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. e du/thir dc ir c uit_1996/95UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

______________

No. 95-5093

______________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

RALPH A. ANDERSKOW, Ap pellant

______________

No. 95-5094

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

DONALD ANCHORS, Ap pellant

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey (D.C. Criminal Nos. 93-cr-00300-02 & 93-cr-00300-03)

_______________

Argued January 25, 1996

Before: COWEN and SAROKIN, Circuit Judges , and POLLAK, District Judge

(Filed July 9, l996)

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Richard F. X. Regan, Esq. (ARGUED) Hayden, Perle and Silber
1500 Harbor Boulevard Weehawken, New Jersey 07087

COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT ANDERSKOW

Michael M. Mustokoff, Esq. (ARGUED)Teresa N, Cavenagh, Esq.

Judith E. Baylinson, Esq. Duane, Morris & Heckscher One Liberty Place Philadelphia, PA 19103

COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT ANCHORS

Allan Tananbaum (ARGUED) Faith Hochberg United States Attorney
970 Broad Street Newark, New Jersey 07102

COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE

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OPINION OF THE COURT

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COWEN, Circuit Judge.

Ralph Anderskow and Donald Anchors appeal from judgments of conviction and sentence entered by the District Court for the District of New Jersey. The convictions arise out of their participation, along with several other coconspirat ors, in the Euro-American Money Fund Trust (the "Trust"), an en tity that was used to perpetrate a pernicious advance-fee scheme. Over a threeyear period, the Trust bilked unsuspecting loan app licants and investors out of over eighteen million dollars. Bo th defendants raise evidentiary and legal sufficiency challenges. We will affirm the judgments of conviction.

I. John Voigt was the mastermind of a scheme to obtain fees from loan applicants and potential investors for no nexistent loans
and investments. At the heart of this scheme was t he Trust. Voigt fabricated a fictitious genealogy for the Trust, cl aiming that it was a long-established European financial instituti on affiliated with the Catholic Church and the Knights of Malta, and that it had
access to billions of dollars. For two and one-hal f years brokers for the Trust would recount this false genealogy to unsuspecting loan applicants and investors, who would part with substantial fees in return for "self-liquidating" loans (loans that repaid themselves) and "Master Collateral Commitments" ("M CCs"), allegedly a special form of commercial paper available only t o banks. Voigt benefitted from the cooperation of s everal coconspirators, including Anderskow, a partner at a Chicago law firm who also was a certified public accountant. H e was hired as the Trust's lawyer in the Chicago area, and his cre dentials helped provide the Trust with an appearance of legitimacy, which facilitated its attempts to lure loan applicants an d potential investors. Anderskow's primary responsibility was providingguarantees to borrowers on behalf of the Trust and maintaining a

client escrow account into which advance fees were deposited. Anderskow would immediately distribute fees that ha d been deposited into his escrow account according to Voigt's instru ctions, which
violated the terms of contracts entered into with t he loan applicants and investors. For his role in the Trus t Anderskow received $995,000 in compensation. In January of 1991 appellant Anchors was h ired for the position of "loan oversight officer." Somewhat aki n to a customer relations manager, Anchors was primarily responsibl e for responding to questions and complaints from customers of the T rust. Over time, Anchors devoted much of his time to placating loan applicants who had paid advance fees and were calling with inc reasing frequency to inquire as to the status of their loan s. Anchors eventually responded to several hundred calls each month, assuring disgruntled borrowers that their loans were about t o be funded. Eventually, Anchors began to tell some applicants t hat other loans had been funded, which he knew was untrue. Anchors received $325,000 for his participation in the Trust. In June of 1993, a federal grand jury issu ed a twentysix-count indictment against Anderskow, Anchors, an d their three coconspirators--Voigt, Mercedes Travis, and Solis A levy. Alevy entered a plea of guilty and became a government wi tness. Subsequently, the grand jury issued a twenty-eight- count superseding indictment against the remaining four d efendants, charging Anderskow and Anchors with conspiracy to c ommit wire fraud, wire fraud, and money laundering, and bringi ng criminal money laundering forfeiture allegations against the m. After a three-month trial, a jury convicte d Anderskow on all charges except two counts of wire fraud. Ancho rs was convicted of conspiracy and seven counts of wire fraud, but w as acquitted of
seven other counts of wire fraud and two counts of money laundering. Anderskow and Anchors were sentenced, respectively, to terms of imprisonment of seventy-eight and thirt y-two months. This appeal followed.

