We Were Cau

Unprepared

The 2006 

Hezbollah-Israel

Matt M. Matthews

The Long War Series

Occasional Paper 26

U.S. Army Combined Arms Center

Combat Studies Institute Press

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

OP 26
Report Documentation Page Form Approved

OMB No. 0704-0188

Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and

maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information,

including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington

VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it

does not display a currently valid OMB control number.

1. REPORT DATE

2008 2. REPORT TYPE

3. DATES COVERED

 00-00-2008 to 00-00-2008 

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE

We Were Caught Unprepared: The 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli War

5a. CONTRACT NUMBER

5b. GRANT NUMBER

5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER

6. AUTHOR(S) 5d. PROJECT NUMBER

5e. TASK NUMBER

5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)

U.S. Army Combined Arms Center,Combat Studies Institute,Fort 

Leavenworth,KS,66027

8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION

REPORT NUMBER

9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S)

11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT 

NUMBER(S)

12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited

13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

14. ABSTRACT

15. SUBJECT TERMS

16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 17. LIMITATION OF 

ABSTRACT

Same as

Report (SAR)

18. NUMBER

OF PAGES

105

19a. NAME OF

RESPONSIBLE PERSON

a. REPORT

unclassified

b. ABSTRACT

unclassified

c. THIS PAGE

unclassified

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)

Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18 
Matt M. Matthews

U.S. Army Combined Arms Center

Combat Studies Institute Press

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 

OP 26

We Were Cau

Unprepared

The 2006 

Hezbollah-Israeli 
Matthews, Matt, 1959-

 We were caught unprepared : the 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli War / 

Matthews.

 p. cm. -- (Long war occasional paper ; 26)

 Includes bibliographical references.

 1. Lebanon War, 2006. I. Title. II. Series.

 DS87.65.M38 2008

 956.9204’4--dc22

 200

CSI Press publications cover a variety of military 

topics. The views expressed in this CSI Press pub

are those of the author(s) and not necessarily thos

Department of the Army or the Department of Def

full list of CSI Press publications, many of them a

for downloading, can be found at http://usacac.ar

CAC/csi/RandP/CSIpubs.asp.

The seal of the Combat Studies Institute authentica

document as an offi cial publication of the CSI. It is prohibited to use 

offi cial seal on any republication of this material without the expressed 

permission of the Director of CSI.

This is the Offi cial US Government ed

this publication and is herein identifi ed to 

its authenticity. Use of the 978-0-16-07

ISBN prefi x is for US Government Printing 

Offi cial Editions only. The Superintend

Documents of the US Government Printing 

requests that any reprinted edition clearly be labeled as a copy of the au

work with a new ISBN.

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; DC area (202) 512-1800

Fax: (202) 512-2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402-0001

ISBN 978-0-16-079899-3
The Combat Studies Institute (CSI) is pleased to present Lo

Series Occasional Paper 26, We Were Caught Unprepared: Th

Hezbollah-Israeli War by CSI historian Mr. Matt M. Matthews. The o

of the war that was, at best, a stalemate for Israel has confounded 

analysts throughout the world. Long considered the most professio

powerful army in the Middle East, with a history of impressive 

victories against its enemies, the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) e

from the campaign with its enemies undefeated and its prestige s

tarnished.

Matthews’s historical analysis of the war includes an exam

of IDF and Hezbollah doctrine prior to the war, as well as an o

of the operational and tactical problems encountered by the IDF 

the war. His research convincingly argues that the Israeli reli

poorly understood and controversial Effects-Based Operations (EB

Systemic Operational Design (SOD) warfi ghting theories, and a 

singular dependence on air power, were root causes of Israeli pr

Additionally, after years of counterinsurgency (COIN) operation

Gaza Strip and West Bank territories, IDF ground forces were ta

unprepared and untrained to fi ght against a determined Hezbolla

that conducted what was, in many ways, a conventional, fi xed-

defense. In researching this study, Mr. Matthews interviewed 

prominent IDF offi cers and other experts in the fi eld, many of wh

not previously been interviewed. The result is an insightful, compre

examination of the war.

In 2006, Hezbollah demonstrated that terrorist groups aro

world are capable of learning from, adapting to, and exploiting wea

in conventional military forces. Inasmuch as the US Army has 

almost exclusively on irregular warfare since 2001, the lessons of

this analysis are particularly relevant. We believe that this study w

great use to the US Army as it conducts current operations and prep

an uncertain future in which potential enemies are watching and l

CSI–The Past is Prologue!

Timothy R. Reese

Colonel, Armor

U.S. Army Combined Arms C

Director, Combat Studies Inst

This Long War Series Paper could not have been written with

help of numerous individuals. Dr. Gil Ariely, a Reserve major an

Knowledge Offi cer in the Israeli Defense Forces took time ou

demanding schedule to visit with me and answer a multitude of q

here at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Adam Harmon, author, Israeli 

and American citizen provided invaluable advice on the Israeli in

into Lebanon from 1982 to 2000. Ehud Eiran, a Reserve offi ce

IDF, author, and former Assistant Foreign Policy Advisor to 

Minister Ehud Barak provided helpful information related to th

Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, as well as the assassination o

Brigadier General Erez Gerstein in February of 1999. Ron Tira, 

former Israeli Air Force (IAF) fi ghter pilot, former section chie

IAF intelligence division (“Lamdan”) and current reservist in 

Campaign Planning Department responded to a host of e-mail q

and provided guidance and assistance throughout this project. B

General (Retired) Shimon Naveh, former chief of the IDF’s Ope

Theory Research Institute (OTRI), also provided important info

related to his Systemic Operational Design. I am indebted to each 

for their candor and expertise. However, any inaccuracies in this w

mine alone.

I would like to thank Mr. Kendall D. Gott, CSI Senior H

Research and Publications Team, for his counsel on this project, as 

the efforts of my editor Jennifer Lindsey. I would also like to ackno

Colonel Timothy R. Reese, CSI Director, and Dr. William G. Ro

CSI Deputy Director and Combined Arms Center (CAC) Co

Historian, for their advice and support in this effort.

Finally, without the encouragement and steadfast support of m

Susan Day Harmison, this work might have never been completed

Foreword .........................................................................................

Acknowledgments ...........................................................................

Introduction .....................................................................................

Chapter 1. The 2000 Israeli Withdrawal from Lebanon .................

Chapter 2. Planning for the Second Lebanon War ..........................

 Map 1: Hezbollah Defensive System in Southern Lebanon .....

Chapter 3. Opening Moves: 12 July to 16 July ...............................

 Map 2: The Ambush Site ..........................................................

Chapter 4. The Ground War: 17 July to 14 August .........................

 Map 3: The Battle of Bint Jbeil ................................................

 Map 4: Drive to the Litani ........................................................

Conclusions .....................................................................................

Bibliography ...................................................................................

Appendix A .....................................................................................

Appendix B .....................................................................................

Appendix C .....................................................................................

Appendix D .....................................................................................

About the Author .............................................................................

The Israelis, regulars and reservists, fought like demons. 

In the words of the Prophet Joel: “Their faces gathered 

blackness; they ran like mighty men; they climbed the 

wall and did not break rank; the earth quaked before them; 

and the Lord made His voice heard in front of His army.”

 Martin van Creveld 

on the 1967 Six-Day War

On 12 July 2006, a well-trained, highly motivated detachm

Hezbollah* fi ghters crossed from southern Lebanon into norther

killing three Israeli soldiers and abducting two others. Israel

Minister Ehud Olmert called the incursion “an act of war” and pro

“Lebanon will suffer the consequences of its actions.”1

 Convinc

could force Hezbollah to disarm and withdraw from southern L

by initiating an effects-based air campaign, the Israeli Air Forc

began pounding targets across Lebanon. Although initially taken a

the destructive air strikes, Hezbollah unleashed its own attack w

hours, launching an extensive rocket barrage from southern Leban

Israel.

Despite Israel assuring the United States of a “quick and d

resolution to the confl ict, Hezbollah’s short-range Katyusha 

continued to rain down on the Israeli population.2

 As days wen

became increasingly apparent to both the Israeli Defense Force

and western military analysts that the IAF was having little e

Hezbollah’s rockets.

When the IDF reluctantly moved its ground forces into s

Lebanon, the apparent ineffectiveness of the operation and the s

resistance of Hezbollah fi ghters stunned military observers wor

After years of highly successful counterinsurgency (COIN) op

against the Palestinians, the IDF appeared remarkably inept to co

successful conventional ground campaign against Hezbollah. 

Without question, the Israeli ground campaign revealed a

confused by its new doctrine. Soldiers were defi cient in train

equipment, and senior offi cers seemed woefully unprepared to fi gh

war.” By the time the United Nations (UN) cease-fi re went int

on 14 August 2006, many military analysts were convinced the I

suffered a signifi cant defeat. One source held that Hezbollah’s 

* Throughout this text, Hezbollah and Hizbollah are used interchangeably

translations tend to use Hizbollah instead of Hezbollah.
2

were the comments by Mossad Chief, Meir Degan, and the head 

Bet, Yuval Diskin, during a meeting with Prime Minister Olmer

immediate aftermath of the war. Both men pointedly told Olmert “

was a national catastrophe and Israel suffered a critical blow.”4

No confl ict in recent past provides a more illuminating study 

US Army than the 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli war. After years of con

successful counterinsurgency operations against the Palestinia

Israeli military encountered substantial problems in shifting its f

major combat operations against Hezbollah. As with the IDF prio

2006 war, the US Army, at least for the last three years, has focused 

exclusively on irregular warfare.5

 For the IDF, these operations s

dulled ground maneuver combat skills, particularly among tank cr

The IDF’s steadfast acceptance of a new doctrine inspired by Effect

Operations (EBO), Systemic Operational Design (SOD), and 

fi repower-based operations also proved problematic. Implications 

US Army in this arena should prove enlightening.

Chapter 1 of this study provides a concise history of the 

withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000. The chapter examines Hez

guerrilla doctrine and its masterful campaign to remove the ID

southern Lebanon. Also closely investigated is the manner by 

Hezbollah turned the Israeli withdrawal into a humiliating rout. Thi

should be of particular interest to all US Army offi cers to ensure 

withdrawal from current US Army operations will not prove s

problematic. 

Chapter 2 offers an overview of Hezbollah’s changing doctrine

as the buildup and planning for the 2006 war. Also examined is th

reliance on its new EBO doctrine that allocated monetary resourc

power and technology at the expense of IDF ground forces. Th

long counterinsurgency efforts against the Palestinians and the r

negative effects on IDF ground forces are also explored.

Chapter 3 focuses on events occurring between 12–16 Ju

includes the kidnapping and killing of Israeli soldiers by Hezbo

the resulting war, as well as the futile effects-based campaign to 

Hezbollah from southern Lebanon. The inherent miscalculations

led to the monumental failings of the IDF’s leadership, are also stu

Chapter 4 addresses events from 17 July through 14 August

covered are the failure of the IDF’s ground campaign against He

and the confusion caused by IDF doctrine, as well as the lack of 

and leadership within the IDF on the ground. Also probed are p
their lack of both training and equipment. Equally important is the 

of Hezbollah’s tactics, particularly its use of “swarming” antitank 

missiles (ATGMs) against the poorly trained IDF tank forces.

For six years, the IDF conducted a counterinsurgency ca

against the Palestinians and developed a doctrine rooted in EBO an

tech wizardry. However, in the summer of 2006, when confront

conventional war with Hezbollah, the Israeli military proved inca

defeating a minor adversary. Although research and analysis of thi

confl ict are still ongoing, the emerging details of ill-conceived 

and an army marred by long years of counterinsurgency operati

yield valid and important lessons for today’s US Army offi cers. 
4

1. Jeremy M. Sharp, Israel-Hamas-Hezbollah: The Current Confl 

Report for Congress, Congressional Research Service, The Library of C

21 July 2006, 6.

2. Augustus Richard Norton, “Hezbollah: A Short History” (Princ

Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2007), 139.

3. Alastair Crooke and Mark Perry, “How Hezbollah Defeated Isr

2: Winning the Ground War,” Asia Times Online, 13 October 2006, http

atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/HJ13Ak01.html (accessed 14 February 

4. “Secret Meeting,” Ynetnews.com, 30 March 2007, http://www.y

com/Ext/Comp/ArticleLayout/CdaArticlePrintPreview/1,2506,L-338

html. Also see, Ofer Shelah and Yoav Limor, Shvuyim belevanon: ha

milkhemet levanon hashniya (Captives in Lebanon) (Tel Aviv: Yedioth 

2007). 

5. The types of military operations that fall under irregular warfare 

counterinsurgency, support to an insurgency, unconventional warfare

internal defense, and combating terrorism. “Army Doctrine Update,” C

Arms Doctrine Directorate, US Army Combined Arms Center, Fort Leav

KS, 24 February 2007, 5. 
The 2000 Israeli Withdrawal from Lebanon

It was also not expected of the Resistance to concentrate 

its equipment and resources on the front lines and go 

through a classic war with the enemy, for this was an 

army role and required suffi cient numbers, equipment and 

military capabilities. Resistance work was essentially “hit 

and run,” leaving the enemy surprised without any visible 

retaliation targets.

Sheikh Naim Qassem

Deputy Secretary-General of Hezbollah

The pullout from Lebanon descended into chaos, as Israeli 

troops staggered back across the border, telling reporters 

that their military equipment and training had proven 

useless against Hezbollah, and its Lebanese allies.

Joel Himelfarb

The Washington Times

Near midday on 28 February 1999, a small convoy of vehicle

down the narrow, dusty mountain road near the village of Kafr Shab

Israeli-occupied security zone of south Lebanon. An armor-plated M

driven by Chief Warrant Offi cer Imad Abu-Rish led the motorcad

the mountainside. Riding with Abu-Rish was his commander, B

General Erez Gerstein, radio operator Staff Sergeant Omer El-Kab

popular Israeli radio reporter, IIan Roeh.1

At 38, Gerstein commanded all Israeli Defense Forces in s

Lebanon and was regarded as a legendary fi gure within the IDF, 

impervious to harm. As Israeli support for the long, costly war in L

slowly eroded, Gerstein remained fi rm in his convictions. “

calling for a unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon,” he warned

endangering the lives of soldiers serving there.” Gerstein also su

“that withdrawal from the security zone would bring the terror 

to Israel’s borders.” Resolute and confi dent, he was determined t

the IDF’s most threatening enemy in Lebanon, Hezbollah (the P

God).2

As the three-vehicle convoy made its way back down the trea

mountain road to IDF headquarters in Marjayoun, Gerstein’s M

rounded a jagged curve. At precisely the same moment, a 
6

ripped through the Mercedes, engulfi ng the automobile in fl ame

Rish, El-Kabetz, and Roeh were blown out of the vehicle and m

wounded as the Mercedes tumbled over a cliff with Gerstein stil

Rescuers who raced down the precipice to save him were unable to 

their commander from the burning wreckage and watched helpl

he burned to death. The killing of the highest ranking Israeli o

Lebanon by Hezbollah confi rmed its status as Israel’s most int

enemy.3

The ambush was fi lmed by Hezbollah and aired on all L

television stations. Professor Judith Palmer Harik, a resident of 

recounted, “Hezbollah was pressing home the point, that any 

military personnel on Lebanese soil was fair game and that ev

ranking offi cers were not safe. . . . Lebanese friends with whom I w

the recording of this operation on the evening news expressed 

about the pinpoint accuracy of the explosion. . . .”4

 While Gerstein

had little effect militarily, it was nonetheless a “psychological def

Israelis.5

By March 1999, a majority of Israelis were demanding an 

the Lebanese quagmire.6

 For over 20 years, Israel had waged an 

continual military campaign in Lebanon, fi rst in opposition to the 

acts of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), then against a 

of Lebanese secular groups determined to force the Israelis out 

country.

The IDF’s 1982 invasion of Lebanon, named Operation PEAC

GALILEE, was designed to destroy the PLO threat to Israel and 

its capacity to wage war. At the onset of the campaign, three Israe

divisions hastily moved north to the outskirts of Beirut, trapp

killing numerous PLO members and driving the remnants into h

retreat. At the same time, the Israeli Air Force (IAF) destroyed 

not all, of the Syrian air defense systems in Lebanon without a sin

According to Israeli author and IAF intelligence offi cer Ron Ti

PLO never recovered from 1982 and never regained its capabilitie

Although the IDF defeated the PLO, it still faced a large L

population who were not at all happy with the Israeli occupation

who had initially greeted the IDF as liberators now turned again

Israeli occupiers. Of all Israel’s enemies, none proved more prob

than the Shiite faction Hezbollah. Created in response to Israel’s co

occupation of Lebanon, this militia force was trained, armed, and e

by Iran and Syria.8
secular groups, the IDF withdrew into southern Lebanon in 1985

new security zone, which encompassed 10 percent of Lebanon, 

and its ally, the South Lebanon Army (SLA), began constructing 

of company-size fortifi ed outposts. Ignoring United Nations Re

425, which called for a complete Israeli withdrawal from Leban

IDF and SLA prepared for a lengthy stay. Israel made it clear that

they could have some assurance against terrorist border incursi

rocket attacks from Lebanon, they would remain in the security zo

Hezbollah, however, was determined to drive the IDF out of L

believing that, unless attacks continued, the Israelis would never 

Beginning in 1985, they relentlessly assaulted the IDF and SLA 

security zone. Hezbollah developed 13 principles of war, spe

designed to defeat a relatively fi xed, technologically advanced ene

1. Avoid the strong, attack the weak—attack and withdrawal!

2. Protecting our fi ghters is more important than causing enemy 

casualties!

3. Strike only when success is assured!

4. Surprise is essential to success. If you are spotted, you have 

failed!

5. Don’t get into a set-piece battle. Slip away like smoke, before 

the enemy can drive home his advantage!

6. Attaining the goal demands patience, in order to discover the 

enemy’s weak points!

7. Keep moving; avoid formation of a front line!

8. Keep the enemy on constant alert, at the front and in the 

rear!

9. The road to the great victory passes through thousands of 

small victories!

10. Keep up the morale of the fi ghters; avoid notions of the 

enemy’s superiority!

11. The media has innumerable guns whose hits are like bullets. 

Use them in the battle!

12. The population is a treasure—nurture it!

13. Hurt the enemy and then stop before he abandons 

restraint!11
8

elaborated further on this asymmetrical concept in his book, Hizbul

Story from Within. He wrote that Hezbollah’s doctrine helped acc

a number of goals, two of which included:

1. Confusing the enemy and obliging its command to call for a 

constant state of alert, eventually leading to the exhaustion 

and decline in power.

2. Spreading panic among enemy troops, the fear of death 

persisted after every successful or possible resistance attack. 

This served to shake enemy morale and subsequently affected 

troop performance.12

As time would prove, the doctrine provided an exceptionally e

blueprint for victory. 

By the 1990s, Hezbollah had transformed itself into a highly co

resistance organization, as well as an emergent political party with ex

support among the Lebanese population. Its principal intent, acco

Professor Judith Palmer Harik: 

. . . was to stampede the Israelis and the SLA into as 

disorderly and as costly a withdrawal as possible by 

imposing casualties that further eroded the troops’ morale 

and increased domestic pressure for their departure. 

Strategists therefore aimed at clever operations that would 

emphasize Hezbollah’s implacability and long reach and 

demonstrate the enemy’s vulnerability.13 

Hezbollah slowly chiseled away at Israeli public support for the 

infl icting a constant stream of casualties on Israeli military forces. 

bombings, sophisticated ambushes, and direct attacks on the IDF a

were often captured on fi lm and shown on Hezbollah’s television 

al-Manar. The disturbing images were beamed into Israeli hou

depicting the horrors of war often muted by Israeli television.14

The Israelis did not remain entirely on the defensive. In 1

response to increased casualties in the security zone, they la

Operation ACCOUNTABILITY. Hezbollah had prepared for an 

ground offensive and was taken aback by the massive Israeli 

artillery campaign waged against them. The military operation wa

any Hezbollah had encountered in that the Israelis chiefl y em

standoff-based precision fi repower. It proved a valuable lesson 

that would better prepare Hezbollah for the next war.15
When Hezbollah rockets wounded 38 civilians in northern Israel, 

unleashed Operation GRAPES OF WRATH. Once again, the IDF g

resorted to standoff-based precision fi repower or what Amir Kulick 

“fi re-intense effort.”16 The new IDF campaign targeted not only He

but also civilian infrastructure targets and civilian population ce

southern Lebanon. Israel expected to cause a mass exodus of c

from southern Lebanon, forcing the Lebanese and Syrian gove

to take action against Hezbollah. Clearly, the operation was desi

force the hand of the Lebanese and Syrian governments and not to 

Hezbollah’s military capabilities.17 Not surprisingly, Operation G

OF WRATH failed miserably and served only to further alienate s

Lebanese people and produce widespread international scorn.18

As Israeli precision-guided weapons and bombs rained d

southern Lebanon, Hezbollah struck back at northern Israel with h

of Katyusha rockets, forcing thousands of Israelis to seek cover i

shelters. The Hezbollah Secretary-General, Hasan Nasrallah, 

clear, “If Israel hits Lebanese civilian targets, then Hizballah hits I

Although Israel infl icted heavy losses on Hezbollah, at no time 

Operation GRAPES OF WRATH was the IDF’s standoff p

weaponry able to silence Hezbollah’s rockets.20 It was a lesson n

Hezbollah and entirely ignored by the IDF. With Hezbollah cap

responding in kind, both sides reached a tacit agreement on 26 Ap

not to target civilians.21

As the war in southern Lebanon continued, mounting IDF ca

propelled antiwar groups into the political spotlight as politici

a preponderance of the public called for a unilateral withdraw

Lebanon. The strength of the antiwar movement compelled Ehud 

a candidate for Prime Minister at the time, to promise a withdraw

Lebanon if elected. Upon his election in 1999, Barak assured the 

he would remove the IDF from southern Lebanon within 12 month

bilaterally or unilaterally.22

Hezbollah, however, was determined to accelerate the 

withdrawal. It offered “leniency” to all SLA members who surr

before the withdrawal began, while continuing its attacks on SLA 

outposts in the security zone. New SLA defections to Hezbollah 

alarmed the Israelis. When the IDF shut down four forward outpo

the town of Jezzine in June 1999, SLA units began withdrawing fro

outposts within the city limits. Hezbollah fi ghters quickly moved 

town and continued to pummel the dwindling ranks of the SLA 

moved into new positions to the south.23
10

into a handful of fortifi ed positions. Of the 50 outposts in the securi

the SLA manned 42. Although these strongholds were heavily f

Hezbollah still infl icted numerous casualties on both the IDF an

Using American-made, tube-launched, optically-tracked, wire

missiles (TOWs), Hezbollah sent the explosive projectiles directly 

the window slits of the IDF and SLA outposts. According to P

Augustus Richard Norton, “Most of the seven Israeli soldiers felled 

January and February of this year [2000] were killed by TOWs.”24

In January 2000, the SLA was badly shaken by the assassin

one of its key leaders. Aql Hashim was killed when Hezbollah man

place a bomb inside his house. Once again, SLA defections picked 

When bilateral discussions in Geneva between Syria, Israel, and the 

States fell apart in March 2000, Barak began making plans for a u

withdrawal from Lebanon. He announced, “by July 2000, the ar

withdraw to the international border, and it is from the internationa

that we will defend the north of the country.”25

With Barak’s announcement that the IDF would withdraw f

security zone by July, the Israeli government assured the SLA the

be protected. The government informed them that “Israel is mor

politically committed to the safety and security of the soldiers of th

Lebanon Army and the Civil administration offi cials who worked al

Israel for many years to protect the southern Lebanese populati

the encroachment of terrorist organizations. . . . In this contex

is prepared to absorb any SLA soldiers or civil offi cials who ch

relocate to Israel, together with their families.”26 Although the Isra

promised the SLA sanctuary in Israel, apparently the word never 

down to the ranks, which left them discouraged and dispirited. A

the SLA appeared solid and capable, rumors persisted within the I

the readiness of the SLA was dubious.27

On 21 May, SLA soldiers abandoned their positions in the 

Taibe. Panicky Israeli offi cers in the area told the SLA, “Hezbol

coming.” The dire warning threw the security zone into near chaos

end of the day, an SLA Shiite brigade in the central sector of the 

zone collapsed, with scores of soldiers surrendering to Hezbollah. A

of the SLA disintegration spread, southern Lebanese civilians, wh

before had been removed from their villages in the security zon

moving in large numbers toward their former homes. In many ca

civilians were moving well ahead of Hezbollah fi ghters.28
from the security zone and move to the Israeli border. As other SL

pulled back, they destroyed their bunkers and outposts. By the en

day, it was readily apparent that the IDF was accelerating its with

Television audiences around the world watched in stunned disb

the chaotic nature of the withdrawal. The Hezbollah television 

al-Manar, captured the humiliating retreat and called on “Pale

to follow in its path,” while the Arab media painted Israel as a 

tiger.”29

By 23 May, the SLA had completely disintegrated. Its western 

at Bint Jbeil was ordered to pull back to the Israeli border, while th

brigade in the east simply melted away. In many cases, the IDF 

SLA abandoned their military equipment. When the infamous SLA 

at Khiam was liberated that afternoon, Hezbollah’s al-Manar br

the event live around the world.30 At the border, chaos reigned as I

SLA forces moved quickly into Israel. An eyewitness reported, 

troops staggered back across the border, telling reporters that their 

equipment and training had proven useless against Hezbollah, 

Lebanese allies.”31

As each outpost fell, Hezbollah planted its yellow fl ags a

fortifi cations. Israeli citizens along the border watched as the fl ag

triumphantly only a short distance from their settlements. Harik r

“Along the border fence, crowds were already gathering to ta

throw stones at the Israeli soldiers manning the observation tower

other side.”32 The Israeli withdrawal from the security zone was s

complete fi asco.

