United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Report to the Subcommittee on Air and 

Land Forces, Committee on Armed 

Services, House of Representatives 

DEFENSE 

ACQUISITIONS 

Department of 

Defense Needs 

Framework for 

Balancing Investments 

in Tactical Radios 

August 2008 

 

GAO-08-877 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

August 2008

DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS

Department of Defense Needs Framework for 

Balancing Investments in Tactical Radios

Highlights of GAO-08-877, a report to the 

Subcommittee on Air and Land Forces, 

Committee on Armed Services, House of 

Representatives 

The Department of Defense (DOD)

has spent an estimated $12 billion 

on the development and production 

of tactical radios over the last 5 

years—about as much as was spent 

producing Virginia Class 

submarines ($10.8 billion) in the

same period. Survivability and 

lethality in warfare are increasingly

dependent on superior information 

and communication capabilities. 

DOD is counting on the Joint 

Tactical Radio System (JTRS) to 

deliver the breakthroughs in this 

area. At the same time as it is

developing JTRS, DOD wants to

ensure that current forces are 

equipped with sufficient legacy

radios. To address Subcommittee 

concerns regarding DOD's 

approach to meeting current and 

future radio needs, GAO examined 

this subject. In response, this 

report addresses (1) how planned

investments in key tactical radio

systems changed over the last 5

years, (2) why these changes 

occurred, and (3) the challenges 

ahead. 

To assess these topics, GAO’s work 

included reviewing 2003 through 

2007 budget requests, legacy radio 

procurements, and the status of the 

JTRS program; and interviewing

officials from DOD organizations. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that the

Secretary of Defense develop a 

comprehensive investment strategy

for tactical radios and take actions

to improve oversight of their

acquisition. In commenting on a

draft of this report DOD agreed 

with these recommendations.

Over the past 5 years, DOD investments in key tactical radios have shifted 

dramatically, both in size and composition. In 2002, when JTRS first began 

system development, DOD planned to invest close to $3 billion in JTRS over 

fiscal years 2003-2007. However, as shown below, actual investments more 

than doubled and shifted to producing thousands more legacy radios. 

Compared with the $3.2 billion that was slated to be spent on JTRS and the 

Army and Marine Corps legacy radios, about $8.3 billion was actually spent. 

Of this, about $5.7 billion was spent on the legacy radios, while $2.5 billion 

was spent on JTRS development. 

 

Planned and Actual Spending on Tactical Radios, 2003-07 

012 3 456 7 8 9

Actual

Planned

Legacy

JTRS

Development and Procurement of Tactical Radios, fiscal years 2003 and 2007

Source: GAO analysis of service and JTRS annual budget requests.

Dollars (in billions)

The change in tactical radio investments was brought about by (1) delays in 

the development and production of JTRS and (2) urgent demands for more 

radios to equip current forces. JTRS has encountered significant cost, 

schedule, and performance problems, causing some users to buy more legacy 

radios instead. Moreover, the military services’ demand for tactical radios 

soared because of combat operations, the need to equip Guard and Reserve

forces with modern radios, and to add more radios per combat unit. 

Supplemental funding of $5.5 billion paid for most of these legacy radios. 

Over the next 5 years, DOD faces several challenges in providing needed 

tactical communications capabilities to the warfighter, including: 

• Overcoming technology hurdles, size and power constraints, and 

security architecture issues to complete JTRS development. 

• Managing investments within defined fiscal constraints. A legacy

vehicle radio costs about $20,000, while its more capable JTRS 

replacement is estimated to cost up to 10 times more. 

• Phasing in JTRS without prematurely retiring a relatively young 

inventory of legacy radios. 

DOD does not have a strategy to meet these challenges and thus runs the risk 

of having its future communications capabilities decided ad hoc.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on GAO-08-877. 

For more information, contact Paul Francis at 

(202) 512-4841 or francisp@gao.gov. 
Contents 

Letter 1

Results in Brief 2

Background 4

Investment in Key Tactical Radio Systems Has Shifted Dramatically 

in Both Size and Composition 8 

Dramatic Change in Tactical Radio Investments Is Due Primarily to 

Delays with JTRS and Near-Term Operational Needs 9 

Strategy for Acquiring Tactical Radios over Next Several Years in 

Flux 17

Conclusions 27

Recommendations for Executive Action 27 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 28 

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 30 

Appendix II Characteristics of Selected Tactical Radios 32 

Appendix III Comments from the Department of Defense 35 

Appendix IV GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 37 

Tables 

Table 1: Comparison of Frequency Band, Nominal Channel 

Bandwidth, and Data Rates for Selected Legacy 

Waveforms and New Wideband Waveforms 6 

Table 2: JTRS Procurement Quantities 22 

Page i GAO-08-877 Defense Acquisitions
Figures 

Figure 1: Comparison of Planned and Actual Spending for Tactical 

Radios 8

Figure 2: Impact of Restructuring on JTRS Schedules 10 

Figure 3: Army’s Total Authorized Acquisition Objective for 

SINCGARS 15

Figure 4: Funding for Army and Marine Corps Tactical Radios 16 

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Page ii GAO-08-877 Defense Acquisitions
United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

August 15, 2008 

The Honorable Neil Abercrombie 

Chairman Chairman 

The Honorable Jim Saxton 

Ranking Member 

Subcommittee on Air and Land Forces 

Committee on Armed Services 

House of Representatives 

The Department of Defense (DOD) has spent an estimated $12 billion on 

the development and production of tactical radios over the last 5 years. 

To put this investment in context, the amount spent on tactical radios is 

comparable to the estimated investments made in the Army’s Future 

Combat Systems ($10.4 billion) and the Navy’s production of Virginia Class 

submarines ($10.8 billion) during the same period. 

The Department of Defense (DOD) has spent an estimated $12 billion on 

the development and production of tactical radios over the last 5 years. 

To put this investment in context, the amount spent on tactical radios is 

comparable to the estimated investments made in the Army’s Future 

Combat Systems ($10.4 billion) and the Navy’s production of Virginia Class 

submarines ($10.8 billion) during the same period. 

Survivability and lethality in warfare are increasingly dependent on 

smaller, highly mobile, joint forces that rely on superior information and 

communication capabilities. Moving this information—including 

bandwidth-intensive data and video—to, from, and across the battlefield 

requires breakthroughs in radio technology. DOD’s existing or “legacy” 

radios lack the capacity and flexibility necessary to achieve and maintain 

this level of information superiority. DOD is counting on the Joint Tactical

Radio System (JTRS), a development program begun in 1997, to deliver the 

needed breakthrough. JTRS relies on networked communications to 

improve information sharing, collaboration, and situational awareness, 

thus enabling more rapid and effective decision making and execution on 

the battlefield. It is intended to provide the bandwidth volume to handle 

the information traffic, emulate different legacy radios, and function as a 

router for tactical networks. The design of some new weapon systems, 

such as the Future Combat Systems, depends on a JTRS-equipped 

network. 

Survivability and lethality in warfare are increasingly dependent on 

smaller, highly mobile, joint forces that rely on superior information and 

communication capabilities. Moving this information—including 

bandwidth-intensive data and video—to, from, and across the battlefield 

requires breakthroughs in radio technology. DOD’s existing or “legacy” 

radios lack the capacity and flexibility necessary to achieve and maintain 

this level of information superiority. DOD is counting on the Joint Tactical

Radio System (JTRS), a development program begun in 1997, to deliver the 

needed breakthrough. JTRS relies on networked communications to 

improve information sharing, collaboration, and situational awareness, 

thus enabling more rapid and effective decision making and execution on 

the battlefield. It is intended to provide the bandwidth volume to handle 

the information traffic, emulate different legacy radios, and function as a 

router for tactical networks. The design of some new weapon systems, 

such as the Future Combat Systems, depends on a JTRS-equipped 

network. 

At the same time DOD is developing JTRS for future forces, it is striving to 

ensure that current forces are equipped with legacy radios to carry out 

assigned missions. DOD is confronted with the challenge of balancing the 

investment in both current and future radios—a dynamic proposition 

given that current needs change and future capabilities do not necessarily 

proceed predictably. To determine whether DOD and the military services 

are acquiring radios in the most cost-efficient and effective manner and 

At the same time DOD is developing JTRS for future forces, it is striving to 

ensure that current forces are equipped with legacy radios to carry out 

assigned missions. DOD is confronted with the challenge of balancing the 

investment in both current and future radios—a dynamic proposition 

given that current needs change and future capabilities do not necessarily 

proceed predictably. To determine whether DOD and the military services 

are acquiring radios in the most cost-efficient and effective manner and 

Page 1 GAO-08-877 Defense Acquisitions
have developed a strategy to balance near- and long-term requirements, 

address capability gaps, and determine funding needs, the Subcommittee 

requested that GAO study how effectively DOD and the military services 

are managing the acquisition of radio systems. Specifically, we (1) 

examined how the services’ planned investments in key tactical radio 

systems have changed over the last 5 years, (2) determined why these 

changes occurred, and (3) identified challenges that will confront the 

services as they plan tactical radio investments to provide desired future 

capabilities. 

