# Curacao - United States Department of State

- Curaçao National Day Antony J. Blinken, Secretary of State													HomeThe Secretary of State Remarks &amp; Releases&#8230;Curaçao National Day				hide		if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}																										Curaçao National Day																																		Press Statement																		October 10, 2023																																							On behalf of the people of the United States of America, I congratulate the people of Curaçao as you celebrate Curaçao Day.Our longstanding friendship is a testament to the people-to-people ties, shared history, and common values that bind us. The United States and Curaçao will continue working together to disrupt transnational criminal networks and make life safer for all our citizens. Together, we are expanding economic opportunity by investing our time and resources into education and entrepreneurship. Through regional initiatives such as the U.S.-Caribbean Partnership to Address the Climate Crisis (PACC 2030), we are partnering with Caribbean institutions to improve Caribbean resilience and our ability to face future challenges.Wishing the people of Curaçao a happy Curaçao Day and looking forward to continuing to build a brighter future for our peoples.						Tags																					Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs																								Curacao																								Office of the Spokesperson																								The Secretary of State
- Press briefing with Todd D. Robinson, Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs Todd D.  Robinson, Assistant SecretaryBureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement AffairsMODERATOR:  Greetings to everyone from the U.S. Department of State’s Media Hub of the Americas in Miami, Florida.  I would like to welcome our participants who have dialed in from the United States and across the region.  This is an on-the-record press briefing with the Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs Todd D. Robinson. Assistant Secretary Robinson will discuss outcomes from Friday’s virtual ministerial to launch a Global Coalition to Address Synthetic Drug Threats as well as next steps for the global coalition.  This coalition seeks to unite countries worldwide in a concerted effort to prevent the illicit manufacture and trafficking of synthetic drugs, identify emerging drug trends, and respond effectively to their public health impacts. As a reminder, today’s briefing is on the record.  And with that, I will turn it over to Assistant Secretary Robinson. ASSISTANT SECRETARY ROBINSON:  Thank you for joining this call today and for the opportunity to discuss the collective efforts we have undertaken to confront the important issue of synthetic drugs. Last Friday, as you know, Secretary Blinken hosted a virtual ministerial to launch a Global Coalition to Address Synthetic Drug Threats.  Nearly 100 countries and international organizations participated in the launch, underscoring the shared concern about this public health and national security threat.  The coalition aims to unite countries worldwide in a concerted effort to combat the illicit manufacture and trafficking of synthetic drugs.  Together, we hope to strengthen efforts to prevent the production and trafficking of illicit synthetic drugs, identify emerging synthetic drug trends and use patterns, and promote efforts to respond effectively to the public health impacts they impose. Participants at the ministerial underscored the importance of sharing data and increasing efforts to mitigate the health impact of synthetic drug use.  As you all already know, synthetic drugs such as fentanyl and methamphetamine pose a grave risk to the health and security of our citizens here in the United States.  The consequences of these drugs are devastating as evidenced by the alarming statistics. In 2022, the CDC estimated that nearly 110,000 Americans lost their lives to drug overdoses.  Recognizing the gravity of this situation, the Biden administration is fully committed to preventing drug use and minimizing its negative impact.  We understand the importance of connecting individuals to treatment and supporting the more than 20 million Americans in recovery.  President Biden’s National Drug Control Strategy has allocated a substantial $24 billion dollars in this fiscal year to strengthen drug-related public health interventions.  These measures not only safeguard the health of our citizens, but also exemplify our dedication at home as we look to other nations to also take action. It is vital to note that these dangers are not limited to the United States.  More countries than ever are facing an increasing threat from synthetic drugs like tramadol, Captagon, MDMA, and Ketamine.  Criminals are constantly innovating to create new synthetic drugs, adjusting formulas to avoid international controls and domestic regulations, and creating new demand.   One staggering number to note:  Over the past decade, more than 1,100 new synthetic drugs were detected and reported by the United Nations.  Through the Global Coalition to Address Synthetic Drug Threats, we are harnessing international cooperation and shared knowledge to tackle this crisis head on.  By working together, we can more effectively disrupt the illicit synthetic drug supply chains, enhance our ability to identify and respond to emerging threats, and protect the lives and well-being of our own citizens and of people around the world. The United States has already been working with partners like Mexico, Canada, and other countries to drive urgent global action to disrupt the synthetic drug trade from beginning to end.  We are engaging with countries such as India to strengthen our partnerships on securing pharmaceutical and chemical supply chains to prevent criminal diversion of dual-use precursor chemicals, and we remain committed to engaging with the PRC to address the threat illicit synthetic drugs pose to our countries.  The Department of State also works within the UN, the Organization of American States, the G7, G20, and other organizations to improve the abilities of our countries to detect and disrupt the illicit manufacturing, diversion, and trafficking of precursor chemicals and finished drugs.   We have more important work to do, so in closing, let me express my gratitude to our international partners who have already joined us in this crucial endeavor.  The fight against synthetic drugs requires a global response, and we are confident that our collective efforts will yield significant results.  Together, we can create a safer and healthier future for our citizens and generations to come.   Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.   MODERATOR:  Thank you so much, Assistant Secretary.  We will now begin the question-and-answer portion of today’s briefing.  For those on the English line asking questions, please limit yourself to one question related to the topic of today’s briefing.  If you submitted your question in advance, I have incorporated the question into the queue.  Our first question today we received from Daniel – from Jim Carson of La Jornada in Mexico:  “What specific will be new out of this declaration?  Are you setting up a FinCEN-type structure to share information, do evaluations, and a secretariat, or is it simply a reiteration of past commitments without any specific additional actions?”   ASSISTANT SECRETARY ROBINSON:  Great question.  The first thing I would say is we are – we are building on what we have done in the past and what has been done by other countries in the past.  The coalition is intended to be an inclusive forum for sharing best practices and identifying areas for collaboration to improve the global response to public health and security threats posed by synthetic drugs.  We ask that countries commit to working collaboratively with other coalition member countries at both political and technical levels to develop a joint framework for addressing synthetic drugs and develop actions in line with that framework.  Thanks.   MODERATOR:  Thank you.  We received a question from journalist Fernando Morales from Red Salvadoreña de Medios in El Salvador: “El Salvador is a corridor for the transit of synthetic drugs like fentanyl.  How is work being done to prevent the trafficking of these narcotics?”   ASSISTANT SECRETARY ROBINSON:  I’m sorry.  Could you say that again?  MODERATOR:  Absolutely, Assistant Secretary.  “El Salvador is a corridor for the transit of synthetic drugs like fentanyl.  How is work being done to prevent the trafficking of these narcotics?&#8221; ASSISTANT SECRETARY ROBINSON:  Great question.  As our correspondent will note, the United States Government on several different levels is working with members of the civilian security forces in El Salvador and throughout the region – El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras – on things like investigations, going after the trafficking networks.  We have experts on the ground from DEA and the Department of Justice.   We also work on training.  As the correspondent will note, there is an International Law Enforcement Academy hosted by the Government of El Salvador where we can do training for police and prosecutors in the region on different techniques and modernized techniques for going after these networks.  So those are ways that we are – those are ways that we are trying to get after these – shut down these corridors.   MODERATOR:  Thank you, Assistant Secretary.  The next question will go to Jesús Esquivel from Proceso Magazine in Mexico.  Jesús, please unmute yourself.   QUESTION:  Hello.  Can you hear me?   MODERATOR:  Yes.  Please ask your question.  &#8212;    QUESTION:  Okay.  Yes.  Under Secretary, there has always been the accusations that the Mexican cartels are responsible for all the synthetic drugs in the United States, but as you probably know, the domestic cartels in the U.S. are also responsible for the distributions and sale of these drugs.   My question to you is:  What exactly or when exactly the U.S. Government for the first time is going to be exposing the domestic cartels in this problem and in the United States?  And also, if you think the accusations as – members of the U.S. Congress made to Mexico and threats that they probably going to invade Mexico to stop the drug trafficking, it will help in this global coalition in the case of – specifically of Mexico to cooperate with the U.S. Government?   ASSISTANT SECRETARY ROBINSON:  Thank you, Jesús.  Both good questions.  Look, first of all, I would – I would not exactly support the premise of your question.  