NUCLEAR TERRORISM PREVENTION:

STATUS REPORT ON THE FEDERAL

GOVERNMENT’S ASSESSMENT OF NEW RADIATION

DETECTION MONITORS

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND

INVESTIGATIONS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND

COMMERCE

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

SEPTEMBER 18, 2007

Serial No. 110–63

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44–317 PDF 2008

NUCLEAR TERRORISM PREVENTION:

STATUS REPORT ON THE FEDERAL

GOVERNMENT’S ASSESSMENT OF NEW RADIATION

DETECTION MONITORS

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND

INVESTIGATIONS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND

COMMERCE

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

SEPTEMBER 18, 2007

Serial No. 110–63

(

Printed for the use of the Committee on Energy and Commerce

energycommerce.house.gov

NUCLEAR TERRORISM PREVENTION: STATUS REPORT ON THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT’S

ASSESSMENT OF NEW RADIATION DETECTION MONITORS

COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE

JOHN D. DINGELL, Michigan, Chairman

HENRY A. WAXMAN, California

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts

RICK BOUCHER, Virginia

EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York

FRANK PALLONE, JR., New Jersey

BART GORDON, Tennessee

BOBBY L. RUSH, Illinois

ANNA G. ESHOO, California

BART STUPAK, Michigan

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York

ALBERT R. WYNN, Maryland

GENE GREEN, Texas

DIANA DEGETTE, Colorado

Vice Chairman

LOIS CAPPS, California

MICHAEL F. DOYLE, Pennsylvania

JANE HARMAN, California

TOM ALLEN, Maine

JAN SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois

HILDA L. SOLIS, California

CHARLES A. GONZALEZ, Texas

JAY INSLEE, Washington

TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin

MIKE ROSS, Arkansas

DARLENE HOOLEY, Oregon

ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York

JIM MATHESON, Utah

G.K. BUTTERFIELD, North Carolina

CHARLIE MELANCON, Louisiana

JOHN BARROW, Georgia

BARON P. HILL, Indiana

JOE BARTON, Texas

Ranking Member

RALPH M. HALL, Texas

J. DENNIS HASTERT, Illinois

FRED UPTON, Michigan

CLIFF STEARNS, Florida

NATHAN DEAL, Georgia

ED WHITFIELD, Kentucky

BARBARA CUBIN, Wyoming

JOHN SHIMKUS, Illinois

HEATHER WILSON, New Mexico

JOHN B. SHADEGG, Arizona

CHARLES W. ‘‘CHIP’’ PICKERING,

Mississippi

VITO FOSSELLA, New York

STEVE BUYER, Indiana

GEORGE RADANOVICH, California

JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania

MARY BONO, California

GREG WALDEN, Oregon

LEE TERRY, Nebraska

MIKE FERGUSON, New Jersey

MIKE ROGERS, Michigan

SUE WILKINS MYRICK, North Carolina

JOHN SULLIVAN, Oklahoma

TIM MURPHY, Pennsylvania

MICHAEL C. BURGESS, Texas

MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee

PROFESSIONAL STAFF

DENNIS B. FITZGIBBONS, Chief of Staff

GREGG A. ROTHSCHILD, Chief Counsel

SHARON E. DAVIS, Chief Clerk

DAVID L. CAVICKE, Minority Staff Director

(II)

(III)

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS

BART STUPAK, Michigan, Chairman

DIANA DeGETTE, Colorado

CHARLIE MELANCON, Louisiana

Vice Chairman

HENRY A. WAXMAN, California

GENE GREEN, Texas

MIKE DOYLE, Pennsylvania

JAN SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois

JAY INSLEE, Washington

JOHN D. DINGELL, Michigan (ex officio)

ED WHITFIELD, Kentucky

Ranking Member

GREG WALDEN, Oregon

MIKE FERGUSON, New Jersey

TIM MURPHY, Pennsylvania

MICHAEL C. BURGESS, Texas

MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee

JOE BARTON, Texas (ex officio)

(V)

C O N T E N T S

Page

Hon. Bart Stupak, a Representative in Congress from the State of Michigan,

opening statement ................................................................................................ 1

Hon. Ed Whitfield, a Representative in Congress from the Commonwealth

of Kentucky, opening statement ......................................................................... 4

Hon. Gene Green, a Representative in Congress from the State of Texas,

prepared statement .............................................................................................. 6

Hon. Joe Barton, a Representative in Congress from the State of Texas,

opening statement ................................................................................................ 7

Hon. Tim Murphy, a Representative in Congress from the Commonwealth

of Pennsylvania, opening statement ................................................................... 8

Hon. John D. Dingell, a Representative in Congress from the State of Michigan, prepared statement ...................................................................................... 9

WITNESSES

Gene Aloise, Director, Natural Resources and Environment Division, U.S.

Government Accountability Office ...................................................................... 11

Accompanied by Keith Rhodes, Chief Technologist, U.S. Government Accountability Office

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 13

Answers to submitted questions ...................................................................... 74

Vayl Oxford, Director, Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, U.S. Department

of Homeland Security .......................................................................................... 27

Accompanied by Huban A. Gowadia, Assistant Director, Mission Management, Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, U.S. Department of Homeland

Security

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 29

David Huizenga, Assistant Deputy Administrator, Office of International Material Protection and Cooperation, National Nuclear Security Administration, U.S. Department of Energy ........................................................................ 34

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 35

Answers to submitted questions ...................................................................... 83

Paul A. Schneider, Under Secretary, Management, U.S. Department of Homeland Security ........................................................................................................ 38

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 41

Answers to submitted questions ...................................................................... 103

SUBMITTED MATERIAL

Letter of March 11, 2007 from Messrs. Dingell and Stupak to Secretary

Chertoff ................................................................................................................. 157

Letter of July 2, 2008, from Elaine C. Duke, Department of Homeland Security, to Mr. Dingell ............................................................................................... 159

Letter of September 21, 2007 from Messrs. Dingell and Stupak to Secretary

Chertoff ................................................................................................................. 161

Letter of February 25, 2008 to Mr. Dingell from Secretary Chertoff .................. 165

Committee exhibit binder ....................................................................................... 167

(1)

NUCLEAR TERRORISM PREVENTION: STATUS

REPORT ON THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT’S

ASSESSMENT OF NEW RADIATION DETECTION MONITORS

TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 18, 2007

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT

AND INVESTIGATIONS,

COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE,

Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:08 a.m., in room

2123, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Bart Stupak (chairman) presiding.

Present: Representatives Melancon, Green, Inslee, Whitfield,

Walden, Murphy, Burgess, and Barton.

Staff present: Richard Miller, John Sopko, Chris Knauer, Scott

Schloegel, Kyle Chapman, Hasan Sarsour, Angela Davis, Alan

Slobodin, Dwight Cater, and Garrett Golding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BART STUPAK, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF MICHIGAN

Mr. STUPAK. This meeting will come to order. Today we have a

hearing entitled, ‘‘Nuclear Terrorism Prevention: Status Report on

the Federal Government’s Assessment of New Radiation Detection

Monitors.’’

Before we begin, I want to let you know that Ranking Member

Whitfield and I discussed our desire to keep as much of this hearing in open session as possible. It is a long-standing tradition of

this committee and this House to keep our hearings open to the

American public. If—and that is a big if—we need to go into closed

session to have a few questions answered by our witness, we will.

But it will be our intent to make sure that the vast majority of this

hearing is held in open session.

I also remind Members that the purpose of this hearing is to discuss the management and validity of the ASP testing process. We

are not here to discuss the scientific results of DNDO’s testing or

which machine may be better or worse.

Each Member will be recognized for their opening statement, 5

minutes for an opening statement. And I will begin.

Preventing terrorists from smuggling radioactive material or a

nuclear weapon into this country is our Nation’s highest homeland

security priority. Since 1993, the International Atomic Energy

Agency has confirmed 16 incidents of trafficking in highly enriched

2

uranium or plutonium and 540 cases of illicit trafficking in nuclear

or radiological materials. A significant percentage of that material

could be used to produce a nuclear weapon or a dirty bomb. The

co-chair of the 9/11 Commission, former Governor Tom Kean,

summed it up when he said, ‘‘Preventing terrorist access to weapons of mass destruction warrants a maximum effort by our Government.’’

Radiation detection equipment is currently deployed at our ports

and borders. By using a two-step process coupled with the United

States Customs and Border Protection procedures, CBP is able to

identify the types of radioactive material in cargo containers. As

cargo enters the United States, it is screened through polyvinyl toluene radiation detectors at the primary inspection stage. These polyvinyl, or PVT, detectors will alarm if the cargo contains a nuclear

weapon or innocuous forms of naturally occurring radiation, which

is present in substances such as granite, bananas and kitty litter.

If there is an alarm, CBP officers pull the cargo container aside to

conduct a secondary inspection with a hand-held radioactive isotope identification device, or RIID, to determine whether or not the

radiation is coming from an innocuous source or an actual threat.

If necessary, physical inspection of the cargo may follow.

The Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, DNDO, is developing the

next generation of radiation detection devices called advanced spectroscope portals, ASPs. ASPs have potential to distinguish possible

threats from innocent cargo, and thereby reduce the number of nuisance alarms that have to be investigated by the CBP. This ability

to better differentiate threats from benign materials is helpful in

high-volume locations to speed up the inspection process.

In October 2006, the Government Accountability Office, GAO,

found that DNDO’s cost-benefit analysis did not justify DHS’s plan

to spend $1.2 billion for purchasing and deploying ASPs. The GAO

recommended that DNDO conduct further testing of ASP systems.

In response to GAO’s critical review, Congress restricted DNDO

from expending funds for full-scale procurement of ASP until the

Secretary of Homeland Security certifies that the ASPs will provide

a—and I quote now—‘‘significant increase in operational effectiveness.’’

In January 2007, I, along with Chairman Dingell and Ranking

Members Barton and Whitfield, asked the GAO to review DNDO’s

testing. DNDO did their phase 1 at the Nevada test site in late

February through early March. Phase 2 was report writing. And

then DNDO then conducted additional phase 3 testing in late

March through early April.

Today we will hear that GAO has significant concerns about

DNDO’s testing.

First, GAO reports that DNDO gave the three ASP vendors access to many of the packages that would be tested. This allowed

the vendors to calibrate their machines to many of the radioactive

sources prior to the tests. GAO has expressed concerns that this

may have biased the ASP test results.

Second, GAO raised concerns that the tests did not assess the detection limits of these new ASP machines. Nearly a year ago, even

before DNDO commenced testing, the Department of Energy asked

DNDO to conduct special tests to determine the limits of detection

3

for these ASP machines based on masking material they routinely

encounter in international commerce.

Unfortunately, DNDO did not conduct these outer-limit tests. Instead, DNDO is doing computer simulations, referred to as injection studies, which may be informative but also need to be validated. However, GAO believes that these injection studies should

not be considered a substitute for actual testing.

It is critical to know the level at which the ASPs can detect

masked radioactive material. If DNDO doesn’t know the outer detection limits of these new ASP machines, dangerous materials

could possibly slip through our borders without the CBP officers’

knowledge. Federal officials need to be absolutely sure they understand exactly how these new machines will perform before they are

deployed to keep us safe. After all, Department of Homeland Security has well-functioning radiation portal monitors in place today,

so there is not an urgent need to rush certification of the ASPs.

DNDO officials have told the committee staff and GAO that they

do not intend to wait for the results of the injection studies before

they issue a certification this fall. It is hard to fathom how DNDO

can credibly certify ASPs as ‘‘significantly increase operational effectiveness’’ without completing the injection studies and subjecting

them to external validation review.

I look forward to hearing from DNDO’s explanation on why it is

rushing certification. By all appearances, the arbitrary certification

deadline appears to be driving the testing, rather than the testing

driving the certification. Why isn’t DNDO driven by a desire to obtain valid, unbiased and complete test results prior to any certification?

Just 1 week after the Nevada test campaign was completed, and

even before the data was analyzed, the director of DNDO was declaring that he believed the Department of Homeland Security’s

Secretary would approve full-scale procurement by July. A June

26th certification deadline was the target. Then the certification

deadline was pushed to July 28th. After a decision was made to

conduct injection studies, it was moved to September 21. Then on

August 30, DHS advised Congress that CBP was conducting 2 more

months of field testing with new software, and the date would be

further extended.

Not only is the schedule shifting, but the data to be used in certification is also shifting. Originally, phase 1 data would be used

for certification. Now we learn that two additional sets of tests,

which were not designed for certification and may lack sufficient

statistical power, are going to be used for certification.

Just prior to GAO finalizing its assessment in late July, Under

Secretary for Management Paul Schneider announced an independent review of DNDO’s basis for certification. On the one hand, we

are pleased to see DHS initiate the independent review that was

separate from the DNDO. On the other hand, we are disappointed

to see public statements from DHS disparaging the GAO qualifications to assess the testing plans carried out by DNDO. This created

the appearance that DHS was seeking to organize a review panel

to insulate DHS from what they anticipated would be a critical assessment by GAO.

4

On August 3, the Under Secretary requested Dr. Peter Nanos of

the Defense Threat Reduction Agency to head up the review effort

and directed him to complete the review by September 17. Last

week we learned that John Higbee of the Defense Acquisition University replaced Dr. Nanos. Then, just last Friday afternoon, the

committee was informed that Mr. Higbee has now been removed,

and instead Mr. George Thompson of the Homeland Security Institute will head the review team.

I look forward to hearing why it is that Under Secretary Schneider has appointed three different people to head up the independent review in 6 weeks’ time. I am also curious to learn why Mr.

Schneider believes that his latest appointee, Mr. Thompson, is

independent, given the fact that his organization receives its funding from DHS.

I look forward to hearing these answers to several questions

today: What events have caused DNDO to delay certification three

times? Did DNDO test the limitations of the ASP machine in its

tests at the Nevada test site? If not, why not? Were the phase 1

tests potentially biased? Is DNDO relying on computer simulations

to make up for weaknesses in the testing plan?

Should DNDO certify performance, leading to a $1.2 billion purchase, based merely on a computer simulation, or should there be

validation in the field first? How can DNDO certify ASPs before it

completes and fully reviews the injection studies?

After certification has been submitted to Congress, how many

ASPs does DNDO plan to purchase, and will these be deployed for

primary or secondary screening? Has DNDO been moving the goal

posts on both deadlines and the elements it was using to develop

its certification?

In summation, the ASP technology looks promising, but there are

enough questions about the testing that I cannot be comfortable

with a possible DHS certification of the ASPs. As is frequently said,

we need to be right 100 percent of the time, and the terrorists only

need to be right once.

Given all that I have learned thus far, I think it would be cheap

insurance for DNDO to do a new and truly blind testing, using

comprehensive test protocols, which would give us accurate data regarding the capabilities and limitations of the ASP machines.

We need to be sure our technology can be right 100 percent of

the time. After all, CBP says the technology that we employ every

day works. So it is not imperative that we rush ASP machines into

full-scale deployment.

With that, I yield to my friend, Mr. Whitfield, for an opening

statement.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ED WHITFIELD, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY

Mr. WHITFIELD. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for having

this important hearing on radiation portal monitors.

Since the attacks of 9/11, the subcommittee has held several

hearings about the security of our ports and borders. Specifically,

we have examined how effectively the programs were being carried

5

out to protect the United States from terrorists who may attempt

to smuggle radiological material into the U.S. for an attack.

