## APHIS **Animal Health Status Evaluation of the**  **Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Feve r,**  **Sw ine Vesicular Disease,**  **Foot and**  **Mouth Disease**  **, and Rinderpest**

**Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service**

**Veterinary Services 2014** 2

2 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest **Tabl e of Contents**  **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ................................**  **................................ ..............................**  **4 HAZARD IDENTIFICATIO** **N AND BACKGROUND INF ORMATION**  **................. 6**  **PATHWAYS ASSESSMENT FOR HAZARD ENTRY INT**  **O CROATIA ................**  **8 ENTRY ASSESSMENT**  **................................ ................................**  **................................ ...**  **9** 1. AUTHORITY , O RGANIZATION , AND INFRASTRUC TURE OF C ROATIA ’ S VETERINARY S ERVICES ................................ ................................ ................................ ......................... 9 2. CSF, FMD, SVD, AND RINDERPEST S TATUS OF C ROATIA ................................ ........ 17 3. D IS EASE STATUS OF ADJACENT REGIONS ................................ ................................ .... 18 4. ACTIVE D ISEASE C ONTROL P ROGRAMS ................................ ................................ ..... 19 5. VACCINATION S TATUS OF C ROATIA ................................ ................................ ........... 24 6. S EPARATION OF C ROATIA FROM ADJACENT REGIONS ................................ ................ 24 7. C ROATIA ’ S M OVEMENT C ONTROLS AND B IOSECURITY ................................ ............. 24 8. C ROATIA ’ S LIVESTOCK D EMOGRAPHICS AND MARKETING P RACTICES .................... 39 9. CSF, FMD, AND SVD S URVEILLANCE IN C ROATIA ................................ ............... 57 10. C ROATIA ’ S D IAGNOSTIC LABORATORY C APACITY ................................ ................ 69 11. C ROATIA ’ S EMERGENCY RESPONSE C APABILITY ................................ .................. 71 ENTRY A SSESSMENT C ONCLUSIONS ................................ ................................ .............. 76 **PATHWAY ANALYSIS -**  **NATURAL MOVEMENT OF FERAL SWINE OR**  **OTHER WILDLIFE INTO CROATIA** **................................ ................................**  **........ 81**  **PATHWAY ANALYSIS -**  **INCOMING VEHICLE OR PASSENGER TRAFFIC**  **AND ANIMAL PROD UCTS FOR PERSONAL CO** **NSUMPTION .........................**  **81 PATHWAY ANALYSIS**  **- IMPORT OR TRANSIT OF**  **COMMERCIAL SHIPMENTS OF INFECTE**  **D LIVE ANIMALS OR CO NTAMINATED ANIMAL**  **PRODUCTS ................................**  **................................ ................................**  **..................... 83**  **EXPOSURE ASSESSMENT ................................**  **................................ .........................**  **84 CONSEQUENCE ASSESSME**  **NT ................................**  **................................ ................**  **86 RISK ESTIMATION**  **................................ ................................**  **................................ ......**  **86 A** **PPENDIX 1: IMPORT DATA** **-- TOTAL, AND TOP 5 COU** **NTRIES --**  **FOR THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA**  **FOR AGRICULTURAL COM MODITIES**  **RELEVANT TO THIS EVA LUATION, 2010**  **- 2012**  **. ................................**  **................... 88**  **REFERENC ES**  **................................ ................................**  **................................ ................**  **90**3

3 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest
**Abbreviations** AHP Animal Health Protection (Sector) APHI S Animal and Plant Health Inspection Servic e AV/AVO Authorized veterinarian/Authorized veterinary organization BiH Bosnia and Herzegovina BIP Border Inspection Po st BVIITS Border Veterinary Inspection and International Trade Service C/D Cleaning and D isinfection CAA Croatian Agricultural Agency CFR Code of Federal Regulations CLC Croatian Livestock Center CP Contingency Plan CSF/v Classical Swine Fever /virus CVED Common Veterinary Entry Document CVI Croatian Veterinary Institute DFHWI Directorate of Forestry, Hunting, and Wood Industry EC European Commission EU European Union FMD/v Foot- and-Mouth Disease/virus FVO Food and Veterinary Offi ce (of the EU) HACCP Hazard Analys is and Critical Control Point MAFRD Ministry

of Agriculture, Fisheries, and Rural Development MS Member State (of the European Union) OG Official Gazette (of the Republic of Croatia) PBM Preventative biosecurity measure s RP/v Rinderpest/virus RVID Regional Veterinary Inspection Department S -M Sisak-M o sl avina (county) SVD/v Swine Vesicular Disease/virus SVID State Veterinary Inspection Department USDA United States Department of Agriculture V- S Vukovar- Sri j em (county) VA Veterinary Act VD Veterinary Directorate VID Veterinary Inspection Directorate VI S Veterinary Inspection Sector4

4 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest **E xecutive Summary**  This animal health status evaluation qualitatively evaluates the risk of classical swine fever virus (CSFv) , foot- and-mouth disease virus (FMDv) , swine vesicular disease virus (SVDv) , or rinderpest virus (RPv) being introduced into the United States via the importation of swine and swine products into the United States from the Republic of Croatia. The information contained and analyz ed in the risk assessment is based on information that Croatian animal health officials provided to APHI S , and other publically available information. Its conclusions are largely b ased on the findings and determinations of a site visit conducted to Croatia in June 2012. On the site visit, APHI S officials clarified and verified the information provided by Croatian animal health officials on the organization and oversight of veterinary services in Croatia and the demographics , movement, and marketing of livestock in Croatia . APHI S c onfirmed the measures in place , including biosecurity measures , to reduce the risk of introduction into and spread throughout Croatia of contagious animal diseases ; c onfirmed Croatia’s disease surveillance efforts ; and verified other animal health matters and their associated risks for international trade . The APHI S site visit team visited central and regional offices of Croatia’s Ministry o f Agriculture, Forestry, and Rural Development (MAFRD) Veterinary D irectorate (VD) , the competent authority for animal health and veterinary services in Croatia ; the central laboratory of the Croatian Veterinary

Institute (CVI); multiple border inspection posts (BIPs), including a maritime port; two swine breeding farms and one swine fattening farm; a rendering facility; a livestock market; a slaughterhouse; a hunting ground; and an authorized veterinary office. APHI S found no evidence in any information submitted nor on the site visit of CSFv , FMDv , SVDv , or RPv currently existing in Croatian livestock populations, feral animals, or wildlife. However, there are certain counties in Croatia considered higher risk for classical swine fever (CSF ) because of previous CSF outbreaks or inability to rule out with certainty

the pre sence of CSFv in wild boar . Mitigations are in place , including active CSF surveillance , movement controls, and biosecurity measures , in the higher risk counties to prevent CSFv , should it be detected, from spreading to domestic swine within the three higher risk counties of Croatia, and throughout Croatia as a whole. APHI S considers the following pathways by which CSFv, FMDv, and/or SVDv could potentially

b e introduced into Croatia: imported live animals with undetected infection ; imported animal products with undetected contamination ; incoming vehicle or human traffic, including individuals carrying products for personal consumption; and the natural movement of infected wildlife or feral animals (e.g. swine) . For one or more of these viruses to be sub sequently introduced from Croatia into the United States in live animals or animal products would require infection of Croatia’s domestic livestock or contamination of animal products , followed by export of animals or animal products with undetected infection or contamination to the United States. APHI S considers the likelihood of CSFv, FMDv, and SVDv being transmitted from Croatia to the United States to b e low, and the likelihood of RPv subsequently b eing transmitted from Croatia to the United States to b e negligible.5

5 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest Figure 1. Map of the Republic of Croatia [ 1 ] .6

6 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest **Hazard Identification and Background Information** One of the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service’s (APHIS ) primary missions is to prevent the introduction of foreign animal diseases into the United States. As such, and per Title 9, Part 92, of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), APHI S conducts an animal health status evaluation addressing hazards of primary concern prior to initiating or resuming import of animal commodities. The World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) lists several highly contagious animal diseases that are considered primary hazards associated with trade of animals and animal products. APHI S considers classical swine fever virus (CSFv), foot and mouth disease virus (FMDv), swine vesicular disease virus (SVDv), and rinderpest virus (RPv) to be hazards associated with trade of live ruminants and swine, as well as certain products and b y-products derived from these species. Croatia requested that APHI S evaluate its animal health status for classical swine fever (CSF ) , foot and mouth disease (FMD ) , swine vesicular disease ( SVD ) , and rinderpest. Based on disease prevalence, recent history, and other risk factors outlined in the entry assessment, this evaluation focuses primari ly on CSFv . The evaluation follow s the OIE recommended format for import risk assessment . The evaluation i s qualitative, and based on information provided to APHI S by Croatian animal health officials -- including information verified on a site visit conducted by APHI S to Croatia in June 2012 -- and other publicly available information. **Previous APHIS**  **Animal Health**  **Status Evaluations**  **of the**  **European Union**  **and Individual Member States**  APHI S has previously evaluated the animal health infrastructure , oversight, legislation, and corresponding disease control pro grams and pro cesses of the European Union (EU) and multiple individual Member States (MS) for CSF, FMD, SVD, and rinderpest. The evaluations assess ed European Community-wide animal health measures ; the ab ility

o f a M S to effectively transpose EU animal health regulations into their own veterinary

infrastructure ; and define d the adminis trative unit for each EU MS . Overall, APHI S has concluded that the animal health infrastructure, oversight, legislation, and corresponding disease control programs and processes are adequate at the EU- level. This evaluation will briefly analyz e and reference EU legislation and EU- level animal health controls , but will focus primarily on Croatia’s veterinary infrastructure, animal health legislation, and corresponding disease control processes , and assess Croatia’s ability

to transpose and implement EU- level animal health controls. **The Administrative Unit in EU Member States** APHI S defines an administrative unit for EU MS animal health status evaluations as the smallest administrative jurisdictions in those countries that have effective oversight of animal movements into, out of, and within those jurisdictions, and that, in association with national authorities if necessary, have the responsibility f or controlling animal disease locally [ 2 , 3 ] . The smallest administrative unit at which Croatia’s Veterinary D irectorate administers veterinary

s ervices is the municipality, which Croatia refers to as an “ epizootological unit” . However, the county (larger than a municipality, and termed an “ epizootological area” ) is the jurisdictional level at which , if an outbreak of an animal7

7 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest disease were to occur, a local disease control center (LDCC) would be established . Croatian animal health officials and therefore APHI S consider the county the level to which Croatia would regionalize in the event of a disease outbreak .8

8 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest **Pathway s**  **Assessment for Hazard Entry into Croatia** The following assessment identifies four potential pathways by which CSFv , SVDv , FMDv , or RPV could be introd uced into Croatia from other EU Member States or third countries:

-via commercially

imported live animals with undetected infection

-via commercially

imported animal products with undetected contamination

-via incoming vehicular or passenger traffic, including individuals unknowingly or intentionally

carrying prohibited animal products

-via natural movements of infected wildlife, such as feral swine For one or more of these hazards to be introduced from Croatia into the United States, a subsequent export event from Croatia to the United States of undetected infected live animals or undetected contaminated animal products or fomites must occur . These pathways are visually

presented in Figure 2 . Figure 2. Simple pathways map b y which hazards could be intro duced into Croatia .
Incoming vehicular or human traffic

Natural movement of wildlife ( feral swine )

Commercial import of infected animal product Commercial import of infected live animals Susceptible wild animal population

Meat , meat products Infective virus on vehicles or clothing

Market distribution

Genetic material Infective virus in meat or meat products for personal consumption Infective virus in waste products

Susceptible domestic livestock population Meat , meat products

Live animals

Genetic material Virus - infected or virus contaminated commodities to the U . S .

Hazard enters Croatia Hazard enters the United States via undetected infected or contaminated

commodities Hazard enters Croatian domestic livestock via waste feeding , direct or indirect

contact with infected wildlife , or direct on -farm exposure9

9 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest **Entry Assessment**  This entry assessment qualitatively describe s the modes by which CSF, FMD, SVD, or rinderpest could be introduced into the United States from Croatia ; the likelihood of a disease incursion happening; and mitigations in place to prevent it . The entry assessment is based on the OIE guidelines for risk analys is [ 4 ] and 9 CFR 92.2 , which outlines APHI S’ process for evaluating the animal health status of a f oreign region , and is formatted according to the version of 9 CFR 92.2. that was in place when Croatia requested these animal health status evaluations . **1. Authority, Organization, and Infrastructure of**  **Croati a’s Veterinary Services**  The central competent authority for animal health and veterinary s ervices in Croatia is the Ministry

o f Agriculture, Fisheries, and Rural Development ’s (MAFRD) Veterinary

D irectorate (VD) [ 5 ] . An organizational diagram of MAFRD is provided in Figure 3 . Figure 3 : Organizational diagram of Croatia’s Ministry o f Agriculture , Fisheries, and Rural Development [ 6 ] .

The VD is headed by

the Chief Veterinary

O fficer (CVO) [ 5 ] . Ithas 327 employees: 7 1 are in the central office, 52 are border veterinary inspectors, 204 are state veterinary

inspectors and official veterinarians. The VD has 9 regional offices (map and discussion on p. 10 ) and one veterinary o ffice in each of Croatia’s 20 counties, plus one in the City

of Zagreb [ 6 ] . An organizational diagram of the VD is provided in Figure 4 .10

10 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest Figure 4 : Organizational diagram of MAFRD -VD [ 7 ] .