Hezbollah set out to “stampede the Israelis and the SLA 

disorderly and as costly a withdrawal as possible.”33 In the eyes 

of the world, they succeeded. One Israeli newspaper called the 

of the withdrawal a “Day of Humiliation,” while an Australian 

offi cer, with many years of experience in Lebanon, concluded, 

was defeated by Hezbollah in Lebanon, forcing its withdrawal on 

2000.” Ultimately, the superb fi ghting qualities of Hezbollah, Isr

fatigue, and uncertain allies turned the withdrawal into an emba

rout.34 Within days, both sides began preparations for the inevitable 

round.
12

1. “Israeli General Killed In Lebanon,” BBC Online Network, BB

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/287941.stm, 1-3 (acces

February 2008); “Commander of IDF Lebanon-Liaison Unit Killed, 

Officer, Soldier and Civilian Killed in Explosion,” Israel Ministry of 

Affairs, http://www.israelmfa.gov.il/MFA/Government/Communiques/19

mander%20of%20IDF%20Lebanon-Liaison%20Unit%20and%20Thre

1-2 (accessed 1 August 2007); “The Occupied Zone: An Overview,” Huma

Watch, http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/lebanon/Isrlb997-02.htm, 4 (ac

August 2007); “Death by the roadside,” Jerusalem Post, 1 March 1999.

2. Ehud Eiran, telephone interview by author, 25 July 2007; “Gers

IDF Head In Lebanon,” Jerusalem Post, 27 February 1998; Emanuel A. 

“Making Israel Bleed,” Winston Mideast Analysis & Commentary, http

org.il/english/article/1999/march/win1.htm 4 (accessed 1 August 2007

Eiran, e-mail interview by author, 5 August 2007.

3. “The Occupied Zone,” 4; “Death By The Roadside;” Ehud Eira

interview by author, 31 July, 7 August 2007; See also, Ehud Eiran, The E

Longing: General Erez Gerstein and the War in Lebanon (Tel Aviv, Israe

Books (Hebrew), 2007).

4. Judith Palmer Harik, Hezbollah: The Changing Face of Te

(London: I.B. Tauris, 2004), 131.

5. Simon Murden, “Understanding Israel’s Long Confl ict in L

The Search For An Alternative Approach to Security During the Peace P

British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies Vol. 27, No. 1 (May 2000): 43

6. Ibid., 43.

7. Martin van Creveld, The Sword and the Olive: A Critical Histo

Israeli Defense Force (New York: Public Affairs, 1998), 289–291; Dan

Helmer, Flipside of the COIN: Israel’s Lebanese Incursion Between 198

(Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2006), 35–41; R

e-mail interview by author, 15 August 2007.

8. Professor Augustus Richard Norton noted that “There is litt

that Iran and Syria were deeply involved in the creation of Hizballah.” A

Richard Norton, “Hizballah and the Israeli Withdrawal from Southern L

Journal of Palestine Studies Vol. 30, No. 1 (Autumn 2000), 24.

9. Martin van Creveld, The Sword and the Olive: A Critical Histo

Israeli Defense Force, (New York: Public Affairs, 1998,) 303; Augustus 

Norton, Hezbollah: A Short History (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton U

Press, 2007), 81.

10. Augustus Richard Norton, Hezbollah: A Short History (Princ

Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2007), 81.

11. Ehud Ya’ari, “Hizballah: 13 Principles of Warfare,” The Je

Report, 21 March 1996, quoted in Daniel Isaac Helmer, Flipside of th

Israel’s Lebanese Incursion Between 1982–2000 (Fort Leavenworth, KS

Studies Institute Press, 2006), 53-54.
(London: SAQI, 2005), 71.

13. Harik, 130.

14. Norton, “Hizballah and the Israeli Withdrawal from Southern L

31.

15. Amir Kulick, “Hizbollah vs. the IDF: The Operational Dim

Strategic Assessment, Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv Unive

9, No. 3 (November 2006), 1–2.

16. Ibid, 1; “Operation Grapes of Wrath,” Ynetnews.com, 1 Augu

1-2, http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3284744,00.html (acc

August 2007).

17. Ron Tira stated that both the 1993 and 1996 campaigns were “sta

and were designed to push [the] civilian population to the north thereby 

the big bosses to do something (effects).” Ron Tira, e-mail interview by a

August 2007.

18. “Operation Grapes of Wrath,” 1–2; Norton, Hezbollah: A Short 

84–85.

19. Norton, “Hizballah and the Israeli Withdrawal from Southern L

29.

20. “Operation Grapes of Wrath,” 1.

21. Norton, “Hizballah and the Israeli Withdrawal from Southern L

29.

22. Norton, Hezbollah: A Short History, 88.

23. Harik, 126–127.

24. Norton, “Hizballah and the Israeli Withdrawal from Southern L

30; Harik, 132.

25. Norton, “Hizballah and the Israeli Withdrawal from Southern L

31; Norton, Hezbollah: A Short History, 88–89; Harik, 130–131.

26. “The Israeli Withdrawal from Southern Lebanon,” Jewish Virtual 

4, http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Peace/lebwith.html (acc

August 2007).

27. Mordechai Nisan, “Did Israel Betray Its Lebanese Allies?” Mid

Quarterly (December 2000), 2.

28. Ibid, 2; Harik, 137–138.

29. Nisan, 2; Abraham Rabinovich, “Despite Ragtag Pullout From L

Israel Is No Paper Tiger,” International Herald Tribune, 30 May 2000.

30. Nisan, 2; Harik, 138.

31. Joel Himelfarb, “Hezbollah’s Deadly Record,” The Washingto

16 March 2005.

32. Joel Himelfarb, “Hezbollah’s Deadly Record,” The Washingto

16 March 2005; Harik, 138.

33. Harik, 130.

34. Major Christopher E. Whitting, When David Became Golia

Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College, 20

Helmer, 70.

Planning for the Second Lebanon War

Victory means achieving the strategic goal and not 

necessarily territory. I maintain that we also have to part 

with the concept of a land battle. We have to talk about the 

integrated battle and about the appropriate force activating 

it. Victory is a matter of consciousness. Air power effects 

the adversary’s consciousness signifi cantly.

Commander Dan Halutz

Israeli Air Force (IAF), 2001

The Blue Line

By June 2000, a United Nations cartographic team working w

United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) had estab

new border line between Lebanon and Israel. Christened the “Blu

the new 79-kilometer demarcation or withdrawal boundary w

endorsed by the UN Security Council on 18 June 2000. It conclud

of 16 June, Israel had withdrawn its forces from Lebanon in acc

with Security Council resolution 425.” According to a UN press 

Secretary-General Kofi Annan “expressed the hope that the implem

of resolution 425 would be seen by all people of the region, es

Syrians, Palestinians and Israelis, as well as Lebanese, as an encoura

to quickly move ahead in negotiating peace treaties.” Annan also 

out that UNIFIL’s highest priority was “helping the Lebanese Gov

and armed forces to assume their responsibilities along the bor

throughout the area from which Israel had withdrawn.” While c

admirable in its intentions, Annan’s peace plan was doomed f

start.1

Due to the convoluted power structure in Lebanon, the L

central government either could not or would not commit its 

police duty in southern Lebanon. The chief spokesperson for U

Timur Goksel, was not far off the mark when he suggested, “The

political constraints . . . and they don’t want to risk the army. . . . If 

the country follows.” Further complicating the peace process was 

that Israel had managed under the UN-brokered resolution to retain 

portion of land (Shebaa Farms) which was located at the northern 

the Golan Heights. Many Lebanese thought the land was theirs a

outraged over Israel’s continued possession of Shebaa Farms. In a 

given by Lebanon’s President, Emile Lahoud, in May 2000, the L
16

not enough to realize the comprehensive peace desired. . . . Isra

return all Arab lands, including Lebanon’s Shebaa Farms region.”

The Lebanese government was still highly suspicious of 

intentions and therefore reluctant to send its army into southern L

and dismantle Hezbollah’s war-making capabilities. Undoubtedl

remained the most effectual power broker in Lebanon and did not 

see Hezbollah disarmed.3

 Iran, too, relied on Hezbollah as a proxy 

force and would not endorse its removal from southern Lebano

of this aberrant political situation, Hezbollah once again stepped 

as the chief defender of Lebanon. In fact, when it came to pr

Lebanon against Israel, Hezbollah believed it could perform th

good deal more effectively than the Lebanese army. Clearly, it 

about to dismantle its military resources. “It is public knowledge

Hezbollah Deputy Secretary-General Qassem, “that the Lebanese 

much weaker than its Israeli counterpart, and an Israeli decision to 

Lebanon whether by land, sea or air would be faced by army retali

a limited effect that could not impede a wide-scale aggression, g

obvious imbalance in capabilities.” Qassem also pointed out “Exp

has clearly shown that Resolution 425, diplomatic efforts and US p

did not liberate Lebanon from a twenty-two-year occupation. Leba

liberated through resistance and public support for such resistanc

we are in possession of such effective means, why would we inten

incapacitate them? What do we fear by maintaining them? And wh

guarantee a deterrence of Israel should we lose them?” With 

Iranian and Syrian support, Hezbollah began organizing its militar

for the next confrontation with Israel.5

 

Hezbollah’s Preparations for the 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli 

It would appear that a major portion of Hezbollah’s operationa

was based on the presumption that Israel no longer had a tolera

war and its inevitable butcher’s bill. In fact, Hezbollah Secretary-

Hasan Nasrallah stated in his victory speech on 26 May 2000, in th

liberated town of Bint Jbeil, “Israeli society is as weak as a spide

Nasrallah was convinced that “the Israeli Achilles’ heel” was 

society itself.” The Hezbollah Secretary-General was certain “tha

society is a brittle post-military society that cannot endure wars a

and that under pressure, it can succumb to Arab aggression.” B

on this premise, Hezbollah was convinced that, in any future wa

would rely heavily on air and artillery precision weapons and limi

of ground forces. These operational hypotheses were based on Hez
would have no stomach for casualties in any future confl ict and 

conduct the majority of its operations using standoff-based fi r

Available historic evidence appears to indicate this rationale was 

as Hezbollah began its operational and tactical planning.6

It was imperative that Hezbollah’s combat operations penetr

inside Israel’s border and not yield to the IDF’s massive precision fi r

To accomplish this task, Hezbollah formed several rocket units b

2000 and 2006. South of the Litani River, Hezbollah organized the 

unit, which would control a vast arsenal of 122-mm Katyusha rock

would be used to strike within Israel. To undermine any attempt b

to decimate Hezbollah’s fi repower, missile launchers were scattere

various villages and even open areas.7

Hezbollah established a simple, yet effective system for fi 

Katyusha rockets. Once lookouts declared the area free of Israeli 

a small group moved to the launch site, set up the launcher, and 

departed. A second group would then transport the rocket to the 

location and promptly disperse. A third small squad would the

at the location and prepare the rocket for fi ring, often using r

controlled or timer-based mechanisms. The entire process was 

less than 28 seconds with many of the rocket squads riding bic

the launch location. The vast majority of the rocket systems were 

in underground caches and bunkers built to withstand precision 

artillery strikes.8

A second rocket unit containing medium-range FAJR and ex

range Katyusha rockets was placed both north and south of the Litan

if not all, of these rockets were to be fi red from vehicle-mounted lau

Sandwiched between the Litani River and Beirut, Hezbollah ad

additional long-range rocket units containing the 610-mm Zelza

other long-range systems. By 2006, Iran and Syria had supplied He

with an astonishing 12,000 to 13,000 short-, medium-, and long

ground-to-ground missiles. According to some intelligence 

Iranian elements managed the offl oading of the rockets in Leban

trained Hezbollah in their use.9

 (For a complete listing of Hezbolla

systems, see Appendix B).

If war erupted, Hezbollah believed it absolutely crucial to ma

constant barrage of rockets on Israel. Hezbollah was prepared to 

both civilian and military targets. While the group Human Right

is convinced Hezbollah fi red rockets “indiscriminately” into Israe

the 2006 confl ict, it would be debatable to maintain that all the 
18

however, that with a Circular Error Probability (CEP) of up to 5 pe

the range, the Katyushas had to be aimed at large targets, like villa

towns. This made civilian casualties all but inevitable.11

In order to protect its rocket systems, it was essential for Hezb

delay any Israeli ground attack aimed at taking out the launch site

A Hezbollah authority stated:

Alongside these three or four rocket formations was 

a ground array created south of the Litani based on 

underground tunnels and bunkers, explosives-ridden 

areas, and anti-tank units. This array was intended to 

confront ground forces to a limited extent, to stall ground 

incursions, and infl ict as many casualties as possible, 

which would wear out IDF forces, slow down their 

progress, and allow continued rocket fi re.12

It is worth noting, however, that some experts within the IDF 

Hezbollah’s ground-fi ghting force was not built separately or spe

to protect the rockets and delay an IDF ground assault but we

interconnected to the rocket units.13

The Hezbollah fi ghters assigned to protect the rockets were 

and equipped with a massive array of sophisticated weaponry. Rei

with hundreds of antitank missiles ranging from the AT-14 Korn

the American-made TOW, Hezbollah’s veteran military personne

trained in Iran and Syria) were prepared to conduct elaborate 

ambushes. (For a complete listing of Reported Hezbollah A

Weapons, see Appendix C). Its fi ghters had trained extensively to i

mortars and rockets into this lethal mix by presighting suspected 

avenues of approach and training forward observers in proper indi

procedures. Mines and IEDs were expertly placed throughout the s

defensive sector in order to stop Israeli mechanized forces and 

Hezbollah to mass both direct and indirect fi res. A sturdy and tec

advanced underground command and control (C2) system was d

to help with the expedient delivery of orders to the front.14 Evide

suggests that Hezbollah’s military commanders planned to ke

operational control over their rocket units, while giving more 

leeway to their ground troops.15

In the logistics arena, Hezbollah stockpiled every item it would 

prosecute the war effort south of the Litani. The supplies were sec

well-fortifi ed bunkers and entrenchments designed to withstand b

IDF-precision fi repower.16
southern Lebanon was an engineering marvel. In their highly infor

three-part article, “How Hezbollah Defeated Israel,” Alastair Cro

Mark Perry described the extraordinary defensive system and Hez

adroit deception plan:

Hezbollah’s robust and hardened defenses were the result 

of six years of diligent work, beginning with the Israeli 

withdrawal from the region in 2000. Many of the command 

bunkers designed and built by Hezbollah engineers 

were fortifi ed, and a few were even air-conditioned. 

The digging of the arsenals over the previous years had 

been accompanied by a program of deception, with some 

bunkers being constructed in the open and often under 

the eyes of Israeli drone vehicles or under the observation 

of Lebanese citizens with close ties to the Israelis. With 

few exceptions, these bunkers were decoys. The building 

of other bunkers went forward in areas kept hidden from 

the Lebanese population. The most important command 

bunkers and weapons-arsenal bunkers were dug deeply 

into Lebanon’s rocky hills—to a depth of 40 meters. 

Nearly 600 separate ammunition and weapons bunkers 

were strategically placed in the region south of the 

Litani. For security reasons, no single commander knew 

the location of each bunker and each distinct Hezbollah 

militia unit was assigned access to three bunkers only—a 

primary munitions bunker and two reserve bunkers, in 

case the primary bunker was destroyed. Separate primary 

and backup marshaling points were also designated for the 

distinct combat units, which were tasked to arm and fi ght 

within specifi c combat areas. The security protocols for 

the marshaling of troops was diligently maintained. No 

single Hezbollah member had knowledge of the militia’s 

entire bunker structure.17

Although the Israeli intelligence community believed Hez

defensive network was based on “Iranian military doctrine,” anothe

suggests the elaborate system was based on “a defensive gueril

organized along North Korean lines.” In fact, the same source co

that “all the movement’s underground facilities, including arms 

food stocks, dispensaries for the wounded, were put in place prim

2003–2004 under the supervision of North Korean instructors.” E

further suggests that the Iranian Revolutionary Guard was also 
20DUTIES

4.1

Marwaheen

ISRAEL

LEBANON

SYRIA

Mediterranean

Sea

Qana

Al Q laylah

Zibqine

Kafra

Hasbayya

Kafr Shouba

Marjeyoun

Al Khiyam

Kiryat

Shmona

Kafr Kila

Froun

M ajdal S ilm

Houla

T ibnine

M ais al Jabal

Brashit

Yarun

Bint Jbeil

At T iri

Al Mansouri

Al Bayyadah

Alm a ash Shab

Yatar

Bayt Lif

Ram iyh

Aiyt a’Shab

Avivim

Zarit

Litani R iver

Litani

R iver

Tyre

Naqoura

Lebouneh

Sidiqine

Debel

Maroun a-Ras

Srifa Ghanduriyah

Nabatiyeh

NABATIYEH CAZA

SIDON CAZA

TYRE CAZA

BINT JBEIL CAZA

HASBAYYA CAZA

MARJEYOUN CAZA

GOLAN HEIGHTS

Al Tayyabah

Addaisseh

Markaba

SHEBAA FARM

Al Ghajar

0 3.1 6.2Miles

N

W adi al-Stuqi

Ar Rashidiyah

20-25 km

Sector C

Sector A

Sector B

Sector HQArea HQLogisticsRocket Firing PositionTacticalDefensesBorder

GOLAN HEIGHTS

Minefields up to 7 km

in depth

Am bushes established

throughout depth of

sector

Marwaheen

ISRAEL

LEBANON

SYRIA

Mediterranean

Sea

Qana

Al Q laylah

Zibqine

Kafra

Hasbayya

Kafr Shouba

Marjeyoun

Al Khiyam

Kiryat

Shmona

Kafr Kila

Froun

M ajdal S ilm

Houla

T ibnine

M ais al Jabal

Brashit

Yarun

Bint Jbeil

At T iri

Al Mansouri

Al Bayyadah

Alm a ash Shab

Yatar

Bayt Lif

Ram iyh

Aiyt a’Shab

Avivim

Zarit

Litani R iver

Litani

R iver

Tyre

Naqoura

Lebouneh

Sidiqine

Debel

Maroun a-Ras

Srifa Ghanduriyah

Nabatiyeh

NABATIYEH CAZA

SIDON CAZA

TYRE CAZA

BINT JBEIL CAZA

HASBAYYA CAZA

MARJEYOUN CAZA

GOLAN HEIGHTS

Al Tayyabah

Addaisseh

Markaba

SHEBAA FARM

Al Ghajar

0 3.1 6.2Miles

N

W adi al-Stuqi

Ar Rashidiyah

20-25 km

Sector C

Sector A

Sector B

Sector HQ Sector HQArea HQ Area HQLogistics LogisticsRocket Firing Rocket Firing Position PositionTactical TacticalDefenses DefensesBorder

GOLAN HEIGHTS

Minefields up to 7 km

in depth

Am bushes established

throughout depth of

sector
Hezbollah was believed to be benefi ting from assistance prov

North Korean advisers, according to a July 29 report in al-Sharq a

The report quotes a high-ranking Iranian Revolutionary Guard 

who stated that North Korean advisers had assisted Hezbollah in b

tunnel infrastructure, including a 25-kilometer underground tunne

Between 2000 and 2006, Hezbollah also purportedly maste

delicate art of counter-signals intelligence (C-SIGNET), a ca

that would pay huge dividends in future wars with Israel. In the 

intelligence (HUMINT) arena, Hezbollah also proved highly suc

Working with Lebanese intelligence offi cers, Hezbollah managed t

Israeli agents in southern Lebanon and dismantle a sizable Israeli s

“In some small number of crucially important cases,” wrote Cro

Perry, “Hezbollah senior intelligence offi cials were able to ‘fee

false information on their militia’s most important emplacements 

with the result that Israel target folders identifi ed key emplaceme

—did not, in fact, exist.”20 It also appears likely that Hezbollah su

in placing its own agents in northern Israel.21

By the summer of 2006, Hezbollah had assembled a well-

well-armed, highly motivated, and highly evolved warfi ghting mac

Israel’s northern border. Hezbollah calculated accurately and desi

organization and operational plan based on well-grounded assumpt

reserve IAF campaign-planning offi cer Ron Tira pointed out, “H

designed a war in which presumably Israel could only choose wh

underbelly to expose: the one whereby it avoids a ground operat

exposes its home front vulnerability, or the one whereby it enters L

and sustains the loss of soldiers in ongoing ground-based attrition 

guerilla organization. Hezbollah’s brilliant trap apparently left Isr

two undesirable options.”22 At the tactical level, Hezbollah addre

IDF’s precision weapons capability by reducing its own weapon s

and target-appearance time and then building hardened de

positions. Knowing full well that the IDF desired to “generate 

on its “systems,” Hezbollah “created a network of autonomous ce

little inter-cell systemic interaction.” On the strategic level, Hezbol

predicted that the IDF would attack with long-range precision wea

its strategic centers of gravity (SCOG). To counter this, Hezbollah 

did away with them. In any future war with Israel, there woul

critical strategic asset to attack.23 

The key to defeating Israel required Hezbollah to modify its d

By the early summer of 2006, Hezbollah had transformed its ori
22

course of the Israeli occupation of Lebanon) into a new and unique 

As Hezbollah’s Secretary-General Nasrallah would later point ou

resistance withstood the attack and fought back. It did not wage a g

war either . . . it was not a regular army but was not a guerrill

traditional sense either. It was something in between. This is t

model.”24

It could be argued that Hezbollah’s “new model,” which co

both guerrilla and conventional methods, in many ways mirro

approach adopted by the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong during th

war with the United States. In fact, one source suggests that “He

leaders studied the historical model of the Viet Cong as inspira

establishing an advanced tunnel network, extending through th

avenues of approach into southern Lebanon.”25

Over the course of six years, Hezbollah was able to effi cientl

its tactics and operational design. Its planning was simple and i

During this time, the Israelis also formulated a new doctrine. Unfor

for Israel, this new doctrine was highly complex and would ul

play into the hands of Hezbollah.

