CHEMICAL-BIOLOGICAL ATTACK: 

ACHILLES HEEL OF THE AIR

EXPEDITIONARY FORCE?

by 

Byron C. Hepburn, Colonel, USAF, MC, FS 

The Counterproliferation Papers 

Future Warfare Series No. 4 

USAF Counterproliferation Center 

Air War College 

Air University 

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 

Chemical-Biological Attack: Achilles 

Heel of the Air Expeditionary Force? 

Byron C. Hepburn, Colonel, USAF 

September 1999 

The Counterproliferation Papers Series was established by the USAF 

Counterproliferation Center to provide information and analysis to assist 

the understanding of U.S. national security policy-makers and USAF 

officers to help them better prepare to counter the threat from weapons of 

mass destruction. Copies of No. 4 and previous papers in this series are 

available from the USAF Counterproliferation Center, 325 Chennault Circle, 

Maxwell AFB AL 36112-6427. The fax number is (334) 953-7538; phone 

(334) 953-7538. This study was co-sponsored by both the USAF 

Counterproliferation Center and the Air War College Center for Strategy and 

Technology (CSAT) and is a joint product of the two centers. 

Counterproliferation Paper No. 4 

USAF Counterproliferation Centel 

Air War College 

Air University 

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 36112-6427 

The internet address for the USAF Counterproliferation Center is: 

http://www.au.af.mil/aulawc/awcgate/awc-cps.htm 

Contents 

Page 

Disclaimer ...................................................................................................... i 

The Author ..................................................................................................... ii 

Acknowledgments......................................................................................... iii 

Abstract ......................................................................................................... iv 

Introduction.................................................................................................... 1 

I. The Chemical-Biological Weapons Threat .................................................3 

II. The Air Expeditionary Force.................................................................. 15 

III. USAF Response:. The Air Expeditionary Force Chemical- 

 Biological Threat Team ........................................................................ 21 

IV. Conclusion ........................................................................................... 35 

V. Recommendations ................................................................................. 37 

Notes ............................................................................................................ 39 

Disclaimer 

The views expressed in this publication are those of the author and do 

not reflect the official policy or position of the the U.S. Government, 

Department of Defense, or the USAF Counterproliferation Center. 

i 
The Author 

Colonel Byron C. Hepburn, M.D., is one of eight USAF pilot-physicians. 

Prior to residence at the Air War College in 1998-1999, he served with the 

33rd Flight Test Squadron and coordinated all human factors testing on the 

C-17A. These tests included aeromedical, chemical defense, night vision, 

and oxygen systems evaluations. Additionally, he is actively involved in 

aircrew pharmacological research with the Air Force Research Laboratory 

and the French Institute of Aerospace Medicine. Other assignments have 

included a tour as Chief of Aerospace Medicine, 437th AMDS, staff 

physician, USAF Academy Hospital, and Deputy Chief of Standardization, 

11th AAS. Colonel Hepburn is a distinguished graduate of the U.S. Air Force 

Academy and Squadron Officers School. He holds a masters equivalent from 

the University of Geneva, Switzerland and a M.D. from the Uniformed 

Services University of the Health Sciences. He is a Command Pilot with 

over 3,000 hours in the T-37, T-38, C-9A, and C-17A. 

ii 
Acknowledgments 

I wish to thank the following individuals for their expert advice and 

counsel during the completion of this work: Dr. William Martel and Col (ret) 

Ted Hailes of the Center for Strategy and Technology (CSAT) of the Air War 

College; Dr. Barry R. Schneider and Col Jim Davis of the USAF 

Counterproliferation Center; Dr. W. Seth Carus of the National Defense 

University Center for Counterproliferation; Lt Col George A. Tirabassi, 

Chief of the Medical Integration Branch of the USAF Doctrine Center; Lt Col 

Peter Walsh, from the Directorate of Medical Readiness, Office of the 

Surgeon General, Maj Scott Horan from USAF Civil Engineering Readiness, 

and Maj Richard Matta from the Medical Readiness section' of the Air 

Combat Command. Thanks also to members of the USAF directorates for 

Expeditionary Aerospace Force Implementation and Counterproliferation 

Policy, particularly Lt Col Ginna Werezynski, and Lt Col Jim Player. All of 

these individuals are to be commended for their professionalism and 

commitment to the Air-Force mission. 

I dedicate this work to the memory of my late father, Lieutenant Colonel 

James W. Hepburn, U.S. Army Chemical Corps. As commander of the 164th 

Chemical Company during WWII, his unit's offensive weapons capability 

helped deter the use of such weapons on our own forces. Later as Chief of 

the Chemical Corps Materiel Planning and Program office, his expertise was 

vital to the establishment of sound policy during the critical Cold War period. 

Colonel Hepburn's love of family and country lives through the lives of his 

children and grandchildren. 

iii 
Abstract 

The U.S. National Security Strategy calls for our armed forces to help 

shape the international environment, respond to threats and crises, and 

prepare now for an uncertain future. To assist in the execution of this strategy, 

the U.S. Air Force is developing a new operational entity, the Air 

Expeditionary Force. This force will be tailored to quickly respond to crises 

or conflicts at any point on the globe. Given its technological and materiel 

superiority, the force will have no conventional equal. However, to 

effectively accomplish its mission the Air Expeditionary Force must have 

minimal redundancy in personnel and equipment and be supported over 

extended distances by airlift. These characteristics make the force 

particularly vulnerable to an asymmetric attack by chemical and biological 

weapons. 

Despite formal international prohibitions against chemical-biological 

weapons, recent history has documented their use against civilian and 

military personnel with significant consequences. Currently, twenty-five 

nations are known to have chemical-biological weapons and it is presumed 

non-state actors, such as terrorists groups have acquired them as well. 

Air Force leadership must neither exaggerate nor trivialize the 

chemical-biological threat to the Air Expeditionary Force. This paper calls 

for an objective and ongoing analysis of the threat and appropriate 

organizational response, through the creation of an Air Expeditionary Force 

Chemical-Biological Threat Team. This multifunctional group would 

evaluate how the expeditionary forces are planned, organized, trained and 

equipped to deal with the chemical-biological threat. With this concerted 

approach, the Air Expeditionary Force should avert chemical-biological 

defeat and prove a formidable operational entity well into the 21st century. 

iv
Chemical-Biological Attack . . . 1 

I. Introduction 

“I believe the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction 

presents the greatest threat that the world has ever known.” 

Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen1

The U.S. has entered a post-Cold War era that is characterized by 

continued regional crises and transnational threats. Given U.S. global 

interests and formal responsibilities, the U.S. Air Force will increasingly be 

called upon to help shape and stabilize this often chaotic and dangerous 

international scene. The Air Expeditionary Force will be a key operational 

element in this process. It will be tailored to respond rapidly and effectively 

to selected regional crises or conflicts at any point on the globe.2 With 

technological materiel superiority, this force will have no conventional equal. 

As a consequence, future adversaries will be likely to employ asymmetric 

threats against the U.S. to “democratize the battlefield.”3 Two of those 

asymmetric threats are weapons of mass destruction, specifically, chemical 

and biological weapons. 

Despite formal international prohibitions against chemical-biological 

weapons, recent history has clearly documented their global presence and 

lethality. These weapons can be used across the spectrum of conflict to 

achieve varied effects from the immediate death of an individual to lasting 

strategic effects across entire theaters of operation. Because of their 

relatively low cost, ease of production, and increasing lethality, chemical and 

biological weapons are now an integral part of the arsenals of many potential 

adversaries. Their presence or potential use cannot be discounted. 

For the U.S. to objectively respond to this threat, it is essential that 

leaders, both military and civilian, first come to clearly and objectively 

understand the capabilities of such weapons. This study provides a basic 

review of the historical use of such weapons and documents their recent use 

by state and non-state actors. It then details the specific categories of both 

classes of weapons and defines their military significance. With this basic 

foundation, the study then focuses on the unique, implications of the 

chemical-biological threat to the operational concept of the Air 

Expeditionary Force. Areas of vulnerability to these weapons are 

documented for each phase of military action from predeployment to 

redeployment. Finally, the study advocates a formal process to evaluate the 

capabilities needed to successfully meet this threat, and offers representative 
2 . . . Chemical-Biological Attack 

solutions to present deficiencies in the areas of planning, organization, 

training, and equipment. 

In short, the chemical-biological weapons threat to the Air Expeditionary 

Force exists today and will increase in the future. It must be addressed in an 

objective long-term manner and should not be trivialized nor exaggerated. 

With a strong Air Force commitment to fight and win in a chemical-biological 

environment, the Air Expeditionary Force will be in a better position to meet 

its future challenges and prevail. Without such a commitment, the USAF 

might one day face a chemical-biological disaster on a future battlefield. 

There is no other rational USAF option other than to thoroughly prepare to 

meet the chemical-biological threat. 
Chemical-Biological Attack . . . 3 

II. The Chemical-Biological Weapons Threat 

The History of Chemical and Biological Weapons 

“Whether or not gas will be employed in future wars is a 

matter of conjecture. But the effect is so deadly to the 

unprepared that we can never afford to neglect the question.” 

General John J. Pershing4

Chemical and biological agents have been a part of human conflict 

throughout history. During the Peloponnesian War (431-404 B.C.) the 

Spartans used noxious smoke containing arsenic for attacks against 

Athenian-allied cities.5

 During the 14th century, attacking Tartars catapulted 

plague-infected cadavers into the city of Kaffa (now Feodosia, Ukraine). The 

subsequent outbreak of the plague resulted in the conquest of the city.6 The 

U.S. military first confronted chemical weapons during World War I when 

the enemy used mustard and chlorine gases. During that conflict over one 

million allied and enemy casualties were attributed to chemical attack.7

Russian armies suffered 50 percent of those casualties because of their 

inability to field any effective defensive measures.8 During World War II, 

the Japanese used biological agents, including the bacteria that cause anthrax, 

plague, and cholera, in at least 11 Chinese cities.9

Efforts to restrict the use of chemical and biological weapons began with 

the Greeks and Romans, who condemned the use of poison in war as a 

violation of ius gentium, the law of nations.10 In recent times, a fundamental 

tenet of international law has been that weapons should not be used if their 

effects cause. suffering disproportionate to their military utility.11 12 The 

potential of chemical-biological weapons to cause protracted human suffering 

and injury to non-combatants makes them particularly egregious in the eyes 

of the law. This concept was emphasized in the 1874 International 

Declaration Concerning the Laws and Customs of War, which included a 

prohibition against poison or poisoned arms.13 The subsequent Geneva Protocol 

of 1925 also prohibited the use of gases and bacteriological weapons.14

Finally, the 1972 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, 

Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological and Toxin Weapons and on 

Their Destruction and the 1997 Chemical Weapons Convention are the most 

recent steps in that direction. These treaties prohibit the use, development, 

production, stockpiling, and transfer of chemical-biological weapons.15
4 . . . Chemical-Biological Attack 

Despite these prohibitions, several significant examples of chemicalbiological weapons use have occurred in recent years. During the Iran-Iraqi 

War (1980-88), Iraq used chemical agents including mustard and the nerve 

agent, Tabun, to produce approximately 45,000 Iranian casualties.16 The 

Iraqis, who were trained and influenced by Soviet advisors, effectively used 

these chemical agents against the human-wave attacks of the much less prepared Iranian infantry.17 Additionally, on March 19, 1988, Iraqi airplanes 

bombed the Kurdish village of Halabja with cyanide and mustard filled 

explosives and killed 5,000 Kurds and injured an additional 7,000.18 As a consequence of these effective attacks and an ineffectual international response, 

military experts have argued the “chemical warfare threshold” has been 

substantially lowered.19 To compound this problem, recent events have 

demonstrated that chemical weapons are now in the hands of terrorist and 

cult groups. The March 20, 1995, Aum Shinrikyo (Supreme Truth) cult's 

Sarin gas attack on the Tokyo subway produced 5,500 casualties and 12 

deaths.20

The most serious finding in the recent history of chemical-biological 

warfare has been the public disclosure of the Soviet biological weapons 

program. At its zenith during the late 1980s, 60,000 scientists and staff 

personnel worked in some 40 research and production facilities.21 Despite 

the dissolution of the Soviet Union, it is presumed that Russia has retained 

a biological weapons research and production capability. More importantly, 

it is known that many scientists working for Biopreparat were left without 

work. While some of the scientists went to the U.S. or Great Britain, others 

are believed to have gone to Iraq, Iran, Syria, Libya, and China.22 It has been 

reported Iran is now offering former Soviet scientists $5,000 per month to 

work on their biological weapons program.23 This worldwide spread of 

expertise in biological weapons is a significant event and will increase the 

threat to U.S. forces in the decades to come. 

