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37–317 2008

[H.A.S.C. No. 110–31]

THE POSTURE OF THE U.S. STRATEGIC

COMMAND (USSTRATCOM)

HEARING

BEFORE THE

STRATEGIC FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

HEARING HELD

MARCH 8, 2007

(II)

STRATEGIC FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE

ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California, Chairman

JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina

SILVESTRE REYES, Texas

RICK LARSEN, Washington

JIM COOPER, Tennessee

HANK JOHNSON, Georgia

DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa

TERRY EVERETT, Alabama

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas

MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama

ERYN ROBINSON, Professional Staff Member

KARI BINGEN, Professional Staff Member

JASON HAGADORN, Staff Assistant

(III)

C O N T E N T S

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS

2007

Page

HEARING:

Thursday, March 8, 2007, The Posture of the U.S. Strategic Command

(USSTRATCOM) .................................................................................................. 1

APPENDIX:

Thursday, March 8, 2007 ........................................................................................ 35

THURSDAY, MARCH 8, 2007

THE POSTURE OF THE U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND (USSTRATCOM)

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Everett, Hon. Terry, a Representative from Alabama, Ranking Member, Strategic Forces Subcommittee .................................................................................. 4

Tauscher, Hon. Ellen O., a Representative from California, Chairman, Strategic Forces Subcommittee ..................................................................................... 1

WITNESSES

Cartwright, Gen. James E., Commander, U.S. Strategic Command ................... 5

APPENDIX

PREPARED STATEMENTS:

Cartwright, Gen. James E. .............................................................................. 39

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD:

[There were no Documents submitted.]

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD:

Mr. Everett ........................................................................................................ 69

Ms. Tauscher ..................................................................................................... 61

(1)

THE POSTURE OF THE U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND

(USSTRATCOM)

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, STRATEGIC FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE, Washington, DC, Thursday, March 8, 2007.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:02 p.m., in room

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ellen Tauscher (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, STRATEGIC

FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE

Ms. TAUSCHER. The hearing will come to order.

First, before we begin the hearing, I would like to acknowledge

the presence of our distinguished Ranking Member, Mr. Everett of

Alabama.

And I know that I am speaking not only for myself and my family, but my constituents in California and the American people. We

want to wish our condolences to Mr. Everett for the tragedy that

occurred in his district when the tornado struck just last week resulting in the loss of his constituents and friends from his constituency. And we want to offer him our condolences, and condolences

to the families in his constituency.

Mr. EVERETT. And I thank my friend and colleague.

And thank you for your remarks, General Cartwright.

And the other colleagues in the Congress that have mentioned it,

thank you.

Ms. TAUSCHER. Today, the Strategic Forces Subcommittee meets

to receive testimony from General James Cartwright, Commander

of United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM).

General, thank you, again, for being here.

This hearing is an important opportunity for the subcommittee

to consider the posture of our Nation’s strategic forces. Nuclear

weapons have and will continue to play a central role in deterring

threats to the United States and our allies.

However, today, we face significant choices on the role and size

of our strategic forces to meet evolving threats from nation states

and terrorist groups.

We also have to consider new threats to our space assets and

cyber-systems, particularly in light of China’s recent anti-satellite

(ASAT) test. It is imperative that our military capabilities adapt to

these new threats and address possible vulnerabilities.

General Cartwright, I am grateful that you agreed to appear

here today to discuss these matters. Your service to our country is

2

second to none. As STRATCOM Commander, you have one of the

broadest job descriptions in the military.

STRATCOM merged with U.S. Space Command in 2002 and, just

a year later, was assigned four additional mission areas: global

strike; missile defense integration; information operations; and

global command, control, communications, computers, intelligence,

surveillance, and reconnaissance. Like you, my concern is to ensure

that all of these missions and tools fit together seamlessly.

Since 9/11, U.S. strategic posture has changed significantly. The

Bush Administration’s Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), released in

2002, proposed a change in paradigm from the Cold-War nuclear

TRIAD of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarinelaunched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and bombers to a new TRIAD

composed of both nuclear and non-nuclear offensive-strike systems,

both active and passive defenses, and responsive infrastructure.

The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), completed in 2006,

built upon these changes by calling for a wider range of non-kinetic

and conventional strike capabilities while maintaining a robust nuclear deterrent.

A conventional global strike capability that can hold fleeting targets anywhere in the world at risk is a powerful concept. But there

are a number of important questions that need to be answered before moving forward with any particular program.

Specifically, in last year’s defense authorization bill, Congress expressed concerns about the proposed Conventional Trident Modification Program’s concept of operations (CONOPS) and assurance

strategy.

General, I would be interested in hearing your views on the

issues raised by the Congress in the fiscal year 2007 Defense Authorization Act.

I strongly believe that we a need a public debate on the nature

of strategic deterrence and the role of nuclear weapons.

General, as you know, I believe that finding ways to prevent the

spread and possible use of nuclear technology, material and weapons is at least important as the future of the nuclear arsenal. And

I know you recognize that these two issues are intimately connected.

Today, I would like to hear your perspective on how we will ensure strategic stability in the future and prevent nuclear terrorism.

Finally, I would be interested in your thoughts on how we might

expand the public debate on these issues.

One of the key issues before us today involves the nuclear arsenal, and it is called the Reliable Replacement Warhead Program

(RRW). While the recently announced RRW proposal would not—

would not—have new military characteristics—and I do not consider it to be a new weapon—I am still seeking more information

about this program.

We must ask, first and foremost, do we really need a significant

modernization of our existing nuclear capabilities, particularly in

light of the recent plutonium ageing study which found that plutonium pits have a lifespan of 85 years or more.

In particular, what current or planned programs would be foregone as a result of RRW? Will the reliability improvements promised by RRW allow us to significantly reduce the size of our nuclear

3

arsenal? Will it require live testing of the nuclear component of the

weapon? Will the RRW program ultimately reduce production costs

within the nuclear weapons complex?

And I would also like to know how you believe the recent plutonium-ageing study will impact plans for and the cost of the pit facility.

These are the types of in-depth questions we will be asking in

the days ahead.

While a great deal of attention has been paid to RRW recently,

Congress has made no decision to build RRW, nor will we make a

decision in this budget year. A baseline design has been selected

for further study. Only after detailed design work, and development of a cost, scope and schedule plan, will Congress face the decision to proceed to engineering work. Nonetheless, I look forward

to hearing your perspective on the Reliable Replacement Warhead

program.

Another aspect of our strategic posture which needs attention are

threats to our space-based assets and infrastructure, the recent

Chinese ASAT test being the case in point.

It is my understanding that you believe that the most important

action we can take now is to expand our Space Situational Awareness (SSA) capabilities. I am concerned these activities have not received the appropriate consideration and resources in the past, due

to emphasis on rapid deployment of transformational space platforms, such as Space Radar and Transformational Satellite (TSAT)

Communications.

General, I would be interested in your thoughts about the level

of resources required to improve our Space Situational Awareness

capabilities.

I have similar concerns with regard to missile defense. I believe

the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) has been too focused on research and development (R&D) activities at the expense of meeting

our near-term requirements for our warfighters. One of my key priorities as chairman is to ensure that our Nation’s warfighters receive the capabilities they need to successfully conduct global missile defense operations.

In January 2002, then-Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld exempted

the Missile Defense Agency from the traditional Department of Defense (DOD) requirement process, which effectively removed the

warfighter from playing a major role in the development of the missile defense system.

STRATCOM and the Missile Defense Agency have sought to correct this problem through the creation of the Warfighter Involvement Program, which I was briefed on recently.

General Cartwright, I am interested in hearing your thoughts as

to whether you are satisfied with the current role that STRATCOM

and other combatant commanders are playing in decisions affecting

the missile defense development process and future force structure.

With that, General Cartwright, I would also like to thank you,

again, for being here today, and I look forward to your testimony.

Let me, right now, recognize my very good friend and colleague,

the distinguished Ranking Member, Mr. Everett.

Mr. Everett.

4

STATEMENT OF HON. TERRY EVERETT, A REPRESENTATIVE

FROM ALABAMA, RANKING MEMBER, STRATEGIC FORCES

SUBCOMMITTEE

Mr. EVERETT. Thank you very much, and I appreciate the earlier

words from my chairman and friend.

First and foremost, I would like to echo the chairman’s comments

and thank General Cartwright for appearing before us today. We

have had several opportunities this year to meet with you, and we

appreciate each time you come back.

We also know that you have a staff of dedicated professional men

and women working 24–7 to support STRATCOM’s missions. We

are grateful for the job that you and your staff perform—and what

you have done for the Nation.

As the first Marine officer to lead STRATCOM, you have brought

your get-it-done mindset to the command and broken down barriers

to getting the job done.

Under your commendable leadership, I have seen STRATCOM

transform the way it does business. Your innovations have brought

operators, intelligence analysts and decision-makers together in

real-time to share information.

As the chairman remarked, this is an important hearing for our

subcommittee. Our Nation’s strategic posture serves as a framework for identifying the composition of our strategic forces and the

capabilities that are needed.

During the Cold War, our deterrent strategy and strategic posture was rather simple and focused, ensuring mutual shared destruction by possessing a survival second strike nuclear capability.

The Pentagon’s 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review recognized

that today’s threats are markedly different and require tailored deterrence, but STRATCOM must remain a strong nuclear deterrent.

It also must posture itself with wide-ranging capabilities to address new security challenges that include non-state terrorism networks, which are undeterred by traditional strategic bombers and

nuclear weapons; rogue nations like North Korea and Iran, who are

pursuing missile and nuclear capabilities and proliferation; and advanced military power like China, who, unofficially, advocates

asymmetric warfare.

I expect you to talk about these challenges and how they have

affected STRATCOM’s missions, strategic posture and pursuit of

new capabilities.

There are several key issues germane to the Nation’s strategic

posture in the areas of space, missile defense and nuclear forces

that I would like to ask you to discuss today.

In the space arena, I am most concerned about our ability to protect our space assets. China’s recent anti-satellite test was clearly

a shot, in my estimation, across the bow.

However, it is only one of several capabilities that China and

others are developing, which pose a serious threat to U.S. space assets.

To the extent you can discuss this in an open forum, I would appreciate your thoughts on the warfighter’s space protection and

survivability needs and how this event might influence the composition of our future space forces and architecture.

5

Commanders, in previous testimonies, have stated their need for

more missile-defense inventory to keep pace with the threat. Just

yesterday, the Pacific Command (PACCOM) and U.S. forces career

commanders made a similar statement.

I would like your assessment on how well the combatant commanders’ need for missile-defense capabilities and operational support is being met and whether opportunities for improvement exist.

In 2006, this committee drafted and enacted, with bipartisan

support, legislation setting forth the objectives of a Reliable Replacement Warhead.

I continue to strongly support RRW and the means to achieving

a safer, more secure, and more reliable nuclear weapon for our

strategic forces.

General, as the agent responsible for the operational readiness of

our Nation’s nuclear forces, please explain why you have greater

confidence in RRW, over the long term, than Life Extension Programs (LEPs).

Additionally, though it is still very early in the design phase,

there will be future decisions on RRW—quantity, legacy, stockpile,

life extensions, and—and delivery systems or modernizations.

Please comment on these moving parts and discuss any force structure STRATCOM has.

Last, I would like to say I would appreciate a discussion of gaps

or shortfalls in challenges you face in the areas of intelligence, command, control and communications, and particularly cyberspace.

STRATCOM is truly a global command with a breadth of missions befitting that global scope.

General, thank you, again, for your leadership and service, at

this time of great transition in our Nation’s strategic forces, our position and capabilities. I look forward to your testimony.

And, again, I thank our chairman for calling the hearing at this

particular time. Thank you.

Ms. TAUSCHER. I thank the ranking member.

General Cartwright, the floor is yours. You have submitted significant and very comprehensive testimony way before the deadline. You are not meant to do that, by the way. It is meant to be

late like everybody else’s is. [Laughter.]

But we have thoroughly reviewed it. But we are interested if you

would like to talk to us extemporaneously, answer some of the

questions we have put forward.

We are happy to take your testimony. The floor is yours.

STATEMENT OF GEN. JAMES E. CARTWRIGHT, COMMANDER,

U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND

General CARTWRIGHT. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman and Congressman Everett.

I, too, would like to acknowledge we have had a series of briefings back and forth at the staff levels and at the member levels for

individual issues and for more comprehensive reviews. And that

has been very valuable in framing this discussion, number one.

And, number two, it also acknowledges the fact that things don’t

just happen in the spring, that we have engagement all year long,

and that it is important to keep that dialogue going. And it is probably one of the more valuable things, particularly for something in

6

the strategic side with both significance to the country and the regret factors if we get it wrong. Having a continual dialogue is critical to this activity.

I will keep my comments very short here, because I would like

to spend the time responding to you all. But just to go back over

a few things: deterrence—and I think it has been framed very well

by both of the opening comments—the breadth and the scale of the

activities that have emerged since 2001 are significant. And our

ability to stay ahead of those threats and to actually affect and

deter has been challenged.

As was mentioned, we have moved from the old strategic TRIAD

construct of the bombers, the submarines, and the Intercontinental

Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) to one that is more integrated and offers

the country a broader range of activities that can deter and assure

our allies, and this is critical.

The idea of having an offensive capability, a defensive capability

that is balanced and can be tailored within the region, bounded by

the lessons that we have learned in the conventional forces on a

responsive infrastructure, so that—similar to what we experienced

in the first Gulf War, when we built mountains that were called

iron mountains—rather than doing management by inventory, to

get to a responsive infrastructure that allows us to adapt, to respond to operational and technical surprises, and to not manage by

inventory is critical in how we move forward in our strategic capabilities, because these are expensive capabilities.

If we put them together, many times, some of the programs that

have been brought forward in space, in the strategic side of our

weapons and in our platforms, have oftentimes been guilty of being

legacy before Initial Operational Capability (IOC). And we have got

to find a way to respond to a threat that lives in an age that is

more driven by Moore’s Law than by the industrial constructs that

we have often worked against.

So I look forward to the opportunity to start to understand where

we can get this leverage, where we can adapt and be responsive,

because, quite frankly, our crystal ball is no better than anyone

else’s. We can make mistakes. We can be surprised. And we have

got to acknowledge that fact in our strategy.

And so having a balanced offense/defense infrastructure underpinned by command and control and intelligence, surveillance and

reconnaissance (ISR) is critical to the strategy.

The command has set up components. We did this very differently than the standard model. This command was about 4,000

man years when we started this activity. We have reduced that significantly, moved those authorities and resources out to the components to allow the organization to flatten out to handle these global

challenges. And the scale and the magnitude and the number of

transactions that are part of an activity like that are significant.

And to bring that into one headquarters would really be unwieldy

for the Nation, and our ability to stay ahead of our adversaries

would be questionable.

