### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT JAC KSON A ssi gne d on Br ie fs O ct obe r 3, 200 7
STA TE OF TEN NES SEE v. ERNES T MIC HAE L TU RN ER

Appeal f rom the Circ uit Court for Tip ton County No. 5252 Joseph H. Wal ker, III, Judge

No. W2006-02661-C CA-R 3-CD - F iled April 4, 2008

Appellant, Erne st Mic h ae l Turner , was c onvicted by a Tipton County

jury of violating a habitual motor vehicle of

fende r orde r, violating the i mplied consent law a nd driving under the influence (“ DU I ” ). I n a

bif ur c a te d h e ari ng , th e jur

y fo un d App e lla

nt guil ty of thi rd of fe ns e DU I . A s a

re su lt of the c onvictions, Appellant was se ntence d to an effec tive six -y ear sentenc e. On appe al, Appellant challeng es: (1) the trial court’ s decision to allow two police offi ce rs t o testify as to their opinion about Appellant’ s state of i n t o x ication; (2) the va lidity of the orde r dec laringAppellant to be a ha b it u a l m o to r

v e h ic le o f

f e n d e r ; a n d ( 3 ) th e s u f

f ic ie n c y o f th e e v id e n c e

. We d e te r mi n e that Appellant is improperly

attempting to c ollatera lly attack the underlying order decla ring him to be a habitual motor vehicle offe nder a nd that the trial cour

t properly allowed the police office rs t o testify under Te nnessee Rule of Evidenc e 701. Consequently , the judg ments of the trial c ourt are aff irmed.

Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 App e al a s o f Rig ht ; J udgm e nt s o f the Ci r c uitCo ur t a r e Affir m e d.

J ER R Y L. S MI TH , J ., delivere d the opinion of the cour t, in which N OR MA M C G EE O G LE and A L AN E. G L EN N , J J ., joined.

Edwin C. L enow, Me mphis, Tennessee , for the a ppellant, Erne st Michael Turne r.
Rob e rt E. Coo per, J r. , A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l and

Re po rt e r; L a c y

Wilb e r, As sis tant A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l; El iza be th Ric e , Di str ic t Attor

ne y Ge ne ra l, a

nd Mik e Du nava nt, As sis tant D ist

ri c t A tto rn e y

Ge ne ra l, for the a ppellee, State of

Tenne ssee.

OP IN ION

I n November

of 2005, Appe llant was indicted by the Tipton County Gra nd J ury for DUI , violation of a habitual motor vehic le offe nder or der, th i rd o ff en s e DUI and violation of the implied consent law.-2- State’s Proof At trial, Serg eant Ala

n Wil lis of t he Coving ton, Tennesse e Police De partment testified that on Aug ust 3 0 , 2 0 0 5 , h e wa s on routine patrol in Tipton County on Hig hway

51. At some point during the ea

rly morning hours, S erg eant W illis observe d a van driving down the hig hway with the “re ar door of the va n open and some thing ha

ng ing out.” Serg eant W illis turned around “to stop the vehicle” beca

use he w as unable to a scer tain what wa s hang ing out of the bac k of the va

n. Serg eant Wil lis was able to maintain visual conta ct with the van as he turned around. He f ollowed the van for a pproxi mately

one hundre d y ards be fore it turned into the parkinglot of the Bax ter Motel. He did not see any

err atic drivingduring that short time period. When Ser g eant Willis pulled into the motel parking lot, he was able to see that there was a ladder sticking out of the back of the van. He also noticed that the driver was “fumbling around i n the front [of the van].” Serg eant Willis parke d and exited his patrol car . When he started walking up to the van, the dr iver e x ited the van. Ser g eant Willi s id e nti fi e d App e lla nt a s th e dr ive r. Ac c or din g to S e rg e ant Wi lli s, App ell ant w a s “ re a lly unsteady on his feet” and wa s “stumbling a round” on the paved sur fac e of the parkinglot. Serg eant Willi s b e g an a

