only to purely functional limitations that do 

not provide the structure that performs the recited function.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1311 

(citing Watts v. XL Sys. Inc., 232 F.3d 877, 880-81 (Fed. Cir. 2000)). “[A] claim term 

that does not use ‘means’ will trigger the rebuttable presumption that [35 U.S.C.] § 112 

¶ 6 does not apply.” CCS Fitness v. Brunswick Corp, 288 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 

2002). This presumption can be rebutted “by showing that the claim element recite[s] a 

function without reciting sufficient structure for performing that function.” Watts, 232 

F.3d at 880. “Our cases make clear, however, that the presumption flowing from the 

absence of the term ‘means’ is a strong one that is not readily overcome.” Lighting 

World, Inc. v. Birchwood Lighting, Inc., 382 F.3d 1354, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 

Here, the “compression member” limitation does not use the term “means,” and 

the presumption against means-plus-function treatment is not overcome. The claims

and the specification unmistakably establish that “compression member” refers to 

particular structure. The claim language demonstrates that the compression member 

must fit inside the cylindrical opening and be of sufficient size to exert a force on the 

screw head, which implies structure. ’678 patent, col. 4, ll. 22-24. The specification 

likewise makes clear that the term “compression member” refers to a particular 

cylindrical insert and is not simply a general reference to any structure that will perform 

a particular function. See id., col. 2, l. 58-col. 3, l. 16, col. 3, l. 44-col. 4, l. 6. The

prosecution history, while in evidence, provides no further guidance one way or the 

other. However, dictionary definitions and experts on both sides confirm that

“compression member” is an expression that was understood by persons of ordinary 

skill in the art to describe a kind of structure. See Lighting World, 382 F.3d at 1358 

05-1311, -1335 27
(“The task of determining whether the limitation in question should be regarded as a 

means-plus-function limitation . . . is a question on which evidence from experts may be 

relevant.”). 

 Moreover, Mas-Hamilton is not applicable here. In that case, no other claim 

terms attributed structural significance to the elements at issue, and there was no

evidence that the term at issue had an understood structural meaning in the art. MasHamilton, 156 F.3d at 1213-15 (“[W]e do not see that the remaining terms in the claim 

limitation . . . provide any structure necessary to remove this limitation from the ambit of 

section 112, ¶ 6.”); id. at 1215 (“The district court determined that there was no 

evidence that a ‘movable link member’ has a well-understood structural meaning in the 

art.”). That is not the case here. Instead, the overall impression of the claims and

specification of the ’678 patent is that “compression member” implied structure to one of 

ordinary skill in the art. This is shown by the intrinsic record and confirmed by the

extrinsic evidence. Accordingly, we reject Medtronic’s argument that the district court 

erred in not construing “compression member” as a means-plus-function limitation and 

in not finding non-infringement of all three models on that basis. 

VI. JMOL on Lost Profit Damages 

Medtronic argues on cross-appeal that the court erred in denying its motion for 

JMOL on the subject of lost profits because DePuy Spine did not become an exclusive 

licensee of Biedermann Motech’s ’678 patent until the 1999 Exclusive License 

Agreement was entered into on August 31, 1999. Because Biedermann Motech lacked 

manufacturing and marketing capacity to meet demand, Medtronic argues that neither

05-1311, -1335 28
party can claim lost profit damages prior to that date and that the jury’s judgment

awarding damages from before that date should be adjusted. 

DePuy counters that determining an exclusive licensee relationship is a factual 

matter and that substantial evidence supports the jury’s finding that an exclusive 

licensee relationship was created by a 1993 Technology Agreement that became 

operative with respect to the ’678 patent in January 1998. DePuy argues that the 1999 

Exclusive License Agreement merely confirmed the rights created by the 1993

Technology Agreement. 