Israeli Preparations for the 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli War

Within months of the IDF’s withdrawal from Lebanon in 200

faced a Palestinian uprising in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Kn

the Second Intifada, the insurrection produced a massive strain 

Israeli military, particularly the ground forces. As a result of the 

Intifada, fewer recruits received suitable training, resulting a comb

often ill-prepared for the challenges ahead. The Palestinian rev

had a deleterious effect on offi cers who had little experience with 

operations, other than counterinsurgency warfare.26 

During this same timeframe, Israel also continued to deal with 

constant stream of Hezbollah provocation on its northern border

complete listing, see Appendix D). However, unlike its massive r

to the Palestinian uprising, Israel, for the most part, remained relu

conduct any extensive retaliation against Hezbollah.27 Many ind

in Israel contend that Prime Minister Ehud Barak certainly did not 

intensify actions against Hezbollah, as this would equate to acknow

he was wrong in withdrawing from southern Lebanon in the fi rs

Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, who replaced Barak, had been dri

of politics for his role in the 1982 invasion of Lebanon. After ne

years in the political wilderness, he had no intention of involving 

another war there.28 
State of Israel after the 2006 war, concluded that:

Some of the political and military elites in Israel have 

reached the conclusion that Israel is beyond the era of 

wars. It had enough military might and superiority to 

deter others from declaring war against her; these would 

also be suffi cient to send a painful reminder to anyone 

who seemed to be undeterred; since Israel did not intend 

to initiate war, the conclusion was that the main challenge 

facing the land forces would be low intensity asymmetrical 

confl icts. Given these assumptions, the IDF did not need 

to prepare for “real war”. . . .29

In fact, in the years following its withdrawal from southern L

the IDF began to embrace the theories of precision fi repower, 

Based Operations (EBO), and Systemic Operational Design (SOD

emerged out of the Network-Centric Warfare (NCW) concept i

with the publication of a white paper by the US Joint Forces Co

(JFCOM). At its core, EBO is designed to affect “the cognitive dom

the enemy and his systems, rather than annihilating his forces.30

Effects-Based Operations are part of an amorphous body of 

that emerged from US Air Force doctrinal work, think tank stud

the US Joint Forces Command in the 1990s. EBO has its roots i

that the advent of the information age and of precision-guided m

would allow a military force to destroy specifi c portions of its ene

incredible precision. Furthermore, EBO theory held that the target 

attacks ought not to be traditional front-line ground or air forces but, 

should be key command and control, logistics, radars, transportat

related capabilities whose destruction will render the enemy in

of employing his military forces and unable to accomplish his 

objectives. An important secondary benefi t often cited by these think

the reduction in military casualties and collateral damage by the a

of new weapons and the avoidance of extensive ground battles.31

USAF theorist, John A. Warden, a leading advocate of p

fi repower, divided an enemy into fi ve concentric rings of system

leadership at the center and fi elded military forces at the oute

He held that precisely targeted air strikes could destroy key no

capabilities within the inner rings of the enemy’s systems, rende

enemy incapable of organized resistance.32 US Air Force doctrine 

stated that “precision engagement creates the opportunity for a d
24

doctrine used the concept of strategic attack to describe op

intended to directly achieve strategic effects . . . and to achie

objectives without fi rst having to necessarily engage the adv

fi elded military forces in extended operations at the operatio

tactical levels of war.”34 Strategists at the US Joint Forces Comma

the term rapid decisive operations (RDO) to describe a new con

war. RDO combines Effects-Based Operations “with superior kno

and command and control capabilities” to render an enemy inc

thereby forcing him to “cease actions that are against US interests 

his capabilities defeated.”35

Proponents of EBO and other theorists buttressed their claims b

what they believed to be the dominant role of air power in the Iraq 

1990–91 and in the Bosnian and Kosovo campaigns of the mid- a

1990s. In 1992, for example, US Air Force historian Richard P. 

opined, “Simply stated, airpower won the Gulf war. In the airpo

neither armies nor navies can be considered the primary instru

securing victory in war.”36 Later in the decade, the famed British 

historian John Keegan declared that, when the history of the Koso

was written, “it will, I believe, tell a quite simple story: how, for 

time in military history, air forces won a war.”37 Although they dif

the particulars, EBO proponents and other theorists generally agre

in the late 20th century and into the 21st, it would be possible for 

to use precision fi repower, delivered primarily from the air, to 

discrete targets within an enemy’s leadership and C2 systems, a

doing so would then make it possible to achieve one’s strategic ob

without the need to resort to traditional ground operations focuse

destruction of the enemy’s main forces or the need to capture a

territory. 

EBO proponents within the IDF came to believe that an enem

be completely immobilized by precision air attacks against critical 

systems. The Israeli supporters of EBO also hypothesized that litt

land forces would be required since it would not be necessary to 

the enemy.

Unlike EBO, Brigadier General Shimon Naveh’s Systemic Ope

Design (SOD) was a tool intended to help IDF commanders pl

campaigns. Naveh founded the IDF’s Operational Theory Research 

(OTRI) in 1995. After years of work by Naveh and other intel

within the OTRI, SOD attempted to provide commanders with the 

necessary “to think critically, systemically and methodologicall
provides operational commanders with tools to conceptualize bo

enemies and themselves for the purpose of designing suitable camp

wrote a former OTRI member.38

Canadian Army offi cer L. Craig Dalton, who interviewed N

2006, described SOD as an “intellectual exercise that draws on the 

vision, experience, intuition, and judgment of commanders to 

a framework for the development of detailed operational plans

this new design, Naveh drew heavily on terminology from “post 

French philosophy, literary theory, architecture and psychology.” 

general explained SOD in the following way:

This space that you look at, this room that you look at, 

is nothing but your interpretation of it. Now, you can 

stretch the boundaries of your interpretation, but not in an 

unlimited fashion, after all, it must be bound by physics, 

as it contains buildings and alleys. The question is, how do 

you interpret the alley? Do you interpret the alley as a place, 

like every architect and every town planner does, to walk 

through, or do you interpret the alley as a place forbidden 

to walk through? This depends only on interpretation. We 

interpreted the alley as a place forbidden to walk through, 

and the window as a place forbidden to look through, 

because a weapon awaits us in the alley, and a booby trap 

awaits us behind the doors. This is because the enemy 

interprets space in a traditional, classical manner, and I 

do not want to obey this interpretation and fall into his 

trap. Not only do I not want to fall into his traps, I want to 

surprise him! This is the essence of war. I need to win. I 

need to emerge from an unexpected place. . . . This is why 

we opted for the methodology of moving through walls. 

. . . Like a worm that eats its way forward, emerging at 

points and then disappearing.40

For the IDF, the major problem with SOD was the new terminol

methodology. Not every offi cer in the IDF had the time or the inc

to study postmodern French philosophy. It was questionable whe

majority of IDF offi cers would grasp a design that Naveh proclaim

“not intended for ordinary mortals.”41 Many IDF offi cers thought th

program elitist, while others could not understand why the old sy

simple orders and terminology was being replaced by a design t

could understand.42 
26

was endorsed and signed by the new Chief of the IDF Genera

Lieutenant-General Dan Halutz, in April 2006. Halutz was the fi 

offi cer ever appointed Chief of the IDF General Staff. On the fi rst 

the document, Halutz wrote, “Familiarity with and use of the con

operation are the key to our success in warfare, in which the only 

available is victory. Therefore, the commanding offi cers of the ID

understand, assimilate and implement what is written there when t

their forces into action and prepare them for their goal.”43 It is p

that not even Halutz understood the new doctrine he endorsed and 

Naveh explained that the “core of this document is the theory of 

However, Naveh remains convinced that Halutz failed to link SO

other elements and harshly criticized his military acumen.44

According to Ron Tira, the new doctrine was designed t

“strategy, force transformation, EBO as well as introducing a new 

language and new structure for staff work methodology, battlefi eld 

and orders structure and contents. While it is not exactly based on 

Naveh’s SOD,” Tira noted, “it is very much inspired by it” and “the 

between EBO and SOD were blurred in this doctrine.

Tira also pointed out that:

Similar to SOD, it replaces the “old” structure of Mission, 

Commander’s Intent, Forces and Tasks . . . with a whole 

new world of Political Directive, Strategic Purpose, 

System Boundaries, operational Boundaries, Campaign’s 

Organizing Theme, Opposite System Rationale . . . and 

so on. Field commanders did not like the new doctrine, 

principally because they didn’t understand it. Of the 170 

pages long doctrine document, many experienced offi cers 

didn’t understand more than half. Offi cers responsible for 

planning EBOs in the Air Force, could not understand 

the defi nition of EBO (more precisely in Hebrew EffectBased Campaigns) or of the defi nition of the word 

“Campaign” in the document. The terminology used was 

too complicated, vain, and could not be understood by the 

thousands of offi cers that needed to carry it out. . . . The 

new terminology and methodology was supposed to be 

limited to the higher levels of command, and at the level 

of theater command and defi nitely at the division level, 

the old terminology and methodology should have been 

used. Nonetheless, it trickled down. . . . Commanders 
essentially of two things: what do we occupy and what 

do we blow up. This is understandable. When an order 

is given to render the enemy “incoherent” or to make the 

enemy feel “distress” or “chased down,” or to “achieve 

standoff domination of the theatre” fi eld commanders 

simply do not know what to do and cannot judge how 

well or how bad they are progressing.45

By the spring of 2006, the problematic new doctrine was in pl

few IDF offi cers were willing to step forward and voice their co

One astute observer noted these offi cers were convinced “that th

were selling nonsense, that there were no new clothes, but w

embarrassed to say so out loud. They thought they were not smart 

Until the war came and pointed at the king’s [nakedness].”46

Even before Halutz took command, the IDF was stretched to t

by budgetary cuts to the ground forces and the continuing demand

on them by the Palestinian uprising. To make matters worse, soldi

perishable combat skills, such as tank crewmen, patrolled the We

and Gaza Strip, in some cases, going years without training on their a

vehicles. A distraught reserve armored battalion commander con

the three IDF chiefs of staff before Halutz “for having neglected 

forces in favor of the air force, for sacrifi cing ground mobility on 

of high-tech wizardry, and for squandering tank specialists in th

and crannies of the intifada.” He also pointed out that prior to the o

of war in the summer of 2006, reservist tank crews received little t

“To be in top form,” he stated, “a tank reservist needs a fi ve-day r

exercise each year. Most hardly got that in the course of three year

in the space of fi ve, and yet others none at all.”47

The IDF also made sizable cuts in the reserve ground forces

and equipment. According to the Winograd Report, “the quality 

equipment in the depots sent a message about values to the reserve s

And in fact, missing, obsolete or broken equipment told the reser

there was no one making sure that he would be equipped in a man

that would allow him to operate in an optimal way . . . when he wa

to the fl ag.”48

Even more disturbing than the reserves cuts and the breakd

skills at the tactical level was the fact that many high-ranking IDF 

both regular and reserve, had not received adequate training. “

generals were under-trained, and commanders above brigade le

not command their units in training for years,” Tira wrote. “Some 
28

here is that this under-training was not the result of neglect or om

but of intentional policy.”

Under the IDF’s new doctrine, the corps formation was elimina

plans were in the works to also abolish the division when the war 

in 2006. According to Tira, Halutz and the followers of Naveh

“did not see a role for land formations larger than a brigade.” B

generals were to command an element that when translated from 

means “Campaign Trend” or “Operational Trend.” These element

be responsible for implementing “a specifi c effect in the frame

the EBO. Each brigadier general would command a Campaign T

realize an effect, and all of them together should have constitu

EBO. A Campaign Trend was not an organic unit and the brigadier 

should have been given the different elements or ‘molecules’ (b

air power, special operations, etc.) necessary for generating the ef

The important point is that they did not see training above brigade 

important and therefore did not invest in it.” Tira also concluded 

new doctrine infl ated the “focus on the cognitive side of war and th

war. Instead of killing the bad guys like in the good old days, they 

to create a ‘consciousness of victory’ on our side and ‘cognitive pe

of defeat’ on the other side.”49

By early summer 2006, the IDF had been highly successfu

low-intensity campaign against the Palestinians. Having man

dismantle the terrorist infrastructure in 2002, the IDF spent the n

years conducting irregular operations, detaining new terrorist recru

keeping a tight lid on the volatile situation. However, budget c

constant patrolling of Palestinian areas had greatly reduced the 

profi ciency of IDF soldiers, particularly among tank crewmen. 

With its overreliance on EBO, SOD, and precision fi repow

new complicated and convoluted doctrine added to the problem

the IDF. Many offi cers could not comprehend the doctrine whil

believed it to be utter nonsense. Incredibly, a few generals brou

terminology and methodology to their divisions, divisions that 

conducted large-scale training exercises with their brigades in 

Against this backdrop, Halutz remained supremely confi dent that 

could defeat any enemy who had the audacity to attack Israel. 

Countdown to War

While Hezbollah Secretary-General Nasrallah had no inten

attacking Israel, he was exceedingly interested in kidnapping a f
wad al-sadiq (faithful promise) to liberate Lebanese fi ghters still 

Israeli jails. In 2005, an attempt to capture Israeli soldiers near the 

Rajar was stopped cold by the IDF. The attack served only to inten

already stringent Israeli security measures. 

Hezbollah, however, remained undeterred and continued to p

observe IDF forces along the border. In May 2006, conceivably in an 

to assess the Israeli response, Hezbollah engaged an IDF outpost a

border with indirect fi re, wounding one soldier. The Israeli resp

the attack was quick and forceful. Using its artillery positioned 

the border, the IDF conducted pinpoint artillery strikes on 20 He

positions in southern Lebanon, reducing many of them to rub

response, Hezbollah fi red eight Katyusha rockets at the IDF’s n

command center. A former UN military observer in southern L

reported that “fi ve of these notoriously inaccurate rockets actuall

antennae farm near the headquarters and sent a clear reminder to I

the nature of Hezbollah’s arsenal. . . . Both sides were clearly itc

a fi ght.”51 Whether or not both sides were “itching” for a full-scal

debatable. However, by early July 2006, Hezbollah was prepared 

another attempt to kidnap IDF soldiers. This time, Hezbollah’s p

was precise and meticulous, leaving nothing to chance. 
30

1. “United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon—Background,” P

Security Section of the Department of Public Information in Cooperation 

Department of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations, 2006, 1–3. http

un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unifi l/background.html (accessed 22 Augu

“Press Release SC/6878.” United Nations, 1 http://www.un.org/New

docs/2000/20000618.sc6878.doc.html (accessed 22 August 2007).

2. Howard Schneider, “Israel’s Army Is Gone, So Where Is Leb

The Washington Post, 8 June 2000; Judith Palmer Harik, Hezbollah: The C

Face of Terrorism (London: I.B. Tauris, 2004), 139.

3. Norton, Hezbollah: A Short History, 127.

4. Andrew Exum, “Hizballah: A Military Assessment,” 7.

5. Naim Qassem, Hizbullah: The Story from Within (London: SAQ

133–134.

6. Amir Kulick, “Hizbollah vs. the IDF: The Operational Dim

Strategic Assessment, Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv Unive

9, No. 3 (November 2006), 2, http://www.tau.ac.il/jcss/sa/v9n3p7Ku

(accessed 15 July 2007), Sergio Catignani, “The Israeli-Hezbollah Roc

A Preliminary Assessment,” Global Strategy Forum, September 2006, 

globalstrategyforum.org (accessed 1 August 2007).

7. Kulick, 3.

8. “The Hezbollah Challenge... An Alternate Paradigm?” Assistan

Chief of Staff for Intelligence, US Army Training and Doctrine Comma

Monroe, VA, No Date; Ron Tira, e-mail interview by author, 23 Se

2007.

9. Kulick, 3; Andrew Exum, “Hizbollah at War: A Military Asse

The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policy Focus No. 63 (D

2006, 6); “The Hezbollah Challenge... An Alternate Paradigm?”; `“H

As A Strategic Arm Of Iran.” Intelligence and Terrorism Center at th

for Special Studies (C.S.S.), 8 September 2006, http://www.terrorism-

il/site/html/search.asp?sid=13&pid=161&numResults=4&isSearch=yes

es (accessed 21 August 2007); “Hezbollah a North Korea-Type Guerilla 

Intelligence Online, 25 August–7 September 2006, www.IntelligenceOn

(accessed 21 August 2007).

10. “Lebanon/Israel: Hezbollah Targeted Civilians in 2006 War,” 

Rights Watch, 29 August 2007, http://hrw.org/english/docs/200

lebano16740_txt.htm (accessed 15 November 2007); Nicholas N

Response to Andrew Exum’s ‘Hizbollah at War: A Military Assessm

http://64.233.167.104/search?q=cache:CYqBLHuWCV8J:www.mide

com/downloads/Response%2520to%2520Andrew%2520Exum.pdf+%2

onse+to+andrew+exum%27s+%22Hizbollah+at+war&hl=en&ct=clnk&

l=us (accessed 21 August 2006).

11. Ron Tira, e-mail interview by author, 23 September 2007.

12. Kulick, 3.
14. The Hezbollah Challenge... An Alternate Paradigm?; Kulick

15. Kulick, 4.

16. David Makovsky and Jeffrey White, “Lessons and Implication

Israel-Hizballah War: A Preliminary Assessment,” The Washington Ins

Near East Policy, Policy Focus No. 60, October 2006, 49.

17. Alastair Crooke and Mark Perry, “How Hezbollah Defeated Isr

1: Winning the Intelligence War,” Asia Times Online, 2006, 4 http://www

com/atimes/Middle_East/HJ12AK01.html (accessed 29 June 2007).

18. “Hezbollah As A Strategic Arm of Iran.” Intelligence and T

Information Center at the Center for Special Studies (C.S.S.) 8 Septemb

10, http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/site/html/search.asp?sid=13&pid=

mResults=4&isSearch=yes&isT8=yes (accessed 21 August 2007); “Hez

North Korea-Type Guerilla Force,” Intelligence Online, 25 August–7 Se

2006, www.IntelligenceOnline.com (accessed 21 August 2007).

19. “North Koreans Assisted Hezbollah with Tunnel Const

Terrorism Focus, Vol. 3, Issue 30 (1 August 2006), 1.

20. Crooke and Perry, “Winning the Intelligence War,” 7.

21. Kulick, 4-5.

22. Ron Tira, “Breaking the Amoeba’s Bones,” Strategic Assessmen

No. 3 (November 2006) http://www.tau.ac.il/jcss/sa/v9n3p3Tira.html (

15 June 2007).

23. Ron Tira, e-mail interview by author, 22 September 2007.

24. Maryam al-Bassam, “Interview with Lebanese Hizbollah Lead

Nasrallah,” Beirut New TV Channel in Arabic, date of interview unknow

27 August 2006, quoted in Captain Daniel Helmer, “Not Quite Counterins

A Cautionary Tale for the US Forces Based on Israel’s Operation Ch

Direction,” Armor (January–February 2007), 8.

25. Helmer, 8.

26. Uri Bar-Joseph, “Their Most Humiliating Hour,” Ha’aretz, 

2007. It should be noted that this argument is rejected by some Israeli offi c

point out that prior to the 1967 war Israeli tank crewman also lacked trai

27. Zaki Shalom and Yoaz Hendel, “Conceptual Flaws on the Ro

Second Lebanon War,” Strategic Assessment, Vol. 10, No. 1 (June 2007)

28. Ron Tira, e-mail interview by author, 21 September 2007.

29. “The Winograd Report: The Main Findings of the Winogra

Report on the Second Lebanon War,” Haaretz.com, 7, http://www.haar

hasen/spages/854051.html 

30. Edward A. Smith, Effects Based Operations: Applying Network 

Warfare in Peace, Crisis, and War (Washington DC: The Command and 

Research Program, 2002), xv.

31. This discussion EBO relies upon an article by Timothy R

“Precision Firepower: Smart Bombs, Dumb Strategy,” Military Revie

August 2003, 46–53. Used with the author’s permission. 

32. John A. Warden, “The Enemy as a System,” Airpower Journal, 9 

1995), 41–55.
32

(Washington, DC: US Department of the Air Force, September 1997), 

also, Air Force Doctrine Document 2, Organization and Employment of A

Power (Washington, DC: US Department of the Air Force, 17 Februar

Chap 1.

34. Ibid, 51.

35. Jeffrey J. Becker, “Rapid Decisive Operations as Joint Op

Concept,” Army 2 (February 2002), 50. For the base RDO document

Joint Forces Command, A Concept for Rapid Decisive Operations, Fin

(Norfolk, VA: US Joint Forces Command, 25 October 2001).

36. Richard P. Hallion, Storm Over Iraq: Air Power and the G

(Washington, DC; Smithsonian Institute Press, 1992), 254.

37. John Keegan, London Daily Telegraph, 6 June 1999.

38. Caroline Glick, “Column One: Halutz’s Stalinist Momen

Jerusalem Post Online Edition, 8 June 2006, http://www.jpost.com/servl

te?cid=1149572645512&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull (

12 November 2007).

39. LTC L. Craig Dalton, “Systemic Operational Design: Epistem

Bumpf or the Way Ahead for Operational Design?” A Monograph, S

Advanced Military Studies, US Army Command and General Staff Coll

Leavenworth, KS, AY 05-06, iii.

40. Yotam Feldman, “Dr. Naveh, Or, How I Learned To Stop Worr

Walk Through Walls,” www.haaretz.com, 27 October 2007, http://www

com/hasen/spages/917158.html (accessed 5 November 2007).

41. Feldman, “Dr. Neveh, Or, How I Learned To Stop Worrying a

Through Walls.”

42. Ron Tira, e-mail interview by author, 2 November 2007.

43. Alex Fishman, “Struck by a Virus,” Yedioth Ahronoth, B4, (No 

44. Shimon Naveh, interview by author, 1 November 2007.

45. Ron Tira, e-mail interview by author, 19 June 2007.

46. Alex Fishman, B4.

47. Yehuda Avner, “A Battalion Commander’s Anger,” Jerusal

Online Edition, 22 August 2006, http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satel

name=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull&cid=1154525926212 (acces

September 2007).

48. Haninah Levine, “‘The Revolution in Military Affairs’ Shocks 

Not Awe Israeli Commission.” Center For Defense Information, Straus 

Reform Project, 11 June 2007, 8.

49. Ron Tira, e-mail interview by author, 21 June 2007.

50. Ron Tira, e-mail interview by author, 19 June 2007.

51. Augustus Richard Norton, Hezbollah: A Short History, (Princ

Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2007), 134-135.
Opening Moves

12 July to 16 July

When a Katyusha falls on somebody’s house, it’s hard to 

tell them this is going well.

