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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

__________________________________

DIESA PARIS, :

 :

Plaintiff, :

 :

v. : Civil Action 11-2163 (GK)

 :

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, :

Commissioner of Social Security, :

 :

Defendant. :

__________________________________

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff, Diesa Paris, brings this action seeking judicial 

review of a final decision of the Commissioner of the Social 

Security Administration (“Commissioner”) pursuant to Section 

205(g) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), denying 

her claims for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) pursuant to 

Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 42 et seq.

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion for 

Judgment of Reversal [Dkt. No. 8] and Defendant’s Motion for 

Judgment of Affirmance [Dkt. No. 10]. Upon consideration of the 

parties’ cross-motions, the administrative record, and the 

entire record herein, and for the reasons stated below, 

Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment of Reversal is hereby granted in 

part and denied in part, and Defendant’s Motion for Judgment of 

Affirmance is hereby denied.
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I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is a fifty-year-old woman who resides in 

Washington, DC. Administrative Record (“AR”) at 37, 102-105 

[Dkt. No. 3]. She has a high-school education and no specialized 

training. AR at 38, 136. Plaintiff last worked full time on 

January 31, 2007 as a retail manager. See AR at 102, 132. She

has been diagnosed with systemic lupus erythematosus, psoriatic

arthritis, and major depressive order. AR at 15.

As a result of these disorders, Plaintiff filed an 

application for Disability Insurance Benefits pursuant to Title 

II of the Social Security Act on February 25, 2008. Plaintiff’s 

claim was denied initially and upon reconsideration. On April 1, 

2010, a hearing regarding Plaintiff’s alleged disability was 

held in front of an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). On June 

11, 2010, the ALJ denied Plaintiff’s request. Thereafter, 

Plaintiff requested the Appeals Council to review the decision 

of the ALJ. On October 3, 2011, the Appeals Council affirmed the 

decision of the ALJ.

A. Disability Determination Process

In order to qualify for disability insurance benefits, an 

individual must prove that she has a disability that renders her 

unable “to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason 

of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment” for 

a period of “not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(a)(1) & 
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(d)(1)(A). The claimant must support her claim of impairment 

with “[o]bjective medical evidence” that is “established by 

medically acceptable clinical or laboratory diagnostic 

techniques.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(A). In addition, the 

impairment must be severe enough to prevent the claimant from 

doing her previous work and work commensurate with her age, 

education, and work experience that exists in the national 

economy. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A).

The Social Security Administration (“SSA”) uses a five-step 

evaluation process to determine whether a claimant is disabled, 

thus qualifying for benefits. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(1). A 

clear determination of disability or non-disability at any step 

is definitive, and the process ends at that step. 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1520(a)(4). In the first step, a claimant is disqualified if 

she is currently engaged in “substantial gainful activity.” 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). In the second step, a claimant is 

disqualified if she does not have a “severe medically 

determinable physical or mental impairment” that is proven “by 

medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic 

techniques.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1508 & 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). In the 

third step, a claimant qualifies for benefits if her 

impairment(s) meets or equals an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404, subpart P, appendix 1. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). 

Between the third and fourth step, the SSA uses the entire 
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record to make a determination of the claimant's residual 

functional capacity (“RFC”), which is “the most [the claimant]

can still do despite [the] limitations” created by the 

impairment. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4) & 404.1545(a)(1). In the 

fourth step, a claimant is disqualified if her RFC shows that 

she is still able to do her past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1520(a)(4)(iv). In the fifth step, a claimant is 

disqualified if her RFC shows that she is capable of adapting to 

“other work that exists in the national economy.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 

404.1520(a)(4)(v) & 404.1545(a)(5)(ii). If the claim survives 

these five steps, then the claimant is determined disabled and 

qualifies for benefits. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v).

B. The ALJ’s Ruling

The ALJ applied the sequential five-step process described, 

supra, and determined that, while Plaintiff suffered from severe 

impairments including depression, psoriatic arthritis, and 

systemic lupus erythematosus, she was not disabled within the 

meaning of the Social Security Act. The issues in dispute in 

this case arise in steps four and five of the assessment 

process.

At step four of the assessment, the ALJ determined that 

Plaintiff had the RFC to perform a range of sedentary work so 
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long as she had a “sit/stand option”1 and was limited to 

unskilled tasks involving no more than occasional contact with 

the public. AR at 24. At step five of the evaluation process, 

the ALJ relied on a vocational expert’s testimony to determine 

that Plaintiff “is capable of making a successful adjustment to 

[] work that exists in significant numbers in the national 

economy.” Id. at 26.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A district court is limited in its review of the SSA’s 

findings to determining whether those findings are based on 

substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Butler v. Barnhart,

353 F.3d 992, 999 (D.C. Cir. 2004); Poulin v. Bowen, 817 F.2d 

865, 870 (D.C. Cir. 1987). Substantial evidence “means such 

relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate 

to support a conclusion,” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 

401 (1971) (citation omitted), requiring “more than a scintilla, 

but ... something less than a preponderance of the evidence.” 