II. The district court had original jurisdicti on over these criminal actions pursuant to 18 U.S.C.  3231. We exercise appellate jurisdiction to review final judgments of conviction
under 28 U.S.C.  1291.

III.
Both Anderskow and Anchors contest the dis trict court's decision to allow coconspirator Alevy, who pled gui lty prior to trial and testified for the government, to give lay opinion testimony under Rule 701 of the Federal Rules of Ev idence. Alevy's testimony tended to show that Anderskow and Anchors had knowledge of the Trust's fraudulent scheme. Contending that Alevy's allegedly improper testimony provided the governmen t with its only evidence concerning their knowledge that the Trust was a fraud, both defendants claim that this alleged error was s o prejudicial as to warrant a new trial. We disagree.

A. Anderskow
1. During its case in chief, the government c alled Alevy totestify about the workings of the Trust and its var ious components.

Specifically, Alevy was asked to explain why in lat e 1991 he had drafted letters containing false information for An derskow to sign and send to a victim of the Trust who had paid a su bstantial advance fee for an MCC, and was becoming angry at n ot having received it. Anderskow assigns error to the follow ing exchanges between the government and Alevy: Q. How is it that you, on the one hand, passed false
information to Mr. Anderskow but did not intend to
deceive him?

A. Mr. Anderskow was a daily participant in the same fraud that I was. I can't get into h is mind, I have no way of knowing what he knew i nside his mind, but it was obvious to me and to ld to me by Mr. Voigt that [Anderskow] will do an ything we ask
him to.

. . .

Q. When you passed on that false informa tion to Mr. Anderskow, did you do it to deceive h im?

A. No, sir.

Q. Why then did you pass on information if it wasn't

true?

A. It was part of the job I was doing, a nd he was doing the part of the job that he was doing, and some information was necessary for hi s part.

. . .

Q. Did you ever directly or specifically discuss this
fraud with Mr. Anderskow?

A. No, sir.

Q. Why not?

A. There was no reason to. We were both doing the same thing for the same ends every da y.

App. at 1786, 1799.

2.

Anderskow's complaint is twofold. First, he claims that Alevy lacked sufficient personal knowledge to form an opinion as to whether Anderskow knew the Trust was a fraud and, t herefore, that Alevy's testimony failed to meet Rule 701(a)'s "rat ional basis" requirement as a matter of law. Second, Anderskow appears to argue that even if Alevy's opinion was rationally based o n hisperceptions, to the extent it suggested that Anders kow had guilty

knowledge it was tantamount to an opinion on the ul timate issue of Anderskow's guilt. Alevy's opinion testimony, acco rding to Anderskow, failed to meet Rule 701(b)'s "helpfulnes s" requirement

