United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

 

September 4, 2008 

The Honorable Robert C. Byrd 

Chairman 

The Honorable Thad Cochran 

Ranking Member 

Subcommittee on Homeland Security 

Committee on Appropriations 

United States Senate 

The Honorable David E. Price 

Chairman 

The Honorable Harold Rogers 

Ranking Member 

Subcommittee on Homeland Security 

Committee on Appropriations 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Hillary R. Clinton 

United States Senate 

Subject: Various Issues Led to the Termination of the United States-Canada Shared 

Border Management Pilot Project 

In the years since the 2001 terrorist attacks, balancing the need to secure U.S. borders 

while maintaining the flow of legitimate cross-border travel and commerce has taken on 

an added importance. The United States and Canada share a border that extends nearly 

4,000 miles, and one of the world’s largest trading relationships. Each year, 

approximately 70 million travelers and 35 million vehicles cross the border from Canada 

into the United States, according to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Given 

the volume of cross-border travel and trade between the United States and Canada, 

border congestion and the resulting wait times have a substantial economic impact on 

both nations. Furthermore, according to an analysis by DHS, the heightened emphasis on 

border security following the 2001 terrorist attacks has lengthened processing time for 

travelers and cargo crossing into the United States. Recognizing the need to improve 

both border security and border-crossing efficiency, the United States and Canada have 

cooperated on various cross-border management initiatives intended to increase the flow

of legitimate travel across the border while maintaining security. For example, to 

facilitate the travel of low-risk prescreened individuals across the northern border, the 

United States and Canada jointly operate the NEXUS program. The NEXUS program 

allows registered border residents and frequent cross-border travelers identified as lowrisk individuals access to dedicated lanes and expedited processing with minimal 

inspection. The United States and Canada also coordinate on border law enforcement 

Page 1 GAO-08-1038R Shared Border Management
programs such as the Integrated Border Enforcement Team Program (IBET), which is a 

bi-national, multi-agency law enforcement initiative that (1) provides, where necessary, 

support to national security investigations associated to the Canada/United States border 

and (2) investigates illegal cross-border activities. 

A key collaborative effort to improve security and relieve congestion at the ports of entry 

across the northern border is to move customs and immigration inspection activities 

away from the border—a concept known as “land preclearance” or “shared border 

management.” In December 2004, the United States and Canada announced that the two 

governments had agreed to move forward with a land preclearance pilot project at the 

Buffalo, New York-Fort Erie, Ontario Peace Bridge and at one other border crossing site 

along the northern border, which had not yet been determined. 

The land preclearance pilot project flowed from the 2001 Smart Border Declaration and 

its associated action plan, which was meant to enhance the security along the northern 

border while facilitating information sharing and the legitimate flow of people and goods, 

and securing infrastructure. The preclearance pilot at the Peace Bridge would involve the 

relocation of all U.S. border inspection operations for both commercial and passenger 

traffic from the U.S. side of the border in Buffalo, New York, to the Canadian side of the 

border in Fort Erie, Ontario. The other preclearance location had not been determined, 

but would have relocated Canadian border inspection functions to the U.S. side of the 

border at a different port of entry. Currently, U.S. Customs and Border Protection 

(CBP)—a component of DHS and the lead federal agency in charge of securing our 

nation’s borders—conducts inspections of travelers and cargo at all U.S. ports of entry, 

including the Buffalo port of entry at the Peace Bridge. Under the preclearance pilot 

project, the Buffalo port of entry would be moved to the Canadian side of the Peace 

Bridge, and all CBP inspections and operations would take place before travelers and 

cargo entered the United States. 

From 2005 to 2007, the United States and Canada were engaged in negotiations to 

implement land preclearance at the Buffalo-Fort Erie Peace Bridge ports of entry. 

However, in April 2007, these negotiations were officially terminated by DHS. Section 

566 of the 2008 DHS Appropriations Act mandates that we conduct a study on DHS's use 

of shared border management to secure the borders of the United States.1

 In accordance 

with the mandate and discussions with Committee staff, this report addresses the 

following questions: 

(1) What negotiations have been conducted by the Department of Homeland Security 

regarding the shared border management pilot project? 