Fla. Gas Transmission Co. v. FERC, 604 F.3d 636, 645 (D.C. Cir.

2010) (citation omitted). 

A court must “carefully scrutinize the entire record” but 

may not reweigh the evidence or supplant the SSA's judgment of 

 1 The ALJ specified that “[t]he claimant needs a sit/stand 

option; that is, she should not be required to stand for more 

than 20/30 minutes before being permitted to sit, or be required 

to sit for more than 20/30 minutes before being permitted to 

stand.” AR at 24.
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the weight of the evidence with its own. It must only review 

whether the ALJ's findings are based on substantial evidence and 

whether the ALJ correctly applied the law. Butler, 353 F.3d at 

999; Davis v. Shalala, 862 F.Supp. 1, 4 (D.D.C. 1994); Davis v. 

Heckler, 566 F.Supp. 1193, 1195 (D.D.C. 1983). Finally, 

substantial deference should be given to the ALJ's decision, but 

the evidence should be read in the light most favorable to the 

claimant. See Davis, 862 F.Supp. at 4; see also Simms v. 

Sullivan, 877 F.2d 1047, 1050 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (reviewing court 

must determine whether the Commissioner, acting through the ALJ, 

"has analyzed all evidence and has sufficiently explained the 

weight he [or she] has given to obviously probative 

exhibits....").

III. ANALYSIS

A. The ALJ’s Evaluation of Dr. Lumpkins’ Opinion

The administrative record contains progress notes and 

opinions from Tanya Lumpkins, M.D., a rheumatologist and one of 

Plaintiff’s treating physicians.

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ did not properly evaluate Dr. 

Lumpkins’ opinions because he: (1) failed to consider whether 

her opinion was entitled to controlling weight; (2) did not 

discuss the proper factors for the evaluation of medical 

opinions; and (3) did not evaluate many of the limitations noted 

in her January 18, 2008 opinion. Pl.’s Mot. at 6-8. Defendant 
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responds that: (1) the ALJ accurately discussed when a treating 

physician’s opinion should be afforded controlling weight; (2) 

the ALJ properly considered relevant regulatory factors when 

weighing Dr. Lumpkins’ opinion; and (3) to the extent the ALJ 

failed to properly evaluate any portion of Dr. Lumpkins’ 

opinion, such error does not warrant remand. Def.’s Mot. at 15, 

18-19.

The case law in this Circuit is clear that an ALJ must 

accord substantial weight to the reports and opinions of a 

claimant’s treating physician. Butler, 353 F.3d at 1003

(“Because a claimant’s treating physicians have great 

familiarity with [her] condition, their reports must be accorded 

substantial weight.”) (internal citation omitted) (internal 

quotation omitted). A treating physician’s report is “binding on 

the fact-finder unless contradicted by substantial evidence.”

Id. (internal citation omitted) (internal quotation omitted). 

Defendant is correct that the ALJ properly accorded Dr. 

Lumpkins’ opinion significant weight. After discussing the 

regulatory instructions for weighing medical opinions, including 

when a treating physician’s opinion is entitled to controlling 

weight (AR at 19), the ALJ discussed Dr. Lumpkins’ medical 

opinion and, consistent with the law of this Circuit, accorded 

it “significant weight.” AR at 20; see Payne v. Shalala, Civ. A. 

No. 93-0288, 1993 WL 405757 at *3 (D.D.C Sept. 24, 1993) (“The 
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ALJ was obligated to give significant weight to the opinion of 

[] Plaintiff’s treating physician [] so long that opinion was 

supported by acceptable laboratory and clinical diagnostic 

techniques and was not contradicted by substantial evidence in 

the record.”).

Defendant is also correct that, contrary to Plaintiff’s 

argument, the ALJ was not required to discuss each of the 

relevant regulatory factors when deciding what weight to give 

Dr. Lumpkins’ opinion. The regulation at issue states that a ALJ 

will “consider all of the following factors in deciding the 

weight [to] give to any medical opinion.” 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1527(d) (emphasis added). Notably, the regulation requires 

the ALJ to “consider” certain factors, but does not require the 

ALJ to recite and discuss each of the factors in the written 

decision. Plaintiff points to no authority saying that the ALJ 

must do so.