We conducted this performance audit from July 2007 to July 2008 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those 

standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, 

appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence

obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions 

based on our audit objectives. 

To assess tactical radio investments and risks, we reviewed fiscal year 

2003 through 2007 budget1

 requests, procurements of legacy radios for that

time period, the current status of the JTRS program, and JTRS migration 

plans. We interviewed agency officials from various DOD and service 

organizations and reviewed plans and reports produced by Defense 

organizations. More details about our scope and methodology are in

appendix I. 

Over the past 5 years, DOD investments in key tactical radios have shifted 

dramatically, both in size and composition. In 2002, when the JTRS 

program began system development, DOD planned to invest close to $3 

billion in JTRS over fiscal years 2003-2007—about $1 billion to develop

and test the radios and another $2 billion to start procuring them. 

Investment in legacy radios was expected to be relatively small and 

diminish almost entirely as JTRS became available. For example, the Army 

and Marine Corps planned to spend only about $235 million between 2003 

and 2007 on legacy radios for ground vehicles and soldiers/marines. 

However, actual investments more than doubled and shifted away from 

planning to produce JTRS to producing thousands more legacy radios. 

Results in Brief 

 1

 We were only able to identify tactical radio investments in Army and Marine Corps budget 

documents; we were unable to identify tactical radio investments for the Air Force and 

Navy as these services do not centrally procure radios. 

Page 2 GAO-08-877 Defense Acquisitions
Compared with the $3.2 billion that was slated to be spent on JTRS and the 

Army and Marine Corps legacy radios, about $8.3 billion was actually 

spent. Of this, about $5.7 billion was spent on the legacy radios, while $2.5 

billion was spent on JTRS development. Other than fielding an enhanced

legacy handheld radio, no JTRS networking radios were produced or 

fielded during this time. 

The change in tactical radio investments was brought about by two 

primary factors: (1) delays in the development and production of JTRS and 

(2) urgent demands for additional radios to equip current forces. JTRS 

encountered significant cost, schedule, and performance problems early in 

its development. The program was restructured in 2006, resulting in the 

deferral of some capabilities and the addition of much more time and 

funding to complete development. While prudent, the restructuring 

delayed the fielding of the first JTRS Ground Mobile Radios by 5 years to 

2010. Because of the delay, some users who were depending on JTRS 

such as Army helicopter programs had to buy more legacy radios instead.

At the same time, however, the military services’ demand for tactical

radios soared—a demand that was met by buying tens of thousands of 

legacy radios. The demand was fueled by combat operations in Iraq and 

Afghanistan, the need to equip Guard and Reserve forces with modern 

radios, and a change in the Army and Marine Corps’ concept of operations 

that calls for more radios per combat unit. The resultant investments in 

legacy radios have evolved from year to year, as the services reacted to 

needs that cropped up, and were largely enabled by supplemental funding,

which supplied most—an estimated $5.5 billion—of the additional funds. 

Because DOD developed the supplemental budgets relatively quickly and 

without the level of review and oversight normally required through the 

regular annual budget process, there was limited visibility into the 

services’ plans for acquiring tactical radios. In addition, a 

waiver/notification process established by the Office of the Secretary of 

Defense to help manage the transition from legacy radios to JTRS has not 

been effective in tracking the nature and extent of tactical radio 

investments. 

Over the next 5 years, DOD faces several challenges in providing needed 

tactical communications capabilities to the warfighter: completing JTRS 

development, managing investments within tighter fiscal constraints, and 

developing a fielding strategy for tactical radios. While JTRS is making 

progress, the program must still overcome technology hurdles, size and 

power constraints, and security architecture issues to avoid further delays. 

The high cost of JTRS has also become an increasing concern. Currently, 

a legacy vehicle radio costs about $20,000, while its JTRS replacement, 

Page 3 GAO-08-877 Defense Acquisitions
albeit significantly more capable, is estimated to cost up to 10 times more. 

In addition, the cost of integrating JTRS with existing weapons systems is 

expected to be substantial in some cases. Thus, the decision to put more 

radios in each combat unit may not be sustainable with the more costly 

JTRS. In fact, the military services have begun to scale back the number of 

JTRS radios they plan to buy and rethink how JTRS capabilities will be 

fielded. Since the recently purchased legacy radios are expected to have a 

useful life of 10-15 years, fielding JTRS without phasing out legacy radios 

prematurely will necessitate striking a balance between capability and 

cost. For example, DOD may have to consider whether the investment 

priority for JTRS should be on network-dependent systems, like the 

Army’s Future Combat Systems, or for replacing legacy radios. Available

funding, absent continued high levels of supplemental budgets, will likely 

not support meeting both sets of needs. However, DOD does not have a 

strategy for balancing its future tactical radio investments, as previous 

plans are outdated. 

We are recommending that the Secretary of Defense develop an 

investment strategy that establishes priorities to guide resource decisions 

on legacy radios, upgraded radios, and the new generation of radios that 

JTRS represents. We are also recommending that such a strategy provide

discipline to bound investment decisions, such as a reinvigorated 

notification/waiver process, as well as a back-up plan in the event that 

JTRS does not provide the desired capabilities on time. In commenting on 

a draft of this report, DOD agreed with these recommendations. 

Survivability and lethality in warfare are increasingly dependent on 

smaller, highly mobile, joint forces that rely on superior information and 

communication capabilities. DOD’s existing tactical radio systems lack 

the functionality and flexibility necessary to achieve and maintain 

information superiority or to support the rapid mobility and 

interoperability desired by the armed forces. Most of these radios were 

designed with mutually exclusive architectures to perform specific tasks 

and can only interoperate with like radios. Their functions are largely 

governed by their hardware components. In addition, they operate at low 

to medium data rates, have limited networking capabilities, and are not 

capable of simultaneous voice, data, and video operations. Furthermore, 

the radios have many unique components and parts that require 

specialized support and create a logistics burden. 

Background 

The military services use many different types of tactical radios, including 

some that were developed decades ago. The Single Channel Ground and 

Page 4 GAO-08-877 Defense Acquisitions
Airborne Radio System (SINCGARS) is the primary means of command 

and control for Army combat and support units. Different variants of the 

radio are used in vehicles, aircraft, and as “manpack” radios carried by 

soldiers. The radios provide voice and limited data capabilities. The 

Marine Corps also uses SINCGARS, but also relies on the AN/VRC-110 and 

the AN/VRC-111 radios for its vehicles. These radios have multiple 

waveforms,2

 including the SINCGARS waveform, and can be pulled out of

vehicles and used as handheld radios. The Navy and Air Force use a 

variety of radios for their airborne platforms; one of the most common is 

the AN/ARC-210, a single-channel radio which provides voice and data

communications over a variety of waveforms. To meet its fixed station 

and maritime needs, the Navy uses the Digital Modular Radio, which 

operates on multiple waveforms and provides voice and data capabilities, 

and other radios. Appendix II provides a more complete list of selected 

tactical radios currently in use and their capabilities. 

To support new operational and mission requirements, DOD determined 

that the large number and diversity of legacy radios in use would require 

wholesale replacement or expensive modifications. The JTRS program 

was initiated in 1997 to exploit advancements in software-defined radio 

technology and provide superior communications and networking 

capabilities to the warfighter. Software-defined radios such as JTRS use 

software rather than hardware to control how the radio works and, as a 

result, offer significant flexibility to meet a wide variety of needs. Rather 

than developing radios that are built to different standards and operate on

different frequencies as was the case in the past, DOD will develop JTRS 

as a single, interoperable family of radios based on a common set of 

standards and applications. The radios are expected to not only satisfy 

the requirements common to the military’s three operational domains— 

air, sea, and ground— but be able to communicate directly with many of 

DOD’s existing tactical radios. 

In addition to supporting interoperability, JTRS is intended to contribute 

to DOD’s goal of network-centric warfare operations by introducing new 

 2

 In general usage, a waveform is the representation of a signal and the characteristics of a 

radio that includes the frequency, (VHF, HF, and UHF), modulation type (FM, AM),

message format, and/or transmission system. Most of the radios used by the military 

services operate with a single waveform and can only interoperate with similar radios.

However, several military radios have been developed in recent years that operate multiple 

waveforms. Thus, for example, if three waveforms are built into a radio, that single radio 

can emulate three different radios and be compatible with other radios that have these 

waveforms. 

Page 5 GAO-08-877 Defense Acquisitions
wideband networking waveforms that dramatically increase the amount of

data and speed at which the data can be transmitted. The wideband 

networking waveform being developed for ground vehicles, for example, is 

expected to provide data rates of up to 5 megabits per second or more 

which is at least ten times faster than legacy radio systems—akin to 

upgrading from a “dial-up” modem to a broadband connection. As such, 

the waveforms would facilitate the use of maps, imagery, and video to 

support the decision making of tactical commanders at all echelons. Table 

1 compares the frequency band, nominal channel bandwidth, and data

rates of selected legacy waveforms and new wideband waveforms. 