c on ve rs a tio n w ithAp pe lla nt and no te d a “ str on g od or a sso c iate d wi th a n a lc oh oli c bever ag e about [Appellant].” Serg eant Willis also stated that Appe llant was “sway i n g b ack a nd forth.” I n Serg eant Willis ’ asse ssment, Appellant was “ too intox icated to dr ive.” Shortly afte r Serg eant Willis approa ched Appellant, t wo ot her office rs ar rived on the sc ene. Acc ording to O ffice r Rodney McCurry , “[y ]ou could smell a lot of alcohol [around Appe llant] ,” and Appellant wa s “stumbling ar ound” the sc ene. Offic er McCurry also observe d “open c ans of be er” inside the van that Appellant was seen dr iving. Of fice r McCurr

y never saw Appe llant operating the van, but he opined that Appellant was intoxi cate d. Serg eant Willis called dispatch to reque st Appellant’s driving history

. At trial, counsel f or Appellant objec ted to the introduction of Appe llant’s driving history , arguing that a docume nt from the Depa rtment of Safe ty

was not the be st evidence available and that Serg eant Willis was not the proper wi t n es s with which to introduce the document. The State proce eded to introduc e the document for

identification purpose s only

. After rec eiving Appellant’s dr iving history from dispatch, Ser g eant Willis place d Appellant
un de r a rr e st. Ap pe lla

nt d e nie d th a t he ha d be e n dri nk ing and re fu se d to com ple te any fi e ld s ob ri e ty tests or submit to a blood test. Serg eant Willis admitted on cross-e x amination that he could not re m ember whether Appellant had an y k ey s on his person that nig ht. Furthe r, Serg eant Willis stated that he did not inspect the mec hanics of the vehicle to asce rtain whether it was operational, as he did not think that this was nece ssary

. Duringthe re direc t examination o f S er gea n t Wi llis, t he trial c ourt conduc ted a jury out hear ing w ith reg ard to the introduc tion of the order in which Appellant wa s decla red to be a ha

bitual motor vehicle of

fende r. The State soug ht to introduce a cer tified copy

of the “ consent orde r” that-3-

was attached to “other thi ng s which [ acc ording to the prosec utor wer e] clear ly inadmissible.” The State proposed to introduce the document f or identification purposes only , then have portions of the order rea d to the jury by Serg eant Wil lis. Counsel f or Appellant objected to the introduction of the consent orde r base d on the fa ct that the “pe rson who alleg edly signe d [t he orde r]” was not a judg e. C o u n s el for A

ppellant also ar g ued that the or der w as void or voidable be cause the “judg e” who signe d the orde r wa s not appointed by the supreme court to ser

ve as a specia l judge

. The trial c ourt overr

uled the objec tion a n d d et ermined that the order was “ selfauthenticating.” The c ourt specif ically noted that the orde r conta ined the cle rk’s a ffidavit and jud g e ’s a ff

ida vit . A dd iti on a lly , th e tr ia l c ourt ru le d th a t App e lla

nt w a s im pr ope rl y a tte mpt ingto collater ally

attack the order

decla ring him to be a habitual motor vehic le offe nder. When the jury

returne d to the courtroom, the State told the c ourt that there was a “stipulation from [counsel for A

ppellant].” Counsel for the State then r ead the following portion of the conse nt
o r d e r t o t h e j u r y:
State of Tenne ssee, Shelby County . I , Wil liam R. Key , Clerk of the Criminal Court of the 30 J udicial District in Me mphis, do here by cer tify that the forego i n g p ag es th of writing contain a full, complete, true, and perf ect copy of conse nt order de clar ing defe ndant habitual motor vehic le offe nder, in the c ase of State of Tenne ssee ve rsus [Appe l l an t ], Docket Number P-9751, indictment for petition to declare defe ndant habitual motor vehicle offe nder. W itness my hand and the seal of sa id court at off ice in M em p h is, this 26 day of Jul y 1996. Wil liam R. Key , Clerk, by Gloria L owe, th Deputy Clerk.