The Department of Homeland Security, of course, has responsibility for domestic ports and the Department of Energy for overseas ports. Previous hearings have demonstrated how difficult it is

to scan millions of cargo containers at hundreds of ports for radioactive material.

Over the years, we have coordinated with the Government Accountability Office to identify problems with the initial deployment

rate of radiological portal monitors. We also identified problems

with the methods used by the U.S. Customs and Border Protection

to target and screen cargo at foreign ports before it is shipped to

the United States.

As of February 2007, over 900 radiation portal monitors had

been installed at domestic ports throughout the country. Currently,

about 90 percent of the cargo crossing our borders is scanned for

radioactivity, and I think we should all feel good about that.

If radiological materials are detected during primary scanning by

a portal monitor, the U.S. Customs and Border Protection conducts

a secondary screening to pinpoint the location and identify radiological materials in cargo containers.

According to GAO, the screening technologies in use are the best

that have been available. However, new technologies are needed to

secure our borders from a wider range of radiological threats and

simultaneously reduce the impact on the flow of legitimate cargo.

DHS and DOE both believe that the advanced spectroscopic portal,

or ASP, is the best and most likely replacement for existing portal

monitors and hand-held detectors.

Earlier this year, I was pleased to join Chairman Stupak in a

joint request to the GAO to review the efforts of the Department

of Homeland Security to test and certify whether ASP monitors are

ready for full-scale deployment. We must know that these monitors

will work before we spend billions of dollars.

GAO will provide testimony today that outlines its concerns with

the approach DHS has used to assess the effectiveness of the ASP

monitors. It is important to point out that DHS has not completed

its technical review of the ASP monitors, and the Department may

be on a path toward resolving many of GAO’s technical concerns.

There are several unanswered questions regarding the use of

ASP monitors for primary inspections. However, the expert scientists and Government officials we have interviewed agree that

the Department of Homeland Security should proceed with a limited deployment for secondary inspections. In the opinion of one

DOE expert we interviewed, the deployment of ASP monitors in

secondary screening will provide a radical improvement over the

hand-held devices currently in use.

GAO recommends that DHS delay its certification of the ASP

monitors until the Department completes all ongoing research.

GAO also recommends that outside experts review this research

and determine whether more testing is necessary.

These recommendations are certainly reasonable, and I certainly

look forward this morning to the Department’s views. However, in

the meantime, I hope that available funds will be used for a limited

6

deployment of ASP monitors in secondary screening as soon as possible.

I look forward to the hearing, and thank the witnesses for being

with us this morning. And I yield back my time.

Mr. STUPAK. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. Melancon, opening statement?

Mr. Green.

Mr. GREEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to ask unanimous consent to place a full statement

into the record and paraphrase it.

Mr. STUPAK. Without objection.

Mr. GREEN. This is important. I represent the Port of Houston

and have been on the docks many times to watch our Customs

agents, both with the personal radiation detectors, but also with

the portal that they drive through. And I want to make sure that

we move that cargo as fast as we can with the containers, but also

that the technology is there so we can have that feeling when they

are going down our roads and leaving the Port of Houston.

So, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the hearing today, and I look forward to the testimony. And like I said, I will put my full statement

into the record. Thank you.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. GENE GREEN, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM

THE STATE OF TEXAS

Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing on the selection of next generation radiation portal monitors. This is an important issue for our nation and for my

hometown of Houston, and I am glad this committee is exercising its oversight in

this area.

I welcome today’s witnesses and I look forward to their testimony.

For the past 6 years, since the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and

the Pentagon, preventing nuclear and radioactive material into the country, and

protecting our country from a ‘‘dirty bomb’’ has been one of our Nation’s top priorities.

We have refocused our efforts on scanning incoming cargo for dangerous radiation, and Congress has worked with the Department of Homeland Security and our

ports to deploy the necessary technology to protect this country from that threat.

As we look to deploy the next generation of detection equipment, it appears DHS

is rushing to deploy new portal monitor technology despite significant questions that

the technology is as efficient, or as effective as DHS claims.

The current radiation portal monitors which use ‘‘Poly Vinyl Toluene’’ or PVT, are

effective at detecting radiation, but cannot distinguish between naturally occurring

radiation such as that found in tile or granite, and radiation coming from a potential threat, such as highly enriched uranium.

These false positives require a secondary inspection with a handheld ‘‘Radiation

Isotope Identification Device’’ to determine the type and source of the radiation—

the current process is effective, but labor intensive.

Because of this, DHS has moved forward toward purchasing a new technology, advanced spectroscopic portal monitors, or ASPs.

ASPs have the potential capability to detect what type of radiation is being emitted thereby negating the need for a second inspection with the intended effects of

speeding up commerce through our sea and land ports, and reducing the amount

of labor needed to operate the RPMs.

Unfortunately, data on the effectiveness of ASPs is inconsistent at best, as the

Government Accountability Office concluded in their October 17, 2006 report, which

raises serious questions as to whether DHS should be committing such a large

amount of money—$1.2 billion over 5 years—to this technology without completing

and analyzing further test results.

The district I represent in Texas is home to the Port of Houston. This port is

ranked first in the United States in foreign waterborne tonnage, second in the U.S.

in total tonnage, and tenth in the world in total tonnage.

I work frequently with the Port Authority and business all along the port, and

understand the importance of moving cargo safely and quickly.

7

I spoke with folks at the port when I learned we were going to have this hearing

to see if they were experiencing delays due to secondary inspections, and learned

that, aside from a few instances, the RPMs do not negatively impact the gate process.This is an indication that the current RPMs are not significantly delaying commerce, and we should not rush out a new technology that has not been thoroughly

tested and agreed upon by all involved entities, including the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, the Department of Energy, and Customs and Border Protection.

There is broad consensus that PVT and RIID technology is limited, however, and

more susceptible to human error, so we should be looking for a more efficient, more

reliable technology.

ASPs could provide more reliable readings on radiation entering the country, but

more testing needs to be done to guarantee that before we spend more than a billion

dollars on ASP monitors.

I am concerned DHS is rushing to deploy this technology without thorough testing.

DHS and DNDO need to provide Congress with more comprehensive testing results and a better analysis of deployment and maintenance costs before we commit

taxpayer dollars to purchase this equipment.

Again, I thank the chairman for holding his hearing on this important issue, and

I look forward to the testimony from our witnesses.

Mr. STUPAK. I thank the gentleman from Texas.

People will be bouncing in and out. There is a health care hearing up on the third floor, so I think Members will be moving in and

out.

The ranking member of the full committee, Mr. Barton, for an

opening statement, sir.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOE BARTON, A

REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF TEXAS

Mr. BARTON. Thank you, Chairman Stupak, thank you, Ranking

Member Whitfield, for today’s hearing.

Preventing terrorists from smuggling the makings of a nuclear

bomb or dirty bomb into America is our topic today. And I doubt

that there are many more important topics that are going to be

considered today in Congress.

The existing system used by the Department of Homeland Security to scan cargo for radioactive threat materials at ports of entry

is generally effective, and I would accentuate the ‘‘generally.’’ it is

not perfect. However, some of the scanning technologies that the

Department currently relies upon to do the job are outdated. I don’t

think there is any controversy about that. And they have inherent

weaknesses. These weaknesses could leave the country vulnerable.

For instance, we cannot continue to rely on the hand-held radiation detectors to pinpoint the location of suspect nuclear materials

in a fully loaded cargo container. These hand-held detectors do

have well-documented problems and unacceptable, at least to me,

failure rates.

The GAO has raised important concerns regarding the Department of Homeland Security’s research into new scanning technology. GAO has recommended that the Department delay its certification of its best new technology, the advanced spectroscopic

portal monitor.

The Department of Homeland Security has convened a summit

of technical experts this past June to resolve the outstanding

issues. The meeting included more than 25 people from national

laboratories, Homeland Security, the Department of Energy and

8

the GAO. With that many experts in one room, it is surprising that

people could even agree on the time of the day that they were

meeting. But we have interviewed some of the people that participated in that meeting, and they all agree that the research currently under way will show whether full-scale deployment is appropriate. They also agree that we should push forward with a limited

deployment of these new monitors for secondary screening at our

busiest ports.

Experts at the Department of Energy do not believe any further

fundamental technical research is needed to prove whether the new

machines are a significant improvement over the current hand-held

detectors. It would seem that a limited deployment of the new machines next year would allow the Department of Homeland Security to closely examine their effectiveness in real use out in the

field.

I hope that the current disagreements between the General Accounting Office and the Department of Homeland Security can be

resolved. Let’s not ignore a good idea while we continue rigorous

testing to perfect or understand the idea. We can do both. And because this is about shielding our people from those who mean to

kill us, we need to do both. The enhanced protection from these

limited deployments should not be delayed.

I hope that today’s hearing is productive. I thank the chairman

and ranking member for holding it, would yield back, and would

point out, as has already been pointed out, there is another hearing

upstairs on the Health Subcommittee, so I will be going back and

forth.

But thank you, Mr. Stupak and Mr. Whitfield, for this important

hearing.

Mr. STUPAK. Thank you, Mr. Barton.

Mr. Walden, opening statement, please, sir.

Mr. WALDEN. Mr. Chairman, I am going to waive my opening

statement. Appreciate the opportunity. Look forward to hearing

from the witnesses.

Mr. STUPAK. Mr. Murphy, opening statement, please.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. TIM MURPHY, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

Mr. MURPHY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member

Whitfield.

Everyone recognizes that we have to take all measures that are

necessary to prevent dangerous nuclear material from entering this

country. And while it is important to be efficient in our border

searches and preserve the rights of American citizens while doing

so, the safety of the American people must take precedence. We

can’t sacrifice safety for the sake of efficiency, because it only takes

one mistake to create a disaster for all.

The subject of this hearing is the use of advanced technology to

detect dangerous nuclear materials that may be entering this country in cars, trucks and cargo containers on ships. When using this

technology, the absolute worst outcome would be a false negative

finding; that is, a case where the detection equipment fails to recVerDate 11-SEP-98 10:24 Sep 22, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00015 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 Q:\DOCS\110-63 SCOM1 PsN: SCOM1
9

ognize the presence of a dangerous nuclear material that is actually there.

I understand that no nuclear detection equipment is absolutely

perfect, but, as we move forward with advanced and efficient technologies, we must be careful not to increase the possibility that

truly dangerous materials will go undetected.

I should mention one of the companies that has been selected by

DHS to develop and deploy the new advanced spectroscopic portal,

or the ASP, technology is Thermo Fisher Scientific, located in my

congressional district. I am confident, given the proper mandate,

time and guidance by DHS, Thermo Fisher and other companies

will be able to produce and deploy equipment that is both more efficient and more effective than the equipment we now use.

But on the way toward this goal, I want to make sure we do not

make any mistakes. We have to maintain the maximum level of

protection that technology and human effort will allow. I know

when I visited our borders last year at Laredo, TX, I saw some devices in use that detect radioactive items that come through. And

I understand that, after there is some detection, other screening

has to take place. And we are looking for a way to do this in an

efficient way that keeps false negatives down to zero and also helps

speed the efficiency of this whole process.

Throughout this, now, I look forward to hearing how DHS and

the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office plan to conduct and hopefully improve this whole process with their current nuclear detection technology and deployment programs to minimize the possibility that dangerous nuclear materials will enter our country.

I thank you very much, and I yield back, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. STUPAK. I thank the gentleman.

That concludes the opening statements by members of the subcommittee. Any other statements for the record will be included at

this time.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Dingell follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN D. DINGELL, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS

FROM THE STATE OF MICHIGAN

Today, 1 week after the sixth anniversary of 9/11, this subcommittee is holding

a hearing on one of our most important homeland security priorities: the Government’s ability to prevent a nuclear weapon or a radiological bomb from being smuggled into this country and detonated.

The focus of today’s hearing will be a Government Accountability Office study of

the Department of Homeland Security’s testing of a new generation of radiation portal monitors, known as Advanced Spectroscopic Portals, or ASPs. A bipartisan request asked GAO to determine whether the Department of Homeland Security conducted fair and adequate tests of these portals before spending an estimated $1.2

billion to replace the radiation portal monitors now in use at our ports and border

crossings.

Because of concerns raised last year by GAO regarding a faulty cost-benefit analysis done by the Department of Homeland security on these new portal monitors, the

Appropriations Committee, in a bipartisan action, prohibited spending the funds

designated to fully purchase these new machines until the DHS Secretary certified

that ‘‘a significant increase in operational effectiveness has been achieved.’

Today, GAO will report that they have significant concerns about how DHS conducted tests.

First, GAO will report that the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office gave the three

competing vendors advanced access to many of the packages they would be using

for tests. This allowed vendors to calibrate their machinery to detect the specific radiological materials and the various combinations of shielding and masking materials prior to the actual tests.

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Second, GAO will report that the tests did not assess the detection limits of these

new machines. The Department of Energy specifically requested that DHS conduct

tests to learn the masking limits of the new machines, based on what they had

found in international commerce, but apparently, DHS could not find time to address this concern.

In sum, GAO found that DHS did not conduct a fair and balanced evaluation of

the new machines. GAO does not believe the results ‘‘demonstrate a significant increase in operational effectiveness and should not be relied upon to make a full-scale

production decision.’’

How has DHS responded to GAO’s findings? As soon as they learned what GAO

found, they launched an ‘‘end run’’ and created a new ‘‘independent review panel’’

to reassess the results. Today, we will examine how independent and qualified this

new panel actually is.

In addition, DHS changed the certification date and also changed the tests that

would be considered for certification—11th hour efforts to obfuscate errors in the

original tests.

What DHS hasn’t done, which any reasonable taxpayer would expect, is take

GAO’s advice and redo the tests—something that will cost little in comparison to

the overall $1.2 billion procurement. Retesting may cost less than half of one percent of the overall procurement, and would be money well spent. In the words of

DHS Secretary Chertoff, ‘‘The greatest threat we have to prevent is a nuclear device

being detonated by a terrorist.’’

I want to commend the subcommittee chairman and ranking member for holding

this hearing today. I hope that they will continue their strong oversight of this program. Without their work and that of our colleagues on the Appropriations Committee, I believe we would now be witnessing another DHS procurement debacle where

billions of dollars are spent with few tangible results.

Mr. STUPAK. I will now call our first panel of witnesses. On our

panel we have: Dr. Gene Aloise, Director of the Natural Resources

and Environmental Division at the Government Accountability Office; and Mr. Aloise is accompanied by Dr. Keith Rhodes, Chief

Technologist at the Government Accountability Office; Dr. Vayl Oxford, Director of the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office within the

Department of Homeland Security; and Director Oxford is accompanied by Dr. Huban Gowadia, Assistant Director for Mission Management at the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office; and Mr. Dave

Huizenga, Assistant Deputy Administrator of the Department of

Energy’s Office of International Material Protection and Cooperation within the National Nuclear Security Administration; and last

but not least, the Honorable Paul A. Schneider, Under Secretary

for Management at the Department of Homeland Security.

I would like to welcome everyone to the subcommittee.

It is the policy of this committee to take all testimony under

oath.

Please be advised that witnesses have the right under the rules

of the House to be advised by counsel during your testimony. Do

any of you wish to be represented by counsel?

Looks like, by the nods of the head, no one wishes to be represented by counsel, so I will ask you all to please rise and raise

your right hand and take the oath.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Mr. STUPAK. Let the record reflect that witnesses replied in the

affirmative.

