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" ! HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 110TH CONGRESS

2d Session

REPORT

2008

110–858

Union Calendar No. 555

MISLEADING INFORMATION FROM THE

BATTLEFIELD: THE TILLMAN AND LYNCH

EPISODES

FIRST REPORT

BY THE

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND

GOVERNMENT REFORM

TOGETHER WITH

ADDITIONAL VIEWS

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/

index.html

http://www.house.gov/reform

SEPTEMBER 16, 2008.—Committed to the Committee of the Whole House

on the State of the Union and ordered to be printed

(II)

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM

HENRY A. WAXMAN, California, Chairman

EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York

PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland

DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois

JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts

WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri

DIANE E. WATSON, California

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York

JOHN A. YARMUTH, Kentucky

BRUCE L. BRALEY, Iowa

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of

Columbia

BETTY MCCOLLUM, Minnesota

JIM COOPER, Tennessee

CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland

PAUL W. HODES, New Hampshire

CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut

JOHN P. SARBANES, Maryland

PETER WELCH, Vermont

JACKIE SPEIER, California

TOM DAVIS, Virginia

DAN BURTON, Indiana

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York

JOHN L. MICA, Florida

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania

CHRIS CANNON, Utah

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio

DARRELL E. ISSA, California

KENNY MARCHANT, Texas

LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia

PATRICK T. MCHENRY, North Carolina

VIRGINIA FOXX, North Carolina

BRIAN P. BILBRAY, California

BILL SALI, Idaho

JIM JORDAN, Ohio

PHIL BARNETT, Staff Director

EARLEY GREEN, Chief Clerk

LAWRENCE HALLORAN, Minority Staff Director

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

Washington, DC, September 16, 2008.

Hon. NANCY PELOSI,

Speaker of the House of Representatives,

Washington, DC.

DEAR MS. SPEAKER: By direction of the Committee on Oversight

and Government Reform, I submit herewith the committee’s first

report to the 110th Congress.

HENRY A. WAXMAN,

Chairman.

(III)

C O N T E N T S

Page

Executive Summary ................................................................................................. 1

I. Investigations into Corporal Tillman’s Death ............................................. 6

A. Investigations by the Department of Defense ................................... 6

B. The Committee’s Investigation ........................................................... 9

II. Chronology of Events Related to Corporal Tillman .................................... 11

A. The Military Service of Corporal Patrick Tillman ............................ 11

B. Initial Pentagon Reactions .................................................................. 11

C. Early Reports of Friendly Fire ........................................................... 13

D. The Silver Star Award and Corporal Tillman’s Memorial Service .. 15

E. The Announcement of the Fratricide ................................................. 16

III. The White House Response ........................................................................... 20

A. News Breaks at White House ............................................................. 20

B. Statement Issued Prematurely ........................................................... 22

C. Discussion of Corporal Tillman in Presidential Speech ................... 24

D. Knowledge of Fratricide ...................................................................... 27

IV. Secretary Rumsfeld’s Response .................................................................... 29

V. General Myers’s Response ............................................................................. 32

VI. General Abizaid’s Response .......................................................................... 35

VII. The Response of Other Senior Military Leaders ......................................... 36

A. General Bryan Brown .......................................................................... 36

B. Lieutenant General Philip Kensinger ................................................ 37

VIII. The Response to the Capture and Rescue of Private Jessica Lynch 41

A. Private Lynch’s Capture and Rescue ................................................. 41

B. The Dissemination of Inaccurate Information .................................. 41

C. The Response of Public Affairs Officials ............................................ 45

IX. Other Cases Brought to the Committee’s Attention ................................... 46

X. Conclusion ...................................................................................................... 47

ADDITIONAL VIEWS

Additional Views of Hon. Tom Davis ..................................................................... 50

(V)

Union Calendar No. 555

110TH CONGRESS REPORT " ! HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 2d Session 110–858

MISLEADING INFORMATION FROM THE BATTLEFIELD: THE

TILLMAN AND LYNCH EPISODES

SEPTEMBER 16, 2008.—Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the

State of the Union and ordered to be printed

Mr. HENRY A. WAXMAN, from the Committee on Oversight and

Government Reform, submitted the following

FIRST REPORT

together with

ADDITIONAL VIEWS

On July 17, 2008, the Committee on Oversight and Government

Reform approved and adopted a report entitled ‘‘Misleading Information from the Battlefield: The Tillman and Lynch Episodes.’’ The

chairman was directed to transmit a copy to the Speaker of the

House.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report summarizes what the Oversight Committee has

learned about (1) the misleading information given to the Tillman

family and the public following the death of Corporal Patrick Tillman on April 22, 2004, and (2) the misleading information released

about the capture and rescue of Private Jessica Lynch in Iraq in

March and April, 2003.

Corporal Tillman and Private Lynch are the two most famous

soldiers in the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. The misinformation in

both their cases is an unconscionable distraction from their actual

service and heroism. Their dedication to country and willingness to

voluntarily put themselves at great risk are extraordinary examples of patriotism and bravery.

The military has conducted seven separate investigations into

Corporal Tillman’s death by friendly fire in the mountains of Afghanistan. Two early Army investigations focused on reconstructVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:08 Sep 17, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 C:\DOCS\69006.TXT KATIE PsN: KATIE
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ing the events that resulted in the shooting. The scope of later investigations was broadened to include evaluations of whether military officials complied with the Army’s casualty notification regulations, whether military personnel involved in Corporal Tillman’s

death committed criminal acts, and whether the previous investigations had been properly conducted.

These investigations have looked down the chain of command, resulting in punishment or reprimands for enlisted personnel and officers who acted improperly before and after Corporal Tillman’s

death. To date, the highest ranking officer to receive a punishment

related to Corporal Tillman’s death is a three-star general.

In contrast, the Committee’s investigation into Corporal Tillman’s fratricide has looked up the chain of command. The purpose

of the investigation has been to determine what the top officials at

the White House and the Defense Department knew about Corporal Tillman’s fratricide, when they knew this, and what they did

with their knowledge.

The Committee’s investigation adds many new details to the Tillman story. But on the key issue of what senior officials knew, the

investigation was frustrated by a near universal lack of recall. The

Committee interviewed several senior officials at the White House,

including Communications Director Dan Bartlett, Press Secretary

Scott McClellan, and chief speechwriter Michael Gerson. Not a single one could recall when he learned about the fratricide or what

he did in response.

Similarly, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld told the Committee: ‘‘I don’t recall when I was told and I don’t recall who told

me.’’

The highest-ranking official who could recall being informed

about Corporal Tillman’s fratricide was former Chairman of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff General Richard Myers, who said, ‘‘I knew

right at the end of April, that there was a possibility of fratricide

in the Corporal Tillman death.’’ General Myers testified that it

would have been ‘‘logical’’ for him to pass this information to Secretary Rumsfeld, but said ‘‘I just don’t recall whether I did it or

not.’’ He also said he could not recall ‘‘ever having a discussion

with anybody in the White House about the Tillman case, one way

or another.’’

The Committee’s investigation into the inaccurate accounts of

Private Lynch’s capture and rescue also encountered a consistent

lack of recollection. Witnesses who should have possessed relevant

information were interviewed by the Committee. They said they

had no knowledge of how the report that Private Lynch fired her

weapon and was wounded during her capture was spread to the

media and the public. Nor could they explain why it took so long

for the military to correct the inaccurate story of the ‘‘little girl

Rambo from the hills of West Virginia’’ that was widely reported

during the opening days of the Iraq war.

THE WHITE HOUSE RESPONSE TO CORPORAL TILLMAN’S DEATH

The death of Corporal Tillman on April 22, 2004, generated a

flurry of attention and action inside the White House. On the day

following his death, April 23, White House officials sent or received

nearly 200 e-mails concerning Corporal Tillman. Several e-mails

3

came from staff members on President Bush’s reelection campaign,

who urged the President to respond publicly to Corporal Tillman’s

death. The White House did respond, rushing out a statement notwithstanding a Department of Defense policy intended to provide

a 24-hour period for private grieving before officials publicly discuss a casualty.

In comparison to the extensive White House activity that followed Corporal Tillman’s death, the complete absence of any communications about his fratricide is hard to understand. The Committee requested all White House documents related to Corporal

Tillman. The White House provided what it described as a complete response, giving the Committee access to approximately 1,500

pages of e-mails and other documents and withholding only drafts

of a speech in which the President discussed Corporal Tillman. Yet

there is not a single discussion of the fratricide in any of these communications.

On April 29, 2004, Major General Stanley McChrystal sent a

‘‘personal for’’ or ‘‘P4’’ memorandum up his chain of command. This

memo warned that the President might be preparing a speech

about Corporal Tillman without knowing that he was killed by

friendly fire, and it urged the generals receiving the memo to prevent any ‘‘unknowing statements by our country’s leaders which

might cause public embarrassment if the circumstances of Corporal

Tillman’s death become public.’’ When the President spoke about

Corporal Tillman’s death in a speech at the White House Correspondents’ Dinner two days later, the President commented on

Corporal Tillman’s character and his sacrifice in enlisting, but did

not address the circumstances of Corporal Tillman’s death.

The Committee interviewed seven officials in the White House

about the response to Corporal Tillman’s death. Universally, these

officials said they could not recall when they learned about the

fratricide or when the President learned. Former presidential

speechwriter Michael Gerson, who worked on the President’s May

1 speech at the Correspondents’ Dinner, said that he could not remember when he learned about the friendly fire, whether he knew

about it while preparing the Correspondents’ Dinner speech, or

whether he ever discussed the fratricide with the President.

Former Communications Director Dan Bartlett said he did not

have a ‘‘specific recollection’’ of when he learned of the friendly fire.

Asked whether he informed the President of the fratricide, he stated, ‘‘I don’t remember a particular conversation, but I can’t rule out

that I talked to him about it.’’ Former Press Secretary Scott

McClellan said he also could not remember when he or the President learned about the fratricide.

SECRETARY RUMSFELD’S RESPONSE TO CORPORAL TILLMAN’S DEATH

Secretary Rumsfeld took a personal interest in Pat Tillman’s enlistment in the U.S. Army Rangers in 2002. Just after Corporal

Tillman enlisted, Secretary Rumsfeld sent him a personal note

commending him for his ‘‘proud and patriotic’’ decision. Around the

same time, Secretary Rumsfeld wrote a ‘‘snowflake’’ memorandum

to the Secretary of the Army, noting that Corporal Tillman

‘‘sound[s] like he is world-class’’ and saying, ‘‘We might want to

keep our eye on him.’’

4

Testifying before the Committee, Secretary Rumsfeld said he had

no recollection of when he learned about the fratricide or what he

did in response. He testified, ‘‘I don’t recall when I was told and

I don’t recall who told me. But my recollection is that it was at a

stage when there were investigations under way.’’

GENERAL MYERS’S RESPONSE TO CORPORAL TILLMAN’S DEATH

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Richard

Myers, learned of Corporal Tillman’s death soon after it occurred.

One day after Corporal Tillman’s death, General Myers called the

commissioner of the National Football League to inform him of the

incident.

General Myers also learned quickly about the possible fratricide.

He told the Committee that he knew by the end of April, but could

not recall whether he informed Secretary Rumsfeld or President

Bush. General Myers did recall discussing the fratricide with his

public affairs advisor, telling him, ‘‘We need to keep this in mind

in case we go before the press. We’ve just got to calibrate ourselves.

With this investigation ongoing, we want to be careful how we portray the situation.’’ General Myers told the Committee that he had

no responsibility to share the information about the possible fratricide with the Tillman family or the public.

GENERAL ABIZAID’S RESPONSE TO CORPORAL TILLMAN’S DEATH

General John Abizaid, commanding general at CENTCOM and

the main addressee on General McChrystal’s P4 message, testified

that due to a delay at his headquarters, he did not receive the P4

message until approximately May 6, 2004, a week after it was sent.

When he finally received the message, he immediately called the

Joint Chiefs chairman, General Myers, and discovered that General

Myers was already aware of the potential fratricide.

General Abizaid also testified that after returning from theater

to Washington, DC, he informed Secretary Rumsfeld sometime between May 18 and May 20, 2004, that ‘‘there was an investigation

that was ongoing, and it looked like it was friendly fire.’’

THE RESPONSE OF OTHER SENIOR MILITARY LEADERS TO CORPORAL

TILLMAN’S DEATH

The Committee investigated the response of other top military

leaders in Corporal Tillman’s chain of command, including General

Bryan Brown of U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) and

Lieutenant General Philip Kensinger of U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC). General Brown testified to the Committee that he received General McChrystal’s P4 message in late

April, but made no effort to notify his superiors or the Tillman family about the potential fratricide. He said he made the ‘‘bad assumption’’ that these tasks would be handled by the ‘‘normal chain

of command.’’

General Kensinger declined to testify before the Committee in

August 2007, but later agreed to be interviewed by Committee

staff. He acknowledged that he did not inform the Tillman family

as soon as he found out about the potential fratricide, but claimed

that he only learned about the fratricide after attending the May

5

3, 2004, memorial for Corporal Tillman. This version of events was

contradicted by General Kensinger’s deputy, Brigadier General

Howard Yellen, who told Committee staff that he spoke with General Kensinger about the fratricide within two or three days after

it occurred. It was also contradicted by Lieutenant Colonel David

Duffy, who testified that he personally delivered the P4 message to

General Kensinger three days before the memorial service, and by

Colonel Clarence Chinn, deputy commander of the 75th Ranger

Regiment, who testified that General Kensinger informed him that

Corporal Tillman’s death was a possible fratricide.

THE RESPONSE TO THE CAPTURE AND RESCUE OF PRIVATE JESSICA

LYNCH

In the opening days of the Iraq war, a false account of the capture and rescue of Private Jessica Lynch became a front-page story

across the country. Defense Department officials have openly acknowledged that the account of Private Jessica Lynch’s capture and

rescue in the opening days of the Iraq war was an ‘‘awesome story,’’

but they could not explain to the Committee how and why the embellished account became so widely disseminated. Key public affairs officials told the Committee they could not recall any details

of the Jessica Lynch incident.

(6)

1 Captain Richard M. Scott, Commander, Headquarters & Headquarter Company, 2nd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment, AR 15–6 Final Report [Incomplete Draft] (Apr. 29, 2004). 2 Id. Although a complete draft of Captain Scott’s report has not been located, the Department

of Defense Inspector General collected available drafts and exhibits and identified Captain

Scott’s major findings. Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, Review of Matters Related to the Death of Corporal Patrick Tillman, U.S. Army, at 7 (Mar. 26, 2007) (IPO2007E001). 3Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, Review of Matters Related to the Death

of Corporal Patrick Tillman, U.S. Army, at 2 (Mar. 26, 2007) (IPO2007E001). 4 Id. at 20. 5 U.S. Central Command, Report of Fratricide Investigation (May 28, 2004) (containing May

8, 2004, AR 15–6 report by Lieutenant Colonel Ralph L. Kauzlarich, Executive Officer, 75th

Ranger Regiment). 6 Id. at 1. 7Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, Review of Matters Related to the Death

of Corporal Patrick Tillman, U.S. Army, at 2, 31–32 (Mar. 26, 2007) (IPO2007E001). 8 Id. Army rules require both a 15–6 ‘‘legal’’ investigation and a prompt safety investigation

in cases of fratricide. Army Regulation 385–40 (1994); DOD Instruction 6055.7 (2000).

I. INVESTIGATIONS INTO CORPORAL TILLMAN’S DEATH

A. INVESTIGATIONS BY THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

There have been seven investigations conducted by the Department of Defense into the death of Corporal Tillman in Afghanistan

on April 22, 2004, and the Department’s response. Each investigation has had serious flaws or limitations on its scope.

In the days following Corporal Tillman’s death, the 2nd Battalion

of the 75th Ranger Regiment conducted an Army Regulation 15–

6 investigation (commonly referred to as a ‘‘15–6’’ investigation)

into the circumstances surrounding the casualty.1 This investigation reportedly concluded that Corporal Tillman’s death was a likely fratricide.2 In a subsequent review of this investigation, the Defense Department Inspector General concluded that it was ‘‘tainted

by the failure to preserve evidence, a lack of thoroughness, and the

failure to pursue investigative leads.’’ 3

In early May, the commander of the 75th Regiment decided not

to approve the battalion-level investigation because ‘‘he did not find

the work thorough or complete and concluded further investigation

by someone more senior from the regimental level was required.’’ 4

He instead authorized a new regimental-level 15–6 investigation,

which was approved by U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) on

May 28, 2004.5 This investigation concluded that ‘‘CPL Tillman’s

death was the result of fratricide during an extremely chaotic

enemy ambush.’’ 6 The Inspector General found this second 15–6 investigation also ‘‘lacked credibility,’’ in part because the investigator ‘‘failed to visit the scene,’’ ‘‘failed to identify and interview relevant witnesses,’’ and drew conclusions that ‘‘were not based on

evidence included in the report.’’ 7

In August 2004, after an inquiry from the Tillman family, Army

officials discovered that another investigation required by Army

regulations, a ‘‘safety investigation,’’ had not been initiated.8 Three

months later, in October 2004, the friendly fire incident was belatedly reported to the Army’s Safety Center, which produced a report

7

9Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, Review of Matters Related to the Death

of Corporal Patrick Tillman, U.S. Army (Mar. 26, 2007) (IPO2007E001). 10 U.S. Army Safety Center, U.S. Army Accident Report, Date of Accident 040422 (undated). 11 Brigadier General Gary M. Jones, U.S. Army Special Operations Command, Army Regulation (AR) 15–6 Investigation—CPL Patrick Tillman (Jan. 7, 2005). 12 Id. 13 Id. at 10. 14Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, Review of Matters Related to the Death

of Corporal Patrick Tillman, U.S. Army, at 3 (Mar. 26, 2007) (IPO2007E001). 15 Id. 16 Id. at 2. 17 Id. at 54. 18 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Testimony of Thomas Gimble, Acting Defense Department Inspector General, Hearing on Misleading Information from the Battlefield, 110th Cong., at 99 (Apr. 24, 2007) (Serial No. 110–54).

in December of that year.9 The safety report concluded that a ‘‘high

volume of fire’’ from several Rangers ‘‘struck one of the Rangers in

the fighting position, fatally wounding him.’’ 10

In response to further inquiries from the Tillman family, the

Army’s Special Operations Command (USASOC) authorized in November 2004 another 15–6 investigation into the events surrounding Corporal Tillman’s death. This investigation was completed in

January 2005.11 The scope of this investigation included not only

the circumstances of Corporal Tillman’s death, but also subsequent

communications within Corporal Tillman’s chain of command.12

One of this investigation’s conclusions was that the Army’s failure

to immediately tell the Tillman family about the fratricide suspicions was ‘‘due to a desire to complete the investigation and gather all available facts, so as not to give the family an inaccurate or

incomplete picture of what happened.’’ 13

Reviewing this third 15–6 investigation, the Defense Department

Inspector General concluded that the report ‘‘did not address accountability for failures by the chain of command—to comply with

Army policy for reporting and investigating friendly fire incidents,

to coordinate with other investigative authorities, to provide timely

information concerning suspected friendly fire to CPL Tillman’s

next of kin, and to ensure accuracy in documentation submitted in

support of the Silver Star’’ posthumously awarded to Corporal Tillman.14

After Corporal Tillman’s family and others questioned the thoroughness and objectivity of this fourth Army investigation, the Department of Defense Inspector General and the Army Criminal Investigation Command (CID) undertook concurrent investigations

into Corporal Tillman’s death. The results of these two investigations were provided to the Acting Secretary of the Army, Pete

Geren, on March 26, 2007.15

The IG investigation found that ‘‘Corporal Tillman’s chain of

command made critical errors in reporting Corporal Tillman’s

death and in assigning investigative jurisdiction in the days following his death.’’ 16 The IG also determined that a Silver Star posthumously awarded to Corporal Tillman was based on documents

with ‘‘materially inaccurate statements’’ that ‘‘erroneously implied

that CPL Tillman died by enemy fire.’’ 17 An official from the Inspector General’s office testified before the Committee that the IG

concluded that two statements written in support of the Silver Star

award had been altered ‘‘somewhere in the approval chain.’’ 18 But

he stated that his office did not attempt to determine which comVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:08 Sep 17, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6604 Sfmt 6604 C:\DOCS\69006.TXT KATIE PsN: KATIE
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19 Id. 20Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, Review of Matters Related to the Death

of Corporal Patrick Tillman, U.S. Army, at 54 (Mar. 26, 2007) (IPO2007E001). 21 U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command, Report of Investigation into Death of Corporal

Tillman and AMF Soldier Thani, at 2 (Mar. 19, 2007). 22 Executive Summary, Army Action—Department of Defense Inspector General (DoDIG) Report

Related to the Death of Corporal (CPL) Patrick D. Tillman (undated). 23Letter from Major General Galen B. Jackman, Chief of Legislative Liaison, U.S. Army, to

Henry A. Waxman, Chairman, House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform (July

31, 2007); Letter from Major General Galen B. Jackman, Chief of Legislative Liaison, U.S.

Army, to Tom Davis, Ranking Member, House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform

(July 31, 2007). 24 Id.; see also Executive Summary, Army Action—Department of Defense Inspector General

(DoDIG) Report Related to the Death of Corporal (CPL) Patrick D. Tillman (undated). 25 Id. 26Defense Department Briefing with Secretary of the Army Pete Geren and Vice Chief of Staff

of the Army General Richard Cody (July 31, 2007).

puters were used to alter the statements or who had access to the

statements when they were altered.19 Nevertheless, the IG concluded that Corporal Tillman’s ‘‘immediate superiors believed his

actions merited the award’’ notwithstanding the friendly fire.20

The CID investigation concluded that the soldiers who fired at

Corporal Tillman ‘‘believed they were under enemy fire and were

returning fire at enemy combatants.’’ 21

Neither the IG nor the CID investigation examined the actions

of top military leaders including the Secretary of Defense and the

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. For example, neither report

determined whether these leaders were forwarded General

McChrystal’s P4 message.

On the same day the IG and CID reports were completed, March

26, 2007, Acting Secretary Geren directed the commander of the

Army Training and Doctrine Command, General William Wallace,

to independently review the findings of the earlier investigations

into Corporal Tillman’s death.22 As a four-star general and one of

the highest-ranking officers in the Army, General Wallace had the

authority to independently investigate the matter and discipline officers below his rank.

On July 31, 2007, the Army wrote Chairman Waxman and Ranking Member Tom Davis that General Wallace had completed his review and generally supported the findings of the IG and CID investigations.23 This letter also informed the Committee that General

Wallace had sanctioned seven officers for their actions in the aftermath of Corporal Tillman’s death.24 The officers sanctioned included four general officers and three field-grade officers. The highest-ranking officer to be sanctioned was now-retired Lieutenant

General Philip Kensinger, the former commander of the Army’s

Special Operations Command (USASOC).25

Also on July 31, 2007, Army Secretary Pete Geren publicly announced General Wallace’s findings. Although he denied that there

was a ‘‘conspiracy . . . to deceive the public,’’ he stated:

[T]here was a perfect storm of mistakes, misjudgments,

and a failure of leadership that brought us where we are

today, with the Army’s credibility in question about a matter that strikes at the very heart of Army core values—our

commitment to our fallen soldiers and their grieving families; soldiers’ loyalty to fallen soldiers.26

9

27 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Testimony of General John

Abizaid, Hearing on the Tillman Fratricide: What the Leadership of the Defense Department

Knew, 110th Cong., at 217 (Aug. 1, 2007) (Serial No. 110–49). 28 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Hearing on Misleading Information from the Battlefield, 110th Cong. (Apr. 24, 2007) (Serial No. 110–54). 29 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Testimony of Kevin Tillman,

Hearing on Misleading Information from the Battlefield, 110th Cong., at 17 (Apr. 24, 2007) (Serial No. 110–54). 30 Id.

CENTCOM Commander General John Abizaid, in testimony before this Committee, assessed the military’s response to Corporal

Tillman’s death more bluntly, saying, ‘‘It’s very difficult to come to

grips with how we screwed this thing up. But we screwed this

thing up.’’ 27

B. THE COMMITTEE’S INVESTIGATION

The Committee began its investigation into Corporal Tillman’s

death in April 2007. On April 24, 2007, the Committee held a hearing during which it received testimony from two members of Corporal Tillman’s family, an Army Ranger who was an eyewitness to

Corporal Tillman’s death, the acting Department of Defense Inspector General, and the commander of the Army Criminal Investigation Command.28 The Committee also took testimony from former

Private First Class Jessica Lynch, who described the misinformation surrounding her capture and rescue in Iraq in 2003.

Members of Corporal Tillman’s family and Private Lynch testified that government officials spread inaccurate accounts of what

happened to Corporal Tillman and Private Lynch on the battlefield.

They stated that these misleading narratives provided inspiring

stories of heroism for the American public, but they fundamentally

mischaracterized the two soldiers’ actual conduct and sacrifice.

Corporal Tillman’s brother Kevin Tillman, a former Army Ranger

who served together with his brother in Afghanistan, testified that

the story of Corporal Tillman’s death by enemy fire that spread in

the weeks after his death was ‘‘utter fiction,’’ and said he believed

it was intended to distract the public from the unsuccessful siege

of Fallujah, the emerging story of detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib,

and other bad news about the war.29 He stated:

In the days leading up to Pat’s memorial service, media accounts, based on information provided by the Army and

the White House, were wreathed in a patriotic glow and

became more dramatic in tone. A terrible tragedy that

might have further undermined support for the war in

Iraq was transformed into an inspirational message that

served instead to support the nation’s foreign policy wars

in Iraq and Afghanistan.30

Following the April 24, 2007, hearing, Chairman Waxman and

Ranking Member Davis decided that the Committee’s investigation

into Corporal Tillman’s fratricide would focus on the actions of officials at the top of the chain of command. Specifically, the Committee sought to determine when the President, senior White House

officials, the Secretary of Defense, and other top military leaders

learned that Corporal Tillman had been killed as a result of friendly fire and what they did upon learning this information. The Committee also posed questions regarding the dissemination of misleadVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:08 Sep 17, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00013 Fmt 6604 Sfmt 6604 C:\DOCS\69006.TXT KATIE PsN: KATIE
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31 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Hearing on the Tillman Fratricide: What the Leadership of the Defense Department Knew, 110th Cong. (Aug. 1, 2007) (Serial

No. 110–49). 32Letter from Henry A. Waxman, Chairman, House Committee on Oversight and Government

Reform, to Fred F. Fielding, Counsel to the President (April 27, 2007). 33Letter from Fred F. Fielding, Counsel to the President, to Henry A. Waxman, Chairman,

and Tom Davis, Ranking Minority Member, House Committee on Oversight and Government

Reform (Aug. 10, 2007). 34 No contemporaneous transcript was produced from the interview with Mr. McCormack, but

an unofficial transcript was created from an audio recording of the interview.

ing information pertaining to the capture and rescue of Private

Lynch.

The Committee held a second hearing on August 1, 2007, during

which it received testimony from former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld; former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Richard Myers; former commander of U.S. Central Command,

General John Abizaid; and former commander of U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM), General Bryan Brown, about their

knowledge of the circumstances of Corporal Tillman’s death.31

In the course of the Committee’s investigation, the Committee requested that the White House produce all documents received or

generated by any official in the Executive Office of the President

from April 22 until July 1, 2004, that related to Corporal Tillman.32 The Committee reviewed approximately 1,500 pages produced in response to this request. The documents produced to the

Committee included e-mail communications between senior White

House officials holding the title of ‘‘Assistant to the President.’’ According to the White House, the White House withheld from the

Committee only preliminary drafts of the speech President Bush

delivered at the White House Correspondents’ Dinner on May 1,

2004.33

The Committee also conducted nontranscribed interviews of

three former assistants to the President: former Director of Communications Dan Bartlett, former Press Secretary Scott McClellan,

and former Chief Speechwriter Michael Gerson. Because these officials indicated they had only a limited recall of the events in question, they were not called back for a transcribed interview or deposition. Transcribed interviews were conducted with four other

former White House officials: former Spokesman Taylor Gross,

former Director of Fact-checking John Currin, former National Security Council (NSC) Director of Communications Jim Wilkinson,

and former NSC Press Secretary Sean McCormack.34

The Committee reviewed over 31,000 documents produced by the

Department of Defense. The Committee conducted transcribed

interviews of six current or former general officers: General Bantz

Craddock, former senior military assistant to Secretary Rumsfeld;

Admiral Eric Olson, former deputy commander of U.S. Special Operations Command; Lieutenant General John Sattler, former director of operations at U.S. Central Command; Lieutenant General

James Lovelace, former Director of the Army Staff; Lieutenant

General (Retired) Philip Kensinger, former commander of U.S.

Army Special Operations Command (USASOC); and Brigadier General (Retired) Howard Yellen, former deputy commander at

USASOC. In addition, the Committee interviewed seven other officers and civilian officials from Secretary Rumsfeld’s office, the office of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and USASOC.