(2) What issues led to the termination of shared border management negotiations? 

To address these objectives, we visited the Peace Bridge site in April 2008. We observed 

the current U.S. inspection facility in Buffalo as well as where the shared border 

 1

 Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-161, § 566, 121 Stat. 2042, 2092 (2007). 

Page 2 GAO-08-1038R Shared Border Management
management site would have been located in Fort Erie, Ontario, Canada. In addition, we 

analyzed available documentation from DHS, CBP, and the Peace Bridge Authority 

(PBA), a public benefit corporation solely responsible for the maintenance and upkeep 

of the Peace Bridge and for building or expanding both Canadian and U.S. ports of entry 

at the Peace Bridge. The documentation included a 2004 CBP report on shared border 

management, a 2005 CBP infrastructure and strategic needs assessment of the U.S. port 

in Buffalo, a 2005 DHS analysis of shared border management, DHS correspondence to 

congressional staff on the status of the shared border management negotiations, DHS 

memos to the Canadian government, and the PBA’s U.S. port of entry expansion plans. 

We did not seek access to documents from the Canadian government because GAO does

not have a right of access to documents from foreign governments. However, we 

interviewed key officials from both countries who participated in the negotiations to 

gather their views on shared border management at the Peace Bridge site. Specifically, 

we met with officials from the Department of State, DHS, and Public Safety Canada 

(PSC), which was the lead Canadian agency involved in shared border management. We 

also met with officials from the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA), the General 

Manager of the PBA, the Canadian Consul General-Buffalo, and the Mayor of Fort Erie. 

In addition, we met with three local community leaders within the Buffalo/Fort Erie area 

to obtain their views on shared border management. We conducted this performance 

audit from January 2008 through September 2008 in accordance with generally accepted 

government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the 

audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence 

obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings based on our audit objectives. 

Results in Brief 

From 2005 to 2007, the United States and Canada were engaged in negotiations to 

implement a land preclearance pilot project (also referred to as “shared border 

management”), which would have relocated the U.S. border inspection facility from the 

Buffalo, New York, side of the Peace Bridge to the Fort Erie, Ontario, side. All CBP 

inspections and operations would then take place before travelers and cargo entered the 

United States. The Peace Bridge site was selected for the pilot because it is one of the 

busiest commercial crossings between the United States and Canada,2

 yet the existing 

border infrastructure at the Peace Bridge contributes to a number of security and border 

crossing inefficiencies, according to DHS. Specifically, DHS had concluded that the U.S. 

inspection facility, which is located near the center of downtown Buffalo, is outdated, 

undersized, and lacks the modern amenities a port of its size should have to operate 

efficiently and securely. The facility is located on 17 acres of land, as opposed to the 80 

acres that CBP recommends for a large port of entry. DHS has reported that additional 

inspection space is needed to address these infrastructure issues, but there is no easily 

available land adjacent to the facility in Buffalo. On the Canadian side of the Peace 

Bridge in Fort Erie, there are approximately 70 acres of land available on which the U.S. 

inspection facility could have been co-located with Canadian inspection facilities. 

 2

 According to the PBA, approximately $700 million in goods crosses the Peace Bridge weekly, making it the third 

busiest crossing by truck volume. In 2007, about 1.3 million trucks crossed the Peace Bridge accounting for 16 percent 

of all Great Lakes border crossings.

