# Burkina Faso - United States Department of State

- Department Press Briefing – April 30, 2024 HomeDepartment Press Briefing – April 30, 2024				hide		if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}																										Department Press Briefing – April 30, 2024																																																					April 30, 2024																																																								1:17 p.m. EDTMR PATEL: Good afternoon, everybody.QUESTION: Good afternoon.MR PATEL: Let’s see. I have – I don’t have anything off the top, so Daphne, do you want to kick us off?QUESTION: Yes, thank you so much.MR PATEL: Yeah.QUESTION: Prime Minister Netanyahu said today that Israel will carry out an operation against Hamas in Rafah regardless of whether or not &#8212;QUESTION: (Off-mike.)QUESTION: Sorry.MR PATEL: (Laughter.) Go ahead.QUESTION: Yeah, regardless of whether or not a ceasefire and hostage release deal is reached. Is it still the case that the U.S. hasn’t seen a credible plan for entering Rafah? And what will you do if they go ahead, as Netanyahu is warning?MR PATEL: That is correct. We – it continues to be the case that we have not seen a credible plan that would address the varying areas of concerns that you’ve heard me talk about a number of times from up here and others, primarily the ability to address the serious humanitarian concerns surrounding – again, Rafah is a region with more than 1 million people seeking refuge, so that an area that continues to be an important conduit for humanitarian aid as well as the safe departure of foreign nationals. And so any kind of operation that’s – that does not address some of these key concerns would certainly be opposed by us.I’m not going to get into any hypotheticals, but this is something we’re continuing to engage with our partners in Israel. Conversations continue to be happening at all levels, and we continue to press forward on those conversations and asking for what their plans may or may not be as it pertains to Rafah.QUESTION: And are you concerned that this warning that they would go ahead with whether or not a ceasefire and hostage deal is reached could derail hostage talks?MR PATEL: I’m not going to speculate on that. What I can say, Daphne, is that we remain committed to reaching a deal for the immediate – for an immediate ceasefire that secures the release of hostages and allows for additional steps to be taken in terms of surging humanitarian aid, and something that we hope will help bolster the protection of civilians as well.QUESTION: Can I follow up on that?QUESTION: A follow-up on that?MR PATEL: Leon, go ahead.QUESTION: Israel’s track record in heeding to the U.S. statements or calls could be arguably not great. What gives you confidence or what makes you think that Israel would, in fact, listen and hear your calls not to go into Rafah?MR PATEL: I’d dispute, though, the premise of that a little bit, Leon. Over the course of this conflict, there have been a number of endeavors in which the United States has pressed for that we have seen our partners in Israel undertake, dating back to the beginning of this conflict even in the early days of this conversation that we were having around humanitarian aid. We also continue to see steps being taken as it relates to their cooperation on a number of other lines of effort in the humanitarian aid space.But both – look, when it comes to humanitarian aid, when it comes to the protection of civilians, and when it comes to a potential operation in Rafah, our answer continues to be we need to see more, we need to see more steps being taken. And as it relates to an operation in Rafah, we have yet to see a credible plan that would address the underlying concerns that I laid out to Daphne.QUESTION: Can I follow up on that?MR PATEL: Olivia, go ahead, yeah.QUESTION: Just because the Secretary was also asked about this not long ago. He said that the U.S. views on this were well known. But he didn’t address part of the question that – whether Israel had in fact committed to present a military and humanitarian plan. So absent the plans themselves, has there been a formal commitment from the Israeli Government to present those plans before launching any – an invasion?MR PATEL: I am not going to be a spokesperson for the Government of Israel. Through the Strategic Consultative Group that you have seen National Security Advisor Sullivan and Secretary Blinken undertake their consultations with counterparts in Israel, discussions at those levels and through other interlocutors as part of those engagements, those conversations are ongoing. As the Secretary said, the United States position on this could not be clearer. For how long we’ve been talking about this, we have expressed our serious concern about any kind of operation that does not address some of these key pieces, and we’ll continue to stress and raise these very important issues.QUESTION: Thank you. I mean, I totally appreciate not asking you for the Israeli perspective on this, only whether the U.S. has actually received a commitment from the government to have formal plans presented prior to any invasion.MR PATEL: I am just not going to speak to further specificity about this process.QUESTION: Okay. Two others on the region, if that’s okay.MR PATEL: Mind if I jump to Gillian?QUESTION: Sure.MR PATEL: And then we can – we’ll – I’m sure we’ll get to everybody. Go ahead.QUESTION: Okay, thanks. I’m just wondering if State has any comment or any information, anything today on the anti-Israel protests across the nation now, really going from California all the way to New York. A lot of these student protesters are accusing the Biden administration of being complicit in genocide. Wondering if you – if diplomatically &#8212;MR PATEL: Sure.QUESTION: &#8212; foreign-policy-wise, you guys have &#8212;MR PATEL: Yeah, so I’ve spent a number of the last few daily press briefings talking about this, and I’m happy to reiterate what I said before. First, I will echo what the Secretary said in talking to one of your colleagues on the margins of his trip to Beijing. Demonstrating – demonstrations, I should say, expressing your opinion about any kind of government action, expressing your opinion about foreign policy, exercising your First Amendment right – none of those things are problematic or antisemitic or Islamophobic, in their own right. It is when those things are coupled with the use of certain language, and rhetoric, and insults that we have seen and have been part of some of these demonstrations.Beyond that, those kinds of things of course we would condemn and take issue with. But we believe that every American has every right to express their points of view, to exercise their First Amendment right. When it comes to policies that are – that as it relate to any particular campus, those campus officials are better suited to speak to those policies that they have in place both in terms of dealing with expressions of First Amendment rights or otherwise. I am not in a space to speak to that.But of course, everyone has every right to make their point of view heard, and from our perspective across this administration we’ve made clear that we insist that these happen in a peaceful, nonviolent manner. And any kinds of these demonstrations, when they are paired with or coupled with rhetoric, language that is antisemitic, Islamophobic, essentially insults or target someone for just who they are, that’s deeply problematic.QUESTION: A quick follow-up.MR PATEL: Yeah.QUESTION: One thing that’s kind of new as far as I’m aware is you’re seeing regimes now like the Iranian regime, China has started to weigh in – the government, and criticize the Biden administration’s response to these protests. We saw overnight the Chinese saying that the way the U.S. Government is responding is violating these students’ rights. Do you have a comment on these adversaries kind of using it as an opportunity to criticize?MR PATEL: Look, the policies and procedures as it relates to demonstrations, protesting, things like that that may or may not exist on a particular college campus, or may or may not exist in a particular town, city, or municipality, it is certainly not in the remit of the State Department so I am not going to even delve into that.QUESTION: Isn’t it hypocritical though &#8212;MR PATEL: There’s other agencies that are better suited to speak to that. But what I can say broadly, we of course support anybody to be able to express themselves and to exercise their First Amendments rights. They should not and cannot become violent, not peaceful. And in those particular circumstances, we believe it is the right of the appropriate law enforcement and – enforcement and security officials to take appropriate actions consistent with the policies of that jurisdiction. Again, we are delving far away from foreign policy and into law enforcement, which is not the remit of this – of this department.QUESTION: No, because what I’m asking really is: Is it not from a foreign policy, foreign relations, diplomacy perspective, isn’t it, I mean, hypocritical of the Chinese and the Iranians, some of the worst human rights violators in the world, to be criticizing the Biden administration’s policy response to America?MR PATEL: I don’t think anybody in this administration is interested in taking a human rights lesson from the Iranian regime, or the People’s Republic of China for that matter. And both of those regimes’ crackdowns on self-expression, on free and fair press, on basic human rights, is clear.Said, go ahead.QUESTION: The image that it’s giving &#8212;QUESTION: Just a quick follow-up on a couple of things.MR PATEL: Hold on, hold on, hold on, hold on.QUESTION: The image that it’s giving of the United States with the protesters being arrested is not necessarily the one you would want to have.MR PATEL: Leon, there are laws in this country. Again, we are delving away from the topics that are discussed in this department. But if laws are being broken on certain college campuses, in certain municipalities, in certain towns, in certain cities, in certain counties, it is will within the right for the officials of those jurisdictions to enforce whatever laws that are so appropriate as it relates to that region. Beyond that, we fully support anybody’s ability to exercise their First Amendment right and make their opinions as it relates to any action or policy the government may or may not be taking and making their points of view heard.QUESTION: Vedant &#8212;MR PATEL: Said.QUESTION: Thank you, I just have quick follow-ups and then I have a couple questions of my own.Now, in response to Gillian, you said there are certain things that are being said in these protests that you have issue with. Could you share some of those with us?MR PATEL: I’m not going to repeat them from up here, Said, but &#8212;QUESTION: But you made an assertion that you are obviously in command of. What are these statements?MR PATEL: Said, there have been a number of these demonstrations in which the imagery, in which the language that has been written on some of the poster material, has either been akin to what I would believe to be antisemitism. But we’ve also seen expressions, rhetoric, signage that is akin to Islamophobia and the targeting of Arab Americans and Palestinian Americans, as well. Of course any kind of language or rhetoric in that space is concerning, troubling, and unacceptable. But again, we fully support people’s ability to peacefully make their – express their First Amendment rights.QUESTION: Now on the statement by the Israeli prime minister on Rafah, I mean, he is saying very plainly that whether there is a deal or there is no deal, I am going storm Rafah. And you don’t have a position on this? I mean, he’s not waiting for a deal to be arrived at.MR PATEL: I think our position on Rafah – I really don’t appreciate you, Said, twisting my words or the words &#8212;QUESTION: I’m not.MR PATEL: &#8212; of the Secretary or other officials up here. We have made our point of view &#8212;QUESTION: I am quoting what the prime minister of Israel said. I’m not &#8212;MR PATEL: I understand. I understand your question. And in response to your question, and Daphne’s question, and the number of times that we have asked – been asked about a potential operation into Rafah from up here, we have been unambiguous about the concerns that we have when it comes to the more than a million people seeking refuge in that region, when it comes to this region in particular in Gaza being an important conduit for the delivery of humanitarian aid, it being a region in which foreign nationals at least at the beginning of this conflict were able to use, are able to use consistently for safe departure.So any kind of operation that does not address these concerns would be a non-starter for us. And you’ve heard me say this. You’ve heard the Secretary say this. You’ve heard Matt say this; you’ve heard Admiral Kirby, Karine, the President. We have been consistent on this.QUESTION: Yeah. So would it be appropriate for the United States of America to say, whether there is a deal or not a deal, we find that the storming of Rafah is unacceptable?MR PATEL: I – we have been pretty clear about that, Said.QUESTION: Very clear?MR PATEL: We have been very clear that many – any kind of military operation into Rafah that does not address these concerns would be unacceptable to the United States.QUESTION: Right. Now I have a question on the humanitarian situation. Officials at the United States Agency for International Development, USAID, leaked a – they leaked a document that says that the Israeli Government intently sort of put obstacles in the way of these humanitarian aid convoys or whatever, getting food to Gaza. Now are you aware of that report?MR PATEL: So I’m just not going to comment on leaked documents, Said.QUESTION: Why won’t you comment on this document?MR PATEL: I’m not going to comment on leaked documents, on things that continue to exist under a deliberative process. I will just say that the Secretary and the leaders of this administration, they hear a diverse range of views from across this department, from across the interagency. When it comes to processes that are within the deliberative process, we take those points of view into consideration, but beyond that, I am just not going to speak to purportedly leaked documents.QUESTION: Okay. Would you agree that there is a – almost a common opinion among professionals and experts and so on that Israel is in fact – and the prime minister of Israel are in fact – take measures day after day to sort of make these humanitarian aids, including American – large portions of American aid &#8212;MR PATEL: I would disagree with your characterization.Julia.QUESTION: Thank you. I know the State Department and Secretary Blinken have made clear that the ICC doesn’t have jurisdiction in your view over the Palestinian conflict. But I wanted to get your response to remarks from Netanyahu just today, especially in context of the conversation we just had about the campus protests. He said, “Branding Israel’s leaders and soldiers as war criminals will pour jet fuel on the fires of antisemitism, those fires that are already raging on the campuses of America and across capitals around the world.”Do you agree with that assessment that it’s antisemitic for the ICC to pursue Netanyahu? And what do you make of him connecting this to the campus protests?MR PATEL: So fundamentally, at the heart of this, Julia, we do not believe that the ICC has jurisdiction over this issue, and that’s the crux here. Beyond that, I’d let the prime minister and officials within the Israeli Government clarify or offer any commentary on his comments.But at the crux of this for the United States is that we do not believe that the ICC has jurisdiction on this. That being said, we work closely with the ICC on a number of key areas. We think that they do important work – important work as it relates to Ukraine, Darfur, Sudan. But again, on this particular incident – instance – in this particular instance, I’m sorry, they just do not have jurisdiction.QUESTION: If I may, another on Saudi Arabia.MR PATEL: Yeah.QUESTION: There have been reports that Saudi Arabia has decided to normalize relations with Israel but is waiting to determine when they do that based on the U.S. election and the results of the election. What do you make of Saudi Arabia potentially weighing this presidential election so much, when the urgency is now?MR PATEL: So I would – I’d defer to officials in the Saudi Government to speak to their position. I’m not a spokesperson for them. What I can say from the United States is that we also have been unambiguous about how we feel that a greater – a more integrated Middle East region is better for not just the interests of the United States, but it is better for peace and stability in the Middle East region. It is also something that we believe other officials across the Middle East region and Arab world view this as well.We are continuing to work this. We think that Israel’s further integration in the Middle East region can unlock additional benefits. It can offer greater security, which is in the interests of the United States. It’s in the interest of the people of Israel, and it’s also in the interest of other partners as well.But of course, we also are continuing to stress and underline the importance of doing everything we can to reaching a deal for an immediate ceasefire – one that releases the hostages, one that allows a surge of humanitarian aid into the region as well.Go ahead, Nadia.QUESTION: I don’t know if somebody asked you about this or not, but I want to ask you about the Amnesty International report.MR PATEL: Go ahead.QUESTION: Okay. So basically, Amnesty just published its report. I don’t know if you’ve seen it in details. But they say there is a reasonable evidence that Israel has committed war crimes, a gross violation of international – of human rights and violation of international humanitarian law. I’m just wondering – I mean, with something as serious as this from a very reputable organization, that normally use it to talk about rogue states, et cetera, when they finding and they publish their reports – why the State Department still now has not published anything to either contradict or to support other human rights organizations been talking about what’s happening in Gaza? Basically &#8212;MR PATEL: So first, I’ve not seen that specific report, Nadia. But I think you were in the briefing room just about a week and a half ago in which we – when we unveiled the 2024 Human Rights Report, in which there was, in fact, a section outlining Israel and the Palestinian territories.When it comes to the current conflict in Gaza – and I have spent a number of days talking about this – we are continuing to assess what is happening on the ground. We have a number of tools at our disposal to look into what is happening on the ground and, if required, hold appropriate and relevant parties accountable. You’ve heard us talk a great deal in this briefing room about Leahy. You have heard us talk a great deal in this briefing room about the CHIRG process. We continue to have those options as well as other avenues under the Foreign Assistance Act to look into these things. And as in any conflict zone, Nadia, this work is ongoing and we are feeding into that process in close coordination with not just our embassies and consulates, but also civil society, independent media reporting of such things, and, of course, NGOs as well.QUESTION: Can you just assure us that, actually, you treat Israel the same way as you treat any other country that found in violation of international law? Because what we hear from you is all the statements and some actions, like we see with the settlers, but many believe that when the prime minister of Israel pick up the phone, call the White House, the finding is changed and delayed and pushed, just like we heard about – even the Secretary, we were together in Italy when he assured us that we’re going to hear about this report – about the Leahy report and the violation of using U.S. weapons. But we haven’t heard about it. So I just wanted an assurance from you that actually you’re taking these things seriously.MR PATEL: Well, I spent about 50 percent of the daily press briefing yesterday talking about it, so I would take issue with how you laid that out. There are absolutely – we hold Israel to the same standard that we hold any country with, and that is with – in Gaza, outside of Gaza, anywhere. International law, international humanitarian law needs to be followed, and it needs to be abided by. And when we find violations or when we find issues that are concerning, not only do we raise them with the Israeli Government, we will take appropriate actions consistent with the systems and tools that we have in the United States to take appropriate actions.I spent a great deal of yesterday talking about the Leahy process in which we found five violations of – gross violations of human rights. So when we see issues, we will not hesitate to take appropriate action. There is no different standard or different set of rules when it comes to any country on which we have a relationship with.QUESTION: Okay. Just one final clarification.MR PATEL: Yeah.QUESTION: The Secretary said that the