We have never said that all of the fentanyl or synthetic opioids that are coming to the United States are coming from Mexico.  We know that this is a global – a global effort by cartels from different regions around the world, including criminals in the United States.  I don’t think the FBI or the Department of Justice or our local law enforcement authorities have been shy about exposing the criminal networks in the United States that are trafficking in these drugs.  I think they will continue to publicly expose them when available.  So that’s thing number one. Thing number two, we have – the United States has an excellent relationship with our counterparts in Mexico.  We are both working very close to go after the networks in Mexico, to increase our cooperation on both sides of our southwest border, your northern border.  And we are working together internationally to share our experiences with working together with other countries around the world.  I’m very proud of our relationship with our Mexican counterparts, and we’re going to continue to call on them as they call on us to work together to do more to stop – to stop this global trafficking of synthetic drugs. MODERATOR:  Thank you, Assistant Secretary Robison.  The next question will go to Adyr Corral from El Sol de Mexico.  Adyr, please unmute yourself.  Go ahead.  Adyr, can you hear us?   Okay, unfortunately we’re going to have to move on.  I see we have a submitted question in our Q&amp;A from Brendan O’Boyle from Reuters in Mexico City: “Thank you, Ambassador.  Within the coalition, where is there concern about fentanyl’s short-term spread geographically?  In Mexico, some experts have sounded alarm about fentanyl spreading in drug supply domestically, though data is scarce.  Have coalition partners in Mexico recognized domestic spread?” ASSISTANT SECRETARY ROBINSON:  I’m sorry, can you repeat that question again? MODERATOR:  Sure, sir.  “Thank you, Ambassador.  Within the coalition, where is there concern about fentanyl’s short-term spread geographically?  In Mexico, some experts have sounded the alarm about fentanyl spreading in the drug supply domestically, though data is scarce.  Have coalition partners in Mexico recognized domestic spread?” ASSISTANT SECRETARY ROBINSON:  The short answer is I believe the Government of Mexico has recognized the short-term spread of synthetic opioids.  We are – and – but there’s a very good relationship between our Office of National Drug Control Policy and the secretary for Health in Mexico.  They are working very closely together on campaigns to raise awareness about synthetic opioids and what can be done to avoid falling into – into that addiction.  So we feel like we have a burgeoning story to tell, a better story to tell as we go forward on our cooperation on the messaging against the domestic – in Mexico, the domestic spread of the – and growth of the use of synthetic opioids. MODERATOR:  Thank you, Assistant Secretary.  I’m told we’ve resolved the microphone issues with Adyr Corral, so we’ll go back to Adyr Corral from El Sol de Mexico.  Please unmute yourself. QUESTION:  Hi.  You can hear me? ASSISTANT SECRETARY ROBINSON:  Yes. MODERATOR:  We can hear you. QUESTION:  Ah, thank you very much.  Sorry for the problems.  I would like to ask the assistant secretary for a comment on the initiative to designate the fentanyl as a weapon of mass destruction in Congress.  How about that, Assistant Secretary? ASSISTANT SECRETARY ROBINSON:  Thank you, great question.  We have currently – the Department of Justice, DEA, FBI, Department of State – we feel like we have the authorities necessary to go after the networks that are trafficking in these drugs.  At the moment, we don’t see that classifying fentanyl as a weapon of mass destruction will give us any more authority than we already have to try to stop its trafficking.  So we feel pretty comfortable that we’re in a good place in terms of having the tools necessary to go after the drug and to go after the networks that are trafficking the drugs.  QUESTION:  Thank you very much.  MODERATOR:  Thank you, Assistant Secretary.  The next question was submitted in advance from Juan Silva from W Radio in Colombia:  “How do you assess the current situation in Colombia in terms of the fight against drugs?”  ASSISTANT SECRETARY ROBINSON:  Well, as the correspondent, as Juan will know, we have a very long, very strong, very deep relationship with Colombia and Colombia’s security forces that has developed over a number of years.  We feel like we are – we have developed into great partners.  Colombia has become a net exporter of security globally, and that is in large part due to the very strong relationship that has developed with the United States.   Today we continue in that effort.  There are areas where we are hoping to start working – new areas where we are starting to – we want to begin working with the Petro government, and we are in constant conversation with Petro and his team to figure out how we can best help them bring greater security and safety to communities in Colombia, and by doing so, help shut down the networks that are trafficking drugs north to the United States.  Thanks.  MODERATOR:  Thank you, Assistant Secretary.   Our next question we received from Eduard Ribas from EFE:  “What responsibility does China have on the trafficking of fentanyl precursors?  How can this coalition be successful without Chinese participation?”  ASSISTANT SECRETARY ROBINSON:  Well, I would say the – we know good things happen when China is involved in conversations like this.  You will recall in 2019 the Chinese Government scheduled fentanyl and made it much harder to get out of the country directly and be shipped directly to other countries.  And when they did that, the trafficking of fentanyl itself in the United States from China went to almost zero.  So we think that there’s a lot more that can be done by the PRC in terms of greater monitoring and labeling and information-sharing on the precursor chemicals that are leaving the PRC, and they – we invited them to join the coalition.  We expect at some point that they will take us up on our invitation because they want to be responsible, a responsible country in this effort.  And we all know that they play – that there are companies in China that play an important role in the distribution of the precursor chemicals that go into making these drugs.  Over.  MODERATOR:  Thank you, Assistant Secretary.  We have time for about two more questions.  One was submitted in advance from a journalist in Guyana regarding CARICOM, Denis Chabrol from Demarara Waves Online News:  “How badly are Caribbean Community (CARICOM) nations affected by synthetic drugs?”  ASSISTANT SECRETARY ROBINSON:  Thank you.  Again, this is a – that’s a great question.  I would say although we haven’t seen significant production in the Caribbean, it’s important to note that criminal chemists can easily synthesize fentanyl almost anywhere.  The Global Coalition to Address Synthetic Drug Threats will provide a foundation for developing and implementing effective, practical solutions to prevent the illicit manufacture and trafficking of synthetic drugs.  It will help detect emerging drug threats, and we hope it will help respond to the – to their public health impacts.  Over. MODERATOR:  Thank you.  I see in the chat the journalist had added:  “What do we expect from CARICOM and what assistance the U.S. can provide?” ASSISTANT SECRETARY ROBINSON:  Well, actually, I would turn it around.  The question should be:  What more can CARICOM countries do?  And I think, again, when we talk about things like exchanging information, when we talk about things like making sure that they are getting access, making sure their communities are getting access to the antidotes for overdoses, making sure that they are reporting to the international organizations that are collecting information that everybody else can use – those are the things that that we would hope we could get from countries that are involved in the global coalition.  And the United States and the international community will continue to help with training and equipping those police forces and prosecutors that are working on this issue.  Over. MODERATOR:  Thank you, Assistant Secretary.  We had a question from Martin Villena from Andina News Agency in Peru:  “Concerning the Global Coalition to Address Synthetic Drug Threats, does its launch also mean strengthening even more relations with countries such as Peru and Colombia, which face the issue and the related problems concerning cocaine productions in their territories?” ASSISTANT SECRETARY ROBINSON:  Well, we’re always working to strengthening – strengthening the relationship with our good friends in Peru and Colombia.  But in fact, again, we will – what the establishment of this coalition is looking to do is to have our friends from Peru and Colombia share their experiences with other countries around the world and help other countries who don’t have the expertise that our countries do, help them address the issues in their countries.  We have great relationships with our partners in Peru and Colombia; I don’t expect that will change.  But we will – in the establishment of this coalition, we will be asking them to do more to help on a global level.  Over.   MODERATOR:  Thank you, Assistant Secretary.  We received a question from Carrie Kahn with NPR:  “How do proposals from some Republicans in the United States urging military intervention to stop fentanyl trafficking in Mexico affect your plans to enlist global partners?” ASSISTANT SECRETARY ROBINSON:  Well, I would say we’re going to let Congress – the Senate and the House – develop and debate their own ideas.  We are going to – I am focused on working with our civilian security partners globally, making sure that they have the training, the equipment, the strategies; making sure they have access to the expertise necessary to focus on what is our responsibility, which is providing civilian security to our communities, both in the United States and around and world. MODERATOR:  Thank you, Assistant Secretary.  I believe we’ve gone through all the questions that we had today, so that will conclude today’s briefing.  I wanted to thank you for joining us today, as well as all of the journalists on the line for their questions.  If you have any follow-up questions about today’s briefing, you may contact the Miami Media Hub at MiamiHub@state.gov.  An English recording and transcript will be available for this briefing, as well as transcripts in Spanish and Brazilian Portuguese.  Thank you so much and have a good day. ASSISTANT SECRETARY ROBINSON:  Thanks.  Thanks, everybody. 