The world is now entering a new era in the history of chemical-biological 

weapons. This era began with the biotechnology revolution in the 1970s, 

specifically with the advent of genetically engineered agents. Advances in 

biotechnology have blurred the distinction between chemical and biological 

toxins now that “mid spectrum” agents can be produced, which include 

powerful toxins, bioregulators, and physiologically active compounds. As 

this technology has advanced, their lethality has increased exponentially.24

It is quite likely the threat of the future will be the simultaneous employment 

of multiple chemical and biological agents that are engineered to evade 

detection and negate vaccines and medicines. As the U.S. is no longer 
Chemical-Biological Attack . . . 5 

involved in offensive biological and chemical weapons research, there is also 

a potential that new agents will be produced of which it has no knowledge 

This is a serious concern as the U.S. defensive capability may be inadequate 

or ineffective against such agents.25

Despite the proliferation of chemical-biological weapons, many officials 

discount their significance to military forces. To begin, these weapons 

involve two scientific disciplines (chemistry and biology) that may seem 

foreign and irrelevant to many strategic policy makers. Furthermore, for the 

U.S. leadership there is no recent memory of the effects of such weapons on 

its forces. As a consequence, for many it is difficult to conceptualize the 

military impact of chemical and biological weapons. At the same time, for 

those who have come to understand the potential power of chemicalbiological weapons and their specific human effects, there may be a basic 

psychological coping mechanism at play. Additionally, many in the U.S. and 

abroad have come to believe, perhaps naively, that the international 

conventions that prohibit the use of chemical-biological weapons will be 

respected. History is replete with examples to the contrary. Finally, many 

believe the Gulf War demonstrated the U.S. ability to deter the use of chemicalbiological weapons. From this experience, it may then be optimistically 

assumed no future adversary would dare to employ such weapons against 

U.S. forces for fear of overwhelming retaliation. Although certainly a 

desired objective, this may be a simplistic assumption. Some have argued 

the U.S. was deterred from continuing the Gulf War due to Saddam Hussein's 

chemical-biological weapons capability and his resolve to use them if his 

regime was threatened.26

Chemical Agents 

“You can take the most beat-up army in the world, and if they 

choose to stand and fight, you are going to take casualties; if 

they choose to dump chemicals on you, they might even win.” 

General H. Norman Schwarzkopf27

A basic understanding of both chemical and biological weapons must 

first be grasped before one begins to consider viable responses. Chemical 

agents include choking, nerve, blood, blister, vomiting, tear, and 

incapacitating agents (see Table 1).28 These agents result in varied human 

affects from death to transient incapacitation. Choking agents affect the 

unprotected victim through damage to the respiratory tract. Tissues are 

injured to the point where fluid accumulates in the lungs, and death results. 
6 . . . Chemical-Biological Attack 

Nerve agents alter the function of the nervous system and cause convulsions 

and death through respiratory paralysis. Blood agents block the exchange of 

oxygen at the cellular level and are fatal. While blister agents can produce 

fatalities, their greater effect is to cause incapacitation. Exposure to blister 

agents severely irritates the eyes, lungs, and skin. Consequently, it is 

presumed these agents will be used to transiently incapacitate forces and limit 

the use of an area or specific equipment.29 Finally, vomiting agents may be 

deployed first in a chemical attack because they are not detected by present 

defensive systems. These arsenic based agents cause great discomfort and 

can force troops to remove or avoid use of their protective masks. In this 

debilitated, non-protected state, troops would then be vulnerable to a lethal 

second wave nerve agent attack.30

Of additional grave concern is the advent of more potent chemical agents. 

Recent examples include two Russian nerve agents that are eight times as 

potent as the currently most powerful nerve agent known as “VX.”31 The 

discussion of such advanced agents is beyond the scope of this unclassified 

study but it is essential to have an awareness that the chemical threat is 

increasing.32

Chemical weapons can achieve rapid and varied physiologic effects from 

minor eye irritation to death. For instance, one small drop of the nerve agent 

Sarin can kill within minutes after skin contact.33 Chemical weapons are 

often liquids or solids that give off vapor at ambient temperatures and can be 

delivered in a variety of means. Aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles, cruise 

missiles, ballistic missiles or artillery shells, and mines are all potential means 

to deliver these weapons. It must be emphasized even unsophisticated weapons, 

such as mortars, can effectively deliver significant quantities of chemical 

agents. During World War II, eight 4.2 inch mortars could fire approximately 

one ton of a toxic agent within two minutes at a range of over two miles.34

The presence of chemical weapons in a military environment varies from 

those that degrade after several minutes to those that persist for weeks. As 

a consequence, the tactical value of chemical weapons does not necessarily 

rest on their ability to kill an adversary. A persistent chemical agent, such as 

mustard gas, could be dispersed on a desired location prior to the arrival of 

U.S. forces in order to deny the use of terrain or equipment. When actually 

placed on a military force, the greatest value of chemical weapons lies in 

their capacity to rapidly degrade the effectiveness of the force for a defined 

period, and to increase its vulnerability to follow-on conventional attack. For 

a poorly prepared force, “even a small and relatively harmless chemical agent 

attack can produce results out of all proportion to the efforts involved from 
Chemical-Biological Attack . . . 7 

the attacker.”

35 The U.S. Army Chemical and Nuclear Exercises 

demonstrated that the mere wearing of protective gear leads to additional 

casualties, loss of unit efficiency, reduced operational tempo, and degraded 

operational effectiveness.36 Finally, the psychological impact of chemical 

weapons use may also be militarily significant. The terror effect of such 

weapons may drive “troops who feel they are defenseless ... to break and 

run after minimal losses.”

37

Table 1. Major Known Chemical Warfare Agents 

Agent Class Agent Persistence Rate of Action 

Nerve Tabun (GA) Low Very rapid 

 Sarin (GB) * Low Very rapid 

 Soman (GD) Moderate Very rapid 

 GF Moderate Very rapid 

 VX* Very high Rapid 

Blister Sulfur mustard Very high Delayed 

 Nitrogen mustard Moderate-Very High Delayed 

 Phosgene oxime Low Immediate 

 Lewisite High Rapid 

 Phenyldichloroarisine Low-Moderate Rapid 

 Ethyldichloroarsine Moderate Delayed 

 Methyldichloroarsine Low Rapid 

Choking Phosgene Low Delayed 

 Diphosgene Low Variable 

Blood Hydrogen cyanide Low Rapid 

 Cyanogen chloride Low Rapid 

 Arsine Low Delayed 

Riot control Diphenylchloroarsine Low Rapid 

(vomiting) 

 Diphenycyanoarsine Low Rapid 

 Adamsite Rapid 

Riot control (tear gas) Chloroacetophenone Low Immediate 

 Chloropicrin Low-High Immediate 

 Bromobenzylcyanide Moderate-Very high Immediate 

 O-chlorobenzylidene Low-High .. Immediate 

 Malononitrile 

Psychochernicals 3-Quinuclidinyl High Delayed 

 benzilate 

Source: U.S. intelligence data adapted from Bill Gertz, “Horror Weapons,” AIR FORCE 

Magazine 79, no. 1 (January 1996): 46. 

*Persistency of chemical agents varies based on wind, temperature, and precipitation. In 

general, Sarin is effective for 1/4 -4 hours, while VX can remain active from three days to 

three weeks.38 
8 . . . Chemical-Biological Attack 

Biological Agents 

While chemical agents represent a distinct threat to U.S. forces, 

biological weapons are an even more serious concern. Leaders should look 

to history to grasp the impact such pathogens can have on military forces. 

Up to the advent of antibiotics in World War II, deaths due to infectious 

disease and non-battle injuries always far exceeded those caused by actual 

combat.39 Now, with biological weapons, adversaries have the capacity to 

deliberately produce epidemic rates of disease among U. S. and allied forces. 

Biological weapons include pathogens or living microorganisms that 

cause disease in man: bacteria, fungi, rickettsia, and viruses. This category 

of weapons also includes toxins, which are poisonous chemical compounds 

produced by living organisms. All of these agents produce debilitating or 

fatal illness among those who breathe, drink or absorb them through the 

skin.40 Of the 160 known natural pathogens, more than 60 are discussed in 

the open literature as potential biological agents41 (Table #2). 

Bacterial agents can be highly lethal, extremely contagious, and have the 

potential to cause widespread epidemics. If a force is adequately prepared, 

most illnesses caused by bacteria can be prevented by vaccination and are 

treatable with antibiotics if diagnosed in the early stages. However, with 

improved genetic engineering and biotechnological methods, strains may be 

developed which are more pathogenic, antibiotic resistant, and able to resist 

the protection afforded by conventional vaccines. For example, it was 

reported that the Soviets had developed a technique to microencapsulate 

agents, which would make them more resilient to environmental factors, such 

as heat and ultraviolet light.42 Additionally, it has recently been reported 

Israeli scientists are using information from the South African biological 

weapons program to produce pathogens that are ethnic specific.43 While this 

allegation has not been substantiated, it does raise the suspicion of a new 

dimension to biological weapons. 

Viruses are also quite infectious, and many have the potential to be lethal 

(e.g., Yellow fever, Ebola). Of greater concern from a weapons standpoint 

are the viruses that incapacitate personnel without producing fatalities. 

Dengue Fever and Venezuelan Equine Encephalitis viruses both are capable 

of prostrating personnel for a period of several weeks. For a force with 

limited manpower, or limited means of reinforcement, a two-week period of 

inaction could mean victory for the adversary. Finally, rapid acting toxins 

must be viewed as agents that are likely to be used by terrorists or covert 

forces. Toxins, such as botulinum, are not affected by antibiotics and could 
Chemical-Biological Attack . . . 9 

produce significant numbers of fatalities if placed, for example, on the food 

of an unsuspecting force. 

Biological weapons attacks can occur covertly because they are not 

immediately sensed by man, and the ability to detect them via technical 

means is limited. Without initial detection, the distributor can strike and still 

be far removed from the attack site prior to the emergence of symptoms 

among infected personnel. Furthermore, early symptoms may mimic those 

caused by organisms in the natural environment, and thus may be discounted 

as a minor illness until the disease progresses to the point where treatment is 

ineffective. These qualities of biologic weapons may make it extremely 

difficult to attribute the attack to a specific perpetrator.44 Furthermore, the 

potential scope and impact of these weapons means that one must view them 

as strategically important.45 Entire lines of supply or a theater of operation 

could be affected by a communicable disease agent and operations might 

essentially cease in the wake of a biological weapon attack.46

The biological weapons threat to the Air Expeditionary Force will 

increase in the future. For the state or non-state actor with limited resources, 

biological “weapons effects” are much less expensive to produce than 

conventional, chemical, or nuclear weapons. Biological weapons can 

achieve the same casualty rates per square kilometer as conventional 

weapons at a fraction of the cost.47 Additionally, the production of biological 

agents is uncomplicated and equipment used in their production is readily 

found on the open market. It is believed that “a major biological arsenal could 

be built with $10,000 worth of equipment.”48 First, a biological pathogen 

can simply be reproduced in great quantity through the use of fermentors that 

are purchased from the pharmaceutical, agricultural, or brewing industries.49

Once a sufficient quantity of pathogen is obtained, commercially available 

“centrifuges, strainers, and freeze dryers” are then used to concentrate and 

purify the desired agent.50 The detection of the entire production processes 

is extremely difficult, as these activities can be concealed in rooms the size 

of a garage and often resemble legitimate scientific activity.51

Even though the replication of a biologic organism is uncomplicated, the 

subsequent conversion into a viable offensive agent, or “weaponization,” 

necessitates an acquired expertise. Historically, this expertise has resided only 

among states with adequate scientific resources and robust offensive biologic 

weapons programs. Unfortunately, many analysts of biological warfare now 

feel this expertise may be purchased, leading to the conclusion that new state 

and non-state actors may acquire a biological weapons capability. 
10 . . . Chemical-Biological Attack 

Once weaponized. biological agents can be dispersed via many of 

the same platforms that are used for chemical weapons, notably missiles, 

aircraft, and artillery. However, the most worrisome delivery vehicle to 

disseminate biological weapons over an extensive area will be a precision 

guided cruise missile. Multiple small, slow, and low-flying cruise 

missiles launched at night over a circuitous course would be extremely 

difficult for a military force to detect and destroy. Because the effect of a 

biological weapon per pound is extremely high, less than 50 kilograms 

of an agent could easily cover an airbase or port.52 The low payload 

requirement of biological agents coupled with the unique offensive qualities 

of the cruise missiles may make this combination of weapons a “major 

security threat.”5 3 While such advanced delivery vehicles as missiles 

cannot be ignored, biological agents are also ideally suited to “small scale 

attacks by unconventional methods.”54 The clandestine contamination of a 

force's food and water or dispersal of biological agents via simple groundbased aerosol generators or sprayers is quite plausible and capable of 

producing significant casualties. 