However, Plaintiff is correct that the ALJ failed to 

properly evaluate certain relevant portions of Dr. Lumpkins 

January 18, 2008 opinion. For instance, the ALJ did not discuss, 

at any point in the five-step evaluation process, Dr. Lumpkins’ 

opinion that Plaintiff could not bend, twist or kneel and could 

only occasionally move her neck, reach at shoulder level, stand, 

walk, and perform repetitive movements. AR at 211. The ALJ was 

required to explain why he paid no attention to Dr. Lumpkins’ 
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opinion on these issues. Butler, 353 F.3d at 1003 (“We [] 

require an ALJ who rejects the opinion of a treating physician 

[to] explain his [or her] reasons for doing so.” (internal 

citation omitted) (internal quotation omitted).

Accordingly, upon remand, the ALJ must explain the weight 

he attaches to Dr. Lumpkins’ opinion, and if he disregards any 

of her conclusions, he must explain his reasons for doing so.

B. The ALJ’s Assessment of Plaintiff’s RFC

At step four of the disability determination process, the 

Commissioner is required to show that a claimant’s RFC allows 

her to perform other work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(f), 

416.920(f)(1). Assessing RFC is based upon all relevant 

evidence, which may include the claimant’s ability to meet 

physical or mental demands of work and observations of 

limitations by family and friends. 20 C.F.R. § 416.945.

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s RFC assessment is not 

supported by substantial evidence because the ALJ did not 

evaluate medical opinions that conflicted with his RFC 

assessment. Pl.’s Mot. at 11. Plaintiff further argues that the 

ALJ was required “to perform a more detailed assessment of the 

Plaintiff’s capacity to perform the mental demands of work.” Id.

at 14 (emphasis in the original). Defendant responds that, to 

the extent the ALJ failed to evaluate certain medical opinions, 

such error does not warrant reversal or remand. Def.’s Mot. at 
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18-19. Defendant further argues that “the ALJ correctly 

evaluated Plaintiff’s mental functioning as the regulations at 

20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a direct. That is, [the ALJ] made findings 

in the four broad areas of mental functioning that were 

supported by substantial evidence, and he cited to that 

evidence.” Def.’s Mot. at 16.

An ALJ’s decision is statutorily required to include a 

discussion of “findings and conclusions, and the reasons or 

basis therefor, on all the material issues of fact, law or 

discretion presented on the record.” 5 U.S.C. § 

557(c)(3)(A)(1988). “When the ALJ arrives at a conclusion 

regarding [ ] functions that contradicts some part of the 

evidence on the record, the ALJ must explain his [or her]

rationale, for ‘[t]he judiciary can scarcely perform its 

assigned review function ... without some indication ... [as to] 

whether [the] evidence was rejected rather than simply 

ignored.’” Ross v. Astrue, 636 F. Supp. 2d 127, 133 (D.C. Cir. 

2009) (citing Brown v. Bowen, 794 F.2d 703, 708 (D.C. Cir.

1986)). “The ALJ has a duty to explain why [she] either ignored 

or rejected contradictory evidence.” Thomas v. Astrue, 677 F.

Supp. 2d 300, 309 (D.D.C. 2010) (citing See v. Wash. Metro. 

Transit Auth., 36 F.3d 375, 384 (4th Cir. 1994) (“[W]hen faced 

with evidence in the record contradicting his [or her] 

conclusion, an ALJ must affirmatively reject that contradictory 
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evidence and explain his rationale for doing so.”) (emphasis 

added)).

Plaintiff is correct that the ALJ failed to properly 

evaluate evidence that contradicted his RFC assessment. For 

instance, the ALJ acknowledged Dr. Cott’s finding that Plaintiff 

had experienced one or two episodes of decompensation, each of 

extended duration. AR at 19. The ALJ also acknowledged that Dr. 

Cott’s assessment was affirmed by Dr. Nachbahr. Id. However, at 

step four of the disability determination process, the ALJ 

concluded, without explanation, that “[t]he record does not 

disclose any episodes of decompensation of extended duration,” 

id. at 23, which was directly contrary to the opinions of Dr. 

Cott and Dr. Nachbahr. The ALJ’s conclusory determination, with 

no explanation as to why he rejected or ignored their opinions 

is insufficient. 

Similarly, the ALJ failed to explain why he chose not to 

consider those portions of Dr. Garmoe’s report that contradicted 

the his RFC assessment. More specifically, Dr. Garmoe found that 

Plaintiff was severely depressed, discouraged and withdrawn, and 

that persons with profiles such as Plaintiff’s usually had 

marked distress and severe impairment in functioning. AR at 441. 

However, the ALJ did not reference this part of Dr. Garmoe’s 

report in his RFC assessment, let alone affirmatively reject it 

and explain his rationale for doing so.
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In sum, the ALJ failed to properly evaluate evidence that 

contradicted his RFC assessment. Therefore, upon remand, the ALJ 

must reconsider the medical testimony in its entirety, and 

provide an explanation for rejecting any evidence that 

contradicts his determination.