You are now under oath. That will include your opening statements.

We will now hear a 5-minute opening statement from the witnesses. The witnesses may also submit a longer statement for inclusion in the record.

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I will now recognize Mr. Aloise for an opening statement. Sir, if

you would, please.

STATEMENT OF GENE ALOISE, DIRECTOR, NATURAL RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENT DIVISION, U.S. GOVERNMENT

ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, ACCOMPANIED BY KEITH

RHODES, CHIEF TECHNOLOGIST, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE

Mr. ALOISE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, we are pleased

to be here today to discuss the test methods DNDO used to demonstrate the capability of the next-generation radiation detection

portal monitors and whether the tests should be relied upon to

make a decision to procure $1.2 billion worth of this equipment.

Radiation detection portal monitors are a key element in our national defenses against nuclear smuggling. According to DHS and

DOE, the current system of this equipment is effective and does

not significantly impede the flow of commerce. DNDO wants to improve the capabilities of the existing systems with new equipment

with advanced technology.

One of the major drawbacks of the new equipment is the substantially higher cost compared to the existing system of radiation

detection equipment. As was earlier mentioned, in our March 2006

report we recommended that DNDO conduct a cost-benefit analysis

to determine if this additional capability was worth the considerable cost. In October of last year, we concluded that DNDO’s analysis did not provide a sound basis to purchase the new detection

equipment because it relied on assumptions rather than actual test

data. We recommended that DNDO redo the analysis based upon

actual test data and, in doing so, conduct realistic testing of the

new equipment’s capabilities.

The fiscal year 2007 Homeland Security Appropriations Act requires that the Secretary of DHS certify that the new equipment

will provide a significant increase in operational effectiveness before spending additional funds for its procurement. To meet this requirement, DNDO conducted testing of both the new and existing

radiation detection equipment at the Nevada test site between February and March 2007. It is that testing that we will discuss today.

Based on our analysis of DNDO’s test plan, the test results and

discussion with experts from DOE’s national labs and others, we

are concerned that DNDO used biased test methods that enhanced

the performance of the new equipment. In our view, it is highly unlikely that such favorable test circumstances would present themselves under real-world conditions.

Specifically, our concerns with the test methods are: Preliminary

test runs were conducted using almost all of the materials and

combinations of materials, so that vendors could collect test data

and adjust their systems to identify these materials prior to formal

testing. Also, DNDO’s tests were not designed to test the limits of

the equipment’s capabilities—a critical flaw in the testing. Specifically, the tests did not use a sufficient amount of the type of materials that could be used to hide or mask dangerous sources. In addition, DNDO did not use a key standard operating procedure that

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supports the use of hand-held detectors, an important part of the

current radiation detection system.

As a result of concerns we and others raised that DNDO did not

sufficiently test the limits of the new equipment, DNDO is planning additional studies of the test data. DNDO and the eventual

users of the new equipment, Customs and Border Protection and

DOE, have reached an agreement to wait and see whether the results of new studies provide useful data.

In our view and the view of other experts, these studies, which

are essentially computer simulations, may provide useful data but

they are not as good as actual testing with nuclear and masking

materials. We are making several recommendations today designed

to correct the problem of DNDO’s flawed tests, including the creation of an independent testing group within DHS if more testing

is needed.

Mr. Chairman, the equipment being tested is for the purpose of

guarding against perhaps the No. 1 threat to our Nation: the possibility that a nuclear weapon, nuclear materials or a dirty bomb

could be smuggled across our borders. We do not think it is unreasonable to ask DHS to conduct realistic and scientifically rigorous

testing on any equipment that is used to guard against this threat.

That concludes my remarks. And Dr. Rhodes and I will be happy

to answer any questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Aloise follows:]

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Mr. STUPAK. Thank you.

Now, Mr. Oxford, opening statement, please, sir.

STATEMENT OF VAYL OXFORD, DIRECTOR, DOMESTIC NUCLEAR DETECTION OFFICE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, ACCOMPANIED BY HUBAN A. GOWADIA, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR FOR MISSION MANAGEMENT, DOMESTIC

NUCLEAR DETECTION OFFICE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Mr. OXFORD. Good morning, Chairman Stupak, Ranking Member

Whitfield, and other distinguished members of the subcommittee.

I would like to thank the committee for the opportunity to discuss

what DNDO is doing to protect this Nation against a nuclear or radiological attack.

Also, I would like to take this opportunity to publicly thank the

many partners we have had in improving our technical capabilities,

including CBP and DOE, and the larger technical community, to

include five national and Federal laboratories, and the National Institute of Standards and Technology. I am confident in saying that

this is the first program of its type to draw from this breadth of

talent.

We at DNDO are optimistic about the ASP program and its performance capabilities as demonstrated thus far, and we hope to

show you more during the course of this testimony.

Regarding the nuclear threat and ASP development, there can be

no doubt, as has already been referenced this morning, that the

threat of a nuclear attack against the United States is one of the

gravest that we face, and all efforts possible must be directed at

reducing the risk of such an attack. DNDO is committed to doing

everything possible to prevent a nuclear 9/11.

Shortly after 9/11, Customs made the prudent decision to deploy

commercially available radiation detection equipment to address a

glaring vulnerability in our Nation’s homeland security capabilities.

With that said, there were well-understood limitations to these systems.

The fact remains that we are facing a challenge at our ports and

borders in trying to balance the flow of goods and commerce, while

addressing this critical threat. Since that time, the Nation has matured significantly in thinking about homeland security and nuclear threats.

The first step was the formation of DHS, and the second was the

formation of my office, the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, an

interagency office agreed to by the executive branch. Upon its formation, DNDO took the responsibility for improving our nuclear

detection capabilities, with a priority to improve operations at seaports and land border crossings.

ASP systems represent a leap forward in this capability, promising to identify threats and drastically reduce nuisance alarms

caused by innocent materials, provide better information to our

Customs Officers, and resolve difficult cases. Given the importance

of this program, DHS has gone to great lengths to ensure that the

performance of ASP systems is well-understood and that the systems represent a significant improvement in operational effectiveness.

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The test program that we designed and implemented is as rigorous a test program as the U.S. Government has ever conducted. To

ensure that systems performance was well-known, DNDO conducted over 6 months of testing, resulting in over 100,000 data

points.

Testing was designed to evaluate all aspects of ASP performance,

including the following: system qualification tests to demonstrate

that ASP units are manufactured in accordance with specified design requirements; environmental product qualification tests to determine if the system can reliably perform within the operational

environment; tests at the Nevada Test Site to evaluate ASP technical performance and support ASP algorithm development and

secondary concepts of operation; New York Container Terminal

tests to determine if ASP demonstrates a significant reduction in

referral rates to secondary inspection compared to current PVT systems in a real stream of commerce; integration testing to determine

if ASP systems are ready to deploy in an operational setting for

secondary deployment; and finally, field validation testing with

Customs and Border Protection to identify operational issues, take

corrective action and ensure that CBP Officers are comfortable

with the systems.

We have been thorough and rigorous in our approach, ensuring

that both we and CBP are satisfied with ASP systems both technically and operationally before we make any recommendations to

the Secretary.

In conclusion, while the current ASP systems represent a significant step forward in meeting our challenges, we will not stop here.

We will continue to work with CBP and DOE to identify needed

improvements to further optimize performance.

Perhaps more than anything else, I caution against delaying

progress in the pursuit of perfection and allowing critical limitations in our current capabilities to remain unaddressed. Rather, we

should focus on developing a path forward to address this threat.

Chairman Stupak, Ranking Member Whitfield and members of

the subcommittee, I thank you for your attention and will be happy

to answer any questions you may have.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Oxford follows:]

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Mr. STUPAK. Thank you, sir.

Mr. Huizenga, your opening statement, please, sir.

STATEMENT OF DAVID HUIZENGA, ASSISTANT DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR, OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL MATERIAL PROTECTION AND COOPERATION, NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Mr. HUIZENGA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member

Whitfield and other distinguished members of the subcommittee.

Today I will be discussing the Department of Energy’s international role in the administration’s efforts to prevent a nuclear

terrorist attack against our country.

Our first goal is to work with our foreign partners to secure nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons-usable material at the source.

By upgrading security at vulnerable nuclear sites in the Russian

Federation and other former Soviet states and countries of concern,

we deny terrorists access to nuclear weapons and the essential element of a nuclear weapon, the fissile material.

Our second goal is to prevent international smuggling of nuclear

and radiological material. The Second Line of Defense program, or

SLD program, started in 1998, is dedicated to this important effort.

The mission is to detect special nuclear material, essentially large

or extremely small quantities of plutonium or highly enriched uranium, as well as radiological materials that could be potentially

used as a dirty bomb.

We are making steady progress on securing approximately 450

border crossings, airports and feeder seaports in Russia, the former

Soviet states, Eastern Europe and Central Asia, as well as equipping approximately 75 major international seaports with radiation

detection equipment used to scan cargo containers.

Detection of dangerous radioactive material is therefore at the

heart of our mission. And over the last 15 years, we have worked

with the technical experts to successfully deploy more than 1,500

radiation portal monitors at over 300 facilities in 25 countries. In

Russia alone, we have already equipped over a hundred sites with

detection equipment.

Unfortunately, we have clear evidence that the detection systems

are working. In 2003, for example, Georgian border guards, using

U.S.-provided portal monitoring equipment at the Sadakhlo border

crossing with Armenia, detected and seized approximately 173

grams of highly enriched uranium.

The centerpiece of every installation completed under the Second

Line of Defense program is the radiation portal monitor, or RPM.

We deploy RPMs that use plastic scintillators made of polyvinyl toluene, or PVT, to detect gamma signatures and modulated helium

three tubes to detect neutrons. The PVT-based RPMs use a proven

technology capable of operating effectively in varied and often

harsh environmental conditions.

This technology was developed to ensure nuclear material security at the DOE weapons sites. These monitors have been tested

and evaluated by national laboratory technical experts for over

three decades. The RPM detects the presence of radiation and feeds

an alarm information to the operators, typically Customs agents or

border guards. When the alarm is triggered, the vehicle or the peVerDate 11-SEP-98 10:24 Sep 22, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00041 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 Q:\DOCS\110-63 SCOM1 PsN: SCOM1
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destrian is retained, and hand-held equipment is used as part of

the secondary inspection to identify the specific radio isotope that

caused the alarm.

The hand-held identification equipment that we deploy uses commercially available sodium-iodide or germanium technology. Experience has shown that effective use of the hand-held equipment is

highly dependent on the skill and the training of the on-site official

as they try to locate the source of the alarm. Expediting proper adjudication of alarms through these secondary inspections is particularly important in high-volume locations like the major seaports.

It is DOE’s judgment that the use of the advanced spectroscopic

portal monitors, the ASPs we are talking about today, will improve

the rate and accuracy of the alarm resolution in high-volume settings.

In order to determine the effectiveness of the ASPs, DOE is

working with DNDO to ensure that the increased ability of the

monitors to differentiate threats does not compromise threat detection. I have asked the staff at Los Alamos National Laboratory to

work with DNDO and lead a multi-lab effort to collect data on the

spectra of well-characterized, unshielded, special nuclear material—essentially threat objects—that can be controlled carefully at

the laboratory. These data will be combined with the stream of

commerce data already collected by DHS and will provide supplemental information to help validate the upcoming injection studies.

In the near term, DOE is purchasing a limited number of ASPs

via contracts awarded by DNDO. Our plan is to deploy the ASPs

at some of our megaports locations, or our large seaports overseas,

for use in secondary inspection.

Under the planned approach, once the PVT monitor alarms in

the primary inspection point, the container will be sent to the ASP

for secondary inspection. The ASP, with a much larger detection

surface area, larger libraries, and algorithms than the hand-held

detectors, should provide enhanced capability to effectively identify

specific isotopes. This will aid the Customs official in determining

whether a container presents an increased risk of nuclear material.

If the ASPs are demonstrated to be reliable under a variety of

field conditions, we would hope to deploy them to the remaining

megaports installations for secondary inspections.

In closing, I would like to point out that DOE and DHS are

working closely together to improve our nuclear and radiological

detection capabilities. We share a common objective of preventing

terrorists and states of concern from obtaining and smuggling nuclear materials that can be used in acts of terrorism against our

country and our allies.

I want to thank the administration and Congress for their continued support of our program. And I would be happy to answer

any questions you may have.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Huizenga follows:]

TESTIMONY OF DAVID HUIZENGA

Thank you Chairman Stupak, Ranking Member Whitfield and other distinguished

members of the subcommittee. Today I will be discussing the Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) role in the interagency effort

to prevent a nuclear terrorist attack against this country. More specifically, I will

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focus on the role of my office, the Office of International Material Protection and

Cooperation, as a part of this larger, coordinated effort.

Before I start the technical part of my testimony concerning radiation detection

monitors, I would like to provide a short background on the overall mission of my

office. I believe this will demonstrate the history and expertise that DOE brings to

bear on the subject of the hearing today. Detection of dangerous radioactive materials is at the heart of our mission and over the last 15 years we have worked with

technical experts to successfully deploy more than 1500 radiation portal monitors

(RPMs) at over 300 facilities and border crossings within over 25 countries.

SECURE AT THE SOURCE

The first goal of my office is to secure nuclear weapons and weapons-useable nuclear materials by upgrading security at vulnerable nuclear sites in the Russian

Federation and other countries of greatest concern to the U.S. national security. By

working to secure nuclear materials and weapons at the point of origin, we continue

to make important strides toward denying terrorists and states of concern access to

nuclear weapons and the essential element of a nuclear weapon: the fissile material.

We are working at 125 nuclear sites and have secured hundreds of actual nuclear

weapons and enough nuclear material for thousands of additional warheads. We

have completed security upgrades at 160 buildings containing weapons useable material, more than 75% of the Russian nuclear warhead sites of concern, including

39 Russian Navy nuclear sites, and 15 Russian Strategic Rocket Sites. Work is underway at the balance of sites and is on track to be completed by the end of 2008.

SECOND LINE OF DEFENSE

The second goal of my office is to prevent smuggling of nuclear and radiological

material at international seaports, airports and land border crossings. The Second

Line of Defense program, referred to as SLD, was started in 1998 and is dedicated

to this important effort. The SLD program is composed of two equally important offices: the Core Program and the Megaports Initiative. The Core Program focuses on

securing border crossings, airports, and feeder seaports in Russia and other former

Soviet States, Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and other key countries around the

world. Under the Core program, approximately 450 sites have been identified to receive detection equipment. In Russia alone we have already equipped over 100 of

these sites. Under our Megaports Initiative, we work closely with the Department

of Homeland Security’s Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and with the host

governments to equip major international seaports with radiation detection equipment to screen cargo containers for nuclear and other radiological materials. We

have identified approximately 75 seaports of interest to us for implementation and

are currently at various stages of engagement with approximately 40 countries in

this regard.

DOE/NNSA’s SLD Program is also playing a key role in implementing the Secure

Freight Initiative (SFI), a joint DHS-DOE and DOS effort started last December.