11

35 Ex-Player Tillman Likely in Danger Zone as an Army Ranger, Washington Times (Mar. 21,

2003). 36Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, Review of Matters Related to the Death

of Corporal Patrick Tillman, U.S. Army (Mar. 26, 2007) (IPO2007E001). 37 Id. 38 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Testimony of Kevin Tillman,

Hearing on Misleading Information from the Battlefield, 110th Cong., at 18 (Apr. 24, 2007) (Serial No. 110–54). 39 Id. at 30.

II. CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS RELATED TO CORPORAL

TILLMAN

A. THE MILITARY SERVICE OF CORPORAL PATRICK TILLMAN

Patrick Tillman, a defensive back for the Arizona Cardinals, and

his brother Kevin Tillman, a former professional baseball player,

enlisted in the United States Army in May 2002. Although the Tillman brothers refused to talk publicly about why they were joining

the Army, their enlistment was widely reported in the media. Their

father, Patrick Tillman, Sr., explained to one newspaper that his

sons did not want recognition ‘‘separate from their peers’’ because

they felt all the soldiers with whom they served deserved equal recognition.35

Both Pat and Kevin Tillman trained as elite Army Rangers and

were assigned to the A Company, 2nd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment, based in Fort Lewis, Washington. Their battalion did a tour

of duty in Iraq in 2003 and began a tour in Afghanistan in 2004.

At the beginning of this tour, both Pat and Kevin Tillman held the

rank of Specialist (E4).

On April 22, 2004, during operations in a rugged region of eastern Afghanistan, the Tillmans’ platoon was divided into two parts

(‘‘serials’’). Specialist Pat Tillman was a part of Serial 1, which proceeded towards the village of Manah, Afghanistan, through a narrow canyon. Specialist Kevin Tillman was a part of Serial 2, which

was supposed to take a different route, but ultimately changed

plans and followed Serial 1 along the same canyon road.36

During its passage through the canyon, Serial 2 came under attack. When the Rangers in Serial 1 heard the sounds of the ambush, they dismounted from their vehicles and took positions to assist Serial 2. As Serial 2 emerged from the canyon, several Rangers

riding in the lead vehicle opened fire on a nearby ridge, killing Specialist Pat Tillman and an Afghan soldier who had been conducting

operations with the platoon, and injuring two other Rangers, including the platoon leader. The Army posthumously awarded Tillman the Silver Star and promoted him to the rank of Corporal.37

As he testified at the Committee’s hearing on April 24, 2007,

Specialist Kevin Tillman did not witness the firefight that took his

brother’s life. He also testified that he was quickly flown back to

Bagram Air Base and later accompanied his brother’s remains back

to the United States.38 He told the Committee that during these

events, he was under the impression that his brother had been

killed by the enemy.39

B. INITIAL PENTAGON REACTIONS

On the morning of April 23, 2004, news of Corporal Tillman’s

death broke in the United States. Initial reports from a Defense

12

40Former NFL Player Killed in Afghanistan, Associated Press (Apr. 23, 2004); U.S. Military

Says NFL Player Killed in Afghanistan Exemplified All Soldiers’ Patriotism, Associated Press

(Apr. 24, 2004). 41 E-mail from David Compton, Office of the Army Chief Public Affairs, to numerous addressees (Apr. 25, 2004). 42 Id. 43 E-mail from Lieutenant Commander Jane Campbell, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, to Major Kristen Carle, Office of the Army Chief for Public Affairs (Apr.

23, 2004). (Reporting that Corporal Tillman’s death ‘‘was a topic of the discussion at the front

office this morning and CJCS PA [Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Public Affairs] is also

involved.’’). 44 E-mail from Lawrence Di Rita, Office of the Secretary of Defense, to Jeanie Mamo, Director

of White House Media Affairs (Apr. 23, 2004). 45 Id. 46 E-mail from Lawrence Di Rita, Office of the Secretary of Defense, to Bryan Whitman, Office

of the Secretary of Defense (Apr. 23, 2004). 47 Id.

Department spokesman in Afghanistan indicated that a U.S. soldier, identified later that day as Corporal Tillman, had ‘‘died after

a firefight with anti-coalition militia forces about 25 miles southwest of a U.S. base at Khost, which has been the scene of frequent

attacks.’’ 40

On April 23, 2004, and in the following days, thousands of stories, commentaries, and tributes to Corporal Tillman appeared in

newspapers, television, and the Internet. An internal ‘‘Weekend

Media Assessment’’ produced by the Army Chief of Staff’s Office of

Public Affairs on Monday April 25, 2004, reported that the story

of Corporal Tillman’s death had helped generate the most media

interest in the U.S. Army ‘‘since the end of active combat last

year.’’ 41 The report also noted that ‘‘The Ranger Tillman story had

been extremely positive in all media.’’ 42

E-mails reviewed by the Committee also show that the news of

Corporal Tillman’s death was discussed by public affairs officials in

the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and

the Army on April 23, 2004, potentially including a ‘‘front office’’

morning meeting led by Secretary Rumsfeld’s public affairs chief,

Mr. Larry Di Rita.43

Although Mr. Di Rita told Committee staff he could not recall

any particular discussions he had about Corporal Tillman’s death

on April 23, 2004, documents produced by the Department of Defense show that Mr. Di Rita sent two e-mails that day related to

Corporal Tillman. In the first of these e-mails, Mr. Di Rita responded to a request from the White House Media Affairs Director,

who was seeking information about Corporal Tillman for a Sports

Illustrated reporter.44 Mr. Di Rita responded that he would ‘‘see

what we can do. details are sketchy just now.’’ 45

In the second e-mail, Mr. Di Rita responded to a Department of

Defense aide who had drafted a statement for the Department of

Defense to use to respond to press inquiries.46 Mr. Di Rita edited

the proposed statement and sent it back to the aide. His revised

version stated, ‘‘[o]ur thoughts and prayers go out to the family of

Army Sgt Pat Tillman,’’ and noted, ‘‘[w]e mourn the death of every

servicemember who makes the ultimate sacrifice in the Global War

on Terror.’’ 47

The same day, April 23, a memo was prepared by the Army

Human Resources Command for the Army Deputy Chief of Staff

G–1, Lieutenant General Franklin Hagenbeck. This executive summary (‘‘EXSUM’’) document explained that Corporal Tillman’s casVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:08 Sep 17, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00016 Fmt 6604 Sfmt 6604 C:\DOCS\69006.TXT KATIE PsN: KATIE
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48Shari Lawrence, Army Human Resources Command, ‘‘EXSUM’’ Document (Apr. 23, 2004). 49 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Testimony of U.S. Army Specialist

Bryan O’Neal, Hearing on Misleading Information from the Battlefield, 110th Cong., at 94 (Apr.

24, 2007) (Serial No. 110–54); Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, Review of

Matters Related to the Death of Corporal Patrick Tillman, U.S. Army, at 13 (Mar. 26, 2007)

(IPO2007E001). 50 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Testimony of Thomas Gimble, Acting Defense Department Inspector General, Hearing on Misleading Information from the Battlefield, 110th Cong. (Apr. 24, 2007) (Serial No. 110–54). 51Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, Interview of Lieutenant General Stanley

McChrystal, at 3 (Nov. 26, 2006). 52Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, Interview of General Bryan Brown, at

5 (Nov. 17, 2006). 53 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of Brigadier General

Howard Yellen (Retired), at 39 (July 25, 2007).

ualty ‘‘was a high-profile death because SPC Tillman was a member of the Arizona Cardinals and SPC Kevin Tillman was a former

minor league baseball prospect in the Cleveland Indians organization when they enlisted together for three years.’’ 48 The summary

said that in accordance with the Army’s policy of holding casualty

information for 24 hours after the soldier’s family has been notified, the Army would not officially announce Corporal Tillman’s

death until 11 p.m. that night.

C. EARLY REPORTS OF FRIENDLY FIRE

As the Tillman family and the American public absorbed the

news that Corporal Tillman had been killed in Afghanistan, apparently by enemy forces, suspicions that he had actually been killed

by friendly fire quickly traveled through the Department of Defense. But while military officials at the highest levels knew within

a matter of days that Corporal Tillman’s death was a likely fratricide, they did not share this information with the Tillman family

or the public for another month.

Members of Corporal Tillman’s platoon knew almost immediately

he had been killed by his fellow Rangers.49 Moreover, within 24

hours, the top officers in Corporal Tillman’s battalion and regiment, Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey Bailey and Colonel Craig Nixon,

also knew about the suspicions of friendly fire and had authorized

the first Army Regulation 15–6 investigation into the circumstances of his death.50

Within several days, Colonel Nixon, the commander of the 75th

Ranger Regiment, transmitted the information that Corporal Tillman may have been killed as a result of fratricide to Major General

Stanley McChrystal, the commander of the joint task force in Afghanistan under which Corporal Tillman’s battalion was operating.51 General McChrystal subsequently called General Bryan

Brown, the top officer at the U.S. Special Operations Command,

the combatant command under which Corporal Tillman’s battalion

operated in Afghanistan.52

Colonel Nixon also informed Brigadier General Howard Yellen,

the deputy commander of the Army Special Operations Command,

the Army administrative command responsible for the 75th Ranger

Regiment. According to General Yellen, on April 24 or April 25,

2004, he informed his commander, Lieutenant General Philip

Kensinger, of the potential fratricide.53

A few days later, on April 29, 2004, General McChrystal sent a

message to the top generals in Corporal Tillman’s chain of comVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:08 Sep 17, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00017 Fmt 6604 Sfmt 6604 C:\DOCS\69006.TXT KATIE PsN: KATIE
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54 ‘‘Personal For’’ message from Major General Stanley McChrystal to General John Abizaid,

General Bryan Brown, Lieutenant General Philip Kensinger (Apr. 29, 2004). 55Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, Interview of Lieutenant General Stanley

McChrystal (Nov. 26, 2006). 56 ‘‘Personal For’’ message from Major General Stanley McChrystal to General John Abizaid,

General Bryan Brown, Lieutenant General Philip Kensinger (Apr. 29, 2004). 57 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Testimony of General John

Abizaid, Hearing on the Tillman Fratricide: What the Leadership of the Defense Department

Knew, 110th Cong., at 190 (Aug. 1, 2007) (Serial No. 110–49). 58 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Testimony of General Richard

Myers, Hearing on the Tillman Fratricide: What the Leadership of the Defense Department

Knew, 110th Cong., at 190 (Aug. 1, 2007) (Serial No. 110–49). 59 ‘‘Personal For’’ message from Major General Stanley McChrystal to General John Abizaid,

General Bryan Brown, Lieutenant General Philip Kensinger (Apr. 29, 2004). 60 E-mail from Carol Darby, Media and Community Relations Division Chief, U.S. Army Special Operations Command, to Lieutenant Colonel Hans Bush, Chief of Public Affairs, U.S. Army

Special Operations Command (Apr. 28, 2004).

mand alerting them that the first 15–6 investigation was nearing

completion and would find that ‘‘it is highly possible that Corporal

Tillman was killed by friendly fire.’’ 54 According to General

McChrystal, Colonel Nixon assisted him in preparing the message.55

The principal addressee of this communication was General John

Abizaid, commander of CENTCOM, the geographic combatant command that includes Iraq and Afghanistan. The message was also

sent to two recipients for ‘‘information’’ purposes. These recipients

were General Brown, the SOCOM commander, and General

Kensinger, the commander of USASOC.56

General McChrystal sent this communication as a ‘‘personal for’’

or P4 message, a format flag rank officers reserve for sensitive,

‘‘for-your-eyes-only’’ information. Such a communication, according

to General Abizaid, is ‘‘designed to pass information that’s considered very, very important.’’ 57 According to General Myers, information in a P4 is ‘‘supposed to be pretty close hold.’’ 58

General McChrystal’s P4 message stated:

Sir, in the aftermath of Corporal Patrick Tillman’s untimely yet heroic death in Afghanistan on 22 April 04, it

is anticipated that a 15–6 investigation nearing completion

will find that it is highly possible that Corporal Tillman

was killed by friendly fire. This potential is exacerbated by

the unconfirmed but suspected reports that POTUS [President of the United States] and the Secretary of the Army

might include comments about Corporal Tillman’s heroism

and his approved Silver Star medal in speeeches [sic] currently being prepared, not knowing the specifics surrounding his death. . . .

I felt that it was essential that you received this information as soon as we detected it in order to preclude any unknowing statements by our country’s leaders which might

cause public embarrassment if the circumstances of Corporal Tillman’s death become public.59

The day before General McChrystal sent this P4 message,

speechwriting staff from both the Department of Defense and the

White House had contacted a public affairs official at USASOC,

Carol Darby, seeking information about Corporal Tillman’s enlistment, rank, previous duty assignments, and reason for enlisting.60

White House staffer John Currin informed the USASOC official he

15

61 Id. 62 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of Admiral Eric T.

Olson, at 60 (July 27, 2007). 63 Id. at 61. 64 Army Regulation 600–8–22 § 3–10(b) (2006). 65Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, Review of Matters Related to the Death

of Corporal Patrick Tillman, U.S. Army, at 53 (Mar. 2007) (IPO2007E001). 66Silver Star Award Citation for Corporal Patrick D. Tillman, United States Army (undated). 67Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, Review of Matters Related to the Death

of Corporal Patrick Tillman, U.S. Army, at 55 (Mar. 2007) (IPO2007E001). 68 U.S. Army Special Operations Command, Army Awards Silver Star to Fallen Ranger (Apr.

30, 2004). 69 Id.

was seeking this information for a speech President Bush would

deliver at the May 1, 2004, White House Correspondents’ Dinner.61

Admiral Eric T. Olson, the deputy commander of SOCOM in

April 2004, told the Committee that the point at which General

McChrystal sent the P4 would have been the appropriate time to

tell the Tillman family about the possibility of fratricide. According

to Admiral Olson, ‘‘as soon as there is solid indication of the cause

of death, that should be communicated to the family.’’ 62 Admiral

Olson said he did not see the P4 when it was sent in April 2004,

but he told the Committee that the information in the P4 was sufficiently certain to share with the family before the memorial service. His ‘‘after-the-fact’’ reflection was:

But now having seen the contents of that P4, during which

General McChrystal said it’s highly probably there was

fratricide, and that P4 was released before the memorial

service, it would have been reasonable to expect that the

family was informed of the possibility of fratricide.63

D. THE SILVER STAR AWARD AND CORPORAL TILLMAN’S MEMORIAL

SERVICE

On April 29, 2004, the same day General McChrystal sent his P4

message, the Army posthumously awarded Corporal Tillman the

Silver Star, an honor reserved for Army soldiers who have demonstrated ‘‘gallantry in action against an enemy of the United

States.’’ 64 Prior to the award’s approval by the acting Army Secretary on April 29, 2004, several officers in Corporal Tillman’s regiment who were aware of the possibility of friendly fire, including

the regimental commander, Colonel Nixon, reviewed and edited the

Silver Star award.65 Yet the final Silver Star citation asserted that

Corporal Tillman ‘‘put himself in the line of devastating enemy

fire.’’ 66 Both of the eyewitness statements submitted with the Silver Star paperwork were altered by somebody within the 75th

Regiment’s chain of command.67

On April 30, 2004, the same day General McChrystal’s P4 message reached USASOC headquarters, USASOC issued a press release announcing the Silver Star award. The release stated that

Corporal Tillman was being awarded the Silver Star ‘‘for his selfless actions after his Ranger element was ambushed by anti-coalition insurgents during a ground assault convoy through southeastern Afghanistan.’’ 68 The release also referred to ‘‘hostile fires directed at the Rangers’’ and stated that Corporal Tillman ‘‘was shot

and killed while focusing his efforts on the elimination of the

enemy forces and the protection of his team members.’’ 69

16

70 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of Brigadier General

Howard Yellen, at 69 (July 25, 2007). 71 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of Lieutenant General

Philip Kensinger, Jr. (Retired), at 54 (Feb. 29, 2008). 72 Id. 73 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Hearing on Misleading Information from the Battlefield, 110th Cong., at 110 (Apr. 24, 2007) (Serial No. 110–54). 74 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Testimony of Senior Chief Petty

Officer Stephen White, Hearing on Misleading Information from the Battlefield, 110th Cong., at

111 (Apr. 24, 2007) (Serial No. 110–54). 75 U.S. Army Special Operations Command, Press Statement: USASOC Announces Tillman Investigation Results (May 29, 2004) (online at news.soc.mil/advisories/Press-Media%20Releases/

2004/040529–01.htm). 76 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of Scott McClellan

(Sept. 10, 2007).

According to Brigadier General Howard Yellen, USASOC’s deputy commander in April 2004, the release did not explicitly say how

Corporal Tillman was killed, but ‘‘for the civilian on the street, the

interpretation would be that he was killed by enemy fire.’’ 70 When

interviewed by the Committee, General Kensinger said he did not

recall reviewing the release, but ‘‘possibly could have.’’ 71 He agreed

that ‘‘a member of the public reading this probably would have concluded or assumed that Corporal Tillman had been killed by the

enemy.’’ 72

Three days after this Army press release, on May 3, 2004, a memorial service was held for Corporal Tillman in San Jose, California. During the ceremony, Senior Chief Petty Officer Steven White,

a personal friend of Corporal Tillman and a Navy SEAL, gave a eulogy in which he described the circumstances of Corporal Tillman’s

death using language that suggested he was killed by enemy

forces.73 According to Senior Chief White, a member of the 75th

Regiment had read him portions of the Silver Star citation that

morning, and he based his speech on this information. Testifying

before the Committee in April 2007, Senior Chief White said he felt

‘‘let down’’ by the military because he was given inaccurate information to present publicly. He told the Committee: ‘‘I’m the guy

that told America how he died, basically, at that memorial, and it

was incorrect. That does not sit well with me.’’ 74

E. THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE FRATRICIDE

The information that Corporal Tillman had likely been killed by

friendly fire was not shared with the American public until the

morning of May 29, 2004. On that day, the Saturday of the Memorial Day weekend, Lieutenant General Philip Kensinger appeared

at a press availability at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, the headquarters of the Army’s Special Operations Command, and announced that an Army investigation had concluded that ‘‘Corporal

Tillman probably died as a result of friendly fire while his unit was

engaged in combat with enemy forces.’’ 75

General Kensinger’s statement was the only public statement

issued by any Department of Defense or White House official acknowledging that Corporal Tillman had not been killed by the

enemy, as the American public had believed for more than a

month. When he was asked why the White House played no role

in the public fratricide announcement, former White House Press

Secretary Scott McClellan told Committee staff, ‘‘We would leave

that to the proper department, and that would be DOD.’’ 76 White

17

77 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of Daniel Bartlett (Sept.

12, 2007). 78 Id. 79See, e.g., E-mail from Colonel George Rhynedance, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, to Bryan Whitman, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (May 29, 2004) (‘‘No one will ever tell you, but nice job on this one. May have minimized . . . damage by pushing the panic button early.’’). 80Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, Review of Matters Related to the Death

of Corporal Patrick Tillman, U.S. Army, at 29 (Mar. 2007) (IPO2007E001). 81 U.S. Central Command, Report of Fratricide Investigation, at 11 (May 28, 2004). 82 Id.; House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of General John F.

Sattler, at 50 (July 24, 2007). 83 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of General John F.

Sattler, at 46 (July 24, 2007). 84 Id.

House Communications Director Dan Bartlett, asked why the

White House issued a statement after Corporal Tillman died but

not after the fratricide was announced, explained these events

‘‘were fundamentally different things.’’ 77 According to Mr. Bartlett,

media interest in a presidential statement about the fratricide ‘‘was

not there.’’ 78

Evidence reviewed by the Committee suggests that one reason

the Department of Defense publicly released this information on

May 29, 2004, was because the Tillman family had already begun

learning about the friendly fire and because the media was about

to report it.79 In the days before this announcement, the Department of Defense scrambled to release the information in a way that

would cause the least amount of public relations damage to the Department.

The second Army 15–6 investigation into Corporal Tillman’s

death was substantially completed by May 16, 2004.80 The conclusion of this investigation, authored by Lieutenant Colonel Ralph

Kauzlarich, was that ‘‘Corporal Tillman’s death was the result of

fratricide during an extremely chaotic enemy ambush.’’ 81 Over the

next two weeks, the report moved upward through the regiment’s

chain of command. On Friday, May 28, 2004, CENTCOM’s director

of operations, Lieutenant General John F. Sattler, signed off on the

report on behalf of General Abizaid, the CENTCOM commander.82

General Sattler told the Committee that during this period, General Abizaid called him at CENTCOM headquarters in Qatar and

asked him to review Colonel Kauzlarich’s investigation. General

Sattler recalled that General Abizaid told him reviewing the report

was a top priority, ‘‘so whatever I thought was my number one priority no longer was.’’ 83 General Sattler concurred with its findings.84

Although officials told the Committee that the military was waiting for the investigation to be signed before notifying the family,

the record shows that two Tillman family members were actually

informed of the friendly fire before May 28, 2004. Earlier in the

week, the 2nd Battalion of the 75th Ranger Regiment had returned

to its headquarters in Fort Lewis, Washington, where Specialist

Kevin Tillman encountered the members of his platoon for the first

time since his brother’s death. Fearing that Kevin Tillman would

hear about the friendly fire from his fellow soldiers, the 2nd Battalion’s commander, Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey Bailey, was authorized to disclose the information to Kevin Tillman and Corporal TillVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:08 Sep 17, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00021 Fmt 6604 Sfmt 6604 C:\DOCS\69006.TXT KATIE PsN: KATIE
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85Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, Interview of Colonel James Craig Nixon,

at 121 (Oct. 28, 2006). 86 Id. 87Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, Review of Matters Related to the Death

of Corporal Patrick Tillman, U.S. Army, at 44 (Mar. 2007) (IPO2007E001). 88 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of Colonel Hans Bush

(Sept. 19, 2007). 89 Id.; House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of Admiral Eric T.

Olson (July 27, 2007). 90 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of Lawrence Di Rita,

at 69 (Sept. 24, 2007). 91 Id. at 63. 92 Id. 93General Bryan Brown, Response to Questions from BG Jones (Dec. 9, 2004) (‘‘[W]e initially

told Mr. DiRita that OSD PA should make the announcement. They determined it should be

man’s wife, Marie Tillman.85 According to Colonel Nixon, the commander of the 75th Ranger regiment, Colonel Bailey asked for this

authorization after he determined that ‘‘Kevin was getting some

sense of what was going on.’’ 86 The Department of Defense Inspector General concluded that Kevin and Marie Tillman were informed of the friendly fire on May 26 and May 27, 2004, respectively.87

At the same time General Sattler was reviewing the report, other

high-level Pentagon officials began preparing for public release of

the finding of fratricide. On May 28, Larry Di Rita, the Assistant

Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, and General Brown, the

SOCOM commander, coordinated a video teleconference to plan the

public announcement of the fratricide.88 According to various interviews conducted by the Committee, the video teleconference included Mr. Di Rita, General Brown, Admiral Olson, General

Kensinger, CENTCOM chief of staff Major General Steve

Whitcomb, various public affairs officials, and at least one lawyer.89

Mr. Di Rita told Committee staff that he recognized at the time

that this was a ‘‘very important public event’’ 90 He recalled that

that he was ‘‘brought in to it, on the basis of my professional responsibilities, which was to help with the public affairs posture on

this incident.’’ 91 While military public affairs officers were planning to release the fratricide information in a ‘‘passive’’ posture, in

which the Department would only respond to press queries, Mr. Di

Rita decided to adopt an ‘‘active approach’’ and hold a press conference to release the information. Describing the teleconference,

Mr. Di Rita explained:

I spent time working with the responsible offices . . . deciding that it was something that probably required some

public interaction, as distinct from an announcement. I

seem to recall that we discussed the importance of this,

the fact that it was fairly large news, that what everybody

believed to be true was no longer the case, no longer true,

and that it required more of a public presentation than a

simple announcement, particularly inasmuch as this thing

had been concluded late in the week, or at least they were

prepared to announce it late in a week, and I thought it

was important.92

According to Admiral Olson and General Brown, during the teleconference, General Brown suggested that Mr. Di Rita make the

announcement since it was such a high-profile matter.93 Mr. Di

19

a uniformed member of the chain of command. The logical choice was LTG Kensinger. I

agreed.’’). 94 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of Lawrence Di Rita,

at 67 (Sept. 24, 2007). 95 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of Admiral Eric T.

Olson, at 40 (July 27, 2007). 96 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of Colonel Hans Bush,

at 57 (Sept. 19, 2007). 97 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of Lieutenant General

Philip Kensinger, Jr. (Retired), at 63 (Feb. 29, 2008). 98 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of Colonel Hans Bush,

at 57 (Sept. 19, 2007). 99 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of Lieutenant General

Philip Kensinger, Jr. (Retired), at 64 (Feb. 29, 2008). 100 E-mail from Bryan Whitman, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, to Colonel Joseph Curtin, Office of the Chief Public Affairs (May 28, 2004).

Rita apparently decided that his ‘‘responsibilities’’ for managing the

announcement did not extend to actually making the announcement. He told the Committee, ‘‘a public affairs officer, to me, was

not the answer.’’ 94

Admiral Olson described the following discussion:

As I recall, General Brown suggested that the Public Affairs Office for the Secretary of Defense be the one to make

the announcement as a defense matter. Larry Di Rita

thought it was more appropriate for a uniformed officer to

make the announcement. Then the question was who is

the appropriate uniformed officer. It is not a SOCOM responsibility, it was an Army responsibility. Because General Kensinger had an Army chain of command outside of

SOCOM, the discussion just sort of circled in on General

Kensinger as the appropriate officer.95

Another teleconference participant also recalled that Mr. Di Rita

recommended that General Kensinger make the public announcement. Colonel Hans Bush, who was the head of USASOC’s public

affairs office at the time, recalled, ‘‘General Brown acknowledged

the recommendation and then said, General Kensinger, you meet

the criteria. Congratulations, you’re the guy.’’ 96 When Committee

staff asked General Kensinger if he considered this a direct order

by General Brown to make the announcement, he responded, ‘‘Not

in so many words. . . . You can be directed to do it, or you can be

highly encouraged to think that is the right decision.’’ 97

General Kensinger explained that because he was unfamiliar

with the details of the investigation, he did not believe he was the

appropriate person to deliver the news. Colonel Bush, the USASOC

public affairs chief, described General Kensinger’s reaction: ‘‘It was

a little odd to be presenting someone else’s findings, and I think

he felt that way.’’ 98 Because the friendly fire investigation had

been conducted and approved by CENTCOM, General Kensinger

told the Committee he thought ‘‘it would have been CENTCOM or

somebody else would have made it, above CENTCOM.’’ 99 He stated

that he acquiesced to the assignment only after he was told he

would not have to answer any questions from the media.

At the press conference at Fort Bragg on May 29, 2004, General

Kensinger read a prepared statement approved by CENTCOM and

the Secretary of Defense’s public affairs office.100 The statement asserted that ‘‘investigation results indicate that Corporal Tillman

20

101 U.S. Army Special Operations Command, Press Statement: USASOC Announces Tillman

Investigation Results (May 29, 2004) (online at news.soc.mil/advisories/Press-Media%20Releases/

2004/040529–01.htm). 102 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of Colonel Hans Bush,

at 57 (Sept. 19, 2007). 103 U.S. Central Command, Report of Fratricide Investigation (May 28, 2004). 104 E-mail from Colonel George Rhynedance, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for

Public Affairs, to Bryan Whitman, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs

(May 29, 2004). 105 E-mail from Colonel Joseph Curtin, Office of the Chief Public Affairs to multiple recipients

(May 29, 2004). 106 E-mail from Lieutenant Colonel John Robinson to multiple recipients (May 29, 2004).

probably died as the result of friendly fire.’’ 101 According to Colonel

Bush, ‘‘It was specifically requested by CENTCOM that we include

‘probably’ in that sentence.’’ 102 However, this language differed

from the investigative report itself, which stated, ‘‘My findings lead

me to believe that CPL Tillman’s death was the result of fratricide.’’ 103 The report was not made public at that time.

After the press conference, Pentagon public affairs officials congratulated each other for limiting the impact of the disclosure.

Colonel George Rhynedance, an assistant to Mr. Di Rita in the Secretary of Defense’s public affairs office, wrote to Bryan Whitman,

another employee in the same office: ‘‘No one will ever tell you, but

nice job on this one. May have minimized . . . damage by pushing

the panic button early.’’ 104

In another e-mail on the day of the announcement, Colonel Joseph Curtin, an Army public affairs officials, wrote, ‘‘Story will run

hot today and diminish over the weekend.’’ He also noted, ‘‘Senior

leaders want to make sure the public affairs community vigorously

respond to any media query that potentially questions the Silver

Star award.’’ 105 In response, Lieutenant Colonel John Robinson, a

CENTCOM public affairs official, wrote ‘‘the WWII Memorial and

attack in Saudi Arabia have helped dilute the story somewhat.’’ 106

III. THE WHITE HOUSE RESPONSE

Testimony and e-mails obtained by the Committee show that

White House officials were intensely interested in the news of Pat

Tillman’s death. On April 23, the White House rushed out a press

statement acknowledging Corporal Tillman’s death twelve hours

before the Department of Defense publicly confirmed the casualty.