Table 2. Catalog of Significant Biological Agents 

Bacteria Fungi' Rickettsia Viruses Toxins 

Bacillus anthracis Coccidioides Coxiella burneti Dengue fever Aflatoxin 

 immitis 

Brucella species Reckettsia typhi Influenza Botulinurn 

 (rnooseri)

Malleomyces mallei Histoplasma Rift Valley Ricin 

 capsulation fever

Malleomyces Rickettsia Variola Staphylopseudornallei prowazeki (Smallpox) coccus 

Mycobacterium Nocardia Venezuelan 

tuberculosis Asteroides equine 

 encephalitis 

Salmonella Rickettsia 

typhimurium tsutsugamushi Yellow fever 

Shigella 

Vibrio cholerae 

Sources: USAF Scientific Advisory Board, “Report on United States Air Force 

Expeditionary Forces,” Vol 3 Appendix!, February 1998. 1-43. 

Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Proliferation: Threat and Response,” November 1997. 
Chemical-Biological Attack . . . 11 

Nations with Chemical-Biological Weapons Capability 

Today, at least 25 nations have a chemical-biological weapons 

capability, and the sophistication of their agents is increasing. The Arms 

Control and Disarmament Agency has specifically cited Iran, Libya, and 

Syria for their efforts to develop “robust” biological weapons 

capabilities.55

Information regarding chemical-biological weapons is easily 

disseminated on the Internet, and advances in the sciences are helping to 

make the production and distribution of the weapons, more feasible for 

groups with limited resources.56 In the post-Cold War environment, 

where major power defense sponsorship of many states has been reduced, 

governments with limited means may place more emphasis on their 

chemical-biological capability. As mentioned, the acquisition and 

subsequent “maintenance” costs of such weapons are much less than 

those associated with conventional systems. Additionally, with chemicalbiological weapons such states are not as tied to suppliers for technical 

support, critical parts, and munitions. Consequently, these states may be 

less restrained by the threat of trade restrictions or sanctions. 

This proliferation represents a complicated national security 

challenge for the United States and a real operational threat for the Air 

Expeditionary Force.57 As shown in Table 3, states are likely to develop 

chemical-biological weapons as a relatively inexpensive force multiplier 

or to exert influence on a regional level.58 As a rule, these proliferents 

are likely to have unsettled internal politics and loose weapons command 

and control arrangements. As a consequence, the chance of accidental or 

unauthorized use of these weapons is increased.59 The chemicalbiological threat is further increased when these states share their 

weapons capability with other states or non-state actors. 

Non-state actors, such as terrorist groups, crime syndicates, and 

extremist organizations, are also able to acquire chemical-biological 

weapons capabilities.60 These non-state groups often have significant 

resources, and are elusive and less vulnerable to traditional deterrent 

options (international law, economic sanctions .....). Many are not 

politically motivated or constrained but are “driven by revenge, racial or 

ethnic hatred, religious fanaticism, or doomsday and apocalyptic 

philosophies.”61 As a consequence, when armed with chemical-biological 

weapons these non-state actors become more significant threats to the Air 

Expeditionary Force. 
12 . . . Chemical-Biological Attack 

One recent example of non-state threats has been the international 

terrorist group, al Qaida. In August 1998, the U.S. Government stated 

that al Qaida, under the direction of Osama bin Laden, had developed a 

chemical weapons production capability. In response to the group’s 

bombing of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania on August 7, 1998, 

the U.S. destroyed the Shifa pharmaceutical plant in Khartoum, Sudan. 

This plant had purported ties to al Qaida and was alleged to produce the 

nerve agent VX.62 Bin Laden, however, remains at large and his 

organization supports extremists in more than 20 countries.63 The risk of 

a chemical-biological attack on our deployed forces by al Qaida and other 

similar groups remains a grave concern. 
Chemical-Biological Attack . . . 13 

Table 3. Biological and Chemical Weapons Possession and Programs 

Country Biological Weapons Chemical Weapons 

Afghanistan PP

Bosnia SP* 

Burma PP 

Chile SP 

China PP PP 

Cuba SP 

Egypt SP PP 

Ethiopia PP 

France Destroyed SP 

India PP PC 

Iran PP PC 

Iraq CI PC 

Israel SP** PP 

Kazakstan PP 

Libya SP SP 

North Korea PP PP 

Pakistan PP SP 

Russia PC PC 

Serbia SP* 

Somalia SP 

South Africa SP*** SP*** 

South Korea SP 

Syria PP PP 

Taiwan PP PP 

Thailand SP 

Ukraine PP 

United Kingdom Destroyed 

United States Destroyed PC 

Vietnam PP 

Key: PC - Possession Confirmed PP - Probable Possession

 SP - Suspected Programs CI - Clear Intent 

 Blanks indicate None 

Source: Schneider, Barry R., Future War and Counterproliferation U.S. Military 

Responses to NBC Proliferation Threats, (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1999), 5. 

* Deja News: “Chemical Weapons in Bosnia,” November 20, 1998, available from 

http://x1dejanews.com/getdoc.xp?an=413979213.3&context=918400584.169430010&hitnum=0 

**The Sunday Times: “Israel Planning “Ethnic” Bomb as As Saddam Caves In,” November 

15, 1998, available from 

http://www.Sunday-times.co.uk/news/pages/sti/98/11/15/stifgnmid0300r4.html?1124027 

*** BBC Online Network, “South Africa’s Truth Commission Starts Chemical Weapons 

Hearing,” June 8, 1998, available from 

http://193.130.149.130/hi/english/world/africa/newsid_109000/109308.stm 
14 . . . Chemical-Biological Attack 
Chemical-Biological Attack . . . 15 

III. The Air Expeditionary Force 

The immediate post-Cold War period was characterized by optimism that 

the demise of the Soviet threat would reduce the need for the size, of the 

military that the U.S. previously maintained. Consequently, the U.S. Air 

Force experienced a significant reduction in overseas base structure and 

personnel strengths. Although Air Force manpower was reduced by 

one-third, contingency deployments increased fourfold.64 This increased 

level of operations has taken a significant toll on the Air Force. To respond 

to this reality, senior Air Force leadership has sought to provide stability for 

the force through the routine deployment of Air Expeditionary Forces. 

The Air Force leadership has also seen the need to shift from the previous 

“threat-based Cold War garrison force, focused on containment, to a 

capabilities-based expeditionary force focused on responsiveness.”65 This 

force will allow the U.S. to rapidly project combat power in defense of its 

global interests and responsibilities. The Air Expeditionary Forces will be 

“tailored to meet the needs of the Joint Force Commander both for lethal and 

non-lethal applications.”66 On the low end of the operational spectrum the 

expeditionary force may be called on to engage in a humanitarian support 

mission following a natural disaster. As a deterrent force, it also will be able 

to support known requirements to rotate personnel and equipment for 

long-term U.S. commitments in such areas as Southwest Asia. 

With its rapid response capability, the Air Expeditionary Force is 

designed to be a key contributor to the success of U.S. national military 

strategy, which requires its forces to be able to fight and win two nearly 

simultaneous major theater wars. Accordingly, if used in more than 

MOOTWS and small-scale conflicts, the Air Expeditionary Force's speed, 

range, and power would be particularly valuable in the early phases of 

conflict. These qualities will help the force to halt an enemy’s initial 

advances short of their intended objectives.67 As a consequence, there would 

be fewer allied lives and less terrain lost and the. follow-on forces will ideally 

confront a much more manageable operational situation. 

The U.S. Air Force is establishing 10 Air Expeditionary Forces that will 

be deployed for 90 days approximately every 15 months.68 Current plans 

also envision two dedicated on-call Air Expeditionary Wings that will be 

operationally ready at all times for rapid deployment to trouble spots. Should 

both scheduled wings be deployed, a third would be activated and placed on 

ready status. 
16 . . . Chemical-Biological Attack 

Each Air Expeditionary Force will be tailored to complete its defined 

mission: Current planning envisions a force comprised of 40 aircraft: a mix 

of ground-attack, air-to-air, and air-defense-suppression platforms. Tankers 

and bombers also will be included in the force package as needed. For each 

Air Expeditionary Force, its aircraft and support assets will be drawn from 

different bases and amalgamated into a single unit. 

The Air Expeditionary Force will be minimally equipped and able to 

rapidly deploy to any geographic area. Although this force is designed to 

move rapidly to austere bases, a faster and more capable operation is obtained 

by employing locations that have ample infrastructure and prepositioned 

equipment.69 These forces will be light in composition and hence have 

reduced airlift requirements, lean as asset redundancy will be minimized, and 

lethal in view of their ability to conduct decisive military operations. To 

support a force that is comprised of only essential assets, a timely support 

capability will have to exist to provide time-sensitive delivery of additionally 

required personnel and materiel through rapid airlift and sealift. 

The Air Expeditionary Force is an evolving concept. A new section of 

the Air Force staff, the Directorate for Expeditionary Aerospace Force 

Implementation, has recently been created. This staff is currently writing 

support plans to achieve an operational capability by 2000. The development. 

of these support plans requires some critical assumptions be made at the 

outset. First, an evaluation of the potential threats confronting the force must 

be accomplished, as this will drive force composition and support 

requirements. In this regard, it is envisioned the Air Expeditionary Force 

will operate in a highly unpredictable security environment. Unlike the 

previous 50 years, our forces will not have the luxury of knowing where we 

will operate or who we will confront and with what composition of weapons. 

As a consequence the force will need to have the operational flexibility to 

operate in extreme environments and rapidly tailor its composition to 

evolving threats. Currently, it is assumed the force will encounter no peer 

competitor in conventional weapons and that the threat from chemicalbiological attack is minimal.70

This “minimal” chemical-biological weapons threat assessment may be 

based on the assumption the force will not face a viable missile, aircraft, or 

artillery threat to deliver such agents. Further, some might assume that U.S. 

nuclear superiority might deter adversaries from using chemical-biological 

weapons. Finally, this conclusion may be drawn from the fact that there 

have not been any chemical or biological attacks on U.S. forces since World 

War I. In short, contemporary intelligence analysts may not believe such a 
Chemical-Biological Attack . . . 17 

threat is credible until U.S. forces experience it. Nonetheless, this analysis 

must be reevaluated for each deployment, particularly as potential 

adversaries increase their missile, cruise missile, and unmanned aerial 

vehicle capabilities. Furthermore, it must be remembered that during Desert 

Storm the planning assumption was for a high probability of chemicalbiological weapons attack.71 The prudent tactician must assume that the Air 

Force will potentially intervene in situations where the adversaries are equal 

to if not more capable than Iraq in the chemical-biological weapons area in 

the future. 

More importantly, the “minimal threat” planning assumption also 

discounts the possibility of a more unconventional biological strike. For 

example, an adversary’s special operations team could strike the 

expeditionary force clandestinely through the dissemination of an agent in 

the force's food and water. Additionally, ground, sea, or air sprayers may be 

used to attack a down-wind Air Expeditionary Force base. Irrespective of 

the level of risk assigned to chemical-biological weapons, the threat is real. 