This is an unprecedented effort to build upon existing port security measures by enhancing the U.S. Government’s ability to scan containers overseas for nuclear and

radiological materials using both radiation detection equipment and non-intrusive

imaging equipment to assess the risk of inbound containers. Under SFI, DHS is providing non-intrusive imaging systems to host governments while DOE is deploying

radiation portal monitors, optical character recognition systems, and is developing

and installing the communications systems necessary to integrate data from varying

systems together to provide a more comprehensive set of information about U.S.-

bound containers. Data on all scanned containers is provided to the host government. Data on U.S.-bound containers is segregated and provided to U.S. Customs

officials on the ground that also send the information back to the National Targeting Center in Northern Virginia for incorporation into existing risk assessment systems. This effort is currently being implemented at seven foreign ports located in

Pakistan, Honduras, the United Kingdom, Oman, Singapore, South Korea, and

Hong Kong.

Unfortunately, we have clear evidence that the detection systems are necessary.

In 2003, Georgian border guards, using U.S.-provided portal monitoring equipment

at the Sadakhlo border crossing with Armenia, detected and seized approximately

173 grams of highly enriched uranium carried by an Armenian national. Also, in

late 2005, a Megaports RPM picked up a small neutron signal from a scrap metal

container leaving Sri Lanka bound for India. The source of the signal turned out

to be an extremely small neutron source, which was found by the Indian authorities.

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I hope the above information will be useful to the Subcommittee as I move forward to provide the technical information that you have requested concerning the

nuclear detection equipment installed by the SLD program

SLD INTEGRATED DETECTION SYSTEM

To understand how the SLD system works, it is important to understand the

interface between the fixed radiation portal monitors, the alarm station, and secondary inspections with hand-held detectors. The centerpiece of every installation completed under the SLD Core and Megaports Programs is the radiation portal monitor

or RPM. We deploy RPMs that use plastic scintillators made of polyvinyl toluene

(PVT) to detect gamma signatures and Helium 3 tubes to detect neutrons. The primary mission of the SLD Program is to detect special nuclear material (SNM), even

small quantities of SNM, in particular plutonium and highly-enriched uranium—

materials that can be used to make an improvised nuclear device or that may have

already been incorporated into a device. The equipment that we deploy can also detect other radioactive materials suitable for use in radiological dispersal devices,

often referred to as ‘‘dirty bombs’’.

I would like to emphasize that the PVT-based nuclear detection technology deployed by the SLD program is proven technology, capable of operating effectively in

varied, and in many instances harsh environmental conditions. This technology was

developed to ensure nuclear material security at DOE weapons sites and the specific

monitors that we deploy have been tested and evaluated by our National Laboratory

technical experts for over three decades. Indeed, NNSA installs this same type of

monitor at the foreign weapons laboratories and nuclear facilities to prevent insiders from smuggling SNM out of these facilities. Our extensive experience with these

monitors ensures that we can deploy them effectively and ensure their long-term

sustainability.

The RPM detects the presence of radiation and feeds alarm information to operators, typically customs agents or border guards, located in a local or central alarm

station. The communications system graphs the gamma or neutron signal and helps

the operators identify what type of alarm has occurred. At this point, the vehicle

or pedestrian is retained and handheld equipment is used as part of a secondary

inspection to identify the specific radioisotopes that caused the alarm. The handheld

identification equipment that we currently deploy utilizes sodium-iodide or germanium technology and is the standard commercially available technology. Determination of the specific isotopes involved and their specific location is important because

a number of common materials such as ceramic tile and kitty litter, in large quantities, may signal an alarm due to their relatively high concentration of

radioisotopes. We call these ‘‘NORM’’ alarms, for ‘‘naturally occurring radioactive

material’ alarms.

Experience has shown that effective use of the hand-held equipment is highly dependent on the skill and training of the onsite official as they try to locate the

source of the alarm. Expediting proper adjudication of alarms through these secondary inspections is particularly important in high-volume locations like major seaports. It is DOE’s judgment that use of Advanced Spectroscopic Portal (ASP) monitors will improve the rate and accuracy of alarm resolution in these high-volume

settings.

ASP Testing

As you know, the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office at the Department of Homeland Security is leading the research and development (R&D) effort on the ASP

monitors. DOE has been involved in some of the testing activities associated with

the ASP program. In order to determine the effectiveness of the ASPs, we are working jointly with DNDO to ensure that the increased ability of these monitors to differentiate threats does not compromise threat detection. In support of this effort, I

have asked Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) to work with DNDO and lead

a multi-lab effort to collect data on the spectra of well-characterized, unshielded special nuclear material (i.e., threat objects) resident at LANL under carefully-controlled conditions for all of the ASPs. These data will provide supplemental information to help validate injection studies where actual threat signatures will be injected

into stream of commerce data collected at operational sea ports during the ASP test

campaign. This data gathering effort is planned to occur over the next few months.

When it is completed, this information will be combined with stream of commerce

data already collected by DHS to carry out injection studies, an effective and flexible

tool to help determine the extent to which the presence of NORM material in cargo

may mask the identification of SNM and thus prevent containers of concern from

being sent to secondary inspection.

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Finally, DOE will conduct additional performance evaluation of the ASP at LANL

in fiscal year 2008 to determine how best to take advantage of the ASP’s spectral

resolution in order to maximize the performance of the ASPs as secondary inspection tools in SLD deployments. Because the allowable times for secondary inspections and installation parameters vary from one site to another, the ASP configuration parameters must be optimized for the variety of operational sites. SLD will perform tests to optimize the installation parameters and ConOps for the range of deployments required.

USE OF ASPS

In the near-term, DOE is purchasing a limited number of ASPs via contracts

awarded by DNDO. Our plan is to deploy ASPs at some of our Megaports locations

for use in secondary inspections. Under the planned SLD approach, once a PVT

monitor alarms, the container will be sent to the ASP for secondary inspection. The

ASP, with a much larger detector surface area, larger libraries, and better algorithms than the handheld detectors, should provide enhanced capability to effectively identify specific isotopes to aid Customs officials in determining whether a

container presents an increased nuclear risk. Additionally, since the ASP monitors

will be permanently installed and operated with less direct Customs officer involvement (i.e., there will be no need to move the hand-held device across the container)

the ASP should provide greater consistency in secondary inspection. We anticipate

that secondary inspections will be conducted more quickly, thus reducing the potential impact on port operations. If the ASPs are demonstrated to be reliable under

a variety of field conditions, we would hope to deploy them to the remaining

Megaports installations for secondary inspections.

In the future, based on the results of additional analysis or testing and once the

pool of operational experience has been more fully developed, DOE/NNSA may consider deployment of the ASP in some limited primary locations where extremely

high amounts of NORM in the stream of commerce may make this approach necessary and cost effective. Our experience to date has not identified this as a major

area of concern. Therefore, our plan is to continue to deploy PVT for primary detection and use ASPs in secondary in large, high-volume seaports.

In closing, I would like to point out that DOE and DHS are working closely together to improve our nuclear and radiological detection capabilities. We share the

common objective of preventing terrorists and states of concern from obtaining and

smuggling nuclear materials that can be used in acts of terrorism against our country and our allies. I want to thank the Administration and Congress for their continued support of our program.

Thank you. I would be happy to answer any questions you may have.

Mr. STUPAK. Thank you, Mr. Huizenga.

Mr. Schneider, opening statement, please.

STATEMENT OF PAUL A. SCHNEIDER, UNDER SECRETARY,

MANAGEMENT, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Thank you.

Thank you, Chairman Stupak, Ranking Member Whitfield and

members of the committee.

I have been the Under Secretary for Management for a little over

8 months. One of my responsibilities is serving as the acquisition

executive of the Department. And as such, I serve as the principal

advisor to the Secretary on acquisition matters. I also serve as the

vice chairman of the Department’s Investment Review Board. This

board is what the Department uses to approve major investment

decisions.

Based on my experience in acquisition over the years, I indicated

during my Senate confirmation hearing that I would bring some of

the best practices in acquisition that I had learned over the years

to the Department of Homeland Security.

In late July 2007, after reviewing the status of the ASP program

and recognizing the importance of this program to the Nation, I

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concluded that this program would benefit from an independent review of the testing efforts. And by ‘‘independent,’’ I meant, in my

own mind, independent from the program office—independent from

the program office.

I made the recommendation to the Secretary to conduct an independent review of the testing process and the results. He agreed

with this recommendation and directed me to assemble an appropriate team of technical and programmatic experts to conduct a review.

Initially, I identified the Associate Director of the Threat Reduction Agency, DTRA, to head the team. My intent was to leverage

DTRA resources by requesting assistance from the DTRA leader to

assemble an appropriate team of experts to perform this task. However, this review was not intended to be a DTRA study. In early

August, he withdrew from this effort.

I then asked Mr. John Higbee, Dean of the Defense Acquisition

University School of Program Management, to lead the effort. Mr.

Higbee’s role in this effort was a few weeks of planning, documentation collection, getting the team assembled and starting the

effort. Last week I asked him to withdraw, when it became evident

to me that he was a serious contender for a position in DHS. And

while there was no conflict of interest in terms of technologies,

companies or financial interest, because of the significant and, I

might add, surprising amount of external scrutiny this review has

been subjected to, I decided to be overly cautious and remove Mr.

Higbee now.

We have identified the members of the team and have provided

your staff their names. Last week Mr. George Thompson, Deputy

Director of Programs for the Homeland Security Institute, was selected to lead this effort. The Institute is the Department’s federally funded research and development center. Last week I offered

to make Mr. Thompson available to meet with your staff to learn

of any concerns they may have with the ASP testing efforts to date.

In August 2007, based on discussions with the DNDO and a recommendation by Customs and Border Protection, a decision was

made to extend the field validation portion of the schedule by 2

months to obtain more test data. As a consequence of that decision,

the original requirement that this review be completed by September 17 will be adjusted.

In my opinion, this review will provide valuable assistance to the

Secretary and to me, as the Department’s acquisition executive and

vice chair of the DHS Investment Review Board, as DHS considers

the best way forward.

This is not an unusual exercise within the U.S. Government. The

Department of Defense and others typically make use of such review efforts to facilitate decision-making on major programs. This

independent review is not intended to be a substitute for GAO’s review, nor is it a redundant effort. GAO is an agent of the Congress

that appropriately provides information to Congress in support of

its oversight function. GAO’s efforts do not preclude DHS from conducting its own independent review to support DHS’s decision-making process. I and the Secretary value getting inputs from several

sources on major decisions.

40

The ASP is of national importance in our effort to harden our defense against nuclear smuggling. This acquisition is a vital priority

for the Department.

Thank you for your leadership and your continued support of the

Department of Homeland Security and its programs, such as ASP.

I would be happy to answer any questions you have.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Schneider follows:]

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43

44

45

46

47

Mr. STUPAK. Thank you.

That concludes our opening statements by our witnesses.

In order to proceed in a more orderly and efficient manner, I

would propose, instead of 5 minutes for questioning, Mr. Whitfield,

we have 10 minutes for use during questioning. OK with you?

If there is no objection, I propose we do this.

Mr. Whitfield, anything further on that 10-minute rule?

Mr. WHITFIELD. No, that is fine.

Mr. STUPAK. All right. I will begin questioning.

Mr. Aloise, Mr. Rhodes, if I may, I said in my opening statement

there has been criticism of the GAO that you did not have the

qualifications to assess the radiation portal monitors.

How long has GAO, Mr. Aloise, been working on this technology?

And could you briefly, both of you, give me a little bit of your

background in this area under the Government Accountability Office?

And, Mr. Aloise, if you would like to start?

Mr. ALOISE. Mr. Chairman, in the last 5 years we have issued

over 20 products directly related to radiation detection equipment.

We have visited a lot of those countries that Mr. Huizenga mentioned, where the Second Line of Defense has placed this equipment. We have also visited a lot of the areas in the United States

and the ports of entry where the CBP has placed the equipment

to observe its operation, observe the procedures, how to deal with

alarms.

Many of our staff have gone through training on this at PNNL,

the RADCAT training it is called, which goes in depth about how

the equipment works and how to respond to certain things.

And beyond that, we have talked to the manufacturers of this

equipment, the vendors of this equipment, the repairmen who work

on this equipment, the designers of the equipment.

We know this equipment pretty well. We have been all over the

world talking to people about it, as well as all over the United

States and the national laboratories.

And I will let Dr. Rhodes talk some more.

Mr. STUPAK. Doctor?

Mr. RHODES. I would just make one side comment, that, in my

time at the GAO, I have been a key operator in and designer of

the covert sting operations against our borders, where we have

brought radioactive materials across, both undetected and detected.

So I have designed those tests, which are actually testing the

equipment as though the opponent would be testing it.

Mr. STUPAK. Educational background, Dr. Rhodes?

Mr. RHODES. Background is both computer and nuclear engineering. I worked at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in

both intelligence and weapons design prior to coming to GAO. Prior

to that, I worked at Northrop Aircraft Corporation in the extremely

low observables area in their Advanced Systems Division.

Mr. STUPAK. Thank you.

Mr. Oxford, if I may, right in front of you, you have the exhibit

book. And I would ask you to turn to exhibit No. 14, if you would

in there, please.

You said in your testimony one of the most vigorous testings ever

done by the Government—as it should be, because we are talking

48

about our security, our borders and nuclear and radiation detection. In exhibit 14, this Venn diagram prepared by your office, Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, shows that nine of the 16 radiation sources and masking materials used in the dry-run pretesting

activities were also used in the full-scale tests intended for certification.

Is that correct?

Mr. OXFORD. It is.

Mr. STUPAK. OK. Do you agree, then, with GAO’s testimony that,

by providing the vendors with the opportunity to adjust their software and algorithms during the pretesting phase, that the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office—and I use their words now—‘‘used biased test methods and were not an objective assessment of the

ASP’s performance capabilities.’’ Would you agree with that?

Mr. OXFORD. We disagree.

Mr. STUPAK. Well, let me ask Dr. Rhodes, then, or Mr. Aloise,

why would that? I mean, like, here is a test. If I give you nine out

of 16 answers, I should be able to get the test right, right? At least

a passing grade.

Mr. RHODES. I should get a passing grade.

Let me make one statement here.

Mr. STUPAK. Sure.

Mr. RHODES. Without going into the details of the test, because

they are classified, if you think about the material in question as

a candle, and the material I am using to hide it is another candle,

so I set one candle in front of the other, and I know the luminescence of the back candle and I know the luminescence of the front

candle, and now I am able to subtract the front candle away, and

so I know what the value is of the back candle.

Now, let us do another test. Let us put a 100-watt light bulb in

front of that candle. I know the value of the 100-watt light bulb.

I now subtract the 100-watt light bulb, and you only see the candle.

Let us put a 1,000-watt light bulb; let us put a search light in front

of it.

These are all fine calibration tests. These are tests to let me

know that the equipment can indeed be calibrated. They are observations of the calibration of the system. But they are not representative, in a comparative state, of, can I see it if I don’t know it? And

that is our point about the limitations.

Mr. STUPAK. So you don’t mind that they gave nine of the 16 answers, if you will, sources, if you will, if you are in the developmental stage. But that shouldn’t happen during the certification

stage of the reliability of equipment.

Mr. RHODES. That is correct. Our view, at the GAO, is not that—

you can test to death. I mean, Dr. Gowadia and I have talked about

this and we have actually laughed about how long people can test

things. You can turn it over to testers and you will never see an

answer because they will never be done. And you can’t have that.

But if you are going to do a real comparator test and you are

going to have comparative operands here, then you have to make

certain that you are getting an answer that is not biased. And you

are allowed to make certain that systems are working as well as

they can——

49

Mr. STUPAK. So you want some more blind testing then, in other

words.

Mr. RHODES. Blind testing.

Mr. STUPAK. And we do it for FDA, we do it for food safety, we

do it everywhere else, why shouldn’t we do it for radiologically?

