Central Valley, California 

High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area

Fresno, Kern, Kings, Madera, Merced, Sacramento, San Joaquin, Stanislaus & Tulare Counties 

Annual Report 

2005 

Lou Blanas, Sheriff, Sacramento County, Chairman 

William Ruzzamenti, Executive Director, Central Valley, CA HIDTA 

April 2006 
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Central Valley California HIDTA 

2005 ANNUAL REPORT 

I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

The Central Valley California HIDTA (CVC HIDTA) is one of the most prolific 

manufacturing regions for legitimate food crops as well as illegal drugs in the United States. 

Law enforcement agencies have battled the influences and activities of drug cartels for decades 

yet this region retains its ignominious “leadership” as a drug producing region for both 

methamphetamine and massive amounts of marijuana. The immense profits reaped from illegal 

drug production in the CVC HIDTA region are estimated to be in the billions of dollars. Much 

of the drug proceeds are believed to be returned to Mexico to further enrich the drug barons who 

exercise command and control over California’s drug trafficking organizations (DTO’s). 

The typical DTO in the CVC region is one that capitalizes on the relative close proximity to 

the Mexico-U.S. border and the ability to move drugs and illegal aliens across it with relative 

ease. In March 2005, the undocumented population of Mexican Aliens reportedly reached nearly 

6 million with 24% of them living in the State of California.i The typical Mexican DTO is poly 

drug in nature and seizes the opportunity to manufacture methamphetamine in pastoral, rural 

farmlands and orchards. Its members are able to import, purchase and distribute heroin, cocaine, 

marijuana, chemicals and precursors from the many “underworld” contacts that exist in this 

region and in the neighboring drug distribution centers of Los Angeles, San Francisco and San 

Jose, California. 

The Central Valley HIDTA region has been called the “Meth Capitol” of the United States 

for several years but the overall number of methamphetamine laboratories maintained their 

steady decline throughout 2005. Methamphetamine producing DTO’s continued to operate 

superlabs in remote areas of the region producing more than 20 pounds of the drug in a single 

production cycle. There are limited instances of smuggled Pseudoephedrine and Ephedrine 

Hydrochloride occurring in the HIDTA region. These products are produced in Asia and go 

through importers in Canada and Mexico. The majority of pseudoephedrine and ephedrine come 

from domestic sources and were found to have come from the blister packs sold in retail outlets. 

The decline in the number of methamphetamine “superlabs” in the region has caused law 

enforcement experts to speculate on the cause. The leading explanation has been that law 

enforcement and community pressures in California have finally had an impact on the 

manufacturers. The coordination of efforts from the California Precursor Committee, the 

National Methamphetamine Chemicals Initiative, the California Multi-Jurisdictional 

Methamphetamine Enforcement Team (Cal-MMET) program and the HIDTAs have been 

successful. To a limited extent, clandestine laboratories may have been displaced to other states 

and gone back into Mexico. 

U.S./Mexico border enforcement agencies continued to seize methamphetamine at the 

California-Mexico Ports of Entry. Although border seizure data shows a definite increase in 

border importation trends, there is reason to believe that a significant methamphetamine 
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manufacturing potential remains in the Central Valley HIDTA region to meet the continuing 

high-demand for the drug. Reliable informants in the methamphetamine production “business” 

have offered intelligence information to members of the CVC HIDTA’s Fresno 

Methamphetamine Task Force that the “crooks” have gotten smarter. They are still producing as 

much methamphetamine in the Central Valley HIDTA region as they were previously he asserts. 

They are now avoiding discovery by going into the extremely rural agricultural areas, renting 

entire farms, operating the superlabs and burying the toxic waste on the property. Dumpsite 

discovery is therefore avoided, thereby leaving no telltale signs that a methamphetamine 

laboratory was been operating in the region. The toxic chemical dumpsites often prove this 

assertion. For example, in 2005 the Stanislaus, San Joaquin Methamphetamine Task Force 

investigated a report of chemicals dumped in unused well shafts on an extremely remote ranch. 

Access to the ranch property was down a long dusty road and approach was impossible without 

being seen by people on the property. Entrance to the fenced property was prohibited by a gate. 

The ofdficers found that three old well shafts were full of solvent and other chemical containers 

indicating that a superlab producing over 10 pounds of methamphetamine in a single process 

may have been operating in that location for several years. 

Manufacturing DTO’s have also implemented new methamphetamine production methods 

that lessen the production time required to obtain the product and therefore lessen their 

opportunity for discovery by law enforcement. For example, the utilization of Hypophosphorous 

acid and alternate chemicals as well as newly developed “flameless” production methods have 

reduced the production time to 2 hours from the six to twelve hours previously required and 

simplified the methamphetamine production process. As these methods evolve within the 

criminal subculture, new methods to escape police detection also develop making the drug 

enforcement officer’s job more demanding. 

More marijuana plants were harvested in California last year then in any previous year. No 

drug enforcement program is more arduous than the harvesting of outdoor grown marijuana from 

mountainous garden plots and huge marijuana plantations. The Sierra Mountain range borders 

the eastern side of the Central or San Joaquin Valley of California. This area has become the 

nation’s leading production center for outdoor grown marijuana. Mexican DTO’s dominate the 

region’s marijuana growing and have developed complex corporate approaches to their criminal 

endeavors. As this report was prepared in February and March of 2006, reports of DTO 

representatives scouting out new grow areas were being received. 

Drug trafficking organizations are sophisticated and well organized. They have investors, 

comprehensive logistical support teams and a small “army” of temporary workers who hoe and 

cultivate the plantations located in remote, high altitude regions. DTO operational areas often 

span great distances and occasionally extend into adjoining states. Investigations have shown 

that DTO members drive from Central Valley locations to other California counties outside of 

the HIDTA area. Their vehicles have appeared at DTO member locations in other States as well. 

This territorial expansion and displacement is believed due to the DTO’s changing operational 

practices as a result of law enforcement pressures from HIDTA initiatives and programs. Their 
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expansion has been positively confirmed through surveillances as our investigators have found 

related marijuana growing and methamphetamine activities in Shasta County, Tuolumne County 

and others in the State. Shasta County produced over 200,000 marijuana plants in 2005, an alltime record harvest. Tuolumne County is considered a critical area for marijuana cultivation and 

methamphetamine production expansion. This is due to Yosemite National Park being located 

within Tuolumne County. The National Park is an essential component of an on-going public 

lands initiative led by the U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of California. Analysis of 

available intelligence information by the Marijuana Fusion Center staff predicts a shift in 

marijuana cultivation patterns to the east and north of current growing areas. 

Some in-state DTO’s diversify their operations and sell large quantities of other drugs as well 

as manufacture methamphetamine. Most marijuana plantations on either public or private land 

are tended throughout the April-October growing season by armed guards and plot-tenders. 

Often these marijuana gardeners are illegal aliens who have been instructed to use violence to 

protect the valuable crops which have had as many as 80,000 plants in a single locale. Hikers, 

campers, hunters and others who enjoy the pristine wilderness areas of the National Parks and 

U.S. Forest Service lands are put at great risk. 

The CVC HIDTA’s law enforcement agencies continued to make inroads into drug 

manufacturing and distributing organizations in 2005. In many counties, law enforcement 

resources are scarce and the high costs of law enforcement are a continuing issue in each 

jurisdiction. Although the CVC HIDTA region is predominately rural and agricultural, the midsized cities and smaller towns have all the social problems of larger metropolitan areas. There 

are a high percentage of Latinos and minorities in the region providing the environment for the 

infiltration of Mexican dominated drug trafficking organizations. Violent gang activities have 

surfaced within the region and have often pitted one gang against the other in an explosion of 

gunfire and 2005 recorded a high level of gang violence. Outside the cities, ranchers, farmers, 

mountain hikers and urban dwellers are fearful of the violence that has developed as an adjunct 

to the drug trade. Under this backdrop, the CVC HIDTA enforcement initiatives continue to 

score impressive results against those organizations and individuals who promote the drug trade 

within the region’s communities. 

This nation’s drug abuse continues at very high levels and the Central Valley of California is 

a mirror-image of the rest of the nation. Drug treatment admissions from methamphetamine 

abuse in the nine CVC HIDTA have risen each year for the past five years.ii According to the 

National Institute of Drug Abuse, methamphetamine abuse “...several CEWG (Community 

Epidemiology Working Groups) areas report new populations of methamphetamine users, 

including Hispanics and young people...” There is an ebb and flow to the demand for illicit 

drugs in the nation’s drug markets. Regardless of which City or segment of society is the leading 

abuser for a particular drug type, the relentless fact is that someone or criminal organization will 

rise to meet the profitable demand for illicit substances. Because the drug trade is secretive and 

clandestine in nature, we can only gain an inference as to the extent of the region’s problems 

through an examination of the data recorded by law enforcement initiatives. 
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• During CY 2005, $465,842,213 worth of drugs was seized in the Central Valley California 

HIDTA region by HIDTA led initiatives. Under ordinary circumstances this would be a 

staggering blow to any business. The realities are however, that law enforcement experts 

estimate that this is probably only a small percentage of the total drugs trafficked in this region. 

Drug supplies in the CVC HIDTA region remain stable despite these impressive results. 

