(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2004 1 

Syllabus 

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is 

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. 

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been 

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. 

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

Syllabus 

AMERICAN TRUCKING ASSOCIATIONS, INC., ET AL. v. 

MICHIGAN PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION ET AL. 

CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MICHIGAN 

No. 03–1230. Argued April 26, 2005—Decided June 20, 2005 

Petitioners, a trucking company engaged in both interstate and intrastate hauling and a trucking association, asked Michigan courts to 

invalidate the State’s flat $100 annual fee imposed on trucks engaged 

in intrastate commercial hauling, see Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. 

§478.2(1), claiming that it discriminates against interstate carriers 

and imposes an unconstitutional burden on interstate trade because 

trucks carrying both interstate and intrastate loads engage in less intrastate business than trucks carrying only intrastate loads. The 

State Court of Claims rejected the claim, holding that, because the 

fee is regulatory and intended for the Michigan Motor Carrier Act’s 

administration, it is not amenable to apportionment; that it is an appropriate exercise of the State’s police power; and that it does not implicate the Commerce Clause because it falls only on intrastate commerce. The State Court of Appeals affirmed, and the State Supreme 

Court declined review. 

Held: Michigan’s fee does not violate the dormant Commerce Clause. 

That Clause prevents a State from “jeopardizing the welfare of the 

Nation as a whole” by “plac[ing] burdens on the flow of commerce 

across its borders that commerce wholly within those borders would 

not bear.” Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U. S. 

175, 180. Applying this Court’s dormant Commerce Clause principles

and precedents here, nothing in §478.2(1) offends the Commerce 

Clause. The flat fee is imposed only on intrastate transactions. It 

does not facially discriminate against interstate or out-of-state activities or enterprises. It applies evenhandedly to all carriers making 

domestic journeys and does not reflect an effort to tax activity taking 

place outside of the State. Nothing in this Court’s case law suggests 

that such a neutral, locally focused fee or tax is inconsistent with the 
2 AMERICAN TRUCKING ASSNS., INC. v. MICHIGAN 

 PUB. SERV. COMM’N 

Syllabus 

dormant Commerce Clause. That is not surprising, since States impose numerous flat fees on local business and service providers, e.g., 

insurers and auctioneers. The Constitution neither displaces States’ 

authority to shelter their people from health and safety menaces nor 

unduly curtails their power to lay taxes to support state government. 

The record, moreover, shows no special circumstances suggesting 

that Michigan’s fee operates as anything other than an unobjectionable exercise of the State’s police power. Neither does it show that 

the flat assessment unfairly discriminates against interstate truckers. Because the costs the fee seeks to defray, e.g., those of regulating

vehicular size and weight, would seem more likely to vary per truck 

or per carrier than per-mile traveled, a per-truck, rather than a permile, assessment is likely fair. And petitioners provide no details of 

their preferred alternative miles-traveled system or point to evidence 

of its practicality. Nor is there any reason to infer that the State’s 

lump-sum levy on purely local activity erects an impermissible discriminatory roadblock. American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. Scheiner, 

483 U. S. 266, distinguished. As for petitioners’ “internal consistency” argument—that if every State did the same as Michigan, an 

interstate trucker doing local business in multiple States would have 

to pay a fee of several hundred or thousand dollars—any interstate 

firm with local outlets normally expects to pay local fees uniformly 

assessed on all those engaging in local business. Pp. 3–9. 

255 Mich. App. 589, 662 N. W. 2d 784, affirmed. 

BREYER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which REHNQUIST, 

C. J., and STEVENS, O’CONNOR, KENNEDY, SOUTER, and GINSBURG, JJ., 

joined. SCALIA, J., and THOMAS, J., filed opinions concurring in the 

judgment. 
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Cite as: 545 U. S. ____ (2005) 1 

Opinion of the Court 

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the 

preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to 

notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order 

that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 03–1230 

AMERICAN TRUCKING ASSOCIATIONS, INC. AND 

USF HOLLAND, INC., PETITIONERS v. MICHIGAN 

PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION ET AL. 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF 

MICHIGAN 

[June 20, 2005] 

JUSTICE BREYER delivered the opinion of the Court. 

In this case, we consider whether a flat $100 fee that 

Michigan charges trucks engaging in intrastate commercial hauling violates the dormant Commerce Clause. We 

hold that it does not. 