The VD sets the overall animal health strategy f or Croatia . This includes disease specific strategies for CSF, FMD, SVD, and rinderpest. The VD implements a robust animal health strategy for CSF given incidence and recent history of the disease (see 4. Active Disease Control Programs); the VD also sets strategy f or FMD, SVD, and rinderpest, but at lesser and appropriate levels. The VD is responsible for devising and implementing national veterinary legislation. Italso implements measures for the detection, control, monitoring, and investigation of animal disease outbreaks, including zoonoses, and notifies them to the EC, the OIE, to neighboring countries, and trading partners. The VD develops contingency plans for animal disease outbreaks; has oversight of veterinary inspections within and at the international borders of Croatia (s ee Veterinary Inspection Sector under 7. Croatia’s Movement Controls and Biosecurity) ; is responsible for drafting the regulations for slaughterhouses and other guidelines for processing, preparing , and storing animal products and by-products, veterinary b iologics and animal feed; and performs other tasks relating to veterinary public health and veterinary medical products. The VD also establishes the registry, database, and record-keeping requirements for farms and animals and contracts the maintenance thereof to the Croatian Agricultural Agency (CAA, see below) , and interacts with the Croatian Veterinary Institute and affiliated laboratories (CVI ; see 10. Croatia’s Diagnostic Laboratory Capacity) [ 5 , 6 , 8 ] . **Administration of Veterinary Services**  **in the Field** Veterinary

s ervices in the field, including disease - specific efforts for CSF, FMD, SVD, and rinderpest, are admini stered by a network of VD’s regional veterinary o ffices , authorized veterinary

organizations (AVOs) , and official control bodies . Regional11

11 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest veterinary

o ffices are staffed by direct emp loyees (official veterinarians) of the VD who conduct specific tasks for the VD (official veterinary controls) . AVOs and official control bodies are private veterinarians or private veterinary organizations authorized to conduct work for the VD [ 6 , 9 ] . Regional Veterinary Offices MAFRD’s regional veterinary o ffices are broadly distributed throughout Croatia, and are involved in most animal health matters in the field . A map of Croatia’s field veterinary

o ffices is provided in Figure 5 . Regional offices are staffed by state employees of the VD, who conduct work on its behalf. The work is largely conducted under two programs - 1) state veterinary inspection and 2) official controls of live animals and products of animal origin (referenced by Croatian animal health officials and termed in this document “official controls”). State veterinary inspectors and official veterinarians primarily visit farms and agricultural facilities as part of the official control plans. State veterinarians are also stationed at markets to monitor AVOs ( see below), livestock market staff, and movement of animals. Other general tasks and duties include appraising animals and paying out of indemnity; providing training or educational materials to AVOs ; and enforcing animal health regulations, e.g. the ban on feeding of waste to swine. Figure 5 . Map of Croatia’s Regional and Branch Offices * [ 5 ] .

*Note: At the time this map wa s supplied, Croatia’s Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, and Rural Development was called the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Water Management (MAFWM) . Accordingly, the offices listed above are geographically correct . In the map legend, “MAFWM -Veterinary Directorate” is equivalent to “MAFRD - Veterinary Directorate” , and “county vet of fice” is equivalent to “regional office” .12

12 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest Regional officials draft annual plans for work to be conducted in their jurisdictions, and submit those plans to central level VD officials for review and approval. The annual plan establishes, for example, the minimum number of farm inspections , or percentage of farms to be inspected; the ye arly disease sampling plan for the jurisdiction ; and other animal health activities to be conducted . The annual plan for each regional office is based on an assessment largely predicated on current needs and previous inspections for that particular regional jurisdiction. The assessment would include, for example, information obtained from the previous year’s animal health status and veterinary activities , including b iosecurity compliance. Once approved, regional and local offices then designate within their own jurisdiction the best way to implement the annual plan. The bulk of the work in the regional offices comes from conducting official controls of live animals and products of animal origin , the system for which is outlined and regulated by

the Food Act (OG 46/07, 55/11); the Veterinary Act (OG 41/07, 55/11); and the Ordinance on official controls (OG 99/07). However, Croatian law allows delegation of official controls by state employees to so - called “ official control bodies ” , and delegation of certain veterinary tasks to AVOs. The offi cial control bodies are essentially AVOs that are accredited in accordance with the standard ISO/IEC 17020:2005, and have a sufficient number of qualified, experienced, and impartial staff to conduct the work. When veterinary tasks are delegated to either AVOs or official control bodies, the regional office assumes an oversight role rather than conducting the work. Authorized Veterinary Organizations (AVOs) Authorized veterinary

organizations are comprised of private veterinarians who are authorized to conduct certain tasks on behalf of the VD. Croatia has a total of 137 authorized veterinary

organizations, with 897 authorized veterinarians. Thirty- four of the AVOs (137 of the authorized veterinarians) are accredited as official control bodies. Requirements for and registration as an AV/AVO are set at the national level ; oversight of and interaction with AVs/AVOs is largely conducted at the regional level [ 10 ] . Most veterinary

activities

—including CSF specific veterinary work-- in the field are performed by

a uthorized veterinarians (AVs). Authorized activities include veterinary animal health and welfare examinations ; disease control activities , including but not limited to collecting samp les for diagnostic testing and administering preventative vaccinations; identification of animals; and other specific tasks as outlined in the Veterinary

Act (OG 41/07, 55/11), specifically Article 95, and the Ordinance on the conditions to be met by v eterinary

organizations, veterinary practices and veterinary services in the veterinary activities implementation system (OG 45/09, 80/10) . The majority o f field equipment and supplies are maintained by AVs/AVOs ; this is a requirement for them to be and remain authorized. They visit all farms at least once per ye ar for an annual veterinary check, and visit more often if called. Further, they must visit the farm no more than 30 days prior to movement of animals from the farm. AVOs collect samples from domesti c and feral swine for CSF surveillance, and oversee livestock markets, ante - and post-mortem inspections at slaughterhouse, and other approved establishments [ 6 , 9 , 10 ] . The Veterinary

Act (VA) stipulates the legal criteria for providing veterinary services in Croatia, and prescribes the requirements for private veterinarians . It also13

13 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest outlines the criteria for veterinary o ffices, clinics, hospitals, pharmaceutical/biologics, and germplasm collection centers. The aforementioned all must be registered as companies in Croatia, in accordance with the requirements of the VA and the Croatian Veterinary

Institute/Faculty

o f Veterinary

M edicine . Veterinarians must practice under a license, which is issued by the Croatian Veterinary Institute for a period of five years [ 5 ] . Croatian Agricultural Agency Another critical part of Croatia’s veterinary infrastructure is the CAA. By delegation of and under contract to the VD, the CAA is the c ompetent authority f or animal identification (ID ) and registration . As such, the CAA maintains and administers the registries of farms and domestic animals (Registry o f Domestic Animals) and the Land Parcel Identification System (LPI S). The CAA is a non-profit state institution with 380 employees, organized in 12 departments, with 27 county o ffices. Iti s the CAA employees in the field that collect data for entry into respective databases. AVOs are responsible for entering animal movement data into the database . The CAA is also involved in quality

c ontrol and development of agricultural products, and administration of agricultural subsidy

programs [ 11 ] . A detailed discussion of animal ID and registration is available in 8. Croatia’s Livestock Demographics and Marketing Practices . Auditing and Oversight of Veterinary Organizations and Services Generally, Croatia’s accession to the EU has served as an external auditing mechanism . Pre - accession negotiations include d EU checks on the level to which Croatia had transposed EU l egislation and animal health policies and programs into its national legislations, policies, and programs . This includes risk assessments of and site visits to Croatia conducted by

the EU’s Food and Veterinary O ffice (FVO), the results of which supported an EU decision that allowed Croatia to export pig meat and pig meat products without restriction prior to joining the EU (Comm. Reg. 1036/2012). Commission Implementing decision 2013/340/EU further formalized the EU’s acceptance of Croatia’s animal health c ontrol measures relating to classical swine fever, and became effective upon Croatia’s accession to the EU. Specifically, f

or MAFRD employees and services, the Ministry has an Internal Audit Service (IAS). S tarted in 2005, it is independent of all other directorates and departments in MAFRD, and as such reports directly to the Minister [ 8 ] . The IAS has two departments in particular with areas rel evant to this evaluation: D epartment for EU Pre -Accession Assistance, and Department for Audits in the Area of Veterinary S ector and Food Safety . IA S can audit components of veterinary s ervice or food safety personnel or programs—including animal food and feed production, food safety, animal health and welfare -- and does so in compliance with internationally recognized standards, EC guidelines as transposed into Croatian legislation, and the relevant industry ’s best practices. There are currently three staff members dedicated to auditing the veterinary sector and food safety; they are not involved with management or supervision of the systems they

audit [ 8 ] . Discussion of the Organization of Croatia’s Veterinary Infrastructure APHI S considers Croatia’s veterinary infrastructure to be well - organized. MAFRD’s structure of central level staff and regional offices appears to facilitate the14

14 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest dissemination of a sound national animal health strategy that can be uniquely

and adequately implemented at the local level. There appears to be adequate communication between national and regional staff. Further, there appears to be interlocking safeguards between animal health authorities and auditing mechanisms to detect failures therein . To better understand the structure of Croatia’s veterinary s ervices and to confirm that it is effective, the APHI S site visit team visited field veterinary offices, including the Branch Veterinary

O ffice in Vinkovci, Vukovar- Srijem C ounty **(**Regional Office Osijek) and Branch Veterinary

O ffice, Karlovac (Regional Office Zagreb) . Consistent with the information Croatian officials had previously provided, APHIS confirmed through interviews that the primary areas of responsibilities for these Veterinary D irectorate field office s were administering animal health, public health, animal feed and by-products, animal welfare, environmental , and emergency response services, as prescribed in Croatia’s Veterinary

Act. The office s oversee the AVs/AVOs in their respective jurisdictions, and were participants in VD - sponsored workshops and simulation exercises, and other trainings for veterinarians, farmers, hunters, and dealers. Generally, the employees at these office s demonstrated competence and knowledge of operations, procedures, and legal requirements. They also s eemed knowledgeable of livestock demographics and disease situations in their areas and adjacent regions. There appeared to be go od communication between regional veterinary office and national VD staff, and between each regional veterinary o ffice and the AVs/AVOs in its jurisdiction. Communication appeared to flow daily from the national level of the VD to the regional and branch o ffices, then on to AVOs and the field. Specifically, the Vinkovci regional office, and the official in charge there, demonstrated a high awareness of risks related to CSF and other contagious animal diseases; the various pathways by which those diseases can spread; and knowledge of the emergency

response necessary

to control and eradicate disease. This was due largely to the proximity

o f the office to the 2007/2008 CSF outbreaks, and the major role it played in controlling and eradicating the disease (the official in charge served as the “incident commander” for CSF control/eradication efforts). Similarly, the Karlovac office seemed to have knowledge of the special restrictions that apply to this county given its CSF risk factors (See details in 4. Active Disease Control Programs). The APHIS site visit revealed the importance of AVs and official control bodies in Croatia: AVs serve as the primary on- farm veterinary

presence , and official control bodies (which can include AVs, if the AV has been approved and registered as an official control body) conduct official controls at agricultural facilities. AVs and official controls are critical to the organization and administration of veterinary s ervices in Croatia, including disease - specific control and surveill ance measures for CSF, FMD, and SVD. To visit with local veterinarians responsible for administering veterinary s ervices including CSF sampling - in the field, APHIS visited an AVO office. APHI S confirmed that the AVO operates under and per contract with the VD to implement official veterinary

c ontrols in accordance with annual orders on the protection of animal health. It conducts and APHIS reviewed documentation corresponding to annual veterinary checks on registered establishments that include checks of documentation, animal inventory, animal welfare, and biosecurity. Veterinarians from this office perform clinical examinations of animals prior to their movement and issue accompanying health15

15 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest certificates. Other common activities for this AVO include samp ling for various animal disease s and conducting other veterinary health consultations and examinations . APHI S found the AVO office to be clean, well - stocked, and well -maintained. Office staff seemed competent and knowledgeable of operations, procedures, and legal requirements. The AV was knowledgeable of animal health and production practices, livestock demographics, marketing practices, and disease risks for the local area and for Croatia as a whole; had an awareness of CSF, FMD, and SVD; and understood the significance and impact of highly contagious animal diseases. AVs in the office appeared to communicate well internally, with farmers in their jurisdiction, and with the VD. The AV reported that farm visits are used to educate farmers about clinical s igns of disease and reporting obligations, and other topics of special emphasis as determined by the VD. The AV indicated that farmers in this area, particularly on large farms, are highly aware of clinical signs of disease, and generally report them quickly . One AV from this office participated in an FMD simulation exercise in 2010. Overall, APHIS has confidence from information Croatia provided and from the site visit that field veterinarians - official veterinarians employed by Croatia and private veterinarians working in AVOs - capably and effectively administer veterinary

s ervices at the local level, and appear able to sample for and differentially diagnose contagious animal disease s, including CSF, FMD, or SVD. There appears to be continuity in veterinary services strategy and in communication between national level animal health officials and those that administer field services. There appears to be sufficient span of control to adapt comprehensive plans at the national level, yet regions have the flexibility to apply the national plan uniquely and appropriately

as it relates to risk within their jurisdiction. These tenets of the organization structure are facilitated by annual plans for veterinary

s ervices being risk-based and drafted at the field level, lending itself to a bottom-up rather than a top - down approach to strategy and implementation of veterinary services within Croatia. The Veterinary Act The authorities and responsibilities of the VD are primarily laid out in the Veterinary

Act. The VA regulates most aspects of protecting animal health and providing veterinary

s ervices, including authority to conduct veterinary

inspections , control of animal and zoonotic diseases, and ensuring safe food animals and animal origin products for human consumption [ 5 ] . To briefly summarize, the VA authorizes and outlines detection/surveillance, control, and eradication measures for animal diseases. The VA also prescribes measures for animal breeding (semen collection, ova and embryo transfer, etc), animal welfare, biosecurity, and veterinary biologics [ 9 ] . The VA establi shes that the VD must report the occurence of mandatory international notifiable diseases to the European Commission and OIE ; authorizes animal health statuses to be assigned to herds, flocks, holdings, comp artments, regions, or countries; establishes the definitions for infected and endangered zones ; and the implementation of any c orresponding measures , including immediate quarantine of suspected infected premises [ 9 ] . The VA provides authority f or vaccination; sampling and diagnostic testing; epidemiologic investigations; euthanasia/depopulation/stamping- out; surveillance programs; ban of swill feeding; grazing restrictions; feral animal surveillance and control;16