U.S. intelligence indicates that 25 states now have chemical-biological 

weapons programs. Consequently, should the Air Expeditionary Force show 

significant vulnerabilities to this threat, potential adversaries might focus 

their energies on an enhanced chemical-biological weapons capability. In 

short, a lack of strength in this area weakens deterrence and may exacerbate an 

already evolving threat. Enemies who perceive they cannot win a 

conventional conflict with the U.S. may be tempted to attack with 

chemical-biological weapons to level the playing field and take advantage 

of U.S. vulnerabilities to these weapons of mass destruction. 

Air Expeditionary Force Vulnerabilities to the Chemical-Biological Threat 

As U.S. forces have attained a conventional superiority, potential 

adversaries are now more likely to employ asymmetric means of attack 

against its personnel. Of those asymmetric threats, a chemical-biological 

attack at home or abroad could severely impact the mission of strategic force 

projection.72 The Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review issued in May 

1997 reinforces this notion, and counsels U.S. defense planners to assume 

that the use of chemical and biological weapons is a “likely condition of 

future warfare.”73 Furthermore, Joint Vision 2010 articulates the need for 

full dimensional protection against the chemical-biological threat “to ensure 

our forces can maintain freedom of action ... while providing defenses for 

our forces and facilities at all levels.”

74
18 . . . Chemical-Biological Attack 

A “light, lean, and lethal” Air Expeditionary Force has particular 

vulnerabilities to a chemical-biological attack across all phases of operations. 

As this force will play a critical role in the future national defense strategy, 

such an attack could have serious consequences for the U.S. and its allies. A 

recent study by the Air Force Scientific Advisory Board has confirmed in 

detail the threat posed by chemical-biological weapons to the Air 

Expeditionary Force concept.75

In a general sense, the Air Expeditionary Force will operate in a 

geopolitical environment characterized by uncertainty. It will face 

adversaries with varied force capabilities and concepts of operation who may 

employ multiple simultaneous threats. However, to rapidly project its power 

the expeditionary force must deploy with only essential personnel and 

equipment. These assets must be rapidly tailored to meet and overcome an 

adversary. Should the chemical-biological weapons threat not be adequately 

considered, distinct vulnerabilities are present during each phase of Air 

Expeditionary Force operations. 

Predeployment Vulnerability. Susceptibility to chemical-biological 

attack begins at the various U.S. bases that are tasked to support the Air 

Expeditionary Force. Currently, stateside bases have minimal 

chemical-biological defense capabilities and would be most vulnerable to a 

terrorist incident. If a base that provides key assets to the expeditionary 

package is hit, the expeditionary force may be rendered ineffective due to 

incomplete composition or delay in departure. 

Furthermore, should the Air Expeditionary Force lack a robust 

chemical-biological defense capability, senior U.S. leadership may be 

reluctant to employ the force if there is a significant threat that such an 

attack might occur in a given theater. Additionally, with a limited defense 

capability, the expeditionary force would have difficulty in immediately 

using a forward operating base that had previously sustained a strike with a 

persistent chemical agent or one under a continuous chemical-biological 

threat. In both instances an Air Expeditionary Force with poor 

chemical-biological defensive capability would be “neutralized” in the 

United States and unable to engage in planned operations with potentially 

significant ramifications. 

Deployment Vulnerability. Once deployment begins, the CB 2010 Study 

noted that the expeditionary force will be particularly vulnerable to 

chemical-biological attack during the force projection phase of the operation, 

because time-sensitive logistics flows are channeled through critical 

transportation nodes.76 Without unrestricted access to theater-based ports 
Chemical-Biological Attack . . . 19 

and airfields, expeditionary forces “cannot be brought to bear and sustained 

in a timely and effective manner.”77 These sea and air ports of debarkation 

often have limited security, which makes access by terrorists relatively easy. 

Additionally, the sea and air ports are primarily manned by local nationals, 

who will be “particularly vulnerable to CBW [chemical-biological weapons] 

use and related psychological warfare.”78 As a rule, these civilians have no 

chemical-biological readiness training or defensive equipment, are not 

presently vaccinated against the leading biological weapons threat, anthrax, 

and are not required to take medicinal prophylaxis for a possible attack. 

Similar concerns should be raised for the commercial component of our 

strategic airlift fleet. Currently, 50 percent of the Air Mobility Command’s 

strategic airlift capacity is from commercial aircraft augmentation.79 The 

civilian pilots for this fleet also lack appropriate vaccination, training, and 

equipment. Their ability to successfully operate today in a chemicalbiological environment is questionable. 

Employment Vulnerability. The Air Expeditionary Force is vulnerable to 

attack by chemical-biological weapons “from the first entry to a forward 

operating location.”80 Historically, the Air Force has assumed that bases in 

rear areas would operate in a secure environment. However, in the case of 

certain chemical-biological threats, this assumption loses validity. The 

National Security Strategy for a New Century indicates such weapons 

provide “rogue states, terrorists, and international crime organizations the 

means to inflict terrible damage on . . . our troops abroad.” 81

Chemical-biological attacks on the expeditionary force could take many 

forms. At the high end of conflict spectrum, an integrated chemical, 

biological, and conventional munitions attack delivered by missiles or cruise 

missiles could produce devastating consequences to the force. Sustained 

chemical attack alone could “have disastrous effects on both airlift 

throughput and combat sortie generation.”82 More likely, however, are 

biological attacks by terrorist or special operations forces. While such 

attacks could result in a “show stopping” mass casualty situation, they could 

also produce a degradation of unit performance if disguised as a “natural” 

disease outbreak. 

Sustained Operations Vulnerability. Once the- Air Expeditionary Force 

is employed at its forward operating location, its forces will be at risk because 

they will have minimal chemical-biological detection systems and incident 

response assets. During sustained operations, expeditionary force 

performance will be degraded by the mere threat of a chemical-biological 

attack, as protective masks and clothing limit performance significantly.83
20 . . . Chemical-Biological Attack 

Specifically, mission sortie rates are expected to drop by 50 percent after five 

days of wearing full protective gear.84 This decline in performance will be 

worsened by the fact the USAF has insufficient and unsupportable collective 

protection systems (shelters).85

Should the Air Expeditionary Force sustain a chemical attack, military 

operations may cease or be reduced as long as there is no major 

decontamination capability for aircraft, equipment, or personnel. This would 

be a particular concern after a persistent chemical agent attack or a continuous 

chemical-biological attack in which agents may be present for days or weeks. 

Additionally, after a chemical-biological attack at a remote location, relief 

personnel and materiel support may not be able to respond for hours or even 

days. The operational, if not human, consequences of these deficiencies 

could be significant. 

Finally, it should be mentioned that false warnings of biological attack 

alone may have a significant impact on the Air Expeditionary Force. 

Numerous examples of anthrax hoaxes throughout the U.S. have documented 

the real cost such events have on medical and police assets, and their 

disruption of normal urban activities.86 To preclude such an effect on the Air 

Expeditionary Force, rapid biological detection devices must be available to 

discount such hoaxes and reassure base, allied, and civilian personnel. 

Redeployment Vulnerability. Upon the successful completion of its 

mission, the Air Expeditionary Force and its supporting stateside bases must 

remain vigilant and prepared to deal with the possibility of 

chemical-biological attack. Strategists argue such an attack may be executed 

by the defeated adversary or its surrogates purely for purposes of revenge 

and terror without any specific tactical objective. 
Chemical-Biological Attack . . . 21 

IV. USAF Response: The Air Expeditionary Force 

Chemical-Biological Threat Team 

“At present, we do not fully understand the impact WMD will 

have on our missions, but we know that it will be significant. 

We must consider the operational requirements, understand 

our weaknesses, and develop courses of action to make us 

stronger.” 

 General Michael E. Ryan87

Chief of Staff, USAF 

The chemical-biological threat to the Air Expeditionary Force is a 

complex and evolving problem. Unfortunately, as biologic and chemical 

technologies become more sophisticated, this threat will only increase in 

the years to come. To deter the chemical-biological threat, the Air Force 

and Department of Defense argue that an increased ability to deny or limit 

the utility of these weapons is essential. At the Joint level, the 

Counterproliferation Program addresses the chemical-biological threat 

through efforts in deterrence, counterforce, active defense, passive defense, 

and capabilities against transnational or paramilitary threats.88 The program 

is an aggressive one with $5.9 billion to be expended during Fiscal Year 

1999.89 However, numerous shortcomings remain which must be overcome 

before the U.S. military achieves a credible deterrent and response capability 

to these weapons. Expenditures alone will not resolve this threat. Expanding 

awareness and understanding of the chemical-biological threat should be the 

first step in addressing this problem.90 Air Force leaders must focus on the 

unique issues associated with the threat to the Air Expeditionary Force. 

The Air Force is now addressing the chemical-biological threat to all its 

forces both domestic and overseas. In March 1998, a General Officer 

Steering Group was established to examine this problem. Subsequently, an 

October 1998 Threat Response Conference identified, over 40 deficiencies 

in the Air Force response capability to chemical-biological attack. The 

conference report concluded “both CONUS [Continental United States] and 

OCONUS [Outside Continental United States] bases are vulnerable to a 

Chem-Bio attack with significant implications relative to the base mission, 

for warfighting organizations and resources.”91

To resolve this problem attention should also be placed on the unique 

chemical-biological defensive needs of the Air Expeditionary Force. To 
22 . . . Chemical-Biological Attack 

respond to the threat, an Air Expeditionary Force Chemical-Biological Threat 

Team should be established. The team’s charter should be to define the 

unique challenges posed by the chemical-biological threat to the 

expeditionary force and champion viable solutions to those challenges. 

Optimally, this team would be formed and coordinated by the Air Force 

Nuclear and Counterproliferation Policy Directorate (HQ USAF/XONP). It 

would be comprised of representatives from Operations, Civil Engineering 

Readiness, Communications, Health Services, Security Forces, and 

Intelligence. Additionally, action officers from the Force Protection and Air 

Expeditionary Force Battlelabs and the Directorate for Expeditionary 

Aerospace Force Implementation should be active participants.92

Air Expeditionary Force Chemical-Biological Threat Team 

The work of the “Air Mobility in a CB Environment” and the “Fighting 

the Base in a CB Environment” study teams should serve as excellent 

resources for the Chemical-Biological Threat Team, as these studies were 

aimed at identifying the training, equipment, and procedures for forces that 

will operate in a chemical-biological environment. Both studies completed 

their recommendations for a chemical-biological warfare concept of 

operations in early 1999.93 This concept of operations should now be 

evaluated and modified for the distinct needs of the expeditionary forces. 

Through coordinated and in-depth analysis, the Air Expeditionary Force 

Chemical-Biological Threat Team would advise the Air Force on the ways 

and means to better plan, organize, train, and equip its expeditionary forces 

to successfully meet the danger posed by chemical and biological weapons. 

The following are representative examples of recommendations such a team 

might present. The examples are limited and do not address all areas worthy 

of evaluation and change. However, they are areas critical to the 

expeditionary force and warrant immediate attention. Once the threat team 

HQ USAF/XONP

Operations CE Readiness Communications Health Services Security Forces Intelligence

HQ USAF/XONP

Operations CE Readiness Communications Health Services Security Forces Intelligence
Chemical-Biological Attack . . . 23 

is formalized, its broad expertise and insight will provide a process for 

offering viable solutions to the chemical-biological threat in the future. 

Planning 

Organizationally, many in the Department of Defense and the respective 

Services already recognize the potential severity of the chemical-biological 

threat to U.S. and allied security.94 These weapons have the potential to limit 

the U.S. ability to rapidly project its power or defeat U.S. forces in a theater 

of operation. The President's National Security Strategy for a New Century 

recognizes the chemical-biological threat, and indicates the United States is 

“enhancing the preparedness of the Armed Forces to effectively conduct 

sustained operations despite the presence, threat or use of WMD [Weapons 

of Mass Destruction].”95 Because the threat affects all the Military 

Services, public law mandates all chemical-biological defense programs be 

integrated at the Joint level to create greater operational and economical 

efficiencies. The Department of Defense program seeks to “enable our 

forces to survive, fight and win in NBC [Nuclear, Biological, Chemical] 

warfare environments.”96 The Air Staff has recently stated that their 

objective is to “continue near-normal full spectrum operations in a CBW 

[Chemical Biological Weapons] environment.”97 The Air Force response to 

this threat has been multifaceted and is now gaining momentum. 