Page 3 GAO-08-1038R Shared Border Management
In April 2007, DHS officially terminated negotiations with Canada because a mutually 

acceptable framework for United States-Canada shared border management could not be 

reached. Officials from both countries agreed that negotiations were conducted in good 

faith, and the two governments were able to reach accommodations on several key 

issues raised during the negotiations, such as the approval of all of the authorities 

Canada sought for its U.S.-based preclearance area,3

 and the arming of CBP officers at 

the preclearance site on Canadian soil. However, certain issues pertaining to each 

country’s sovereignty and the law enforcement authorities of U.S. CBP officers operating 

on Canadian soil could not be resolved. These issues included concerns over arrest 

authority; the right of individuals to withdraw an application to enter the United States 

while at the land preclearance site in Canada; mutually agreeable fingerprinting 

processes; how information collected by U.S. officials at the land preclearance site 

would be shared; and concerns that future interpretations of the Canadian Charter could 

adversely impact U.S. authorities at the preclearance site.4

 

DHS Entered into Shared Border Management Negotiations to Address 

Space Constraints at the Buffalo Port of Entry 

From 2005 to 2007, DHS engaged in bi-national negotiations with Canada to create the 

first North American land border preclearance pilot project at the Peace Bridge site. The 

pilot project would have relocated the U.S. border inspection facility from Buffalo, New 

York, to Fort Erie, Ontario, Canada. The overarching goal of shared border management 

at the Peace Bridge site was to facilitate cross-border coordination and collaboration, 

while eliminating the need to expand the outdated inspection facility in Buffalo and the 

impact that expansion would have on the surrounding community. The current facility in 

Buffalo sits on 17 acres and is confined on three sides by the Niagara River, a historic 

park, and a residential neighborhood, as shown in figure 1 and figure 2. 

 3

 The site for the Canadian preclearance facility had not been finalized. 

4

 The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms defines the rights and freedoms guaranteed to Canadians. 

Page 4 GAO-08-1038R Shared Border Management
Figure 1: Overhead View of Buffalo Land Port of Entry 

Park Interstate I-190 Buffalo Land Port of Entry Niagara River Peace Bridge

Residential Community

Source: Peace Bridge Authority.

Page 5 GAO-08-1038R Shared Border Management
Figure 2: Close-up View of Buffalo Land Port of Entry

Peace Bridge Niagara River

Source: Peace Bridge Authority.

Interstate I-190 Buffalo Land Port of Entry Park

Residential Community

As a result, there is limited real estate available for the port to expand. On the Canadian 

side of the Peace Bridge, however, there is more land available on which a U.S. 

inspection facility could be located, as shown in figure 3. 

Page 6 GAO-08-1038R Shared Border Management
Figure 3: View of Fort Erie, Ontario, Canada Land Port of Entry

Fort Erie Land Port of Entry Proposed site for U.S. land preclearance facility

Niagara River Peace Bridge

Source: Peace Bridge Authority.

According to DHS, the existing infrastructure at the Buffalo port of entry contributes to a 

number of border crossing and security inefficiencies. In 2005, a DHS cost-benefit 

analysis of shared border management stated that infrastructure constraints and 

limitations at the Buffalo port of entry were major impediments to the smooth flow of 

traffic and trade across the Peace Bridge border crossing from Canada to the United 

States. Specifically, the size of the inspection facility site—17 acres—does not allow for 

a sufficient number of inspection lanes to accommodate and process the volume of 

traffic that crosses the bridge daily, according to DHS. 

In 2005, infrastructure improvements were made to the Buffalo inspection facility, which 

local officials told us have eased congestion. However, DHS stated that additional 

capacity—that is, more inspection lanes—is still needed. In 2005, the number of lanes for 

primary processing at the facility was increased from 8 car lanes and 4 commercial 

vehicles lanes to 10 for cars and 7 for commercial vehicles (and 1 dedicated NEXUS 

Page 7 GAO-08-1038R Shared Border Management
lane). Furthermore, the new lanes are “hi/low” to allow for flexibility in converting them 

to commercial lanes for trucks (“hi”) or passengers (“low”), depending on the specific 

demand. However, DHS stated that the renovations cannot eliminate the congestion at 

the port because additional inspection lanes are still needed to accommodate the volume 

of traffic that enters the port daily. Officials from CBP-Buffalo also noted that increased 

inspection lanes are necessary to improve the operation of the port. 