This early statement was issued notwithstanding a military rule

intended to protect military families from media attention during

the first 24 hours after learning about a casualty. A week later, on

May 1, 2004, President Bush gave a speech discussing Corporal

Tillman’s military service. Yet when the Committee inquired into

how and when White House officials learned Corporal’s death was

a fratricide, the White House provided no responsive e-mails, and

each of the former officials interviewed by Committee staff professed to have no recollection.

A. NEWS BREAKS AT WHITE HOUSE

There was intense interest in the news of Corporal Tillman’s

death at the White House as the story broke in the press on the

morning of April 23, 2004. Documents and interviews with White

House officials show that as White House staff members learned

the news from cable television and other media sources, they quickVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:08 Sep 17, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00024 Fmt 6604 Sfmt 6604 C:\DOCS\69006.TXT KATIE PsN: KATIE
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107 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of Daniel Bartlett

(Sept. 12, 2007). 108 Id. 109 E-mail from Barry Jackson, Deputy to the President’s Senior Advisor, to Karl Rove, Senior

Advisor to the President (Apr. 23, 2004). 110 E-mail from Matthew Scully, Deputy Director of Presidential Speechwriting, to Michael

Gerson, Assistant to the President for Speechwriting (Apr. 23, 2004). 111 E-mail from Jennie M. Koch, Executive Assistant to the National Security Advisor, to

Gregory Schulte, Executive Secretary, National Security Council (Apr. 23, 2004). 112 E-mail from Matthew Dowd, Chief Strategist, 2004 George W. Bush presidential campaign,

to Daniel Bartlett, Assistant to the President for Communications (Apr. 23, 2004). 113 E-mail from Mark McKinnon, Chief Media Advisor, 2004 George W. Bush presidential

campaign to Daniel Bartlett, Assistant to the President for Communications (Apr. 23, 2004). 114 E-mail from Peggy Noonan to Peter Wehner, White House Director of Strategic Initiatives

(Apr. 23, 2004). 115 E-mail from Ron Fournier to Karl Rove, Senior Advisor to the President (Apr. 23, 2004).

ly shared and discussed it with their colleagues and friends. According to former White House Communications Director Dan Bartlett, he discussed Corporal Tillman’s death directly with President

Bush. Mr. Bartlett told Committee staff that he ‘‘had conversations

with the President about this news event.’’ 107 Although Mr. Bartlett claimed he could not recall what was said, he told Committee

staff that he ‘‘likely’’ discussed with the President the ‘‘appropriate

response’’ for the White House to take.108

Barry Jackson, a deputy to President Bush’s political adviser

Karl Rove, sent Mr. Rove language for a potential presidential tribute to Pat Tillman.109 Speechwriter Matthew Scully wrote an email to fellow speechwriter Michael Gerson highlighting Corporal

Tillman’s death as a ‘‘big story.’’ 110 Condoleezza Rice, then National Security Advisor, was informed of Corporal Tillman’s death

by her executive assistant, Army Major Jennie Koch Easterly.111

Several high-level staff members of President Bush’s reelection

campaign contacted White House officials to suggest public responses to Corporal Tillman’s death. Matthew Dowd, the campaign’s chief strategist, sent an e-mail to Mr. Bartlett, writing,

‘‘You hear about pat tilman? Potus should call his family or go to

Arizona or his hometown.’’ 112

Mark McKinnon, the campaign’s media advisor, also e-mailed

Mr. Bartlett, saying: ‘‘Realize President really shouldn’t do anything that he hasn’t done for any other soldier killed in the military, but certainly think he could say something about he exemplifies the ultimate in humility, heroism and sacrifice.’’ 113

Commentators and reporters contacted the White House to offer

advice. For example, Wall Street Journal columnist Peggy Noonan

e-mailed the White House’s Director of Strategic Initiatives, Peter

Wehner, recommending that he ‘‘find out what faith Tillman practiced and have the president go by that church and light a candle

or say a prayer.’’ 114 Karl Rove exchanged e-mails about Pat Tillman with Associated Press reporter Ron Fournier, under the subject line ‘‘H-E-R-O.’’ In response to Mr. Fournier’s e-mail, Mr. Rove

asked, ‘‘How does our country continue to produce men and women

like this,’’ to which Mr. Fournier replied, ‘‘The Lord creates men

and women like this all over the world. But only the great and free

countries allow them to flourish. Keep up the fight.’’ 115

In total, the White House staff sent or received nearly 200 emails relating to Corporal Tillman’s death on April 23, 2004.

22

116 Although various e-mails reviewed by the Committee referred to this as a ‘‘statement’’ or

a ‘‘comment,’’ Mr. Gross explained that he had technically written a ‘‘response to an inquiry,’’

rather than a ‘‘presidential statement’’ because it was released only in reply to particular queries. House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of Taylor Gross, at 61

(Sept. 5, 2007). Other White House officials also told the Committee that they saw a distinction

between Mr. Gross’s ‘‘response to questions’’ and a more formal, proactive ‘‘presidential statement.’’ White House officials were unhappy with news coverage of Mr. Gross’s April 23 comment, possibly because the press referred to it is as a ‘‘statement’’ from the White House. See

E-mail from Scott McClellan, White House Press Secretary, to Suzy DeFrancis, Deputy Assistant to the President for Communications (Apr. 23, 2004). 117 E-mail from Taylor Gross, White House spokesman, to Daniel Bartlett, Assistant to the

President for Communications (Apr. 23, 2004). 118 E-mail from Daniel Bartlett, Assistant to the President for Communications, to Scott

McClellan, White House Press Secretary (Apr. 23, 2004). 119 E-mail from Daniel Bartlett, Assistant to the President for Communications, to Taylor

Gross, White House spokesman (Apr. 23, 2004). 120 Id. 121 E-mail from Daniel Bartlett, Assistant to the President for Communications, to Matthew

Dowd, Chief Strategist, 2004 George W. Bush presidential campaign (Apr. 23, 2004).

B. STATEMENT ISSUED PREMATURELY

At approximately noon on April 23, 2004, the White House

issued a statement of condolence from the President. Before releasing this statement, White House officials failed to confirm with the

Defense Department that Corporal Tillman had actually died. They

also failed to determine whether information about the casualty,

which occurred during a special operations mission, was classified.

Moreover, the White House rushed to release its statement notwithstanding a military requirement intended to protect military

families from media attention during the first 24 hours after a casualty.

Taylor Gross, the White House spokesman responsible for media

outlets in the South and Southwestern United States, told Committee staff that he drafted a White House statement on the morning

of April 23 after receiving several calls from Arizona media outlets.116 He sent the draft to Communications Director Dan Bartlett

and Press Secretary Scott McClellan for approval at 11:40 a.m. The

statement read:

Pat Tillman was an inspiration on the football field and in

his private life. As with all who made the ultimate sacrifice in the war on terror, his family are in the thoughts

and prayers of President and Mrs. Bush.117

Minutes later, both Mr. Bartlett and Mr. McClellan approved the

message on behalf of the President. Mr. Bartlett noted that the

statement might ‘‘set a precedent,’’ but wrote ‘‘I’m fine with it.’’ 118

He later clarified: ‘‘good to go.’’ 119 Speaking to Committee staff,

Mr. Bartlett explained that he made this decision due to the high

level of media interest in the story. According to Mr. Bartlett, the

story of Pat Tillman ‘‘made the American people feel good about

our country . . . and our military.’’ 120

Mr. Bartlett’s response to Matthew Dowd’s April 23, 2004, email, which suggested that the President visit Corporal Tillman’s

family, offers additional insight into the White House’s approach to

the reports. He wrote:

I agree he is a hero. But there will be a lot of pressure not

to single out one guy just because he was a football player.

We are providing a statement to AZ press, but we will

need to discuss anything further.121

23

122 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of Daniel Bartlett

(Sept. 12, 2007). 123 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of Taylor Gross, at 67

(Sept. 5, 2007). 124 Id. at 42. 125 Id. at 52. 126 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of Scott McClellan

(Sept. 10, 2007). 127 Id. 128 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of Daniel Bartlett

(Sept. 12, 2007). 129 Id. 130 Id.

When Committee staff asked Mr. Bartlett whether there were

further discussions within the White House about responding to

Corporal Tillman’s death, Mr. Bartlett said he thought it was likely

there were discussions, but he did not have any specific recollection

of them.122

Although Mr. Gross’s statement was approved by President

Bush’s top communications advisors, it appears that no one in the

White House confirmed with the military whether Corporal Tillman had actually died. The White House also did not confirm with

the military that it could talk publicly about Corporal Tillman,

whose regiment regularly participated in sensitive missions. According to Mr. Gross, ‘‘by and large things are confirmed by the

White House before they’re stated,’’ whether in ‘‘a reactive statement or a proactive statement.’’ 123 But Mr. Gross told Committee

staff that he drafted this statement quickly (‘‘about a two-hour

turnaround time’’), without consulting the Defense Department.124

Mr. Gross stated:

I personally did not verify with DOD, but I got my statement approved via my normal chain of commend. . . . You

know, again, frankly, confirming—confirming that was—

you know, that’s above my pay grade. That was for a superior.125

Mr. Gross’s superiors did not verify the statement either. Mr.

McClellan told Committee staff that ‘‘the way it usually was done

was, you know, you confirm he was killed.’’ 126 But Mr. McClellan

asserted that confirmation of these facts was not his job, and that

he did not attempt to verify the statement before approving it for

release. He also did not check whether information relating to Corporal Tillman’s death was classified, explaining, ‘‘It was obvious. It

was in the news.’’ 127

Likewise, Mr. Bartlett said, ‘‘I did not take any formal steps’’ to

confirm the information.128 Nevertheless, he ‘‘personally was under

the impression that this was true’’ based on the ‘‘totality of information coming from the media.’’ 129 Mr. Bartlett also denied that

confirming the accuracy of a presidential statement was his job. He

explained: ‘‘Generally my conversations with DOD were at a much

higher level.’’ 130

If White House officials had checked with the Department of Defense, they would have learned that the Department had not yet

publicly announced Corporal Tillman’s death. In accordance with a

policy intended to give the families of war casualties a 24-hour private grieving period, the Defense Department did not announce the

24

131Department of Defense, Instruction Number 1300.18 (2008). 132Pub. L. 108–136. 133 U.S. House of Representatives, Conference Report to Accompany H.R. 1588 (Report 108–

354), at 695 (Nov. 7, 2003). Representative Walter B. Jones, the original sponsor of the act, explained that some military families ‘‘had little time to grieve’’ because they were forced to ‘‘fend

off aggressive press inquiries’’ in the hours after a loved one’s death. A 24-hour delay on publicity, he said, ‘‘would not unreasonably impair the public’s access to information about military

activities, but could provide an immeasurable amount of relief to those who have endured the

loss.’’ Statement of Representative Walter B. Jones, Congressional Record, E889 (May 7, 2003). 134 E-mail from Claire Buchan, Deputy White House Press Secretary, to Trent Duffy, Deputy

White House Press Secretary, and Scott McClellan, White House Press Secretary (Apr. 23,

2004). 135 Id. 136 E-mail from Claire Buchan, Deputy White House Press Secretary, to Sean McCormack,

NSC Press Secretary (Apr. 23, 2004). Mr. McCormack told the Committee he had no recollection

of the events described in this e-mail. 137 E-mail from Scott McClellan, White House Press Secretary, to Suzy DeFrancis, Deputy Assistant to the President for Communications (Apr. 23, 2004). 138 E-mail from Noam Neusner, Special Assistant to the President for Economic Speech Writing, to Erin Healy, Assistant White House Press Secretary (Apr. 23, 2004).

casualty until late that evening.131 This 24-hour policy was mandated by an act of Congress, the Military Family Peace of Mind

Act, which President Bush signed into law in November 2003 as

part of the Fiscal Year 2004 National Defense Authorization Act.132

The act sought to ‘‘provide service members’ next-of-kin with a period of privacy before the public is made aware of service members’

death.’’ 133 In the case of Corporal Tillman, the family was not notified until approximately 10:00 p.m. on April 22.

An hour after the White House released its statement, deputy

press secretary Claire Buchan learned that DOD was not yet confirming Corporal Tillman’s death. She sent an e-mail to Scott

McClellan and Trent Duffy, another deputy press secretary, with

the subject line ‘‘alert—do not use tillman statement.’’ 134 The email stated, ‘‘dod is not confirming that he is dead—next of kin still

being notified. unfortunately taylor’s statement is on the wire.’’ 135

Later in the afternoon, Ms. Buchan e-mailed National Security

Council spokesman Sean McCormack and asked him to ‘‘bug your

friend at DOD’’ about the Tillman casualty announcement. Mr.

McCormack quickly wrote back that DOD was ‘‘not confirming yet.

this will soon become a problem.’’ 136 Later that night, Scott

McClellan concurred, writing, ‘‘Media affairs commented when

asked for reaction from arizona press. They did not check to verify

if it had been confirmed.’’ 137

Noam Neusner, a speechwriter for President Bush, criticized the

hastily issued comment as it was reported in the press, noting that

it inappropriately equated Corporal Tillman’s football career with

his military service. In an e-mail obtained by the Committee, he

wrote:

That statement, as quoted, was ridiculous. Pat Tillman

wasn’t a hero on the football field. He played football. But

he died for his country. We shouldn’t try to tie the two

things together—he didn’t.138

C. DISCUSSION OF CORPORAL TILLMAN IN PRESIDENTIAL SPEECH

On May 1, 2004, President Bush delivered a speech during the

annual White House Correspondents’ Dinner. The President devoted a significant portion of the speech to a discussion of Corporal

Tillman. According to Dan Bartlett, ‘‘We made a strategic decision

25

139 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of Daniel Bartlett

(Sept. 12, 2007). 140 E-mail from Lee Bockhorn, White House Research Assistant, to Michael Gerson, Assistant

to the President for Speechwriting (Apr. 27, 2004). 141President George W. Bush, Remarks at White House Correspondents’ Dinner (May 1, 2004). 142 E-mail from John Currin, White House Director of Fact-Checking, to Michael Gerson, Matthew Scully, and John McConnell, White House Speechwriters (Apr. 28, 2004).

to pay tribute to the troops’’ during the 2004 speech because the

White House ‘‘got singed pretty bad’’ for a previous speech in which

the President’s jokes were considered inappropriate during wartime.139

Documents reviewed by the Committee show that White House

officials had decided to include Corporal Tillman in the Correspondents’ Dinner speech by April 27, 2004. On that day, White

House Research Assistant Lee Bockhorn e-mailed White House

speechwriter, Michael Gerson, a number of press clippings in response to Mr. Gerson’s request for the ‘‘’most moving’’ stuff on Tillman, particularly anything he said.’’ 140

In his speech, the President spoke about the sacrifices of military

personnel, singling out Corporal Tillman’s service. He said:

The loss of Army Corporal Pat Tillman last week in Afghanistan brought home the sorrow that comes with every

loss and reminds us of the character of the men and

women who serve on our behalf. Friends say that this

young man saw the images of September the 11th, and

seeing that evil, he felt called to defend America. He set

aside a career in athletics and many things the world

counts important, wealth and security and the acclaim of

the crowds. He chose, instead, the rigors of Ranger training and the fellowship of soldiers and the hard duty in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Corporal Tillman asked for no special attention. He was

modest because he knew there were many like him, making their own sacrifices. They fill the ranks of the Armed

Forces. Every day, somewhere, they do brave and good

things without notice. Their courage is usually seen only

by their comrades, by those who long to be free, and by the

enemy. They’re willing to give up their lives, and when one

is lost, a whole world of hopes and possibilities is lost with

them.141

One sentence in this passage—‘‘Friends say that this young man

saw the images of September the 11th, and seeing that evil, he felt

called to defend America’’—was the subject of extensive discussions

during the speechwriting process. Although the White House did

not give Committee staff access to the earlier drafts of the President’s speech, it appears from e-mails that in at least one of the

earlier drafts, this sentence read, ‘‘Pat Tillman saw the burning

towers on television and felt called to fight the evil behind it.’’ 142

White House e-mails reviewed by the Committee show that John

Currin, the White House Director of Fact-Checking, quickly discovered that he could not find any substantiation for the statement

that Corporal Tillman had enlisted after he ‘‘saw the burning towers on television.’’ When Mr. Currin asked White House speechVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:08 Sep 17, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00029 Fmt 6604 Sfmt 6604 C:\DOCS\69006.TXT KATIE PsN: KATIE
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143 E-mail from Matthew Scully, deputy director of Presidential Speechwriting, to John

Currin, White House Director of Fact-Checking (Apr. 28, 2004). 144 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of Carol Darby, at 39

(Sept. 18, 2007). 145 E-mail from John Currin, White House Director of Fact-Checking, to Matthew Scully, deputy director of Presidential Speechwriting (Apr. 28, 2004).

writer Matthew Scully about the source of this statement, Mr.

Scully responded: ‘‘Should be in news accounts.’’ 143

In an effort to confirm this statement, Mr. Currin contacted

Carol Darby, a public affairs officer at U.S. Army Special Operations Command, to ask whether she could confirm why Pat and

Kevin Tillman had joined the Army. According to Ms. Darby, she

told him:

No, that I could not, that I had never talked to either of

the brothers and I had never seen anything in print of any

sort that stated why they joined the Army. But I had seen

press reports where Pat’s coach had spoke of something

along those lines, but it really didn’t give exactly why Pat

joined the Army. And he asked if I could send him some

of those press reports and I did have those.144

After speaking with Ms. Darby and receiving her faxed articles

discussing Corporal Tillman’s enlistment, Mr. Currin urged the

speechwriting team to change or remove text claiming that Corporal Tillman joined the Army as a result of the attacks of September 11. On April 28, 2004, he wrote to speechwriter Matthew

Scully:

My DoD contact, who checked with the Rangers, confirm

that he never gave any media interview or discussed the

reason why he left the NFL to join the Rangers. . . .

[G]iven that he never spoke to the press about his reasons

for joining the Rangers, we simply do not have support for

the statement that he decided to join the Rangers after

seeing the burning towers on television.145

Two hours later, Mr. Currin e-mailed Michael Gerson, the chief

White House speechwriter:

There is no direct support for the statement that Pat Tillman saw the burning towers on television and felt called

to fight the evil behind it. Tillman and his brother never

discussed their reasons with the press, nor have their parents. Tillman kept his reasons to himself. The people at

Fort Lewis, the base for Tillman’s unit, could not confirm

that September 11 was the reason why Tillman joined the

Army. All that I and Carol Darby at USASOC (Ft. Lewis)

could find is mention in a news article from March 2003

that says that ‘‘friends say the brothers were deeply affected by the September 11 terrorist attacks and felt compelled to enlist.’’ We do not know if these friends were

speculating about Tillman’s reasons or if they had direct

knowledge of Tillman’s reasons. The bottom line is that

Tillman never stated publicly his reasons for joining the

27

146 E-mail from John Currin, White House Director of Fact-Checking, to Michael Gerson, Matthew Scully, and John McConnell, White House Speechwriters (Apr. 28, 2004). 147 E-mail from John Currin, White House Director of Fact-Checking, to Michael Gerson, Matthew Scully, and John McConnell, White House Speechwriters (Apr. 29, 2004).

Rangers, and it is speculation that he did so because of

September 11.146

Mr. Currin thought the issue was important enough that he sent

a third message to the speechwriters on the following day, April 29.

In this e-mail, he wrote that Ms. Darby of USASOC had offered to

call the Tillman family on his behalf, but Mr. Currin advised

against it. He wrote:

As I mentioned yesterday, Pat Tillman and his family

never spoke about the reasons why he chose to leave the

NFL and join the Army, and the statement in the remarks

for the correspondence dinner attributing his motivation to

seeing the burning towers on 9/11 is speculation. I spoke

yesterday with Carol Darby at Ft. Lewis (the base for the

Rangers) to check on Tillman’s correct rank and see if she

could verify Tillman’s reasons for joining the Rangers.

Carol phoned me just now to ask if we wanted to go

through the CACO [casualty assistance officer] assigned to

the Tillman family and see if they would want to talk to

us about Corporal Tillman’s reasons for joining the Army.

I am not certain if we would want to approach the family

in their time of grief (they will receive Corporal Tillman’s

remains today), or if you can work around the problem of

not knowing as fact the reasons that motivated Tillman to

join the Army. Let me know if you want me to go through

the Tillman family CACO to see if the family will let us

know his reasons. My sense, however, is that because Tillman wanted to keep his reasons private, and because his

family continues to respect his wish to this day, we should

as well, and work as best we can around the speculation.147

Yet the final draft, approved and read by the President, retained

the admittedly ‘‘speculative’’ statement about Corporal Tillman’s

motivation for enlisting. Rather than remove the passage, the

speechwriters attributed it to unknown ‘‘friends.’’

D. KNOWLEDGE OF FRATRICIDE

The record before the Committee does not explain when and how

White House officials learned that Corporal Tillman’s death was

due to fratricide. Although the Committee requested from the

White House all documents related to Corporal Tillman, none of

the documents produced discussed the fratricide. Moreover, none of

the White House officials interviewed by Committee staff had any

recollection of how they learned of the fratricide or what they did

in response.

As discussed in part II, on April 29, 2004, General McChrystal

sent a P4 message to the commanding general at CENTCOM, and

sent information copies to the commanders of SOCOM and

USASOC, urging that they inform the President of the likely fratricide. The P4 cited ‘‘unconfirmed but suspected reports that

28

148 ‘‘Personal For’’ message from Major General Stanley McChrystal to General John Abizaid,

General Bryan Brown, and Lieutenant General Philip Kensinger (Apr. 29, 2004). 149 Although the acting Defense Department Inspector General, Thomas Gimble, testified that

his office ‘‘think[s] the P4 memo stopped with the three generals that were on it,’’ the IG did

not interview Secretary Rumsfeld, General Myers, or any White House officials during its investigation. House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Testimony of Thomas Gimble,

Acting Defense Department Inspector General, Hearing on Misleading Information from the Battlefield, 110th Cong. (Apr. 24, 2007) (Serial No. 110–54). 150 10 U.S.C. 151(b). 151 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Testimony of General Richard

Myers, Hearing on the Tillman Fratricide: What the Leadership of the Defense Department

Knew, 110th Cong., at 34 (Aug. 1, 2007) (Serial No. 110–49). 152 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of Daniel Bartlett

(Sept. 12, 2007). 153 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of Scott McClellan

(Sept. 10, 2007).

POTUS [the President of the United States] and the Secretary of

the Army might include comments about Corporal Tillman’s heroism and his approved Silver Star medal in speeeches [sic] currently

being prepared’’ and stressed that it was ‘‘essential’’ that the P4 recipients were immediately informed about the fratricide ‘‘to preclude any unknowing statements by our country’s leaders which

might cause public embarrassment if the circumstances of Corporal

Tillman’s death become public.’’ 148

Two days after the P4 memo was sent, President Bush gave his

speech at the White House Correspondents’ Dinner. As the P4 advised, the President did not discuss how Corporal Tillman died.

None of the documents provided to the Committee indicate whether

the P4 or the information in the P4 reached the White House.149

General Richard Myers, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff, was by statute the ‘‘principal military advisor to the President.’’ 150 Although he knew at the end of April that Corporal Tillman was likely killed by friendly fire, he told the Committee that

he could not remember ‘‘ever having a discussion with anybody in

the White House about the Tillman case, one way or another.’’ 151

The former White House officials interviewed by the Committee

also provided no details about how they, or the President, learned

of the fratricide. Committee staff interviewed seven White House

employees, including the President’s communications director,

press secretary, chief speechwriter, and top NSC communications

officials. None could recall when they learned the death of Corporal

Tillman was under investigation as a possible fratricide, or what

they did in response.

Dan Bartlett, White House communications director in 2004, told

the Committee he did not have a ‘‘specific recollection’’ as to when

he learned of the friendly fire. Asked whether he informed the

President of the fratricide, he stated, ‘‘I don’t remember a particular conversation, but I can’t rule out that I talked to him about

it.’’ 152

Scott McClellan, the White House Press Secretary in 2004, said

he did not remember when he or the President learned about the

fratricide, but stated that he ‘‘maybe’’ could have heard about the

fratricide just before the public release on May 29, 2004.153

Michael Gerson, former chief White House speechwriter, did not

recall when he learned about the friendly fire, whether he knew

about the fratricide while preparing the President’s CorrespondVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:08 Sep 17, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00032 Fmt 6604 Sfmt 6604 C:\DOCS\69006.TXT KATIE PsN: KATIE
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154 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of Michael Gerson

(Sept. 11, 2007). 155 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of Taylor Gross, at 102

(Sept. 5, 2007). 156White House, President Bush Discusses American Competitiveness Initiative During Press

Conference (Aug. 9, 2007). 157Memorandum from Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, to Tom White, Secretary of the

Army (June 25, 2002). 158Letter from Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, to William H. Layer (June 26, 2002). 159Letter from Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, to Mr. Pat Tillman (June 28, 2002).

ents’ Dinner speech, or whether he ever discussed the fratricide

with the President.154

Taylor Gross, former White House spokesman, told Committee

staff, ‘‘after the 23rd of April, I did not have any official conversation with anyone that I can recall regarding this matter on an official or informal basis.’’ He said, ‘‘after that date, my only information that I recall having about Pat Tillman’s death or anything to

do with Pat Tillman’s death, friendly fire or otherwise, was reading

in the news reports.’’ 155

President Bush was asked directly by a reporter in August 2007

when he learned that Corporal Tillman was killed by friendly fire.

He said he did not remember. He explained: ‘‘I can’t give you the

precise moment. But obviously the minute I heard that the facts

that people believed were true were not true, that I expect there

to be a full investigation and get to the bottom of it.’’ 156

IV. SECRETARY RUMSFELD’S RESPONSE

Evidence obtained by the Committee shows that Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld took a personal interest in Pat Tillman’s

enlistment in the Army Rangers. Evidence also establishes that

after Corporal Tillman was killed, senior military officials who reported directly to Secretary Rumsfeld, including the Chairman of

the Joint Chiefs and several combatant commanders, became

aware of the fratricide. Yet when Secretary Rumsfeld testified before the Committee in August 2007, he stated he had no recollection of how or when he learned of the fratricide and no recollection

of what he did in response.

On June 25, 2002, about a month after Pat Tillman enlisted in

the Army, Secretary Rumsfeld wrote a so-called ‘‘snowflake memo’’

to the Secretary of the Army with the subject line, ‘‘Pat Tillman.’’

The memo attached a Chicago Tribune newspaper account about

Mr. Tillman’s enlistment and read, ‘‘Here is an article on a fellow

who is apparently joining the Rangers. He sound[s] like he is

world-class. We might want to keep our eye on him.’’ 157 Documents

produced to the Committee show that a friend living in the Chicago

area had initially brought the Tribune article to Secretary Rumsfeld’s attention.158 Three days later, on June 28, 2002, Secretary

Rumsfeld sent Mr. Tillman a personal letter applauding him for his

decision to enlist. He wrote, ‘‘I heard that you were leaving the National Football League to become an Army Ranger. It is a proud

and patriotic thing you are doing.’’ 159

When he was asked about the June 25 snowflake memo to Secretary White, Secretary Rumsfeld told the Committee he did not intend to ‘‘single out’’ Corporal Tillman for progress reports or other

special treatment. He said the purpose of his memo was to commuVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:08 Sep 17, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00033 Fmt 6604 Sfmt 6604 C:\DOCS\69006.TXT KATIE PsN: KATIE
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160 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Testimony of Donald Rumsfeld,

Hearing on the Tillman Fratricide: What the Leadership of the Defense Department Knew, 110th

Cong., at 203 (Aug. 1, 2007) (Serial No. 110–49). 161 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of Dr. Steven Bucci,

at 26 (Sept. 20, 2007). 162 Id.; House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of General Bantz

J. Craddock, at 18 (July 27, 2007). 163 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of Lawrence Di Rita,

at 41 (Sept. 24, 2007). 164 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Testimony of Donald Rumsfeld,

Hearing on the Tillman Fratricide: What the Leadership of the Defense Department Knew, 110th

Cong., at 35 (Aug. 1, 2007) (Serial No. 110–49).

nicate that, ‘‘here is an individual who is serving his country and

is prominent and gave up a good deal to do that; and that we, as

people in the Department, ought to acknowledge that and be grateful for his service, as I was.’’ 160

Colonel Steven Bucci, Secretary Rumsfeld’s military assistant at

the time, recalled that Mr. Tillman’s enlistment was a major event

that caught the attention of Secretary Rumsfeld. He told the Committee, ‘‘it was all over the newspapers. It was sort of a big event

for everybody.’’ 161 Both Colonel Bucci and Lieutenant General

Bantz J. Craddock, former senior military assistant to Secretary

Rumsfeld, told the Committee this was the only time they could recall Secretary Rumsfeld writing personal notes praising the enlistment of an individual soldier.162

Larry Di Rita, who was serving as Special Assistant to the Secretary in June 2002, had a similar recollection of why Secretary

Rumsfeld took a personal interest in Pat Tillman’s enlistment. Mr.

