J-S08034-21

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

TRAVON M. JOHNSON 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1095 MDA 2020

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered July 29, 2020

In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-22-CR-0001673-2018

BEFORE: STABILE, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED MARCH 16, 2021

Appellant Travon Johnson appeals from the judgment of sentence 

entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County on July 29, 2020, 

following a jury trial. We affirm.

The trial court set forth the relevant procedural history and facts herein 

as follows:

On March 13, 2018, Appellant was charged with Aggravated 

Assault, Kidnapping of Minor, Concealment of Whereabouts of 

Child, Endangering Welfare of Children, and Terroristic Threats. 

Following a jury trial held on February 10-11, 2020, Appellant was 

found guilty of two counts of Aggravated Assault, 1•2 Concealment 

of Whereabouts of Child,3 Endangering Welfare of Children,4 and 

Terroristic Threats.5

On July 29, 2020, Appellant was sentenced. On August 11 

2020, an amended sentencing Order was filed, sentencing 

Appellant to five (5) to ten (10) years in state prison at count 1, 

count 3 merged into count 2 and two (2) years of state supervision 

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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at counts 4, 5, and 6 to run consecutive to each other and 

consecutive to count 2.

6

No post-sentence motions were filed. On August 25, 2020, 

this Court received a timely Notice of Appeal filed with the 

Superior Court of Pennsylvania. This Court ordered Appellant on

August 31, 2020, to file a concise statement of matters 

complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). Appellant 

complied with said Order on September 17, 2020.

Factual Background

The following facts were established at a jury trial held on 

February 10-11, 2020. (Notes of Testimony, Jury Trial, 2/10-

11/20).7

On the night of March 10, 2018, Bianca Jones8 went to a 

club in D.C. with her friends. (N.T., 93). Ms. Jones had Appellant 

watch her children while she was gone. (N.T., 93-94). Her son was 

picked up the same night by his father. (N.T., 9 5). This left 

Appellant to watch Ms. Jones’ one-year-old daughter, DC, 

overnight. (N.T., 92; 95). Ms. Jones began having issues with 

Appellant while she was still out. (N.T., 98-100). Appellant 

became upset and began to threaten Ms. Jones. (N.T., 100). Ms. 

Jones became afraid of Appellant and told Appellant to drop the

child off with Ms. Jones’ father. (N.T., 101-102). Appellant 

indicated that he did not want to do that. (N.T., 102). Because 

she was afraid of Appellant, Ms. Jones went to a friend's home 

instead of going directly to Appellant's home. (N.T., 102-103). Ms. 

Jones continued to speak with Appellant on the phone and could 

hear the child crying in the background. (N.T., 104). Appellant 

began to threaten the child. (N.T., 105). Ms. Jones then called 911 

around 7:30 o'clock a.m. (N.T., 106-107).

On March 11, 2018, around 7:30 o’clock a.m., Officer Uriah 

Aviles9 received a dispatch regarding a possible kidnapped child. 

(N.T., 145). The child in this case, DC, was a one-year-old child 

at the time of this incident. (N.T., 92). Officer Aviles responded to 

336 Cresson Street, but received no response from anyone 

possibly in the residence. (N.T., 146-147). Officer Aviles then 

responded to an address in Lower Paxton Township to meet with 

the mother of the child, Ms. Jones. (N.T., 147). Officer Aviles then 

transported Ms. Jones to the Harrisburg police station to speak 

with a detective. Id.

Detective Richard Iachini10 was then assigned to this case.

(N.T., 189). Detective Iachini interviewed Ms. Jones at the police 
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station. Id. Ms. Jones clarified to Detective Iachini that Appellant 

had permission to watch the child overnight. (N.T., 190).

During the interview with Detective Iachini, Ms. Jones 

received multiple phone calls from Appellant. (N.T., 192). Ms. 

Jones put her cell phone on speaker. Id. In his testimony, 

Detective Iachini described Appellant as very belligerent and cruel 

during these phone calls. (N.T., 193). Appellant was laughing and 

threatening Ms. Jones during the phone calls. Id. Appellant 

threatened to kill both Ms. Jones and the child. (N.T., 193-194). 

Appellant indicated that he was upset because Ms. Jones did not 

check in with him while she was out. (N.T., 197). During these 

phone conversations, Appellant never mentioned that the child 

had injuries or had fallen. (N.T., 194). Ms. Jones requested that 

Appellant return her child, but Appellant refused to do so. (N.T., 

113; 195).