Because the 2005 renovations only included one lane dedicated to NEXUS, expanding 

the port was expected to help maximize other trusted traveler programs such as Free 

and Secure Trade (FAST), according to DHS. FAST is an expedited clearance program 

for known low-risk shipments. DHS reported that a dedicated FAST lane would enable 

greater processing efficiency, thereby reducing queue length and wait time. For example, 

lanes dedicated to FAST have average primary processing times of 30 seconds versus 

Non-FAST lanes at 2 minutes, according to DHS. 

DHS has also stated that expansion of the Buffalo port is necessary to improve 

enforcement and security operations. According to CBP, the current port has inadequate 

space to handle the number of vehicles (both passenger and commercial) referred for 

secondary inspections, which are separate, more thorough screenings of selected 

travelers and cargo. CBP officials told us that if the secondary inspection area is full, 

CBP officers must hold vehicles referred for secondary inspection in the primary lane, 

causing congestion that could be avoided if there were sufficient space for secondary 

inspections. In addition, because of the configuration of the port, vehicles referred to 

secondary inspections must cross paths with commercial vehicles exiting the primary 

inspection area, thus creating an obstructive intersection as well as safety and security 

risks. However, because of space constraints at the facility, this is the only area that can 

handle secondary inspections, according to CBP. CBP officials also noted that the 

administration building at the port is not sufficient or effective for their operations. For 

example, these officials stated that the building has limited space for security and 

management operations, such as secondary inspection processing and agriculture 

inspections. 

Although DHS recognizes that increasing the size of the Buffalo inspection facility is 

necessary to address these issues, there is limited room adjacent to the facility for 

expansion without adversely affecting the surrounding community. According to the 

PBA—which would manage any port expansion project—expanding the port in Buffalo 

would require the acquisition and demolition of approximately 83 adjacent residential 

homes, some of which are historical.5

 However, on the Canadian side of the Peace Bridge 

in Fort Erie, there is land available that could be used for a U.S. inspection facility 

without requiring the taking of any residential properties. Relocating the U.S. inspection 

facility from Buffalo to Fort Erie under shared border management was intended to 

address the need for improvements and expansion of the U.S. inspection facility while 

minimizing adverse impacts on the surrounding community in Buffalo. With sufficient 

land available, the facility was expected to include a total of 25 commercial and 

 5

 The PBA was granted limited eminent domain power by New York State in 2004 to acquire property surrounding the 

Buffalo inspection facility. The PBA stated that because of the historic significance of Front Park (which is adjacent to

the Buffalo inspection facility), expanding the inspection facility into the park was not a viable option. 

Page 8 GAO-08-1038R Shared Border Management
passenger primary inspection lanes and booths, which is the standard for a large port of 

entry, according to CBP officials. In addition, DHS stated that shared border 

management would have also enabled informal information sharing between U.S. and 

Canadian border inspection officials because the inspection facilities would be located 

adjacent to each other. According to the PBA, another benefit of shared border 

management was that constructing a new U.S. inspection facility in Fort Erie would cost 

approximately $100 million less and take less time than expanding the inspection facility 

in Buffalo. Local community officials we spoke with also noted that relocating the U.S. 

inspection facility to Fort Erie would allow for better accommodation of future growth 

or new security measures that may be added, as more space is available for facility 

expansion. 

The United States and Canada Were Unable to Find an Acceptable Framework 

for Shared Border Management 

According to U.S. and Canadian officials, shared border management negotiations were 

terminated in April 2007 because an acceptable agreement that would satisfy both 

countries could not be accomplished. Specifically, DHS stated that it would not have 

been able to exercise the same law enforcement authorities in Canada that it currently 

has at ports of entry in the United States. Officials from both countries agreed that 

negotiations were conducted in good faith, and the two governments were able to reach 

accommodations on several key issues raised during the negotiations. For example, all of

the authorities sought by Canada for its preclearance area—which would have been 

located on U.S. soil—could be provided with minimal changes to U.S. laws, according to 

DHS. Another issue that was resolved was the arming of CBP officers at the preclearance site. When negotiations began in 2005, CBP officers would not have been 

permitted to carry firearms at the pre-clearance site because Canadian border officers 

did not carry firearms. This was a concern for U.S. officials because CBP officers carry 

firearms at U.S. ports of entry. During negotiations, this issue was resolved as a result of 

a change in Canadian government policy that permitted the arming of Canadian border 

officers which allowed for the arming of CBP officers, according to Canadian officials. 