 LT Itamar Abo 

Israeli Defense Forces

The Hezbollah fighter wakes up in the morning, drinks 

his coffee, takes a rocket out of his closet, goes to his 

neighbor’s yard, sticks a clock timer on it, goes back 

home and then watches CNN to see where it lands.

 LTC Ishai Efroni

Deputy Commander, Baram Brigade

The Kidnapping

On 27 June 2006, the IDF issued a high alert along a portion of th

known as milepost 105 near the village of Zarit, Israel. At this l

the road dipped down into a low wadi or valley, making it imposs

nearby observation posts and dug-in tanks to see IDF-mounted pa

they made their rounds. Certain Hezbollah had something in the 

Israeli intelligence placed an elite Egoz reconnaissance unit in 

positions at milepost 105 on 27 June. For days, the Egoz team 

to ensnare any Hezbollah fighters who might attempt to slip ac

border. By 2 July, however, no incursion materialized and the Eg

withdrew from the area. On that same day, the alert level was low

“heightened” and, on 10 July, was reduced to just above “norm

IDF reserve soldiers in the vicinity of milepost 105 returned to 

patrol duties and looked forward to the end of their reserve oblig

12 July 2006.1

 This reserve battalion was part of Brigade 300, Divi

commanded by Brigadier General Gal Hirsch. Interestingly, the 

commander had warned the Israeli Defense Forces General St

the “reserve battalion was not fit to operate along the northern 

and demanded they be replaced with trained soldiers. The Gener

rejected his request.2

On the night of 11 July, IDF monitors picked up several re

contact along the electronic border fence near milepost 105. Shor

these movement reports, an IDF reserve patrol reported 20 He

fighters near the same location. Amazingly, it appears this info

never filtered down to the reserve soldiers preparing to conduct 

patrol in the milepost 105 sector.3
34

of the milepost 105 sector. Reports indicate a festive atmosph

morning. In violation of IDF standing operating procedure (SO

squad conducted no briefing, prepatrol exercise or inspection and 

wait to be dispatched by their dispatching officer. As the soldiers 

onto two high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWV

pitched their civilian luggage into the vehicles, intent on going 

home once they completed their patrol.4

At 0855, as the two HMMWVs arrived at milepost 105, an obs

tower spotted a Hezbollah fighter armed with an antitank missile h

the weeds nearby. The observation tower was apparently unable 

this information to the patrol. The reserve soldiers once again 

their SOP by not dismounting a team from their HMMWVs and 

tactically toward the low point in the road. Instead, no one dism

and both vehicles moved close together (in violation of SOP) 

milepost 105. At precisely 0900, as the two HMMWVs rolled forw

IED exploded next to the two vehicles. At the same time, several 

missiles slammed into the HMMWVs, killing three soldiers and w

four others.5

 As the vehicles exploded and burned, Hezbollah figh

forward pulling two of the wounded soldiers from the burning wr

Placing the IDF soldiers on their backs, the Hezbollah fighters 

quickly back across the border.6

 In an effort to mask their attack an

confusion within the IDF border command, Hezbollah opened fire 

locations and Israeli villages along the milepost 105 sector with m

rockets, antitank missiles, and snipers.7

The situation was so chaotic that the IDF battalion com

responsible for the area did not realize until 0927 that Hezbol

abducted two of his soldiers. Once the situation became clear, he p

broadcast the code word HANNIBAL to all IDF forces in the N

Command, indicating an Israeli soldier had been kidnapped. Ide

issuing of this code word would have set in motion a chain of pre

events designed to rescue kidnapped IDF soldiers.8

Upon issuing the code word, the battalion commander was t

his forces rapidly into Lebanon and attempt to cut off Hezbollah’

routes. Unfortunately for the kidnapped soldiers, this movemen

materialized. Concerned with mines and IEDs, he chose not to a

By 0933, however, certain portions of HANNIBAL were put into 

“Automatic” artillery fire onto Hezbollah positions went forward as 

but was “executed only partially and with long delays.” By 09

attack helicopters arrived at milepost 105 where they found the smo

wreckage of the HMMWVs but no sign of Hezbollah fighters.
DUTIES

4.1

Marwaheen

ISRAEL

LEBANON

SYRIA

Mediterranean

Sea

Qana

Ar Rashidiyah

Al Q laylah

Zibqine

Kafra

Hasbayya

Kafr Shouba

Marjeyoun

Al Khiyam

Kiryat Shm ona

Kafr Kila

Farun

M ajdal S ilm

Houla

T ibnine

M ais al Jabal

Brashit

Yarun

Bint Jbeil

At T iri

Al Mansouri

Al Bayyadah

Alm a ash Shab

Yatar

Bayt Lif

Ram iyh

Aiyt a’Shab

Avivim

Zarit

Litani R iver

Litani R iver

Tyre

Naqoura

Lebouneh

Sidiqine

Debel

Maroun al-Ras

Srifa Ghandouriyeh

W adi al-Saluki

Nabatiyeh

NABATIYEH CAZA

SIDON CAZA

TYRE CAZA

BINT JBEIL CAZA

HASBAYYA CAZA

MARJEYOUN CAZA

GOLAN HEIGHTS

Al Tayyabah

Addaisseh

Markaba

SHEBAA FARM

Al Ghajar

0 3.1 6.2Miles

N

12July2006 Am bush Site

M etulla

Marwaheen

ISRAEL

LEBANON

SYRIA

Mediterranean

Sea

Qana

Ar Rashidiyah

Al Q laylah

Zibqine

Kafra

Hasbayya

Kafr Shouba

Marjeyoun

Al Khiyam

Kiryat Shm ona

Kafr Kila

Farun

M ajdal S ilm

Houla

T ibnine

M ais al Jabal

Brashit

Yarun

Bint Jbeil

At T iri

Al Mansouri

Al Bayyadah

Alm a ash Shab

Yatar

Bayt Lif

Ram iyh

Aiyt a’Shab

Avivim

Zarit

Litani R iver

Litani R iver

Tyre

Naqoura

Lebouneh

Sidiqine

Debel

Maroun al-Ras

Srifa Ghandouriyeh

W adi al-Saluki

Nabatiyeh

NABATIYEH CAZA

SIDON CAZA

TYRE CAZA

BINT JBEIL CAZA

HASBAYYA CAZA

MARJEYOUN CAZA

GOLAN HEIGHTS

Al Tayyabah

Addaisseh

Markaba

SHEBAA FARM

Al Ghajar

0 3.1 6.2Miles

N

12July2006 Am bush Site

M etulla
36

specifics of the kidnapping to his brigade headquarters. It app

brigade headquarters was roused into action 57 minutes later, and 

a few armored vehicles crossed the border into Lebanon. As they 

rapidly toward a hill overlooking a possible Hezbollah escape 

massive IED exploded beneath a Merkava 4 tank, sending heavy 

of steel up to 150 yards away, instantly killing the crew of four. A

teams rushed forward to retrieve the bodies of the dead tank cr

other IDF soldiers died during a vicious firefight with Hezbollah. A

the IDF high command issued an order called the FOURTH DIMEN

activating air strikes on 69 bridges in southern Lebanon. These 

were meant to impede the kidnappers’ escape.9

The IDF’s response to the Hezbollah incursion and kidnap

12 July was a muddled, haphazard affair. From the failure to diss

intelligence, to the lackadaisical approach of the soldiers on pat

the failure to rapidly pursue Hezbollah fighters, the operation rev

stunning ineptitude on the part of the soldiers and leadership wi

IDF. Sadly for Israel, the worst was yet to come.

Pulling the Levers

Around mid-afternoon on 12 July, Chief of the IDF General S

Halutz, Israeli Prime Minister Yossi Olmert, and Defense Minist

Peretz seized control of the situation and began planning their respon

kidnapping. Interestingly, both Olmert and Peretz had limited back

in military affairs. In fact, Olmert had served as an IDF new

reporter, while Peretz fulfilled his military obligation as a main

officer.10 The partial findings of the Winograd Report acknowled

the Defense Minister “did not have knowledge or experience in m

political or governmental matters. He also did not have knowl

the basic principles of using military force to achieve political 

In formulating their response to the kidnapping, both Olmert and 

were forced to rely heavily on Halutz, a general who in every resp

unprepared for a full-scale ground war with Hezbollah.11

A few years prior to the outbreak of hostilities on 12 July, the 

drawn up two “well grounded” contingency plans to use against He

The first was named ICE BREAKER (SHOVERET HAKERACH

plan called for an air campaign against Hezbollah of 48 to 72 

duration. In tandem with ICE BREAKER was a ground invasi

called MEY MAROM, designed to drive Hezbollah north of th

River. Author and IAF campaign planner Ron Tira recalled, “t

was to simultaneously activate ICE BREAKER and call and dep
to either exit the hostilities or activate MEY MAROM. Halutz 

MEY MAROM, opting instead for a stand-alone air campaign.12 S

of State Condoleeza Rice was allegedly told by the Israelis, “You 

about 70 days [in Kosovo], but we need half of that—35 days.”13

Halutz convinced Olmert and Peretz that Israel should 

back against Hezbollah and the Lebanese central government 

substantial air campaign. The plan was not designed to directly 

crush Hezbollah’s capabilities but to produce “effects” that wou

Hezbollah out of southern Lebanon and cause them to disarm.14 

proposed an immense air strike against “symbolic” Lebanese targ

Hezbollah’s military resources. The plan also called for targeted 

against Hezbollah’s military and political leadership. “His idea,” 

stated, “was that . . . we hit all these targets [and] Hezbollah will 

as a military organization. No one really believed that the L

government was in position to really pressure Hezbollah. The id

that Hezbollah would give up and then everybody would go home 

Again, the idea was to change something in the equation; to cha

conditions by forcing them to become political and abandon the 

option.”15 Hezbollah, however, had prepared for an effects-based ca

and the Lebanese government was too weak and incapable of cha

Hezbollah. There was simply no lever to pull that would cause He

to crumple.16 

While some Israeli politicians and IDF officers were skep

Halutz’s campaign plan, he failed to effectively address or prese

doubts to Olmert and Peretz. The Winograd Report maintains Ha

not reveal substantial deficiencies in the ground forces that may we

the success of their mission. Furthermore, he did not adequately 

the fact that the military’s own assessment indicated ground op

would most likely be warranted.17

The stage was now set to reveal to the world what one 

writer described as “a witches brew of high tech fantasies an

unpreparedness.”18 On the night of 12 July, Israeli jets and artiller

limited attacks on infrastructure targets across Lebanon, Hez

rockets, command and control centers, and its mouthpiece, a

television. Just after midnight, an IAF squadron flying in the vic

Beirut attacked and destroyed 54 Hezbollah Zelzal rocket launcher

Halutz received word of the mission’s success, he informed Ol

secure phone that “all the long-range rockets have been destroyed

won the war.” Israel would soon learn that his declaration of 

accomplished could not have been further from the truth.19
38

Nasrallah was completely taken aback by the massive 

bombardment. In fact, during an interview after the war, he admi

“Hezbollah had made a terrible mistake in capturing two IDF sold

killing eight others on the morning of July 12, 2006.”20 On 14 July 

after IAF attacks on the Beirut airport and after the Israeli Navy blo

all of Lebanon, Nasrallah delivered a taped message to the pr

announced to the Israelis, “You wanted an open war, and we are 

for an open war. We are ready for it.” Augustus Richard Norton, a 

military observer for the UN in southern Lebanon, wrote, “N

invited listeners to look to the sea, and with perfect theatrical tim

explosion on the horizon rocked the INS Hanit, an Israeli nava

that was hit by an Iranian-produced C-802 Noor guided missile

missile blasted a hole in the ship and killed four of its crew. Sho

the Eilat (Sa’ar 5)-class missile corvette had failed to activate its 

system against radar-guided antiship missiles. An Israeli rear adm

a reporter from Jane’s that “we were not aware that Hizbullah po

this kind of missile.”22 As Norton pointed out, “This was an early h

Hezbollah might have been better prepared than Israel presumed.”

Between 15 and 16 July, Israel continued to launch air and 

strikes on Lebanon and Hezbollah. In turn, Hezbollah responded 

steady stream of rocket attacks on northern Israel. On 16 July, lon

Hezbollah rockets managed to fall on Haifa, Israel, killing eight 

while the IAF killed at least 31 Lebanese in attacks across Lebano

The next day, in a speech to the Knesset, Prime Minister 

announced Israel’s war aims and detailed his own objectives that i

the release of the two soldiers being held captive, as well as a ce

and withdrawal of Hezbollah forces from along the Lebanon 

Furthermore, Olmert called on the Lebanese army to be deploye

effort to force Hezbollah out of the south. His most fervent aim, h

was that Hezbollah be abolished as a military power.25

The IAF’s attacks on Hezbollah, however, proved ine

Attempts to compromise its logistical sites and defensive position

opening three days of the war proved futile as did a targeted at

Hezbollah’s leadership in Beirut. A US official who closely mo

the war speculated that the IAF air strikes impacted only 7 pe

Hezbollah’s military resources.26

As early as 14 July, Israeli intelligence suggested to high 

military and political leaders that air power alone could not accomp

mission. The intelligence “concluded that the heavy bombing ca
underway would show diminishing returns within days. It stated 

plan would neither win the release of the two Israeli soldiers in Hez

hands nor reduce the militia’s rocket attacks on Israel to fewer tha

day.”27

It soon became clear to some within the IDF that, if Israeli w

were to be successfully prosecuted, the IDF would probably have to 

a major ground offensive into southern Lebanon. However, as 

and his senior commanders mulled over the situation, alarming 

began to trickle into headquarters from small IDF Special Forc

conducting probes into southern Lebanon. They reported, “He

units were fighting tenaciously to hold their positions on the first r

overlooking Israel.”28
40

1. Winograd Committee Interim Report, (Hebrew) 66-68; Ofer Sh

Yaov Limor, Captives In Lebanon, (Hebrew) 21-63; Miskal, Yedioth A

and Chemed Books, 2007; “Eight IDF Soldiers Killed, 2 Kidnapped on 

Frontier,” Jerusalem Post, 12 July 2006.

2. Amir Oren, “Analysis: In Lebanon, Government Hamstrung T

Division,” Haaretz.com, 15 October 2006, http://www.haaretz.co

spages/774974.html (accessed 1 July 2007).

3. Haaretz.com reported “that IDF investigations since the kid

showed that military intelligence ignored signs that Hezbollah was pla

attack.” “Halutz appoints team to examine Hezbollah kidnapping of s

Haaretz.com, 18 September 2006, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages

html (accessed 17 September 2007); Winograd Committee Interim 

(Hebrew) 66-68; Ofer Shelah and Yaov Limor, Captives In Lebanon, (

21-63, Miskal, Yedioth Ahrononth and Chemed Books, 2007.

4. Winograd Committee Interim Report, (Hebrew) 66-68; Ofer Sh

Yaov Limor, Captives In Lebanon, (Hebrew) 21-63, Miskal, Yedioth A

and Chemed Books, 2007.

5. It was recently revealed that the two IDF soldiers abducted by H

were probably mortally wounded in the incident. “Secret Report: Chances 

Survived Are Slim.” Ynetnews.com, http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0

3401556,00.html (accessed 17 September 2007). 

6. Ibid.

7. Winograd Committee Interim Report, (Hebrew) 66-68; Ofer Sh

Yaov Limor, Captives In Lebanon, (Hebrew) 21-63, Miskal, Yedioth A

and Chemed Books, 2007; “Hezbollah Kills 8 Soldiers, Kidnaps Two In O

On Northern Border,” Haaretz.com, 13 July 2006, http://www.haaretz.co

pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=737825 (accessed 18 September 2007).

8. Ibid.

9. Ibid; “IDF Spokesman: Hizbullah Attack On Northern Border 

Response,” Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 12 July 2006, http://www.

il/MFA/Terrorism-+Obstacle+to+Peace/Terrorism+from+Lebanon-+H

Hizbullah+attack+on+northern+border+and+IDF+response+12-Jul-2

(accessed 18 September 2007).

10. Ron Tira, e-mail interview by author, 19 September 2007.

11. Winograd Committee Interim Report, (Hebrew) 66-68; Ofer Sh

Yaov Limor, Captives In Lebanon, (Hebrew) 21-63, Miskal, Yedioth A

and Chemed Books, 2007; The partial findings of the Winograd report st

Halutz “failed in his duties as commander in chief of the army and as 

part of the political-military leadership, and exhibited flaws in professi

responsibility and judgment.” “The Winograd Report,” Haaretz.com, 1 

2007, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/854051.html (accessed 17 Se

2007).

12. Ron Tira, e-mail interview by author, 20 June 2007.
14. Uri BarJoseph, Their Most Humiliating Hour, Haaretz.com, 

2007, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/853115.html (accessed 19 Se

2007).

15. Shimon Naveh, interview by author, 1 November 2007.

16. Ron Tira, e-mail interview by author, 16 August 2007.

17. “The Winograd Report: The main findings of the Winograd part

on the Second Lebanon War,” Haaretz.com, 1 January 2007, http://www

com/hasen/spages/854051.html (accessed 18 September 2007).

18. “‘The Revolution in Military Affairs’ Shocks But Does N

Israeli Commission,” CDI Center For Defense Information, Straus 

Reform Project, 11 June 2007, http://www.cdi.org/friendlyversion/prin

cfm?documentID=3977 (accessed 20 September 2007).

19. Uzi Mahnaimi, “Humbling of the Supertroops Shatters Israe

Morale,” TimesOnLine, 27 August 2006, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/t

world/article620874.ece (accessed 19 September 2007).

20. Nicholas Noe (ed), Voice of Hezbollah: The Statements of Sayyed 

Nasrallah (London: Verso, 2007), 378.

21. Augustus Richard Norton, Hezbollah: A Short History, (Princ

Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2007), 136.

22. Alon Ben-David, Jane’s, http://www.janes.com/defence/n

jdw060718_1_n.shtml (accessed 19 September 2007).

23. Norton, 136.

24. Jeremy M. Sharp, “Israel-Hamas-Hezbollah: The Current Confli

Report for Congress, Congressional Research Service, The Library of C

21 July 2006, 34-37.

25. Norton, 139.

26. Alastair Crooke and Mark Perry, “How Hezbollah Defeated Isr

1: Winning the Intelligence War,” 5, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Midd

HJ12Ak01.html (accessed 24 September 2007).

27. Scott Wilson, “Israeli War Plan Had No Exit Strategy,” Wa

Post.com, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/200

AR2006102001688_pf.html (accessed 24 September 2007).

28. Alastair Crooke and Mark Perry, “How Hezbollah Defeated Isr

2: Winning the Ground War,” 2.

The Ground War

17 July to 14 August

Evidently they had never heard that an Arab soldier is 

supposed to run away after a short engagement with the 

Israelis.

Unidentified Israeli Soldier

Anyone dumb enough to push a tank column through Wadi 

Saluki should not be an armored brigade commander but 

a cook.

Timur Goksel

Former Senior Advisor for UNIFIL

Maroun al-Ras and Bint Jbeil

In keeping with the new doctrine, Chief of the IDF General S

Halutz had no intention of implementing the ground invasion pla

MAROM and activating IDF reserve forces. Days into the war, 

felt the air campaign would succeed. However, Halutz was under p

from army commanders to initiate a reserve callup in the even

scale ground invasion became necessary. Surprisingly, a comprom

reached between Halutz and his army generals that allowed the 

army to make limited battalion- and brigade-size raids into L

These initial raids were not designed to destroy Hezbollah or its 

but to craft a “consciousness of victory” for the Israelis and a “c

perception of defeat” for Hezbollah. It became obvious to some w

IDF that this was utter nonsense. The air campaign could not des

Katyushas (falling on northern Israel at a rate of approximately 100 

and the proposed ground-based raids would certainly have little ef

one distraught Israeli officer commented, “That didn’t make sens

You either activate MEY MAROM [and] occupy the entire rocke

area, or you don’t—but there is absolutely no sense in raids. Th

not going to stop the rockets, yet soldiers can get killed. It is risk 

reward.”1

On 17 July, the first large-scale Israeli ground foray began near 

al-Ras in an effort to establish a foothold in southern Lebanon.2

 On

first units to come to blows with Hezbollah in Maroun al-Ras was 

Maglan unit, part of what the IDF called a “special forces cluster

didn’t know what hit us,” one Maglan soldier told a reporter. The 

Forces soldiers were stunned by the volume of gunfire and the dog
44

and three Kalashnikovs—that was the intelligence we were given. 

we found a hydraulic steel door leading to a well-equipped net

tunnels.” By the next morning, the Maglans were virtually surrou

was reported from northern headquarters that “the commander of th

northern sector, Lieutenant-General Udi Adams, could barely beli

some of his best soldiers had been so swiftly trapped; neither co

chief of staff. ‘What’s wrong with the Maglans?’ Halutz dema

know. ‘They are surrounded,’ Adams replied quietly. ‘I must send 

forces.’”4

From underground bunkers and tunnels, Hezbollah fighters 

around Maroun al-Ras fought back frantically. As the battle inte

the IDF was forced to throw more forces into the fray. Soon, tan

three Israeli brigades entered the fight, along with the Egoz unit f

Golani Brigade, an engineer battalion, and Battalion 101 of the Para

Brigade. On 19 July, a Hezbollah antitank missile killed five Egoz 

as they sought shelter in a house.5

 At the same time, numerous ID

were hit by Sagger antitank missiles, wounding many of the tank cr

“They’re not fighting like we thought they would,” one IDF sold

“They’re fighting harder. They’re good on their own ground.” 

