Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-602 | November 21, 2018 Page 1 of 9

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Paul J. Podlejski

Anderson, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Caryn N. Szyper

Deputy Attorney General 

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Glendon B. Sturgill, Jr.,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

November 21, 2018

Court of Appeals Case No.

18A-CR-602

Appeal from the Madison Circuit

Court 

The Honorable Angela Warner 

Sims, Judge

Trial Court Cause Nos.

48C01-1708-F4-1952

48C01-1604-F5-776

Robb, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-602 | November 21, 2018 Page 2 of 9

Case Summary and Issue

[1] Following a jury trial, Glendon Sturgill, Jr., was convicted of dealing in 

methamphetamine, a Level 4 felony, and sentenced to eight years in the 

Indiana Department of Correction with three years suspended to probation. 

Sturgill appeals his conviction, raising one issue for our review: whether the 

trial court committed fundamental error in admitting evidence Sturgill claims 

was obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States 

Constitution and Article 1, section 11 of the Indiana Constitution. Concluding 

Sturgill has not demonstrated fundamental error, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Over a period of several weeks in 2016, Detective LeeAnn Dwiggins of the 

Madison County Drug Task Force received multiple reports that 

methamphetamine was being cooked at a particular residence in Madison 

County. Detective Dwiggins identified Sturgill and his girlfriend, Melissa 

Bowman, as the occupants of the residence and determined they each had made 

multiple purchases of pseudoephedrine and had been blocked from making 

further purchases on several other occasions.

1

 

1 Although there was no specific time frame given for the purchases, Officer Dwiggins testified that Sturgill 

had made seventy-one purchases of pseudoephedrine and had been blocked from purchasing

pseudoephedrine on an additional eighteen occasions. Bowman had made eighty-six purchases and had been 

blocked on fifteen occasions.
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[3] On April 13, 2016, Detective Dwiggins, who had been monitoring the logs of 

pseudoephedrine purchases, noticed Bowman had made a purchase of 

pseudoephedrine that day. Around 9:00 p.m., Detective Dwiggins, 

accompanied by three other officers, went to the residence. As Officer 

Dwiggins walked around the house trying to get to an unobstructed door to 

knock and talk with the occupants, she noticed a strong chemical odor she 

knew from her training and experience to be associated with the manufacture of 

methamphetamine. As she returned to the front of the house to tell the other 

officers what she had found, she encountered Sturgill in the driveway, 

immediately handcuffed him, and asked if anyone else was on the property. 

Sturgill said Bowman was in the detached garage and his daughter was inside 

the house. Officers entered the residence and the garage to evacuate the 

occupants. While in the garage, Detective Dwiggins observed 

methamphetamine actively cooking. Sturgill and Bowman were advised of 

their rights and gave their verbal and written consent to a search of the 

property. The search yielded items associated with the manufacture of 

methamphetamine. 

[4] The State charged Sturgill with dealing in methamphetamine, a Level 5 felony,

and attempted dealing in methamphetamine, a Level 4 felony.2 Sturgill filed a 

motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of the search of his property, 

 

2 Additional counts of possession of chemical reagents or precursors with intent to manufacture a controlled 

substance, maintaining a common nuisance, and possession of methamphetamine, all Level 6 felonies, were 

dismissed by the State prior to trial.
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including physical evidence and statements he made to the officers during the 

search. The trial court denied the motion to suppress, finding the police had a 

legitimate reason to be on the property and the chemical odors they 

encountered once there created exigent circumstances supporting further action. 

At Sturgill’s request, the trial court certified its order denying the motion to 

suppress but this court denied Sturgill’s motion to accept jurisdiction over an 

interlocutory appeal. At Sturgill’s jury trial, when the State offered various 

items of evidence from the search into evidence,3 Sturgill affirmatively stated he 

had no objection to admission of the exhibits. The jury found Sturgill guilty on 

both counts. The trial court entered judgment of conviction only on the Level 4 

felony attempted dealing in methamphetamine charge and sentenced Sturgill to 

eight years with three years suspended to probation. Sturgill now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

I. Standard of Review

[5] Sturgill contends the trial court erred in admitting evidence seized during the 

search of his property and the statements derived therefrom because the search 

was conducted in violation of his state and federal constitutional rights. A trial 

court has broad discretion in ruling on the admission or exclusion of evidence. 

Palilonis v. State, 970 N.E.2d 713, 726 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied. An 

 

3 The exhibits included twenty-two photographs in and around the garage, a vial of methamphetamine oil, 

and lab results. 
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abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court’s ruling is clearly against the 

logic, facts, and circumstances presented. Id. “A contemporaneous objection at 

the time the evidence is introduced at trial is required to preserve the issue for 

appeal, whether or not the appellant has filed a pretrial motion to suppress.” 

Brown v. State, 929 N.E.2d 204, 207 (Ind. 2010). The purpose of the 

contemporaneous objection rule is to allow the trial judge to consider the 

evidentiary issue in light of any “fresh developments and also to correct any 

errors.” Id.

[6] Here, Sturgill acknowledges that, despite his pretrial motion to suppress, he did 

not object to the admission of the evidence or statements at trial. See

Appellant’s Brief at 9 (noting Sturgill’s trial counsel “failed to raise an objection 

to the admission of the evidence . . . throughout the course of the trial”). In 

fact, not only did Sturgill fail to object to the trial court’s admission of each 

piece of evidence he now attempts to challenge on appeal, he affirmatively 

stated that he had “no objection” to admission. See Transcript, Volume II at 

214 (photographs of the property); Tr., Vol. III at 55 (items recovered from the 

property); 73 (lab report on vial of oil); and 75 (vial of methamphetamine oil). 