as a matter of law. We normally review alleged evidentiary err ors for abuse of discretion. Government of Virgin Islands v. Kni ght, 989 F.2d 619, 629 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 556 (1 993); Eisenberg v. Gagnon, 766 F.2d 770, 780 (3d Cir.), cert. denie d, 474 U.S. 946, 106 S. Ct. 346 (1985). Anderskow, however, failed to object contemporaneously to any of the testimony about whi ch he now complains. As a result, we review his contention f or "'plain error,' that is, 'egregious error or a manifest mis carriage of justice.'" United States v. Price, 76 F.3d 526, 53 0 (3d Cir. 1996) (quoting United States v. Thame, 846 F.2d 200, 204 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 928, 109 S. Ct. 314 (1988)). See Fed. R. Crim. P.52(b). We find no plain error because none of the disputed testimony actually contains a "lay opinion" by Alev y as to Anderskow's knowledge. Although it is readily appa rent that in questioning why Anderskow would know that the infor mation in the letters was false the government was attempting to elicit an opinion from Alevy, he never explicitly opined on d irect examination that Anderskow possessed guilty knowled ge. Instead, Alevy provided several reasons to support the unsta ted conclusion that Anderskow had guilty knowledge. For instance, Alevy testified
that he did not believe that Anderskow would be dec eived since Anderskow and Alevy were part of the same organizat ion working toward a common goal, and because Voigt had told hi m that Anderskow would do anything they asked. This simply furnishe d the basis for an inference, based on circumstantial evidence, tha t Anderskow had guilty knowledge which the government was free to s uggest during its closing argument and which the jury was free to accept or reject. Accordingly, since Alevy's testimony did n ot implicate Rule 701, there clearly was no plain error in its a dmission.

B. Anchors Anchors advances a similar claim with resp ect to Alevy's testimony. Because Anchors preserved this claim fo r appellate review by raising a contemporaneous objection, we r eview the admission of Alevy's opinion testimony under Rule 7 01 for abuse of discretion. Knight, 989 F.2d at 629; Eisenberg, 76 6 F.2d at 780.

1. During its case in chief, the government q uestioned Alevy
about certain documents he had sent to Anchors to b e passed along to borrowers who had paid advance fees and were bec oming angry at not having seen any results. Anchors assigns error to the following exchanges between the government and Alev y: Q. Now, when you were providing this inf ormation concerning schedules and projects to Mr. Anchors, did you intend to deceive him by that information?

A. No, sir.

Q. How so?A. I was doing my job, he was doing his job.

Q. Did you believe that Donald Anchors w ould be deceived by the information that you were sending
him?

. . .

A. Personally, I did not believe that.

Q. Why not?

A. Donald Anchors had probably 20 or 30 borrowers, maybe more for all I know, who had be en promised millions of dollars for a long time, some as long as a year. He had never seen one dim e funded or loaned, and he kept on with the busin ess at hand.
I had no reason to believe that he wa sn't fully aware of what was occurring, as long as he was getting paid.

Q. Did you ever specifically discuss fra ud, the fraud in which you believed you were involv ed with Donald

Anchors?

A. No, sir.

Q. Why not?

A. There was no reason to discuss this, we were doing
it.

App. at 503-04.

2.

Anchors first complains that he had insuff icient contact with Alevy for his opinion to be "rationally based" on his perceptions. We disagree. We have held that lay o pinion testimony can be based upon a witness' "knowledge and partici pation in the day-to-day affairs of his business," Lightning Lube , Inc. v. Witco Corp., 4 F.3d 1153, 1175 (3d Cir. 1993), and upon a witness' review of written documents. United States v. Leo, 941 F. 2d 181, 193 (3d Cir. 1991); Teen-Ed, Inc. v. Kimball Int'l, Inc., 6 20 F.2d 399, 403-04 (3d Cir. 1980). Alevy's testimony revealed that he had contact with Anchors by telephone and via facsimile on a weekly basis in the fall of 1991. Most of this correspond ence concerned loan schedules that had been promised to borrowers. In explaining the workings of the Trust and the roles of its vari ous members, Alevy testified that he would provide schedules con taining false information to Anchors so that he could pass them a long to the borrowers. We think that in light of the weekly co rrespondence by telephone and facsimile between Alevy and Anchors, Alevy had sufficient first-hand knowledge such that his opini on was"rationally based" on his perceptions. Lightning L ube, Inc., 4

