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37–654 2008

[H.A.S.C. No. 110–23]

HEARING

ON

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT

FOR FISCAL YEAR 2008

AND

OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED

PROGRAMS

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

FULL COMMITTEE HEARING

ON

BUDGET REQUEST FROM THE

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

HEARING HELD

MARCH 1, 2007

(II)

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

IKE SKELTON, Missouri

JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina

SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas

GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi

NEIL ABERCROMBIE, Hawaii

MARTY MEEHAN, Massachusetts

SILVESTRE REYES, Texas

VIC SNYDER, Arkansas

ADAM SMITH, Washington

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California

MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina

ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California

ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania

ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California

RICK LARSEN, Washington

JIM COOPER, Tennessee

JIM MARSHALL, Georgia

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam

MARK UDALL, Colorado

DAN BOREN, Oklahoma

BRAD ELLSWORTH, Indiana

NANCY BOYDA, Kansas

PATRICK J. MURPHY, Pennsylvania

HANK JOHNSON, Georgia

CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut

DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa

KIRSTEN GILLIBRAND, New York

JOE SESTAK, Pennsylvania

GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland

KENDRICK B. MEEK, Florida

KATHY CASTOR, Florida

DUNCAN HUNTER, California

JIM SAXTON, New Jersey

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York

TERRY EVERETT, Alabama

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland

HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, California

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina

ROBIN HAYES, North Carolina

KEN CALVERT, California

JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia

W. TODD AKIN, Missouri

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia

JEFF MILLER, Florida

JOE WILSON, South Carolina

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey

TOM COLE, Oklahoma

ROB BISHOP, Utah

MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio

JOHN KLINE, Minnesota

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan

PHIL GINGREY, Georgia

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona

THELMA DRAKE, Virginia

CATHY MCMORRIS RODGERS, Washington

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas

GEOFF DAVIS, Kentucky

ERIN C. CONATON, Staff Director

WILL EBBS, Professional Staff Member

JENNESS SIMLER, Professional Staff Member

MARGEE MECKSTROTH, Staff Assistant

(III)

C O N T E N T S

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS

2007

Page

HEARING:

Thursday, March 1, 2007, Fiscal Year 2008 National Defense Authorization

Act—Budget Request from the Department of the Navy ................................. 1

APPENDIX:

Thursday, March 1, 2007 ........................................................................................ 41

THURSDAY, MARCH 1, 2007

FISCAL YEAR 2008 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT—

BUDGET REQUEST FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Saxton, Hon. Jim, a Representative from New Jersey, Committee on Armed

Services ................................................................................................................. 3

Skelton, Hon. Ike, a Representative from Missouri, Chairman, Committee

on Armed Services ................................................................................................ 1

WITNESSES

Conway, Gen. James T., Commandant of the Marine Corps ............................... 8

Mullen, Adm. Michael G., Chief of Naval Operations .......................................... 6

Winter, Hon. Donald C., Secretary of the Navy .................................................... 5

APPENDIX

PREPARED STATEMENTS:

Conway Gen. James T. ..................................................................................... 122

Mullen, Adm. Michael G. ................................................................................. 58

Winter, Hon. Donald C. .................................................................................... 45

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD:

[There were no Documents submitted.]

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD:

Ms. Davis of California .................................................................................... 164

Mrs. Drake ........................................................................................................ 166

Mr. Kline ........................................................................................................... 165

Mr. McKeon ....................................................................................................... 163

Mr. Miller .......................................................................................................... 164

Ms. Tauscher ..................................................................................................... 163

(1)

FISCAL YEAR 2008 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT—BUDGET REQUEST FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC, Thursday, March 1, 2007.

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 9:34 a.m., in room 2118,

Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ike Skelton (chairman of the

committee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSOURI, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED

SERVICES

The CHAIRMAN. Good morning.

Let me welcome today’s witnesses to our hearing on the 2008

budget request for the Department of the Navy. And we welcome

the secretary of the Navy, Dr. Donald Winter; chief of naval operations, Admiral Michael Mullen; the commandant of the Marine

Corps, General James Conway.

And we appreciate your appearance, and we thank you for your

testimony.

We will ask that your testimony be placed in the record in total,

and hopefully you will be able to condense your remarks somewhat.

And our hearing is to consider your department’s position of

three separate requests: the fiscal year 2007 supplemental, the fiscal year 2008 main budget request, and the 2008 war budget request. The request for the department in 2008 is $139 billion. When we

add funding for the two wars—or, I should say, the two additional

requests, it totals $159 billion.

In size and content, these budgets are all very serious matters.

It is the military—a military at war. Our Marines are on the front

line, and many sailors, naval officers, are serving in front-line roles

as well as providing critical support.

Before delving too deeply into the budget before us, let me first

mention a personal note, if I may, which I know is familiar with

the Admiral. I represent the great state of Missouri in the middle

of the country. My hometown of Lexington is on the major body of

water, the Missouri River. It is not quite navigable for capital

ships, but yet I have always been very proud that my father served

aboard the battleship the USS Missouri, a ship of the Great White

Fleet that predated the battleship, made famous for the signing of

the end of the Second World War.

My personal experience, my study of history underscore the importance of a strong and vibrant navy. Our interests are deeply

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tied to the maritime, especially international trade, and I believe

that our country can only remain a great power if we maintain a

strong navy. We must be able to project power and to maintain

presence in order to deter potential adversaries and reassure our

friends.

It is without question certain of Admiral Mahan’s key insights

remain equally valid today as they did when he wrote them at the

turn of the century.

These beliefs about the need for a navy able to help achieve our

range of national security goals drive my concerns about the

shrinking size of our ship force structure.

I feel like a bit of a broken record. And I know, Mr. Secretary

and Admiral, you have heard me make that point at earlier hearings.

We need to understand what the plan is to accelerate the effort

to increase the size of our Navy and to ensure the effort—make

sure that it stays on schedule.

This month, the Navy will get down to a low of 274 ships. Members such as I remember participating in the drive to build up our

Navy to a 600-ship navy. Two-hundred-seventy-four is a shocking

number.

I am encouraged that in 2008 the Navy will commission seven

more ships than it decommissions. It will budget for seven more

new-construction ships in 2008. And I appreciate the fact that this

year’s budget request is consistent with the CNO’s long-range shipbuilding plan, which I am sure he will discuss.

But I still remain concerned that cost growth in ship construction

could cripple the plan as early as this year.

I know that three of the ships in this year’s request are littoral

combat ships (LCS), a ship class which recently experienced cost

growth so severe that our Navy issued a stop-work order to the

contractor.

And despite a cap of $220 million for each sea frame this committee imposed beginning on the fifth LCS in an effort to control costs,

the budget request appears to ask for about $300 million per LCS

ship, number seven through number nine.

If this is right, simply put, the budget plan doesn’t comply with

the law. Given that 55 of the ships in the long-range ship-building

plan are littoral combat ships, it is critical that we get back in control of the cost.

Turning to our Marine Corps, our Marines remain deeply embroiled in combat in several locations around the world while still

providing a significant portion of the Navy’s 9/11 capability to respond to unexpected events around the world.

This committee is deeply committed to ensuring that the United

States Marine Corps receives all of the resources it needs. And we

stand ready to hear about the Marine Corps’s budget, and especially its unfunded priorities. All of these total over $3 billion.

On a happier note, I am very pleased to see an increase in the

size of the Marine Corps funded in 2008 budget request, and I have

been calling for an increase in the size of our ground forces for a

number of years, in particular the Army. And I am pleased that

both the Army and the Marines hopefully will be beneficiaries.

3

Our main concern about the impact of current operations, especially the troop increase in Iraq, on Marine Corps readiness—this

committee remains deeply committed to meeting our need of our

Marines deployed to combat.

We are especially interested in your need for the reset of equipment, which is fast wearing out in the Middle East. This committee, in a bipartisan effort, added almost $6 billion to last year’s

budget for the Marine Corps equipment reset. We look forward to

hearing about what your reset needs are for the coming year.

Let me, last, mention the desire of this committee to do whatever

we can to improve force protection. We have focused, among other

things, on the mine resistant ambush protected vehicle, known as

MRAP, a program which we believe can be accelerated significantly.

With that, let me recognize my friend—instead of our ranking

today, our colleague from New Jersey, who is serving as ranking

member today, Jim Saxton, for comments he would like to make.

STATEMENT OF HON. JIM SAXTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM

NEW JERSEY, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

Mr. SAXTON. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I appreciate

being recognized at this time.

Secretary Winter and Admiral Mullen, General Conway, thank

you for being with us this morning. We appreciate you being here.

And needless to say, we appreciate your service to the country as

well as all of those you lead in the Navy and Marine Corps.

It is a pleasure to have you here today to learn more about the

fiscal year 2008 budget for the United States Navy and Marine

Corps. While hearings like today’s may seem pro forma because we

do them each year, I believe it is critical for members serving on

this committee to have the opportunity to review the budget, then

ask the tough questions that we must ask about it so we can ensure that we make the right decisions for not only the 50,000 sailors and Marines serving in the Central Command but also for the

Navy and Marine Corps as a whole.

Budgets also tend to serve as signals for policy shifts. Today I

hope that you will elaborate on a few key areas of interest to this

committee in order to help us understand how the Department of

the Navy is addressing some of the tough challenges and how we

might see those decisions reflected in the budget.

First, I am pleased with Secretary Gates’s decision to increase

the Marine Corps end-strength to 202,000. This is a great thing

that he has recommended. As a matter of fact, this committee examined the end-strength needs of each of the services last year

during our committee’s defense review. As a result, we became convinced that such an increase was necessary to relieve stress on the

force and enhance the ability of the Marine Corps to effectively respond to any contingency.

Today, Secretary Winter and General Conway, I hope you will

expand upon the areas within the budget above and beyond additional personnel costs which reflect funds necessary to ensure that

you can accomplish this goal.

Second, I would like you to address the acquisition process from

requirements definition through fielding and sustainment. The

4

question is the same today as it was last year: Why can’t we identify a requirement, develop a solution and get it to the war-fighter

in a reasonable period of time and at a reasonable cost?

The most frustrating part of this problem is that it seems like

we identify the same deficiency on nearly every program that runs

into trouble, whether it is requirements creep, failure of the contractor to perform, or unrealistic schedules.

Two glaring examples of this, as the chairman pointed out, the

littoral combat ship and also, I might add, the expeditionary fighting vehicle. The third ship in the LCS class has been under a stopwork order, as we all know, since January due to cost growth on

the first hull. It is unclear at this time what sort of cost risk we

should have on the second LCS.

It appears that the major cost drivers in this program were the

parallel development of design requirements with the detailed design itself; the drive to meet, launch, and delivery dates over all

else; and the lack of qualified Navy technical personnel to oversee

the program.

The cost growth of LCS has major impacts on other Navy programs, as well.

Admiral Mullen, as you have told us, that you need support to

sustain funding for our ship-building account consistent with the

30-year plan. But you can’t get there if every ship in the Navy buy

is over-budget. Congress set cost caps on several key ship-building

programs for this explicit purpose, to help the Navy control cost.

LCS is nearly 20 percent of our 313-ship Navy. Mr. Secretary, we

are waiting to hear what course of action you plan to take on this

vital program.

Today I hope our witnesses will tell us how the budget for 2008

reflects their attempts to get this right. What are we going to do

in order to change how the Department of the Navy does acquisition? How are you applying lessons learned to another important

program, the mine resistant ambush protected vehicle, MRAP?

Once more, you have a program that is attempting to fulfill a

critical war-fighting gap, and you have an aggressive schedule to

achieve this goal. What steps are you taking to ensure that the

same kinds of stumbling blocks—requirement change, imbalance in

priorities—leading to poor contractor performance and lack of technical oversight? And we want to make sure that we won’t impede

your progress with these kinds of problems.

Last, I would like to hear about how the Navy is taking ownership of the missile defense mission. The missile and nuclear developments in Iran and North Korea are a clear and present reminder

of the need to get our Nation’s missile defense capabilities built,

tested, and fielded in sufficient numbers and as soon as possible.

Last October, in the wake of the North Korean nuclear test, we

sent a letter to the President urging him to further accelerate the

schedule for fielding Aegis ballistic missile defense capabilities, including Standard Missile-2 (SM–2) and Standard Missile-3 (SM–3)

interceptors. What options were considered, and what acceleration

decisions are reflected in the budget request?

I have been particularly concerned about the transition of missile

defense capabilities from the Missile Defense Agency to the services. I am pleased that, starting this year, the Navy has committed

5

operations and sustainment funding for Aegis ballistic missile defense. However, no missile procurement funds are requested in the

budget.

I am a strong supporter of Aegis ballistic missile defense. As

such, I would encourage the Navy to identify its Aegis BMD force

structure requirements and the resources needed to build these requirements.

With that, Mr. Chairman, I would like to conclude by thanking

our witnesses for being here today and, again, for their great leadership capabilities as we move forward.

Thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Thanks so much, Mr. Saxton.

And welcome, gentlemen.

Secretary Winter.

STATEMENT OF HON. DONALD C. WINTER, SECRETARY OF THE

NAVY

Secretary WINTER. Thank you very much, Chairman Skelton,

Congressman Saxton. Thank you for the opportunity to appear this

morning before this committee.

Today I am joined by Admiral Mullen and General Conway, two

outstanding leaders whose dedication to the Navy and Marine

Corps is apparent to all who have had the pleasure of working with

them.

Each of us has prepared a statement for the record, which we respectfully submit. These documents outline in detail this department’s priorities, the strategic thinking behind them, and the funding requests that are necessary to support them.

Our priorities presented in the fiscal year 2008 budget request

encompass both long-term and short-term requirements.