Despite agreement on the authorities sought by Canada and the arming of CBP officers, 

officials stated that an acceptable agreement that would satisfy both countries’ 

sovereignty could not be accomplished. According to DHS, the overarching issue was the 

subordination of U.S. law enforcement personnel and authorities to Canadian law rather 

than U.S. law and the inability to ensure necessary U.S. law enforcement authorities 

under Canada’s legal framework. One of the guiding principles of shared border 

management was that the inspecting country’s operations would be consistent with the 

constitutional and legal frameworks of the host country. However, DHS officials stated 

that for shared border management to meet their requirements, U.S. border inspection 

personnel would require full legal authority, comparable to that provided under U.S. law, 

to replicate the inspection and enforcement activities DHS engages in today. DHS 

officials stated that operating under Canadian law would have limited DHS’s ability to 

manage and secure the border. The following are key issues that surfaced during 

negotiations: 

Page 9 GAO-08-1038R Shared Border Management
• Arrest authority: According to officials from both countries, the host country would 

have sole authority to make arrests at the preclearance site, because of the 

sovereignty of the host government. These officials stated that for the majority of 

possible scenarios, negotiators agreed on how these arrests might work. However, 

U.S. officials told us they were concerned that the U.S. government would not have 

the ability to arrest and then prosecute high profile/high value terrorists or criminals 

who might present themselves at the border. For example, if a high value target of 

interest to the United States presented himself at the preclearance site, U.S. 

authorities could not arrest him; rather, Canadian authorities would make the arrest. 

The individual would then have to be extradited to the United States for prosecution. 

Canadian officials told us that they offered the United States the ability to prioritize 

cases in order to expedite the extradition process in such circumstances. 

• Right of withdrawal: Under Canadian law, individuals have the right to withdraw an 

application to enter Canada at a port of entry, according to Canadian and U.S. 

officials. For example, in a land preclearance scenario if an individual begins the 

inspection process at the port of entry and then decides that he or she no longer

wants to enter into Canada, under Canadian law that person has the right to withdraw 

from inspection. However, U.S. negotiators wanted the ability to inspect and 

fingerprint individuals who present themselves to CBP officers for admission into the 

United States and then request to withdraw their application to enter the country. 

Under U.S. law, CBP officers have the discretion to allow an individual they have 

determined to be inadmissible to withdraw an application for admission in place of 

formal removal proceedings, but the individual does not have the right to withdraw 

from inspection and fingerprinting. U.S. officials stated that they were strongly 

opposed to providing a guaranteed right to withdraw because doing so could allow 

individuals to "probe for weaknesses” at the preclearance site. According to Canadian 

officials, they proposed an alternative whereby U.S. Customs and Border Protection 

would be permitted to search and question individuals who request withdrawal, but 

not take fingerprints. To address this point of disagreement, Canadian officials stated 

that they offered U.S. negotiators a compromise position whereby Canadian border 

authorities would investigate any suspicious person who requests withdrawal. 

However, U.S. officials told us that this approach was not satisfactory. Officials from 

both countries noted that the right of withdrawal issue was a major issue during 

negotiations. 

• Fingerprinting: According to officials involved, both countries differed on how and 

when fingerprints could be taken at the preclearance site. Currently, CBP has the 

authority to fingerprint any individuals who present themselves to CBP officers for 

admission into the United States, and CBP wanted to maintain this ability at the 

preclearance site. For example, CBP may fingerprint individuals who cross the 

border to determine if a person may be a wanted felon. However, according to 

Canadian officials, in a land preclearance scenario, fingerprints could not be taken 

unless the individual volunteers or has been charged with a crime. According to 

Canadian officials, they proposed that CBP would have the ability to take fingerprints 

only if certain criteria had been met. According to officials involved in the 

Page 10 GAO-08-1038R Shared Border Management
negotiations, this was not a viable alternative to U.S. negotiators, and this issue was 

not resolved. 