Medtronic replies that determining the date when lost profits are legally 

compensable is a question of law and that the district court determined when DePuy

Spine became an exclusive licensee in an Order dated November 18, 2002. Medtronic

replies that a 1993 Exclusive License Agreement specifically addressed patent rights

whereas the 1993 Technology Agreement did not, and that therefore the 1993 

Technology Agreement could not form the basis for an exclusive license under the ’678 

patent. 

Whether DePuy Spine is entitled to lost profits is a question of law. PolyAmerica, 383 F.3d at 1310-11. DePuy’s assertion that determining whether an 

exclusive license exists is a factual matter is based on Wang Laboratories v. Mitsubishi 

Electronics, 103 F.3d 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1997). Wang Laboratories dealt with whether an

implied license was created as a result of the parties’ conduct. Id. at 1578. Though the 

parties in Wang Laboratories agreed to submit that question to the jury, id., we 

recognized that the ultimate conclusion was a legal one that was based on underlying

findings of fact regarding the parties’ conduct and the existence of consideration, id. at 

05-1311, -1335 29
1579-80. Here, the underlying facts are not in dispute. Accordingly, we review this

issue de novo. 

Medtronic limits its cross-appeal to a challenge of the jury’s lost profit award 

during the period prior to the 1999 Exclusive License Agreement, arguing that (1) 

DePuy Spine was not an exclusive licensee during the relevant time period, and 

therefore its lost profits were not recoverable; and (2) Biedermann Motech lacked

manufacturing and marketing capacity to meet demand, and therefore it had no basis to

recover its own lost profits. Medtronic does not contest that if DePuy Spine was an

exclusive licensee during the relevant time period, it is entitled to the lost profits at issue 

here. See Weinar v. Rollform Inc., 744 F.2d 797, 806-08 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (affirming an 

award of lost profit damages to a licensee with the exclusive right to sell in the entire

United States). We begin our analysis by determining whether DePuy Spine was an 

exclusive licensee of the ’678 patent during the relevant time period. 

Medtronic’s assertion that the district court ruled on this issue with finality in its 

November 18, 2002 Order is incorrect. In that Order, the court stated that “[t]he

standing of Plaintiff DePuy Acromed, Inc., commenced on August 31, 1999, when 

Biedermann Motech granted DePuy Acromed an exclusive license to the ’678 patent.” 

DePuy Acromed, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., No. 01-10165-EFH (D. Mass. 

Nov. 18, 2002). To the extent this order reflected the court’s initial conclusion, that

conclusion was apparently reversed. In denying Medtronic’s motion in limine to exclude 

evidence of lost profits damages before August 31, 1999, the district court found that 

“Biedermann Motech can recover lost profits [before August 31, 1999] because it was 

‘closely tied’ via a joint venture to the manufacturer, DePuy Acromed, Inc.” DePuy

05-1311, -1335 30
Acromed, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., No. 01-10165-EFH (D. Mass. Sept. 

14, 2004) (citing WMS Gaming, Inc. v. Int’l Game Tech., 184 F.3d 1339, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 

1999)). In denying Medtronic’s renewed motion for JMOL on the subject of lost profit 

damages, the court noted that DePuy “introduced extensive evidence that DePuy had 

an exclusive license to the patent in suit as of January 23, 1998.” DePuy Acromed, Inc.

v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., No. 01-10165-EFH (D. Mass. Feb. 15, 2005). Thus, 

the court ultimately concluded that DePuy was an exclusive licensee as of January 

1998. 

We must therefore examine the 1993 Technology Agreement to determine if it 

supports the conclusion that DePuy was an exclusive licensee to the ’678 patent under

its terms. 

Determining whether a licensee is an exclusive licensee or a bare licensee 

is a question of ascertaining the intent of the parties to the license as

manifested by the terms of their agreement and examining the substance 

of the grant. The use of the word “exclusive” is not controlling; what

matters is the substance of the arrangement. Because patent rights are 

rights to “exclude others,” a licensee is an exclusive licensee only if the 

patentee has promised, expressly or impliedly, that “others shall be 

excluded from practicing the invention” within the field covered by the 

license. Put another way, an exclusive license is “a license to practice the 

invention accompanied by the patent owner's promise that others shall be 

excluded from practicing it within the field of use wherein the licensee is

given leave.” 