Mr. RHODES. Absolutely. And it should ultimately, if your FDA

analogy is very good, it should be a double blind test so that the

tester doesn’t know as well as the person being tested.

Mr. STUPAK. Mr. Secretary, if I may ask you this question. GAO

recently gave three, what I figure key recommendations. You indicated your interest in the best practices independent review. So let

me ask you this: These three recommendations that the Government Accountability Office made to you said DHS delays secretarial certification in full scale production decisions of the ASPs until

all relevant tests and studies have been completed and limitation

to those tests and studies have been identified and addressed.

Furthermore results of these tests and studies should be validated and made fully transparent to DOE, CDP and other relevant

parties. Second, once the test and studies have been completed,

evaluated and validated, DHS should determine in cooperation

with the Custom Border Patrol, CDP, DOE and other stakeholders,

including independent reviewers if additional testing is needed.

Third, if additional testing is needed, the Secretary should appoint

an independent group within DHS, not align with the ASP acquisition progress, to conduct objective, comprehensive and transparent

testing that realistically demonstrates the capabilities and limitations of the ASP system. This independent group would be separate

from the recently appointed independent review panel. These three

recommendations, do you agree with this, these three recommendations?

Mr. SCHNEIDER. No, sir.

Mr. STUPAK. You don’t agree with it?

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Not completely.

Mr. STUPAK. What do you disagree with?

Mr. SCHNEIDER. I don’t have those recommendations in front of

me, I am sorry.

Mr. STUPAK. I think Mr. Huizenga just handed them to you. If

you want the best practices, independent review?

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Well, that is why I think we have to take them

one at a time. I think one of the reasons, in fact, the principal reason why I decided to recommend to the Secretary to have an independent review team was I realized there was a lot of discussion

regarding the testing of the ASP. I read some GAO documentation,

two documents, I believe, dated early March. I had looked at that.

I recognized some of the concerns that had been put forth at the

time by GAO. I have also recently been briefed on the ASP program as part of the process that we use as part of the investment

review board process. It was at that point in time that I really got

an appreciation for the magnitude of this testing effort. It helped

me put in perspective, if you will, some of the GAO comments. My

own background——

Mr. STUPAK. So with those comments then in perspective, you

disagree with these recommendations?

50

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Basically that led me to conclude I wanted it for

the benefit of—my role in the investment review board process and

the fact I am the Secretary’s principal advisor on acquisition, I felt

that he ought to have an independent group of people, technical

people, looking at the testing process and results prior to considering a recommendation for certification.

Mr. STUPAK. Well, this independent review, with all due respect,

the independent review you have still lies within the Department

of Homeland Security. The only truly independent review, whether

you are at DOD or DHS, is really the Government Accountability

Office. They are the truly independent agency. So why wouldn’t you

take the truly independent agency’s three key recommendations on

these ASPs?

Mr. SCHNEIDER. First, I respectfully disagree with you about that

they are the only truly independent review.

Mr. STUPAK. Give me another one that is a truly independent review that doesn’t reside within the Department of Homeland Security.

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Well, Mr. Chairman, let’s talk about testing.

Mr. STUPAK. No, let’s talk about independence. You said there

are others in GAO. Enlighten the committee please. What other

agency would you have us look at for truly independent in order

to do this review of your testing? Other than GAO, who else would

Congress look to?

Mr. SCHNEIDER. First of all, the military departments in DOD in

terms of testing, they do independent testing and recommendations

to the Chief of Naval Operations.

Mr. STUPAK. And who does the independent testing that is outside the Department of DOD?

Mr. SCHNEIDER. It is within the Department. There is a special

group that is set up. There is a director of test and evaluation.

Each of the services have an independent test and evaluation

agent. They report individually and separately to whoever a major

investment decision——

Mr. STUPAK. So why don’t you set up an independent one if you

still wanted the Department of Homeland Security to truly do this

independent review.

Mr. SCHNEIDER. It is done within the Department.

Mr. STUPAK. But even your latest appointment, doesn’t 60 percent of their funding come from Department of Homeland Security?

Is that truly independent.

Mr. SCHNEIDER. It truly is independent given the fact what the

role that Federal FFRDCs play. This is exactly what FFRDCs do.

And I don’t care whether they are the Army, the Navy or the Air

Force, or for that matter, what the FAA has with Casby who was

their FFRDC. This is exactly the type of work that they do, sir.

Mr. STUPAK. When you have three different directors appointed

in 6 weeks, it sort of gets us wondering whether it is truly independent and whether you have confidence that truly is the independent review, which had three in 6 weeks right.

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Three in 6 weeks yes. I explained why. And

frankly on the last one, in the case of Mr. Higby, I was being overly

cautious. In fact, you could say I was gun shy. Under most circumstances, given the fact of the role that DOE plays and the partVerDate 11-SEP-98 10:24 Sep 22, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00057 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 Q:\DOCS\110-63 SCOM1 PsN: SCOM1
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nership arrangement that we have between the Department of Defense and Department of Homeland Security for cooperative efforts

like this, DOE is engaged in many other deep dive program reviews

right now for us.

Again, this is one of the practices that we are trying to institute

where we have a group of people separate from the program office.

And I can’t overstate that enough, separate from the program office, that do not have line execution responsibility for the execution

of the program to go do these reviews.

Mr. STUPAK. My time is up right now. Mr. Whitfield, for questions, please, sir.

Mr. WHITFIELD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Aloise and Dr.

Rhodes, in your testimony you express significant concerns about

the DNDO’s testing, that being biased and so forth. I was just curious, why do you all not recommend that the Department simply

start over and redo all the field tests?

Mr. ALOISE. Sir, because there are some test results we haven’t

seen yet. They had they say had done some blind tests and they

want to use some other test data. And that data they say is still

being analyzed. So we thought it was prudent to allow them to finish that analysis and share that testing that has already been conducted with DOE and CBP and others.

Mr. WHITFIELD. Now, Dr. Gowadia, you and Dr. Rhodes are, I

guess, the technical experts in all of this. How would you describe

the difference of opinions on these tests, the testing that has been

done. Is this a serious disagreement between you and the GAO?

They say it is biased and you are saying it is not biased. Would

you explain to the committee just how significant the disagreement

is between GAO and DNDO on the testing.

Ms. GOWADIA. Yes, certainly. The biggest difference I believe is

right now we are in the process of addressing one phase only of the

test data. We have much more data that we are going through

right now that will also be used to inform the Secretary for his decision. While 9 of 16 cases have been used in the phase 1 effort,

I would point out that only 26 of 90 configurations were actually

shown in pretesting if you consider the totality of the test. So yes,

there is a significant difference. It depends on how you slice the

data.

Mr. WHITFIELD. Dr. Rhodes.

Mr. RHODES. Well, yes, there is limitation on the data. I cannot

speak to something I do not have. But our going in position at the

beginning when we saw phase 1, phase 1 was for certification. That

was why we were concerned. Because we saw it, looked at it, I understood it, we were briefed on it, we received that data. However,

because of the decision that was supposed to be made about that,

and understand that our testimony is based on that, that is the

limitation that we do have.

Mr. STUPAK. If I may jump in, Dr. Gowadia, any reason why you

would not give GAO all the information? Dr. Rhodes said they have

not received all the information. Why wouldn’t you give them all

the information?

Ms. GOWADIA. We have given them all the information as it has

been ready and prepared and finalized. Draft documents are not

52

handed to the GAO. We are presently going through every last

spectrum of a very large——

Mr. STUPAK. Well, when are you going to be done with your review? According to everything we hear, you are going to make a decision in a few weeks. If all the data is not finalized, when are you

going to get this done and get it to GAO and give them time to review it?

Ms. GOWADIA. I believe, sir, the decision is now in November, so

we are exercising extra prudence to make sure that we analyze the

data correctly.

Mr. STUPAK. OK. November. It is late September. When are you

going to give GAO the information they need before November to

make a decision to inform Congress.

Ms. GOWADIA. We will give them the data and the information

once it is finalized, sir.

Mr. STUPAK. When will that be?

Ms. Gowadia. It will likely be before November, before the decision for certification.

Mr. STUPAK. Is there certain information GAO needs, Dr. Rhodes

or Mr. Aloise, in order to make a decision here? I think you should

have all the information.

Mr. ALOISE. Well, of course. And Mr. Chairman with all due respect, this has not been the most transparent review we have ever

worked on. We have had to basically fight and scrape for every

piece of information we have gotten. Now, that has changed recently and we are thankful for that. But until we know what the

results of these tests are, we, of course, are not going to be prepared to say it makes sense to go to secondary deployment without

knowing what the results of the tests are, without having

everybody’s buy in that is enough, that that shows that the equipment is going to do what they say it is going to do.

Mr. STUPAK. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. WHITFIELD. Now, Mr. Oxford you all have the responsibility

under the legislation, the appropriation bill certifying this ASP

technology, is that correct?

Mr. OXFORD. That is correct.

Mr. WHITFIELD. And you don’t need the approval of GAO to certify, do you?

Mr. OXFORD. We do not.

Mr. WHITFIELD. You can do that on your own.

Mr. OXFORD. If I could clarify the position, and we have confirmed this with the appropriations committees that crafted the

language that is in our 2007 bill. This is merely an accountability

statement by the Secretary that this system represents an increase

in operational performance. It is not connected to a deployment decision, nor a production decision. So it is up to those of us that inform the Secretary, ourselves and CBP, as well as now Under Secretary Schneider, to go in with whatever information we think the

Secretary should have to make these recommendations.

Mr. WHITFIELD. Well, obviously everyone on the panel, and all of

us certainly want to be as certain as we can be that this technology

works because of the drastic consequences if it does not work the

way it is supposed to. But Mr. Huizenga, you are with the Department of Energy or National Nuclear Security Administration, you

53

are not bound by any certification and you have already purchased

some ASP technology; is that correct?

Mr. HUIZENGA. Yes, it is.

Mr. WHITFIELD. And you all intend to deploy that in overseas

ports; is that correct?

Mr. HUIZENGA. Yes. Our intention is to put the ASPs in overseas

ports for secondary inspections to gain some additional information

on the operational effectiveness and to try to optimize their use.

Mr. WHITFIELD. Now, you have tremendous responsibility on the

security question in these overseas ports. What was your impression of the GAO’s study on this issue?

Mr. HUIZENGA. I think that the GAO has raised some legitimate

issues. And Mr. Oxford and I have been discussing them for some

time now. But within the administration, I think we are making

good steady progress. We are working through the final issues associated with testing the ASPs.

Mr. WHITFIELD. And there are ASP monitors deployed throughout the U.S. ports now just being tested; is that correct, Mr. Oxford?

Mr. OXFORD. Yes. As part of our overall test program we deployed these to four ports of entry, 5 if you figure out some of the

geographical separations and physical locations. They are under

the control now of CBP officers. They are operating the systems.

They are evaluating the performance in the field to make sure they

are a very stable system. That is why I mentioned before that this

is a joint recommendation to the Secretary, not just DNDO. This

is joint with CBP because they are the operator and they have to

assess the operational utility.

Mr. WHITFIELD. And can you share with us how they are performing at this point?

Mr. OXFORD. I will tell you that the feedback from the port directors at ports where CBP is operating these systems is that the performance is starting to whet their appetite for a larger deployment

based on the immediate feedback. The Deputy Commissioner of

CBP and I have talked. He has commissioned what he calls a blue

ribbon panel within CBP to look at the next steps in going to his

recommendation for certification and future deployment strategies,

so we will be ready once the Secretary makes a decision.

Mr. WHITFIELD. And what would be your best guess as to when

you all may be certifying.

Mr. OXFORD. Again, some of the comments earlier on are a little

bit misleading. We have not reacted to the GAO’s input. We have

been making prudent management decisions as we have learned

things, both through our test program, and through our field validation of systems. We have had a couple requests by CBP to

change some of the features of the fielded systems. We have

changed some of the software. When we do that we essentially

start the field validation over so that CBP officers have at least 2

months of good stable operations in the field. The most recent slip

was based on a request from CBP to have 2 months of field operations of these systems at the four ports of entry. That moves us

into November based on the operator’s input.

Mr. WHITFIELD. And have you all decided on how many ASP systems you may be prepared to deploy next year?

54

Mr. OXFORD. We have an acquisition plan. It is predicated on action once we go through certification, which, as I mentioned before,

is decoupled from the decision for production or deployment. That

is a separate pathway. Right now we have an acquisition strategy

that would start to buy 131 systems, as included in our 2007 request, that is pending the certification step. And again, the actual

deployment strategy will be jointly developed with ourselves and

CBP.

Mr. WHITFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I think we only have a couple

minutes to vote on the floor.

Mr. STUPAK. Right. We only have a couple minutes to vote on the

floor. We will be in recess for 20, 25 minutes. So I would ask the

witnesses to stay. We have three votes, and they promise us a couple of hours uninterrupted. Thank you.

[Recess.]

Mr. STUPAK. OK. The hearing will come to order. Mr. Green, for

questions.

Mr. GREEN. Thank you Mr. Chairman. Unlike the first line of

questions, and I appreciate our witnesses being here, I think you

heard briefly early on my concern is I have a large container port,

Port of Houston, and we are actually expanding it. We just opened

another in Bay Port. And they already leased land to continue, because the growth of containers in our country are just going to be

even more if our economy continues to grow. And having been on

the docks, a lot of times our customers agents, particularly at Barbers Cut, and seeing what we are doing now, and I would hope that

we would be able to have the technology to do even better, but of

course, we need to make sure the cargo moves, but we also need

to make sure there is nothing in there that is going to harm us.

One of the biggest questions when I spoke to the port, Mr.

Schneider, was inquiring about its staffing levels of the new technology. DNDO and DHS state that the ASP monitors are less labor

intensive because there will be fewer secondary hands. How will

staffing levels be affected, both when this technology is new and

being used in addition to the PVT portals for the secondary screening purposes and if it becomes the primary screening device?

Mr. OXFORD. If I could take that, Mr. Green. Let me give you

some information. First of all, from our New York Container Terminal testing that we conducted, we found that there is over a factor of 20 reduction in referrals from primary to secondary inspection based on being able to dismiss ‘‘nuisance alarms.’’ There are

some cases that we are working with DOE that we want to make

sure we explore a little bit more fully. But if that factor holds in

a port like LA/Long Beach where they are getting 500 nuclear

alarms per day, it would go down to about 20 to 25 that they would

have to pay serious attention to in secondary.

Mr. GREEN. So while those only test false positives, I know in our

business, we also look for false negatives. Are the tests being done

on both sides?

Mr. OXFORD. We are doing tests on both sides. There is a special

case that we have identified with DOE. And I think that is part

of the confusion about why we need injection studies and follow-on

testing. There are some cases that we worry about where you could

55

have very high masking levels where there is a possibility that you

would end up with a false negative.

We need to explore those cases. But I will also tell you that it

is not always uniquely a technology issue. For example, we have

seen that case 24 times in the last year and a half in this country.

We can actually set algorithims on these detectors to trigger that

to secondary inspection, so that CBP can then take operational action. It is a combination of the operators as well as the systems

that have to work together.

Mr. GREEN. And are ASP monitors currently being used on a

trial basis in any of the ports of entry or are they just being tested

for example in New York or Long Beach.

Mr. OXFORD. We have four ports of entry right now. LA/Long

Beach, the Port of Laredo in Texas, Detroit in Michigan and Port

Newark. We have them in operational sites with CBP right now.