Hezbollah’s tactical proficiency bewildered the IDF. Hezbollah 

simply hunkering down and defending terrain, but using its sma

mortars, rockets, and antitank weapons to successfully maneuver 

the IDF.6

Although some problems surrounding the IDF’s performance in 

al-Ras remain murky, both officers and soldiers voiced major cr

concerning tactics and casualties. Early in the fight, reports ci

that growing concern over casualties caused IDF commanders to 

overly cautious. Reports also confirmed a lack of combined arms e

and a deficiency in basic tactical skills.7 Years of COIN operations 

the Palestinians had greatly eroded the IDF’s conventional war

proficiency. An IDF general pointed out, “It’s one thing to give th

maps, target list, etc. It’s another thing to be trained for the missio

weren’t trained. . . .”8

Taken aback by the ineffective air campaign and surpr

Hezbollah’s stubborn resistance in Maroun al-Ras, Olmert and 

called up Israeli reserve forces on 21 July. One source concluded t

decision to call the reserves took key senior reserve officers, usu

first to be notified of a pending call-up, by surprise. The reserve cal

handled chaotically—with the reserve ‘tail’ of logistical support 
to the opinion of some, the callup was not designed to assist the 

army in a massive ground invasion of southern Lebanon. Alth

would allow Israel to amass forces along the border, Hulutz’s grou

would remain unchanged. There would be no determined effort 

Hezbollah back across the Litani or destroy its rockets with a lar

ground assault. A general on Hulutz’s staff told a reporter on 22 J

“The goal is not necessarily to eliminate every Hezbollah rocket. W

must do is disrupt the military logic of Hezbollah. I would say tha

still not a matter of days away.” Many ground commanders were 

by the remark and questioned the true aims of the war.10

On the same day the IDF reserve forces were called to duty, Is

forced to request an emergency resupply of precision-guided missi

the United States. In 10 days, the IAF had used up most of its h

munitions, and yet, this huge expenditure of weaponry did little to 

Hezbollah’s “military logic” or its fighting capability. Mossad was 

gathering information to leak to the press on 28 July, indicating “He

had not suffered a significant degradation in its military capabilit

that the organization might be able to carry on the conflict for 

months.”11

Undeterred by the failure of the air campaign and stiff He

resistance, Halutz and his staff continued efforts to secure a “consci

of victory” and to deliver to Hezbollah a “cognitive perception of 

By 24 July, elements of the Golani Brigade and the 7th Armor Brig

established overwatch positions around Bint Jbeil, a large town 

Maroun al-Ras. On 25 July, the 35th Paratrooper Brigade began 

northwest of the town in an attempt to establish a blocking positi

same day, the Division 91 Commander, Brigadier General Gal H

man considered both “brilliant” and “arrogant,” announced to th

that his forces were in control of Bint Jbeil.12 This, however, 

the case. As Hezbollah rockets continued to rain down on Israel 

Israeli citizens, Halutz ordered the commander of IDF northern 

Lieutenant-General Udi Adam, to attack the town. Hezbollah Se

General Nasrallah had delivered his well-known victory speech 

Jbeil after the 2000 Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon. Halutz 

that capturing the town would prove symbolic and “create a spec

victory.” This “spectacle of victory” was undoubtedly designed t

the cognitive perception of Hezbollah. In the end, however, th

for Bint Jbeil would have a great deal more effect on the Israeli 

perception of the IDF’s professionalism and judgment.13
46DUTIES

4.1

X

X

X

Israel Lebanon

26 Jul 06

25 Jul 06

24 Jul 06

19-26 Jul 06

7

35

Golani

25 Jul 06

Maroun Al-Ras

Bint Jbeil

X

X

X

Israel Lebanon

26 Jul 06

25 Jul 06

24 Jul 06

19-26 Jul 06

7

35

Golani

25 Jul 06

Maroun Al-Ras

Bint Jbeil
Adam was infuriated and quickly reminded his commander that the 

[old quarter] of Bint Jbail alone contained more than 5,000 hous

you want me to send in one battalion?” Adam’s protests were to 

and on 26 July, after an intense artillery bombardment of the town, 

Battalion of the Golani Brigade maneuvered into Bint Jbeil from th

In the midst of the artillery barrage, additional Hezbollah fighte

up positions in the town.15 This would not be the last time Hez

intelligence apparatus accurately predicted an impending IDF offe

At 0530, Companies A and C of the 51st Battalion ran headlon

withering array of Hezbollah small arms, machine guns, rocket-p

grenades (RPGs), antitank missiles, mortars, and short-range rocket

ambush from hell” is how one Israeli soldier described the first 

“The Hezbollah men were in upper stories of buildings,” another 

remembered “and had a commanding view of the IDF force. In th

firing, 30 members of C Company, one third of its total strength, w

as was the battalion’s Deputy Commander, Major Roi Klein.” C

A also sustained five casualties. As the fighting intensified, He

squads maneuvered onto their flanks and continued to deliver a m

of direct and indirect fires. Companies A and C continued to re

violent attacks, as other companies from the 51st Battalion rushed 

to assist with the evacuation of dead and wounded.18

An eyewitness reported on the chaotic events at the Golani B

headquarters, noting “emotions ran high as word came in of th

gun-battle and heavy casualties. Soldiers ran back and forth wi

and officers screamed into encrypted cellular phones coor

the evacuation of the wounded. At one point Brig. Gen. Gal Hi

stepped out of the command center to update . . . Halutz. ‘We ca

the helicopters,’ he said, ‘The fighting is too intense.’”19 It would 

night to evacuate the wounded and the dead. In all, 9 soldiers died 

were wounded.20 Ultimately, Hezbollah fighters continued to occu

Jbeil. Even by the close of the war, the town was never entirely 

by the IDF. 

While Hezbollah’s television station al-Manar (which t

failed to knock off the air) continued to broadcast glowing repor

successful battle with the IDF, Israeli state-owned television den

the IDF and what it called “idiotic military maneuvers.” Israe

media also harassed the IDF with “three front page columns” askin

there a proper decision process? No Goals attained,” and “Has th

failed?”21 To make matters worse, international opinion (which e
48

IAF continued to attack Lebanons infrastructure and inadverte

Lebanese civilians.22 Like the air and ground campaign, the IDF’

campaign was floundering. Contrary to Halutz’s game plan, the me

projecting “a cognitive perception of defeat” onto the IDF and th

public.

By the last days of July, however, Halutz remained convin

his method was still viable. Choosing not to follow the counsel o

staff and initiate a massive ground offensive, Halutz implem

more conservative “enter and pull out” strategy. This was met wi

skepticism. Major General Ido Nehushtan advised Halutz on 26 Ju

. . . that without a major ground campaign, the IDF 

could not stop the Katyusha rockets. You must bring this 

before the government. You need to tell them straight that 

without a major ground operation, we cannot remove the 

Katyusha threat. If the government does not approve it [a 

large pre-planned ground offensive], we should tell them 

that they must stop the campaign now. The fact is that the 

war between the IDF and Hezbollah we can describe as 

a draw. . . . We should tell the political echelon that we 

cannot limit [the Katyusha attacks] any more than we are 

now doing, except if we take over [the ground] up to the 

Litani [River].23

Despite these observations, by 1 August, the IDF was still con

only small battalion- and brigade-size raids into southern Leban

that date, the IDF reported that, “during extensive initiated a

intended to hurt Hezbollah[’s] organization [al] infrastructures, 

corps, engineering, and armor forces took positions last night (T

01/08/06) in the area of the villages of Mis El Jabel, Jabel, Mahb

Belidah. Simultaneously, the forces strengthened their hold on the 

of A-Teiba, El-Adisa, and Rav A-Tietin, west of Metula, and the 

Ayta A-Sha’ab, Maorun A-Ras, and Bint-Jbeil.”24 In the fighting 

Ayta A-Shab, 2 IDF soldiers were killed and 25 wounded.25

“In one day in 1982,” Timur Goksel, a former senior adv

UNIFIL, concluded, “they [the IDF] reached Beirut; here, in six o

days, they couldn’t go more than a few miles.”26 Irritated by the 

success, Halutz replaced northern sector Commander Lieutenant-

Udi Adams with his own “personal representative,” Major Genera

Kaplinsky. According to some sources, Kaplinsky was “to man

war.”27
The true magnitude of the ground forces’ fragility became incre

evident as IDF reserve units began to assemble near the border. On

credible source concluded, “Hezbollah commanders found tha

troops were poorly organized and disciplined. . . . IDF commande

also disturbed by the performance of their troops, noting a signal 

discipline even among its best-trained soldiers. The reserves were 

and IDF commanders hesitated to put them into battle.”28

A reserve soldier in a combat infantry brigade told a reporter:

In the past six years I’ve only had a week’s training. 

Soon after we arrived, we received an order to seize a 

nearby Shi’ite village. We knew that we were not properly 

trained for the mission. We told our commanders we could 

control the village with firepower and there was no need 

to take it and be killed for nothing. Luckily we were able 

to convince our commander. . . . For the last six years 

we were engaged in stupid policing missions in the West 

Bank. . . . Checkpoints, hunting stone-throwing Palestinian 

children, that kind of stuff. The result was that we were 

not ready to confront real fighters like Hezbollah.

A reserve engineering officer who was ordered to clear a road runn

Bint Jbeil refused, his men complaining that “10 soldiers had alrea

there.” The brigade commander had the entire platoon arrested an

off to jail.29

IDF soldiers in the reserve paratrooper division were con

perplexed by their orders. “From time to time they got orders 

out Hizbollah on the ground, but every time the orders were ca

at the last minute,” a journalist reported. When they asked their 

commander for an explanation after the war, “he said they didn’t 

to get killed or kidnapped by Hizbollah, or by all the friendly fire t

going on.” It was later revealed “that in many cases, the reluctance 

Israeli troops into battle against Hizbullah grew out of the realiz

commanding officers that the soldiers would have been going on 

missions.” 

One paratrooper platoon had only two light antitank weapons 

for 30 men. “I’ve never fired a LAW in my life,” a soldier in the 

stated. “When Hizbullah is firing antitank missiles at us, how do I re

Many of the reserve soldiers who arrived at their bases to recei

military equipment found basic items missing from their kitbag
50

thermal night-vision devices, as well as food and water.

Some IDF reserve units conducting cross-border attacks 

Hezbollah often found themselves without basic sustenance as thei

trucks were not allowed to go forward for fear of Hezbollah’s 

missiles. In the Alexandroni Brigade, one of the unit’s missio

delayed because of the lack of food and water. A reservist in the 

noted, “We went as long as two-and-a-half days with daily rations 

of tuna, a can of corn and a couple of pieces of bread—to share b

four soldiers. So we got slowed up because 25 soldiers collaps

dehydration and had to be evacuated.”31

Incredibly, even the reserve division commanders lacked train

appeared to be both tactically and technically deficient. Brigadier 

Erez Zuckerman, who commanded the reserve armored divisi

spent most of his career as a marine commando and had never r

training in the use of tanks or mechanized forces. Brigadier Gene

Eizenberg, the commander of the reserve paratrooper division, was 

out for “harsh criticism” for his apparent lack of tactical profic

There can be little doubt that the IDF reserve forces lacked lea

training, and equipment. This was a serious detriment as these 

soldiers comprised nearly 80 percent of the IDF’s ground forces.33

Battle of Awareness and the Drive to the Litani

By 5 August, the IDF had approximately 10,000 soldiers in s

Lebanon. In three weeks of war, the ground forces managed to p

no farther than four miles. Remarkably, the border zone re

unsecured, as were the towns of Maroun al Ras and Bint Jbeil.34 

entire Hezbollah force south of the Litani consisted of only 3,000 f

Unlike the IDF, Hezbollah did not call on its sizable reserve for

chose to fight the entire war south of the Litani with its origin

of 3,000 men.35 For Israel and the IDF, there was still no “spec

victory” or any sign of Hezbollah’s impending defeat. 

“They are experts at deception,” a soldier pointed out after w

battling Hezbollah. “Everyone will think they won no matter wha

how you win when there’s a few thousand of you and 50,000 of 

more of them we kill, the more of them who are generated. Unfort

this is a lost war.” As Hezbollah rockets continued to kill Israeli c

IDF ground forces continued to battle their elusive foe. Many of 

soldiers were amazed by Hezbollah’s elaborate bunker and tunnel 

One infantryman reported finding a bunker near Maroun al-R

was more than 25 feet deep and contained a network of tunnels 
was equipped with a camera at the entrance, linked to a monitor b

help Hezbollah fighters ambush Israeli soldiers.”36

While the IDF had some tactical successes, one senior 

intelligence officer remarked that Hezbollah fighters had “gone to 

on IDF ground forces and described the foe as “an infantry briga

modern weapons.” By 8 August, 61 Israeli soldiers had been kille

the IDF reported 450 Hezbollah fighters killed. This last figure wa

exaggerated, as it appears likely that only 184 Hezbollah fighte

killed in ground fighting in southern Lebanon during the entire wa

While many within the IDF and the Israeli public remained pe

over Halutz’s effects-based ground campaign of “raids” and “en

pull out missions,” retired Israeli politicians and seasoned IDF 

became increasingly alarmed. One report stated:

As the fighting dragged on, some veteran officers lost 

patience with what they saw as the inexperience of the 

chief of staff and defence minister. ‘What are you doing 

in Lebanon, for God’s sake?’ the former defence minister, 

General Shaul Mofaz, asked Olmert. ‘Why did you go 

into Bint Jbeil? It was a trap set by Hezbollah.’ Mofaz 

proposed an old-fashioned IDF assault plan to launch 

a blitzkrieg against Hezbollah, reach the strategically 

important Litani River in 48 hours and then demolish 

Hezbollah in six days. Olmert liked the idea but Peretz did 

not appreciate his predecessor’s intervention and rejected 

it. Olmert appeared to lose confidence and began to issue 

conflicting orders. ‘Our mission changed twice, three 

times every day,’ complained one soldier. Many Israelis 

have been left furious that the legendary deterrent power 

of their army has been shattered.38

On 11 August, the UN Security Council unanimously a

Resolution 1701, which was designed to implement a cease-fire and 

war as soon as possible. A UN press release declared “the utmost 

at the spiraling deadly violence and destruction in Lebanon” an

“for a full cessation of hostilities in the month-long war betwee

and Hizbollah, mapping out a formula for the phased withdrawa

Israel Defence Forces from southern Lebanon, while up to 15,000 

Nations peacekeepers help Lebanese troops take control of the are

Knowing full well that the war would be over in days and 

border reestablished, Olmert and Peretz made the decision to exp
52

one of the most bizarre episodes of the war. While the reasoning 

offensive maneuver remains clouded, the move was clearly not d

to annihilate Hezbollah. Ron Tira was certain that “at no point 

order given to systemically and comprehensively deal with the ro

Hezbollah.”40 It would appear that the IDF was still following H

“raid” strategy, albeit this time with divisions instead of battali

brigades.41 Senior IDF officers would later state that the operat

designed as a “Battle of Awareness against Hizbollah.” Others 

the operation was designed as “a kind of show designed to demon

Hizbollah who is the Boss.”42

On 11 August, the airborne reserve division under Eyal Ei

began moving north toward Dibel and Qana. Two Hezbollah 

missiles hit a dwelling packed with 50 paratroopers after two of Eize

companies were ordered to take up positions in houses in Dibe

daylight hours. The resulting explosion killed 9 and wounded 31 

from the demolition company. By the time the official cease-fire w

effect on 14 August, Eizenberg’s paratrooper division had man

advance about one mile north of Dibel.43 Along the coastal road, 

Eizenberg, unidentified IDF mechanized units managed to advanc

one mile north of Mansuri by the time the war ended on 14 Augus

Meanwhile, Brigadier General Gal Hirsch’s Division 91 b

trek toward the Mediterranean coast, moving west from north 

Jbeil, where pockets of Hezbollah fighters still remained. The 

proved chaotic, similar to attacks on Maroun al-Ras and Bint Jbe

the war, an official government investigation revealed a stunni

of professionalism and competence in Division 91. The inves

concluded that commanders within the division “did not fully und

their orders” and “were not present with their troops during im

battles and even failed to fulfill basic missions.” The investigat

found fault “in the way tactical orders were composed, sometimes 

a time element. Since the orders were not clear, they were chan

some cases, on an hourly basis. Brigade commanders did not p

understand their missions. . . . They didn’t know what their goals w

how long they had to fulfill their missions.” Remarkably, accordin

report, “an entire battalion sat in the same location for several days 

moving and when the commander finally received orders to push 

into enemy territory he was confused and failed to fulfill the miss

Some of the problems within Division 91 were caused by H

operation orders. Instead of using the standard terms and format in 
DUTIES

4.1

Marwaheen

ISRAEL

LEBANON

SYRIA

Mediterranean

Sea

Qana

Ar Rashidiyah

Al Q laylah

Zibqine

Kafra

Hasbayya

Kafr Shouba

Marjeyoun

Al Khiyam

Kiryat Shm ona

Kafr Kila

Farun

M ajdal S ilm

Houla

T ibnine

Mais al Jabal

Brashit

Yarun

Bint Jbeil

At Tiri

Al Mansouri

Al Bayyadah

Alm a ash Shab

Yatar

Bayt Lif

Ram iyh

Aiyt a’Shab

Avivim

Zarit

Litani R iver

Litani R iver

Tyre

Naqoura

Lebouneh

Sidiqine

Debel

Maroun al-Ras

Srifa Ghandouriyeh

W adi al-Saluki

Nabatiyeh

NABATIYEH CAZA

SIDON CAZA

TYRE CAZA

BINT JBEIL CAZA

HASBAYYA CAZA

MARJEYOUN CAZA

GOLAN HEIGHTS

Airborne Reserve

Di

i

i

Unknown

Reserve Armored

Division

Al Tayyabah

Addaisseh

Markaba

SHEBAA FARM

Al Ghajar

Division 162

Division 91

0 3.1 6.2Miles

N

Metulla

Marwaheen

ISRAEL

LEBANON

SYRIA

Mediterranean

Sea

Qana

Ar Rashidiyah

Al Q laylah

Zibqine

Kafra

Hasbayya

Kafr Shouba

Marjeyoun

Al Khiyam

Kiryat Shm ona

Kafr Kila

Farun

M ajdal S ilm

Houla

T ibnine

Mais al Jabal

Brashit

Yarun

Bint Jbeil

At Tiri

Al Mansouri

Al Bayyadah

Alm a ash Shab

Yatar

Bayt Lif

Ram iyh

Aiyt a’Shab

Avivim

Zarit

Litani R iver

Litani R iver

Tyre

Naqoura

Lebouneh

Sidiqine

Debel

Maroun al-Ras

Srifa Ghandouriyeh

W adi al-Saluki

Nabatiyeh

NABATIYEH CAZA

SIDON CAZA

TYRE CAZA

BINT JBEIL CAZA

HASBAYYA CAZA

MARJEYOUN CAZA

GOLAN HEIGHTS

Airborne Reserve

Di

i

i

Unknown

Reserve Armored

Division

Al Tayyabah

Addaisseh

Markaba

SHEBAA FARM

Al Ghajar

Division 162

Division 91

0 3.1 6.2Miles

N

Metulla
54

new doctrine. Israeli Air Force campaign planner Ron Tira, who re

the orders after the war, wrote that “when Division 91 gave it

orders to its brigades, the orders were such that they were impos

understand.”45 Not surprisingly, Division 91’s drive to the Medite

fell far short of the mark by war’s end.

Northeast of Division 91, Brigadier General Guy Tzur’s Divis

began its drive west from Metulla toward Qantara and Ghando

Situated on the high ground overlooking the Litani, with east-w

north-south roads running through it, Tzur’s Division saw Ghand

as a key piece of terrain. For over a week, Tsur planned to cap

town, but each time his division initiated the orders, higher head

abruptly canceled them.

In an effort to provide cover for the tanks and clear the high 

above Wadi al-Saluki, Division 162 air assaulted in elements of th

Brigade. The soldiers apparently landed unopposed on the outs

Farun and Ghandouriyeh. It is likely that the soldiers of the Nahal 

occupied several buildings in the two Lebanese towns and did litt

way of clearing the high ground above the Wadi. On 12 August, h

they informed their commander that the area was secure.46

With the high ground presumably secure, 24 tanks of Brig

began crossing the Wadi al-Saluki. Soon after moving forward, 

lead tanks in the column found their route blocked by a collapsed b

As the tanks searched for another crossing point, a large IED 

exploded behind them, collapsing the road. At precisely the same m

a Hezbollah Kornet laser-guided antitank missile slammed into a c

commander’s Merkava, killing him and the entire crew. Within s

swarms of antitank missiles assailed the tank column. Amazingly, 

reported that every single tank crew in the Wadi failed to use the 

screen system on their tanks to help protect them from the deadly m

One of the ambushed tank crewmen recalled, “When the first tank 

we knew that the nightmare had begun. You should understand 

first missile which hits is not the really dangerous missile. The one

come afterward are the dangerous ones—and there always follow 

five after the first. . . . It was hellfire, and have no idea when it will 

You just pray that it will end at last, that the volley will end and 

will hear on the radio that everybody is OK. But, unfortunately, th

what we heard when the shooting ended, no sir!”48

Pinned down by Hezbollah antitank missiles, direct-fire weapo

mortars, the infantry soldiers of the Nahal Brigade were hard pr
Saluki after the area had been cleaned up, but then the terrorists c

of the houses and hiding places and started shooting at us as if we [

a shooting range,” another tank crewman remembered.50 Incredib

was no coordination whatsoever between the infantry and the tan

frantic calls from the trapped tank command for artillery and air 

were denied by Northern Command due to concerns over fratricid

By the time the ambush ended, 11 of the 24 Merkava 4 tanks 

al-Saluki had been hit by antitank missiles.52 Eight tank crewm

four infantrymen were killed. Although the exact number of w

is not yet established, both the battalion commander and his de

the tank column suffered injuries.53 It would appear that, by the t

cease-fire went into effect, Division 162 had advanced no farth

Ghandouriyeh. An officer from Division 162 stated, “There wer

professional mistakes made in the use of the tanks. The soldiers w

trained properly for this battle and the division lacked experience 

tanks and infantry units operating together and in this type of te

Undoubtedly, the actions of Division 162 at Wadi al-Saluki und

the dismal state of the IDF’s ground forces, particularity in con

conventional maneuver operations.

To the north of Tzur’s Division 162, Brigadier Gener

Zuckerman’s reserve armored division was also having d

implementing the so-called “Battle of Awareness.” While the opera

the reserve armored division remains sketchy, there appears to ha

major problems within the command. Zuckerman was “castigated

official IDF investigative team after the war for the poor perform

his tank units. The report also stated that “his lack of training led 

failures.”55 Zuckerman would later relinquish his command, tel

superiors that “I have failed and I resign. . . . Toward the end of th

felt that I had failed in my duty and decided to take personal respon

. . . I told this to my commanders and subordinates every chance 

According to an Israeli source, out of 11 IDF brigade commande

one ever crossed the border into Lebanon by wars’ end.57

On 13 August, one day before the cease-fire, the IDF condu

assaults and airborne drops south of the Litani. These air assau

airborne drops were intended to expand Israeli control to the 

This decision could easily have had calamitous results if not 

implementation of the cease-fire. According to one source, mos

IDF soldiers were “immediately surrounded” once they hit the 

Although many regarded the decision as purely political, one reti
56

public relations purposes.

Halutz monitored these last missions from inside his bunke

Aviv. When he received word that one of the IDF’s Sikorsky 

helicopters had been shot down by Hezbollah, killing the entire c

chief of staff purportedly exclaimed that he “felt defeated, both pe

and professionally.” Hezbollah, in a final act of defiance, fired 250 

into Israel in the closing hours before the cease-fire.59 
1. Ron Tira, e-mail interview by author, 20, 21 June 2007.

2. Andrew Exum, “Hizballah at War: A Military Assessmen

Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policy Focus No. 63, Decemb

9.

3. Alex Fishman, “The Changing Face of the IDF: The Security 

and the Ballot Box,” Strategic Assessment, Jaffee Center for Strategic 

Vol. 8, No. 4 (February 2006), 6, http://www.tau.ac.il/jcss/sa/v8n4p3F

html (accessed 25 September 2007).

4. Uzi Mahnaimi, The Sunday Times, 27 August 2006, http

timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/article620874.ece (accessed 24 Se

2007).

5. Ibid.

6. Exum, 10.

7. Jerusalem Post, 24 July 2006.

8. Exum, 10.

9. Alastair Crooke and Mark Perry, “How Hezbollah Defeate

Part 2: Winning The Ground War.” http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Midd

HJ13Ak01.html (accessed 1 September 2007), 2.

10. Ibid.

11. Ibid.

12. Amos Harel, “Caught Between The Pride Of Combat And The 

Criticism,” Haaretz.com, 4 November 2006, http://www.haaretz.co

spages/783040.html (accessed 4 October 2007).

13. Uri Bar-Joseph, “Their Most Humiliating Hour,” Haaretz.com, 

2007, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/853115.html (accessed 23 Se

2007).

14. Ibid, 3-4.

15. “Bint Jbeil: Hezbollah Heartland,” BBC News, http://news.bbc

hi/middle_east/5221086.stm (accessed 19 September 2007).

16. Alastair Crooke and Mark Perry, “How Hezbollah Defeated Isr

1,” 8.