Textile Prods. v. Mead Corp., 134 F.3d 1481, 1484 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (internal citations

omitted). 

The 1993 Technology Agreement provides that it shall be construed in 

accordance with Indiana law. Indiana follows the “four corners rule” of contract

interpretation in which courts do not look beyond the instrument in question to 

determine the parties’ intent if the terms of the instrument are unambiguous. Schmidt v.

05-1311, -1335 31
Schmidt, 812 N.E.2d 1074, 1080 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004); see also Univ. of S. Ind. Found. 

v. Baker, 843 N.E.2d 528, 532 (Ind. 2006). “The terms of a contract are ambiguous only

when reasonably intelligent persons would honestly differ as to the meaning of those 

terms.” Schmidt, 812 N.E.2d at 1080; see also Baker, 843 N.E.2d at 532. 

The terms of the 1993 Technology Agreement unambiguously provide an 

exclusive license to DePuy Spine for all of Biedermann Motech’s current and future

knowledge, techniques, processes, data designs, prints, drawings, specifications, 

procedures and other information relating to the manufacture of any product for use in 

the treatment of the human spine. In January 1998, Biedermann Motech acquired the 

’678 patent, which covers a particular design of pedicle screw for use in the treatment of 

the human spine. It follows that in 1998, when Biedermann Motech acquired the ’678 

patent, it acquired the design of the products covered by that patent as well. That

design is a “future” design under the express terms of the 1993 Technology Agreement 

and provides a basis for the jury’s lost profit award. 

The terms of the 1993 and 1999 Exclusive License Agreements do not affect this 

conclusion. First, the 1993 Exclusive License Agreement is a license between Ort-Med, 

the licensor, and DePuy Spine, the licensee. Ort-Med never was—nor became—the 

owner of the ’678 patent. Thus, the 1993 Exclusive License Agreement is not relevant 

to any determination of rights as between Biedermann Motech and DePuy Spine. 

Second, the 1999 Exclusive License Agreement was entered into on August 31, 1999; it

is thus not relevant to the rights that were created between the parties by the 1993

Technology Agreement entered into on February 4, 1993. Therefore, we conclude that 

05-1311, -1335 32
DePuy was entitled to lost profit damages prior to August 31, 1999, and the court did 

not err in denying Medtronic’s motion for JMOL on this issue. 

CONCLUSION 

Because the district court erred in construing the scope of the “hollow sphericallyshaped portion” in the ’678 patent to exclude the edge thereof, and because the court 

erred in limiting application of the doctrine of equivalents, we reverse the district court’s

summary judgment of non-infringement under the doctrine of equivalents on the 

Vertex® model and remand for further proceedings. We affirm the district court’s grant 

of summary judgment of no literal infringement for the Vertex® model. 

Because we conclude that the bottom-loaded screw models lack the “opening” 

limitation as a matter of law, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment of 

non-infringement for the bottom-loaded screw models. 

Because the jury verdict finding that the MAS model infringed the ’678 patent

under the doctrine of equivalents was supported by substantial evidence and because 

the theory of equivalence was not legally insufficient, we hold that the district did not err 

in denying Medtronic’s motion for JMOL of non-infringement. Because the district court 

correctly determined that DePuy became an exclusive licensee of the ’678 patent prior 

to August 31, 1999, the district court did not err in denying Medtronic’s motion for JMOL 

to preclude an award of lost profit damages prior to that date. We therefore affirm the 

jury verdict and damages award on the MAS model. 

AFFIRMED-IN-PART, REVERSED-IN-PART, AND REMANDED.

COSTS 

Costs to DePuy. 

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