I 

A subsection of Michigan’s Motor Carrier Act imposes 

upon each motor carrier “for the administration of this act, 

an annual fee of $100.00 for each self-propelled motor 

vehicle operated by or on behalf of the motor carrier.” 

Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §478.2(1) (West 2002). The provision assesses the fee upon, and only upon, vehicles that 

engage in intrastate commercial operations—that is, on 

trucks that undertake point-to-point hauls between Michigan cities. See Westlake Transp., Inc. v. Michigan Pub. 

Serv. Comm’n, 255 Mich. App. 589, 592–594, 662 N. W. 2d 

784, 789 (2003). Petitioners, USF Holland, Inc., a trucking company with trucks that engage in both interstate 

and intrastate hauling, and the American Trucking Associations, Inc. (ATA), asked the Michigan courts to invali-
2 AMERICAN TRUCKING ASSNS., INC. v. MICHIGAN 

 PUB. SERV. COMM’N 

Opinion of the Court 

date the provision. Both petitioners told those courts that 

trucks that carry both interstate and intrastate loads 

engage in intrastate business less than trucks that confine 

their operations to the Great Lakes State. Hence, because 

Michigan’s fee is flat, it discriminates against interstate 

carriers and imposes an unconstitutional burden upon 

interstate trade. 

The Michigan Court of Claims rejected the carriers’ 

claim for three reasons. First, the $100 fee “is regulatory 

and intended” for the Motor Carrier Act’s administration, 

which includes “regulation of vehicular size and weight, 

insurance requirements and safety standards.” App. to

Pet. for Cert. 44a. Such a fee “is not amenable to a fee 

structure based on apportionment by usage rates.” Ibid. 

Second, the fee reflects a “legitimate expression of the 

[S]tate’s concern that the welfare of its citizens be protected,” and hence an appropriate exercise of the State’s 

police power. Ibid. Third, the fee does not implicate the 

Commerce Clause because it falls only on intrastate, not 

interstate, commerce. Id., at 45a. 

The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed. It did not 

agree that the intrastate nature of §478.2(1) sheltered the 

fee from Commerce Clause scrutiny. 255 Mich. App., at 

617–619, 662 N. W. 2d, at 802. Nonetheless, the court 

rejected the truckers’ claim because the statute “regulates 

evenhandedly,” id., at 621, 662 N. W. 2d, at 804, and 

because the record lacked any “evidence that any trucking 

firm’s route choices [were] affected by the imposition of the 

fee,” id., at 621, 662 N. W. 2d, at 803–804. Rather, the 

record indicated that any “effect . . . on interstate commerce is incidental,” rendering the truckers’ claim of 

discrimination “a matter of pure speculation.” Ibid. 

The Michigan Supreme Court denied petitioners leave 

to appeal. Westlake Transp., Inc. v. Michigan Pub. Serv. 

Comm’n, ___ Mich. ___, 673 N. W. 2d 752 (2003). We 

granted their petition for certiorari and consolidated the 
Cite as: 545 U. S. ____ (2005) 3 

Opinion of the Court 

case with Mid-Con Freight Systems, Inc. v. Michigan Pub. 

Serv. Comm’n, No. 03–1234, a case in which interstate 

truckers sought review of a separate state motor carrier 

fee. We now affirm the Michigan court’s judgment sustaining §478.2(1). 

II 

Our Constitution “was framed upon the theory that the 

peoples of the several states must sink or swim together.” 

Baldwin v. G. A. F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U. S. 511, 523 (1935). 

Thus, this Court has consistently held that the Constitution’s express grant to Congress of the power to “regulate 

Commerce . . . among the several States,” Art. I, §8, cl. 3, 

contains “a further, negative command, known as the 

dormant Commerce Clause,” Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. 

Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U. S. 175, 179 (1995), that “create[s] an area of trade free from interference by the 

States,” Boston Stock Exchange v. State Tax Comm’n, 429 

U. S. 318, 328 (1977) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

This negative command prevents a State from “jeopardizing the welfare of the Nation as a whole” by “plac[ing] 

burdens on the flow of commerce across its borders that 

commerce wholly within those borders would not bear.” 

Jefferson Lines, supra, at 180. 

Thus, we have found unconstitutional state regulations 

that unjustifiably discriminate on their face against outof-state entities, see Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U. S. 