The short-term imperatives include supporting Marines and sailors in the field, funding the urgent requirements such as the mine

resistant ambush protected vehicle program, and making up for the

losses of vehicles, equipment and aircraft that have been incurred

in combat operations.

At the same time, we must provide for the critical needs of the

Navy and Marine Corps of the future. To that end, the Department

of the Navy is pursuing an unprecedented modernization program

across the full spectrum of our weapons platforms in both the Navy

and Marine Corps. This drive to transform the force is necessary

and vital to our national security.

The current transformation entails a shift from a blue-water-centric fleet to one with greater brown-and green-water capability.

This shift in focus reflects a greater demand for expeditionary capability, a capability that will allow us to operate in the littorals.

The broad transformation now under way includes a new generation of ships, submarines, and aircraft, with programs in development production already in operation with the fleet.

Some of the department’s new programs have encountered significant challenges. The Navy’s littoral combat ship program and

the Marine Corps’s expeditionary fighting vehicle program are both

innovative weapon platforms incorporating new technologies. We

are working on solving the problems that have arisen so that we

can deliver vitally needed capabilities to our war-fighters.

6

Both of these programs represent the kinds of capability that the

future Navy and Marine Corps will need to fight and win the wars

of tomorrow. Faced with a dangerous, uncertain world, with terrorist enemies, states that actively support or condone them, and rising powers with intentions and capabilities that lack transparency,

we have no choice but to improve our own capabilities.

Mr. Chairman, in addition to addressing current and future

needs, there are two outstanding issues from last year that I would

like to bring to your attention.

First, the basic allowance for housing shortfall must be remedied, for it represents a shortfall of over $500 million and has a direct

impact to our sailors, Marines and their families.

Second, the Department of the Navy was given a mandate to execute the BRAC directives, but the Base Realignment and Closure

(BRAC) appropriation contained in the revised continuing appropriations resolution for fiscal year 2007 did not include adequate

funding to support BRAC activities.

We owe it to the sailors and Marines and their families to find

a speedy resolution of these issues.

Mr. Chairman, the Department of the Navy’s fiscal year 2008

budget request is critical to both the short-term and the long-term

national security of the United States.

Thank you for your continued support for our efforts to meet our

constitutional obligations to provide for the common defense of the

American people. I look forward to answering your questions.

Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Secretary Winter can be found in the

Appendix on page 45.]

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, thank you very much.

America’s number-one sailor, Admiral Mullen.

STATEMENT OF ADM. MICHAEL G. MULLEN, CHIEF OF NAVAL

OPERATIONS

Admiral MULLEN. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Saxton, members of this

committee, thank you for your continued support of our men and

women in uniform and for the opportunity and privilege to appear

before you today.

I am honored to join Secretary Winter and General Conway here

and consider myself fortunate to serve alongside them at this critical time in our Nation’s history.

And it is a critical time, Mr. Chairman. As you said and the secretary said, we are a nation at war, and a maritime nation at war,

fighting an elusive and adaptive enemy bent on using terror and

irregular tactics to spread hatred and fear across the globe. At the

same time, we are confronted by potentially hostile nation-states

determined to develop and use sophisticated weapons systems.

Your Navy is ready to meet these challenges. In fact, I would

argue that it is more ready, more capable than I have ever seen

it in my 38 years of active service.

Through our fleet response plan, we continue to meet the demands of the combatant commanders for trained, flexible and sustained forces with six carrier strike groups available on 30 days’

notice and an additional carrier strike group ready to serve within

90 days.

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Indeed, nearly 100 of your ships and submarines are at sea today

deployed, and more than 60,000 sailors are forward. Fully half of

these men and women serve in the Middle East, and almost half

of that number are on the ground, in combat and combat support

roles. They are performing magnificently, each and every one.

I had the opportunity to visit with many of them over the holidays in the Persian Gulf and Iraq, Afghanistan, Bahrain, and the

Horn of Africa. I can tell you they are focused, well-trained, and

well-led. They are proud of what they are doing, still prouder of the

difference they know they are making.

The best readiness we have ever achieved, the best sailors we

have ever recruited, the very best support from absolutely remarkable families—it is an unbeatable combination, sir.

But we have to work hard to sustain this readiness. I remain

concerned about high operations tempo (OPTEMPO) and certain

shortfalls among our expeditionary forces, SEALs, explosive ordnance disposal personnel, our Seabees, our medical corps, and our

naval intelligence community. And, as I testified to the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense last month, the accelerated

wear and tear on systems and equipment in a harsh physical environment requires immediate attention, especially our Seabee equipment and older models of our expeditionary aircraft.

The sound investments we have made in recent years to improve

fleet capacity and capabilities have paid off. We must now re-energize our procurement accounts to maintain those capabilities in the

future.

Our fiscal year 2008 budget request helps us do that, calling for

the construction of seven new ships, including a Virginia-class submarine, an amphibious transport dock (LPD), and the continued

construction of a new aircraft carrier, as well as the addition of 188

new operational aircraft to the inventory—nearly 40 more than we

ordered last year.

As you know, we submitted a ship-building plan to Congress last

year that will produce a fleet of 313 ships by 2020, a fleet size and

balance to meet the challenges we face at the maximum acceptable

risk. That plan, submitted again to you with this budget, has not

changed.

Still centered on 11 aircraft carriers and a battle force of 48 submarines and commensurate surface combatants, it will provide the

Nation more options and more flexibility than ever before, particularly in core war-fighting competencies like mine and undersea

warfare and anti-ballistic missile defense.

I appreciate the support we have received from this committee

in developing this plan and in building the fleet. It is important

that we sustain it.

We continue to evaluate, as we must, the impact global developments have had on the plan’s original risk assumptions. The security environment is too dynamic and the pace of change too rapid

for us not to do so. But I assure you I remain committed to a stable

ship-building program and to pursuing, with our partners in industry and you on the Hill, the efficiencies required to make it affordable.

Three things have definitely not changed, Mr. Chairman: my priorities to sustain combat readiness, build a fleet for the future, and

8

develop 21st-century leaders. I know the role our Navy must play

in helping win the war on terror, while providing a powerful deterrent and meeting our commitment as a vital element of this Nation’s strategic reserve.

I know, and I know you know, that a maritime nation such as

ours depends in great measure on the overmatching capability,

global reach, persistent presence, agility and lethality of a strong

navy. We are that Navy, Mr. Chairman. And with your continued

support, we will remain that Navy.

Again, on behalf of your sailors, Navy civilians, and their families, I thank you for the opportunity to appear before you and stand

ready to answer your questions.

[The prepared statement of Admiral Mullen can be found in the

Appendix on page 58.]

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Mullen, thank you very much.

The commandant of the Marine Corps, General Conway.

STATEMENT OF GEN. JAMES T. CONWAY, COMMANDANT OF

THE MARINE CORPS

General CONWAY. Chairman Skelton, Congressman Saxton, the

distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to report to you today on the status of your Marine Corps.

I pledge to provide you with frank and honest assessments, and

I come here today with that thought again in mind.

In the past five years, your Marine Corps has been immersed in

what we believe are the first battles of the long war, a generational

struggle against Islamic extremists. The Marines in our operating

forces are being pushed hard, strained by the operational tempo

and the frequency of combat deployments. But their morale has

never been higher, because they believe they are making a difference.

Over two-thirds of our Marines have enlisted or re-enlisted since

9/11. They know full well what the Nation expects of its Marines

in a time of war, and they are shouldering that duty with selflessness and courage.

They also believe that, through its elected government, the people of the United States are behind them. The evidence of that support is everywhere: tangible support in the feeling of new materiel,

the latest equipment to protect them in harm’s way, the reset of

the force to accomplish follow-on missions throughout the globe,

and most recently the proposal to grow our end-strength.

Increasing to 202,000 Marines will greatly reduce the strain both

on the individual Marine and on our institution as a whole. The

end-strength increase will gradually improve the deployment-todwell ratio in some of our most critical units. Currently many of

these units are deployed for seven months and home for only seven

months, some even less time, before they return to combat.

Our Corps is, by law, to be the most ready when the Nation is

least ready: the Nation’s shock troops. These additional Marines

will allows us the dwell time needed to train and sharpen the skills

that will be required of us in the next contingency, thereby reducing future operational and strategic risks.

Over 70 percent of our proposed end-strength increase is comprised of first-term Marines, so we are making the necessary inVerDate 22-MAR-2001 10:07 Sep 15, 2008 Jkt 037654 PO 00000 Frm 00012 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\110-23\060000.000 HAS2 PsN: HAS2
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creases in recruiting and retention. This will be a challenge, but

our standards will remain high. We will need your continued support for enlistment bonuses and other recruiting programs, such as

advertising, which are essential for us to continue to bring aboard

the best that America has to offer.

Turning to the plus-up operations in Iraq, we have approximately 4,000 Marines affected.

First I would like to correct the misunderstanding by some in the

media that our end-strength increase is directly tied to the plusup in Iraq. This is not the case. Our request for additional Marines

is separate from—indeed, it predated it by several weeks—the announcement of the plus-up operation.

I also want to assure you that all Marines going into the alAnbar province will be properly trained. Units that have been accelerated in the rotation have indeed had their training schedules

adjusted. But those schedules include all five phases of our

predeployment training package.

They will be properly equipped. We have identified their only

equipment shortfalls, which is a result of manufacturer nonavailability, and those are the latest generation sniper and spotter

scopes.

Ladies and gentlemen, your Marines recognize that this is an important time in history to serve our country. They are truly a special breed of America’s warriors. It is on their behalf that I come

before you today to answer your questions and help all understand

how we can best support these tremendous young Marines and

sailors in combat.

I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of General Conway can be found in the

Appendix on page 122.]

The CHAIRMAN. General, thank you very much.

And, Mr. Secretary, before I ask any questions and turn it over

to the members, I think it is incumbent upon me to note that there

are so many here on this committee that represent port cities. And

what they don’t know is that I represent a port city. Lexington,

Missouri, was the largest port in western Missouri during the latter part of the 1930’s and the 1940’s and the 1950’s. And it was

the War Between the States that shut down our port operations.

So I think that those that represent port cities should take note of

my nautical interest along the Missouri River. [Laughter.]

I will reserve my questions for a moment later.

Mr. Ortiz.

Let me mention this. The five-minute rule is still in effect. Everyone is doing well. Please do your best to abide by it, we appreciate

it, so everybody can get their questions in. Thank you.

Mr. Ortiz.

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, Admiral, General, thank you so much for joining

us today.

Admiral, in your testimony you state, ‘‘Within our own hemisphere, some leaders have become increasingly vocal in their opposition to policies of the United States.’’

Now, I would like to know, how does the Navy’s strategy plan,

given that after BRAC there will be no longer Navy ships in the

10

Gulf region—you know, we have a lot of refineries, we have the

commercial sea lanes, we have a lot of Gulf oil-drilling. And how

do you address that?

Admiral MULLEN. Clearly——

Mr. ORTIZ. Let me, before I finish, because we are limited. And

then I saw in some testimony that we are about to give some

minehunters ships to Lithuania, which I think is good, to Turkey,

which is good. They might be old, but we are not going to have anything on the Gulf Coast. And that concerns me, and I hope that you

can address this question, Mr. Admiral.

Admiral MULLEN. Certainly. I understand the concern, Mr. Ortiz.

And the statement in my testimony was focused on certain evolving

events and rhetoric coming from the countries south of us.

We have ships in that area of responsibility (AOR) routinely.

They come from our ports on both coasts. And the way they are

both dispersed and operated right now, I am not overly concerned

that they can’t respond to the need in that part of the world.

My general philosophy there is to engage these countries both

militarily and diplomatically. And so, my take on that is we are a

long way from any kind of military engagement, based on what is

going on in that part of the world.

With regard to the minehunters, the ships to which I think you

are referring, we have decommissioned those and recommended

they be transferred based on the fact that I don’t have a capability

requirement for hunting mines. My warfare problem is in sweeping

mines right now, as far as ships are concerned, which is why we

both decommissioned them and are recommending they be transferred.

Their original mission was tied to port breakout, which would be

applicable were we to be concerned about getting out of our ports.

I don’t see that as a concern in the near term or the far term,

which is why I think those ships should be transferred.

Mr. ORTIZ. We are still having problems with Katrina on the

Gulf Coast. And the first ship that responded was from our home

port, which was Ingleside. We were on the verge of developing

some new technology to do away with the minehunters and put

them on the ships, you know. Where is that technology today?

Have they been—do we have it?

Admiral MULLEN. Sir, the future mine warfare plan integrates

many of the capabilities that we are developing on the littoral combat ship, the mine warfare module. And clearly the response of the

ships, the minehunters in particular in Katrina, which was terrific

in clearing ports, shows the flexibility that we have in platforms

which go to sea, whether they are Navy or Coast Guard. But it has

not been their principal mission.

And as I try to balance the books overall, that is with the—what

is the current war-fighting requirement? That is why we made the

decision to decommission those ships.

Mr. ORTIZ. But that is the future plan. I am talking about now,

what do we have. I mean, we are still waiting on the technology,

because you are talking about a future plan. Am I correct?

Admiral MULLEN. In terms of mine warfare?

Mr. ORTIZ. Yes, sir.

11

Admiral MULLEN. Yes, sir, we are actually fielding that plan

right now. I mean, we have developed a number of technologies

over the last ten years which we will field in the next couple of

years. And the modules coming with LCS are a significant part of

that. But it is not just on ships; it is in aviation as well.

Mr. ORTIZ. I just want you all to know that I am very concerned.

Some of this fuel, as you well know, is used by our military. And

all this takes is one strike, and then with nobody protecting the

Gulf Coast and the Gulf of Mexico—I am very, very concerned

about this. And I just wanted to mention this to——

Admiral MULLEN. Yes, sir. I understand.