17. Mitchell Prothero, “The Day Israel Realized That This Was 

War,” Guardian Unlimited, 30 July 2006, http://observer.guardian.co.u

story/0,,1833349,00.html (accessed 4 October 2007); “9 IDF Troops K

Day Of Fighting,” Ynetnews.com, http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0

3281856,00.html (accessed 4 October 2007).

18. Anshel Pfeffer, “It was all so very fast-the shooting, the sh

Jerusalem Post Online Edition, 28 July 2007, http://www.jpost.com/serv

lite?cid=1153292016359&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FPrinter (ac

October 2007).

19. Yaakov Katz, “Names Of Nine Soldiers Killed In Lebanon Re

Jerusalem Post Online Edition, http://info.jpost.com/C002/Supp

CasualtiesOfWar/2006_07_26.html (accessed 4 October 2007).
58

Jerusalem Post Online Edition, 28 July 2007; Deadly Battles In Bint Jbe

Soldiers’ Stories,” Ynetnews.com, http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0

3282017,00.html (accessed 4 October 2007). 

21. Uzi Mahnaimi, “Humbling Of The Supertroops Shatter

Army Morale,” 4; Aron Heller, “Lebanon Offensive Criticized In 

Washingtonpost.com, 26 July 2006, http://www.washingtonpost.com/

content/article/2006/07/26/AR2006072601156_pf.html (accessed 1 

2007).

22. Augustus Richard Norton, Hezbollah: A Short History (Princ

Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2007), 136–140.

23. “IDF Shake-Up Over Hezbollah War,” The Jewish Insti

National Security Affairs, JINSA Online, 23 March 2007, http://ww

org/articles/articles.html/function/view/categoryid/154/documenti

history/3,2360,654,154,3736 (accessed 5 October 2007), 6.

24. “IDF Forces Continue Extensive Ground Operations in S

Lebanon,” Israel Defense Forces: The Official Website, 02/08/2006, 

idf.il/DOVER/site/mainpage.asp?sl=EN&id=7&docid=55441&Pos=1

(accessed 1 September 2007).

25. Israel Defense Forces: The Official Website, 55429&Pos=

(accessed 2 September 2007).

26. Captain Daniel Helmer, “Not Quite Counterinsurgency: A Ca

Tale for US Forces Based on Israel’s Operation Change of Direction,” Ar

CXVI, No. 1 (January–February 2007): 8.

27. David Makovsky and Jeffrey White, “Lessons And Implication

Israel-Hezbollah War: A Preliminary Assessment,” The Washington Ins

Near East Policy, Policy Focus No. 60, October 2006, 50.

28. Alastair Crooke and Mark Perry, “How Hezbollah Defeated Isr

2: Winning The Ground War,” 5.

29. Uzi Mahnaimi, “Humbling Of The Supertroops Shatters Israe

Morale,” TimesOnline, The Sunday Times, 4.

30. Larry Derfner, “Lambs To The Slaughter?” Jerusalem Pos

Edition, 24 August 2006, http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=11

6658&pagename=JPost/JPArticle/ShowFull (accessed 15 October 2007)

31. Ibid.

32. Josh Brannon, “Halutz Slammed For Promoting Leban

Generals,” Jerusalem Post Online Edition, 30 October 2007, http://ww

com/servlet/Satellite?pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull&c

811237367 (accessed 5 October 2007); Amos Harel, “Seven Months 

IDF Implementing Lessons Of The Lebanon War,” www.haaretz.com

www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/822989.html (accessed 7 October 2007

Yehoshua, “Lebanon War Commander Resigns,” Ynetnews.com, http

ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3407286,00.html (accessed 7 October 2

33. Larry Derfner, “Lambs To The Slaughter,” 3.

34. Captain Daniel Helmer, “Not Quite Counterinsurgency: A Ca
35. Greg Myre, Risks Escalate As Israel Fights A Ground W

New York Times, 5 August 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/0

middleeast/05zone.html (accessed 1 October 2007); Crooke and Perr

Hezbollah Defeated Israel, Part 2,” 5.

36. Jonathan Finer, “Israeli Soldiers Find A Tenacious Foe In Hez

WashingtonPost.com, 8 August 2006, http://www.washingtonpost.com/

content/article/2006/08/07/AR2006080701453.html (accessed 9 Octobe

1-4.

37. Crooke and Perry, “How Hezbollah Defeated Israel, Part 2,” 10

38. Uzi Mahnaimi, “Humbling Of The Supertroops Shatters Israe

Morale,” 5.

39. “Security Council Calls For End To Hostilities Between H

Israel,” United Nations Security Council SC/8808, 11 August 2006, http

un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sc8808.doc.htm (accessed 10 October 200

40. Ron Tira, e-mail interview by author, 11 July 2007.

41. Ibid.

42. Nava Tzuriel and Eitan Glickman, “The Canyon Of Death,” 

Adam Keller, Yediot Aharonot, 16 August 2006, 1. http://www.kibush.co.

file.asp?num=15859 (accessed 1 October 2007).

43. Josh Brannon, “Halutz Slammed For Promoting Leban

Generals,” Jerusalem Post Online Edition, 30 October 2007, http://ww

com/servlet/Satellite?pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull&c

811237367 (accessed 5 October 2007); Amos Harel, “Seven Months 

IDF Implementing Lessons Of The Lebanon War,” www.haaretz.com

www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/822989.html (accessed 7 October 2007

Yehoshua, “Lebanon War Commander Resigns,” Ynetnews.com, http

ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3407286,00.html (accessed 7 October 2

44. Yaakov Katz, “Commanders Failed To Fulfill Missions,” Jerusa

Online Edition, 15 October 2006, http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?

9193446682&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull (accessed 11 

2007).

45. Ron Tira, e-mail interview by author, 19 June 2007.

46. Captain Daniel Helmer, “Not Quite Counterinsurgency: A Ca

Tale for US Forces Based on Israel’s Operation Change of Direction,” Ar

CXVI, No. 1 (January–February 2007), 7-11.

47. Yaakov Katz, “Post-battle Probe Finds Merkava Tank Mi

Lebanon,” Jerusalem Post Online Edition, 3 September 2006, http://ww

com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1154525995589&pagename=JPost%2FJPArti

rinter (accessed 5 October 2007).

48. Nava Tzuriel and Eitan Glickman, “The Canyon Of Death

Aharonot, 16 August 2006, 2.

49. Helmer, “Not Quite Counterinsurgency,” 10.

50. “The Canyon Of Death,” 2.

51. Yaakov Katz, “Wadi Saluki Battle—Microcosm Of War’s M
60

Satellite?cid1154525969154&pagenameJPost%2FJPArticle%2FS

(accessed 15 September 2007), 1-2.

52. Katz, “Wadi Saluki Battle,” 2.

53. Helmer, “Not Quite Counterinsurgency,” 9-10; Nava Tzuriel a

Glickman “The Canyon Of Death,” 3.

54. Katz, “Wadi Saluki Battle,” 2.

55. Amos Harel, “Seven Months On, The IDF Implementing Le

Lebanon War,” Haaretz.com, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/822

(accessed 10 October 2007).

56. “Lebanon War Commander Resigns,” Ynetnews.com, http

ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3407286,00.html (accessed 1 October 2

57. Yaakov Katz, “Commanders Failed To Fulfill Missions,” Jerusa

Online Edition, 15 October 2006, http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?

9193446682&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull (accessed 12 

2007).

58. Crooke and Perry, “How Hezbollah Defeated Israel, Part 2,” 9.

59. Uzi Mahnaimi, “Humbling Of The Supertroops Shatters Israe

Morale,” 5; Andrew Exum, “Hizballah at War: A Military Assessment,” 
The IDF was not ready for this war.

The Winograd Report

By the time the UN crease-fire went into effect on 14 August, He

had launched 3,790 rockets in Israeli territory. A total of 901 of these 

hit Israeli towns and cities, killing 42 civilians and wounding 4,

additional 2,773 Israeli civilians were treated for “shock and anxiet

war was a wakeup call for Israel. The Effects-Based Operations 

and Systemic Operational Design (SOD)-inspired doctrine that vig

embraced air power at the expense of a classic ground maneuver ca

was certainly a major factor in the IDF’s disappointing performa

IAF campaign planner Ron Tira noted: 

Israel failed on the strategic, operational, and tactical 

levels. Israel did not succeed in generating decapitation, 

paralysis, blindness, or any other effect that substantially 

harms the will or functioning of the organization’s 

command and control echelon. Nor did it succeed in 

suppressing the operational effectiveness of Hizbollah’s 

combat groups and light surface-to-surface rocket 

formations. At the end of the day, Israel did not upset 

the equilibrium of Hizbollah’s system and did not create 

a sense of helplessness and distress, nor did it push the 

organization towards cognitive-strategic collapse and a 

drive to end the war immediately on Israel’s terms.2

As enemy rockets rained down on northern Israel, the IDF at

to orchestrate the strategic cognitive collapse of Hezbollah through 

of air power and precision firepower-based operations. When thi

the IDF sought to produce the same effects by using its ground f

conduct limited raids and probes into southern Lebanon. These re

initiatives designed to create a cognitive perception of defeat also 

produce the effects necessary to incapacitate Hezbollah. The pres

several IDF mechanized divisions north of the Litani in the first 7

of the war, combined with a violent, systematic clearing of Hez

bunkers and tunnels, might have brought about the cognitive 

Halutz so desperately sought. Unfortunately, the new IDF doctrin

to incorporate a large land maneuver component into its effec

approach.

According to Ron Tira, one of the major problems within 

was “the over-zealous embrace of the American effects-based op
62

contrast to destroying its military force. This is achieved by strik

headquarters, lines of communication, and other critical junction

military structure. EBO [was] employed in their most distinct form 

Shock and Awe campaign that opened the 2003 Iraq War. Howe

Americans used EBO to prepare the way for their ground maneuv

not as an alternative to them.”3

Unfortunately for Israel, the new commander of the IDF 

embraced this new philosophy. The ascension of Lieutenant-Gene

Halutz to the position of Chief of the IDF General Staff in Jun

marked the first time in the history of Israel that an air force 

was chosen to command the entire IDF.4

 Considered by many 

and arrogant, Halutz possessed the utmost confidence in air pow

precision weapons, going so far as to suggest in 2001 that the IDF 

“to part with the concept of a land battle” altogether.5

 Not surp

Halutz endorsed a completely new doctrine for the IDF, one tha

heavily on EBO, SOD, and precision firepower-based operation

expense of the ground maneuver forces.

The new doctrine was a departure from the traditional, in that e

was now placed on precision firepower as “magical ‘game ch

systems.” Halutz’s adherence to the faulty new doctrine was ma

more problematic by the inadequately prepared IDF ground force

Israeli Major General Amiram Levin, a former norther

commander, wrote after the war that he thought the doctrine “w

around the genius of the commanding officer instead of placing e

upon proper staff work.” He was also convinced that the new 

stood “in complete contradiction to the most important basic pr

of operating an army in general and the IDF in particular. It is no

upon, and even ignores, the universal fundamentals of warfare. M

the new concept disregards the uniqueness of the IDF and the deve

of military traditions. . . . This is not a concept that is better or w

is a completely mistaken concept that could not succeed and shou

have been relied upon.”7

One of the most critical indictments of Halutz, the IDF ca

plan, and the new EBO/SOD doctrine it was based on came from H

Levine, a science fellow at the Center for Defense Information

synopsis of the Winograd Commission Interim Report. Levine wr

“as the conflict unfolded, Halutz’s optimistic assessment of the m

state of readiness merged with his false confidence in the abiliti

advanced weapon systems . . . to create a state in which the chief o
divorced both from reality and from what the information availabl

suggested.”8

Shimon Naveh’s SOD, which formed the core of the new IDF d

also proved highly disruptive. The new language and meth

severely handicapped many commanders in the field. A large maj

IDF officers simply did not grasp the SOD-inspired doctrine. W

terminology made its way into at least one division’s operation ord

brigade commanders were at a complete loss to understand them. 

of this effects-based, SOD-inspired doctrine in the 2006 Hezbollah

war should promote spirited debate within the US Military’s d

establishment and stand as a lucent example of the limitations of E

Another crucial factor in the IDF’s reverses in southern Leban

the dismal performance of its ground forces. Years of counterins

(COIN) operations had seriously diminished its conventional war

capabilities. The IDF was completely dismayed to find that its lan

could not conduct a successful ground campaign in southern L

Although Naveh was heavily criticized, his observations are ast

timely. “The point is, the IDF fell in love with what it was doi

the Palestinians,” he stated. “In fact it became addictive. You kno

you fight a war against a rival who’s by all means inferior to y

may lose a guy here or there, but you’re in total control. It’s nice, 

pretend that you fight the war and yet it’s not really a dangerous 

I remember talking to five brigade commanders. . . . I asked them 

had an idea . . . what it meant to go into battle against a Syrian d

Did they have in mind what a barrage of 10 Syrian artillery ba

looked like?”9

In the conventional arena, the IDF ground forces pe

unsatisfactorily. The fight at Wadi al-Saluki, for example, r

the failure of tank commanders and crewmen to use their smok

systems, the lack of indirect-fire skills, and the total absence of co

arms proficiency.10 The IDF lost many of these perishable comb

during its long years of COIN operations against the Palestinians. 

Hezbollah proved to be a highly dedicated and professional 

force, armed with some of the most advanced weapon system

world. There can be no doubt that the IDF greatly underestim

opponent. From 2000 to 2006, Hezbollah successfully embraced 

doctrine, transforming itself from a predominantly guerrilla fo

a formidable quasi-conventional fighting force. Hezbollah c

ascertained the manner in which the IDF would fight the war and p
64

an EBO campaign. 

In the tactical arena, Hezbollah proved a worthy adversary 

ground forces. Its use of swarming ATGMs and RPGs agains

tanks was both shrewd and inventive.11 Of the 114 IDF personne

during the war, 30 were tank crewmen.12 Out of the 400 tanks inv

the fighting in southern Lebanon, 48 were hit, 40 were damaged

penetrated. It is believed that five Merkavas were completely dest

Clearly, Hezbollah has mastered the art of light infantry/ATGM 

against heavy mechanized forces. Hezbollah also deserves high m

its innovative use of sophisticated ambushes and the clever use 

direct and indirect fires.14

The lackluster performance of the IDF in the 2006 Hezbollah-Isr

was the result of a multiplicity of factors. Halutz’s steadfast confid

air power, coupled with his disdain for land warfare, increased the 

of the IAF at the expense of the ground forces. While continuin

operations against the Palestinians, the IDF saw its budget for 

forces slashed and training for major combat operations by divisi

brigades greatly reduced. Within the IDF reserve, equipment 

replaced or repaired, and the tactical skills of both reserve and 

ground forces continued to decline. Training for reserve tank c

was all but forgotten. 

The new Halutz doctrine served to compound the serious defi

inherent in the ground forces. The language and style incorporate

doctrine proved nearly incomprehensible to many officers within 

When air power proved ineffective in stopping Hezbollah’s rocket 

Halutz was compelled to call upon his ground forces. Not surp

they, too, proved to be unsuccessful. 

It is apparent the US Army would do well to further exam

outcomes of the 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli war, especially as it 

to COIN, EBO, and SOD. While the US Army continues to 

irregular warfare operations throughout the world, it must not 

ability to execute major combat operations. The results of this wa

call for an indictment of EBO per se but underscore the fact th

cannot be effective when used exclusive of ground maneuver ope

Shimon Naveh’s SOD has come under much criticism for being 

incomprehensible to those who were charged with its implementat

core of SOD may not be without merit, but it is useless if it ca

understood by officers attempting to carry out operation orders usi

terminology and methodology.
with valuable examples of potential difficulties when counterins

operations are abruptly changed to major combat operations. For 

Army, which has been almost exclusively involved in irregular 

for years, this issue is of paramount importance. While the US Arm

be proficient in conducting major combat operations around the 

it is possible that years of irregular operations have chipped awa

capability, not unlike the situation encountered by the IDF. 
66

1. David Makovsky and Jeffrey White, “Lessons And Implication

Israeli-Hizballah War: A Preliminary Assessment,” The Washington Ins

Near East Policy, Policy Focus No. 60 (October 2006), 43.

2. Ron Tira, “The Limitations Of Standoff Firepower-Based Op

On Standoff Warfare, Maneuver, and Decision,” Institute for National 

Studies, Memorandum 89, March 2007, 44.

3. Ron Tira, “Breaking The Amoeba’s Bones,” Strategic Assessme

Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University Vol. 9, No. 3 (Novemb

1-2, http://www.tau.ac.il/jcss/sa/v9n3p3Tira.html (accessed 10 Septembe

4. The Chief of the General Staff Lieutenant General Dan Halutz w

in 1948 in Tel Aviv. He grew up in Moshav Hagor and completed his hig

studies at the “Kogel” high school in Holon. Dan Halutz was drafted into 

in 1966, and volunteered for the IAF’s pilot’s course, which he completed 

as a combat pilot. After completing a field training course on an “Orago

and serving as a pilot on the “Mister 4” and “Vutour” planes, he transf

the end of 1969, to the IAF’s first “Phantom” Squadron (“The One”). 

participated in the War of Attrition, during which he completed approxim

operational sorties, and after which he was posted as an instructor at the IA

school. In 1973, Dan Halutz was released from service in the IDF. He c

to serve as a reserve pilot, which included service in the Yom Kippur Wa

which he completed 43 operational sorties. After the war, he returned to 

executive officer of the “Phantom” Squadron. In 1978, Halutz was relea

active duty once more and served as a reserve pilot for four years, during 

participated in operation “Peace for Galilee.” In 1982, he returned to ser

began piloting F-16 aircraft. In 1984, he received command over the “P

Squadron, and two years later was appointed Head of the Operational U

“Lavi” project. Dan Halutz’s command positions in the IAF included He

Weapon Systems Department, Commander of the IAF Base “Hatzor,” 

the Air Division and Chief of the IAF Staff. He took part in the IAF’s op

activities since the War of Attrition and acquired rich operational experie

hundreds of operational sorties, which resulted in the downing of thre

aircraft. In July of 1998, Dan Halutz was promoted to the rank of Major 

and appointed Assistant Head of the General Staff Branch in the IDF’s 

Staff. In April 2000, he was appointed Commander of the IAF. In Ju

he was appointed Deputy Chief of the General Staff. In June 2005, Li

General Halutz was appointed Chief of the IDF General Staff. During hi

in the IAF, Halutz has accumulated approximately 4000 flight hours. R

Private Collection.

5. Sarah E. Kreps, “The 2006 Lebanon War: Lessons Learned,” Par

Spring 2007, 72-84, http://www.carlisle.army.mil/USAWC/Parameters/0

kreps.htm

6. “‘The ‘Revolution In Military Affairs’ Shocks But Does Not Aw

Commission,” CDI Center For Defense Information, Straus Military 
cfm?documentID3977 (accessed 10 September 2007).

7. Alex Fishman, B4.

8. “‘The Revolution In Military Affairs’ Shocks But Does N

Israeli Commission,” CDI Center For Defense Information, Straus 

Reform Project, 11 June 2007, http://www.cdi.org/friendlyversion/prin

cfm?documentID=3977 (accessed 20 September 2007).

9. Shimon Naveh, interview by author, 1 November 2007.

10. Helmer, “Not Quite Counterinsurgency,” 10-11.

11. Ibid, 11.

12. “Israel At War: 156 Dead,” Ynetnews.com, 13 August 2006, http

ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3289147,00.html (accessed 14 October 

13. Makovsky and White, 46.

14. Helmer, “Not Quite Counterinsurgency,” 9.

Published Articles

Barnea, Nahum. “Israel vs. Hezbollah.” Foreign Policy, November–D

2006.

Ben-David, Alon. “Lebanon War Report Reproaches Israeli Leaders

Defence Weekly, Vol. 44, No. 19, May 2007.

Boot, Max. “The Second Lebanon War.” Weekly Standard, September 20

Gordon, Shmuel L. “The Vulture and the Snake: Counter-Guerrilla Air 

The War in Southern Lebanon.” Mideast Security and Policy Studies

July 1998.

Helmer, Captain Daniel. “Not Quite Counterinsurgency: A Cautionary Ta

Forces Based on Israel’s Operation Change of Direction.” Armor, 

February 2007.

Inbar, Efraim. “How Israel Bungled the Second Lebanon War.” Mid

Quarterly, Summer 2007.

Kreps, Sarah E. “The 2006 Lebanon War: Lessons Learned.” Paramet

XXXVII, No. 1, Spring 2007.

Murden, Simon, “Understanding Israel’s Long Conflict in Lebanon: Th

for an Alternative Approach to Security During the Peace Process,

Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 27, No. 1, May, 2000.

Nisan, Mordechai. “Did Israel Betray Its Lebanese Allies?” Middle East Q

December, 2000.

Norton, Augustus Richard. “Hizballah and the Israeli Withdrawal from 

Lebanon.” Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 30, No. 1, Autumn 200

Norton, Augustus Richard and Jillian Schwedler. “(In)Security Zones 

Lebanon.” Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 23, No. 1, Autumn 199

“North Koreans Assisted Hezbollah with Tunnel Construction.” Terrorism 

Vol. 3, No. 30, August 2006.

Vego, Milan N. “Effects-Based Operations: A Critique.” JFQ, No. 41, 2nd 

2006.

Wenger, Martha and Julie Denney. “Lebanon’s Fifteen-Year War 1975

Middle East Report, No. 162, January–February 1990.

Books

Achcar, Gilbert with Michel Warschawski. The 33-Day War: Israel’s 

Hezbollah in Lebanon and It’s Consequences. Boulder and London: P

Publishers, 2007.

Campbell, Kenneth J. A Tale of Two Quagmires: Iraq, Vietnam, and t

Lessons of War. Boulder and London: Paradigm Publishers, 2007.

Chehabi, H.E. Distant Relations: Iran and Lebanon in the last 500 years. 

I.B. Tauris, 2006.

Clausewitz, Carl von. On War. Edited by Michael Howard and Pet

Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976.

Collelo, Thomas. Lebanon: A Country Study. Washington DC: Federal R

Division, Library of Congress, 1987.
70

Defense Force. New York: Public Affairs, 1998.

Gabriel, Richard A. Operation Peace for Galilee: The Israeli-PLO 

Lebanon. New York: Hill and Wang, 1985.

Hamizrachi, Beate. The Emergence of the South Lebanon Security Bel

Saad Haddad and the Ties with Israel, 1975–1978. New York: 

1988.

Harik, Judith Palmer. Hezbollah: The Changing Face of Terrorism. Lon

Tauris, 2004.

Harmon, Adam. Lonely Soldier: The Memoir of an American Soldier in th

Army. New York: Ballantine Books, 2006.

Harris, William W. Faces of Lebanon: Sects, Wars, and Global Ex

Princeton, NJ: Markus Wiener Publishers, 1997.

Helmer, Daniel Isaac. Flipside of the COIN: Israel’s Lebanese Incursion 

1982–2000. The Long War Series Occasional Paper 21. Fort Leav

KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2006.

Laffin, John. The War of Desperation: Lebanon 1982–85. London: 

1985.

Noe, Nicholas, ed., Voice of Hezbollah: The Statements of Sayyed 

Nasrallah, London: Verso, 2007.

Norton, Augustus Richard. Amal and the Shi’a: Struggle for the Soul of L

Austin: University of Texas Press, 1987.

Norton, Augustus Richard. Hezbollah: A Short History. Princeton and 

Princeton University Press, 2007.