• Drug enforcement task forces are a cost center and drug enforcement is an expensive 

necessity. When small rural agencies commit valued personnel and limited financial resources; 

it may creates a burden on the community and often detracts from the agency’s ability to fully 

meet other requirements. Law enforcement administrators agree that drug enforcement cannot 

be ignored. To those ends, drug proceeds and assets derived from drug trafficking are seized and 

forfeited. During 2005, CVC HIDTA agencies seized $5,598,894 in real property, personal 

property and cash drug proceeds from drug traffickers. 

• The Central Valley California HIDTA’s base budget is $2.5 million for 2005. With ONDCP 

supplemental funding, the overall budget was $4,991,842. Given that investment and the 

leverage created from the contributions of Federal, State and local participating agencies, the 

combined value of drug and property seizures from drug traffickers in 2005 was $472,881,908. 

• During 2005, CVC HIDTA initiatives identified 47 drug trafficking organizations (DTO’s) as 

being the most significant targets operating in the CVC HIDTA region. Although there were 

others considered for investigation, these 47 dominated the efforts of HIDTA initiatives. Many 

of the investigations were intensive and expensive yet proved to be immensely valuable to the 

HIDTA’s drug strategy. 

• The identification and emergence of Hispanic gangs as dominant drug trafficking threats 

arose during 2005. Whereas they have existed for generations in the CVC HIDTA region, their 

prominence in methamphetamine trafficking as well as other drugs has raised concerns. The 

involvement of Norteños, Sureños and Mara Salvatrucha gangs in outdoor marijuana production 

has caused concern among law enforcement officials. 

II. INTRODUCTION 

The CVC HIDTA is pleased to summarize the exemplary work done by the men and women 

of the CVC HIDTA Initiatives during 2005. The reader will find that this Annual Report 

presents a summary of initiative activities during the last calendar year. The CVC HIDTA exists 

to implement the National Drug Control Strategy within this nine county region of Central 

California. It is structured similarly to many other HIDTAs and follows the policies and 

procedures proscribed in the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) Program Policy 

and Budget Guidance and other applicable directives. The CVC HIDTA was designated in 1999 

and has been funded for the past few years at $2.5 million. The Office of National Drug Control 

Policy designated the Central Valley California region as a critical drug trafficking area 

adversely impacting the United States. This designation has withstood the test of time and 

remains one of the nation’s most significant illegal drug producing regions. 
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The CVC HIDTA is one of 28 individual HIDTAs spread throughout the nation. It works 

cooperatively with all other HIDTAs. Because of the Central Valley’s prominence as a drug 

producing region, numerous out-of-state HIDTA threat assessment documents refer to the CVC 

HIDTA region and California as the source of their drugs. The CVC HIDTA has fostered 

cooperative and effective working relationships with regional federal, state and local law 

enforcement agencies. Nearly 400 miles spans the northern and southern terminus of the CVC 

HIDTA area of responsibility. The great distances are overcome through the close working 

relationships developed between the CVC HIDTA initiatives and regional law enforcement 

agencies. A detailed description of each initiative can be found in the CVC HIDTA 2005 

Strategy. 

CVC HIDTA law enforcement initiatives have established priorities that focus on 

investigating the most-significant DTOs operating in the region in a concentrated effort to lessen 

the drug supply. They particularly concentrate on those organizations involved with drug-related 

violent crime and presenting threats to their communities. HIDTA initiatives target DTOs that 

have the greatest adverse impact on the production and distribution of illicit substances in the 

region. There is a determined effort to counter drug production and distribution through the 

HIDTA’s area of responsibility. New investigative methodologies and techniques developed by 

the initiatives exemplify their commitment to the law enforcement process and the rule of law. 

The cooperation between federal agencies having scarce personnel resources and state and local 

agencies facing the same personnel shortages is exemplary. 

In 2005 the CVC HIDTA’s Threat Assessment defined the nature of the drug problems facing 

the nine-county region. Most Executive Board members were acutely aware of the nature of the 

drug crimes in their jurisdictions prior to developing the CVC HIDTA’s annual 2005 Strategy 

and crafting enforcement initiatives to meet those challenges. Quantifiable performance targets 

were established as a means to document individual initiative performance and achievements 

towards attaining the Strategy objectives and CVC HIDTA mission. 

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The National Program Mission Statement provides the overarching guidance for each individual 

HIDTA program: 

National HIDTA Program 

Mission Statement 

The mission of the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTA) Program is to 

disrupt the market for illegal drugs in the United States by assisting federal, state, and 

local law enforcement entities participating in the HIDTA program to dismantle and 

disrupt drug trafficking organizations, with particular emphasis on drug trafficking 

regions that have harmful effects on other parts of the United States. 

The CVC HIDTA Executive Director and Executive Board collaborated with participating 

law enforcement agencies and HIDTA staff to develop a Vision Statement for the future which 

clearly reflects what outcomes HIDTA initiatives seek to achieve. 

Central Valley California HIDTA 

Vision Statement 

Our vision is to reduce drug availability in the region which will greatly improve 

the overall quality of life for the citizens of the Central Valley of California over 

the next five years. The vision will be achieved by commitment, professionalism 

and excellence in drug law enforcement. Through our adherence to the HIDTA 

program’s mission, we will forge collaborative partnerships placing health, safety 

and welfare of the citizens first. Our efforts will sustain the beauty of this region 

and protect its rich environmental heritage for future generations to work and live. 

CVC HIDTA success is measured in part by its ability to facilitate greater efficiency, 

effectiveness and cooperation among and between external participating agencies at the local, 

state and federal level. The collocation of participating law enforcement agencies facilitates and 

enhances resource sharing. This has become a key strategy to success for the HIDTA program. 

The increased information sharing and inter-agency cooperation fostered by the CVC HIDTA’s 

design and strategy has forged the separate law initiatives into an effective and efficient 

counterdrug force. The CVC HIDTA Executive Director and Executive Board realizes that with 

clarity of mission and a dedication of combined resources, this region’s law enforcement, 

intelligence and prosecution communities can make inroads into solving the immense public 

safety problems that confronts this region. 
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Central Valley California HIDTA 

The CVC HIDTA mission statement succinctly states the program’s intent and direction. 

Central Valley California HIDTA 

Mission Statement: 

The mission of the Central Valley California HIDTA (CVC HIDTA) is to reduce 

the manufacture, trafficking, and distribution of methamphetamine, precursor 

chemicals, and other dangerous drugs by attacking and dismantling the largescale and often violent organizations responsible through the implementation of 

cooperative and innovative strategies. The goals of the CVC HIDTA are to: 

reduce drug availability by disrupting and dismantling drug trafficking 

organizations; to reduce the harmful consequences of drug trafficking and to 

improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the region's law enforcement 

organizations. 

Reporting Period: This Annual Report covers the reporting period January 1, 2005 to December 

31, 2005. 

Budget Allocation: During 2005, ONDCP allocated a $2,500,000 base budget for CVC HIDTA 

operations. The majority of CVC HIDTA funds are applied to investigative and intelligence 

initiatives with only about 10% of the funds applied to Administrative overhead expenses. This 

approach maximizes the impact of the enforcement and supporting intelligence initiatives and 

places recognition of their importance towards attaining the National HIDTA Mission. As noted 

in this Annual Report, the CVC HIDTA has documented significant success towards achieving 

its mission, and yet each law enforcement officer knows that this is a long-term struggle against 

the criminal influences of the region and the individual miseries created by drug addiction. 

Geographic Area of Responsibility: 

• Central Valley California HIDTA Counties: Kern, 

Kings, Tulare, Merced, Madera, Fresno, San Joaquin, 

Stanislaus and Sacramento. 

• The Cities of Sacramento and Bakersfield define the 

northern and southern boundaries. 

• One hour drive east of San Francisco metropolitan 

area. 

• Two hours drive northeast of Los Angeles. 

• Six hours drive from the U.S.-Mexico Border. 

• Region produces 1/4th of the nation’s food products. 

The Central Valley California HIDTA region; 

contains a unique blending of geography and cultures. It 
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is nearly 400 miles in length and extends from the top of the Sierra Mountains to the west and 

abuts the Coastal Counties. Agriculture and food production is the predominate industry. 

Orchards, farms and ranches dominate the landscape. The 2000 Census lists Fresno as the 

largest city with nearly 1⁄2 million residents and Sacramento, Modesto and Bakersfield follow. 

III. National HIDTA Goals 

HIDTAs have adopted two specific goals that define the challenge of mission attainment. 

These two goals guide all HIDTA initiatives and activities throughout the United States. The 

CVC HIDTA is proud to present these national HIDTA program goals, plus concise summaries 

of its Threat Assessment for Budget Year 2005 and resultant Strategy in the following sections. 

The CVC HIDTA has fashioned its strategy to meet local drug threats currently existing. The 

national goals are the local goals for the same objective is obtained. 

NATIONAL HIDTA GOALS 

Goal 1: Disrupt the market for illegal drugs by 

dismantling or disrupting drug trafficking and/or money 

laundering organizations; and 

Goal 2: Improve the efficiency and effectiveness of 

HIDTA initiatives. 