. . . .
I n the Criminal Court of Tenne ssee, 30 J udicial District at Memphis, Division I V, th State of Tenne ssee ve rsus [Appellant] , motor vehicle ha bitual offe nder, T.C.A. 55- 10-601 et seq., dr iver’s lice nse number 67713648, date of birth June 4, 1969, Docke t Nu mb er P -9 7 5 1 , co n s en to rd er

d ec l ar i n g d ef

en d an th abitual offe nder unde r the Motor Vehicle Habitual Offende rs Act. This matter ca me on - - c ame to be he ard on Ma y 27, 1992, upon the petition of the State of Tenne ssee to de clar e th e d ef endant habitual offe nder unde r the Motor Ve hicle Of fende rs Act. It is therefor e orde red,
a dju dg e d, and

de c re e d th a t th e de fe nd ant h e re in, [Ap pe lla nt], be and here by

is decla red a n habitual offender

in acc ordanc e with the Motor Ve hicle Ha bitual Offen d ers Act, and is barr ed fr om operating a motor vehicle upon the highw ay s of this state. Bill Anderson J r., J udg e, Division I V, Criminal Court of Tennesse e, 30 th J udicial District at Memphis. Signe d [Appellant] , defe ndant, a n d T r e nt H a ll , attorney for de fenda

nt, May 27, 1992.-4-

Th e tr ia l c ourt

the n in str

uc te d th e jur

y a s f oll ow s: [C ]ertain documents ar e self- authentic ating ; that is, they can be admitted into the p r o o f a s p arto f t h e r e c o r d

w i t h o u th a v i n g t o h a v e a

w i t n e s s c o m e t o c o u rtt o t e s t i f y.
This document that’s bee n marke d as an e x hibit for identification purpose s is a self-a uthenticating document; . . . . And in this case it has be en stipulated or ag ree d - - a

nd a stipulation is ag ree ment - - that c erta in matters ar e true and par t of the proof. Normally Itell y ou that what the attorney s say is not proof. Howe ver, unde r a stipulation, what he jus t rea d is part of the proof. I n this case it’s bee n stipulated that [Ap pe lla

nt] w a s d e c lare d to be an h a bit ua l of fende r u nd e r t he Mo tor Ve hic le Offe nders Ac t, on May

27, 1992, . . . . Appellant’s Proof Appellant ca lled his live-in fiance e, Reg ina B ailey , to testify . Ms. B ailey testified that she and Appe llant own t he black and si lver van toge ther. Ac cordingto Ms. Bailey , she drove the van on Aug ust 29, 2005. Ms. Ba iley claimed that the “clutch was going out” on the van and that y ou had to “disconnec t the battery

cable s beca

use som ething was draining the battery .” Ms. B ailey stated that she had the only

key s to the van and that Appellant di d not drive that vehicle bec ause he was “ not supposed to drive.” Ms. Ba iley stated that the va

n had not bee n driven since “ar ound seven o’ clock” that evening

.
I n the ea rly morning of August 30, 2005, Ms. Bailey stated that Appe llant went out to the van and “w ent throug h the bac k of it” to look fo r “s o m e m issing items” that ha d been stolen f rom the
v an

. A c c o r d in g to M s

. B a il e y , th e v anw o u ld o n ly dr iv e “ tw o to five mi les anh o u r ” th e n e xt morning when she tried to drive it to the “shop.”