Qassem, Naim. Hizbullah: The Story from Within. Translated by Dali

London: SAQI, 2005.

Schiff, Zeev. A History of the Israeli Army 1874 To The Present. Ne

Macmillan Publishing Company, 1985.

Shelah, Ofer and Yaov Limor. Captives In Lebanon. Miskal, Yedioth Ah

and Chemed Books, 2007. (Hebrew)

Smith, Edward A. Effects Based Operations: Applying Network Centric 

in Peace, Crisis, and War. Washington DC: The Command and 

Research Program, 2002.

Internet Sources

“9 IDF Troops Killed in Day of Fighting.” Ynetnews.com. http://www.y

com/articles/0,7340,L-3281856,00.html (accessed 4 October 2007).

Amman, Khalil Marwan in. “Hizbullah Vows to Fight on as Israel Prepare

from Lebanon.” Crescent International (May 2000). http://www.mu

com/archives/oaw00/leb-kidnap.htm (accessed 15 July 2007).

Amos, Harel. “Army Inquiries Into Lebanon War Will Lead to P

Changes.” Haaretz.com. http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/772

(accessed 15 June 2007).

“Arab Assessments of the War in Lebanon.” Intelligence and Terrorism Info

Center at the Israel Intelligence Heritage & Commemoration Cente
mResults3&isSearchyes&isT8yes (accessed 21 August 2007).

Ariel, Jonathan. “Analysis: Government and IDF Racked by Unpre

Leadership Crisis.” Israelinsider. http://web.israelinsider.com/bin/e

DispWho=Article%E19 (accessed 21 June 2007). 

Bangash, Zafar. “Hizbullah, the Party of God, Puts the Fear of Go

Followers of Satan.” Muslimedia (October 1997). http://www.mu

com/archives/special98/hizbulah.htm (accessed 25 July 2007).

Bar-Joseph, Uri. “Their Most Humiliating Hour.” Bint Jbeil. http://www.

com/articles/2007/en/0427-barjoseph.html (accessed 16 June 2007)

Bart, Roni. “The Second Lebanon War: The Plus Column.” Strategic Ass

Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University. http://www.

jcss/sa/v9n3p4Bart.html (accessed 1 August 2007).

Ben-David, Alon. “Hizbullah Hits Israel’s INS Hanit with Anti-ship M

Jane’s Defence News (July 2006). http://www.janes.com/defence/n

jdw060718_1_n.shtml (accessed 20 June 2007).

Bentsur, Eytan. “Op-ed Article on Israel’s Withdrawal from Lebanon

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (May 2000). http://www.israel-mfa.gov

Government/Speeches+by+Israeli+leaders/2000/Op-ed+Article+on

s+Withdrawal+from+Lebanon.html (accessed 21 June 2007).

Berkovich, Dani. “Doesn’t Hizbollah Brake at Red Lights?” Strategic Ass

Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University. Vol. 9, No. 4 

2007). http://www.tau.ac.il/jcss/sa/9_4_02.html (accessed 10 June 2

“Bint Jbeil: Hezbollah Heartland.” BBC News. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi

east/5221086.stm (accessed 19 September 2007).

Bishara, Marwan. “America’s Asymmetrical Wars: Following a Faile

Military Doctrine.” For The Record, The Jerusalem Fund. http

thejerusalemfund.org/images/fortherecord.php?ID=21 (accessed 

2007).

Catignani, Sergio. “The Israeli-Hezbollah Rocket War: A Preliminary Asse

Global Strategy Forum (September 2006). www.globalstrategyfo

(accessed 1 August 2007).

Cody, Edward and Molly Moore. “The Best Guerrilla Force in the 

Analysts Attribute Hezbollah’s Resilience to Zeal, Secrecy and 

Funding.” Washingtonpost.com. http://www.wahingtonpost.com/

content/article/2006/08/13/AR2006081300719_pf (accessed 1 Jul

“Commander of IDF Lebanon-Liaison Unit Killed, Warrant Officer, Sol

Civilian Killed in Explosion.” Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs. http

mfa.gov.il/MFA/Government/Communiques/1999/Commander%

0IDF%20Lebanon-Liaison%20Unit%20and%20Three%20Ot (acc

August 2007).

Creveld, Martin van. “How the Victorious IDF of 1967 Become the Defe

of 2006.” JewishJournal.com. http://www.jewishjournal.com/home/

php?id=17745 (accessed 27 February 2008).
72

Winning the Intelligence War. Asia Times Online. http://www.atim

atimes/Middle_East/HJ12AK01.html (accessed 29 June 2007).

Crooke, Alastair and Mark Perry. “How Hezbollah Defeated Israel, 

Winning the Ground War.” Asia Times Online. http://www.atim

atimes/Middle_East/HJ13AK01.html (accessed 14 June 2007).

”Deadly Battles in Bint Jbeil: Fallen Soldiers’ Stories.” Ynetnews.com

www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3282017,00.html (accessed 4 

2007). 

“Deconstructing Hizbullah’s Surprise Military Prowess.” Jane’s Int

Review (November 2006). http://www4.janes.com/subscribe/jir/d

jsp?K2DocKey=/content1/janesdata/mags/jir/history/jir2006/ji

htm@current&Prod_Name=JIR&QueryText ( accessed 15 June 200

Derfner, Larry. “Lambs to the Slaughter?” Jerusalem Post Online Edition 

2006). http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1154525936658

me=JPost/JPArticle/ShowFull (accessed 15 October 2007).

Erlich, Reuven. “Agreements, Arrangements and Understandings Co

Lebanon to Which Israel was Involved During the Past 30 Years – Bac

Data, Lessons and Conclusions.” Intelligence and Terrorism Info

Center at the Israel Intelligence Heritage & Commemoration Cente

(No Date). http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/site/html/search.asp?sid

=161&numResults=5&isSearch=yes&isT8=yes (accessed 21 augus

Erlich, Reuven. “Hezbollah’s Use of Lebanese Civilians as Human Shie

extensive military infrastructure positioned and hidden in populat

From within the Lebanese towns and villages deliberate rocke

were directed against civilian targets in Israel.” Intelligence and T

Information Center at the Israel Intelligence Heritage & Commem

Center (IICC). http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/site/html/search.a

3&pid=161&numResults=2&isSearch=yes&isT8=yes (accessed 21 

2007).

Erlich, Reuven. “Raising the issue of the Shebaa’s Farms in proposed A

French Security Council draft resolution for ending the fighting: bac

information and significance.” Intelligence and Terrorism Informatio

at the Israel Intelligence Heritage & Commemoration Center (IICC

www.terrorism-info.org.il/site/html/search.asp?sid=13&pid=161&n

lts=4&isSearch=yes&isT8=yes (accessed 21 August 2007).

Eshel, David. “Hezbollah’s Intelligence War.” Defense Update. htt

defense-update.com/analysis/Lebanon_war_1.html (accessed 14 Jun

Eshel, David. “Is Israel Victimizing Itself by its Own Openness?” 

Update. http//www.defense-update.com/analysis_130507_self_vict

democracy.htm (accessed 19 June 2007).

“High-ranking Officers Didn’t Undergo Training for Their Positions.” E

Jewish Congress. Israeli Press Review (May 2006). http://www.euroj

org/ejc/news.php?id_article=641 (accessed 15 June 2007).

Fendel, Hillel. “Retiring General: Disengagement Led to IDF Failure in L

Arutz Sheva IsraelNationalNews.com. http.www.israelnationalnews
WashingtonPost.com (August 2006). http://www.washingtonpost.

dyn/content/article/2006/08/07/AR2006080701453.html (accessed 9 

2007). 

Fishman, Alex. “The Changing Face of the IDF: The Security Agenda 

Ballot Box.” Strategic Assessment. Jaffee Center for Strategic Stud

8, No. 4 (February 2006). http://www.tau.ac.il/jcss/sa/v8n4p3Fishm

(accessed 25 September 2007).

“General Blames Halutz for War Failure.” Ynetnews.com. http://www.y

com/Ext/Comp/ArticleLayout/CdaArticleprin (accessed 5 June 2007

Hanan, Greensberg. “Commander: Egoz Must Keep Fighting.” Ynetne

http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3279381,00.html. 

Harel, Amos. “Caught Between the Pride of Combat and the Public’s Cr

Haaretz.com. http//www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/783040.html (

16 June 2007).

Harel, Amos. “Seven Months On, IDF Implementing Lessons of Leban

Haaretz.com. http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/822989.html (

1 August 2007).

Harel, Amos and Amir Oren. “Halutz Appoints Team to Examine H

Kidnapping of Soldiers.” Haaretz.com. http://www.haaretz.co

spages/764384.html (accessed 17 September 2007).

Hasson, Nir. “Gal Hirsch: MI Warning Would Have Prevented 

Abduction.” Haaretz.com. http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages

html (accessed 12 July 2007).

Hasson, Nir and Aluf Benn. “PM to War Probe: IDF Let Itself Down in 

Lebanon War.” Haaretz.com. http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages

html (accessed 21 June 2007).

Hazony, David. “The War of Fog.” Azure. http//www.azure.org.il/m

popup_print.asp?ID=332&member_ID= (accessed 6 July 2007).

Heller, Aron. “Lebanon Offensive Criticized in Israel,” Washingtonpost.c

2006). http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/200

AR2006072601156_pf.html (accessed 1 October 2007).

Heller, Mark A. “Implications of the Withdrawal from Lebanon For 

Palestinian Relations.” Strategic Assessment. Jaffee Center for 

Studies, Tel Aviv University. Vol. 3, No. 1 (June 2000). http://www.

jcss/sa/v3n1p6.html (accessed 17 July 2007).

Hendel, Yoaz. “Failed Tactical Intelligence in the Lebanon War.” 

Assessment. Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv Univer

9, No. 3 (November 2006). http://www.tau.ac.il/jcss/sa/v9n3p9Hen

(accessed 1 July 2007).

“Hezbollah a North Korea-Type Guerilla Force.” Intelligence Online (A

September 2006). www.IntelligenceOnline.com (accessed 21 Augus

“Hezbollah as a case study of the battle for hearts and minds in the confr

between Israel and the terrorist organizations.” Intelligence and T

Information Center at the Israel Intelligence Heritage & Commem

Center (IICC). http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/site/html/search.a
74

2007).

“Hezbollah as a Strategic Arm of Iran.” Intelligence and Terrorism Info

Center at the Israel Intelligence Heritage & Commemoration Cente

(September 2006). http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/site/html/search.

13&pid=161&numResults=4&isSearch=yes&isT8=yes (accessed 2

2007).

“Hezbollah Kills 8 Soldiers, Kidnaps Two in Offensive on Northern 

Haaretz.com, (July 2006). http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/page

jhtml?itemNo=737825 (accessed 18 September 2007).

“Hizbullah Attacks Along Israel’s Northern Border May 2000-June 

Israel ministry of Foreign Affairs (June 2006). http://www.m

NR/exeres/9EE216D7-82EF-4274-B80D-6BBD1803E8A7,fra

htm?NRMODE=Published (accessed 20 August 2007).

“Hizbullah’s Katyusha Rockets Force Barak to Back Down.” 

International (May 2000). http://www.muslimedia.com/archives/

katyusha.htm (accessed 12 July 2007).

Howland, Jonathan. “IDF Shake-UP Over Hezbollah War.” The Jewish 

for National Security Affairs (March 2007). http://www.jinsa.org

print.htm/documentid/3736 (accessed 5 July 2007).

Human Rights Watch. “The Occupied Zone: An Overview.” http://www

reports/1999/lebanon/Isrlb997-02.htm (accessed 12 February 2008)

“IDF Spokesman: Hizbullah Attack on Northern Border and IDF Re

Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs (July 2006). http://www.mfa.gov

Terrorism-+Obstacle+to+Peace/Terrorism+from+Lebanon-+Hizbu

bullah+attack+on+northern+border+and+IDF+response+12-Jul-2

(accessed 18 September 2007).

“Israeli Army in Race Against a UN Ceasefire in Lebanon.” DEBKAfil

wwwdebka.com/article_print.php?aid=1200 (accessed 5 June 2007)

“Israeli General Killed in Lebanon.” BBC Online Network. http://n

co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/287941.stm (accessed 1 August 2007)

Katz, Yaakov. “Commanders Failed to Fulfill Missions.” Jerusalem Pos

Edition (October 2006). http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=

446682&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull (accessed 11 

2007).

Katz, Yaakov. “Names of Nine Soldiers Killed in Lebanon Released,” Je

Post, http://info.jpost.com/C002/Supplements/CasualtiesOfWar/2

26.html (accessed 4 October 2007).

Keegan, John. “Why Israel Will Go to War Again–Soon.” Telegrap

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/opinion/main.jhtml?xml=/opinion/200

do0302.xml (accessed 6 July 2007).

Kulick, Amir. “Hizbollah vs. the IDF: The Operational Dimension.” 

Assessment, Vol. 9, No. 3 (November 2006). http://www.tau.ac.i

v9n3p7Kulick.html (accessed 15 July 2007).
(August 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/05/world/mi

05zone.html (accessed 1 October 2007).

Nahal Haredi-Netzah Yehuda Battalion. “7/17/2006 Nahal Haredi 

in Lebanon.” http://www.nahalharedi.org/nahal_haredi_news.ph

(accessed 6 June 2007).

Noe, Nicholas. “A Response to Andrew Exum’s “Hizbollah at War: A 

Assessment,” 5. http://64.233.167.104/search?q=cache:CYqBLHu

www.mideastwire.com/downloads/Response%2520to%2520Andre

Exum.pdf+%22a+response+to+andrew+exum%27s+%22Hizbollah

&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=1&gl=us (accessed 21 August 2006).

“Operation Accountability.” Ynetnews.com (August 2006). http://www.y

com/articles/0,7340,L-3284732,00.html (accessed 12 August 2007)

“Operation Grapes of Wrath.” Ynetnews.com (August 2006). http

ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3284744,00.html (accessed 10 Augu

Ophir, Noam. “Look Not to the Skies: The IAF vs. Surface-to-Surface 

Launchers.” Strategic Assessment. Jaffee Center for Strategic Stu

Aviv University, Vol. 9. No.3 (November 2006). http://www.tau.ac.i

v9n3p5Ophir.html (accessed 5 August 2007).

Oren, Amir. “Analysis: In Lebanon, Government Hamstrung Troubled D

Haaretz.com. http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/774974.html (

1 July 2007).

Osman, Khalil. “The Key Elements of the Victory of the Hizbullah-led 

Resistance in Southern Lebanon.” Crescent International (July 2000

www.muslimedia.com/ARCHIVES/oaw00/hizb-key.htm

Pfeffer, Anshel. “After Maron al-Ras Battle Bint-Jbail Looms as Next Ch

Jerusalem Post (July 2006). http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?

3291981228&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull (acces

September 2007).

Pfeffer, Anshel. “It Was All So Very Fast-The Shooting, The Shouting.” Je

Post Online Edition. (July 2007). http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Sate

=1153292016359&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FPrinter (acc

October 2007).

“Press Release SC/6878.” United Nations. http://www.un.org/New

docs/2000/20000618.sc6878.doc.html (accessed 22 August 2007).

Prothero, Mitchell. “The Day Israel Realized That This Was a Re

Guardian Unlimited. (July 2006). http://observer.guardian.co.u

story/0,,1833349,00.html (accessed 4 October 2007).

“Secret Meeting.” Ynetnews.com (March 2007). http://www.ynetne

articles/0,7340,L-3383151,00.html (accessed 12 July 2007).

“Secret Report: Chances Captive Survived Are Slim.” Ynetnews.com. http

ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3401556,00.html (accessed 17 Se

2007).

“Security Council Calls For End To Hostilities Between Hizbollah, Israel

Nations Security Council SC/8808 (August 2006). http://www.un.or

Press/docs/2006/sc8808.doc.htm (accessed 10 October 2007).
76

Lebanon War. Strategic Assessment. Jaffee Center for Strategic Stu

Aviv University, Vol. 10, No. 1 (June 2007). http://www.tau.ac.il/jcs

1_05.html (accessed 27 August 2007)

Shapira, Shimon Brig. Gen. “Countdown to Conflict: Hizballah’s 

Buildup and the Need for Effective Disarmament.” Intelligence and T

Information Center at the Israel Intelligence Heritage & Commem

Center (IICC). http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/site/html/search.as

3&pid=161&numResults=4&isSearch=yes&isT8=yes (accessed 2

2007).

Shatz, Adam. “Nasrallah’s Game.” The Nation. http://www.thenat

docprint.mhtml?i=20060731&s=nasrallah_game (accessed 6 June 2

Siboni, Gabriel. “Command in the IDF.” Strategic Assessment. Jaffee C

Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University, Vol. 9, No.4 (March 2007

www.tau.ac.il/jcss/sa/v9n3p5Ophir.html (accessed 11 July 2007).

Tira, Ron. “Breaking the Amoeba’s Bones.” Strategic Assessment Vol. 

(November 2006). http://www.tau.ac.il/jcss/sa/v9n3p3Tira.html (acc

June 2007).

“The Israeli Military is in a Crisis of Leadership.” Spiegel Online. http

spiegel.de/international/0,1518,449793,00.html (accessed 20 Augus

“The Israeli Withdrawal From Southern Lebanon.” Jewish Virtual Librar

www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Peace/lebwith.html (accessed 

2007).

“The Israeli Withdrawal from Southern Lebanon-Special Update.” Israel 

of Foreign Affairs (May 2000). http://www.israel-mfa.gov.il/MFA

Modern+History/Historic+Events/The+Israeli+Withdrawal+from+

+Lebanon-+Spec.htm (accessed 12 August 2007).

“The Occupied Zone: An Overview.” http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/

Isrlb997-02.htm (accessed 5 August 2007).

“The Winograd Report.” Haaretz.com. http://www.haaretz.co

spages/854051.html (accessed 5 July 2007).

“United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon.” Peace and Security Se

the Department of Information in cooperation with the Depar

Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations. http://www.un.org/Dep

missions/unifil/background.html (accessed 22 August 2007).

“Using the Quds Force of the Revolutionary Guards as the main tool t

the revolution beyond the borders of Iran.” Intelligence and T

Information Center at the Israel Intelligence Heritage & Commem

Center (IICC) (April 2007). http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/site/htm

asp?sid=13&pid=167&numResults=2&isSearch=yes&isT8=yes (

21 August 2007).

“War was a Catastrophe, Top Security Officials Told Olmert.” Ynetne

http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3383151,00.html (acce

July 2007).
Wars? Strategic Assessment. Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, 

University, Vol. 9, No.4 (March 2007). http://www.tau.ac.il/jcss

12.html (accessed 1 August 2007).

Winston, Emanuel A. “Making Israel Bleed.” Winston Mideast An

Commentary (March 1999). http://gamla.org.il/english/article/199

win1.htm (accessed 1 August 2007).

Yehoshua, Yossi. “Lebanon War Commander Resigns.” Ynetnews.com. 

Ze’evi Aharon (Farkash). “A critical Look at Intelligence.” Strategic Ass

Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University, Vol. 9, No. 4 

2007). http://www.tau.ac.il/jcss/sa/9_4_08.html (accessed 29 June 2

Newspapers

Avner, Yehuda. “A Battalion Commander’s Anger.” The Jerusalem 

August 2006.

Bar-Joseph, Uri. “Their Most Humiliating Hour.” Haaretz, 27 Apr

Blanford, Nicholas, Daniel McGrory and Stephen Farrell. “Tactics Hav

Israeli Army at Bay.” The Times, 8 August 2006.

Blanford, Nicholas. “Hizbullah’s resilience built on years of ho

Meticulous planning and a through understanding of Israeli military 

both play into its success.” The Christian Science Monitor, 11 Augu

Cambanis, Thanassis. “Hezbollah Fighter Strove to be a Martyr.” Th

Globe, 30 December 2006.

Derfner, Larry. “Lambs to the slaughter.” The Jerusalem Post, 24 Augus

“Eight IDF Soldiers Killed, 2 Kidnapped on Northern Frontier.” Jerusal

12 July 2006.

Fishman, Alex. “Struck by a Virus.” Yedioth Ahronoth, No Date.

Fisk, Robert. “Smoke Signals From The Battle of Bint Jbeil Send A Wa

Israel.” The Independent, 27 June 2007.

Glick, Caroline. “Column One: Halutz’s Stalinist Movement.” The Je

Post, 8 June 2006.

Goldenberg, Suzanne. “Chaos and Humiliation as Israel Pulls Out of L

The Guardian, 24 May 2000.

Goldenberg, Suzanne. “Israel Pulls Out: Last Troops Slam the Gate on L

Party.” The Guardian, 25 May 2000.

Goldenberg, Suzanne. “Israel Pulls Out: SLA Exodus: Refugees Po

Frontier.” The Guardian, 24 May 2000.

Himelfarb, Joel. “Hezbollah’s Deadly Record.” The Washington Times, 1

2005.

Horan, Deborah. “Israeli Forces Flee Positions in Lebanon.” Houston C

24 May 2000.

“Human Rights Watch Comes Under Fire from Hezbollah Over Report C

Guerrilla Group.” International Herald Tribune, 29 August 2007.

Landau, David. “Israel Lays Groundwork for Withdrawal from Lebanon

Telegraphic Agency, No date.
78

Withdrawal was Forced by Collapse of Allied Militia. St. Lou

Dispatch, 24 May 2000.

“Israel’s Occupation of S. Lebanon Collapses.” St. Louis Post-Dispatch

2000.

“Israel Pulls Last Troops Out Of Lebanon Hezbollah Forces Move Int

Positions.” Times Picayune, 24 May 2000.

Katz, Yaakov. “IDF Report Card.” The Jerusalem Post, 24 August 2006.

Katz, Yaakov. “Post-Battle Probe Finds Merkava Tank Misused in L

Jerusalem Post, 3 September 2006.

Katz, Yaakov. “Wadi Saluki Battle-Microcosm of the War’s Mistak

Jerusalem Post, 29 August 2006.

Levins, Harry. “Israel Appears Glad to Be Free of Entanglements in Leba

Louis Post-Dispatch, 30 May 2000.

Mahnaimi, Uzi. “Humbling of the Supertroops Shatters Israeli Army 

The Sunday Times, 27 August 2006.

Rabinovich, Abraham. “Despite Ragtag Pullout From Lebanon, Israel is N

Tiger.” International Herald Tribune, 30 May 2000.

Schiff, Ze’ev. “The Foresight Saga.” Haaretz, 16 August 2006.

Schneider, Howard. “Israel’s Army Is Gone, So Where Is Lebanon

Washington Post, 8 June 2000.

Sontag, Deborah. “Israel Hurries Pullout Plans After Clashes Along Bord

New York Times, 9 May 2000.

Susser, Leslie. “Closing Ranks.” The Jerusalem Report, 8 January 2007.

Susser, Leslie. “No more ‘Post-Heroic’ Warfare.” Jewish Telegraphic A

February 2007.

Tzuriel, Nava and Eitan Glickman. Translated by Adam Keller. “The C

Death.” Yediot Aharonot, 16 August 2006.

Whitaker, Brian. “Analysis: Withdrawal is at Best a Leap in the Da

Guardian, 6 May 2000.

Reports

Berkovich, Dani. “Doesn’t Hizbollah Brake at Red Lights?” Strategic As

Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Vol. 9, No.4, March 2007.

“The Hezbollah Challenge: An Alternate Paradigm?” Assistant Depu

of Staff for Intelligence, US Army Training and Doctrine Comma

Monroe, VA.