After remaining at the Harrisburg police station from around 

9:00 o'clock a.m. until around 2:00 o'clock p.m., she went to her 

father's home in Steelton, Pennsylvania. (N.T., 198).

Police attempted to locate Appellant through the cell phone 

company but were only able to locate a large radius. (N.T., 199-

200). Without Ms. Jones’ knowledge, police set up surveillance 

outside of Ms. Jones’ father's apartment. (N.T., 200-201). This 

surveillance team included Detective Iachini, Lieutenant Wealand, 

and Detective Fustine. Id. Unknown to this surveillance team, 

Cloreatha Conway, 11 Appellant's mother, contacted Ms. Jones and 

told her to come pick up the child at Ms. Conway's home. (N.T., 

118; 260). After this call, the surveillance team observed a woman 

pick up Ms. Jones in a vehicle. (N.T., 202). The surveillance team

followed Ms. Jones and the woman to Ms. Conway's home. Id. Ms. 

Jones eventually exited the home with her child, DC. Id. Detective 

Iachini approached to check on the condition of the child. (N.T., 

202-203). The child was asleep but had visible injuries to her face. 

(N.T., 203). The surveillance team escorted Ms. Jones and her 

child to the Harrisburg hospital. (N.T., 204). Physicians eventually 

decided to transfer the child to the Hershey hospital. Id.

At the Hershey hospital, Dr. Kent Hymel,12 a member of the 

Child Protective Team, examined the child. (N.T., 152; 157-158). 

Dr. Hymel proceeded to document and interpret the child's 

injuries. (N.T., 159). According to Dr. Hymel's testimony, the 

child's injuries were not consistent with a fall down the stairs. 

(N.T., 168). On the contrary, the injuries were highly specific with 

abuse. Id. Dr. Hymel explained that a child's reflexive movements 

would have protected the child's ears and most of her face if she 
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had fallen down the stairs. (N.T., 167). Here, the child's injuries 

included direct trauma to her ears and eyes. (N.T., 159-163). This

included linear bruises, suggesting an open hand had caused the 

injuries. (N.T., 161). In a fall, the ears are the least likely to get 

bruised and the eyes are usually protected. (N.T., 161). Further,

there was no direct trauma to the nose. (N.T., 163). Dr. Hymel's 

assessment concluded that the child had been physically abused. 

(N.T., 178). However, nothing in Dr. Hymel's report referenced 

serious bodily injury. (N.T., 178).

Kelsi Pipes, a Children and Youth caseworker, followed up 

three or four days after the incident to take photographs of the 

child's facial injuries. (N.T., 180-181).

Detective Iachini was able to locate and speak with 

Appellant the next day, March 12, 2018. (N.T., 205). Appellant 

told Detective Iachini that the child fell down the stairs and that 

one scratch near her lip was present before he had the child. (N.T., 

206-210). Appellant told Detective Iachini that he treated the 

child's injuries with witch hazel and a cold compress. (N.T., 222). 

Although other people were present to witness this alleged fall 

down the stairs, Appellant refused to give Detective Iachini any 

names of these possible witnesses. (N.T., 206).

Zalia Moore,13 niece of the Appellant, testified at trial that 

she witnessed the child fall down the stairs after chasing a balloon. 

(244-248). Ms. Moore never called for medical help for the child 

nor did she contact police at any time to indicate that she was a 

witness to the child’s injuries or that her uncle, the Appellant, did 

not injure the child. (N.T., 254-255). George Davis,14 a friend of 

the Appellant, also testified that the child fell down the stairs after 

playing with a balloon. (N.T., 274). Mr. Davis testified that he did 

not see any bruises on the child. (N.T., 279).

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1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2702(A)(9)

2 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2702(A)(8)

3 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2909(A)

4 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4304(A)( I)

5 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2706(A)(l)

6 Amended Sentencing Order, 8/1 1/20

7 Hereinafter, “N.T.”

8 Hereinafter, “Ms. Jones”

9 Hereinafter, “Officer Aviles”

10 Hereinafter, “Detective Iachini”

11 Hereinafter, “Ms. Conway”

12 Hereinafter, “Dr. Hymel”

13 Hereinafter, “Ms. Moore”
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14 Hereinafter, “Mr. Davis”

Trial Court Opinion, filed 10/22/20, at 1-5. 