16 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest biosecurity; veterinary

inspections; quarantine; inspection of animals at fairs, mar kets, exhibitions, auctions, livestock markets, sporting competitions; AI/other breeding techniques; animal welfare during transport to market; inspection of slaughter establishments; collection/disposal of animal by-products; and animal identification [ 9 ] . Secondary Veterinary Legislation, Including Disease
-Specific Ordinances Most of the authorities and responsibilities covered in the VA are supplemented by s econdary

veterinary

l egislation, including disease - specific ordinances . Croatia annually i ssue s wide -ranging CSF - specific regulations as part of their active disease control programs . Generally, they include c ountry-wide control measures, including updated restrictions on movement and breeding of swine; marketing of meat/products directly f rom the farm; requirements for cleaning/disinfection of marketing and assembly centers; reporting and sampling requirements; and restrictions on moving wild bo ar between hunting areas. The Orders ty pically also include specific restrictions for higher risk CSF areas ; recently, those have applied to holdings and hunting areas in VukovarSrijem (V- S) , Sisak-M o sl avina (S -M) , and/or Karlovac county [ 12 ] . Please see 4. Active Disease Control Programs for details about current legislation and corresponding requirements. Additionally, CSF requirements are also outlined in the CSF diagnostic manual and the CSF contingency plan . The VD issues similar governance for FMD and SVD. Additional ly, supplemental legislation applies to numerous other animal health topics, including but not limited to, veterinary

inspection and international and domestic trade of animals and products; animal identification and registration; animal protection and welfare; and introduction into Croatia of personal consignments of prod ucts of animal origin. These topics are all discussed in greater detail later in this evaluation. **Summary and**  **Conclusions about**  **the Authority,**  **Organization, and**  **Infrastructure of**  **Croatia’s Veterinary Services** Overall, the information Croatia provide d and the information obtained on the site visit indicate a strong veterinary infrastructure within the country . The infrastructure is comprised of central and regional competent authorities from the VD, including but not limited to Internal and Border Veterinary Inspection Service s and the Croatian Veterinary Institute; employees of the CAA ; private veterinarians and veterinary organizations; and Croatia’s farmers, producers, hunters, and other agricultural entities. Croatia’s animal health strategy and veterinary

legislation , including CSF - , FMD - , and SVD - specific approaches and directives , are aligned with international standards and EU- level animal health measures. Overall, APHI S considers the whole of Croatia’s veterinary

legislation broad and thorough, so as to cover country-wide measures ; flexible and risk-based, so as to apply uniquely to specific areas or animal disease issues in the country; relevant to the epidemiological situation at hand ; and fully transpos ing EU- level animal health requirements . Field veterinary

s ervices , including certain CSF - , FMD - , and SVD - specific tasks, are primarily conducted by private veterinarians operating in AVOs. The role of regional offices of the VD largely a ppears to be focused on oversight, administration, and organizational functions, including oversight of the AVOs within its jurisdiction. AVOs and regional officials demonstrated competence and knowledge regarding operations,17

17 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest procedures, and legal requirements for administering veterinary s ervices in Croatia, and an awareness of CSF, FMD, and SVD. C ommunication and interaction between AVOs and VD’s regional offices appeared solid, as did communication between the regional and central level VD officials. APHI S considers the organizational structure and relati onship between regional veterinary

o ffices and AVs/AVOs satisfactory f or administering field veterinary s ervices given what appears to be clear and timely communication from the national level to the AVOs, as mediated by

regional offices . It appeared, from interviews conducted on the site visit, that animal health strategies and directives, including CSF - , FMD - , and SVD specific information, are communicated well from the central level of the VD out to the regional l evel , then on to AVOs and official control bodies, then on to f armers, producers, hunters, and other agricultural entities. Further, individuals from all components of Croatia’s animal health network seemed knowledgeable not only o f Croatian animal health regulations, but also of EU - level legisl ation, and how the tenets of the EU’s animal health system have been transposed into Croatia’s veterinary infrastructure. **2. CSF, FMD, SVD**  **, and Rinderpest Status of**  **Croatia** The last reported case of CSF in domestic swine in Croatia was confirmed in March 2008 [ 5 , 7 , 13 ] . This case marked the end of an epidemic that oc curred in 2007 and 2008, during which 131 outbreaks were confirmed in 11 Croatian counties. Croatia’s wild boar surveillance program continues to detect seropositive wild boar in 3 counties (Karlovac, Sisak-Moslavina, and Vukovar- Srijem) . The seroprevalence appears to be declining since 2009, and no virus has been detected since 2008 [ 7 ] , but the surveillance data indicate that the presence of CSF virus in wild boar in these areas cannot be completely excluded. FMD was last reported in Croatia in 1978, and the OIE considers Croatia free without vaccination [ 5 , 14 , 15 ] . SVD has never been reported in Croatia [ 16 ] , and rinderpest was last reported in Croatia in 1883 [ 17 ] . Discussion and Central Risk Issue CSF , FMD, SVD, and rinderpest are notifiable disease s in Croatia [ 5 , 8 , 18 - 20 ] . APHI S found no evidence that CSFv is currently c irculating in domestic swine. Since the 2007/2008 CSF outbreaks , a risk-based surveillance program (described in 9. CSF, FMD, and SVD Surveillance in Croatia) has uncovered no virological evidence of circulating virus in domestic swine [ 7 ] . APHI S found no evidence that FMD , SVD, or rinderpest currently exists in Croatia . APHIS also believes that Croatia’s animal health infrastructure , as described in this document, is adequate to detect vesicular diseases and conduct the epidemiological investigations necessary

to accurately diagnose FMD, SVD, or rinderpest. The central risk issue is the fact that wild boar surveillance data indicates that the presence of CSF virus in wild boar cannot be completely r uled out. Therefore, there could be some risk of introduction of CSF virus into the domestic swine population from wild boar . Croatia has a number of measures in place

—including enhanced biosecurity requirements for domestic swine located in the area where seropositive wild boars18

18 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest continue to be found-- to mitigate these risks . These mitigations are discussed in 4. Active Dis ease Control Programs . **3. Disease status of adjacent regions** Croatia is bordered to the north and northwest by the EU member states Hungary and Slovenia. Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) are neighbors to the east and southeast, respectively . The extreme southeastern tip of Croatia shares a very short border with Montenegro. The southwestern portion of Croatia borders the Adriatic Sea. APHI S considers Hungary f ree of SVD and FMD. APHI S evaluated Hungary ’s CSF status and concluded that the risk of infected live swine, pork, or pork products entering the United States from Hungary and exposing U.S. livestock given the mitigations specified in 9 CFR 94.24 and 98.38, to be very l ow, and has added Hungary to the APHI S - defined European CSF region. CSF is endemic in feral swine in Hungary in several counties on Hungary ’s northern border with Slovakia [ 21 , 22 ] . While the APHI S assessment found that Hungary sufficiently mitigates the risks posed to its domestic population by

infected wild boar, wild boar can cross national borders and expose domestic livestock in neighboring countries. However, the risk of the infected wild boar in Hungary

entering Croatia is low, since the affected area in Hungary i s over 100 miles from the Croatian border and there is no evidence of disease spread in wild boar into more southern parts of Hungary . APHI S recognize s Slovenia as free of SVD, FMD, and rinderpest, and low risk for CSF and thus part of the ‘ APHIS - defined European CSF region ’ in 9 CFR Part 94.24. There has been no detection of CSF in wild boar in Slovenia since 2002 [ 23 - 25 ] . APHI S has not evaluated the CSF status of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and therefore does not include BiH in the list of regions considered free or low risk of CSF. BiH submits regular reports to the OIE, and the last reported case of CSF in domestic swine was in December 2007, and in wild boar was in January 2002 [ 26 , 27 ] . While CSF has not been reported since 2007, there is no evidence that it has been eradicated. The Croatian animal health authorities indicate that BiH has a compulsory preventive CSF vaccination program, though BiH does not include this control measure in its reports to the OIE. In response to the vaccination program, Croatia does not allow imports of swine or swine products from BiH [ 8 ] . APHI S has not evaluated the FMD or S VD status of BiH, and thus does not specifically list BiH in the list of regions free of FMD or SVD. APHIS does , however, consider Yugoslavia free of SVD. BiH was part of Yugoslavia until 199 2 [ 28 ] , and Yugoslavia was added to the SVD free list prior to this split. Since that time, there has been no risk assessment or subsequent rulemaking to indicate that the BiH portion of Yugoslavia should have been removed from that list (search of the US Federal Register) . BiH last reported FMD to the OIE in 1968, and the OIE considers BiH free without vaccination. Additionally, BiH has never reported a case of SVD to the OIE [ 29 ] . APHI S has not evaluated the disease status of Serbia or Montenegro. Until 2007, Serbia and Montenegro were one nation and reported their animal health status to the OIE as such . Montenegro last reported CSF in domestic swine in 2007, when still reporting with Serbia. S erbia reported clinical CSF disease in domestic swine in November 2010 through March 2011 [ 30 , 31 ] . OIE reports from these outbreaks indicated that contact with wild swine may

have been the source of the disease in at least one outbreak . Neither19

19 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest nation has recently reported diagnosed CSF in wild species to the OIE, but it is unclear how surveillance is conducted. Both Serbia and Montenegro report using vaccination for CSF c ontrol, and due to this, Croatia bans importations of swine and their products from these countries . The nations last reported FMD in 1996, and the OIE considers both free without vaccination. Like BiH, APHI S does not specifically list Serbia or Montenegro as SVD free, but these nations were part of the former nation of Yugoslavia at the time it was added to the SVD free list, and the territory that is now Serbia and Montenegro has never reported a case of SVD to the OIE [ 32 ] . In 2011, the OIE issued a declaration that rinderpest had been globally eradicate d [ 33 ] . Rinderpest has been eradicated from Europe since 1960 [ 34 , 35 ] . Many European countries have never reported rinderpest, and all of the aforementioned countries that border Croatia last reported rinderpest in 1881 or 1883 [ 34 ] . Discussion and Key Risk Issue APHI S considers the key risk issue to be the entry o f CSF or SVD into Croatia from adjacent regions of higher risk. This is due to the prevalence and incidence of CSF in wild boar in Europe overall, and the fact that Croatia is surrounded by c ountries which have an unknown or uncertain CSF status, which vaccinate for CSF, or which report CSF in wild boar . Potential entry

p athways for CSF into Croatia are incoming vehicl e or passenger traffic, including individuals unknowingly or intentionally c arrying prohibited animal products, and the natural movement of feral swine. A potential entry p athway for SVD into Croatia is incoming vehic le or passenger traffic, including individuals unknowingly or intentionally

carrying prohibited animal products. The primary

mitigations for contagious animal disease incursions into Croatia, including CSF, FMD, and S VD, are the man-made interdiction efforts of Croatia’s B order Veterinary

Inspection and International Trade Service (B VIITS ) and the Customs Administration of the Republic of Croatia (“Customs”) . B VIITS and Customs provide robust border veterinary inspection services at all points of entry into the country . The APHI S site visit team specifically visited Border Inspection Points (BIPs) into Croatia for live animals and animal products, including a sea port, to verify that Croatia has in place mitigations to prevent the incursion of CSF, FMD, and SVD . These mitigations are discussed in detail in 7. Croatia’s Movement Controls and Biosecurity , Additionally, Croatia has a comprehensive active disease control program in place for CSF in wild boar and domestic swine that includes targeted surveillance conducted near borders , discussed in 9. CSF, FMD, and SVD Surveillance in Croatia . **4. Active Disease Control Programs** The primary swine disease control program currently conducted in Croatia is for CSF . Itincludes Croatia’s active CSF surveillance program for domestic and feral swine, which will be discussed at length in 9. CSF, FMD, and SVD Surveillance in Croatia . D isease programs are in place for FMD and SVD but not for rinderpest; each program or lack thereof appears appropriate for the prevalence and incidence of FMD, SVD, and rinderpest in Croatia and other risk factors (e.g. the OIE declaration that rinderpest has been globally eradicated).20

20 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest Current CSF Control Program Standards Throughout Croatia The tenets of the CSF control program are outlined in the Order on Measures to Prevent the Appearance and Spread of Classical Swine Fever, and are summarized below . This ordinance , updated annually, lays down the general provisions of the CSF control program, which apply to the whole of Croatia, and include but are not limited to the ban of swill feeding; general grazing, movement, breeding, and marketing restrictions; and general biosecurity measures to avoid contact of domestic pigs with feral swine. The control program includes special restrictions for three Croatian counties