- Curaçao HomeReportsOffice to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons2023 Trafficking in Persons Report&#8230;Curaçao				hide	document.addEventListener("DOMContentLoaded", function(event) {	if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}});																						2023 Trafficking in Persons Report: Curaçao																																																																																												 In this section										/																							CURAÇAO (Tier 3)*																																													CURAÇAO (Tier 3)*																															PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS:																																																																																		PROSECUTION																																																																																		PROTECTION																																																																																		PREVENTION																																																																																		TRAFFICKING PROFILE:																																																																																																								CURAÇAO (Tier 3)*				The Government of Curaçao does not fully meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking and is not making significant efforts to do so, even considering the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, if any, on its anti-trafficking capacity; therefore Curaçao remained on Tier 3.  Despite the lack of significant efforts, the government took some steps to address trafficking, including providing shelter and other services to two trafficking victims, prosecuting two alleged traffickers, and adopting and funding a NAP to improve law enforcement efforts to combat trafficking.  However, the new NAP did not include lines of effort to protect victims or prevent the crime, courts did not convict any traffickers, and the government continued to condition foreign victims’ assistance, including residency, on cooperation with law enforcement in cases against traffickers.  Lack of funding remained a primary obstacle to robust anti-trafficking efforts.  Officials demonstrated limited familiarity with human trafficking and conflated the crime with migrant smuggling, hindering the effectiveness of prosecution, prevention, and protection efforts.  The government’s coordination with civil society organizations and internally, across agencies, was inadequate.																																					PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS:						    																																															Increase efforts to identify victims, including through proactively screening vulnerable populations, such as detained migrants and individuals in commercial sex. Provide potential victims, including those who choose not to cooperate with law enforcement in cases against traffickers, with services. Fully implement the SOP for victim identification and referral and train officials on its use. Improve coordination and information-sharing with anti-trafficking stakeholders within the government, across the Kingdom of the Netherlands, and civil society.  Vigorously investigate and prosecute trafficking crimes and convict traffickers, including complicit officials, and seek adequate penalties for convicted traffickers, which should involve significant prison terms. Increase funding for victim services, including staffing, specialized care for trafficking victims, and services accessible to male victims. Provide appropriate shelter options for trafficking victims, including male victims. Allocate and disburse sufficient resources for anti-trafficking efforts. Fully implement the current NAP and expand it to include objectives for victim protection and prevention of trafficking. 																																												PROSECUTION						    																																															The government maintained prosecution efforts.  Article 2:239 of the penal code criminalized sex trafficking and labor trafficking and prescribed penalties of up to nine years’ imprisonment or a fifth category fine of up to 100,000 Antillean guilder ($55,550) for crimes involving a victim 16 years of age or older, and up to 12 years’ imprisonment or a fine for those involving a victim younger than 16.  These penalties were sufficiently stringent and, with respect to sex trafficking, commensurate with those prescribed for other serious crimes, such as kidnapping.The Curaçao Police Force’s organized crime unit (DGC) was the law enforcement entity responsible for anti-trafficking efforts; DGC worked closely with the public prosecutor’s office to investigate trafficking crimes.  Authorities initiated one investigation in 2022, compared with one in 2021 and one in 2020.  The government did not report any ongoing investigations from previous years.  The government prosecuted two suspected labor traffickers in 2022, compared with prosecuting one alleged trafficker for sex and labor trafficking in 2021 and no prosecutions in 2020.  In this case, which progressed from investigation to prosecution in four months, officials responded to a police report of forced labor in the cultivation of dragon fruit on a rural property; DGC arrested two suspects and charged them with human trafficking and migrant smuggling for reportedly forcing the women to perform agricultural and household labor while sexually abusing them.  Judges did not convict any traffickers in 2022, compared with no convictions in 2021 and five (three for sex trafficking and two for sex and labor trafficking) in 2020.  The government did not report any appeals cases involving trafficking charges in 2022, compared with appeals cases involving five sex traffickers in 2021.  The courts ruled to acquit one alleged trafficker of trafficking charges in 2022, compared with acquitting six alleged traffickers in 2021.  Courts often convicted suspected traffickers of related crimes – such as migrant smuggling and labor code violations – in lieu of trafficking, even when prosecutors levied trafficking charges; observers indicated the judiciary’s limited familiarity with trafficking led prosecutors to charge traffickers with these related crimes to secure conviction.  Prosecutors struggled to build cases without victim testimony.  The government did not report any new investigations, prosecutions, or convictions of government employees complicit in human trafficking crimes.The DGC funded anti-trafficking activities under its transnational crime budget but, like most Curaçao Police Force (KPC) units, operated with resource and personnel shortages.  Some officials reported lack of funding and limited government resources disincentivized investigation of trafficking crimes.  Observers expressed concern nonspecialized law enforcement officials, such as patrol officers, had a limited understanding of trafficking and did not use a victim-centered approach.  The government trained 54 KPC officers on trafficking indicators and victim identification in 2022.  The public prosecutor’s office had a designated prosecutor responsible for most human trafficking cases; however, this prosecutor also managed a broader portfolio spanning several subject matter areas.  Officials reported the prosecutor’s office also suffered from capacity limitations and sometimes struggled to assign sufficient staff to major investigations.  The government continued to address human trafficking and migrant smuggling with the same resources and procedures, frequently charging traffickers with smuggling crimes; officials often conflated the two crimes.																																												PROTECTION						    																																															The government maintained inadequate protection efforts.  Authorities reported identifying two trafficking victims in 2022, compared with not identifying any victims in 2021 and 2020, three victims in 2019, and 44 victims in 2018.  Officials identified the victims, both Colombian women exploited in labor trafficking, during a law enforcement operation on a rural property, prompted by a police report.  Observers and officials reported a third woman worked under similar conditions at the property but could not be located; reportedly, she returned to Venezuela, her country of origin, without government support.The DGC conducted assessments to confirm trafficking victims’ status as such.  Officials did not regularly perform proactive screenings among vulnerable groups, such as migrants or individuals in commercial sex, construction, supermarkets, and catering, despite a Kingdom-wide requirement to do so.  KPC officials utilized a standard intake form when interviewing detained migrants; the intake form included questions regarding migrants’ vulnerability to trafficking.The government reported providing shelter, medical care, and psychological support to two trafficking victims in 2022, compared with providing some pre-trial support to three trafficking victims (two sex trafficking victims and one labor trafficking victim), in 2021.  Both victims agreed to support ongoing law enforcement proceedings and returned to their country of origin within 90 days of being identified.  In practice, assistance for victims was contingent upon cooperation with law enforcement efforts to prosecute traffickers.  The government’s procedures outlined services for trafficking victims, including shelter, meals, medical attention, and psychological services, and assigned an agency to provide each service.  The agencies responsible lacked dedicated funds to furnish these services; consequently, service provision was inconsistent and costs often fell to the DGC or international organizations.  Civil society service providers administered most of the services, such as housing and medical care, available to victims.Trafficking victims willing to participate in trials against traffickers could apply for a temporary residence permit valid for six months.  Officials could renew the permit, up to 18 months, if the criminal investigation or prosecution of the trafficker continued; however, authorities canceled residence permits upon the conclusion or dismissal of these criminal proceedings.  In practice, funding shortfalls delayed processing of permit applications, creating uncertainty for foreign trafficking victims otherwise vulnerable to deportation.  Foreign victims who did not participate in investigations against traffickers were not eligible for temporary residence permits and could not legally remain in Curaçao; due to inconsistent application of victim identification protocols and conflation between trafficking and smuggling, authorities likely deported some mis- or unidentified trafficking victims, including Venezuelan nationals.  Observers suggested the government’s infrequent issuance of residence permits and the absence of a long-term residency option discouraged victims and civil society organizations from reporting possible trafficking cases to government officials.  Through a separate administrative process, victims were eligible to apply for temporary work permits; however, the costs associated with the application rendered these permits inaccessible to most victims.  Observers reported victims’ inability to work legally caused them hardship and hampered efforts to hold traffickers accountable; without a work permit, some victims receiving government services sought informal work or withdrew their support for ongoing investigations and prosecutions to depart Curaçao.  The law stipulated trafficking victims could receive up to 50,000 guilder ($28,090) in restitution from traffickers.  The government could advance victims 5,000 guilder ($2,810) to facilitate victims’ timely access to court-ordered restitution; however, officials reported significant delays and a multi-year backlog in restitution payments for victims of all crimes.  Courts did not order restitution for any trafficking victims in 2022.The government had an SOP for identifying trafficking victims and referring them to services; however, stakeholders’ use of the SOP was inconsistent.  The SOP stipulated officials should refer all potential trafficking victims, male and female, to the DGC and the victim support bureau (SSHC), which coordinated services for victims of all crimes.  The government did not operate any specialized shelters for trafficking victims.  The SSHC could place some trafficking victims – adult women and their children up to 12 years of age – in an NGO shelter for victims of domestic violence that could accommodate up to six individuals.  High rates of domestic violence meant the shelter had limited capacity for trafficking victims.  Authorities required victims to check in with facility staff when leaving the domestic violence shelter; observers expressed concern the shelter’s safety protocols, designed to protect victims at risk of partner violence, were overly restrictive and inappropriate for trafficking victims.  The government could refer child trafficking victims to guardianship councils for placement in boarding school or foster care; the government did not assist any child trafficking victims in 2022.  There were no government or NGO shelters equipped to serve male victims; authorities reported difficulty arranging housing for male trafficking victims in rented accommodations due to budget constraints.  