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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

)

TESAE HARRINGTON, ) 

)

 Plaintiff, )

)

 v. )

)

Civil Action No. 18-cv-1056 (TSC)

SECRETARY OF STATE/MICHAEL R. 

POMPEO, 

)

)

 Defendant. )

)

AMENDED MEMORANDUM OPINION1

Plaintiff Tesae Harrington, proceeding pro se, sued Secretary of State Michael Pompeo2

for workplace discrimination. Plaintiff’s remaining claims3 are for disparate treatment based on 

her sex, race, and disability, retaliation based on her disability and sex, and hostile work 

environment based on her disability. Both parties have moved for summary judgment. See Pl.

Mot. for Summ. J., ECF No. 49; Def. Cross-Mot., ECF No. 51. For reasons set forth below, the 

court will DENY Plaintiff’s motion and GRANT Defendant’s Cross-Motion. 

1 The court hereby amends its March 1, 2023 Memorandum Opinion to reflect changes in its 

legal analysis of the issues presented. The corresponding order is unchanged, and this action 

remains dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. See ECF No. 65.

2 Plaintiff does not appear to bring her claims against Pompeo in his individual capacity. 

3 On September 30, 2020, the court dismissed Plaintiff’s failure to promote disparate treatment 

claim, her race-based retaliation claim, and her sex and race-based hostile work environment 

claims. See Order, ECF No. 42 at 1. 
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I. BACKGROUND4

Plaintiff is a Black woman and former State Department contractor in the Division of 

Defense Trade Controls (DDTC). See Def. Statement of Undisputed Material Facts (“SUMF”), 

ECF No. 51-2 ¶¶ 1, 6; Pl. Aff., ECF No. 51-3 at 3–4. She was employed by Kelly Government 

Solutions, a subcontractor of Global Solutions Network (“GSN”). See SUMF ¶ 7; Pl. Aff. at 4. 

From 2007 until June 27, 2014, Plaintiff worked in the Registration Division, and from 2007 

through September 2013, she was employed in a scanner position. See SUMF ¶¶ 13–14; Pl. Aff. 

at 3; Aguirre Aff., ECF No. 51-4 at 3. At all relevant times, Plaintiff’s contracting firm 

supervisor was Tiffany Henderson, and Daniel Cook—a White man—supervised some of

Plaintiff’s assignments, including registration imaging and storing of registration records, in his 

role as Supervisory Compliance Specialist in DDTC. See Pl. Aff. at 3; SUMF ¶¶ 24–25; Cook 

Aff., ECF No. 51-9 at 2–3. 

In July 2013, Stacey Gladney—one of Plaintiff’s co-workers—reported to Lisa Aguirre

that Plaintiff threatened her. See SUMF ¶ 34; Aguirre Aff. at 6. At the time, Aguirre—a White 

woman—was Chief of Staff of the Office of Defense Trade Controls Management, and it 

appears that as the contracting officer representative she exercised supervisory authority over 

Plaintiff. See SUMF ¶¶ 18–19, 21; Aguirre Aff. at 2–4. Aguirre reported the incident to Kelly 

Government Solutions which, in turn, addressed the matter with Plaintiff and Gladney. See 

SUMF ¶¶ 35–36; Aguirre Aff. at 5, 8–9. 

Plaintiff alleges that between July and September 2013, she asked Rob White—who is 

White and employed through a different contractor—if he had repeatedly turned off her desk 

4 Because Plaintiff has not complied with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) and (e), the 

court accepts Defendants’ undisputed facts as true. See Infra Section II. 
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fan/heater and he admitted to doing so. Pl. Aff. at 10, 13, 16. Plaintiff told him not touch 

anything on her desk and claims he “went off,” started pacing back and forth, and began yelling 

at her, telling her to leave him alone and ultimately left the office for the day. Id. Plaintiff 

claims she feared White would hit her, she was crying hysterically, and she reported the incident 

to Aguirre. Id. 