offer they gave to Hamas is generous. Who decide what is generosity? Is it the United States and Israel? What is it – is it Arab partners in the Saudi summit that they decided it was generous? I mean, I guess my question: How do you define what is generous and what is (inaudible)?MR PATEL: So Nadia, over the course of this conflict, we have seen Hamas move the goal post, renege on agreements that they have made as it – as relates to part of this deal. And so the Secretary was simply underlining the fact that we are in this position in which Hamas has a generous offer on the table, and it’s imperative for them to move and to act on it as swiftly as possible.Olivia, go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you.MR PATEL: Yeah.QUESTION: Just one point of clarification on Leahy, which I know you amply addressed yesterday, but you mentioned yesterday that the process was open-ended, right? It was subject to the MOU that exists between the Israeli Government and the United States. This new information that Israel has provided with regard to the fifth unit, is – can it continuously supply new information with regard to that unit until the U.S. sort of adjudicates in a particular direction? Or is this a finite set of information on whose basis the U.S. will decide whether to take punitive action?MR PATEL: I would say the information is definitive and it is more that, consistent with the memorandum of understanding that we have, we are bound by that to consult and engage with officials in Israel on the process, on steps that they may or may not be taking, and we are assessing all of those things to ensure that they are in standard with what is laid out in the Leahy Law. And if not, as I said yesterday, there will, of course, be a resistance of applicable – a restriction on applicable U.S. assistance.QUESTION: Okay. And then a separate question on aid.MR PATEL: Yeah.QUESTION: The Secretary from Jordan earlier mentioned the opening of new crossings into northern Gaza. I was hoping you could just update us on the overall metrics, on the volume of aid that’s going in, and how that compares to what the U.S. believes is necessary.MR PATEL: So look, we are still very much in the same place that we were when David Satterfield came and talked to you all. We have seen some measurable steps in the right direction. Northern crossings including Erez and Zikim are preparing to reopen. We are seeing that routes from Jordan and Ashdod are showing progress, but not fully yet realized. And southern crossings, specifically Kerem Shalom and Rafah, have seen some fluctuating numbers of trucks, but trending in the right direction.This is all to say that we still need to see more. And some metrics that I can offer is that April – on April 25th, approximately 303 trucks entered Gaza according to the UN; 282 trucks via Kerem Shalom, and 21 trucks via Rafah. That is not nearly enough, but it is a step in the right direction. We want to continue to see more. And I know also we spend a lot of time up here talking about trucks and their inflows and outflows, possibly because it might be the most digestible metric out there when talking about this issue.But ultimately, when we talk about humanitarian aid, it is great to see trucks enter Gaza; it is even better when the humanitarian aid that enters Gaza is getting to the Palestinian people, to Palestinian civilians who need it. And we will continue to work closely with the Government of Egypt, Government of Jordan, Government of Israel, and relevant NGO partners, including the United Nations, to ensure that that final step is happening and it’s getting to the places it needs to go.Go ahead.QUESTION: I’ve asked several times about the right to defend one’s self for Palestinians, and out of this room we’ve heard that the U.S. does not exhibit any double – double standards. And today in the West Bank there – the Israelis’ occupation forces chased, beat, and threw off a roof a 32-year-old man – Palestinian man, Hassan Mansiya, near – in the Hebron district. Also, the Israeli forces attacked at least two schools with tear gas, two – inside and outside schools in the Hebron and Jenin districts, where students were, and teachers, and some of them experienced some suffocation. Since October 7th, we’ve – I mean, we’ve had, like, what is it, 95 minors that have been killed in the West Bank. I asked before: Do Palestinians have a right to defend themselves? I’m not talking about rogue individuals. I’m talking about as far as a legal authority to defend Palestinians. Do they – does the State Department view that Palestinians have a right and duty to defend themselves?MR PATEL: So look, I have not seen those reports that you outlined. I’m happy to look into them, and I have no doubt our partners in the IDF may be able to share more. What I can say is that actions like these, if true, they are destabilizing. They contribute to a deteriorating security situation, and they are not in the interest of Israel’s own security. And when we have seen actions like this, when we see actions from – we believe quite strongly that these kinds of activities take us away from a two-state solution, and they feed into further instability.QUESTION: Okay.MR PATEL: That &#8212;QUESTION: But does – does the Palestinian Authority have the right to defend its citizens?MR PATEL: Absolutely it does. Absolutely it does.QUESTION: It does? Okay.MR PATEL: Go ahead.QUESTION: A follow-up on the campus protests.MR PATEL: Yeah.QUESTION: I have a question. The U.S. Government, everybody from President Biden on down to here at the podium has been quick to call out antisemitism at these protests, but there’s also been an enormous number of examples of Islamophobia and racism from counterprotesters. Why doesn’t the administration denounce that as well, and would you do that here?MR PATEL: I did. You can check the transcript. I did.QUESTION: Well, and let me ask you about Netanyahu’s – the news on Netanyahu today &#8212;MR PATEL: Mm-hmm.QUESTION: &#8212; where he said that even if there’s a hostage deal, they’re still going into Rafah.MR PATEL: Ryan, you’ve got to be on time. You’ve got to come to the briefing on time.QUESTION: Did you get asked about that this morning?MR PATEL: I spoke to that too. Come on, man.QUESTION: Okay.MR PATEL: Go ahead.QUESTION: All right.QUESTION: Thank you. Thank you, Vedant.MR PATEL: Yeah.QUESTION: Today photos of pier in Gaza were published. My question: Will the Palestinian Authority, PA, be the one who will control this pier?MR PATEL: Sorry, you &#8212;QUESTION: The port.MR PATEL: Uh-huh.QUESTION: Today I – there is photos of this port published. I wonder if the PA, the Palestinian Authority, will control this port in Gaza.MR PATEL: I do not believe that the Palestinian Authority has a role in the maritime corridor, but I am happy to defer you to my colleagues at the Defense Department and USAID to speak to this process in a little bit more specificity.QUESTION: Don’t – just one – don’t you think this port will build over the Palestinian territories, and should Palestinian people have the authority over this port?MR PATEL: So broadly, when we are talking about the future of Gaza and the future of a two-state solution and ensuring that Gaza is no longer a launch pad for terrorism against the Israeli people, part of that for us, of course, includes a Gaza that is reunited under the Palestinian Authority. But as it relates to this maritime corridor, I do not believe that they have a specific role. But that being said, my colleagues at the Pentagon and USAID may be in a better place to speak to some of the more logistical components of this.QUESTION: Okay.MR PATEL: Go ahead, in the back.QUESTION: Thank you, Vedant. I just wanted to ask about the Erez border crossing.MR PATEL: Sure.QUESTION: It’s also reopening in the north weeks after POTUS’s call with Netanyahu. What should we read into the timing of this opening considering that Blinken is now there to request more aid, and also this ceasefire deal hangs in the balance?MR PATEL: I would not read anything into the timing of this beyond us just stressing, again, that all of these things need to happen as swiftly as possible. But we also fully understand that there may be steps that need to be taken in when factoring in vetting, safety, other things as it relates to crossings that are used for the inflow of aid. We are not naive to the fact that this is a process, but look, we have been clear that we need this to happen as swiftly as possible.QUESTION: And I just want to touch on some of the other questions as well.MR PATEL: Yeah.QUESTION: Was it the U.S.’s aim to try to beat the clock on a Rafah invasion by getting the ceasefire deal in place beforehand? And if so, have Netanyahu’s comments this morning altered that at all?MR PATEL: It’s not about beating any clock. We – if you go back and look at the history and trajectory of this conflict, there have been a number of instances in which we have been hoping, encouraging, working tirelessly for a deal that would release the hostages that we hope would be partnered with some kind of ceasefire. That has been our position for quite some time. And simultaneously, as it relates to Rafah, it has also been our position for quite some time that any kind of operation that does not address the sort of various components of humanitarian concern that we have would be unacceptable to us.QUESTION: Thank you.MR PATEL: Yeah. Go ahead in the back. Yeah.QUESTION: Thank you so much. Any comment on John Bass’ trip to Doha and Islamabad? Was the meeting with Taliban official in his schedule?MR PATEL: So, as you so noted, acting Under Secretary for Political Affairs John Bass is on travel to Doha and Islamabad. In Doha he’ll meet with senior Qatari officials and other diplomatic missions to discuss support for Afghanistan and other shared security interests in the region, and in Islamabad we expect him to meet with senior Pakistani officials and discuss a range of regional and bilateral issues as well.QUESTION: A follow-up?MR PATEL: Go ahead next. Yeah.QUESTION: Thank you, Vedant.MR PATEL: Yeah.QUESTION: I know the State Department already talked about the Kurdistan Region’s local elections &#8212;MR PATEL: Yeah.QUESTION: &#8212; some time ago, as it has been scheduled for June 10th. So now there’s a discussion that should be postponed for at least three months, so what’s your comment?MR PATEL: So we understand that President Barzani and various Iraqi authorities and other political parties are actively considering next steps. From our point of view, we would encourage them to schedule free, fair, and timely elections, and we hope that process takes place, but I don’t have anything to offer beyond that.Guita, go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you, Vedant.MR PATEL: Yeah.QUESTION: I have two questions on two separate topics.MR PATEL: Great.QUESTION: At the White House Correspondents Dinner on Saturday, the President called on Putin to release RFE/RL journalist Alsu Kurmasheva. I was wondering if the State Department is following up her case into seeing whether she’s been – she can be identified as wrongfully detained.MR PATEL: So first, let me just say we have no higher priority than the safety and security of U.S. citizens overseas, and in the case of Alsu Kurmasheva, we remain deeply concerned about her detention in Russia. And to echo the President, we believe she should be released, and we condemn in the strongest possible terms the Kremlin’s continued attempts to intimidate, repress, and punish journalists and other civil society actors.In terms of a wrongful detention designation, I’m just not going to get ahead of our process. There is a deliberative and fact-driven process underway. That process continues to be ongoing, and we constantly review circumstances surrounding detentions of U.S. nationals, so I don’t have anything to offer there.QUESTION: How often – can you tell us how often you may review cases?MR PATEL: I – we – I am not going to speak to the specifics of this process.QUESTION: Okay, another one on Burkina Faso.MR PATEL: Yeah.QUESTION: Voice of America and BBC have been banned there. I was wondering if the State Department is doing anything in that regard.MR PATEL: So we are very alarmed that Burkina Faso’s Superior Council of Communication has suspended multiple independent outlets, including Voice of America and BBC, for covering the Human Rights Watch report about some recent massacres. You’ve heard the Secretary say, and including from this very podium, that far too many governments use repression to silence free expression, particularly against journalists and media organizations, for simply doing their jobs. Freedom of expression, particularly for media, is critical for accountable and transparent governance.Go ahead, Alex.QUESTION: You should allow more journalists as well, Mr. Vedant.MR PATEL: Go ahead, Alex.QUESTION: Thank you, Vedant.QUESTION: I mean, one is – when you talk about free journalism, are you going to give a chance (inaudible) &#8212;MR PATEL: You’re interrupting your colleague, Jalil.QUESTION: Thank you, Vedant.QUESTION: This is my third time and you have not given me a chance. Is this free journalism?MR PATEL: You’re – I’m happy to come to you – I’m happy to come to you after.QUESTION: Please.MR PATEL: Alex, go ahead.QUESTION: Thanks so much, Vedant. Can you please clear up – either validate or keep alive – some of the reports claiming that the U.S. has eased some of the sanctions on Russian banks, including central bank, to allow some energy-related operations? Why?MR PATEL: I’m not sure what reports you’re referring to, Alex. What I can just say broadly, though, is that when it comes to our efforts to hold the Russian Federation accountable for its infringement on the territorial integrity and sovereignty of our Ukrainian partners, we have not taken our foot off the gas, going back to February of 2022 since this invasion occurred. And we will continue to take steps both to continue to support our Ukrainian partners, but also through sanctions, export controls, and other measures hold the Russian Federation accountable.QUESTION: So there is no shift at all in that policy?MR PATEL: There is no policy shift at all.QUESTION: Thank you.MR PATEL: Yeah.QUESTION: On Poland, Poland today handed official request to United States to host nuclear weapons in Poland. Do you have any reaction?MR PATEL: I don’t have any comment for you on that. I’m sure my colleagues at the Pentagon can speak to that greater.QUESTION: Sure, thank you. And final topic on Armenia-Azerbaijan. The Secretary spoke with both leaders over the weekend. Any reason to why he called this – any, like, intel or any concern did he want to convey? And separately on Azerbaijan and human rights, a portion of the discussion was about human rights, but hours after that call Azerbaijan arrested another civil society leader. So how much is it the reflection of functional relationship?MR PATEL: So first let me just say, Alex, it should come to no surprise to you that this is an area of the world that the Secretary himself is personally deeply engaged on. And over the course of his time as Secretary, he has had regular engagements at regular intervals with both of these countries. And our engagements with both of them are ongoing, and we continue to believe that a peace and – is possible here. And that’s something that we’re going to continue to work towards.On the second question that you raised, we are deeply troubled by the continuing arrests of members of Azerbaijani civil society, most recently Anar Mammadli. And we urge the Azerbaijani Government to immediately release all individuals who are unjustly detained.Jalil, go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you very much, Mr. Vedant, and thank you very much, State Department, for bearing with me these nine years. Just one question, and then if you’ll allow me, I’ll ask another question.How do you feel – when journalists here are friends with the same podium people from the U.S. since last two decades, and you guys – this administration since last two years – if a journalist doesn’t agree – agree with you, you just ignore them. I mean, this is the beauty of this newsroom. This is the beauty of this press room. Why you guys like – you guys not feel bad to be treating somebody like this? Like, what’s the reason?MR PATEL: I’m sorry. Who are we treating in what way?QUESTION: I’m talking about this gentleman right here. Since last two years &#8212;MR PATEL: Did something happen to you?QUESTION: Sir, I feel very ignored. I ask one question, and you pass me, you are &#8212;MR PATEL: First of all, it is never a guarantee that everyone gets a question every day. We try our best to get to everybody, but sometimes we’re dealing with the confines of time. And I will just say, Jalil, in my time up here and Matt’s time and Ned’s time, we have taken questions from you pretty regularly.QUESTION: I don’t agree. But anyway, thank you very much.MR PATEL: Rabia, go ahead.QUESTION: I just have a question about &#8212;MR PATEL: You just used your one question, so I’m going to move – I’m going to move on now. Go ahead.QUESTION: Sir, I had a follow-up question on Kabul expansionism.MR PATEL: That’s fine.QUESTION: Under secretary is going there. The region has terrorism going on.MR PATEL: Then you should ask that question, Jalil.QUESTION: Half of the country is &#8212;MR PATEL: Then you should &#8212;QUESTION: Half of Afghanistan is under no education for girls. The under secretary is going. How do you feel talking to a nation where terrorism is once again growing up? Today in Kabul, six people were killed. Every week there is terrorism. Why is the under secretary holdings talks with the Taliban if the girls do not have education and what’s your interest there?MR PATEL: So let me just say a couple things. First, I will just – since you’ve gotten us way off topic, if you have a question, you should ask a question, not waste your colleagues’ time about other things.Secondly, I’m not aware of any travel to Afghanistan by any undersecretary, but let me just say that when it comes to our engagements with the Taliban, we engage when it is in the United States interest to do so. This is the best way to not just protect U.S. national interests but also support the Afghan people. Engagement allows us to speak directly with the Taliban, and it’s an opportunity for us to continue to press for the immediate and unconditional release of U.S. nationals in Afghanistan including those who we have determined to be wrongfully detained. We’ll also use those opportunities to directly talk about the Taliban’s commitments to counterterrorism, and of course, as always, human rights is also on the agenda.QUESTION: Thank you very much.MR PATEL: Rabia, go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you very much.QUESTION: A quick one: Do you have anything on the talks between Türkiye and the U.S. – U.S. energy firm ExxonMobil? A Turkish energy minister said that they are interested in diversifying Türkiye’s national gas supplies. What is your comment on this? And was this a topic of discussion between the two countries?MR PATEL: So I don’t have any more specifics to offer as it relates to the Secretary’s engagement with Foreign Minister Fidan, but let me just say I’ve seen those public reports, and I’m not going to offer anything additional on potential commercial negotiations, but from our vantage point we would encourage any country to diversify its energy supply and curb dependence on Russian energy. And to just broaden the aperture a little bit, Türkiye has played a very important role as the host of the Southern Gas Corridor in helping diversify European energy supplies and European gas supplies away from dependence on Russia, and as the host of multiple LNG liquification facilities which have received a lot of American LNG since the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion in Ukraine.QUESTION: Can I have a quick one on Middle East?MR PATEL: Sure.QUESTION: Do you have any comment on the Hamas and Fatah leaders meeting in Beijing at the invitation of China? What is your comment on dialogue between Hamas and Fatah?MR PATEL: So our message on this has been what it was since October 7th. If any country purports to have influence or relationships with Hamas, the message is quite clear: release every single hostage and it can no longer be business as usual. They should call on Hamas to lay down their arms, and that is the best and fastest way to get us where we need to be.Taka, go ahead.QUESTION: So the family of the Japanese nationals abducted by North Korea met State official this morning. Do you have any detail about the meeting? Who met the families? How do you describe the meeting?MR PATEL: So I’m happy to check if there’s any specific officials that we can share, but the U.S. stands with the long-suffering relatives of Japanese abductees, and we continue to urge the DPRK to right this historic wrong and provide full accounting of those that remain missing. And we don’t have any other meetings on this to announce at this time.QUESTION: Details?MR PATEL: I’m happy to check some more specifics but I don’t have anything for you at the – go ahead, Diyar.QUESTION: Thank you, Vedant.MR PATEL: Yeah.QUESTION: You talked about the