Mr. ORTIZ [continuing]. Our leadership this morning today. So

thank you so much. I am running out of time.

Admiral MULLEN. Thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman.

In lieu of the ranking member, Mr. Saxton.

Mr. SAXTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral and General Conway, you both made reference in your

opening statements to something that I would just like to make

note of, particularly General Conway, when you said that we are

in the first few battles of this long struggle. And it reminded me

of some thoughts that have been occurring to many of us, to some

of us at least, in the last period of time.

And that is this: As time goes on and technology changes, our

war-fighting capabilities change and the threat changes. And we

are going to talk today about LCS and the mine resistant ambush

protected vehicle and probably some other things. And that is because warfare has again changed. And the weapons being used

against us have changed. We hear about improvised explosive devices (IEDs).

But maybe one of the things that we haven’t realized sufficiently

is that our enemies are using a different kind of weapon against

us today, different types of weapons that we ourselves developed

and made available to them: information technology and television.

Let me point out what I think is the best example of their smart

use of this. Vice President Cheney went to Afghanistan recently.

He stayed overnight at Bagram Air Force Base. He had in tow a

contingent of the press. The bad guys decided they could make a

statement. They got a guy with a suicide vest. He found his way

to the gate of Bagram military base, or at least near it, got himself

ensconced among 20 civilians and one American soldier, and pulled

the cord on his vest. It was the biggest story in this country this

week: an attempt on the vice president’s life.

I am pretty much convinced that wasn’t an attempt on the vice

president’s life. I am convinced that that was a statement and a

story sent to the American people. Bad news. And so, this information-technology world that we live in today is being used as a weapon to try to convince the leaders of this country and the American

people that this war is not worth fighting. And I am here to say

that we have no choice but to fight it successfully.

Now I would like to talk about LCS.

Mr. Secretary, at the time that the 90-day stop-work order was

issued for LCS 3, you told the committee that you were targeting

45 days for the review. And that time, of course, has now passed.

12

What is the current status of your review, and when do you expect to resolve the stop-work order? And is the Navy Program Management Assist Group’s assessment complete?

Secretary WINTER. Sir, we have made, I think, very good

progress, in terms of the overall assessment. There are a few other

data requests that I had made and a few additional briefings that

will take us on through the better part of next week. But that

should complete the period of assessment.

And I believe that, with the data that I am being provided, at

that time we will be in a position to make a rapid assessment of

the appropriate courses of action for at least the flight zero, the

first four of the LCS vessels. I intend to take that immediately to

the under secretary for acquisition, technology, and logistics

(AT&L) and the Deputy Secretary of Defense, get their approval,

and then come back here to you, to Congress, to inform you of what

I would like to do on the LCS program.

Mr. SAXTON. Do you have a timeframe by which you will be able

to make that information available to us?

Secretary WINTER. Sir, I expect that that will be in the next two

to three weeks.

Mr. SAXTON. Very good.

Let me go on here a little. A highly puzzling set of press stories

on the LCS program appeared yesterday, in which ‘‘high-ranking

Navy sources’’ first predicted the second LCS ship being built by

General Dynamics at its Austal shipyard would cost in the neighborhood of $350 million, which is close to the estimated cost of the

LCS 1, being built by Lockheed Martin.

Then later in the day, we saw a sort of retraction, implying the

Navy misstated the cost estimates of both LCS 1 and LCS 2 and

is apparently unsure of what the General Dynamics ship will cost.

Please help us understand, is the second contractor’s ship coming

in at costs similar to LCS 1, which led you to issue the stop-work

order? Or is the Navy again unaware what the true cost is for the

ship that is approximately 40 percent complete?

Secretary WINTER. Sir, we are watching it very carefully. As you

have just indicated, LCS 2 under construction under General Dynamics’ prime contract is only 40 percent complete, as opposed to

LCS 1, the Lockheed vessel, which is around 75 or 80 percent complete at this point in time.

We obviously have a little bit better understanding of the cost

posture on LCS 1 as a result of that advanced stage.

On LCS 2, the indications right now are that there are some increases in cost. But we have not seen anything approaching the

numbers that were indicated in the press. The numbers are significantly less than that. But it is a matter that we want to watch very

carefully.

I would also note that we have not seen certain specific issues

that have been problematic with LCS 1. We do not have an issue

with the reduction gear. LCS 2 also is manufactured principally out

of aluminum as opposed to steel and, as a consequence, has experienced less of a cost growth in raw materials. And also, because

LCS started a bit later, it has not suffered from the same degree

of concurrency in the design and construction activities.

13

We are hopeful that those factors will contribute to a lower cost

than we are experiencing on LCS 1. We will watch this very, very

carefully, sir. And I expect to get further cost estimates in the week

to come.

Mr. SAXTON. What is your current estimate of the cost of the first

LCS ship?

Secretary WINTER. At this point in time, we believe, assuming we

are able to continue the current progress, in the $350 million to

$375 million range.

Mr. SAXTON. Finally, if both contractors’ ships appear to experience cost growth, are you concerned that the problem may lie with

how the Navy is managing the program?

Secretary WINTER. I think the cost growth is due to several factors. First of all, a general over-optimism at the beginning of the

contract, regarding both cost and schedule. And that was exacerbated, if you will, by the use of a cost-reimbursable contract. This

was further complicated by some limitations in Navy oversight and

some performance issues on the part of the contractors.

That is something we are going to have to look at. And, in particular, in terms of future acquisitions, I expect to make some significant changes to the overall acquisition process.

Mr. SAXTON. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Mr. Chairman, I have some other questions, but I will be glad

to withhold them until later in the day.

The CHAIRMAN. You bet. Thank you very much.

The gentleman from Mississippi, Mr. Taylor, Gene Taylor.

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to thank all of you gentlemen for being here.

Secretary Winter, I am, for one, particularly disappointed in the

whole design build concept. I think it has been a miserable failure.

I think it is completely contrary to the investment our Nation

makes, starting with sending young people to Annapolis, working

on their advanced degrees. It completely ignores the life skills that

these young ensigns, who become lieutenants, who become commanders, who become captains—they are the ones who ought to be

coming up with the plans for the next generations of ships.

And I would hope that you would take to heart the failure of this

program, not let it be repeated in the Destroyer (Experimental)

(DD(X)) program or any other program.

I am also disappointed—although I understand you have to tow

the company line, as an appointee of the President—that once

again the President of the United States is asking for seven ships.

Even in the best of times, when ships lasted for 30 years, seven

times 30 would translate to a 210-ship fleet.

Given that many of these ships, including the coastal

minehunters that are included in your testimony, the block–1

cruisers, are being retired at less than 20 years, this 7-ship acquisition times 20 would lead us to about a 140-ship fleet. And that is

unacceptable.

I am very pleased that our colleague on the Appropriations Committee has expressed an interest in trying to fund 12 ships this

year. If the Bush Administration won’t ask for them, then Congress

is going to fulfill our constitutional responsibility to build a navy.

14

Given the willingness of the appropriators to make that happen,

given that you have only asked for five, if we are able to find the

funds—which is going to be a challenge; we are going to have to

find about $5 billion—what would you like to see those other five

ships look like?

Secretary WINTER. Congressman, thank you for the question.

If the additional funds are made available—and I have to emphasize that, because I think within the current funding we have made

a proper optimization of the overall department’s budget. But if the

additional funds are available, I will note, first of all, that CNO has

indicated his highest priority is for an additional LPD–17.

And I would support that from a requirements perspective, although I will note that it may create some issues in terms of the

workforce availability down at Pascagoula, given the post-Katrina

issues that have been faced by that yard.

Mr. TAYLOR. Let’s worry about the fleet.

Secretary WINTER. Yes, sir.

Mr. TAYLOR. We will make everything else fall in place.

Secretary WINTER. I understand.

Mr. TAYLOR. Good.

Secretary WINTER. The second item that I would note, perhaps

the easiest one to work, would be to accelerate the additional production of T–AKEs. We have, in the past, produced those at a twoa-year basis. The current plan is a one-a-year basis. And so, given

the yard capability there, accelerating that production back up to

two would appear to make sense.

One of the other areas of particular interest, I recognize, on the

part of many of the members of this committee, has to do with the

Virginia class. There we are right now at a one-per-year production

rate with a plan to go to two a year in 2020.

The Virginia-class submarines require us to start with a two-year

advanced procurement, to be able to provide for the nuclear power

plant that supports them. So we would need to start two years in

advance. What that says is, if we were able to start in 2008 with

advanced procurement, we could accelerate, potentially, the two a

year to 2010.

I would make two specific requests, however, relative to any acceleration in Virginia class. First of all is we have been working

very, very hard to provide a degree of stability for the shipyards.

If we are going to go to two a year in 2010, we really need to go

to two a year for 2010, 2011 and out from there on. We don’t want

to go to two a year and then back to one a year. I think that would

create too much stress into the workforce there.

The other thing is that we do need to have multi-year approval

on the Virginia class to be able to achieve the efficiencies that we

are looking for, in terms of that class of vessels. And that multiyear would have to encompass any additional vessels here.

Mr. TAYLOR. Commandant, your force has taken a very ambitious

stance toward the MRAP. It is my understanding that they are

going to try to have 4,000 of those vehicles in the inventory sometime around the first of the year.

I want to applaud the Marines. I would hope that you would encourage your colleagues in the Army to work with you on that. And

15

I would ask for your personal involvement in this, to see that the

ambitious goals that have been set by the Marines are fulfilled.

General CONWAY. You have it, sir.

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Forbes, the gentleman from Virginia.

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And, first of all, let me thank you, Admiral and General and Mr.

Secretary, for the great job you do in defending our country and

keeping us free.

As you know, I have the privilege of serving with my colleague

from California as one of the co-chairs of the Navy-Marine Corps

Caucus. She is a great champion for your issues.

And we understand that—and we respect your integrity, first of

all, as you come before us and thank you for that. We also know

you have enormous competing demands that you must reconcile.

And we just wish we had a day that we could do nothing but bring

in all the wonderful, good things that you do, so that we could

make sure that they were clear to the American people.

But today, I would like to ask you just three questions, and I will

just throw them out there and then see if you have time to answer

them.

One of the things that continues to just worry me is what we are

seeing with asymmetrical warfare challenges, especially situations

like we had with the Cole and the recent anti-satellite test (ASAT)

situation from the Chinese and looking at the destruction of our

communications capability.

And the first question I would ask you is, do you feel comfortable

with our response to those asymmetrical threats? Is there anything

that we don’t have in the budget that you need to be able to deal

with those threats, number one?

The second one, I continue to be concerned—and I know it is just

a difficult situation—but how we deal with the escalating cost of

ships. We are continuing to price ourselves out of the market. That

is something that I know requires a partnership, that we kind of

put our arms around and see what we can do. Is there more that

we can do in that area?

And the third thing—and, General, this is yours—with the

MRAP, as Mr. Taylor mentioned, I know that we have got a shortfall there. And if you get the funding for that, are you able to obligate that funding in 2007? And the last part of that, how are we

working to make sure that the interoperability of those units function?

And so, with those three questions I would just ask your insight.

Admiral MULLEN. Thanks, Mr. Forbes.

On the asymmetric piece, and, clearly, in some of the previous

testimony today, there has been discussion about force protection.

And that generally, these days, is focused on ground forces. But it

is equally of concern to me, and Cole would be an example of that.

And we have continued to invest in the technology and in the procedures and exercises, if you will, to make sure that we get that

right for the future.

We are going to talk, probably a lot, about LCS today. But LCS,

the urgency of that need was generated by the Navy because of the

16

asymmetric kinds of threats that it can address, not exclusively,

but it clearly allows us to address, for instance, the waves-of-smallboats kind of attacks that could be loaded with explosives, as well,

as an example.

And so, we are working on the Navy side to transform how our

people are trained and what their skill sets are for the future, how

our ships are both put to sea and the technologies that are inserted

in them, as well as expanding from the blue water to the brown

water, which gets to—we are deploying our first riverine squadron

literally this month to Haditha Dam to relieve the Marines. But we

have not got three squadrons, and you have supported that well,

and we need that continued support.

So there is a people piece of this, a capability piece, and a technology piece. Which we find ourselves in the middle of transforming, literally, in so many ways, to meet the threat.

Networks are also a concern and how we operate with them and

without them, for instance, is another one.

So your concern is well-founded. We are in pretty good shape in

this budget, with respect to the investment to get where we need

to go.

Secretary WINTER. Sir, regarding the escalating cost of ships, I

would just identify three specific items that we are trying to work

on right now, one of which is the stability to plan.

And you heard today that we are very pleased that the 30-year

ship-building plan that we just submitted to you is the same exactly in 2008 and 2009 and almost the same in the out-years as

what was submitted last year. And this gives the industrial base

the opportunity to properly plan for those activities.

Second of all, we are making a greater attempt to stabilize the

requirements. We clearly need to make a great investment in working these requirements up front, so that we have a definitive set

of requirements before we start a program and then we manage

any changes very carefully once the program has initiated.

Third, we are looking very, very hard at the actual contract process here. And, in this regard, I fully expect that we will make a

material change in our contracting approach, going further in

terms of the requirements maturation process before we go into the

actual construction, and then use a different contract vehicle, most

likely a fixed-price incentive contract vehicle, for the actual construction phase.

Relative to the MRAP activity, I will just say that we are initiating activities with nine vendors to acquire test articles so that we

can develop a great industrial base than we have currently used to

date. And these additional test articles will be used to evaluate

both the operability characteristics and the survivability characteristics of their proposed offerings and give us the opportunity to flex

in terms of our production capability as the requirements continue

to evolve.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman.

Dr. Snyder from Arkansas.