On July 29, 2020, Appellant was sentenced to an aggregate term of five 

(5) years to ten (10) years in prison followed by six years of consecutive state 

supervision. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal on August 25, 2020. On 

September 17, 2020, Appellant filed his concise statement of the matters 

complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). The trial court filed 

its Rule 1925(a) Opinion on October 22, 2020. 

In his appellate brief, Appellant presents the following issue for our 

review:

Was the evidence presented at trial insufficient to prove 

beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant committed the offense 

of Aggravated Assault when the evidence failed to establish that 

he was the one who caused the injury to the child and the expert 

testimony failed to establish serious bodily injury? 

Appellant’s Brief at 5. 

This Court’s standard of review of the sufficiency of the evidence is wellsettled: 

In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we must determine 

whether the evidence admitted at trial, and all reasonable 

inferences drawn from that evidence, when viewed in the light 

most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner, was 

sufficient to enable the fact finder to conclude that the 

Commonwealth established all of the elements of the offense 

beyond a reasonable doubt. The Commonwealth may sustain its 

burden by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Further, the 

trier of fact is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence. 

Moreover, as an appellate court, we may not re-weigh the 

evidence and substitute our judgment for that of the factfinder.
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Commonwealth v. Williams, 176 A.3d 298, 305-06 (Pa.Super. 2017)

(citations and quotation marks omitted). “[T]he facts and circumstances 

established by the Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of 

innocence.” Commonwealth v. Colon-Plaza, 136 A.3d 521, 525-26 

(Pa.Super. 2016). It is within the province of the fact-finder to determine the 

weight to be accorded to each witness's testimony and to believe all, part, or 

none of the evidence. Commonwealth v. Tejada, 107 A.3d 788, 792-93 

(Pa.Super. 2015).

Herein, Appellant’s issue is twofold. First, Appellant maintains the 

Commonwealth failed to present sufficient evidence to prove Appellant’s

actions or inaction was the actual cause of the bruising to D.C.’s face; 

therefore, both Aggravated Assault convictions should be vacated. Appellant 

argues the sole evidence the Commonwealth introduced at trial pertaining to 

causation was the testimony of Ms. Jones who admitted she had lied to police, 

delayed seeking the return of D.C., and that other individuals had access to 

D.C. during the relevant time period. Appellant’s Brief at 17-18.

 At trial, Ms. Jones explained that her delay for two to three hours in 

retrieving D.C. from Appellant’s mother, whom she knew and trusted, was due 

to the fact that she was not driving and did not have a ride. She also knew 

Appellant wasn’t with the child at that time. N.T. 2/10/20, at 119-120. Ms. 

Jones also admitted she had lied to the 911 operator when she indicated her 
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daughter had been taken and that, in addition to not having a ride, she was 

too intoxicated to pick up her daughter immediately. Id. at 136-37. 

Appellant further posits the Commonwealth’s evidence was insufficient 

to show the injuries the child sustained were “serious” for the purposes of 18 

Pa.C.S.A. § 2702(a)(9) and 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2301. Appellant reasons that 

based upon the testimony of Ms. Jones and Dr. Hymel, the “only” injuries 

observed on the eighteen month old child were “quite extensive and confluent 

facial bruising” and “facial and head bruising.” Appellant also stresses Dr. 

Hymel believed the child acted “normally” upon examination. Appellant’s Brief 

at 18-19. 

Under the relevant subsections of the Aggravated Assault statute, a 

person is guilty of Aggravated Assault if he or she: “(8) attempts to cause or 

intentionally, knowingly or recklessly causes bodily injury to a child less than 

six years of age, by a person 18 years of age or older; or (9) attempts to 

cause or intentionally, knowingly or recklessly causes serious bodily injury to 

a child less than 13 years of age, by a person 18 years of age or older.” 18 

Pa.C.S.A. § 2702(a)(8)-(9). Further, serious bodily injury is defined as 

“[b]odily injury which creates a substantial risk of death or which causes 

serious, permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the 

function of any bodily member or organ.” 18 Pa. C.S. § 2301.