—Karlovac , Sisak-Moslavina, Vukovar- S ri jem

—that are considered higher risk for CSF because the circulation of CSFv in feral swine cannot be definitively excluded. Country-wide CSF -related restrictions are lesser in scope and scale than the special provisions for the three higher risk counties. F or live swine, general movement requirements such as animal identification, travel papers as appropriate, and a signed health certificate apply. P igs can be marketed throughout Croatia provided that during the 30 - day

period prior to the dispatch of the pigs from the holding no domestic pigs were introduced into the holding from Karlovac , S -M, and V- S county hol dings. If pigs from outside of Karlovac, S - M, and V- S c ounties are sold in and delivered to any o f those three counties, the transport vehicles must be thoroughly disinfected prior to returning to other Croatian counties . There are no restrictions on selling fresh pig meat, meat preparations, or meat products consisting of or containing meat of pigs originating from holdings outside of the three higher risk counties. S emen originating from boars kept at approved semen collection centers outside of Karlovac , S -M, and V- S can be marketed with no restrictions. Ova and embryos from pigs from holdings outside Karl ovac , S -M, and V- S marketed without CSF restrictions. Additional CSF Control Program Standards for Karlovac, S
- M, and V
-S Counties The additional restrictions applied to sale s and marketing o f pigs, meat, meat products, and semen and ova within and from Karl ovac , S -M, and V- S counties build on the country-wide control measures, and the CSF control program essentially regionalizes these three higher risk counties as it relates to CSF risk. The CSF control program lays down the movement and marketability requirements for live swine and pork products WITHIN the three counties, and the movement and marketability requirements for live swine and pork products originating from these three counties but moving OUTSIDE of them. The additional measures, including but not limited to very specific biosecurity requirements such as cleaning and disinfection (C/D) of vehicles and equipment, are specifically designed to limit exposure to feral swine and mitigate the potential for virus to be transferred to domestic pigs in the event that that occurs. For live swine, restrictions apply to where pigs from within Karl ovac , V- S, and S M can move, and the requirements they must meet to move there. Generally, domestic swine from holdings situated in the Karl ovac , S -M, and V- S counties can be marketed within Croatia if they

undergo clinical examination and sampling procedures prior to dispatch from holding of origin; and test negative by PCR for CSF within the 7 days prior to movement ; and no pigs have been introduced to the holding within 30 days prior to movement. These requirements do not apply if the animals are going directly to slaughter. Also, animals must travel with a health certificate that includes the number of pigs, place of origin, date of clinical examination , and disease s ampling and diagnostic21

21 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest test results . Specifically, domestic swine originating from holdings within Karl ovac , VS, and S -M cannot be sold or marketed elsewhere in the EU. Pigs that are pasture - grazed within Karl ovac , V- S, and S -M cannot be sold or marketed outside of those three counties. Fresh meat, meat preparations, or meat products consisting of or containing meat of pigs originating from holdings in Karl ovac , S - M, and V- S may b e marketed and sold outside of the counties ONLY if no evidence of CSF has been recorded in the previous 12 months in the holding, and the holding is located outside a protection or surveillance zone; and the pigs have been resident for at least 90 days on the holding, and no pigs have been introduced into the holding within the previous 30 days before dispatch to slaughter; and the holding has been inspected by an AV, including appropriate clinical examination and sampling of animals, twice per ye ar; and, if moving directly to slaughter, animals are clinically examined and sampled by an AV, culminating in a signed health certificate; and any and all other parts of the Order for Detection, Control, and Eradication of CSF have been implemented, as confirmed b y a veterinary inspector. Semen, ova, and embryos from pigs from Karl ovac , S -M, and V - S cannot be marketed outside those counties. Current CSF Control Program Standards for Karlovac, V
-S, and S
-M Live swine from holdings in Karl ovac , S -M, and V- S counties can be marketed and sold within in these counties. If the pigs have been pasture - grazed, they must meet the same provisions as live swine marketed outside the counties (see above). Similarly, if pigs from Karl ovac , V - S, and S -M counties are sent straight to slaughter within the counties, fresh meat, meat preparations and meat products containing such meat will be placed on the market outside Karl ovac , S -M, and V- S counties also only under the previously

mentioned provisions. Vehicles used for transport for pigs originating in Karl ovac , V - S, and S -M must be C/D immediately

after transport. P igs from Karl ovac , S -M, and V- S going to other counties must be transported by registered transporters, exclusively on main roads, without stopping. The transporter must furnish proof of performed C/D to a veterinary inspector once per month. Current CSF Control Program Standards for Feral Swine The current CSF control program includes measures for feral swine; certain program details are discussed at greater length under 8
. Croatia’s Livestock Demographics and Marketing Practices . Similar to the CSF control program for domestic swine, Croatia’s strategy f or CSF in feral swine is to apply specific restrictions to the three higher risk counties. The primary effort is to restrict the movement of live feral swine from the three higher risk counties: transporting or moving feral swine from Karl ovac , S -K, and V- S counties to other parts of Croatia is prohibited, as is the movement of live animals from one hunting ground, or part thereof, to another hunting ground, or part thereof, within the three counties. Additionally, carcasses of all harvested feral swine must be kept on the hunting grounds until negative results of diagnostic tests for CSF are obtained. The carcasses may not be moved outside the three high risk counties , nor can their meat be used in meat preparations and meat products that consist of or contain meat that are intended for market outside of Karl ovac , S -M, and V- S22

22 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest counties before negative results of diagnostic tests for CSF are obtained . If the hunting ground has no room to store the carcass, it must be safely disposed of. The program includes other technical restrictions on wild boar, most of which will be discussed under 8. Croatia’s Livestock Demogra phics and Marketing Practices. To briefly summarize, on hunting grounds under restriction by this program

—those that have had CSFv seropositive feral swine -- the official veterinarian or the control body ’s veterinarian must examine each feral pig shot or f ound dead and take samples for testing for CSF in accordance with the Ordinance on the Diagnostic Manual for CSF. Any f eral pig that tests serologically and/or virologically positive for CSF, as well as feral swine which have been in contact with positive feral pigs, must be safely disposed of. The offal and other parts of feral swine not intended for human consumption, and feral swine found dead and parts thereof, also must be safely disposed of. Last, the carcasses of harvested wild boar must be kept until negative CSF test results are obtained. While animal health issues are the purview of MAFRD/VD , the oversight of government- and privately- owned hunting grounds falls to the Directorate of Forestry, Hunting, and Wood Industry . Many of the specific elements of the feral swine program then fall to individuals. Hunters and hunting grounds must notify the competent veterinary

o ffice and Hunting officials of the place and time of a hunt and the name and contact telephone number of the person responsible for hunting operations at least 48 hours prior to the hunt. Hunting grounds must keep records of feral swine shot or found dead on the premises. If

a hunter or anyone else finds a dead feral pig, they must act per the Surveillance Program for CSF in Feral P igs. These and other details -- including the findings of a site visit conducted to a Croatian hunting ground-- are addressed in relevant parts of the risk assessment (e.g. 7. Croatia’s Movement Controls and Biosecurity , 8. Croatia’s Livestock Demographics and Marketing Practices ). Training, Outreach, and Awareness Training and outreach can be considered important elements of an active disease control program . The VD frequently conducts and participates in training and outreach, particularly for CSF. Generally, these trainings aim to encourage awareness of CSF risks and control measures implemented at the national and regional level, as well as to promote outreach, awareness, and communication at the regional level. The target audience of most programs is hunters, veterinarians, official veterinarians, veterinary inspectors, and laboratory experts [ 8 ] . Similarly, multiple emergency response simulations have been conducted, largely aimed at the same audience. Numerous site visit interviewees (regional offices, AVOs, producers, etc. ) were able to produce literature promoting CSF and other contagious animal disease awareness, and reported attending VD - sponsored training on these and other animal health issues. S imilarly, appropriate signage was displayed at border inspection posts (BIPs) and ports; this topic will be discussed in 7. Croatia’s Movement Controls and Biosecurity. Summary, Discussion, and Key Risk Issue Croatia’s current veterinary infrastructure and field activities are designed to either actively or passively detect and/or control all of the hazards under concern in this evaluation , and there are overarching elements of a robust diseas e control program in place. In addition to active disease control programs, including active disease23

23 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest surveillance, veterinary

inspection and passive surveillance occur at border inspection po sts, livestock markets, slaughterhouses, and other points of conc entration . Collectively, these control programs are likely to detect the hazards under evaluation. APHI S acknowledges the evolution of Croatia’s previous CSF control programs, and considers them demonstrative of the VD’s ability to apply disease control programs, and utilize lessons learned from previous approaches to improve future ones. APHIS reviewed precursor CSF control programs , the epidemiological history o f the country ’s 2007/2008 CSF outbreak and response measures , and the c orresponding defici encies and corrective actions , and generally found them to be appropriate for the situation at hand. To summarize, Croatia implemented specific eradication steps in 2007/2008, including an Action Plan to control the outbreak that incorporated five main el ements: a contingency

p lan, registration of pig holdings, diagnostic capacity, intensified control of illegal movements, and CSF surveillance in wild boar. Croatian officials attempted to capture and provide to APHI S the details of the exact impacts of each of those measures. Most importantly

for this discussion and analysis, Croatian authorities report that the CSF situation improved dramatically f ollowing the implementation of this plan , and those five elements represent the foundation of the current CSF control program . For multiple reasons, including but not limited to disease history and incidence in the region, Croatia conducts lesser but nonetheless appropriate disease programs for FMD and SVD that are primarily a f unction of active and passive surveillance for those hazards , and Croatia does not conduct an active program for rinderpest. Nonetheless, APHI S considers Croatia’s veterinary infrastructure capable of detecting these diseases given the interlocking safeguards of the system, and its ability to detect vesicular disease. For example, veterinary inspection procedures, including ante - and post-mortem inspection at slaughter, appear adequate to detect vesicular disease , the detection of which would trigger contingency p lans and preventative measures , which would include diagnostic testing, which would likely detect FMDv or SVDv. APHI S considers Croatia’s overall approach toward disease control to be thorough, flexible and relevant. The country ’s veterinary infrastructure appears adequately and appropriately organized to implement active and passive measures to detect, control , and eradicate the hazards under consideration in this evaluation. Generally speaking, APHI S found disease - specific efforts to be acceptable, and appropriate for the level of risk for each hazard. The key risk issue as it relates to ongoing active disease control programs is CSF, specifically the three counties of higher risk as it relates to CSF because circulation of the virus in feral swine cannot be fully excluded. However, APHIS considers the CSF control program- comprised of movement controls, biosecurity programs, training and simulations, passive and active disease surveillance, etc. - to be relevant, and appropriate in scope and scale for the current swine health s ituation in Croatia. In essence, the CSF control program treats these three high risk counties of Croatia as a “region”, and assigns to them a distinctly different CSF risk categorization from the rest of the country . With that distinction comes corresponding special restricti ons for CSF control that are more stringent than those that are applied country-wide, including restrictions for live animals, meat and meat products, wild boar and hunting grounds, and germplasm.24

24 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest **5. Vaccination Status of**  **Croat ia**  Vacc ination for CSF and FMD is prohibited in Croatia [ 5 , 18 , 20 ] , except under emergency

c ircumstances, i.e. during a disease outbreak. Per the VA, the VD is the responsible authority

f or any emergency

vaccination campaigns against CSF or FMD . The regulations , requirements , and procedures for emergency CSF and FMD vac cination, including the risk-based matrices on which vaccination decisions are based, are outlined in their respective veterinary l egislation and contingency p lans [ 9 ] , which APHIS reviewed and found sufficient. **6. Separation of**  **Croat ia from Adjacent Regions**  Croatia’s geographic boundaries include sections of the Dinaric Alps on the eastern border, and the Adriatic Sea on the western border. However, these geographic boundaries are not substantial: generally speaking, the Dinaric Alps are not severe in altitude, and Croatia shares plains borders with the same countries it shares mountainous borders. Croatia reports that feral swine in Vukovar- Srijem county have virtually unhindered contact with feral swine from Serbia, and parts of the county are known migratory routes of these animals [ 36 ] . As previously discussed, Serbia reported a CSF outbreak in domestic swine in 2010; the presumed source was contact with wild species. The Adriatic coastline bordering the west obviously eliminates any disease risk associated with movement of terrestrial animals, but said coastline also supports a large maritime and port presence . This maritime presence includes a relatively extensive ferry system that includes daily trips between Croatia’s islands and mainland, as well as ferries to and from other EU Member States (Italy, Slovenia) ; international cruise ships ; and domestic and international fishing boats and personal watercraft. Croatia’s coastline therefore presents an equivalent-- if not higher-- risk given the volume of passenger traffic and the potential that they legally or illegally transport prohibited animal products. Discussion and Key Risk Issues Overall, APHIS concludes that Croatia’s physical boundaries do not effectively mitigate the risk of disease incursion via the entry p athways of incoming vehicular or passenger traffic, including individuals unknowingly or intentionally c arrying prohibited animal products, and the natural movement of infected wildlife, such as feral swine. Portions of Croatia’s mountainous borders are non- severe, sparsely populated, and/or have shared grazing on pasture contiguous with neighboring countries. Croatia’s Adriatic coastline promotes extensive maritime traffic. The primary

risk mitigation for adjacent regions therefore is the manmade prevention and interdiction measures of the BVIITS and Customs at Croatia’s borders , which will be discussed in the next section. The APHI S site visit team specifically visited Border Inspection Points (BIPs) into Croatia for live animals and animal products, including a sea port, to verify that Croatia has in place measures to reduce the risk of animal disease incursions. **7. Croatia**  **’s Movement Controls and Biosecurity** The primary

mitigation for the incursion into and dissemination throughout Croatia of contagious animal diseases, including the hazards for this analysis, are the detection and interdiction methods of Croatia’s Veterinary Inspection Directorate (VID). The VID is responsible for conducting internal and border veterinary inspection, and25

25 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest implementing affiliated veterinary activities. The Veterinary Inspection Sector (VIS ) is responsible for internal veterinary inspections and controls, and the Border Veterinary Inspection and International Trade Sector is responsible for border veterinary inspections and controls conducted on imported or transiting products [ 5 ] . The Director of the VID reports directly

to the CVO of the VD. An organizational diagram is provided in Figure 6 . Figure 6 : Organizational Diagram of Croatia’s VID [ 5 ] .