Table 1: Comparison of Frequency Band, Nominal Channel Bandwidth, and Data Rates for Selected Legacy Waveforms and

New Wideband Waveforms

Waveform 

Frequency band 

(millions of Hertz (MHz)) 

Nominal 

channel bandwidth 

(thousands of Hertz (KHz)) 

Data rate (thousands of 

bits per second (Kbps)) 

Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio 

System (SINCGARS) 

30 - 88 25 Voice: 16

Data: .075 - 16

Enhanced Position Location Reporting System

(EPLRS) 

420 - 450 3,000 Data: Up to 1,000

High Frequency 

2 - 30 3/6/12 

Voice and Data: 11 

distinct data

rates between

.075 – 9.6

Have Quick 

225 - 400 25 Voice: 16

Data: .075 - 16

Tactical Data Information Link-Joint (TADIL-J) 960 - 1,215 3,000 Voice: 2.4 and 16

Data: 28.8 – 1,137

Ultra High Frequency Satellite 

Communications Demand Assigned Multiple

Access (UHF SATCOM DAMA) 

225 – 400 5 and 25 Voice and Data:

.075 – 56, or 64

New 

Wideband Networking

a

 2 - 2,000 25 – 30,000 Data: up to 5,000

Soldier Radioa 2 - 2,000 13,000 Data: up to 1,000

Joint Airborne Network – Tactical Edge 2 - 2,000 To be determined To be determined

Source: GAO analysis of April 2003 JTRS Operational Requirements Document, Annex E.

a

The Wideband Networking Waveform and Soldier Radio Waveform are actually families of 

waveforms. The Wideband Networking Waveform family consists of four different waveforms and the 

Soldier Radio Waveform family consists of three different waveforms. 

In addition to providing new wideband waveforms, individual JTRS radios 

would have the capability to support multiple services (e.g., voice, data, 

Page 6 GAO-08-877 Defense Acquisitions
and video) and operate on multiple channels simultaneously. For example, 

a four-channel JTRS radio set intended for a ground vehicle could be 

programmed to have channels dedicated to SINCGARS, EPLRS, the 

Wideband Networking Waveform, and the Soldier Radio Waveform. All 

four channels could be operating simultaneously. Data could also be 

transferred from one channel (or network) to another through a “gateway” 

device implemented with hardware and software. Furthermore, since 

JTRS is expected to operate as a mobile network, each multi-channel JTRS

set will function as a router, meaning that it is responsible for passing 

along information (voice, data, and video) from other JTRS radios. 

To manage JTRS’ development, DOD established a joint program office, 

and service-led product offices clustered by requirements. In 2006, all the 

JTRS programs were realigned under the authority of a single JTRS Joint 

Program Executive Officer (JPEO). The JPEO established an 

organizational structure for JTRS that includes three domains: (1) ground 

radios; (2) air, maritime, and fixed station radios; and (3) network 

enterprise services and a program for special radios. 

In an effort to manage the transition of tactical radios to JTRS, in 1998, the

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, 

Communications, and Intelligence issued a memorandum directing all 

Component efforts to develop and acquire any radio system be held in 

abeyance. Service, command, or agency acquisition executives could 

submit requests for exceptions through the JTRS Joint Program Office and 

the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information 

Integration.3

 The request for exceptions (or waiver policy) was amended 

in May 2005. The amended policy suspended the waiver process and only

required that notifications of plans to acquire radios be provided to the 

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration. 

 3

 The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration is the

successor organization to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, 

Communications and Intelligence. 

Page 7 GAO-08-877 Defense Acquisitions
Over the past 5 years, investments in key tactical radios systems have 

exceeded planned investments by more than double and shifted 

dramatically in scope. In 2003, DOD and the services planned to invest 

mainly in the development and production of JTRS. At the same time, 

investment in legacy radios was expected to be relatively small and 

diminish almost entirely as JTRS became available. However, actual 

spending on tactical radios turned out to be very different. Not only did 

spending between fiscal years 2003 and 2007 increase significantly, from 

about $3.2 billion to about $8.3 billion, it shifted away from procuring 

JTRS to procuring tens of thousands of additional legacy radios. See 

figure 1. 

Investment in Key 

Tactical Radio 

Systems Has Shifted 

Dramatically in Both 

Size and Composition 

Figure 1: Comparison of Planned and Actual Spending for Tactical Radios

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Planned Actual

Dollars (in billions)

Development and procurement of tactical radios, FY 2003 and FY 2007

Legacy

JTRS

Source: GAO analysis of service and JTRS annual budget requests.

In 2003, DOD and the services planned to spend approximately $3 billion 

on JTRS over the next 5 years—$1 billion for research and development, 

and $2 billion to procure the first JTRS radios. The Army and Marine 

Corps planned to spend approximately $235 million for legacy radios 

between 2003 and 2007. The Army planned to spend approximately $140 

million to procure SINCGARS and handheld and “manpack” radios; the 

Page 8 GAO-08-877 Defense Acquisitions
Marine Corps planned to spend about $98 million to procure a variety of 

tactical communications systems. 

In actuality, DOD and the services invested over twice as much as planned 

to develop JTRS capabilities—about $2.5 billion—while no JTRS 

networking radios were produced during this time. Legacy radio spending, 

on the other hand, ballooned to approximately $5.7 billion, about 24 times 

what was planned. Of this, the Army spent approximately $4.1 billion, 

including $2.3 billion on SINCGARS radios and $1.8 billion on handheld 

and manpack radios. The Marine Corps spent $1.6 billion on a variety of 

tactical communication systems. 

The dramatic change in the size and scope of tactical radio investments 

over the last 5 years is due to two primary factors. First, cost, schedule,

and performance problems delayed development of JTRS capabilities by 

several years. Second, combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have 

significantly increased the demand for tactical radios--a demand that could 

only be met by buying legacy radios. The demand was driven by a desire to

equip deploying units with modern radios and a change in concept of 

operations that calls for more radios per unit. The resultant investment 

in legacy radios evolved from year to year as needs arose and was largely 

enabled by the availability of supplemental funding. Although a 

notification process was established to help manage the transition from 

legacy radios to JTRS, it was not effective in tracking the extent of 

investments in legacy radios that occurred. 

As we have previously reported, developing JTRS has proven to be a

significant technical and management challenge.4

 A few years into system 

development, the program experienced considerable cost and schedule 

overruns and performance shortfalls, necessitating a major restructuring 

of the program in 2006. As a result, considerably more time and funding 

were added to complete the first increment of JTRS. The revised 

schedules for each of the JTRS program components expanded 

development times by several years (see Fig. 2). 

Dramatic Change in 

Tactical Radio 

Investments Is Due 

Primarily to Delays 

with JTRS and NearTerm Operational 

Needs 

Development and 

Production of JTRS 

Delayed by Several Years 

 4

 GAO, Challenges and Risks Associated with the Joint Tactical Radio System Program, 

GAO-03-879R (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 11, 2003); GAO,Defense Acquisitions: Restructured

JTRS Program Reduces Risk, but Significant Challenges Remain, GAO-06-955 

(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 11, 2006). 

Page 9 GAO-08-877 Defense Acquisitions
Figure 2: Impact of Restructuring on JTRS Schedules 

Ground Mobile radios

Low-rate production decision

Handheld, Manpack, and Small Form Fit

Low-rate production decision

Airborne, Maritime, and Fixed Station radios

System development and demonstration decision

2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

Original New

Source: GAO analysis of JTRS JPEO data.

a

The pre- and post restructuring components of the Handheld, Manpack, and Small Form Fit program 

did not lend themselves to a direct comparison. For figure 2, we compared the two components that 

were the closest in scope. The pre restructuring component was Spiral 2, which consisted of 1- and 

2-channel Handhelds, an enhanced 2-channel Manpack, and Small Form Fit variants A through L. 

The post restructuring component was Phase 2, which consists of a 2-channel Handheld, 2-channel 

Manpack, and Small Form Fit variants B, C, D, I, and J. 

The production decision for the Ground Mobile Radio variants, for 

example, was delayed by 5 years, from 2005 to 2010. In addition, the start 

of system development for the Airborne, Maritime, and Fixed Station 

radios was delayed by 2 years. Although the Airborne, Maritime, and Fixed 

Station program went through a presystem development phase to reduce

technical risks associated with developing airborne networking 

capabilities, the program was delayed from starting until costs and 

production quantities could be worked out. Overall, the estimated cost to 

develop JTRS and its various program components increased from about 

$3.5 billion to almost $6 billion through fiscal year 2011. 

Problems encountered with JTRS were largely the result of starting system 

development with immature technologies, unstable requirements, and 

aggressive schedules. The Army-led JTRS program for ground vehicles 

Page 10 GAO-08-877 Defense Acquisitions
and helicopters,5

 for example, began system development in 2002 with 

none of its 20 critical technologies sufficiently matured, requirements not 

clearly defined, and a compressed development schedule that allowed too

little time for testing. As a result, the program struggled to mature and 

integrate technologies to meet size, weight, and power constraints and 

evolving security requirements for the radios, and was forced to make 

design changes to address these issues. Meeting requirements in the JTRS 

Handheld, Manpack, and Small Form Fit radio program also proved to be

challenging, given the smaller size, weight, and power needs for these 

radios. 