The above goals represent an aiming point for CVC HIDTA initiatives. They also provide 

the foundation upon which performance planning and outcome measurement are based. As the 

CVC HIDTA develops budget submissions, each CVC HIDTA initiative must present 

programmatic and fiscal justifications that are based on the regional Threat Assessment. They 

must articulate how the initiative’s funding request directly addresses the threat then set realistic 

performance measures. Each initiative must eventually provide specific information on how the 

funding has allowed the CVC HIDTA to meet its desired outcomes. CVC HIDTA initiatives are 

developed within clear national guidelines governing all HIDTA activities and expenditures. 

The CVC HIDTA Executive Board is significantly involved in all aspects of the Central 

Valley California HIDTA, and reviews the Intelligence, Investigation, Interdiction, and initiative 

activities. The Board provides a forum to discuss and evaluate important trends in regional drug 

trafficking. It exchanges information on which drugs are being distributed throughout the 

region, and the DTOs that are responsible. The Board also addresses important administrative 

issues in its oversight capacity. The Board has established an Intelligence Subcommittee that 

supports CVC HIDTA initiatives and its participating agencies on a wide variety of intelligence 

issues. These include training, computer technology and other matters. CVC HIDTA success is 

measured by results, and each initiative is fully accountable for its success or failure in meeting 

its objectives. 
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IV. Summary of Threat Assessment for Budget Year 2005 

Mexican led DTO’s are the dominant force in the production of both marijuana and 

methamphetamine. These are the leading drugs of abuse for the region. The DTO’s are 

responsible for the manufacture, importing and exporting of methamphetamine and the 

importation and distribution of other drug types including heroin, cocaine and marijuana. The 

HIDTA area is a distribution source for many Central and Eastern States. 

Most criminal organizations are relatively small however that is not always the case. One DTO 

that was investigated during 2005 is believed to have over 150 members and operates in at least 

5 different states. The Mexican led DTOs are organized and well financed. Many have operated 

for years without significant intervention by law enforcement. They frequently use illegal 

Mexican immigrants. They are difficult to penetrate by law enforcement because of their 

structure and familial relationships. Most have direct ties into their original hometowns and 

states in Mexico. 

Central Valley methamphetamine “superlabs” produce more than all other domestic 

laboratories. A “superlab” is one that manufactures over 10 pounds of methamphetamine in one 

24 hour production cycle. In the past five years the El Paso Intelligence Center’s National 

Clandestine Laboratory Seizure System reported 249 “superlabs” were found in CVCA HIDTA 

counties. Some laboratories produced over 20 pounds each cycle and are believed to have 

operated without detection for months before police intervention. Kern County recorded the 

most number of superlabs (6) of all counties in the Central Valley HIDTA during 2005 although 

their overall laboratory responses have decreased considerably. The HIDTA’s nine counties 

accounted for one third of the total superlabs in California and over half of all the superlabs 

found in the nation. Most of the nation’s methamphetamine markets are supplied by 

methamphetamine manufactured or shipped from the Central Valley of California. Drugs are 

transported from the Central Valley over the freeways and highways intersecting this region. 

Pseudoephedrine and ephedrine are critical to methamphetamine manufacturing. Mexico 

based DTO’s have set up accounts with chemical suppliers in Europe, Canada, Asia and the Far 

East to obtain precursor chemicals, reagents and solvents. Tons of ephedrine and 

Pseudoephedrine were imported into Mexico last year. 

Marijuana cultivation on public lands: Mexican DTO’s are often polydrug operations thus 

maximizing year-round income. They have seemingly perfected the “art” of creating large-scale 

marijuana cultivation plots on public lands in the CV HIDTA region and throughout California. 

In 2005, violence in the marijuana growing forest regions continued sporadically throughout the 

state. A Forest Service K-9 dog was assaulted and injured attempting to apprehend a suspect. 

Forest Service officers were shot at and a California Department of Game and Fish Officer was 

shot in the legs during a Santa Clara County marijuana garden raid. Other violent events 

include: 

♦ A Stanislaus County Sheriff’s Sergeant led a marijuana eradication team into Del Porto 

Canyon in September 2005. The garden was a typical Mexican National grow site that 

was protected by armed individuals. A garden tender shot at a sheriff’s sergeant as they 
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approached the garden and the bullet hit a branch near his head. A splinter from that 

branch hit the Sergeant’s head. The eradication team retreated and called for 

reinforcements. Afterwards, they recovered 16, 967 plants from the grow site. 

♦ In September 2005, two Dos Palos men were shot while looking for a marijuana garden 

between Merced and Los Baños. The men told police that they intended to take some of 

the marijuana but were shot by an unknown assailant who escaped. 

Harmful Consequences: Methamphetamine addiction is the greatest regional abuse issue. 

Marijuana use is widespread. Treatment program admissions vary by drug however 

methamphetamine treatment program admissions are rising. Heroin admissions are declining. 

Ecstasy and the “designer” drugs are commonly abused as are pharmaceuticals such as 

OxyContin. Cocaine and crack cocaine remain in demand in all locations particularly in the 

larger cities where street level crack sales are often conducted by gang members. 

Protecting drug endangered children is a priority. During 2005, HIDTA task force members 

reported rescuing 49 Drug Endangered Children from dangerous environments. There are 

significant levels of methamphetamine deposited throughout a house with a methamphetamine 

laboratory. This is dangerous for small children as methamphetamine contamination pervades 

everything in a house. The short and long term affects of this exposure remains unknown. 

The Central Valley HIDTA promotes the ONDCP 25 Cities initiative in Sacramento. A 

California National Guard operated Drug Demand Reduction Initiative works throughout the 

region informing young people of the dangers of drug abuse. 

V. CVC HIDTA Strategy Summary 

The 2005 Strategy was designed to address Central Valley California HIDTA operations. 

The CY 2005 CVC HIDTA Strategy was designed to implement National Goal #1 and #2 and to 

improve the efficiency and effectiveness of HIDTA Initiatives. The consequences of this aspect 

of the strategy are expected to result in a greater potential to disrupt or dismantle a DTO. 

Training does not necessarily offer a short term and immediately identifiable return on 

investment. 

Once the drug threat is defined, the Executive Board’s strategy to combat drug crimes uses 

the existing law enforcement initiatives already in place whenever possible. If already HIDTA 

funded, an initiative’s operations are reviewed for modifications and continued funding. The 

HIDTA Director and Executive Board have the responsibility to review and restructure existing 

HIDTA initiatives and conduct an annual assessment. They may modify those initiatives as 

necessary to meet emerging threats or shifting conditions. Enforcement efficiencies are 

enhanced by using the existing taskforce structures and redefining their individual 

responsiveness through the mission statements. 

Additional task forces or non-enforcement entities can contribute service and knowledge that 

heightens the overall success of the CVC HIDTA program. The HIDTA Director and Executive 
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Board examined their response options to the identified threats and looked towards building 

additional elements into the program that become components of the four HIDTA subsystems: 

• Investigative sub-system 

• Interdiction sub-system 

• Intelligence sub-system 

• Support sub-system 

In the CVC HIDTA, collaborating with the California National Guard’s demand reduction 

outreach program has proven to be very successful and a value-added activity. All initiatives are 

encouraged to have a public outreach and education component. 

A regional intelligence center in Fresno is staffed by trained experts whose services are 

available to all initiatives. The expansiveness of the Central Valley HIDTA region often leads to 

prolonged travel time to the Fresno Intelligence Center. A review of ISC intelligence service 

usage led the Director and staff to conclude that decentralized intelligence analysts would 

provide additional benefits to the investigative initiatives. A mechanism was developed to place 

decentralized intelligence analysts into the operating HIDTA task forces. This enabled on-site 

tactical intelligence support at the point of greatest criticality. Travel time delays were 

eliminated. The combined effort yields a program that is effective and efficient and continues to 

meet the drug enforcement needs of the Central Valley of California. 

Initiative performance and adherence to ONDCP programmatic requirements are reviewed 

annually through the CVC HIDTA’s annual self-review process. Key performance areas are 

examined to include compliance with Fiscal; Inventory; Administrative and Performance aspects 

of each task force. 

Intelligence led investigations are the keystone of HIDTA activities. To accomplish its 

mission, the CVC HIDTA coordinates intelligence-driven, multi-agency initiatives. The 

investigative targets of a DTO are its functional components including the following aspects: 

Precursor chemical acquisition 

Production 

Logistics 

Command and control 

Communications systems 

Transportation 

Money laundering and drug proceeds removal 

The CVC HIDTA funded 8 core initiatives in CY 2005. Four (4) Supplemental Funded 

initiatives were also undertaken. One (1) unfunded National Guard led demand reduction 

initiative participated in the CVC HIDTA region. 

Base Funded Initiatives for 2005:

5 Investigative DTO focused initiatives. 

1 Fugitive Initiative 
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1 Intelligence Initiative 

1 Management Initiative 

Supplemental Funded Initiatives during 2005: 

1 Investigative Initiative, Central Valley Marijuana Investigative Team 

1 Marijuana Fusion Center (Intelligence sub-system) 

1 Domestic Market Eradication Program initiative 

1 Highway Interdiction Initiative 

1-CAMP-Campaign Against Marijuana Planting Eradication team 

1- CAMP -Investigative team 

Unfunded Drug Demand Reduction initiative:

California National Guard was housed in the ISC offices. 

(Note - A detailed description of each initiative can be found in the 2006 Strategy.) 