Di Rita told Committee staff that he did not remember being involved in the drafting of Secretary Rumsfeld’s June 25 snowflake

memo or June 28 letter, but he generally remembered the attention

Corporal Tillman’s enlistment received within the Secretary’s office. He told the Committee:

This was a noteworthy event in the country. It had to do

with the Department for which he [Secretary Rumsfeld]

had oversight responsibility and control. . . . [T]his was

less than a year after 9/11. So there was still a great deal

of interest in what was happening with respect to the

Armed Forces. . . . [I]t was a very unusual circumstance,

a football player leaving the NFL to join the Army. I don’t

recall that it had happened to anybody else while we were

serving. So the nature of that kind of event is not surprising to me that the Secretary would have chosen to single

it out.163

In his testimony before the Committee, Secretary Rumsfeld said

he could not recall when he learned about the fratricide or who told

him. He told the Committee:

I don’t recall when I was told and I don’t recall who told

me. But my recollection is that it was at a stage when

there were investigations under way, in which case I

would not have told anybody to go do something with respect to it. . . . And it was not something that I would inject myself into the normal course of my role as secretary

of defense.164

31

165 Id. at 177. 166 Id. at 178. 167 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Testimony of General John

Abizaid, Hearing on the Tillman Fratricide: What the Leadership of the Defense Department

Knew, 110th Cong., at 32 (Aug. 1, 2007) (Serial No. 110–49). 168Letter from Donald Rumsfeld to Henry A. Waxman, Chairman, and Tom Davis, Ranking

Minority Member, House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform (July 26, 2007). 169 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of Dr. Steven Bucci,

at 26 (Sept. 20, 2007). 170 Id. at 32.

When he was asked how he could not have known that Corporal

Tillman’s death was being investigated as a fratricide, Secretary

Rumsfeld responded: ‘‘You’re talking about an institution of something like 3 million people: active duty, Reserve, Guard, civilians,

contractors. . . . It’s not possible for someone to know all the

things that are going on.’’ 165 Furthermore, Secretary Rumsfeld told

the Committee, ‘‘I know that I would not engage in a cover-up. I

know that no one in the White House suggested such a thing to

me.’’ 166

The Committee received conflicting evidence about when Secretary Rumsfeld learned about the fratricide. General Abizaid, the

CENTCOM commander, recalled informing Secretary Rumsfeld

‘‘that there was an investigation that was ongoing and it looked

like it was friendly fire’’ between May 18 and May 20, 2004, more

than a week prior to the public announcement.167

But Secretary Rumsfeld informed the Committee that his military assistant, Colonel Steven Bucci, recalled that Secretary Rumsfeld did not learn about the fratricide until after May 20. In a letter to the Committee, Secretary Rumsfeld wrote:

I am told that I received word of this development sometime after May 20, 2004, but my recollection reflects the

fact that it occurred well over two years ago. As a result,

I do not recall when I first learned about the possibility

that Corporal Tillman’s death might have resulted from

fratricide. I am confident that I did not discuss this matter

with anyone outside the Department of Defense.168

The Committee interviewed Colonel Bucci, who returned to the

Secretary’s personal office on Monday, May 24, 2004, after a sixmonth temporary assignment to the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq. Sometime during that week, he said he received a call

from the Army Chief of Staff’s executive assistant or the Secretary

of the Army’s military assistant. His colleague told him, ‘‘We’re

pretty sure that this may have actually been a fratricide event, and

you need to let the Secretary know.’’ 169 Colonel Bucci’s colleague

also told him officials were ‘‘trying to ascertain exactly which caliber weapon had killed him [Corporal Tillman] and trying to check

that against the weapon that his brother was carrying,’’ in order

to eliminate any possibility that Corporal Tillman had been killed

by his brother, Specialist Kevin Tillman.170

Colonel Bucci stated that he shared this information with Secretary Rumsfeld within fifteen minutes, at one of the Secretary’s

daily ‘‘stand up’’ staff meetings. He told the Committee:

I said, ‘‘Sir, you know, I have bad news. The Army thinks

and they are pretty sure that this was actually a fratricide.’’ And he said, ‘‘Oh, gosh, that’s a shame. Well, they

32

171 Id. 172 Id. at 34. 173 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of General Bantz J.

Craddock, at 19 (July 27, 2007). 174 Id. at 27. 175 Id. at 17. 176 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of General Bantz J.

Craddock, at 28 (July 27, 2007). 177 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of Lieutenant General

James Lovelace, at 20 (July 31, 2007).

need to settle it and get the word out as quickly as possible.’’ And it was clear to me from his reaction and the reaction of General Craddock and the others that that was

the first time anyone had heard anything about it being a

fratricide.171

When asked to further explain his observation that the people in

the meeting appeared to be hearing the fratricide news for the first

time, Colonel Bucci explained:

We tend in the military to not be particularly happy when

there’s fratricide of any sort. You know, it’s enough of a

tragedy when you lose soldiers to the enemy. When you

lose them because your own guys did something, you

know, made a mistake, it’s particularly tragic. So, yeah,

everybody’s response to me said this was the first time

they were hearing about that aspect of it.172

When the Committee interviewed Secretary Rumsfeld’s senior

military assistant, General Bantz J. Craddock, he did not recall

this conversation. Instead, he recalled that he first heard about the

suspected fratricide ‘‘over the fence at my quarters one weekend’’

from his colleague and neighbor at Fort Myer, Lieutenant General

James Lovelace, who at that time was Director of the Army

Staff.173 General Craddock told the Committee:

As I said, I recall at sometime—and it would have been on

a weekend. I don’t recall when. My neighbor, Jim Lovelace,

indicated it was a possibility, that it was a concern that it

might have been a fratricide and it was, like I was, ‘‘you’re

kidding.’’ 174

General Craddock told the Committee that he could not recall

ever talking to Secretary Rumsfeld about Corporal Tillman.175 He

stated that he was ‘‘surprised and taken aback’’ to hear the news

of the fratricide, but he never raised the issue with Secretary

Rumsfeld, General Myers, or the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs

of Staff.176 General Lovelace told the Committee that he did not recall the ‘‘over the fence’’ conversation with General Craddock. He

also told the Committee that, based on a review of his e-mails, he

believed he learned about Corporal Tillman’s fratricide on May 27,

2007, two days before the public announcement.177

V. GENERAL MYERS’S RESPONSE

General Richard Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in

2004, testified before the Committee on August 1, 2007. As Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Myers was the highest-ranking officer in the military and the ‘‘principal military adviser to the

33

178 10 U.S.C. 151(b); although the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is not in the chain

of command between combatant commanders and the Secretary of Defense, the Goldwater-Nickles Act allows the Chairman to act as a conduit for communications between the combatant commanders and the Secretary, 10 U.S.C. 163(a). 179 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of General Bantz J.

Craddock, at 34 (July 27, 2007). 180 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Testimony of Donald Rumsfeld,

Hearing on the Tillman Fratricide: What the Leadership of the Defense Department Knew, 110th

Cong., at 34 (Aug. 1, 2007) (Serial No. 110–49). 181 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Testimony of General Richard

Myers, Hearing on the Tillman Fratricide: What the Leadership of the Defense Department

Knew, 110th Cong., at 32 (Aug. 1, 2007) (Serial No. 110–49). 182 Id. 183 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Testimony of General John

Abizaid, Hearing on the Tillman Fratricide: What the Leadership of the Defense Department

Knew, 110th Cong., at 31 (Aug. 1, 2007) (Serial No. 110–49). 184 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of General John F.

Sattler, at 41 (July 24, 2007).

President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense.’’ 178 In that role, he communicated many times a day with

Secretary Rumsfeld, including attending a daily ‘‘roundtable’’ meeting in Secretary Rumsfeld’s office.179 Moreover, according to Secretary Rumsfeld, he and General Myers also ‘‘met with the White

House frequently.’’ 180

When General Myers testified before the Committee on August

1, 2007, he confirmed that he learned about the friendly fire suspicions only days after Corporal Tillman died. He testified: ‘‘I knew

right at the end of April, that there was a possibility of fratricide

in the Corporal Tillman death, and that General McChrystal had

started an investigation.’’ 181 General Myers did not recall how he

learned of the investigation, but thought he might have heard it

from the operations office within the Joint Chiefs of Staff.182

General Myers’s early knowledge of the fratricide was confirmed

by General Abizaid, commander of CENTCOM. General Abizaid

testified that he called General Myers after receiving the P4 message on or after May 6, 2004, but found that General Myers was

already aware of the situation:

I called the chairman, I told the chairman about having received General McChrystal’s message that friendly fire

was involved. . . . And it was my impression from having

talked to the chairman at the time that he knew about

it.183

According to Lieutenant General Sattler, General Abizaid’s top

operations officer at CENTCOM, General Abizaid likely called General Myers with the understanding that the Chairman would pass

the information in the P4 message on to Secretary Rumsfeld. General Sattler stated:

I’m sure that General Abizaid’s goal would have been to let

the Secretary know immediately as in his chain of command. And there’s obviously two different ways. One is

point to point; the other one is through his confidant and

advisor, the Chairman. So, yes, I would be very surprised

if General Abizaid did not know, one way or the other, the

Secretary was going to be informed immediately.184

General Myers could not recall whether he informed the Secretary of Defense or the President about the fratricide. General

Myers acknowledged in his testimony that it would have been ‘‘logVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:08 Sep 17, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00037 Fmt 6604 Sfmt 6604 C:\DOCS\69006.TXT KATIE PsN: KATIE
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185 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Testimony of General Richard

Myers, Hearing on the Tillman Fratricide: What the Leadership of the Defense Department

Knew, 110th Cong., at 223 (Aug. 1, 2007) (Serial No. 110–49). 186 Id. 187 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Testimony of General Richard

Myers, Hearing on the Tillman Fratricide: What the Leadership of the Defense Department

Knew, 110th Cong., at 33 (Aug. 1, 2007) (Serial No. 110–49). 188 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of Rear Admiral Frank

Thorp, IV, at 26 (Sept. 19, 2007). 189 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Testimony of General Richard

Myers, Hearing on the Tillman Fratricide: What the Leadership of the Defense Department

Knew, 110th Cong., at 197 (Aug. 1, 2007) (Serial No. 110–49). 190 Id. at 219.

ical’’ for him to share the news with the Secretary of Defense, but

said ‘‘I just don’t recall whether I did it or not’’ and ‘‘I don’t have

any documentation that says I did.’’ 185 General Myers also testified

that he could not recall ‘‘ever having a discussion with anybody in

the White House about the Tillman case, one way or another.’’ 186

Shortly after learning of the possibility of a fratricide, General

Myers had a conversation with his top public affairs official, thenCaptain Frank Thorp, about how to discuss the circumstances of

Corporal Tillman’s death. He told the Committee:

[I]n working with my former public affairs adviser, I said,

you know, ‘‘We need to keep this in mind in case we go before the press. We’ve just got to calibrate ourselves. With

this investigation ongoing, we want to be careful how we

portray the situation.’’ . . . I do remember talking to him

about the potential of fratricide and just say we’ve got to

be cautious here, . . . if we make any comments.187

When the Committee interviewed now-Admiral Thorp, he had a

similar recollection of the encounter:

He pulled me aside, as I recall, pulled me in his office and

gave me a heads—I don’t remember his exact words, but

I do remember him saying, giving me a heads up that he

has heard it is possible fratricide and advising me to make

sure that I kept him honest and correct in his public remarks.188

General Myers told the Committee he was ‘‘cautious’’ when discussing Corporal Tillman’s death to avoid exerting ‘‘command influence’’ over those investigating the fratricide, even though General

Myers, as Joint Chiefs Chairman, was not technically in the chain

of command. He denied engaging in a cover-up of the friendly

fire.189

General Myers told the Committee that he took no steps to notify

the Tillman family or speak in public about the possibility of

friendly fire. He told the Committee that notifying the family

‘‘wouldn’t be our responsibility’’ at the Joint Chiefs because it is

done in ‘‘Army channels.’’ He said it would have been ‘‘absolutely

irresponsible of me to interfere with Army procedures, frankly.’’ 190

He further explained:

I mean, it sounds harsh, and it is harsh, but the reality

is there is a lot of things going on, and this—Corporal Tillman’s death was significant, but it wasn’t the kind of issue

that occupied a whole lot of time. . . . We were working

on the battle of Fallujah. We had a myriad of issues. Abu

35

191 Id. 192Shari Lawrence, Army Human Resources Command, ‘‘EXSUM’’ Document (Apr. 23, 2004). 193 Id. 194 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of Paul Tagliabue (May

27, 2008). 195General Abizaid blamed the delay in his receipt of the P4 on ‘‘a problem within my own

headquarters.’’ According to CENTCOM’s Director of Operations at the time, Lieutenant General John Sattler, ‘‘we had problems with our P4 system’’ while deployed outside of the continental United States that might have caused such a delay. House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of General John F. Sattler, at 33 (July 24, 2007). 196 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Testimony of General John

Abizaid, Hearing on the Tillman Fratricide: What the Leadership of the Defense Department

Knew, 110th Cong., at 31 (Aug. 1, 2007) (Serial No. 110–49). 197 Id. 198 Id. at 233.

Ghraib had just broke; we spent a lot of time in the media

with Abu Ghraib. There were a lot of issues taking our attention. I think it would have been irresponsible for the

chairman to get involved in what are Army matters.191

Although General Myers did not notify the Tillman family of the

possible friendly fire, he did notify the National Football League on

April 23 that Corporal Tillman had been killed.192 Greg Aiello, Vice

President for Public Relations for the NFL, told Army representatives that General Myers called NFL Commissioner Paul Tagliabue

on April 23, 2004, to notify him of the casualty.193 Mr. Tagliabue

confirmed to Committee staff that he received this call.194 At the

time General Myers made this call, Defense Department policy required that the Department refrain from public comment on the

death of a soldier until 24 hours after family notification.

VI. GENERAL ABIZAID’S RESPONSE

General John Abizaid, commanding general of CENTCOM, was

the military officer at the top of Corporal Tillman’s operational

chain of command and the main addressee on General

McChrystal’s P4 memo. General Abizaid testified before the Committee that he was traveling in Iraq and Afghanistan when the P4

memo was sent and that CENTCOM headquarters in Tampa, Florida failed to forward him the message in a timely way. As a result,

General Abizaid testified, he received the P4 message a week or

more after it was sent, probably around May 6, 2004.195

General Abizaid told the Committee that immediately after receiving the P4, he contacted General Myers, the Joint Chiefs Chairman, to notify him that Corporal Tillman’s death was a suspected

friendly fire. He stated, ‘‘[a]s soon as I saw the message . . . I

called the chairman; I told the chairman about it.’’ 196 General

Abizaid testified that when he called General Myers, ‘‘it was my

impression from having talked to the chairman at the time he

knew about it.’’ 197 General Abizaid also testified that in their conversation, he told General Myers he thought the ‘‘leadership’’

should know about the suspected fratricide, by which he meant

‘‘the secretary and the president.’’ 198

During his visit to Afghanistan in late April, General Abizaid

spoke with Corporal Tillman’s platoon leader, 1st Lieutenant David

Uthlaut, who had been injured in the same firefight in which Corporal Tillman was killed. In his April 30, 2004, press availability

in Qatar, General Abizaid made the following comment:

36

199Department of Defense, Gen. Abizaid Central Command Operations Update Briefing (Apr.

30, 2004) (online at www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2557). 200 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Testimony of General John

Abizaid, Hearing on the Tillman Fratricide: What the Leadership of the Defense Department

Knew, 110th Cong., at 31 (Aug. 1, 2007) (Serial No. 110–49). Then-Captain Uthlaut told the

DOD IG that he was unaware of the friendly fire for approximately 10 days while recuperating

after the firefight. Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, Interview of Captain

David Uthlaut, at 5 (July 29, 2006). 201Letter from General John Abizaid (Retired) to Chairman Henry Waxman and Ranking

Member Tom Davis, House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform (Jan. 15, 2008). 202 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Hearing on the Tillman Fratricide: What the Leadership of the Defense Department Knew, 110th Cong., at 32 (Aug. 1, 2007)

(Serial No. 110–49). 203Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, Interview of General John Abizaid, at

9 (Dec. 13, 2006).

I’d also like to say that while I was in Afghanistan yesterday I had the opportunity to talk to 1st Lieutenant Dave

Hutman [sic] of the 1st Ranger Battalion, of the Ranger

battalion—maybe I’ve got the wrong Ranger battalion that

he was with. He was the platoon leader of Pat Tillman. I

asked him yesterday how operations were going. I asked

him about Pat Tillman. He said, ‘‘Pat Tillman was a great

Ranger and a great soldier, and what more can I say about

him?’’ And I’d say that about every one of those young men

and women that are fighting, not only in Afghanistan but

in Iraq. I also probably bear some understanding that—

that lieutenant I was talking to happened to be a former

first captain of corps of cadets at West Point, and when he

was talking to me, he was still nursing a large number of

wounds that he sustained in that firefight where Pat Tillman lost his life.199

General Abizaid testified that Lieutenant Uthlaut ‘‘gave no indication that there was a friendly fire issue’’ during their conversation.200

In a written response to the Committee, General Abizaid said he

was not informed about the friendly fire suspicions before or during

this trip to Afghanistan. He also reiterated his testimony that he

did not know about the friendly fire before he reviewed General

McChrystal’s P4 message on about May 6, 2004.201

General Abizaid told the Committee that when he traveled to

Washington, DC, between May 18 and May 20, 2004, he informed

Secretary Rumsfeld ‘‘that there was an investigation that was ongoing and it looked like it was friendly fire.’’ 202 Yet when asked by

the Defense Department Inspector General whether he spoke with

the Secretary upon learning of the fratricide, General Abizaid stated, ‘‘No. I didn’t talk to the Secretary of Defense about it.’’ 203

VII. THE RESPONSE OF OTHER SENIOR MILITARY LEADERS

A. GENERAL BRYAN BROWN

General Bryan Brown, the SOCOM commander, told the Committee he received General McChrystal’s April 29, 2004, P4 memo,

but failed to inform his superiors or the Tillman family of the fratricide. According to General Brown:

When I got the P4, I made the assumption and probably

the bad assumption since I was an info addressee and not

the ‘‘to’’ that that information would flow through the norVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:08 Sep 17, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00040 Fmt 6604 Sfmt 6604 C:\DOCS\69006.TXT KATIE PsN: KATIE
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204 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Testimony of General Bryan

Brown, Hearing on the Tillman Fratricide: What the Leadership of the Defense Department

Knew, 110th Cong., at 218 (Aug. 1, 2007) (Serial No. 110–49). 205Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, Interview of General Bryan Brown, at

16 (Nov. 17, 2006). 206 Id. 207 Id. at 39. 208General Kensinger had been invited to attend the August 1, 2007, Committee hearing, but

refused, citing a ‘‘previously scheduled business matter.’’ E-mail from Charles Gittins, Attorney

for General Kensinger, to Majority Staff, House Oversight and Government Reform Committee

(July 22, 2007). A subpoena was issued to compel his appearance, but U.S. Marshals could not

locate General Kensinger prior to the hearing. Subpoena from Henry A. Waxman, Chairman,

House Oversight and Government Reform Committee, to Lieutenant General Philip Kensinger

(July 31, 2007). 209 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of Lieutenant General

Philip Kensinger, Jr. (Retired), at 24 (Feb. 29, 2008).

mal chain of command. It would have been very simple for

me to pick up the phone and call the chairman, I didn’t.

I did respond to the P4 back to General McChrystal but

quite frankly, I just made the assumption, a bad assumption now—I know that normal P4 traffic moves pretty

fast—that that would go to the chairman immediately. So

it’s unfortunate it was poorly handled and unfortunately

it’s the Tillman family that had to pay the price for it.204

General Brown told the Defense Department Inspector General

that he knew about the friendly fire suspicions even before receiving the memo because he received a phone call from General

McChrystal a few days earlier notifying him that the shooting was

a possible friendly fire and that an Army 15–6 investigation was

under way. He also said that he believed the Department of Defense should have notified the Tillman family of the investigation

as soon as it became aware of the information.205

According to General Brown, notifying the family was not his responsibility because he was a combatant commander.206 Nevertheless, General Brown told the Committee that when he learned the

notification had not taken place, more than a month after the

shooting, he initiated an effort to notify the Tillman family before

the public announcement on May 29, 2004.207

B. LIEUTENANT GENERAL PHILIP KENSINGER

Precisely how and when General Kensinger, the commanding

general of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC),

learned of the fratricide remains a subject of dispute. When the

Committee interviewed General Kensinger, he stated that he was

unaware of any suspicions of friendly fire when he attended Corporal Tillman’s memorial service in San Jose, California, on May

3, 2004. But his account is contradicted by the testimony of several

other officers, as well as by General Kensinger’s own prior statements, all of which suggest he learned about the possibility of

friendly fire prior to the May 3 memorial service. All the witnesses

agree, however, that General Kensinger made no effort to inform

the Tillman family of the fratricide until the end of May 2004.

When the Committee interviewed General Kensinger on February 29, 2008, he was asked when he first learned that Corporal

Tillman’s death may have been caused by friendly fire.208 General

Kensinger responded, ‘‘to the best that I remember, it was after the

memorial service when I got the P4.’’ 209 General Kensinger said he

38

210 Id. at 30. 211Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, Interview of Brigadier General Howard

Yellen, at 8 (Dec. 1, 2006). 212 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of Brigadier General

Howard Yellen (Retired), at 40 (July 25, 2007). 213 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of Lieutenant General

Philip Kensinger, Jr. (Retired), at 25 (Feb. 29, 2008). 214 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of Brigadier General

Howard Yellen (Retired), at 39 (July 25, 2007). 215 Id. at 62.

did not learn about suspicions of friendly fire until Colonel Clarence K.K. Chinn, the deputy commander of the 75th Ranger Regiment, told him about them after the memorial service. He also stated that he did not see General McChrystal’s P4 memo until after

he returned to Fort Bragg, North Carolina, after the service. He

told the Committee this recollection was based in part on his feeling that he would have been uncomfortable attending the memorial

service knowing about the friendly fire suspicions. He stated:

I mean I just have a hard time going back and trying to

rectify the dates. And that is why I said that it was after

the memorial service. Because I would have had a different feel—I just know myself. I would have had a different feeling at the memorial service if I had known about

this before going to the memorial service.210

General Kensinger’s statements are contradicted by the testimony of Brigadier General Howard Yellen, the deputy commander

of USASOC in April 2004. He told the Defense Department Inspector General that on April 24, the commander of the 75th Ranger

Regiment, Colonel Nixon, called and told him ‘‘I think we have a

possible fratricide.’’ 211 General Yellen told Committee staff he

shared this information with General Kensinger on the same day.

He stated: ‘‘I either went by and went into his office and told him,

or brought it up at a daily update.’’ 212 When asked about this conversation, General Kensinger told the Committee, ‘‘I don’t remember that.’’ 213

General Yellen also told the Committee that General Kensinger

‘‘[a]bsolutely’’ knew about the suspected fratricide prior to the memorial service on May 3.214 According to General Yellen, he had a

discussion with General Kensinger prior to the memorial about the

need to disclose to the Tillman family the possibility of fratricide.

General Yellen told the Committee:

I remember indicating that not saying anything might not

be to our best—bad news doesn’t get better with time. And

I remember General Kensinger saying the investigation is

not yet complete. . . . My recommendation was just to explain to the family that we have a suspicion that this may

have been friendly fire. We have a thorough investigation

currently ongoing and we are going to brief you just as

soon as that investigation is complete. We are going to

come out there and we’re going to lay all the facts on the

table for you and explain this, as we do for all of our 15–

6 collateral investigations. . . . I mean, this was not unusual in going out and briefing a family. In fact, General

Shinseki, when he was Chief of Staff, instituted that policy.215

39

216Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, Interview of Brigadier General Howard

Yellen, at 74 (Dec. 1, 2006). 217 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of Lieutenant General

Philip Kensinger (Retired), at 59 (Feb. 29, 2008). 218Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, Interview of Lieutenant Colonel David

Duffy, at 7 (Nov. 30, 2006). 219 Id. at 8. 220 Id. at 16. 221 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of Lieutenant General

Philip Kensinger (Retired), at 28 (Feb. 29, 2008). 222 Id.

According to General Yellen, General Kensinger did not support

sharing the information with the Tillman family before the investigation was complete. General Yellen summed up their disagreement in the following way: ‘‘He wanted to have a complete report.

And I, my approach is you don’t need the completed report.’’ 216 Although he did not recall specific conversations with General Yellen

about notifying the family of the fratricide investigation, General

Kensinger told the Committee he recalled believing ‘‘that until the

investigation was completed you didn’t notify the family.’’ 217

General Kensinger’s assertion to the Committee that he learned

about friendly fire suspicions after the May 3 memorial is also contradicted by another former member of General Kensinger’s staff,

Lieutenant Colonel David Duffy. Colonel Duffy told the Department of Defense Inspector General that he personally delivered

General McChrystal’s P4 message to General Kensinger on the

morning of April 30, 2004, three days before the memorial service.

Colonel Duffy stated:

Once I got it I hand carried it immediately up to GEN

Kensinger, the commander at the time. . . . I mean, I sat

down. He sat in on chair, I sat in the other and I handed

it to him.218

Colonel Duffy recalled that General Kensinger was concerned

about the P4 message, and warned him to avoid discussing it:

[H]e read it and, you know, was dismayed by the contents

obviously. And then basically looked me in the eye and

said if it leaked anywhere that, you know, it was on me.

. . . I do know that he said words to the effect of ‘‘Damn,

I wish they hadn’t have told me.’’ 219

Colonel Duffy noted that General Kensinger’s warning not to disclose the information in the P4 was not a routine occurrence:

That’s unusual. That the only time it ever happened. The

only time. . . . And I had a good relationship with GEN

Kensinger. But it was like, you know, ‘‘Hey if leaks out,

Duffy, you know, you’re dead,’’ or something.220

Although General Kensinger told Committee staff that he only

received P4s ‘‘very infrequently’’ and agreed that they tended to be

urgent messages, he said that he had no recollection that Colonel

Duffy, or anyone else, delivered the message from General

McChrystal.221 He had no explanation for the delay he says he experienced in receiving the P4, stating: ‘‘I can’t tell you why I didn’t

get it in a timely manner. I don’t know.’’ 222 According to his deputy, General Yellen, P4s were generally delivered promptly at

40

223 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of Brigadier General

Howard Yellen, at 47 (July 25, 2007). 224Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, Interview of Colonel Clarence Chinn,

at 26 (Nov. 7, 2006). 225 Brigadier General Mike Jones, Interview of Lieutenant General Philip Kensinger, Jr. (Nov.