This is a different construct. For instance, in my intelligence,

surveillance and reconnaissance component, rather than build one

from scratch, the commander of the Defense Intelligence Agency

7

(DIA) is my commander of ISR; the same for the cyber side, we

used the commander of the National Security Agency (NSA).

Rather than building new constructs, build ones that can be joint

from the start, can move to a combined or allied type of configuration when it is appropriate, and for which we have existing partnerships, centers of excellence, relations with industry, relations

with the rest of the interagency already built in, so that we don’t

have to build those at the time of crisis. We grow those. We train

in that configuration and it is essential.

They also have the ability to define requirements, resource appropriate activities and manage acquisition in a way that this

headquarters does not and cannot, and should not be tied down

with. Okay?

So it is a very different construct, and it is worth watching. It

is worth understanding where value is gained in it, and it is worth

questioning where maybe there isn’t value.

We are about two years into a three-year endeavor to put that

together. The reason we took three years was to ensure that we did

not disrupt families. So we stayed in the three-year military rotation cycle.

So the third tranche of people and resources will move this year

to make these components hold. All of them have declared initial

operating capability. And all of them will declare full operational

capability probably some time toward the end of this year. And so

they have moved along, both in their credibility and their capability as we have stood these commands up.

On the offensive side—and I am just going to step through a couple of highlights on the TRIAD, just to frame some issues and respond quickly to a few that were highlighted in the comments—we

look at three areas here. And Marines tend to deal in threes. So

triangles work out for us.

But in the offensive side of this, the nuclear-strike capabilities

framed in the Moscow Treaty, which is drawing us down significantly from 2001 through 2012, with 2007, this year, being an evaluation half point. How are we doing? Is it working?

Now, the reductions between 2000 and 2012 were to be commensurate with increases in capability in the other areas, and so what

I am here to report about is how well have the other areas moved

in response to the planned reductions? And where are we in that

drawdown?

And I will tell you that we are well ahead of schedule at the midpoint, that because of the capabilities that have been demonstrated

on the conventional side of the house and the capabilities that we

have demonstrated in the defensive side—and I will talk to each

one of those—we have elected to take additional risk and draw

down quicker to free up resource, so that we don’t have to ask for

resource to do things like, Reliable Replacement Warhead, the

Complex 2030, that is associated with revitalizing the national infrastructure associated with nuclear weapon production. Those

things are critical in order to be able to move forward, and we have

to pick and choose.

What is nice here is that we have got offensive capabilities and

defensive capabilities against which to manage the risk. And so I

will step through those.

8

On the conventional side, the fielding of what has been called the

J-coded weapons, but the GPS-guided J–DAM, the J–SOW, which

is a glide-type weapon, and the newly-emerging two cruise missiles,

one being sea-launched and one being air-launched, have really

given us a significant amount of offensive capability and precision

and survivability under stressing threats, and otherwise, that have

put us in a position that our conventional forces are second-tonone.

Where we have a hole, where we have a gap is in the prompt

global strike (PGS) side of the equation. And the chairman identified this in her comments. But, today, for those high-regret factors,

fleeting targets that we would want to address, we only have a nuclear weapon as an alternative.

And in the diverse threats that we deal in, that is not necessarily

appropriate across the spectrum of threat, and we really need to

be able to provide a capability for the Nation below the nuclear

threshold that can address these fleeting high-value, high-regret

factor type threats.

And we can talk more about some of the issues that emerged in

the discussion last year—I am happy to do that—and how we are

trying to move forward in that area, but I see that as a scene that

is causing us undue risk.

Now, the question is, when do you match up the threat with the

capability? How early do you want to have it? How much of a deterrent value does this conventional capability bring to the table,

so that if you bring it out earlier than the threat, it prevents or

at least inhibits the adversary from fielding the threat?

Those are the questions that ought to be asked. Again, my crystal ball is no better than anybody else’s, but I will give you my best

advice on that.

I am sorry; I forgot the non-kinetic side of this on the offensive

weapons. Suffice it to say that we have stood up a component with

the National Security Agency. And for me, and for the Nation, our

judgment was that the center of excellence for working in this environment is going to be where the Nation has its highest concentration of cryptologists, mathematicians and computing power, and

that is the National Security Agency. It is today, and it is likely

to be into the future.

We need to encourage the national lab system to start to bring

to the table the intellectual underpinning for the R&D and future

concepts that are going to dominate the cyber environment.

But for the Nation, the bulk of our transactions in the commerce

side of the house and in just general business are occurring on

these networks. Our competitive edge lives on these networks. This

Nation’s ability to compete internationally lives on these networks.

Our military capabilities live on these networks.

We must understand this environment. We must have access to

this environment. And we must be able to protect our interests in

this environment. It is not drastically different than the sea or the

air or space. And we have to start to understand and organize ourselves to be able to operate in this environment.

And I think that we are on a footing to move in that direction

organizationally and with the intellectual underpinning. But we

have got to bring a more holistic approach. We have got to be able

9

to integrate ourselves with industry, as appropriate, with Homeland, with the Department of Energy (DOE), all of these organizations—Justice. All have equities in this area.

The paradigms that have been established in policy and law are

sufficient. We may want to tweak them a little bit, but they give

us a good guidepost to go out and start understanding how to operate in this medium, and then understand where we might be challenged and come back to you all and explain that. And I will be

happy to have a more detailed discussion, but that would probably

have to be in a closed session, and we can do that at a future date.

On the defensive side, missile defense. Missile defense has

emerged over the past year in the relationship that has been established between Strategic Command and our component integrated

missile defense with the Missile Defense Agency. And the test programs have moved to a much more successful footing, technically,

because MDA has done a great job.

Operationally, because we have integrated the warfighter into

the test programs, started to drive the program in a direction that

is more appropriate for fielded capabilities—in other words, the

warfighter involved in the Warfighter Improvement Programs and

information programs—and started to drive this in a direction that

gives us an operational capability.

This year, we are in a configuration to be able to do operational

work. We demonstrated that through an extended period of time

around the Fourth of July, when the North Koreans fired off several missiles. We stayed in an operational configuration for an extended period of time. The system worked well. We learned a lot.

The system can be moved to an operational configuration anytime. It will be the end of this year before we are in a position

where we can concurrently do R&D and development work along

with sustained operations. And that is our goal, is to drive the system to that posture.

The focus this year that we are driving MDA toward is the part

of the capability—when we talked about this capability, it was

against rogue states to defend the Nation, but it was also for forward-deployed forces, allies and friends. Forward-deployed forces,

allies and friends is the focus this year. We have got to start to understand how to move out.

The good news is we have many allies who want to participate

in this capability, who want to understand how to use it. The credibility against an emerging, proliferating threat of ballistic missiles—particularly short- and medium-range—their quick reaction

times are things that threaten nations.

To give them the capacity, both to stand on their own feet and

to integrate with us or anyone else to build layered and mutual defenses, is where we want to end up in this capacity. And driving

toward that is going to be essential.

The key R&D test points, many of them will occur this year. And

we must watch those. We must drive those. But that is where the

next real leverage point will come in missile defense. And we ought

to be watching that this year.

The other piece of defense that I think is absolutely critical in

understanding how we can start to take the pressure off of a strategy that was focused purely on nuclear weapons for deterrence is

10

in the counter-proliferation, non-proliferation side of the house,

also in our mission area and starting to work in those areas to expand our capability out.

Part of the strategy that we are advocating at STRATCOM is

that we generally look at conflict in five phases, zero through five.

So—Marine math, it is really six, but zero through five.

And the idea here is that zero and one are pre-conflict. And that

is where you want to win. That is where you want to be most effective. And, heretofore, we have not done as good a job as we could,

particularly at STRATCOM, on focusing on zero and one.

The capabilities like missile defense, the capabilities like working

in non-proliferation and counter-proliferation focus on phases zero

and one in the conflict, trying to prevent it. The better you are at

that, the less you need in your stockpile of offensive capabilities.

They ought to reinforce each other. They ought to be able to be

tailored for the region, so the problems that we may face in Southeast Asia versus Southwest Asia, North—you pick the region. We

ought to be able to tailor a balance between offense and defense in

the tools we use. And counter-proliferation, non-proliferation capabilities offer us a wide range of opportunities to do that. And we

have got to focus in that area.

The other piece here in the defensive side that I think is important to understand is the defense of our networks and how we are

going to move to defend our networks and defend the activities on

our networks, both at home and abroad.

And, today, you know, bless it, but the Internet was really designed around the terminals. Everything was designed around protecting the terminals. We put firewalls and patches in our terminals, in our computers, in our servers, et cetera.

We have got to start to look and not walk away from that, but

we have got to start to expand out our awareness of the networks,

so that we know what is going to attack our terminals before the

attack occurs, so that we can configure them in a way that makes

sense. That is a difficult technical problem, but not beyond the

reach of this country and its intellectual capital. We have got to

start to do that.

The day when we can afford in American commerce to be attacked, shut down, wait two weeks to two months for a patch to

arrive, and then come back online cannot be passed off to the consumer anymore. It is just too expensive. We have got to find a more

responsive way to defend our networks. And we are working on

that. We are pushing on that, both on the R&D side, but also on

the architectural side of how we are going to do this.

We are not alone in this activity. Homeland Security is our partner in this, Justice, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI). All of us are playing together in this and working

to understand how we can better defend the Nation’s networks.

This is a critical part. It is how we fight wars, but it is also how

we do business as a nation. And it is going to be important as we

move forward.

The responsive infrastructure, which is the last leg in the new

TRIAD. To me, this is critical. This underpins our ability to have

a flexible and dynamic deterrent capability. Having an infrastrucVerDate 22-MAR-2001 11:33 Sep 26, 2008 Jkt 037317 PO 00000 Frm 00014 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\110-31\067290.000 HAS2 PsN: HAS2
11

ture that can respond to operational and technical surprise is critical.

In the 1950’s, 1960’s and 1970’s, when most of our nuclear arsenal was put together, it was put together under a constrict where

we used inventory to manage operational and technical risk.

If a weapon had a flaw that we discovered at a certain part in

its life and we lost that entire character of weapon, we had to have

an alternative weapon that would fit into that slot. We had to have

a big enough inventory to go through and repair all of those weapons and do it in a timeline that was sufficient to not have a gap

in our capability. So we had—had and have—very large inventories

to manage operational and technical risk.

We have long since learned—and I will go to a grunt mentality

here, but—with the 155 round in artillery, that most of what was

going on out there was associated with the logistics of moving huge

inventories to the fight, and it consumed us. And we built large

iron mountains to make sure we were ready.

We really can’t afford to do that. It reduces our nimbleness. It

reduces our flexibility to be surprised, because if somebody comes

up with an alternative that defeats that weapon, we have an iron

mountain that is useless and we have a hole in our capability. We

can’t afford that.

Precision changed that dynamic for the 155. It allowed us to

have less rounds, but, coupled with precision, was an agile infrastructure, one that could be warm and building, in time, to affect

the fight. That is critical.

We have to think the same way about the nuclear enterprise. We

have to have an infrastructure that is responsive to technical and

operational surprise. We have to have a weapon that is safe to the

user, and the handler is secure, in that—for me, nirvana is that if

the wrong person gets a hold of it, it is a paperweight. That is

where we really want to be.

And we have got to have reliability, because the reliability means

that the number of weapons against any problem is the minimum

number necessary. And the goal of the Administration, as stated,

is the fewest weapons necessary to ensure national security. And

to move in that direction, we need to move toward a safe, secure,

reliable weapon and an infrastructure that is responsive to operational and technical surprise.

RRW puts us on the path. It is not the only element. It is a form,

fit, function replacement in that we are not changing any of the delivery vehicles. In fact, we are reducing substantially the number

of delivery vehicles it goes in. It has the same operational characteristics, but it is safer for the people who have to handle it. It is

secure, so that one of these weapons does not end up in the wrong

place and used in the wrong way. And it is reliable, which draws

down the number of platforms I need and the number of weapons

we have to deliver.

It puts us on the right path toward drawing this stockpile down

to the minimum number necessary for national security, which I

think is essential.

We have two domains that we are responsible for at

STRATCOM, the cyber domain and the space domain. We have

12

talked a little bit about cyber. Let me just touch on space, and then

I will quit. I promise.

The space domain. We had the test with the ASAT here recently.

That is not something that is unprecedented, in that the United

States and, at the time, the Soviet Union both conducted ASAT

tests.

When we conducted those tests, we did so in a way that we

thought was responsible, but we did create debris in the atmosphere when we tested. And this was back in 1985. And when we

tested in 1985, we tested at the lower end of what is considered the

Low Earth Orbit (LEO) belt. Even testing at the low end of the

Low Earth Orbit belt, it took over 20 years for that debris to come

down out of space and burn up in the atmosphere.

The recent test was in the upper area of the Low Earth Orbit

belt. That means that material, over the next 20-plus years, will

have to migrate down through all of the—what we would call appropriate users of the Low Earth Orbit regime through that area

and then down into the atmosphere. That is going to take a long

time.

This test occurred above the altitude at which the International

Space Station is in orbit. It occurred above where most of the satellites that use the Low Earth Orbit regime orbit. So we are going

to have to make significant adjustments as collision, or, as we call

it, conjunction opportunities occur over the next 20-plus years.

Every time you move a satellite, you are saying to a vendor, ‘‘You

are going to expend fuel, which reduces the life of a satellite and

changes the investment criteria that you assumed when you put

that satellite up.’’ That is going to have an effect on business, on

commerce. And it is going to have an effect on our national assets

that are in Low Earth Orbit, because we are going to have to move

to avoid this debris when it occurs. That is an impact on us. We

would like to have not had that happen, but it did. And so we are

where we are.

Both the Chinese and our National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) have programs associated with manned flight,

today and into the future, flight that intends to go beyond Low

Earth Orbit and out to the lunar exploration, et cetera. You are

going to have to pass through this debris. You are going to have

to understand the risks that you are now going to have to take to

move through that. So that is one attribute associated with space

that we are going to have to work on.

Because of that, STRATCOM, and the military space side of this,

is responsible for predicting where that debris will be, advising

users of space when they are going to conflict with it, so if you plan

a manned launch, where are the gaps, so that you do not run into

this debris.

We have been in what I will call a cataloguing posture in space

for the last 50 years. We look and see what is up there, based on

what we know was launched. Based on multiple passes over our radars and optical sensors, we try to get a good estimation of what

is up there and where it is.

Inside of geosynchronous orbit (GEO), from 23,000 miles in, there

are approximately 40,000 pieces of debris and intended satellites,

et cetera, that we are trying to manage on a regular basis.

13

The timeliness of that knowledge is a catalog. We post this on

open source, so the commercial vendors globally can use that. And

then we give them high-resolution information for launch-type activities, et cetera.