Many documents, which address the chemical-biological threat to U.S. 

forces, have been recently published or are currently in draft or revision. 

Joint Pub 3-11, “Joint Doctrine for Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical 

Defense” has been in draft since May 1998. HQ USAF/XON has released 

a classified Counterproliferation Master Plan, which requires all levels of Air 

Force operations from the Major Commands to the operational level 

formulate their own master plans to further define their planned response to 

the chemical-biological threat.98

The foundation for all planning is doctrine. While the above documents 

reflect a growing awareness of the chemical-biological threat, the Air Force 

presently has no distinct doctrine for chemical-biological defense that will 

provide a focus for tactical planners. Given the complexity and level of the 

threat posed by chemical-biological agents to U.S. forces, it is essential the 

Air Force develop specific chemical-biological operational doctrine. The 

Department of Defense in the 1998 Annual Report to Congress on NBC 

Defense concluded, “the unique physical, toxicological, destructive 

properties of the CB [chemical-biological] threats warrant unique operational 
24 . . . Chemical-Biological Attack 

and technological responses.”99 To provide consistent operational response 

across all Air Force functional areas, a well-defined chemical-biological 

defense doctrine must be formed. 

The need for this doctrine was raised at a 1995 National Defense 

University workshop entitled, “The Impact of the Proliferation of Nuclear, 

Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Weapons on U.S. Air Force Doctrine, 

Operating Principles, and Capabilities.”100 The need was also articulated at 

the October 1998 USAF Chemical-Biological Threat Response Conference. 

The conference report stated that Air Force “doctrine and training do not 

address the protection and response of CONUS and OCONUS installations 

across the full-spectrum of incidents.”101 To respond to this deficiency, a 

well-formulated chemical-biological defense doctrine must be written and 

then put into practice. This doctrinal guidance will define the basic principles 

to direct the Air Force in military action and provide a strong foundation for 

its personnel as they “plan, employ, organize, train, equip, and sustain” their 

forces.102

The Directorate for Nuclear and Counterproliferation Policy, HQ 

USAF/XONP, as the focal point for all Air Force counterproliferation 

matters, has proposed the creation of doctrine for “Counter-NBC [Nuclear, 

Biological, Chemical] Operations.” This request was approved by the Air 

Force Doctrine Working Group on March 3, 1999. The Air Force Doctrine 

Center has initiated a one-year process for formulating a coherent 

chemical-biological defense doctrine.103

Air Force doctrine is written in a hierarchy of three levels: basic, 

operational, and tactical.l04 Current Air Force Basic Doctrine refers to the 

National Security Strategy which requires military forces “cope rapidly and 

decisively” with weapons of mass destruction.105 Air Force Basic Doctrine 

also clearly states that “airpower is most vulnerable on the ground” and that 

“air base defense is an integral part of airpower deployments.”106 This basic 

doctrine must be expanded if it is to articulate the chemical-biological threat 

to the Air Force, and emphasize a resolve to effectively conduct sustained 

operations despite the presence, threat, or use of these agents. 

In. addition to modifications to basic doctrine, the new Counter-NBC 

Operations doctrine should be written at the “operational” level. This level 

of doctrine defines how the Air Force fights by anticipating the changes 

which may affect military operations, such as technological advances.107

Operational doctrine also guides forces as they fight in distinct 

environments.108 The distinct and complex characteristics of a battlespace 

that includes chemical-biological weapons mandates a sound doctrine to 
Chemical-Biological Attack . . . 25 

successfully execute Air Force core competencies. The proliferation of 

chemical-biological weapons and their increasing lethality will affect the 

conduct of operations in the future. Air Force doctrine must address this 

emerging threat in succinct terms. 

This doctrine should further define the broader Joint Nuclear, Biological 

and Chemical Defense Operations guidance detailed in Joint Pub 3-11. 

(Currently in draft) First and foremost, it should clearly reaffirm the Air 

Force commitment to fight and win in a chemical-biological environment. 

This resolve, when coupled with well-developed operational concepts, 

adequate equipment, and sufficient training of USAF units, will signal 

potential adversaries that the Air Force recognizes the threat, and has a broad 

and long-term focus to overcome its challenges. As a consequence, the 

doctrine itself may have a deterrent effect. 

As in JP 3-11, Air Force doctrine should also include sections on 

fundamentals of chemical-biological defense, training, logistics and medical 

support. Additionally, it must address specific Air Force concerns. For 

example, in a chemical-biological environment, the conduct of flight 

operations (to include the Civil Reserve Air Fleet), decontamination of 

personnel, equipment, and aircraft, and air evacuation of casualties should 

be detailed. Furthermore, USAF doctrine should clearly define functional 

responsibilities within the active Air Force, Air National Guard, and Air Force 

Reserve and interface with the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps. As the Air 

Expeditionary Force will be a key element in future Air Force operations, the 

specific requirements and concerns of this entity must be defined. In a 

broader sense, the doctrine should outline the relationship between U.S. 

bases, their surrounding communities, and the federal agencies that will 

respond to a domestic chemical-biological attack. Finally, this doctrine must 

address how the Air Force will deal with the chemical-biological threat 

during the conduct of coalition operations, and when civilian personnel are 

actively supporting U.S. forces. 

Once an Air Force chemical-biological doctrine is established, it can be 

used in conjunction with the applicable “Tactics, Techniques, and 

Procedures” as planning guidance. With these tools, the regional 

Commanders in Chief will have a firmer foundation on which to build their 

war plans.109 Chemical-biological doctrinal principles will thus be 

interwoven into the air component commander's supporting war plans and 

flexible deterrent options. Once the doctrinal gap is closed relating to air 

operations in a chemical-biological environment, the Air Expeditionary 

Force could enter a theater based on plans that give its commanders 
26 . . . Chemical-Biological Attack 

confidence that the chemical-biological threat has been systematically and 

thoughtfully addressed. 

Organization 

The Quadrennial Defense Review indicates that managing the response 

to the threat posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction must 

be an “organizing principle in every facet of military activity.”

110 This will 

certainly be the case for Air Expeditionary Force operations. New 

chemical-biological defense doctrine and related contingency planning will 

create the need to modify present and to form new organizational structures. 

As the Air Expeditionary Force will be forward deployed with minimal 

materiel and personnel resources, a robust command and control system will 

be essential. This system must integrate medical and non-medical means to 

immediately detect and warn the force of any chemical-biological strike. The 

detection and identification of a strike by a chemical agent dispersed by a 

conventional munition may be accomplished with available equipment. 

However, covert attack with a biological agent whose human effects may 

evolve over hours or days and will require the use of new information systems 

to track patient symptoms. These information systems must then have the 

ability to analyze this data and warn the medical and operational leadership 

of a probable attack. 

The Enhanced Consequence Management Planning and Support System. 

Currently, there is a prototype disease tracking system, Desert Care II, is 

being tested by U.S. forces in South-West Asia. While this system holds 

promise, additional systems are being developed. The Defense Advanced 

Research Projects Agency is now developing a more comprehensive system 

for chemical-biological attack response which is known as the Enhanced 

Consequence Management Planning and Support System (ENCOMPASS). 

This system is an integrated grouping of computer-based programs, which 

will provide many critical functions to a force responding to a 

chemical-biological attack.111 This system will enable expeditionary forces 

to manage such an attack, as opposed to merely reacting to it in a “crises” 

mode and possibly being overwhelmed by it. While the current program is 

being developed to support the U.S. Marine Corps Chemical-Biological 

Emergency Response Force, the system holds great promise Tor use by the 

Air Expeditionary Force. There is a current proposal to test this system 

during Expeditionary Force Experiment 1999 in order to validate and refine 

the system's effectiveness.112
Chemical-Biological Attack . . . 27 

Joint Chemical-Biological Operations Center. After an attack, Air 

Expeditionary Force personnel will need real-time access to information to 

optimize the military and medical response. Ideally much of this information 

will be immediately available as hard copy texts or on digitalized databases. 

However, should additional subject matter expertise be required from rear 

echelon areas or the United States, reach-back data systems need to be 

structured to facilitate that access. As an example, medical personnel may 

need timely consultation with the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) in 

Atlanta, Georgia or the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious 

Diseases (USAMRIID) at Fort Detrick, Maryland. This organizational 

response capability must be formalized, funded, and staffed to provide 

critically needed information on a 24-hour-a-day basis. To facilitate that 

coordination, a Joint Chemical-Biological Operations Center should be 

established. One possibility would be to expand the function of the current 

U.S. Army Soldier and Biological Chemical Command (SBCCOM) 

Operations Center to include support for overseas forces. This should be a 

Joint asset that would provide the Air Expeditionary Force and other forces 

with a “reach back” capability to obtain expert guidance in various 

functional areas (i.e., agent identification, decontamination, and treatment). 

These requirements would be coordinated and channeled through the 

Operations Center in order to provide timely coordination with other military, 

federal, and civilian organizations. Ideally this communication would be 

direct from the expeditionary force to the Operations Center via secure 

Internet or satellite telecommunications. Other operations centers in the 

chain of command would monitor these communications and provide input 

on an as needed basis. Information flow from an Air Expeditionary Force to 

the Operations Center could proceed as follows: 
28 . . . Chemical-Biological Attack 

Theater Chemical-Biological Emergency Response Forces. The 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has recently directed the regional 

combatant commands to “develop plans, identify and exercise forces for, and 

when directed, respond to foreign WMD [Weapons of Mass Destruction] 

within their assigned areas of responsibility.113 Additionally, the Chairman 

has directed that U.S. Atlantic Command will deploy follow-on specialized 

assets from the United States to augment forces in need overseas. 

To fulfill the requirement for an initial theater response capability, the 

geographic Commanders in Chief, with the assistance of Atlantic Command, 

should provide Theater Chemical-Biological Emergency Response Forces. 

These tailored response forces will provide the needed personnel, equipment, 

and treatment to support an Air Expeditionary Force whose intrinsic assets 

are overwhelmed. Their function will be to validate the nature of the attack, 

provide initial consequence assistance to mitigate the effects of the attack, 

and assist in the quick restoration of normal operations. While the response 

force's task list and concept of operations would need to be clearly defined, 

it must be emphasized that the organization must be a professional unit that 

can operate in a potentially chaotic and lethal environment. The unit should 

be geographically positioned to provide timely support to a deployed force 

after an attack. This location might optimally be the main operating base 

that is supporting the Air Expeditionary Force.114 For instance, an air base 

in Germany might be the response force location for an Air Expeditionary 

AEF

CDC MRICD NRC USAMRIID

Theater CINC

National Military Command Center (NMCC)

Atlantic Command Operations Center

Joint Chemical-biological Operations Center

(SBCCOM Operations Center, Aberdeen, MD)

Subject Matter Experts

AEF

CDC MRICD NRC USAMRIID

Theater CINC

National Military Command Center (NMCC)

Atlantic Command Operations Center

Joint Chemical-biological Operations Center

(SBCCOM Operations Center, Aberdeen, MD)

Subject Matter Experts
Chemical-Biological Attack . . . 29 

THEATER CHEMICAL-BIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE FORCE

Force deployed to Africa. The response force should be composed of a 

number of specialties, including security, civil engineering, communications, 

and medical. It must have its own equipment aid logistics packages to 

rapidly assist a force in need. It is essential that their materiel assets, 

including diagnostic tools, decontamination equipment, medicines, and 

vaccines, be stockpiled in theater for timely movement. 

From a personnel standpoint, the core of the unit should be trained and 

equipped as a fixed team to optimize its effectiveness. However, additional 

assets and personnel should be added to, or subtracted from, the response 

force based on the nature of the attack. For instance, Special Operations 

Forces may be needed to assist in the execution of this emergency response. 

Their fixed and rotary wing aircraft may be needed to access an Air 

Expeditionary Force during or after an attack. Additionally, their organic 

force protection and communications capability could prove essential to the 

success of the mission. 