As the trial court stresses, Appellant’s Aggravated Assault convictions 

do not require a showing that Appellant caused D.C. substantial bodily injury 
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under the aforementioned statute. Appellant was found guilty of Aggravated 

Assault – Attempt to Cause Serious Bodily Injury and Aggravated AssaultCaused Bodily Injury. Under the first charge, the Commonwealth had the 

burden to establish Appellant attempted to cause serious bodily injury, not 

that Appellant actually caused serious bodily injury. Moreover, to establish

the second charge, the Commonwealth had the burden to prove that Appellant 

caused bodily injury, not that he caused substantial bodily injury. See Trial 

Court Opinion, filed 10/22/20, at 7-8. 

Notwithstanding the foregoing, Dr. Hymel explained that D.C’s left ear 

was “pretty severely bruised.” N.T. 2/10/20, at 164. He further stated that 

one could have had a normal CT scan and still have suffered a concussion, or 

a brief loss of consciousness from head trauma. Id. at 172. 

In addition, in finding the Commonwealth had shown Appellant was the 

cause of D.C.’s bodily injuries, the trial court observed the following:

As stated above, the Commonwealth presented evidence, 

through the testimony of Ms. Jones, Dr. Kent Hymel, and 

Detective Iachini, that the child had injuries to her facial area. (N. 

T., 121, 159, 203). Here, the child's injuries included direct 

trauma to her ears and eyes. (N.T., 159- 163). This included linear 

bruises, suggesting an open hand had caused the injuries. (N.T., 

161). Dr. Hymel testified that these injuries were not consistent 

with a fall and were consistent with abuse. (N.T., 168-178). Dr. 

Hymel's assessment does not include a reference to or indication 

of seriously or substantial bodily injury. (N. T., 178). However, the 

standard here is bodily injury. The injuries sustained by the child 

constitute bodily injury. Therefore, we believe the Commonwealth 

presented sufficient evidence for the jury to find that Appellant 

caused bodily injury, as required under the relevant statute, 

beyond a reasonable doubt.
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Appellant next argues that the Commonwealth failed to 

establish that Appellant was the one who caused the injuries to 

the child. We disagree. The Commonwealth presented testimony,

through Dr. Hymel, that proved the child's injuries were not 

consistent with a fall down the stairs. (N.T., 168). On the contrary, 

the injuries were highly specific with abuse. Id. Dr. Hymel 

explained that a child's reflexive movements would have protected 

the child's ears and most of her face if she had fallen down the 

stairs. (N.T., 167). Here, the child's injuries included direct trauma 

to her ears and eyes. (N.T., 159-163). This included linear bruises, 

suggesting an open hand had caused the injuries. (N.T., 161). In 

a fall, the ears are the least likely to get bruised and the eyes are 

usually protected. (N.T., 161). Further, there was no direct 

trauma to the nose as one would expect from facial injuries 

consistent with a fall down the stairs. (N.T., 163). Dr. Hymel's

assessment concluded that the child had been physically abused. 

(N.T., 178). Appellant is the one who was watching the child. 

(N.T., 93). The injuries to the child's ears and eyes were not

present when Ms. Jones left the child with Appellant. (N. T., 210). 

Ms. Jones could hear the child crying while on the phone with 

Appellant. (N.T., 104). Additionally, Appellant actually threatened 

to harm the child in a phone conversation with Ms. Jones because 

he was upset with her. (N.T., 98-100, 105). Therefore, we believe 

the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence for the jury to 

find that Appellant was the one who caused the child's injuries 

beyond a reasonable doubt.

Further, the testimony presented by the Commonwealth is 

not so inherently unreliable as to require the exception to the 

general rule that the jury is the sole arbiter of the facts. (See

Commonwealth v. Karkaria, 625 A.2d [1167,] 1170 [Pa. 

1993])

Trial Court Opinion, filed 10/22/20 at 8-9 (footnotes omitted). 

 In light of all of the foregoing and following our review of the record, we 

find no error in the trial court’s analysis. Although Appellant stresses his 

witnesses testified that the child’s injuries were sustained in a fall at a party

and that others had been caring for her in addition to Appellant, the testimony 

of Ms. Jones, Detective Iachini and Dr. Hymel was sufficient for the jury, as 
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the finder of fact, to have found Appellant guilty of the two counts of 

Aggravated Assault. Tejeda, supra. An appellate court will not substitute 

its assessment of credibility for that of the finder of fact. Commonwealth v. 

Manley, 985 A.2d 256, 262 (Pa.Super. 2009). Thus, Appellant’s issue lacks 

merit. 

Judgment of Sentence Affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 03/16/2021