(Internal) Veterinary Inspection Sector The Veterinary

Inspection Sector (VI S) is responsible for conducting internal veterinary

inspections, and overseeing the production, health, and welfare of animals produced for trade, food, and feed. The VIS has a central office at VID headquarters (the S tate Veterinary

Inspection Department, SVID), and has six Regional Veterinary Inspection Departments (RVID), located in Zagreb, Varaždin, Bjelovar, Osijek, Rijeka, and Split. The VIS largely constitutes Croatia’s government veterinary f ield force, and it is responsible for overseeing disease control programs and providing oversight for animal inspections and movements. These office s collectively coordinate and implement the veterinary

activities - including inspections - in Croatia’s 20 counties and Zagreb via 65 branch offices [ 5 ] . A map showing the location of county and branch offices is available in Figure 5 (p. 11). Internal Movement of Animals and Animal Products Trade and/or movement of livestock and animal products within Croatia is generally permitted insofar as a veterinary inspection is conducted at the place of dispatch. Croatian veterinary officials provided details regarding their system of on- farm inspection and movement controls , including a cop y of the Ordinance on veterinary checks of live animals in internal trade and certificate of health condition and place of origin of the animal (OG No 87/2008) [ 37 ] , which outlines the regulations for veterinary26

26 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest inspection of animal holdings and the requirements for placing animals on the domestic market.The primary

purposes of veterinary

inspection are to ensure identification and traceability

of the animal or commodity, and to verify that the conditions of the certificate are met. These inspections must be conducted by an authorized veterinarian, and must satisfy inspection criteria as stipulated by MAFRD. Consignments must be reported to an authorized veterinarian upon arrival at the place of destination, and may undergo another veterinary

inspection as stipulated by MAFRD [ 9 ] . For live animals, a cop y of the health certificate must travel with the live haul vehicle, and be presented at the request of a veterinary inspector or official veterinarian. If paperwork is missing or it is determined that the load originates from an infected or endangered zone, the haul i s stopped and the vehicle/commodities detained. Vehicles transporting animals or products may b e stopped and inspected, including offload of animals if necessary . Transport vehicles must be cleaned and disinfected (C/D) by authorized personnel after the animals are offloaded at the destination, and carry documentation confirming that C/D took place. If animals are being shipped to, from, or in an infected or endangered zone, an approved veterinarian must supervise the C/D procedures [ 9 ] . For any animal movement that requires a certification, the veterinary inspection is conducted prior to movement from a holding or assembly c enter. The veterinary inspector confirms documentation and animal identity, and conducts the physical inspection, looking for visible clinical signs of disease on the animals being move d and on cohort animals from the herd or flock. There are derogations for the veterinary inspection for a movement certificate . F or example, bovines shipped direct to slaughter : a movement certificate can be issued without veterinary inspection if the holding has had a veterinary

inspection within the previous 30 days (unless the holding has a history o f noncompliance, in which case they are not eli gible for this derogation). Veterinary inspection at the holding of destination is not mandatory; however, arrivals of swine, cattle, sheep and goats must be reported to veterinary officials [ 37 ] . A veterinary

inspector can stop the movement of animals or animal products if he/she determine s that they have been moved or marketed out of compliance with any o f the provisions of the Veterinary Act or originate from an infected zone or a suspected infected zone , or if animals show clinical signs of disease, . The veterinary inspector can order all animals to be unloaded and immediately quarantined or animal products be offloaded and stored in appropriate conditions , and be tested with the appropriate diagnostic test. If there is no suitable quarantine facility available, or if it is less expensive and there are no reasons to prevent sl aughter, animals are sent to the nearest slaughterhouse. A veterinary inspector can also stop the movement of animals or animal products if animals do present clinical signs of disease, or if they originate from an infected area or a suspecte d infected are a. The veterinary inspector can order euthanasia for live animal s (and disposal of carcasses), or destruction and disposal of animal products [ 9 ] . Measures are in place at the regional level for VD officials to monitor animal movements, compliance with animal health regulations, and biosecurity . Namely, a riskbased process is used to generate inspection schedules for each ye ar. Factors used to determine the inspection schedule include previous non- compliance with minimum27

27 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest biosecurity

standards or other national programs, and proximity to high risk premises. Veterinary

a uthorities are authorized to make unannounced spot inspections to ensure compliance. The APHI S site visit team visited the Branch Veterinary O ffice in one of Croatia’s three high risk counties for CSF, Karlovac County . Karlovac veterinary officials reported that the most common farm violations are related to perimeter fencing and failure to meet minimum biosecurity standards. However, they also reported that b iosecurity

violations in Karlovac County were primarily observed at livestock markets and fairs, which were all subsequently closed with the publication of the Order on measures to prevent the appearance and spread of classical swine fever (OG/135/2011). The office also reported violations for illegal cattle movements, including citations to a large bovine producer for ‘no vehicle disinfection’ and ‘incomplete data records’. Border Veterinary Inspection and International Trade Sector A map of Croatia’s former and current border crossings is provided in Figure 7 . Prior to EU accession Croatia had EU- approved BIP s at Zagreb Airport; ports of Rijeka, Split, and Ploče; road BIPs to BiH at Li čko Petrovo Selo, Stara Gradišćka, Kamensko, Vinjani Donji, Metković, Županja; road and railway B IP s to Serbia at Bajakovo and Tovarnik, respectively; a road BIP to Montenegro at Karasovići; and road BIPs to the EU at Bregana, Macelj, Rupa, Goričan, Duboševica. There are also two Customs - operated border crossing stations for the Neum Corridor, Kleck and Zaton-Doli, that process domestic movements between the non- contiguous parts of Croatia (see Neum Corridor below) [ 8 ] . With Croatia’s accession to the EU , s even official EU- approved BIPs remain : Zagreb airport, ports at Rijeka and Ploče, and road BIPs at Bajakovo, Stara Gradiška, Metković (Nova Sela) , and Karasovići [ 8 ] . Figure 7 . Current and f

ormer BIPs in Croatia [ 38 ] .

Legend:Current BIP Former BIP28

28 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest Import or Transit of Animals or Animal Produc ts Import into or transit through Croatia of live animals, products of animal origin, feed of animal origin, hay and straw, and other products which could transmit infectious diseases is permitted only at BIP s . These commodities may not enter Croatia without undergoing veterinary

inspection, as stipulated by MAFRD, excepting the noncommercial movement of pets, which can be inspected/cleared by Customs [ 5 , 9 , 37 ] . Inspection can include document check, identification check, or physical inspection. Customs is authorized to conduct document checks and collect user fee s , but is not authorized to conduct veterinary inspections [ 5 , 9 , 37 ] . Import data for Croatia for 2010 - 2012, including data on the top 5 exporters to Croatia of relevant agricultural commodities, is available in Appendix 1. Detection, Rejection, and Confiscation of Prohibited Materials The confiscation of restri cted commercial items presented for import or transit and restricted items contained in passenger luggage is performed by Customs officials, per the Ordinance on conditions for the introduction of personal consignments of products of animal origin (OG 56/0 9) , which transposes EC 206/2009 on the introduction into the Community

of personal consignments of products of animal origin [ 8 ] . Seized consignments of international origin must be collected and destroyed by incineration, per the Ordinance on animal by-products not intended for human consumption (OG 87/2009), which transposes EC 1774/2002. T o accomplish this, MAFRD VID provides Customs with 18 ref rigerated containers and 40 non-refrigerated containers, all labeled Category 1 , which contain the confiscated products until they c an be incinerated [ 8 ] . Domestic and International Passenger Traffic (Key Risk Issue) APHI S considers incoming vehicular or passenger traffic, including individuals unknowingly or intentionally c arrying prohibited animal products, a potential entry pathway into Croatia f

or the hazards under evaluation, and therefore a key risk issue in this analysis. Entry

c ould be in the form of animals with undetected infection, fomites, or, more likely, contaminated animal products illegally transported

—inadvertently or intentionally

— into Croatia. This evaluation will not specifically address intentionally smuggled goods, which can occur via any of the modes of travel described below, as limited data exists to either quantify or qualify

smuggling of prohibited products into Croatia. The detection and interdiction methods discussed in this evaluation do apply to smuggled goods and are likely to deter intentional illegal entry of prohibited products. APHI S analyz ed a 2007 report from the Republic of Croatia’s Ministry of the Sea, Touri sm, Transport, and Development (MSTTD) [ 39 ] . Although the data is from 2006, it contained interesting information and trends that could be used as a barometer for current passenger traffic patterns. Overall in 2006, 69.58 million passengers entered Croatia through all modes of travel, of which 22.09 million were of Croatian nationality and 47.49 million were foreign nationals. In2 006, 19.99 million passenger vehicles entered Croatia by road; two -thirds of the vehicles that entered were registered in other countries. Passenger vehicles hauled 66.1 million passengers, approximately ~95% of the total passengers that entered Croatia. The next most significant share of cross -border passengers was air (1.75 million, ~2.5%), then sea/coastal (1.07 million, ~1.5%), and29

29 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest finally rail (0.66 million, ~0.95%). O f these travel modes, all but rail (9% decrease) had increased through 2006. The map in Figure 8 demonstrates the domestic and international transportation modes and routes in Croatia. Figure 8: Domestic and International Transportation in Croatia [ 40 ] .

The primary mode of passenger travel in Croatia is road travel. It accounted for 51% of all passenger AND freight travel in 2006 . Railway was the next most significant (37%) passenger travel mode, while coastal/maritime portage (27%) was the next most significant freight travel mode. Of interest, overall railway usage, in terms of passengers travelling, generally

increased through 2006, and international travelers represented 4.2% of the total rail passengers. 106 trains are used for international service, the most significant passenger services being: Zagreb to and from Vienna, Budapest, Muni ch, Venice, Zurich, Ljubljana, and Belgrade; and Rijeka to and from Budapest and L jubljana. Also of interest is that of Croatia’s seven international airports (Zagreb, Dubrovnik, Split, Zadar, Pula, Rijeki, and Osijek; Croatia also has two small airp orts, Brač and Mali Lošinj, through which occasional international travel takes place), 90% of the approximately

4 .5 million air passengers travelling in 2005 passed though the three biggest airports - Zagreb, Split, and Dubrovnik. Risk Mitigation
- Site V

isits to Road BIPs at Croatia’s Borders with Serbia and BiH The APHIS site visit team visited BIP Bajakovo, a road BIP on the border of Croatia and Serbia, and BIP Metković, a road BIP on the border between Croatia and BiH, to verify

and clarify

information provided by Croatian authorities, and assess whether road BIPs mitigate the risk of disease incursion into Croatia. At each BIP, the30

30 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest site visit team interviewed the VD officials, border veterinary inspectors, and Customs officials. Live animals presented for import or transit must be accompanied by the EU’s CVED and require 24 hour advance notice to the BIP. The veterinary inspection process, as outlined in Croatia’s Ordinance on transport of live animals (OG/7/2007), includes a health check for dead, non- ambulatory, or otherwise unhealthy animals. Additionally, border veterinary

inspectors compare animal identification on approximately 1 0% of the animals to the accompanyinghealth certificate, and perform a welfare check. If there are inconsistencies or discrepancies in the number or identification of animals, or animal welfare concerns, the consignment is rejected, and relevant authorities at the place of origin and the EU are notified. A c onsignment cannot be cleared through Customs until it passes veterinary

inspection. If for any reason a consignment of live animals arrives and disease is suspected, or if a dead animal arrives at the BIP, the consignment is refused entry, the animal(s) are sampled and euthanized as appropriate, and an epidemiological investigation is initiated. Dead or euthanized animals are collected and incinerated . APHI S officials were informed that C/D is only

done at BIP Bajakovo when mandated by special restrictions, ty

pically triggered by

disease suspicion in a foreign country, and relayed to the BIP staff by c entral level VD. APHIS officials also confirmed that the BIP has no disinfection facilities, equipment, or supplies, on hand; those would be sourced from MAFRD in the event of control measures. Regarding animal products, commercial consignments of animal products do not require 24 hour advance notice to the BIP; rather, they must notify

the BIP just prior to arrival. The inspection process for animal products includes a document and identification check and a physical insp ection of the consignment, and can, if stipulated by an annual plan specific for each BIP, including sampling. As with live animals, commercial consignments of animal products must pass veterinary inspection prior to being cleared by Customs. Only l amb meat is imported through BIP Bajakovo, as no other meat or milk products from Serbia are allowed. Customs has confiscated prohibited meat, milk, and cheese products (including 70 kg of beef from a single vehicle), but only from passenger traffic. Prohibited products are confiscated and securely stored until collection and incineration . Information obtained at BIP M etković was consistent with the information obtained at BIP Bajakovo. The BIP M etković is staffed by three border veterinary inspectors. Live animal imports through BIP M etković are authorized, but do not occur (excepting bees and pets) given the ban on live animals from neighboring BiH. Approximately

2 0 consignments of animal products for human consumption, and animal by-products, are imported through BIP Metković per month. Each consignment undergoes a veterinary

inspection that includes document and identification check and a physical inspection of the consignment. If stipulated by an annual plan specific for each BIP, consignments will also be s ampled. Examples of animal products imported through BIP Metković include milk from Poland; ham from Italy; f ish from Spain and Italy; p ork and honey

f rom Hungary; chicken meat from Brazil; and poultry f rom Netherlands. Similar to the “triggering events” described by B IPB ajakovo staff, BIP Metković officials reported that MAFRD personnel communicates to them positive test results for31

31 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest animals and animal products reported in other countries, so as to put them on alert for animals or products from those points of origin. Discussion
- Croatia’s Road BIPs and Preventing Dis ease Incursions The road BIPs at Bajakovo and M etković appeared to have a sufficient infrastructure. Physical resources appeared sufficient for needs and appropriate for the volume of traf

fic through the BIP. The veterinary inspection processes at both BIPs seemed appropriate relative to the volume of live animals and animal products they process. BIP Metković, for example, had only a single road crossing with a single lane in each directi on, and given the physical constraints posed by the layout of the facility and terrain, it appeared congested. However, there is not a high volume of commercial consignments of live animals or animal products through the BIP, so such space is not required . The EU’s Trade Control and Expert System (TRACES ) - which monitors the movements of animals and products of animal origin within, and imported into, the EUis fully f unctional at both BIPs. Notices were posted at both BIPs advising travelers against importing prohibited animal products, and Customs inspectors at both BIPs were actively monitoring traffic, including document checks and random sampling of luggage and vehicles. Contingency p lans and response procedures were available and seemed easily acce ssible. The BVIITS staff stationed at both BIPs seemed competent and knowledgeable of operations, procedures, and legal requirements; appeared to have good communication with central level VD staff; and appeared to communicate and collaborate well with Customs officials. Staffs at both BIPs spoke of receiving educational materials, including information on animal diseases, from MAFRD/VD. Further, BVIITS employees reported participating in quarterly training organized by