617 (1978), or that impose burdens on interstate trade that 

are “clearly excessive in relation to the putative local 

benefits,” Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U. S. 137, 142 

(1970). We have held that States may not impose taxes 

that facially discriminate against interstate business and 

offer commercial advantage to local enterprises, see, e.g., 

Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Department of Environmental 

Quality of Ore., 511 U. S. 93, 99–100 (1994), that improperly apportion state assessments on transactions with out-
4 AMERICAN TRUCKING ASSNS., INC. v. MICHIGAN 

 PUB. SERV. COMM’N 

Opinion of the Court 

of-state components, Central Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. 

Mealey, 334 U. S. 653 (1948), or that have the “inevitable 

effect [of] threaten[ing] the free movement of commerce by 

placing a financial barrier around the State,” American 

Trucking Assns., Inc. v. Scheiner, 483 U. S. 266, 284 (1987). 

Applying these principles and precedents, we find nothing in §478.2(1) that offends the Commerce Clause. To 

begin with, Michigan imposes the flat $100 fee only upon

intrastate transactions—that is, upon activities taking

place exclusively within the State’s borders. Section 

478.2(1) does not facially discriminate against interstate 

or out-of-state activities or enterprises. The statute applies evenhandedly to all carriers that make domestic 

journeys. It does not reflect an effort to tax activity that 

takes place, in whole or in part, outside the State. Nothing in our case law suggests that such a neutral, locally 

focused fee or tax is inconsistent with the dormant Commerce Clause. 

This legal vacuum is not surprising. States impose

numerous flat fees upon local businesses and service 

providers, including, for example, upon insurers, auctioneers, ambulance operators, and hosts of others. See, e.g., 

Wyo. Stat. §33–36–104 (Lexis 2003); S. C. Code Ann. §38– 

7–10 (West 2002). Although we have “long since rejected

any suggestion that a state tax . . . affecting interstate 

commerce is immune from Commerce Clause scrutiny

because it attaches only to a ‘local’ or intrastate activity,” 

Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U. S. 609, 615 

(1981), we have also made clear that the Constitution 

neither displaces States’ authority “to shelter [their] people from menaces to their health or safety,” D. H. Holmes 

Co. v. McNamara, 486 U. S. 24, 29 (1988) (internal quotation marks omitted), nor “unduly curtail[s]” States’ power 

“to lay taxes for the support of state government,” 

McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 309 U. S. 33, 

48 (1940). 
Cite as: 545 U. S. ____ (2005) 5 

Opinion of the Court 

The record, moreover, shows no special circumstance 

suggesting that Michigan’s fee operates in practice as 

anything other than an unobjectionable exercise of the 

State’s police power. To the contrary, as the Michigan 

Court of Appeals pointed out, the record contains little, if 

any, evidence that the $100 fee imposes any significant 

practical burden upon interstate trade. See 255 Mich. 

App., at 620–622, 662 N. W. 2d, at 803–804. The record 

does show, for example, that some interstate trucks “top 

off” some interstate hauls with intrastate pickups and 

deliveries. See Brief for Intervening Plaintiffs-Appellants

in Nos. 226052, 226122 (Ct. App. Mich.), Exh. 3, Affidavit 

of James C. Crozier ¶7 (licensing and fuel manager of TNT 

Holland Motor Express, Inc. describing this practice). But 

it does not tell us the answers to such questions as: How 

often does “topping off” occur across the industry? Does 

the $100 charge make a difference by significantly discouraging interstate carriers from engaging in “topping 

off”? Does the possibility of obtaining a 72-hour intrastate 

permit for $10 alleviate the alleged problem? See 

§478.2(3); see also Brief for Respondents 2, n. 3 (4,928 temporary permits were issued in 2004). If the fees ($100 and 

$10) discourage “topping off,” does that local commercial 

effect make a significant interstate difference? Would a 

variable fee (of the kind the truckers advocate) eliminate 

such difference? The minimal facts in the record tell us 

little about these matters. Compare App. 60–61, Supplemental Affidavit of Thomas R. Lonergan ¶10(e) (official of 

the Michigan Public Service Commission stating that topping off is rare for most interstate carriers because it disrupts schedules and shipping patterns), with Reply Brief for 

Intervening Plaintiffs-Appellants in Nos. 226122, 226137 

(Ct. App. Mich.), Exh. A, Supplemental Affidavit of James 

C. Crozier ¶6 (TNT Holland frequently tops off interstate 

loads). And at oral argument, ATA conceded the absence 

of record facts that empirically could show that the $100 
6 AMERICAN TRUCKING ASSNS., INC. v. MICHIGAN 

 PUB. SERV. COMM’N 

Opinion of the Court 

fee significantly deters interstate trade. Tr. of Oral Arg. 5. 