F.3d at 1175; Leo, 941 F.2d at 193; Teen-Ed, Inc., 620 F.2d at 403-
04. Although we conclude that Alevy's testimon y was "rationally based" on his perception of Anchors, we conclude that Alevy's subjective belief that Anchors "must have k nown" fails to meet Rule 701(b)'s "helpfulness" requirement. Anch ors' principal contention is that the reasons supporting Alevy's o pinion as to why Anchors would not be deceived were already before t he jury. Since it was for the jury to determine whether he "must h ave known" that the Trust was engaged in a large-scale fraud, Alevy 's opinion on the subject, according to Anchors, essentially turn ed him into a thirteenth juror. We agree. In United States v. Rea, 958 F.2d 1206 (2d Cir. 1992), the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held th at where the jury has before it the same circumstantial evidence of a defendant's criminal knowledge on which a witness b ases an opinion concerning a defendant's knowledge, testimony from a witness concluding that the defendant "had to know" usually will not meet Rule 701(b)'s helpfulness requirement: [W]hen a witness has fully described what a defendant was in a position to observe, wh at the defendant was told, and what the defen dant said or did, the witness's opinion as to t he defendant's knowledge will often not be "helpful" within the meaning of Rule 701 because the jury will be in as good a posi tion
as the witness to draw the inference as to

whether or not the defendant knew.

Id. at 1216 (internal citations omitted). The Rea court found that testimony by a witness that the defendant "had to k now" failed to meet Rule 701's helpfulness requirement, but went o n to conclude

that the error was harmless. In this case, Alevy testified about the nu mber of complaints Anchors was receiving from customers; An chors' response to those complaints; and the sheer passage of time during which Anchors saw no loans funded. That Alevy "had no re ason to believe that [Anchors] wasn't fully aware of what was occur ring, as long as he was getting paid," App. at 504, simply was not h elpful to the jury's determination of Anchors' criminal knowledge . The government suggests that because a coconspirator's subjective belief that a defendant "must have known" simply pr ovides
additional circumstantial evidence as to the defend ant's objective mental state, it is helpful to the jury. We are no t persuaded. We do not understand how a witness' subjective belief that a defendant "must have known" is helpful to a factfinder that h as before it the very circumstantial evidence upon which the subject ive opinion is based. Furthermore, during its closing argument th e government is free to ask the jury to draw the inference suggeste d by the
circumstantial evidence: that the defendant must ha ve known. Accordingly, our holding does nothing to hamper the government's ability to establish a defendant's criminal knowled ge, even where members of a conspiracy never openly discuss their criminalactivity.

Although we conclude that Alevy's opinion testimony fails to meet Rule 701(b)'s helpfulness requirement, its admission was harmless error. As our opinion will demonstrate, s ee infra IV.B., the circumstantial evidence of Anchors' knowledge w as overwhelming. Furthermore, the government did not rely on Alevy's testimony in its summation, stressing instead the mountain of ci rcumstantial evidence supporting the inference that Anchors "mus t have known." Accordingly, there is no possibility that Alevy's o pinion testimony
to the same effect contributed to the verdict.

IV. At trial the government had no direct proo f of a tacit agreement among Voigt, Alevy, Anderskow and Anchors to engage in an advance-fee scheme. Accordingly, both defendants f iled posttrial motions for judgments of acquittal contending that the government had failed to adduce sufficient evidence that they were knowing participants in a scheme to defraud potential borro wers and/or investors. They appeal the district court's denial of those
motions. Our review of the sufficiency of the evide nce is "governed by strict principles of deference to a ju ry's findings," United States v. Ashfield, 735 F.2d 101, 106 (3d Ci r.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 858, 105 S. Ct. 189 (1984), such t hat we draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the jury verdict. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct 2781, 2789 (1 979). We will overturn a verdict only "if no reasonable juror cou ld accept evidence as sufficient to support the conclusion of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." United States v. Coleman, 811 F.2d 804, 807 (3d Cir. 1987) (quoting United States v. Campbell, 702 F.2d 262, 264 (D.C. Cir. 1983)). Consequently, a "claim of insufficiency places a very heavy burden on an appe llant." United States v. Gonzalez, 918 F.2d 1129, 1132 (3d Cir. 19 90) (quoting United States v. Losada, 674 F.2d 167, 173 (2d Cir. ), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1125, 102 S. Ct. 2945 (1982)), cert. denie d, 499 U.S. 982, 111 S. Ct. 1637 (1991).