Plaintiff further alleges that the following day, White hugged her “from the back” while 

she was sitting at her desk and said he was sorry. Id. Plaintiff told him not to touch her again,

reported the incident to Aguirre, and threatened to call the police. Id. Ultimately Aguirre, Cook, 

Henderson, and the contracting company owner met with Plaintiff and told her if she ever felt 

threatened by White to go to a place where she felt safe and call the company owner. Id. at 13, 

16. Aguirre claims she, Cook, and a representative from White’s subcontracting company also 

met with White about the matter. Aguirre Aff. at 6. Plaintiff claims that at some point, Aguirre 

purportedly explained that she believed White’s apology was sincere and did not recommend 

White for termination. Pl. Aff. at 16, 23; see Aguirre Aff. at 6.

Plaintiff states in her affidavit that although she was “[f]orced to work with [White] on a 

daily basis, Aguirre “never had to address any other issues” between the two and Aguirre 

testified that White had no further conduct issues after their meeting. Pl. Aff. at 14, 16; Aguirre 

Aff. at 6. Plaintiff contends, however, that White often made derogatory comments about her to 

other coworkers and claims he “sucked his teeth” and would “say things under his breath” when 

he walked past her desk. Pl. Aff. at 14, 19.

In September 2013 Plaintiff was moved from a scanner position to a Registration Analyst 

I position, a move her supervisors considered a promotion. See SUMF ¶¶ 15–16; Aguirre Aff. at 
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4; Henderson email, ECF No. 51-7 (“The customer has extended a 2% retroactive pay increase to 

you with an effective date of 10/1/12 through 9/23/13 when you received your promotion.”). 

In Spring 2014, during an office reorganization, Aguirre told Plaintiff that she would be

receiving guidance from Cook on duties for the Registration Division and guidance from Aguirre

on scanning duties, and therefore Plaintiff would “need to serve two masters for a while.” 

Aguirre Aff. at 8; SUMF ¶¶ 22–23. Around the same time, Plaintiff told Aguirre that she was 

continuing to have issues with White because, in her view, he was not doing enough work. See 

SUMF ¶ 41; Aguirre Aff. at 6; Cook Aff. at 7. Aguirre instructed Plaintiff to stop working with 

and training White. See SUMF ¶¶ 42–43; Aguirre Aff. at 6. 

In June 2014 Plaintiff told Aguirre that she suffered from dyslexia. See SUMF ¶ 2; Pl. 

Aff. at 8; Aguirre Aff. at 4–5. Plaintiff did not request any accommodation and continued to 

perform her assigned duties. See SUMF ¶¶ 3–5; Pl. Aff. at 8–9; Aguirre Aff. at 5–6. Cook 

maintains that he was not made aware of Plaintiff’s dyslexia. See SUMF ¶ 26; Cook Aff. at 4. 

Sometime after Aguirre told Plaintiff not to work with or train White, Plaintiff told White

that he was mentally challenged and suffered from a disability, which is why he could not 

perform his work. SUMF ¶¶ 44; Aguirre Aff. at 6; see also Pl. Aff., at 25 (“I explained to Rob 

that I was Dyslexic . . . . I told Rob I know you have a disability. Rob responded I don’t have a 

disability . . . Rob and I shared an even exchange of words.”). White then reported these 

comments to Aguirre, and on or about June 26, 2014, Aguirre contacted Plaintiff’s company and 

requested that Plaintiff not be permitted to return to the work site. See SUMF ¶¶ 44; Aguirre 

Aff. at 7. Aguirre based her request on Plaintiff’s insubordination and disorderly conduct as 

evidenced by (1) the 2013 incident with Gladney, (2) the 2013 incident with White, (3) the 2014 

incident with White; and (4) Plaintiff’s noncompliance with the directive to stop working with or
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training White. See SUMF ¶ 48. The same day, Henderson told Plaintiff she was terminated,

and several days later Henderson gave Plaintiff written notice confirming that she was let go due 

to workplace “incidents” which she had “instigate[d].” Pl. Aff., at 10–11 (providing that 

Plaintiff’s termination email said the State Department “indicated they have had some history of 

incidents with you, some of which were addressed by us previously . . . you continued to some 

extent to instigate issues with co-workers . . . For the reasons listed above, your assignment was 

ended.”). 