Kurdistan Region’s election &#8212;MR PATEL: Yeah.QUESTION: &#8212; but I need a clarification on that. What do you mean when you say that you encourage them to schedule a free and fair election? Because it’s already been scheduled for June 10. Does the U.S. support rescheduling that election?MR PATEL: Our understanding is that President Barzani and various other authorities are actively considering next steps, and we will let that process play out before commenting further.QUESTION: Do you support rescheduling this election?MR PATEL: That’s not for us to decide. What we would encourage is for these elections to be scheduled and for them to be free, fair, and credible. But beyond that, our understanding is that President Barzani and various other entities are actively discussing additional next steps.Go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you, sir.MR PATEL: Yeah.QUESTION: Pakistani ambassador in Washington, D.C., (inaudible) Masood Khan, recently talked about the importance of Pakistan-U.S. security cooperation and the need to bolster Pakistan’s defense capabilities due to regional challenges. Do you have any – something to tell us, what kind of strategy or initiative both of our countries are working on to enhance security cooperation?MR PATEL: Yeah. So the United States and Pakistan have a shared interest in combating threats to regional security. And we support Pakistan’s efforts to combat terrorism and ensure the safety and security of its citizens in a manner that promotes the rule of law and protection of human rights. Our partnership with Pakistan on security issues includes, of course, a high-level counterterrorism dialogue, funding robust counterterrorism capacity, and building programs and supporting a series of U.S. and Pakistan military-to-military engagements.QUESTION: Sir, The Washington Post’s latest article revealed that Indian Prime Minister Modi inner circle, including spy chief Samant Goel and even the national security advisor, were aware of the assassination plot on a Sikh activist in New York. So how concerning is this for you?MR PATEL: So we continue to expect accountability from the Government of India based on the results of the Indian inquiry committee’s work, and we are regularly working with them and enquiring for additional updates. We’ll also continue to raise our concerns directly with the Indian Government at senior levels, but beyond that I’m not going to parse into this further and will defer to the Department of Justice.Julia, go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you. On Sudan, I had a follow-up on &#8212;MR PATEL: Yeah.QUESTION: &#8212; the UN Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield’s comments calling it a – the potential for a large-scale massacre. And she also said that the U.S. is appealing to countries, including the UAE, to stop support for the warring parties. Has any progress been made with the UAE and other countries, and what is the U.S. doing to try to prevent this catastrophe?MR PATEL: So to put it bluntly, as Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield said yesterday, this – we certainly do not view this as conjecture, and we are seeing the possibility of history repeating itself in Darfur in the worst possible way. There are credible reports that the RSF and its allied militias have razed multiple villages west of El Fasher and are planning an imminent attack on El Fasher, putting 500,000 internally-displaced persons at risk on top of the 2 million Sudanese who call El Fasher home. We also know, as the ambassador said, that both sides are receiving weapons and other support to fuel their efforts. And we’ve directly raised our concerns about reports of UAE support to the RSF with our Emirati partners, and we have made clear that the provision of arms to either side only deepens and prolongs the conflict.Go ahead, Daphne, and then we’re going to wrap.QUESTION: Thank you.QUESTION: You said all – you said you’d take everybody’s questions.MR PATEL: That’s not what I said. I said I would get to as many people as I &#8212;QUESTION: You didn’t even &#8212;MR PATEL: I said I’d get to as many as I can.QUESTION: That’s not what you said.MR PATEL: Go ahead, Daphne.QUESTION: The Philippines today said a coast guard ship and a fisheries vessel were damaged by water cannons used by Chinese coast guard ships. This comes right after Blinken’s trip to China. Do you have any comment on this, concerns?MR PATEL: So the repeated harassment of Philippine vessels near Scarborough Reef is detrimental to regional peace and stability, and our belief is that the Chinese coast guard installation of these barriers also endangers Philippine fisherfolk’s livelihoods and prevents them from exercising their legal rights to fish in those waters. These are rights that were set out in 2016 in a final and legally binding judgment in the Philippines-China arbitration brought to the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention, and consistently – and this is something that the Secretary made clear on his travels as well – is that we urge the PRC to respect the navigational rights and freedoms guaranteed to all states under international law.All right. Thanks, everybody.QUESTION: Thank you.(The briefing was concluded at 2:05 p.m.)# # #						Tags																					Afghanistan																								Armenia																								Azerbaijan																								Burkina Faso																								China																								India																								Iraq																								Israel																								Japan																								North Korea																								Office of the Spokesperson																								Pakistan																								Palestinian Territories																								Philippines																								Qatar																								Russia																								Saudi Arabia																								Sudan																								Turkey																								Ukraine
- Joint Statement on Civilian Massacres and Media Suspensions in Burkina Faso Office of the SpokespersonThe following joint statement was released by the Governments of the United Kingdom and the United States of America.The Governments of the United Kingdom and the United States are gravely concerned by reports of massacres of civilians by Burkinabe military forces in late February.  A recent Human Rights Watch report details first-hand accounts of the execution of at least 223 civilians, including 56 children, in the villages of Nondin and Soro in Burkina Faso’s Yatenga province.  We call on the Transition Authorities to thoroughly investigate these massacres and hold those responsible to account.We offer our deepest condolences to the loved ones of all victims of violence perpetrated in Burkina Faso in recent months, including Christians and Muslims murdered by terrorist groups in their places of worship, and members of the armed forces who have been killed.&nbsp; We call on all actors in Burkina Faso to respect human rights and adhere to international humanitarian law as applicable. &nbsp;The only long-term solution to the scourge of terrorism is expanding good governance based on the&nbsp;rule of law, respect for human rights, and promotion of social cohesion.We strongly oppose the suspensions of media outlets, including VOA and the BBC, the blocking of Human Rights Watch’s website, and restrictions placed on all media from reporting on their articles. &nbsp;This decision coincides with World Press Freedom Day on May 3, which reminds us that societies are strengthened, not threatened, by well-informed publics and expressions of opinion. &nbsp;Free and independent media must be permitted to conduct investigations and good-faith reporting without fear of reprisals. &nbsp;We strongly urge Burkina Faso’s Superior Council of Communication (CSC) to reconsider its suspensions of media outlets.						Tags																					Bureau of African Affairs																								Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor																								Burkina Faso																																Human Rights																															Office of the Spokesperson																																Press Freedom
- Burkina Faso HomeReportsBureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices&#8230;Burkina Faso				hide	document.addEventListener("DOMContentLoaded", function(event) {	if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}});																							2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Burkina Faso																																					Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor																																																																																							Download Report																																																							Translations																																																																 In this section										/																							EXECUTIVE SUMMARY																																													EXECUTIVE SUMMARY																															Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person																																																									a. Arbitrary Deprivation of Life and Other Unlawful or Politically Motivated Killings																																																																											b. Disappearance																																																																											c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and Other Related Abuses																																																																			Prison and Detention Center Conditions																																																																																																																		d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention																																																																			Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees																																																																																																																		e. Denial of Fair Public Trial																																																																			Trial Procedures																																																								Political Prisoners and Detainees																																																																																																																		f. Transnational Repression																																																																											g. Property Seizure and Restitution																																																																											h. Arbitrary or Unlawful Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence																																																																											i. Conflict-related Abuses																																																																																	Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties																																																									a. Freedom of Expression, Including for Members of the Press and Other Media																																																																			Internet Freedom																																																																																																																		b. Freedoms of Peaceful Assembly and Association																																																																			Freedom of Peaceful Assembly																																																																																																																		c. Freedom of Religion																																																																											d. Freedom of Movement and the Right to Leave the Country																																																																											e. Protection of Refugees																																																																											f. Status and Treatment of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)																																																																																	Section 3. Freedom to Participate in the Political Process																																																									Elections and Political Participation																																																																																	Section 4. Corruption in Government																															Section 5. Governmental Posture Towards International and Nongovernmental Monitoring and Investigation of Alleged Abuses of Human Rights																															Section 6. Discrimination and Societal Abuses																																																									Women																																																																											Systemic Racial or Ethnic Violence and Discrimination																																																																											Children																																																																											Antisemitism																																																																											Trafficking in Persons																																																																											Acts of Violence, Criminalization, and Other Abuses Based on Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity or Expression, or Sex Characteristics																																																																											Persons with Disabilities																																																																											Other Societal Violence or Discrimination																																																																																	Section 7. Worker Rights																																																									a. Freedom of Association and the Right to Collective Bargaining																																																																											b. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor																																																																											c. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment																																																																											d. Discrimination (see section 6)																																																																											e. Acceptable Conditions of Work																																																																																																							EXECUTIVE SUMMARY				On April 19, Transition President Captain Ibrahim Traoré signed a decree establishing a “general mobilization and warning” that gave him broad powers to abridge individual rights, purportedly in the interest of defeating terrorist groups. The decree stated that the transition government would have power to requisition individuals, goods, and services, and authorized restrictions on unspecified rights.Significant human rights issues included credible reports of: arbitrary or unlawful killings, including extrajudicial killings; enforced disappearance; torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment by and on behalf of the government; arbitrary arrest or detention; serious problems with the independence of the judiciary; arbitrary or unlawful interference with privacy; serious abuses in a conflict, including reportedly unlawful or widespread civilian deaths or harm, enforced disappearances or abductions, physical abuses, and conflict-related sexual violence or punishment; unlawful recruitment or use of children in armed conflict by armed groups; serious restrictions on freedom of expression and media freedom, including violence or threats of violence against journalists, unjustified arrests or prosecutions of journalists, censorship, or enforcement of or threat to enforce criminal libel laws to limit expression; substantial interference with the freedom of peaceful assembly and freedom of association; inability of citizens to change their government peacefully through free and fair elections; serious and unreasonable restrictions on political participation; serious government corruption; extensive gender-based violence, including domestic or intimate partner violence, sexual violence, workplace violence, child, early, and forced marriage, female genital mutilation/cutting, femicide, and other forms of such violence; and crimes involving violence or threats of violence targeting members of the Fulani ethnic group.Beyond opening investigations, the Transition Authorities did not take credible steps to identify and punish officials who may have committed human rights abuses.The country experienced deadly attacks by violent extremist organizations during the year. Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims), the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara, and other armed groups, such as the homegrown Ansaroul Islam, perpetrated numerous attacks resulting in hundreds of civilian deaths as well as scores of deaths among government security forces and state-sponsored militias. Security incidents included improvised explosive device attacks; targeted killings; kidnappings; attacks on mining sites (especially gold mines); burning of schools, medical centers, and homes; and theft of cattle, vehicles, and food assistance. According to the UN Human Rights Office, the country recorded 513 security incidents that left more than 1,400 dead during the first six months of the year. The Transition Authorities detained several hundred suspected violent extremists. This included children allegedly associated with armed groups, including potential trafficking victims.																														Section 1.													 Respect for the Integrity of the Person												    																																																a. Arbitrary Deprivation of Life and Other Unlawful or Politically Motivated Killings										There were numerous reports that government security forces and government-sponsored militias, known as the Volontaires pour la defense de la Patrie (Volunteers for the Defense of the Fatherland, or VDPs) committed arbitrary or unlawful killings, including extrajudicial killings, during the year.On March 27, an article in the French newspaper Libération accused government security forces of torturing to death seven children from the Fulani community suspected of complicity with terrorists in Ouahigouya, Nord Region. According to the article, the seven victims were among more than 40 individuals, mostly from the Fulani community, who were kidnapped by government security forces and VDPs in retaliation for a terrorist attack on February 13. In a public statement, the Transition Authorities condemned the article and denied the allegations, asserting that the country’s security forces acted in strict compliance with international humanitarian law.On April 7, soldiers of the Dori garrison conducted a “punitive expedition” against residents following the killing of a soldier on the night of April 3 at his home in a district of Dori, Sahel Region. Soldiers inflicted inhuman, cruel, and degrading treatment on the population, killing seven individuals and wounding several others.According to reports by the press and human rights groups, including the Collective Against Impunity and Stigmatization of Communities (CISC), armed men, identified as VDPs by surviving victims, killed 28 unarmed civilians from the Fulani ethnic community in the city of Nouna, Boucle du Mouhoun Region, in December 2022, following an attack on the local VDP headquarters the night before. On January 2, the transition government issued a statement acknowledging the killings and noted the opening of an investigation. The investigation was pending as of year’s end.On April 20, a group of armed men in local military uniforms with motorcycles, pickup trucks, and an armored transport vehicle entered the village of Karma, Nord Region, and began killing the mostly Mossi population there, leaving nearly 150 dead, according to survivors and civil society representatives. Audio recordings shared by villagers in Moore, a local language, accused the security forces of being responsible for the killings. Speaking to French media entity Le Monde anonymously, a military official suggested that the massacre may have been perpetrated by terrorists masquerading as security forces. The Transition Authorities announced an investigation into the case, which continued at year’s end. In a May 2 press release, the transition government rejected the West African regional bloc ECOWAS’ characterization of “genocide” to describe the massacre.There were numerous reports that violent extremist groups committed killings. Multiple sources reported that violent extremists killed hundreds of civilians, members of the security forces, and members of state-sponsored militias. There were several accounts of criminal groups working in concert with terrorist organizations and drug traffickers to kill gendarmes, police, and VDPs.On February 17, a local branch of the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (IS-GS), Dawlatoul Islamia, attacked state security forces, killing 51 soldiers on the road from Deou to Oursi in Oudalan Province, Sahel Region, near the border with Mali and Niger. Social media activists put the death toll at 80. On February 20, the same group killed approximately 19 soldiers and left 30 others of the Tin-Akoff military detachment missing in Oudalan, and later claimed responsibility for both attacks.In February the Transition Authorities amended the law to elevate the importance of provost marshals, who were deployed in the national territory with combat units to document human rights abuses and other offenses committed by defense and security forces. In August the Transition Authorities set up an intraministerial working group to address allegations of human rights abuses.																																				