MAFRD, and BIPs Bajakovo and Metković are actively involved in Croatia’s Integrated Border Management (IBM) system , a collaborative network of BVIITS, Police, and Customs that with shared strategies and resources for maintaining border integrity. Both BIPs referenced satisfactory

working re lationships with IBM personnel, and generally referenced conducting and participating in trainings to increasing awareness of the pathways of disease introduction into Croatia via imported animals or animal commodities, and passenger traffic. Further, both BIPs reported satisfactory working relationships with border officials from the neighboring country, and were clearly engaged in transboundary i ssues specific to their particular area. B IPB ajakovo officials, for example, described general collaboration with Serbia on transboundary animal health issues and cooperation on specific transboundary

events like Serbia’s 2010 CSF outbreak in domestic swine. Similarly, BIP Metković officials reported satisfactory working relationships with border officials from BiH, but also specifically communicated good collaboration with Port Ploče and Klek-Neum 1, as border veterinary inspectors from BIP Metković assist with official duties at Port Ploče and confiscated goods at Klek-Neum 1 are redirected to BIP Metković. Records at both BIPs were easily located and well organized. The site visit team reviewed records of animal or animal product consignments. The records included country and farm of origin, ty

pe of animal, license plate number of transport vehicle, CVED number, and address of place of destination. The site visit team reviewed BIP32

32 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest monthly reports (internal documents sent monthly to central - level MAFRD officials monthly and biannually) in addition to log books for Monitoring and Inspection activities. Generally, record-review supported information collected pre - site visit and during the site visit interviews. Records are kept in hard cop y and electronically, and maintained three ye ars. Records of imports are entered into TRACES. Officials reported that BVIIT S and Customs entry and exit data for transit consignments are reconciled. Overall , APHI S considers the road BIPs to have measures in place to decrease the risk of illegal introduction of live animals or animal products (including introduction of improperly documented live animals or animal products) , and to be a strong mitigating factor that is capable of preventing disease incursions into Croatia. Croatian border veterinary

officials seemed knowledgeable of what to do in the event of disease suspicion or outbreak in an adjacent country or trading partner. Of slight concern, given the lack of disinfection supplies and equipment on site at the road BIPs, would be the time to ramp up C/D biosecurity

measures and other border contingencies in the case of diseas e outbreak in a neighboring country or trading partner. Iti s possible that would be a lag time - a risk window- before certain control measures regarding cleaning and disinfection of vehicles could be fully implemented. However, this concern is not unique to Croatia and its borders or BIPs, as the notion of having “zero risk” of disease incursion through passenger traffic does not apply here , or in any other country . Further, the risk would be partially i f not fully mitigated by the movement controls placed on animals and animal products in Croatia and the source country upon disease suspicion . Croatia’s Border with BiH
- The Neum Corridor One specific area related to Croatia’s border with BiH warrants further analys is and discussion. The Neum Corridor is a 9km stretch (26.3 km of coastline) of BiH which extends to the Adriatic Sea and divides Croatia into two non- contiguous parts. The areas of Croatia surrounding the Corridor are predominantly tourist destinations [ 8 ] , leading to a high volume of passenger traffic. With only a few small farms in the surrounding areas of Croatia, animal and animal product movements through the Corridor are small and well -regulated (see below). Although the Neum Corridor involves international boundaries, the movement of passengers and commercial shipments of animals and animal products between the noncontiguous parts of Croatia are de facto domestic movements: only animals and animal products moving from one part of Croatia to the other part of Croatia are eligible to transit the Neum Corridor. These movements are conducted and controlled via road border crossings Klek (N eum I, on the north) and Zaton Doli (Neum II , on the south). Because the Neum Corridor border crossing s process and convey traffic between non- contiguous parts of Croatia, they are not BIPs, and as such do not conduct BIP related animal health activities, including veterinary inspection. Import and transit of animals or animal products subject to veterinary regulation and inspection are not allowed through these border crossings . Rather, animals or animal products imported into or transiting Croatia must arrive at and be processed through a BIP. C onversely, the Klek and Zaton Doli cannot serve as points of embarkation for export of animals or animal products from Croatia [ 8 ] . Customs therefore supervises , processes, and controls movement of passengers and goods through the Corridor by way o f standard border control measures on persons33

33 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest and vehicles not in transit . Their methods at the Neum Corridor border crossings are consistent with other international borders, the primary method being random inspection of vehicles and passengers . Additionally, however, they monitor vehicle entry times into the Corridor on one side and exit back into Croatia on the other, and validate that against the approximate time needed to transit . There is a specific agreement in place with BiH formalizing the arrangement that BiH border police prevent consignments from leaving the highway

route on BiH roads. Further, there are no decent connecting roads or alternative po ints of entry b etween Croatia and BiH in this area, which helps restrict unauthorized access of passengers and illegal products [ 8 ] . Key Risk I

ssue and Mitigation
- Site Visit to Croatia/BiH Road Border Crossing at Klek The Neum Corridor border crossing s process and convey traffic and goods moving between non- contiguous parts of Croatia . APHI S officials visited the border crossing at Klek to confirm adequate regulation of vehicle and passenger traffic and the movement of goods and people. APHIS confirmed that the Klek (and Zaton-Doli) border crossings are Customs posts only : BVIITS does not have a permanent presence , and commercial consignments for import or transit into or through Croatia that are subject to veterinary

c ontrols must be processed through BIP Metković. The facility operates under an EU- aligned bilateral agreement with B iH . (Also operating under bilateral agreement is the movement of B iH goods f rom its port to mainland through the Neum Corridor. However, this movement of people and products does not require crossing the Croatian border; as such, these movements are only subject to B iH regulations.) Between 250 and 600 commercial trucks and 2,000 buses and personal vehicles move through the Klek border crossing each day . Most of the traffic is domestic travelers or commercial haulers moving between the non- contiguous parts of Croatia. The current facility and road are constrained by physical restrictions : the facility i s small, the road a single lane in each direction . Croatia is constructing a new road and facility that will have 5 lanes into and 5 lanes out of Croatia, and will separate passenger vehicles from commercial traffic. Commercial consignments of domestic goods are inspected (documentation check and visual inspection) at either Klek or Zaton Doli; are sealed with a Customs seal; and are then checked at the border crossing on the opposite side of the Neum Corridor. If the seal is intact, no commingling or adulteration with B iH products is suspected, and the vehicle moves on. If the seal is not intact, the vehicle is held or returned. Entry and exit times to both border crossings are documented . Although stops in Bosnia are not prohibited, unusually

long transit times can be cause for investigation. During the APHI S visit to Klek, Customs officials were actively monitoring traffic, including checking traveler documentation and conducting random inspections of luggage and vehicles. Consistent with what the site visit team found at BIPs, Customs does not have a baseline requirement or minimum number of inspections required for passenger vehicles. Customs officials do, however, conduct de facto risk-based sampling, as they target and inspect frequent travelers and repeat offenders. Further, undercover Customs officials observe shopping areas in the Neum Corridor, and call ahead to the border crossings if they suspect potential smuggling attempts. Customs officials also arrange and implement, without advance notice to travelers, inspection campaigns targeted at tour buses. During these campaigns, all passengers and luggage are unloaded34

34 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest and inspected. The campaigns are usually conducted twice a week, and last approximately

8 hours per campaign. Customs officials reported on average approximately

10 violators per bus. Customs officials from Port Ploče assist during these campaigns. Notices were posted at Klek advising travelers against importing restricted animal products. If the passenger has not declared a prohibited animal product they are found to possess, they

are issued a ticket and fine. The prohibited product is logged, confiscated, transported to BIP Metković, and securely stored until collection and incineration . This border crossing issued 236 misdemeanors in 2011 for prohibited animal products. Customs officials reported that the most common violations were for Albanian products, as they are not available for purchase in Croatia or other EU MS . They also reported, generally, that the price of goods is lower in BiH than in Croatia, and thus there tends to be a flow of goo ds towards Croatia. Customs staff seemed competent and knowledgeable of operations, procedures, and legal requirements for maintaining Croatia’s border integrity, and seemed aware of the risks - including those risks related to illegal entry o f prohibited animal products associated with a high volume of passenger and commercial traffic. Communication and collaboration between veterinary and Customs officials seemed good. Records were easily l ocated and seemed well organized, although VD staff does not have direct access to the Customs database. It has been proposed to allow for such, but in the interim, Customs provides a summary report to the VD of confiscated prohibited animal products. Overall, APHIS found no specific or elevated risk as it relates to this section of Croatia’s international border with BiH. APHIS considers the key risk issue for this international boundary area to be similar to Croatia’s other border areas: the entry pathway o f incoming vehicular or passenger traffic, including individuals unknowingly or intentionally

c arrying prohibited animal products . Overall, APHI S was able to establish that movements of passengers and products through the Neum Corridor are de facto domestic movements between Croatia’s noncontiguous parts. APHI S also concludes that the key risk issue of prohibited animals and animal products being transported into Croatia via passenger or vehicle traffic is equivalent at this section of Croatia’s international border as at the rest of it; that the same mitigations are in place in this area as in others ; and those mitigations are implemented at somewhat the same level. Croatia’s Maritime Ports and Ferry System Given Croatia’s extensive coastline and island system, and the proximity o f nations surrounding the Adriatic Sea, APHI S includes maritime vessels and passengers in the entry p athway o f incoming vehicular or passenger traffic, including individuals unknowingly or intentionally c arrying prohibited animal products. Croatia has a relatively high number of ports and a relatively high volume of maritime vessel movements that contribute to this risk pathway, including commercial shipping lines; domestic and international commercial passenger vessels; and private vessels. Based on volume of passenger traffic and varying countries of embarkation, APHIS considers the key risk issue to be international passenger traffic processed through Croatia’s maritime ports, including the ferry and cruise services they support. A primary

risk associated with maritime passenger movements is illegal entry o f prohibited animal products via traveler /passenger luggage.35

35 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest Similar to previous discussions on vehicle/passenger movements, this evaluation of maritime traffic will not specifically address intentionally smuggled goods, as limited data exists to either quantify or qualify

smuggling of prohibited products into Croatia via maritime routes. However, it can be assumed that the detection and interdiction methods discussed in this evaluation do apply to goods smuggled via seagoing vessel and are likely to deter intentional illegal entry of prohibited products. To gain a better understanding of port processes, and to determine if risks associated with the maritime pathway were adequately

mitigated, the APHI S site visit team visited the s eaport at Ploče. Information obtained at that site visit, and analysis thereof, will be included in relevant sections below. While the information obtained at and the conclusions reached regarding Ploče are not intended to be fully transferrable to all other Croatian ports, Ploče was selected as representative because it receives a substantial number of commercial shipping vessels, domestic and international passenger vessels, and private seacraft . Thus, the information obtained there is important to confirm in general the information that Croatia submitted regarding its maritime ports and traffic, and risk mitigations in place for this entry pathway . Commercial Shipping Lines and Shipments, Including Animals and Animal Products The port of Ploče receives between 500 and 600 commercial cargo vessels per ye ar. The port primarily receives and processes dry and liquid bulk cargo. No live animals are imported or transit through the port, and it does not receive fresh or chilled animal products. The port receives commercial consignments of animal commodities only in the form of frozen products, including pork from the USA and Ireland; beef from Argentina, Brazil and New Zealand; and poultry meat (with the exception of a small volume of transiting skins and hides). The port has two warehouses, one for frozen meat and fish, to maintain cold chain requirements. For processing and offload of commercial goods, all ships must notify P ort Authorities 24 hours in advance of their arrival, and indicate their origin. Upon arrival and prior to moving inland, the cargo containers undergo document checks and physical/visual inspection, including counting of the containers and temperature checks to ensure appropriate cold chain requirements were met . Articles at the port cannot clear Customs without first being inspected and approved by the BVIITS . If BVIITS does not inspect cargo at the port itself, the official veterinarian at the final destination is notified to conduct the inspection, after which Customs clears the consignment. Passenger Ships, Including Domestic and International Cruise Lines and Ferries As depicted in the high- altitude Google map in Figure 9 (p. 3 7 ) , Croatia’s ferry system operates with and through numerous large and small ports. Also depicted in Figure 9 are the Italian ports to or from which international ferries carry passengers/vehicles. The port of Ploče receives domestic and international cruise vessels and ferries. Between 10 and 12 international cruise ship s arrival annually, primarily f rom Venice. Most arriving cruise vessels carry b etween 300 to 500 passengers, and 200 to 300 crew members. Per information received from Croatia [ 8 ] , and as confirmed on the site visit to Ploče, Customs officials conduct offload and inspection of passengers and luggage. The regulations in Croatia’s Rules for personal consignments of products of animal origin36

36 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest apply to passengers offloading from international maritime vessels , per which passengers are allowed to carry up to 10kg of animal products from other EU MS in their personal luggage . Figure 9: High- altitude Google map of Croatia’s ferry ports [ 41 ] .