Neither does the record show that the flat assessment 

unfairly discriminates against interstate truckers. The fee 

seeks to defray costs such as those of regulating “vehicular

size and weight,” of administering “insurance requirements,” and of applying “safety standards.” App. to Pet.

for Cert. 44a. The bulk of such costs would seem more 

likely to vary per truck or per carrier than to vary per-mile 

traveled. See 255 Mich. App., at 612–617, 662 N. W. 2d, 

at 799–801. And that fact means that a per-truck, rather 

than a per-mile, assessment is likely fair. Cf. Jefferson 

Lines, 514 U. S., at 199 (rejecting taxpayer’s discrimination 

claim in part because “miles traveled within the State simply are not a relevant proxy for the benefit conferred upon 

the parties to a sales transaction”). Nothing in the record 

suggests the contrary. 

Nor would an effort to switch the manner of fee assessment—from lump sum to, for example, miles traveled—be 

burden free. The record contains an affidavit, sworn by a 

Michigan Public Service Commission official, that states 

that to obtain the same revenue (about $3.5 million) 

through a per-mile fee would require the State to create a 

“data accumulation system” capable of separating out

intrastate hauls and determining their length, and to 

develop related liability, billing, and auditing mechanisms. App. 64, Second Supplemental Affidavit of Thomas 

R. Lonergan ¶2. This affidavit, on its face, suggests that 

the game is unlikely to be worth the candle. While petitioners argue the contrary, they do not provide the details 

of their preferred alternative administrative system nor 

point to record evidence showing its practicality. See 

Jefferson Lines, supra, at 195 (State is not required to use 

a particular apportionment formula just because it may be 

“possible” to do so).

Petitioners insist that they do not need empirically to

demonstrate the existence of a burdensome or discrimina-
Cite as: 545 U. S. ____ (2005) 7 

Opinion of the Court 

tory impact upon interstate trucking, or (presumably) the 

unfairness of the assessment in relation to defrayed costs, 

or (presumably) the administrative practicality of the 

alternatives. They say that our earlier case, American 

Trucking Assns., Inc. v. Scheiner, 483 U. S. 266 (1987), 

requires invalidation of the $100 flat fee, even in the absence of such proof. We disagree. 

In Scheiner, this Court invalidated a flat $25 “marker 

fee” and a flat “axle tax” that Pennsylvania levied upon all 

trucks (interstate and intrastate) that used its roads, 

including trucks that merely crossed Pennsylvania’s borders to transport, say, Ohio goods to New Jersey customers. See id., at 273–275. Data showed that the fees imposed a cost per mile on interstate trucks that was 

approximately “five times as heavy as the cost per mile 

borne by local trucks.” Id., at 286. The assessments 

largely helped to raise revenue “to improve and maintain

[the State’s] highways and bridges,” id., at 270, thereby

helping to cover costs likely to vary significantly with 

truck-miles traveled, see ibid. And the assessments did 

“not even purport to approximate fairly the cost or value of 

the use of Pennsylvania’s roads.” Id., at 290. In light of 

these considerations, Pennsylvania’s lump-sum taxes 

“threaten[ed] the free movement of commerce by placing a 

financial barrier around the State of Pennsylvania.” Id., 

at 284. We concluded that “[i]f each State imposed flat 

taxes for the privilege of making commercial entrances 

into its territory, there [was] no conceivable doubt that 

commerce among the States would be deterred.” Ibid. 

The present fee, as we have said, taxes purely local

activity; it does not tax an interstate truck’s entry into the 

State nor does it tax transactions spanning multiple 

States. See 255 Mich. App., at 592–594, 662 N. W. 2d, at 

789. We lack convincing evidence showing that the tax 

deters, or for that matter discriminates against, interstate 

activities. See supra, at 5. Nor is the tax one that, on its 
8 AMERICAN TRUCKING ASSNS., INC. v. MICHIGAN 

 PUB. SERV. COMM’N 

Opinion of the Court 

face, would seem to call for an assessment measured per 

mile rather than per truck. See supra, at 6. Consequently, we lack any reason to infer that Michigan’s lumpsum levy erects, as in Scheiner, an impermissible discriminatory road block.

Petitioners add that Michigan’s fee fails the “internal 

consistency” test—a test that we have typically used

where taxation of interstate transactions are at issue. 

