CECW-EH-Y

Engineer 

Pamphlet

1110-2-8

Department of the Army

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers

Washington, DC 20314-1000

EP 1110-2-8

30 April 1992

EXPLAINING FLOOD RISK

Distribution Restriction Statement

Approved for public release; distribution is 

unlimited.
FOREWORD 

Floods are the most frequent natural disaster in the 

United States and cause large losses of life and property. 

The problem is worsening as population growth and 

urbanization outpace implementation of flood loss 

reduction measures. 

A key reason for the failure to take action on flood 

problems often is a lack of understanding of the nature 

and extent of the flood risk on the part of local officials 

and the general public in threatened areas. 

This booklet aims at improving the technical expert’s 

skills in communicating information about flood risk to 

local officials and the public. It discusses the most 

important concepts and techniques of effective 

communication and points out problems that can 

impede understanding. It also provides suggestions for 

dealing with the media. 

FOR THE COMMANDER: 

Colonel, Corps of Engineers 

Chief of Staff 
CONTENTS 

Chapter 1 - Introduction 

Chapter 2 - Risk Communication Problems 

Receiver Problems 

Source Problems r 

Chapter 3 - Considerations in Planning Risk 

Communications 

Identifying the Audience 

Means of Communicating 

Presenting the Information 

11 

11 

12 

13 

Chapter 4 - Dealing with the Media 18 

The Media’s Interest in Risk 20 

General Considerations 21 

Objectivity in the Media 24 

The Media and Extreme Viewpoints 24 

Personalization of Issues 24 

Chapter 5 - Dealing with the Community 26 

Importance of Community Input 26 

Managing Community Input 27 

Trust and Credibility 28 

References 31 
CHAPTER 1 

INTRODUCTION 

“If we think (the people) not enlightened enough to exercise 

their control with a wholesome discretion, ‘the remedy is not 

to take it from them, but to inform their discretion.” 

Jefferson 

C orps of Engineers projects for reducing flood risks usually 

require the endorsement of those in the area to be 

benefited and often their financial support. Worthwhile 

projects sometimes falter and die for lack of that 

necessary local support. 

It seems that people would be interested in learning 

about flooding that could threaten their lives and 

property and that they would act promptly when a way 

of mitigating the threat was presented. Unfortunately, 

that’s not the case. Presenting people with information 

on flood risk does not necessarily ensure their learning 

and learning does not necessarily lead to action to 

reduce the risk. 
This lack of response to information on risk has been 

studied in recent years by psychologists and other social 

scientists. Some of the reasons why theseikinds of 

communications are often ineffective are coming to light 

and that knowledge offers hope of improving future 

efforts. This booklet summarizes the most promising 

information including concepts of what’s involved in the 

process of risk communication, the nature of problems 

that impede communications and suggestions for 

improving communications. 

2 
! CHAPTER 2 

\ 

RISK COMMUNlCA7’lON PROBLEMS 

C ommunication about flood risk usually involves 

providing information concerning: a) the existence and 

nature of the flood threat; b) the seriousness of the risk; 

and c) steps that can be taken to control the flooding or 

mitigate its effects. Regardless of the scale of the project 

being considered, the purpose of the communication 

effort usually is to persuade people to take some 

recommended action. Effective communication is 

impeded by problems on both the source and receiver 

side of the information exchange. 

RECEIVER PROBLEMS 

Successful communication of information about flood 

risk requires overcoming a number of problems springing 

from human nature and from the views and experiences 

of the audience. These problems relate to people’s 

perception of risk in general and the way in which riskrelated information is viewed and evaluated. 

3 
Lack of Znterest in Risk Information 

People have enough problems in the day-to-day course 

of living. Information on a new risk reclresents an 

additional burden. Moreover, whatever action’is needed 

to respond to the risk is likely to either cost something c 

require changing some present habit or practice. The 

natural tendency is toward rejecting the new 

information, rationalizing why it is not applicable, 

finding fault with the information or its source, or 

otherwise creating a way to avoid dealing with the risk. 