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I wanted to ask several questions but one quick question to our

service chiefs, Admiral Mullen and General Conway.

17

Starting with you, Admiral, and you can answer this very briefly:

Goldwater-Nichols did a lot of good things. There are some that feel

we need to revisit—there is a lot of frustration in this town and

country about our acquisition process and procurement process.

Do we need to revisit the provisions in terms of the participation

of the service chiefs in the acquisition process?

Admiral MULLEN. The short answer is yes. Although, clearly, in

the team that I am in right now with Secretary Winter, the service

chief is very much included. But that is because of this leadership

team. It isn’t always the case, in terms of service chief inclusion

from beginning to end.

Dr. SNYDER. Statutorily you have some restrictions, in terms of

being in the sign-off process on some of the acquisitions.

Admiral MULLEN. Yes, sir.

Dr. SNYDER. Is that the problem?

Admiral MULLEN. Yes, sir.

Dr. SNYDER. General Conway, have you formed an opinion about

that issue?

General CONWAY. Sir, I agree with the CNO. That has been my

observation in the short three months.

Dr. SNYDER. And, again, a question for our service chiefs: There

is a lot of attention, and will be on months and years to come, on

the events at Walter Reed and the fact that—I think probably driven by medical holds, people get past their acute phase but then

weeks and months go by as things are trying to be determined by

outpatient care.

Have you all looked at what is going on at Camp Pendleton and

other places and the different hospitals that you all are responsible

for, in terms of being sure that you don’t have similar situations

of people being, kind of, caught in a limbo?

Again, Admiral Mullen and General Conway.

Admiral MULLEN. Certainly the articles that have been out there

and this issue, which has been widely spoken to, was a concern to

me immediately. Although I personally have made many visits to

Bethesda and have not seen those kinds of things.

That said, we did take a very rapid look to see if we have the

same problems, and we don’t. We have very few that are in that

after-care kind of—on the Navy side, and I will let General Conway

speak for the Marine Corps.

That said, the secretary has directed an assessment over the

next couple of months to make sure that through the Department

of the Navy institutions that we have this right. It is a big organization, and we want to make sure that we get it right for those

who serve so nobly and, when they get hurt, to make sure they are

cared for exceptionally well throughout the system.

Dr. SNYDER. General Conway? And, of course, not just at Bethesda. You have got medical facilities at Camp Pendleton. Have

you all looked at this issue?

General CONWAY. Yes, sir. And it has been one of my priorities,

sir, in the short time, again, I have been the commandant, to get

around and visit these facilities.

And I think what is being presented with regard to Walter Reed

is an anomaly. I don’t see that same kind of issue anywhere else

in the country in the hospitals that I have visited.

18

And I would add that Marines who go to Walter Reed for treatment do not stay in Building 18, but they are generally pretty

pleased with the quality of the work, primarily prosthetics, that

they receive there.

Dr. SNYDER. The issue that has been of concern—we had this

several years ago with reserve component folks—is when they get

in some kind of a medical hold status. Everybody agrees the acute

case is excellent. It is what happens after that. And I assume you

all have a process of making sure you don’t have enclaves of people

at Camp Pendleton or other places that——

General CONWAY. Sir, we are creating in the Marine Corps what

we call the Wounded Warrior Regiment, with battalion headquarters on both coasts, that are going to get after the organization

aspect of what you are describing. The battalions in particular will

have a tracking responsibility for Marines, wherever they are in

the country, be it in a hospital, be it on convalescent leave, perhaps

even if they are out of the service and have needs. We want to understand what those needs are and try to match up the generosity

we see in the country with these people.

Dr. SNYDER. We need you to keep us informed about that.

General Conway, one final question. I have heard the description

of what is going on with our troops in Iraq now is that you, the

troops, our fighting men and women, are like the offensive line in

a ball game, but other government agencies are like the backfield.

A high-ranking officer described it to me, ‘‘It is great, great people, but it is like we have got soccer players coming in that weren’t

really trained and equipped to play football,’’ that the State Department and other agencies are really having trouble fielding the kind

of team that you all need to be doing the redevelopment and political stuff.

Is that a fair metaphor for what you are seeing in western Iraq?

General CONWAY. Sir, I think it is close. My concern is more with

quantity than quality. Those individuals that I worked with in Iraq

really were pretty good at what they did; there just was not nearly

enough of them from the various agencies.

Dr. SNYDER. Not enough, yes.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman.

Before I call on Mr. Kline, let me ask Secretary Winter: As I understand it, the Navy seeks to cut 901 medical personnel, 100 of

which are doctors. Is that correct?

Secretary WINTER. Sir, are you referring to the civilian conversion process?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Secretary WINTER. I don’t know the exact numbers offhand, but

that sounds directionally correct.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, think on these things. We will discuss it a

bit later. All right?

Secretary WINTER. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Kline.

Mr. KLINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, gentlemen, for being here.

19

I have so many questions. But I want to pick up where Dr. Snyder left off, if I could, General Conway, with the Wounded Warrior

Regiment.

I heard you explain this at an earlier caucus briefing or something a couple weeks ago. I think it is a terrific idea. But we clearly

have a horrific disconnect in our care for soldiers and Marines that

are coming back from Iraq. And sometimes it is in the hand-off between the Navy-Army medical system and Veterans Affairs (VA).

We had just a horrific, tragic case occur in Minnesota in the last

few weeks. A Marine reservist had been to Iraq, come back, had

difficulties, was in the V.A. medical system, and yet he committed

suicide. And the V.A. has got an I.G. investigation going now, as

they should, to see if there is something, a process particularly,

that needs to be corrected.

And so, I am very excited about this Wounded Warrior Regiment

and the battalions.

The question is, not for you to explain the whole system—I think

it is terrific, and if you would like to add anything you can—but

is there something that you need from us? Money I am sure, but

if there is something you need from us in the way of statute or authority or anything we can do to make that better, because if it is

in my head what is in your head, it is absolutely the model for

what we should be doing in all the services everywhere.

What do you need?

General CONWAY. Sir, I have taken a brief at Quantico about two

weeks ago, and there were some costs associated with the requirement. It involved principally new construction. And I am just not

sure, at this point, that we have to have what is being requested

in order to satisfy the requirement.

We selected this week the commanding officer of the regiment.

He is a regimental commander currently in Hawaii, coming this

way. I am going to toss this football to him and have him to give

me a second analysis, if you will.

At this point, I think we can field the requirements within our

own resources. But I would like to put a raincheck on the table and

say we might be back to you asking for some more.

Mr. KLINE. When you say field it, when do you expect this to

take place? You have got the regimental commander inbound; he

is obviously not briefed up and ready to go yet. When will you have

these two functioning battalions——

General CONWAY. Sir, I think by the end of spring we will be

fully operational. Elements of it are in place right now in our

wounded warrior barracks on both coasts. And I suspect, at least

in one case, a lieutenant colonel operating there will be named as

that battalion commander, simply because of his expertise.

What we will need are the organization aspects of assigning our

wounded Marines to a battalion headquarters, the methodology for

checking on them weekly and that manner of thing to see what

their needs are.

I think where we drop, sir, is really when a Marine goes out on

convalescent leave. And he then has to go to the local medical facility for his treatment. There is not a Marine in the chain. I don’t

know that they receive the priority we would like to see them have.

And those are some of the things we are going to work on.

20

Mr. KLINE. Well, I think it is absolutely outstanding. And if it

does not continue the tracking through convalescent leave and then

as they are taken up in the V.A. system, then it will not have done

what I think you have in mind and certainly what I have in mind.

General CONWAY. I agree with you.

Mr. KLINE. We owe it to these Marines, to all the service men

and women, we owe it to them to make sure they are not falling

through the cracks. And clearly, they are falling through the

cracks.

It has been my belief for a long time, maybe because I served all

my life on active duty, that when the Marine stays on active duty

he has got a family there with him, he stays, in the case of the Marines, in the Navy medical system, and he has got a lot of support

built right in. It is the Marine reservists and the Marines who are

leaving where the problem occurs.

And if this Wounded Warrior Regiment does what you have envisioned, I think it is terrific, and I hope it will be the model for everyone.

And, Mr. Chairman, I have a lot of questions having to do with

reset and MV–22s and things, but I will just defer them and yield

back my time. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman.

The gentlelady from California, Ms. Davis.

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you to all of you for being here, Mr. Secretary, General

Conway, and Admiral Mullen.

And I just wanted to thank you, as well, for being so responsive

to the Navy-Marine Caucus. I appreciate the kind words of my colleague, Mr. Forbes. And that does give us a chance to, really, in

a very informal way, not quite this setting, to talk about the issues

that are of concern to all of us. And I appreciate that. Thank you.

I wanted to turn for a second, General Conway, because I have

actually had some concerns about the battalion aid stations at

Camp Pendleton. And so, I would just ask you to take a look at

that.

One of the concerns is that the corpsmen there do not have access to the technology that they need to track many of the Marines

there. And the other concern is that they are using Marine Corps

dollars as opposed to Navy medical dollars to treat many of the

folks there. And if you could take a look at that, that would be

helpful.

General CONWAY. I am sorry, can you clarify? Are you talking

battalion aid stations in the various regiments, or are you talking

about the hospital per se?

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Well, we are hearing this from the

corpsmen at Camp Pendleton.

General CONWAY. Okay. Got it.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 164.]

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you very much.

I think the other concern, really, is the fact that—I think that

the chairman has touched on it—that, in fact, we are decreasing

21

medical professionals and the numbers in the Navy, while the Marine numbers are going to be going up.

And I am wondering how that increased requirement, really, on

the Navy is going to be played out as the Marines will have, certainly, more need for medical, even chaplains, in the services that

are going to be required.

How are you dealing with that balance, if you will?

Admiral MULLEN. From the medical perspective, I think the concern is a legitimate concern. And I just actually returned earlier

this week from a trip out in Lemoore, California, near Fresno,

which we have a big naval air station there. And there is concern

about the ability to hire certain specialty skills in that area if we

were to convert. We are actually short out there in some of the specialties right now.

So I think we have to be very careful about how much military/

civilian we do. And as we do it, we are very precise in making sure

that, as we distribute those conversions, they are distributed in a

way where we can actually hire the care, have the skills on the

medical side that would be able to take care of our troops and their

families.

And that is probably my biggest concern writ large across all the

medical kinds of capabilities that we——

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Is it also a legitimate concern that, in

fact, the Navy is having difficulty recruiting physicians, bringing

people I guess into the pool essentially, to go on and perform that

very important——

Admiral MULLEN. There are some key areas that we are experiencing difficulties in: anesthesiologists, general surgeons, psychologists, psychiatrists, to name four. There is one more, I just can’t

recall what it is right now.

And we have been supported before and asked for support this

year for expanding the bonus incentive pool to attract these kinds

of individuals for scholarships and also to retain the ones who are

with us right now.

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Well, I think, in that regard, we are

all interested in how we can be more helpful to try and help out

in that area.

If I could turn for a second, I know that we were discussing yesterday the role that many of our airmen are playing in lieu of positions. And you mentioned and we all know how magnificently the

Marines are performing. And, in many ways, they are essentially

in their role there. But I think for some of the Navy, perhaps, not

necessarily in what they actually were trained to do.

Could you respond to that? And are we putting people in positions that puts them more at risk because of that training?

Admiral MULLEN. Certainly being in a combat environment

ashore where a war is going on, versus being at sea, there is more

risk.

We have generated a tremendous amount of effort to make sure

they are trained for where they are going. And the Army, in particular, has worked with us very carefully. And our training is conducted down at Fort Jackson. And I visited there and have been

impressed with the—getting our people trained right.

22

I just, as I indicated in my opening statement, came back from

overseas, was ashore. The Navy has got over 5,000 sailors on the

ground in Iraq right now in combat support and combat service

support roles. They are using about 80 percent of the skills they

have in the roles in which they are functioning. So, by and large,

we are taking advantage of their skill set. Obviously it is a different environment.

They have had a big impact. General Conway will tell you that;

General Schoomaker will tell you that; I get that feedback all the

time.

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

That is in addition to the 7,500 that the Air Force has doing

Army duties?

Admiral MULLEN. Well, I have got 10,500 on the ground—I am

sorry. I have got almost 13,000 on the ground in CENTCOM AOR.

That is Iraq, Afghanistan, the Horn of Africa, throughout. So it is

in addition to, clearly, the ones that the Air Force——

The CHAIRMAN. Hopefully the increase in the size of the Army

and the Marines will help put more of them at sea.

Mr. Conaway, to be followed by Mr. Courtney. Mr. Conaway of

Texas.

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I am assuming from your opening remarks that you are trying

to get a carrier based down in the Missouri River. [Laughter.]

The CHAIRMAN. We are working on it.

Mr. CONAWAY. Okay, good. You and Madam Bordallo are neck

and neck for the next carrier.

The CHAIRMAN. I claim seniority on that one. [Laughter.]

Mr. CONAWAY. I like your position.

Thank you, gentlemen, for coming.

A couple questions on the BRAC funding that was—the continuing resolution that was stripped out, the impact that that is going

to have on those issues as it relates to the Navy.

The F–35, lengthening out when we are going to take delivery on

that, what impact that has on our carrier wings and how we are

going to maintain all the airplanes we need for the carriers that

we have got.

And then, Mr. Secretary, the tension that I think is always there

between what is on the unfunded list and what is in the baseline,

and how do you mitigate, or at least tell us you mitigate, how you

put things in the baseline that you have to have and you put

things on the needs list that are not necessarily wants but don’t

fit in the have-to-have category.

Because there is a game we can play by putting the things that

you know we will fund on the needs list and funding things that

you want in the baseline budget.

Could you talk to us a little bit about that tension and how you

mitigate that?