Under the contract between GSN and the State Department, the State Department could 

“direct the Contractor to remove any employee immediately from the worksite(s) should it be 

determined that the person is unfit for the job.” GSN Contract ¶ H.8; SUMF ¶ 11. Among other 

reasons, an employee could be deemed “unfit” due to “[d]isorderly conduct, use of abusive or 

offensive language, quarreling, intimidation by words or actions, or fighting. Also, participation 

in disruptive activities which interfere with the normal and efficient operations of the 

Government.” GSN Contract ¶ H.8; SUMF ¶ 12.

Following her termination, Plaintiff timely filed an Equal Employment Opportunity

complaint and brought this suit, asserting race, sex, and disability-based disparate treatment and 

retaliation claims, hostile work environment claims, and failure to promote claims. The court 

granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss several of these claims. See Order, 09/30/2020, ECF No. 

42.

On June 7, 2021, Plaintiff moved for summary judgment, but only included a few 

references to the record and failed to include the required statement of undisputed facts. On July 

7, 2021, Defendant cross-moved for summary judgment and the court subsequently issued a FoxNeal order advising Plaintiff of her obligations under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and 
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the Local Rules. See Order, ECF No. 57 at 2–4. The Order provided detailed instructions for 

how Plaintiff should comply with Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Local 

Rule 7(b), (h). Id. Plaintiff was specifically cautioned that “the court may accept as true any 

factual assertions contained in affidavits or attachments submitted by the Defendant, unless the 

Plaintiff submits her own affidavits or documentary evidence showing that the Defendant’s 

assertions are untrue.” Id. at 4 (citing Neal v. Kelly, 963 F.2d 453, 456 (D.C. Cir. 1992)).

Plaintiff filed an opposition to Defendant’s cross-motion but did not file a separate 

statement disputing Defendant’s statement of undisputed facts, as required by Local Rule

7(h)(1). In her opposition, in a section titled “Defendant Aguirre statement of Fact Document 

51-2,” Plaintiff appears to respond to several of Defendant’s asserted facts, but in refuting 

Defendant’s facts she either makes allegations without supporting evidence or cites to evidence 

which is not actually contradictory. See Pl. Combined Reply and Opp’n at 3–6. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact,

and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. 

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). “A fact is material if it ‘might affect the outcome of the suit 

under the governing law,’ and a dispute about a material fact is genuine ‘if the evidence is such 

that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.’” Steele v. Schafer, 535 

F.3d 689, 692 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 

(1986)). In determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, the court must view all 

facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. 

Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). 
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The moving party “bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the 

basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to 

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits . . . which it believes 

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323, 

(internal quotations marks omitted). The nonmoving party, in response, must “go beyond the 

pleadings and by [its] own affidavits, or by the depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 

admissions on file, designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. at 

324 (internal quotation marks omitted). Rule 56(c)(1) states:

A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the 

assertion by:

(A) citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, 

documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, 

stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, 

interrogatory answers, or other materials; or

(B) showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of 

a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence 

to support the fact.

Furthermore, the court “need consider only the cited materials.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3). If a 

party fails to comply with Rule 56(c), then the court may:

(1) give an opportunity to properly support or address the fact;

(2) consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion;

(3) grant summary judgment if the motion and supporting materials—including 

the facts considered undisputed—show that the movant is entitled to it; or

(4) issue any other appropriate order.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e).

And “[w]hile we liberally construe pro se pleadings, pro se litigants do not have a 

‘license’ to ‘ignore the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.’” Oviedo v. Washington Metro. Area 

Transit Auth., 948 F.3d 386, 397 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (quoting Moore v. Agency for Int’l Dev., 994 

F.2d 874, 876 (D.C. Cir. 1993)).
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III. ANALYSIS

A. Plaintiff’s Sex, Race, and Disability-based Disparate Treatment Claims 

In a Title VII disparate treatment suit the court’s focus is on whether the plaintiff has 

produced “sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that the employer’s asserted nondiscriminatory reason was not the actual reason and that the employer intentionally discriminated 

against the employee.” Brady v. Off. of Sergeant at Arms, 520 F.3d 490, 494 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 