A. Anderskow
Anderskow was convicted on ten counts of m oney laundering arising out of various transfers of funds from his attorney escrow account to Trust members, pursuant to Voigt's instr uctions, between July and October of 1991. He also was convicted on numerous counts of wire fraud relating to his actions during the sa me period. Anderskow claims that the evidence is legally insuf ficient to sustain those convictions because the government fa iled to prove that he knew the funds being transferred represente d the proceeds of unlawful activity, 18 U.S.C.  1956(a)(1), or that the transfers were intended to promote "the carrying on of specif ied unlawful activity." Id.  1956(a)(1)(A)(i). He likewise contends that the
evidence is insufficient to demonstrate that he was a knowing and willful participant in a scheme to defraud. Id.  1343. Simply stated, Anderskow argues that the government failed to prove that he was a member of the conspiracy. We disagree. The crucial period with respect to Andersk ow's legal sufficiency challenges is July of 1991, the start o f his money laundering activity. Anderskow's position on appea l is that hejoined the Trust believing it to be a bona fide pro vider of funding

services and that Voigt was a "legitimate, honest i nternational financier." Anderskow's Br. at 32. He also points to Alevy's testimony that they never openly discussed the frau dulent nature of the Trust and the "steady stream of false and decep tive information" Alevy provided him to be passed on to the Trust's customers. Id. at 34. Anderskow argues that absen t Alevy's improper opinion testimony as to his knowledge, the government produced insufficient evidence that he was a knowin g and willful participant in an illegal venture between July and September of
1991. In rejecting Anderskow's argument, we begi n our analysis by observing that at trial Anderskow asserted a goo d-faith defense to the fraud charges. The government, therefore, s ought and
obtained from the district court a "willful blindne ss" instruction. The district court charged the jury that "[t]he ele ment of knowledge may be satisfied by inferences drawn from proof that a defendant may have deliberately closed his or her e yes to what otherwise had been obvious to him or her." App. at 4287-88. We
think that even if Anderskow were correct that the government
failed to establish that he was aware of the Trust' s fraudulent nature when he first joined in March of 1990, viewe d in the light most favorable to the government, Jackson v. Virgin ia, 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S. Ct. at 2789, the evidence more than adeq uately supports the jury's finding that he knew of the Trust's ille gal activities by July of 1990 and, instead of withdrawing, contin ued as a willing participant in return for substantial remuneration. As the government points out, the Trust An derskow joined in March of 1990 had a "strong aura of unreality." Government's Br. at 77. It purported to sell "self-liquidating" loans; i.e., loans that did not have to be repaid. It also clai med to be a long-established European financial institution aff iliated with the Catholic Church and the Knights of Malta, and that it had access to billions of dollars. Furthermore, loan applicants were required to sign bizarre confidentiality agreements that purpor ted to bar customers from disclosing information about the Tru st in this life and the hereafter. Loan applicants also were requi red to fill out peculiar personal questionnaires that asked if they could hold their breath under water or were flat footed, and t hey were asked to provide hair samples and blood tests. Given And erskow's status as a partner in a Chicago law firm and a certified public accountant, and in light of his initial questioning of Trust brokers as to whether the money was "clean," a rati onal jury was entitled to find that Anderskow was suspicious from the outset. Furthermore, a rational jury could have accepted th e government's argument that Anderskow's credentials provided the Trust with an appearance of legitimacy. More significant, however, is that during 1990 no less than seventeen advance fees, which totaled $1.5 mil lion, were deposited into Anderskow's escrow account. Despite the fact that not one loan was funded during that time, Anderskow immediately would parcel out the money to the various coconspir ators. By July of 1991, moreover, seventeen additional borrowers a nd investors had paid Anderskow advance fees totaling $6.5 million d ollars, whichAnderskow disbursed to his confederates. Anderskow himself