VI. HIDTA Performance Measures 

Performance measures introduce a new capability to quantify and track HIDTA targets and 

monitor HIDTA results. With application of the new PMP, the CVC HIDTA Annual Report now 

functions as a report card; a barometer of HIDTA efficiency and effectiveness; a source for 

comparison with previous year efforts; and most importantly, a beacon for future action. The 

following series of tables and charts present specific outputs and efficiency measures organized 

in CVC HIDTA Goal order. These measurable results reflect a continuing increase in efficiency 

and effectiveness at lower programmatic costs. 

Performance Measures for Goal 1 

Goal 1: Disrupt the market for illegal drugs by 

dismantling or disrupting drug trafficking and/or money 

laundering organizations; and 
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Table 1 – DTOs and MLOs Disrupted or Dismantled for 2005 

HIDTA Law Enforcement Initiatives for 2005 at Central Valley California HIDTA 

Year DTOs 

Identified 

Total 

Targeted 

# 

Disrupted 

% of 

Targeted 

Disrupted 

# 

Dismantled 

% of 

Targeted 

Dismantled 

Begin 

2005 9 9 4 44% 0% 

During 

2005 39 37 9 24% 19% 

Total 

2005 48 46 13 28% 15% 

0 

7 

7 

CVC HIDTA CY2005 field operations began with several very significant DTO investigations 

carried over from the previous year. The size, sophistication and diversified nature of the DTO’s 

operations required considerable manpower to be dedicated to surveillances and other 

investigative activities. Investigators traveled across the country to Eastern and Central States 

pursuing investigative leads and collaborating with investigators in those jurisdictions. Although 

there may be fewer organizations reported as disrupted or dismantled, the statistics belies the 

scope and importance of those investigations. 

Table 2 - Percentage of DTOs and MLOs Disrupted or Dismantled by Scope, 2005 

HIDTA DTOs Disrupted or Dismantled, for 2005, at Central Valley California HIDTA [ALL DTOs; MLOs 

included] 

Scope # 

Identified 

# 

Targeted 

# 

Disrupted 

% of 

Targeted 

Disrupted 

# 

Dismantled 

% of 

Targeted 

Dismantled 

Total 

Disrupted 

or 

Dismantled 

Total % 

Disrupted 

or 

Dismantled 

International 5 5 3 60% 0 0% 3 60% 

Multi-state 8 8 2 25% 0 0% 2 25% 

Local 35 33 8 24% 7 21% 15 45% 

Total 48 46 13 28% 7 15% 20 43% 

CVC HIDTA Initiatives worked throughout 2005 on intelligence driven investigations of major 

trafficking organizations. The investigation of local organizations naturally dominates 

investigative efforts as the sources of information and technical capabilities allow the initiatives 

to proceed within their normal range of operations. 
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Table 3 - Percentage of Money Laundering Organizations Disrupted or Dismantled by 

Scope, 2005 

The Central Valley California HIDTA did not have any Money Laundering Organizations 

reported during 2005. 

HIDTA Money Laundering Organizations Disrupted or Dismantled, for 2005, at Central Valley California 

HIDTA 

Scope 

# 

Identified 

MLOs 

# 

Targeted 

# 

Disrupted 

% of 

Targeted 

Disrupted 

# 

Dismantled 

% of 

Targeted 

Dismantled 

Total 

Disrupted 

or 

Dismantled 

Total % 

Disrupted 

or 

Dismantled 

International 0 0 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 

Multi-state 0 0 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 

Local 0 0 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 

Total 0 0 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 

Table 4 - Operational Scope of All DTO Cases Initiated for 2005 

HIDTA Operational Scope, 2005, at Central Valley California HIDTA 

Scope # CPOT 

Cases 

# RPOT 

Cases 

# OCDETF 

Cases 

% OCDETF of 

Total Cases 

International 0 0 1 50% 

Multi-state 0 0 4 57% 

Local 0 1 4 27% 

Total 0 1 9 38% 

Drug trafficking organizations in the Central Valley HIDTA region are no different than the 

organized crime organizations identified as the “Mafia.” Although most are of a different 

ethnicity, they are as well organized, as ruthless, as well financed and managed as the Italian 

Mafia organizations of previous decades. The CVC HIDTA region DTO’s are comprised mostly 

of Mexican individuals. Many come from the State of Michoacan in Mexico. They are very 

tight knit and difficult to penetrate by undercover operatives. The fear of assault or death from 

DTO members minimizes the number of confidential informants that are recruited into the 

highest level of international DTO’s. 
______________________________________________________________________________ 

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Central Valley California HIDTA 

We have noted that the DTO’s are efficient at the production of their illegal drugs. The U.S.­

Mexico border does not appear to be a serious impediment either and escaping law enforcement 

detection is paramount. They now practice business diversification and are vertically integrated 

from raw material acquisition to product distribution. Police surveillance units frequently note 

that the DTO’s practice counter-surveillance techniques. Their farms, ranches or compounds 

have been seen to have armed guards on occasion. The sophistication and intent of the Central 

Valley criminal organizations has caused them to be a potent force to be dealt with by law 

enforcement. 

Long term investigations must be under taken in order to gather sufficient evidence for arrest 

and prosecution. Costly and protracted electronic surveillance methods must be employed in 

order to dismantle an organization. The Central Valley of California is an under-recognized 

production and transshipment locale for drug markets around the country. Their 

methamphetamine, marijuana, cocaine and heroin are delivered to virtually every major 

metropolitan area in the country. The significance of California as a drug source is reflected in 

the Threat Assessments of other HIDTAs. Most of them clearly reference that the source of their 

drug supply is in California. Highway interdiction and Pipeline stops in Northwest, Midwest and 

Eastern states disclose that drugs are outbound from California and bulk cash seizures are 

traveling west towards the state. 

Tables 1 through 4 reflect the impact CVC HIDTA initiatives had on DTOs, not only within 

the HIDTA region itself, but also on a national and international level as well. Throughout the 

year, CVC HIDTA initiatives identify the most significant DTO’s operating in the region. 

These tables demonstrate the CVC HIDTA’s commitment to improve community safety and 

reduce retail drug sales by targeting local DTOs. Targeting local DTO’s is an important 

component of the HIDTA strategy as they generally have their sources of drug supply in Mexico. 

Oftentimes they become the “retail” distributors of the Mexico-produced drugs. Proving the 

exact nature of that supply source isn’t always possible. Attacking the wholesalers who supply 

street level traffickers in conjunction with investigating larger DTO targets has a ripple effect in 

the drug supply chain. Arresting street dealers, even though the drug quantity seized may be 

small, impacts the ability of international and multi-state DTOs to get their drugs into the hands 

of drug users, thus helping in the overall disruption of this “black market industry.” By making 

it more difficult and time consuming for drug buyers to “score” a local connection it disrupts the 

drug markets. If local agencies and task forces adopt a two pronged drug enforcement strategy 

that consists of attacking both the supply and demand, it is harder for street level dealers to sell 

their drugs and for buyers to obtain the substances. The ultimate result is market disruption as 

the DTO’s are not able to move the volume of drugs that they want. 
______________________________________________________________________________ 

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Central Valley California HIDTA 

Table 5 - Drugs Removed from the Marketplace, 2005 

There are massive amounts of drugs in the Central Valley HIDTA region during any given 

year. The region is both a manufacturing and warehousing region for illicit drugs and a 

waypoint to other states in the nation. Most major DTO’s assume the likelihood that a portion of 

their drugs will be seized by law enforcement. These are generally considered to be “acceptable 

losses” but are to be avoided whenever possible. During CY 2005, the CVC HIDTA had a 

significant impact on the region’s drug trade through its drug seizures. HIDTA initiatives submit 

an annual drug price list showing the market price of each drug type in their respective territory. 

These are averaged for the entire area and a median value is reported for PMP purposes. Since 

HIDTA initiatives investigate the higher-level of drug organizations, they are considered to 

operate at the “wholesale” level and their price lists reflect that focus. Table 5 lists the wholesale 

values of the respective drugs seized, thus giving a depiction of the drugs in circulation and 

economic impact of removing these drugs from the marketplace. In this fashion, achieving the 
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Central Valley California HIDTA 

CVC HIDTA goals is more clearly shown in terms of real dollar outcomes. Table 6 shows the 

Actual ROI on drug seizures. 

Table 6 - Return on Investment (ROI) for Drugs Removed from the Marketplace by Law

Enforcement Initiatives, 2005 

Central Valley California HIDTA Return on Investment (ROI) for Drugs Removed from 

the Marketplace by Law Enforcement Initiatives, by Year 2005 

Year Budget Baseline Drug 

Wholesale Value 

Targeted 

Drug ROI 

Drug Wholesale Value 

Removed From Market 

Actual 

Drug ROI 

2004 $2,259,166.00 $22,259,166.00 $2.00 $1,198,261,165.00 $530.00 

2005 $4,991,842.00 $22.259,168.00 $2.00 $1,604,897,085.00 $321.50 

Table 7 - Return on Investment (ROI) for Assets Removed from the Marketplace by Law

Enforcement Initiatives, 2005 

Central Valley California HIDTA 

Return on Investment (ROI) for Assets 

Removed from the Marketplace by Law Enforcement Initiatives, by Year 

Year Budget 

Baseline 

Value 

of Drug 

Assets 

Targeted 

Asset ROI 

Value of Drug 

Assets Removed 

from Market 

Actual 

Asset ROI 

Cash Other Assets Total 

2004 $2,259,166 $4,518,832 $2. $2,757,875 $1,754,600. $4,512,475 $2. 