DOD restructured the JTRS program to reduce risk and establish a more 

incremental approach to developing JTRS capabilities. In restructuring 

JTRS, DOD deferred several requirements and radio features to later 

program increments. For example, DOD reduced the number of radio 

variants by half (26 to 13) and the number of waveforms by about twothirds (32 to 11). The original intent of JTRS was to allow most waveforms 

to operate on most of the radio variants. By reducing the number of 

waveforms per radio variant, DOD expected to reduce costly porting 

efforts—software development needed to make a waveform work on 

different radio variants—and more readily address size, weight, and power 

constraints. 

Although JTRS will deliver radios significantly later than initially planned, 

the program is still intended to meet the needs of key users such as the 

Future Combat Systems (FCS) program. FCS, which is a large and 

complex effort by the Army to develop a suite of new weapon systems and 

vehicles linked by a new information network, is depending on several 

JTRS variants and wideband waveforms to provide critical 

communications and networking capabilities. However, as we have 

reported over the past several years, the FCS program has struggled to

define requirements and mature critical technologies, and is at risk of 

incurring further cost and schedule delays. 6

 

 5

 When JTRS began, DOD structured it into several programs clustered by requirements. 

The JTRS Cluster 1 program was intended to develop ground vehicle and helicopter radios

as well as most of the waveforms to be used in JTRS. 

6

GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Significant Challenges Ahead in Developing and

Demonstrating Future Combat System’s Network and Software, GAO-08-409 (Washington, 

D.C.: Mar. 7, 2008); GAO, Defense Acquisitions: 2009 Is a Critical Juncture for the 

Army’s Future Combat System, GAO-08-408 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 7, 2008). 

Page 11 GAO-08-877 Defense Acquisitions
Several other users depending on JTRS have had to invest in legacy radio 

systems to meet their needs because of the delays with the program. For 

example: 

• Army Aviation, which needed JTRS to provide the required 

interoperability capability for Future Force and Joint Force operations, 

was planning to buy JTRS radios for its helicopters starting in fiscal 

year 2006. Several Army helicopter systems, such as the Longbow 

Apache (AH-64D), are being modernized and the Army planned to 

integrate JTRS sets into these aircraft. According to the Army, the 

aircraft modernization work could not be delayed until JTRS becomes 

available and the aircraft would not be mission capable without a 

communications package. As a result, the Army decided to buy an 

alternative legacy radio system to fulfill this need. According to Army 

estimates, it will spend approximately $310 million between 2005 and 

2013 to procure the alternate radio system for various helicopter 

programs. 

• The Air Force and Navy also had to procure legacy communications 

systems for various aircraft systems and ships that were either in 

production or being upgraded. The Air Force, for example, requested 

AN/ARC-210 radios for the Global Hawk, F-15E, F-16 Block 40/42, and 

A-10 aircraft while the Navy requested Digital Modular Radios for new 

ship construction in support of the National Defense Sealift Fund. 

• The Navy is modernizing the AN/ARC-210 radio in part because of the 

need to add certain capabilities that will not be filled by the first 

increment of JTRS. For example, it is adding the capability to host a 

Joint Precision Approach and Landing System waveform to the 

AN/ARC-210. The new approach and landing system, which is 

intended to provide more accurate Global Positioning System (GPS)-

based landing guidance for aircraft during all weather conditions, has 

been in development in DOD for several years. The Navy is also 

modernizing the AN/ARC-210 to address National Security Agency 

(NSA) requirements for cryptographic obsolescence in legacy radio 

systems.7

 According to Navy officials, the Navy plans to spend

approximately $50 million in research and development for the 

modernization of the AN/ARC-210 radio. 

 7

 According to Navy documentation, requirements for cryptographic devices with their endof-life dates, including devices in the AN/ARC-210 radio, are identified in Chairman, Joint

Chiefs of Staff Instruction and Notice 6510. 

Page 12 GAO-08-877 Defense Acquisitions
Combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have also been a key reason 

for the huge increase in spending on legacy radios by the Army and Marine

Corps. With the build-up of the war, tactical radios have become critical to

conducting operations. According to the Army and Marine Corps, legacy 

radios were purchased to ensure units being deployed had modern 

communications capabilities. In some cases, newer versions of legacy 

radios were purchased to replace older radios and to ensure units were 

equipped to wartime readiness levels. This included, for example, 

replacing several thousand Vietnam-era radios that still existed in certain 

Army National Guard and Reserve units with SINCGARS radios. In 

addition, as we have previously reported,8

 some Army National Guard 

units were equipped at less than wartime readiness levels (often at 65 to 75

percent of requirements) under the assumption that there would be 

sufficient time for Guard forces to obtain additional equipment prior to 

deployment. While the Army was able to transfer equipment from nondeploying units to deploying units to compensate for some of these 

shortages in the near term, the large number of units needed for 

deployment required the purchase of additional communications 

equipment. 

Combat Operations and 

Force Modernization 

Requirements Have 

Increased the Demand for 

Tactical Legacy Radios 

According to Marine Corps officials, before combat operations in Iraq and 

Afghanistan started, the Marine Corps had envisioned keeping many of its

aging legacy radios until the introduction of JTRS radios could replace 

them. However, as operations got under way, the Marine Corps began 

modernizing its inventory of radios, replacing them with newer legacy 

radios that provided improved on-the-move and over-the-horizon 

communications capabilities. The Marine Corps, for example, replaced 

older versions of SINCGARS and other manpack radios with newer multiband radios that allow a marine to operate a single radio in either VHF, 

UHF line-of-site, or UHF SATCOM modes of operation. In addition, the 

Army and Marine Corps needed radios to replace combat losses and to 

equip new force protection vehicles being procured, such as up-armored 

High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled vehicles and, more recently, the Mine 

Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles. 

The Army and Marine Corps have also increased the number of radios to 

combat and support units based on lessons learned from combat 

 8

 GAO, Force Structure: Army Needs to Provide DOD and Congress More Visibility 

Regarding Modular Force Capabilities and Implementation Plans, GAO-06-745 

(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 6, 2006). 

Page 13 GAO-08-877 Defense Acquisitions
operations. As a result of attacks against combat and support vehicles that

did not have sufficient communications capabilities, the services have

been pursuing a strategy to equip virtually every vehicle being used in 

combat operations with a radio. For example, very few trucks in logistics 

units were supplied with tactical radios; however, the threat to supply 

convoys made providing these units with radios more critical. 

Furthermore, the services have expanded communications to platoon and 

squad levels of the force, purchasing handheld and intra-squad radios for 

soldiers who previously had no radios. For example, a typical Marine 

Corps rifle company, which consists of about 180 marines, was equipped 

with 9 tactical radios prior to the war in Iraq. The same rifle company is 

now equipped with about 225 radios, most of which are intended for intrasquad communications. 

Moreover, since 2004, the Army has also been going through a major force 

restructuring—referred to as modularity—that has driven requirements to 

field more tactical radios to lower echelon units. In restructuring the force, 

the Army has established modular Brigade Combat Teams and Support 

Brigades that are designed, equipped, and staffed differently than the units

they replace. The new brigades are intended to be more self-sustainable, 

agile, and deployable through the introduction of key enablers such as 

enhanced military intelligence and communications capabilities. In 

September 2004, the Army estimated it would need an additional 66,166

SINCGARS receiver/transmitter units to support the modularity initiative. 

Without additional tactical radios, the Army could not achieve its intended 

design objectives for these brigade units. 

According to Army officials, increased demands for equipment, like radios, 

are translated into specific quantities the Army refers to as authorized 

acquisition objectives. The acquisition objective establishes the total 

quantity of a piece of equipment needed to supply and sustain the force 

and is not intended to be constrained in terms of available resources. In 

the Army, acquisition objectives are derived from force structure reviews 

that analyze threat, operational conditions, and force readiness. As shown 

in figure 3, since 2002, the Army’s acquisition objective for SINCGARS 

ground radios increased steadily, from about 232,000 radio 

receiver/transmitter units9

 in fiscal year 2002 to more than 526,000 units in 

 9

 A SINCGARS ground vehicle radio configuration typically includes two 

receiver/transmitter units. 

Page 14 GAO-08-877 Defense Acquisitions
2007, reflecting the emergence of new requirements for radios. The Army 

bought 244,780 SINCGARS between 2003 and 2007 to meet this objective. 

Figure 3: Army’s Total Authorized Acquisition Objective for SINCGARS 

0

100,000

200,000

300,000

400,000

500,000

600,000

2002 2004 2005 2007 2008

Number of radio units

Fiscal year

Source: GAO analysis of Army data.

581,000

526,192

472,567

327,655

232,411

Investment in Tactical 

Radios Evolved From Year 

to Year as Supplemental 

Funding Became Available 

The increased demand for legacy radios was largely facilitated through the 

availability of supplemental funding, which provided the vast majority of 

funding to procure these radios. Between 2003 and 2007, supplemental 

funding supplied an estimated 90 percent—$5.5 out of $6.1 billion—of the 

funding the Army and Marine Corps received to procure legacy radios (see 

figure 4). DOD and the services requested a relatively small proportion of 

funding through the regular budget process. 

