NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

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No. 23-1497

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

NOAH LANDFRIED,

Appellant

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On Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Western District of Pennsylvania 

(D.C. No. 2-19-cr-00008-001) 

District Judge: Honorable J. Nicholas Ranjan

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Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)

April 18, 2024

Before: HARDIMAN, SMITH, and FISHER, Circuit Judges.

(Filed: April 23, 2024)

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OPINION*

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* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent.
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HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge.

Noah Landfried appeals his judgment of sentence, claiming the District Court 

erred in calculating the total drug weight for which he was responsible under the United 

States Sentencing Guidelines. We will affirm. 

I

Soon after he was released in 2017 from a prison sentence for conspiring to 

distribute thousands of pounds of marijuana, Landfried built a vast drug-trafficking 

empire in western Pennsylvania that distributed heroin, fentanyl, oxycodone, and K2. He 

worked closely with various co-conspirators, including James Perry, who was responsible 

for diluting, repackaging, and delivering Landfried’s cocaine. With the assistance of 

Michel Cercone, a licensed realtor, Landfried used some of his drug proceeds to buy 

residential properties which he then rented to friends or used to store drugs. 

After a federal investigation uncovered evidence of Landfried’s criminal 

enterprise, he was indicted for conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to 

distribute Schedule I, II, and III controlled substances, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846; 

conspiracy to commit money laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h); and 

possession with intent to distribute and distribution of fentanyl and heroin, in violation of

21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B)(vi), and (b)(1)(C). 

In December 2021, Landfried was tried before a jury along with Cercone and 

Anthony Smith, a co-conspirator who distributed K2 that he received from Landfried.

The jury convicted Landfried on all counts alleged against him in the superseding 
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indictment. 

At sentencing, Landfried objected to the drug-quantity calculation in the 

Presentence Investigation Report: 13,350.42 kilograms of converted drug weight based 

on 55 kilograms of cocaine, 92 grams of fentanyl, 100 grams of heroin, 1,252 grams of 

synthetic cannabinoid, and 270 grams of oxycodone. The cocaine alone accounted for 

11,000 kilograms of converted drug weight. The District Court overruled Landfried’s 

objection, which resulted in a range of 10,000 to 30,000 kilograms of converted drug 

weight under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(3). That range yielded a base offense level of 34, and 

various enhancements resulted in a total offense level of 43. So Landfried’s advisory 

Guidelines range was life. The District Court varied downward, sentencing him to 300

months’ imprisonment followed by 10 years’ supervised release. Landfried timely 

appealed,1 challenging only his sentence.

II

Landfried claims the District Court erred in calculating his base offense level 

because the basis for its calculation lacked sufficient indicia of reliability. Landfried 

preserved this argument at sentencing, so we review the District Court’s drug-quantity 

determinations for clear error. United States v. Diaz, 951 F.3d 148, 159 (3d Cir. 2020). 

In calculating the amount of cocaine attributable to Landfried, the District Court 

determined the amount reasonably foreseeable to him to be 55 kilograms. See U.S.S.G. 

§ 1B1.3, cmt. n.3(D). It relied on estimates provided at trial by Perry, who testified that 

1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction under 

28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742. 
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he observed Landfried obtain “about 35” kilograms of cocaine from one source and 

“anywhere from 20 to 30” kilograms from a second source. App. 401–02. 

Landfried argues that Perry’s testimony “was suspect at best and greatly 

exaggerated at worst.” Landfried Br. 21. He emphasizes that Perry: (1) accepted 

responsibility for only five kilograms of cocaine in his plea agreement; and (2) admitted 

he was seeking leniency in exchange for his testimony. Landfried’s counsel crossexamined Perry extensively about both issues, but the District Court concluded that 

Perry’s estimates were reliable. It did not err in doing so. As the District Court 

persuasively reasoned, “[t]here is nothing inconsistent with . . . Perry admitting 

responsibility for a minimum amount of cocaine that falls below the testimony he later 

provided,” as plea bargains can “simply reflect the relative risks as to the strength or 

weakness of the evidence had the case gone to trial.” United States v. Landfried, 2022 

WL 3370041, at *4 & n.2 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 16, 2022); see also Brady v. United States, 397 

U.S. 742, 752 (1970) (describing the “mutuality of advantage” to plea bargaining). And 

the District Court’s assessment of Perry’s credibility is “entitled to great deference at the 

appellate level.” United States v. Givan, 320 F.3d 452, 464 (3d Cir. 2003) (citation 

omitted). For these reasons, the District Court’s conclusion was at least “plausible” and 

thus not clearly erroneous. Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985).

Landfried also argues that “the quantities [Perry] supplied were just ‘from the top 

of his head’ and were not based on clear facts.” Landfried Br. 24. But in calculating drug 

quantities, “a degree of estimation is sometimes necessary.” United States v. Gibbs, 190 

F.3d 188, 203 (3d Cir. 1999); see U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 cmt. n.5 (“Where there is no drug 
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seizure or the amount seized does not reflect the scale of the offense, the court shall 

approximate the quantity of the controlled substance.”). And the District Court may rely 

on an estimate in this context so long as it has “sufficient indicia of reliability,” which 

can be based on “the provision of facts and details,” “corroboration by or consistency 

with other evidence, or the opportunity for cross-examination.” United States v. Freeman, 

763 F.3d 322, 337 (3d Cir. 2014) (citations omitted). Each of these indicia was present 

here. 

Perry identified several customers to whom he had personally delivered cocaine—

approximately 28 to 33 kilograms—for Landfried. Because this number is far lower than 

what Perry recalled seeing Landfried himself obtain (55 to 65 kilograms), Landfried 

suggests the District Court clearly erred by finding him responsible for the higher 

amount. But Perry explained that his estimate of the amount of cocaine he delivered was 

just a subset of the cocaine he saw Landfried receive. See App. 433 (“That’s about it that 

I delivered to.”). And Perry’s estimate of the 28 to 33 kilograms he remembers 

delivering, together with additional estimates totaling 27 to 34 kilograms provided 

through the testimony of other witnesses at trial and sentencing, supports the aggregate 

amount of 55 kilograms found by the District Court. Not only did Landfried’s counsel

have the opportunity to cross-examine all of the witnesses testifying to these estimates,

but he did so for almost all of them. For these reasons, the District Court’s calculation of 

the quantity of cocaine attributable to Landfried was not clearly erroneous. Because the 
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55 kilograms of cocaine alone suffice to support a base offense level of 34,2 we need not 

address Landfried’s challenges to the District Court’s other drug-quantity calculations, as 

any errors that may have been made as to those calculations would be harmless. See Diaz, 

951 F.3d at 159.

* * *

For the reasons stated, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.

2 Applying U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1, cmt. n.8(D), 1 gram of cocaine equals 200 grams of 

converted drug weight, so 55 kilograms of cocaine equals 11,000 kilograms of converted 

drug weight—a quantity within the range of 10,000 to 30,000 kilograms for a base 

offense level of 34 under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(3).