When existing shelter facilities reached maximum capacity, the government placed victims in short-term government-funded accommodations.The government’s victim identification SOP stipulated victims were entitled to up to 15 days’ reflection period, while receiving services, before deciding to file a police report or participate in the trial against the trafficker; however, the government had not reported implementing a reflection period for any victims identified since 2019.  The government did not report any trafficking victim assistance expenditures in 2022, compared with 8,000 guilder ($4,490) in 2020, the most recent year for which data was available.  Similarly, the government did not report the operating budget for the SSHC, which supported victims of all crimes; in 2020, the SSHC operated with a budget of 307,000 guilder ($172,470).  Observers reported the SSHC was understaffed and relied on volunteer workers to provide support, including psychological services, to victims.  Foreign victims participating in trials were entitled to similar care as domestic victims.  The government could provide no-cost medical insurance, funded by the Ministry of Social Services and Labor, to foreign trafficking victims.  Kingdom evaluators determined officials inconsistently informed victims of their rights as trafficking victims, especially foreign victims, and lacked written resources enumerating these rights in common languages.																																												PREVENTION						    																																															The government increased prevention efforts, which remained insufficient.  The national coordinator nominally led the interagency anti-trafficking task force and oversaw the government’s efforts to combat trafficking; however, the coordinator had other full-time duties.  In 2022, the government assigned a policy advisor to support the national coordinator part-time.  The national coordinator managed a dedicated anti-trafficking budget of 200,000 guilder ($112,360), as well as additional financial contributions from the Kingdom of the Netherlands; the government did not spend the full budget in 2022.  The task force met two times in 2022 to coordinate anti-trafficking efforts across the government.  Observers indicated neither the task force nor other government entities coordinated substantively with civil society organizations; they also noted the government’s interagency coordination on anti-trafficking efforts appeared inconsistent, despite the task force.  The government finalized and adopted the 2022-2026 NAP to guide anti-trafficking efforts, replacing the 2017-2022 NAP.  However, the new NAP was not comprehensive; it outlined efforts to hold traffickers criminally accountable but did not include objectives to protect victims or prevent the crime.  The government allocated 250,000 guilder ($140,450) for training under the NAP.  The government developed and launched a new campaign to raise awareness of labor exploitation, including forced labor, using Kingdom of the Netherlands funding.  It continued to conduct radio- and television-based awareness messaging, as well as distribute awareness materials at public events.  The government reported spending approximately 76,000 guilder ($42,697), including 39,000 guilder ($21,910) from the Kingdom of the Netherlands, on awareness-raising efforts in 2022; it did not report its spending in 2021.  The SSHC operated a generic victim assistance hotline, which did not receive any trafficking-related calls in 2022, compared with one in 2021; calls to the hotline were not toll-free.  The national coordinator reported collaborating with national anti-trafficking coordinators from Aruba, the Netherlands, and Sint Maarten to revise the MOU outlining coordinated anti-trafficking efforts across the Kingdom of the Netherlands; the governments did not finalize the draft MOU before the end of the reporting period.  The government continued a public awareness campaign informing the public that women, especially foreign women, employed in Curaçaoan bars could be sex trafficking victims.  The government did not make efforts to reduce demand for commercial sex.  Government officials coordinated with airport administration to monitor ticketing and passenger logs for patterns indicative of human trafficking.																																												TRAFFICKING PROFILE:						    																																															As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic and foreign victims in Curaçao.  Undocumented migrants in Curaçao, especially the substantial population of Venezuelan nationals, are vulnerable to both sex and labor trafficking.  In 2020, pandemic-related movement restrictions prevented migrants from departing Curaçao, creating new trafficking risks for migrants who lost work during the economic downturn associated with the pandemic; traffickers may have exploited some of these individuals, taking advantage of their vulnerable position.  Officials reported traffickers’ activity increased during the pandemic, especially individual traffickers acting independently.  Traffickers exploit women and girls from Curaçao, Dominican Republic, and Venezuela, among other countries, in sex trafficking.  Women and girls working in Curaçao’s “snack bars” are vulnerable to sex trafficking; bar owners recruit victims with offers of work as waitresses or “trago girls” and subsequently force them into commercial sex.  Traffickers exploit migrant workers from other Caribbean countries, South America, the People’s Republic of China, and India in domestic servitude, as well as forced labor in construction, landscaping, minimarkets, retail, and restaurants.  Venezuelan migrants are vulnerable to exploitation by Spanish-speaking traffickers, who may purport to offer employment assistance in Curaçao.  Recent research suggests traffickers in Curaçao may exploit more Curaçaoan and more male victims than previously understood.* Curaçao is a semi-autonomous entity within the Kingdom of the Netherlands.  For the purpose of this report, Curaçao is not a “country” to which the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking in the Trafficking Victims Protection Act apply.  This narrative reflects how Curaçao would be assessed if it were a separate, independent country.  However, the Kingdom is an important contributor to the Government of Curaçao’s anti-trafficking efforts.																																				    							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- Curaçao: International School of Curaçao: 2024 Special Needs Profile Office of Overseas Schools&nbsp;Download the Special Needs Profile (Curacao 2024 Special Needs-Curacao ) for this school to learn more about their capability to support students with exceptionalities.The International School of Curaçao (ISC) is a K-12, accredited, private, nonprofit, coeducational day school that provides instruction in English. ISC was founded in 1968 and offers a rigorous academic program in order to prepare students who plan to pursue higher learning at colleges and universities around the world. The school year extends from mid-August to mid-June.This is intended to provide general information. Prospective users of the schools may wish to inquire further of A/OPR/OS or contact the school directly for more specific and up-to-the-minute information. Information and statistics are current as of December 2023 and provided by the school.NOTE: School situations can change quickly, particularly as schools face cutbacks to learning support programs due to the pandemic, unrest, and economic uncertainty. For the most current information, work with the REO and school. Information in this document was collected by the Department of State’s Office of Overseas Schools directly from the school in December 2023 and shows the availability of services rather than an assessment of the quality of the services. The profile is intended as a jumping off point for a conversation with the REO and school to understand the best fit for your child. Definitions may vary school to school.
- Curaçao National Day Antony J. Blinken, Secretary of StateOn behalf of the United States of America, I congratulate the people of Curaçao as you celebrate Curaçao Day.  The longstanding friendship between our two countries is rooted in our shared values and cultural ties.  Our united support for the rule of law and for democracy serves as the foundation for our strong cooperation to disrupt transnational criminal networks, allowing us to prevent 142 metric tons of narcotics &#8211; valued at $2.1 billion dollars &#8211; from causing devastating consequences to communities in Curacao and in the United States in the last year.  Our cooperation extends to expanding economic opportunity by encouraging economic investment, by supporting Curacao&#8217;s entrepreneurs through our exchange programs, and by furthering our joint initiative to create Curacao&#8217;s first English Immersion School.Wishing the people of Curaçao a happy Curaçao Day and looking forward to our continued partnership.
- Telephonic Press Briefing on Food Security across Latin America with Jose Fernandez, Under Secretary of State for Economic Growth, Energy, and the Environment Jose W. Fernandez, Under Secretary for Economic Growth, Energy, and the EnvironmentModerator:  Greetings to everyone from the U.S. Department of State’s Media Hub of the Americas in Miami, Florida.  I would like to welcome our participants who have dialed in from the United States and across the region.  This is an on-the-record press briefing with Jose Fernandez, Under Secretary of State for Economic Growth, Energy, and the Environment.  Under Secretary Fernandez will discuss food security in Latin America.  He will give opening remarks and take questions from participating journalists.  And with that, I’ll turn it over to Under Secretary Fernandez.  Under Secretary Fernandez:  Thank you.  Thank you, Kristina.  Good afternoon, everyone.  Buenas tardes.  Boa tarde.  It’s a pleasure to be here.  Let me just make a couple of remarks early on, and then I’ll be delighted to take questions.Look, let’s start with where we’ve been in the last five years.  In the last five years, the number of people that have been living in acute foot insecurity has increased from 100 million to about 160 million.  And this is in large part because of climate, conflict, COVID, and increased demand.  But the world food organizations’ project the conflict in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine will push more than an additional 40 million people into food insecurity.  Prior to the – to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, we had a number of initiatives that were starting to make  we were hopefully making a dent on food insecurity – climate-smart agriculture.  We have agriculture innovation missions for climate.  We have our Feed the Future program and we have a number of other programs.  But what’s happened now is because of the war in Ukraine, right now Russia’s military forces have occupied some of Ukraine’s most productive farmland.  They’ve planted explosives throughout the fields.  They’ve destroyed and stolen vital agricultural infrastructure.  We now have a naval blockade and a threat of further attacks that are preventing crops from being exported.  And so we now have a situation where 20 million tons are trapped in silos and ships in Ukraine.  And as I said earlier, there are credible reports that Russia is pilfering Ukraine’s grain exports to sell for its own profit.  So not only are they destroying the agricultural infrastructure, but they’re taking the exports that could have been sold by Ukraine and selling them for their own profit, and those that they cannot sell, they are  on Ukraine’s coast.  What this does is it means that millions of people that are far from Ukraine, people around the world, especially in Latin America but also in the Middle Eastern region and Africa, are at risk of food security – insecurity.  So what are we doing?  Well, we can go into this a little bit more, but we’ve provided already $2.8 billion – $2.8 billion to food security.  Plus, there also a supplemental additional aid of five and a half billion dollars that we are projecting.  Second, there’s also – in countries such as Brazil, I know there’s a concern with fertilizer, and we’re working with other countries to mitigate the shortage in fertilizer.  President Biden has announced a $500 million investment to increase U.S. fertilizer production, to increase capacity.  We are continuing – this is number three.  We are continuing to work through our initiative, Feed the Future, which is providing about a billion dollars a year in food aid, increasing our agricultural capacity and resilience.  We’re also providing additional assistance to cushion the shocks of this crisis in the most vulnerable populations.  We’re working diplomatically with our allies and partners on improving food security and trying to mitigate the consequences of Putin’s invasion.On that score, I do want to remind you that on May 18th, we hosted the Global security – Food Security Call to Action.  