Page 15 GAO-08-877 Defense Acquisitions
Figure 4: Funding for Army and Marine Corps Tactical Radios

0

500

1,000

1,500

2,000

2,500

2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

Dollars (in millions)

Supplemental budget

Base budget

Source: GAO analysis of Service budget data.

Development and procurement of tactical radios, FY 2003 and FY 2007

The reliance on supplemental budgets to acquire tactical radios continued 

in fiscal year 2008, with the Army and Marine Corps requesting an 

additional $3.3 billion in October 2007. Although Congress did not act on 

the budget request, DOD resubmitted the request in February 2008. In 

March 2008, however, the Army informed Congress that it had overstated 

its request for SINCGARS funding by $1.7 billion; the Army had requested 

funds for 170,756 more SINCGARS, when only 56,000 were needed to meet 

its authorized acquisition objective. 

Because DOD’s regular budget process is lengthy—it takes 18 months to 

plan, develop, and complete an annual budget submission to Congress-- 

the services should identify potential offsets when seeking additional 

funding in excess of budget-year guidance levels. Supplemental budgets

provided an opportunity for the services to respond to emerging needs 

relatively quickly and to request funding without having to trade against 

other ongoing or planned weapon system investments. However, because

supplemental budgets were developed quickly and as one-time requests to 

address immediate needs, they offered little visibility into the services 

plans for acquiring tactical radios. 

Page 16 GAO-08-877 Defense Acquisitions
The huge increase in legacy radio investments was also facilitated by the 

suspension of a JTRS waiver process. In 1998, DOD instituted a waiver 

policy in order to control the acquisition of legacy radios in anticipation of 

JTRS capabilities becoming available. In May 2005, in response to delays 

with the delivery of JTRS products, DOD suspended the waiver policy for 

tactical radios. However, in order to maintain visibility into legacy 

procurement activities, DOD still required the services to notify the Office 

of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information 

Integration (Office) prior to any procurement actions to buy tactical

radios. In notifying the Office of procurement actions, the services were 

required to identify the requirements necessitating the procurement and 

whether any operational impacts would result if the request was 

disapproved. According to data the Office has collected through federal

contract announcements and other means, notifications from the services 

have been inconsistent and do not reflect all tactical radio procurements 

that took place over the past several years. In addition, according to a 

representative of the Office, notifications that were submitted by the 

services did not provide sufficient detail to understand why radios were 

being procured or how the procurement actions fit in with other 

procurements. 

DOD’s original strategy for acquiring tactical radios centered on JTRS as a 

replacement for legacy radios and a means to achieve new networking 

capabilities. While JTRS has made progress in developing radio products 

and waveforms, it must still resolve key technical hurdles that could lead 

to further delays in the program. When JTRS actually becomes available,

however, the strategy of replacing legacy radios as previously envisioned

may no longer be an option in view of (1) the potentially smaller market 

for JTRS given the large, unanticipated purchase of legacy radios that have 

many years of life left and (2) the need to manage investments within 

reasonable funding expectations. In addition, while JTRS radios may offer 

significant new capabilities, they are much costlier than legacy radios and 

in some cases additional large investments are required to fully integrate 

them into existing military platforms. These costs may run counter to 

recent decisions to significantly increase the numbers of radios issued to 

each unit. The high costs of JTRS radios have led to the services to scale

back their plans for acquiring the radios and have also led to recent efforts 

to seek lower cost alternatives. Fielding JTRS expeditiously while making 

the most out of the large investment in legacy radios will necessitate 

striking a balance—both in terms of capability and cost. DOD, however, 

does not yet have a strategy for guiding the services’ acquisition of tactical

radios over the next several years. 

Strategy for Acquiring 

Tactical Radios over 

Next Several Years in 

Flux 

Page 17 GAO-08-877 Defense Acquisitions
The JTRS program has made progress since being restructured. Early 

prototypes of JTRS ground radio variants and networking waveforms have 

been developed and some JTRS capabilities have been demonstrated in a 

laboratory environment and, to a lesser extent, during recent field 

experiments. However, significant technological challenges remain that 

place completion of JTRS development at risk. In particular, designing 

JTRS radios that meet operational requirements within required size, 

weight, and power constraints has proven to be particularly challenging 

for several of the JTRS radio configurations. Moreover, the transition 

from legacy radios that operate at a single level of security and have their 

functionality defined in hardware to networked radios that operate at 

multiple levels of security and have their functionality defined in software 

has raised new concerns about tactical radios’ security architecture—

concerns that were not fully appreciated when the JTRS program began. 

Whether or not these technical challenges can be overcome will not be 

known until major test and evaluation events are conducted in the next 

few years. 

JTRS Program Must Still 

Resolve Technology Issues 

JTRS radios require significant amounts of memory and processing power, 

particularly to run the new transformational networking waveforms that 

will enable network-centric operations. The processing power required to

run these networking waveforms rapidly consumes electric power in the 

radios and generates a significant amount of heat, which must be 

dissipated to keep the electronic components of the radio operating at a 

safe temperature. Dissipating heat often requires increasing the size and 

weight of the radio. However, keeping size, weight, and power 

consumption to an absolute minimum is a critical operational requirement 

for JTRS and particularly for the Handheld, Manpack, and Small Form Fit 

variants. For example, the JTRS program is attempting to develop a 2-

channel handheld radio weighing no more than 3.8 pounds that is capable

of running the Soldier Radio Waveform, as well as key legacy waveforms. 

The challenge of meeting these design constraints has prompted the 

program manager to identify size, weight, and thermal management as 

high-risk elements for the JTRS 2-channel handheld radio development. 

Although the recently started Airborne, Maritime, and Fixed-Station 

program should benefit from the system development experiences of the

earlier JTRS programs, its size, weight, power, and thermal issues are 

currently seen as a key program risk. 

JTRS radios must address stringent security architecture requirements 

established by the NSA and must be certified through a multistage process 

during their design and development. Certification is a rigorous and 

potentially time-consuming process, and consequently must be factored 

into the schedule for each radio’s system development. While JTRS 

Page 18 GAO-08-877 Defense Acquisitions
developers must be concerned with traditional security issues affecting all 

tactical radios, the unique characteristics of JTRS radios have introduced

new complexities into the certification process. First, because much of 

the functionality of JTRS radios is defined in software rather than in 

hardware, developers must be prepared to incorporate the features 

commonly required for computer security. Second, JTRS is required to 

operate in a networked environment, at multiple levels of security, and 

consequently allows greater access to other networks. Because this 

access increases the number of potential users and the likelihood of 

threats to the network, developers must be prepared to implement 

additional features required to maintain network security. According to 

NSA representatives, JTRS’s open networking capability has raised the bar 

for ensuring that its security architecture is sound. 

The JPEO continues to identify security certification requirements as a 

significant risk element for the development of each variant of JTRS 

radios. For example, following the preliminary design review of the 

Ground Mobile Radio in July 2007, NSA informed the JPEO that certain 

aspects of the radio's security architecture did not meet the agency's 

standards. In response to these concerns, the JPEO is assessing potential

design modifications to the radio and hopes to have an implementation 

plan in place later this year. The difficulties encountered in meeting 

security requirements also contributed to a significant Nunn-McCurdy 

unit-cost breach for the Ground Mobile Radio program that was declared 

in November 2007.10 The breach reflected an increase in the program 

acquisition unit cost of about 24 percent above the current program cost 

baseline established in 2002. In addition, the need to address NSA security 

requirements has recently delayed the Multifunctional Information 

Distribution System-JTRS program. Although NSA concurred with the 

design of the system, the program encountered difficulties in meeting the 

requirements for security verification testing. This contributed to a 

program schedule slip of almost 12 months. 

 10 10 U.S.C. § 2433 requires the Secretary concerned to report to Congress when a 

program’s acquisition unit cost increases by at least 15 percent over the current baseline 

estimate or increases by at least 30 percent over the original baseline estimate. 

Page 19 GAO-08-877 Defense Acquisitions
While JTRS radios are intended to provide a significant increase in 

communications and networking capabilities, they will be significantly 

more costly than the legacy radios they will replace. Depending on the 

JTRS product, estimated unit costs will range from an average of about 

$27,00011 for the Handheld, Manpack, and Small Form Fit radios to more 

than $1 million for the much larger maritime/fixed station radios. For some 

of the JTRS products, the costs are several times more than the legacy 

systems they will replace. For example, a fully configured vehicular 

version of the Army’s SINCGARS radio costs about $20,000 and the Army’s 

Enhanced Position Location Reporting System costs about $20,000 to 

$33,000 depending upon its configuration. In contrast, the average cost of 

the 4-channel vehicular configuration of the JTRS Ground Mobile Radio—

which will be able to perform the function of both of these legacy radios 

and will add a transformational networking capability—is about $220,000. 

Similarly, according to AN/ARC-210 program office representatives, the 

latest generation of the 1-channel AN/ARC-210 radio costs about $80,000, 

with most aircraft configured with two of the radios. In contrast, the 

average unit cost of the 2-channel airborne configuration of the JTRS radio 

is about $480,000. 