Secretary WINTER. Let me go through these rather quickly here,

if I could.

On the BRAC, there is about a $3 billion DOD shortfall. The allocation of that will be made by the OSD, the secretary of defense.

We have not seen the specific allocation yet, so it is a little hard

23

for us to assess the specific impacts it will have. It is likely to have

an impact on our ability to meet the prescribed schedule in the

BRAC law. The extent of that and the particular areas it would impact I can only speculate on at this point in time.

In terms of the joint strike fighter (JSF) program, the F–35 program, we are watching that very carefully. We are managing that

very carefully.

As you probably note in the budget request, we have six of the

STOVALs requested for 2008. We are looking for the first flight of

the STOVAL configuration coming up here in June of 2008. That

will give us the opportunity to go ahead and initiate the first phase

of the procurement after that. We are roughly two years away, at

this point in time, from the projected first flight of the carrier version of that.

We are managing that activity very carefully. We are looking at

what is a prudent acquisition strategy there, given the current, asexperienced development schedule for JSF and also looking at the

budgetary constraints on the overall top line.

We are dealing with some of the shortfalls there based on the

continuing acquisition of the Super Hornet line. And I would like

to say a ‘‘no comment’’ on the overall impact of that, and then perhaps we can get back to the baseline budget, unfunded priority list

after that.

Admiral MULLEN. I just want to strongly reaffirm the need for

that airplane. It is a very critical airplane to us. And I am anxious

to have it deliver on its current schedule and at its current cost.

In the interim, we clearly have accepted some risk, in terms of

a shortfall in our F–18 inventory. And, in fact, on the reset requirement, the supplemental, we have asked for additional F–18s. Because our oldest F–18s are now, on average, our legacy F–18s are

16 years old on what is typically about a 20-year expected service

life.

And we are buying F–18s E’s and F’s, which were the new versions now, and there is a balance between purchasing those up to

a point and getting them in the fleet until we start JSF. And there

is tension there and trying to keep that balance where we are.

I have got additional F–18s that I have actually put in the program to mitigate what looks to be about a 50-aircraft shortfall in

the strike fighter world that I can predict right now, based on

when JSF comes in.

General CONWAY. Sir, I would like to go back to your first question, if I can, and comment on the continuing resolution.

For my service, it is absolutely critical that we get that through.

We, for two decades probably, have consciously not been able to

prioritize barracks and living spaces for our Marines in lieu of

other things that we simply had to have.

We find ourselves, at this point, pretty much against a wall, with

a lot of our troops living in barracks that were built during the Korean era. We have a 108-barracks program through 2011. It will

bring us to a two-man room standard, not one, which I think is

helpful in terms of conserving resources. But we really do need

that kind of support.

Secretary WINTER. Relative to the baseline budget and unfunded

priority list, I would just—we can discuss that later.

24

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman very much.

The gentleman from Connecticut, Mr. Courtney.

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to thank the witnesses for being here today.

Admiral Mullen, in the appendix of your testimony, you had

some comments regarding the new submarines which have most recently been produced, the Texas and the Hawaii.

I actually visited the Texas back in December, down in Groton,

and, like you, was very impressed with the quality of the boat and

also the crew and the officers there.

The Hawaii was actually going down the Thames River, being

delivered ahead of schedule, just a little bit, but nonetheless still

ahead of schedule.

And I think the folks down there are very proud of the fact that

there is a good story to tell the taxpayers about what is happening

with the Virginia class. That last sub was produced with hundreds

of thousands of fewer man-hours than the subs that preceded it.

And I just was wondering if you wanted to comment for a moment about whether or not—I mean, obviously there are issues like

energy costs, which are beyond the control of anyone, it seems,

these days. But in terms of at least that program, I mean, it really

does seem that we are making great strides in terms of getting

closer to that target of a $2 billion submarine. Would you agree?

Admiral MULLEN. Yes, sir. We clearly are. Both the secretary

and I have sat recently with the program manager and have great

confidence in him and the program executive officer (PEO) that are

directing this program. And it is clearly a joint effort with industry

in this. This is a very proud shipyard. I have visited it before; I

know what they do. And they are on a path right now to make this

work, so we can get to a submarine which is at $2 billion and get

to two in fiscal year 2012.

And when I also think about this, obviously I have to think about

cost, but I also think about this great capability. We need this capability out there. Texas and Hawaii and North Carolina to follow—those are all critical assets for us in the future.

Mr. COURTNEY. Admiral Haney actually just finished with the

test runs on the Hawaii and was absolutely ecstatic about the performance of that ship.

Admiral MULLEN. Well, I hope to get to sea on her pretty soon.

Mr. COURTNEY. Right. But going back to your initial testimony,

written testimony, where you talked about the fact that even in the

last year there has been some changing threats across the globe.

And one of them, obviously, is the Chinese navy’s aggressive plans

to increase submarine production.

And looking at the Navy’s own stated goals of a 48-ship fleet, I

mean, at some point, when you do the math, as Mr. Taylor did earlier, it is clear: If we wait until 2012 to go up to two subs a year,

we are going to dip below 48 ships for a fairly substantial period

of time.

And I am just wondering how, given the demands already on the

submarine fleet, how we are going to juggle that need with the

changing situation, again, that you identified in your testimony.

Admiral MULLEN. Sure. I talked about the criticality of the asset.

If you look—and I am sure you have—at that 30-year ship-building

25

plan, you can see that from about 2020 to 2034 or so, based on getting two in fiscal year 2012, we will be below 48 submarines.

As I have previously testified, it is up to me to figure out how

to mitigate that shortfall operationally, which is really the critical

piece. We have recently completed a review looking at four different ways to do that, which would include things like building

the Virginia submarines of the future in less time; changing our

operational tempo, not unreasonably but in ways that would mitigate the shortfall forward, which is where you really want to be

able to focus; and looking at possibly extending the service life of

existing submarines, which has already been done once.

And, actually, I am encouraged. And if we were to do some of

that, some or all of that, we would greatly mitigate the years in

which that shortfall would occur.

Mr. COURTNEY. Well, again, like Mr. Taylor, I am hoping that we

can help you find a way to fill that gap. And certainly we feel that

this program, again, is poised to move up its game and it really is

ready to take on a different building schedule, as the secretary described earlier.

Admiral MULLEN. Sir, I wouldn’t push back on that at all, except

to say that, as we look at this gap, as the secretary said, between

now and 2012, that can be a bill as high as $5 billion or $6 billion

to me inside the program. And we have worked very hard to stabilize this. And that can, if I have to pay that bill and come up

with those resources, very badly destabilize that shipbuilding and

conversion, Navy (SCN) plan.

Mr. COURTNEY. I see my light is on here, so I am just going to

ask real—was that the gavel? Okay. [Laughter.]

Thank you. I will follow up later with some additional questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

The last person on the before-the-gavel list is Mr. Cummings.

Then we go to the after-gavel.

Mr. Cummings.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I don’t know how many of you all saw the Bob Woodruff piece

on ABC News, but it was one of the most chilling things I have

even seen, when he talked with people who had been brain-damaged in some way or another.

And, you know, when I think about all the things that we are

doing trying to recruit, one of the things that I think that is so important to recruiting is for people to know that if they go into battle they are going to be equipped, they are going to be trained, and

if they are injured, that they are going to be treated with the best

of care.

One of the issues that came up during the Woodruff piece over

and over again is that the soldiers might have brain damage; then

they get treated, and they are treated pretty good. But then when

they need follow-up and they go back to all of these rural areas,

the care is not there.

And I am telling you, I just think that—and I am just wondering,

what are we doing about that?

I heard you, General Conway, talk about prosthetics and that

your people were very pleased about, you know, if they were injured, they were taken care of.

26

But I am talking about this, something that—and a lot of these

people had kids. And they were basically on—they had one fellow

on a farm, and there was just no way to get treatment. And it was

clear that it was not an isolated incident.

And I guess I just want to make sure that we are doing the right

things by our veterans—not veterans, but, you know, folks that are

injured. And I just want you all to comment on that, please.

General CONWAY. Sir, I will comment. Your instincts were exactly right. I think, within the service and within the hospitals,

certainly Bethesda but to include Walter Reed and other major facilities, we are doing pretty good. We may be understrength some

in our psychologists and psychiatrists, but the counseling and that

type of thing is a priority and is being worked pretty well.

As I commented, though, to Congressman Kline, I think that

when that young Marine or soldier goes out to the farm, he is a

long way away from that kind of support. The immediacy of the

need, the availability of the counseling—they get it, but they get

it on a schedule months away. And I think it is widely believed

that the sooner you get the counseling, the sooner you are going

to get well. And there is a window there that should be taken advantage of.

So it is a shortfall. I don’t know exactly how to address it from

a service perspective, except to identify it and request that those

follow-on agencies do a better job in providing counseling.

Mr. CUMMINGS. General Winter, did you have a comment?

Secretary WINTER. Sir, one of the items that we have put as a

core aspect of the assessment that we are conducting internal to

the Navy relative to this continuing care is to make sure that we

have an understanding of how that care continues during and after

various transitions of responsibility.

And I think many of the issues that you are addressing here

right now, very correctly, are part of what we are trying to get at.

We think we have got a basic process established. We want to

make sure that we are providing the best possible care. They deserve it; there is no question about that. We need to make sure we

understand where and where we are not achieving the expectations.

Mr. CUMMINGS. I think that program probably did substantial

damage to recruiting efforts. You know why? Because it looked as

if the person goes out there, he fights for his country, gives it everything they got; when they are injured, they are left alone. And

I am just telling you, that is how it came off.

And I talked to my staff and so many other people about it. And

the reason why I am bringing this up is because we can sit here

and we can talk about—first of all, I applaud our military for all

you are doing.

But I am telling you, I am on the Naval Academy Board of Visitors, and when I sit with those young people this Monday after the

board meeting and I look at those wonderful, brilliant, young people, I want to make sure that when they go on that field, go out

there, that they are equipped, that they are trained and have got

the best equipment possible.

Last question: As far as head injuries, is there anything else we

can do? I know about the Humvees and all that, but, I mean, as

27

far as head equipment? Is there anything that you need? Where is

the technology with regard to that?

And then I will——

General CONWAY. Sir, one of our largest research and development (R&D) efforts, at this point, is to find a helmet that will take

on a 762-caliber round and defeat it. And we are trying to look for

that lightweight composite material that will give us that capacity.

People who work it say that, you know, we may be able to develop something, but at a 90-degree point of impact it will break

the man’s neck. Well, that is better than the injuries I see week

after week at Bethesda and Walter Reed.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman for his inquiry.

May I ask, for the record, Mr. Secretary, as I understand it,

there is an ongoing study of blast injuries on the brain at Bethesda

Navy Hospital? A Dr. DeGraba is working on that issue.

May I make a formal request for an update of that study and the

funding prospects and your recommendations for that continued

study? The little I know about it, it is very, very important, and

it is just along the line of what the gentleman from Maryland, Mr.

Cummings, is inquiring on.

Would you do that for me, make a note?

Secretary WINTER. Mr. Chairman, I would be pleased to arrange

that.

The CHAIRMAN. I would appreciate it very much.

Mr. Bartlett from Maryland.

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much.

Thank you, gentlemen, for your service to your country and your

testimony.

I am a farmer, and the cattle on our farm are frequently constrained by electric fences. And I have watched them. And they

touch the electric fence just once. I have never seen a cow that

needed a second experience to convince them that they should stay

away from the electric fence.

We have had a lot of different classes of ships, and every time

we have a lead ship we have a pretty substantial growth in time

and cost to complete that ship. And our newest ship, the LCS, is

no exception. We missed pretty substantially how much it was

going to cost and how long it would take.

So I am in the process of re-evaluating the intelligence of my

cows.

Frequently the analysts, like the Congressional Research Service,

look at what we are doing and make comments on it. Have they

done that for the LCS? And, if so, what are they telling us it is

going to cost?

Secretary WINTER. Sir, I believe they have looked at that. There

have been estimates that they have provided which are higher than

the original estimates that we had for the program. I don’t recall

the specific numbers here right now, though.

Mr. BARTLETT. Do any of you recall the specific estimates that

they have made, as to what the cost of the—how they conform to

our present knowledge?

28

Secretary WINTER. We have looked at their estimates, and we

have worked to compare our estimating methodology with them.

That is part of the process that we engage in.

Mr. BARTLETT. I know that your analysis is not complete, but I

also know that you have done a lot of work in the last 45-plus days

in looking at what went wrong.

Can you tell us what we have learned so far, recognizing that

there will be additional knowledge that we gain with the studies

that are now ongoing that you will receive the results of in about

two weeks?

Can you tell us what we have now learned that we might use in

the projections of what the next ship like the DD(X) will cost us

and how we are going to avoid the, I think, consistent track record

of never getting it right on the first ship?

Secretary WINTER. Yes, sir, I think that the principal lesson

learned here is that we need to continue on with the design activities prior to initiating the construction activities until such time as

we have both a clear set of requirements and a design that is consistent with those requirements.

We have tended to initiate programs, design and construction activities, before we have finalized and settled on many of those requirements and design decisions. I think we also have to separate

out the critical decisions of what it is that we want to buy, how we

want to buy it, and who we want to buy it from.

Those changes are going to require a change in terms of the acquisition flow, the structure of the contracting, and the contract

type. My hope is that it will enable us to use more fixed-price-type

contracting, FPI-type contracting, in the actual construction. And

that will motivate both the contractors and the Navy to get it right

from the get-go, in terms of the overall cost estimates.

Mr. BARTLETT. Are these causes of the overruns different than

the cause of overruns in prior first-of-class ships?