Similarly, a disability disparate treatment claim under the Rehabilitation Act requires that the 

plaintiff have suffered an adverse employment action because of her disability or perceived 

disability. Baloch v. Kempthorne, 550 F.3d 1191, 1196 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (citation omitted); 

Mitchell v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 407 F. Supp. 2d 213, 238—40 (D.D.C. 2005) (citing 42 

U.S.C. §§ 12102(2)(A); 12102(2)(C)). The court must consider these questions “in light of the 

total circumstances of the case,” asking “whether the jury could infer discrimination from the 

combination of (1) the plaintiff’s prima facie case; (2) any evidence the plaintiff presents to 

attack the employer’s proffered explanation for its actions; and (3) any further evidence of 

discrimination that may be available to the plaintiff or any contrary evidence that may be 

available to the employer.” Hamilton v. Geithner, 666 F.3d 1344, 1351 (D.C. Cir. 2012) 

(cleaned up and citation omitted).

Because Defendant “assum[es] for purposes of this motion . . . that Plaintiff can prove a 

prima facie case of discrimination,” Def. Mem., ECF No. 51-1 at 14, the court proceeds directly 

to determining whether Defendant’s proffered reasons for terminating Plaintiff are pretextual. 

Defendant claims that Plaintiff was terminated because she “refused direction from Ms. Aguirre” 

and was disruptive to the work environment. Id. (citations omitted); see Aguirre at 5 (explaining 

that in Spring 2014 Aguirre instructed Plaintiff to not work with or train White, but she 
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continued to do so anyway). As evidence of Plaintiff’s disruptive behavior, Defendant relies on 

three incidents: (1) Gladney’s complaint to Aguirre in July 2013 that Plaintiff threatened her; (2) 

Plaintiff and White’s “heated argument,” later in 2013; and (3) Plaintiff telling White that “he 

was mentally challenged and suffered from a disability” in June 2014, after Aguirre instructed 

her not to interact with White. Id. (citing SUMF ¶¶ 34–48); see also Aguirre Aff. at 6

(answering that “Gladney[] reported that [Plaintiff] was threatening her”); Pl. Aff. at 17

(describing an incident between Plaintiff and White during which Plaintiff asserts that White was 

“yelling to the top of his lungs” after she told him “not to touch anything on [her] desk again”); 

Aguirre Aff. at 6 (explaining that she was concerned about Plaintiff’s conduct when, in Spring 

2014, White told her that Plaintiff said he “has a mental challenge.”). 

Despite not responding to Defendant’s statement of facts, Plaintiff asserts that 

“Aguirre[’s] claim that I threatened Stacy Gladney is a unfathomable lie,” and that Aguirre’s 

recollection of the incident with White demonstrates “a clear view of her Bias attitude against 

African American women.” Pl. Combined Reply and Opp’n at 3–4. These unsupported 

assertions are not enough for a factfinder to find discrimination. Under the GSN contract, 

Defendant can “direct the Contractor to remove any employee” due to “[d]isorderly conduct, use 

of abusive or offensive language, quarreling . . . [or] participation in disruptive activities which 

interfere with the normal and efficient operations of the Government.” GSN Contract ¶ H.8. 

Plaintiff does not dispute that an argument took place between her and White in 2013 or that she 

called him mentally challenged. Given the reports Defendant received from Gladney and White, 

it was not unreasonable for Defendant to believe that Plaintiff’s workplace conduct was 

disruptive and thus seek her termination. See Fischbach v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Corr., 

86 F.3d 1180, 1183 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (holding that “[o]nce the employer has articulated a non-
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discriminatory explanation for its action . . . the issue is not ‘the correctness or desirability of the 

reasons offered but whether the employer honestly believes in the reasons it offers.’”) (internal 

punctuation omitted).

i. Race-based Disparate Treatment Claim

In ruling on Defendant’s motion to dismiss, the court concluded that Plaintiff could 

proceed on her race-based termination claim because she had sufficiently alleged that (1) her 

White supervisors had grouped all Black employees into one department, resulting in lower pay, 

and (2) Aguirre told her she worked for “two masters.” Mem. Opinion, 09/30/20, ECF No.41 at 

8. In her opposition to Defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff attached an 

exhibit which appears to show the names of employees, their departments, and an associated 

identification number. See Pl. Combined Reply and Opp’n at 11–14, 18–19. But this document

sheds no light on the employees’ races, and there is no evidence in the record to establish 

whether employees are grouped by race and how their salaries compare to colleagues of other 

races. 