The Air Expeditionary Force planners may learn much regarding 

doctrine, training, and equipping the response force from the National 

Guard’s Rapid Assessment and Initial Detection teams, the Army’s Technical 

Escort Unit, and the Marine Corps’ Chemical/Biological Incident Response 

Force. The latter is a “national asset, globally sourced to Marine Force 

Commanders and National Command Authority for duties as the President 

may direct.” It is equipped with state-of-the-art detection, monitoring, and 

decontamination equipment and is prepared for operations in a wide range of 

contingencies.115 Additionally, the Marine Corps presently is staffing a 

concept for an integrated response team for overseas crises.116 This concept 

could evolve in the Joint arena and ultimately lead to a Marine component 

to the Theater Chemical-Biological Emergency Response Forces. 

Commander

Agent/Pathogen

Identification

Decon Element Medical Element Air Evacuation

Element

Force Protection

Element

Communications

Element

Commander

Agent/Pathogen

Identification

Decon Element Medical Element Air Evacuation

Element

Force Protection

Element

Communications

Element
30 . . . Chemical-Biological Attack 

Education and Training 

To adequately prepare the Air Expeditionary Force to meet the 

chemical-biological threat, new education and training programs should 

evolve at the individual, unit, group, and ultimately Joint, and coalition 

levels. Training and exercises are the “best means for evaluating operational 

concepts and doctrine, assessing readiness, and fostering innovation and 

adaptation.”117 Chemical-biological defense training and exercises will 

increase awareness and understanding of the threat among U.S. forces and 

allies and will increase their level of confidence to deal with a threat 

environment or actual attack. Most importantly, once educated and trained, 

personnel at all levels will begin to offer solutions to the complex problems 

presented by chemical-biological weapons. 

Joint Training. Ultimately, joint level exercises should include realistic 

chemical-biological attack scenarios as part of the overall training. 

Exercises, such as the Pacific Command’s Tandem Thrust, should have a 

chemical-biological attack component to validate and refine theater response 

capabilities. Ideally, the U.S. Atlantic Command should also develop 

scenarios to simulate an Air Expeditionary Force chemical-biological attack. 

These scenarios should be joint in composition and include Air Force, Army, 

Navy, and/or Marine assets. While this would require a considerable 

commitment and expense, such exercises would provide invaluable 

experience for all U.S. forces. 

Air Force Chemical-Biological Defense Training. The preparation of an 

Air Expeditionary Force comprised of different active, reserve, guard, and 

civilian personnel to respond to the chemical-biological threat will be a 

significant undertaking. Personnel drawn together from disparate units must 

aggressively train prior to deployment and in theater to survive a 

chemical-biological attack. Air Force training programs must be developed 

to effect a unified response to such an attack. Intelligent Computer-Aided 

Instruction and distributed training technologies, should be integrated in this 

process.l18 Furthermore, initial and recurring readiness training must place 

an increased emphasis on biological threats compared to the past where they 

have been neglected. Low probability threats, as biological weapons attacks 

are often considered to be, should be addressed because of their potential for 

extreme costliness should they occur. 

USAF Health Services Training. For medical personnel, aggressive 

chemical-biological defense training must begin at entry into the Air Force 

and continued on a recurrent basis. Today, the overwhelming majority of 
Chemical-Biological Attack . . . 31 

U.S. health care providers have never diagnosed or treated patients ill from 

chemical-biological weapons effects. While some physicians may recognize 

the presence of a nerve agent attack, as its effects are similar to those of some 

agricultural chemicals, most would not. Furthermore, most of the infectious 

diseases produced by the common biological weapons are not prevalent in 

the United States. Standardized training for recognition and treatment of all 

these entities is essential. 

At present, the Air Combat Command is developing a three-phased 

training program for its medical staff. This program uses the “Management 

of Chemical and Biological Casualties Course” produced by the U.S. Army 

Medical Research Institute of Infectious Disease and the U.S. Army Medical 

Research Institute of Chemical Defense.119 This training will provide an 

excellent foundation for the medical personnel who will support the initial 

Air Expeditionary Forces. 

The Air Combat Command concept should be expanded upon and 

provided to all Air Force medical service facilities. Ideally, a medical 

response course would be established at the Joint level to provide consistency 

across Service lines. This Advanced Biological Chemical Life Support 

program could be developed from the “Management of Chemical and 

Biological Casualties Course” and administered by the Military Training 

Network at the Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences. The 

program should be mandatory for all military physicians, nurses, and 

physician assistants and repeated on a two-year cycle. Information and skills 

learned during biannual Advanced Biological Chemical Life Support 

training should be reinforced during Continuing Medical Readiness Training 

and through the use of computer accessed updates. 

Equipment 

Just as new educational and training programs must evolve to respond to 

the chemical-biological threat, new defensive equipment with unique 

qualities must also be developed to support the Air Expeditionary Force. 

As the force concept of operation requires the flexibility to rapidly deploy. 

to any location on the globe, equipment must be light and compact to 

minimize airlift requirements. As the equipment must function in austere 

environments with minimal support, it must be rugged, essentially 

maintenance free, and have minimal power requirements. Ideally, to reduce 

personnel requirements, this defensive equipment should operate 

autonomously without the need for human input. Should operators be 
32 . . . Chemical-Biological Attack 

required, the equipment function should be simplified to the maximum extent 

possible. This again will facilitate reduced training and personnel 

requirements. 

Presently, many of the chemical-biological defense systems are 

suboptimal for an Air Expeditionary Force. Adequate wide-area or early 

detection capabilities versus biological weapons attacks have not yet been 

developed. Moreover, present detection devices, decontamination chemicals 

and equipment all pose significant logistical burdens. They are often quite 

large, require specially trained personnel to operate and maintain, and in 

many cases are still in development. Individual protective masks and 

clothing restrict communication, vision, mobility, and impose heat stress. All 

these factors degrade operational performance significantly. At temperatures 

of 90 F, estimated continuous work time is only 0.6 hours while in protective 

ensembles.120 Additionally, due to the physiological stress and limitations 

of operation in individual protective ensembles, collective protection shelters 

will be needed to allow personnel to eat, drink, and rest. At present, the Air 

Expeditionary Force will have very limited collective protection capabilities. 

This could be a major problem in a chemical-biological environment. 

Without a place to rest, change suits, discharge bodily functions, and 

decontaminate individuals, the Air Expeditionary Force would have extreme 

difficulty in functioning for any prolonged period in a CB environment. 

Finally, effective and robust chemical-biological agent detection and 

identification systems must be developed and integrated into airbase 

warning and command and control systems for the force to sustain and 

overcome a chemical-biological weapons attack. 

Air Expeditionary Force Chemical-Biological Detection Systems. 

Optimally, the Air Expeditionary Force should be equipped with an 

integrated chemical-biological detection and warning system. As such a 

system does not currently exist, complementary systems will be used to 

provide a basic detection capability. The force will have chemical threat 

detection capability via M8 liquid agent detection paper and M9 adhesive 

detection tape for equipment and personnel protective ensembles. It will also 

have the hand-held Chemical Agent Monitor (CAM) and the Chemical Agent 

Detector Kit (M256/A 1) for point detection.121 These systems allow for the 

rapid detection and identification of both nerve and blister agents. Most 

likely the expeditionary force will also have the M221 Automatic Chemical 

Agent Detector Alarm (ACADA) system. These units will be positioned 

around the base to provide continuous monitoring for possible chemical 
Chemical-Biological Attack . . . 33 

attack.122 Finally, strong consideration should also be given to the use of 

U.S. Army detection capabilities on an as needed basis. 

In the near term, the Air Expeditionary Force will have no significant 

capability to rapidly detect and identify biological pathogens. The 

Department of Defense is aware of this shortfall and is developing an Air 

Base/Port Biological Detection Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration. 

This system, Portal Shield, will provide rapid automated biological attack 

detection, identification, and warning for high value fixed sites such as 

ports and airfields. It will be based on the U.S. Navy Interim Biological 

Agent Detector prototype and should soon begin, field- testing.123 This 

system holds great promise for future use with the Air Expeditionary Force 

and ideally will be refined for Air Force operational needs. The Portal Shield 

concept, however, still necessitates the capability to perform quick 

confirmatory biological agent testing. This confirmatory analysis can be 

accomplished by another system, the Rapid Pathogen Identification System. 

The Rapid Pathogen Identification System. The Rapid Pathogen 

Identification System (RAPIDS) is a state-of-the-art biological agent 

identification device that is being evaluated by the Modernization Cell of 

the Air Combat Command’s Surgeon’s office. The system, still in development, 

is designed to support an “immediate and urgent need to support the 

Warfighting CINCs with a diagnostic system which will provide rapid, 

specific, and sensitive detection and identification of biological warfare 

agents and infectious pathogens in clinical specimens.”124 It should be 

emphasized that as the Air Expeditionary Force deploys around the globe its 

personnel will potentially be exposed to outbreaks of endemic and emerging 

infectious diseases (such as Ebola).125 RAPIDS, once perfected and. 

deployed, should enable the expeditionary force to identify those natural 

pathogens as well as biological warfare agents. This dual capability, if and 

when validated, will be critical to the good health of the force. 

RAPIDS will identify biological pathogens that are present in clinical 

specimens, food and water samples, air and surface swipes. The device is 

a lightweight backpack system, is operable by one person with minimal 

training, and can evaluate 30 samples within 25 minutes. The unit is portable 

and will use an advanced molecular biology technique called Polymerase 

Chain Reaction (PCR) to identify the biological agent. This technique 

confirms the presence of a biological pathogen through the identification of 

specific segments of genetic material.126 Once the pathogen has been 

identified, medical personnel will be able to institute effective preventive 

measures, administer prophylaxis, and treatments. When deployed, Air 
34 . . . Chemical-Biological Attack 

Expeditionary Force personnel will monitor the results derived from 

RAPIDS through epidemiological tracking modalities such as the previously 

described ENCOMPASS system. With such a quick diagnostic tool tied to 

an effective consequence management system, the Air Expeditionary Force 

will have increased resiliency against biological attacks. In sum, it is 

expected that RAPIDS will be an outstanding addition to the biological 

defense capability and will have little impact on support requirements. It will 

also offer the added benefit to the Air Expeditionary Force of providing 

pathogen detection in food, water, and medical specimens. 

To accelerate acquisition of this system, several prototypes should be 

purchased and evaluated. If the results of lab and field testing are favorable, 

Air Force leadership should champion the technology at the Joint level. The 

device should then be put on a “fast track,” 18-month acquisition cycle and 

effectively deployed with our Air Expeditionary Forces. Furthermore, once 

approved in the Joint arena, RAPIDS holds great promise for use by the other 

Services and as a component of other chemical-biological detection systems. 
Chemical-Biological Attack . . . 35 

V. Conclusion 

The Air Expeditionary Force will be the primary mode of Air Force 

operational employment in the very near future. This force will, have 

minimal redundancy in personnel and equipment, and be supported over 

extended distances by airlift. Additionally, the force will be 

geographically concentrated to minimize support requirements. While 

these qualities make the force more efficient, they also make it 

particularly vulnerable to an increasing chemical-biological threat. 

Recent reports by the Defense Science Board and the Air Force Scientific 

Advisory Board have confirmed this threat in very succinct terms.127

The specter of chemical-biological attack poses- a very real threat to 

the Air Expeditionary Force. Recent and past history has shown that 

despite legal prohibitions, these agents have been used with significant 

consequences against civilians and military personnel. Continued 

scientific advances have produced chemical-biological weapons that 

have utility across the spectrum of conflict. Agents can be selected to 

produce varied physiologic effects from transient incapacitation to death. 