Offloading of Food W

aste The offloading of food waste is internationally regulated under the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL). Croatia also has national regulations estab lishing processes and prices for food waste offload at its ports that transpose EU regulations (E C/1774/2002 ) disposal requirements for animal byproducts not intended for human consumption [ 8 ] . Generally, in ports with approved BIPs, the BVIIT S is responsible for international waste offloaded from vessels, and official veterinarians oversee waste offloaded at non-BIP ports [ 8 ] . APHI S confirmed waste offloading/removal processes at Ploče. All commercial vessels (cargo and cruise) arriving at Ploče must declare food waste. The amount of foo d waste is checked onboard the vessel by Port Authorities; they compare the daily

amount of food waste produced on the ship to the actual amount in the hold, and check the vessel’s capacity. If found, discrepancies or other violations are reported, and the ship can be held at port until the situation is corrected. If offloaded in Ploče, all waste - including kitchen waste, excepting hazardous waste - is placed in an open waste container and taken (b y a contracted company)to a landfill. All waste, including kitchen waste, is marked, but kitchen waste does not currently need to be separated. In practice, waste from international vessels is not commonly o ffloaded at Croatian ports because of the high prices for collection and incineration. According to37

37 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest Croatian officials, most vessels return their waste to the country o f origin, or offload it in other countries where it is cheaper to do so. Personal W

atercraft Croatia’s coastline is host to domestic and international personal watercraft (e.g. yachts, pleasure boats, fishing boats, other private vessels). While APHI S recognizes this as a potential entry

pathway, the data does not exist to fully categorize the risk associated with personal watercraft, as there is no way to qualify

or quantify

unregistered ves sels and unregistered port entries. Negatively impacting the risk profile is the fact that the more stringent MARPOL regulations do not apply to personal watercraft, and Croatia’s BVIITS does not conduct veterinary inspection onboard those vessels. Mitigating the risk is Croatia’s requirement that all personal watercraft register with the port on arrival, and all international arrivals of personal watercraft are subject to all Customs processes. Further, what waste is offloaded from personal watercraft is regulated, including disposal to landfill by

the third party

c ontractor. Therefore Croatia’s key regulatory component at this border interface -- and the primary mitigation for this entry p athway-- is the IBM system, and the interdiction and enforcement ef forts of Customs and BVIIT S. Discussion about Port Ploče and Maritime Entry Pathways Overall, APHI S considers Croatia’s coastal border to present an equivalent risk

— and be similarly

mitigated-- as its terrestrial borders, particularly with regard to the pathway and likelihood that contaminated animal products would enter the Croatia via travelers and their luggage. In particular, imports of up to 10kg of animal products from other EU MS are allowed in personal luggage, and there is a relatively high volume of passenger traffic on international cruises and ferries from Italy 1 . Croatian officials clearly stated that they

prohibit animal products from Sardinia and Sicily, but the frequency o f these movements contribute to the likelihood that contaminated products could enter Croatia via this pathway. A large number of cruise ships and ferries arrive from Italy; Croatia regionalizes Italy f or certain hazards and animals/products, including an entry ban on live animals and animal products from Sicily and Sardinia, but regionalization does not apply

to passenger traffic and personal luggage. Clearly the primary

mitigation is man-made interdiction and enforcement efforts of Croatia’s port officials, veterinary a uthorities and Custom s staff. Port Ploče officials, veterinary

a uthorities, and Customs staff seemed competent and knowledgeable of operations, procedures, and legal requirements governing maritime traffic and travel, and appeared to have a general understanding of the entry risks associated with maritime pathways. Further, they

were transparent when discussing deficiencies in their systems: Croatian officials acknowledged poor communication between the Ministry o f the Sea and the Ministry

o f Agriculture, Fisheries, and Rural Development at the national level. Multiple times they

specifically recommended better coordination between those

1 APHIS considers Italy free of FMD (with restrictions imposed under 9 CFR 92.11), and part of the APHIS - define d European CSF region. APHIS recently recognized the Italian regions of Lombardia, Emilio -Romagna, Veneto, and Piemonte and the autonomous provinces of Trento and Bolzano as free of SVD [26, 27]. However, because of its proximity to or trading relationship s with SVD - affected regions, APHIS applies the restrictions of 9 CFR Sec. 94.13 to these Italian regions and autonomous provinces.38

3 8 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest Ministries, and alluded to the fact that it would foster better collaboration between BVIIT S and Port Authority at the local level. However, in addition to internal controls in the country or region of origin, mitigations are in place to reduce the risk associated with infected undetected products arriving via the pathways of international catering waste and passenger luggage. Mitigations inc lude but are not limited to high awareness of contagious animal diseases from Customs and BVIITS , and random inspections of offloading passengers and luggage. Customs officials seemed aware of and had access to information related to contagious animal dise ases, and appeared to understand the role that international passenger traffic plays as a potential pathway in the spread of contagious animal diseases. Overall, Customs jurisdiction, awareness of contagious animal diseases and potential pathways of transmission, and communication and collaboration with BVIIT S was consistent with what the site visit team observed at other BIPs. Customs and BVIIT S meet annually at the national level to exchange information and strategy . B VIIT S organizes training on various topics, including personal luggage, and has trained key Customs officials in each region of Croatia. B VIS sends leaflets and other informational materials to the port. Customs reports to BVIS annually the ty pe and volume of confiscations of prohibited animals and animal products. The primary

difference between maritime and terrestrial entry p athways is the maritime entry

p athway o f offloaded kitchen waste from international vessels containing contaminated products, which could in turn be deposited at a landfill and subsequently scavenged by

f eral swine or other susceptible species. Kitchen waste offloaded from international ships at Port Ploče, for example, is not separated from other waste: it is collected, transported in open containers to landfill, and disposed as part of “mixed waste”. It is possible therefore that infected undetected products could be discarded as kitchen waste and subsequently foraged at landfills by

feral swine or other wildlife. For this entry

p athway, mitigations include but are not limited to the international regulations of MARPOL, with which port officials indicated that 90% of their arriving vessels comply, and by

which non- compliant vessels can be flagged and barred from port (Port Ploče can, and has, banned ships from entering the port based on MARPOL violations). Also mitigating this pathway are EU (and Croatian) regulations regarding Category 1 food waste, which Port Ploče largely meets: it had many EU- level procedures already in effect in advance of acceding to the EU , ex cepting the requirement that all animal products be inspected at the BIP. With accession to the EU, Croatia is now required to meet all EU regulations for Category 1 materials, which includes international catering waste. While facilities at Ploče are insufficient for performing detailed veterinary inspections on animal product consignments at the port-- inspections are currently performed at final destination

— APHI S considers the volume of food waste offloaded (at Port Ploče) to be relatively low, and construction is underway on a new facility with sufficient space to perform checks at the BIP. Additionally, other ports in Croatia that handle higher volumes of live animals or animal product consignments, or international cruise ships, have more advanced measures in place. Port Rijeka and Zagreb International Airport, for example, do separate kitchen waste from other vessel waste when it is offloaded, and Croatian officials provided data from those ports on the volume of kitchen waste and total vessel waste. Another mitigation for this entry pathway i s the interdiction and compliance efforts of port officials, BVIIT S, and Customs.39

39 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest **8. Croatia**  **’s Livestock Demographics and Marketing Practices** This evaluation focuses on swine and swine products. As a result, the following discussion of Croatia’s livestock demographics and marketing practices focuses on domestic and feral swine. Swine Croatia has approximately 1. 4 million pigs, raised on 9 1 ,000 pig farms [ 7 ] . A map of Croatia showing the spatial distribution of pig farms is available in Figure 10 . S wine farms are predominantly

l ocated in Croatia’s eastern plains and mountain regions, less so in the coastal areas. Figure 10: Spatial distribution of swine farms in Croatia [ 8 ] .

Most pigs in Croatia are raised in small numbers on small farms, i.e. backyard or hobby production units [ 7 , 42 , 43 ] , but Croatian officials reported that swine production is trending toward fewer but larger swine farms . T able 1 provides detailed demographics data for swine production in Croatia in 2013. Table 1 : Farm size and demographics, swine production, Croatia, May 2013 [ 44 ] . Number of pigs per holding Number of pigs Percentage of pigs Number of

holdings Percentage of

holdings 1 3,360 0.2 3,360 3.7 2 - 10 275,133 19.9 65,814 72.3 11 - 50 382,115 27.6 19,871 21.8 51 - 100 77,360 5.6 1,128 1.2 101 - 200 53,271 3.9 374 0.4 201 - 500 96,906 7.0 314 0.3 501 - 1000 50,957 3.6 74 <0.0140

40 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest 1001 - 2000 62,205 4.5 45 <0.01 2001 - 5000 79,783 5.8 27 <0.01 5001 - 10000 139,266 10.1 17 <0.01 >10000 162,836 11.8 10 <0.01 **Total 1,383,192**  **100 91,034**  **100** Approximately half (48%) of the 1.4 million pigs in Croatia are raised on small farms . Of these small farms, 97% have 1 to 50 pigs and 76 % have 1 - 1 0 pigs. S mall backyard swine farms and hobby producers may

have lower biosecurity measures and other husbandry

standards , and tend to support a local or regional marketing network with a high volume of animal transfers that typically involve a lower number of pigs. Regarding large swine farm s, approximately 47% have over 100 pigs , approximately

3 5% have over 500 pigs , and approximately 22% have over 5,000 pigs . Large farms are likely

to be commercial production systems , with high biosecurity measures and other husbandry standards; high control of on- and off - farm movements of animals, people, and fomites; and tend to support commercial industries with a low number of animal transfers that ty pically involve a larger number of pigs. Registration of Swine Farms S wine farm registration requirements are established by Croatia’s Ordinance on the compulsory

identification and registration of pigs. S wine farms that have more than 2 pigs must be registered in the CAA ’s Farm Register database , part of the Central Register of Domestic Animals. Applications are submitted to the CAA ; approved farms are assigned a Unique Farm Identification Number (UFIN) , consisting of a two - letter code for the country

o f origin (Croatia = HR) and a unique eight- digit number and allotted a Farm Identification Card (FIC), which must be kept at the farm location [ 8 ] . The Farm Register logs the UFIN, the address of the farm, keeper and owner information (both, if different), geographical coordinates, secondary locations and their coordinates, ty

pe of production, ty

pe and annual number and maximum capacity of animals kept on the farm, veterinary information, including the authorized veterinarian or veterinary

organization associated with the farm. This information is maintained for a period of three years from which the last pigs are kept on the farm [ 8 ] . Farms that have one pig are exempt from farm registration requirements; however, these farms must report pig purchases and to the competent veterinary organization when the pig is delivered to the farm . The information is recorded in the Central Register of Pigs, where the farm is identified by name, Personal Identification Number, and address. If the pig is moved from the holding (i.e. not slaughtered for personal consumption), the holding must then obtain a UFIN and be updated into the Farm Registry [ 8 ] . Swine Identification and Registration Croatia’s swine identification requirements are outlined in the VA , which aligns with EU Directive 92/102/EEC (identification and registration of animals) and 64/432/EEC (intra- community trade of swine and bovines, as amended by 1 5/2000/EC); and EC Decision 2000/678 rules for registration of holdings in national databases for porcine animals [ 8 ] . The VD is the competent authority f or the identification and41

41 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest registration of animals, but contracts those services to the CAA. The CAA maintains the Central Register of Livestock, which is the database associated with animal ID. The Central Register of Livestock includes the Central Register of Pigs [ 8 ] . Pigs are identified by holder/owner, AVOs, or the CAA using an eartag or tattoo [ 9 , 11 , 45 , 46 ] . The holder/owner is responsible for ensuring that animals are properly identified and registered. Holders must also keep the required records to ensure the traceability

o f animals in the event of their movement, and ensure that proper identification and paperwork is with the animals when they move. The animal holder is also responsible for the cost of identifying animals [ 9 ] . Compliance with animal identification and registration requirements, including movement of animals, is investigated and enforced by the VI S [ 8 ] . On
-Farm Veterinary Presence at Swine Holdings On-premise veterinary

inspections are mandatory f or swine farms except those with only a single pig. Veterinary inspections are conducted by a uthorized veterinarians within their own administrative/epizootological unit with the goal of confirming that the inspected farm complies to national program standards, animal health and welfare requirements, including minimum biosecurity standards, and Croatia’s registration and recordkeeping requirements. Inventory i s taken at each farm on its annual inspection. Farm inspection reports are completed and filed at the corresponding regional veterinary office. The methods and frequency of inspections is set yearly b y the VD [ 37 ] . APHIS Site Visits to Swine Farms in Croatia To observe representative commercial swine farms first-hand and to confirm onfarm processes, the APHIS site visit team visited three swine farms in Croatia: a fattening farm and a breeding farm for a large, vertically integrated producer2 that currently exports swine products to other EU MS , and a family- operated commercial farm . The APHIS site visit team did not vis it backyard or hobby swine farm s due to the high variability in farm size, facilities, and husbandry practices between backyard producers . Iti s difficult to extrapolate from representative backyard or hobby swine farms any

c onclusions that could be categorically applied to other backyard farms. Commercial Fattening Farm in Koprivnica -Križevci County The AP HIS site visit team visited a commercial fattening farm of a large vertically integrated agricultural producer . The site visit team conducted interviews with the farm’s owner/operator, the company veterinarian, state veterinary insp ectors, and AVs focused on operating procedures . The site visit team also reviewed farm documentation , including the farm registry, treatment book (for vaccinations, etc. ) , disinfectant log ( for footbaths and wheel washes) , feed delivery l og , pest control plan , and the farmer’s personal logbook . There were no CSF testing records to review, as this farm is only subject to random s election for CSF testing based on size , ty pe , and location ( see 9. CSF, FMD, and SVD Surveillance in Croatia) and had not yetb een selected for CSF testing (the farm has only b een in operation since 2010). The farm was in

2 Vertically integrated (swine) production combines different stages of production (e.g. breeding, farrowing, nursery and finishing) under a common management structure. It can also include supply and processing chains.42