Moreover, although Defendant admits that during an office reorganization Aguirre 

commented that she and Cook would provide Plaintiff guidance on her duties and Plaintiff would 

therefore “need to serve two masters for a while,” SUMF ¶ 23, this single comment cannot form 

the basis of a race-based disparate treatment claim. See Said v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 317 

F. Supp. 3d 304, 323 (D.D.C. 2018) (quoting Morris v. McCarthy, 825 F.3d 658, 669 (D.C. Cir. 

2016) (“It is well established that ‘an isolated race-based remark unrelated to the relevant 

employment decision does not, without more, permit a jury to infer discrimination.’” (internal 

brackets omitted)). Further, Plaintiff claims she was “harassed and demoted” after she asked “to 

be treated equally to [her] white coworkers,” that her white coworkers were “given Compliance 
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Job titles because of their White Race,” and that she “could not even sit in the ENFORCEMENT 

DIVISION because of the color of [her] skin.” Pl. Combined Reply and Opp’n at 11–12. But 

she has not provided or pointed to any evidentiary support in the record for these allegations, and 

therefore her race-based disparate treatment claim cannot proceed. 

ii. Sex-based Disparate Treatment Claim 

Plaintiff’s sex-based disparate treatment claim is based on her allegations that (1) White

was not recommended for termination following their June 2014 argument, (2) Aguirre 

terminated two other Black women by “questionable means,” and (3) Cook and White were 

permitted to harass her and “[n]othing happened to them.” Pl. Mot. for Summ. J. at 4. 

First, to rely on comparator evidence, Plaintiff must demonstrate “that all of the relevant 

aspects of her employment situation were nearly identical to those” of the comparator. Wheeler 

v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 812 F.3d 1109, 1115–16 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (internal punctuation and 

citation omitted). Although Plaintiff was recommended for termination after the June 2014 

incident with White and he was not, they are not similarly situated because Plaintiff has not 

pointed to evidence showing he had a similar disciplinary record to hers, which contained at least 

three incidents of workplace disruption. Therefore, White is an inapt comparator. See e.g., 

Gulley v. District of Columbia, 474 F. Supp. 3d 154, 167 (D.D.C. 2020) (“None of his 

comparators has a disciplinary record as extensive as his.”). 

Second, whether Aguirre terminated two other Black women for unlawful reasons does 

not allow a factfinder to infer that Plaintiff’s termination was the result of sex-based 

discrimination, nor does Plaintiff provide evidentiary support for the claim. Third, the evidence 

set forth by Plaintiff in her affidavit regarding Cook’s alleged harassment is insufficient to 

establish pretext. See Pl. Aff. at 11, 15, 16, 19, 21 (describing Cook’s harassment of her: he used
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“bold,” “stern,” and “forceful” language when addressing her, he required her to train White and 

write training manuals, he looked at her while laughing when a female colleague commented that 

“she was tired of working with her weird friends upstairs,” and he told her that she was not 

allowed “in his circle because [she is] trouble” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 

iii. Disability-based Disparate Treatment Claim 

The only fact in the record that could sustain a possible inference of disability-based 

termination is that Plaintiff was fired within one month after she told Aguirre that she has 

dyslexia; but a totality of the circumstances analysis requires that this fact be considered 

alongside all the others. See Hamilton, 666 F.3d at 1351. Because Plaintiff has not proffered 

any evidence of pretext, shown that it was unreasonable for Defendant to believe the workplace 

misconduct reports about Plaintiff from Gladney and White, or disputed certain material facts 

such as her disregard of Aguirre’s instructions not to train or work with White, there is no

evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could find that Defendant’s reasons for 

recommending Plaintiff’s termination were pretextual. See Doak v. Johnson, 19 F. Supp. 3d 259, 

273 (D.D.C. 2014), aff’d, 798 F.3d 1096 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (dismissing a disability based disparate 

treatment claim where Plaintiff “provided no evidence” that she was discriminated against 

because of her disability); Fischbach, 86 F.3d at 1183.