Mr. GREEN. Let me follow up. Since you answered that question

I have one. After the ASP certification has been to Congress, how

many ASP units does your office plan to purchase; do you plan to

use it for primary or secondary screening initially?

Mr. OXFORD. Initially, we will go with a production and deployment recommendation to the Secretary after certification. They are

not coupled in that regard. Right now we have a total purchase

plan based on the current deployment strategy with CBP for both

primary and secondary sites of about 1,200 ASP systems. That is

our current acquisition plan. However, the agreement with CBP, is

that we will initially go into secondary deployment. They are developing the priorities for where they will go and how they will be deployed over time. We will make a decision in the next 6 to 12

months as to what the criteria are and how to progress into primary deployment after that time.

Mr. GREEN. And you said you are doing them in the ports, the

Port of Laredo, which is the biggest port, I guess, in the world. Is

it your intention to deploy them in other ports along with both the

Canadian and the Texas and—well, the southern border.

Mr. OXFORD. Absolutely. Our deployment strategym developed

with CBP since they are the operational customer, includes both

land border crossings and sea ports, as well as introducing capabilities into airports of entry as well, which is a new part of our

phased deployment. I would like the committee to understand that

our deployment strategy will continue to rely on a combination of

the current generation systems, as well as these new systems. We

have a strategy worked out with CBP on how that can be both

operationally effective and cost effective.

Mr. GREEN. Well, again, all of us are representative of districts,

but our concern is our Nation. And I know New York, Long Beach,

and just last year, I think the Port of Houston was given level 1

concern because of the resources and assets we have there with the

petrochemical industry particularly. But we are also growing a

huge container capability, along with Wilmington and lots of other

places in our country. Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding the

hearing today.

Mr. STUPAK. I thank the gentleman. Let us go for a second round

of questions for a bit here. And as other Members show up, they

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sponse to Mr. Whitfield’s questions, did you say that the ASPs are

deployed overseas?

Mr. HUIZENGA. No. Actually, there is one in South Hampton,

United Kingdom, and that is the only one that we have overseas

at this point. The ones that we are talking about directly here are

part of the DNDO testing process. We have been using a similar

technology, this sodium iodide technology in the Bahamas for over

a year now. And again, in kind of a pilot mode where we run a detector over the containers and use the PVT to initially alarm.

Mr. STUPAK. The one that you have had over a year now in the

Bahamas, has GAO looked at that to certify it?

Mr. HUIZENGA. GAO is aware of that monitor as well.

Mr. STUPAK. Not aware of. Have they looked at the test results

and analyzed it? That is what I am asking.

Mr. HUIZENGA. I am not sure. They have reviewed us several

times. And I know Mr. Aloise is aware of it. I don’t know if he specifically looked into a certification issue.

Mr. STUPAK. Mr. Aloise, let me ask you this then. Is it GAO’s

view that ASPs are ready to be deployed overseas as a secondary

screening at this time with all the full understanding of their detection limits? We keep hearing about additional operational testing in the field. What does that mean to you? Does it tell us that

a machine can accurately detect various threat materials? What is

the limitation on the operational testing in terms of your certification for testing limits.

Mr. ALOISE. Certainly the field testing is important, but it is not

testing with special nuclear materials. That was done in the February to March test that we are criticizing here. Let us not forget,

that is the key test out of all of this, is that test which used special

nuclear materials. And that test did use 6 of the 7 same materials

and 9 of the 14 or 16, depending how you count configurations.

Mr. STUPAK. That was phase 1 testing, is that right?

Mr. ALOISE. Phase 1 testing, correct.

Mr. STUPAK. Phase 2 is more or less writing your report, correct?

Mr. ALOISE. We understand it, yes.

Mr. STUPAK. OK. And phase 3, you have not received any of that

data?

Mr. ALOISE. We have not seen that data. We did finally get a

copy of the test plan. And in the test plan it said that was not

going to be used for certification. And it was even questioning the

statistical validity of some of that information for some purposes.

So we have not yet seen those results.

Mr. STUPAK. Have you seen any blind testing results?

Mr. ALOISE. No, we have not seen the blind test results.

Mr. STUPAK. Mr. Oxford, one of the requirements were that you

test the outer limits of these machines to determine what can ASP

detect and what it can’t detect, correct?

Mr. OXFORD. Yes, sir.

Mr. STUPAK. Have you done that?

Mr. OXFORD. We think we have. Let me explain, Mr. Chairman,

that when we talk about ‘‘requirements’’, that is a very loose term.

Right now there is one threat baseline that we have been asked to

address. I can’t go into it in this session.

57

Mr. STUPAK. Let me just ask it this way then. Would it be common sense that you test the outer limit to know what a machine

can and cannot do?

Mr. OXFORD. We are doing that.

Mr. STUPAK. Have you shared those outer limit test results?

Mr. OXFORD. We have shared the raw data with the GAO. We

have not finalized the test report. In all these cases, especially

phase 1, we offered them the opportunity to actually review the

test plan before we conducted it. They turned us down in that review and said they would wait until the test results. But in terms

of phase 3——

Mr. STUPAK. The test results of these outer limits—I don’t want

to leave here yet——

Mr. OXFORD. We have not finalized the report.

Mr. STUPAK. And you haven’t provided it to GAO.

Mr. OXFORD. Not yet. I haven’t even seen it.

Mr. STUPAK. Have you not seen it?

Mr. OXFORD. I have not seen the final report. It is not prepared,

so I have not actually coordinated or approved the document at this

point.

Mr. STUPAK. But you would agree with me, common sense and

for security of this Nation, we would test the outer limits of the

ASPs.

Mr. OXFORD. Absolutely. We think we have taken a big step in

doing that.

Mr. STUPAK. This outer limit testing, is this the injection studies?

Mr. OXFORD. Actually, it is phase 3 that starts that. Again, there

is also a difference in my mind between secondary and primary deployment and what testing is necessary to make those decisions. As

we identify other cases that may or may not have been tested that

are in phase 1 and phase 3, we will identify other opportunities.

They will be informed by the injection studies, which the technical

summit that we held on June 27 suggested we need to do injection

studies to identify where the current data is relevant.

Mr. STUPAK. So is the outer limit going to be determined by injection studies or realistic blind studies?

Mr. OXFORD. A combination. And the injection studies will inform what future testing is required.

Mr. STUPAK. What about blind studies?

Mr. OXFORD. The blind studies, if I could try to correct the impression, was really a red team operation. I know Mr. Aloise and

Dr. Rhodes, who has already acknowledged that he has worked in

some of the covert sting operations that GAO has conducted, understands that you do that to find out if there are any

vulnerabilities or gaps in your processes and capabilities. That is

why we ran that red teaming operation out in Nevada. We wanted

to see whether our test methods were sound and whether there

were gaps in our understanding of how you place sources and how

you learn from that.

Mr. STUPAK. Let us go back to my original question. The outer

limits of what this machine can detect and cannot detect, you rely

upon, I understand, more than just the injection study, the computer simulations? Am I correct or wrong in that?

58

Mr. OXFORD. Injection studies will inform what testing needs to

be done and will determine which tests to conduct if they are necessary. Again, that will be a joint decision with DOE and others

as we look at these special cases.

Mr. STUPAK. Let me ask it one more time. The outer limits testing determine what the machine can and cannot detect. Will it be

done by injection studies only or are you going to do blind testing

on it?

Mr. OXFORD. It will be done with both injection studies and testing.

Mr. STUPAK. You said testing. That is not blind. Are you talking

about blind testing or not? I am not trying to play semantics here.

I am trying to get to the root problem here. I want this done outer

limit testing in real world application, not a computer simulation.

Mr. OXFORD. It will not be a computer simulation.

Mr. STUPAK. So what is it going to be then? What other testing

is there, other than computer simulation that you can do to test the

outer limits?

Mr. OXFORD. We actually have proposals for two test series during the course of fiscal year 2008.

Mr. STUPAK. And what are those test series?

Mr. OXFORD. We have not written the actual test plan because

we are still working with the——

Mr. STUPAK. So you think you are going to do two testing, but

you don’t know what the testing is?

Mr. OXFORD. Not at this point.

Mr. STUPAK. Are we making this up as we go along?

Mr. OXFORD. No, we are not.

Mr. STUPAK. Or do we have a plan here?

Mr. OXFORD. We will have a plan. We will have a test plan.

Mr. STUPAK. These two new plans you plan on bringing up, are

you going to run those by GAO to make sure that they are valid

tests.

Mr. OXFORD. Perhaps.

Mr. STUPAK. Are you certifying these ASPs before you do these

two tests that you don’t know what they are yet.

Mr. OXFORD. Again, I cannot presuppose what the Secretary will

or will not decide.

Mr. STUPAK. Well, you are making recommendations from what

I understand is going to be November and you don’t know what the

two tests are going to be. It sounds like you certified before you

even know what the two tests are.

Mr. OXFORD. Mr. Chairman, let me clarify. We held a technical

summit with the DOE, the national laboratories, you had committee members or staff present, we had the GAO present. A conclusion out of that discussion, an all-day discussion with those representatives, was that these systems were ready to go to secondary,

but there were some cases that were of concern before we made a

primary deployment decision.

The certification decision is not coupled with the deployment

strategy. The fact is that we can go to certification without necessarily having done every possible test. We will continue to test

over time to refine the algorithms in these systems, but the techVerDate 11-SEP-98 10:24 Sep 22, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00065 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 Q:\DOCS\110-63 SCOM1 PsN: SCOM1
59

nical community is comfortable with the secondary deployment decision if the Secretary certifies it.

Mr. STUPAK. Then if the Secretary certifies it and if it doesn’t

meet the outer limits test, then how do you decertify it then as a

primary?

Mr. OXFORD. Again, the deployment decision is separate from

certification that it does represent an increase in performance.

Mr. STUPAK. But you and I are both in government. We know

once you deploy something we don’t pull it back. We want to make

sure it is done properly before you even deploy it. So what assurances can you give the American people that there are going to be

valid ASP machines before you even deploy them.

Mr. OXFORD. We will probably spend the next 6 to 12 months determining what test and evaluation needs to be done before we

make a decision to deploy to primary inspection sites. Most of these

special cases are coupled to the concerns of the ASP and a false

negative in the primary role versus the secondary role.

Mr. STUPAK. Let me ask GAO, Mr. Aloise or Dr. Rhodes, again

about this injection study. Isn’t injection study just a fancy word

for fixing a process that is flawed?

Mr. ALOISE. Well, the injection studies that occur had flaws in

the original February-March test plan. That is what that technical

summit was designed to do. I didn’t understand that they were

making a decision coming out of that submit to deploy in secondary. So that is another question we have we have been asking.

They are not as good as real testing injection studies. They can provide useful information, but not as good as real testing. And after

all, injection studies are designed, as I said, to correct flaws with

the initial test in February-March, and to us those are the key

tests.

Ms. RHODES. Let me just take a couple of minutes and talk about

the injection studies and try to use an analogy from another part

so that we don’t get into the details of the studies themselves. We

can no longer do underground nuclear testing so we have to do simulations.

Mr. STUPAK. Sure.

Mr. RHODES. And we have to go back to the old underground test

data. Some of the testing that I did was at Livermore. That is data

that we feed into assimilation to try and model some of the money,

a large amount of money that the Government is putting into

Livermore and Los Alamos and San Diaz to do these simulations.

Mr. STUPAK. Correct.

Mr. RHODES. The simulations are good, but they are simulations,

they are models. You try your best to validate. The stockpile stewardship program in the Department of Energy through NNSA is a

large effort to try and give surrogate tests to try and match the

original detonations and neutron counts and things like that. So

that is why we say that the injection studies may help. But they

do have to be validated. The validation of an injection study is back

to reality. The validation of injection study is not do other simulation.

Mr. STUPAK. OK. Mr. Oxford you are nodding your head in the

affirmative. Do you agree that the validation studies or your simulation studies have to be validated?

60

Mr. OXFORD. I agree. That is why I say they will inform what

testing needs to be done so we can get to that validation.

Mr. STUPAK. How are you going to validate it?

Mr. OXFORD. Through testing.

Mr. STUPAK. What testing are you going to do to validate it?

Mr. OXFORD. Again, the injection studies will tell us exactly what

test runs, what sources, masking cases, et cetera, we need to evaluate against and then we will plan that test accordingly.

Mr. STUPAK. So you don’t know what tests you are going to use

to verify the simulation?

Mr. OXFORD. Not at this date. We have an idea of what we are

going to be testing.

Mr. STUPAK. You are not going to validate this until after you do

this testing on your injection studies right.

Mr. OXFORD. We will not validate?

Mr. STUPAK. Right. You won’t certify, I am sorry, you won’t certify?

Mr. OXFORD. Again, that decision is left to the Secretary. Again,

it is not a deployment decision. It is a decision he will make.

Mr. STUPAK. You will be making a recommendation to the Secretary, won’t you.

Mr. OXFORD. I will, the Under Secretary will——

Mr. STUPAK. Then will you promise this committee you won’t

make a recommendation until you figure out the two tests you are

going to use to certify the injection studies.

Mr. OXFORD. I will not commit to what we are going to make a

decision on in front of the Secretary at this point in time, because

we think, in some cases, we have.

Mr. STUPAK. I didn’t ask you for your recommendation. I asked

you to make a commitment to this committee that you don’t make

a recommendation either way to the Secretary until after you have

a validation of these injection studies by two more tests that you

said you are going to do.

Mr. OXFORD. No, sir, I will not make that commitment today.

Mr. STUPAK. OK. That is interesting. Mr. Whitfield for questions.

I am going to come back for a third round of questions. I am now

getting warmed up.

Mr. WHITFIELD. Thank you Mr. Chairman. Mr. Oxford, we know

that the ASP system, while it would vastly improve the security

situation, is quite a bit more expensive, and it is my understanding

that right now the PVT system that you are using, that that costs

about $70,000 per monitor and the other one, the ASP is around

$400,000 and you have about 1,400 PVT systems deployed worldwide. And I was wondering is it more cost effective to deploy ASP

systems at the major ports where you have most of the nuisance

alarms and only in secondary screening instead of considering primary screening as well?

Mr. OXFORD. Again, that will be a joint decision with Customs

and Border Protection based on, again, the effectiveness of the system as well as their operational work load. As I mentioned, at the

Port of LA/Long Beach, which gets 500 nuclear alarms per day,

once we feel like we have confidence that you can deploy ASP in

the primary, I think the CBP recommendation will be to do primary and secondary deployment of ASP at a very high volume port

61

like that. In other cases, we will continue to rely on PVT in primary with ASP in secondary. But again, this is a balance with the

operator that we have to judge.

Mr. WHITFIELD. Now, at the Port of Los Angeles, it is my understanding there are about 150 Custom and Border Protection inspectors and there are a lot of nuisance alarms there particularly. And

if you deploy this ASP system in Los Angeles with the reduction

of the nuisance alarms, it would be possible, I am assuming, to reduce the number of Customs employees there as well.

MR. OXFORD. I would expect that to be the case, but I wouldn’t

speak on behalf of CBP. They have a lot of missions they conduct

at the port, so I doubt that there would just be less in demand.

They would probably have other missions they could cover more

comfortably. There wouldn’t be a reduction in the requirement.