This is especially easy in the case of flooding that is 

often viewed as something which may or may not 

happen sometime in the future. 

incorrect Estimation of Risk 

Scientifically designed studies have asked people to 

estimate the relative risk of various kinds of threats. The 

results indicate clearly that people tend to over-estimate 

the risk of rare 

l( ‘(. . #people tend to. . . under- hnnh I n +n%l A+/7 

estzmate estimate the 9 risk of more 

common common eveI events like floods. ” 

events and underestimate the risk of 

more common 

events like floods. 

This characteristic 

error in estimating risk is attributed to the fact that 

unusual deaths and injuries receive far more attention in 

the media than the more common ones. Spectacular 

4 
incidents of damage or dramatic situations are alscj mc)rc 

likely to be remembered and recalled. ?A. 

Misunderstanding of Probability 

Most people also share the “gambler’s fallacy,” believing 

that because some event has occurred, it is less likely to 

occur again soon. For example, people tend to believe 

after a large flood has occurred that the chance for 

another such flood happening in the foreseeable future is 

reduckd when, in fact, the chances have not changed. 

5 
Lack of Experience 

Most people lack significant experience “with relatively 

rare events, such as major floods. It’s difficult fo’r a person 

who has seen only small floods to conceive of a great 

flood occurring. Closely related to this is the tendency 

for people to misinterpret some single experience. 

Someone who once experienced minor flooding on the 

periphery of what was described as a large flood, or even 

saw m.inor flooding in a watershed adjacent to one 

having what was described as a large flood may develop a 

wrong idea of the seriousness and destructive power of 

such a flood and underestimate it. 

Desire for Certainty 

Dealing with information on pbtential flooding would be 

troubling enough for people if the nature of the risk was 

easy to understand and the extent of the risk was 

obvious. The problem is usually compounded by 

uncertainty concerning whether the risk affects the 

individual’s location, the probabilistic nature of flooding. 

and the incomplete protection usually recommended. 

Uncertainty provides a convenient rationalization for 

disregarding the problem. 

Reluctance to Make Trade-offs 

Actions reducing a hazard sometimes have their own 

6 risks. For example, building a levee to prevent 
moderate levels of flooding may create some risk of a 

more catastrophic type of flooding if the levee fails or is 

overtopped. People generally have difficulty making 

trade-offs among 

these kinds of 

risks, especially if 

“Actions reducing a hazard 

sometimes have their own the risks cannot be . , ,, 

compared in rzsks” 

explicit terms. A 

similar type of problem arises if people are asked to 

choose between two mutually exclusive alternatives. 

The usual response is a wish to have the advantages of 

both alternatives. 

Potential for Success 

People and communities are more willing to take action 

in response to information on flood risk if it is believed 

that the recommended action will be effective. Action is 

less likely when the recommended measure only has 

some probability of reducing the risk or will only 

partially eliminate the risk. Related to this, individuals 

and small communities often feel powerless against the 

risk of flooding. In order to influence them, information 

on flood loss reduction projects must make it clear that 

what is required can be accomplished, preferably by 

showing that it has been successfully accomplished by 

others in their circumstances. 

7 
SOUHCEPROBLEMS 

There are also pnMems on the source side that impede 

the cx&nge of information about flood risks. These 

problems can frequently be solved. 

Limited Understanding of Receiver Goals 

Those providing information on flood risk and 

attempting to persuade people or communities to move 

forward on some project usually have a relatively narrow 

viewpoint. The Corps of Engineers interest is in 

reducing flood losses or meeting some other waterrelated goal. But individuals and communities normally 

have a wide range of interests, fears, values, priorities, 

and preferences that are important to their decision 

making and which are largely unknown to the Corps of 

Engineers personnel working on a project. 

Individuals and communities behave in the way that 

best satisfies the concerns that are most important to 

them. For example, a decision to live in an area subject 

to flooding may be based on many factors such as natural 

amenities, travel to employment, home price, nearness 

to friends and family, etc. Only a portion of these factors 

relate to the potential for flood losses and, even if the 

adverse consequences of floodplain residence are 

appreciated, they may not be enough to tip the overall 

equation in favor of moving. In order to have any 

8 significant chance of success, informational 
programs need to determine and consider as many as 

possible of the viewpoints and interests Qf the intended 

recipients. 