But we are reactive in this. We are going to have to change our

posture to one of predictive, to understand where this debris is

going to be with longer lead times, so that we can better plan

launches, have increased safety margins for manned flight, which

many countries are starting to move back to—not many, but, clearly, those involved with the International Space Station and those

who are involved with space exploration. That means greater margins. We have got to reconfigure ourselves in order to do that.

The expense is not that—I never say this the right way—the expense is there. We are working our way through this. But, first, we

have got to change the mindset in the organizational construct and

put us in a position where we are thinking more about capabilities

that are predictive in nature, and move ourselves to the computing

power and the sensor integration that will allow us to do that.

We started that about three years ago. We are well on our way

to that. Those are funded programs, and I think they are in good

shape.

But I would be happy to talk in more depth on those. Probably

have to move to closed session to get to technical detail, but general capability, we can do.

And I will leave it at that, Madam Chairwoman.

[The prepared statement of General Cartwright can be found in

the Appendix on page 39.]

Ms. TAUSCHER. Well, General Cartwright, thank you for a thorough vetting of many of the questions that I think I asked and the

ranking member asked in our opening statements. And I think this

is a great compliment to your significant, and, as I said, very comprehensive statement.

I am going to ask a couple of questions and turn to the ranking

member.

We have got members here that have questions, and we are

going to use the five-minute rule.

I just, very quickly, wanted to talk to you, get back to something

you talked about, because RRW has been in the news recently. And

I just really want to have you state for the record almost unambiguously, once again, whether RRW will deliver any new military capabilities?

And, forgive me, General, the reason I bring it up is because I

want to note for the record that the last time the Administration

brought a proposal forward for a new nuclear weapons capability—

the redundantly named, Robust Nuclear Penetrator—I helped kill

it. So I wanted to be sure that—I just wanted to get your view. Is

RRW a new weapon?

General CARTWRIGHT. It is a component. When we look at a

weapon, it is a combination of the delivery vehicle, the systems

that navigate to take you from Point A to Point B, and then put

you in a position to have the effect that was desired—in this case,

a nuclear weapon.

RRW is a component of that—with no different characteristics

than the weapons that we have today, other than it is safer, more

14

secure, and more reliable. But from a standpoint of weapon effect,

from a standpoint of the delivery vehicle and its intended use,

there is no change.

Ms. TAUSCHER. Same yield?

General CARTWRIGHT. Within percentages, one or two percent. In

other words—I am smiling, because I am trying to make sure I

don’t go outside the box of classification here—but the way we are

getting the capability and keeping the same weapons effect and yet

having safety improved and reliability improved is that we are allowing the designers to reduce, when appropriate, the size and the

yield—and we are talking just in very small numbers, single-digittype numbers—in order to optimize for larger margins to assure

that we don’t need to test, to assure that we can put additional

safety and security measures inside.

Some of that volume is compensated by the fact that we have

moved from tube technology to microcircuits, so we can gain some

advantage there. But, where necessary, we have allowed them to

reshape components—including the physics packages, so to speak—

to fit into this volume, optimizing for no testing, higher security,

higher safety, higher reliability.

Ms. TAUSCHER. I am going to suspend my questions for the time

being. I am going to yield five minutes, or as much time as he

might use, to the Ranking Member, Mr. Everett.

Mr. EVERETT. Thank you, Chairman. I am going to basically do

the same thing. I just have a couple of questions.

Let me talk a bit about space. We have had a lot of hearings, and

you referred to the use of space in our economy. I think last hearing we had, globally, there was about a $90-billion industry. Don’t

remember, but I think it was growing somewhere in the rate of 16

percent a year.

General CARTWRIGHT. Yes, sir.

Mr. EVERETT. That will continue. We, on this committee, and

most of the Congress, recognizes that, while we have redundancy,

it would be a severe loss to our military to lose our space systems.

In that light, let me mention that there are a number of ways

to achieve greater survivability—protection of our space assets,

hardening on-orbit spares, redundancy, distributed architectures,

alternatives such as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), active prevention and denial, non-material solutions and rapid replenishment.

Along those lines, in your opinion, what is the military utility for

operation response to space?

General CARTWRIGHT. I think you have characterized this very

well, Congressman Everett.

There is more than one way to skin this cat. But what we have

to start to understand in the larger construct here is can we

change the risk equation from the standpoint of we have, in many

sectors in space, moved in a direction that it is expensive to go to

space, so we increase the likelihood of success, so we build a bigger

motor, more reliable motor, more redundant systems.

We make the payload bigger, because, since it is going to cost so

much to get there, we gotta stay there a long time. So we put additional redundancy, which turns to weight, which means the motor

has to be bigger. And we work ourselves into a spiral that the risk

15

equation here is zero tolerance for failure, which puts us in a highcost environment.

Some systems need to be exquisite. They need to be cutting edge,

and they need to have those characteristics, but not all. And we

can get resilience, and we can get survivability with a very different risk equation and the combination of both commercial assets, military assets, lower-tech assets, particularly for the

warfighter. Many times, we do not need the level of technology that

is necessary for, say, technical intelligence.

So getting a balance in space is critical. Having it be responsive—I will express that I have concerns when people put a label

on a capability like responsive space, because then it becomes a

buzz word and everybody defines their capability based on some

metric of responsive. Responsive to do what-is-what is important

for me to understand and for the command to understand.

We can be responsive with on-orbit assets and tailor them to

problems. We have done that for many years, and it just takes a

software reprogramming, a different orbit that can be adjusted.

Many things can be responded with the assets that we have today.

And we do that very well between ODNI, STRATCOM, and DOD.

Some assets, we could change the risk equation and build much

cheaper capabilities that don’t last any longer, but can augment or

replace or replenish, based on the scenario, particularly with communications.

When you know that you are going to need much greater bandwidth in a particular region, surging to that, rather than putting

something up there that would otherwise be an overage of capability for, say, an extended five- to ten-year period, may make a lot

more sense.

It also allows us to start to broaden the industrial base out and

keep it warm, instead of building something, waiting 10 years and

then trying to re-gather the people and rebuild again. So we have

got to take all of the pieces that have been laid out here.

Responsive, to me, is using those on-orbit assets in ways that we

maybe didn’t design them, but could be done. Next is having a

warm industrial base that can allow us to respond quickly to either

surge, replenish or replace, to have the capability in that warm industrial base, then, and the intellectual capital to see a new problem and respond to it. I mean, between those three things, that is

what I would look for in the definition of responsive for space.

We are trying to move in that direction with a responsive space

capability. I am focused on the capability. Others may be focused

on defining it as an acquisition practice, et cetera. But, for me, it

is delivering capability and understanding what is driving the

timelines and not overreacting in those.

I mean, we could buy responsive with large numbers of assets in

the barn, so to speak, assets stored on orbit, et cetera. That, to me,

at this stage in the game, is not necessary.

What we have got to understand is what is it we are trying to

do and what is the timeline for response when we are surprised,

technically or operationally.

Is that——

Mr. EVERETT. That is very consistent with what you said in

Omaha last October, and I appreciate that.

16

Mr. Reyes and I had the opportunity to be at Kirkland when the

14th Air Force was stood up.

And I have one other question. And I will admit to some personal

feelings about this, but, last year, this committee, as well as the

Intel Committee, had information or had in our bill that the Air

Force could not close down the U2 program before the Secretary of

Defense certified to the appropriate committees that there would be

no loss of ISR.

The Air Force plans again this year to close down the U2. I am

not sure that, at this point in time, we have—and Golden Hawk

is what we are talking about. I don’t think that we yet have the

sensors that we need that would replace the U2. And I would just

ask you if you have an opinion on that.

General CARTWRIGHT. Sir——

Mr. EVERETT. Air Force, Marine——

General CARTWRIGHT. The U2 has been part of our stable of capabilities for a lot of years and has been an incredibly capable

asset. And it has a long legacy. And it has been adapted over the

years. The engines have been upgraded. The avionics have been

upgraded to be as relevant as they can be. And so it has been a

workhorse.

Today, its primary limitation—and this is not pejorative—but its

primary limitation is the fact that it has a pilot. That pilot is generally good for X number of hours. And that is what limits the duration on station.

It also is challenged in being able to enter into a threat environment. It is not survivable in a high-threat environment. But we

have a substantial amount of activity that does not occur in highthreat environments.

The Global Hawk is to focus on those areas that are not high

threat, but allows us the routine sorties today that we are flying

with Global Hawk in theater, generally about 22–1/2 hours on station. That is a significantly longer period of it. So the Global Hawk

offers us a movement forward in availability of sensors.

The Global Hawk has had its challenges in production, and I

won’t go technically into those. I think having the Air Force in here

might allow you to do that in more detail, but we are working

through those.

The objective, here, capability is to move to a more persistent

platform, one that is able to stay on station longer, give us the sensor phenomenologies to be able to aid the warfighter in real-time

and give him or her the information they need in order to prosecute.

The trade between Global Hawk and U2 is one that we have got

to manage. The Global Hawk has to demonstrate its capability,

both in the upgrades and the numbers, before we want to let go

of the U2. How much risk we are willing to take is the balancing

act that the Air Force is trying to work through for the Department.

For STRATCOM, I cannot afford a gap in capability. And that is

the way we responded to the query from last year is we can’t afford

the gap in capability.

Having said that, there are certain theaters in which the U2 is

extremely valuable because of its sensor package. So as we draw

17

it down, we have to retain, particularly in those theaters, that capability until we are absolutely certain that we have a replacement

that is on station and ready to replace it.

There are other places where we use U2s where we can afford

to take a little risk. So prioritizing that is what we did from a command position to the Air Force. We listed the highest priorities to

the lowest priorities and where we could afford to take risk as a

Nation in the transition between Global Hawk and U2. And that

should help inform the debate as we move forward in this area.

Mr. EVERETT. Well, I thank you.

Of course, this committee and the Intel Committee’s only position

was that we would be certified that there was no loss to ISR to the

warfigher.

Thank you, Madam Chairman.

Ms. TAUSCHER. You are welcome, Mr. Everett.

I am happy to yield five minutes, now, to Mr. Larsen.

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you, Madam Chairman.

And, General Cartwright, five minutes applies to my questions

and your answers in total, the way the rules run. So I am going

to be quick, and——

General CARTWRIGHT. I will try to be the same.

Mr. LARSEN [continuing]. I would like you to be quick as well.

About a month ago, I met with a People’s Liberation Army (PLA)

general who is equivalent of the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs

of Staff (VCJCS). He was in D.C., met with a few folks. We had

a conversation about the Chinese ASAT test in which we brought

up the issue of debris, and he characterized the issue of debris as

a baseless concern.

We did our part to enlighten him on what we thought was a good

foundation for having that concern. It wasn’t a very pleasant conversation, but we got through it and only would suggest that if you

can find that opportunity to explain, through your appropriate

chain of command, to the Chinese how you described it to us, it

might enlighten them further on what the problem is—one part of

the problem—with their ASAT tests.

Also, I have some questions on China, but I submitted them for

the record to Secretary Gates and General Pace when they were

before us. You probably will be getting copies of those questions to

participate in developing those answers.

But along that line, one question I think is important for us to

talk about has to do with Space Situational Awareness. One of the

problems we have been struggling with in the committee has been

the investment into transformational satellite systems, as it has

been called, the amount of money we have invested. I think Dr.

Sega has done a good job explaining how they are trying to get that

under control, but whether or not we are investing in the right

thing.

And so I would like to ask you if we are investing enough in

Space Situational Awareness capabilities that are needed to deter,

defend and recover from possible threats against our space assets

and their related ground infrastructures? And, if not, what are the

greatest needs in that area?

General CARTWRIGHT. Different approaches to Space Situational

Awareness. The first is to be able to survey space and know what

18

is there and know it with some accuracy, so that you can have access and passage in a safe way for any who want it. And that is

the first capability.

And what we have done is net together, initially, terrestrial capabilities, radars, et cetera. And, now, we are starting to move toward

netting together our space sensors, so that they are integrated with

the ground and we are integrated in a way that gives us a higher

degree of fidelity and a higher degree of reliability that we are actually seeing everything that is out there that we need to see.

Mr. LARSEN. In your opinion, is the technology to do that mature

enough to do this and do it right once?

General CARTWRIGHT. Yes, from the standpoint of taking advantage of everything that we have and everything that is a program

of record today that is funded.

We have a couple of capabilities that we are planning over the

next few years to launch that will fill in gaps of systems that have

lapsed. But given that, yes, I believe that we have what we need

in those areas.

What we have to do now is get ourselves organized, so that the

information flow and the uplinks and downlinks in the ground infrastructure is netted together in such a way as to have the information processed and provided, so that it can be responded to inside the decision cycle of having to act. Okay?

And I believe that we are on the path to do that, and that we

have the resources necessary to do that in the aggregate. There

may be disconnects—either programs that have technical issues, et

cetera—but we are down to a point where we are close. That is the

first piece.

The second piece that you alluded to was the phenomenologies to

be able to utilize space as we utilize other areas for sensor knowledge understanding awareness. And the Department has been a

large advocate of radar, because it washes away the night, and it

washes away bad weather, to a large extent. And so it gives us

eyes and ears when nighttime comes and when we have bad weather, which is important to us to be able to dictate the tempo of any

conflict. That is why radar is so critical.

The question, now, are there more and more capabilities being

associated with radar, as we move to the future. How many of

those are appropriate from space? How many of those are appropriate from air and terrestrial sensors? Air and terrestrial being a

little easier to adapt, change, fix, et cetera.

What we are trying to understand, and what the command is focused on is not having to look at the problem as if you are a space

person. If I ask a space person to solve a problem, I get a space

answer. If I ask an air person to solve it, I get an air answer.

We are trying to sit in a position where we can look at the integration of air, space and terrestrial, understand the balance, not go

too heavy in any one area, and then integrate them in a way that

is appropriate. I am not convinced yet that we have that framed

correctly for Space Radar.

Mr. LARSEN. Okay. And I would say if you ask Congress, you will

get a congressional answer, which may not be, sometimes, helpful,

but if you need help on that——

19

So just in conclusion here, what I hear you saying is that not

that we are radar heavy, but that the future allows us to have capability that may not just be focused on radar. And we may be able

to do that in a leaner way with pretty good effectiveness.

General CARTWRIGHT. Integrating between the mediums and between the Intelligence Services (INTS).

Mr. LARSEN. So that you have a better way of approaching this

problem.

Thanks.

Thank you, Madam Chair.

Ms. TAUSCHER. Mr. Larsen, do you want to submit a form of your

correspondence to General Pace and Secretary Gates to General

Cartwright for questions for the record?

Mr. LARSEN. Yes, I would actually like to do that, yes, if I could.