Secretary WINTER. I think some of them, sir, are common. I

think there are a few unique issues here. We can talk about aspects like the naval vessel rules as being unique, but I would also

categorize them as generic requirements that continue to evolve as

the design and construction activities have already been started. It

is part of the requirements stabilization that we just have to get

right in the future.

Mr. BARTLETT. Well, thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentlelady from Guam, Ms. Bordallo.

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

And, gentlemen—Secretary Winters, nice to see you again.

And, Admiral.

And of course, the commandant, thank you for coming to Guam.

It was nice to visit with you last week.

Gentlemen, I represent Guam, and geographically Guam is a

small island. Geopolitically, however, Guam would seem to be

growing larger and larger in significance with the advent of each

new crisis in the Asia Pacific region. That the Department of Navy

is readying itself to move a significant number of Marines from

Okinawa to Guam is indicative of our importance.

29

Could you share with the committee your thoughts on the role

Guam will play in the next, say, 10 to 20 years? In particular, do

you believe that Guam will grow in strategic importance to the Department of Navy, the fleet, the Marine Corps, and our country?

And I guess I would give you this question, Mr. Secretary: Is the

Marine movement process on target, since it will be a very costly

move?

Secretary WINTER. Congresswoman, first of all, we are proceeding on the current plan. We have a plan in place in terms of the

move of the Marines from Okinawa to Guam. As you know, this is

also conditional on certain activities to be engaged in by the government of Japan. So we are watching that very carefully. So far,

things seem to be moving on both sides properly.

Our first initial steps here, in terms of its implementation, have

to do with the stand-up of the joint Guam program office, which

will manage this activity both in terms of the Marines, the Navy

move, and also some of the supportive activities from the Army and

the Air Forces.

And the first activity for that group is the preparation of the environmental impact study. We are proceeding on that regard. We

have asked for funds in this budget request to support that.

We think that that will enable us to make the moves of the Marines to Guam, as well as some of the other activities, such as a

transient CVN berthing and other requirements that have been

asked for by both the Navy and the Army to be implemented. And

this will all enable us to use Guam in the more strategic sense that

you referred to earlier.

General CONWAY. And I would add, ma’am, that I think Guam

is going to be a centerpiece for our training in the Pacific. As you

know well, there are some training opportunities on the island, but

not sufficient for the numbers that would be there.

So I have met with my commander in the Pacific. He is developing what he would call the Twentynine Palms of the Pacific, which

would incorporate what is available on Guam but also what we

could do on some other island chains nearby. And it looks encouraging.

Ms. BORDALLO. Very good. I am very happy to hear that, because

we do work as a region, and some of the other islands have made

this request.

General CONWAY. Yes, ma’am.

Ms. BORDALLO. Also, I am encouraged—and I know this has been

discussed—about the LCS ships on Guam. At one time, the Navy

was considering basing some of them on the island.

I am concerned, however, about reports that the cost of these

ships will likely rise to—my figures here are $350 million to $400

million, compared to a much lower estimate initially.

Is Guam still being considered? Would you have to cut down the

order? I know it has been discussed, but I just wondered if you

have that information.

Admiral MULLEN. As was indicated earlier, ma’am, the LCS is

about 20 percent of the future ship-building plan, and it is still a

critical requirement for us. So my expectation is, obviously within

affordability constraints, is that the number 55 LCS is still out

there, and we need to move forward to try to achieve that goal.

30

We have worked various concepts of operations for where LCS’s

will operate, and the western Pacific certainly is one of those theaters that remains vital both to us as a Nation and, we think, to

the world and certainly our regional partners there.

And so, we would expect LCS, certainly, to operate there. We

haven’t made the final decision about where those ships are going

to be home-ported.

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you very much, Admiral.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from South Carolina, Mr. Wilson.

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And, Admiral, Mr. Secretary, General, thank you very much for

being here today.

I am very grateful. I have a son serving in the Navy. I am very

grateful that serving in my office several years ago is the late Colonel McLeod, a Marine, a very proud Marine. Indeed, I just feel like

we have got the best people serving in the Navy and Marine Corps

ever. And so, I am very, very grateful for the difference that you

all are making, protecting our country.

Additionally I am very grateful that I represent—I am very fortunate to represent Parris Island, the Marine Air Station, the

Beaufort Naval Hospital.

And, Mr. Secretary, we are looking forward to your visit. I can

assure you that the rose petals have been prepared. [Laughter.]

And so, it will be a very warm visit in a very beautiful and historic community of Beaufort.

As we look ahead, with the delay of the F–35 joint strike fighter,

it affects the Marines and Navy in different ways. With the Navy,

the shortage, in terms of aircraft for the carrier wings, is this going

to be made up by F–18s as an interim? How will this be addressed?

Admiral MULLEN. The short fall that we project right now, out

through the next 4 or 5 years, is about 50 strike fighters. And to

fill in that shortfall, we are going to buy more F–18E/Fs. The exact

profile—I mean, there is a program to do this right now. So we put

an additional 28 aircraft in our future-year defense plan in order

to start to get at and mitigate that shortfall.

We are also wearing them out at a rate about 30 percent higher

than we had expected to, which is why they are also in the supplemental request, because, obviously, at their expected service life,

they are going to go away. That said, I am encouraged by the early

results of a study to extend their life, to move them from 8,000

flight hours to 10,000 flight hours, which is another way to help

mitigate that shortfall.

In addition to—I need the F–35 as soon as we can get it.

So it is that balance that we are trying to hit, with all those factors in play.

General CONWAY. Sir, in our case, I think you know we have

skipped a generation, if you will. We have not bought the E and

the F. We waited for the arrival of the joint strike fighter. We, too,

have some risk in the out-years, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012 or so,

where we will be about 45 to 50 aircraft short. So any movement

of the JSF right puts us at even greater risk.

We are, as the admiral said, attempting to extend the life of the

F–18s that we do have to hopefully mitigate that some.

31

Mr. WILSON. And we are very pleased at the Marine Air Station;

it is a joint base, Navy-Marine. Has there been any determination

of where the F–35 Marine training facility will be?

General CONWAY. Not decided yet, sir. We are looking at various

options, as you might imagine. A number of factors come into it.

But we are still some ways out from making that determination

fully.

Mr. WILSON. Well, Beaufort comes to mind?

General CONWAY. Yes, sir, that is——

Mr. WILSON. And additionally, I have had the privilege of landing on the Abraham Lincoln, the George Washington, in a C–2

COD. That is a very memorable experience.

And what is the status, Mr. Secretary, of the C–2? Is it being replaced? Are more being built? What is the status?

Secretary WINTER. Sir, the C–2 COD replacement program is

currently scheduled, I believe, for several years out yet.

And, CNO, maybe you can comment on that.

I believe we are outside of the current planning period there. But

we have identified it.

Admiral MULLEN. It is a very important asset. We have struggled, over the last decade or so, getting it in the program and sustaining it because of the other aviation requirements that are

there.

One of my commitments over the next year or so is to, not unlike

we did in ship-building, is to get an aviation plan stabilized so, one,

people can depend on it, and also all-encompassing to these kind

of requirements, again, within the limits of affordability.

But the CODs are not young airplanes. And old airplanes, just

like old ships, take a lot of money and a lot of maintenance. And

clearly we are going to have to get this right for the future as well.

Mr. WILSON. And, again, I appreciate your service. And, as I visit

with the troops, all of us have gone to encourage them, but it really

is in reverse: They encourage us. And thank you very much for

your service.

I yield the balance of my time.

The CHAIRMAN. Before I call on the gentleman from Washington,

Mr. Larsen, I might say that it appears that we will be having two

votes shortly, one 15-minute vote, one 5-minute vote. And in the

event we don’t get everyone called upon, I would hope that our witnesses could stick around until everyone has that opportunity, because we are moving along quite rapidly today.

Mr. Larsen.

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And, recognizing the 5-minute rule, I will say: Investment in the

E–18G, good; P–8A, good. Marine Corps prepositioned Norway,

good. With a name like Larsen, I am glad to see you mention that

in your—I think that the Norway-U.S. relationship is a very important one.

So that is the quick headline.

For the secretary, obviously, we know you are going through this

decision on home-porting the Benson as it comes out, and I know

you met with my colleague from Washington state yesterday. And,

you know, a lot of people looking forward to that decision. If there

32

is any advice that you can continue to provide, all the communities

would appreciate taking it.

Now to a larger issue, and that is electronic warfare. And I have

got questions for the admiral and the general on this.

First off, General, I note that on the aircraft utilization rates,

hours per month, your program utilization for EA–6Bs is 29.6

hours and your actual utilization is 133.8 hours per month.

And then I also note that, at least from what I have seen, in your

planning timeline, your EA–6B platform is disappearing at some

point, but so far the Marine Corps hasn’t yet developed what they

are planning to do beyond that for an electronic warfare (EW) capability. And I was wondering if you could take a few moments to enlighten us a little bit about what you are planning to do with that.

General CONWAY. Sir, essentially what we have seen, starting

with OIF really, is that our EA–6B squadrons became a national

asset and were used very much in that regard. So that function of

Marine aviation is increasingly being centralized and done more

and more by Navy and Air Force. I think that they will come and

we will not have the organic capability.

Mr. LARSEN. You won’t—okay, well, then this makes it an even

more interesting question for Admiral Mullen. Because, currently

in OIF and OEF, the Navy is providing the E.W. capability not just

from the air but on the ground as well. And I think, in the future,

we may have a—not a conflict, but I know the Army is considering

developing a land-based E.W. capability for specific missions. Talking about it, thinking about it, but not quite—sounds like not quite

there to make a decision; still be relying on Navy.

How has the increased responsibilities for the Navy doing most

of the E.W. capability, land-based and air-based, how has it impacted the E.W. community? Would you say it is strained or not

strained?

Admiral MULLEN. I think the community—and when you use

that word, I think more of the people, that——

Mr. LARSEN. Yes.

Admiral MULLEN [continuing]. They are pushed, but their operational tempo is really pretty good. They are having a big impact.

Alongside the Marine Corps——

Mr. LARSEN. Huge impact.

Admiral MULLEN [continuing]. These squadrons are centralized,

and that the Navy and Marine Corps have the predominant capability for the Nation. And that is going to continue to be the case

for the future. That is why the roll-out of the Growler this year was

so important. These aircraft are beyond their service life, typically

about four years so far. So we have to move them forward in this

mission very carefully, and it is a really vital mission.

That is why we have asked for additional E–18Gs in the supplemental.

Mr. LARSEN. Right.

Admiral MULLEN. Because we need to replace these aircraft as

rapidly as possible.

Of concern to me is, beyond those aircraft that are required for

the naval assets, Navy and Marine Corps, is the national mission,

which is an increased number of aircraft overall, long term, that

we have not invested in yet. And there is a substantial investment

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that would be required to meet that, as the Navy and the Air Force

will provide this requirement over the long run.

Mr. LARSEN. I see the yellow light is on, so I will try to wrap up

here.

With regard to the Army—and I am not saying this, sort of,

against the Army at all. It is just that with the IED work, the

Navy is involved a lot with that obviously; the Army is getting

more and more involved and sort of developing their own organic

capability.

Can you comment on how that relationship is going and where

you think there might be——

Admiral MULLEN. Tremendous. We have had some 300 sailors

embedded with the ground units from the Prowler community,

from the surface community, from the submarine community. The

Ops that enlisted over the last year, we are relieving them now.

There isn’t a ground commander that doesn’t tell me, feed back to

me what an impact they have had in positively effecting saving

lives out there.

The Army is committed to stand this capability back up. They

are going to do that over the next two to three years. And I suspect

our requirement will be reduced, obviously, as they stand it up.

Mr. LARSEN. Just a quick note, and then I would like to at some

point then talk to you about whether there needs to be a joint service component for that. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Before I call on Ms. Drake, let me ask quickly:

Are you cutting back, Admiral, on flying hours for the Navy? Training flying hours?

Admiral MULLEN. Not overall, no, sir. My stressed airframes, P–

3s, I am managing each airframe by literally hours——

The CHAIRMAN. That is not what I am asking.

Admiral MULLEN. No, sir. We are not.

The CHAIRMAN. The Air Force is drawing down its personnel so

they can invest more in assets—I think that is the way they frame

it—things, physical things. Are you seeking a draw-down of any

personnel?

Admiral MULLEN. Mr. Chairman, you and I have talked about

this before. We are in our fourth year of about 10,000 a year. We

have come down about—so that, at the end of 2007, this year, we

will have come down about 40,000. We are requesting to come

down about another 12,000 and then level off, basically, shortly

after that.

So I am comfortable with that draw-down. That clearly has created resources. That isn’t why we did it originally, to create resources so we could buy things. We really thought it was the right

thing to do.

And, in fact, because of the cost of people, which I think is a

huge challenge for all of us, I haven’t really taken the resources

that have come from the budget, which is over $5 billion, and

bought anything with it. In fact, my people costs are still going up

very gradually. And that is a big concern that I have, near-term

and far-term.

The CHAIRMAN. Would that level-out show that kind of——

34

Admiral MULLEN. Yes, sir, that will level out in the next two to

three years. We will level out somewhere between 320,000, 325,000

active duty, uniformed sailors. There is a commensurate level-out

on the reserve side.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Ms. Drake.

Mrs. DRAKE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral Mullen, first I want to say to you that about two weeks

ago I had the opportunity to talk to a Navy lieutenant who is assigned to the Theodore Roosevelt, serving in Iraq, working on the

reconstruction team.

And what he told me in our conversation, which was just absolutely incredible—and crystal-clear cell phone reception, which surprised me—was about something called Iraq First, and how we are

employing Iraqi companies and Iraqis first before they make other

decisions. And that is not what we hear. And I wanted to thank

you for that.

And I think Congressman Wilson is exactly right, that he may

have been surprised to get a call from a Member of Congress, but

it was me that was really encouraged by the call and to hear what

he is doing. So thank you for that.