29, 2004); Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, Interview of Lieutenant General

Philip Kensinger, Jr., at 6 (Dec. 8, 2006). 226 Brigadier General Mike Jones, Interview of Lieutenant General Philip Kensinger, Jr., at

3 (Nov. 29, 2004). 227 Army Regulation 600–34 § 3–7 (2003) (‘‘[W]ithin a reasonable period of time after family

members are notified of the death of a soldier, but not more than 30 days after the date of notification, the CAO [casualty assistance officer] . . . will ensure that the PNOK [primary next of

USASOC because ‘‘personnel understood the sensitivity and the expediency of those messages.’’ 223

General Kensinger’s account was also contradicted by a third officer, Colonel Clarence Chinn, the deputy commander of the 75th

Ranger Regiment in 2004. In an interview with the Defense Department Inspector General, Colonel Chinn disputed the idea that

he had informed General Kensinger of the ongoing fratricide investigation. He told investigators that sometime after the memorial

service, General Kensinger informed him that Corporal Tillman’s

death was a possible fratricide. Colonel Chinn stated that he was

certain of his recollection:

Oh, I am very clear. I, I am absolutely, one hundred percent positive he told me. . . . And the reason I am very

aware of that because I was not very happy about not

knowing and going to a memorial service for a soldier unaware that that is what happened.224

Finally, General Kensinger’s statements to the Committee are

contradicted by his own previous testimony to Army investigators

that he learned the information shortly before the May 3 memorial

service. On two separate occasions, he testified that he was told

about the friendly fire investigation by Lt. Colonel Chinn, who

picked him up at the airport before the memorial.225 When Army

investigators then asked him if there was ‘‘a conscious decision

made not to tell the family of that possibility,’’ General Kensinger

responded:

On that particular day, considering what I was told, the

answer is: Yes. You know, the decision was made not to—

first of all, we didn’t have enough information to say that

it was. And I think what we wanted to do is make sure

that we told them the right information. Again, that was

a memorial service. I didn’t think it was my responsibility

to go up to them and say, ‘‘Hey, you know, this is a possible friendly fire.’’ Again, I think that would just not be

the right thing to do personally. Again, I didn’t have any

information. Mine was all hearsay.226

Despite the conflicts in testimony relating to when General

Kensinger found out about the ongoing fratricide investigation, all

the witnesses agree that when he did find out, General Kensinger

chose not to tell the Tillman family. Instead, he waited until the

investigation had been completed at the end of May 2004. This

delay was not consistent with Army regulations, which required

the Army to notify the Tillman family that it was investigating

Corporal Tillman’s death as a possible fratricide.227

41

kin] and other family members . . . [a]re informed of the investigations, the names of the agencies conducting the investigations, and the existence of any reports by such agencies that have

or will be issued as a result of the investigations’’); Army Regulation 600–8–1 § 4–13(b) (1994)

(providing a script for notifying family members in cases of friendly fire, including, ‘‘His/her

death is the result of suspected friendly fire. An investigation is being conducted.’’). 228 U.S. Army, Attack on the 507th Maintenance Company, 23 March 2003, An Nasiriyah, Iraq

(undated) (online at www.army.mil/features/507thMaintCmpy/AttackOnThe507MaintCmpy.pdf). 229 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Testimony of Jessica Lynch,

Hearing on Misleading Information from the Battlefield, 110th Cong., at 22 (Apr. 24, 2007) (Serial No. 110–54). 230 U.S. Central Command Operational Update Briefing with Major General Victor Renuart,

CENTCOM Director of Operations (Apr. 5, 2003). 231 Id. 232 American Troops Rescue Iraq POW Lynch, Associated Press (Apr. 1, 2003). 233 Id.

VIII. THE RESPONSE TO THE CAPTURE AND RESCUE OF

PRIVATE JESSICA LYNCH

A. PRIVATE LYNCH’S CAPTURE AND RESCUE

Private First Class Jessica Lynch was a member of the Army’s

507th Maintenance Company, a logistics team assigned to support

a Patriot missile battery during the initial invasion of Iraq. While

the company was heading towards Baghdad as part of a convoy on

March 23, 2003, several vehicles experienced mechanical problems,

and the company fell hours behind. As a result, the company

missed a turn and headed into territory controlled by Iraqi

forces.228

Iraqi forces attacked the company as it traveled through the city

of An Nasiriyah. Private Lynch was severely injured when the

Humvee she was riding in crashed into another convoy vehicle.

Iraqi forces captured Private Lynch and transported her to a military hospital and later to the Saddam Hussein General Hospital in

An Nasiriyah.229

For the next seven days, Iraqi hospital staff treated Private

Lynch’s life-threatening wounds, which included numerous shattered bones. During that time, Marines conducting operations in

the area learned that Private Lynch was being held at the hospital

and that Iraqi forces were using the hospital as an operations center.230

Late on the night of April 1, 2003, a U.S. special forces unit rescued Private Lynch and recovered the remains of nine U.S. soldiers

who had been killed during the earlier battle. Private Lynch was

transported to the Landstuhl Regional Medical Center in Germany

for further treatment.231

B. THE DISSEMINATION OF INACCURATE INFORMATION

On April 1, 2003, immediately after the rescue of Private Lynch,

military officials at U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) headquarters in Doha, Qatar, called in members of the media to announce the success of the mission. CENTCOM’s chief spokesman

Jim Wilkinson stated: ‘‘America doesn’t leave its heroes behind.

. . . Never has. Never will.’’ 232 He also stated, ‘‘We also have other

POWs we are just as worried about. This is good news today but

we need a lot more good news.’’ 233

The next morning, Brigadier General Vincent Brooks, another

CENTCOM spokesman, gave his daily press briefing. During this

42

234 U.S. Central Command Operational Update Briefing with Brigadier General Vincent

Brooks, CENTCOM Deputy Director of Operations (Apr. 2, 2003). 235Missing Soldier Rescued; U.S. Forces Remove POW From Hospital, Washington Post (Apr.

2, 2003). 236 Id.

briefing, he showed a four-minute video of the rescue operation and

gave the following narration:

[C]oalition Special Operations forces did stage an operation last night into the town of An Nasiriya. It was in the

Saddam Hospital in An Nasiriya, a facility that had been

used by the regime as a military post.

We were successful in that operation last night and did retrieve Pfc. Jessica Lynch, bringing her away from that location of danger, clearing the building of some of the military activity that was in there. There was not a fire-fight

inside the building I will tell you, but there were fire-fights

outside of the building getting in and getting out.

There were no coalition casualties as a result of this and

in the destruction that occurred inside of the building, particularly in the basement area where the operations centers had been, we found ammunition, mortars, maps, a terrain model, and other things that make it very clear that

it was being used as a military command post.

The nature of the operation was a coalition special operation that involved Army Rangers, Air Force pilots and

combat controllers, U.S. Marines and Navy Seals. It was

a classical joint operation done by some of our nation’s finest warriors, who are dedicated to never leaving a comrade

behind.234

On the same day, April 2, 2003, the Washington Post printed its

first report (‘‘Missing Soldier Rescued; U.S. Forces Remove POW

From Hospital’’) on the Lynch rescue. The front page story was

written by Vernon Loeb and Dana Priest, and it provided a factually accurate account of the rescue. The story’s opening paragraph

began:

Jessica Lynch, a 19-year-old private first class missing

since the ambush of an Army maintenance company 10

days ago in southern Iraq, has been rescued by Special Operations forces, defense officials said yesterday. CIA

operatives in Iraq located Lynch in a hospital near

Nasiriyah, where she was being held because of multiple

wounds, officials said, and a helicopter-borne team of Navy

SEALS and Army rangers rescued her about midnight

local time.235

The story quoted Mr. Wilkinson, who said of Private Lynch,

‘‘[s]he’s safe in coalition hands and happier than where she

was.’’ 236

The April 2 story did not include any details about heroic actions

by Private Lynch. But just one day later the Washington Post reported sensational new details. The April 3 front page story (‘‘She

Was Fighting to the Death’’), written by Susan Schmidt and Vernon Loeb, began with a vivid battlefield account:

43

237 ‘She Was Fighting to the Death’; Details Emerging of W. Va. Soldier’s Capture and Rescue,

Washington Post (Apr. 3, 2003). 238 Id. 239 Id. 240 Id. 241 Remains Found at Iraqi Hospital to be Flown to U.S., Military Times (Apr. 3, 2003). 242 Id. 243 A Broken Body, a Broken Story, Pieced Together; Investigation Reveals Lynch—Still in Hospital After 67 Days—Suffered Bone-crushing Injuries in Crash During Ambush, Washington Post

(June 17, 2003).

Pfc. Jessica Lynch, rescued Tuesday from an Iraqi hospital, fought fiercely and shot several enemy soldiers after

Iraqi forces ambushed the Army’s 507th Ordnance Maintenance Company, firing her weapon until she ran out of

ammunition, U.S. officials said yesterday. Lynch, a 19-

year-old supply clerk, continued firing at the Iraqis even

after she sustained multiple gunshot wounds and watched

several other soldiers in her unit die around her in the

fighting March 23, one official said.237

The article quoted ‘‘one official’’ as saying that at the time of her

capture, Private Lynch ‘‘was fighting to the death. She did not

want to be taken alive.’’ 238 The authors stated that according to

this anonymous official, Private Lynch ‘‘was also stabbed when

Iraqi forces closed in on her position,’’ though there was no ‘‘indication’’ that Lynch’s wounds were ‘‘life-threatening.’’ 239 The article

also stated:

Several officials cautioned that the precise sequence of

events is still being determined, and that further information will emerge as Lynch is debriefed. Reports are thus

far based on battlefield intelligence, they said, which

comes from monitored communications from Iraqi sources

in Nasiriyah whose reliability has yet to be assessed. Pentagon officials said they heard ‘‘rumors’ of Lynch’s heroics

but had no confirmation.240

On the same day, April 3, 2003, the Military Times ran a similar

account with confirmation from Navy Captain Frank Thorp.241 At

the time, Captain Thorp was a CENTCOM public affairs officer

stationed at the command’s Qatar headquarters. He subsequently

became the top public affairs official for General Myers and was

promoted to Rear Admiral. According to this report:

Thorp said Lynch ‘‘waged quite a battle prior to her capture. We do have very strong indications that Jessica

Lynch was not captured very easily,’’ he said. ‘‘Reports are

that she fired her (M–16 rifle) until she had no more ammunition.’’ 242

The dramatic story and video of Private Lynch’s rescue dominated the media for the next few days. In the words of one

CENTCOM public affairs official, Lieutenant Colonel John Robinson, ‘‘It was an awesome story.’’ 243

The story of Private Lynch’s rescue unfolded during a difficult

time for the White House. An April 3, 2003, Washington Post story

detailed the difficulties the Bush Administration was having at the

time with communications about the war. The Post reported that

the Administration’s plan ‘‘did not allow for strong Iraqi resistance

44

244White House is Revising its War Message; Setbacks Providing Lessons, Washington Post

(Apr. 3, 2003). 245 Id. 246Pfc. Jessica Lynch Isn’t Rambo Anymore, New York Times (Nov. 9, 2003). 247 A Broken Body, a Broken Story, Pieced Together; Investigation Reveals Lynch—Still in Hospital After 67 Days—Suffered Bone-crushing Injuries in Crash During Ambush, Washington Post

(June 17, 2003). The military conducted at least two investigations into Private Lynch’s capture

and rescue, one by the Army and one by the Defense Department Inspector General, but neither

specifically addressed the dissemination of false information. Defense Department Office of Inspector General, Executive Summary: Alleged Premeditated Fabrication and Inappropriate Conduct of U.S. Military Personnel Involved in the Rescue of Private First Class Jessica Lynch, U.S.

Army (undated); U.S. Army, Attack on the 507th Maintenance Company, 23 March 2003, An

Nasiriyah, Iraq (undated) (online at www.army.mil/features/507thMaintCmpy/

AttackOnThe507MaintCmpy.pdf). 248Steve Ritea, Jessica Lynch’s Story: A Little Too Perfect? American Journalism Review

(Aug./Sept. 2003). 249 Id.

and overestimated the welcome allied troops would receive.’’ 244 The

story also noted:

After nearly two weeks of discouraging news from Iraq,

the White House viewed yesterday as an excellent message

day. There were new details on the rescue of prisoner of

war Jessica Lynch by U.S. Special Operations forces.245

Those new details, however, included an entirely fictional account of her capture. It is not uncommon for initial battlefield reports to have factual inaccuracies, since they are often written in

difficult circumstances and under intense time pressures. Subsequent reports then correct the record. The opposite was true,

though, in Private Lynch’s case. The initial reporting was accurate.

It was the subsequent stories that invented new facts. This unusual situation raised concerns that the misinformation might be

part of a deliberate propaganda strategy. As New York Times columnist Frank Rich wrote, ‘‘[w]hen American forces were bogged

down in the war’s early days, she was the happy harbinger of an

imminent military turnaround: a 19-year-old female Rambo who

tried to blast her way out of the enemy’s clutches, taking out any

man who got in her way.’’ 246

In a June 17, 2003, story, the Washington Post disclosed that Private Lynch did not engage the enemy, was not wounded by gunshots, and was rescued without significant resistance. According to

the Post, the source of the inaccurate account was a top-secret battlefield intelligence report that military officials had quickly leaked

to the press without verifying.247

In late 2003, Vernon Loeb, one of the authors of the erroneous

April 3 Post story, stated: ‘‘I don’t think we were spun at all. . . .

I don’t think the Pentagon ever set out to make Jessica Lynch a

poster child for battlefield heroism.’’ 248 According to an article in

the American Journalism Review, Mr. Loeb and one of his editors

at the Post ‘‘say they have no reason to doubt that their April 3

story accurately reflected the information contained in those [intelligence] reports—even if the reports had inaccuracies. ‘We had multiple sources because multiple people were reading the same intelligence reports.’ ’’ 249

In May 2004, the Washington Post reported that another U.S.

soldier had been captured and then executed in the same ambush

during which Private Lynch was taken captive. The article noted

that this soldier’s mother ‘‘believed the Army had not given her son

45

250Family Learns Iraqis Executed Soldier Captured at Same Time as Lynch, Washington Post

(May 29, 2004). 251 E-mail from Rear Admiral Frank Thorp, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Joint

Communication, to Majority Staff, House Oversight and Government Reform Committee (Apr.

19, 2007) (ellipses in original). 252 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of Rear Admiral Frank

Thorp, IV, at 69 (Sept. 19, 2007). 253 Id. at 73. 254 Id.

credit for actions first attributed to Lynch.’’ The article further explained that the soldier’s ‘‘family and others have said that early

reports depicting a blond soldier bravely fighting off Iraqis may

have been mistakenly attributed to Lynch, possibly because of an

erroneous translation of Iraqi radio transmissions.’’ 250

C. THE RESPONSE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICIALS

The Committee exchanged e-mails and interviewed now-Admiral

Thorp about his knowledge of the capture and rescue of Private

Lynch. In an April 2007 e-mail to Committee majority staff, Admiral Thorp described his statements to the Military Times reporter

about Private Lynch. He wrote:

As I recall, this was a short interview and media desperately wanted me to confirm the story that was running

in the States. . . . I never said that I had seen any intel

or even intimated the same. . . . I may have said I am familiar with ‘‘the reports’’ meaning the press reports, but as

you can see I did not confirm them. . . . We did have reports of a battle and that a firefight had occurred. . . .

That is what I stated . . .251

Five months later, during a transcribed Committee interview,

Admiral Thorp was asked about the same conversation with the

Military Times reporter. At this time, he denied having any memory of the interaction, stating, ‘‘I do not recall specifically talking

to this reporter about this.’’ 252

During the interview, Admiral Thorp was asked what his source

was for his statements that Private Lynch ‘‘waged quite a battle’’

and that he had ‘‘strong indications’’ that she ‘‘was not captured

very easily’’ and fired her rifle ‘‘until she had no more ammunition.’’ Admiral Thorp responded that he could not recall making

these statements, but stated that if he had, he would have gathered the information from ‘‘various sources.’’ 253 He also said that

his statements could have been ‘‘based on things that I had heard,’’

including other press reports.254

Admiral Thorp explained that in the opening days of Operation

Iraqi Freedom, he regularly confirmed press reports by citing other

press reports. He explained how this process worked at CENTCOM

headquarters in Qatar:

I could give you one anecdote to tell you, to give a perspective as to what was going on, which was on numerous occasions I would be standing there watching a television

monitor on CNN reporting from a unit in Iraq in which a

journalist next to me would ask me to confirm that what

we were watching together on TV was happening, which

obviously he had the same knowledge I did of that live sitVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:08 Sep 17, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00049 Fmt 6604 Sfmt 6604 C:\DOCS\69006.TXT KATIE PsN: KATIE
46

255 Id. at 71. 256 Id. at 75. 257 Id. at 76. 258 Id. at 73. 259 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of James R. Wilkinson,

at 58 (Mar. 14, 2008).

uation on the ground. It would not be odd for me to then

tell another journalist later that I saw something on CNN.

. . . So there were times where I would say I just saw on

CNN a report that boom, boom, boom. Whether somebody

attributed that to me, that a Navy spokesman said there

are reports, that I have no way of knowing because it was

happening so fast and so furious. But I absolutely felt that

in my realm of responsibility, to share other reports that

were already out, that reporters had made to make sure

that everyone knew.255

Admiral Thorp told the Committee that he did not recall seeing

classified battlefield intelligence reports about Private Lynch, and

he said he did not remember if his remarks were based on such reports.256 When asked whether he knew at the time he spoke to reporters that Private Lynch had not actually fired any shots, Admiral Thorp replied: ‘‘I would absolutely never, ever, ever, ever say

anything that I knew to not be true.’’ 257

According to Admiral Thorp, the public affairs official who attended CENTCOM operational briefings was Jim Wilkinson, the

Director of Strategic Communications for CENTCOM commander,

General Tommy Franks.258 When the Committee interviewed Mr.

Wilkinson, he said he was not a source for the story and that he

was never familiar with the operational details of Private Lynch’s

capture and rescue. He told the Committee: ‘‘I still, to this day,

don’t know if those details are right or wrong. I just don’t know.

I don’t remember seeing any operational report.’’ 259

Neither Mr. Wilkinson nor Admiral Thorp said they knew the

identity of the ‘‘U.S. officials’’ cited in the April 3, 2003, Washington Post story. Neither could explain why initial news reports about

Private Lynch’s capture and rescue were accurate, and subsequent

stories contained significant errors.

IX. OTHER CASES BROUGHT TO THE COMMITTEE’S

ATTENTION

The Committee’s investigation has focused on the information

the Defense Department provided about the two most famous U.S.

soldiers in the Iraq and Afghanistan wars: Corporal Tillman and

Private Lynch. During the course of the investigation, however,

families and friends of soldiers killed or injured in the wars contacted the Committee’s majority staff to recount similar experiences in which the Pentagon provided misleading information

about a battlefield casualty.

For example, the family of Specialist Jesse Buryj of Canton,

Ohio, who died in Iraq on May 5, 2004, experienced many of the

same frustrations as the Tillman family. The Army initially

claimed that Specialist Buryj had been killed by the enemy and

posthumously awarded him a Bronze Star for his valor while

47

260 An Army Death, and a Family Left in the Dark, Washington Post (Jan. 17, 2006). 261 Id. 262 Id.; House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Majority Staff, Telephone

Interview of Peggy Buryj (June 2, 2008). 263 NOW, PBS (Nov. 17, 2006) (online at www.pbs.org/now/transcript/246.html). 264 An Army Death, and a Family Left in the Dark, Washington Post (Jan. 17, 2006). 265Father Wants Soldier’s Death Reinvestigated, Associated Press (June 4, 2008).

guarding a highway checkpoint.260 Nine months later, after several

investigations, the family learned his death was actually a fratricide.261 In July 2004, Specialist Buryj’s parents accepted an invitation to meet President Bush at a campaign rally. They asked him

to help them learn the truth about how their son died. According

to the family, the President agreed to assist.262 Specialist Buryj’s

mother recalled that after the meeting, her case received more attention, but the military still did not provide a satisfactory account

of what happened to her son.263 A few months later, a Bush-Cheney campaign official contacted the family. Rather than offer assistance, the official asked Specialist Buryj’s mother to appear in

a campaign commercial for the President. Mrs. Buryj refused.264

The Committee’s majority staff was also contacted by the family

and friends of Private First Class LaVena Johnson, a weapons supply manager from Florissant, Missouri, who died, family members

say, in a suspicious non-combat incident near Balad, Iraq, on July

19, 2005. According to news reports, the Army ruled the death a

suicide, and a medical examiner concurred with this finding.265 But

Private Johnson’s family believes Army investigators ignored physical evidence inconsistent with a finding of suicide. They also believe that the Army has additional information about the circumstances of Private Johnson’s death that it has not shared with

the family.

While the names of these soldiers are not as well-known as Pat

Tillman and Jessica Lynch, their sacrifices were just as great and

their families are just as deserving of the truth.

X. CONCLUSION

The men and women who serve in the military act selflessly and

courageously in defending our country and fighting for freedom.

They are willing to risk serious injury and even death in fulfilling

their responsibilities. And too often their willingness to sacrifice becomes an actual and irreplaceable loss for their families and for our

country.

Our nation cannot adequately recognize that service, but we can

honor their sacrifice by keeping faith with their trust and dedication.

That starts by making sure our troops never go to battle unless

it is absolutely necessary. It also means making sure they have the

benefit of the best equipment and intelligence and the best medical

care if they are injured.

Our nation also has an inviolate obligation to share truthful information with a soldier’s family and the American people should

injury or death occur. As Corporal Tillman’s brother, Kevin, told

the Committee:

Pat and these other soldiers volunteered to put their lives

on the line for this country. Anything less than the truth

48

266 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Testimony of Kevin Tillman,

Hearing on Misleading Information from the Battlefield, 110th Cong., at 21 (Apr. 24, 2007) (Serial No. 110–54).

is a betrayal of those values that all soldiers who have

fought for this nation have sought to uphold.266

That standard was not met in either Corporal Tillman’s or Private Lynch’s cases.

Neither case involved an act of omission. The misinformation

was not caused by overlooking or misunderstanding relevant facts.

Instead, in both cases affirmative acts created new facts that were

significantly different than what the soldiers in the field knew to

be true. And in both cases the fictional accounts proved to be compelling public narratives at difficult times in the war.

The fictional version of Private Lynch’s circumstances came

when many Americans were first beginning to worry about the direction of the Iraq war. The heroic efforts of Private Lynch became,

in the words of one CENTCOM officer, ‘‘an awesome story.’’

Specialist Kevin Tillman told the Committee that he believed the

combination of a difficult battle in Fallujah, bad news about the

state of the war, and emerging reports about Abu Ghraib prison

created a motive to fictionalize the details about his brother’s

death. Whether he is correct or not, the public affairs staff of the

Army recounted that the death of Corporal Tillman generated the

most media coverage of the Army ‘‘since the end of active combat’’

and was ‘‘extremely positive in all media.’’

As the Committee investigated the Tillman and Lynch cases, it

encountered a striking lack of recollection. In Private Lynch’s case,

Jim Wilkinson, who was the Director for Strategic Communications

for the CENTCOM Commander and attended CENTCOM operational briefings, told the Committee he did not know where the

false information originated or who disseminated it.

In Corporal Tillman’s case, even after seven Defense Department

investigations, no one has been able to identify the person who created the false information about enemy fire. At the top of the chain

of command, where the Committee focused its attention, pertinent

questions also remain unanswered. The White House was intensely

interested in the first reports of Corporal Tillman’s death. On April

23, White House officials sent or received nearly 200 e-mails concerning Corporal Tillman. In contrast, the White House could not

produce a single e-mail or document relating to any discussion

about Corporal Tillman’s death by friendly fire. Not a single written communication about the personal reactions or the substantive,

political, and public relations implications of the new information

was provided to the Committee.

Despite receiving information from all the top military leaders in

Corporal Tillman chain of command—including Secretary Rumsfeld, General Myers, and General Abizaid—the Committee could

not determine if any of the officials had communicated with President Bush or White House officials about fratricide in Corporal

Tillman’s case. The lack of recollection also prevented the Committee from understanding how information about Corporal Tillman

was handled within the Defense Department and how the Defense

49

Department and the White House shared information on this matter.

If the testimony the Committee received is accurate and if the

documents submitted are complete, then the intense interest that

initially characterized the White House’s and Defense Department’s reaction to Corporal Tillman’s death was followed by a stunning lack of curiosity about emerging reports of fratricide and an

incomprehensible carelessness and incompetence in handling this

sensitive information.

The pervasive lack of recollection and absence of specific information makes it impossible for the Committee to assign responsibility

for the misinformation in Corporal Tillman’s and Private Lynch’s

cases. It is clear, however, that the Defense Department did not

meet its most basic obligations in sharing accurate information

with the families and with the American public.

(50)

ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF HON. TOM DAVIS

The tragic loss of Army Corporal Pat Tillman in Afghanistan in

April 2004 painfully reminds all Americans of the costs of war. He

was a true hero, a role model whose personal sense of duty drew

him from the ranks of elite professional sports to perilous military

service in the barren hills of Afghanistan. Nothing we say can improve or diminish his shining legacy of patriotism and self-sacrifice.

What is said about the death of a hero should be said thoughtfully, carefully, and reverently. Events surrounding the timeless

end of a heroic life should never be shaped or shaded by either side

to fuel the political disputes of the day. This bipartisan investigation asked whether Pentagon or White House officials broke that

rule by manipulating information to build public support for an unpopular war. The record before us contains substantial evidence of

inadvertence, misjudgment, ineptitude, error—and even negligence.

But, as the Committee’s report acknowledges, the investigative

record is incomplete, and therefore inconclusive, on the question

whether government officials purposefully delayed or distorted information about battlefield events. The same rule against political

misinformation argues strongly against the Committee filling those

evidentiary gaps with unsupported inferences and negative characterizations. However inconvenient or frustrating, the absence of

evidence cannot be used to prove a conclusion the actual evidence

does not sustain.

As much out of disappointment as disagreement, we submit

these Additional Views to supplement and clarify the factual findings of the Committee Report. This has been a bipartisan investigation from the outset, and we appreciate the majority sharing early

drafts with us and incorporating our suggestions into the final report. Nevertheless, we believe it necessary to state certain matters

for the public record separately because we find the report not always complete and balanced in its discussion of key questions.

What should be a factual summary gets weighed down by conclusions, inferences and characterizations not reasonably supported by

the investigative record. The facts deserve an unfettered opportunity to speak for themselves.

The Committee Report concludes the White House and DoD displayed ‘‘carelessness and incompetence’’ in handling information

about the death and friendly-fire incident. We agree. Rules and

procedures put in place precisely for the purpose of providing timely and accurate information about combat deaths were ignored.

Those errors, omissions and delays understandably fueled suspicions senior government officials knew the actual circumstances

of Corporal Tillman’s death, but manipulated the information to

avoid bad news. After several investigations, it now seems clear

those officials could have known friendly fire was suspected. It was

a disservice to the memory of Corporal Tillman, to his family, his

51

unit and this nation to let the happy myth outrun the unpleasant

facts, even for a day.

But even serial incompetence at the highest levels does not constitute proof of a conspiracy—intentional distortion of public statements about both Patrick Tillman and Jessica Lynch. So the Committee attempts to build a bridge of circumstance—faded memories

and a lack of e-mail traffic—to link the hard facts of ineptitude to

soft speculation that only conscious manipulation explains otherwise ‘‘incomprehensible’’ actions and a ‘‘stunning lack of curiosity’’

about conflicting battlefield reports.

An objective presentation of the facts makes such speculation

and characterizations unnecessary, even counterproductive to an

accurate historical record. It seems perfectly comprehensible, even

inevitable, that years later people might not recall the exact moment they obtained specific information about these events. The

Committee concludes witnesses should have detailed recollection

about fleeting conversations and transactions that stand out from

the torrent of daily activities only in magnified hindsight. We need

not reach conclusions about what government officials should have

known to summarize the factual findings of an extensive investigation.

It’s said the first casualty of war is the truth. We now know in

the fog of war the truth comes under friendly fire as well. Whether

exaggerated accounts of heroism, delayed acknowledgement of fratricide, or widely published—but utterly fictional—blogs describing

alleged cruelty by U.S. troops, misinformation from the battlefield

corrodes the bond of trust that defines us as a nation of free men

and women.

Corporal Patrick Tillman, like thousands of other brave Americans, gave his life in service to this nation. His death was made

even more heartbreaking by the fact it was found to have been

caused by fratricide. The U.S. Army’s egregious mishandling of the

process meant to ensure complete and timely notification to families turned this ‘‘friendly fire’’ incident into a prolonged, decidedly

unfriendly spectacle of official malfeasance and miscommunication.

As then-Acting Secretary of the Army Pete Geren conceded, ‘‘We as

an Army failed in our duty to the Tillman family, the duty we owe

to all the families of our fallen soldiers: Give them the truth, the

best we know it, as fast as we can.’’

That is our charge as well.

I. THE INVESTIGATION

The Committee’s inquiry into the circumstances in which senior

White House and Pentagon officials became aware that Army Corporal Pat Tillman was a victim of fratricide took more than fourteen months. In this period, the Committee held two hearings in

which it heard from ten witnesses, including former Secretary of

Defense Donald Rumsfeld, and retired Generals Richard Myers,

John Abizaid, and Bryan Brown. Committee staff received 50,000

pages of documents from the Pentagon, the White House, and the

Defense Department Inspector General and reviewed additional

documents ‘‘in camera.’’ In addition, staff interviewed 19 witnesses,

totaling nearly 29 hours and producing more than 1,200 pages of

52

1See Interview by House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform [hereinafter House

Oversight Committee or the Committee] staff of General John F. Sattler, U.S. Marines, in Washington, D.C. (Jul. 24, 2007) [hereinafter Sattler Transcript]; Interview by House Oversight Committee staff of Brigadier General Howard W. Yellen, U.S. Army (Retired), in Washington, D.C.

(Jul. 25, 2007) [hereinafter Yellen Transcript]; Interview by House Oversight Committee staff

of General Bantz Johnson Craddock, U.S. Army, in Washington, D.C. (Jul. 27, 2007) [hereinafter

Craddock Transcript]; Interview by House Oversight Committee staff of Admiral Eric T. Olson,

U.S. Navy, in Washington, D.C. (Jul. 24, 2007) [hereinafter Olson Transcript]; Interview by

House Oversight Committee staff of Lieutenant General James Lovelace, U.S. Army, by telephone (Jul. 31, 2007) [hereinafter Lovelace Transcript]; Interview by House Oversight Committee staff of Taylor Gross, former White House Communications official, in Washington, D.C.