2005 $4,991,842. $4,518,332 $2. $1,440,801. $5,598,894. $7,039,695. $1.41 

CVC HIDTA initiatives had a return on investment of $1.41 for every dollar invested in asset 

seizures. Although seizing and forfeiting assets obtained from drug sales is an important 

component of task force operations, it is not a primary component of enforcement operations. 

Asset seizures vary greatly from year to year and the variables do not lend themselves to easily 

project that a given amount will be seized annually. It is well-recognized that the costs to 

participating law enforcement agencies are quite high and exceed that which HIDTA provides. 

These costs include such expenses as officer salaries, police overhead and so forth. Table 7 does 

factor in such outside expenses when calculating ROI, but is focused directly on what HIDTA 

spends. It is surmised that the target 2005 ROI of $2.00 was not met because of the exhaustive 

investigative efforts that occupied most of the initiative’s available time. 
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Central Valley California HIDTA 

Table 8 - Total Return on Investment (ROI) for Drugs and Assets Removed from the 

Marketplace by Law Enforcement Initiatives, 2005 

Central Valley CA HIDTA Total ROI by Year 

Year Budget 

Drugs and 

Assets 

Baseline 

Targeted 

Total ROI 

Drugs and 

Assets 

Removed 

From Market 

Actual 

Total 

ROI 

2004 $2,250,166 $6,777,498 $3 $1,202,809,640 $532 

2005 $4,991,842. $6,777,498 $4. $1,611,936,780. $322.91 

2006 

2007 

A criminal enterprise is somewhat similar to a business corporation. Corporate survival and 

profit making are key issues to staying in business. A DTO is no different in that has its 

structure and vulnerabilities. A criminal organization may be disrupted or dismantled much like 

a business can. One of the effective techniques for disassembling a DTO is reducing its drug 

assets and consequently its ability to pay its “stockholders” and survive. In the case of a drug 

trafficking criminal organization, seizing its drug assets is an effective and efficient methodology 

for damaging the DTO’s ability to continue in a highly competitive marketplace. 

Tables 6, 7 and 8 demonstrate the efficiency of the CVC HIDTA initiatives and their 

identification and targeting of the region’s most-significant drug trafficking organizations. 

Utilizing intelligence directed investigations presents opportunities for success and the 

realization of larger returns than less sophisticated investigative methods. The drug and asset 

seizures serve as testimony as to the success of long-term investigations. 

As shown in Tables 6 and 7, the CVC HIDTA law enforcement officers seized $1.604, 

897,085.00 wholesale value of illicit drugs during 2005. The seizures culminated several longterm investigations of high-level DTO’s engaged in the production and distribution of wholesale 

quantities of drugs. The volume of drugs seized in 2005 may not be repeated in subsequent years 

however the potential remains. 

In all, the CVC HIDTA permanently removed 1.6 billion dollars in illicit drugs and drug 

related assets from the marketplace. This is a remarkable figure and reflects a ROI of $322.91 for 

CY 2005. . Significant benefits were achieved at low cost. 
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Central Valley California HIDTA 

Table 9 - Prosecution Outputs and Outcomes, 2005 

HIDTA Cost per Investigation by Year at Central Valley California HIDTA HIDTA 

Year Investigations 

Baseline 

Investigations 

Projected 

Investigations 

Handled 

% 

Handled 

2004 0 0 0 0% 

2005 0 0 0 0% 

No prosecution initiatives exist in the CV HIDTRA 

Table 10 - Value of Clandestine Methamphetamine Labs Dismantled by size for 2005 

HIDTA Methamphetamine Laboratories Dismantled in 2005, 

at Central Valley California HIDTA 

Meth Cost Per Ounce $525.00 

Lab Size 

A. Less than 2 Oz 

ID/Targeted 

17 

Dismantled 

17 

Dismantled 

Value of Labs 

$17,850.00 

B. 2 - 8 Oz 18 18 $47,250.00 

C. 9 Oz – 1 Lb 2 2 $13,125.00 

D. 2 - 9 Lbs 3 3 $138,600.00 

E. 10 - 20 Lbs 16 16 $2,016,000.00 

F. Over 20 Lbs 4 4 $672,000.00 

Total 60 60 $2.904,825.00 

Methamphetamine production continued throughout 2005. The chart leads the reader to 

believe these were one-time “clanlab” events but that is incorrect. Methamphetamine 

laboratories can operate for months or years before discovery. Evidence gathered by law 

enforcement initiatives now proves the movement of large superlabs into remote regions. 

Mexico based trafficking organizations are the preeminent poly-drug traffickers in the United 

States. They excel at hiding their superlabs in extremely rural and remote locations escaping 

detection and intervention. The Mexican organizations have sources of supply for chemicals, 

precursors and solvents needed to produce methamphetamine in clandestine laboratories 

throughout the region. Superlabs remain numerous and the region has been a leader for several 

years in methamphetamine laboratories capable of producing over 20 pounds in a single 

production cycle. 
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Central Valley California HIDTA 

The Central Valley HIDTA region has been the “Meth Capitol” of the United States for 

several years. DTOs import pseudoephedrine and ephedrine from Canada and Mexico as well as 

purchased it from domestic sources. In the last three years, there has been a recorded decline in 

the number of methamphetamine “superlabs” in the region, law enforcement has only speculated 

on the cause for the declines. The leading explanation has been that the immense concerted law 

enforcement and community pressures in California that developed over the past 20 years of 

dealing with the methamphetamine lab problems have finally shown to be effective. The 

coordination of efforts from the California Precursor Committee, the National Methamphetamine 

Chemicals Initiative, the California Multi-Jurisdictional Methamphetamine Enforcement Team 

(Cal-MMET) program and the HIDTAs have proven their worth. To a limited extent, 

clandestine laboratories may have been displaced to other states and back into Mexico however 

CVC HIDTA initiatives continue in their enforcement efforts against the many laboratory 

operators in the region. 

Table 10 shows that CVC HIDTA initiatives identified and targeted 60 labs and dismantled all. 

Methamphetamine has an average local selling price of $525. per ounce. That is down from the 

$620 per ounce price of last year. The removal of nearly $3,000,000 worth of methamphetamine 

has had little impact on the region’s supply. It is worth noting that the average price of an ounce 

of methamphetamine had dropped nearly $100 from 2005 to 2006. We believe this supports the 

contention of abundant meth supplies in the HIDTA area. 

Table 11 - Clandestine Laboratory Activities, 2005 

HIDTA Clandestine Activities for Central Valley California HIDTA, in 2005 

Baseline # Projected # Identified % Identified 

Laboratory Dump 

Sites Seized 63 67 115 171% 

100% Chemical/Glassware 

Equipment Seizures 

Persons Affected: 

5 22 22 

Children 0 61 61 100% 

Table 11 shows three methamphetamine related activities that are indicia of the extent of a 

region’s methamphetamine problems. The chart merely records events but does not impart the 

scope of the clandestine laboratory dumpsites, for example. Table 11 does not quantity the 

impact of tons of toxic substances buried in the farmlands of this region. It does provide an 

understanding that the business community often plays an innocent role in the operation of 

clandestine laboratories. The demand for pseudoephedrine in this region is generally met by one 

of two ways. First is the importation and acquisition of bulk ephedrine hydrochloride or 

pseudoephedrine to use as the essential precursor for the production of methamphetamine. Bulk 

quantities of pseudoephedrine are harder to acquire as a result of rigorous enforcement by U.S. 
______________________________________________________________________________ 

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Central Valley California HIDTA 

and Canadian authorities. Mexico-based DTOs import from foreign sources into that country 

and it is assumed that the majority of the pseudoephedrine is used in Mexican laboratories. 

The second source of obtaining pseudoephedrine is through the purchase or theft of cold 

tablets containing the drug in compound. Large groups of individuals and often street gang 

members can make considerable profits from engaging in “smurfing.” That term is applied to 

many individuals going to retail outlets throughout the region and buying the legal limits of cold 

pills. The individual purchases are then aggregated at a central location and the “bulk” tablets 

are sold to the methamphetamine producing individuals. The number of suspicious calls from 

merchants reflects the valued relationship that has been developed between the CVC HIDTA’s 

Precursor Vendor Program investigators and their merchant training programs which instruct 

store operators on the methods and techniques of those buying essential products for 

methamphetamine production. 

The decline in dumpsites, chemical and glassware seizures have been readily apparent for the 

last few years. Methamphetamine manufacturers came to realize that police officers were 

studying their dumpsites in detail and processing the evidence as a crime scene. Often 

fingerprints and identifying items found intermingled in the dumpsite led to criminal 

prosecutions. Also, clusters of dumpsite patterns are analyzed to determine the estimated 

production volume and duration of production of related methamphetamine laboratories. The 

analysis of dumpsites and their materials has led to focusing investigative efforts to within a few 

miles radius of the dumpsites. On occasion the laboratories were located by conducting a search 

of the surrounding area which was often rural and sparsely populated. Now the 

methamphetamine manufacturers are burying their toxic dumpsite material in the ground using 

tractors and bulldozers rather than risking discovery by the police. The adverse environmental 

impact of this practice is clear. The CVC HIDTA initiatives have been successful with 

identifying and dismantling operational laboratories, as indicated in Table 10. 