Ms. TAUSCHER. So ordered.

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you.

Ms. TAUSCHER. Thank you very much.

I am happy to yield five minutes to the distinguished gentleman

from Texas, Mr. Thornberry.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you, Madam Chair.

General, you have been quoted in some publications recently as

being somewhat concerned, as I read it, about the fragmentary nature of our cyber efforts as a Government. Can you briefly outline

for us what your concerns are, the kinds of things you think we

ought to be thinking about?

General CARTWRIGHT. My concern on the cyber side is really on

an organizational level. And it was the fragmentation of defense organizations responsible for defending networks, organizations responding for operating and doing what we call reconnaissance on

those networks, setting the—being in the cyber environment. They

were separated by, organizationally, not a common commander.

And so what we were advocating for was, as the mission came

to STRATCOM, part of what we needed to do was get unity of command, unity of effort, so that we could get balance of offense and

defense, understand that balance and articulate it to the Congress,

because, right now, one group comes to you and asks about defensive capabilities. Another group comes in at a different area and

talks about offensive capabilities. And you don’t know whether or

not this has been integrated. That is really the heart of the issue

for me.

I believe, one, having the mission come to STRATCOM. Two, allowing us to put a head, which, in our framework, is—the National

Security Agency is the senior head. We have Defense Information

Services Agency (DISA), which worries about day-in, day-out running your service, running your backbone, but, also, the defensive

nature, integrating the two of them together, so that I have got one

commander who I turn to, who deconflicts.

Now, the next piece that we need to do is do that for the Government. I mean, you have to have somebody that knows what is

going on out there to deconflict.

So those are my concerns, sir.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Well, I am interested in working further with

you on it, because I agree. I think we do need a government-wide

approach to it.

20

I also want to ask about RRW and responsive infrastructure. My

impression is—and from listening to you again today—is that the

two things have to go together.

And my further impression is that the Department of Defense—

and primarily you, I guess—are going to have to be much more involved in making sure that responsive infrastructure is really

there, rather than—as it has been in the past, in my view—Department of Defense turning to the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) and saying, ‘‘Produce what I want, and I don’t care

how you do it.’’

To have responsive infrastructure, you are going to have to be

more involved in monitoring the—not day to day, necessarily, but

making sure, year by year, that that infrastructure is responsive

and not being allowed to deteriorate. Am I on the right track with

that?

General CARTWRIGHT. Yes, sir, you are. We had to do that—and

I will go back to the 155 round just because I am comfortable being

a grunt.

But, you know, we had to enter into a partnership with industry,

because we had to set certain criteria about a warm base, make

sure that the lines for various munitions stayed warm and that the

expertise was there to respond, if we needed it, enter into a partnership that understood the cost of doing that to industry, et

cetera. But you could not just sit back and say, ‘‘I want.’’ It really

demanded a partnership. And this demands a partnership.

And I am hopeful, because we have set some precedents here. We

took risk on the operational side to draw down, in order to free resource for the DOE to be able to move aggressively in and start to

move on RRW, but also on their Complex 2030 program.

It has to be a trade back and forth. And we have got to understand each other’s risk when we do that. But it has to be done in

partnership. You are exactly right.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Let me just ask this: If you are watching and

you see either the RRW delayed or the Complex 2030 not happening like it should, seems to me your response, based on what you

have said, is, ‘‘Okay, you have to slow down dismantlements,’’ because, now, we are relying on numbers to protect us, and if we

can’t have the RRW move ahead on schedule and the responsive infrastructure on schedule, our country’s only option is to keep thousands of nuclear warheads.

Am I on the right track with that?

General CARTWRIGHT. I think you are exactly right. The only

thing I would add to it is that there is at least a partial ability to

look at other parts of the TRIAD and say maybe they have advanced in a way that allows you to continue to reduce.

But, at the end of the day, we will have to stay with an inventory

management scheme until we are absolutely convinced that we

have something to replace it. The regret factors for the Nation, in

this area, are too high to let go of the trapeze before you know you

have got something to grab onto.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you.

Ms. TAUSCHER. If the gentleman—your time is up, but if you will

yield, because I think there is a corollary to that, too, that is interesting, and before we go to Mr. Spratt, the other piece of it is we

21

are still spending enormous amounts of money on LEP programs

and other things.

So, I mean, I am not an advocate of RRW, but I think that there

is another piece to this, which is instead of reducing weapons and

doing other things, we are still extending the life of these weapons

and spending an enormous amount of money to do that. And the

question of a responsive infrastructure and the right size of the

complex and all that, that question is left out there, too, if we don’t

make some of these decisions. I agree with you.

Thank you, Mr. Thornberry.

I am happy to yield five minutes to the chairman of the Budget

Committee——

Mr. SPRATT. General Cartwright, thank you for your excellent

testimony, as always, your lucid explanations.

I have, however, some clarifications I would like to get from your

written statement, particularly with respect to RRW.

First of all, you have chosen Livermore as the primary entity to

care for the RRW program. Could you give us, quickly, just a

timeline that you expect for bringing the first RRW warhead to

completion for substitution?

General CARTWRIGHT. Yes, sir. There are several disciplined acquisition points at which we would move through, stop, move forward for either a technical review or a policy or oversight review.

And the one that we have just finished is kind of what we would

call preliminary design. So we have stopped at that point.

We have had a certain set of criteria that are associated with

preliminary design. We have looked at those. We have made a

down select, understood the attributes associated with that down

select.

The next area we enter into is a detailed design activity focused

on what we think is the most promising design. At the end of that,

we would come back and ask for permission to enter into development, and then on into fielding.

Objectively, what we are trying to accomplish here is that the

Moscow Treaty put us on a drawdown through 2012. At 2012, we

would like to be in a position where we have high confidence that

we have a design and a manufacturing capability that would allow

us to start to replace, to move into the trade between draw down

and demilitarization of weapons——

Mr. SPRATT. Does that mean that you can link or associate the

significant drawdown with a replacement of the RRW, that the two

could be packaged more or less together?

General CARTWRIGHT. Sir, yes, sir.

Mr. SPRATT. Is that part of the strategy of trying to advance the

idea of this——

General CARTWRIGHT. It has to be from the standpoint that the

design has to give us a capability to handle operational and technical surprise, absent doing it with inventory. In other words,

modularity, interoperability, a responsive, trained workforce that

can respond to a surprise, rather than an inventory that is so diverse and so large that you don’t worry about being surprised. You

just bring in more inventory.

Mr. SPRATT. Does the RRW anticipate the construction of a new

Re-entry Vehicle (RV)?

22

General CARTWRIGHT. It does not. It is form, fit, function into the

existing systems.

Mr. SPRATT. Now, you say here, on page six of your testimony,

‘‘We lack the capability to respond globally to globally-disbursed or

fleeting threats.’’

Then, on the next page, you say, ‘‘The new TRIAD, when mature,

will provide improved agility and flexibility in dealing with a wider

range of contingencies.’’

It gives me a little pause, because I read into that the possibility

you are saying that the new warhead would have tactical utility,

that we are resurrecting an old idea that we might be using nuclear warheads early in a threat, as opposed to the ultimate strategic reserve to respond to a threat.

General CARTWRIGHT. That was not my intent, sir. If I have stated it unclearly, the intent, here, is that the mature TRIAD would

have a conventional alternative that would allow us to address targets more appropriate for conventional munitions than nuclear, A.

B, for those tactical things where we used to have all the way

down to artillery, to now be in a position where we have the new

J-coded weapons, we have both the cruise-missile variant and the

gravity variants and the glide variants, along with a prompt global

strike, we have more appropriate responses for—when we have a

mature TRIAD—for threats that are more appropriately addressed

by conventional munitions and effects.

May not have been able to do that in the past, because our conventional capabilities weren’t——

Mr. SPRATT. But you are talking about a conventional alternative

to round out the TRIAD for——

General CARTWRIGHT. Yes, sir.

Mr. SPRATT [continuing]. Prompt and fleeting threats, not a nuclear alternative.

General CARTWRIGHT. That is correct.

Mr. SPRATT. Okay. Still got time?

Ms. TAUSCHER. Yes, sir.

Mr. SPRATT. Page 10, there was an intriguing statement at the

top of the page. Maybe I missed something in the story about it,

but on July the 4th, 2006, the North Koreans fired several missile

launches.

You state there, rather briefly, that we had our nuclear—our ballistic-missile defense system up and in operation. Can you shed

some light on exactly what it was doing and what we learned from

that experience?

General CARTWRIGHT. Without going into the operational details,

we moved to an operational footing, brought the sensors to command and control and the ground-based interceptors (GBIs) online

in a posture where, if necessary, we could have responded.

We had ambiguous activities going on at that time. We had several missiles that were being poised to be launched, including one

that had the potential to be intercontinental in range. And so we

took that opportunity to bring the system out of R&D configuration

into an operational configuration.

We held it in that operational configuration for an extended period of time, which allowed us, on the warfighter side of the equation, to validate the training that we had been doing, the certifiVerDate 22-MAR-2001 11:33 Sep 26, 2008 Jkt 037317 PO 00000 Frm 00026 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\110-31\067290.000 HAS2 PsN: HAS2
23

cation of crews, certification of equipment, run that equipment for

an extended period of time in operational conditions.

We learned a significant amount of information, mostly associated with our ability to do command and control of an operational

missile defense system, because, understand, this system—part of

the challenge here is—in the command-and-control side—is U.S.

Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) has responsibility for defending the continental United States.

U.S. Pacific Command has responsibility in the Pacific Theater.

The United States European Command (USEUCOM) has responsibility for Europe, but also Russia, as the new construct has been

put together. This threat covered all of those simultaneously.

So managing the defense, we learned a lot about how to net

these organizations together, work with sensors that are spread

across all of those regions, but keep them on a common footing, and

how to manage day-in and day-out the routine maintenance that

must occur with any machine over an extended period of time and

not have a gap in our coverage.

Much of that work was done at our integrated missile defense

headquarters out at Schriever Air Force Base in standing them up

and then confirming the capabilities, but there are nodes all over

the world that have to be netted together to make this work. This

was our opportunity to put that together, demonstrate that it

could.

The good news here is that the mechanical side of this worked

very well. The command-and-control side, we made some adjustments, but it worked very well.

We had allies looking over our shoulder the whole time. They

were very compelled by what they saw, as you can see in the response by the Japanese and how they have started to move to integrate and build a defensive capability.

And, at the end of the day, what we were looking for was a credible deterrent capability that offered an alternative to an offensiveonly capability, offered timelines that were consistent with the

threat that was out there and capabilities that were not shield, but

certainly were enough to put doubt in your adversary’s mind about

the veracity of whether or not they could act inside your timelines

and inside your capability to respond. And, to me, that is what we

learned over the July 4th activity.

Mr. SPRATT. Thank you very much.

General CARTWRIGHT. Yes, sir.

Ms. TAUSCHER. Thank you, Mr. Spratt.

I am happy to yield five minutes to the gentleman from Arizona,

Mr. Franks.

Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you, Madam Chair.

Ms. TAUSCHER. You are welcome.

Mr. FRANKS. And, General, thank you for being on our side. You

know, your acumen and your ability is just so obvious to all of us,

and we appreciate you being such an advocate for human freedom.

You know, I was struck by a couple of your phrases that I suppose all good soldiers use to emphasize the graveness of the situation by sort of a subtle understatement.

You used the term, ‘‘conjunction opportunities,’’ related to the

space debris from the ASAT test from China. And, of course, that

24

paints the picture in my mind of something slamming into the

space station at high velocity and knocking out the command and

control and seeing it plummeting to the Earth. But the subtle understatement there is still appreciated.

You also used the ‘‘high-regret factor’’ when we are talking about

missile defense. And I think that is a concept that needs to be emphasized to a tremendous degree, because if, in fact, there ever

comes a time when missile defense becomes critical to us, that

high-regret factor could be something that would be clear in all of

our minds.

General CARTWRIGHT. Yes, sir.

Mr. FRANKS. Unfortunately, it seemed like about half the population thinks we have a full-blown system that is completely operational. And while our systems are real, we are not there yet. And

the other half of the population thinks that that is just something

that is, you know, just pie charts and something that we hope for.

But I think the North Korean incident probably demonstrated

the operational availability of the system more than anything, including in the Aegis system and the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD).

One of the things I am concerned about is related to—you know,

the operational commanders are doing a good job saying what is

necessary and what is needed, and the Missile Defense Agency is

doing a good job in making sure that we have interceptors. But the

services haven’t all taken ownership of those yet. And can you tell

me what the timeline—is there another dynamics there that we are

not aware of?

General CARTWRIGHT. It was alluded to earlier that we used a

different requirement, resourcing, and acquisition strategy to field

this capability.

Missile defense, historically, has been more focused, for this Nation, on aircraft that might fire a missile—cruise missile, et

cetera—and on short-range type activities. And even in the shortrange ballistic, we really have had a capability, but nascent, at

best.

The dynamics, since the early 1990’s, when we had the fall of the

wall, but moved out of the Cold War, ballistic missiles have become

a weapon of choice in proliferation, because they can be fleeting. In

other words, they can be moved to someplace. So they are hard to

track. Their time of action is very, very quick. And, until you make

the decision to use them, you are not flying every day, et cetera,

and expending money. So they have become something that has

proliferated.

And so the threat associated with them has grown. And we

watched this in the first Gulf War, moving into the second and

really into the age that we are in today.

What we are trying to understand, as we do missile defense, is,

one, what is the right construct, and not be bounded by service

lines or acquisition lines or requirements lines that have grown up

in—not stovepipes—let’s call them ‘‘vertical cylinders of excellence’’,

okay—but be able to move across these and find excellence and

find leverage, and, when we do, to build the compelling argument

that this might be a better way to look at the problem.

25

And once we build that, then to try to say, ‘‘In this vertical structure, let’s optimize Aegis.’’

Mr. FRANKS. General, my time is about gone here.

General CARTWRIGHT. I am sorry.

Mr. FRANKS. I wanted one other question on the record here.

General CARTWRIGHT. Please go ahead.

Mr. FRANKS. Yesterday, at PACCOM, I had asked General Bell

how important ballistic missile defense (BMD) was to our

warfighters. And he responded, ‘‘I have got 800 of these missiles

pointed at U.S. troops right now in South Korea. So I would support vigorously a robust approach to theater ballistic missile defense, intercontinental ballistic missile defense. It is a very important part of the total approach to this very serious problem.’’

And I would sure like to get you on the record in about those

same kind of terms.

General CARTWRIGHT. You can use that quote for me.

But the idea here is that we don’t want to build a missile-defense

system for short range, a different system for cruise missiles, a different one for intercontinental. We have got to find a way to leverage the sensors across these mission areas, across these vertical organizations in a way that makes sense. And the only way to do

that is to take a look at it, find the value and then advocate,

‘‘Army, will you take this? Air Force?’’ You have to have one of

those services come on board at some point.