(Sep. 5, 2007) [hereinafter Gross Transcript]; Interview by House Oversight Committee staff of

Carol Darby, Public Affairs Officer, U.S. Army, in Washington, D.C. (Sep. 19, 2007) [hereinafter

Darby Transcript]; Interview by House Oversight Committee staff of Colonel Hans Bush, U.S.

Army, in Washington, D.C. (Sep. 19, 2007) [hereinafter Bush Transcript]; Interview by House

Oversight Committee staff of Rear Admiral Frank Thorp IV, U.S. Navy, in Washington, D.C.

(Sep. 19, 2007) [hereinafter Thorp Transcript]; Interview by House Oversight Committee staff

of Colonel Steven P. Bucci, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, U.S.

Department of Defense, in Washington, D.C. (Sep. 20, 2007) [hereinafter Bucci Transcript];

Interview by House Oversight Committee staff of John Currin, former Director of Fact-Checking, Office of Presidential Speechwriting, White House, in Washington, D.C. (Sep. 21, 2007)

[hereinafter Currin Transcript]; Interview by House Oversight Committee staff of Lawrence Di

Rita, former director, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, U.S. Department of Defense, in Washington, D.C. (Sep. 24, 2007) [hereinafter Di Rita Transcript]; Interview

by House Oversight Committee staff of George Rhynedane, IV, former Senior Military Assistant

to the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs, U.S. Department of Defense, in Washington, D.C.

(Sep. 27, 2007) [hereinafter Rhynedance Transcript]; Interview by House Oversight Committee

staff of Hedy Henderson, Office of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense, in

Washington, D.C. (Sep. 28, 2007) [hereinafter Henderson Transcript]; Interview of Sean McCormack, Spokesman, National Security Council, by House Oversight Committee Staff, in Washington, D.C. (Feb. 20, 2008) [hereinafter McCormack Transcript] [Note, no contemporaneous transcript was produced for this interview, however, an unofficial transcript was created from an

audio recording of the interview]; Interview by House Oversight Committee staff of Lieutenant

General Philip Kensinger, Jr., U.S. Army, in Washington, D.C. (Feb. 29, 2008) [hereinafter

Kensinger Transcript]; Interview of James Wilkinson, Strategic Communications, U.S. Central

Command, by House Oversight Committee Staff, in Washington, D.C. (Mar. 14, 2008) [hereinafter Wilkinson Transcript]. 2 Untranscribed interview of Scott McClellan, White House Press Secretary, by House Oversight Committee Staff, in Washington, D.C. (Sep. 9, 2007) (Committee staff notes on file) [hereinafter McClellan Interview]; Untranscribed interview of Michael Gerson, Chief Speechwriter,

White House, by House Oversight Committee Staff, in Washington, D.C. (Sep. 11, 2007) (Committee staff notes on file) [hereinafter Gerson Interview]; Untranscribed interview of Dan Bartlett, Director, White House Communications, by House Oversight Committee Staff, in Washington, D.C. (Sep. 12, 2007) (Committee staff notes on file) [hereinafter Bartlett Interview].

transcription.1 The Committee also received supplementary information from three individuals.2

In an effort to determine the origins of the Washington Post story

about Jessica Lynch’s purported behavior at the time of her capture, the Committee took testimony from Ms. Lynch and one of her

physicians at a hearing which also examined the Tillman situation.

Staff posed questions to two other persons in three interviews. In

addition, staff evaluated twenty-nine U.S. Army documents made

available to a media outlet pursuant to a Freedom of Information

Act request in an effort to learn more about the procedural problems which apparently allowed an Army soldier to report inaccurate details from the battlefield for The New Republic.

II. SECRETARY RUMSFELD, SENIOR DEPARTMENT OF

DEFENSE LEADERSHIP

A. EXTENT OF SECRETARY RUMSFELD’S INTEREST IN PAT TILLMAN’S

ENLISTMENT AND MILITARY SERVICE

Written material produced by Secretary Rumsfeld between the

time of Corporal Tillman’s enlistment and his death provides an

understanding of Secretary Rumsfeld’s interest in Corporal Tillman

and his enlistment. Shortly after Corporal Tillman enlisted, SecVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:08 Sep 17, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00056 Fmt 6604 Sfmt 6604 C:\DOCS\69006.TXT KATIE PsN: KATIE
53

3Memorandum from Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary, U.S. Department of Defense, to Thomas

White, Secretary, U.S. Army (Jun. 25, 2002; 14:39 EDT) [hereinafter Rumsfeld/White Snowflake] (Committee staff notes on file). 4Memorandum from Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary, U.S. Department of Defense, to Corporal

Patrick Tillman (Jun. 28, 2002) [hereinafter Rumsfeld/Tillman Letter] (Committee staff notes

on file). 5Letter from Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary, U.S. Department of Defense, to Mrs. Patrick Tillman (May 3, 2004) [hereinafter Rumsfeld/Condolence Letter] (Committee staff notes on file). 6 Rumsfeld/White Snowflake.

7Letter from Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary, U.S. Department of Defense, to [Acquaintance]

[name withheld by Committee staff] (Jan. 26, 2002) (emphasis in the original). Note Secretary

Rumsfeld’s statement that ‘‘[he] had not seen [the article regarding Tillman].’’ Id. 8 Rumsfeld/Tillman Letter.

9The Tillman Fratricide: What the Leadership of the Defense Department Knew before the

House Oversight Committee, 110th Cong. (Aug. 2, 2007) [hereinafter Tillman Hearing II], at Tr.

107–08 (referring to Rumsfeld/White Snowflake).

retary Rumsfeld distributed a memorandum (known colloquially as

a ‘‘snowflake’’) regarding Corporal Tillman to U.S. Army Secretary,

Tom White.3 Secretary Rumsfeld also sent Corporal Tillman a personal note.4 After Corporal Tillman’s death, Secretary Rumsfeld

signed a condolence letter to Corporal Tillman’s widow.5

The enlistment of Corporal Tillman and his brother, Kevin Tillman, in May 2002 was the subject of numerous news reports.

Thereafter, an individual who appears to be a personal acquaintance of Secretary Rumsfeld sent Secretary Rumsfeld a note about

Corporal Tillman’s enlistment, enclosing a related June 2, 2002

newspaper column.

On June 25, 2002, Secretary Rumsfeld forwarded the June 2,

2002 article to Secretary White with a note that stated (in full):

Here is an article on a fellow who is apparently joining the

Rangers. He sound [sic] like he is world-class. We might

want to keep our eye on him.6

The following day, Secretary Rumsfeld responded to his acquaintance (addressing him by nickname) writing (in full):

Thanks so much for sending along the article from the

Tribune. I had not seen it. You are quite right—this fellow,

Pat Tillman, sounds like a world-class American.7

On June 28, 2002, Secretary Rumsfeld wrote to Corporal Tillman,

saying:

I heard you were leaving the National Football League to

become an Army Ranger. It is a proud and patriotic thing

you are doing.8

The phraseology and timing of this exchange strongly implies

that Secretary Rumsfeld learned from his acquaintance and not the

Army or Defense Department bureaucracy that a professional football player, of whom he appears not to have been previously aware,

had enlisted. It also suggests that Secretary Rumsfeld believed his

memorandum to Secretary White would be the first time the

Army’s top civilian leader learned about Corporal Tillman and his

service commitment.

Secretary Rumsfeld testified under oath that he did not intend

the comment ‘‘[w]e might want to keep our eye on him’’ as a literal

instruction.9 Rather, it appears that this was intended as a rhetorical statement. Testimony and other evidence support this interpretation. For example, the apparently standard clause ‘‘please reVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:08 Sep 17, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00057 Fmt 6604 Sfmt 6604 C:\DOCS\69006.TXT KATIE PsN: KATIE
54

10 Rumsfeld/White Snowflake. 11See, e.g., Craddock Transcript at Tr. 47–48 (Q: ‘‘Do you have any knowledge of the fact that

the Secretary--either Secretary of the Army or Secretary of the Defense kept an eye on [Corporal

Tillman] after his enlistment?’’ A: ‘‘Not that I’m aware of. Again, if that happened, it happened

before I got there. Nothing was left to me by my predecessor, stay on top of this, watch this

or be aware of this.); Lovelace Transcript at Tr. 49–50 (Q: ‘‘When you arrived in your position

as Army Staff Director, did you get the impression at any time that, in fact, Army leadership

was, quote, keeping an eye on Tillman?’’ A: ‘‘No.’’ Q: ‘‘You didn’t get correspondence about him,

memos about him, phone calls about him?’’ A: ‘‘No.’’); Di Rita Transcript at Tr. 39 (Q: ‘‘Okay.

Based on your close working relationship with Secretary Rumsfeld, what did he mean when he

said, We might want to keep our eye on him?’’ A: ‘‘I think he was making a point that this

is somebody who has done something of a very high-profile nature, and that is impressive, and

we ought to recognize that somewhere along the way, we appreciate this kind of commitment

to public service. I would imagine that is the extent of his intent there.’’ Q: ‘‘Were there times

later in Corporal Tillman’s service where he turned to you and said, How is this Tillman guy

doing?’’ A: ‘‘ I don’t remember him ever doing that.’’ Q: ‘‘Check up on Tillman?’’ A: ‘‘Yeah, it

would have been unlike him, but that is not to say it wouldn’t have happened. I just don’t remember that.’’ Q: ‘‘How common was it for Secretary Rumsfeld to single out a soldier like this

on a snowflake or in a communication with the Secretary?’’ A: ‘‘Let me just step back on that.

It was very common of Secretary Rumsfeld to see something in the paper and comment on it

by saying --by shooting a note to somebody and saying, This is interesting. Could I get more

information? Or did you see this? I find this something worth following up on. Or something

like that. So that was not uncommon. So he was -- he didn’t read the papers cover to cover every

day, but he was generally aware of what was happening in areas involving the Department of

Defense. So as much attention as this would almost certainly have gotten when Pat Tillman

joined, it is not surprising that he would have seen it and said, Wow, that’s interesting.’’); Di

Rita Transcript at Tr. 76–78 (A: ‘‘And in this case, this was primarily an outgoing -- it is a bit

of the way Rumsfeld operated: ‘‘Hey, let’s just keep an eye on that fellow; that’s interesting.’’

But it wasn’t like he was asking for a report back or anticipating something.’’ Q: ‘‘You don’t

think he was -’’ A: ‘‘I would tend to doubt it. I’m looking at that the way -- the person who

transcribed the Dictaphone kind of drew the same conclusion. I mean, she just decided not to

put a date [by which a response was required] on there, because it’s not the kind of thing where

a deadline really applies.’’ Q: ‘‘Am I correct that you said in your testimony that you don’t recall

seeing a report come back?’’ A: ‘‘I don’t recall anything coming back. From Secretary White?’’

Q: ‘‘Correct.’’ A: ‘‘Yeah, no, I don’t recall anything.’’ Q: ‘‘How about from anyone else?’’ A: ‘‘I don’t

recall. I don’t recall.’’). 12See, e.g., Bucci Transcript at Tr. 29; Craddock Transcript at Tr. 17. 13 Craddock Transcript at Tr. 24, 28–29 (Q: ‘‘Wasn’t [the news of Corporal Tillman’s death]

a hot one on April 23rd, you know, when every newspaper and television station in America

was, you know, talking about it?’’ A: ‘‘[] I can’t tell you that it was a hot one and everything

came to a stop and we focused on Pat Tillman. I apologize for that. It is bad, but that’s not

the way I recall it. [] But, I’ve got to tell you, I don’t recall that everything came to a screeching

halt to deal with this.’’). Craddock believed he learned of Corporal Tillman’s death ‘‘on the

news.’’ Craddock Transcript at Tr. 19–21.

spond by’’ at the bottom of Secretary Rumsfeld’s memorandum was

crossed out, as if to suggest no reply was expected.10 Also, the

Committee received no documents or testimony that indicated that

Corporal Tillman’s activities were, in fact, monitored in any way by

Secretary Rumsfeld or other Department of Defense or White

House officials. In fact, the Committee received testimony that indicated the opposite: Secretary Rumsfeld was not keeping track of

Corporal Tillman.11 Finally, there is no indication that Secretary

Rumsfeld ever noted or was concerned by the fact that no followup information was ever conveyed to him, lending strong credence

to the suggestions that Secretary Rumsfeld did not expect any.

Indeed, in testimony received by the Committee, no one (including his closest assistants) recalled Secretary Rumsfeld referring to

Corporal Tillman between his June 28, 2002 letter to Corporal Tillman and the time of Corporal Tillman’s death in 2004.12 Secretary

Rumsfeld’s senior military assistant told the Committee that, in

light of the press of business in Secretary Rumsfeld’s office, he did

not ever discuss Corporal Tillman with Secretary Rumsfeld even

upon Corporal Tillman’s death.13

On April 29, 2004, one week after Corporal Tillman’s death, an

executive secretary in Secretary Rumsfeld’s office drafted a condolence letter for Corporal Tillman’s widow. The executive secretary

55

14 E-mail from Monica Generous, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Executive Services, U.S.

Department of Defense, to various (Apr. 29, 2004; 15:34 EDT) (bates no. 1871). 15See Craddock Transcript at Tr. 48–49; Di Rita Transcript at Tr. 58–59, 85, 89–90. 16Tillman Hearing II at Tr. 55, 72, 152, 100. 17 Id. at Tr. 30–31, 64, 98. See also Letter from Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary, U.S. Department

of Defense, to Henry A. Waxman, Chairman, House Oversight and Government Reform Committee, and Tom Davis, Ranking Member, House Oversight and Government Reform Committee,

(Jul. 26, 2007) [hereinafter Rumsfeld/Committee Letter]. 18Tillman Hearing II at Tr. 30, 157. Secretary Rumsfeld also told the Committee that he was

not disturbed by the timing or method of his notification. Id. at Tr. 104. 19 Id. at Tr. 15–16. 20Letter from Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary, U.S. Department of Defense, to Thomas Gimble,

Acting Inspector General, U.S. Department of Defense (Dec. 15, 2006). 21Tillman Hearing II at Tr. 32–34, 125–7. See also Bucci Transcript at Tr. 40–41; Craddock

Transcript at Tr. 38–39. 22 Bucci Transcript at Tr. 31 (‘‘[] I got a phone call in the morning there at the office from

one of the military assistants in the Army. And I can’t remember whether it was the Chief of

Staff’s executive assistant or Secretary of Army’s military assistant who called me.’’).

apparently used a brief Pentagon statement issued on the day after

Corporal Tillman was killed to prepare this condolence letter.14

Secretary Rumsfeld signed the condolence letter dated May 3,

2004. There seems to be nothing extraordinary about the way it

was drafted and promulgated; the Committee received testimony

that Secretary Rumsfeld signed similar communications to families

of all those killed in action.15

B. SECRETARY RUMSFELD’S KNOWLEDGE OF FRATRICIDE AS A CAUSE

OF CORPORAL TILLMAN’S DEATH

Secretary Rumsfeld also testified under oath before the Committee that he never instructed anyone to withhold information about

the finding that Corporal Tillman’s death resulted from fratricide

and that he was not aware of (nor was he a party to) any related

‘‘cover-up.’’ 16 He testified that he had neither foreknowledge of the

Correspondents Dinner speech in which the President referenced

Corporal Tillman nor any discussions with the White House about

the circumstances of Corporal Tillman’s death prior to such details

becoming public.17

Secretary Rumsfeld testified before the Committee that he did

not remember when or how he learned that fratricide was the suspected cause of Corporal Tillman’s death.18 From the testimony

and evidence provided to the Committee, it is possible to identify

a period in which these details were probably conveyed to him.

In testimony before this Committee, Secretary Rumsfeld repeated

the statement he had made previously in letters to Chairman Waxman, Ranking Member Davis, and to the DoD Inspector General

(DoD IG), namely: ‘‘I am told I received word of this development

[i.e., the suspicion of fratricide] after May 20, 2004.’’ 19 According

to Secretary Rumsfeld, he was able to proffer a date because, in responding to questions from the DoD IG on this matter on December

15, 2006,20 an aide consulted others to determine if they remembered circumstances Secretary Rumsfeld did not.21 One aide, Colonel Steven Bucci, apparently recalled details of Secretary Rumsfeld’s notification and was able to determine the period in which

this occurred.

The Committee took sworn testimony from Colonel Bucci. Colonel

Bucci testified that, in the course of his normal duties in Secretary

Rumsfeld’s office between May 24 and May 28, 2004, he received

a phone call from one of the military assistants in the Army.22

56

23 Id. at Tr. 31–32. 24 Id. (‘‘[] I got a phone call in the morning there at the office from one of the military assistants in the Army. And I can’t remember whether it was the Chief of Staff’s executive assistant

or Secretary of Army’s military assistant who called me. And they said, hey, you need to let

the Secretary know. We’re pretty sure that this may have actually been a fratricide event, and

you need to let the Secretary know.’’). 25 Id. at Tr. 32. 26 Id. at Tr. 31–32. For a description of the timing and attendance at morning ‘‘stand up[]’’

meetings, see Bucci Transcript at Tr. 11. 27 Id. at Tr. 39, 33. 28 Review of Matters Related to the Death of Corporal Patrick Tillman, U.S. Army, Thomas

F. Gimble, Acting Inspector General, U.S. Department of Defense (Mar. 26, 2007) [hereinafter

DoD IG Report] (unnumbered appendix). On May 28, 2004, Marine Maj. Gen. John Sattler, the

CENTCOM director of operations, approved the AR 15–6 report, in the absence of Gen. John

Abizaid, the CENTCOM Commander. See DoD IG Report (unnumbered appendix). See also

Sattler Transcript at Tr. 42–43, 46–51, 54–56. 29Lovelace Transcript at Tr. 20, 21, 35–36, 57. For findings, see DoD IG Report at 29. 30Lovelace Transcript at Tr. 23–27, 55–56, 58. Lt. Gen. Lovelace was interviewed telephonically by Committee staff. During the call, Lt. Gen. Lovelace had in his possession an eFrom this call, Colonel Bucci learned that an investigation into

Corporal Tillman’s death had been undertaken and that this inquiry had determined that fratricide was the likely cause of

death.23 Colonel Bucci further testified the caller suggested that

this information be conveyed to Secretary Rumsfeld, which Colonel

Bucci did ‘‘about 15 minutes’’ later at a regularly-scheduled morning meeting.24

Colonel Bucci testified he believed this was the first Secretary

Rumsfeld learned that friendly fire was being considered as a cause

of Corporal Tillman’s death.25 Colonel Bucci testified that Secretary

Rumsfeld responded to the news by saying [something to the effect

of] ‘‘Oh, gosh, that’s a shame. Well, they need to settle it and get

the word out as quickly as possible.’’ 26 Colonel Bucci testified that

he was able to determine the date range in which these events

transpired because he returned from six months of duty in Iraq on

May 20, 2004, but did not report to work in Secretary Rumsfeld’s

office until May 24, 2004. Assuming this information is correct,

Colonel Bucci received the call from the military assistant before

a daily morning briefing sometime in that five-day period between

May 24 and May 28, 2004.27

Additional details add further credence to the timing and substance of Colonel Bucci’s account. According to the DoD IG, on May

25, 2004, Army Maj. Gen. Stanley McChrystal, the commander of

the Joint Task Force to which Corporal Tillman was assigned, approved the investigative report of Corporal Tillman’s death and

conveyed it to U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM).28 The director

of the Army staff, Lt. Gen. James J. Lovelace, testified before the

Committee that he was informed of the investigation and its findings (namely, that ‘‘[Corporal] Tillman’s death was the result of

fratricide’’) by both Lt. Gen. Philip Kensinger and the Army Operations Center ‘‘on or about’’ May 27, 2004.29 Inasmuch as this is

two days after Gen. McChrystal’s approval and in the period

CENTCOM was considering the report, it is logical for Lt. Gen.

Lovelace to have been notified at this time.

Lt. Gen. Lovelace said that it was also on May 27, 2004, that he

called Lawrence Di Rita, at that time the director of the Office of

the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, with this

news and took steps to have Gen. Bantz Craddock (Colonel Bucci’s

supervisor), and assistants to the Army Secretary and to the Army

Chief and Vice Chief of Staff receive this information by e-mail.30

57

mail showing when and how he notified the others. This e-mail informed his recollection of the

matter. See Lovelace Transcript at Tr. 22–23. Additionally, with one exception, Lt. Gen. Lovelace

stated he believed the principals to each aide learned about the fratricide investigation as a result of his e-mail. Lt. Gen. Lovelace appears to have agreed with the question posed by Committee staff that ‘‘[Y] ou have no knowledge of when the Secretary himself might have [learned].’’

Id. at Tr. 27. However, this is confused somewhat by a mischaracterization by Majority interviewers of ‘‘May 20 [2004]’’ as a date certain that ‘‘[Secretary Rumsfeld] learned that Corporal

Tillman’s death was a suspected fratricide.’’ Id. Secretary Rumsfeld stipulated that he had been

told he was informed ‘‘after May 20, [2004].’’ Rumsfeld/Committee Letter (emphasis added). See

also Di Rita Trancript at Tr. 44 for his recollection that he recalled learning of the fratricide

‘‘shortly before it was publicly announced, I would imagine, because I remember being involved

in some of the discussions about how it would be announced. But I don’t remember when that

was.’’ 31 Both generals at the time lived in military housing, and their yards shared a fence. See

Craddock Transcript at Tr. 19. 32 Id. at Tr. 19. 33 Id. at Tr. 27, 29. Gen. Craddock also testified that, after learning of the fratricide from Lt.

Gen. Lovelace, he never raised the issue with Secretary Rumsfeld, Gen. Myers, or Gen. Peter

Pace, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 34Lovelace Transcript at Tr. 20–21, 23–25, 55–56. 35 Craddock Transcript at Tr. 32–33. 36 Id. at Tr. 32–34.

Thus, it seems possible that it was Lt. Gen. Lovelace’s communications which resulted in the call Colonel Bucci remembers receiving.

Gen. Craddock, Secretary Rumsfeld’s senior military aide, testified he learned about the possibility of fratricide from Lt. Gen.

Lovelace in person. Gen. Craddock recalls seeing Lt. Gen. Lovelace

in the yard separating their homes 31 and remarking that ‘‘[Corporal] Tillman may have been killed by friendly fire.’’ 32 Gen.

Craddock said he was ‘‘surprised and taken aback’’ by this information.33 Although Lt. Gen. Lovelace testified he did not recall this

conversation, because he claims to have found out about the friendly fire ‘‘on or about May 27’’ and the backyard exchange had to

have occurred before Lt. Gen. Lovelace had an e-mail sent on this

topic on May 27, the two generals probably encountered each other

on or just before May 26.34

Furthermore, when Gen. Craddock was asked by Committee

staff: ‘‘[D]id you ever get a report or ever hear that an investigation

was going on into [Corporal Tillman’s death],’’ Gen. Craddock replied, ‘‘I do recall [that it was] being investigated’’ 35 and said he

‘‘probably’’ learned of this from the Chairman or Vice Chairman of

the Joint Chiefs of Staff or the Department’s General Counsel in

the course of the notification being provided to Secretary Rumsfeld.36 Gen. Craddock’s encounter with Lt. Gen. Lovelace likely preceded Gen. Craddock’s learning about the investigation, otherwise

Gen. Craddock would not have been ‘‘surprised’’ upon hearing of

the possibility of fratricide in the death of Corporal Tillman. Assuming the recollections of Gen. Craddock and Lt. Gen. Lovelace

are correct, Gen. Craddock likely learned of the investigation May

27 or May 28.

The recollections of Gen. Craddock and others are consistent

with Colonel Bucci’s description and add further credence to the

timing and substance of Colonel Bucci’s account. However, these

specifics do not prove whether Colonel Bucci’s report to Secretary

Rumsfeld was, in fact, the first Secretary Rumsfeld learned of the

possibility of fratricide as the cause of Corporal Tillman’s death.

CENTCOM commander, U.S. Army Gen. John P. Abizaid, testified before the Committee about his interaction with Secretary

Rumsfeld in May 2004. Gen. Abizaid said, ‘‘I was in Washington

from the 18th to the 20th [of May 2004] and I talked with [SecVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:08 Sep 17, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00061 Fmt 6604 Sfmt 6604 C:\DOCS\69006.TXT KATIE PsN: KATIE
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37Tillman Hearing II at Tr. 76. See also id. at Tr. 26. 38 Interview by DOD IG staff of Gen. John P. Abizaid, then-U.S. CENTCOM Commander (Dec.

13, 2006) [hereinafter Abizaid IG Transcript], at Tr. 7, 9. There is further uncertainty about

this matter. According to Gen. Abizaid, his only knowledge of the possibility of fratricide as the

cause of Corporal Tillman’s death derived from an Army communication known as a P4 (discussed further in text below). See Letter from Gen. (Ret.) John P. Abizaid, former U.S.

CENTCOM Commander, to Henry A. Waxman, Chairman, House Oversight and Government

Refrom Committee, and Tom Davis, Ranking Member, House Oversight and Government Reform Committee (Jan. 15, 2008) [hereinafter Abizaid/Committee Letter]. However, the IG determined Gen. Abizaid received this P4 sometime between May 6 and May 20, 2004 (See DoD IG

Report (unnumbered appendix)). Assuming the accuracy of Gen. Abizaid’s recollection that he

received the P4 before meeting with Secretary Rumsfeld, it appears either Gen. Abizaid

misremembers the date of his meeting (and it actually occurred later than he remembers), or

the DoD IG erred in concluding Gen. Abizaid could have received the P4 as late as May 18,

2004 or thereafter. It is not possible to reconcile both possibilities. 39 Bush Transcript at Tr. 53–54, 81–84. See also E-mail from Lt. Col. Hans Bush, U.S. Army,

to various (Jun. 2, 2004; 10:17 EDT) (bates nos. 2250–2905 to 2250–2906). For description of

the routine circumstances of this e-mail, see, e.g., Bush Transcript at Tr. 66–67, 79–81, 90. For

Di Rita’s description of his involvement, see Di Rita Transcript at Tr. 63–76. 40See, e.g., Tillman Hearing II at Tr. 33. 41 Id. at Tr. 47–48 (statement by Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary, U.S. Department of Defense).

See also Craddock Transcript at Tr. 37–38.

retary Rumsfeld] during that period, and I believe during that period I discussed with him the fratricide investigation.’’ 37 In a December 2006 colloquy with the DoD IG, however, about ‘‘what if

any action you took after receiving the information that friendly

fire was suspected,’’ Gen. Abizaid was asked, ‘‘[d]id you have any

discussions with [] the Secretary of Defense,’’ to which Gen. Abizaid

answered, ‘‘No. I didn’t talk to the Secretary of defense about it.’’ 38

The Committee is unable to reconcile these statements.

No individual who gave testimony to the Committee provided

support to Gen. Abizaid’s recollection of talking with Secretary

Rumsfeld between May 18 and May 20, 2004, about the possibility

of Corporal Tillman’s death being a fratricide. No one recalled this

exchange nor said that Secretary Rumsfeld commented upon it. In

addition, if Secretary Rumsfeld had been informed during this period, there is no evidence that he ordered any action to be taken

as a result.