The ne x t witness to testify for Appellant was L isa Ba skin, the custodian of re cords f or Don B a sk in T ru c k Sa le s in

Cov ing ton , T e nn e ss ee. App e lla nt a nd Ms. B a ile y

wo rk e d f or Do n B a sk in Truck Sales. A c c o r d in g to M s

. B a s k in , th e v anw a s to w e d to D o nB a s k in

T r u c k Sa le s o nthe
mor nin g of Au g us t 30, 200 5, fr om M ike ’s Auto. Th e “ c lut c h w a s b ur nt u p in it, ” and Do n B a sk in Truck Sale s was “g oing to r eplac e it.” Appellant took the stand in his own beha lf. He c laimed that he a nd Ms. Ba iley took the van to w ork at Don Ba skin Tr

uck Sales on Aug ust 29, 2005. Ms. Bailey drove the van. Af

ter wor k, they went to do laundry and went to the store befor e returning to the motel a round seven or eig ht o’clock that evening . Ms. Ba iley

ag ain drove the van. Appe llant admitted that he dra nk a “qua rt of Colt 45” around 10:00 p.m. that eve ning. Ap p el lant denied dr iving the va n on Aug ust 30, 2005. Further , Appellant cla imed that the offic ers did not ask him to complete fie ld sobriety tests and did not rea d-5-

him the i m p lied consent for m. Appellant admitted that he ha d been de clar ed a ha bitual motor vehicle of fende r in 1992.

At t h e c o n cl u s i o no f t h e p ro o f, t h e j u ry fo u n d Ap p el l an tgu i l t y

o f D UI, gu i l t y

o f v i o l at i n g a habi t u al m o t o r v ehicle of fende r orde r, and guilty

of violating the implied consent law. The trial court then c harg ed the jury with deter mining whether Appellant was guilty of t hird offe nse DUI . The State introduced two of

Appellant’s pr ior DUI

convictions from 1997 a nd 2003. The jury

found A p p e l l an tg u i l t y

o f t h i r d o f f e n s e D U I.

Th e tr ia l c ourt

sen ten ced

Ap pe lla nt t o a n e ff e c tiv e six- y e ar s e nte nc e . App e lla nt a pp e a ls, arguing that: (1) the evide nce is insuffic ient to support t h e convic tions; (2) the void order adjudicatinghim as a habitual motor vehicle offe nder violate d his constituti onal rig hts; and (3) the trial court erre d in allowing the officers to testify as t o their opinion about Appellant’s intoxi cation.

An aly sis Appellant ar g ues that the e vidence was insuffic ient to suppor t his conviction. Howe ver, a rea ding of Appellant’s a

rg ument reve als that Appellant c ouches his ar g ument as a suff iciency of the
e vid e nc e c ha lle ng e , b ut in re a lity he is atte mpt ingto c ha lle ng e the un de rl yingor de r d e c lari nghim to be a habitual motor vehicle offe nder. Specifica lly , Appellant ar g ues that the orde r is void “since [si c] the State of Tenne ssee f ailed to revive the J udg ment ag ainst y our Appellant within the te n y ear period fr om May

23 , 1992 until May

25 , 2002 and the State failed to produce any Orde r re viving rd th the Habitual M o t o r Ve hicle Of fende r status ag ainst the Appellant. . . .” Appellant conte nds that be c a us e the or de r i s vo id, the tr ia l c ourt la c ke d jur isd ic tio n. Ad dit ion a lly , Ap pe lla nt a rgue s th a t hi s due proc ess rig hts were violated bec ause the re was no proof that the order declaring Appellant to be
a ha bit ua l mo tor ve hic le of

fe nd e r h a d e ve r b e e n “ re c e ive d, ” and wh e n App e lla

nt w a s in dic te d in 2005, the orde r “ha d become moot by over t h re e y ear s.” The State disa g ree s, contendingthat Appellant ca

nnot col l at erally

attack his status as a

habitual motor vehicle offe nder a nd that the evidenc e wa s sufficient to support the c onvictions.