We had countries and regional organizations take steps, and they pledged $215* in new emergency food assistance, largely to African countries, bringing the total U.S. funding for emergency food assistance to the $2.8 billion that I just mentioned, and for countries in Africa, the Middle East, and Latin – and South America and Central America.  Now what is happening is this week, tomorrow I believe, we have a – we are supporting the German-led Global Alliance for Food Security to meet on donor responses and to coordinate additional actions to increase global food security.  We have approximately 40 countries represented by foreign ministers coming as well as a number of UN crisis groups.So tomorrow Secretary Blinken will head to Germany to join foreign ministers for the Berlin ministerial conference on June 24th.  And what he’s going to do, the Secretary will work with his counterparts to address food insecurity – food insecurity stemming not just from Russia’s unprovoked and brutal war against Ukraine, but also the effect of other conflicts.  And so we’re doing all we can.  We are well aware of the crisis that has been created because of the shortage of food around the world, and we will continue to do what we can to help countries around the world to meet this need.So with that, let me just, Kristina, ask you to just ask our colleagues if they have any questions.  Moderator:  Thank you, Under Secretary.  We will now begin the question and answer portion of today’s call.Our first question will go to Claudia Torrens from Associated Press.  The question is:  “Food insecurity is tied to migration.  Tell us which areas are most concerning to you within Latin America when it comes to food insecurity.”Under Secretary Fernandez:  Look, there are a number of countries that are affected by food insecurity.  Obviously, the one that we hear about more here in the U.S. are our neighbors in Central America.  But it is a – no country is immune from food insecurity.  We’ve seen over the years how different crops are affected.  I would say food insecurity continues to be a problem, continues to be something we’re concerned about and we’re working to mitigate in Central America, but also countries that can ill afford it – Venezuela, for example.  That just adds to the woes that the population there is feeling.Moderator:  Thank you.  We will now go to Philippe Buteau.  Operator, please open line 22.Question:  Hello?Moderator:  Yes, please go ahead.Question:  Thank you, Under Secretary.  My question is:  Would the State Department consider working with the Millennium Challenge Corporation to grant to the governments of developing countries or to stop the food insecurity problem?Under Secretary Fernandez:  Yeah, thank you for the question.  Look, the Millennium Challenge Corporation, we’re very proud of it.  It’s a program that was started by the first – by – I’m sorry, by President Bush, and it does good work all around the world.  We cooperate with the MCC.  We work with them jointly.  But keep in mind that the Millennium Challenge Corporation works with countries to ascertain the needs.  So they would have – the countries working together with the MCC would have to come up with a plan, and of course we would – and I have in the past personally worked with the MCC to try and help implement the projects, the programs that have done a lot of good around the world, and we continue to support it.Moderator:  Thank you.  The next question goes to Bertha Becerra from El Sol de Mexico.  The question is:  “Given the situation in Eastern Europe due to the war conflict, since both nations are producers of grains and fertilizer, what measures are taken so that more grains and oil  do not become more expensive in our hemisphere?”  Under Secretary Fernandez:  Sorry, you could – could you repeat the – what?Moderator:  What measures – yes.  “What measures are taken so that more grains and oil  do not become more expensive in our hemisphere?”  Under Secretary Fernandez:  Look, let’s start from the beginning.  We – it’s the – this is because of the Russian Government has tried to deflect responsibility for its actions by blaming everyone but Russia for the worsening crisis in the global food system.  It’s part of their disinformation campaign.  Start from the basics.  Okay.  And this goes – this will answer your question, I hope.Russia is using food as a weapon.  It’s using food as a weapon by blocking the export of foodstuffs from Russia – from Ukraine’s ports.  We are not sanctioning – now, this is not an opinion.  This is in black and white.  You take a look at General License No. 6.  The U.S. is not sanctioning exports of Russian grain, agricultural commodities, fertilizer, and medicines.  In fact, it explicitly – black and white – exempts those agricultural commodities, as were mentioned, from sanction.  So the first thing that needs to happen for us to be able to start reducing the consequences of the worsening crisis in the global food system is for Russia to stop the invasion.  That is the most important thing that needs to be done.  What are we in the U.S. doing to help mitigate the food security crisis?  Number one – and I mentioned some of this in my beginning talk – we are a leader, and have been – this is way before the Russia-Ukraine conflict – we’ve been a leader in addressing food insecurity, and in fact we have committed to work with Congress to invest more than 11 billion – $11 billion over the next three years to address food insecurity.  Since the war began, we have provided – we’ve announced $2.8 billion, as I mentioned, in humanitarian aid assistance.  We’ve got the American farmers that are doing more to expand their agricultural production.  We’ve got the Feed the Future program that has been around since 2007 at the State Department to provide additional foodstuffs to needed areas.  So we are continuing to do what we can, and in fact we believe that we lead the world in providing food security assistance.  But at the end of the day, we need the invasion to end and we need Russia to stop blocking, as I said at the beginning, more than 20 million tons of foodstuffs in the ports and silos in Ukraine.  Moderator:  Thank you.  The next question was sent by Everardo Martinez from El Heraldo.   subsidies which will help people with more purchasing power instead of subsidies only for diesel and food? Under Secretary Fernandez:  Subsidies for – Kristina, repeat that, please.  I’m sorry, I was hoping you could – yeah. Moderator:  “In Mexico, would you recommend passing gasoline subsidies instead of subsidies only for diesel and food?”  Under Secretary Fernandez:  Well, I – one thing I’ve learned in life is not to provide unrequested consejos to other countries.  I couldn’t answer that.  That’s really a question for the Mexican Government to provide, but it underscores the fact that in Mexico, as throughout Latin America, you are seeing the effects of the invasion on the people that are most needed – that are most – neediest.  But I can’t comment on that.  I’m sorry.    Moderator:  Thank you.  We have one question from Anna Ramdass from Trinidad Express in Trinidad and Tobago.  The question is as follows.  “What assistance, if any, will be given to Latin American and Caribbean countries in particular to assist with food security?  Trinidad and Tobago and other small nations are experiencing high prices in wheat, leading to increased prices to an already burdened population.”Under Secretary Fernandez:  Yeah, look, as I mentioned at the beginning, we have a number of programs.  We have the food security program.  We’ve provided over – we’ve provided just since the war began in February more than $2.8 billion in humanitarian food assistance.  Some of that is going to Latin America.  We are also working with countries.  I have personally been involved with Brazil to try and support their production of fertilizer.  We’ve provided $500 million of assistance to our farmers so that they can increase the production of fertilizer, some of which can be exported.  Over the next three years, we’ve committed to invest more than $11 billion to address food insecurity.  This is something we’ve been doing for a long time, and we will continue to do all we can to ameliorate the situation.  Again, a situation that Latin America did not create, but Latin America as well as many countries around the world that are really far away from Ukraine are feeling right now.  Moderator:  Thank you.  We have time for one more question.  The question comes from Adela de Coriat from La Estrella de Panama.  The question is:  “Will the United States enter a recession in 2023?  How much longer are we going to have escalated oil prices and how does this intercede in the food chain, especially in Latin American countries?”  Under Secretary Fernandez:  Increasing food prices and oil prices affect agriculture, obviously.  It affects the price of fuel needed to transport food.  It affects the cost of fertilizers.  It has an effect on food prices.  We – President Biden has taken a number of steps to lower gas prices to U.S. families, but also to reduce the prices around the world.  The President has announced the release of a record 1 million barrels per day from our strategic petroleum reserve, which has been critical.  And lead oil market analysts will tell you this has been critical in keeping this from rising even more.  A couple of months ago, he rallied international partners to join the United States by releasing a combined 240 million barrels of oil on the market.  We’ve also expanded access to biofuels like E15.  This is gasoline that uses 15 percent of ethanol.  Increasing supply lowers prices.  And we’re also engaging with oil and refining companies to ask them to work with the administration to bring forth concrete solutions that increase refinery capacity and output.  The other thing to keep in mind is our oil and gas industry is – has continued to improve production.  Right now, more than 50 percent of the gas that’s imported into Europe comes from the United States.  This is something that was not – did not take place until earlier this year, and it was a result of our gas producers just ramping up production in order to make up for the loss of gas from Russia.  Just already in the first year of this administration, okay, just in the first year of the Biden administration, the U.S. has produced more oil than it did under the first two years of the prior administration.  And so we are ramping up production.  We are working with countries around the world to increase their production.  And we believe that it’s having some effect.  But again, we’ve also known, Kristina, that this – Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was not going to be painless.  We’re all feeling it.  We in the U.S. are feeling it at the gas pump.  In Latin America that’s also being felt and it has knock-on effects on inflation and also on fertilizer prices.  So we are – we’ve always known this was not going to be painless and we’re feeling the pain, but we’re doing all we can to reduce that pain on the continent and also to – frankly, to increase the costs to Putin, to do all we can.  Thank you.   Moderator:  Thank you.  Before concluding today’s call, I’d like to pass the word back to Under Secretary Fernandez for closing remarks.  Under Secretary Fernandez:  Thank you.  Look, thank you very much for this opportunity and I hope we can do this more in the future.  I think let’s keep something in mind.  The reason we thought it was important to have this conversation is that there’s a lot of misinformation on – coming from Russia on the causes of the food insecurity  not just in Latin America, but around the world, and it’s being used for many reasons.  Something to keep in mind:  When you look at food insecurity, first of all, we were in a difficult situation at the beginning of the year, but then Russia invaded Ukraine.  It invaded Ukraine.  It captured Ukrainian farmland.  It put landmines on the Ukrainian fields.  It has bombed Ukrainian agricultural plants and silos.  It is now blocking ports – 20 to 25 million tons of food right now are being blocked by Putin.  And he’s saying that if we want that food to be released, we’ve got to cut our sanctions.  So he’s basically blackmailing people around the world who need this food today.  And then to add insult to injury, Russia is stealing, pilfering the exports from Ukraine and selling it for its own benefit.  So we wanted to make it clear that these are the reasons why the – why the food prices have skyrocketed in the last few months, that were also – I want to make it clear that we are doing all we can to help with the food insecure around the world with billions of dollars of aid, and we will continue to do that.  And then the last thing to stress is we do not have sanctions on food, on medicine or on fertilizer.  In fact, they are explicitly – black and white – excluded from our sanctions.  Russia is selling lots of oil and gas around the world.  It could do the same thing for food if that’s what it wanted to do, but it’s not doing that because it’s holding the food insecure populations of the world hostage as we speak.  Thank you. Moderator:  That concludes today’s call.  I want to thank Under Secretary Fernandez for joining us and thank all of our callers for participating.  If you have any questions about today’s call, you may contact the Miami Media Hub at MiamiHub@state.gov.  Thank you and have a good day. 