The Committee received testimony and documents that public affairs officials at the U.S. Army Special Operations Command

(USASOC) were among those individuals informed on May 27,

2004, that an investigation into Corporal Tillman’s death was

about to be approved by CENTCOM. Consequently, these officials,

working with Di Rita, began preparations for notifying Congress

and the media.39 Gen. Abizaid’s possible notification of Secretary

Rumsfeld would have come just as the friendly fire investigation

was about to formally conclude and preparations for announcing

the findings were about to begin. It is not clear what instructions

Secretary Rumsfeld could have issued at that time even if he had

wanted to do so.40

Based upon documentary evidence provided to the Committee, as

well as interviews and testimony, the most senior officials at the

Pentagon seem not to have been preoccupied by the news of Corporal Tillman’s death, aware of the breadth of related media coverage, inquisitive about the ensuing investigation, or cognizant of

the existence or application of Army next-of-kin regulations.41 In

addition, to the extent senior officers at the Pentagon and others

were aware of impressions held by the public relating to the circumstances of Corporal Tillman’s death, it is not at all apparent

they understood that such impressions were being derived from acVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:08 Sep 17, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00062 Fmt 6604 Sfmt 6604 C:\DOCS\69006.TXT KATIE PsN: KATIE
59

42See, e.g., Tillman Hearing II at Tr. 70–72, 113–114, 147–149. 43See DoD IG Report (unnumbered appendix). 44 Id. at 44. 45See, e.g., Bush Transcript at Tr. 58. 46 E-mail from SFC Darien Swilley, USA SOC, to various (Apr. 22, 2004; 16:28 EDT). 47DOD IG Report at 42–43. 48See, e.g., Currin Transcript at Tr. 17; Gross Transcript at Tr. 8, 39–40. Further, McClellan

stated that he learned from Gross. McClellan Interview. 49See, e.g., E-mail from Ron Fournier, Reporter, Associated Press, to Karl Rove, Political Advisor, White House (Apr. 23, 2004; 11:45 EDT) (bates no. HOGR004–00684); E-mail from Peter

H. Wehner, Director, Strategic Initiatives, White House, to various (White House official appears to have been blind carbon copied) (Apr. 23, 2004; 11:44 EDT) (bates no. HOGR004–01040). 50See, e.g., E-mail from Steve Cardona to Michael Gerson, Chief Speechwriter, White House

(Apr. 25, 2004; 16:35 EDT) (bates HOGR004–00976 to -0977); E-mail from Barry S. Jackson,

Deputy Political Advisor, White House, to Karl Rove, Political Advisor, White House (Apr. 23,

2004; 17:05 EDT) (bates HOGR004–01120); E-mail from Peggy Noonan to Peter H. Wehner

(Apr. 23, 2004; 12:47 EDT) (bates no. HOGR004–00560).

tions (or inaction) ascribed to the DoD, and hence ostensibly subject to corrective action by DoD. This situation is further complicated by DoD’s persistent deference to the military’s hierarchical

environment and delineated lines of authority in which responsibility for handling Army battle deaths rested only with certain individuals and institutions.42

In addition, as outlined above, it seems Pentagon officials initiated arrangements to announce the friendly fire findings as soon

as they received word that the investigation was concluding. The

DoD IG concluded that Kevin Tillman, Corporal Tillman’s brother,

was informed of the fratricide finding on May 26, 2004.43 The IG

concluded that Corporal Tillman’s wife, Marie Tillman, was notified

the next day.44 The Committee took testimony from several witnesses who suggested the timeline for Marie Tillman’s notification

was spurred by the fact that media inquires were being made

about the friendly fire results even before Lt. Gen. Philip

Kensinger’s public announcement.45

III. THE WHITE HOUSE

A. INITIAL ANNOUNCEMENT OF DEATH

The Army Special Operations Command communicated word of

Corporal Tillman’s death to the Army Human Resources Command

in Alexandria, Virginia at 4:28 p.m. on April 22, 2004.46 As outlined in the DoD IG’s report, because of erroneous details provided

by the Army medical facility which received Corporal Tillman’s

body, the form which transmitted the details of death indicated

‘‘hostile’’ fire from ‘‘enemy forces’’ as the cause of death.47 There is

no evidence that senior Defense or White House officials were

aware of this report.

Evidence gathered by the Committee, including e-mails and

interviews conducted by Committee staff demonstrate that White

House staffers learned about Corporal Tillman’s death from television news reports or from individuals who had received information from these sources.48 As a result of news coverage, a number

of White House employees, friends, family members, and colleagues

sent e-mail to advise of the tragedy and to express their own personal shock and remorse.49 That day and later, some individuals

provided unsolicited suggestions for White House action or sought

more information from their contacts there.50

60

51Gross Transcript at Tr. 8, 39–40. 52 Id. at Tr. 41. 53Gross Transcript at Tr. 49–50. 54 E-mail from Daniel J. Bartlett, White House Communications Director, to Taylor Gross,

Spokesman, White House Media Affairs, and Scott McClellan, White House Press Secretary

(among others) (Apr. 23, 2004; 11:55 EDT) (bates HOGR004–01083) (responding to E-mail from

Taylor Gross, Spokesman, White House Media Affairs, to Daniel Bartlett, White House Communications Director, and Scott McClellan, White House Press Secretary, (among others) (Apr. 23,

2004; 11:55 EDT)). 55 E-mail from Daniel J. Bartlett, White House Communications Director, to Scott McClellan,

White House Press Secretary (Apr. 23, 2004; 11:45 EDT) (bates no. HOGR004–01084). 56 E-mail from Daniel J. Bartlett, White House Communications Director, to Matthew Dowd,

Bush Campaign Official (Apr. 23, 2004; 11:53 EDT) (bates no. HOGR004–01704) (responding to

E-mail from Matthew Dowd, Bush Campaign Official, to Daniel J. Bartlett, White House Communications Director (Apr. 23, 2004; 11:50 EDT)).

The White House produced nearly 200 pages of e-mails referencing Corporal Tillman in response to the Committee’s subpoena. It

is difficult to argue, however, that the large number of e-mails

somehow reflects a particular interest on the part of White House

staffers in the matter of Corporal Tillman’s death. In fact, a large

percentage of this computer traffic consists of messages to and from

White House employees (many very junior) and friends or family

in which the parties mention Corporal Tillman’s death and express

sympathy. In some instances, the chains continue at great length

and diverge into a myriad of unrelated private topics. Because the

Committee’s subpoena required the entirety of such exchanges be

produced, this had the affect of inflating the volume of material

provided to the Committee and providing a distorted impression of

official White House interest beyond that reported herein.

Taylor Gross, a spokesman in the White House Media Affairs office, who was responsible for media outlets and issues in the South

and Southwestern U.S., told the Committee that he learned from

a cable television news broadcast at approximately 10:00 am on

April 23, 2004 that Corporal Tillman had been killed.51 Shortly

thereafter, Gross had started to receive a number of inquiries from

Arizona journalists about ‘‘what the President thinks about Pat

Tillman’s death.’’ 52 The interest of Arizona media stemmed from

the fact that Corporal Tillman had played college and professional

football in Arizona. At 11:40 am, Gross, on his own initiative, drafted remarks which he proposed to distribute to reporters in response to such queries, and then sought approval from his supervisors, including White House Communications Director Dan Bartlett and White House Press Secretary Scott McClellan, for the comments he had prepared.53 Specifically, Gross proposed replying to

these media inquiries by saying:

Pat Tillman was an inspiration on the football field and in

his private life. As with all who made the ultimate sacrifice in the war on terror, his family are in the thoughts

and prayers of President and Mrs. Bush.54

Five minutes later, Bartlett wrote McClellan, ‘‘does this set a

precedent? i’m fine with it.’’ 55

In this period, Bartlett also received an e-mail from Matthew

Dowd, a Bush campaign official who suggested (using an abbreviation for the President of the United States,) that

Potus should call his family or go to Arizona [. . . .] True

hero.56

61

57 Id. 58 E-mail from Scott McClellan, White House Press Secretary, to Daniel J. Bartlett, White

House Communications Director (Apr. 23, 2004; 11:54 EDT) (bates no. HOGR004–01091); see

also McClellan Interview. Senior advisors on the Presidential campaign agreed. Mark McKinnon,

Media Advisor, Bush Campaign, wrote to Bartlett: ‘‘[I r]ealize President really shouldn’t do anything that he hasn’t done for any other solider killed in the military, but certainly think he

could say something about he exemplified the ultimate in humility, heroism, and sacrifice.’’ Email from Mark McKinnon, Media Advisor, Bush Campaign, to Daniel J. Bartlett, White House

Communications Director (Apr. 23, 2004; 13:01 EDT) (bates no. HOGR004–01099). 59 E-mail from Daniel J. Bartlett, White House Communications Director, to Taylor Gross,

Spokesman, White House Media Affairs, and Scott McClellan, White House Press Secretary

(among others) (Apr. 23, 2004; 11:55 EDT) (bates no. HOGR004–01083) (responding to E-mail

from Taylor Gross, Spokesman, White House Media Affairs, to Daniel Bartlett, White House

Communications Director, and Scott McClellan, White House Press Secretary (among others)

(Apr. 23, 2004; 11:55 EDT)). 60Gross Transcript at Tr. 79. 61 Id. at Tr. 60–62, 86–87. See also Bartlett Interview; McClellan Interview. 62Gross told the Committee he never talked to the President about Corporal Tillman on the

day the soldier was killed or otherwise. Gross Transcript at Tr. 113. In responding to an e-mail

about Corporal Tillman’s death from a friend, Gross wrote ‘‘[d]on’t know if you saw my quote

about this in the AZ Republic web site, but obviously the President was notified and the White

House mourns his loss.’’ E-mail from Taylor Gross, Spokesman, White House Media Affairs, to

[name withheld by Committee staff] (Apr. 23, 2004; 19:07 EDT) (bates no. HOGR004–00234 to

00236). Gross also told Committee staff that he actually had no knowledge of the President’s

notification. Gross Transcript at Tr. 111–113. It is possible Gross meant to imply otherwise in

order to impress a friend.

Bartlett responded at 11:53 am and, in doing so, conveyed the concerns he was apparently contemplating in considering Gross’ proposal. ‘‘. . . I agree he is a hero,’’ Bartlett wrote,

But there will be a lot of pressure not to single out one guy

just because he was a football player. We are providing a

statement to the AZ press, but we will have to discuss anything broader.57

McClellan responded to Gross’ suggestion similarly:

[I t]hink it is fine to respond if asked, as long as we always

keep in context of president mourns loss of all those who

have sacrificed to make America safer.58

With agreement apparently at hand, Bartlett e-mailed Gross: ‘‘good

to go.’’ 59 With this approval, Gross replied to press queries from

his region with the two-sentence script.60

Based on staff interviews and e-mails, it seems White House officials specifically rejected other options when deciding to proceed in

this manner. One alternative was to offer comments on the matter

without waiting to receive press inquiries. Another possibility was

to issue a Presidential ‘‘statement’’ remarks intended to be directly

attributed to the chief executive. While these alternatives may

seem to differ little from the chosen course of action, the distinctions were significant to the White House press office as it wrestled

with the issue. The press officials sought to acknowledge the tragedy of Corporal Tillman’s death, but in a manner which did not

slight others. White House staffers believed their approach (a relatively junior employee responding only when asked) properly balanced these competing demands.61

Indeed, it was not possible to determine how and when the President learned that Corporal Tillman had been killed.62 However, the

President was out of Washington on April 23, 2004; the deputy

62

63 E-mail from Trent Duffy, Deputy White House Press Secretary, to Claire Buchan, Deputy

White House Press Secretary (Apr. 23, 2004; 15:15 EDT) (bates no. HOGR004–01080). See also

McClellan Interview. 64See, e.g., E-mail from Trent Duffy, Deputy White House Press Secretary, to Claire Buchan,

Deputy White House Press Secretary (Apr. 23, 2004; 15:15 EDT) (bates no. HOGR004–01080);

E-mail from Claire Buchan, Deputy White House Press Secretary, to Sean McCormack, Spokesman, National Security Council (Apr. 23, 2004; 16:07 EDT) (bates no. HOGR004–01107); E-mail

from Suzy DeFrancis, Deputy Assistant, White House Communications, to Scott McClellan,

White House Press Secretary (Apr. 23, 2004 16:31) (bates no. HOGR004–01110). 65 E-mail from Claire Buchan, Deputy White House Press Secretary, to Scott McClellan, White

House Press Secretary (among others) (Apr. 23, 2004; 12:40 EDT) (bates no. HOGR004–01109)

(emphasis in original). 66 E-mail from Scott McClellan, White House Press Secretary, to Claire Buchan, Deputy White

House Press Secretary, Trent Duffy, Deputy White House Press Secretary, and Sean McCormack, Spokesman, National Security Council (Apr. 23, 2004; 13:37 EDT) (Committee staff notes

from in camera review). 67Gross Transcript at Tr. 84–86; Currin Transcript at Tr. 8, 14–15. 68 E-mail from Noam Neusner, White House, Speechwriter, to Erin Healy, White House staff

(Apr. 23, 2004; 16:50) (Committee staff notes from in camera review). 69 E-mail from Suzy DeFrancis, Deputy Assistant, White House Communications, to Scott

McClellan, White House Press Secretary (Apr. 23, 2004 16:31) (bates no. HOGR004–01110). 70 E-mail from Scott McClellan, White House Press Secretary, to Suzy DeFrancis, Deputy Assistant, White House Communications (Apr. 23, 2004; 19:10 EDT) (bates no. HOGR004–01122). 71 E-mail from Scott McClellan, White House Press Secretary, to Jeanie Mamo, Director,

Media Affairs, White House, and Taylor Gross, Spokesman, White House Media Affairs (Apr.

23, 2004; 19:21 EDT) (bates no. HOGR004–01124).

press secretary traveling with him forwarded inquiries about Corporal Tillman to colleagues in the White House.63

In Washington, however, soon after Gross acted upon Bartlett’s

instructions, two problems became apparent. First, once Gross provided his remarks to the Arizona media, some outlets elsewhere repeated his comments, but inaccurately described them as a ‘‘statement’’ from the President.64 Because officials had specifically

sought to avoid this situation, this mischaracterization caused confusion and angst in the White House. ‘‘[Dan Bartlett] approved a

comment from taylor gross for the Arizona papers,’’ one staffer

explained with apparent exasperation, yet ‘‘our wires are asking

what the white house statement was.’’ 65 ‘‘[W]e are not putting out

a statement, we are responding if asked,’’ explained McClellan.66

Media reports of the White House reaction confused even those

who worked there. A White House speechwriter, employed in the

office charged with authoring Presidential statements, was perplexed by the coverage.67 ‘‘Did we issue a ‘statement of sympathy’

on Tillman’s death?’’ he asked a colleague, ‘‘So says MSNBC.’’ 68

Another befuddled staffer queried McClellan that afternoon, ‘‘Did

we put out a statement as MSNBC said[?]’’ 69 ‘‘No-ap reported it

that way,’’ McClellan responded. He added, ‘‘[w]e should correct

msnbc too.’’ 70 Later that evening, McClellan instructed Gross and

the individual in charge of Media Affairs, ‘‘let’s make sure we correct if people r [sic] saying we put out a statement.’’ 71

The second problem became apparent when the White House

press office learned that the Defense Department had not yet officially confirmed the fact that Corporal Tillman had been killed.

This meant that the White House was in the awkward position of

commenting upon a wartime death before the Pentagon had announced it. The 2004 National Defense Authorization Act, which

became law in November 2003, contained a provision prohibiting

DoD from releasing the names of casualties until twenty-four hours

after next-of-kin had been notified. The legislation was meant to

prevent the possibility of family members learning of a death from

news accounts. By ensuring that relatives will not be contacted by

63

72See, e.g., Gross Transcript at Tr. 68–70; McClellan Interview; Bartlett Interview. 73Gross had no knowledge whatsoever of any communications between DoD and the White

House. Gross Transcript at Tr. 45. 74 E-mail from Claire Buchan, Deputy White House Press Secretary, to Trent Duffy, Deputy

White House Press Secretary, and Scott McClellan, White House Press Secretary (Apr. 23, 2004;

12:54 EDT) (bates no. HOGR004–01108). This e-mail also reports ‘‘next of kin still being notified.’’ Id. (NB: This was erroneous; by this time Corporal Tillman’s parents and widow had been

informed.) 75 E-mail from Claire Buchan, Deputy White House Press Secretary, to Sean McCormack,

Spokesman, National Security Council (Apr. 23, 2004; 16:07 EDT) (bates no. HOGR0004–01107)

(including E-mail from Claire Buchan, Deputy White House Press Secretary, to Sean McCormack, Spokesman, National Security Council (Apr. 23, 2004; 16:00 EDT)). 76 Id. (including E-mail from Sean McCormack, Spokesman, National Security Council, to

Claire Buchan, Deputy White House Press Secretary (Apr. 23, 2004; 16:06 EDT)). 77 Id. 78 Id. Buchan continued, ‘‘are you anticipating a bigger problem than just managing this?’’ Id. 79 E-mail from Shari Lawrence, Deputy Public Affairs Officer, U.S. Army Human Resources

Command, to various (Apr. 23, 2004; 15:59 EDT) (bates no. 200–205) (forwarding death notice

data sheet of Corporal Tillman). For instructions on release date and time as well as death notice data sheet, see id. Note that the release indicates the statement ‘‘[t]he incident is under

investigation.’’ Id. This apparently was standard phraseology used on all announcements of theContinued

the media immediately upon notification, the provision also ensures

that survivors have time to consider how to respond.

Unfortunately, because the media were running stories about

Corporal Tillman’s death even in the absence of official confirmation, the law’s goals were stymied even before the White House

elected to respond to inquiries on the matter. Significantly, however, White House officials denied knowing of the legislation.72

This may be because in the seven months between its enactment

and Corporal Tillman’s death, the White House had not been

queried about a specific wartime death, and thus, there had been

little cause for White House employees to know of a prohibition on

Pentagon actions. There is no evidence the White House intentionally acted in contravention of this provision.

It seems that White House and DoD officials did not communicate about the Corporal Tillman case until after Gross began to

reply to inquires.73 As a result, Claire Buchan, one of two White

House deputy press secretaries, somehow learned that the Pentagon had not yet announced Corporal Tillman’s death. At 12:54 pm

(fifty-nine minutes after approval had been given to Gross), Buchan

sent an e-mail to McClellan. The e-mail was captioned ‘‘alert—do

not use tillman statement,’’ the text said, in part, ‘‘dod is not confirming that he is dead,’’ but conceded, ‘‘unfortunately, taylor’s

statement is on the wire.’’ 74

Apparently seeking details of what she thought was an imminently forthcoming Defense Department release, Buchan then inquired of Sean McCormack, the National Security Council’s spokesman, ‘‘can you bug your friend at dod[?]’’ 75 Presumably speaking

of Pentagon officials, McCormack replied, ‘‘not confirming yet;’’ 76

and he added, ‘‘this will soon become a problem.’’ 77 Buchan responded

trust me. it is already. i have everyone and their brother

bugging me for ‘the statement.’ can they give you any

sense of timing? 78

In fact, the Pentagon release was not issued until 11:15 pm; about

ten hours later. As required, this was twenty-four hours after Corporal Tillman’s family was informed of his death.79

64

ater deaths at the time. See, e.g., Bush Transcript at Tr. 23–24; Henderson Transcript at Tr.

24.80 E-mail from Scott McClellan, White House Press Secretary, to Suzy DeFrancis, Deputy Assistant, White House Communications (Apr. 23, 2004; 19:10 EDT) (bates no. HOGR004–01122). 81Gross Transcript at Tr. 52–3, 64–67, 70, 93–96. 82 Bartlett Interview. In addition, McClellan said this was something Gross’ office ‘‘could have

done.’’ McClellan Interview (Committee staff notes). 83Gross Transcript at Tr. 41–42, 44, 46–47. 84McClellan Interview. 85Gross Transcript at Tr. 75. 86 Id. at Tr. 98. 87 Id. 88 E-mail from Claire Buchan, Deputy White House Press Secretary, to Sean I. McCormack,

Spokesman, National Security Council (Apr 26, 2004; 11:36 EDT) (bates no. HOGR004–01105).

Four hours before the DoD release, in the course of instructing

subordinates to ensure media outlets corrected any

mischaracterization of Gross’ remarks, McClellan outlined his understanding of what had transpired that day:

Media affairs commented when asked for reaction from Arizona press. They did not check to verify if it had been confirmed.80

In an interview with the Committee, Gross acknowledged that he

did not confirm news accounts of Corporal Tillman’s death before

drafting the proposed response. He explained that he assumed, if

confirmation was to be secured, it was the responsibility of others.81 Bartlett, in his interview with the Committee, said he assumed someone had done so.82 Although the Committee did not receive any White House documents which reflect this, Gross also recalled ‘‘verbal conversations’’ with staffers (although he could not

remember which) about the veracity of the broadcast reports,

whether or not Corporal Tillman’s family had been informed, and

the desirability of a response from the Pentagon or White House.83

McClellan told the Committee that although Corporal Tillman’s

death was certainly newsworthy, it did not ‘‘dominate’’ press office

duties that day.84 Gross recalls no after-action follow-up on the

matter.85 Indeed, Gross told the Committee that ‘‘my knowledge of

Pat Tillman’s death, and any information about Pat Tillman’s

death stopped’’ on April 23.86 He declared ‘‘I never once, to my

recollection, again took up the subject’’ aside from ‘‘maybe a friend

or two e-mailing me or contacting me over the phone. . . .’’ 87

Staffers also apparently did not attempt to discern the basis of

the mix-up surrounding Gross’ remarks. This may be because it

was a Friday when the White House reacted to news of Corporal

Tillman’s death. By the next business day (Monday, April 26), concern about White House actions appear to have dissipated and

other events had come to preoccupy staffers.

It seems Buchan did not take note of the official Pentagon release until returning to work after being off for the weekend. On

April 26 at 11:36 am she e-mailed McCormack, ‘‘i see the army is

finally confirming it.’’ 88 Although she had known since the afternoon of April 23 that the White House response had preceded the

Defense Department’s announcement, she seems not to have monitored the situation later that day in order to determine how long

in advance Gross’ remarks had circulated.

65

89 E-mail from Robert Pratt, White House staff, to various (May 3, 2004; 13:01 EDT) (bates

no. HOGR004–00613) (forwarding E-mail from Margaret Suntum, White House staff, to various

(May 3, 2004; 12:54 EDT), including Official Remarks by the President at the White House Correspondents Dinner, May 1, 2004). 90 E-mail from Lee Bockhorn, Research Assistant, White House, to Michael J. Gerson, Chief

Speechwriter, White House (Apr. 27, 2004; 13:49 EDT (bates no. HOGR004–01137). 91 Id. 92 Id. (citing, Richard Lacayo, One For The Team, TIME MAG. (May 3, 2004) (quoting Corporal

Pat Tillman)). See also, Currin Transcript at Tr. 9, 47–48. 93For description of fact checker responsibilities and process, see Currin Transcript at Tr. 6–

7, 12. 94For Henderson’s role, see Currin Transcript at Tr. 15, 23; Henderson Transcript at Tr. 22–

23, 31. For understanding of the routine nature of contact, see Henderson Transcript at Tr. 29,

46–49. 95 E-mail from John Currin, White House speechwriting factchecker, to Hedy Henderson, Office of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense (Apr. 29, 2004; 13:50 EDT) (bates

Continued

B. CORRESPONDENTS DINNER SPEECH

On May 1, eight days after the announcement that Corporal Tillman had been killed, the President gave remarks at the annual

White House Correspondents Dinner. In this short speech, the

President spoke of wartime journalists (including those killed in action) and World War II veterans. He also said:

The loss of Army Corporal Pat Tillman last week in Afghanistan brought home the sorrow that comes with every

loss, and reminds us of the character of the men and

women who serve on our behalf. Friends say that this

young man saw the images of September the 11th, and

seeing that evil, he felt called to defend America. He set

aside a career in athletics and many things the world

counts important: wealth and security and the acclaim of

the crowds. He chose, instead, the rigors of Ranger training and the fellowship of soldiers and the hard duty in Afghanistan and Iraq. Corporal Tillman asked for no special

attention. He was modest because he knew there were

many like him, making their own sacrifices.89

In an April 27, 2004 e-mail to Gerson from research assistant,

Lee Bockhorn, Bockhorn conveyed three news clippings about Corporal Tillman to the speechwriter, with the note, ‘‘[y]ou asked for

the ‘most moving’ stuff on Corporal Tillman, particularly anything

he said. . . .’’ 90 Bockhorn noted ‘‘pretty remarkable’’ comments by

Corporal Tillman on September 12, 2001, about the affect of the

previous day’s terrorist attacks on his professional aspirations.91

‘‘At times like this,’’ one clip quoted Corporal Tillman as saying,

compared to other relatives who had served in the military, he believed he hadn’t ‘‘done a damn thing as far as laying myself on the

line like that.’’ 92

As the speech was being finalized, a draft was provided to John

Currin, the White House speechwriting ‘‘fact-checker’’ for review.93

On the morning of April 28, Currin e-mailed Hedy Henderson, a

counterpart at the Defense Department.94 He wrote

I hope you can help us confirm some information. We are

putting in the President’s remarks at the correspondent’s

[sic] dinner a few lines about Pat Tillman. We need to get

confirmed his rank and that he did tours of duty in both

Afghanistan and Iraq.95

66

no. 14005) (forwarding E-mail from John Currin, White House speechwriting factchecker, to

Hedy Henderson, Office of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense (Apr. 28, 204;

11:45 EDT). 96 Id. (forwarding E-mail from Hedy Henderson, Office of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense, to John Currin, White House speechwriting factchecker (Apr. 28, 2004;

11:59 EDT). Henderson told Committee staff that she recalled these were the only points Currin

raised with her during this call, not Corporal Tillman’s enlistment motivations. Henderson said

she had ‘‘vague’’ recollections that it was ‘‘very possible’’ this topic came up. Henderson Transcript at Tr. 27–28, 34–40, 44–45. Currin had the same recollection. Currin Transcript at Tr.

75–76. 97 E-mail from Hedy Henderson, Office of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense, to John Currin, White House speechwriting factchecker (Apr. 28, 2004; 14:03 EDT) (citing

U.S. Army Special Operations Command News Service, Press Release 040423–01: Army Ranger

killed in Afghanistan, Apr. 23, 2004) (forwarding E-mail from John Currin, White House speechwriting factchecker to Hedy Henderson, Office of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of

Defense (Apr. 28, 2004; 13:46 EDT). See also Henderson Transcript at Tr. 28, 38, 42–43. For

the routine origins of the release, see Darby Transcript at Tr. 28–31. Henderson also apparently

talked with Darby before referring Currin to her. Id. 98 Currin Transcript at Tr. 29–31. 99 Henderson Transcript at Tr. 21. 100 Id. at Tr. 21–22, 29. 101Sworn Statement by Carol Darby, Public Affairs Officer, U.S. Army (Feb. 22, 2005) (available in DoD IG Report (unnumbered appendix)). 102 Currin Transcript at Tr. 35, 71. 103 Id. at Tr. 72.

Henderson responded by forwarding the April 23, 2004 Defense Department press release announcing the death and commented ‘‘I’m

still checking the Afghanistan/Iraq part.’’ 96

Between 12:40 pm and 2:03 pm on April 27, 2004, Currin and

Henderson then exchanged five e-mails about the nations in which

Corporal Tillman served and the proper way to refer to his rank.

When Currin was told that Corporal Tillman was a Specialist, he

replied (referencing those who crafted the speech), ‘‘The writers

pulled from a news article that put his rank as sergeant;’’ as if by

explanation, Henderson responded only with the Internet link to an

Army Special Operations Command statement about Corporal Tillman’s death (which noted he ‘‘received a posthumous lateral appointment April 26 from the rank of specialist to corporal’’) and the

name and telephone number of Carol Darby, the Special Operations Command’s civilian public affairs officer at Fort Lewis,

Washington.97 Currin apparently then called Darby to discuss

these matters further.98

Henderson told the Committee ‘‘probably sometime in late May’’

2004 she learned ‘‘[f]rom the news’’ that Corporal Tillman was possibly a victim of fratricide.99 Before then she did not know an investigation was underway nor had she heard any suggestion that

speeches with which she was involved ‘‘should avoid going into detail about how Corporal Tillman died.’’ 100

Darby similarly testified that she had no knowledge of fratricide

or an investigation until weeks after her communication with

Currin; this was consistent with an affidavit she had executed in

February 2005.101 Lastly, Currin told the committee that neither

Henderson nor Darby apprised him that friendly fire was suspected

in Corporal Tillman’s death or an inquiry was ongoing, and no

speech draft he saw referenced in any way the circumstances in

which the soldier died.102 Indeed, he did not learn of the fratricide

finding until after the Army released the information publicly on

May 29.103

67

104Darby Transcript at Tr. 39. 105 Id. 106 Id. 107 E-mail from John Currin, White House speechwriting fact checker, to Matthew Scully,

Deputy Speechwriter, White House (Apr. 28, 2004; 14:09 EDT) (bates no. HOGR004–01093).

Throughout the time the Tillman brothers were stationed at Fort Lewis, Darby was responsible

for conveying various media requests to them. She told the Committee she thought they declined

interview requests because ‘‘they wanted to do what they had joined to do without the interruptions of media query and media involvement;’’ in describing to the Committee her encounter

with Currin, Darby denied the suggestion that she knew Tillman refused to reveal the reason

he joined the Army. Rather, she stated she did not know his motivation. Darby Transcript at

Tr. 22, 41–42. 108 E-mail from John Currin, White House speechwriting fact checker, to Matthew Scully,

Deputy Speechwriter, White House (Apr. 28, 2004; 14:25 EDT) (bates no. HOGR004–010904)

(forwarding E-mail from Matthew Scully Deputy Speechwriter, White House, to John Currin,

White House speechwriting fact checker (Apr. 28, 14:11 EDT). 109 Currin Transcript at Tr. 51, 53. 110 E-mail from John Currin, White House speechwriting fact checker, to Matthew Scully,

Deputy Speechwriter, White House (Apr. 28, 2004; 14:25 EDT) (bates no. HOGR004–010904).