b. Disappearance										There were reports of disappearances by or on behalf of security forces and state-sponsored volunteer militias during the year.There were numerous reports of disappearances of civilians by violent extremist groups.The international nongovernmental organization (NGO) Doctors Without Borders (MSF) announced that one of its employees was abducted in Ouagadougou on the night of July 6. According to MSF, Issa Dicko, a Fulani employee who worked as a “cultural mediator” for the organization, was arrested by individuals believed to be security forces.On the night of September 28, two Fulani individuals accompanying a patient were abducted at the Gaoua Regional Hospital, Poni Province, Sud-Ouest Region, by individuals believed to be VDPs.On December 1, at least six individuals believed to be police abducted Daouda Diallo, the secretary general of the CISC and one of the most prominent human rights defenders in the country, in front of the passport office in Ouagadougou, where he had gone to renew his travel documents. Diallo had been on a list of at least 10 individuals critical of the transition government to be conscripted since November but had refused to comply. Diallo had previously escaped an attempted kidnapping by unidentified individuals on January 6, following the CISC’s denunciation of the killings of 28 individuals allegedly by VDPs in Nouna.The CISC recorded 203 enforced disappearances as of mid-November. The Transition Authorities announced the opening of investigations into many of these disappearances, but there were no updates on these investigations as of year’s end.																																				c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and Other Related Abuses										The constitution and law prohibited such practices, but there were credible reports that government officials employed them. According to articles 4-8 of the Penal Code, a guilty verdict of torture or similar practices was punishable by a term of three years to life imprisonment. The CISC and le Mouvement burkinabe des droits de l’homme et des peuples (the Burkinabe Movement for Human and Peoples’ Rights, or MBDHP) alleged numerous instances of torture committed by VDPs. Most allegations of torture involved victims suspected of having links to extremists or persons of Fulani/Peuhl ethnicity. Impunity was a significant problem.According to media reports, on May 23 residents and VDPs stripped, tied up, and beat 63 members of the Fulani community including seven women and three children at the Ouahigouya market, Yatenga Province, Nord Region. The victims had fled attacks by violent extremists in Zogore and Oula communes in the Nord Region and were transporting several hundred animals to the Ouahigouya market.																Prison and Detention Center Conditions						Conditions in prisons and detention facilities were harsh and at times life threatening due to inadequate sanitary conditions and medical care.Abusive Physical Conditions: Women prisoners had better conditions than men, in large part due to less crowding. Some infants and children younger than age five accompanied their inmate mothers. There were no appropriate facilities or installations for prisoners or detainees with disabilities, and persons with disabilities relied on other inmates for assistance.Food, potable water, sanitation, heating, ventilation, lighting, and medical care were inadequate in most detention facilities across the country. The High Security Prison in Ouagadougou employed one on-site nurse and a second volunteer nurse to treat more than 900 detainees and prisoners, with no doctor present but available on call.Prisoners received two meals a day, but diets were inadequate, and inmates relied on supplemental food from relatives and the formal partnership with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to treat malnourished inmates with specialized supplements. Sanitation was rudimentary.Administration: The Transition Authorities did not provide information on investigations into allegations of mistreatment in prisons.Independent Monitoring: The Transition Authorities permitted monitoring by independent nongovernmental observers. The ICRC and MBDHP were able to visit prisoners in some facilities throughout the country, including the High Security Prison.																										d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention										The constitution and law prohibited arbitrary arrest and detention and provided for the right of persons to challenge the lawfulness of their arrest or detention in court. Arbitrary arrests occurred, however, and lack of access to defense counsel and inadequate staffing of the judiciary prevented many detainees from seeking pretrial release in court. The MBDHP and CISC received hundreds of new cases of persons reported missing by their families during the year.																Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees						By law police and gendarmes were required to possess a court-issued warrant based on sufficient evidence before apprehending a person suspected of committing a crime, but authorities did not always follow these procedures. Authorities did not consistently inform detainees of charges against them. Detainees had the right to expeditious arraignment, bail, access to legal counsel, and, if indigent, access to a government-provided lawyer after being charged. In practice, however, attorneys were not appointed until trial began. A judge could order temporary release without bail pending trial. Authorities seldom respected these rights. The law provided detainees access to family members through court-issued authorizations.The law limited detention without charge for investigative purposes to a maximum of 72 hours, renewable for a single 48-hour period. In terrorism investigations the law allowed detention for a 15-day period with an extension of 10 days. In cases not related to terrorism, police did not always comply with the law, and the average time of detention without charge was one week. Once authorities charged a suspect, the law permitted investigative judges to impose extensions for pretrial detention up to one year for correctional matters, and up to two years for criminal matters (sentences of 10 years and above). Individuals charged with terrorism offenses could be detained indefinitely until trial. Authorities often detained defendants without access to legal counsel for weeks, months, or even years before the defendant appeared before a magistrate. There were instances in which authorities detained suspects incommunicado.Arbitrary Arrest: Local independent rights groups alleged that security forces regularly arrested individuals arbitrarily for suspected involvement in terrorism. An official with the Ministry of Justice reported that hundreds of individuals detained at the High Security Prison remained in detention without being charged. Judiciary leaders decried what they saw as a “broad net” cast by security forces in the field, whom they suspected of rounding up large groups of suspects without sufficient cause.Pretrial Detention: In many cases authorities held detainees without charge or trial for periods longer than the maximum sentence for conviction of the alleged offense; this was especially true in cases involving terrorism, including children detained for alleged association with armed groups. While a pretrial release system existed, the extent of its use was unknown. Authorities estimated 52 percent of prisoners nationwide were in pretrial status, but local independent rights groups estimated it to be as high as 70 percent. Local media regularly reported on cases of persons detained more than one year without trial. Some terrorism suspects were held for years awaiting trial.																										e. Denial of Fair Public Trial										The constitution and law provided for an independent judiciary, but according to some NGOs, the judiciary was corrupt, inefficient, and subject to executive influence.On July 28, traditional healer Amseto Nikiema and eight of her associates were taken into police custody in Komsilga and then transferred to an Ouagadougou prison following the issuance of an arrest warrant for assault, acts of torture shared on social media, and illegal confinement. The same day, soldiers with the National Intelligence Agency, purportedly at the direction of Transition President Traoré, demanded the healer’s release into their custody, and she was released to soldiers on July 29 through a verbal order that reportedly came from the minister of justice.Following Nikiema’s release, all three of the country’s magistrate unions issued formal declarations of a work stoppage by the judiciary amid widespread condemnation of the process by civil society organizations, members of the bar, unions, and members of the public. The Transition Authorities justified their interference in the judicial proceedings through official communications from the Ministry of Communications, citing national security interests. On September 6, the traditional healer was fined one million CFA francs ($1,653) and issued a three-year suspended prison sentence. Her eight codefendants were fined 500,000 CFA francs ($826) each and sentenced to four-year prison terms, which were later suspended. Some observers noted the military’s involvement and lack of respect for the rule of law during the trial’s proceedings, calling into question whether the outcomes of the trial were predetermined.Legal codes were often outdated, although the Ministry of Justice initiated a program to rewrite the Criminal Procedure Code to improve access to justice and streamline criminal procedures. Nonetheless, there were not enough courts, and legal costs were excessive. Citizens’ lack of knowledge of their rights further weakened their ability to obtain justice. The reluctance of private defense lawyers to represent terrorist suspects in criminal cases was a problem, due to lack of funds to pay appointed counsel, concern regarding personal safety, and the social stigma associated with representing accused extremists.The country’s second session of criminal terrorism trials concluded on June 23 in the Specialized Antiterrorism Court, nearly two years after the country’s first terrorism trial in August 2021. During the two-week special session, 50 defendants appeared at the Antiterrorism Court in 26 cases. A three-judge panel acquitted 17 defendants and found 23 guilty. Trials for another 10 defendants were delayed or remanded for differing causes, including the unknown whereabouts of coconspirator defendants. Convicted criminals received various sentences including 10 years of imprisonment, life imprisonment, and, in some instances, substantial fines. Journalists were required to refrain from publishing articles on the trials until the end of the session to reduce security threats from terrorist organizations. Post-session reporting, however, was minimal. Overall, most observers assessed that the second round of terrorism trials were a significant improvement over the first round in 2021 and represented institutional improvement.																Trial Procedures						The constitution provided for the right to a fair and public trial, but the judiciary generally did not enforce this right. The law presumed defendants were innocent. Defendants had the right to be informed promptly and in detail of the charges against them, with free assistance of an interpreter. Trials were public but could be delayed. Defendants had the right to be present at their trials and to legal representation, consultation, and adequate time and facilities to prepare a defense. Defendants had the right to provide evidence and not to be compelled to testify or confess guilt, but a refusal to testify often resulted in harsher sentences. Defendants could challenge and present witnesses and had the right of appeal. In criminal cases court-appointed lawyers were mandatory for those who could not afford one. The government did not always respect these rights, due in part to a shortage of magistrates and court-appointed lawyers.						Political Prisoners and Detainees						There were no reports of political prisoners or detainees.																										f. Transnational Repression										Not applicable.																																				g. Property Seizure and Restitution										Not applicable.																																				h. Arbitrary or Unlawful Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence										The constitution and law prohibited such actions, and the government generally respected these prohibitions. In cases of national security, however, the law permitted surveillance, searches, and monitoring of telephones and private correspondence without a warrant. The penal code permitted wiretapping in terrorism cases, to be authorized by the president of a tribunal for a limited term. Investigative judges had the authority to authorize audio recording in private places. The national intelligence service was authorized to use technology for surveillance, national security, and counterterrorism purposes. The state of emergency, which was put in place in 2018, remained in effect in 22 provinces within eight of the country’s 13 administrative regions in response to continued insecurity from extremist attacks. On April 19, Transition Authorities introduced a “general mobilization and warning” decree, empowering the government to take extraordinary measures in order to maintain a higher level of national defense posture. This decree gave the Transition Authorities the power to requisition individuals, goods, and services, laid the groundwork for a general military conscription, and authorized restrictions on unspecified fundamental freedoms. The decree also granted additional powers to security forces to carry out searches of homes and restrict freedom of movement and freedom of peaceful assembly.During the year, the Transition Authorities carried out surveillance, searches, and monitoring of homes, telephones, and private correspondence of many activists and political leaders under the general mobilization decree.On March 25, the transition legislative body passed a law establishing Monitoring and Development Committees to involve the populace in the security and development of the country. According to Transition Authorities, these committees complemented VDP forces, 50,000 of which were recruited during the year, by collecting intelligence. According to international and local independent rights groups, the military employed informant systems to generate lists of suspected extremists based on anecdotal evidence. Violent extremist groups were widely reported to employ similar systems to identify civilians accused of aiding security forces; some of those identified suffered violence or death at the hands of these groups.																																				i. Conflict-related Abuses										The country experienced numerous attacks by violent extremist organizations during the year, such as targeted killings; abductions; attacks on schools, health centers, and mining sites; and theft of food assistance, contributing to a humanitarian crisis and creating significant internal displacement. Security forces and state-sponsored militias were implicated in killings and other abuses. Violent extremist groups including the Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM), IS-GS, and Ansaroul Islam committed numerous killings and other abuses.Killings: Both security forces and state-sponsored militias were implicated in or credibly accused of abuses against civilians, including killings.On March 10, the CISC accused government forces and VDPs of killing at least 21 civilians in a raid on the village of Toessin-Foulbe in the Centre-Nord on March 8. According to the CISC, all but two of the dead belonged to the Fulani ethnic group, several women were reportedly injured, and three individuals were missing. The Transition Authorities subsequently announced they had launched an investigation into the incident.According to the MBDHP, 17 bodies from Fulani and Tamashek communities were found on May 28 in Ekeou, Senou Province, Sahel Region. The victims had reportedly been arrested by soldiers and VDPs in February.Violent extremist groups killed hundreds of civilians during the year. These groups frequently targeted villagers suspected of collaborating with state-sponsored militias and security forces, or simply killed civilians in retribution for losses inflicted by security forces.On February 26, terrorists killed at least 60 individuals in Partiaga, Est Region, according to witnesses. The terrorists went from house to house and killed everyone they encountered, burning some alive. They also destroyed infrastructure, including the equipment of the sole mobile phone company in the area and the gendarmerie headquarters.According to a local security-focused think tank, between March 10 and 14 nearly 50 individuals, both civilians and security forces, were killed in five separate attacks in the Centre-Nord and Sahel regions. On March 12 and 14, extremists killed at least 24 artisanal miners at mining sites in Sahel Region. On May 25, violent extremists killed 50 civilians fleeing the rural communes of Madjoari and Kompienga, Est Region. On October 15, extremists killed at least 11 civilians and soldiers in Silmague, Centre-Nord Region.Abductions: Violent extremists kidnapped dozens of civilians throughout the year, including international humanitarian aid and medical workers. The assailants sometimes kidnapped health workers for a temporary period to obtain medical assistance. On January 1, a group of armed individuals abducted two patients, a nurse, a pharmacist, and another person from the Touka Bayel health center, northern Sahel Region. The victims were found dead on January 2.Local authorities such as mayors, religious, or traditional leaders were recurrent targets of abduction by terrorist groups. On January 2, terrorist groups abducted and then executed a Catholic priest in Dedougou, Boucle du Mouhoun Region.According to the governor of Sahel Region, terrorists abducted approximately 60 women near Arbinda on January 12 while the women were gathering wild fruit in the countryside. Security forces freed them one week later. A prefect from Tcheriba commune in the Boucle du Mouhoun Region was kidnapped by armed men on May 8 and later was found dead in a forest. His colleague and driver, who were also abducted, escaped from their captors. The former mayor of Kompienga, Est Region was reportedly abducted from his farm on May 21.Child Soldiers: There were no reports of the government recruiting or using child soldiers. Nonetheless, according to UNICEF, children were being increasingly recruited by armed groups. The Transition Authorities detained children for alleged association with violent extremist groups, some of whom may have been trafficking victims. The number of children detained during the year was estimated at between five and 15. The Transition Authorities held children in a high-security prison separately from adult detainees. They allowed international organizations and NGOs access to provide specialized care, including legal services. In many cases, authorities held detainees, including children, without charge or trial for longer periods than the maximum sentence for the alleged offense; this included terrorism cases. Detainees faced harsh conditions, including inadequate food and water, and poor sanitation, heating, ventilation, lighting, and medical care.Other Conflict&#8211;related Abuse: According to media reports, on July 12 armed terrorists attacked a humanitarian supply convoy bound for Arbinda, Sahel Region, killing 16 individuals and stealing the supplies. Twenty empty trucks were left behind and multiple individuals were reported missing.On February 8, terrorists killed two MSF staff members in their marked vehicle in Sourou Province, Boucle du Mouhoun Region. On February 17, MSF temporarily suspended operations in the country and stated it would respond only to life-saving emergencies. On August 10, armed individuals shot a World Food Program cargo helicopter that was transporting humanitarian assistance from Ouagadougou to Djibo, Sahel Region. There were no casualties or injuries among the passengers or pilots, and the helicopter was able to continue its mission. This was the first time an aircraft belonging to a humanitarian organization was targeted.																																					Section 2.													 