Services Reconsidering 

Commitments to JTRS 

Because of High Costs and 

Continued Need for Legacy 

Radios 

Moreover, to take full advantage of the new capabilities JTRS can provide, 

it must be integrated into existing military platforms. Integration costs, 

which are in addition to the cost of the JTRS radio itself, are borne by the 

integrating program and, according to Navy representatives, are most 

significant when attempting to fully integrate the networking capabilities 

of the JTRS radio into the mission avionics of legacy aircraft. Unlike 

ships, these aircraft do not have the computer architecture to easily 

incorporate modern networking capabilities. Consequently, fully 

integrating JTRS into legacy aircraft will require major modifications to 

both the hardware and software of the aircraft’s mission avionic systems, 

as well as extensive testing and evaluation to ensure that the airworthiness 

of the aircraft has not been adversely affected. According to Navy 

representatives, the cost to retrofit and fully integrate JTRS networking 

capabilities into four Naval aircraft—the F/A-18E/F, EA-18G, E-2C, and E2D—has been estimated to be about $868 million. Air Force 

representatives agreed that full integration of JTRS onto legacy aircraft 

would be very expensive. They noted, however, that as long as integration 

 11 Average procurement unit cost for all Handheld, Manpack, and Small Form Fit radios 

over the life of the program as reported in the December 2007 Selected Acquisition Report. 

The unit cost for these radios will vary significantly by form factor from about $6,000 for 

the least expensive small form fit radio, to about $38,000 for the Manpack radio. 

Page 20 GAO-08-877 Defense Acquisitions
of JTRS occurs in conjunction with major modifications or modernization 

of these aircraft—during which mission avionic systems are upgraded and

extensive airworthiness must be carried out—the incremental costs of 

integrating JTRS would be much less. 

While JTRS was originally intended to replace virtually all legacy radios, 

this is no longer a practical or affordable investment strategy for DOD and

the services. JTRS is still critical to networking the force but the strategy 

of a wholesale replacement of radios is being reconsidered in light of the 

cost and availability of JTRS radios, the recent large investment in legacy 

radios, and the need to continue acquiring legacy radios in the near term. 

According to the services, the legacy radios purchased in the past several 

years provide effective communications capabilities to meet current 

operational demands. As these radios are expected to have an operating 

life of 10-15 years, the services expect to use a large proportion of them for 

many years to come. Absent JTRS radios, the services plan to continue 

purchasing legacy radios over the next several years because of continuing

combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, and to implement plans to 

increase the size of the force. In January 2007, the President announced a 

permanent increase in the size of the Army and Marine Corps to enhance 

overall U.S. forces, reduce stress on deployable personnel, and provide 

more forces for the Global War on Terrorism. The planned expansion will 

add more than 74,000 soldiers to the Army by 2013 and 27,000 marines to 

the Marine Corps by 2011. 

DOD and the services have scaled back the number of JTRS radios they 

plan to buy (see table 2). For example, the total planned quantity of JTRS 

Ground Mobile Radios was recently reduced from 108,086 radios to 86,512,

a 20 percent decrease. While a portion of this decrease is due to the fact

that several Army helicopter systems were originally to have received the

Ground Mobile Radio variant but will now receive the Airborne, Maritime, 

and Fixed Station radio variant, the decrease is also due to the Marine 

Corps reducing its requirement to only 210 radios. According to Marine 

Corps officials, they plan to continue investing in legacy radios and defer

spending on fully capable JTRS radios until later. In addition, the total 

planned quantity of JTRS Handheld, Manpack, and Small Form Fit radios 

was recently reduced from an original baseline of 328,514—established in 

May 2004—to just 95,551, a 71 percent decrease. 

Page 21 GAO-08-877 Defense Acquisitions
Table 2: JTRS Procurement Quantities 

Current procurement 

quantities by service 

JTRS products

Initial approved 

procurement 

quantities

(Milestone B) 

Procurement 

quantities identified

when program

restructured (2006)

Current 

procurement 

quantities (2008) Army Air Force Navy USMC

Ground Mobile Radio 108,086 138,913 86,512 86,209 93 0 210

Handheld, Manpack, 

and Small Form Fit 

328,514 164,137 95,551 74,512 10,680 1,477 8,882

Airborne, Maritime, 

and Fixed Station 

n/a 17,007 11,040 5,845 4,725 470 0

Total 436,600 320,057 193,103 166,566 15,498 1,947 9,092

Source: GAO analysis of data provided by JPEO. 

Note: Excludes procurement quantities for the Multifunctional Information Distribution System—JTRS 

program. 

Also, although the JTRS Airborne, Maritime, and Fixed-Station program 

was only recently approved to start system development, the number of 

required radios identified by the services is significantly lower than the 

number they initially identified when JTRS was restructured in 2006—

11,040 versus 17,007 radios. Part of this reduction is due to the Navy and

Marine Corps no longer identifying a requirement for airborne radios and 

only a modest requirement for maritime/fixed station radios. According to

Navy officials, the requirement for these radios has been deferred because

of the high cost of the radios and because the airborne radio currently 

being developed will not include all the requirements desired by the Navy. 

The officials indicated that the JTRS restructuring in 2006 resulted in a 

scaled-down version of the airborne radio—with fewer channels and 

waveforms--that will not include voice capabilities. Voice is essential for 

pilots to be able to talk with other pilots and with ground control. Navy 

officials pointed out that while the JTRS airborne radios would provide 

enhanced networking capabilities, the lack of voice capabilities would 

necessitate keeping a legacy radio (e.g., the AN/ARC-210) in the aircraft 

and there would not be space for both radios. The Air Force plans to 

install the JTRS airborne radio primarily in larger aircraft that have space

for multiple radios. 

The Joint Program Executive Office has begun to look at other options to 

acquire less expensive JTRS radios and other tactical radios. These efforts 

include: 

• The JTRS “Rifleman” Radio. This radio is being planned to meet an 

emerging Army need for a low-cost handheld soldier networking radio 

Page 22 GAO-08-877 Defense Acquisitions
that can support intra-squad communications and provide position 

location information. The radio will be part of the JTRS small form 

factor family. Specifically, it will be acquired as a less expensive 

stand-alone variant of the small form factor “C” radio. Like the basic 

small form factor “C” radio, it is intended to be a 1-channel JTRScompliant radio with networking capabilities that will support 

unclassified communications. However, to achieve significant cost 

savings, it is intended to rely on commercial (GPS) services, instead of 

military GPS services. The preliminary unit cost estimate for the radio 

is about $2,000, which is significantly less than the $8,700 unit cost of 

the small form factor “C” radio using military GPS. The Army has 

proposed an initial requirement for 100,000 or more of these radios.12

The Joint Program Executive Office hopes to begin production of the 

radio in 2009. 

• A 2-channel JTRS Ground Mobile Radio. Although the Army still needs 

the 4-channel Ground Mobile Radio for its Future Combat Systems, 

senior Army leadership has expressed concern about the high cost of 

JTRS Ground Mobile Radios for other components of the force. 

According to the Joint Program Executive Office, discussions are now 

under way with the Army about potential requirements trades that 

could be made, leading to a less expensive 2-channel Ground Mobile 

Radio variant. 

• An enhanced legacy 1-channel handheld radio. To address the 

services’ need for near-term radios, the JPEO began offering an

enhanced legacy handheld radio in 2007 that is capable of running 

multiple legacy waveforms, including SINCGARS, and meets NSA 

security modernization requirements. However, it does not provide the 

networking capabilities intended for JTRS handheld radios. The JPEO 

established a consolidated contract that provides two competing 

versions of the radio built by different contractors. In addition, the 

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and 

Information Integration reinstated the waiver process for handheld 

radio procurements, requiring the services to obtain a waiver for 

purchasing radios outside of the consolidated contract. By 

consolidating purchases across the services in one contract and using 

competitively awarded delivery orders, the cost of these radios is 

lower than handheld radios purchased separately by each of the 

 12 This quantity is not reflected in the “Current Procurement Quantities” column in table 2. 

Page 23 GAO-08-877 Defense Acquisitions
services.13 Furthermore, to meet the services’ demand for manpack 

radios, the JPEO is now planning to acquire an enhanced manpack 

radio and provide it to the services through a consolidated contract 

with features similar to the contract for 1-channel handheld radios. 

DOD and the Services 

Lack a Comprehensive 

Strategy for Investments in 

Tactical Radios 

Fielding JTRS judiciously without prematurely phasing out legacy radios 

will necessitate striking a balance between communications capabilities 

and available funding. DOD and the services, however, do not have a 

strategy to guide decisions on how best to proceed in acquiring tactical 

radios over the next several years—one that prioritizes capability needs, 

reconciles needs with bounded funding levels, defines an effective 

approach to fielding and sustaining tactical radios, and identifies 

contingencies for problems that may occur. Five years ago, DOD and the 

services had a migration strategy that was relatively straightforward—

replace legacy radios as JTRS became available. Now, however, the 

market for new tactical radios is quite different and the services must 

balance the continued need for legacy radios with the desire to acquire the 

advanced networking capabilities expected with JTRS. In addition, 

whereas supplemental funding was readily available in the past to meet 

the demand for the huge increase in legacy radios, funding in the future 

may be more constrained. While supplemental budgets may be around for 

as long as operations continue in Afghanistan and Iraq, there is mounting 

pressure to bring non-war related spending into the normal budget 

process. 