- Additional $314 Million for U.S. Humanitarian Response to the Venezuela Regional Crisis Office of the SpokespersonPresident Biden announced at the Ninth Summit of the Americas nearly $314 million in new humanitarian, health, economic, and development assistance for Venezuelan refugees and vulnerable migrants across the hemisphere.  This assistance includes nearly $103 million from the State Department’s Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM) and over $171 million from the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance to support vulnerable Venezuelans inside Venezuela and those who have sought refuge throughout Latin America and the Caribbean as well as $40 million in development funding through USAID.Nearly $103 Million in Department of State Humanitarian AssistanceThis new funding through PRM supports a wide range of life-saving humanitarian programs for Venezuelan refugees and migrants, such as emergency shelter; access to health care; water, sanitation, and hygiene supplies; increased access to education; support for livelihoods; COVID-19 support, and protection for vulnerable groups including survivors of gender-based violence, children and adolescents, LGBTQI+ persons, and indigenous people in seventeen countries including Argentina, Aruba, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Curacao, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guyana, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, and Venezuela. $171 Million in USAID Humanitarian AssistanceThis new funding through USAID will provide humanitarian relief for vulnerable Venezuelans in Venezuela and emergency food assistance for Venezuelan migrants and refugees in Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru. Venezuela Regional Refugee and Migrant ResponseMore than 6.1 million people have fled Venezuela since 2015, making it the largest external displacement of persons in the Hemisphere’s history. Of those, more than 5 million have sought refuge throughout Latin America and the Caribbean. Many are in urgent need of humanitarian assistance such as access to shelter, education, health, and in some cases, international protection.  The COVID-19 pandemic has exacerbated these needs and increased the vulnerability of Venezuelan refugees and migrants, along with the host communities that have welcomed them, throughout the region.PRM leads in providing U.S. humanitarian assistance, protection, and solutions for refugees, asylum seekers, migrants in situations of vulnerability, and stateless persons and works in close coordination with USAID. PRM’s response, through the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR), the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), and other international and nongovernmental organization partners has been a comprehensive approach with programs targeted to the country-specific challenges faced by Venezuelan refugees and migrants.PRM’s Regional Refugee Coordinators located in Colombia, Ecuador, and Panama coordinate humanitarian diplomacy; liaise with national and local government officials, civil society, donor country representatives, UN officials, and aid recipients; and monitor and evaluate PRM-funded programs in the region.
- Curacao HomeReportsOffice to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons2022 Trafficking in Persons Report&#8230;Curacao				hide	document.addEventListener("DOMContentLoaded", function(event) {	if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}});																						2022 Trafficking in Persons Report: Curacao																																																																																												 In this section										/																							Curaçao (Tier 3)																																													Curaçao (Tier 3)																															PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS:																																																																																		PROSECUTION																																																																																		PROTECTION																																																																																		PREVENTION																																																																																		TRAFFICKING PROFILE																																																																																																								Curaçao (Tier 3)				The Government of Curaçao does not fully meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking and is not making significant efforts to do so, even considering the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on its anti-trafficking capacity; therefore Curaçao was downgraded to Tier 3. Despite the lack of significant efforts, the government took some steps to address trafficking, including providing pre-trial support to three victims participating in legal proceedings against traffickers, awarding restitution to two sex trafficking victims, and extending the use of the national action plan (NAP) that expired in December 2021. However, the government did not convict any traffickers, it did not identify any victims, and it continued to condition foreign victims’ assistance, including residency, on cooperation with law enforcement in cases against traffickers. Lack of funding remained a primary obstacle to robust anti-trafficking efforts. Officials conflated human trafficking with migrant smuggling, hindering the effectiveness of prosecution, prevention, and protection efforts. The judiciary’s limited familiarity with trafficking contributed to frequent acquittals in trafficking cases.																																					PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS:						    																																															Increase efforts to identify victims, including through proactively screening vulnerable populations, such as migrants and individuals in commercial sex.Provide potential victims, including those who choose not to cooperate with law enforcement in cases against traffickers, with services and legal alternatives to deportation, especially where victims face harm or abuse in their home country.Routinely screen detained migrants for trafficking indicators and train detention center staff on victim identification procedures.Uphold the reflection period and refer victims to protection services without requiring them first to commit to assist a criminal investigation.Improve coordination and information-sharing with anti-trafficking counterparts across the Kingdom of the Netherlands.Vigorously prosecute and convict traffickers, including complicit officials, sentencing them to significant prison terms.Disseminate to law enforcement and detention facility staff standard operating procedures for victim identification and referral and train officials on their use.Provide specialized care and assistance for trafficking victims, including male victims.Allocate and disburse sufficient resources for anti-trafficking efforts, including protection services and funding for full implementation of the NAP.Provide targeted resources and training for local officials to conduct outreach to vulnerable communities through awareness campaigns on workers’ rights, trafficking indicators, and available resources.																																												PROSECUTION						    																																															The government decreased prosecution efforts. Article 2:239 of the penal code criminalized sex trafficking and labor trafficking and prescribed penalties of up to nine years’ imprisonment or a fifth category fine of up to $56,000 for offenses involving a victim 16 years of age or older, and up to 12 years’ imprisonment or a fine for those involving a victim younger than 16. These penalties were sufficiently stringent and, with respect to sex trafficking, commensurate with those prescribed for other serious crimes, such as kidnapping.The Curaçao Police Force’s organized crime unit (DGC) was the lead agency for law enforcement efforts to combat trafficking. Authorities initiated one investigation in 2021, compared with one in 2020 and one in 2019. The government did not report any ongoing investigations from previous years. The government prosecuted one alleged trafficker for sex and labor trafficking in 2021, compared with no prosecutions in 2020 and prosecuting four traffickers (in one case) in 2019. Judges did not convict any traffickers in 2021, compared with convicting five traffickers (three for sex trafficking and two for sex and labor trafficking) in 2020 and eight traffickers in 2019. Curaçaoan prosecutors defended the 2019 convictions of five sex traffickers in a Netherlands-based appellate court; the court ruled to reaffirm the convictions. The courts ruled to acquit six alleged traffickers of trafficking charges—four in a labor trafficking case initiated in 2017, one in a labor trafficking case initiated in 2019, and one in a sex and labor trafficking case initiated in 2021. Observers reported the judiciary’s limited familiarity with trafficking led prosecutors to charge traffickers with related crimes carrying lighter sentences—such as migrant smuggling and labor code violations—instead of trafficking to secure a conviction; courts often convicted suspected traffickers of these related crimes in lieu of trafficking, even when prosecutors levied trafficking charges. Prosecutors reported there were no ongoing trafficking prosecutions or appeals related to trafficking cases at the end of the reporting period. The government did not report any new investigations, prosecutions, or convictions of government employees complicit in human trafficking crimes; however, appellate courts ruled in two cases involving police officers allegedly complicit in trafficking crimes. In the first case, the court acquitted the official of labor trafficking charges, instead sentencing him to a six-month suspended sentence and 240 hours of community service for facilitating migrant smuggling and violating labor regulations. In the second, the court reaffirmed the complicit official’s sex trafficking conviction.Law enforcement suffered from budget and personnel shortages across all units. Officials typically requested funding from the central Ministry of Justice (MOJ) budget on a case-by-case basis, but the government did not fill all trafficking-related funding requests, citing funding limitations. Some officials reported the lack of funding and lengthy request process disincentivized investigation of trafficking crimes. MOJ reported it sometimes directed law enforcement officers away from routine duty, including anti-trafficking efforts, to enforce curfews and mandatory closures or cover staffing gaps attributable to the pandemic. The government did not provide trafficking-related investigative training opportunities for law enforcement. The government continued to address human trafficking and migrant smuggling with the same resources and procedures, frequently charging traffickers with smuggling crimes; officials often conflated the two crimes.																																												