Limited Au thori tY and Resources 

Even if all of the important concerns of an individual or 

community were known, the Corps of Engineers often 

lacks the authority and resources to address them in 

anything more 

than a cursory 

manner. As a 

“. . . project proposals often 

result, project generate questions that cannot 

proposals often be answered easily. . . ” 

generate questions 

that cannot be answered easily and which tend to stymie 

decision making. Minimizing these kinds of problems 

requires anticipating the impacts of the recommended 

action and ensuring all of the appropriate parties are 

involved in the planning. 

Disagreements Among Experts 

People generally believe that specialists in some field 

have knowledge superior to their own and tend to accept 

their conclusions and opinions. But people also expect 

experts using the same information to come to more or 

less the same conclusions and recommendations. 

Disagreements among experts or agencies about the 

existence of a threat, its severity or the appropriate 9 
-. 

reaction is confusing. From the perspective of the lay 

person, they are being asked to make a decision that 

can’t be decided by the experts. Minimizing these kinds 

of problems requires ensuring that the experts are 

working with the same basic information and using the 

same assumptions. 

Use of Difficult Language 

Most fields make use of specialized terminology that is 

precise and expressive for those in the field but difficult 

for others to understand. The typical reaction is to 

ignore flood risk information presented in an overly 

technical or bureaucratic way. 

10 
CHAPTER 3 

CONSIDERATIOZVS IN 

PLANNING RISK COMMUNICATIONS 

s uccessfully communicating information about flood risk 

requires some planning. The chief matters to be 

considered are: 

u The intended audience for the communication. 

0 The means of communicating information. 

q How to present the information. 

q Testing for effectiveness. 

ZDENTZFYZNG THE AUDIENCE 

Community officials and members of the public tend to 

specialize in selected issues. Some may be interested and 

active in tax-related issues, some in historical 

preservation, etc. In order to attract the involvement of 

a significant share of a community in solving a flood 

problem, it may be necessary to employ multiple 

approaches that address the risk with respect to 

flooding’s potential impact on several topics of interest. 

The same applies to providing information on a li 
proposed project. A presentation designed to explain a 

proposed project to an environmentally oriented group is 

not likely to answer many of the questions that would be 

in the minds of, for instance, those interested primarily 

in economic development. 

MEANS OF COMMUNICATING 

There are numerous channels that can be used for 

communicating information about flood risk. Not all of 

them are usually suitable for any particular informational 

effort but frequently several are. The following are the 

most familiar of the channels that are generally suitable 

for one or another of the types of informational programs 

carried out by the Corps of Engineers. 

u 

q 

Cl 

q 

12 

Mass media; e.g., radio, television, and 

newspapers. 

Public hearings and informational meetings. 

Reports and report summaries. 

Audio-visual materials for use by others; e.g., 

photographs, slide sets, and audiotapes. 

Exhibits and displays, information racks, closedcircuit television showings, traveling exhibits. 

Leaflets, manuals, handbooks, reference guides, 

brochures, booklets and books. 

Inserts and enclosures in other forms of 

communication; e.g., magazines, books and utility 

bills. 
q Participation in meetings, seminars and 

conferences. 

q Provision of speakers for local organizatiqns. 

n Telephone answering services, i.e., recorded 

messages. 

q Folk network (“the grapevine”, the family, 

community leaders, community groups, religious 

organizations, etc.) 

PRESENTlNG THE INFORMATZON 

Motivating action is an uphill battle. However, 

psychologists, 

social scientists 

and others have 

“Motivating action is an uphill 

made a number of battle. ” . 

suggestions 

concerning how to maximize the chance of success. 

13 
Timing Risk Communications 

People are faced with large amounts of information, a 

considerable amount of which is risk-related. Most 

information is discarded without much consideration 

unless the topic is of interest at the time. Research 

indicates, for example, that as little as five percent of 

direct mail materials are read. Flood-related information 

is most likely to be considered and acted on in the 

period.immediately after a flood. In view of this, it may 

be useful in some cases to have risk communication 

packages stockpiled so that they can be distributed 

quickly after a flood. 