To avoid waiver of the issue, Sturgill contends the trial court committed 

fundamental error in allowing admission of the evidence. The fundamental 

error doctrine is an exception to the general rule that failure to object at trial 

constitutes procedural default precluding consideration of the issue on appeal. 

Benson v. State, 762 N.E.2d 748, 755 (Ind. 2002).
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The fundamental error exception is extremely narrow, and 

applies only when the error constitutes a blatant violation of 

basic principles, the harm or potential for harm is substantial, 

and the resulting error denies the defendant fundamental due 

process. The error claimed must either make a fair trial 

impossible or constitute clearly blatant violations of basic and 

elementary principles of due process. This exception is available 

only in egregious circumstances.

Brown, 929 N.E.2d at 207 (citations and quotation marks omitted).

II. Fundamental Error 

[7] Our supreme court has held that fundamental error is not available when the 

defendant affirmatively states he has no objection to proffered evidence because 

in such a case, the defendant has invited the error in its admission. Halliburton 

v. State, 1 N.E.3d 670, 678-79 (Ind. 2013) (“The appellant cannot on the one 

hand state at trial that he has no objection to the admission of evidence and 

thereafter in this Court claim such admission to be erroneous.”). “A finding of 

fundamental error essentially means that the trial judge erred . . . by not acting 

when he or she should have, even without being spurred to action by a timely 

objection.” Brewington v. State, 7 N.E.3d 946, 974 (Ind. 2014) (internal citation 

omitted); see also Winston v. State, 165 Ind.App. 369, 376, 332 N.E.2d 229, 233 

(1975) (noting in cases in which fundamental error is found, “the error involved 

the mistake or misconduct of the trial judge in the exercise of his own 

affirmative duties”). Without a contemporaneous objection, a trial court has no 

cause to reconsider its earlier evidentiary ruling. See, e.g., Brown, 929 N.E.2d at 

207. And upon the defendant’s express declaration of “no objection,” the trial 
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court has no obligation to interject itself on a defendant’s behalf and determine 

for itself whether the introduction of a particular piece of evidence was in the 

defendant’s best interests. Halliburton, 1 N.E.3d at 679; see also Brewington, 7 

N.E.3d at 975 (noting that fundamental error and invited error are closely 

related and that “fundamental error gives us leeway to mitigate the 

consequences of counsel’s oversights, but invited error precludes relief from 

counsel’s strategic decisions gone awry”). Thus, Sturgill has not shown any 

error by the trial court in not acting when it had a duty to do so.

[8] Moreover, in Brown v. State, our supreme court concluded that a claim of error 

premised on admitting evidence that was the product of an unconstitutional 

search and seizure, without more, does not assert fundamental error where 

there is “no claim of fabrication of evidence or willful malfeasance” on the part 

of the investigating officers or where there is no claim the “evidence is not what 

it appears to be.” 929 N.E.2d at 207. Sturgill does not allege that evidence was 

fabricated or that the challenged evidence is not what it appears to be. He does 

assert that Dwiggins’ conduct was willful malfeasance because she knew she 

did not have probable cause that Sturgill was engaged in any illegal activity 

when officers entered the property. See Appellant’s Br. at 12-13.

[9] “Malfeasance” is defined as:

Evil doing; ill conduct. The commission of some act which is 

positively unlawful; the doing of an act which is wholly wrongful 

and unlawful; the doing of an act which person ought not to do 

at all or the unjust performance of some act which the party had 

no right or which he had contracted not to do.
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Black’s Law Dictionary at 956 (9th ed. 2009). The trial court has already 

addressed Sturgill’s claim that the evidence was unlawfully seized because 

officers should not have entered his property and determined during the motion 

to suppress proceedings that the officers had acted reasonably in entering the 

property and conducting the search. Sturgill’s argument on appeal does not 

allege anything further that would rise to the level of malfeasance, willful or 

otherwise. Even if the officers had been mistaken in their assessment of the 

circumstances, this does not rise to the level of willful malfeasance. See Mamon 

v. State, 6 N.E.3d 488, 490 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (rejecting claim of fundamental 

error where defendant argued officer misunderstood the traffic law that formed 

the basis for a stop but did not dispute the truth of the officer’s testimony or 

exhibits). In Brown, the court noted that admission of evidence as the result of 

an improper seizure is not per se fundamental error: “because improperly 

seized evidence is frequently highly relevant, its admission ordinarily does not 

cause us to question guilt.” 929 N.E.2d at 207. 

[10] For these reasons, Sturgill’s claim does not allege fundamental error and we 

decline to review Sturgill’s challenge to the admissibility of the evidence. See id.

at 208 (explaining that it is not necessary to resolve the issue of whether a 

search was lawful where the defendant had failed to preserve the issue at trial 

and where there was no fundamental error).
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Conclusion

[11] Because Sturgill affirmatively consented to the admission of the evidence he 

now challenges as improperly admitted and because his claim is premised on an 

admission of evidence from an allegedly unconstitutional search, without more, 

his claim is not reviewable for fundamental error, and his conviction is 

affirmed.

[12] Affirmed.

Baker, J., and May, J., concur.