• Information sharing: According to officials from both countries, there was 

disagreement over how information collected by U.S officials at the land 

preclearance site could be shared. U.S. officials told us they wanted to maintain the 

ability to share information collected at the preclearance site with appropriate U.S. 

law enforcement agencies, which they can do under U.S. law. However, Canadian 

officials told us that the ability of U.S. authorities to share information collected in 

Canada would be guided by Canadian laws. As a result, under Canadian law, DHS 

would not be permitted to share all information collected at the preclearance site 

with U.S. law enforcement agencies, according to DHS officials. 

• Canadian Charter: According to DHS officials involved in the negotiations, future 

interpretations of the Canadian Charter could adversely impact U.S. authorities at the 

preclearance site. In addition, DHS officials stated that the Canadian Charter, as it 

has been interpreted by Canadian courts, would limit the use of certain law 

enforcement tools available to CBP. For example, under U.S. law, CBP officers can 

search individuals, conveyances, and cargo at the border without a warrant or 

probable cause. However, according to Canadian officials, under Canadian law, 

reasonable grounds are needed to conduct searches. According to DHS, these 

limitations would make it difficult for CBP officers to fully carry out their duties. 

Officials from both countries stated that these issues could not be resolved through 

negotiations because operating a U.S. port of entry in Canada under land preclearance/shared border management would have required the United States to abide by 

Canadian law—which U.S. officials stated would have limited the ability of U.S. law 

enforcement personnel to secure the border. DHS wanted to operate the shared border 

management facility according to the same standards as all other U.S. ports of entry, but 

to operate in Canada would have meant that those standards could not have been 

achieved, according to officials from both governments. 

According to officials from both countries, the best way to address U.S. concerns related 

to having a U.S. inspection facility located on Canadian soil would be to conduct what 

they termed a “land swap.” Under a land swap, the United States would be granted land 

in Canada to place the inspection facility and Canada would be granted reciprocal land in 

the United States for placement of its inspection facility. Since the U.S. inspection facility 

would therefore be technically located on U.S. soil, CBP would be able to conduct its 

inspections with full U.S. legal authority and could operate the port of entry according to 

the same standards as all other U.S. ports. However, both U.S. and Canadian officials 

told us a land swap was never seriously pursued as an option because of the legal and 

political issues involved. Therefore, officials involved in the negotiations did not believe 

this was a realistic possibility. 

Page 11 GAO-08-1038R Shared Border Management
In June 2008, Canadian and U.S. officials told us there are currently no plans to re-open 

negotiations regarding shared border management at the Peace Bridge site. With the 

conclusion of the negotiations, the PBA, with the support of DHS, is moving forward 

with its plans to improve and expand the U.S. inspection facility in Buffalo. According to 

the PBA, the timeline for beginning construction on the new facility has not been 

finalized. 

We provided a draft of the report to DHS for its review and comment. CBP provided 

technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. We also met with relevant 

officials within the Canadian Government who confirmed the accuracy of the report and 

provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. 

- - - - - 

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Homeland Security. We will also 

make copies available to others upon request. In addition, the report will be available at 

no charge on GAO’s Web site at http://www.gao.gov. 

If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please contact me at (202) 

512-8777 or by e-mail at Stanar@gao.gov. Contact points for our Office of Congressional 

Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who

made key contributions to this report are listed in the enclosure. 

Richard M. Stana 

Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues 

Enclosure

Page 12 GAO-08-1038R Shared Border Management
Enclosure 

GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

GAO Contact

Richard M. Stana (202) 512-8777 or stanar@gao.gov 

Staff Acknowledgments

In addition to the contact named above, Mike Dino, Assistant Director, and Adam 

Hoffman, Analyst-in-Charge, managed this assignment. Bintou Njie, Sally Williamson, 

Frances Cook, and Michele Fejfar made significant contributions to the work. 

(440691) 

Page 13 GAO-08-1038R Shared Border Management
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