Chemical dump sites pose a significant health hazard for the CVC HIDTA region, its 

population and the agricultural lands. Intelligence analysts and initiative investigators combined 

to identify 115 dump sites in 2005. The California Department of Toxic Substances is 

responsible for dumpsite remediation after law enforcement completes its investigative activities. 
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Central Valley California HIDTA 

(This Space Intentionally left blank.) 
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Central Valley California HIDTA 

Goal 2: 

Improve the efficiency and effectiveness of HIDTA initiatives. 

Performance Measures for Goal 2 

Table 12 – CVC HIDTA Training Efficiency by Year and Type of Training for 2005 

HIDTA Training Efficiency, 2005, at Central Valley California HIDTA 

Type of 

Training 

# Students 

Expected for 

Training 

# Students 

Trained 

# Training 

Hours 

Actually 

Provided 

Total Training 

Cost 

Training Cost 

per Hour 

2004 2005 2004 2005 2004 2005 2004 2005 2004 2005 % Change 

2004-2005 

Analytical/ 

Computer 

25 25 21 33 526 160 $7,168 $7,650 $14. $47.81 313% 

Investigative/ 

Interdiction 410 400 516 664 6703 833 $48,383 $57,935 $7. $69.55 1000% 

Managment/ 

Administrative 

40 3 30 5 432 96 $3,534 $2,240 $8. $23.33 300% 

Other 0 0 0 0 0 0 $0 $0 0 0 0% 

Total 475 428 498 702 7,623 1,089 $59,135 $67,825 $29.00 $62.28 214% 

Training is essential in improving the safety, efficiency and effectiveness of CVC HIDTA 

initiative operations. Training that focuses on providing the lawfully mandated clandestine 

laboratory investigation skills (OSHA Hazardous Materials Technician, etc.) is the primary 

training type for HIDTA initiatives. Most initiatives maintain standing “clan’lab” teams on 

constant stand-by duty in preparation of a laboratory callout. The CVC HIDTA provided 

training to 702 students in 2005 for a total of 1,089 classroom hours. The training was designed 

to improve their analytical skills, bolster their investigative knowledge and develop their 

managerial abilities. This training, which cost CVC HIDTA on average $62.00 per classroom 

hour reflects the technical sophistication of this year’s training programs such as those required 

for highway interdiction. Naturally, this training was provided free of charge to CVC HIDTA 

assigned investigators. These training courses would not have been available without CVC 

HIDTA support, funding and the utilization of no-cost guest instructors provided by a variety of 

training vendors. 

Table 13 follows and depicts one of the critical aspects of drug law enforcement activities 

in the Central Valley California HIDTA region. Investigators and intelligence analysts have 
______________________________________________________________________________ 

______________________________________________________________________________ 

Central Valley California HIDTA 

used the event and case deconfliction system provided through the Los Angeles Clearinghouse 

(LA HIDTA) and the Western States Information Network for many years. Its intent is to 

provide increased officer safety by coordinating investigative activities and avoiding one 

undercover drug investigator from “selling” purported drugs to another undercover officer 

“buyer.” This traditional “sting” type of operation concludes in an arrest situation and critical 

event deconfliction is designed to preclude the “buyer” officer from believing that he/she is the 

subject of an armed robbery. Coordinating investigations and ensuring no duplicative 

investigative efforts over a wide-region is the intent of “case or subject” deconfliction. Both 

event and case/subject deconfliction are done through the same system throughout California. 

Table 13 - Percentage of HIDTA Initiatives Using Event and Case Deconfliction Services, 

2005 

HIDTA Deconfliction Services by Year at Central Valley California HIDTA 

Year Total HIDTA 

Initiatives 

# Initiatives 

Targeted to Use 

Services 

# Initiatives 

Using Services 

% Initiatives 

Using Services 

2004 6 6 6 100% 

2005 7 7 7 100% 

2006 7 7 0 0% 

2007 0 0 0 0% 

The CVC HIDTA mandates that all enforcement and intelligence initiatives utilize the 

deconfliction services and all initiatives participate in this endeavor. 

Table 14 - Percentage of Event and Case Deconflictions Submitted for 2005 

HIDTA Deconfliction Submissions by Year at Central Valley California HIDTA 

Year 

Baseline # 

Deconflictions 

Submitted 

# 

Deconfliction 

Submissions 

Expected 

# Event 

Deconflictions 

Submitted 

# 

Case/Subject 

Deconflictions 

Submitted 

Total 

Deconflictions 

Submitted 

% 

Deconflictions 

Submitted 

2004 5000 5000 7683 11302 18985 153% 

2005 29500 40000 418 40781 41199 102% 

2006 29500 51500 0 0 0 0% 

2007 29500 35000 0 0 0 0% 
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______________________________________________________________________________ 

Central Valley California HIDTA 

All the four (4) California HIDTAs along with Washington, Oregon, Hawaii and Nevada 

HIDTA use the same Critical Event Deconfliction system. The advantages of this are 

immeasurable as traveling criminals and DTOs operating over a broad area are put at a 

disadvantage. In California, for example, the HIDTA regions are very close to each other in 

some circumstances and adjoining task forces often collaborate on investigations even though 

they are listed as being part of different HIDTA programs. One example is the LA HIDTA #44 

task force and the CVC HIDTA’s Southern Tri County Task Force. Another is the Sacramento 

Area Intelligence Narcotics Team and the San Francisco (Northern California HIDTA) task 

forces. 

It is clear that separate law enforcement initiatives, while aggressively pursuing suspects or 

engaged in a tactical event, can easily cross paths in the field. This can be detrimental to an 

investigation or dangerous if either party is unaware of the other. In a “best case” scenario, it 

merely results in harmless interference. At worst, however, it could cost an officer his or her life 

in a dangerous encounter. Information which can serve to deconflict such potential encounters is 

vital to well coordinated policing. The CVC HIDTA provides such information through its 

deconfliction system. Table 13 and 14 depict the usage by CVC HIDTA initiatives. Event and 

case/subject deconfliction data is provided by the Los Angeles Clearinghouse War Room and we 

2004 activity data sets the baseline. These services promote officer safety, conserve resources 

and help to coordinate investigations. 

Table 15 - Percentage of Investigations Provided Analytical Support for 2005 

HIDTA Investigations Supported by Year at Central Valley California HIDTA 

Year 

Baseline # 

Investigations 

Receiving 

Analytical 

Support 

# HIDTA 

Investigations 

Targeted for 

Analytical 

Support 

# HIDTA 

Investigations 

Provided 

Analytical 

Support 

% Targeted 

Investigations 

Supported 

2004 455 450 567 126% 

2005 455 145 478 329% 

2006 455 160 0 0% 

2007 455 150 0 0% 

The CVC HIDTA Investigative Support Center staff and its decentralized intelligence 

analyst positions were relied upon for their specialized services throughout the year. Table 15 

depicts the case-support activity by the analysts. It shows that this labor-intensive activity has 
______________________________________________________________________________ 

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Central Valley California HIDTA 

been readily accepted by investigators as being critical to intelligence led policing efforts. The 

demand for intelligence support to investigations increases yearly as the value of such an effort is 

demonstrated to case investigators. The intelligence analyst resources and time are finite 

however and are readily achieving a maximum-output capacity. HIDTA analysts supported 70 

wiretaps and 137 pen registers during 2005. 

Table 16 - HIDTA Initiative Cases Referred to Other HIDTAs and Other Agencies for 2005 

HIDTA Initiative Investigations Referred by Year at Central Valley California HIDTA 

Year 

Total HIDTA 

Initiative 

Investigations 

# Initiative 

Investigations 

Targeted for 

Referral 

# HIDTA 

Initiative 

Investigations 

Referred to 

Other 

HIDTAs 

# HIDTA 

Initiative 

Investigations 

Referred to 

Other 

Agencies 

Total 

Initiative 

Investigations 

Referred 

% Targeted 

Initiative 

Investigations 

Referred 

2004 864 10 9 15 24 250% 

2005 1333 15 11 8 19 126% 

2006 0 25 0 0 0 0% 

2007 0 33 0 0 0 0% 

Tables 15 and 16 depict the intensity level of investigations and the regional focus of 

investigative work. At the same time Table 16 demonstrates the positive outcome achieved by 

CVC HIDTA initiatives in the areas of interacting with other agencies and affiliated Case 

Referrals. These activities are essential to the CVC HIDTA and improving efficiency and 

effectiveness through information sharing and coordinated intelligence collection and 

dissemination. The CVC HIDTA far exceeded the anticipated number of requests for analytical 

support (Table 15), and in virtually every instance it was able to provide some level of service to 

investigators. Further, CVC HIDTA investigators and analysts referred 19 investigations either 

to other HIDTA regions or other agencies for additional scrutiny and investigative action. 