The area of impact can be restricted to a specific individual or broadened 

to an entire theater of operation and their persistence can be minutes to 

years. Finally, the global proliferation of these agents exacerbates the 

threat. As noted previously, at least 25 nations are presumed to have 

chemical and/or biological weapons. Experts believe that these weapons 

may also be in the hands of non-state actors, such as terrorist groups.128

To respond to this threat, the Air Force’s greatest challenge may be an 

intellectual one. Historically, the Air Force has always presumed its air bases 

would operate in a relatively secure environment. With the chemicalbiological threat, particularly an evolving biological threat, that presumption 

is no longer valid. No base is secure from attack. Furthermore, as the 

chemical-biological threat is complex, it was previously been viewed as “too 

hard” to solve and therefore dealt with only modestly. While the threat is a 

difficult one, it can be effectively addressed over the long-term in a focused 

incremental manner.129

For the Air Force to prevail against future chemical and biological 

warfare threats, all personnel must first gain an objective understanding of 

the capabilities of chemical and biological agents, their alternate means of 

delivery, the vulnerabilities of U.S. and allied forces, and the means of 

effective defense. Once this understanding is achieved, an aggressive and 
36 . . . Chemical-Biological Attack 

thorough organizational response must follow. With a sustained 

commitment, the Air Expeditionary Force can have an increased resiliency 

to chemical-biological attack and prove to be a formidable operational entity 

well into the 21st century. Without such a commitment, the Air 

Expeditionary Force may be approaching a future chemical-biological 

catastrophe. This can and must be avoided. 
Chemical-Biological Attack . . . 37 

VI. Recommendations 

To respond to the chemical-biological threat to the Air Expeditionary 

Force new doctrine, organizational structures, training programs, and 

equipment must be developed. The vehicle for this change should be through 

an Air Expeditionary Force Chemical-Biological Threat Team coordinated 

by HQ USAF/XONP. With a synergistic cross-functional approach to the 

threat, practicable solutions to the challenge will emerge and be put into 

operation. To initiate this process, the author advocates the following: 

1) USAF formulate doctrine for Chemical and Biological Defense 

Operations. The Air Force Doctrine Center has initiated the 

formal process to develop such a doctrine. This doctrinal guidance 

will provide a strong foundation for Air Force personnel as they 

plan, organize, train, and equip to fight and win in a chemicalbiological environment. 

2) Evaluate the ENCOMPASS command and control system for 

chemical-biological attack consequence management. The 

Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency is developing a 

comprehensive system for chemical-biological attack response 

known as the Enhanced Consequence Management Planning 

and Support System. This system should be evaluated and refined 

to provide our forces with the ability to effectively manage such an 

attack. 

3) Expand the charter of the U.S. Army Soldier Biological Chemical 

Command Operations Center to include support for U.S. forces 

overseas. Expeditionary forces will need real-time access to vital 

information to optimize the military and medical response to a 

chemical-biological attack. A Joint Chemical-Biological Operations 

Center should be created to facilitate that informational flow. 

4) Establish Theater Chemical-Biological Emergency Response 

Forces. The geographic Commanders in Chief should develop 

emergency response forces to provide rapid assistance to a 

deployed force post chemical-biological attack. These tailored 

forces will provide the needed personnel, equipment, and 

treatment to support an Air Expeditionary Force whose intrinsic 

assets are overwhelmed. 
38 . . . Chemical-Biological Attack 

5) Create a joint Advanced Biological Chemical Life Support course 

for all U.S. military health care providers. The “Management of 

Chemical and Biological Casualties Course” produced by the U.S. 

Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Disease and the 

U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Chemical Defense should 

be modified and made mandatory for all military physicians, 

nurses, and physician assistants. 

5) Accelerate evaluation and acquisition of the RAPIDS biological 

detection system. There is currently an urgent need for our forces 

to quickly identify biological warfare agents. A state-of-the-art 

device, the Rapid Pathogen Identification System, is now being 

tested to address this need. This system should be perfected and 

deployed to enable the expeditionary force to identify natural 

pathogens as well as biological warfare agents. 
Chemical-Biological Attack . . . 39 

Notes 

1. Richard J. Rinaldo, “Consequence Management: The Mother of All MOOTWS”, 

A Common Perspective, Joint Warfighting Center's Newsletter, vol. 6, no 1, April 1998, 11. 

2. Air Force Association, “Air Force Association 1999 Statement of Policy,” Air Force 

Magazine, November 1998, 5. 

3. Lt Gen M.R. Steele, “USMC Expeditionary Operations for the 21st Century,” 

Briefing. Air War College, Montgomery, AL, November 19, 1998. 

4. Frederick R. Sidell M.D., et al., Textbook of Military Medicine, PartI Chemical and 

Biological Warfare. (Washington, DC: TMM Publications, 1997), 6. 

5. Ibid., 11. 

Curt Wachtel, Chemical Warfare, (Brooklyn, NY: Chemical Publishing Co, Inc., 

1941), 20. 

6. LTC George W. Christopher, et al., “Biological Warfare: A Historical Perspective,” 

JAMA: The Journal of the American Medical Association, vol. 278, no. 5, August 6, 1997, 

412. 

7. Rinaldo, op. cit., 12. 

8. Terry J. Gander, ed., Jane's NBC Protection Equipment, (Surrey, U.K.: Jane’s 

Information Group, 1997), 14. 

9. Christopher, et al., op. cit., 413. 

10. Leonard A. Cole, “The Specter of Biological Weapons,” Scientific American, 

vol.275, no. 6, December 1996, 64. 

11. Mark C. Storella, Poisoning Arms Control: The Soviet Union and 

Chemical/Biological Weapons, (Cambridge, MA: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Inc, 

1984), 4. 

12.Michael Howard, George Andreopoulos, and Mark R. Shulman, eds., The Laws of 

War: Constraints on Warfare in the Western World, 1994, ch 1. 

13. Sidell, et al., op. cit., 13. 

14. Barend ter Haar, The Future of Biological Weapons, (New York: Praeger, 1991), 

114. 

15.William S. Cohen, Proliferation Threat and Response, (Washington DC: Office of 

the Secretary of Defense, November 1997), 60. 

16. Anthony H. Cordesman and Abraham R. Wagner, The Lessons of Modern War, 

Volume 11: The Iran-Iraq War, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990), 517 

17.Sidell et al., op. cit., 69. 
40 . . . Chemical-Biological Attack 

18. Elaine Landau, Chemical and Biological Warfare (New York, NY: Lodestar 

Books, 1991), 51. 

19. Sidell et al., op. cit., 117. 

20. Kaplan, David E., and Andrew Marshall. The Cult at the End of the World, (New 

York: Crown Publishers, 1996), 251. 

21. Judith Miller, William J. Broad, “Germ Weapons: In Soviet Past or in the New 

Russia’s Future?” The New York Times, December 28, 1998. 

22. Richard Preston, “The Bioweaponeers,” The New Yorker, March 9, 1998, 52. 

23. Chemical & Biological Arms Control Institute, Chemical & Biological Arms 

Control Dispatch, December 1-14, 1998. 

24. Department of Defense, Counterproliferation Program Review Committee, 

Biotechnology and Genetic Engineering: implications for the Development of New Warfare 

Agents, (Washington, DC, 1996), 4. 

25. Peter L. Hays, Vincent J. Jodoin, Alan R. Van Tassel, eds., Countering the 

Proliferation and Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 

1998), 233. 

26. Avigdor Haselkorn, The Continuing Storm, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 

1999), 86. 

27. General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, with Peter Petre, The Autobiography: It Doesn't 

Take A Hero (New York: Bantam Books, 1992), 439. 

28. Bill Gertz, “Horror Weapons,” Air Force Magazine, January 1996, 46. 

29. Gander, 16. 

30. Gertz, op. cit., 48. 

31. “Russia Reportedly Has New Poison,” The Washington Post, April 4, 1997, A17. 

32. Gander, op. cit., 14.

33. Cole, op. cit., 60. 

34. Brooks E. Kleber and Dale Birdsell, United States Army in World War 11, The 

Technical Services, The Chemical Warfare Service: Chemicals in Combat, (Washington DC, 

Office of the Chief. of Military History, United States Army, 1966), 418. 

35. Gander, op. cit., 14. 

36. Schneider, Barry R., Future War and Counterproliferation U.S. Military Responses 

to NBC Proliferation Threats, (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1999), 36. 

37. Cordesman and Wagner, op. cit., 518. 
Chemical-Biological Attack . . . 41 

38. Ali, Javed, and Leslie Rodrigues. Jane’s U.S. Chemical/Biological Defense 

Guidebook. (Alexandria, VA: Jane’s Information Group, 1998), 35. 

39. During World War I, 50,510 U.S. deaths were attributed to battle, while 55,860 

deaths were due to non-battle causes, principally disease. Col James J. James, Lt Col 

Alyce J. Frelin, and Col Rober J. Jeffery, “Disease and Nonbattle Injury Rates and Military 

Medicine,” Medical History, August 1982, 18. 

40. Richard Danzig, “The Next Superweapon: Panic,” New York Times, November 

15, 1998, OP-ED 15. 

41. Robert P. Kadlec, M.D., Colonel (S) Randall J. Larsen, “Bio War: A Threat to 

America’s Deployable Forces,” Aerospace Education Foundation, April 1995, 11. 

42. Ibid. 

43. Uzi Mahnaimi, Marie Colvin, “Israel Planning ‘Ethnic’ Bomb as Saddam Caves 

In,” The Sunday Times, November 15, 1998. 

44. Defense Science Board, The Defense Science Board 1997 Summer Study Task 

Force on DOD Responses to Transnational Threats; Volume 1-Final Report, (Washington 

DC, October 1997), 47. 

45. Gander, op. cit., 3. 

46. Kadlec, op. cit., 22. 

47. Leonard A. Cole, The Eleventh Plague: The Politics of Biological and Chemical 

Warfare, (New York, NY: W. H. Freeman and Company, 1997), 8. 

48. Cole, “The Specter of Biological Weapons, op. cit., 61. 

49. Kadlec, op. cit., 14.

50. Victor A. Utgoff, “The Biotechnology Revolution and Its Potential Military 

Implications,” in Biological Weapons: Weapons of the Future?, ed. Brad Roberts 

(Washington, DC: The Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1993), 29. 

51. Ibid. 

52. Irving Lachow, “GPS-Guided Cruise Missiles and Weapons of Mass Destruction,” 

(Director's Series on Proliferation, RAND/RP-463), 20. 

53. U. S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment (OTA), “Technologies 

Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction,” OTA-BP-ISC-115 (Washington DC: U.S. 

Government Printing Office, December 1993), 98. 

54. U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment (OTA), “Proliferation of 

Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks,” OTA-ISC-559 (Washington DC: U.S. 

Government Printing Office, August 1993), 69. 
42 . . . Chemical-Biological Attack 

55. W. Seth Carus, “Biological Warfare Threats in Perspective,” Critical Reviews in 

Microbiology, vol. 24, no. 3, 1998, 153. 

56. Web sites related to design, production, and weaponization of chemical-biological 

agents are multiple. Several .include: http://mod-source.com/anarchist/cookbook.html, 

http://www.spacestar.net/users/austad/boom/explo.html, and 

http://rutchem.rutgers.edu/chemclub_html/chemwar.html. 

57. Department of Defense, “Department of Defense Nuclear/Biological/Chemical 

(NBC) Defense, Annual Report to Congress,” (Washington DC, February 1998), xvi. 

58. During a presentation at the Georgia Institute of Technology, former Secretary of 

Defense Donald Rumsfeld gave the following caution, “The belief we can deter a state from 

the use of a weapon of mass destruction is an anachronism.” See Donald Rumsfeld, “The 

Twelfth Annual Report of the Secretaries of Defense,” Conference. Georgia Institute of 

Technology, Atlanta, GA, November 6, 1998. 

59. Scott SchIess, “Office of the Secretary of Defense Counterproliferation Policy,” 

Briefing. Air War College, Montgomery, AL, November 17, 1998. 

60: Jessica Stern, The Ultimate Terrorists, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 

Press, 1999), 69. 

61. Ali,,Javed, and Rodrigues, op. cit., 254. 

62. Karl Vick, “Many in Sudan Dispute Plant’s Tie With Bomber,” The Washington 

Post, October 22, 1998, A29. 

63. Michael Grunwald and Vernon Loeb, “Charges Filed Against Bin Laden; Saudi 

Exile Accused of Masterminding Embassy Bombings,” The Washington Post, November 

5, 1998, A 17. 