Preferred Ways of Receiving Znfomation 

People generally state that they prefer receiving riskrelated information in written form so as to be able to 

keep it for reference. However, within a few months of 

being given such information, a large percentage of 

people cannot recall its receipt. Research indicates that 

there is little 

actual difference 

in effectiveness 

between 

brochures, radio 

“Risk communication should 

involve a two-way dialog.. . ” 

and television. When television is used, one study has 

found that the use of purchased time is much more 

effective than reliance on public service 

14 announcements. 
Effectiveness in Delivering Znformation 

For maximum effectiveness, risk commu&ations should 

involve a two-way dialog that enables identifying and 

addressing the actual concerns of the audience and 

I 

; 

ensuring the message is explained in understandable 

terms. Face-to-face contact appears to be the most 

< effective technique of communicating risk information. 
Length of Message 

Evidence shows that people only retain: small part of 

lengthy messages concerning risk. It is a waste to provide 

more information about a flood problem or a project 

than the audience is interested in having. 

Use of Fear as Motivator 

Studies have suggested that it is not very effective to rel! 

on fear as a motivator. While such attempts may 

sometimes be successful, the duration of their impact is 

usually short. In some cases, the use of fear may have 

unexpected results that are the reverse of the ones 

desired. It is more effective to use a positive type of 

motivation. Research also indicates that modest use of 

fear as a motivator is as effective as a high level of fear. 

Comparison of Risks 

It is generally not effective to compare flood risk with 

other types of risks. Perceptions of risks and decisions to 

take action to reduce a risk are affected by the 

characteristics of hazards such as uncertainty, 

controllability, catastrophic potential, and others that 

are not comparable between hazards. 

16 
Description of Small Probabilities 

The manner of presenting flood probab&y data, is very 

important. Small flood probabilities are likely to be 

equated with zero risk. The effectiveness of 

communications can be improved if the flood probability 

is stated in terms of a “lifetime probability” or in another 

aggregated form that yields a number or ratio of a 

magnitude that is easy to understand and appreciate. For 

example, flood probabilities might be stated in terms of a 

decade or over the life of a typical home mortgage. 

Need for Ewaluating Risk Communication Products 

Many programs intended to inform people about floods 

and motivate action fail because. they do not address the 

concerns of the 

intended audience 

or for other 

“Many programs fail because 

reasons. In order they do not address the 

to improve their concerns of the. . .audience . ” 

chance of success, 

large scale informational programs should include 

provisions for determining the nature and importance of 

such concerns and for testing whether the approaches 

and tools that are to be used deal effectively with them. 

17 
CHAPTER A 

I nfotmation about flood hazards and flood-related 

projects can often be done most effectively through tht 

mass media. In some cases, such as in the event of a 

flood, reporters are likely to seek out sources of 

information about what happened and what people 

should do to protect themselves. In other cases, such a’ 

an effort to encourage some action, the situation migh 

be reversed with agency staff trying to interest the met 

in running a story to educate people about the measun 

and its benefits. 

Dealing with reporters often causes anxiety, particula 

when the reporter has unexpectedly initiated the 

contact. A certain amount of dread is not unusual evl 

in situations in which an effort is being made to obta 

coverage of some issue. However, some skill in 

communications and an understanding of how the 

media approach risk-related issues helps in smoothin 

things out. 

18 
Whether or not working with the media is a pleasure, it 

is a fact of life that must be dealt with on occasion. 

When there’s a good story, the media will cover it with 

or without your help and the risks of ducking the media 

are generally greater than cooperating with them. 

News stories are a collaboration between the reporter 

and the sources they talk to. There’s not much that can 

be done to change the nature of journalism or the 19 
way reporters work, However, an improvement in 

coverage can often be brought about by proper 

performance of the source. 

, 

THE MEDIA’S INTEREST IN RISK 

Reporters don’t usually have any special interest in risk 

It’s just one of several things to be covered when it 

becomes newsworthy. Generally, the fact that some risk 

exists is not 

particularly “News storiei are a 

newsworthy. 