testified that during 1991 he received approximatel y twelve complaints per day from anxious loan applicants and investors inquiring about their money. Although he knew that not one loan or MCC had been funded, Anderskow continued to provide a plethora of
false excuses intended to lull customers into belie ving that their money was forthcoming. Even more damning was Anderskow's admissio n under crossexamination that by dividing up advance fees among the coconspirators, instead of retaining them in his es crow account, he knew in June of 1991 that he was violating his cont ractual and ethical duty to hold customers' funds until they ha d received their
loans. The evidence showed that Anderskow also lie d to one borrower in the latter part of 1991, claiming that the Trust had funded loans in the past when, in fact, Anderskow k new that no such funding had occurred. Finally, the evidence of And erskow's financial motive and willingness to cooperate is no t seriously debatable. In 1990 Anderskow earned $100,000 from the Trust, and in 1991 he received $437,000, which was more than t en times greater than his 1989 income. Anderskow mechanically compl ied with Voigt's
directions as to how to disburse the advance fees i n his escrow account among the various coconspirators. The government presented an overwhelming c ircumstantial case that by July of 1991 Anderskow had willfully b linded himself
to the Trust's fraudulent activities. We have held that there must be evidence establishing a "'unity of purpose,' the intent to achieve a common goal, and an agreement to work tog ether toward that goal." United States v. Wexler, 838 F.2d 88, 90-91 (3d Cir. 1988). See United States v. McGlory, 968 F.2d 309, 321 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 962, 113 S. Ct. 1388 (1993). We have further held that "all of the elements of the gover nment's case, including the existence of the agreement, may be pr oven entirely through circumstantial evidence." United States v. Schramm, 75 F.3d 156, 159 (3d Cir. 1996) (citing United States v. Kapp, 781 F.2d 1008, 1010 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1 024, 106 S. Ct. 1220 (1986)). Given Anderskow's lulling of disgrun tled customers, his admitted knowledge that disbursing advance fees among the coconspirators violated both the Trust's contractua l obligations and his ethical duties, and his financial motive, a rational jury could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that Anderskow was a knowing and willing participant in a scheme to de fraud by July of
1991.

B. Anchors
Anchors likewise contends that there is in sufficient evidence of his knowing and willful participation i n a scheme to defraud loan applicants. The jury acquitted Anchor s of counts three through six, but found him guilty of counts s even through ten and twelve through fourteen. Accordingly, the jury found that Anchors had the requisite knowledge as of October 3 1, 1991, the
date on which he faxed a letter on behalf of Anders kow. Again, while the government's evidence of Anchors' knowled ge was entirely circumstantial, we think it provides overwhelming p roof that Anchors had willfully blinded himself to the fact t hat he was participating in a fraudulent scheme.Anchors joined the Trust as a "loan office r" in January

of 1991, with thirty years of experience in busines s, the last
seven of which were as a loan officer. From the mo ment he joined the Trust, Anchors was aware that there were loan a pplicants who had paid advance fees but had not received their lo ans. According to his own testimony, Anchors fielded "between 70 a nd 80" calls in January of 1991 alone from concerned customers. Ap p. at 1203. By February, merely one month into his employment, Anc hors informed Voigt that he was using "every excuse in the world, " id. at 1205, and he raised the possibility of liabilities flowin g from the Trust's failure to fund the loans. All the while, Anchors continued to provide excuses to angry customers, kn owing that not a single loan had been funded. Anchors testified t hat by May of 1991 he was fielding approximately 250 calls per we ek. Despite the fact that not one loan was fun ded, Anchors continued to assuage disgruntled applicants with ex cuse after excuse, responding to twenty calls per day from mid -July on. Furthermore, notwithstanding his attempts to downpl ay his significance to the Trust, Anchors clearly understo od the importance of his role. For instance, he wrote Voi gt that "sometimes I amaze myself with [the customers'] res ultant patience," and that "I feel as though I am the [T]r ust to those borrowers under my care." Id. at 181. More signif icantly, by September and October of 1991, Anchors had affirmat ively lied to one customer, falsely telling him that eight other loans had been funded, which provided strong circumstantial eviden ce of knowledge and intent. At the same time, however, Anchors wro te to Alevy about the rising tide of customer complaints and as ked for additional "creative" excuses that he could put in writing. Finally, Anchors' financial motive was beyond dispu te. Although he earned $25,000 in the year prior to joining the Tru st, he received $200,000 during 1991, his first year with the Trust