Tenne ssee Code Annotated section 55-10-603 de fines ce rtain re peat motor ve hicle off ender s a s “ ha bit ua l of fe nd e r[s ].” Up on

a fi nd ing that an ind ivi du a l is a ha bit ua l of fe nd e r, a tr ia l c ourt

mus t enter an orde r dec laringthe individual as such and dir ectingthe Depa rtment of Safe ty

to revoke the individual’s driver’ s license. T.C.A. § 55-10-613. Tenne ssee Code Annotated se ction 55-10-616( b) provides that it is a Class E fe l o n y fo r an individual to operate a motor ve hicle while a n order decla ring him/her to be a ha

bitual offende r is in ef

fe ct . An individual “may petition . . . for restoration of the privileg e to oper ate a motor vehicle” afte r three y ea rs

. T

. C.A. § 55-10-615. Howeve r, it is unlawful for a ny pers o n t o operate any

vehicle in this State while the judg ment or order of the c ourt prohibiting the ope ration re mains in effe ct. T.C.A. § 55-10-616.

Al tho ug h pro se c uti on s und e r T e nn e sse e Cod e An no tate d s e c tio n 5 5- 10 -6 16 (b ) a re c ri min a l, the initial procee dings to de clar e a pe rson a ha bitua l m o t o r vehicle of

fende r ar e civil and a

re g overne d by

the Tenne ssee Rules of Civil Procedure

. State v. Malady , 952 S.W .2d 440, 444 (Tenn.-6-

Cr im. Ap p. 19 96 ); Ba nk

sto n v . S tate , 8 15 S.W. 2d

21 3, 21 6 ( Te nn . Cr im. Ap p. 19 91 ); Eve r h a rt v. Sta te , 5 6 3 S.W .2d 795, 797 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1978) . Thus, the appr opriate pr ocedur e for
c ha lle ng inga

ha bit ua l of fe nd e r o rd e r i s to f

il e a mot ion purs ua nt t o T e nn e sse e Rul e of Civ il Procedur e 60.02. Bankston , 8 15 S.W. 2d a t 21 6. Rul e 60 .0 2 p ro vid e s in pe rt ine nt p art :

On motion and upon such terms as ar e jus t, the court may relieve a par

ty or the party ’s leg al re prese ntative from a final judg ment, o rd er or proce eding for the following rea sons: (1) mistake, i nadver tence , surprise or excusable negle ct; (2) f raud (whe ther he retofor e denominate d intrinsic or extrinsi c), misre prese ntation, or other misconduct of an adver se party ; ( 3) the judg ment is void; (4) the judg ment has bee n satisfied, re lease d or dischar g ed, or a prior judg ment upon which it is based has bee n re ve rs e d o r o the rw ise va c a te d, or it i s n o lo ng e r e qu ita

ble t hat a jud g me nt s ho uld have pr os p ec t i v e application; or (5) any other re ason justify ing r elief f rom the operation of the j udg ment. The mot ion shall be made within a reasonable time, and for r easons ( 1) and ( 2) not mor e than one y ear afte r the judg ment, order

or proc eeding
was e ntere d or take n.

Acc ording ly , a def

enda nt w h o is p r o s e c uted under

Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 55-10-616 ca n only obtain relief from an underlying habitual offe nder or der if the defe ndant moves to set that orde r aside pursua

nt to Rul e 60. Sta te v . J

os e ph Ke v an Cla rk, N o

. W2 0 0 6

- 0 0 2 4 5

- CC A

- R3 CD , 2 0 0 6 WL 3 2 0 8 5 7 0 , at * 3 (T en n

. C ri m

. Ap p

. , at J ac k s o n , No v
. 7 , 2 0 0 6 ) ( ci t i n g State v. Donnie M. Jac ks , No. 03C0 1 -9108C R00256, 1992 W L84220, at *1 (Te nn. Crim. App., at Knoxvi lle, Apr. 28, 1992))