Most of us are 

collaboration between the 

continually at reporter ad the sources...” 

some degree of risk 

from one or another agent and, more often than not, 

from several sources simultaneously. 

This situation changes when the degree of risk poses ar 

imminent threat. When a situation like a flood occurs, 

reporters suddenly take an intense interest in the risk 

and generally won’t stop digging until some kind of sto 

is developed. 

When dealing with issues that are not a present crisis, 

the reporter’s job is to come up with news, not to assist 

in an educational effort. Reporters are not particularly 

interested in how to compute flood probabilities. Flooc 

risks that do not pose an imminent hazard usually only 

20 become newsworthy when some related event 
makes them so. For example, a court case on taking land 

for a levee might interest a reporter in doing a story on i’& 

the flood problem 

cc 

. . . the reporter's job is.. .news, that makes the 

not to assist in an educational levee necessarY+ 

effort." 

Without an event, 

and preferably one 

with something to 

photograph, it is difficult to get coverage of a flood 

problem that is only a threat. 

There is nothing wrong with manufacturing a 

newsworthy event. Displays, contests and various other 

techniques can often be used to attract attention to an 

otherwise uninteresting subject. 

GENERAL CONSZDERATZONS 

There are a few matters that should be observed when 

working with reporters, regardless of who initiated the 

contact: 

q At the of a episode, reporters 

primarily interested when it occur, its 

and magnitude, whether people evacuate. 

They not usually at this in the 

about how analysis was how the 

might have prevented, or any lengthy 

of risk Some of kinds of 

may be interest on next day the 

21 
------- .-- 

one ifter that if the crisis is serious or prolonged. The 

interest in just bare-bones information is especially 

prevalent in the case of radio and television which can 

reach their audiences quickly with information on wha 

going on and what they should do. Reporters should bt 

asked about what kinds of information are of interest 

and an effort made 

to meet that need. “Stories must be simple. ” 

Long explanations 

of unasked for background, even if the reporter sits stil 

for them, are likely to be discarded. 

Stories must be simple. Covering a topic in 40 

seconds on television or in 15 short paragraphs in the 

paper doesn’t give an opportunity to describe nuances 

22 and complexities. If the source can’t simplify the 
story and explain it in plain English, the reporter will try 

to do so, sometimes with an adverse effect on accuracy. 

Every effort should be made before meeting*with a 

reporter to think over the story or position being taken, 

strip it down to the essentials and organize it effectively. 

If the use of some technical term can’t be avoided, the 

best way to explain it should be considered. 

u The reporter’s thrust is usually to simplify a story to 

a dichotomy. The basic story is whether a situation is 

hazardous or not, not whether it’s a little hazardous or 

greatly hazardous. If the situation can’t support that kind 

of simplification, a source shouldn’t waffle but, instead, 

explain to the reporter that the issue is not “risky or not” 

but rather “how risky”. 

q Except reporters for the largest newspapers or 

broadcasting stations, those covering a story are likely to 

have very little science background. Their goal is usually 

to find out enough to put together the story and move on 

to the next, not to learn everything that’s available about 

an issue. 

i I Reporters usually cover two or three stories a day 

and have deadlines to meet. They also have to consider 

the amount of detail which will interest their audience 

and the time and space that will be given for the story. 

Sources should be on time for meetings, dispense with all 

but the barest introductory remarks and get on with the 

interview. 

23 
OBZECTZVZTY IN THE MEDIA 

Reporters are concerned about objectiv?ty. By and large, 

however, they view objectivity as accurately presenting 

their audience with the viewpoints of those on both (or 

several) sides of an issue. Opposing viewpoints are 

usually set out in alternating paragraphs or in side by sic 

stories. It’s not the reporter’s job to evaluate the 

information, decide on the truth, and then write only 

that side of the story. Whenever dealing with the medi: 

it should be expected that the reporter will seek out 

others with differing views. 

THE MEDZA AND EXTREME VIEWPOINTS 

Reporters deal with people having views on an issue 

ranging from one extreme to the other. Views at each 

end of the range are often not reported and those in tb 

middle of the spectrum that have no strong opinion 

don’t warrant much attention. Reporters tend to give 1 

most attention to positive and negative views that are 

strong but not extreme. Sources should tell the report1 

which aspects of an issue are more familiar, and on 

which aspects the source may consequently take a 

stronger position. 