Some of that is very obvious. Aegis is a straightforward mix.

Once we build it, the Navy assumes it. The land-based missiles

have been pretty straightforward.

It is the sensors where we are trying to understand who ought

to be responsible. If the sensor is on the water, but really serves

for space or for air, who should run it and how should we manage

it? And we are working our way through that. We have got a good

forum with the warfighters to do it. We are not at a point where

that is critical yet on these new sensors, but discovery is part of

this activity in understanding it.

But, at the end of the day, the Nation does not want four or five

different ways to address these problems. You really want a combined way.

Mr. FRANKS. Thank you, General.

Thank you, Madam Chair.

Ms. TAUSCHER. You are welcome, Mr. Franks.

I am happy to yield to the Chairman of the Intelligence Committee, Mr. Reyes.

Mr. REYES. Thank you, Madam Chair.

General, good to see you again.

I have two different tracks that I want to ask you a couple of

questions about. The first one kind of builds on the questions that

you were just asked, because, in the past, combatant commanders

have expressed their concerns that they do not have sufficient

numbers of Patriot PAC–3 missiles, depending on the location, to

deal with missile threats that they are facing and their troops are

facing.

So my questions are, are you satisfied that the current numbers

of Patriot PAC–3 missiles in inventory are sufficient?

26

General CARTWRIGHT. If PAC–3 is the only defense, we don’t

have enough of them. What we are trying to understand, though,

is, in combination with the emerging Terminal High Altitude Area

Defense (THAAD) system——

Mr. REYES. Right.

General CARTWRIGHT [continuing]. In combination with——

Mr. REYES. But it will be a while before the THAAD

inventory——

General CARTWRIGHT. The line is hot, and we are producing. We

have a warm industrial base. We are upgrading those missiles,

based on new technology and new threat, and I believe that we are

in a good position.

If we had to freeze in time and we didn’t have any of these other

systems, you would need more PAC–3—commanders would ask you

for more PAC–3.

Mr. REYES. Right.

General CARTWRIGHT. But given that we are starting to bring on

Standard Missile-3 (SM–3) from—the naval variance of these capabilities—that THAAD has had a very good test record now, as we

have—we have put it back on the—we are trying to understand—

keep that line warm and producing, but understand what the right

balance is going to be for the Nation as we move——

Mr. REYES. Combination of THAAD and PAC——

General CARTWRIGHT. THAAD, PAC–3, the sea-based capabilities.

Mr. REYES. Is that a conversation that is ongoing——

General CARTWRIGHT. Yes.

Mr. REYES [continuing]. Right now, from your perspective, with

the Secretary of Defense and others?

General CARTWRIGHT. It is a conversation that is being informed

by tabletop technical war games within the Department, external

to the Department and the Government and external with our allies, because they have a big stake in this.

And so we have a series of war games and tabletop exercises that

we run to understand these balances and trades, because it is not

just our American systems, really. We are looking at systems associated with NATO, associated with other alliances to augment this.

And they should inform our investment decisions also.

Mr. REYES. There are areas in different parts of the world where,

basically, the Patriot is the only protection they have, thinking

about Japan——

General CARTWRIGHT. Right.

Mr. REYES [continuing]. Some areas in the Middle East.

Some of the NATO countries, as they have had discussions with

us, feel that that is their only protection, at this point, against the

Iranian missiles.

General CARTWRIGHT. Right.

Mr. REYES. Would you agree with all that?

General CARTWRIGHT. There are many countries that have fielded PAC–3 or PAC–2 as their primary defensive capabilities. Others

have gone with indigenous systems.

There is great value in having some diversity, in having some of

these indigenous systems, but PAC–3 is the—kind of the weapon

of choice.

27

Mr. REYES. Kind of a staple.

General CARTWRIGHT. It really is.

Mr. REYES. Just switching to space for a moment, we know that

there are multiple ways to achieve greater survivability and protection of our space assets to include hardening, on-orbit spares, redundancy, alternatives, such as UAVs and other such systems.

Can you tell me what the Department’s overall strategy for assuring support from space systems—what is the strategy for that?

General CARTWRIGHT. I think all of the things that you just highlighted in the diversity of the approaches to space are key.

In addition to that, trying to now net together for the U.S. all

of those who have utility in space—commercial, other agencies

within the Government, the intelligence community, et cetera. We

have, at STRATCOM, endeavored to bring those communities together in a common room, keep each other informed of intelligence,

of threats. We take responsibility for the defensive side to make

sure people understand what is out there, but netting together.

Now, what is different from when I talked to you last year is that

the DNI and DOD’s space operations centers are virtually netted

together. They have common deputy commanders. So, in other

words, we have a military person that is in both places in common.

So I have a unity of command, quick information whenever anything is conjunctioned in nature or other types of threats. And we

are developing that with the commercial sector. We have got to

move that to an international footing, and that is the next step.

Mr. REYES. All right. Thank you, General.

Thank you, Madam Chair.

Ms. TAUSCHER. Mr. Cartwright, I also want to pursue some questions on missile defense. And, you know, last year the committee

expressed concern that MDA’s program had been very focused on

what we consider to be long-term R&D efforts, such as Kinetic Energy Interceptor (KEI), at the expense of nearer-term capabilities

like THAAD and Aegis BMD.

And I am impressed, I did see in Colorado Springs your

Warfighter Involvement Program. And I think that there is a lot

that you have done to integrate with the other combatant commanders the sense that this is not a system looking for a buyer.

We also have, besides the warfighter, we have our allies, and, obviously, our homeland are the most important things for us to protect. We have Japan, obviously, working with us on—we have got

PAC–3s and other situations.

What are we doing to integrate the allied situation to make sure

that we have not just ourselves, and what are we doing to, once

again, make sure that people understand that this is a defensive

weapons system?

General CARTWRIGHT. A couple of activities that are going on. We

alluded to the exercise programs and the tabletop work. That helps

inform people of the capabilities. And, oftentimes, these systems

are attributed with capabilities they don’t have or are attributed

with less capability than they really have.

Much of what has been focused on in missile defense is the

ground-based interceptor. The reality is, for STRATCOM in particular, the larger capability here is one of a technology that does

28

not demand that you have to buy a certain sensor or a certain

weapon or have a certain command-and-control system.

The technology of today allows us to integrate, in a plug-and-play

way, in ways we never have been able to do before. That allows you

to build a collective defense mindset, rather than, ‘‘Let me show

you how I could do something for you.’’

This allows nations to bring to the table their capabilities, tailored for what they believe are their national priorities, their role

in a collective defense, and contribute, and build partnerships, as

they come to the table and understand the threat in the environment that they feel is appropriate to respond to for their national

needs. That is what is significantly different about this system,

that and the ability to integrate across, not just short-range ballistic, but a wide range.

So we saw South Korea announce that they wanted to focus on

short-range capabilities. It was appropriate for their problem, but

they can tie into the larger system in a way that allows them to

be an ally.

Take Australia or the United Kingdom. They tend to move with

us on a global nature. But they bring to the table different weapons

systems, different platforms to allow them to immediately join and

not have to go through an unnecessary change in their configuration, et cetera, allows more nations to come to the table, understand that this is a defensive capability, be able to articulate the

characteristics that are necessary for them, participate in a different scenario, if it is Iraq, as it was here recently, and still be

a viable contribution.

That is what is different about this system is its ability to move

and align policy and technical capability and intent and sovereignty into one system.

Ms. TAUSCHER. Thank you, General.

Mr. Everett.

Mr. EVERETT. More questions?

I have often said that missile defense hasn’t lacked funding so

much as it has lacked focus. It has gone off in pursuit of different

things at different times. And one perennial that keeps cropping up

is space-based systems, satellite-based systems.

Given your concern about counter-space systems and the problems they carry with them, is there any money requested this year

for space-based interceptors or something that might serve that

function?

General CARTWRIGHT. The only thing that I am aware of—and I

will go back and be very precise in the record—but the only thing

I am aware of that we are endeavoring to do in space is to increase

our sensor capability.

Right now, we have a set of sensors that allow us to characterize

very quickly a launch from anyplace on the Earth. We are going

to the next generation of that capability. It is a program of

record——

Mr. EVERETT. Space Based Infrared Surveillance (SBIRS)——

General CARTWRIGHT. This is the SBIRS-low portion of—remember SBIRS-high?

Mr. EVERETT. Yes.

29

General CARTWRIGHT. SBIRS-low? The SBIRS-low piece is coming into its initial test demonstration does-this-work phase.

That money is in the budget. I believe—and I would have to go

back, but I believe it is like 2016 before we actually go to—assuming that everything worked, we would go to a fielding of that, but,

in this budget, is resourced to start to work our way through the

SBIRS-low side of this, where you get the high-fidelity, quick-reacting knowledge that something has been launched.

Mr. EVERETT. Would you like to comment—as long as there is a

little time, would you like to comment on the complications of placing both radars and potential interceptors in Europe? If this is not

the right setting, I will understand, but——

General CARTWRIGHT. No. This is obviously an ongoing activity.

So I am trying to be cognizant and not prejudice that activity in

the negotiations that are ongoing. But I think it goes back to the

attributes that we would like to find of a collective defense, a defense alternative, an alternative to offense that is a credible defense.

What does it look like? What are the attributes of the system?

How do nations retain a certain amount of sovereignty and articulate their needs versus the global need? How do they fit in? Those

are the questions. And what does that do—I think one of the key

issues here is what does it do to the balance out there?

If an adversary is focused on offense-only capabilities and you introduce a defensive capability, what could be positive is that you

dissuade them from moving in a direction here—in the proliferation of ballistic missiles—in a direction that would have them further proliferate ballistic missiles.

But you have to be sensitive to the balances of offense and defense in the region. And so you have got to tailor it for the region.

And the region has to make a decision on how it wants to move

forward, and whether it finds value in defensive capabilities as an

alternative to offensive only.

Mr. EVERETT. Thank you very much.

One other question. What is the role of your command in putting

together a package of what we call Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat

Reduction (CTR)?

General CARTWRIGHT. I am glad you asked that. And I made

mention in my opening statement about how important I find

counter-proliferation, non-proliferation activities.

Mr. EVERETT. It was cut below the $400-million traditional

benchmark this year.

General CARTWRIGHT. I think that Nunn-Lugar and CTR, has

been an important vehicle in moving us forward, in helping us get

to a point where we have reduced the threat levels.

We really need to think about that construct, the attributes of

Nunn-Lugar, in a broader context for nations who are not necessarily today a threat, but who, if we gave them the right tools,

could, not only move in an appropriate direction in the international community, but help themselves.

Nunn-Lugar gives us the ability to help nations police their borders, understand what is happening inside of their borders, control

that, report, when it is appropriate to report, to a larger organization that, ‘‘Hey, I have got a problem. Something is here.’’

30

It has had many successes. It has had many challenges. But it

has had many successes. What we would like to do is build on

those successes, helping nations help themselves, in phase zero and

phase one, long before we get to a conflict-type stage.

I believe there is an awful lot that we could do in those areas

that would be hugely leveraging. We are pushing hard to start to

understand that, working with our counterparts at the State Department and trying to understand a framework in which we could

move this forward on a larger scale than what Nunn-Lugar had envisioned from the standpoint of the former Soviet states.

Mr. EVERETT. Thank you, sir.

Ms. TAUSCHER. Mr. Franks.

Mr. FRANKS. Madam Chairman, I didn’t know we were going to

have another round here. I thought that these other guys were just

more important than me.

Ms. TAUSCHER. At this moment, no one is more important than

you.

Mr. FRANKS. Thank you.

Ms. TAUSCHER. For the next three and a half minutes. [Laughter.]

Mr. FRANKS. Well, General, appreciate getting another chance

here.

You know, I obviously agreed with your assessment of the importance of later defense, which includes protecting our space assets.

But given the aggression—or perhaps that is a bad word—just the

developments in China, Iran and North Korea, how do you advise

legislators about our current and future missile-defense priorities?

I mean, I know that has been touched on a lot, both in terms of

funding, and, as Mr. Spratt has said, you know, the focus of where

those priorities should be.

General CARTWRIGHT. On the missile-defense side, and referring

to priorities for fulfilling operational need, we have advocated for

continuing to complete defense of the United States, but really to

start more focus on deployed forces, allies and friends, building an

integrated cooperative defensive capability globally.

To me, the deployed forces capabilities and the allies and friends,

integrating them in, is where we want to be focused over the next

few years, not to the exclusion, but it offers, operationally, a significant amount of leverage in our capability and a way to balance our

operational offensive capabilities, not necessarily just our strategic,

but our operational forces, because, again, if Aegis only had offensive capabilities to bring to the fight, it would send a message by

its presence, and there are other messages you could use that platform to send that would be reducing tension, rather than posturing

to increase it.

And having defensive capabilities on your tactical and operational, conventional, general-purpose forces is equally important

to having it in your strategic forces. Does that make sense?

Mr. FRANKS. Sure.

Let me just see if I could just key off that, you know. I think,

as you say, you know, when you have a defensive capability that

has no intrinsic threat to potential opponents, it sort of lowers the

decibel level a little bit.

31

With that said, you know, with some of the—to use your

phrase—the forward-deployed forces, allies and friends being at potential risk across the world, and, of course, with our homeland as

well, what do you think—you have stated that there is a great advantage in maintaining a defensive posture.

What do you think the risks are associated with reducing the

numbers of our interceptors or reducing our emphasis on missile

defense, as it were, both in the minds of our potential adversaries

and in real terms?

General CARTWRIGHT. The initial—and you never know on second-, third-order effect, but the initial piece is that you would

have—what we are trying to build is something that we can tailor.

So the adversary who has a perception of threat that is unique to

that adversary, we will reduce the tool kit that we have to keep

them from going to conflict.

Having more defensive options, in addition to a reasonable set of

offensive options, allows us to tailor against more adversaries,

against the adversaries changing their mind and changing the

character of the threat, as we saw with, say, the emergence of terrorists and things like that, the ability to have a reasonably comprehensive continuum of capability, which goes from non-conflicttype activities to defensive activities to conventional to nuclear,

having that continuum so that the commander of the Pacific Command can look at a particular area and say, ‘‘This is what will effect them the most.’’ If he has a hole in his capability, he is going

to have to overbalance with something else.

And so, I mean, you can carry this to an extreme, and I am not

trying to drive you in that direction, but having a reasonable continuum that allows you to tailor appropriate for what it is you are

trying to address is where we want to get.

If we end up with no conventional long-range prompt ballistic or

we end up with a gap in our capability on the defensive side, say,

against chemical munitions or something like that, that becomes a

seam, and you have to overbalance to compensate for the existence

of that seam.