Table 17 Fugitives Targeted and Apprehended for 2005 

Central Valley California HIDTA Fugitives Targeted and Apprehended by Year 

Year # Identified # Targeted 

% 

Targeted 

of 

Identified 

# Apprehended Apprehended % of 

Targeted 
______________________________________________________________________________ 

______________________________________________________________________________ 

-

Central Valley California HIDTA 

2004 296 296 100% 237 80% 

2005 749 681 100% 681 90% 

2006 

2007 

Table 17 reflects the number of drug fugitives targeted and apprehended by the CVC HIDTA 

initiatives during the calendar year. These performance figures illustrate the difficulty of 

locating individuals who are fugitives hiding from the law and often fleeing from the region. At 

the same time, Table 17 provides insight as to the effectiveness of the HIDTA’s initiative entitled 

Joint Fugitive Task Force. A HIDTA intelligence analyst is assigned to the U.S. Marshal’s 

office to help in the research of investigative targets. It finds over 8 out of 10 fugitives that it 

goes after. 

Table 18 Outdoor Marijuana Plants Eradicated 

Central 

Valley CA HIDTA Outdoor Marijuana Plants Eradicated 

Mj Cost Plant 

Kg $8,000 

Year 

# Plants on Federal 

Land 

Identified/Targeted 

# Plants on Non 

Federal Land 

Identified/Targeted 

Total # 

Marijuana 

Plants 

Eradicated 

Value of 

Marijuana 

Plants 

Eradicated 

2004 362,833 59,511 422,344 $1,174,112,984 

2005 292,795 211,586 504,351 $1,834,003,636 

2006 $0 

2007 $0 

NOTE: Plants and Price expressed in Kilograms – Average yield=1 lb + per plant. 

California led the nation in 2005 for the production of outdoor marijuana on public and 

private lands. The terrain and climate together with a seemingly limitless number of alien 

Mexican workers provide the well-financed and operated DTOs with an opportunity to reap 

profits in the billions of dollars. The National Marijuana Initiative lists 6 major marijuana states 

behind California. The three West Coast 

states and Hawaii comprise the Western 

Four. The most prominent western 

states having interconnected DTO’s and 

interstate production efforts. 

Spotting high mountain marijuana 

gardens requires trained aerial spotters 

working with state and local agencies. 
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Central Valley California HIDTA 

Once they identify the marijuana plots and then operational plans are constructed as to how to 

best dismantle the grow site. Often these marijuana plantations encompass a wide area and 

include thousands of marijuana plants growing is a vast number of individual plots, generally fed 

by a single water supply. General trends are that the plants are grown between 1,500 and 5,000 

feet elevations. The sites are generally within a mile or two of the nearest trail head, up steep 

mountainous trails and all supplies must be carried in on backpacks. Eradication teams are often 

inserted via helicopter cables as pictured above right. Eradicating marijuana is depicted in the 

photo on the left. 

The DTO’s often recruit a small “army” of illegal aliens to prepare the grow sites in 

approximately March to April after the snows recede and weather permits establishing a base 

camp. Potential growing locations are scouted out during the winter months and DTO advance 

party surveyors have been reported operating as early as February. Once the irrigation systems 

have been installed and the ground prepared and planted, Mexican aliens are left in charge of the 

plot with specific instructions to tend the plants and safeguard the crops. Most grow sites have 

had weapons present creating a hazard for hikers, campers, hunters and general day users of the 

forests. 

Marijuana producing organizations plant seeds that produce high-quality Sensimilla buds 

which are sometimes sold as “BC Bud,” a varietals of marijuana that may command a higher 

price. The general appearance of the California produced marijuana bud denotes its high-quality 

and desirability to the marijuana abuser. These bring an average price of $8,000 per kilogram in 

the region. Because of their value, armed guards are deemed to be a requirement in the 

marijuana gardens. This presents the challenge to law enforcement whenever they attempt to 

harvest the growing crops. 

Table 19 Percentage of Intelligence Driven Cases Supported by Year 

Central Valley 

CA HIDTA Intelligence Driven Cases 

Baseline # # Cases # Cases Total % Cases Year Cases Strategically Tactically Cases Supported Generated Supported Supported Supported 

2004 863 2 547 549 64% 

2005 863 3 478 481 56% 

2006 

2007 

The CVC HIDTA Investigative Support Center provides intelligence support to every 

initiative either through on-site analysts or through the centralized Investigative Support Center 

in Fresno. The demand for intelligence support exceeds the number of available analysts and 

analyst-time. Although the intelligence resources in the CVC HIDTA region are limited, table 

20 shows the impressive level of effort expended to support investigations. HIDTA initiatives 
______________________________________________________________________________ 

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Central Valley California HIDTA 

are Central Valley HIDTA Spin-off Cases Referred for Year 

Year 

Baseline # 

Prisoner 

Debriefings 

Baseline # 

Spin-off 

Cases 

# Prisoner 

Debriefings 

# Spin-off 

Cases 

Referred 

% Change in 

Cases Referred 

from Baseline 

2004 85 15 142 54 260% 

2005 

2006 

2007 

85 15 453 19 126% 

extremely busy pursuing local, multi-state and international drug targets in this area that is 

considered to be a “target rich environment.” 

Table 20 – Number of Spin-off Cases referred for Year 2005 

CVC HIDTA initiatives were busy and opened over 1,300 investigations during 2005. Each 

year the number of spin-off cases may fluctuate considerably however doing so ensures that 

investigative targets are pursued if they move outside of the region. All agencies strive 

whenever possible to refer investigations to other agencies and to other HIDTAs for appropriate 

follow-up. The Table 21 data shows that CVC HIDTA initiatives exceeded their baseline by 

126% during 2005 and offered spin-off cases to other agencies 19 times. 

VII. Conclusions 

The Central Valley California HIDTA Executive Board’s 2005 Strategy was enacted and 

achieved. The Performance Management Process database chronicles the results of this 

program’s work during the year. The data illuminates the extent and complexity of this region’s 

drug trafficking and how both National and Central Valley HIDTA goals are on target for 

mission attainment. Clear evidence of successful strategy enactment and initiative productivity is 

present throughout the report. One must conclude the inescapable fact that with each arrest and 

drug seizure, drug availability is somehow reduced. The criminals that comprise the identified 

DTOs are being prosecuted and the organizations are disrupted or dismantled (Goal 1). These 

accomplishments are done with relative efficiency, effectiveness and at reasonable cost. HIDTA 

sponsored training and information sharing programs (Goal 2) strive to unilaterally improve 

initiative operations and achieve greater efficiencies yielding a greater return on the investment 

of public tax dollars. 

Merely because an initiative improves its performance without increased funding does not 

necessarily prove efficiency or effectiveness by itself. Examining the Outcomes of an initiatives 

work is important. Key introspective questions should be asked: “Are law enforcement agencies 

working together better and more effectively? Is information reaching the people who need it? 

Have traditional barriers among different law enforcement agencies been overcome sufficiently 
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Central Valley California HIDTA 

so that these entities can find a common ground to pursue common goals? Are we making real 

progress in addressing illicit drug trafficking organizations? The results set forth in this CY 

2005 Annual Report suggest that all these questions can be answered affirmatively. 

The CVC HIDTA has created a pathway for success in future law enforcement undertakings 

through its neutrality and collaboration building. The HIDTA program brought divergent law 

enforcement agencies together and forged a unified force to address the serious drug trafficking 

issues facing the San Joaquin and Sacramento Valley areas of Central California. Heretofore, 

many agencies feared a breach of security or confidentiality if they permitted “outsiders” to look 

at confidential files and share investigative information. This, no doubt, foreclosed some 

opportunities to disrupt or dismantle significant DTOs and one can only speculate about how 

many drug and violent crimes remain unsolved because information held by one department or 

agency was never shared with another. 

Since the CVC HIDTA began in 1999 there has been a steady and positive increase in the 

number of participant agencies, number of queries and data elements shared through the HIDTA 

information sharing system. With the enactment of the National Criminal Intelligence Sharing 

Plan and the National Virtual Pointer Index, interagency coordination continues to improve. 

Technology developments are greatly contributing to this behavioral transition. West Coast 

HIDTAs currently use the WSIN/RISS System for intelligence and deconfliction. It is scheduled 

for modifications and improvements in 2006 with a transition to RISSIntel and better integration 

with all other RISS projects in the nation. These system changes will improve connectivity into 

the National Virtual Pointer Index which most HIDTAs use. The expanded use of HIDTA.net 

and LEO.gov systems has enabled secure data transmission between federal and local agencies 

that never had this capability before. 

Intelligence support to investigations became more prominent in 2005. The construction and 

operation of the Central Valley HIDTA Intelligence Fusion Center was accomplished during 

2005. This was built and staffed with funding from the National Marijuana Initiative. It is a 

collaborative effort with the California National Guard and is a centralized analytical center that 

receives and disseminates all-source intelligence information on marijuana growing 

organizations. Fusion Center staff works with the intelligence analysts throughout California, 

Oregon, Washington and elsewhere to share information and enhance the investigative process. 

Law enforcement initiatives operating in the Central Valley California region continued to 

make significant progress in identifying, investigating and dismantling the most dangerous and 

prolific drug traffickers operating in the region during 2005. As the tables and charts presented 

throughout this report clearly attest, CVC HIDTA initiatives continue to support HIDTA Goal 1 

objectives. 