PROTECTION						    																																															The government maintained inadequate protection efforts. Authorities did not identify any victims for the second consecutive year, compared with identifying three victims in 2019 and 44 victims in 2018. Officials reported a civil society organization identified one potential sex trafficking victim, a Colombian woman; however, the government did not identify her as a trafficking victim after officials interviewed her and could not substantiate reports of her exploitation. Officials did not regularly perform proactive screenings among vulnerable groups, such as individuals in commercial sex, construction, supermarkets, and catering, despite a Kingdom-wide requirement to do so. Similarly, the government did not report screening other vulnerable groups, such as Venezuelans, for trafficking indicators.The government provided some pre-trial support to three trafficking victims participating in ongoing prosecutions against traffickers (two sex trafficking victims and one labor trafficking victim, all identified in previous reporting periods), compared with providing shelter and healthcare services to one victim, also supporting a trafficking prosecution, in 2020 and 12 victims in 2019. In practice, assistance for victims was contingent upon cooperation with law enforcement efforts to prosecute traffickers. The government’s procedures outlined standard services for trafficking victims, including shelter, meals, medical attention, and psychological services, and assigned an agency to provide each service; however, officials did not report providing such services to any victims during the year. The agencies responsible lacked dedicated funds to furnish these services; consequently, service provision was inconsistent, and the costs often fell to the DGC or international organizations. Civil society organizations provided most requisite services, such as housing and medical care, to the three victims participating in trials against traffickers during the reporting period.Trafficking victims willing to participate in trials against traffickers could apply for a temporary residence permit valid for six months. Officials could renew the permit if the criminal investigation or prosecution of the trafficker continued; however, authorities canceled residence permits upon the conclusion or dismissal of these criminal proceedings. In practice, funding shortfalls delayed processing of permit applications, creating uncertainty for foreign trafficking victims otherwise vulnerable to deportation. Foreign victims who did not participate in investigations against traffickers were not eligible for temporary residence permits and could not legally remain in Curaçao; due to inconsistent application of victim identification protocols and conflation between trafficking and smuggling, authorities likely deported some mis- or unidentified trafficking victims, including Venezuelan nationals. Observers reported the pandemic likely contributed to fewer deportations during the reporting period. Through a separate administrative process, victims were eligible to apply for temporary work permits; however, many victims could not afford the costs related to the application. The government reported the courts awarded 3,000 Antillean guilder ($1,690) in restitution to two sex trafficking victims in 2021; in another case, the courts referred a victim and his spouse to civil court to seek compensation after acquitting the suspected trafficker.The government had a handbook outlining the procedure for identifying trafficking victims and referring them to services, developed in coordination with an international organization in 2020; in January 2021, the government expanded use of these procedures to assist male trafficking victims, as well as female victims. The government worked with the organization again in 2021 to train officials from the police force, Ministry of Labor, and other ministries on the handbook. The government handbook for victim identification and referral stipulated officials would refer all potential trafficking victims to the victim support bureau (SSHC) and the DGC. The government did not operate any specialized shelters for trafficking victims. The government could place some trafficking victims—adult women and their children up to 12 years of age—in an NGO shelter for victims of domestic violence that could accommodate up to eight individuals; increased domestic violence cases meant the shelter had reduced capacity to accommodate trafficking victims. The government could refer child trafficking victims to guardianship councils for placement in boarding school or foster care; the government did not assist any child trafficking victims in 2021. There were no government or NGO shelters equipped to serve male victims; authorities reported difficulty arranging housing for male trafficking victims in rented accommodations due to budget constraints. Authorities required victims to check in with shelter staff when leaving the facility. When existing shelter facilities reached maximum capacity, the government placed victims in short-term government-funded accommodations.Under the 2017-2021 NAP, victims could reflect for 30 days before deciding to participate in the trial against the trafficker; however, the government reported it shortened the reflection period in January 2021 to 15 days. The government did not report implementing the 15-day reflection period in 2021 or the 30-day reflection period in 2020 or 2019. The government did not report any trafficking victim assistance expenditures in 2021, compared with 8,000 Antillean guilder ($4,490) in 2020. Similarly, the government did not report the operating budget for the SSHC, which supported victims of all crimes; in 2020, the SSHC operated with a budget of 307,000 guilder ($172,470). Foreign victims were entitled to similar care as domestic victims. The government’s policies included providing no-cost medical insurance, funded by the Ministry of Social Services and Labor, to foreign trafficking victims; because officials required victims to demonstrate adequate medical coverage to apply for residency, this new policy eliminated one barrier to obtaining a residence permit. Kingdom evaluators determined officials inconsistently informed victims of their rights as trafficking victims, especially foreign victims, and lacked written resources enumerating these rights in common languages.																																												PREVENTION						    																																															The government maintained insufficient prevention efforts. The national coordinator nominally led the interagency anti-trafficking task force and oversaw the government’s efforts to combat trafficking; however, the coordinator had other full-time duties. The government reported allocating dedicated funds, 131,500 Antillean guilder ($73,880), for anti-trafficking efforts in the national budget for the first time; however, due to government-wide austerity measures, it may not have disbursed all funds outlined in the budget. The task force met frequently in 2021, and a separate inter-ministerial group met monthly to coordinate anti-trafficking efforts across the government. The government began drafting a 2022-2026 NAP to guide anti-trafficking efforts; during the reporting period, it extended the 2017-2021 NAP to remain in effect until replaced. The national coordinator continued to participate in radio and television programming. The government launched a new trafficking-awareness website and shared awareness materials on social media. MOJ reported it allocated 91,000 Antillean guilder ($51,120) to fund the website’s upkeep and other awareness-raising efforts over three years; the Netherlands contributed an unspecified share of this funding. The SSHC operated a victim assistance hotline, which received one trafficking-related call; calls to the hotline were not toll-free. The government did not confirm whether it continued a public awareness campaign informing the public that women, especially foreign women, employed in Curaçaoan bars could be sex trafficking victims. The government did not make efforts to reduce demand for commercial sex. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not report whether it continued to coordinate with airport administration to monitor ticketing and passenger logs for patterns indicative of human trafficking.																																												TRAFFICKING PROFILE						    																																															As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic and foreign victims in Curaçao. Undocumented migrants in Curaçao, especially the substantial population of Venezuelan nationals, are vulnerable to both sex and labor trafficking. In 2020, pandemic-related movement restrictions prevented migrants from departing Curaçao, creating new trafficking risks for migrants who lost work during the economic downturn associated with the pandemic; traffickers may have exploited some of these individuals, taking advantage of their vulnerable position. Officials reported traffickers’ activity increased during the pandemic, especially individual traffickers acting independently. Traffickers exploit women and girls from Curaçao, Dominican Republic, and Venezuela, among other countries, in sex trafficking. Bar owners recruit women and girls to work as waitresses or “trago girls” and subsequently force them into commercial sex. Traffickers exploit migrant workers from other Caribbean countries, South America, China, and India in domestic servitude, as well as forced labor in construction, landscaping, minimarkets, retail, and restaurants. Venezuelan migrants are vulnerable to exploitation by Spanish-speakers purporting to offer employment assistance in Curaçao. Recent research suggests traffickers in Curaçao may exploit more domestic and more male victims than previously understood.																																				    							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- Curaçao Independence Day Antony J. Blinken, Secretary of StateOn behalf of the people and Government of the United States of America, I congratulate the people of Curaçao as you celebrate Curaçao Day.The longstanding friendship between our two countries is rooted in our shared values and cultural ties based on rule of law and support for democracy.  Working together in partnership, we will overcome the COVID-19 pandemic, tackle the climate crisis, and build back a better economy. Despite the pandemic, our joint law enforcement efforts, including the largest aerial counter narcotics deployment in 10 years, continue to disrupt the nefarious activities of narcotraffickers. Additionally, we have furthered our joint initiative to promote English language education in public schools, which builds lasting bridges between cultures and expands economic opportunity.I wish the people of Curaçao a happy Curaçao Day and looking forward to our continued partnership.