B. Sex and Disability-based Retaliation Claims 

Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision makes it unlawful for an employer “to discriminate 

against [an] employee[] . . . because he has opposed any practice” prohibited by Title VII. 42 

U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). Statutorily protected activities include “opposing alleged discriminatory 

treatment by the employer or participating in legal efforts against the alleged treatment,” 

Coleman v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 422 F. Supp. 2d 209, 212 (D.D.C. 2006) (citation 

omitted), and a plaintiff “must be opposing an employment practice made unlawful by the statute 
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under which she has filed her claim of retaliation,” Lemmons v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 431 F.

Supp. 2d 76, 91–92 (D.D.C. 2006). Retaliation is similarly banned under the Rehabilitation Act. 

See Walker v. District of Columbia, 279 F. Supp. 3d 246, 271 (D.D.C. 2017) (explaining that the 

standards articulated in the Title VII employment context apply to Rehabilitation Act claims).

Retaliation claims with no direct evidence of reprisal are analyzed under the McDonnell 

Douglas burden-shifting framework. See Holbrook v. Reno, 196 F.3d 255, 263 (D.C. Cir. 1999). 

However, once a defendant proffers a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the materially 

adverse employment action, a court must “proceed[] to the ultimate issue of retaliation vel non.” 

Jones v. Bernanke, 557 F.3d 670, 678 (D.C. Cir. 2009); see also Wiley v. Glassman, 511 F.3d 

151, 156 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (once a defendant proffers a non-discriminatory reason, whether a 

plaintiff established a prima facie case is generally “no longer relevant.”). “At that stage, the 

only question is whether the employee’s evidence creates a material dispute on the ultimate issue 

of retaliation either directly by showing that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the 

employer or indirectly by showing that the employer’s proffered explanation is unworthy of 

credence.” Jones, 557 F.3d at 678 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Once an 

employer provides “a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for its employment action, ‘positive 

evidence beyond mere proximity is required to defeat the presumption that the proffered 

explanation is genuine.’” Durant v. District of Columbia Gov’t, 875 F.3d 685, 700 (D.C. Cir. 

2017) (quoting Talavera v. Shah, 638 F.3d 303, 313 (D.C. Cir. 2011)) (internal brackets 

omitted).

For purposes of this motion, Defendant assumes that Plaintiff has met her prima facie 

burden to show retaliation, see Def. Mem. at 14, but argues that she has not established evidence 

that the reasons for her termination were pretextual. In deciding the motion to dismiss, the court 
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concluded that Plaintiff could make out sex and disability-based retaliation claims because she 

pleaded that she reported to Cook in March 2014 that a co-worker made fun of her disability, 

reported to Aguirre in May 2014 that Cook laughed at her disability, reported to Aguirre and 

Cook a non-consensual hug from White, and was terminated within a “few months” of reporting 

“inappropriate conduct.” Mem. Opinion at 13. On the record before the court, Plaintiff has not

shown evidence from which a fact finder could determine “that a discriminatory reason more 

likely motivated the employer” or that “the employer’s proffered explanation is unworthy of 

credence,” Jones, 557 F.3d at 678, because she has not proffered evidence that her termination 

was pretextual, see Supra Section III.A. 

At this juncture, Plaintiff has not pointed to evidence supporting an inference that she 

was terminated because she reported disability-based discrimination to Cook in March 2014 or to

Aguirre in May 2014. While temporal proximity can sometimes suffice, Plaintiff has not gone 

further and offered any “positive evidence” of retaliation, for instance that her disability was a 

factor in Aguirre recommending her for termination or that these reports were improperly shared 

with her co-workers. See Talavera, 638 F.3d at 313. Consequently, no reasonable factfinder

could find, without more, that she was terminated because she reported that her co-workers 

laughed at her and made fun of her disability. 