My question goes to Secretary Winter.

You are aware that Virginia Beach has recently signed a memorandum of understanding to set forth principles with which the

Navy can respond to development around Oceana. That memorandum of understanding clearly gives the Navy a seat at the table in

the development process. And it also follows up on the joint landuse study, which ensures very early Navy participation and prohibits any new incompatible use in the APZ–1 in the Clear Zone.

There are also financial incentives and a commitment of $15 million annually.

I think this is a very serious long-term commitment to Oceana.

And given this very significant effort on the part of Virginia Beach

and the Commonwealth of Virginia, can you give citizens of Virginia Beach and Navy personnel that are stationed at Oceana an

assurance that these efforts will satisfy the needs of the Navy?

Secretary WINTER. Well, ma’am, we are very appreciative of the

work that has been done to date. We appreciate the opportunity to

engage through the memorandum of understanding (MOU) process

that you just described. We are looking forward to working with

the local communities and the commonwealth to continue to help

manage that activity.

And we trust that if that activity continues to be as successful

as people hope it will be, that we should be in a very good position

for a long-term relationship there.

Mrs. DRAKE. Good. That is very good. Thank you.

And my second question is about, about a year ago the Naval Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC) was set up with 15 people

at Little Creek to train, organize and equip expeditionary forces.

Today the NECC forces are deployed around the world and certainly playing a major role in Afghanistan and Iraq.

I believe the NECC is a success. So I wondered if you could share

your observations concerning the NECC and tell us how we can

better support this command to meet future requirements.

35

Secretary WINTER. Well, ma’am, I actually would like to hand

that over to CNO, if you would permit, because——

Mrs. DRAKE. That is fine.

Secretary WINTER [continuing]. I think the major advantages of

NECC are operational in nature and really have afforded us the

opportunity to integrate and coalesce all the relevant components

that are operating overseas on our behalf.

Mrs. DRAKE. And I would also tell Admiral Mullen that I visited

Admiral Bullard this week and had a tour of what they are doing.

Admiral MULLEN. Thank you, ma’am. First of all, I would just

like to say thanks for your support on the Oceana issue. I know

you have been a very, very strong supporter in getting this right,

and very consistent in your message. And I just echo what the secretary said, in terms of——

Mrs. DRAKE. Thank you.

Admiral MULLEN [continuing]. The commitments, as these things

continue to go well.

NECC is a very important new command tied to the world that

we are facing now and I think we are going to face for the next

couple decades. It also provides an organization train-and-equip for

our explosive ordnance people, for our naval coastal warfare, for

our Seabees, for our security forces, in addition to our riverine

force.

So when you talk with Admiral Bullard, he is commanding somewhere around 35,000 sailors right now. And the Navy wasn’t organized to do this in the past. This is a big adjustment for us. But

it gives us an ability to focus, provide resources, make sure that

big Navy, as well as the Navy on the waterfront, is focused to make

sure we can meet this capability for the future.

And, as you said, they are deployed all over the world. I am concerned, in the case of the explosive ordnance personnel, about their

OPTEMPO. They are in the fight every day. They are the ones that

are out there before anybody else to see if there is an IED out there

and then defusing it before anybody goes on the road, as an example.

So there has been a tremendously positive step forward in this

area and one that I think is really relevant for the future. And it

has been well-supported, as all things Navy are, in Norfolk and Little Creek.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Johnson.

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

It is indeed a poor cow that can’t lick its own calf. And in that

regard, certainly we must have a military that is capable of protecting this country and its assets and its ability to positively influence policy around the globe. And so, I want to thank you for the

work that you do in order to help us perform our constitutional

duty, which is to provide for the common defense.

And it is my great pleasure to serve on this committee, to help

America remain strong and free.

And of course the Navy helps us keep our shipping lanes free,

so that we can protect against any aggression that may occur, and

also provides us with the global reach to be able to project our

power around this great earth.

36

And the Marines are our shock troops, to go in, it is kind of like

the battering ram, and meet the threat head-on.

Now, what I would like to know today is, specifically General

Conway, what types of injuries are we seeing predominantly as a

result of the current wars in Iraq and Afghanistan?

General CONWAY. Sir, we would say that the signature weapon

that the enemy is using is the improvised explosive device. I think,

as a result of that, a lot of the wounds that we see are concussionrelated, as Congressman Cummings talked about. We do have a lot

of head injuries, traumatic brain injuries, and that manner of

thing.

We see unconsciousness a lot, even when there is no other injury

on the part of the Marines or sailors that may be in the vehicles

or when they are struck on the ground.

We also see amputations. We have a goodly number of those.

I would say, though, just so there is a clear understanding, that

the Navy medical support that the Marines, in particular, receive

in the field is just tremendous. For every 11 Marines that are hit,

one will be killed. And of the remaining ten, seven will be returned

to duty.

And those that do survive very serious injuries do so with the

quality of care on the part of a corpsman, a young corpsman that

may be little more than 21, 22 years old, that I think used to be

provided by doctors. And I have heard that said again and again,

that this Marine would not have survived had it not been for that

brave and able corpsman on the scene.

Mr. JOHNSON. Once the person is damaged by the traumatic

brain injury, if you will, they may also suffer some post-traumatic

stress disorder as well, and even those who have not been injured

can suffer post-traumatic stress as well. Are you seeing a large increase in the numbers of post-traumatic stress disorders?

General CONWAY. Sir, I wouldn’t say it is a large increase. I

think it happens with every major conflict.

We are aware that we have Marines suffering from it. We are

taking every measure to try to diagnose it, understand it and treat

it, even to the extent where we are sending people now into theater, so that they are there alongside the Marines at their base and

station to examine.

The Navy is looking at a baseline program which will help us to

determine, even if an individual isn’t willing to admit it, that he

doesn’t test the same way he did before he was, perhaps, subjected

to a blast or a concussion.

So we are taking every step that we can to try to get these young

men and, in some cases, women back in battery as soon as we can.

Mr. JOHNSON. Now, once a person suffered from post-traumatic

stress disorder or a close-to-head injury, a blast injury, and they

exit the Army or they exit the armed services, they don’t receive

free medical care at that point like they do when they were enlisted, is that correct?

General CONWAY. Sir, through the Veterans Administration, they

can continue to get a level of medical care. We will document, of

course, the nature of their injury, and if it has resulted in a discharge or that type of thing, there is a hand-off there that takes

place, and they can continue to get treatment.

37

Mr. JOHNSON. Often, though, the treatment is not without cost

to them, is that correct?

General CONWAY. Yes, sir, that is fair.

Mr. JOHNSON. And so, they have various deductibles that they

must then come forward with themselves, in addition to actually

trying to get to the location where they can be treated.

Are we doing all that we can do to take care of our veterans,

with respect to health care?

General CONWAY. Sir, I think the answer is, yes, we are doing

all that we can. I think we can still do more. But within the confines of where we are now—I don’t know if you were here earlier

when the question was raised and we talked about an assessment

that the secretary of the Navy has directed to examine further just

where the weak linkages may be and how we can improve.

Mr. JOHNSON. All right. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Johnson.

We have one member left, and we do have two votes. I assume,

from indications, that no one else wants to take a second round,

so you can clean up, Mr. Sestak. You are recognized for five minutes.

Mr. SESTAK. Thank you, sir.

Admiral, Mr. Secretary, General, I apologize, I wasn’t here for all

of it, particularly for the Department of the Navy’s testimony. I

had an appointment with my daughter at Children’s Hospital. My

apologies.

Question, Admiral Mullen: There has been a significant reduction in aircraft procurement, Navy (APN) compared to last year.

Between 2008 and 2011, we have taken out 125 aircraft. I gather

that is to support the S.C. and the ship-building account. We have

placed in the GWOT supplemental 43 aircraft, including, you know,

the Prowlers and the F–18s and anti-submarine helicopters.

I know we have had some latitude of how we interpret what is

for the global war on terror, but do you think this is the appropriate place to place these? Or does it help you permit to take some

of the pressure off of the base budget that you have to undergo by

putting this in the GWOT?

Sir, if you don’t mind?

Admiral MULLEN. I think it is a great question. It is one, as I

know you know, it is one of trying to balance everything to get it

right.

I think it is probably too harsh to say it is a direct result of the

SCN plan. And clearly we have worked to balance those two. I am

committed this year to try to get stability in the APN plan, not unlike what we have put in place in the SCN plan.

Maybe a little different perspective is if I go back to the 2003

budget, when we had 83 airplanes in the APN plan. We are at 188

this year. We are 40 more airplanes, I think it is 40 more airplanes, this year than we bought last year.

And so, the ramp is up. It is not up as rapidly as we would like

it to be, and it does get to the heart of the shortfall, the strike

fighter shortfall, which we also talked a little bit about earlier.

We are wearing them out——

Mr. SESTAK. I am sorry, I don’t mean to interrupt. But do you

think this is the appropriate place to place those 45 air——

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Admiral MULLEN. We are wearing them out pretty quickly, and

we are wearing them out in Prowlers; we are clearly wearing them

out in Iraq and Afghanistan. And actually, even the Hornets, you

know, most of our support is there. So that is a factor of wearing

out aircraft we can’t replace.

Mr. SESTAK. Sir, in steaming hours, last year you came in at 36

steaming hours per quarter. I gather potentially you were going to

make it up in the supplemental. This year you have come in at 45

steaming hours per quarter for deployed units and state that the

rest of it will come from the supplemental.

We historically have operated, or the DON has, at 51 days per

quarter. Wouldn’t you historically just operate at 51 days anyway?

And is the appropriate use of GWOT funding?

Admiral MULLEN. Part of the reason that we came in so low last

year and obviously moved it up this year was that we looked at

where we were steaming and what we were doing. And, in fact, our

deployed steaming days were in the 60’s and the 70’s. And in the

overall program, both the 36—and we probably went to low—but

the 45 is the same thing, just trying to balance on these.

And the last thing in the world I want to do is try to game the

supplemental in that regard. What we find ourselves doing is we

are steaming an awful lot while deployed.

Mr. SESTAK. Mr. Secretary, I probably already missed this question, but just one more, CNO. The ADS, advanced deployable system, you stated we have canceled that in the budget, at calculated

risk, and stated that we will rely upon more traditional systems,

platform systems.

This is a change from the anti-submarine warfare (ASW) concept

of operations of a few years ago, particularly with China now, by

the end of next year, having 28 or 29 modern submarines—the

same amount of submarines, if not more, total that we have. And

with submarines at $2 billion and this platform, is this a significant change for the Navy?

And, if so, if we are relying upon systems that have been sufficient in the past—that were sufficient in the past, now in the future, why did we go after this ADS and other systems then?

Admiral MULLEN. It isn’t a significant change, in terms of where

we are headed. We still need distributed systems. We need remote

censors. We need the kind of queuing that I know you are familiar

with in order to make this overall concept work.

What we found in the ADS in particular is it wasn’t ready, technically really challenging, and very expensive.

Mr. SESTAK. So the other systems of distribution——

Admiral MULLEN. Yes, sir. The other systems are still working

and for the future.

Mr. SESTAK. Thank you.

Mr. Secretary, the last question: To some degree, there has always been just a conspiracy of optimism. We always hope that

things are going to be well-done. CBO has said that the cost of the

ship-building program of 30 years will be one-third higher than its

projected. That is $4 billion to $5 billion more per year. To some

degree, we are already facing this pressure by taking amphibious

assault ship replacement (LHAR) out in fiscal year 2010, and we

face this in the LCS overruns.

39

Are we facing a realistic budget that we really do think we are going to be able, at the procurement, a budget of $14.5 billion per

year—that CBO projection that it will be 35 percent higher. We are

already taken a $3.5 billion ship out. Is that realistic?

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead and answer the question.

Secretary WINTER. Sir, I think that that is a matter that we are

going to be looking at very carefully here in the aftermath of LCS.

One of the critical issues that I need to understand is how much

of this is really associated with lead ship-related activities and how

much is more tied to production-related aspects. And that is something we will be getting at here shortly.

Mr. SESTAK. Thank you very much.

I am sorry I went over.

The CHAIRMAN. I might say something to my friend from Pennsylvania, that the spirit of optimism pervades all of the services,

and, in many cases, that is a very, very good thing. Thank you for

mentioning it.

Secretary Winter, Admiral Mullen, General Conway, we appreciate you being with us. We are going to be able to make our vote.

And you thoroughly answered our questions, and we will proceed

from here. Thank you.

And we are adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 11:39 a.m., the committee was adjourned.]

A P P E N D I X

MARCH 1, 2007

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QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE

RECORD

MARCH 1, 2007

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MCKEON

Mr. MCKEON. Admiral, I note that you have listed $96M for Critical ASW Enhancements as the 4th of 20 items on your FY 2008 Unfunded Programs List. Can

you describe for me the importance of unmanned surface vessels, operated from the

Littoral Combat Ship and other surface combatants, to distributed anti-submarine

warfare?

Admiral MULLEN. Unmanned surface vehicles are an important feature of the

Navy’s future ASW concepts for three reasons. First, unmanned surface vehicles

allow the use of passive as well as active bistatic/multistatic systems to establish

detection of the target submarine while separating the active acoustic source from

the manned Navy platform. Other surface combatants could also be the passive receiver for these active sources. Second, by deploying multiple offboard vehicles, the

host ship can search a larger ocean area than would be possible with hull mounted

sensors. Finally, the relatively long endurance time of the unmanned surface vehicles dovetail with the availability of aerial ‘‘pouncers’’ like the SH–60B/F/R.