Mr. FRANKS. Okay. Well, General, just a last brief question.

Given the potential of rogue states to gain even a nuclear capability, but perhaps with an unorthodox delivery system, do you still

think that missile defense is important and pertinent to, say,

again, terrorists getting hold of some type of weapon that they

might try to deliver—how important do you think missile defense

is to addressing that problem?

General CARTWRIGHT. From the standpoint of an actual scenario,

difficult to lay out, but, generally, with a terrorist organization,

they are looking for a seam by which to be aggressive toward you.

Oftentimes, in the calculus of an adversary, what we are seeking

to do is take their objective away. So if you take away the highend objectives, they may have been able to afford them. They may

not have.

If you take away even the mid-level objectives of, say, being able

to take a crude weapon or a crude airplane or turn some vehicle—

if you start to take those away, then you get to the very difficult,

which is to take away from an individual who is willing to sacrifice

32

their life for what they believe is a cause. How do you deter that

type of an individual? What type of defenses do you put together?

And the reality is, again, you are still trying to take away their

objective. You may do it through what we would call consequence

management. In other words, make it very difficult to approach a

building or to get through an airport, et cetera.

So you have to layer this in, but you don’t want to leave a hole

in order to go—you don’t want to play ninth-grade soccer, where

everybody goes to the ball. You really want to build a continuum.

But it is—the most difficult is to take away from an individual

who answers to no one in their timing and is very difficult to monitor at the entity level, take away their objective from them. That

is what you seek to do in consequence management.

Mr. FRANKS. Thank you, Madam Chairman.

Thank you, General. I still love your Marine understatement.

Ms. TAUSCHER. General Cartwright, for an hour and 45 minutes,

you have captivated this committee with one piece of paper in front

of you. I think you may have referred to it once or twice. It probably tells you where you are going next. We want to thank you

and—see if Mr. Reyes has anything else.

You want to add another question?

Mr. REYES. Just one quick question.

General, the U.S. currently does not have the capability to support Aegis BMD operations in Central Command’s (CENTCOM)

area of responsibility. This is primarily due to the fact that all

BMD-capable Aegis ships are assigned to the Pacific and there are

no naval magazines certified to handle this—missiles in the

CENTCOM AOR.

Given the current and emerging Iranian ballistic missile threat

to the region, what steps are you taking to ensure that we can conduct Aegis BMD operations in CENTCOM’s AOR?

General CARTWRIGHT. The fielding rate now includes ships configured and capable. We have to work our way through the magazines this year. If we had to act absent the magazines being certified, et cetera, we could do that. It would take airlift and some

other things to work our way through that. We can do that.

It is really more of a policy question, and what is it we want to

be able to do and what effect do we want to create. And it is

wrapped up in the larger debate about missile defense in Europe

and all that. All of these pieces have to come together in a way.

But this highlights for you it could be that we decide we want

a missile defense capability in that part of the region, but not in

the—so what would be appropriate? SM–3 gives us an awful lot of

flexibility in those types of things, as does Patriot.

So we can respond in that area if we believe that that is consistent with how we want to posture in that region, and I turn to, in

this case, currently John Abizaid, but, eventually, Admiral Fallon,

here as he takes the reins, to think our way through that, exercise

work with the partners, decide what is appropriate, and then when

do you want to introduce that capability, because you have to be

sensitive to the offense-defense balance that is there now, and the

allies that live in the region, how they want to posture.

But, technically and logistically, we can do this.

Mr. REYES. All right. Thank you.

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Thank you, Madam Chair.

Ms. TAUSCHER. General Cartwright, thank you very much. We

want to extend our best wishes to you and the thousands of people

that you command in STRATCOM. Please extend to them our very

best wishes and thank them for their service. We thank you for

your service. You are certainly a strategic asset to this country.

We appreciate your time. And we look forward to having you testify again before us in the near future. Thank you.

General CARTWRIGHT. Thank you.

[Whereupon, at 4:48 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

A P P E N D I X

MARCH 8, 2007

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

MARCH 8, 2007

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QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE

RECORD

MARCH 8, 2007

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. TAUSCHER

Ms. TAUSCHER. Today, while USSTRATCOM is active in setting warfighter’s requirements for military capabilities, it is the responsibility of the services to fund

and develop those capabilities. a. Please describe the working relationship between

USSTRATCOM and the services. b. Is there a gap between USSTRATCOM’s mission needs and the services’ ability to fund and carry out the needed programs? c.

Do you perceive a trending convergence or divergence between warfighter requirements and the services’ programs to carry them forth?

General CARTWRIGHT. a. Processes are in place to address Service funded Combatant Commander warfighting requirements, such as the Integrated Priority List

(IPL), Senior Warfighter Forum (SWARF), Joint Requirements Oversight Council

and other Senior Leader Forums. While the Services are largely responsive to Combatant Commander requirements, today’s constrained resource environment leads to

inevitable disagreements on some issues. The current DOD Planning, Programming,

Budgeting and Execution (PPBE) process anticipates ‘‘friction points’’ and incorporates checks and balances, to include direct appeal to the Secretary of Defense,

prior to finalizing the President’s Budget for submission to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). b. Fiscal constraints prevent fully funding all of

USSTRATCOM’s mission requirements; however, the DOD Planning, Programming,

Budgeting and Execution (PPBE) process provides ample opportunity for the Services, COCOMs, Joint Staff and OSD principals to vet and determine DOD funding

priorities. c. Convergence is perceived between warfighter requirements and service

programming actions.

Ms. TAUSCHER. Over the past 15 years, USSTRATCOM has evolved to become a

command with many missions. How do you envision the command to change in the

next 15–20 years?

General CARTWRIGHT. The transformation of U.S. Strategic Command over the

past 15 years has been one borne out of necessity. All of the mission areas, while

diverse in their detailed characteristics, are strategic in nature and global or unconstrained by geographic boundaries. The recent implementation of joint functional

components places a strong operational focus on the mission areas, while the headquarters staff focuses on supporting the President and Secretary of Defense, providing strategic guidance to the command, and ensuring synchronization across all of

the commands efforts.

Looking into the future, I believe Strategic Command will take on a role similar

to U.S. Special Operations Command as a force provider of unique global capabilities, responsible for cradle to grave development, fielding and employment of capabilities in support of global operations.

New or currently unidentified adversaries will continue to emerge. Strategic Command will have a greatly increased role in our nation’s daily defense, as adversaries

continue to seek an advantage by avoiding our traditional strengths in conventional

military forces. In particular, cyberspace will become a central front in our national

defense as criminals, terrorists, and nation states attack our vulnerable seams.

The Strategic Command organizational structure will continue to evolve as the

New Triad of capabilities is fully fielded. Within 20 years, most of the capabilities

now under development will be fully operational and legacy systems designed for

the Cold War will be gradually phased out. Allied and interagency collaboration will

have a significantly larger role within Strategic Command’s mission areas and as

a result our relationships beyond the Department of Defense will need to be as robust as those internal to DOD are now.

Ms. TAUSCHER. In a 2006 report, GAO found that better guidance and communications between the STRATCOM leadership and its components was needed to enhance the command’s ability to execute its missions. a. Please describe the relationship between the USSTRATCOM’s service components and the new JFCCs. Has this

relationship had an opportunity to fully mature? b. How has the execution of

USSTRATCOM’s mission improved since the implementation of JFCCs?

General CARTWRIGHT. Initially, USSTRATCOM HQ, its service components, and

functional components relied principally on telephone and electronic mail for

connectivity and synchronization. These methods were far from optimum. Today,

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new tools are in place. All components now enjoy full real-time collaborative

connectivity via the STRATCOM Knowledge Integration Web (SKIWeb) and Global

Operations—Collaborative Environment (GOC–CE) at all levels of security. Their

employment has fostered a much better level of understanding/interaction amongst

all components; hence a greater ability for timely and on-the-mark functional component execution, supported by the capabilities and resources supplied by the service components. b. The implementation of JFCCs has created synergy among

USSTRATCOM’s assigned missions. We have gained tremendous effectiveness by

the alignment of our JFCCs with service or agency centers of excellence. We continue to mature this capability through robust exercise and training opportunities.

Ms. TAUSCHER. According to a September, 2006 GAO report, USSTRATCOM

JFCCs lack adequate direction and criteria for declaring Full Operating Capability.

According to that same report, all of the JFCC’s were scheduled to reach the FOC

milestone in 2006 or 2007. What measures have been taken to ensure that when

the JFCC’s reach the FOC milestone they have, in fact, achieved the required capability?

General CARTWRIGHT. Our focus in 2006 was to achieve an Initial Operating Capability across the command as adequate resources were made available. We have

established an integrated training and exercise program that will evaluate and enhance JFCC and command-wide operational capabilities. We will continually monitor the command’s progress on six month increments. Our components are

resourced and operational today and we will continue to improve our capability as

we move toward full operational capability.

Ms. TAUSCHER. Please describe the process involved in setting requirements for

the future nuclear force structure. What is USSTRATCOM’s role? What obstacles

or challenges might be impeding more specific definition of military requirements

for the future nuclear force structure?

General CARTWRIGHT. USSTRATCOM provides warfighter force structure requirements to the Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC) through the Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Memorandum (NWSM) development process. The process culminates in an annual memorandum to the President from the Secretaries of Defense and Energy

that specifies the size and composition of the stockpile. Implementation of the New

TRIAD, particularly in the areas of offensive strike and responsive infrastructure,

will enable us to better define future military nuclear force structure requirements.

Ms. TAUSCHER. Does USSTRATCOM have a position on ratification of the CTBT,

given that one of the key objectives of RRW is to minimize the likelihood of testing?

General CARTWRIGHT. RRW provides a path forward for the long-term

sustainment of nuclear capabilities in the absence of underground nuclear testing.

RRW transformation, therefore, will address many of the stockpile sustainment concerns raised with respect to ratification of the CTBT. RRW, however, is still in the

early stages of development and a national decision has not been made to proceed.

If that decision is made, it will take decades to replace all the legacy warheads in

the stockpile. RRW has the potential to be a key element in the ratification of CTBT

if we continue through the various development and fielding milestones.

Ms. TAUSCHER. What is the warfighter’s need for RRW? Can the warfighter’s

needs be satisfied by maintaining just the current stockpile through the Stockpile

Stewardship Program and LEPs?

General CARTWRIGHT. A long-term strategy based on extending the life of legacy

warheads leaves the nation heavily reliant on a limited number of aging, increasingly costly and difficult to maintain warhead types for its nuclear deterrent. Such

a strategy does not adequately exercise the facilities, scientists, engineers, and technicians needed for a responsive infrastructure. Many of our legacy warhead types

need to be refurbished or replaced over the next several decades when the scientists,

engineers and technicians that developed, tested and fielded legacy nuclear weapons

will be retired.

As a result, we continue to maintain a large and costly ‘‘hedge’’ of non-deployed

warheads to mitigate the risks of technological and/or operational surprise. It is difficult to predict if, or when, the current strategy may become unsustainable or when

we will face a technical challenge we may not be able to resolve without testing.

Delaying transformation until we reach that point may put stockpile readiness and

the nuclear deterrent at significant risk.

Life Extension Program strategies address individual component issues without

regard to end-to-end design. Eventually, (10–15 yrs.) the number of component

changes compromizes our ability to certify in the absence of testing.

Ms. TAUSCHER. How do decisions on future delivery systems (e.g., ICBM, bomber

modernization) impact RRW capabilities and timelines? Conversely, how do RRW

decisions influence development of future delivery systems?

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General CARTWRIGHT. Future delivery system decisions have little impact on RRW

capabilities and timelines. The health of the legacy stockpile, infrastructure, and

planned life extension activities are the principal drivers for RRW development and

deployment strategy. RRWs will be sized to the same dimensions as the legacy warheads they replace and provide similar military capability. RRWs will be integrated

into their delivery systems during development. Modularity and interoperability enable compatibility with existing and future delivery systems and provides a spiral

development pathway for the future. The first RRW, for example, will be compatible

with the Navy’s D5 submarine launched ballistic missile and adaptable to the Air

Force’s MinuteMan III inter-continental ballistic missile and follow-on long-range

strike delivery systems. Future delivery systems will enable us to take full advantage of RRW’s features through common interfaces and the use of common modular

components.

Ms. TAUSCHER. Have the warfighter’s needs been adequately captured in the RRW

design and decision-making process?

General CARTWRIGHT. USSTRATCOM was an active participant in the RRW Feasibility Study and the Nuclear Weapons Council decision making process and remains actively engaged to ensure RRW meets warfighter needs. These warfighter

requirements have been validated in a Joint Requirements Oversight Council

Memorandum.

Ms. TAUSCHER. What role will RRW play in the nation’s overall strategic deterrence and New Triad objectives, particularly given investments in a conventional

PGS capability?

General CARTWRIGHT. RRW coupled with a responsive infrastructure is an important element in our tailored deterrence strategy. Transformation of the nuclear enterprise, coupled with other elements of the New TRIAD, will further reduce our reliance on nuclear weapons.

Ms. TAUSCHER. What risks do you see, if any, in pursuing a ‘‘Life Extension Program-only’’ strategy as opposed to proceeding with the reliable replacement warhead?

General CARTWRIGHT. A long-term strategy based on extending the life of legacy

warheads leaves the nation heavily reliant on a limited number of aging, increasingly costly and difficult to maintain warhead types for its nuclear deterrent. Such

a strategy does not adequately exercise the facilities, scientists, engineers, and technicians needed for a responsive infrastructure. Many of our legacy warhead types

need to be refurbished or replaced over the next several decades when the scientists,

engineers and technicians that developed, tested and fielded legacy nuclear weapons

will be retired.

As a result, we continue to maintain a large and costly ‘‘hedge’’ of non-deployed

warheads to mitigate the risks of technological and/or operational surprise. It is difficult to predict if, or when, the current strategy may become unsustainable or when

we will face a technical challenge we may not be able to resolve without testing.

Delaying transformation until we reach that point may put stockpile readiness and

the nuclear deterrent at significant risk.

Life Extension Program strategies address individual component issues without

regard to end-to-end design. Eventually, (10–15 yrs.) the number of component

changes compromizes our ability to certify in the absence of testing.

Ms. TAUSCHER. Do you perceive a capability gap in the Prompt Global Strike

arena? If so, when evaluating options for Prompt Global Strike, can the warfighter

afford to accept the risk imposed by that capability gap for the next 12–15 years

or more until an alternative technology might first be available?

General CARTWRIGHT. A capability gap in the Prompt Global Strike arena exists.

The nation requires the capability to deliver prompt, non-nuclear kinetic effects

under all conditions across a range of scenarios. Given adversarial offensive space

activities, missile and WMD proliferation and aspirations, and the potential of

emerging high value, time sensitive targets in the global war on terror (GWOT), a

near-term solution to deploy a PGS capability is essential. We also require a alternative prompt global strike capability in order to avoid high risk, self deterring scenarios.