Illicit drug availability has been reduced yet the challenges remain in every locality. HIDTA 

initiative drug seizures, coupled with drug asset seizures have put a major crimp in DTO 

activities yet much needs to be done as the demand for drugs continues at a high rate throughout 

the region. CVC HIDTA is extremely pleased that its initiatives comply fully with the precepts 
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of HIDTA Goals 1 and 2. They have demonstrated efficiency and effective methodologies to 

achieve their results to date and continue to improve into the current operating year. CY 2005 

marked a positive turning point in the CVC HIDTA history of fighting illicit drug activities. 

HIDTA leadership, both nationally and locally, envisioned an organization that could do even 

more than had been accomplished in previous years. It saw an organization that could improve 

by becoming more proactive and developed a Performance Management Process to measure the 

relative effectiveness of each HIDTA. 

For several years the CVC HIDTA has been developing and improving initiative operations 

and expertise through a no-cost training program. The CVC HIDTA Executive Director has 

worked with regional agencies to develop alternate programs that address the various nuances of 

the drug threat in this region. New programs such as Highway Interdiction, violent gang 

intervention, 25 Cities Program and others that were conceived and developed during 2004 

continued into 2005. CVC HIDTA leadership stressed that the initiatives need to continue with 

the emphasis on education of their members, developing the essential skills and honing the 

tradecraft of drug enforcement. During CY 2005, the CVC HIDTA Vision and Mission 

statements remained as the beacons for developing agency goals, objectives and programs. The 

HIDTA Vision provides the bright line for all to follow into the foreseeable future. Achieving 

that mission involves a myriad of individuals, efforts and outcomes. Annual outputs and 

outcomes will be measured and compared to previous efforts in order to evaluate the 

performance of each initiative and achievement of the HIDTA strategy. The National HIDTA 

program and the CVC HIDTA Executive Board have created a shift in the organizational 

paradigm recognizing that operational effectiveness must be measured and held up to the light of 

accountability. 

Identifying measurable results for each federal dollar spent was adopted by the National 

HIDTA program as a key component of the new CVC HIDTA focus on meaningful outcomes. 

This is one of the main principles that now guide how every CVC HIDTA initiative approaches 

its effort to reduce drug crime and its harmful consequences. More than 100 federal, state and 

local agencies in the CVC HIDTA region participate in the CVC HIDTA law enforcement, 

investigative support initiatives. 

The first component of the CVC HIDTA strategy for the preceding year was to develop goals 

and objectives that each initiative could embrace, with measurable outputs and outcomes that 

would form the basis for a reasonable means of self assessment and evaluation. The national 

HIDTA goals provided the roadmap. The CVC HIDTA Executive Board carefully considered 

the nature of their activities and provided the vision and mission. Based on many years of direct 

experience in the field, initiative supervisors, agency managers, and CVC HIDTA staff 

developed the measurable outputs and outcomes. Through training and constant reinforcement 

of the goals and objectives, each initiative began its 2005 program with enthusiasm and ended 

the year successfully. 

There is still a great deal of work left to do. The presence of internationally-connected drug 

trafficking organizations, the continuing unacceptably high levels of methamphetamine, heroin, 
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cocaine and marijuana addiction plague the CVC HIDTA region. Drug-related crime in the 

Cities, Counties and Towns of the nine CVC HIDTA counties continues. By bringing together 

criminal justice professionals and adhering to the CVC HIDTA Strategy, the current initiatives as 

well as other innovative and effective solutions will be applied to the region’s drug threats. The 

Central Valley California HIDTA will continue to lead the region’s drug enforcement effort. 
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VIII. Appendices 

A. Table of Organization for the HIDTA. 

B. Table listing composition of Executive Board showing local, state and federal affiliation. 

C. List of participating agencies. 

D. List of Counties participating in the HIDTA 

APPENDIX A - See Attached 

APPENDIX B 

CENTRAL VALLEY CALIFORNIA HIDTA EXECUTIVE BOARD MEMBERS 

FEDERAL AGENCY MEMBERS: 

1. Antonio C. Amador, United States Marshal 

2. Javier Pena, Special Agent in Charge, Drug Enforcement Administration 

3. Charles H. Demore, Special Agent in Charge, Bureau of Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement 

4. McGregor Scott, United States Attorney, Eastern District of California 

5. Roger Wirth, Special Agent in Charge, Internal Revenue Service 

6. Drew Parenti, Special Agent in Charge, Federal Bureau of Investigation 

7. Paul Vido, Special Agent in Charge, Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms 

8. Scott Hinson, SAC National Park Service 

9. Col. Richard Lesch, National Guard Program 

STATE AND LOCAL AGENCY MEMBERS 

10. Lou Blanas, Sheriff, Sacramento Sheriffs Department 

11. Elizabeth Egan, District Attorney, Fresno County 

12. Jerry Dyer, Chief, Fresno Police Department 

13. Mark Herder, Chief, Stockton Police Department 

14. Rick Oules, Director, California Department of Justice 

15. Richard Pierce, Sheriff, Fresno Sheriffs Department 

16. Mark Puthuff, Assistant Sheriff, Stanislaus County Sheriffs Department 

17. Mac Wimbish, Sheriff, Kern County Sheriffs Department 

18. Bill Wittman, Sheriff, Tulare County Sheriffs Department 

19. Mark Pazin, Sheriff, Merced County Sheriffs Department 

20. Bill Rector, Chief of Police, Bakersfield Police Department 
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APPENDIX C 

PARTICIPATING AGENCIES: 

Federal 

Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms 

Drug Enforcement Administration 

Federal Bureau of Investigation 

Immigration and Customs Enforcement, DHS 

Internal Revenue Service 

Office of the Inspector General 

United States Attorney for the Eastern District of California 

US Marshal Service 

State Agencies 

Bureau of Narcotics Enforcement 

CA Department of Corrections 

CA National Guard 

CA Youth Authority 

California Highway Patrol 

Local Agencies 

Bakersfield Police Department 

Delano Police Department 

Fresno County Sheriffs Department 

Fresno Police Department 

Fresno County Child Protective Service 

Kern County Sheriffs Department 

Kings County Sheriffs Department 

Madera County Sheriffs Department 

Merced County Sheriffs Department 

Modesto Police Department 

Sacramento County Probation Department 

Sacramento County Sheriff’s Department 

Stanislaus County District Attorney 

Stanislaus County Probation Department 

Stanislaus County Sheriffs Department 

Tulare County Sheriffs Department 

Yolo County District Attorney 
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APPRNDIX D 

LIST OF COUNTIES CENTRAL TO THE HIDTA REGION 

Northern Region

Sacramento County 

San Joaquin County 

Central Region

Stanislaus County 

Madera County 

Merced County 

Fresno County 

Southern Region

Kern County 

Tulare County 

Kings County 
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IX. List of Tables and Charts 

Table 1 -DTOs and MLOs Disrupted or Dismantled, 2005.......................................................... 11 

Table 2 - Percentage of DTOs and MLOs Disrupted or Dismantled by Scope, 2005.................. 11 

Table 3 - Percentage of Money Laundering Organizations Disrupted or Dismantled by Scope, 

2005....................................................................................................................................... 12 

Table 4 - Operational Scope of All DTO Cases Initiated, 2005 ................................................... 12 

Table 5 - Drugs Removed from the Marketplace, 2005 ............................................................... 13 

Table 6 - Return on Investment (ROI) for Drugs Removed from the Marketplace by Law 

Enforcement Initiatives, 2005............................................................................................... 15 

Table 7 - Return on Investment (ROI) for Assets Removed from the Marketplace by Law 

Enforcement Initiatives, 2005............................................................................................... 15 

Table 8 - Total Return on Investment (ROI) for Drugs and Assets Removed from the 

Marketplace by Law Enforcement Initiatives, 2005............................................................. 16 

Table 9 - Prosecution Initiative Outputs and Ourcomes, 2005..................................................... 16 

Table 10 - Value of Clandestine Methamphetamine Labs Dismantled in 2005, by Size ............. 16 

Table 11 - Clandestine Laboratory Activities, 2005..................................................................... 18 

Table 12 – CVC HIDTA Training Efficiency by Year and Type of Training for 2005............... 20 

Table 13 - Percentage of Initiatives Using Event and Case Deconfliction Services, 2005 .......... 21 

Table 14 - Percentage of Event and Case Deconflictions Submitted, 2005 ................................. 21 

Table 15 - Percentage of Investigations Provided Analytical Support, 2005............................... 22 

Table 16 - Percentage of HIDTA Initiative Investigations Referred to Other HIDTAs and 

Other3Agencies, 2005........................................................................................................... 26 

Table 17 - Fugitives Targeted and Apprehended in 2005 23 

Table 18 - Outdoor Marijuana Plants Eradicated in 2005 24 

Table 19 - Wholesale Value of Marijuana Seized by Location 25 

Table 20 - Percentage of Intelligence Driven Cases Supported by Year 25 

Table 21 - Number of Spin-off cases Referred by Year 26

X. Endnotes - Cite the sources of essential information referenced in this 

report. 

i

 Estimates of the Size and Characteristics of the Undocumented Population, Pew Hispanic Center, March 21,2005 ii CVC HIDTA Commissioned study on Methamphetamine Admission Trends, 2005