. Appellant her ein has not filed a motion to s et aside the order under Rule 60. Ap pe lla nt a rgue s h e re in t

hat T e nn e sse e Cod e Anno tate d se c tio n 2 8- 3- 11 0 c on ta ins a statut e of limitations t hat re quires the St ate to commence action on the order de clar ing him to be a habitual mot or ve hic le of

fe nd e r w ith in t e n y e ars . T e nn e sse e Cod e Anno tate d s e c tio n 2 8- 3- 11 0 p ro vid e s: The followingactions shall be c ommenced w ithin ten (10) y ea rs af t er the cause of action ac crue d: (1) A ct ions ag ainst g uardia ns, executors, administrators, sher iffs, cle rks, and other pu bli c of fi c e rs on the ir bo nd s; (2) Ac tions on judgments and de cre es of courts of rec ord of this or any other state or g overnme nt; and (3) All other

case s not ex pressly

provided for

. Appellant ar g ues that bec ause the State did not “revive ” t h e o rd er decla ring him to be a habitual motor vehicle of

fende r at some point be tween May 23, 1992 (the date of the e ntry of the orde r) a

nd-7-

May 25 , 2 00 2 (t e n y e ars late r) , the or de r is so me ho w vo id and the tr ia l c ourt la c ke d ju ri sd ic tio n to confe r the indictment upon him.

Th is C ourt

ha s h e ld t

hat th e re is n o c od if

ie d sta tut e of

lim itatio ns in t

he Mo tor Ve hic le Habitual Offende rs Act. See State v. Earl Stanley W illiams , No. E2001-01675- CCA-R3-CD, 2002 WL 489124, at *1 (Te nn. Crim. App., at Knoxvi lle, Apr. 2, 2002). Furthermore , Appellant has not taken the a ffirmative steps require d for r einstatement of his lice nse. See T.C.A. § 55-10-615. Finally , Appellant ar g ues that the underl y i n g o rd er declar ing him to be a habitual motor
ve hic le of fe nd e r i s some ho w voi d an d viol a te d his rig hts to due pr oc e ss und e r the law. Th is i s a lso a collate ral attack on the pr evious judg ment and is impermissible in a proce eding of this nature. See Da v is v . S tate , 793 S.W .2d 650, 651 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990). Moreove r, althoug h Appellant make s a state me nt t

hat hi s d ue pr oc e ss r ig hts were vi olate d, the re is n o e xplanatio n a s to ho w h is r ig hts
wer e violated. Appe llant is not entit led to relief on this iss ue.
W itness Testimony Next, Appellant argues that the trial c ourt err ed in allowing “both Serg eant Willis and Of fice r Rod ne y Mc Cur ry to t e sti fy a s to the ir

op ini on that th e Ap pe lla

nt w a s to [sic ] int oxic a te d th a t hi s driving ability

was impaire d.” Specif

ically , Appellant conte nds that nei t h er office r wa s qualified to testify as an e x pert unde r Tenne ssee Rule of Evidence 702. Fur ther, Appe llant argues he obje cted to their testimony

at trial. Appe ll an t als o argues that eve n if the off icer s were allowed to testify about their opinion of Appellant’s intox ication as lay witnesses under Tenne ssee Rule of Evidenc e 701, the pr o s ec u tor failed to lay a “f oundation for the two of fice r’s [sic] opi nion that y our Ap pe lla nt’ s a bil ity to o pe rate a mo tor

ve hic le up on

the ro a ds and

hig hw ay s o f T ipt on

County Tenne ssee wa s impaired” a nd that “[t] his basic re quirement of e vidence can not [sic] be swept under the rugas a ha

rmless err or.” The State counter s t hat neither of the off

icer s was pre sented a s an expe rt a t tr ia l. F u rth e r , th e St a te c o n te n d s th a t th e o f f ic e r s w e r e p r o p e r ly a ll o w e d to te s ti fy under Tenne ssee Rule of E vidence 701.