Generally speaking, that test asks, “What would happen if 

all States did the same?” See, e.g., Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 

U. S. 252, 261 (1989); Jefferson Lines, supra, at 185 (test

looks to the structure of the tax to see whether its identical application by every State “would place interstate 

commerce at a disadvantage as compared with commerce 

intrastate”). We must concede that here, as petitioners 

argue, if all States did the same, an interstate truck would 

have to pay fees totaling several hundred dollars, or even

several thousand dollars, were it to “top off” its business 

by carrying local loads in many (or even all) other States. 

But it would have to do so only because it engages in local 

business in all those States. An interstate firm with local 

outlets normally expects to pay local fees that are uniformly assessed upon all those who engage in local business, interstate and domestic firms alike. See, e.g., Commonwealth Edison, 453 U. S., at 623–624 (dormant

Commerce Clause does not seek “to relieve those engaged 

in interstate commerce from their just share of state tax

burden even though it increases the cost of doing business” (internal quotation marks omitted)); cf. Jefferson 

Lines, supra, at 187–188 (in context of sales tax, “the 

Commerce Clause does not forbid the actual assessment of 

a succession of taxes by different States on distinct events 

as the same tangible object flows along”). A motor carrier 

is not special in this respect.

In sum, petitioners have failed to show that Michigan’s 

fee, which does not seek to tax a share of interstate trans-
Cite as: 545 U. S. ____ (2005) 9 

Opinion of the Court 

actions, which focuses upon local activity, and which is 

assessed evenhandedly, either burdens or discriminates 

against interstate commerce, or violates the Commerce 

Clause in any other relevant way. See Complete Auto 

Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U. S. 274, 279 (1977) (noting 

that a tax will be sustained where it is applied to an activity with a “substantial nexus” to the taxing State; where,

if applied to interstate activity, it is “fairly apportioned”; 

where it does not discriminate; and where it is “fairly 

related to the services provided”).

For these reasons, the judgment of the Michigan Court 

of Appeals is affirmed. 

It is so ordered. 
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Cite as: 545 U. S. ____ (2005) 1 

SCALIA, J., concurring in judgment 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 03–1230 

AMERICAN TRUCKING ASSOCIATIONS, INC. AND 

USF HOLLAND, INC., PETITIONERS v. MICHIGAN 

PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION ET AL. 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF 

MICHIGAN 

[June 20, 2005] 

JUSTICE SCALIA, concurring in the judgment. 

Michigan imposes a flat fee on trucks that engage in 

purely intrastate commercial operations. I agree with the 

Court that this fee does not violate the negative Commerce 

Clause. Unlike the Court, ante, at 3–4, 8–9, I reach that 

determination without adverting to various tests from our 

wardrobe of ever-changing negative Commerce Clause 

fashions: the balancing approach from Pike v. Bruce 

Church, Inc., 397 U. S. 137 (1970), the four-factor test from 

Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U. S. 274 (1977), 

and the internal-consistency test from cases such as American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. Scheiner, 483 U. S. 266 (1987). 

Instead, I ask whether the fee “facially discriminates 

against interstate commerce” and whether it is “indistinguishable from a type of law previously held unconstitutional by this Court.” West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy,

512 U. S. 186, 210 (1994) (SCALIA, J., concurring in judgment). As the Court correctly concludes, Michigan’s fee 

meets neither of those conditions. It does not facially

discriminate against interstate commerce, ante, at 4, and 

it is distinguishable from petitioners’ best analogue, the 

fees invalidated in Scheiner, which applied to interstate 

trucks even when they engaged in no intrastate business, 

ante, at 7–8. 
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Cite as: 545 U. S. ____ (2005) 1 

THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 03–1230 

AMERICAN TRUCKING ASSOCIATIONS, INC. AND 

USF HOLLAND, INC., PETITIONERS v. MICHIGAN 

PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION ET AL. 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF 

MICHIGAN 

[June 20, 2005] 

JUSTICE THOMAS, concurring in the judgment. 

I would affirm the judgment of the Michigan Court of

Appeals because “ ‘[t]he negative Commerce Clause has no

basis in the text of the Constitution, makes little sense, 

and has proved virtually unworkable in application,’ 

Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 

U. S. 564, 610 (1997) (THOMAS, J., dissenting), and, consequently, cannot serve as a basis for striking down a state 

statute.” Hillside Dairy Inc. v. Lyons, 539 U. S. 59, 68 

(2003) (THOMAS, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 

part).