Mr. WHITFIELD. OK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. STUPAK. Thank you. I want to go back to Mr. Oxford if I

may, because I am disturbed about the outer limits here that are

not being tested. In your testimony, on page 2, you state, and I’ll

quote, ‘‘There are known detection limitations to the current system.’’ So you acknowledge there is limitations to the ASP, correct?

Mr. OXFORD. My comments were intended to convey that there

were known limitations to the currently deployed systems, not the

ASP.

Mr. STUPAK. OK. PVT.

Mr. OXFORD. Correct.

Mr. STUPAK. By this, then, do you mean that the existing systems, existing ones, PVT, can overlook radiological threats that

could potentially be smuggled through our borders?

Mr. OXFORD. Without getting into the details——

Mr. STUPAK. Just answer yes or no would be sufficient.

Mr. OXFORD. I can tell you that we have found some cases that

we would be concerned about, yes.

Mr. STUPAK. Then does the organization plan to use phase 3 testing in support of a certification of the ASPs.

Mr. OXFORD. We will look at the relevant data from phase 3 to

help inform that recommendation, yes, sir.

Mr. STUPAK. Then right there the book binder in front of you

please, turn to exhibit 10, page 2. This is the phase 3 test plan.

Mr. OXFORD. Which reference again, sir?

Mr. STUPAK. Exhibit No. 10, page 2. First of all, exhibit 10 is

your phase 3, correct?

Mr. OXFORD. It is the phase 3 test plan, yes.

Mr. STUPAK. So go to page 2. Doesn’t the section entitled ‘‘Test

Purpose’’ state that the phase 3 test plan is not intended for key

decision point three decision, which is a decision to approve full

scale? Isn’t that what it says?

Mr. OXFORD. Yes, sir.

Mr. STUPAK. OK. Stay with that exhibit. Please turn to page 19,

the same thing. Doesn’t this say in the section entitled ‘‘Sample

Size Methodology’’ that the tests run in phase 3 are not large

enough to be statistically meaningful for assessing probability of

detection.

Mr. OXFORD. It does.

62

Mr. STUPAK. Then if you turn to page 2 at the beginning it says,

this is the signature page. There are no signatures on the version

we are provided by your office. Did you sign this document?

Mr. OXFORD. I can’t recall whether I actually signed this version

or not. Again, sometimes when we go through version control we

add on a new version. If you notice, this is marked version 3. So

the original test plan, if we make modifications to the test plan——

Mr. STUPAK. Is there a modification after?

Mr. OXFORD. After version 1, yes.

Mr. STUPAK. After this one?

Mr. OXFORD. No, not after version 3.

Mr. STUPAK. So after March 30 this plan, exhibit No. 10, that is

the plan you are following.

Mr. OXFORD. Right.

Mr. STUPAK. You don’t know if you signed it.

Mr. OXFORD. I can’t recall if I signed that version.

Mr. STUPAK. Is there a reason why you would not have signed

the version?

Mr. OXFORD. I can’t recall that.

Mr. STUPAK. I hate to assume, but I guess we would assume you

signed off on this testing then, right?

Mr. OXFORD. We actually conducted this test.

Mr. STUPAK. So I assume then you must have signed off on this

test if you have actually conducted it?

Mr. OXFORD. Our milestone test process requires that the test

plan is approved before we go through what we call a test readiness review, which begins the test team authority to deploy and

begin the testing.

Mr. STUPAK. So you must have signed it.

Mr. OXFORD. I don’t know if I signed this one or not.

Mr. STUPAK. Well, can you explain how your office can justify

using data which is not significantly—I am sorry. Can you justify

using test data which is not of a statistically significant size to support your certification.

Mr. OXFORD. What we do is look at any available data, we find

out if it is relevant to the Secretary’s decision and we will look at

whether that data shows any trends or any potential deficiencies

in our capability. I made the decision on May 29.

Mr. STUPAK. But your document that you allegedly signed said

it must be statistically significant. The methodology that you are

collecting is not statistically significant. How would you use it for

a certification.

Mr. OXFORD. We would be remiss if we learned something in that

test that we did not provide to the Secretary. So while we first envision this test to look at some of the outer limits to look at some

of the—the goal of this test was to look at some of the limits of ASP

performance, to further develop the algorithms associated with the

systems and to define concept of operations or help work with CBP.

I made a decision that if there is existing data that is relevant to

the Secretary’s decision, it is prudent to make use of that data as

opposed to ignoring it.

Mr. STUPAK. To look at the outer limits, as you just said. And

then you said you can’t use it because it is not statistically significant. So therefore you never looked at the outer limits, did you?

63

Mr. OXFORD. I don’t think that is true. We can get into a statistics debate. If I am making a recommendation to the Secretary, I

need to make use of existing data, whether we have done 1,000

runs or 60 runs or whether we think we can draw a good reference

from that data.

Mr. STUPAK. In order to draw a valid reference from the data,

the data has to be of a significant size so you can reach a conclusion. Otherwise if your sample size is too small, the conclusion you

reach can probably be erroneous. Isn’t the confidentiality index

supposed to be 95 percent in this, and if your sample size is too

small, how do you draw your 95 percent?

Mr. OXFORD. I apologize, Mr. Chairman, for not being a statistician. We have had NIST working with us.

Mr. STUPAK. Neither am I. But it is common sense. You all know

that from looking at statistics. You try to get 95 percent, isn’t that

true?

Mr. OXFORD. That is true.

Mr. STUPAK. And isn’t that what you call for in your studies, 95

confidence before this is done?

Mr. OXFORD. There is a difference between 95 percent confidence

and the 95 percent performance goal that we have.

Mr. STUPAK. So from what I gather, you are just picking data

that justifies the certification and not passing testing that show the

ASPs have problems.

Mr. OXFORD. I totally disagree with that approach.

Mr. STUPAK. I disagree with that approach, too. How about GAO?

If the size is significantly significant, can you have a valid test.

Mr. ALOISE. That is one of our concerns about using that data,

sir, among others. But this gives you kind of an idea what we have

been trying to deal with as well. All we are looking for is what is

the plan, what is the approach, tell us what your data is and we

will go away. But it has been difficult to get those kinds of answers.

Mr. STUPAK. I understand that. Mr. Secretary, you serve at the

pleasure of the President, right.

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Yes, sir.

Mr. STUPAK. Do you think the President would be comfortable

putting detection monitors on our borders that we don’t know what

the outer limit of detection is?

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Mr. Chairman, I’ve been following this conversation. I do not understand quite frankly the details of the testing

plan or what different words mean. I am having a hard time frankly following this discussion.

Mr. STUPAK. Let me help you.

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Well, sir——

Mr. STUPAK. Let me help you. The outer limits, don’t you think

we ought to know the outer limits of the ASP before you put them

on our borders.

Mr. SCHNEIDER. I think it is important to know what the characterization of the performance is.

Mr. STUPAK. If you don’t want me to use the words ‘‘outer limit’’

give me the word you want to use. Don’t you think it is important.

Mr. SCHNEIDER. I am not in a position to answer your question

sir. I am not technically competent at this point in time.

64

Mr. STUPAK. This isn’t technical. I am not a nuclear scientist.

But any machine you put on our border that detect nuclear radiological devices coming in this country, don’t you want to know, if

it is an ASP or PVT, don’t you want to know what we can find with

that machine and what we can’t find with that machine.

Mr. SCHNEIDER. I think you have to know whether or not it

meets the established performance requirements.

Mr. STUPAK. Is it one of the performance requirements to know

what to detect and not detect.

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Mr. Chairman, I have not studied the detail performance requirements to be able to make that assessment at this

point.

Mr. STUPAK. But you are head of acquisition. Are you going to

buy something that you know that doesn’t detect things and what

it can and cannot detect, or do you just buy it based on price?

Mr. SCHNEIDER. No, we don’t just buy based on price.

Mr. STUPAK. So you want to know what it can detect and what

it cannot detect?

Mr. SCHNEIDER. As this thing works its way up the chain I will

ultimately get involved in the details to be able to make an informed recommendation to the Secretary.

Mr. STUPAK. Will you let me ask the same question I asked Mr.

Oxford. You will be the one making the recommendations to Mr.

Secretary Chertoff, won’t you, on this ASP, you will be making the

recommendation?

Mr. SCHNEIDER. I will make several recommendations.

Mr. STUPAK. Whether or not you should purchase the ASP, will

you make that recommendation?

Mr. SCHNEIDER. The investment review board will make that.

Mr. STUPAK. And are you part of that investment review board?

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Yes, I am.

Mr. STUPAK. You are chairman of it, are you not?

Mr. SCHNEIDER. I am the vice chairman.

Mr. STUPAK. So before you make that recommendation to the

Secretary, will your board and you, don’t you want to know what

this machine can and cannot detect, what are the limitations of

this machine?

Mr. SCHNEIDER. We are going to ask an awful lot of questions regarding the performance.

Mr. STUPAK. Will that be one of the questions you are going to

ask?

Mr. SCHNEIDER. I would like to review the data. I would want

to know what the performance of this machine is.

Mr. STUPAK. Including the outer limits, wouldn’t you want to

know the performance on the outer limits of this machine?

Mr. SCHNEIDER. On the surface, it sounds like that is a commonsense thing to want to know.

Mr. STUPAK. And also a security thing you would want to know,

right?

Mr. SCHNEIDER. I think it is important to understand the basis

for the performance requirements which is the capability that is required.

Mr. STUPAK. Absolutely. If this machine has limitations, this

ASP, we want to know that, don’t we?

65

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Well, if it has limitations and it cannot meet its

established performance requirements, a key performance parameter, I think that is absolutely critical. But there was rationale that

went into establishing each of the performance requirements. And

so we would look for objective quality evidence, if you will, that, in

fact, meets those performance requirements.

Mr. STUPAK. Mr. Secretary, what is the risk of a false negative

here with an ASP machine that has been fully tested? What is the

risk?

Mr. SCHNEIDER. I can’t assess that risk.

Mr. STUPAK. It can be catastrophic? Isn’t that what you all said

in your opening statements, right?

Mr. SCHNEIDER. I didn’t say that in my opening statement.

Mr. STUPAK. OK. Well, you heard other people say that at the

table, right?

Mr. SCHNEIDER. I heard other people say that.

Mr. STUPAK. So there is a risk of a false negative. So don’t we

want to know what the false negative is before we deploy it in an

ASP?

Mr. SCHNEIDER. I don’t have the performance requirements in

front of me, but I believe there are requirements in there for false

negatives, as well as false positives.

Mr. STUPAK. Let me ask a couple questions, if I can Mr. Secretary. Your September 14 letter indicates that George Thompson,

Deputy Director of Homeland Security, the HSI, will replace Mr.

Higby as chair of the independent review and that you will be

issuing a task order to fund this work, correct?

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Yes, sir.

Mr. STUPAK. When did you and Mr. Thompson first discuss heading up the review of the HSI?

Mr. SCHNEIDER. I discussed it with the head of the Homeland Security Institute on Thursday afternoon. I met with Mr. Thompson

on Friday morning. This is last Friday.

Mr. STUPAK. OK. So Thursday afternoon, Mr. Higby was there,

but after your discussion you decided to put——

Mr. SCHNEIDER. You said Mr. Higby was there. Mr. Higby was

where?

Mr. STUPAK. He was head of your HSI.

Mr. SCHNEIDER. No, he was not the head of HSI.

Mr. STUPAK. OK. What was he?

Mr. SCHNEIDER. He was and still is the dean of the Defense Acquisition University School of Program Management?

Mr. STUPAK. He was head of the review team, right?

Mr. SCHNEIDER. He was head of the review team. I talked to him

I think it was that morning about the fact or the evening before,

I forget exactly when, that I was going to replace him.

Mr. STUPAK. OK. And then you decided to go with Mr. Thompson? You talked with him Thursday afternoon.

Mr. SCHNEIDER. No. I talked to his boss, the head of the Homeland Security Institute on Thursday afternoon. I met with Mr.

Thompson on Friday morning. I did not know Mr. Thompson. And

for that matter, I don’t know what the, with one exception, I don’t

know any of the people that are on the review team.

66

Mr. STUPAK. If you didn’t know Mr. Thompson, then why did you

decide to hire Mr. Thompson to head up your independent review?

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Mr. Thompson is one of the senior officials at

the Homeland Security Institute, or FFRDC. When I realized that

perhaps I could use one of the senior folks at HSI to lead the effort,

I talked to the head of the HSI. And I said I would like your recommendations for somebody to lead this particular effort. We

worked with HSI in supporting other reviews of other DHS programs. And I was pleased—I’ve been pleased to date with the type

of support we have got.

He then basically gave me, I think it was, two recommendations.

I looked at their backgrounds, and based upon my discussion with

him I thought that Mr. Thompson would be the best choice. I wanted to confirm that by actually meeting with him. That was set up

on Friday morning.

Mr. STUPAK. OK. HSI gets 100 percent of its funding from the

Department of Homeland Security, doesn’t it?

Mr. SCHNEIDER. I believe it does.

Mr. STUPAK. Isn’t it also the case that HSI has some of its employees detailed or embedded in DNDO?

Mr. SCHNEIDER. I don’t know if they are embedded at DNDO or

not.

Mr. STUPAK. HSI doesn’t have anyone detailed over to——

Mr. SCHNEIDER. I have no idea.

Mr. STUPAK. OK.

Mr. SCHNEIDER. I know Mr. Thompson is not embedded in

DNDO.

Mr. STUPAK. If they are detailed or embedded in DNDO, could

this have an impact on HSI’s independence?

Mr. SCHNEIDER. No, it doesn’t. I get back to my comment what

an FFRDC is. This is bread-and-butter type of work for FFRDCs.

Whether it is in defense or the FAA, this is what they do.

Mr. STUPAK. Are there any HSI employees embedded in your office?

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Not that I am aware of.

Mr. STUPAK. Do you have any HSI employees detailed to your office?

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Not that I am aware of.

Mr. STUPAK. OK. Isn’t it also the case some of the funding for

HSI comes from your office?

Mr. SCHNEIDER. We have an agreement with HSI to support our

reviews. This is exactly what HSI——

Mr. STUPAK. You fund HSI, right?

Mr. SCHNEIDER. I fund HSI within the scope of what an FFRDC

is supposed to do in accordance with the interagency agreement we

have established.

Mr. STUPAK. Isn’t the case HSI leaders, including Mr. Thompson

and Mr. Anderson, the HSI director, lobbied your office for work?

Mr. SCHNEIDER. I have never met Mr. Anderson until I think it

was Wednesday afternoon.

Mr. STUPAK. Right.

Mr. SCHNEIDER. So I wouldn’t have known him if I ran into him

in the hallway.

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Mr. STUPAK. So my question was has Mr. Thompson or Mr. Anderson, the HSI director, lobbied your office for work?

Mr. SCHNEIDER. No. I have never—as I said, until Thursday, in

the case of Mr. Anderson, I never met the guy.

Mr. STUPAK. Let us go back to your September 14 letter, the task

order. Is the task order, is that a product of asking for work and

soliciting work from HSI?

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Right. We have an established agreement by

which all work under the FFRDC is done. I would be happy to provide you——

Mr. STUPAK. Sure. And in your due diligence, you said you looked

at HSI to make sure they are a good agency to get recommendations from, right?

Mr. SCHNEIDER. What I said was HSI is our FFRDC. This is

what FFRDCs do for a living.

Mr. STUPAK. Sure.