As we be g in our ana ly sis, we note we ll-es ta b li s h e d p r e c e d e nt pr oviding “ that trial courts have broad discr etion in determining the admis sibili ty of evidence, and their rulings will not be reve rsed absent a n abuse of that discretion.” State v. Mc Leod , 937 S.W .2d 867, 871 (Tenn. 1996) . Moreove r, the Tenne ssee Rules of Evidence embody , and our c ourts traditionally have a cknowledg ed, “a

policy of libera lity

i n t h e ad m i ssion of evidenc e in both civil and cr iminal cases.” State v. Bank s , 564 S.W. 2d 94 7, 94 9 ( Te nn . 1 97 8) ; State v. Robinson , 930 S.W

. 2 d 78, 84 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995)

. Fur ther, “ [i ]t is well-settled that the propr iety , scope , m an n er and control of the examination of witnesses is a matter wi t hin the discretion of the trial judg e, subjec t to review f or abuse of discretion.” State v. Caughron , 855 S.W .2d 526, 540 (Tenn. 1993) . Rule 701 of the Te nnessee Rul e s o f E vid e nc e state s:-8-

(a ) Ge ne ra lly . - I f a w itn e ss i s n ot t e sti fy inga s an e xpe rt , th e wi tne ss’ s te sti mony in the form of

opinions or infere nces is limited to thos e o p inions or infere nces w hich
are (1) r ationally

based on the perc eption of the witness a nd (2) he lpful to a clea

r under standing of t he witness’s testimony or the de termination of a f act in issue.
“[A] l ay witness may

testify to his own phy sical condition or that of a nother pe rson provided that the witness first states t h e d et ai l ed facts and then g ives his opinion or conclusion.” Simpson v. Sa tte rfi e ld , 5 6 4 S

. W

. 2 d

9 5 3 , 9 5 5 -5 6 (T en n

. 1 9 7 8 ) ( qu o t i n g McKenziev. Campbell and Dann Mfg. Co. , 209 Tenn. 475, 479, 354 S.W .2d 440, 442 (1962)) . Fur thermore , “[i] f an opinion is based upon a l ay wi t n es s ’s o wn o b s erv at i o n s , h i s o r h er co n cl u s i o n s re qu i re n o ex p er t i s e an d ar e w i t h i nt h e r an ge of common experienc e, the opinion is admissible.” State v. Tony Samue l , No. W2006-00090-CCAR3-CD, ___ S.W .3d ___, 2007 WL 2026621, at *9 (Tenn. Crim. App., at J ackson, July 12, 2007), perm. app. de nied , (T e n n

. O c t

. 1 5 , 2 0 0 7 ) ( ci t i n g Sta te v . W ing ar d , 891 S.W .2d 628, 636 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994), overruled on othe r grounds by State v. J ames , 81 S.W .3d 75 (Tenn. 2002) ).

I n the ca se at hand, Serg eant Wil lis testified that his “ sense of smell . . . c aused [him] to form
ano p i n i o na s t o w h e t h e r o r n o t[ A p p e l l an t ] w a s u n d e r t h e i n f l u e n c e o f ani n t o x i c an t

. ” S p e c i f

i c a l l y, Serg eant Willis testified that af ter obser ving A ppellant at the sc ene, in his opinion, Appellant wa s “too intox icated to dr ive.” Office r McCurr y , on the other ha

nd, observe d the situation and believe d Appellant wa s “drunk, be cause he had [consumed] a lot of alcohol.”

We f in d th a t th is te s ti mo n y w a s b o th “ r a ti o n a ll y b a s e d o n th e p e r c e p ti o no f th e w it n e s s [e s ]” and helpf ul to a clea

r under standing of . . . the de termination of a f act in issue.” See Tenn. R. Evid. 701(a) . Moreove r, citing Tenne ssee Rule of E vidence 701, this Court has de termined that a police office r’s “ opinion of intox ication as a lay witness was clea

rly admissible ba sed upon his perc eption of the [defe ndant] at the time of arr est.” See State v. Johnnie Darrell Rice , No. M2003-01294-CCAR3-CD, 2004 WL 1857108, at *3 (Te nn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Aug . 17, 2004). Appe llant is not entitled to relief on this issue.

Conclusion

For the fore g oing r easons, the judg ments of the trial c ourt are aff irmed.

___________________________________ J ERRY L . SMI TH, JUDGE