. We think that when viewed in the light mos t favorable to the government, Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. at 31 9, 99 S. Ct at 2789, the circumstantial evidence of Anchors' knowl edge and willful participation was overwhelming. Pointing to Alevy' s testimony that they never discussed the fraud in which they were e ngaged, Anchors' principal contention is that, absent Alevy's allege dly improper opinion testimony, the government failed to adduce any direct evidence of his knowledge of the conspiracy's illic it purpose. As we noted earlier, however, "all of the elements of the government's case," including knowledge of the conspiracy's illi cit purpose, "may be proven entirely through circumstantial evid ence." Schramm, 75 F.3d at 156 (citing Kapp, 781 F.2d at 1010). If Anchors' argument were taken at face value, the government c ould never prove the existence of a conspiracy where, as here, the c oconspirators do
not discuss the fraudulent nature of their actions. United States v. Klein, 515 F.2d 751, 754 (3d Cir. 1975) ("Circum stantial evidence is clearly proper . . . especially in a co nspiracy case where direct evidence is likely to be scant.") (foo tnote omitted). We refuse to so hold. Ten months passed during whi ch no loan was ever funded. Given the mounting complaints and Anch ors' willingness to provide both creative and false excuses for the Trust's nonperformance, which was motivated by the opportun ity forsubstantial financial remuneration, the jury had am ple evidence

with which to conclude that, at a minimum, Anchors had willfully
blinded himself to the fact that the Trust was a fr aud and that his actions were aiding its fraudulent purpose. See Un ited States v. Ruuska, 883 F.2d 262, 264 (3d Cir. 1989) (lulling d efrauded victims
with false excuses is circumstantial evidence of me ns rea); United States v. Shoup, 608 F.2d 950, 958 (3d Cir. 1979) ( anticipated remuneration circumstantial evidence of coconspirat or's mens rea). United States v. Klein, 515 F.2d at 751, c ited by Anchors, is not to the contrary. In Klein we set a side a defendant's convictions for mail fraud and conspira cy to commit mail fraud, which arose out of a scheme by owners o f a "debtridden" hotel to set their hotel afire and then col lect the proceeds of several fire insurance policies. Id. a t 752. Klein was hired to destroy the hotel for $60,000. After the hotel had been partially destroyed by fire, codefendant Luick was hired by another unindicted coconspirator to prepare and sub mit proofs of loss forms to the insurance companies. We overturn ed Luick's convictions because submission of the proofs of los s forms alone failed to prove that he knew of the conspiracy's un lawful purpose. Although Luick had paid Klein a referral fee, and h ad done so in the past, we found it significant, if not dispositi ve, that "[i]t was not shown that . . . Luick should have been put on notice of suspicious facts in this case because of his past d ealings with Klein. In fact the nature of Klein's and Luick's p ast dealings was left wholly unexplained." Id. at 755 (footnote omi tted). Here, by contrast, the relationship among Voigt, Alevy, Anderskow and Anchors was fully explored at trial. It is true that Anchors joined a conspiracy that was already in pro gress. But unlike the defendant in Klein, Anchors engaged in n umerous activities over a substantial period of time in fur therance of the conspiracy. While Klein stands for the unremarkabl e proposition that a latecomer to a conspiracy does not automatic ally acquire knowledge of the conspiracy's unlawful purpose simp ly by taking a one-time action ostensibly in furtherance of its pu rpose, surely Klein does not preclude a conviction where, as here , the defendant provides a steady stream of false excuses in the fa ce of mounting complaints from disgruntled customers in return for substantial remuneration. Klein is inapposite.

V. For the foregoing reasons the judgments of conviction and sentence will be affirmed in all respects.