Moreover, the only alleged incident establishing that she engaged in protected activity,

and potentially permitting an inference of sex-based retaliation, is Plaintiff’s reported nonconsensual hug from White and her subsequent threat to call the police. See Pl. Aff. at 14, 17; 

Mem. Opinion at 13 (explaining that the court should not dismiss Plaintiff’s sex-based retaliation 

claim because she alleged a nonconsensual hug from White). However, Plaintiff reported the 

alleged hug between July and September 2013, but the State Department did not terminate 
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Plaintiff until June 2014. Thus, Plaintiff cannot rely on temporal proximity to establish evidence 

of pretext and, as discussed above, she has no other gender-based evidence that the reasons for 

her termination were pretextual. See Supra Section III.A. Consequently, no reasonable 

factfinder could conclude that Defendant retaliated against her for reporting unwanted touching 

from her male colleague. 

C. Disability-based Hostile Work Environment Claim 

“Not all abusive behavior, even when it is motivated by discriminatory animus, is 

actionable.” Barbour v. Browner, 181 F.3d 1342, 1347 (D.C. Cir. 1999). To prevail on a hostile 

work environment claim, a plaintiff must show that the “workplace is permeated with 

discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the 

conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working environment.” Harris v. 

Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). A

court considers “the totality of the circumstances, including the frequency of the discriminatory 

conduct, its severity, its offensiveness, and whether it interferes with an employee’s work 

performance.” Baloch v. Kempthorne, 550 F.3d 1191, 1201 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (citing Faragher v. 

City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 787–88 (1998)).

In ruling on Defendant’s motion to dismiss, the court concluded that “[a]lthough it is a 

close case,” Plaintiff could proceed on her disability-based hostile work environment claim. 

Mem. Opinion at 14. Plaintiff pleaded that Cook was aware of her disability and assigned her 

tasks outside the scope of her duties, and on two separate occasions Cook laughed when coworkers made derogatory comments about her disabilities. Id. at 14–15. But at the summary 

judgment stage, there is no evidence in the record showing that Cook knew that Plaintiff has 

dyslexia, and he maintains that he did not know. See SUMF ¶¶ 26–27. Nor are there facts in the 

record from which to infer that Cook assigned Plaintiff tasks that were too difficult for her to 
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accomplish because of her disability. A reasonable factfinder might infer the opposite, given that 

Plaintiff’s own exhibit shows that at least one colleague was grateful for her work product on the 

last day of her employment. See Pl. Combined Reply and Opp’n at 17 (“Many thanks for all the 

work populating the system so far!”); see also Pl. Aff. at 7 (“I performed all my previous job 

duties without accommodations as a perfectionist. I have always adopted my own methods in 

completing my work.”).

The only fact still in dispute is whether two co-workers made derogatory comments about 

Plaintiff’s disability, drawing laughs from others including Cook. See Pl. Aff. at 17 (recalling 

that a co-worker made a comment at a meeting that she was tired of working with her “weird 

friends upstairs” and everyone, including Cook, laughed while looking at Plaintiff). As a 

threshold matter, Plaintiff has provided no evidence that her coworker’s comments were directed 

at her. Further, the fact that Cook looked at Plaintiff while laughing is scant evidence that he 

was indeed laughing at her or that he harbored disability bias. But even if the incident did occur

as alleged, it is not so “extreme to amount to a change in the terms and conditions of 

employment,” Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788, and therefore Defendant’s cross-motion for summary 

judgment on Plaintiff’s hostile work environment claim will be granted as well. See e.g., 

Rattigan v. Gonzales, 503 F. Supp. 2d 56, 78–81 (D.D.C. 2007) (denying a plaintiff’s hostile 

work environment claim because a few isolated incidents and disparate acts do not make a work 

environment hostile).

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the court will GRANT Defendant’s Cross-Motion for 

Summary Judgment: ECF No. 50. Plaintiff has not shown that she is entitled to summary 

judgment, and the court will therefore DENY her Motion for Summary Judgment: ECF No. 49. 
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Date: April 14, 2023

Tanya S. Chutkan

TANYA S. CHUTKAN

United States District Judge