64. Gen Michael Ryan, “Air Force Begins Transition to Expeditionary Aerospace 

Force,” Policy Letter Digest, Office of the Secretary of the Air Force, August 1998. 

65. Gen Michael Ryan, “Evolving to an Expeditionary Aerospace Force”, 

Commanders’ NOTAM 98-4. 

66. Secretary Sheila E. Widnall, “Global Engagement: A Vision for the 21st 

Century Air Force,” Department of the Air Force, 11. 

67. John A. Tirpak, “The Long Reach of On-Call Airpower,” Air Force Magazine, 

December 1998, 22. 

68. SMSgt Jim Katzaman, “Air Force Readies Itself for 21st Century,” Air Force 

News Service, August 6, 1998. 

69. United States Air Force Scientific Advisory Board, Report on United States Air 

Force Expeditionary Forces, Volume I: Summary, SAB-TR-91-01, November 1997. 
Chemical-Biological Attack . . . 43 

70. Lt Col Peter Walsh, Office of the Air Force Surgeon General. Bolling AFB, 

Washington, DC, telephone interview by author, September 22, 1998. 

71. COL Darryl Kilgore, 2nd Chemical Battalion Commander, Operation Desert 

Storm, telephone interview by author, December 3, 1998. 

72. HQ USAF/XON, “Concept Paper,” “USAF Chemical and Biological Threat 

Response Conference Attendee Book,” October 21, 1998, Herndon, VA, 1. 

73. Cohen, iii. 

74. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Vision 2010, (Washington DC: Joint Staff, 1995), 23. 

Available from http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jv20l0/jvpub.htm. 

75. United States Air Force Scientific Advisory Board, Report on United States Air 

Force Expeditionary Forces, Volume 3: Appendix I (Washington DC, February 1998). 

76. Booz, Allen, and Hamilton, “Assessment of the Impact of Chemical-biological 

Weapons on Joint Operations in 2010 (The CB 2010 Study),” (Washington DC, 1997), 35. 

77. Greg Weaver and J. David Glaes, Inviting Disaster: How Weapons of Mass 

Destruction Undermine U.S. Strategy for Projecting Military Power, (McLean, VA: 

AMCODA Press, 1997), 11. 

78. Center for Counterproliferation Research, “The Impact of the Proliferation of 

Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons on the United States Air Force,” (National 

Defense University, February 1996), 4. 

79. Headquarters Air Mobility Command, “1998 Air Mobility Command Master 

Plan,” (Scott AFB, IL, October 1997), 2-29. 

80. United States Air Force Scientific Advisory Board, Report on United States Air 

Force Expeditionary Forces, Volume 3 (Washington DC, February 1998). 

81. William J. Clinton, A National Security Strategy for a New Century, (Washington, 

DC, October 1998), 6. 

82. Weaver and Glaes, 5. 

83. This protective gear, referred to in Air Force nomenclature as IPE (Individual 

Protective Equipment) protects the wearer from direct exposure to chemical-biological 

agents. IPE consists of a protective mask, an impermeable hood a protective suit, gloves, 

and overboots. The equipment is worn depending on various levels of defensive response, 

or Mission Oriented Protective Postures (MOPP). These levels range from 0, where the gear 

is carried, to level 4 where the entire ensemble is worn. See Air Force Manual 32-4017, 

Civil Engineer Readiness Technician’s Manual for Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical 

Defense, June 1, 1998, 36. 

84. David Atkinson, “Report: AF's Expeditionary Forces Vulnerable to Chemical 

Attack”, Defense Daily, vol. 200, no. 43, October 21, 1998, 4. 
44 . . . Chemical-Biological Attack 

85. United States Air Force Scientific Advisory Board, Report on United States Air 

Force Expeditionary Forces, Volume 3: Appendix I (Washington DC, February 1998). 

86. Center for Disease Control, “Bioterrorism Alleging Use of Anthrax and Interim 

Guidelines for Management—United States, 1998,” MMWR February 05, 1999/48(04); 

69-74. Available from http://www.cdc.gov/epo/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/00056353.htm 

87. General Michael E. Ryan, quoted on AF/XONP Counterproliferation Web Site 

homepage. Available from http://www.hq.af.mil/xo/xon/xonp/cpsite/index.html 

88. Hays et al, op. cit., 217. 

89. The Department of Defense's prioritized Areas for Capability Enhancement (ACE) 

and related investments ($M) for fiscal year 1999 are as follows: 1) Detection, Identification, 

and Characterization of biological weapons agents (228.3), 2,3) Detection, characterization, 

and defeat of nuclear, biological, chemical weapons facilities/underground facilities with 

minimal collateral effects (110.5), 4) ballistic missile active defense (3,997.4), 5) support for 

special operations forces and defense against paramilitary, covert delivery, and terrorist 

nuclear, biological, and chemical threats (127.4), 6) provide consequence management 

(120.8), 7) cruise missile defense (supported by ballistic missile defense programs), 8) 

collection, analysis, and dissemination of actionable intelligence to counter proliferation 

(1.5), 9) robust passive defense to enable sustained operations on the nuclear, chemical, 

biological battlefield (476.1), 10) biological weapons vaccine research, development, test, 

and evaluation and production to ensure stockpile availability (49.1), 11) target planning for 

nuclear, biological, chemical, weapons and their means of delivery (54.4),12) prompt mobile 

target detection and defeat (125.3), 13) detection, tracking, and protection of nuclear, 

biological, chemical weapons and related materials and components (7.3), 14) support export 

control activities of the U.S. Government (13.2), 15) support inspection and monitoring 

activities of arms control agreements and regimes (600.4) See Counterproliferation Program 

Review Committee, Report on Activities and Programs for Countering Proliferation and 

NBC Terrorism, (Washington DC, May 1998), 2-7. The administration has requested a 

counterproliferation budget increase to $10 billion for fiscal year 2000. Mann, Paul, 

“Anti-Terrorism Efforts Boosted to $10 Billion.” Aviation Week & Space Technology, 15 

February 1999. 

90. Hays et al, op. cit., 235. 

91. HQ USAF Nuclear and Counterproliferation Policy Directorate /XONP, “Report 

of the CB Threat Response Conference,” (Washington DC, November 1998), 9. 

92. The threat team may also seek the expert counsel of the USAF Counterproliferation 

Center. The Center’s permanent staff may provide an element of continuity to the team in 

addition to key insight, based on its broad experience in the chemical-biological weapons 

arena. 
Chemical-Biological Attack . . . 45 

93. HQ USAF Nuclear and Counterproliferation Policy Directorate/XONP, “Fighting 

the Base Study,” Air Force Counterproliferation Review, November 1998, 2. 

94. Booz, Allen, and Hamilton, op. cit., 4. 

95. Clinton, op. cit., 22. 

96. Department of Defense, Department of Defense Nuclear/ Biological/Chemical 

(NBC) Defense, Annual Report to Congress, (Washington DC, February 1998), iii. 

97. Col Thomas “Dutch” Miller, “USAF Counterproliferation Program,” Briefing. 

Air War College, Montgomery, AL, October 27, 1998. 

98. Policy Division, “The Counterproliferation Master Plan,” Air Force 

Counterproliferation Review, November 1998, 8. 

99. Department of Defense, Department of Defense Nuclear/ Biological/Chemical 

(NBC) Defense, Annual Report to Congress, (Washington DC, February 1998), iii. 

100.Center for Counterproliferation Research, Operations in Nuclear, Biological, and 

Chemical Environments, (Washington DC, September 1995), 6. 

101.HQ USAF/XONP, “Meeting Report: USAF Installation Full-Spectrum Threat 

Planning and Response Project,” Herndon, VA, October 22, 1998, 1. 

102.AFI 33-360V1, January 1, 1998, 16. 

103.Headquarters Air Force Doctrine Center, Air Force Instruction 10-1301, Air and 

Space Doctrine, (Maxwell AFB, AL, June 1998), 3. 

104.“Basic doctrine” provides the strategic level direction for the U.S. Air Force. 

105.Air Force Doctrine Document 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine, September 1997, 5. 

106.Ibid., 19. 

107.AFI 33-360VI, January 1, 1998., 17. 

108.Air Force Doctrine Document 1, op. cit., 2.

109.War plans include both deliberate and contingency plans. Deliberate plans are 

written proactively and focus on known threats and anticipated response scenarios. 

Contingency plans are essentially ad hoc crises action plans in response to unforeseen 

situations. 

110.Cohen, 61. 

111.Col John S. Silva, “Enhanced Consequence Management Planning and Support 

System,” Briefing. Herndon, VA, October 22, 1998. 
46 . . . Chemical-Biological Attack 

112.Maj Kevin Hall, “Initiative Abstract EFX99, Course of Action Analysis-BW/CW 

Event,” Office of the Air Combat Command Surgeon, Langley AFB, VA, June 5, 1998, 1. 

113.Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3214.01, Military Support to 

Foreign Consequence Management Operations, June 30, 1998. 

114.United States Air Force Scientific Advisory Board, Report on United States Air 

Force Expeditionary Forces, vol 2: Appendices E-H, Washington DC, February 

1998, H-32. 

115.Department of Defense, Department of Defense Nuclear/ Biological/Chemical 

(NBC) Defense, Annual Report to Congress, Washington DC, February 1998, 5-25 

116.Robert Holzer, “U.S. Marines Develop Integrated Crises Response Teams,” 

Defense News, November 16-22, 1998, 8. 

117.Cohen, 61. 

118.United States Air Force Scientific Advisory Board, Report on United States Air 

Force Expeditionary Forces, Volume 2: Appendices E-H, (Washington DC, February 

1998), E-44. 

119.Col Rolan Santa Anna, “Chemical and Biological Warfare Defense Training Plan 

for ACC Medics,” Briefing. Office of the Air Combat Command Surgeon, April 1998. 

120.United States Air Force Scientific Advisory Board, Report on United States 

Air Force Expeditionary Forces, Volume 3: Appendix I ,Washington DC, February 1998, 

I-62. 

121.Ibid., I-67. 

122.Ibid, 37.

123.Department of Defense, Department of Defense Nuclear/ Biological/Chemical 

(NBC) Defense, Annual Report to Congress, Washington, DC, February 1998, A- 17. 

124.Letter from Brig Gen Klaus O. Schafer, Air Combat Command Surgeon, to 

AFMC/CC, HSC/CC, April 10, 1998. The subject was the Requirement for a Rapid 

Biological Warfare Detection Capability. 

125.Col Thomas L. Cropper, Chief USAF Public Health, USAF CB Threat Response 

Conference, Washington, DC, interviewed by author, October 22, f998. 

126.Malcolm Dando, Biological Warfare in the 21st Century: Biotechnology and the 

Proliferation of Biological Weapons, (London: Brassey's Ltd, 1994), 108. 

127.Defense Science Board, The Defense Science Board 1997 Summer Study Task 

Force on DOD Responses to Transnational Threats; Volume 1-Final Report, (Washington, 

DC, October 1997), United States Air Force Scientific Advisory Board, Report on United 

States Air Force Expeditionary Forces, Volume 1: Summary, SAB-TR-97-01 

(Washington D.C., November 1997). 
Chemical-Biological Attack . . . 47 

128.CIA Director George Tenet stated in recent Congressional testimony that 

terrorist leader Bin Laden has professed it is his “religious duty to acquire weapons of 

mass destruction.” Available from 

http://www.npr.org/programs/morning/archives/l999/99021 8.me.html. 

129.Defense Science Board, The Defense Science Board 1997 Summer Study Task 

Force on DOD Responses to Transnational Threats; Volume 1-Final Report, Washington 

DC, October 1997, xiii. 
48 . . . Chemical-Biological Attack 
Chemical-Biological Attack . . . 49 

USAF Counterproliferation Center 

The USAF Counterproliferation Center was established in 1998 to 

provide education and research to the present and future leaders of the 

USAF, to assist them in their activities to counter the threats posed by 

adversaries equipped with weapons of mass destruction. 

Barry R. Schneider, Director 

USAF Counterproliferation Center 

325 Chennault Circle 

Maxwell AFB AL 36112-6427 

(334) 953-7538 (DSN 493-7538) 

Email: Barry.Schneider@maxwell.af.mil 
50 . . . Chemical-Biological Attack