Respect for Civil Liberties												    																																																a. Freedom of Expression, Including for Members of the Press and Other Media										The constitution provided for freedom of expression, including for the press, but the government limited this right through legal means. Restrictions on journalists reporting any security-related news remained in place.Freedom of Expression: A 2019 revision of the penal code criminalized communicating the position or movements of defense forces, sites of national interest or of a strategic nature, and the publication of any terrorist crime scene without authorization. The amendment significantly increased penalties for the crime of publicly insulting another person if electronic communications were used to publish the insult; the law had previously only prohibited persons from insulting the head of state or using derogatory language with respect to the office.During the year, the Transition Authorities arrested several civil society leaders who had been critical of the transition government’s policies. Arouna Loure and 11 other civil society leaders were forcibly conscripted into the VDP forces after they criticized the transition government, the deterioration of the security situation, and the inadequate response to humanitarian matters. The transition government spokesperson told media in early September that citizens called to serve on the battlefield should be proud.Violence and Harassment: Several journalists and their family members reported receiving death threats or other acts of intimidation from transition government supporters because of their critique of the transition government. A May 8 statement from the Collective of Journalists, Activists, and Opinion Leaders Who Are Victims of Threats assessed that the transition government had moved to the stage “of muzzling inherent in any dictatorial regime” after several months of rule characterized by a “worsening of the security and humanitarian crisis and the exacerbation of the diplomatic, economic and social cohesion crisis.”During the year several cases of violent attacks or other acts of intimidation against journalists and other activists remained pending before the courts.Censorship or Content Restrictions for Members of the Press and Other Media, Including Online Media: During the year, the Transition Authorities appealed to the press’s “patriotism,” telling them to refrain from comments that could divide the citizens or distract from the counterterrorism effort. On July 19, the Higher Council of Communication, a government-affiliated entity, released seven watch points for media managers and journalists. The points urged members of the press “to assume their social responsibility, by putting at the heart of their daily reporting the concern not to accentuate the fragility of the country.” In addition to prohibitions on publishing security-related information and insulting the head of state, the law prohibited the publication of shocking images or material that demonstrated lack of respect for the deceased. Journalists practiced self-censorship, fearing that publishing blatant criticism of the government could result in arrest or closure of their newspaper.In March the Transition Authorities expelled all France 24 journalists, and on April 1, journalists working for French daily newspapers Le Monde and Libération. In March Transition President Traoré stated on national television that the Transition Authorities would close all media entities that were distributing “propaganda” of the “enemy.” On August 10, the Transition Authorities suspended Radio Omega, a popular local radio station, after it broadcast an interview deemed “insulting” to Niger’s new military leaders. On September 10, the Transition Authorities lifted the suspension stating that the media had “learned the lessons of the sanction.” On September 25, the Transition Authorities suspended all Jeune Afrique media in the country for their reporting on alleged divisions within the army.																Internet Freedom						The law permitted a judge, at the request of a prosecutor, to block internet websites or email addresses being used to spread “false information” to the public. The Transition Authorities did not restrict or disrupt access to the internet; however, the Higher Council of Communication and the chief prosecutor monitored internet websites and discussion forums to enforce compliance with regulations.																										b. Freedoms of Peaceful Assembly and Association										The law provided for the freedoms of peaceful assembly and association, but the Transition Authorities frequently restricted these rights for those critical of the Transition Authorities.																Freedom of Peaceful Assembly						The law provided for the right of political parties and labor unions to hold meetings and rallies without government permission, although advance notification and approval were required for public demonstrations that could affect traffic or threaten public order.During the year, the Transition Authorities often denied approval of public events hosted by those critical of the transition government but did not do so for supporters. A coalition led by the National Confederation of Burkinabe Workers and a group of civil society organizations called for a rally on October 31 in Ouagadougou to protest “abusive measures” taken by the Transition Authorities. Days before the event, local authorities issued a press release asking the unions and their allies to “suspend” it, citing national security interests. The rally did not take place. Nevertheless, on November 5 and 11, thousands of individuals successfully held meetings in Ouagadougou to express support for the Transition Authorities.																										c. Freedom of Religion										See the Department of State’s International Religious Freedom Report at  https://www.state.gov/religiousfreedomreport/.																																				d. Freedom of Movement and the Right to Leave the Country										The constitution provided for freedom of internal movement, foreign travel, emigration, and repatriation, and the Transition Authorities generally respected these rights.In-country Movement: The Transition Authorities required citizens to carry a national identity document, and authorized officials to request the document at any time. Without a national identity card, citizens could not pass between certain regions of the country and were subject to arrest and fines.During the year, the Transition Authorities suspended the importation, sale, and free distribution of motorized two-wheeled vehicles throughout the country. The measure aimed to reduce the mobility and operational capacity of armed groups but applied to all persons in the country.Armed extremists restricted movement of thousands of rural inhabitants throughout the country by planting improvised explosive devices on major highways, hijacking vehicles, and setting up checkpoints. In response to dozens of attacks by unknown armed groups, local authorities instituted a nighttime ban on motorcycle traffic in the Est, Sahel, and Nord regions.																																				e. Protection of Refugees										The Transition Authorities cooperated with the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations in providing protection and assistance to refugees, as well as to returning refugees, asylum seekers, stateless persons, and other persons of concern.Access to Asylum: The law provided for the granting of asylum or refugee status, and the Transition Authorities had established a system for providing protection to refugees. The Ministry of Solidarity, Humanitarian Affairs, National Reconciliation, Gender, and Family, aided by the National Committee for Refugees, was the focal point for coordination of national and international efforts.Freedom of Movement: According to UNHCR, police arbitrarily arrested Fulani refugees traveling from the Sahel Region to Ouagadougou on multiple occasions, sometimes holding them in detention overnight before releasing them.Access to Basic Services: According to UNHCR, public institutions such as banks, schools, and hospitals occasionally refused service to refugees on a discriminatory basis. As part of the Refugee Identity Card program, in collaboration with the National Commission for Refugees and the National Identification Office, UNHCR continued an enrollment operation for refugees hosted in the country. The issuance of these identity cards to refugees provided protection against arbitrary arrest and abusive detention, and helped facilitate refugees’ access to basic services, livelihoods, and durable solutions.																																				f. Status and Treatment of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)										Worsening conflict and growing insecurity continued to force families to flee from their homes during the year. As of March, the National Council for Emergency Relief and Rehabilitation had registered more than two million IDPs, constituting 10 percent of the country’s population, with estimates reaching up to 2.9 million IDPs by the end of the reporting year, according to UNHCR.In December 2022, the Transition Authorities expelled UN Resident Coordinator Barbara Manzi in a culmination of growing tensions with the United Nations. Humanitarian coordination weakened throughout the year in the absence of a permanent resident coordinator. The Transition Authorities’ requirement of military escorts for humanitarian convoys continued to obstruct the delivery of commodities as it violated humanitarian principles, risked greater loss of life, and necessitated the use of expensive helicopters, which lacked cargo capacity to meet humanitarian needs. Bans on cash assistance by the governors of the Sahel, Centre-Nord, and Est regions further inhibited the humanitarian response. Humanitarian actors also faced mounting physical and existential threats from the Transition Authorities bolstered by claims that humanitarian assistance ultimately ended up in the hands of terrorists.For further information concerning IDPs in the country, please see the materials of the Internal Displacement Monitoring Center:  https://www.internal-displacement.org .																																					Section 3.													 Freedom to Participate in the Political Process												    																						The constitution provided citizens the ability to choose their government in free and fair periodic elections held by secret ballot and based on universal and equal suffrage. This right was not respected since the January 2022 coup d’état.																										Elections and Political Participation										Abuses or Irregularities in Recent Elections: Following the coup d’état on January 24, 2022, and subsequent military putsch on September 30, 2022, the Transition Authorities had not taken steps to hold elections, agreed upon with ECOWAS to occur no later than July 2024. On September 29, Transition President Traoré indicated that elections were not a priority and announced a process for rewriting the constitution to “better reflect the interests of the masses.”Political Parties and Political Participation: Prior to the January 2022 coup, political parties generally operated freely. Following the two military takeovers, the Transition Authorities suspended the activities of political parties and civil society organizations. During the year, political leaders unsuccessfully requested that the transition government lift the ban on political party activities. In May political parties refused to amend a government draft document on political and electoral reforms unless the suspension was lifted.Participation of Women and Members of Marginalized or Vulnerable Groups: No laws limited participation of women and members of minority groups in the political process, but many members of minority groups did not participate. Although the gender quota law required political parties to name women to fill at least 30 percent of the positions on their candidate lists in legislative and municipal elections, no political party met this requirement in the November 2020 elections. In March 2020 a new law establishing “zebra lists” mandated that electoral lists alternate names of men and women to better achieve a 30 percent quota. The law included positive incentives for political parties respecting the quota but no penalties for those who did not abide by the law. The transition government included four women among 23 cabinet members.																																					Section 4.													 Corruption in Government												    																						The law provided criminal penalties for corruption by officials, but the Transition Authorities did not implement the law effectively. There were numerous reports of government corruption during the year, including cases of misappropriation, fraud, or other offenses.Corruption: The NGO National Network for Anti-Corruption cited the customs, police, and General Directorate of Land and Maritime Transport as the most corrupt entities in the government. According to the organization, cases of corruption continued to increase with 651 alleged cases recorded in 2022, compared to 303 cases during the previous year. On July 11, the Transition Authorities launched an e-transformation process for police operations to improve quality of policing services and reduce corruption.Corruption was pervasive at all levels of government, but the anti-corruption authorities focused their investigatory energies on officials of former President Roch Kaboré’s government and perceived political enemies.Since March 2022, the Higher Authority for State Control, and the Fight against Corruption (ASCE-LC) conducted a series of audits of more than one hundred public institutions, including the presidency, the prime ministry, National Assembly, and the security and defense ministries, among others. On March 9, the ASCE-LC released its investigations alleging nearly 16 billion CFA francs ($26 million) in financial irregularities at the presidency, prime ministry, and the National Assembly during the tenure of former President Kaboré.On March 1, a court in Ouagadougou convicted and sentenced the former CEO of the national lottery company to four years in prison and 750 million CFA francs ($1.2 million) in fines for embezzlement and abuse of authority. On August 17, Vincent Dabilgou, former transport minister, was sentenced to 11 years in prison, four of them suspended, for embezzlement of public funds, illicit enrichment, and money laundering.For additional information regarding corruption in the country, please see the Department of State’s Investment Climate Statement for the country, and the Department of State’s International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, which includes information on financial crimes.																											Section 5.													 Governmental Posture Towards International and Nongovernmental Monitoring and Investigation of Alleged Abuses of Human Rights												    																						At least 30 Burkinabe citizens including trade union leaders, civil society organizations leaders, journalists, human rights defenders, and political leaders were allegedly conscripted into the VDP after they criticized the Transition Authorities, the security situation, or social conditions in the country. On December 6, the judiciary ruled that these forced conscriptions were illegal because they were not aimed at strictly defending the country’s territory. The Transition Authorities ignored this ruling.Retribution against Human Rights Defenders: During the year, human rights defenders were threatened and intimidated by individuals believed to be affiliated with the transition government. On November 30, prominent social media activist Wendpouire Charles Sawadogo was conscripted into the VDP forces after he reposted a UN High Commissioner for Human Rights statement referring to the terrorist group JNIM as a “party” following the November 26 JNIM attack on the city of Djibo. The Transition Authorities also summoned the UN Human Rights Office representative to express their anger regarding the published statement. Sawadogo had previously been arrested on April 27 for suspicion of “foreign intelligence” to destabilize the transition government but was released four days later.Government Human Rights Bodies: The Office of the Ombudsman addressed citizen complaints regarding government entities and other bodies entrusted with a public service mission. The ombudsperson, whom the president appointed for a nonrenewable five-year term and who could not be removed during the term, was generally viewed as effective and impartial.The government-funded National Commission on Human Rights (CNDH) provided a permanent framework for dialogue on human rights concerns. Its members included 15 representatives of human rights NGOs, unions, professional associations, and the government. On July 4, the CNDH organized a workshop on the national mechanism for the prevention of torture in order to improve its implementation.																											Section 6.													 Discrimination and Societal Abuses												    																																																Women										Rape and Domestic Violence: According to the penal code, rape of any person was punishable by a prison sentence of seven to 20 years, or 10 to 21 years in case of aggravated circumstances such as causing mutilation or handicap, and a substantial monetary fine when committed against a person age 13 or older. The penalty was 11 to 30 years in prison and higher monetary fines when the survivor was younger than 13. The government generally enforced the law. On March 20, a man was sentenced to two years in prison for rape of a child in Bobo-Dioulasso, according to media reports. According to the UN Human Rights Office, on April 17 a court sentenced a VDP to one year in prison and a fine of 500,000 CFA francs ($826) for the attempted rape of a woman whom he intimidated with his gun. Rape was widely underreported in part due to societal taboos and the drawn-out judicial process owing to the overburdened justice system.Gender-based violence was also prevalent, including reports of rape and domestic violence, which was also criminalized. One in five women age 15 to 49 reported being subjected to physical domestic violence since the age of 15, according to the fifth demographic investigation of the National Institute of Statistics and Demography published in September. Insecurity led to an increase in gender-based violence by armed group actors and other individuals.The law made conviction of “abduction to impose marriage or union without consent” punishable by six months to five years in prison. Conviction of sexual abuse or torture or conviction of sexual slavery was punishable by two to five years in prison and monetary fines. The law required police to provide for protection of domestic violence survivors and their minor children and mandated the establishment of chambers in the High Court with exclusive jurisdiction over cases of violence against women and girls. The law required all police and gendarmerie units to designate officers to assist women affected or threatened by gender-based violence and to respond to emergencies; some units did not comply. The law mandated the creation of care and protection centers in each commune for gender-based violence survivors and a government support fund for their care. The centers received survivors on an emergency basis, offered them security, provided support services (including medical and psychosocial support), and, when possible, referred them to court officials for legal assistance.Survivors of domestic violence seldom pursued legal action due to shame, fear, or reluctance to take their spouses to court. For the few cases that went to court, the Ministry of Justice did not provide statistics on prosecutions, convictions, or punishment. The Ministry of Solidarity, Humanitarian Action, National Reconciliation, Gender, and the Family operated a toll-free number for survivors of domestic abuse. A government-run shelter for survivors of gender-based violence housed women and girls, regardless of nationality. In Ouagadougou the ministry assisted survivors of domestic violence at four centers. The ministry sometimes provided counseling and housing for survivors of domestic violence.The ministry had a legal affairs section to educate women on their rights, and several NGOs cooperated to protect women’s rights. To raise awareness of gender discrimination and reduce gender inequalities, the ministry organized numerous workshops and several awareness campaigns mainly in the Nord, Sahel, Est, and Centre-Ouest regions.Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting (FGM/C): The practice of FGM/C was prohibited by law, and those found guilty were liable to a prison sentence of one to 10 years with a substantial monetary fine. If a victim of FGM/C died during or following the procedure, the sentence increased to a term of 11 to 20 years’ imprisonment and an even higher monetary fine. Accomplices were also subject to the law. The transition government enforced the law. According to the minister of gender and family, the FGM/C prevalence rate was 18 percent.The Transition Authorities continued to fund and operate a toll-free number to receive anonymous reports of FGM/C. The Transition Authorities also continued to fund the Permanent Secretariat of the National Council for the Fight against the Practice of Excision. The government’s official midwifery curriculum included components on the prevention of FGM/C and care for women and girls affected by the practice.Other Forms of Gender-based Violence or Harassment: In the Centre-Est and Nord regions, primarily in rural areas, self-proclaimed traditional healers performed rituals in which participants denounced others as “witches” whom they held responsible for their misfortune. Those accused, often elderly women and less frequently men, were sometimes tied up, humiliated, beaten, brutalized, banned from their villages, or killed. Widows were disproportionately accused of witchcraft by male relatives, who then claimed their land and other inheritance. The law, which was seldom enforced, made the physical or moral abuse of women or girls accused of witchcraft punishable by one to five years in prison, a substantial monetary fine, or both.Discrimination: The law prohibited discrimination based on race, color, sex, religion, political opinion, social origin, gender, disability, language, sexual orientation or gender identity, HIV-positive status or having other communicable diseases, or social status with respect to employment and occupation. The Transition Authorities did not effectively enforce these laws and regulations. Penalties were commensurate with those for comparable offenses but were seldom applied. Although the constitution provided for gender equality, legal restrictions remained on women’s employment in occupations deemed arduous or “morally inappropriate” and in industries such as construction. Women were forbidden from doing work that was determined to have a risk for their health or reproductive capacity.Although the law generally provided the same legal status and rights for women as for men, including under family, labor, property, and inheritance laws, discrimination frequently occurred. Labor laws provided that all workers, regardless of gender, should receive equal pay for equal working conditions, qualifications, and performance. Women nevertheless generally received lower pay for equal work, had less education, and owned less property.Although the law provided equal property and inheritance rights for women and men, land tenure practices emphasized family and communal land requirements more than individual ownership rights. As a result, authorities often denied women the right to own property, particularly real estate. Many citizens, particularly in rural areas, held to traditional beliefs that did not recognize inheritance rights for women and regarded a woman as property that could be inherited upon her husband’s death.Reproductive Rights: There were no reports of coerced abortion or involuntary sterilization on the part of government authorities.Government and private health centers were open to all women and offered reproductive health services, skilled medical assistance during childbirth (essential obstetric and postpartum care), and diagnosis and treatment of sexually transmitted diseases. Family planning services were free in all public health facilities. Remote villages, however, often lacked these facilities or did not have adequate transportation infrastructure to permit easy access. The government provided emergency contraception and postexposure prophylaxis for survivors of sexual violence.According to a March 2022 survey, modern contraceptive prevalence among women in union increased from 28 percent in February 2020 to 32 percent in March 2022. The survey revealed an increase in unavailability for certain contraceptive methods such as the implant, the pill, and condoms in health facilities in the first quarter of the year compared with 2020. The survey revealed unmet reproductive needs dropped from 32 percent to 17 percent between December 2014 and March 2022.Geographical distance, illiteracy, insufficient capacity of providers, lack of medical supplies, and religious and social beliefs regarding the negative effects of contraceptive methods were the main barriers to access to contraception. Women’s limited decision-making power and men’s lack of support for and understanding of family planning were also barriers to access to contraception.The Transition Authorities worked with international and local aid organizations to provide access to sexual and reproductive health services for IDPs.The country’s volatile security situation impacted women’s and girls’ health needs, including sexual and reproductive health, because 12 percent of the health centers in the Nord, Sahel, and Est regions remained closed due to insecurity.In 2016, according to the National Institute of Statistics and Demography, the maternal mortality rate was 320 deaths per 100,000 live births. According to the UN Population Fund, between 2014 and 2019, 80 percent of births were attended by skilled health personnel. Among the leading causes of maternal deaths were hemorrhage (30 percent) and infection (23 percent).																																				Systemic Racial or Ethnic Violence and Discrimination										There were no specific laws that protected members of marginalized groups, but the constitution provided that all persons were equal under the law. Long-standing conflicts between Fulani herders and sedentary farmers of other ethnic groups sometimes resulted in violence. Incidents were commonly triggered by herders allowing their cattle to graze on farmlands or by farmers attempting to cultivate land set aside by local authorities for grazing. The Transition Authorities’ efforts at dialogue and mediation contributed to a decrease in such incidents.Allegations of killings, physical abuse, and other human rights abuses by state-sponsored militias continued, particularly against the Fulani community. According to rights groups, violence targeting Fulani ethnic groups significantly increased during the year. In May at least 45 Fulani community members were arrested and executed across the Nord, Boucle du Mouhoun, and Hauts-Bassins regions while participating in daily activities like livestock market participation and intercity travel. On May 21, three Fulani community members were removed from a bus between Hounde and Bobo-Dioulasso, Tuy Province, Hauts-Bassins Region and executed on the spot. The perpetrators, whom several sources alleged to be VDPs, also removed their motorcycles from the bus and set them on fire. On May 31, four Fulani shepherds were almost lynched by locals in Bobo-Dioulasso. Local security forces took the men into custody but later released and cleared them of suspicion of sympathizing with terrorists.Many observers, including the CISC, noted an ethnic dynamic underscoring the increased violence in the country. Armed groups often recruited from the Fulani community, while most men allegedly killed by VDPs were Fulani because of their perceived support of extremist groups.There were reports the VDP did not incorporate Fulani into their ranks, nor did Fulani seek to be included. This dynamic underscored the precarious situation for the Fulani, who lacked security in their community but were excluded from the state’s security effort, thereby fueling a perception of or actual marginalization among the Fulani.During the year, in addition to targeted killings of Fulani community members, incidents of hate speech circulated via audio on social networks promoting ethnic discrimination, including calls to kill Fulani.																																				Children										Birth Registration: Citizenship derived either from birth within the country’s territory or through a parent. Parents generally did not register births immediately, particularly in rural areas; lack of registration sometimes resulted in denial of public services, including access to school. To address the problem, the government periodically organized registration drives and issued belated birth certificates.Education: The law provided for compulsory schooling of children until age 16. Nevertheless, many children did not attend school. Targeted attacks on schools and insecurity forced thousands of schools to close. Girls’ enrollment was lower than that of boys at all levels due to poverty, a cultural preference to educate boys, the early marriage of girls, and sexual harassment.Many children attended Quranic schools. Some educators exploited children sent to Quranic schools in forced begging. Catholic schools banned wearing of headscarves, effectively denying many Muslim girls access to these institutions.Child Abuse: The penal code provided for a prison sentence of one to three years with a substantial fine for those found guilty of inhuman treatment or mistreatment of children.Child, Early, and Forced Marriage: The law prohibited forced marriage and provided for prison sentences ranging from six months to two years for offenders, and a three-year prison sentence if the survivor was younger than 13. According to media reports, however, the traditional practice of kidnapping, raping, and impregnating a girl and then forcing her family to consent to her marriage to her violator persisted. NGOs reported that minors, especially girls, were sometimes kidnapped on their way to school or to market and forced into early marriage.The legal minimum age for marriage for women was 17 and for men was 20, but there was the option to request an exemption by the civil court, and the government did not effectively enforce the law. Data from UNICEF indicated that 10 percent of girls were married before age 15 and 52 percent before 18. During the year, the Transition Authorities, through the national steering body for the prevention and elimination of child marriage, organized awareness-raising campaigns on the abandonment of child marriage, reaching more than three million persons, and held 192 public declarations of abandonment of child marriage across the country.Sexual Exploitation of Children: The law criminalized the sale of children, child commercial sexual exploitation, including child sex trafficking, and child pornography. The law prescribed penalties of 11 to 20 years’ imprisonment and a substantial monetary fine for sex trafficking involving a victim 15 or younger, and five to 10 years’ imprisonment and substantial monetary fines for sex trafficking involving a victim older than 15. The law prescribed penalties for conviction of child pornography of five to 10 years’ imprisonment, a substantial monetary fine, or both. The minimum age of consensual sex was 15. Children from poor families were particularly vulnerable to sex trafficking. The Transition Authorities did not report any convictions for violations of the law during the year.Infanticide, Including Infanticide of Children with Disabilities: The law provided for a sentence of 10 years to life imprisonment for infanticide. Media reported an increase in the number of cases of abandonment of newborn babies by IDP women in Kaya, Centre-Nord Region. According to those women, extreme poverty and the categorical rejection of children from rape by violent extremists or other civilians were the main reasons why they abandoned infants.																																				Antisemitism										There was no known Jewish community and no reports of antisemitic acts.																																				Trafficking in Persons										See the Department of State’s Trafficking in Persons Report at  https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/.																																				Acts of Violence, Criminalization, and Other Abuses Based on Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity or Expression, or Sex Characteristics										Criminalization: No laws explicitly criminalized same-sex sexual conduct or identity; however, lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, or intersex (LGBTQI+) persons could be prosecuted for “indecent assault” or “violation of morality.” The government rarely enforced these laws.Violence and Harassment: The Transition Authorities incited anti-LGBTQI+ harassment. For instance, in early August, a youth coalition likely funded by the Transition Authorities held a rally to spread homophobic messages and demonstrate against homosexuality. The government tolerated or condoned societal violence and discrimination against LGBTQI+ persons. LGBTQI+ rights advocacy groups often counseled members of the community to conceal their sexual orientation or gender identity to protect them from violence. Efforts to report violence against LGBTQI+ persons were not taken seriously by police or gendarmes. There were reports of rape and physical abuse of prisoners based on sexual orientation or gender identity. Victims of violence who were targeted by family members because of sexual orientation or gender identity sometimes did not seek treatment or help from social services, due to further ostracization or violence. The country had no hate crime laws or other criminal justice mechanisms to aid in the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of bias-motivated crimes against the LGBTQI+ community.According to a leader of a human rights organization, LGBTQI+ community members faced stigma. The government did not address or respond to societal violence and discrimination against LGBTQI+ persons, exposing them to the threat of harassment.Discrimination: The law did not prohibit discrimination by state and nonstate actors based on sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, or sex characteristics. LGBTQI+ persons faced discrimination in access to health care, employment, housing, and public accommodation. Members of the LGBTQI+ community were fired from their jobs, both in the private sector and in government, when their employers became aware of their sexual orientation.Availability of Legal Gender Recognition: Legal gender recognition was not available. Further, transgender persons did not have access to medical services related to gender transition, leading some to travel to Cote d’Ivoire or Togo for treatment, or to take hormone therapy without the supervision of a doctor. Persons whose gender expression did not comport with the gender identity on their government documents risked arrest for identity theft.Involuntary or Coercive Medical or Psychological Practices: Strong societal and cultural taboos dissuaded many LGBTQI+ persons from revealing their identity publicly or even privately. Human rights NGOs made no public reports of so-called conversion therapy. There were no known reports of medically unnecessary and irreversible surgeries performed on children or on nonconsenting adult intersex persons.Restrictions of Freedom of Expression, Association, or Peaceful Assembly: LGBTQI+ persons faced restrictions on their freedom to associate and assemble and were often excluded from gathering in public or commercially owned spaces. NGOs were required to register with the government, but some organizations of interest to LGBTQI+ persons reported they had to use obfuscating names or mission statements to obtain that registration. Freedom of expression was limited for topics of interest to LGBTQI+ persons. On August 24, the High Council for Communication banned the transmission of any content suggestive of LGBTQI+ practices on television.																																				Persons with Disabilities										Persons with disabilities encountered discrimination and could not access education, health services, public buildings, and transportation on an equal basis with others. The law prohibited discrimination against persons with physical, sensory, intellectual, and mental disabilities in employment, education, transportation, access to health care, the judicial system, or the provision of other state services. There was legislation to provide persons with disabilities reduced cost or free health care and access to education and employment. The law also included building codes to provide for access to government buildings. On August 31, the Transition Authorities signed a charter for better inclusion of persons with disabilities in humanitarian action. The Transition Authorities did not effectively enforce these provisions.The Transition Authorities had limited programs to aid persons with disabilities, but NGOs and the National Committee for the Reintegration of Persons with Disabilities conducted awareness campaigns and implemented integration programs.The Transition Authorities continued to arrange for candidates with vision disabilities to take the public administration recruitment exams by providing the tests in Braille. Additionally, the Transition Authorities opened specific counters at enrollment sites to allow persons with disabilities to register more easily for public service admission tests. According to the Ministry of Education, children with disabilities attended school at lower rates, although the Transition Authorities provided for limited education programs for students with disabilities in Ouagadougou.																																				Other Societal Violence or Discrimination										Societal discrimination against persons with HIV and AIDS continued to be a problem and prohibited some individuals from receiving medical services due to fear of harassment. Families sometimes shunned persons who tested positive for HIV and sometimes evicted wives with HIV from their homes, although families did not evict husbands with HIV. Some property owners refused to rent lodgings to persons with HIV and AIDS. The Transition Authorities distributed free antiretroviral medication to some persons with HIV who qualified according to national guidelines.																																					Section 7.													 Worker Rights												    																																																a. Freedom of Association and the Right to Collective Bargaining										The law allowed workers to form and join independent unions, bargain collectively, and conduct legal strikes. The law prohibited antiunion discrimination and provided unions the right to conduct their activities without interference.Nonetheless, restrictions in domestic law limited the exercise of these rights. For example, the law placed restrictions on the labor rights of public employees such as magistrates, police, military, and other security personnel considered essential public servants. The law significantly limited the right to strike. For strikes that called on workers to stay home and that did not entail participation in a rally, the union was required to provide eight to 15 days’ advance notice to the employer. If unions called for a march, they had to provide three days’ advance notice to the city mayor. Transition Authorities held march organizers accountable for any property damage or destruction that occurred during a demonstration. The law strictly prohibited all strikes that included occupying the workplace, including nonviolent strikes. The law also gave the Transition Authorities extensive requisitioning powers, authorizing them to requisition private- and public-sector workers to secure minimum service in essential services. The Transition Authorities defined essential services more broadly than international standards, including services such as mining and quarrying, university centers, and slaughterhouses.The law prohibited antiunion discrimination and allowed a labor inspector to reinstate immediately workers fired because of their union activities. Relevant legal protections covered all workers, including migrants, workers in the informal sector, and domestic workers. International organizations reported that contract workers and agency workers faced antiunion discrimination from employers. The Transition Authorities did not effectively enforce the law. The law listed sanctions for violations, including warnings, penalties, suspension, or dissolution. Penalties consisted of imprisonment and fines and varied depending on the gravity of the violation. Penalties were less than those for comparable offenses. Amendments to the law awarded a legal existence to labor unions and NGOs, created a commission of mediation, and required that associations abide by the law concerning funding terrorism and money laundering. The law also stated that no one could serve as the head of a political party and the head of an association at the same time.The Transition Authorities generally respected freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining. The Transition Authorities generally respected the right of unions to conduct activities without interference. Unions had the right to bargain directly with employers and industry associations for wages and other benefits. Worker organizations were independent of the government and political parties. There were no reports of strikebreaking during the year. Government resources to enforce labor laws were not sufficient to protect workers’ rights. Penalties were rarely applied against violators.Employers did not always respect freedom of association and sometimes discouraged union membership. For example, workers in the mining industry were often intimidated, transferred, or fired when they chose to join a union. National unions reported that domestic workers, workers hired through employment agencies and subcontractors, and other contract workers were fired for joining unions and were unable to utilize complaint mechanisms because they were employed in the informal wage sector.There were no reports of government restrictions on collective bargaining during the year. There was extensive collective bargaining in the formal wage sector, where workers utilized complaint processes to report worker rights violations. No official records counted violations in the informal sector.																																				b. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor										See the Department of State’s annual Trafficking in Persons Report at  https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/.																																				c. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment										See the Department of Labor’s Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor at  https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ilab/resources/reports/child-labor/findings .																																				d. Discrimination (see section 6)																																														e. Acceptable Conditions of Work										Wage and Hour Laws: The law mandated a minimum monthly wage in the formal sector, which did not apply to subsistence agriculture or other informal occupations. The minimum wage was less than the poverty income level, which was 45,000 CFA francs ($74) per month.The law mandated a standard workweek of 40 hours for nondomestic workers and a 60-hour workweek for household employees. The law provided for overtime pay, and there were regulations pertaining to rest periods, limits on hours worked, and prohibitions on excessive compulsory overtime. Employers often paid less than the minimum wage. Employees usually supplemented their income through reliance on extended family, subsistence agriculture, or trading in the informal sector.Occupational Safety and Health: Existing occupational safety and health (OSH) standards provided general, not industry-specific guidance, and did not actively identify unsafe conditions in particular industries. Although the labor law required employers to take measures to provide for worker safety, to protect the physical and mental health of their workers, and to verify that the workplace, machinery, materials, substances, and work processes under their control did not present health or safety risks to the workers, the International Labor Organization noted in 2020 that the government had not yet formulated a national OSH policy, conducted periodic reviews, nor developed a national OSH program.The law required every company with 30 or more employees to have a work safety committee. The law provided that employees in such companies had the right to remove themselves from dangerous situations without jeopardy to their employment. If an employee working for a company with fewer than 30 employees decided to remove themselves due to safety concerns, a court ruled on whether the employee’s decision was justified.No official data were available on work-related injuries or death.Wage, Hour, and OSH Enforcement: The Ministry of Civil Service, Labor, and Social Security was responsible for enforcing the minimum wage and hours of work standards. Ministry inspectors and labor tribunals were responsible for overseeing OSH standards in the small industrial and commercial sectors, but these standards did not apply in subsistence agriculture and other informal sectors.The Transition Authorities did not effectively enforce the law. Penalties for violations were commensurate with those for comparable offenses, but the penalties were seldom applied. Inspectors lacked transport and training, and the number of inspectors was insufficient. There were no reports of effective enforcement of inspection findings during the year for wage, hour, and safety regulations.																																				    							View report by:																				Afghanistan											Albania											Algeria											Andorra											Angola											Antigua and Barbuda											Argentina											Armenia											Australia											Austria											Azerbaijan											Bahrain											Bangladesh											Barbados											Belarus											Belgium											Belize											Benin											Bhutan											Bolivia											Bosnia and Herzegovina											Botswana											Brazil											Brunei											Bulgaria											Burkina Faso											Burma											Burundi											Cabo Verde											Cambodia											Cameroon											Canada											Central African Republic											Chad											Chile											China (Includes Hong Kong, Macau, and Tibet)											Colombia											Comoros											Costa Rica											Côte d&#8217;Ivoire											Croatia											Cuba											Cyprus											Czech Republic											Democratic Republic of the Congo											Denmark											Djibouti											Dominica											Dominican Republic											Ecuador											Egypt											El Salvador											Equatorial Guinea											Eritrea											Estonia											Eswatini											Ethiopia											Fiji											Finland											France											Gabon											Georgia											Germany											Ghana											Greece											Grenada											Guatemala											Guinea											Guinea-Bissau											Guyana											Haiti											Honduras											Hungary											Iceland											India											Indonesia											Iran											Iraq											Ireland											Israel, West Bank and Gaza											Italy											Jamaica											Japan											Jordan											Kazakhstan											Kenya											Kiribati											Kosovo											Kuwait											Kyrgyz Republic											Laos											Latvia											Lebanon											Lesotho											Liberia											Libya											Liechtenstein											Lithuania											Luxembourg											Madagascar											Malawi											Malaysia											Maldives											Mali											Malta											Marshall Islands											Mauritania											Mauritius											Mexico											Micronesia											Moldova											Monaco											Mongolia											Montenegro											Morocco											Mozambique											Namibia											Nauru											Nepal											New Zealand											Nicaragua											Niger											Nigeria											North Korea											North Macedonia											Norway											Oman											Pakistan											Palau											Panama											Papua New Guinea											Paraguay											Peru											Philippines											Poland											Portugal											Qatar											Republic of the Congo											Romania											Russia											Rwanda											Saint Kitts and Nevis											Saint Lucia											Saint Vincent and the Grenadines											Samoa											San Marino											Sao Tome and Principe											Saudi Arabia											Senegal											Serbia											Seychelles											Sierra Leone											Singapore											Slovakia											Slovenia											Solomon Islands											Somalia											South Africa											South Korea											South Sudan											Spain											Sri Lanka											Sudan											Suriname											Sweden											Switzerland											Syria											Taiwan											Tajikistan											Tanzania											Thailand											The Gambia											The Netherlands											Timor-Leste											Togo											The Bahamas											Tonga											Trinidad and Tobago											Tunisia											Turkey (Türkiye)											Turkmenistan											Tuvalu											Uganda											Ukraine											United Arab Emirates											United Kingdom											Uruguay											Uzbekistan											Vanuatu											Venezuela											Vietnam											Yemen											Zambia											Zimbabwe															Build A Custom Report																						On This Page				search													>																										EXECUTIVE SUMMARY																Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person																																							a. Arbitrary Deprivation of Life and Other Unlawful or Politically Motivated Killings																																																						b. Disappearance																																																						c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and Other Related Abuses																																																				Prison and Detention Center Conditions																																																																																				d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention																																																				Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees																																																																																				e. Denial of Fair Public Trial																																																				Trial Procedures																																												Political Prisoners and Detainees																																																																																				f. Transnational Repression																																																						g. Property Seizure and Restitution																																																						h. Arbitrary or Unlawful Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence																																																						i. Conflict-related Abuses																																																			Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties																																							a. Freedom of Expression, Including for Members of the Press and Other Media																																																				Internet Freedom																																																																																				b. Freedoms of Peaceful Assembly and Association																																																				Freedom of Peaceful Assembly																																																																																				c. Freedom of Religion																																																						d. Freedom of Movement and the Right to Leave the Country																																																						e. Protection of Refugees																																																						f. Status and Treatment of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)																																																			Section 3. Freedom to Participate in the Political Process																																							Elections and Political Participation																																																			Section 4. Corruption in Government																Section 5. Governmental Posture Towards International and Nongovernmental Monitoring and Investigation of Alleged Abuses of Human Rights																Section 6. Discrimination and Societal Abuses																																							Women																																																						Systemic Racial or Ethnic Violence and Discrimination																																																						Children																																																						Antisemitism																																																						Trafficking in Persons																																																						Acts of Violence, Criminalization, and Other Abuses Based on Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity or Expression, or Sex Characteristics																																																						Persons with Disabilities																																																						Other Societal Violence or Discrimination																																																			Section 7. Worker Rights																																							a. Freedom of Association and the Right to Collective Bargaining																																																						b. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor																																																						c. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment																																																						d. Discrimination (see section 6)																																																						e. Acceptable Conditions of Work																																																									Tags																					Bureau of African Affairs																								Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor																								Burkina Faso
- Statement on the Escalation of Violence Against Civilians in Burkina Faso Matthew Miller, Department SpokespersonThe United States is gravely concerned by the rise in violence against civilians in northern and eastern Burkina Faso in late February.In addition to deadly attacks on multiple military installations, terrorists killed dozens of worshipers in a mosque in Natiaboani and churches in Essakane, a tribal leader and his security team in Kominyenga, and civilian road crews in multiple locations. Such attacks on civilians, especially in their places of worship, are reprehensible.In separate incidents, Burkinabe forces reportedly attacked and killed civilians in Tuy. These most recent attacks follow previous incidents of large-scale violence against civilians in 2023, notably at Karma, Zaongo, and several locations in the province of Soum. We call upon the Transition Authorities to complete investigations of these incidents with integrity and transparency and hold those responsible to account. We reiterate our previous calls for the Transition Authorities to ensure that security operations are planned and executed with respect for the human rights and fundamental freedoms of civilians. The only long-term solution to the scourge of terrorism is expanding good governance based on the rule of law, respecting human rights, and promoting social cohesion.The United States remains a committed partner to the Burkinabe people, providing hundreds of millions of dollars in development and humanitarian assistance, as well as counterterrorism support to civilian security and law enforcement actors.
- U.S. Concerns about Human Rights in Burkina Faso Matthew Miller, Department SpokespersonIn this moment of insecurity and transition in the Sahel, the United States condemns the increasing and unacceptable violence committed by terrorist groups against civilians, military, and police in Burkina Faso. Violent extremism has taken a significant toll on the people of Burkina Faso, and our condolences go out to the victims, their families, and their communities. The United States remains a committed partner in the fight against terrorism.The United States is concerned about the actions by Burkina Faso’s Transition Authorities, such as the growing use of targeted forced conscriptions, shrinking civic space, and restrictions on political parties. These actions have the cumulative effect of silencing individuals who are working on behalf of their country to promote democratic governance and ensure that the people of Burkina Faso’s rights are protected. The protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, coupled with the timely investigation into allegations of human rights violations and abuses and holding accountable those found to be responsible, are necessary to build peace and security.When Burkina Faso joined the United Nations in 1960, it embraced the values of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Since then, Burkina Faso has also ratified a series of international instruments, taking on obligations to respect and protect a wide number of human rights and fundamental freedoms.The United States will continue to engage with the Transition Authorities and others to promote the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms. We also commit to supporting the people of Burkina Faso and their aspirations of a more democratic, prosperous, and peaceful nation.
- Burkina Faso National Day Antony J. Blinken, Secretary of StateOn behalf of the United States of America and the American people, I congratulate the people of Burkina Faso on the 63rd anniversary of your independence.The United States recognizes the many sacrifices and lives lost due to terrorist violence and offers its heartfelt condolences.  Despite the significant challenges Burkina Faso has faced this year in the fight against violent extremism, the resilience and determination of the Burkinabe people shine brightly.  The United States of America stands with people of Burkina Faso in their pursuit of and transition to democratic governance and the protection of human rights for all.  We unite in the desire to advance a strong, secure, and economically prosperous Burkina Faso.Congratulations as you celebrate your national day.
- Online Press Briefing with Ian J. McCary, Deputy Special Envoy for the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS BRUSSELS HUBMODERATOR:  Good afternoon from the State Department’s Brussels Media Hub. I would like to welcome everyone joining us for today’s virtual press briefing.  Today we’re very honored to be joined by Ian J. McCary, the deputy special envoy for the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS.Finally, a quick reminder that today’s briefing with the deputy special envoy is on the record. And with that, let’s get started.  Deputy Special Envoy McCary, thanks so much for joining us this evening and I’ll turn it over to you for opening remarks.MR MCCARY:  Thank you very much, John, and thank you to our colleagues in the press corps for your interest. We just wrapped up a meeting today of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS, political director-level meeting, which is a meeting that we have once a year.  The meeting was hosted this year by the Italian foreign ministry and we had over 40 delegations present today.Our coalition reflects a counterterrorism context that increasingly demands civilian-led solutions and the development of lines of effort outside of Syria.  Our coalition is regionalizing its efforts to move effectively counter Daesh affiliates active in Africa and in the Central Asia region.Successfully achieving these objectives includes increased coalition engagement with Sub-Saharan African states, and today we had with us representatives of Benin, Togo, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Kenya, and Senegal, as well as non-member states from Central Asia, including Uzbekistan.  All of these states sent delegations to participate with us in this event today.Italy has played an outstanding leadership role within the Global Coalition to defeat ISIS, including by hosting this meeting today and by serving as the co-chair of the coalition’s Africa Focus Group and also the coalition’s Counter-ISIS Finance Group.  And I think we ended today with a very successful meeting and we have released a co-chair statement that you’ll be interested in reviewing.  And I’d be glad to field any questions that you may have.MODERATOR:  Thank you, Deputy Special Envoy. We’ll go first to a submitted question from Gabriele Steinhauser from The Wall Street Journal in South Africa: “How is the departure of French troops from Niger affecting the war against ISIS and terrorism more broadly in the Sahel?”MR MCCARY:  Well, I do think we regret the developments in Niger over the past few months.  Niger had been a premier counterterrorism partner for the United States and other countries with the Global Coalition.  We had extraordinary cooperation with them, and I think we’re making a lot of progress in defeating ISIS elements, ISIS affiliates, and other violent extremist groups in that region.And we do regret the developments and the coup that led to the removal of President Bazoum, and we’re hoping and working closely with our partners and with ECOWAS and other regional partners and international partners to achieve a political solution there so that we can get back to the sort of counterterrorism cooperation that we enjoyed before.MODERATOR:  Thank you, sir. We’ll actually go to a live question now.  Pearl Matibe. Pearl, you have the mike.  Pearl, go ahead, if you can unmute yourself.QUESTION:  Yes, thank you so much, John. Good morning, Mr. McCary. It’s good to talk to you again. I’m glad to see that there was a good contingent of African states at your meeting.  Could you speak a little bit about Nigeria’s role?  Any successes or challenges that you see in succeeding in your efforts?MR MCCARY:  Well, Nigeria is – was present in our meeting today, and of course, Nigeria, as the chair of ECOWAS, plays an extremely important role in regional security.  We have very good counterterrorism cooperation with Nigeria, and I expect that will continue going forward.  Nigeria has been a member of the global coalition for many years, and obviously, given their geography, the resources that they have, and their – the challenges that they face, we’re going to continue to engage closely with Nigeria.  Clearly that’s a very important element of the solution there.MODERATOR:  Thank you, sir.  We’ll go to the next question – actually another live question – from Diyar Kurda.  Diyar, please go ahead.QUESTION:  Thank you, John. Hi, Ian.  I have two questions, one question about what’s the level of Turkish drone attacks’ impact on your operations and local partner in northeast Syria, and what engagements you have with Türkiye on that.And the second question, if you could speak about your assistance and engagement with KRI Peshmerga forces in this fight against ISIS.  How do you see the return of Peshmerga minister to his office, as he was resigned for a long time ago?  Thank you.MR MCCARY:  Well, I would say Türkiye is a very important member of the Global Coalition, and they were represented at – they sent several senior officials to the meeting today, and Türkiye is extremely active in the Global Coalition.  In fact, they co-chair our – they co-chair our Foreign Terrorist Fighter Working Group and hosted an important meeting of the working group that took place in Istanbul at the end of October.  