- Curacao HomeReportsOffice to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons2021 Trafficking in Persons Report&#8230;Curacao				hide	document.addEventListener("DOMContentLoaded", function(event) {	if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}});																						2021 Trafficking in Persons Report: Curacao																																																																																												 In this section										/																							CURAÇAO: Tier 2 Watch List†																																													CURAÇAO: Tier 2 Watch List†																															PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS:																																																																																		PROSECUTION																																																																																		PROTECTION																																																																																		PREVENTION																																																																																		TRAFFICKING PROFILE																																																																																																								CURAÇAO: Tier 2 Watch List†				The Government of Curaçao does not fully meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant efforts to do so. These efforts included drafting new guidelines for victim identification and referral and providing services to a victim and the victim’s spouse. However, the government did not demonstrate overall increasing efforts compared to the previous reporting period, even considering the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on its anti-trafficking capacity. Authorities prosecuted fewer traffickers, did not report identifying any victims, and continued to condition foreign victims’ access to services, including residency, on cooperation with law enforcement in cases against their traffickers. Lack of funding remained a primary obstacle to robust anti-trafficking efforts. Officials conflated human trafficking with migrant smuggling, hindering the effectiveness of prosecution, prevention, and protection efforts. Because the government has devoted sufficient resources to a written plan that, if implemented, would constitute significant efforts to meet the minimum standards, Curaçao was granted a waiver per the Trafficking Victims Protection Act from an otherwise required downgrade to Tier 3. Therefore Curaçao remained on Tier 2 Watch List for the third consecutive year.																																					PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS:						    																																															Provide potential victims, including those who choose not to cooperate with law enforcement in cases against their traffickers, with services and legal alternatives to deportation, especially where victims face harm or abuse in their home country. • Provide foreign victims access to health insurance, which victims must have to apply for temporary residency, and medical services. • Train detention center staff on victim identification procedures and routinely screen detained migrants for trafficking indicators. • Enforce the 30-day reflection period and refer victims to protection services without requiring them first to commit to assist a criminal investigation. • Improve coordination and information-sharing with anti-trafficking counterparts across the Kingdom of the Netherlands. • Vigorously prosecute and convict traffickers, including complicit officials, sentencing them to significant prison terms. • Increase proactive victim identification among vulnerable populations, such as migrants and individuals in commercial sex. • Disseminate standard operating procedures for victim identification and referral to law enforcement and detention facility staff and train officials on their use. • Provide specialized care and assistance for trafficking victims, including male victims. • Allocate sufficient resources for anti-trafficking efforts, including protection services and funding for full implementation of the national anti-trafficking action plan. • Provide targeted resources and training for local officials to conduct outreach to vulnerable communities through awareness campaigns on workers’ rights, trafficking indicators, and available resources.																																												PROSECUTION						    																																															The government slightly decreased prosecution efforts. Article 2:239 of the penal code criminalized sex trafficking and labor trafficking and prescribed penalties of up to nine years’ imprisonment or a fifth category fine of up to $56,000 for offenses involving a victim 16 years of age or older, and up to 12 years’ imprisonment or a fine for those involving a victim younger than 16. These penalties were sufficiently stringent and, with respect to sex trafficking, commensurate with those prescribed for other serious crimes, such as kidnapping.The organized crime unit (DGC) within the Curaçao Police Force was the lead agency for law enforcement efforts to combat trafficking. Authorities initiated one investigation in 2020, compared with one in 2019 and four in 2018. Officials did not report any ongoing investigations from previous years, although they stipulated there was investigative activity related to ongoing prosecutions. The government did not initiate prosecution of any alleged traffickers in 2020, compared with prosecuting four alleged traffickers in one case in 2019 and none in 2018. Authorities also reported four ongoing prosecutions related to one labor trafficking case initiated in 2017; officials expected the case to return to trial in 2021. There was one new arrest associated with the ongoing case; authorities detained one suspect in the Netherlands and transported him to Curaçao to face charges. Judges convicted five traffickers (three for sex trafficking and two for sex and labor trafficking) in two cases in 2020, compared with eight traffickers in 2019 and zero in 2018. The government reported it secured two of these convictions on appeal. The courts prescribed sentences ranging from 12 months’ to three years’ imprisonment, with conditions. The courts reexamined on appeal the cases of 10 accused traffickers; although officials cautioned further appeals could affect the courts’ findings, judges reaffirmed the convictions of two traffickers, newly convicted two more, and postponed the review of six convictions until 2021. Law enforcement officials reported decreased case volume for all crimes due to reduced investigative activity during lockdowns to mitigate the impacts of the pandemic; during these spans, law enforcement helped to enforce movement restrictions. The government did not report any new investigations, prosecutions, or convictions of government employees complicit in human trafficking offenses; however, authorities reported two active cases—one ongoing prosecution and one appeal of a 2019 conviction—involved complicit officials, both policemen. In the first case, authorities released the complicit official from pretrial detention upon payment of a $3,500 fine to the victim; criminal proceedings against the officer were set to resume in May 2020 but were delayed due to lockdowns. Courts expected to hear appeals in 2021 in the second case involving a complicit official, a police officer convicted in 2019 and initially sentenced to 12 months’ imprisonment for sex trafficking.Law enforcement suffered from generalized budget and personnel shortages and did not have a dedicated anti-trafficking budget; instead, officials requested funding from the central Ministry of Justice budget on a case-by-case basis. Some officials reported the lack of funding and lengthy request process disincentivized investigation of trafficking crimes. The pandemic caused discontinuation of anti-trafficking training for law enforcement between March 2020 and September 2020; the government did not report funding law enforcement training during the reporting period. However, an unspecified number of law enforcement officials attended four trainings funded by international organizations and foreign governments. The government reported it lacked the resources to provide virtual training opportunities during the pandemic. The government continued to address human trafficking and migrant smuggling with the same resources and procedures, frequently prosecuting traffickers for smuggling crimes; officials often conflated the two crimes.																																												PROTECTION						    																																															The government maintained inadequate protection efforts. Authorities did not report identifying any victims in 2020, compared with three sex trafficking victims in 2019 and 44 victims in 2018. Officials did not regularly perform proactive screenings among vulnerable groups, such as individuals in commercial sex, construction, supermarkets, and catering, despite a Kingdom-wide requirement to do so. Similarly, the government did not report screening vulnerable migrant groups. In practice, assistance for victims was contingent upon cooperation with law enforcement efforts to prosecute traffickers. The government’s procedures outlined standard services for victims of trafficking, including shelter, meals, medical attention, and psychological services, and assigned an agency to provide each service. However, the agencies responsible lacked dedicated funds to furnish these services; consequently, service provision was inconsistent, and the costs often fell to the DGC or international organizations. In 2020, the government provided shelter and healthcare services to one victim identified in a previous reporting period and the victim’s spouse, compared with providing such services to 12 victims in the previous reporting period; the victim continued to cooperate in the trial against his trafficker. Trafficking victims willing to participate in the trial against their traffickers could apply for a temporary residence permit valid for six months. Officials could renew the permit if the criminal investigation or prosecution of the trafficker continued; however, residence permits valid beyond the conclusion or dismissal of these criminal proceedings would be canceled. In practice, funding shortfalls delayed processing of permit applications, creating uncertainty for foreign trafficking victims otherwise vulnerable to deportation. Foreign victims who did not participate in investigations against their traffickers were not eligible for temporary residence permits and could not legally remain in Curaçao; the government sometimes deported victims and potential victims present in the country illegally, including Venezuelan nationals. Observers reported the pandemic likely contributed to fewer deportations during the reporting period. Through a separate administrative process, victims were eligible to apply for temporary work permits; however, many victims could not afford the costs related to the application.In 2020, the government worked with an international organization to develop a comprehensive handbook for victim identification and referral procedures; although the government approved the new procedures, it had not yet implemented or trained relevant officials on them. Under the new system, officials would refer all potential trafficking victims to the victim support bureau (SSHC) and the DGC. The government did not operate any specialized shelters for trafficking victims. The government could place a limited number of trafficking victims—adult women and their children up to 12 years of age—in an NGO shelter for victims of domestic violence that could accommodate up to eight individuals; in 2020, an increase in domestic violence cases meant the shelter had reduced capacity to accommodate trafficking victims. The government could refer child trafficking victims to guardianship councils for placement in boarding school or foster care; the government did not assist any child trafficking victims in 2020. Authorities reported difficulty arranging housing for male victims due to budget constraints; the government did not report any shelters for male victims. Authorities required victims to check in with shelter staff when leaving the facility. When existing shelter facilities reached maximum capacity, the government placed victims in short-term government-funded accommodations. Under the 2017-2021 national action plan (NAP), victims could reflect for 30 days before deciding to participate in the trial against their trafficker; however, the government did not report implementing the reflection period in 2019 or 2020. The government reported approximately 8,000 Dutch guilder ($4,490) in trafficking victim assistance expenditures in 2020. The SSHC, which supported victims of all crimes, operated with a budget of 307,000 guilder ($172,470). Foreign victims were entitled to similar care as domestic victims but did not have access to publicly funded medical insurance; adequate medical insurance was a requirement to apply for the temporary residence permit. Kingdom evaluators determined officials inconsistently informed victims of their rights as trafficking victims, especially foreign victims, and lacked written resources enumerating these rights in common languages.																																												PREVENTION						    																																															The government maintained insufficient prevention efforts. The national coordinator nominally led the interagency anti-trafficking task force and oversaw the government’s efforts to combat trafficking; however, the coordinator had no dedicated budget in this capacity and had other full-time duties. The government continued to use the 2017-2021 NAP. In 2020, the government did not report any new or ongoing awareness activities; it attributed the absence of programming to the pandemic and general funding limitations. However, the national coordinator continued to participate in radio and television programming. The SSHC operated a victim assistance hotline but did not report receiving any trafficking tips during the reporting period; calls to the hotline were not toll-free. Due to health concerns during the pandemic, the government closed the open-air brothel Campo Alegre in March 2020. The government made efforts to reduce demand for commercial sex acts through its public awareness campaign informing the public that women, especially foreign women, employed in Curaçaoan bars could be sex trafficking victims. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs continued to coordinate with airport administration to monitor ticketing and passenger logs for patterns indicative of human trafficking; when observed, the government could institute additional checkpoints, including visa requirements, to reduce trafficking risk.																																												TRAFFICKING PROFILE						    																																															As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic and foreign victims in Curaçao. Undocumented migrants in Curaçao, especially the substantial population of Venezuelan nationals, are vulnerable to both sex and labor trafficking. In 2020, movement restrictions prevented migrants from departing Curaçao, creating new trafficking risks for migrants who lost work during the economic downturn associated with the pandemic; traffickers may have exploited some of these individuals, taking advantage of their vulnerable position. Officials reported traffickers’ activity increased during the pandemic, especially individual traffickers acting independently. Traffickers exploit women and girls from Curaçao, Dominican Republic, and Venezuela, among other countries, in sex trafficking. Bar owners recruit women and girls to work as waitresses or ‘trago girls’, and subsequently force them into commercial sex. Traffickers exploit migrant workers from other Caribbean countries, South America, China, and India in domestic servitude, as well as forced labor in construction, landscaping, minimarkets, retail, and restaurants. Venezuelan migrants are vulnerable to exploitation by Spanish-speakers purporting to offer employment assistance in Curaçao. Recent research suggests traffickers in Curaçao may exploit more domestic and more male victims than previously understood._____________________† Curaçao is a semi-autonomous entity within the Kingdom of the Netherlands. For the purpose of this report, Curaçao is not a “country” to which the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking in the Trafficking Victims Protection Act apply. This narrative reflects how Curaçao would be assessed if it were a separate, independent country. However, the Kingdom is an important contributor to the Government of Curaçao’s anti-trafficking efforts.																																				    							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