In October 2003, shortly after JTRS was approved to begin system 

development, DOD and the services developed a joint migration plan for 

the transition from legacy radios to JTRS. The plan articulated key 

objectives for the program. It also identified the initial quantities of radios

that the services planned to procure each year for fiscal years 2003 

through 2012, and for 2013 and beyond, and the platform systems that 

would use JTRS. However, the plan was an interim document and 

contained numerous gaps, which the department planned to fill through 

refinement and periodic updating. For example, the plan provided very 

limited data linking needs to available and expected funding, and said 

nothing about associated integration costs. DOD had envisioned that the 

 13 An upgrading of the 1-channel radio is also under way to meet DOD’s revised standard 

for UHF satellite communications. In 2006, DOD established a requirement that the

services migrate legacy UHF satellite communication systems from the Demand Assigned 

Multiple Access waveform to the more efficient Integrated Waveform. Efforts are now 

under way to add the Integrated Waveform to the 1-channel handheld radio. 

Page 24 GAO-08-877 Defense Acquisitions
migration plan would be a “living and evolving document,” which would be 

updated on a continuing basis and reviewed annually. As the plan became 

progressively more detailed, the department believed it would help to 

identify deficiencies where additional purchases of legacy systems might 

be required, and ultimately become a comprehensive roadmap for 

transitioning DOD to JTRS-based networked communications. However, 

despite the department’s plans to maintain a living document and the more 

complex environment that has arisen since it was put in place, the 

migration plan has not yet been updated. 

Each of the services has taken some steps to update its JTRS migration 

plan. Except for the Air Force, however, these efforts are either outdated 

or fall short in helping to identify how the services plan to achieve desired 

capabilities, balance near- and long-term needs, and prioritize funding. 

• The 2004 Navy migration plan provided detailed information on the 

legacy radios that would be replaced by JTRS sets, the platforms that 

those legacy radios supported, the number of legacy radios fielded, the 

estimated number of JTRS channels needed to replace the legacy

radios, and yearly acquisition milestones from 2003 to 2020. The Navy

plan also provided an estimate of how long legacy radios would be 

sustained. 

• The Air Force completed a relatively extensive JTRS migration plan in 

January 2007. In developing the plan, the Air Force used a 

prioritization scheme that assessed the availability, operational status, 

and suitability of various aircraft platforms for JTRS. The plan also 

identified near-term, mid-term, and long-term phases for achieving 

needed communications capabilities in terms of specific platforms, 

taking into account integration costs and planned procurement 

funding. 

• The Marine Corps’ August 2007 Strategic Radio Plan provides highlevel information on plans to evolve from legacy to network-capable

radios, but does not discuss specific quantities or platforms for 

migration into JTRS or funding that will be needed. 

• The Army has not yet developed a JTRS migration plan, but is in the 

process of doing so. Specifically, the basis of issue for the Army’s 

JTRS requirements is currently being developed and is scheduled for 

completion later this year. According to Army officials, the basis of 

issue will map out the distribution of JTRS products, by type, for each 

brigade-sized unit within the Army. 

Page 25 GAO-08-877 Defense Acquisitions
DOD has also begun to lay the foundation for an updated and more 

comprehensive JTRS fielding plan. Specifically, in May 2007 the Joint 

Staff’s director for Command, Control, Communication, and Computer 

systems approved the first version of the Tactical Wireless Joint Network 

concept of operations. The network concept of operations seeks to evolve 

the JTRS concept of operations into an overarching concept document 

that will articulate the department’s expectations for operational and 

tactical wireless capabilities. The first version primarily focuses on JTRS, 

but future versions are expected to incorporate additional joint programs 

and concepts in more detail. The development of the network concept of

operations is an important first step, and is in line with our September 

2006 recommendation14 that the Secretary of Defense develop JTRS 

migration and fielding plans that are consistent with a well-developed 

concept of operations for using JTRS networking capabilities. 

The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and 

Information Integration has also recently begun to develop a new JTRS 

migration and fielding plan and has requested each of the services to 

provide detailed information on JTRS and legacy radio requirements. The 

plan is intended to provide visibility into the migration to JTRS, as well as 

the status of the services’ legacy radio inventories and related legacy radio 

procurements. The fielding plan would also serve as a data point for 

reporting to Congress, a tool for the Joint Staff’s assessment of the 

supportability of the JTRS concept of operations, and a means to assess 

the services’ compliance with the DOD radio acquisition policy. However, 

according to representatives from the Office of the Assistant Secretary, the

input provided by the services has not been linked to operational 

architectures that define the communications and networking tasks and 

functions that are needed on the battlefield to enable simultaneous, 

interoperable operations. In addition, the services’ input has lacked 

sufficient detail regarding current and future requirements, and funding 

priorities. As such, a comprehensive plan that balances needs with 

available resources, targets where investments in JTRS should be made, 

identifies contingencies in the event JTRS encounters further delays, and 

provides central direction for acquiring tactical radios over the next 

several years is still lacking. 

 14 GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Restructured JTRS Program Reduces Risk, but Significant 

Challenges Remain, GAO-06-955 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 11, 2006).

Page 26 GAO-08-877 Defense Acquisitions
While weapon system investments are normally associated with major 

platforms such as aircraft and ships, DOD’s investment in radios rivals the 

cost of some of its largest acquisition programs. As DOD looks ahead at its 

tactical radio investments over the next 5 years, it faces a less ambitious, 

yet more complicated undertaking than it did in 2003. DOD hopes to 

complete development and begin production of JTRS within the next few 

years. Yet, this is a down sized JTRS program that initially offers less 

capability than originally planned. Instead of being able to phase out old 

legacy radios as planned, DOD now faces a much larger inventory of 

relatively new legacy radios and improved interim radios with much useful 

life left in them. Phasing out these radios will necessarily be more 

deliberate given the huge costs already expended and the expected high 

price of JTRS sets. While much of the increased investment in radios since 

2003 has been ad hoc, reactionary, and enabled by large supplemental 

budgets, this may have been unavoidable. However, this does not mean 

that the next 5 years should follow suit. Rather, DOD needs to regain 

control over tactical radio investments so that the best mix of capabilities 

can be procured with a judicious expenditure of funds. Having an 

investment strategy that establishes priorities, discipline, and contingency

plans will be essential to making good decisions, particularly when 

predictability is elusive. While DOD and the services are making a series 

of decisions on a case-by-case basis to reconcile JTRS investments with 

lower-cost alternatives and relatively young legacy radio inventories, this 

approach could make future capabilities a product of such decisions 

rather than the strategic choice it should be. DOD does not have such a 

strategy today, and its previous migration plans and its waiver/notification 

process have been overtaken by events. 

To improve DOD’s ability to plan for and manage the development and 

fielding of tactical radios across the department, we recommend that the 

Secretary of Defense 

Conclusions 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action 

• develop a comprehensive strategy and implementation plan for making 

sound investment decisions for tactical radios that: 

• is based on operational architectures that define the 

communications and networking functions needed on the 

battlefield, 

• assesses and prioritizes the capabilities and requirements needed in 

the near- and long-term, 

Page 27 GAO-08-877 Defense Acquisitions
• sets bounds for the funding that will be committed to address these 

needs, 

• lays out an effective migration and fielding plan for delivering 

capabilities to the warfighter, and 

• identifies contingencies in case there are further problems and 

delays with JTRS. 

We also recommend that the Secretary of Defense 

• reinvigorate the tactical radio notification/waiver process to provide 

department wide insight into the continued procurement of legacy and 

interim radios. In doing so, consideration should be given to ensuring 

clear guidance and procedures are developed and communicated 

across the department. 

In its letter commenting on the draft of our report, DOD agreed with our 

recommendations. DOD’s letter is reprinted in appendix III. DOD noted 

that our report recommendations are consistent with the measures taken

by the department to develop a comprehensive strategy and plan for 

optimizing investments in future systems, such as JTRS, while balancing 

the need for further investment in current systems. As we point out in the 

report, DOD has recently taken steps to develop a new migration and 

fielding plan for tactical radio systems. However, DOD did not provide 

any additional information on the measures it is taking that are consistent 

with our recommendations. It is important that the additional measures 

the Department does take provide a strategic basis for making investment 

decisions on tactical radios in the future. Specifically, the Department’s 

plan needs to be linked to operational architectures, prioritize capability 

needs, set funding bounds, and identify contingencies to address potential

delays with JTRS. 

DOD also provided detailed comments, which we incorporated where 

appropriate.

We are sending copies of this report to the Chairmen and Ranking 

Members of other Senate and House committees and subcommittees that 

have jurisdiction and oversight responsibilities for DOD. We will also send 

copies to the Secretary of Defense; the Secretaries of the Air Force, Army, 

and Navy; and the Director, Office of Management and Budget. Copies will 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation 

Page 28 GAO-08-877 Defense Acquisitions
also be available at no charge on GAO’s Web site at http://www.gao.gov. If 

you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me 

at (202) 512-4841. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional 

Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. 