C. The ALJ’s Reliance Upon the Testimony of the 

Vocational Expert

At step five in the disability determination process, if 

the claimant is found unable to do any work she has done in the 

past because of severe impairment, the ALJ must consider her 

RFC, age, education, and work experience to see if she can do 

other types of work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(f)(1). If there are 

non-exertional limitations in question, the ALJ may rely on the 

expertise of a vocational expert (“VE”) to assist in 

ascertaining a claimant’s RFC.2 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1566(e), 

416.966(e). In doing so, the ALJ may pose a hypothetical 

question to the VE, communicating the claimant’s age, education, 

work experience and RFC. If the hypothetical put to the VE is 

flawed or contains omissions, it undermines “the foundation for 

the expert’s ultimate conclusion that there are alternative jobs 

appellant can do.” Simms v. Sullivan, 877 F.2d 1047, 1051 (D.C. 

Cir. 1989).

 2 “The Secretary must introduce expert vocational testimony to 

prove that a significant number of jobs are available for the 

claimant.” Smith v. Bowen, 826 F.2d 1120, 1122 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
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Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s question to the VE was 

fatally defective because the ALJ “ignored or otherwise 

overlooked the restrictions set forth by Dr. Lumpkins, the 

Plaintiff’s treating physician, without explanation.” Pl.’s Mot. 

at 17. Plaintiff further argues that the ALJ “failed to properly 

address the Plaintiff’s limitations on concentration, 

persistence, or pace in his hypothetical question to the 

vocational expert.” Id. at 17-18. Defendant responds that the 

ALJ’s step five findings are supported by substantial evidence, 

and that to the extent that there are any errors with the 

hypothetical posed to the VE, none of those errors warrant 

remand. Def.’s Mot. at 18-20.

An ALJ who looks to the opinion of a VE at stage five of 

the disability determination process “must accurately describe 

the claimant’s physical impairment in any question posed to the 

expert.” Butler, 353 F.3d at 1006. The ALJ’s hypothetical 

question to the VE must “present a faithful summary of the 

treating physician’s diagnosis unless the ALJ provides good 

reason to disregard the physician’s conclusions.” Lockard v. 

Apfel, 175 F. Supp. 2d 28, 33 (D.D.C. 2001).

Plaintiff is correct that the ALJ’s hypothetical did not 

fully and accurately describe Plaintiff’s impairments. In fact, 

Defendant concedes that the ALJ failed to include in his 

hypothetical question a number of the vocationally-relevant 
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restrictions set forth in Dr. Lumpkins’ January 18, 2008 

opinion.3 See Def.’s Mot. at 18. Despite this concession, 

Defendant contends that Plaintiff has demonstrated no basis for 

remand because, even accepting all of the limitations set forth 

by Dr. Lumpkins, Plaintiff would still be capable of performing 

the jobs identified by the VE. Defendant’s argument has no merit 

because the ALJ “must accurately describe” the claimant’s 

impairments unless he provides good reason for disregarding the 

physician’s conclusions. Butler, 353 F.3d at 1006 (emphasis 

added). The ALJ did not accurately describe Plaintiff’s 

impairments, nor did he explain why he disregarded Dr. Lumpkins’ 

opinion. 

Furthermore, the ALJ found in his RFC that Plaintiff has 

“moderate” limitations in concentration, persistence or pace, 

but his hypothetical question to the VE stated that Plaintiff 

had only “mild” limitations in concentration persistence or 

pace. See AR at 23, 24, 55. 

These deficiencies in the ALJ’s hypothetical undermine the 

foundation for the VE’s conclusion. Accordingly, upon remand, if 

the ALJ elects to call a VE, the hypothetical posed must 

 3 As discussed, supra, Dr. Lumpkins concluded that Plaintiff 

could not bend, twist or kneel and could only occasionally move 

her neck, reach at shoulder level, stand, walk, and perform 

repetitive movements. AR at 211.
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describe the Plaintiff’s impairments accurately in light of 

objective medical testimony. 

IV. CONCLUSION

Upon consideration of the parties’ cross-motions, the 

administrative record, and the entire record herein, and for the 

reasons set forth in this Memorandum Opinion, Plaintiff’s Motion 

for Judgment of Reversal is hereby granted in part and denied in 

part, and Defendant’s Motion for Judgment of Affirmance is 

hereby denied.

This case is hereby remanded to the Commissioner for 

rulings in steps four and five of the disability determination 

process. In consideration of these steps, the entire medical 

record, including Dr. Lumpkins’ January 18, 2008 opinion, must 

be given due regard.

/s/________________________ 

August ___, 2012 Gladys Kessler

United States District Judge

Copies to: attorneys on record via ECF