PERSONALZZATZON OF ZSSUES 

Stories about chronic risk tend to be uninteresting. In 

24 effort to make them more interesting and to get 
points across more clearly, reporters often try to 

personalize the issue with such questions as “have you 

floodproofed your home” or “would you let Four family 

live there”. Sources should give some thought to the issue 

to be discussed and try to anticipate what sorts of 

personalizing questions might be asked and what answers 

might be given. 

25 

I 
CHAPTER 5 

DEALING WITH THE COMMUNITY 

F lood risks usually affect large areas or whole groups of 

people and require solutions of comparable scope. 

Explanation of these kinds of problems and mitigating 

actions involve dealing with the community through 

meetings, workshops and other formats. Sometimes these 

kinds of risk communications go smoothly but often 

enough they either become stormy or the local 

government and public simply lose interest. How things 

progress depends in part on the nature of the interaction 

with the community and the public that is planned as 

part of the risk communication effort. 

ZMPORTANCE OF COMMUNITY ZNPUT 

It’s important to plan for community input in risk 

communication efforts for four major reasons: 

People have a right to make decisions about issues 

that directly affect their lives. 

Involvement in the decision making process 

26 
improves the public’s understanding of the 

risk and leads to more appropriate response. 

q Input from the public helps the infoFmation 

provider in identifying factors that are important 

beyond the bare scientific analysis of the risk and 

potential responses. 

u A willingness to accept input increases the 

credibility of the information provider. 

>:> ““, Public 

; ; Meeting .s” Tonight 

8:00 p.m. 

AT CITY HALL 

Flood Awareness Information 

We Need Your Input! 

MANAGING COMMUNITY INPUT 

Successful efforts to obtain community input must 

consist of more than presenting a plan that has already 

been worked out and defending against critical 

comments. Procedures that increase the effectiveness of 

communications with the community are: 

q Involving the community at the earliest stage 

possible. 

27 
!I 

cl 

n 

cl 

0 

Clarifying the use of the input and defining those 

things that are subject to change as 3 result of the 

input and those things that are not. 

Identifying the different audiences that exist and 

responding to their special needs for information. 

Wherever possible, substituting small informal 

meetings for large meetings or formal hearings. 

Recognizing that people’s feelings are an 

important aspect of their response to risk and not 

responding to emotional statements by quoting 

technical data. 

Listening to expressions of values and feelings, 

acknowledging them, and being prepared to 

describe the values on which the agency’s 

planning is based. 

TRUST AND CREDIBILITY 

Risk communications almost always require the lay 

audience to rely on the expertise of the agency providing 

the information, both with respect to the scientific 

aspects that are 

involved and their “Credibility and trust me not 

interpretation. 

The effort to 

automatic” 

explain the flood 

risk or project proposal are almost certain to fail unless 

the agency is viewed as being credible and trustworthy. 

28 
Credibility and trust are not automatic. In fact, the 

opposite is often the case, and the agency initiating the 

communication effort must overcome a naeural 

resistance to outsiders suggesting what the community 

should or must do. 

Whether or not an agency builds trust depends on a 

number of factors such as: apparent competence; 

willingness to invite public involvement and take it 

seriously; openness; and consideration of community 

concerns. Trust and credibility can be enhanced by: 

0 

cl 

cl 

cl 

q 

Identifying those community organizations 

that do have local trust and credibility and asking 

for their assistance in explaining the flood risk and 

proposed project. 

Explaining agency procedures in the detail 

necessary to show their logic and describing how 

the public’s input will fit into the procedures. 

Taking the time to consider what kinds of 

information different groups may want or need to 

know, preparing a list of issues and the responses 

that address them, and furnishing information at 

the earliest possible time even if no specific 

requests for it have been made. 

Only making promises that can be kept and 

following through on those that are made. 