Major contributors to this report are listed in appendix IV. 

Paul L. Francis, Director 

Acquisition and Sourcing Management 

Page 29 GAO-08-877 Defense Acquisitions
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

To assess how the services’ planned investments in key tactical radio 

systems changed over the last 5 years, we compared the services’ fiscal 

year 2003 to 2007 tactical radio procurement plans to actual procurements. 

To calculate the Army’s spending plans for tactical radios, we utilized the 

SINCGARS and Improved High Frequency Family of Radios budget line 

items. It is important to note that the Improved High Frequency Family of

Radios budget line began in fiscal year 2005; prior to this date, the Army 

had been utilizing a combination of budget lines to procure handheld and 

manpack radios. To calculate Marine Corps plans for tactical radios we 

utilized the Radio Systems budget line, which includes a variety of radios. 

To determine the actual procurement of legacy radios between 2003 and 

2007, we sent out a data call to service acquisition officers. For the Army, 

we obtained actual procurement information from the Program Manager 

Tactical Radio Communications System (PMO TRCS) in Fort Monmouth, 

N.J. For the Marine Corps, we obtained more accurate information from 

Headquarters Marine Corps Command, Control, Communications and 

Computers in Washington, D.C. through comments to our draft report. We 

were unable to obtain plans or actual procurement information from the 

Navy or Air Force. According to Navy and Air Force officials, these 

services do not centrally procure radios. 

To assess why tactical radio procurement plans changed, we reviewed and 

analyzed samples of tactical radio procurement waivers/notifications 

submitted to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and 

Information Integration (ASD NII) by the services. These waivers and 

notifications provide information as to why the procurements were 

needed. In addition, we interviewed officials from: Navy’s Program 

Executive Office Command, Control, Communications, Computers and 

Intelligence (PEO C4I) San Diego, California; Air Combat Electronics 

Program Office (PMA 209) Patuxent River, Md.; Office of the Chief of 

Naval Operations , Directorate for Communication Networks, Arlington, 

Va.; Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Quantico, Va.; Marine 

Corps Systems Command, Quantico, Va.; Army Aviation, Arlington, Va.; 

Office of the Army’s Deputy Chief of Staff, Arlington, Va.; Office of the 

Army’s Chief Information Officer, Washington, D.C.; Office of the 

Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, Rosslyn, Va.; and the 

Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Arlington, Va. 

To determine what challenges will confront the services as they plan 

tactical radio investments to provide future capabilities, we obtained and 

analyzed briefings from JTRS program managers, reviewed the JTRS 

Board of Directors quarterly reports for the first and second quarters of 

fiscal year 2008, the 2003 JTRS joint migration plan, as well as service 

Page 30 GAO-08-877 Defense Acquisitions
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

migration plans for the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps; reviewed the

services’ estimates for future JTRS procurements and interviewed officials 

from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 

Technology and Logistics; the National Security Agency; the Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration; Office of

the Army’s Deputy Chief of Staff (G-8); and the Office of the Chief of Naval 

Operations, Directorate for Air Warfare. 

We conducted this performance audit from July 2007 to July 2008 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those 

standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, 

appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence

obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions 

based on our audit objectives. 

Page 31 GAO-08-877 Defense Acquisitions
Appendix II: Characteristics of Selected

Tactical Radios

Radio Output Power Range Frequency Waveforms Manufacturer

Handheld radios

AN/PRC-148 JEM 

5 Watts 

5 miles (environment 

dependent) 

30-512 MHz AM, FM, 

HAVEQUICK I/II, 

SINCGARS SC, 

ANDVT (PSK); P25 

Thales 

AN/PRC-152 

5 Watts 

5 miles (environment 

dependent) 

30-512 MHz AM, FM, 

HAVEQUICK I/II, 

SINCGARS FH, 

ANDVT (PSK), P25, 

HPW

Harris 

PRC-153 

(Integrated Intra 

Squad Radio) 

1-5 Watts 

1 km 

136-520 MHz VHF/UHF Motorola 

Manpack Radios

AN/PRC-117F

(COTS) 

20 Watts 

SATCOM/DAMA = 

5,000 miles 

LOS = 50 miles 

30-512MHz (VHF) SINCGARS, 

LOS 30 to 512MHz, 

CTCSS, 

(UHF) SATCOM 

DAMA, IW 1a

, 

HAVEQUICK, 

Maritime 

Frequencies, HPW

Harris 

AN/PRC-150 20 Watts 1 to 150 miles or 

more 

(environment 

dependent) 

2 to 60 MHz LSB, USB, AME, 

CW, VHF-FM 

Harris 

AN/PSC-5D 20Watts 

SATCOM/DAMA = 

5,000 miles 

LOS = 10 Km 

(terrain dependent) 

30-512MHz (VHF) SINCGARS, 

CNR, 

LOS 30 to 512MHz, 

CTCSS 

(UHF)SATCOM 

DAMA, IW1a

, 

HAVEQUICK, 

Maritime Mode, 

LMR, JSTARS 

Interoperable 

Waveform 

Raytheon 

Appendix II: Characteristics of Selected 

Tactical Radios 

Page 32 GAO-08-877 Defense Acquisitions
Appendix II: Characteristics of Selected

Tactical Radios

Radio Output Power Range Frequency Waveforms Manufacturer

Airborne Radios

AN/ARC-210 10- 23 Watts 

LOS and SATCOM 

30- 512 MHz HAVEQUICK I & II, 

SATURN, 

SINCGARS (V), 

ESIP, SATCOM 

DAMA, IW 1a, Link 

4A, Link 11, JPALS 

data link capable, 

among others 

Rockwell Collins

AN/ARC-201D

(Airborne

SINCGARS) 

10W

40 statute miles at 

1200’ AGD 

30 – 87.975 MHz SINCGARS ITT

AN/ARC-231 125Watts (Power

Amplified) SATCOM/DAMA = 

5,000 miles 

LOS = 50 miles 

30-512MHz (VHF) SINCGARS, 

CNR, ATC, 

LOS 30 to 512 MHz, 

CTCSS, 

(UHF) SATCOM, 

DAMA, IW a

, 

HAVEQUICK, 

Maritime Mode, LMR 

Raytheon 

Ground Radios

EPLRS 100 W (max) 

Ground to ground: 

10 Km 

Ground to air: 40 Km

420-450 MHz EPLRS Raytheon 

SINCGARS 5 W and 

50 W (with an 

external Power

Amplifier) 

5W – 5-10Km 

(voice) 

50W – 10-40Km

(voice) 

30 – 87.975 MHz SINCGARS ITT

AN/VRC-110 

Vehicular adapter for 

PRC-152 

20-50 Watts 

20 miles 

(environment 

dependent) 

30-512 MHz AM, FM, 

HAVEQUICK I/II, 

SINCGARS FH, 

ANDVT (PSK), P25, 

HPW

Harris 

AN/VRC-111 

Vehicular adapter for 

PRC-148 

20-50 Watts 

20 miles 

(environment 

dependent 

30-512 MHz AM. FM, 

HAVEQUICK I/II, 

SINCGARS FH, 

ANDVT (PSK), P25

Thales 

AN/VRC-104 

Vehicular adapter for 

PRC-150 

20-150 Watts 

1 to 2,000mi or more

(environment 

dependent) 

2 to 60 MHz LSB, USB, AME, 

CW, VHF-FM

Harris 

Page 33 GAO-08-877 Defense Acquisitions
Appendix II: Characteristics of Selected

Tactical Radios

Radio Output Power Range Frequency Waveforms Manufacturer

AN/VRC 103 

Vehicular adapter for 

PRC-117 

50 Watts (LOS + 

SATCOM) SATCOM/DAMA = 

5,000 miles 

LOS = 25 Km 

(terrain dependent) 

30-512MHz (VHF) SINCGARS, 

LOS 30 to 512MHz, 

CTCSS, 

(UHF)SATCOM, 

DAMA, IW a

, 

HAVEQUICK, 

Maritime 

Frequencies, HPW

Harris 

Maritime Radios 

DMR Depending on power

amplifiers 

2 MHz- 2 GHz HAVEQUICK I/II, 

SINCGARS, Link-11, 

among others 

General Dynamics 

Source: GAO analysis of legacy radio data. 

a

The supported waveform for Integrated Waveform (IW) is pending implementation and not presently 

in any radios. 

Page 34 GAO-08-877 Defense Acquisitions
Appendix III: Comments from the Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense 

Department of Defense 

Page 35 GAO-08-877 Defense Acquisitions
Appendix III: Comments from the 

Department of Defense 

Page 36 GAO-08-877 Defense Acquisitions
Appendix IV: 

St

GAO Contact and 

aff Acknowledgments

Page 37 GAO-08-877

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

Paul L. Francis, Director, (202) 512-4841 

In addition to the contact above, Greg Campbell, John Oppenheim, 

Guisseli Reyes-Turnell, Jeffrey Rose, Jay Tallon, Hai Tran, Alyssa Weir, 

and Paul Williams made key contributions to this report. 

Defense Acquisitions

GAO Contact 

Staff 

Acknowledgments 

(120669) 
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