In describing her contact with the fact-checker, Darby told the

Committee Currin also asked ‘‘if I could tell him why Pat Tillman

joined the Army. . . .’’ 104 She recounted her response:

I told him no, that I could not, that I had never talked to

either of the [Tillman] brothers and I had never seen anything in print of any sort that stated why they joined the

Army. But I had seen press reports where Pat’s coach had

spoke [sic] of something along those lines, but [the reports]

didn’t really give exactly why Pat joined the Army.105

In response to a request from Currin, Darby faxed him copies of

the articles she had at hand.106

Currin apparently reviewed this material, and then queried Matthew Scully, one of Gerson’s deputies:

What is your source for the statement that Corporal Tillman seeing on September 11 the burning towers on television, felt called to fight that evil. Going back to press accounts at the time, Corporal Tillman refused to give his

reasons, and kept it to himself.107

Scully replied (possibly referencing the packet of news clips that

had been provided by Bockhorn) ‘‘[s]hould be in news accounts.’’ 108

Currin told the Committee he never saw the e-mail from Bockhorn

or its attachments.109 This may be why, in reply to Gerson, Currin

(while also noting Corporal Tillman ‘‘ha[d] been posthumously promoted to Corporal’’) responded:

My DoD contact, who checked with the Rangers, confirm

[sic] that he never gave any media interview [sic] or discussed the reasons why he left the NFL to join the Rangers. [. . .] But given that he never spoke to the press

about his reasons for joining the Rangers, we simply do

not have support for the statement that he decided to join

the Rangers after seeing the burning towers on television.110

About one and a half hours later, Currin wrote again:

There is no direct support for the statement that Pat Tillman saw the burning towers on television and felt called

to fight the evil behind it. Tillman and his brother never

discussed their reasons with the press, nor have their parVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:08 Sep 17, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00071 Fmt 6604 Sfmt 6604 C:\DOCS\69006.TXT KATIE PsN: KATIE
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111 E-mail from John Currin, White House speechwriting fact checker, to Matthew Scully,

Deputy Speechwriter, White House, Michael Gerson, Chief Speechwriter, White House, and others (Apr. 28, 2004; 15:53 EDT) (bates no. HOGR004–01095). 112 E-mail from John Currin, White House speechwriting fact checker, to Matthew Scully,

Deputy Speechwriter, White House, Michael Gerson, Chief Speechwriter, White House, and others (Apr. 29, 2004, 13:47 EDT) (bates no. HOGR004–01096) (‘‘CACO’’ which is mentioned in this

e-mail is an abbreviation for Casualty Assistant Calls Officer, an individual assigned by the

Army to provide advice and counseling to next of kin on the military’s procedures and protocols

in the case of active duty deaths.). Currin told Committee staff that he routinely submitted written remarks and sometimes other back-up material to the White House staff secretary about

the items he fact-checked. Thus, it is possible that at least one other White House official (other

than those known to be the e-mail recipients) were apprised of the substance of Currin’s conversations with Darby. Currin Transcript at Tr. 12–14, 42–44, 64–65, 74–75.

ents. Tillman kept his reasons to himself. The people at

Fort Lewis, the base for Tillman’s unit, could not confirm

that September 11 was the reason why Tillman joined the

Army. All that I and Carol Darby at USASOC (Ft. Lewis)

could find is mention in a news article from March 2003

that says that ‘‘friends say the brothers were deeply affected by the September 11 terrorist attacks and felt compelled to enlist.’’ We do not know if these friends were

speculating about Tillman’s reasons or if they had direct

knowledge of Tillman’s reasons. The bottom line is that

Tillman never stated publicly his reasons for joining the

Rangers, and it is speculation that he did so because of

September 11.111

The next afternoon, it seems that Darby called Currin to discuss

the matter further. The fact-checker summarized this conversation

in an e-mail to Gerson, Scully, and a third speechwriter:

As I mentioned yesterday, Pat Tillman and his family

never spoke about the reasons why he chose to leave the

NFL and join the Army, and the statement in the remarks

for the correspondence dinner attributing his motivation to

seeing the burning towers on 9/11 is speculation. I spoke

yesterday with Carol Darby at Ft. Lewis (the base for the

Rangers) to check on Tillman’s correct rank and see if she

could verify Tillman’s reasons for joining the Rangers.

Carol phoned me just now to ask if we wanted to go

through the CACO assigned to the Tillman family and see

if they would want to talk to us about Corporal Tillman’s

reasons for joining the Army. I am not certain if we would

want to approach the family in their time of grief (they

will receive Corporal Tillman’s remains today), or if you

can work around the problem of not knowing as fact the

reasons that motivated Tillman to join the Army. Let me

know if you want me to go through the Tillman family

CACO to see if the family will let us know his reasons. My

sense, however, is that because Tillman wanted to keep

his reasons private, and because his family continues to respect his wish to this day, we should as well, and work as

best we can around the speculation.112

In a subsequent exchange of e-mails, Gerson referred Currin to a

‘‘new draft’’ of the speech which the writer believed addressed the

fact-checker’s concerns. Currin responded by saying, ‘‘I gather you

69

113 E-mail from John Currin, White House speechwriting fact checker, to Michael J. Gerson,

Chief Speechwriter, White House (Apr. 29, 2004; 14:01 EDT) (bates HOGR004–01086). 114 E-mail from Michael J. Gerson, Chief Speechwriter, White House, to John Currin, White

House speechwriting fact checker (Apr. 29, 2004; 14:02 EDT) (Committee staff notes from in

camera review). 115See E-mails to/from John Currin, White House speechwriting fact checker (Committee staff

notes from in camera review). See also Currin Transcript at Tr. 55–56. 116 Id. at Tr. 35–37, 55, 63, 67–68. 117 Currin Transcript at Tr. 57, 70. 118 Nick Wishart, Tillman Declines to Discuss his Enlistment in Army, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Jul. 14, 2002, D5 (noting ‘‘[Tillman] is not talking to the media . . . He wants to be left

alone to pursue his most recent goal, leaving the rest of us to speculate on his motivations.’’) 119Mark Emmons, Tillman Takes His Won Path from NFL to Army; Friends and Family of

Arizona’s Pat Tillman Aren’t Surprised He’s Giving Up NFL Lifestyle to Become an Army Ranger, WICHITA EAGLE, Jun. 4, 2002, 1D. 120Troy Johnson, NFL No Match for Tillman’s New Challenge; Former Cardinal Defensive

Back to Begin Army’s Ranger Training, CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Jul. 12, 2002, 5B. 121 Carlson John, Decision to Serve, Rather than Be Served, Admirable, DES MOINES REGISTER,

Jul. 10, 2002, 1B. 122 Hearing on Misleading Information from the Battlefield before the House Oversight and

Government Reform Committee, 110th Cong. (Apr. 24, 2007) [hereinafter Tillman Hearing I]

(prepared statement by Thomas Gimble, Acting Inspector General, U.S. Department of Defense).

have worked around the issue?’’ 113 to which Gerson responded: ‘‘I

think so.’’ 114 Currin seemed to concur. When he reviewed the later

version, he did not object to any discussion of Corporal Tillman’s

enlistment, but rather to the fact that the soldier’s rank was incorrectly noted as ‘‘corporal.’’ In the next nine minutes, he sent or received five e-mails on the subject, to ensure that this detail was

properly revised.115

Currin agreed when the Committee asked him if his preoccupation with Corporal Tillman’s rank indicated ‘‘satisfaction’’ with the

way the speech draft addressed enlistment motivations. However,

he also said it was ‘‘perhaps not 100 percent’’ in compliance with

his suggestions.116 In addition, when asked if it was accurate to

say that in his ‘‘research and fact-checking’’ he learned that the

Tillman brothers considered their ‘‘reasons for joining the military

as something they didn’t want to talk about in public,’’ he replied

‘‘that is probably fair.’’ 117

Contemporary media accounts of Corporal Tillman’s time in the

Army are replete with reports of acquaintances commenting upon

the circumstances of the Ranger’s enlistment. In addition to the

two cited by Bockhorn, one 2002 article said, ‘‘[s]ome close to him

suspect that the Sept. 11 attacks had an influence on his decision.’’ 118 A month earlier, a Kansas newspaper reported,

‘‘[a]lthough Tillman had been considering joining the military before Sept. 11, friends say the terrorist attacks stoked his patriotic

embers.’’ 119 Another story explained, ‘‘Several of Tillman’s confidants say the Sept 11 terrorist attacks influenced’’ him.120 In July

2002, the Des Moines Register described Corporal Tillman’s reason

for joining the military: ‘‘It’s a personal decision, he told friends,

who think it has something to do with what happened to this country last Sept. 11.’’ 121

The exchange between Currin and Darby on April 27 and April

28 likely spurred Army Maj. Gen. Stanley McChrystal to send his

Personal For (or ‘‘P4’’) message to Gen. Abizaid on April 29, although this connection cannot be precisely established. The DoD IG

testified before the Committee that the P4 ‘‘stopped with the three

generals that were on it.’’ 122 The Committee’s inquiry supports this

conclusion. No other individual, including Secretary Rumsfeld, Gen.

70

123See Tillman Hearing II at Tr. 28, 63, 93 (statements by Gen. Richard Myers); Id. at Tr.

16 (statements by Donald Rumsfeld); Id. at Tr. 75 (statement by Donald Rumsfeld, regarding

having never received any P4 message); Lovelace Transcript at Tr. 28–29; Di Rita Transcript

at Tr. 55. 124 E-mail from Jim Cunneen, President and CEO, San Jose Silicon Valley Chamber of Commerce, to Ruben Barrales, Intergovernment Affairs Office, White House (Apr. 30, 2004; 11:37

EDT) (bates nos. HOGR004–00379–00381) (forwarding E-mail from Jim Cunneen, President and

CEO, San Jose Silicon Valley Chamber of Commerce, to Ruben Barrales, Intergovernment Affairs Office, White House (Apr. 29, 2004; 02:00 EDT); E-mail from Jeananne Fair, White House

staff, to Ruben Barrales, Intergovernment Affairs Office, White House (Apr. 27, 2004; 17:34

EDT) (bates no., HOGR004–01111); E-mail from Pat Dando, Mayor, City of San Jose, to Ruben

Barrales, Intergovernment Affairs Office, White House (Apr. 28, 2004; 17:26 EDT) (bates no.

HOGR004–00135). 125 E-mail from Brook Holladay, White House staff, to Brooke Chambers, White House staff

(May 7, 2004; 14:15 EDT) (bates no. HOGR004–01113–01114) (forwarding E-mail from Brook

Holladay, White House staff, to Brooke Chambers, White House staff (May 6, 2004; 15:08 EDT)). 126 Id. (Emphasis in original.) 127 E-mail from Brooke Manning, White House staff, to David Holt, White House staff (May

6, 2004; 15:51 EDT) (bates no. HOGR004–01117–01119) (forwarding E-mail from Brooke Holt,

White House staff, to David Holt, White House staff (May 6, 2004; 15:39 EDT)). 128 Id.

Myers, Lt. Gen. Lovelace and DiRita, testified to having had knowledge of the P4 or its contents.123

C. OTHER ACTIVITIES

The White House intergovernmental affairs office apparently responded to a request from the San Jose Mayor to assist in arranging for Corporal Tillman’s widow to fly to California with her late

husband’s remains.124 On the other hand, it is difficult to determine if the White House contemplated involvement in Corporal

Tillman’s memorial service. On May 6, Brook Holladay, an apparently junior-level employee reported to another staffer about receiving a telephone call from ‘‘Stu Hadley’’ who was involved with planning a memorial service for Corporal Tillman at the University of

Arizona. Holladay said Hadley reported ‘‘someone from the White

House called and offered a message for the event to be read;’’ Holladay lamented that Hanley did not ‘‘have the name of the person

who called.’’ 125 After an exchange of e-mails, Holladay reported on

what appears to be a second call with Hadley, stating he ‘‘COULD

NOT HAVE BEEN MORE UNDERSTANDING OR NICER about

this whole situation! All’s good.’’ 126

Although the situation appeared to be satisfactorily resolved, the

e-mail exchange continued between eleven more staffers. One volunteered ‘‘this issue probably rises to a Karl-level,’’ presumably a

reference to Presidential aide Karl Rove.127 This brought the reply,

‘‘[t]hey are checking with them.’’ 128 This suggests that either a

White House staffer or the Arizona contact was getting in touch

with ‘‘Karl.’’ The Committee found no further evidence that the

White House contemplated or actually sent a message about Corporal Tillman to the University of Arizona or that Rove was involved. Of course, even if it was determined that Rove contemplated proffering some sort of official statement to be read at

a University of Arizona event, this does not indicate that he was

aware of the likelihood that Corporal Tillman had been killed by

friendly fire.

D. KNOWLEDGE OF FRATRICIDE

No White House staffer interviewed by the Committee said they

knew that fratricide was suspected until the Army’s announcement

71

129See Gross Transcript at Tr. 101–2; Currin Transcript at Tr. 72; Bartlett Interview; McClellan Interview; Gerson Interview. 130McClellan Interview. 131See Gross Transcript at Tr. 107–108, 117–118; Bartlett Interview; McClellan Interview. In

addition, Committee staff performed an article search and a search of White House press gaggles and did not find any instance of White House officials being quoted or asked, respectively,

about Corporal Tillman immediately after to the announcement of the finding of friendly fire. 132Susan Schmidt and Vernon Loeb, ‘She Was Fighting to the Death,’ Details Emerging of

W.Va. Soldier’s Capture and Rescue, WASH. POST, Apr. 3. 2003, p. A1. 133Thorp Transcript at Tr. 79. 134 In the week following the Post story, editorials and articles appeared, relating Lynch’s

heroics to the prospect of women being given combat roles. See Joan Lowy, Heroics of female

POW raise combat debate, SCRIPPS HOWARD NEWS SERVICE, Apr. 3, 2003; Pfc. Jessica Lynch

shows again that women can handle combat; she kept firing at attackers until ammunition ran

Continued

on the subject.129 The Committee did not obtain any information

to the contrary. It also found no evidence which suggested that

other White House staffers or the President had foreknowledge of

the friendly fire suspicions.

When the Pentagon released the fratricide findings, White House

press and speechwriting officials considered it a Defense Department matter about which a comment or explanation from the Presidential staff was unnecessary.130 The media apparently shared this

view. There is no record of any question about Corporal Tillman

being posed in a White House press conference immediately after

the release by the Army of the findings of the friendly fire investigation; this was confirmed by White House officials.131

IV. OTHER CASES

A. JESSICA LYNCH

The April 3, 2003, front page Washington Post article which attributed special heroism to Private Jessica Lynch was based on information provided by unnamed ‘‘U.S. officials.’’ 132 The Washington

Post article was widely circulated and formed the basis of additional stories in other publications in the following days. Many

other media outlets apparently sought to substantiate claims about

Private Lynch’s actions at the time she was captured. As then-U.S.

Navy Captain Frank Thorp, a CENTCOM public affairs official, recounted to Committee staff, ‘‘I remember specifically everyone and

their brother and sister trying to chase that story and being unable

to.’’ 133

Some charge that now-Rear Admiral Thorp or other administration or Pentagon officials intentionally misinformed the Washington Post as part of an effort to make Private Lynch appear to be

particularly heroic and thus buttress support for the Iraq War. It

is also possible the flawed Washington Post article resulted from

prosaic circumstances. The story may have been based upon innocent confusion about details conveyed amidst the war. Alternatively, some have argued that the problematic Washington Post

article may have been advanced by proponents of an expanded role

for women in the military namely, by demonstrating that Private

Lynch had behaved valiantly in combat, efforts to allow other females into front-line units would have presumably been aided. A

cursory examination of some of the articles subsequently written

based upon the initial Washington Post article lends support to this

suggestion.134

72

out, official says, DETROIT NEWS, Apr. 4, 2003, p. 8A; Women are proving they’re just as tough

as the men; The arguments for keeping women out of combat are quickly losing credibility, PORT- LAND (ME) PRESS HERALD, Apr. 5, 2003, 9A; Lynch quells gender debate, BOSTON HERALD, Apr.

6, 2003, 26; Jessica’s Lesson, ROCHESTER DEMOCRAT AND CHRONICLE, Apr. 7, 2003, 8A; Frank

Ritter, Lynch settles the question of women in combat, TENNESSEAN, Apr. 9, 2003, 13A; Martha

Ackmann, A woman’s place is on the battlefield, too, RECORD (Bergen County, NJ), Apr. 10,

2003, L11. 135Thorp Transcript at Tr. 68–79; Wilkinson Transcript at Tr. 43–76. 136Steve Ritea, Jessica Lynch’s Story: A Little Too Perfect?, AMERICAN JOURNALISM REVIEW

(Aug./Sep. 2003). 137 Andrew Kramer, Family Learns Iraqis Executed Soldier Captured at Same Time as Lynch,

WASH. POST, May 29, 2004, A15. 138 Rowan Scarborough, Army to probe Lynch Capture, WASH. TIMES, May 23, 2003, A01. 139 Id. 140 Id. 141 Id. 142Dana Priest, William Booth and Susan Schmidt, A Broken Body, a Broken Story, Pieced

Together; Investigation Reveals Lynch—Still in Hospital After 67 Days—Suffered Bone-crushing

Injuries in Crash During Ambush, WASH. POST, June 17, 2003, A01 [hereinafter Jun. 17, 2003

Post Follow-up]. 143Dana Priest, M-16s Jammed During Ambush in Iraq, WASH. POST, Jul. 10, 2003, A14.

The Committee’s investigation of the identity and motivation of

the Washington Post’s source for the article was limited to posing

a handful of questions to two witnesses: Rear Admiral Thorp and

Jim Wilkinson, a CENTCOM official charged with strategic communications during the April 2003 time period. Neither stated any

knowledge of the background of the leak.135 The Committee obtained no further information on this topic.

Significantly, the Post journalists and their editors, according to

a 2003 account in the American Journalism Review, reject the suggestion they were intentionally mislead by Pentagon officals; 136

they instead trace the difficulties to flawed data from the battlefield. This possibility seemed buttressed in 2004 when it was suggested that erroneous translations of Iraqi radio transmissions

about the convoy ambush may have led some to believe Private

Lynch undertook actions actually performed by another soldier.137

After Private Lynch’s rescue, an Army 15–6 investigation was

conducted to learn more about the actions of her unit on the day

it was attacked.138 In the month after the Washington Post article,

another news account reported that ‘‘two Pentagon officials in

interviews cast doubt on the Washington Post’s report. The officials

said all evidence suggests that [Private] Lynch’s truck crashed in

the chaos of the ambush . . ..’’ 139 The article attributed to these

same ‘‘officials’’ the view that Private Lynch ‘‘suffered several bone

fractures and was in no position to put up a fight.’’ 140 Indeed, an

Army spokesman, who described the inquiry as ‘‘extremely complex,’’ stipulated it would answer the query ‘‘[w]hen the ambush

hit, did the vehicle wreck or did she fight?’’ 141

On June 17, 2003, the Washington Post reported that Private

Lynch did not engage the enemy, was not wounded by gunshots,

and was rescued without significant resistance.142 According to

press reports, the 15–6 investigation results, officially released the

following month, said much the same.143

On April 5, 2003, three days after Private Lynch’s rescue, Air

Force Maj. Gen. Victor Renuart, in the course of a CENTCOM

briefing, told assembled reporters he would ‘‘spend a minute or two

talking about the rescue of Private Lynch,’’ and declared ‘‘you’ll forgive me for referring to notes a little bit more, but the facts of this

73

144Transcript of CENTCOM Operational Update Briefing by Maj. Gen. Victor Renuart, FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, Apr. 5, 2003. 145 Id. 146 Id. 147 Id. 148 Id. 149 Id. 150Jun. 17, 2003 Post Follow-up. 151 John Kampfner, Saving Private Lynch Story ‘Flawed’, BBC NEWS (ONLINE), May 15, 2003,

available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/correspondent/3028585.stm [last visited Jul.

14, 2008]. 152 Id.

are important . . .’’ 144 Significantly, when describing the operation, Gen. Renuart made no assertions about Private Lynch’s response when her unit was attacked.

[A]s you know, on or about 23rd of March [Private Lynch’s]

507th maintenance company was ambushed in the vicinity

of An Nasiriyah. A number of members of that maintenance company were killed, a number captured and a

number were unaccounted for, [Private Lynch] being one of

them.145

Gen. Renuart explained further that the military’s special forces

subsequently ‘‘got an indication’’ that an injured American POW

was being ‘‘held in . . . the Saddam Hospital, in An Nasiriyah.’’ 146

As a result, he said, highly trained elite Army, Air Force, Navy,

and Marine units were ordered to ‘‘very rapidly get into the area

of the hospital to determine the location of Private Lynch and then

to bring her out, and at the same time, exploit some areas of the

hospital where we had reports of enemy headquarters, command

and control facilities and the like.’’ 147

In the assault, one group of Marines was charged with creating

a diversionary attack to allow a main rescue group to approach the

hospital unimpeded. Gen. Renuart explained that this second element ‘‘persuaded a local physician to lead them to Private Lynch’s

location.’’ 148 The General also said some military personnel on the

rescue team discovered a ‘‘weapons cache’’ in the hospital and a

three-dimensional map of the town. Gen. Renuart said this ‘‘terrain

model’’ included red and blue markers which ‘‘depicted with relative accuracy the general position of U.S. forces and also enemy

forces in the town.’’ 149

Lynch’s rescue was, as later recounted by CENTCOM public affairs official, Lt. Colonel John Robinson, ‘‘an awesome story.’’ 150

However, notwithstanding Robinson’s declaration and Gen.

Renuart’s explanation, some questioned the conduct of the rescue

operation. Six weeks after Private Lynch’s rescue, the British

Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) aired a documentary segment entitled ‘‘War Spin’’ on its Correspondent television program. About

the rescue, the documentary concluded: ‘‘her story is one of the

most stunning pieces of news management ever conceived.’’ 151 The

program asserted ‘‘the US military knew there were no Iraqi forces

guarding the hospital, and quoted a local doctor saying the troops

used blank rounds to ‘make a show’ of the operation.’’ 152 ‘‘War

Spin’’ also questioned whether Private Lynch ‘‘had been slapped

74

153 Id. 154 Id. 155Letter from Pete Stark, Member of Congress, to Joseph E. Schmitz, Inspector General, U.S.

Department of Defense (Jun. 2, 2003) (on file with Committee staff). 156Letter from Joseph E. Schmitz, Inspector General, U.S. Department of Defense, to Rahm

Emmanuel, Member of Congress (Sep. 2, 2003) (see Attachment: Executive Summary) (on file

with Committee Staff). 157 Id. 158 Id. 159 Id. 160 Id. 161 Id. 162 Id.

about on her hospital bed and interrogated’’ before troops came to

her aid.153

A Pentagon spokesman termed these assessments ‘‘void of all

facts and absolutely ridiculous.’’ 154 However, three Members of

Congress asked the Defense Department Inspector General to undertake an inquiry to determine the veracity of the BBC’s assertions. Writing about the charges in ‘‘War Spin,’’ one wrote, ‘‘[I]f

these allegations prove true the US military put Private Lynch’s

life in greater risk in order to produce a made-for-TV event to boost

public support for this war,’’ and noted, ‘‘if true, this is hardly a

fitting way to treat Private Lynch in light of her bravery and courage.’’ 155

None of the accusations made by the BBC, however, appears to

be accurate. A DoD IG inquiry was undertaken in response to the

request from the Members. In September 2003, the DoD IG reported that, under its oversight, the CENTCOM Inspector General

had completed an investigation which included ‘‘extensive evidence

not available to the media.’’ 156 Investigators ‘‘concluded that the allegations were not substantiated’’ and ‘‘no further investigation was

warranted.’’ 157 The operation to locate and repatriate Private

Lynch ‘‘constituted a valid mission to recover a U.S. POW under

combat conditions,’’ the IG found.158

In addition, the inquiry found ‘‘[t]he level of force used by [the

U.S. Special Operations Forces (USSOF)] to perform the mission

was consistent with the anticipated resistance and established doctrine.’’ 159 The video tape collected during the mission (and shown

later to reporters) ‘‘was filmed by a combat cameraman and a member of USSOF in accordance with standard procedures’’ and the IG

determined ‘‘no public affairs personnel were involved in the planning or filming of the operation.’’

In sum, the IG reported:

USSOF conducted a personnel recovery mission, during

wartime, in a nonpermissive environment, to rescue a U.S.

POW from a hostile enemy location. During the mission

USSOF received enemy fire from the hospital building, the

surrounding complex, and nearby areas. They successfully

engaged the enemy forces they encountered, neutralizing

them without sustaining any casualties of their own.160

The IG also conveyed an assessment of the possibility mission participants were ‘‘acting for the camera;’’ there was no evidence of

this, investigators reported.161 Indeed, ‘‘all USSOF members,’’ the

IG stated, ‘‘were offended by such an accusation.’’ 162 These results

75

163Tillman Hearing I (prepared statement by Thomas Gimble, Acting Inspector General, U.S.

Department of Defense). 164Scott Thomas Beauchamp, Blog: The Plank, NEW REPUBLIC (ONLINE), Jul. 26, 2007. 165 Id. 166 Editors, A statement on Scott Thomas Beauchamp, NEW REPUBLIC (ONLINE), Aug. 2, 2007. 167Marcus Baram, Pentagon: Baghdad Diarist Writes Fiction, ABC NEWS, Aug. 7, 2007. See

also Howard Kurt, Army Concludes Baghdad Diarist Accounts Untrue, WASH. POST, Aug. 8,

2007. 168 Id. 169Franklin Foer, Fog of War: The story of our Baghdad Diarist, NEW REPUBLIC (ONLINE), DEC. 10, 2007.

were conveyed to the Committee by the DoD IG at the Committee’s

first hearing into this matter.163

B. SCOTT THOMAS BEAUCHAMP

While an Army private stationed in Iraq in 2007, Scott Thomas

Beauchamp ‘‘blogged’’ for The New Republic under a pseudonym.

His postings recounted acts he had allegedly witnessed or participated in during his time in theater. These included U.S. soldiers

mocking a disfigured woman, making playthings of the bones of

dead children, and intentionally running over stray dogs. To some,

these episodes illustrated the morally debasing effects of the Iraqi

conflict on U.S. service personnel. When others disagreed and expressed doubt about the events reported, Beauchamp responded

‘‘[m]y pieces were always intended to provide my discrete view of

the war; they were never intended as a reflection of the entire U.S.

Military.’’ 164 He also revealed his actual identity. ‘‘I was initially

reluctant to take the time out of my already insane schedule fighting an actual war in order to play some role in an ideological battle

that I never wanted to join,’’ and ‘‘That being said, my character,

my experiences, and those of my comrades in arms have been

called into question, and I believe it is important to stand by my

writing under my real name.’’ 165

On August 2, 2007, however, The New Republic editors disclosed

that their initial inquiry into Beauchamp’s veracity had found a

‘‘significant’’ discrepancy in one story: some witnesses recalled seeing a mutilated woman fitting the description provided by

Beauchamp in Kuwait, not Iraq.166 This is important because if

Beauchamp and others had encountered her and behaved inappropriately towards her there, it could not been because of the rigors

of combat. This is because Beauchamp’s unit was in Kuwait before

it entered the fight. But, only five days later, the Army announced

the results of an inquiry into the claims in Beauchamp’s blog: not

only was the boorish behavior towards the injured disproved, but

all ‘‘the allegations made by PVT Beauchamp were found to be

false,’’ according to Multilateral Division-Baghdad spokesman

Major Steven F. Lamb.167 Major Lamb explained that Beauchamp’s

‘‘platoon and company were interviewed and no one could substantiate his claims.’’ 168 In December 2007, in light of inconsistencies

coming to light, The New Republic’s editor published an explanation of their position declaring, ‘‘[W]e cannot stand by these stories.’’ 169

The next month, twenty-seven sworn statements from soldiers

were provided to a New York media outlet as a result of a Freedom

76

170The New Republic’s Soldier’s Tale, RADAR [MAGAZINE] (ONLINE), available at http://

www.radaronline.com/exclusives/2008/01/scott-beauchamp-new-republic-documents-foia.php [last

visited Jul 14, 2008] [hereinafter RADAR article]. 171Sworn affidavit by E–6/Squad Leader [name withheld by Committee staff] (Jul. 28, 2007;

18:21) (reported in RADAR article).

of Information Act request.170 These sworn statements buttress the

reported conclusions of the Army’s investigation: no interviewee admitted to having any information which supported any of

Beauchamp’s alleged observations. In addition, in one sworn statement by Beauchamp’s squad leader indicates that Beauchamp did

not consult with him before making blog posts in violation of ‘‘operational security’’ regulations governing soldiers on the battlefield.171

It is not clear how an Army private was able to repeatedly and

intentionally disseminate misinformation from the battlefield to a

major publication, especially when doing so violated security provisions and slandered his fellow troops.

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