Mr. SCHNEIDER. We are using them in other areas to support

other reviews of individual programs. And they appear to be doing

a good job. That is one of the reasons why I assumed whoever

made the decision to select this group to be the FFRDC some years

ago exercised pretty good judgment.

Mr. STUPAK. As the Under Secretary, you are aware that the

Senate Homeland Security Appropriations Act of fiscal year 2008

has noted lackluster performance by HSI, cut their core funding by

50 percent, and noted that their authorization to exist will expire

in 2009. You are aware of all that?

Mr. SCHNEIDER. No, I am not.

Mr. STUPAK. Isn’t it also the case that HSI has had four directors

in 3 years?

Mr. SCHNEIDER. I don’t know.

Mr. STUPAK. Isn’t it also the case that the DHS contract with

Anser, the company running the Homeland Security Institute, expires next year and they want a contract extension?

Mr. SCHNEIDER. I am not involved—I am not aware of the details

of the contract extension.

Mr. STUPAK. Could this need for an extension have any potential

impact on HSI’s ability to give an unvarnished assessment of the

ASPs?

Mr. SCHNEIDER. I would like to point out, again, that I have

asked Mr. Thompson to head this team. The majority of the people

that are on this team come from Oakridge, Brookhaven, Lawrence

Livermore, and one outside person. And just like with DTRA, it

was not a DTRA study. I have gone to No. 1, No. 2, and No. 3 guy

at HSI to run this study. So I think to try to characterize it as an

HSI study or review probably would not be totally accurate.

Mr. STUPAK. Well, the problem I am having from where I sit, the

connectiveness between HSI and the Department of Homeland Security, you don’t bite the hand that feeds you. And then yet we

have a completely independent agency over here called Government

Accountability Office, and you seem to ignore them, but you seem

to embrace HSI, even though you have had three different directors

in 4 years, the Senate says they are not doing a real robust job

here, they have cut their funding, they are due to expire. I would

think we are thinking of something so important as our homeland

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security and what a catastrophic risk this country could face if we

don’t do this right, you would look to the completely independent

agency called Government Accountability Office and embrace their

concerns and work with them to alleviate any concerns Congress

would have, or more importantly, the American people would have

about the ASPs being our main source of detection on the borders.

You agree with that?

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Yes, sir. First off, I think if you have six members of the team that are not part of HSI, and a team leader, and

with the full knowledge of the fact that when this review is completed and presented to the Department we expect the whole team

to participate in that——

Mr. STUPAK. Did you vet all six of those people on there?

Mr. SCHNEIDER. I am sorry?

Mr. STUPAK. Did you vet all six of those people on this independent review team.

Mr. SCHNEIDER. All six people are in the process of signing conflict of interest statements.

Mr. STUPAK. Did you vet them before?

Mr. SCHNEIDER. When you say ‘‘vet,’’ what do you mean by ‘‘vet,’’

sir?

Mr. STUPAK. Did you check their background? Did you make sure

they had no conflict of interest and all of that?

Mr. SCHNEIDER. First of all, I wanted to know who they were,

whether or not they were qualified to be on this group.

Mr. STUPAK. Did you appoint these six people as your independent review?

Mr. SCHNEIDER. No.

Mr. STUPAK. Who did appoint them?

Mr. SCHNEIDER. First of all, it wasn’t a question of appointment.

I refer back to my testimony.

Mr. STUPAK. Who assigned these six people to the independent——

Mr. SCHNEIDER. I asked the associate director of DTRA to assemble of a team of people. I relied on his judgment to pick the set of

qualified people to run this particular review.

Mr. STUPAK. That gentleman is gone now, right?

Mr. SCHNEIDER. But in the process of what he did initially, he

identified several candidates that could participate.

Mr. STUPAK. Sure.

Mr. SCHNEIDER. That was basically refined and completed after

he completed—after his involvement ended. And the fact of the

matter is they are all nuclear physicists or nuclear chemists.

Mr. STUPAK. Great. That is good. Our problem is we got changing

directors, changing people, three people in 6 weeks, widening

schedules, validation without the outer limits being known. We are

talking about catastrophic risk here, I want to make sure we do it

right.

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Would you give me a chance to answer some of

those?

Mr. STUPAK. Sure. I want to make sure we do it right so we don’t

have to worry about that catastrophic risk we have been talking

about this morning. More importantly, I think the American people

would like to make sure we have it done right.

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Mr. SCHNEIDER. All right. Let us take them one at a time. First

of all, the schedule. Based upon a discussion that Mr. Oxford, the

deputy commissioner from CBP and I had, it was at that point in

time when the deputy commissioner from CBP said I really would

like another 2 months of field validation testing.

Mr. STUPAK. Great.

Mr. SCHNEIDER. And so that was the reason for the change in

schedule.

Mr. STUPAK. But you won’t promise me that you will let these

tests be conducted, give GAO time to look at the validity of the

tests before you make a recommendation on whether or not we

should move forward with the ASP.

Mr. SCHNEIDER. I think Mr. Oxford clearly stated it is the Secretary’s prerogative as to how much information and what information——

Mr. STUPAK. I agree, but you have to make the recommendation.

You have a responsibility to make the recommendation to the Secretary.

Mr. SCHNEIDER. I have a responsibility to make the recommendation, and I will make that recommendation.

Mr. STUPAK. Will you promise me you won’t make the recommendation until we do the outer limits testing we are talking

about until GAO has a chance to look at it.

Mr. SCHNEIDER. I will not make that commitment here today.

Mr. STUPAK. That is why, sir, we have to have this back and

forth, because I think it is critically important and it is only common sense that someone looks at the tests and know the outer limits of the machines before you make a recommendation to spend

$1.2 billion on ASPs that may or may not work. And the reason

why we don’t know if they may or may not work, because you are

not giving the people time to test it, to make sure it is certified,

so GAO can look at it, a truly independent agency, and say this is

what we ought to do. If we are talking about catastrophic problems

for this country, I would hope we get it right. Remember, we have

to be right 100 percent of the time; the terrorist only has to be

right once. Now that is not nuclear science, that is just common

sense. Don’t you agree with me?

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Mr. Chairman, you had quite a lot of stuff in

that particular statement. And I frankly can’t remember everything you just rattled off.

Mr. STUPAK. It was just a quick summation of this hearing we

had today. You work with this stuff day in and day out. I thought

you would keep it straight. My question isn’t that complex.

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Sir, let me make it simple. I do not agree with

everything you said. So whether or not you included it in that comprehensive statement or not, there is no way that——

Mr. STUPAK. Would you like the court reporter to read it back to

you so then you could answer the question? We have that ability

here. All I am asking, and you keep telling me, no, you won’t, that

you allow all the testing that is necessary, that GAO has a chance

to analyze it, make the recommendations before you, before you,

Mr. Oxford, and others make the recommendations to Secretary

Chertoff to spend $1.2 billion on a machine we don’t know works

or not work, when your statistical sample is so small it is not even

70

significant in the whole equation, but you are relying upon it.

Those are the things we brought out here so far today, and that

is all I am asking you to do. Common sense. Don’t you think?

Mr. SCHNEIDER. The recommendation on whether or not to spend

the money as part of a production and deployment would be made

only after and if the Secretary makes a certification regarding the

performance of the system. It is a sequential step. So from my

standpoint, the issues regarding the performance of the system will

have been thrashed out, evaluated, assessed. The Secretary is a

very demanding decision-maker. He asks for lots of information. He

will probably, as in my discussion with him, ask the GAO to come

in and brief him so he can quiz them. And he will factor all that

information into making the certification regarding performance.

Mr. STUPAK. So you know the Secretary is going to ask GAO in

before he makes his decision? You know that? Do you know that?

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Mr. Chairman, I talked to the Secretary. He explained his approach. It is to get information from multiple sources.

Mr. STUPAK. And he said GAO?

Mr. SCHNEIDER. In this particular effort, he told me he may, in

fact, ask the GAO to come in and brief him.

Mr. STUPAK. Now ‘‘may’’ is discretionary. It is not mandatory,

right? May? He may ask GAO? And he may not ask GAO?

Mr. SCHNEIDER. I think that is the prerogative of the Secretary.

Mr. STUPAK. Sure it is. But isn’t it your responsibility to the Secretary and to the American people to make sure all the questions

on testing, whether it is outer limits, are done and fully evaluated

before you make that recommendation?

Mr. SCHNEIDER. I think it is my responsibility to the Secretary

to give him my best advice based upon the testing that has been

done to date, what testing has not been done, what testing may be

planned in the future, and to provide that as part of my overall recommendation on whether he ought to certify the performance.

Mr. STUPAK. I agree with you. But let me ask you this. Have you

read GAO’s report on the ASP testing? Have you read it?

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Which report, sir? There is a lot of GAO reports.

Mr. STUPAK. Today’s testimony.

Mr. SCHNEIDER. I didn’t get this testimony, unfortunately, until

during the hearing, when you asked me whether or not I agreed

with those recommendations. So I was slightly stumbling when you

asked me if I agreed with all four recommendations. I hadn’t read

it at the time you asked me the questions. So if that is the report,

during the break I scanned the report.

Mr. STUPAK. OK. Do you agree with what GAO is saying?

Mr. SCHNEIDER. I do not agree with the recommendations.

Mr. STUPAK. That is not what I asked you. I said do you agree

with the report on the ASP testing?

Mr. SCHNEIDER. I do not understand in enough detail the details

around the different views that you have been talking about here

today.

Mr. STUPAK. If you don’t understand this, weren’t you supposed

to certify this tomorrow or yesterday? Wasn’t September 17——

Mr. SCHNEIDER. I don’t certify anything. The Secretary is the one

that certifies.

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Mr. STUPAK. All right, I am sorry, made your recommendation to

the Secretary. Weren’t you supposed to do that yesterday?

Mr. SCHNEIDER. The schedule was changed.

Mr. STUPAK. Right. So I would think you would be more on top

of this, especially the GAO report, if you were supposed to make

a recommendation this week. What date do you intend to get involved in the details of this certification recommendation?

Mr. SCHNEIDER. We would start very shortly over the next week

or two laying out the detailed schedule for what steps would be

taken prior to, and roughly a rough time frame by which the field

validation testing would be completed, what would be an appropriate amount of time for analyzing the results, what would be an

appropriate amount of time for the results of that to be provided

to the review team, and then kind of work out the schedules as to

leading up to a session with the Secretary. So it obviously would

be after the 2-month extension on the field validation testing.

Mr. STUPAK. After you make your recommendation to the Secretary, does he have a certain amount of time within which he has

to make a decision?

Mr. SCHNEIDER. There is no prescribed—as far as I am aware,

there is no prescribed time limit for that. No, as far as I know.

Mr. STUPAK. OK. Mr. Whitfield, you have any questions?

Mr. WHITFIELD. No. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate your having this

hearing. And I would just, in concluding, as a conclusion, state that

while we know there are several unanswered questions regarding

the use of the ASP in primary inspections, most of the scientists

that at least we have talked to, and Government officials, agree

that the agency should proceed with a limited deployment for secondary inspections. And I don’t think anyone would suggest that

ASP monitors in secondary screenings wouldn’t provide a dramatic

improvement over the hand-held devices that are currently being

used. So with that, Mr. Chairman, I have no other questions.

Mr. STUPAK. Let me just ask one more question, Mr. Aloise, if

I may, of the Government Accountability Office. Has GAO reviewed

the phase 3 and blind tests?

Mr. ALOISE. No, sir.

Mr. STUPAK. OK. Has GAO examined the independent review

process?

Mr. ALOISE. No, sir.

Mr. STUPAK. Well, we need GAO to continue its review of these

tests and injection studies, especially on the independent review.

So Mr. Aloise, if you would, would GAO agree to undertake that

additional work as part of your ongoing review of the ASP?

Mr. ALOISE. We certainly would intend to, yes.

Mr. STUPAK. OK. They are willing to do it. Are you willing, Mr.

Secretary, to make sure that they get the information so they can

do their review of the phase 3, the blind tests, and examine your

independent review process so they can enlighten Congress on it?

Mr. SCHNEIDER. I agree with most of that. I do not agree that

they ought to be involved in our independent review process. I believe that is within the purview of the Secretary to get advice from

whoever he wants.

Mr. STUPAK. So you don’t think——

72

Mr. SCHNEIDER. And I don’t believe—I think that’s part of the

predecisional making deliberation process on behalf of the Secretary. So I would not agree at this point in time to—I think any

concerns they may have about the testing that has been done to

date and the testing plans would be valuable input, but I do not

expect, nor would I, at this point in time, agree to provide them

access to the details of what that review team does.

Mr. STUPAK. OK. But you are going to give them all the information, the data on phase 3, the blind testing, and injection studies.

Mr. SCHNEIDER. I think Mr. Oxford has already testified today

about information that has been provided and information that will

be continuing to be provided as part of their ongoing rolling review,

so to speak.

Mr. STUPAK. Why is it then they testified today they can’t get the

information? Have you, GAO, received all the information you need

from DNDO or from the Secretary?

Mr. ALOISE. We have not received the blind tests or phase 3 tests

because they are still analyzing that, that is correct.

Mr. STUPAK. And we don’t know when that is going to be done,

but when it is done you, Mr. Secretary, you will make sure it gets

to the GAO so they can review it?

Mr. OXFORD. Mr. Chairman, if I could take that.

Mr. STUPAK. Sure.

Mr. OXFORD. We have already committed to doing that. As soon

as those test reports are completed, they will be given to the GAO.

Mr. STUPAK. OK.

Mr. OXFORD. They have the data. We are finalizing the actual report that they can work from.

Mr. STUPAK. OK. Will you make sure they get the injection study

data, too?

Mr. OXFORD. The injection studies will take about a year, but we

can certainly talk about the plan for how the injection studies will

go forth, yes, sir.

Mr. STUPAK. Well, when it is done in a year, you will give it to

them?

Mr. OXFORD. Absolutely.

Mr. STUPAK. So there really shouldn’t be a certification for at

least a year, because the injection studies won’t be done, right?

Mr. OXFORD. No, sir.

Mr. STUPAK. You will do certification before the injection studies

are completed?

Mr. OXFORD. We may make a recommendation, because we think

most of the injection study work and future testing will be primarily based on what the ranking member said, based upon the decision for primary, not secondary deployment.

Mr. STUPAK. Any questions, Mr. Whitfield?

Mr. WHITFIELD. Mr. Schneider, you are having these conflict of

interest issues are certainly being monitored by the Department,

though, correct?

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Yes, sir.

Mr. WHITFIELD. OK. Thank you.

Mr. STUPAK. OK. No further questions. I will dismiss this panel

and thank you all for coming today. I am sure before this thing is

validated we may have you back, or maybe we will have the SecVerDate 11-SEP-98 10:24 Sep 22, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00079 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 Q:\DOCS\110-63 SCOM1 PsN: SCOM1
73

retary back. But thank you for coming and thank you for answering our questions. That concludes all the questions. I want to thank

all of our witnesses for coming today and your testimony.

I ask for unanimous consent that the hearing record will remain

open for 30 days for additional questions for the record.

Without objection, the record will remain open. I ask unanimous

consent that the contents of our evidence binder there in front of

Mr. Oxford, with the exception of those documents marked for official use only, be entered into the record. In addition, the committee

will retain a copy of the full evidence binder for the record. Without

objection, the documents will be entered into the record. That concludes our hearing. Without objection, the meeting of this subcommittee is adjourned. Thank you all for being here.

[Whereupon, at 12:44 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

[Material submitted for inclusion in the record follows:]

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