Mr. MCKEON. Admiral, you may know that a large part of the China Lake Naval

Base is in my district. I was happy to see the results of the BRAC legislation which

enacted, among other things, China Lake as a Center of Excellence (COE) for Weapons and Armaments research, development, acquisition, testing for the Navy while

also establishing similar Centers for the Army and Air Force. I am especially

pleased because of what it portends for greater efficiencies and the potential for

these three centers to work together toward joint service solutions. I am anxious to

learn how the implementation of the China Lake COE is progressing, understanding

that the USAF and USA Weapons and Armaments COEs are moving forward. Will

you please provide me with an update on the progress of the implementation as set

forth by the BRAC Commission, and also comment on the Navy’s view of the BRAC

legislation relative to the China Lake COE? Will you please also include an estimate

of when the Navy might start to realize the efficiencies that BRAC will bring?

Admiral MULLEN. The Department of the Navy (DON) submitted the Naval Integrated Weapons & Armaments Research, Development, Test & Evaluation Center

(Tech 15) plan to the Office of the Secretary of Defense on 5 April 2007 for approval.

A summary paper will be provided after the plan is approved. DON believes the

technical synergy created by this recommendation will be invaluable.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. TAUSCHER

Ms. TAUSCHER. The Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (Aegis BMD) is one of the

most promising missile defense capabilities. a. Could you provide us an update on

the status of your current plans for upgrading Aegis ships to conduct missile defense

operations?

Admiral MULLEN. The Missile Defense Agency is committed to fund 18 Ballistic

Missile Defense (BMD) capable ships (15 destroyers and three cruisers) by 2009.

The Navy’s Destroyer Modernization Program is funded to provide BMD capability

for the remaining 47 destroyers. Two destroyers will begin modernization in FY12,

and three destroyers will be upgraded each following year. BMD capability for the

remaining 19 cruisers is not funded. Adding BMD capability for the remaining

cruisers is under consideration for POM–10.

Ms. TAUSCHER. All Aegis BMD-capable ships are currently deployed in the Pacific.

a. Given the emerging missile threat from Iran, have you given any thought to assigning Aegis BMD-capable ships to CENTCOM on a regular basis? b. Does the

Navy currently have enough Aegis BMD-capable ships to meet all of its requirements over the next 5–10 years? c. Could that Navy use more resources to upgrade

additional Aegis ships?

Admiral MULLEN. (a) There are currently seven BMD-capable ships available for

deployment to any theater of operation. The Missile Defense Agency provides funding for 15 destroyers and three cruisers to be completed by FY 2009. Based on the

demands of our combatant commanders, the Navy carefully considers where these

multi-mission platforms are employed. Iran is certainly a growing concern.

164

(b) The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) will modify a total of 15 destroyers and

three cruisers by 2009. The Navy’s Destroyer Modernization Program is funded to

provide BMD capability to the remaining 47 destroyers beginning in FY12. The requirement for BMD capability for the remaining 19 cruisers is unfunded and is

under consideration for POM–10.

(c) Additional ship capacity provides increased flexibility to operational commanders. The Missile Defense Agency’s (MDA) resources provided in the President’s

budget will upgrade a total of 18 Aegis ships for Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD),

including two destroyers in the Atlantic Fleet. Future war fighting requirements are

uncertain; however, the addition of 19 BMD capable Aegis cruisers to the 18 Aegis

ships provided by MDA and the 47 destroyers programmed in the Destroyer Modernization Program is being considered in POM–10.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA

Ms. DAVIS. I have had some concerns about the battalion aid stations at Camp

Pendleton. And so, I would just ask you to take a look at that.

One of the concerns is that the corpsmen there do not have access to the technology that they need to track many of the Marines there. And the other concern

is that they are using Marine Corps dollars as opposed to Navy medical dollars to

treat many of the folks there.

General CONWAY. Based on input we compiled from a recent installation data call,

the Marine Corps has action underway on several fronts. For the near term, HQMC

developed minimum habitability standards and directed that our operational commanders and installations take immediate action to ensure these standards are met.

If they cannot be met, the facility is to be closed. Installations are to report back

no later than 30 June of this year that each BAS/RAS has met these standards or

has been closed. These standards include but are not limited to requirements for

clean and freshly painted surfaces, floors in good structural repair and well maintained, mechanical systems in good operating order, sufficient lighting, regularly

scheduled field day and solid waste disposal, exam room privacy, waiting areas that

are separated from the examination rooms, clean and operational windows with

proper window treatments, sufficient ‘‘double lock’’ storage for medical records, doors

with properly functioning hardware, sufficient fire suppression equipment/smoke detectors with documented evidence of routine inspection, and furnishings that comply

with basic infection control by being clean, functional and in reasonable repair.

Funding is in place at the operational unit level and at our installations to take necessary corrective actions to meet these standards.

We are also translating recently developed medical standards for the level of care

that is to be provided within a BAS/RAS into basic facilities criteria to support this

level of care. These criteria define the square footage, configuration, special requirements, mechanical systems, etc. necessary to support the number of Marines assigned. These criteria will be used to assess whether sufficient capacity and quality

of facilities are available to support these units, and where not, provide the necessary information to develop corrective projects. In addition, we are revising our

facility coding process to provide BASs/RASs with a unique facility identifier, which

will allow better tracking of the condition of these facilities. We expect these efforts

to be completed this fiscal year. These criteria and unique identifiers will allow us

to ensure the appropriate priority is assigned to corrective projects for these facilities and that we programmatically address overall requirements through our minor

construction and, if necessary, the Military Construction Program.

Finally, a recent revision to the Manual of the Medical Department delineating

Navy Medicine’s funding responsibilities for garrison care was signed by the Surgeon General of the Navy on May 16, 2007. Establishing both the medical standards

and the fiscal responsibilities, this revision has allowed USMC and USN Health

Services and Facilities organizations to develop facilities criteria for aid stations

that when combined with the medical standards can be incorporated into inspection

protocols used by the Inspector General and other oversight organizations to validate routine compliance.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MILLER

Mr. MILLER. The F–35 Joint Strike Fighter procurement plan has shifted so far

to the right that there is a real danger that we will not have enough carrier air

wings to match up with our carriers in the middle of the next decade. What is the

plan? Are you going to ramp up the F/A–18 production line? Where does the delay

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of the F–35 leave the Marine Corps, which never transitioned to the F/A–18 from

the F/A–14 Tomcats?

Secretary WINTER and Admiral MULLEN. Inventory reductions stemming from the

USN/USMC TACAIR Integration; F/A–18/A/B/C/D service life limits, the 2004 Joint

Strike Fighter (JSF) program replan, and lowered JSF procurement ramps have

combined to create a Department of the Navy (DoN) strike-fighter shortfall that exists today and possibly extends through 2020.

The USMC shortfall peaks in 2013, and is a result of service life limitation and

attrition of the F/A–18D and AV–8B airframes. The USMC shortfall is being minimized by prioritizing Short Take-Off & Vertical Landing (STOVL) JSF in the early

Low-Rate Initial Production (LRIP) buys to maintain the Initial Operational Capability (IOC) of 2012.

Navy’s shortfall is projected to peak in 2018. The depth and breadth of that shortfall is directly related to the JSF recapitalization plan and legacy F/A–18A/C service

life predictions. The strike-fighter shortfall range varies depending on these recapitalization rates and service life limitations.

To begin mitigating the shortfall, the Fiscal Year (FY) 2008 budget procures 28

additional F/A–18E/F above the FY07 Appropriations Bill in FYs 2010–2012. This

investment will also keep the F/A–18E/F production line open and provide DoN with

options during a more informed POM–10 decision process.

The F/A–18A/B/C/D Hornet service life assessment program is due to complete in

December 2007. Results of this effort will better define the shortfall and support required adjustments to F/A–18E/F and JSF procurement plans, while ensuring DoN

provides the capacity and capabilities desired by component commanders.

Mr. MILLER. How will the delay of BRAC 2005 FY07 funding impact Navy BRAG

execution?

Secretary WINTER and Admiral MULLEN. Department of the Navy (DON) has received approximately $297M out of a budget request of $690M. If the FY07 supplemental request for $3.1B is approved, DON would expect to receive an additional

$393M, which would fully fund the BRAG 05 FY07 program.

Impacts if additional funding is not received:

• BRAC construction projects will be disproportionately affected. $565M (81%) of

the BRAC 05 PB 07 program is for planning, design and execution of construction projects. There are forty-nine construction projects scheduled for contract

award this fiscal year.

• Without the full program amount for FY07, savings already programmed, that

are intended to support BRAG implementation, will be delayed or possibly not

realized.

• May impact September 15, 2011 statutory deadline.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. KLINE

Mr. KLINE. What are the costs associated with the Wounded Warrior regiment?

Will additional funding be required and requested?

General CONWAY. Initial stand up costs for the wounded warrior regiment will be

approximately $61M in FY08 primarily due to new MILCON projects. Daily operational costs for the command and its facilities will be about $7.2M annually. The

Marine Corps has incorporated these costs into its baseline funding requests. No unfunded requirements have been identified at this time.

$Million FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11 FY12 FY13

MILCON $56.0

O&M

FSRM $2.1 $2.1 $2.1 $2.1

CIVPAY $0.5 $1.5 $1.5 $1.6 $1.6 $1.6 $1.6

Contracts/Supplies/TAD $2.9 $2.9 $2.9 $3.0 $3.0 $3.0 $3.0

Collateral Equipment $4.8

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$Million FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11 FY12 FY13

NMCI $0.4 $0.6 $0.4 $0.5 $0.5 $0.5

O&M—Total $3.4 $4.8 $9.8 $7.1 $7.2 $7.2 $7.2

Total All Appn $3.4 $60.8 $9.8 $7.1 $7.2 $7.2 $7.2

Mr. KLINE. In your written testimony, you discuss the goal of achieving a 1:2 deployment-to-dwell ratio. For the Marine Corps, this translates to seven months deployed, fourteen months at home station. What was the deployment-to-dwell ratio

prior to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and since the commencement of

combat operations in Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom?

General CONWAY. Prior to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks the Marine

Corps maintained a deployment-to-dwell ratio of 1:3. This allowed us to conduct all

necessary field training and still provide our Marines with two months in their

home residence for each one month away from home.

Dwell since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks varies by unit type but in

aggregation reflects an approximate 1:1.5 deployment to dwell over the entire period.

Mr. KLINE. In Section III, ‘‘Resetting the force and preparing for the next contingency,’’ you discuss the high optempo’s, the high utilization rates for both ground

and aviation equipment, and the high mission capable rates for that deployed equipment. As you note in that testimony, the cost of these high mission capable rates

is ‘‘a decrease in non-deployed unit readiness.’’ What are the current readiness levels of non-deployed (i.e., those units at home station) units?

General CONWAY. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the

committee files.]

Mr. KLINE. How much money was allocated specifically for recruitment advertising in FY 2006 and FY 2007? What has been budgeted for advertising in FY 2008

(to include the supplemental funding)?

General CONWAY.

3CIF

OMMC 2006 2007 2008

BASELINE

Recruiting 69,808 63,948 82,196

Advertising 44,584 44,935 59,182

Total 114,392 108,883 141,378

SUPP

Recruiting 13,569 20,253 25,139

Advertising 14,742 38,205 19,048

Total 28,311 58,458 44,187

4A6G

OMMCR

BASELINE

Recruiting 3,187 3,149 3,397

Advertising 4,726 4,815 5,293

Total 7,913 7,964 8,690

SUPP

Recruiting 60

Advertising 0

Total 60 0 0

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MRS. DRAKE

Mrs. DRAKE. Mr. Secretary, as you know, the Navy is in the process of conducting

an Environmental Impact Statement to study the feasibility of stationing additional

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surface ships and/or a nuclear aircraft carrier at Naval Station, Mayport, FL. The

Quadrennial Defense Review and the retirement of the Kitty Hawk will begin the

movement of aircraft carriers and submarines to the Pacific. Considering the large

military construction bill that faces us on the West Coast and in places such as

Guam, do you believe the threat and the cost of building new nuclear infrastructure

merits such an investment at this time?

Secretary WINTER. The Navy is very sensitive to the full impact of any change

in force structure. In addition to environmental concerns addressed in the Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) process, we take into account numerous other important factors when developing a complete assessment of any such changes. These

factors include national security requirements, strategic positioning of our ships,

force posture adjustments in accordance with the QDR, existing capabilities, total

cost and other programmatic implications, impact on sailors and their families, and

the effect on local economies. These and other considerations help to form a complete and total plan that will guide any force structure decisions.

For Naval Station Mayport, the Navy has undertaken this EIS to ensure that we

continue to effectively support Fleet operational requirements through the most efficient utilization of this base in the future and to evaluate the potential

enviromnental impacts on Mayport for each of the ship homeporting alternatives

that are under consideration.

The Navy is being both environmentally and fiscally responsible in awaiting the

conclusion of the EIS, with a Record of Decision expected in January 2009, to add

to the body of knowledge before making any specific recommendations for force

structure changes.

Mrs. DRAKE. Mr. Secretary, in FY07, Congress authorized and appropriated $13.5

million dollars to construct the first phase of a much-needed headquarters facility

for the Joint Forces Command. As you know, the Military Quality of Life Bill was

not completed last year. Today, Joint Forces Command has the Service’s lead role

in transformation. It serves a pivotal role in experimentation, modeling and simulation and joint training. As the Executive Agent for Joint Forces Command, what is

the Navy’s plan to ensure the warfighters have a modern headquarters that meets

the requirements and demands of Joint Forces Command’s mission?

Secretary WINTER. The P839 Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) Headquarters

Building is included as a priority in the Department of the Navy project list for consideration and rationalization in the next budget cycle. Joint Forces Command’s requirements are being evaluated with respect to other competing priorities and funding, and will be addressed with the rest of the Navy shore infrastructure requirements.

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