Ms. TAUSCHER. Six years have passed since the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review laid

out the framework of the New Triad, yet the U.S. has yet to implement this new

vision. What is your vision for the New Triad? What technologies are of greatest

importance to the warfighter in trying to implement this New Triad?

General CARTWRIGHT. We envision a broad suite of integrated offensive and defensive capabilities enabled by persistent global command and control (C2), robust

planning and intelligence, and a responsive defense infrastructure that provides improved agility and flexibility in dealing with a wider range of contingencies. Technologies of greatest importance include robust offensive, defensive, and exploitation

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cyber capabilities in order to defend the Nation’s economic base, cruise and ballistic

missile defense integration into a collective defence network, horizontally integrated

persistent ISR capabilities, and a broader array of offensive prompt, precise kinetic

and non-kinetic capabilities are essential.

Ms. TAUSCHER. In the Fiscal Year 2007 National Defense Authorization Act, Congress expressed a number of concerns with the Conventional Trident Modification

proposal including the maturity of the concept of operations and risk of misinterpretation. Do you believe the concerns raised by Congress have been adequately addressed?

General CARTWRIGHT. The Department has worked hard to address congressional

concerns. In March 2007, we delivered the Conventional Trident Modification (CTM)

Report to Congress which addressed the CTM concept of operations as well as our

recommended approaches for addressing misinterpretation. The potential risk of

misinterpretation of a CTM missile launch as a nuclear attack is extremely low and

can be effectively managed. The United States and the Russian Federation now

have a more cooperative and less adversarial relationship than during the Cold

War, and this new relationship provides improved transparency and understanding

to any launch of a ballistic missile.

Ms. TAUSCHER. According to one press article, the Conventional Trident Modification submarines would use a weapon virtually identical to its nuclear-armed twin;

would remain on patrol typically just off Russian coasts, potentially posing at least

a debris threat to Russia; would likely be closed to Russian onsite inspection; and

would possibly take hours or longer to receive target data and steam within range

of nations where fleeting threats may appear. By comparison, this article claims

that ‘‘a land-based missile could be configured so it is incapable of carrying a nuclear payload and use a trajectory to its target that would not threaten other nuclear weapons nations. It also could be inspected by the Russians under existing

arms control regimes, based on a U.S. coastline so launch debris could fall in the

ocean rather than on land, and made capable of being rapidly retargeted.’’ What are

your views of the merit of this comparison between the Conventional Trident Modification and a possible conventional ICBM?

General CARTWRIGHT. Both land based and sea based prompt global strike capabilities are envisioned to be part of the options available to national leadership in

the future. Both land and sea based prompt global strike concepts have unique considerations and characteristics. Our approach to prospective concept of operations

and international engagements seeks to minimize constraints and risks and maximize capability. We support continued development of a broad array of prompt global strike options to support tailored deterrence in the 21st century. Conventional

Trident Modification (CTM) is a ‘‘hedge’’ opportunity to begin closing the gap, and

is part of a broader, time-phased strategy leading to a robust suite of PGS capabilities.

Ms. TAUSCHER. In October 2006, the President issued a new national space policy.

How has, or will, this policy affect STRATCOM missions and operations?

General CARTWRIGHT. USSTRATCOM ensures all mission planning, coordination

and operations are consistent with National Space Policy. The revised space policy

in 2006 served to echo the already on-going efforts at USSTRATCOM in promoting

the use of space by all nations for peaceful purposes while preserving our rights,

capabilities, and freedom of action in space.

Ms. TAUSCHER. We have seen considerable coverage of the Chinese anti-satellite

test since our subcommittee met with you immediately after the January test. Now

that the community has had time to reflect on the significance of the event: a. What

lessons learned have you taken from the event and what aspects of our space operations need improvement? b. What type of counterspace and space situational

awareness systems do you think will be needed in the future to combat threats to

space? c. Do you see the priorities for space acquisition outlined in the 2008 President’s Budget altered due to the Chinese ASAT test?

General CARTWRIGHT. The Chinese ASAT test increases the risk to the manned

and unmanned space assets for all space-faring nations and, as a result we are reexamining our ability to continue to operate effectively in the event of kinetic or

non-kinetic ASAT employment by an adversary. The test also reaffirmed our need

to increase our space situational awareness (SSA) abilities. The Air Force, as the

Executive Agent for Space, identified the need to increase SSA as its number one

space funding priority. USSTRATCOM will work closely with the services to define

the appropriate SSA architecture, as well as a viable protection strategy for our

spacecraft. Vulnerability of low earth orbit satellites to increased space debris

caused by destructive testing or direct attack also highlighted the need to rapidly

adjust our space readiness levels, and for improved capability to quickly launch and

augment or reconstitute a space-based asset. b. First, we must better understand

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the ‘‘Who, What, Where, and Why’’ regarding every space based object and activity.

Improvements to our ground and space-based Space Situational Awareness (SSA)

capabilities will allow us to differentiate between environmental and ‘‘man-made’’

unintentional or malicious effects on the Nation’s space assets. Capabilities that incorporate improved defensive space posturing measures may include shutter controls, anti-jamming, sensor detection, proximity warning, enhanced ground facility

security, cryptological user equipment protection upgrades and other alternatives. c.

Yes. Additional discussion is classified.

Ms. TAUSCHER. What is USSTRATCOM’s position on the development of a code

of conduct or ‘‘rules of the road’’ for space-faring nations?

General CARTWRIGHT. While existing Treaties and Conventions provide adequate

guidance on proper space-faring conduct, we are looking at the potential utility of

a code of conduct or ‘‘rules of the road’’ for additional value in providing a common

understanding or defining differences in acceptable or unacceptable behavior within

a medium shared by all nations.

Ms. TAUSCHER. There are a multiple ways to achieve greater survivability and

protection of our space assets—hardening, on-orbit spares, redundancy, distributed

architectures, alternatives such as UAVs, active prevention and denial, non-material

solutions, and rapid replenishment. a. What is the Department’s overall strategy for

assuring support from space systems? If possible, please comment on the costs and

operational considerations of the different strategies. b. In your opinion, what is the

military utility of an operationally responsive space capability?

General CARTWRIGHT. USSTRATCOM is working to better integrate both space

and non-space capabilities across multiple domains. This integration extends across

our national services and agencies to allied forces and commercial entities. The resulting ‘‘network’’ of capabilities, includes communications, Intelligence Surveillance

and Reconnaissance (ISR), and Space Situational Awareness (SSA) sensors, and will

maximize our capacity to support the warfighter while providing redundancy to critical assets, reducing potential single-points-of-failure. This approach will diversify

our risk portfolio across multiple mediums and multiple participants. Better integration will further transform the warfighter’s perspective of space from ‘‘platforms and

programs’’ to ‘‘capabilities and effects.’’

Operationally Responsive Space (ORS) will enable improved integration through

rapid deployment/employment of new, pre-planned, or existing capabilities. It will

link operational, acquisition, industry partners, and science and technology communities to rapidly exploit emergent capabilities to fill operational gaps. ORS will generate warfighting effects for operational and tactical use in response to urgent or

unanticipated needs. The focus is on responsiveness. Tasked by a Joint Force Commander, it will be timely and targeted to the need, while enhancing survivability

and adversary deterrence. b. The Operationally Responsive Space (ORS) concept is

intended to rapidly deliver space capabilities to the Joint Force Commanders. This

will enable the warfighter to integrate space capabilities when and where needed

to produce the desired effect. ORS strategy includes rapid exploitation of new or innovative space technical and operational capabilities, augmenting space capabilities

in time of crisis, and reconstituting capabilities when required. ORS is presently in

the experimentation and demonstration phase.

Ms. TAUSCHER. The current national security space architecture is comprised of

big, complex, and costly satellite systems which require a decade of development.

Cost overruns and schedule delays in space acquisition programs, such as SBIRSHigh, GPS–IIF, and NPOESS, continue to be attributed to requirements growth, inadequate cost estimating, and lack of systems engineering, to name a few. a. To

what extent have these acquisition issues impacted the warfighter? b. What changes

to the current and programmed national security space architecture would you recommend? c. TSAT and Space Radar are costly ‘‘transformational’’ programs. In this

budget constrained environment, is it wise for DOD to invest so much of its resources in systems that will not be available until 2016 at the earliest? Should the

DOD reconsider its transformation goals and concentrate on providing users with

evolved or cloned systems based on those currently under development?

General CARTWRIGHT. Freedom of action in space requires the dexterity to counter

or out pace threats that are always evolving. The Nation continues to depend on

complex, robust systems to provide our warfighters the necessary tactical, operational and strategic advantage. One of the focus areas for space acquisition is continuity of service, especially in missile warning, strategic communications, and positioning, navigation, and timing. Delays in these programs could jeopardize the assured continuity of space support to the warfighter.

Delaying the capabilities provided by these systems impacts the warfighter with

increased reliance on aging less reliable, less responsive systems. This may result

in delay information delays and reduced battlefield decision cycles at all echelons.

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b. USSTRATCOM is working to better integrate both space and non-space capabilities across multiple domains. This integration extends across our national services

and agencies to allied forces and commercial entities. The resulting ‘‘network’’ of capabilities, includes communications, Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance

(ISR), and Space Situational Awareness (SSA) sensors, and will maximize our capacity to support the warfighter while providing redundancy to critical assets, reducing potential single-points-of-failure. This approach will diversify our risk portfolio across multiple mediums and multiple participants. Better integration will further transform the warfighter’s perspective of space from ‘‘platforms and programs’’

to ‘‘capabilities and effects.’’

Operationally Responsive Space (ORS) will enable improved integration through

rapid deployment/employment of new, pre-planned, or existing capabilities. It will

link operational, acquisition, industry partners, and science and technology communities to rapidly exploit emergent capabilities to fill operational gaps. ORS will generate warfighting effects for operational and tactical use in response to urgent or

unanticipated needs. The focus is on responsiveness. Tasked by a Joint Force Commander, it will be timely and targeted to the need, while enhancing survivability

and adversary deterrence. c. USSTRATCOM continuously looks to balance the

promise of transformational capability advances with evolved capabilities. We continue to advocate for the attributes inherent in TSAT and Space radar. An incremental/block approach coupled with these attributes:

—Integration across domains

—Integration of allied communications capabilities

—Diversified risk portfolios

Ms. TAUSCHER. Some have observed a ‘‘friction’’ between the DOD and Intelligence Community on space matters. a. What areas of black-white space integration

need improvement? b. In your opinion, is the current national security space organization and management structure responsive to the warfighter? c. If not, what

changes to the organization and management would you recommend?

General CARTWRIGHT. Black-white space integration continues to improve. A far

more collaborative operational relationship exists today than in the past. Numerous

operational examples of collaboration include the sharing of data and best practices.

Data previously held only in black channels is now routinely passed to white world

operators to help build a comprehensive space activity picture. In our organization

and management areas, there are many successes, which include crossflow of personnel and the establishment of the NRO’s Deputy Director for Mission Support

wearing a second hat as the Deputy Commander of my Joint Functional Component

Command for Space. These initiatives further reinforce on-going collaboration efforts

and improve situational awareness for both the black and white communities. We

continue working with the intelligence community on issues of classification. b. Recent national security space organizational and management structure changes continue to facilitate responsiveness to the joint warfighter. The establishment of the

USSTRATCOM Joint Functional Component Command for Space (JFCC SPACE),

designation of the Deputy Director of Mission Support for the National Reconnaissance Office to serve as the JFCC Space Deputy Commander, and the establishment

of a Director of Space Forces (DIRSPACEFOR) within the theater for support to the

Joint Force Commander have been positive steps to improve integration of space capabilities into joint operations. c. There are no additional organization and management changes needed at this time. We continue to look for ways to improve our support to warfighters around the globe.

Ms. TAUSCHER. In 2002, former Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld exempted the Missile Defense Agency from the normal DOD requirements process. In understand that

STRATCOM and MDA have developed a new program called the Warfighter Involvement Program (WIP) to ensure warfighter views are incorporated into the missile defense development process. To date, are you satisfied with WIP process? Are

there areas where the process could be improved?

General CARTWRIGHT. The Warfighter Involvement Process (WIP) has become the

accepted means for advocacy of needed missile defense capabilities; however, the

process is still growing to meet the demands of the warfighter. We are working with

the Missile Defense Agency to develop a single document describing our respective

roles, responsibilities, and objectives under the Warfighter Involvement Process

(WIP). Creation of this formal document establishes a reference for the entire missile defense community and serves as the standard against which we may gauge future process improvements.

Ms. TAUSCHER. In the 2006 Prioritized Capability List (PCL), the annual list that

STRATCOM provides to MDA outlining the warfighter’s prioritized list of capability

needs for future missile defense systems, you outlined a number of key requireVerDate 22-MAR-2001 11:33 Sep 26, 2008 Jkt 037317 PO 00000 Frm 00070 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\DOCS\110-31\067290.000 HAS2 PsN: HAS2
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ments. These included, among others: ensuring missile defense communications;

maintaining the operational availability of the GMD system; and expanding our capability to defeat ballistic missiles in their terminal phase. To what extent has MDA

been responsive to STRATCOM’s requirements as outlined in the PCL? What areas

need improvement?

General CARTWRIGHT. MDA adheres to a capabilities-based ballistic missile defense systems acquisition approach. To enhance warfighter needs and system development efforts, MDA has partnered with USSTRATCOM to develop the Warfighter

Involvement Process (WIP). The WIP enables prioritized guidance on needed Combatant Commander capabilities to MDA’s developmental efforts. MDA has announced plans to focus their 2007 Summer Study around the just delivered second

iteration of USSTRATCOM prioritized capabilities list (PCL). By taking this approach, MDA has clearly indicated their willingness to further incorporate

warfighter needs into system development and acquisition processes. We continue

to improve and refine our Warfighter-MDA information exchange processes. This includes better definition of the capabilities sought in the PCL and greater granularity

in the capability development plans included in MDA’s PCL response. Development

continues on an effective means for warfighter appraisal of these development plans.

Ms. TAUSCHER. MDA (and its legacy organizations SDIO and BMDO) is first and

foremost a research and development organization, whose primary responsibility is

to develop future capabilities. Because the services have generally been reluctant to

assume responsibility for fielding missile defense capabilities, MDA has been forced

to take up the slack. Given its new and emerging missions, is MDA currently structured to provide optimal support to the warfighter? If not, what changes to MDA’s

current structure would you recommend?