Cordesman, Anthony H. “Preliminary ‘Lessons’ of the Israeli-Hezboll

Center for Strategic and International Studies. Revised: 17 August 

Exum, Andrew. Hizballah at War: A Military Assessment. The Washington 

for Near East Policy. Policy Focus No. 63, December 2006.

Gordon, Shmuel L. “The Vulture and The Snake Counter-Guerrilla Air 

The War in Southern Lebanon.” Mideast Security and Policy Studie

Sadat Center for Strategic Studies. No. 39, July 1998.

Hendel, Yoaz. “Failed Tactical Intelligence in the Lebanon War.” 

Assessment, Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies. Vol. 9, No. 3, N

2006.
for Strategic Studies. Perspectives Paper No. 22, 28 September 2006

Levine, Haninah. “‘The Revolution in Military Affairs’ Shocks but D

Awe Israeli Commission.” Center For Defense Information, Straus 

Reform Project. 11 June 2007.

Makovsky, David and White, Jeffrey. “Lessons and Implications of th

Hizballah War: A Preliminary Assessment.” The Washington Inst

Near East Policy. Policy Focus No. 60, October 2006.

Perthes, Volker. “Syria’s Involvement in Lebanon.” Middle East Report. 

Spring 1997.

Reilly, James A. “Israel in Lebanon, 1975-82.” MERIP Reports. No. 1

September-October 1982.

Russell, Tom. “A Lebanon Primer.” MERIP Reports. No. 133, June 1985

Sharp, Jeremy M. “Israel-Hamas-Hezbollah: The Current Conflict.” CR

for Congress, Congressional Research Service, The Library of Con

July 2006.

Siboni, Gabriel. “Command in the IDF.” Strategic Assessment, Jaffee C

Strategic Studies, Vol.9, No. 4, March 2007.

“Thoughts On The Operational Art.” United States Marine Corps Marin

Warfighting Laboratory, Marine Corps Combat Development Comm

October 2006.

Tira, Ron. “The Limitations of Standoff Firepower-Based Operations: On 

Warfare, Maneuver, and Decision.” Institute for National Strategic 

Memorandum 89, March 2007.

Ze’evi, Aharon. “A Critical Look at Intelligence.” Strategic Assessme

Center for Strategic Studies. Vol. 9, No. 4, March 2007.

Interviews

Ariely, Dr. Gil. Interview by author 22 June 2006.

Eiran, Ehud. E-mail interview by author 25 July, 5, 7 August 2007.

Naveh, Shimon. Interview by author 1 November 2006.

Tira, Ron. E-mail interview by author, 19, 20, 21 June, 15 August 2007.

Thesis

Acosta, David. The Makara of Hizballah: Deception in the 2006 Summ

Monterey, California: Naval Post Graduate School, June 2007.

Whitting, Major Christopher E. When David Became Goliath. Fort Leav

KS: US Army Command and General Staff College, 2001.
80

pp

Final Report of the Commission to Investigate 

the Lebanon Campaign*

(The Winograd Report)

January 3

Press Release

Good Evening. 

1. About an hour ago we submitted the Final Repor

Commission to Investigate the Lebanon Campaign in 

the Prime minister, Mr. Ehud Olmert, and to the Min

Defense, Mr. Ehud Barak. 

2. The task given to us was difficult and complex. It invo

examination of events in 34 days of fighting, and the 

of events before the war, since the IDF had left Leb

2000. This covered extensive, charged and comple

unprecedented in any previous Commission of Inquir

3. The fact that the Government of Israel opted for 

examination, and that the army conducted a large nu

inquires of a variety of military events, are a sign of s

and an indication that the political and military lea

Israel are willing to expose themselves to critical rev

to painful but required mending. 

4. We have included in the classified version of the 

all the relevant facts we have found concerning 

Lebanon war, systematically and in a chronologica

*Information and Internet Department, Winograd Committee Final Repo

Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 30 January 2008.
part of our work. It is reasonable to assume that n

decision maker had access to a similar factual basis

task we had a unique advantage over others who have 

about this war, since we had access to a lot of prim

comprehensive material, and the opportunity to cla

facts by questioning many witnesses, command

soldiers, including bereaved families. 

5. For obvious reasons, the unclassified Report does not 

the many facts that cannot be revealed for reasons of pr

the state’s security and foreign affairs. We tried, none

to balance between the wish to present the public 

meaningful picture of the events and the needs of s

We should note that we did not take the mere fact th

data has already been published in the media as a re

including it in our unclassified Report. 

6. We, the members of the Commission, acted accordin

main objectives for which the Commission was establis

respond to the bad feelings of the Israeli public of a cr

disappointment caused by the results of the 2ndLeban

and from the way it was managed by the political and 

echelons; and the wish to draw lessons from the fai

the war and its flaws, and to repair what is required, 

and resolutely. We regarded as most important to inv

deeply what had happened, as a key to drawing lesson

future, and their implementation. 

7. This conception of our role was one of the main 

for our decision not to include in the Final Report p

conclusions and recommendations. We believe t

primary need for improvements applies to the structu

systemic malfunctioning revealed in the war – on all l

Nonetheless, it should be stressed that the fact we r

from imposing personal responsibility does not imply 

such responsibility exists. We also wish to repeat our st

from the Interim Report: We will not impose different st

of responsibility to the political and the military eche

to persons of different ranks within them. 
82

an echelon or a unit, we did not imply that the respo

was only or mainly of those who headed it at the tim

war. Often, such responsibility stemmed from a va

factors outside the control of those at the head. In ad

significant part of the responsibility for the failures an

we have found lies with those who had been in ch

preparedness and readiness in the years before the wa

9. The purpose of this press release is not to sum up th

Report. Rather, it is to present its highlights. The 

itself includes discussions of many important issues

are an inseparable part of the Report, its conclusi

recommendations. 

10. In the Final Report we dealt mainly with the event

period after the initial decision to go to war, which 

discussed in the Interim Report. Yet the events of th

covered by the Final Report took place under the sh

the constraints created by the decision to go to war, wi

failings and flaws. 

We want to stress that we stand behind everything we 

the Interim Report, and the two parts of the Report com

each other. 

11. Overall, we regard the 2nd Lebanon war as a serious 

opportunity. Israel initiated a long war, which ended 

its clear military victory. A semi-military organizati

few thousand men resisted, for a few weeks, the s

army in the Middle East, which enjoyed full air sup

and size and technology advantages. The barrage of 

aimed at Israel’s civilian population lasted through

war, and the IDF did not provide an effective respon

The fabric of life under fire was seriously disrupted, an

civilians either left their home temporarily or spent th

in shelters. After a long period of using only stand

power and limited ground activities, Israel initiated 

scale ground offensive, very close to the Security 

resolution imposing a cease fire. This offensive did n

in military gains and was not completed. These fa
our neighbors, and our friends in the region and aro

world. 

12. In the period we examined in the Final Report - fro

18, 2006, to August 14, 2006- again troubling findin

revealed, some of which had already been mentione

Interim Report: 

• We found serious failings and shortcomings in the d

making processes and staff-work in the political 

military echelons and their interface. 

• We found serious failings and flaws in the qu

preparedness, decision-making and performance 

IDF high command, especially in the Army. 

• We found serious failings and flaws in the lack of s

thinking and planning, in both the political and the 

echelons. 

• We found severe failings and flaws in the defenc

civilian population and in coping with its being a

by rockets. 

• These weaknesses resulted in part from inadequ

preparedness and strategic and operative plannin

go back long before the 2nd Lebanon war. 

13. The decision made in the night of July 12th – to reac

kidnapping) with immediate and substantive military 

and to set for it ambitious goals - limited Israel’s r

options. In fact, after the initial decision had been mad

had only two main options, each with its coherent 

logic, and its set of costs and disadvantages. The f

a short, painful, strong and unexpected blow on He

primarily through standoff fire-power. The second 

was to bring about a significant change of the realit

South of Lebanon with a large ground operation, inc

temporary occupation of the South of Lebanon and ‘c

it of Hezbollah military infrastructure. 
84

political discretion of the government; however, t

the original decision to go to war had been made; 

Israel went to war before it decided which option to 

and without an exit strategy – all these constituted 

failures, which affected the whole war. Responsib

these failures lay, as we had stressed in the Interim Re

both the political and the military echelons. 

15. After the initial decision to use military force, and 

very end of the war, this period of ‘equivocation’ co

with both the political and the military echelon not d

between the two options: amplifying the military achie

by a broad military ground offensive, or abstaining fro

a move and seeking to end the war quickly. This ‘equiv

did hurt Israel. Despite awareness of this fact, long 

passed without a serious discussion of these optio

without a decision – one way or the other – between t

16. In addition to avoiding a decision about the trajector

military action, there was a very long delay in the dep

necessary for an extensive ground offensive, whi

another factor limiting Israel’s freedom of action and 

flexibility: Till the first week of August, Israel did not 

the military capacity to start a massive ground operati

17. As a result, Israel did not stop after its early 

achievements, and was ‘dragged’ into a ground o

only after the political and diplomatic timetable preve

effective completion. The responsibility for this basic 

in conducting the war lies at the doorstep of both the 

and the military echelons. 

18. The overall image of the war was a result of a mi

flawed conduct of the political and the military echel

the interface between them, of flawed performance 

IDF, and especially the ground forces, and of deficien

preparedness. Israel did not use its military force w

effectively, despite the fact that it was a limited war 

by Israel itself. At the end of the day, Israel did no

political achievement because of military successes

it relied on a political agreement, which included 
had failed to win. 

19. This outcome was primarily caused by the fact that, f

very beginning, the war has not been conducted on the 

deep understanding of the theatre of operations, of th

readiness and preparedness, and of basic principles o

military power to achieve a political and diplomatic g

20. All in all, the IDF failed, especially because of the 

of the high command and the ground forces, to pro

effective military response to the challenge posed 

the war in Lebanon, and thus failed to provide the 

echelon with a military achievement that could have s

the basis for political and diplomatic action. Responsib

this outcomes lies mainly with the IDF, but the misfit b

the mode of action and the goals determined by the 

echelon share responsibility. 

21. We should note that, alongside the failures in t

performance, there were also important military achiev

Special mention should go to the great willingness 

soldiers, especially reserve soldiers, to serve and figh

war, as well as the many instances of heroism, coura

sacrifice and devotion of many commanders and sold

22. The air force should be congratulated on very im

achievements in this war. However, there were thos

IDF high command, joined by some in the political e

who entertained a baseless hope that the capabilities o

force could prove decisive in the war. In fact, the im

achievements of the air force were necessarily limit

were eroded by the weaknesses in the overall perform

the IDF. 

23. The “Hannit” episode colored to a large extent the 

performance of the Navy, despite the fact that it made a 

contribution to the naval blockade, and provided the N

Command with varied effective support of its fighting

24. We should also note that the war had significant dip

achievements. SC resolution 1701, and the fact it was 
86

stands even if it turns out that only a part of the stipula

the resolution were implemented or will be implemen

even if it could have been foreseen that some of them 

not be implemented. This conclusion also does not 

on the intentions or goals of the powers that suppo

resolution.

25. We note, however, that we have seen no serious staff 

Israeli positions in the negotiations. This situation im

in part when the team headed by the prime minister’s 

staff was established. The team worked efficiently a

dedication, professionalism and coordination. This co

compensate, however, for the absence of preparato

work and discussions in the senior political echelon. 

26. This fact may have much significance to the way Israel c

negotiations, and to the actual content of the arrang

reached. In such negotiations, decisions are often m

may have far-reaching implications on Israel’s in

including the setting of precedents. 

27. The staff work done in the Ministry of Foreign 

concerning the adoption of a favorable resolution 

Security Council was, in the main, quick, systema

efficient. At the same time, for a variety of reason

not reflect clear awareness of the essential need to m

an effective relationship between military achieveme

diplomatic activities. 

28. We now turn to the political and military activity con

the ground operation at the end of the war. This is on

central foci of public debate. 

29. True, in hindsight, the large ground operation did not 

its goals of limiting the rocket fire and changing the pi

the war. It is not clear what the ground operation con

to speeding up the diplomatic achievement or impro

It is also unclear to what extent starting the ground o

affected the reactions of the government of Leban

Hezbollah to the ceasefire. 
these decisions should not be made with hindsight. I

depend on the achievements or the costs these decision

had. The evaluation must be based only on the reason

operation, and its risks and prospects as they were kno

as they should have been known - when it was decide

Moreover, it is impossible to evaluate the ground o

at the end of the war without recalling the develo

that preceded it and the repeated delays in the adop

the Security Council resolution; and as a part of the 

conduct of the war. 

31. Against this background, we make the following find

the main decisions: 

• The cabinet decision of August 9th– to approve in p

the IDF plan, but to authorize the PM and the M

decide if and when it should be activated, acco

the diplomatic timetable - was almost inevitable

the Israeli government necessary military and 

flexibility. 

• The decision to start in fact the ground operation wa

the political and professional discretion of its ma

the basis of the facts before them. The goals of the 

operation were legitimate, and were not exhauste

wish to hasten or improve the diplomatic achie

There was no failure in that decision in itself, de

limited achievements and its painful costs. 

• Both the position of the Prime minister – w

preferred to avoid the ground operation – and the 

of the Minister of Defense – who had thought i

have served Israel’s interest to go for it – had bee

on the merits and on the basis of evidence. Both 

serious support among the members of the gene

of the IDF and others. Even if both statesmen to

account political and public concerns – a fact we 

ascertain - we believe that they both acted out of 

and sincere perception of what they thought at t

was Israel’s interest. 
88

was the political leaders. The sole test of these deci

public and political. 

33. At the same time, we also note that: 

• We have not found within either the political or the 

echelons a serious consideration of the question 

it was reasonable to expect military achievemen

hours that could have contributed meaningfully to 

the goals of the operation; 

• We have not found that the political echelon wa

of the details of the fighting in real time, and we h

seen a discussion, in either the political or the 

echelons, of the issue of stopping the military o

after the Security Council resolution was adopted

• We have not seen an explanation of the tension b

the great effort to get additional time to conclude 

stage of the planned ground operation and the d

not to go on fighting until the ceasefire itself.

34. A description of failures in the conduct of war may be r

as harming Israel. There will be those who may use our 

to hurt Israel and its army. We nonetheless point o

failures and shortcomings because we are certain th

in this way Israel may come out of this ordeal streng

We are pleased that processes of repair have already 

We recommend a deep and systematic continuation 

processes. It is exclusively in the hands of Israeli 

and public to determine whether, when facing challe

the future, we will come to them more prepared an

and whether we shall cope with them in a more seri

responsible way than the way the decision-makers had 

in the political and the military echelons -- in the 2nd L

war. 

35. Our recommendations contain suggestions for system

deep changes in the modalities of thinking and actin

political and military echelons and their interface, 

routine and emergency, including war. These are d
by current affairs, local successes or initial repairs. A pe

and prolonged effort, on many levels, will be needed 

to bring about the essential improvements in the w

thinking and acting of the political-military systems. 

36. For these reasons we would like to caution against 

which might upset plans and delay required change pr

and thus produce dangerous results: 

• Fear of criticism in case of failure may lead to de

reactions, working by the book, and abstentio

making resolute decisions and preferring non-actio

behavior is undesirable and also dangerous. 

• In a dynamic complex reality, one should not prepa

for the last war. It is also essential not to limit on

superficial action, designed to create an appeara

flaws had been corrected. 

• It is also essential not to focus exclusively on copi

dangers, but to combine readiness for threat scenar

an active seeking of opportunities. 

• When speaking on learning, one should take into 

that enemies, too, are learning their lessons. 

37. The 2nd Lebanon War has brought again to the for

for thought and discussion issues that some parts o

society had preferred to suppress: Israel cannot su

this region, and cannot live in it in peace or at least n

unless people in Israel itself and in its surroundings 

that Israel has the political and military leadership, 

capabilities, and social robustness that will allow her 

those of its neighbors who wish to harm her, and to 

them - if necessary through the use of military force 

achieving their goal. 

38. These truths do not depend on one’s partisan or 

views. Israel must - politically and morally - seek pea

its neighbors and make necessary compromises. At th

time, seeking peace or managing the conflict must com
90

the ability and willingness to fight for the state, its val

the security of its population even in the absence of p

39. These truths have profound and far-reaching implicat

many dimensions of life in Israel and the ways its ch

are managed. Beyond examining the way the Leban

was planned and conducted; beyond the examination 

in decision-making and performance that had been rev

it - important as they may be; these are the central q

that the Lebanon war has raised. These are issues that l

very essence of our existence here as a Jewish and dem

state. These are the questions we need to concentrate 

40. We hope that our findings and conclusions in the 

and the Final Reports will bring about not only a re

failings and flaws, but help Israeli society, its lead

thinkers, to advance the long-term goals of Israel, and 

the appropriate ways to address the challenges and res

them. 

41. We are grateful for the trust put in us when this diffic

was given to us. If we succeed in facilitating rectific

the failings we have identified - this will be our best r

Thank you.
Appendix B 

Hizballah Rockets*

System Range

(Kilometers) 

Warhead

Weight

(Kilograms)

ZelZal-2 210 600 

Nazeat 100-140 1,300(6)/250(10) 

Fajr 3 43 45 

Fajr 5 75 90 

302mm 75 100 

220mm 70 Unknown 

122mm 20 30 

107mm 6 Unknown 

*Makovsky, David and White, Jeffrey. “Lessons and Implications of the Israel Hizballah 

Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Policy Focus #60, October 2006. 
Appendix C 

Reported Hizballah Antitank Weapons*

System Range

(Kilometers) Penetration Guid(Manu

Kornet AT–14 3.5 mi 1,100–1,200 mm 

Kornet AT–5 75 m 800 mm 

Metis-M AT–13 80 m to 1.5 km 460–850 mm 

Sagger AT–3 3 km 200 mm 

Fagot AT–4 70 m to 2 km 400 mm 

Milan 400–2,000 m 352 mm 

TOW 600–3,700 m 800 mm 

RPG–29 460 m 750 mm 

RPG–7 500 m 3300 mm 

*Makovsky, David and White, Jeffrey. “Lessons and Implications of the Israel Hizballah 

Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Policy Focus #60, October 2006. 
The following is a chronological list of events along Israel’s n

border in which Israeli civilians or soldiers were killed or wound

May 2000 until 12 July 2006.*

27 May 2006 - An IDF soldier was wounded when Katyushas we

at an army base at Mt. Meron in the upper Galilee.

27 December 2005 - A branch of a Palestinian organization conn

Al-Qaida fired six Katyushas, damaging a house in Kiryat Shm

a house in Metulla. In response, the IAF attacked a training bas

Popular Front, south of Beirut.

21 November 2005 - An attempt to kidnap an IDF soldier wa

when paratroopers patrolling near Rajar village discerned a Hizbu

approaching. Private David Markovitz opened fire, killing all fo

heavy attack of mortars and Katyusha rockets that ensued, nine 

and and two civilians were injured. 

29 June 2005 - More than 20 mortars were fired from across the 

Cpl. Uzi Peretz of the Golani Brigade was killed and four soldiers w

including the unit’s doctor. Fire was exchanged and helicopters an

attacked five Hizbullah outposts in the Reches Ramim area.

7 April 2005 - Two Israeli Arabs from the village of Rajar on th

Lebanon border were kidnapped by Hizbullah operatives and 

captivity for four days in an attempt to obtain information on Israe

9 January 2005 - An explosive device was detonated against an ID

at Nahal Sion. One Israeli soldier was killed, and a UN officer wa

20 July 2004 - Hizbullah sniper fired at an IDF post in the wester

of the Israeli-Lebanese border. Two IDF soldiers were killed. 

7 May 2004 - Fire in the Mt. Dov sector. IDF soldier Dennis Lemi

killed, and two other soldiers were severely wounded. The IDF r

fire.

19 January 2004 - An antitank missile was fired at IDF D

neutralizing explosive charges near Zari’t. An IDF soldier, Yan Ro

was killed and another soldier was severely wounded.

*“Hizbullah Attacks Along Israel’s Northern Border May 2000–Jun

Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, http://www.mfa.gov.il/NR/exeres/9EE

82EF-4274-B80D-6BBD1803E8A7,frameless.htm?NRMODE=Pu

(accessed 20 August 2007).
94

fired at an IDF force south of the Fatma Gate in the eastern se

addition, the Hizbullah fired missiles and rockets at an IDF pos

Reches Ramim area.

10 August 2003 - Haviv Dadon, 16, of Shlomi, was struck in the c

killed by shrapnel from an antiaircraft shell fired by Hizbullah terr

Lebanon. Four others were wounded.

20 July 2003 - Hizbullah snipers fired on an Israeli outpost near 

killing two Israeli soldiers.

7 May 2003 - Hizbullah attacked IDF positions in the Sheba far

heavy rocket, mortar, and small arms fire. One Israeli soldier wa

and five others were wounded in the attack.

29 August 2002 - Fire at an IDF post in the Mt. Dov sector. IDF 

Ofer Misali was killed, and two other soldiers were lightly wound

12 March 2002 - Infiltration: In a shooting attack on the Shlomi- M

route. Six Israelis civilians were killed, among them IDF off

German Rojkov.

14 April 2001 - Fire at an IDF post in the Mt. Dov sector. IDF sold

Litvak was killed. 

16 February 2001 - Fire at an IDF convoy on Mt. Dov. IDF sold

Shneor was killed, and three other soldiers were wounded.

26 November 2000 - A charge was detonated near an IDF conv

soldier Khalil Taher was killed and two other soldiers were wound

7 October 2000 - Kidnapping: Three IDF soldiers: Adi Avitan

Soued and Binyamin Avraham were kidnapped by the Hizballah f

Mt. Dov sector. 

In addition, Hizbullah was involved in terrorist acts carried out by a

Palestinian terrorist cells in Israel:

28 April 2001 - A 60-year-old Israeli man was found stabbed t

in Kfar Ba’aneh, near Carmiel in Galilee. The terrorists respons

the attack were apprehended in July. Six members of a Hizbullah

Palestinian terrorist cell responsible for the murder were arrested 

The murder was the initiation rite of the organization.

1 April 2001 - A 42-year-old Israeli woman was stabbed to death i

Her murder was the initiation rite of a terrorist cell, whose membe

apprehended in July. Six members of a Hizbullah-linked Pal

terrorist cell responsible for the murder, originally thought to be cri
of the terrorists into the organization.
96

Matt M. Matthews joined the Combat Studies Institute (

July 2005 after working for 16 years as a member of the Worl

Opposing Force (OPFOR) for the Battle Command Training Pro

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Mr. Matthews graduated from Kans

University in 1986 with a BS in History. He served as an Infantry 

man in the Regular Army from 1977 to 1981, a Cavalry offi cer in 

Army Reserve from 1983 to 1986, and an Armor offi cer in the 

Army National Guard from 1986 to 1991. Mr. Matthews is the a

CSI Press publications The Posse Comitatus Act and the Unite

Army: A Historical Perspective and Operation AL FAJR: A Study 

and Marine Corps Joint Operations and The US Army on the M

Border: A Historical Perspective. He has coauthored numerous s

articles on the Civil War in the Trans-Mississippi, including “Sho

Pieces: The Battle of Lone Jack,” “To Play a Bold Game: The B

Honey Springs,” and “Better Off in Hell: The Evolution of the 

Red Legs.” He is a frequent speaker at Civil War Roundtables, 

recently appeared on the History Channel as a historian for Bill 

Investigating History. Mr. Matthews was the mayor of Ottawa,