If a delay occurs in meeting a commitment, 

getting back in contact with the person and 

explaining the reason for the delay. 29 
11 If pressed for a date of some event or decision that 

can’t be controlled, explaining the process and 

goals rather then guessing at a date that will 

probably turn out to be wrong. 

n Ensuring all of the appropriate coordination has 

been done both within the agency and with other 

agencies and explaining any differences in agency 

views and recommendations rather than letting 

them cause confusion. 

0 haking every meeting open to the public because 

closed meetings arouse suspicion’and seldom go 

unnoticed. 

30 
Referekes 

. 

Entries in the following blhliography thar are of particular interest are m holdface type. A more extenwve 

hlhlwgraphy related [o risk communication can he ohtamed from the Hydrologic Engineermg Center. 

Adler, Robert S. and R. Dawd Ptttle. “Cajolery or Command: Are Educatwn Campaigns an Adequate Suhstwte 

for Regulation. Yak Journal on Regulation. 

Covello. Vincent T. “Perception of Technological Risks: A Lnerature Review”. Technological Forecastmg and Socud 

Change. 23. (1983): 285. 297. 

Covello, Vincent T. “Risk Communication: A Review of the Literature”. Risk Abstracts. 3. No. 4 (1986): 

171-182. 

Chnstensen. Larry and Carlton E. Ruth. “Assessment of Brochures & Radw & Televwon Presentawns on 

Hurricane Awareness.” Mass Emergencies. March 1978. 

Dynes, Rusell R. and Denms Wager. “Factors in the Community Perception of Water Resource Problems”. 

Water Resources B&m; Ameran Water Resources Association. August 1971. 

Dzunk. Andrew A. Flood Plan Management and lntergwemmenlal Coordinalon: An Analysts of Co+-State 

Interaaron. Florida State University. Resident Scholar Program Research Paper No. 6. 1976. 

Edgmon, Terry D. “A Systems Resourcea Approach to Ciuzen Partlclparion: The Case of the Corps of Engmeers”. 

Water Resources Bullam 15. No 5 (October 1979): 1341-1352. 

Evans, Rlchard L., Richard M. Rozelle, Thomas M. Lasater, Theodore M. Dembroskl, and Bern P. Allen. 

“Fear Arousal, Persuasion, and Actual Versus lmplred Behaworal Change: New Perspecrive Utdizmg a 

Real-Life Dental Hygwne Program.“Joumnl of Personality and Social Psychology 

Frandsen. Kennerh D. “Effects of Threat Appeals and Media of Transmwon.” Speech Monographs Vol. 20. No. 2. 

June 1963. 

Hansson, Robert O., et. al. “Threat, Knowledge, and Support for a Collective Response fo Urban Fleading”. 

Journal ofApplied Soad Psychology 9. No. 5 (September-October 1979): 413-425. 

Illinois Department of Transportation. Notifying Floodplain Residents: An Assessment of the Literature. 

Illinois Department of Transportation. Division of Water Resources. Chicago, IL. 1980. 

Kasperson, Roger B. “Six Propositions on Public Participation and their Relevance for Risk Communication. 

Risk Analysis. 6. No. 3 (1986): 275- 281. 

Keeney, Ralph L. and Detlof von Winterfeldt. “Improving Risk Communication”. Risk Analysis. 6. No. 

417.424. 

Lichtenstein, S., P. Slowc, B. Flschoff, M. Lavman, and B. Combs. “Percaved Frequency of Lethal Evenr,“. 

Decrszon Research. Eugene, OR. Decision Research Report 76.2. 1978. 81 pp. 

Lorelh, James T “Perceiving Flood Risk”. Water Specmcm. 14 No. 2 (Spring 1982): 26-34. 

New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection. Improving Dialog With Communities. January 1988. 

Rogers, Ronald W. and C. Ronald Mewborn. “Fear Appeals and Attitude Change: Effects of a Threat’s 

Noxiousness, Probabllzty of Occurrence, and the Efficacy of Coping Responses”. Journal ofPrnon&~ and 

Social Psychology 

R&r, Wolf. “Attitudes and Knowledge on the Topeka Flood Plain”. In: Papers on Flcai Problems. E&red hy 

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