General CARTWRIGHT. MDA is an effective research and development activity that

focuses on warfighter BMD needs. Recently, MDA leadership activated the

Warfighter Support Center, located at Schriever Air Force Base. The Warfighter

Support Center’s mission is to coordinate enhanced operations and logistics support

to warfighting activities. We are begnning to take steps to integrate the BMD architecture with the appropriate Cruise Missile Defense (CMD) architecture. Military

Services are developing CMD capabilities independent of a warfighter-centeric architecture that integrates command and control, battle management, sensors, and

weapons across these service capabilities. Integrating these CMD architectures with

those of BMD is problematic when CMD lies outside MDA’s charter. MDA is focused

on providing products and services that meet warfighter needs. An example of MDA

effectiveness includes the BMDS Transition and Transfer planning process which

provides a framework for the operationalization of BMDS elements. We should leverage the ballistic missile defense work MDA has completed to date by expanding

their focus to include cruise missile defense configuration and architecture. A MDA

configuration management role over service Cruise Missile Defense (CMD) capabilities, responsive to a single Air and Missile Defense Integrating Authority that would

balance and integrate MDA BMD and service CMD development would ensure common data standards, command and control, and situational awareness integration.

Ms. TAUSCHER. In 2002, the Unified Command Plan (UCP) assigned STRATCOM

responsibility for planning, coordinating, and integrating global missile defense operations. However, mission execution (i.e., pulling the trigger) remains the responsibility of each geographic combatant commander in their respective area of responsibility (AOR). Do you believe you currently have sufficient authority to ‘‘adjudicate’’

disputes that could arise between combatant commanders during missile defense operations? How are you using your current authorities, as outlined in the UCP, to

minimize disputes from occurring?

General CARTWRIGHT. We do not have the authority to adjudicate disputes, rather

we provide a recommendation for leadership to consider in the deliberation and decision process. We provide supporting capabilities to enable mission execution by designated geographical combatant commanders. Where issues arise over prioritization

of forces, through the Request for Forces (RFF) process, we provide a recommendation to the Global Force Management Board in determining allocation of high demand missile defense forces. We conduct collaborative planning and work with the

Combatant Commands (COCOMs) to resolve areas where disagreements arise. One

avenue is the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) Management Structure,

with representatives from the OCOMs, Missile Defense Agency (MDA), and other

partners to resolve issues at an early stage. This has been successful to date in resolving issues. We continue to conduct wargames such as Nimble Titan and exercises with Combatant Commanders to increase our knowledge of ballistic missile defense operations. We insert new knowledge and lessons learned into current operational procedures and plans.

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Ms. TAUSCHER. STRATCOM recently completed a Capabilities Mix Study, which

outlines the combatant commander’s future missile defense force structure requirements. What were the key findings from that study? How were the results of that

study taken into account in the President’s FY08 budget request?

General CARTWRIGHT. USSTRATCOM participated in the Joint Staff-led Joint Capabilities Mix (JCM) Study that explored weapon and sensor mixes to counter expected threats in three major operation areas in future epics. Part I recommended

an increase to the number of Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) Firing

Units and interceptors, an increase of Standard Missile (SM–3) interceptors, and

continued support of the Sea-Based Terminal program. Once approved, Part II (completed in March 2007) will provide an initial recommendation for the minimum

number of upper-tier THAAD and SM–3 interceptors required for combat operations

in 2015 for a near-simultaneous two MCO fight. Joint Staff-led Joint Capabilities

Mix (JCM) I concluded in April 2006 and influenced MDA’s programmatic decisions

to increase the number of Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) Firing

Units and interceptors, increase the number of SM–3 interceptors, and continue

support of the Sea-Based Terminal program.

Ms. TAUSCHER. In the past, combatant commanders have expressed concern that

they do not have sufficient numbers of PATRIOT PAC–3 missiles and sea-based

Standard Missile-3 interceptors to deal with short, medium, and intermediate range

missile threats. Are you satisfied with the current number of Patriot PAC–3 missiles

and Standard Missile-3 interceptors in the inventory? If not, have you raised this

issue with the Army, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the Missile Defense

Agency? What has been their response?

General CARTWRIGHT. We will make appropriate recommendations on the missile

inventory as we continue to define and demonstrate Terminal High Altitude Area

Defense capabilities (THAAD). We believe that THAAD effectiveness will have significant impact on the interceptor mix quality. In response the Army has increased

the buy of PAC–3 missiles, and, as a result of the Joint Capabilities Mix (JCM)

Study (JCM I concluded in April 2006), MDA has increased the number of programmed Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) Firing Units and interceptors, increased SM–3 interceptors, and started a Sea-Based Terminal program. However, interceptors alone are not sufficient to meet the threat posed by potential adversaries. USSTRATCOM is uniquely structured to leverage and synchronize other

capabilities, such as attack operations and non-kinetic options, in support of the geographic combatant commanders.

Ms. TAUSCHER. The President’s FY08 budget request contains sufficient funding

for the deployment of a European missile defense site. For a number of reasons, deploying long-range interceptors in Europe will raise serious command and control

challenges. To what extent have STRATCOM and other combatant commander

begun to plan to operate a European missile defense site? What do you believe are

the key command and control challenges associated with a European missile defense

site?

General CARTWRIGHT. We have just begun to work with USEUCOM and

USNORTHCOM for operations of the Ground-Based Interceptors and Midcourse

Discriminating Radar in Europe, but have not yet developed a formal operations

concept.

(1) Coordinating the Command and Control relationships.

(2) The integration with current and emerging NATO systems and C2 architectures (Active Layered Theater BMD, and the possible NATO Missile Defense

Feasibility Study-recommended capabilities).

(3) Bilateral support arrangements with Host Nations.

Ms. TAUSCHER. In 2004, STRATCOM conducted a Military Utility Assessment of

the initial set of ground-based missile defense capabilities deployed in California

and Alaska. The purpose of this assessment was to determine how military effective

those capabilities were. That said, how confident are in the current capabilities resident in the GMD system? Are there areas where you believe improvements need to

be made? Do you have any plans to conduct another Military Utility Assessment of

the GMD system in the near future?

General CARTWRIGHT. We assess that the Ballistic Missile Defense System

(BMDS) has the potential to defend the homeland, deployed forces, friends, and allies against a limited attack of from ballistic missile threats. Command and Control

and Battle Management are areas where we need to continue improving. MDA and

the Services continue to develop and provide BMD and Cruise Missile Defense

(CMD) weapons, sensors, and command and control systems. The effective use and

integration of the C2 and Battle Management capabilities remains the warfighters

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greatest challenge. The Combatant Commands, MDA, and Service Force Providers

continue to work together to develop and implement our tactics techniques and procedures for fighting with these expanding capabilities. Version 2007 of the BMDS

MUA has completed general/flag officer coordination and once finalized will be forwarded to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. EVERETT

Mr. EVERETT. The Air Force indicates that it intends to start retiring U–2 aircraft

in FY 2008—one in FY08, five in FY09, eight in FY10, one in FY11, and fifteen in

FY12. Last year, Congress prohibited U–2 retirement unless the Secretary of Defense could certify it no longer contributed to mitigating ISR gaps identified in the

Pentagon’s 2006 Quadrennial Defense review. a. Given the issue you raise in your

testimony about warfighter information needs not being met, is this retirement in

the best interest of the nation? b. In your testimony, you mentioned we can afford

to take risks in some mission areas. What mission areas will see greater risk given

the retirement profile of the U–2? c. In what timeframe do you anticipate followon capabilities with equal or greater capability to be proven and fielded, and how

might current budget constraints or programmatic issues associated with potential

follow-on systems impact this fielding timeline?

General CARTWRIGHT. USSTRATCOM conducted a study that evaluated the Department’s plan to replace the U–2 with Global Hawk and determined that the U–

2 drawdown introduced regional risk but did not result in a significant reduction

in enterprise capacity or cause a technical collection gap. As a result, the Air Force

revised their U–2 to Global Hawk transition plan to cover the STRATCOM identified regional risk and ensure continued support of the combatant commander’s intelligence requirements. This plan sequences the U–2 divestiture with successful demonstration of Global Hawk capabilities to ensure no overall loss of high altitude airborne ISR capability.

b. Transition to Global Hawk provides for persistent coverage not today available

from legacy systems such as U–2s, effectively increasing coverage by a factor of 2–

3 times. The current Air Force U–2 to Global Hawk transition plan addresses regional risk identified by USSTRATCOM, sequencing the U–2 divestiture with successful demonstration of Global Hawk capabilities to ensure no overall loss of high

altitude airborne ISR capability.

c. The Global Hawk program has undergone restructuring due to Nunn-McCurdy

requirements, to include its fielding schedule. Fielding of the block 30(M) Global

Hawk aircraft will provide an integrated, multi-intelligence sensor suite consisting

of electro-optical, synthetic aperture radar, and signals intelligence payloads, providing greater capability and more flexibility than the U–2. Block 30(M) aircraft will

begin arriving in the field starting in FY11. Global Hawk will enable increased mission duration, greater area coverage, and signals, radar, and imagery collection simultaneously from one aircraft on one mission, resulting in greater intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) effects delivered to our joint warfighers. Unanticipated resource challenges could extend the transition. Platform ‘‘offramps’’ have

been developed to ensure no loss in capability.

Mr. EVERETT. Does STRATCOM see any barriers to fully implementing the Joint

Intelligence Operations Centers (JIOCs)? If so, what are they?

General CARTWRIGHT. USSTRATCOM does not foresee any barriers to fully implementing the Joint Intelligence Operations Centers (JIOCs).

Mr. EVERETT. Please provide your assessment of the state of black-white space integration. What is working well and what areas need improvement? Consider this

question in the context of operations, planning and acquisition, and organization

and management.

General CARTWRIGHT. Black-white space integration continues to improve. A far

more collaborative operational relationship exists today than in the past. Numerous

operational examples of collaboration include the sharing of data and best practices.

Data previously held only in black channels is now routinely passed to white world

operators to help build a comprehensive space activity picture. In our organization

and management areas, there are many successes, which include crossflow of personnel and the establishment of the NRO’s Deputy Director for Mission Support

wearing a second hat as the Deputy Commander of my Joint Functional Component

Command for Space. These initiatives further reinforce on-going collaboration efforts

and improve situational awareness for both communities. We continue working with

the intelligence community on issues of classification.

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Mr. EVERETT. How will the Chinese anti-satellite test affect the warfighter’s priorities in space? How do you foresee this event affecting the composition and attributes of our national security space architecture?

General CARTWRIGHT. The Chinese ASAT test increases the risk to the manned

and unmanned space assets for all space-faring nations. We are re-examining our

ability to continue to operate effectively in the event of kinetic or non-kinetic ASAT

employment by an adversary, to include the use of both space- and terrestrially

based capabilities. The test also reaffirmed our need to increase our space situational awareness (SSA) abilities. The Air Force, as the Executive Agent for Space,

identified the need to increase SSA as its number one space funding priority.

USSTRATCOM will work closely with the services to define the appropriate SSA architecture, as well as a viable protection strategy for our spacecraft. Vulnerability

of low earth orbit satellites to increased space debris caused by destructive testing

or direct attack also highlighted the need to rapidly adjust our space readiness levels, and for improved capability to quickly launch and augment or reconstitute a

space-based asset.

Mr. EVERETT. In the 2006 Prioritized Capability List (PCL), the warfighter’s list

of prioritized missile defense capability needs, STRATCOM outlined a number of

key requirements. These included, among others: ensuring missile defense communications; maintaining the operational availability of the GMD system; and expanding our capability to defeat ballistic missiles in their terminal phase. a. To what extent has MDA been responsive to STRATCOM’s requirements as outlined in the

PCL? b. What areas need improvement?

General CARTWRIGHT. MDA adheres to a capabilities-based ballistic missile defense systems acquisition approach. To enhance warfighter needs and system development efforts, MDA has partnered with USSTRATCOM to develop the Warfighter

Involvement Process (WIP). The WIP enables prioritized guidance on needed Combatant Commander capabilities to MDA’s developmental efforts. MDA has announced plans to focus their 2007 Summer Study around the just delivered second

iteration of USSTRATCOM Prioritized Capabilities List (PCL). By taking this approach, MDA has clearly indicated a willingness to further incorporate warfighter

needs into system development and acquisition processes. b. We continue to improve

and refine our Warfighter-MDA information exchange processes. This includes better definition of the capabilities sought in the Prioritized Capabilities List (PCL) and

greater granularity in the capability development plans included in MDA’s PCL response. We are also looking at the possibility of integrating the development of

Cruise Missile Defense capabilities with ongoing Ballistic Missile Defense System

(BMDS) efforts.

Mr. EVERETT. To what extent are the Combatant Commanders influencing the

Services force structure planning? More specifically, to what extent are the

COCOMs missile defense requirements being incorporated into the Services longterm operational force structure sizing?

General CARTWRIGHT. In general, combatant commanders influence Service force

structure planning through Senior Leadership Review Groups as part of the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution Process; annual Integrated Priority

Lists (IPL); and Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS)

processes. For missile defense, combatant commanders present their capability

needs to the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) via the Warfighter Involvement Process

(WIP) and the Prioritized Capabilities List (PCL). As systems are developed and mature, MDA uses the BMDS Transition and Transfer planning process as the venue

where developmental and fielding plans, through negotiations with designated lead

Services, are incorporated into Service force structure planning.

Mr. EVERETT. Assume for a moment that the nation did not go forward with RRW

but rather maintained the existing stockpile through stockpile stewardship and Life

Extension Programs (LEPs), then fast forward 10–15 years from now. Do we start

to take risk and if so, in what areas? What impact would this have on our nation’s

stockpile readiness and the ability of the stockpile to meet our nation’s strategic deterrence needs?

General CARTWRIGHT. A long-term strategy based on extending the life of legacy

warheads leaves the nation heavily reliant on a limited number of aging, increasingly costly and difficult to maintain warhead types for its nuclear deterrent. Such

a strategy does not adequately exercise the facilities, scientists, engineers, and technicians needed for a responsive infrastructure. Many of our legacy warhead types

need to be refurbished or replaced over the next several decades when the scientists,

engineers and technicians that developed, tested and fielded legacy nuclear weapons

will be retired.

As a result, we continue to maintain a large and costly ‘‘hedge’’ of non-deployed

warheads to mitigate the risks of technological and/or operational surprise. It is difVerDate 22-MAR-2001 11:33 Sep 26, 2008 Jkt 037317 PO 00000 Frm 00074 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\DOCS\110-31\067290.000 HAS2 PsN: HAS2
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ficult to predict if, or when, the current strategy may become unsustainable or when

we will face a technical challenge we may not be able to resolve without testing.

Delaying transformation until we reach that point may put stockpile readiness and

the nuclear deterrent at significant risk.

Life Extension Program strategies address individual component issues without

regard to end-to-end design. Eventually, (10–15 yrs.) the number of component

changes compromizes our ability to certify in the absence of testing.

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