We have very close engagement and communication with our Turkish counterparts on all issues, and there are areas – there’s a great deal of overlap and common ground with our Turkish partners, and there are some areas of disagreement as well, but we’re determined to continue to develop our counterterrorism cooperation with the Turkish government.MODERATOR:  Thank you, sir. We’ll go to submitted questions now.  From Joseph Haboush from Al Arabiya English in the U.S.:  “With almost 80 attacks since October 17th, do you believe the current U.S. approach has deterred malign actors or states, including Iran, which the U.S. has attributed these attacks to, from not negatively impacting Washington’s fight against ISIS?”MR MCCARY:  Yeah. Well, as Joseph mentioned, we’ve been outspoken in our attribution of those attacks and our rejection of the very unconstructive role or malign role that Iran and its proxies have been playing in northeast Syria, as well as in other parts of the Middle East.  But we are also absolutely determined that we will not be deterred in conducting our Defeat ISIS operations in northeast Syria.  We are applying the resources and implementing the tactics necessary both to defend our forces against any such attacks and to continue our campaign against the remnants of ISIS/Daesh in that region.MODERATOR:  Thank you, sir.  We’ll go to another live question now: Soran Khateri. Soran, please go ahead.QUESTION:  Hello, sir. Do you hear me?MODERATOR:  Yes, we hear you. Go ahead.QUESTION:  So, in recent days, local reports suggest that there has been rising activity of ISIS in both Syria and Iraq.  Do you believe that it’s somehow related to the Gaza war first, and second, the attacks by Iran-aligned proxies against U.S. forces in both of the country – I mean, Syria and Iraq?MR MCCARY:  Yes. Well, let me first say that we have an extraordinary partnership with the Iraqi Security Forces, and we have a lot of confidence in their capability – their capabilities to defend Iraqi sovereignty and defend their people against any threats from remnants of Daesh in Iraq.  And we’re also continuing unabated or undeterred our operations to defeat Daesh elements that may remain in northeast Syria.We do believe that Daesh is seeking opportunities to exploit the violence between the conflict between Israel and Hamas for its own purposes.  But again, we’re determined that we’re going to remain steadfast in our operations to defeat Daesh.MODERATOR:  Thank you, sir.  We’ll go to another live question – Michael Hernandez.  Michael, I believe you have your hand up.  Michael, if you can unmute, otherwise we’ll go to – oh, go ahead.QUESTION:  Can you hear me now?MODERATOR:  Yeah, go ahead.QUESTION: Okay, great. Thank you, Ambassador, for doing this.  I wanted to follow up on an earlier answer you provided to us, saying that you are determined to continue to develop our counterterrorism cooperation with the Turkish government.  I wanted to see if you could outline any verticals or areas in which you are trying to do just that.  Thank you.MR MCCARY:  Well, like I said, the Turkish Government is one of the co-chairs of the coalition’s Foreign Terrorist Fighter Working Group, and they hosted a very productive meeting at the end of October in which we took stock of our ongoing efforts to disrupt and intercept terrorist movements, including potential movements of Daesh affiliates into or out of Afghanistan.  And we have a dialogue with Türkiye, conducting – about other theaters in which we’re confronting Daesh, including in Africa.  Türkiye also has a great deal of interest in what’s happening there, in Sub-Saharan Africa.And we’re also – with regard to combatting the threat from the so-called Daesh-Khorasan, we have a – we’re working closely with our Turkish partners to take – make the best use of their very good relationship with Central Asian states and tightening cooperation among coalition partners to help build capacity of Central Asian states as they take measures and we work with them to build their capacity to contain and defeat so-called Daesh-Khorasan.QUESTION:  Thank you, Ambassador.MR MCCARY:  Thank you.MODERATOR:  Thank you, sir. Pearl Matibe, you have your hand up again.  Do you have a follow-up question or &#8212;QUESTION:  John, yes, I do. Thank you so much. The information being shared is actually very valuable.  Mr. McCary, you mentioned earlier that the Global Coalition is regionalizing your efforts.  I wonder if you could just kind of break that down a little bit. How will this be operationalized?  What does that look like?  Are you institutionalizing anything?  And I know – maybe if you could make a comment on the Country Reports on Terrorism that were just released last Thursday, I’d appreciate that too if you could tack that on, if you have enough time.  Thank you so much.MR MCCARY:  Well, thank you, Pearl. In terms of the regionalization, what we mean by that is that obviously when the coalition started, all of the focus was on defeating the so-called territorial caliphate which Daesh had created in northeast Syria and Iraq, and all of the attention was on that particular theater.  And the threat has evolved significantly.  The challenges in northeast Syria in particular and also in Iraq persist, but they’re of a very different nature than they were back in 2014 to 2019, roughly, period.And then we have worked over the past few years to increase the coalition’s focus on Sub-Saharan Africa and also Central Asia.  And with regard to Africa, we had a very successful meeting of the coalition’s Africa Focus Group in Niamey, Niger, back in March.  And that was a very productive meeting at which we developed the four-point action plan in which we’re – the four pillars of which being capacity building, counterpropaganda, counterterror finance, and countering malign influences and the disinformation associated with some of the malign actors in Sub-Saharan Africa.But we also decided, as we reflected on the results of the meeting in Niamey, that the challenges in – on the African continent alone are so dispersed geographically that it made sense to break the problem apart and deal with it more piece by piece.  And consequently, we decided to have a meeting in Cotonou, Benin, which we had on the 15th of November, in which we focused exclusively on the nature of the threat and on the needs of our partners, our counterterrorism partners, in the coastal West African states and the Sahel.And I think we’re going to have follow-on meetings, perhaps in other parts of Africa where we also bring coalition attention to other parts of the African continent.  And also, of course, there’s a lot of follow-up to do in West Africa and the Sahel following up on our meeting in Cotonou.  So that’s just an example of what we mean by regionalization.And likewise, we’ve tightened our focus on the threat from so-called Daesh-Khorasan or ISIS-Khorasan.  And as I mentioned, Türkiye hosted a very productive meeting in late October in Istanbul, in which the Foreign Terrorist Fighter Working Group focused on the ongoing challenges of disrupting terrorist movements and dealing with the displaced people who need to be repatriated in northeast Syria, and also talked a great deal about the nature of the threat and steps we can take to counter and undermine and ultimately defeat so-called ISIS-Khorasan.MODERATOR: Thank you, sir, for those remarks.  Unfortunately, we have run out of time.  Thank you to everyone who has joined us.  And special thanks to the Deputy Special Envoy Ian McCary for joining the call as well.  Deputy Special Envoy, can I turn it back to you for any final thoughts, if you have any?MR MCCARY:  Well, now, thank you, John. I appreciate the interest from our colleagues in the press.  And we’d be happy to field more questions or do more tailored interviews as colleagues might be interested in.  I think we’re going to, in 2024, continue to increase our efforts.  And a takeaway from the meeting today is that there – in spite of all of the many other challenges that are crowding the global agenda today, there’s still a very strong international will not to be distracted in our efforts to defeat ISIS and to continue to refine our tactics and deploy whatever tools we need to deploy to ensure that Daesh can’t threaten international security in the future.MODERATOR: Thank you, sir, for those final thoughts. Shortly we will send the audio recording of the briefing to all the participating journalists (inaudible) transcript as it is available.  Thanks again for your participation.  We hope you can join us again for another press briefing in the near future.  This ends today’s briefing.# # #
- Burkina Faso HomeReportsBureau of CounterterrorismCountry Reports on Terrorism 2022&#8230;Burkina Faso				hide	document.addEventListener("DOMContentLoaded", function(event) {	if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}});																							Country Reports on Terrorism 2022: Burkina Faso																																					Bureau of Counterterrorism																																																																																																				 In this section																																												Burkina Faso																																												Burkina Faso				Overview:  The number of terrorist attacks in 2022 surpassed the total number from 2021.  ISIS-Sahel, formerly known as ISIS-GS, and the al-Qa’ida-affiliated JNIM operate in Burkina Faso.  According to open-source reporting, JNIM carried out more than 400 total attacks across 10 of the 13 regions in Burkina Faso in 2022.Both JNIM and ISIS-Sahel increased attacks against civilians, with 2022 recording a significantly higher number of civilian casualties, per public data.  Methods included improvised explosive devices (IEDs), ambushes, targeted assassinations, and targeted critical infrastructure attacks on cell phone towers, the water supply, and government offices.  The Sahel, Nord, Centre-Nord, Est, Centre-Est and Boucle du Mouhoun Regions experienced the greatest impact of violent extremist organization (VEO) activity.U.S. bilateral security assistance for the Government of Burkina Faso is restricted, as a result of the January coup d’état.2022 Terrorist Incidents:  Terrorists carried out dozens of attacks throughout Burkina Faso in 2022 against civilians, including humanitarian workers and community leaders, and against defense and security forces.  Multiple mass casualty events occurred, including instances of specifically targeting civilians, using ambushes and IEDs.On March 13, VEOs ambushed a group of gendarmes responding to an IED attack northeast of Kaya (Centre-Nord Region), killing at least 13 and wounding five.During June 9-11, VEOs attacked Seytenga (Sahel Region), killing 11 police and at least 100 civilians, primarily men.On July 4, armed assailants killed at least 22 civilians during an attack in Kossi province (Boucle du Mouhoun Region).On September 6, 37 civilians were killed and another 37 wounded when a vehicle transporting supplies and passengers hit an IED near the towns of Djibo and Bourzanga (Sahel Region).On September 26, 10 civilians and 27 soldiers were killed in Gaskindé (Sahel Region) during an ambush on a supply convoy bound for Djibo.Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:  The state of emergency declared in six regions and 14 provinces since 2019 remained in effect through 2022.  In June, former transition president Lt. Col. Paul-Henri Damiba established two military “zones of interest,” requiring civilians to vacate them.  In October, Transition President Capt. Ibrahim Traore announced a recruitment effort to add 50,000 civilian defense volunteers to assist government forces in combating terrorism.  The country’s specialized military counterterrorism capabilities nest within the army’s Special Forces.  Both the National Gendarmerie and the National Police have their respective specialized law enforcement counterterrorism units, proficient in crisis response and rural border patrol capabilities.  The Brigade Spéciale des Investigations Antiterroristes (or BSIAT) is Burkina Faso’s hybrid police-gendarmerie unit charged with handling terrorism investigations and referring cases to the counterterrorism court for prosecution.  There were no terrorism trials in 2022.Approximately 15 out of 21 fixed border posts installed at the land border crossings remain operational.  Immigration border police have access to systems to conduct, analyze, and store biometric enrollment for travelers.  Burkina Faso’s border with Côte d’Ivoire remained officially closed throughout 2022.Countering the Financing of Terrorism:  Burkina Faso is a member of the Intergovernmental Action Group Against Money Laundering in West Africa and its Financial Intelligence Unit, the National Financial Information Processing Unit-Burkina Faso (or CENTIF-BF), is a member of the Egmont Group.  Burkina Faso remained on the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) “gray list” in 2022.In 2022, FATF reported Burkina Faso took steps toward improving its Anti-Money Laundering and Countering Financing of Terrorism regime, including by adopting and implementing follow-up mechanisms for monitoring actions in its national strategy, conducting targeted financial sanctions awareness-raising programs, and strengthening efforts to pursue confiscation as a policy objective.Countering Violent Extremism:  In March, then-Transition President Lt. Col. Damiba announced the establishment of Local Dialogues for the Restoration of Peace, aimed at bringing local leaders and low-level VEO members together to resolve conflicts.  This was an expansion of an initiative begun by former-President Kaboré.  Current Transition President Traore has discontinued the initiative, noting, “We can’t negotiate our values.”  Damiba also publicly pushed efforts for deradicalization to violence and touted a government center to receive and reintegrate former violent extremist fighters, while Traore has been silent on those efforts.International and Regional CooperationG-5 Sahel:  Burkina Faso is part of the G-5 Sahel, along with Chad, Mauritania, and Niger.  The group’s effectiveness has been called into question after Mali’s withdrawal in May.Accra Initiative:  In November, the member states decided to establish a Multinational Joint Task Force with 10,000 troops.  Burkina Faso has not stated whether or how it would work together with that force.ECOWAS:  Following the January coup, Burkina was suspended from full participation in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) until elections are held, currently envisioned for mid-2024.  ECOWAS announced the development of a regional peacekeeping force in December.																												    							View report by:																				Afghanistan											Albania											Algeria											Argentina											Australia											Austria											Bahrain											Bangladesh											Belgium											Bosnia and Herzegovina											Brazil											Bulgaria											Burkina Faso											Cameroon											Canada											Chad											Colombia											Côte d’Ivoire											Cyprus											Democratic Republic of the Congo											Denmark											Djibouti											Egypt											Ethiopia											France											Georgia											Germany											Greece											India											Indonesia											Iraq											Israel, West Bank, and Gaza											Italy											Jordan											Kazakhstan											Kenya											Kingdom of Saudi Arabia											Kosovo											Kuwait											Kyrgyz Republic											Lebanon											Libya											Malaysia											Maldives											Mali											Mauritania											Mexico											Morocco											Mozambique											Niger											Nigeria											North Macedonia											Norway											Oman											Pakistan											Panama											Paraguay											People&#8217;s Republic of China (Hong Kong and Macau)											Peru											Philippines											Qatar											Russia											Senegal											Serbia											Singapore											Somalia											South Africa											Spain											Sri Lanka											Sudan											Sweden											Sweden											Sweden											Tajikistan											Tanzania											Thailand											The Netherlands											Trinidad and Tobago											Tunisia											Türkiye											Turkmenistan											Uganda											United Arab Emirates											United Kingdom (Northern Ireland)											Uzbekistan											Venezuela											Yemen																										On This Page				search													>																										Burkina Faso																	Tags																					Bureau of African Affairs																								Bureau of Counterterrorism																								Burkina Faso																																														Countering Terrorism																																							Countering Violent Extremism																																							Counterterrorism																																							Terrorism
- Winners of the 2023 Secretary of State’s Award for Corporate Excellence HomeOffice of the SpokespersonPress Releases&#8230;Winners of the 2023 Secretary of State’s Award for Corporate Excellence				hide		if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}																										Winners of the 2023 Secretary of State’s Award for Corporate Excellence																																		Media Note																														October 19, 2023																																							The U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs is pleased to announce five winners of the 2023 Secretary of State’s Award for Corporate Excellence (ACE). Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken will present these five American companies, large and small, with the award in a ceremony on October 30, 2023, at 11:00 a.m. EDT at the State Department. The 2023 ACE categories are Women’s Economic Security; Innovation; and Sustainable Supply Chains.The award recognizes two companies in the category&nbsp;Women’s Economic Security.&nbsp;Avertra Corp., operating in Amman, Jordan, is a medium-sized Virginia-based American software firm dedicated to an equitable and inclusive workplace for women in a male-dominated field. The second winner is&nbsp;Google Poland, which is setting the standard in promoting gender equality in the workplace and supporting women in tech initiatives in Poland, Ukraine, and the region, including Ukrainian refugees from Russia’s brutal war against Ukraine.In the&nbsp;Innovation&nbsp;category, the 2023 ACE Winner is&nbsp;Kentegra Biotechnology, operating out of Nairobi, Kenya. Kentegra is a biotech firm that has pioneered Kenya&#8217;s revival as a global leader in cultivating pyrethrum with smallholder farmers. Pyrethrum is a climate change-resistant cash crop and is an active ingredient used in sustainable organic biopesticides to grow healthier food and provide stronger crop protection.In&nbsp;Sustainable Supply Chains, the first 2023 ACE Winner is&nbsp;Ampersand USA Inc., operating in Kigali, Rwanda. Ampersand is Africa’s first mobility energy company, providing electricity and vehicles to power fleets of thousands of electric motorcycle taxis across the continent. The second winner is&nbsp;Parsyl, Abidjan, Côte d&#8217;Ivoire, a supply chain technology company specializing in risk management and cargo insurance for perishable goods. It supports cold chain data collection and analytics at the national, district, and local levels in Senegal, Côte d&#8217;Ivoire, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Niger, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo to help strengthen vaccine supply chain systems and identify needed improvements.This year marks the Award for Corporate Excellence’s 24th anniversary. Established in 1999, ACE recognizes the crucial role U.S. companies are playing in elevating global standards of business conduct. Together, these companies are leading the way in addressing some of our greatest global challenges.The U.S. Department of State is committed to working with companies to further responsible business practices worldwide and to recognize their efforts to improve lives at home and abroad. For more information, please visit:&nbsp;http://www.state.gov/ace.The invitation-only 2023 ACE ceremony will be open to credentialed members of the media on a space-available basis. A separate notice to the press with access details will be issued soon. For media inquiries, please contact&nbsp;eb-press-inquiry@state.gov.						Tags																													Award for Corporate Excellence																															Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs																								Burkina Faso																								Burundi																																Business																															Côte d&#039;Ivoire																								Democratic Republic of the Congo																																Economic Affairs																																																					Economic Prosperity and Trade Policy																																																					Energy																															Jordan																								Kenya																								Niger																								Office of the Spokesperson																								Poland																								Rwanda																								Senegal																								Ukraine																																Women’s Economic Empowerment
- Evaluation of TIP Office Victim Identification Data Collection Efforts [PDF]