42 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest compliance with record keeping requirements, and records were well - organized and maintained. The fattening farm is highly contained, with access restrictions for animals, people, and supplies . F arm visitors must shower and don personal protective equipment prior to entering the core of the premises, and shower when they depart. All piglets for fattening are supplied by

the company ’s commercial breeding farm (see next section) and are moved onto the farm and off the farm to slaughter in a single transfer (“all - in/all out”). The farm is stocked 2 to 3 times per ye ar, with between 500 and 700 piglets. These animals are tattooed at the breeding farm prior to transp ort to the fattening farm. Swine are transported in company- owne d trucks to this fattening farm and other company grow- out farms where they are fattened for approximately 3 .5 months before going directly to slaughter. Ninety

percent (90%) of the swine sent to slaughter go to Croatia’s largest meat producer; the other ten ( 10%) are sourced to Croatia’s other meat producers . Feed is delivered to the farm and manure is dried and used as fertilizer on local fields. Carcass es are stored in a shed near the entrance to the farm and collection is contracted to an AVO . Biosecurity procedures exceeded the minimum standards for biosecurity as established by

the VD , and compliance appeared to be acceptable . The farm entrance was gated and the entire perimeter fenced . The entrance to the farm had f ootbaths , a hand sanitizer and a wheel washing vat for on- and off - farm human and vehicle movement. Personal protective clothing was required prior to entering the farm. Per company protocol, no meat can be brought onto the premise s . Any fomites entering the premises must be disinfected (Virkon- S) or ultra-violet irradiated for 45 minutes. Employees are not permitted to own swine nor have contact with other swine, including wild boar on hunting grounds , within 72 hours of arrival on the farm, and must attest to meeting these requirements prior to entering the premises. The VA recommends that C/D and pest- , rodent- , and/or insect- control programs be conducted in all facilities on all premises where animals temporarily or permanently reside, and on all affiliated transport vehicles and equipment. The VA also vests MAFRD veterinary

inspectors with the legal authority to mandate disinfection and pest control for a premises , if necessary . If disinfection or pest control program s are mandated, program measures must be conducted by an AVO . Otherwise, animal owners or farm employees can implement disinfection and pest control measures , or the farm can contract them out, as is the case with this farm. This farm also contracts out the C/D of empty swine housing rooms (i.e. rooms between stocking cycles) [ 9 ] . The company

veterinarian visits the farm every 2 weeks on average or when c alled to administer veterinary c are. The AV f

or thi s farm visits regularly to issue health certificates and movement documents. All veterinarians must follow the 72 hour restriction for contact with other swine . Overall, APHI S observed this commercial fattening farm to be an intensive , high biosecurity operation with veterinary measures implemented on the farm sufficient to detect contagious animal disease s such as CSF, FMD, and SVD. The company and this individual farm receive educational information distributed by the MAFRD and that company officials have attended VD - sponsored swine disease sy mposia. Based on interviews the farm owner/operator’ s swine disease awareness appeared primarily to regard changes to production parameters (e.g. morbidity, mortality, weight gain, etc. ) that43

43 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest would accompany a disease outbreak rather than clinical signs of CSF or vesicular disease. Otherwise, the owner/operator seemed knowledgeable of farm operations, company procedures , and company and Croatian veterinary /legal requirements . There appeared to be good communication and collaboration between the farm owner, the company veterinarian, the AV, and Croatian veterinary officials. Commercial Breeding Farm in Vukovar
-Srijem County APHI S also visited a commercial breeding farm of a large vertically integrated agricultural producer. The breeding operation is an intensive, high biosecurity, restricted access, shower- in/shower- out facility . The farm is IS O:9001 (Quality) and IS O:18001 (Safety) certified, and is also Good Agricultural Practices certified. The site visit team interviewed the farm manager, the company’s Head of Public Relations, and veterinarians affiliated with the farm. The site visit team reviewed health certificates, movement documents, and other farm records including documentation of CSF testing and clinic al inspection. All CSF test results were negative. APHI S found evidence of on- and off - farm movement controls and affiliated records for animals, people, and supplies . The company owns a feed mi ll and feed trucks , collects on- farm daily mortality in their own transport vehicles , and owns a registered disinfection station. F omites carried on to the farm must be dipped in disinfectant or ultra-violet irradiated. Employee uniforms are laundered on farm, except for their coveralls, which are laundered by a c ontract company . Employee s are even restricted from bringing food, including pork products, onto the farm; instead, the company provides c all on- site meals. This farm, like other company farms, has its own water system. Manure produced by the farm is collected in a covered lagoon, dried, and applied as fertilizer. This farm is scheduled to begin biogas collection from manure waste. APHI S also found evidence of animal disease traceability . The farm has 1200 breeding sows that wean approximately 2 6 piglets per sow per ye ar. The piglets are kept from farrow to wean and then contracted out to individual growers. This farm is the single stocker source for contract growers (including the commercial fattening farm discussed in the previous section). No outside animals or semen are purchased in the company’s breeding program. All sows on the farm have 2 tattoos and an ear tag, and all piglets are tattooed b y day 3. Biosecurity procedures at this farm greatly exceed the minimum standards for biosecurity

as establishe d by

the VD and compliance appears to be very high. The farm is remotely located with perimeter fencing, gated access, footbaths for personnel entering or exiting the facility, and wheelwash for vehicles entering or exiting the farm (with a truck sprayer available). Company policy stipulates no contact with pigs within the previous 24 hours prior to entering the facility . Employees cannot hunt nor raise and slaughter their own pigs, and are restricted from commingling with those who have. F omites carried on to the farm must be disinfected or ultra-violet irradiated for 40 minutes per side. Regarding on- farm veterinary presence, the company veterinarian visits this facility a minimum of once per week. He schedules his visits to the company ’s fattening farms to accommodate the biosecurity requirements that “two nights pass” between the veterinarian’s last contact with live swine and his visit to the commercial breeding farm. The company veterinarian oversees the general health and productivity o f the animals . This includes review of production statistics in the company database;44

44 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest administering/overseeing disease monitoring programs (e.g. leptospirosis, brucellosis, mycoplasmosis, porcine reproductive and respiratory s yndrome ); supervising the farm’s veterinary technicians; and identifying and correcting any problems as they

arise. The farm is also assigned an AV, who is responsible for CSF sampling. P igs must be clinically

examined and serologically tested prior to movement. The number of pigs tested is based on a percentage of the total number moved: 5% of the total moved are serologically tested and 10% of the total moved are clinically examined for fattening pigs; 5% of the total moved are clinically examined for sows or boars direct to slaughter. Overall, this commercial breeding farm implemented the advanced swine production and husb andry practices of a vertically integrated commercial operation. F arm staff and the Director of Public Relations seemed extremely knowledgeable of company operations, procedures, and legal requirements; seemed aware of Croatian and EU animal health regulations; seemed extremely k nowledgeable of contagious diseases of swine , and the implications of a disease outbreak; and appeared to be highly aware of the sources of risk, including the pathways by which contagious animal disease could be transmitted. Family
- Operated Breeding Farm in Karlovac County APHI S visited a family- owned and - operated swine breeding farm. The f arm almost exclusively

sells weaned piglets to individuals within Karlovac County for further fattening or consumption. The site visit team was hosted by the owner- operators, state veterinary

inspectors, and AVs. The site visit team reviewed the Register of Pigs on the Farm, which records onfarm (born, purchased) and off - farm (sales, death, other) swine movements, as well as the Health Status and Treatment Records, which included ty pe, identification number, and treatment of animals (including manufacturer of product, and disposal of excess product). Educati onal materials (pamphlets) on CSF, swine breeding, and wild boar were easily located and readily available . The farm has internet access by which employees/personnel can access additional educational information online. The farmers reported attending VD sp onsored training. The farm has approximately 3 50 animals: 64 sows, 40 gilts, 2 boars, the remainder are piglets. Piglets are tattooed at birth. The farm produces most of its feed with occasional deliveries of feed additives. The farm’s pest control program and carcass removal services are contracted . Wastewater is collected underground; manure is dried and used as fertilizer. Piglets are not sold through a livestock market; rather, they are sold and delivered, in groups of 1 to 10, farm-to - farm or farm-to -household. The farm transports animals using their own vehicle (tractor and trailer), of which no special registration is required because they

do not deliver beyond a 60km radius. The farmers reported that vehicles are cleaned and disinfected after each offload. The farm occasionally purchases piglets from a neighboring farm to supplement their supply and meet market demand, but they do not bring those pigs back to the farm. A few animals are sold direct to slaughter, at the request of the individual buyer ; the farm also has a c atering service offering rotisseried whole hogs. Regarding on- farm veterinary presence, records indicated that the AV visited every two weeks for routine veterinary i ssues. The AV must also perform a clinical45

45 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest examination and is sue a health certificate and travel document prior to swine movements off the farm. If the animals move out of Karlovac County, the AV must conduct a clinical examination and take samples for CSF diagnostic testing. Records are kept of all visits by AVs. Records also confirmed visits for pest control twice in the past ye ar. Farm owners and veterinary

o fficials were responsive to site visit team questions; seemed competent and knowledgeable of operations, procedures, and legal requirements; seemed knowledge able of swine health and production practices; seemed knowledgeable of livestock demographics and marketing practice; and appeared to be aware of contagious animal disease risks in their area. Overall, the farm had satisfactory b iosecurity, husbandry, and operational standards . The farm was clean and generally well maintained, with a fenced perimeter, and swine were bred and raised in a core facility on the farm that was further restricted by another fence and a disinfectant barrier. The farm controlled and catalogued on- and offfarm movements of animals, people, and supplies, and satisfied animal disease traceability

requirements . Analysis of Representative Swine Farms: Conclusions and Key Risk Issues The commercial fattening and breeding farms represent a high intensity, high biosecurity, vertically

integrated production and marketing system. The movement of animals, people, and fomites on, off, and between farms are highly controlled, and each premises maintains very high biosecurity standards. APHI S c onsiders the likelihood of CSFv , FMDv , or SVDv entering this production chain to be low . Further, because of advanced swine husbandry standards, farm monitoring by c ompany veterinarians, swine disease awareness and sampling, and data collection for most swine production parameters , APHI S considers it highly likely that a swine disease would be quickly detected and contained should it infiltrate this production system. Overall, the site visit team gained confidence in Croatia’s vertically- integrated swine se ctor, the affiliated production and marketing systems, and Croatia’s oversight thereof. APHIS considers this production system to be the most likely s ource of pork or pork products for export to the United States, and considers the risk of undetected CSFv- , FMDv- , or SVDvcontaminated products being sourced from this production chain to be low. APHI S considers the risk associated with the family- operated breeding farm to be slightly different than that of the vertically integrated commercial swine production sector. The representative family- operated breeding farm was adequately b iosecure, meeting the minimum biosecurity standards of the VD (but not matching the standards of the vertically integrated commercial facilities). However, it conducts a medium to high number of off

- farm animal movements, supplying local holdings with pigs for fattening for the winter/Christmas season. Although the farmers reported that they rarely visit more than one farm per day, and although animals undergo veterinary inspection and disease testing prior to moving off - farm , there are no restrictions on the number of farms or holdings they

c an visit per day, and these animal movements , albeit monitored by annual inventory reports and the Registry o f Domestic Animals, could be generally c ategorized as more frequent and less traceable . APHIS considers it likely that, should a contagious swine disease occur, this distribution pattern could contribute significantly to disease spread.46

46 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest Finally, there are also risk implications for small, family- operated, “backyard” farms, including farms with a single pig. Iti s difficult to draw substantial conclusions about backyard farms given the variability o f farm size, facilities, and husbandry practices, but farms with a single pig are exempt from most of Croatia’s premises and animal registration requirements . This presents a gap in animal disease traceability . Generally, backyard farms may also present a biosecurity gap as some implement only minimal biosecurity

measures. B ackyard farmer may not always conduct animal disease sampling or collect, analyze, and respond to changes in production data. However, these risks are mitigated by the fact that although these farms are exempt from entry

in the Farm Register, they must report to the competent veterinary organization, at the time of delivery, the purchase of the pig. Further, the pig is most likely f ed and fattened for personal consumption, so APHIS considers it unlikely that a pig or pigs would be moved off of a single - or double -pig backyard f arm. Further, any animals that do move off of a small farm require a movement permit and corresponding health certificate, and would most likely enter the local livestock market, where market rules would be enforced (see related discussion below). Cattle, Sheep, and Goats In 2012, Croatia had approximately 4 96 , 0 00 cattle, distributed on 40,0 00 farms; 55 1 ,000 sheep raised on 1 4 , 0 00 farms; 47 , 0 00 goats raised on 2, 0 00 farms , and 1, 0 00 mixed ovine and caprine farms raising another 8 4 , 0 00 sheep and goats [ 7 ] . M ap s of Croatia showing the spatial distribution of cattle, sheep, and goat farms in Croatia are available in Figure s 11 - 13 . Ruminant farms are primarily l ocated in Croatia’s eastern plains and mountain regions. Figure 11 : Spatial distribution of cattle farms in Croatia [ 8 ] .47

47 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest Figure 1 2 : Spatial distribution of sheep farms in Croatia [ 8 ] .

Figure 13 : Spatial distribution of goat farms in Croatia [ 8 ] .

Registration of Bovine, Ovine, and Caprine Holdings, and On
-Farm Presence Registration requirements for c attle, sheep, and goat farms are similar to those for swine farms. According to the Veterinary Act, any f arm with more than 1 cow, sheep, or goat must be registered in the CAA ’s Farms Register, which is part of the Central Register of Domestic Animals. Farms of biungulates and solipeds exceeding 20 animals, and breeding farms of wild game, must also be registered [ 8 , 9 ] . Animal Identification and Registration for Cattle, Sheep, and Goats The Veterinary

D irectorate is the competent authority f or the identification and registration of cattle, sheep, and goats, via contract with the CAA. The CAA keeps and maintains the database associated with animal ID , the Central Register of Livestock, which includes the Central Register of Bovine Animals and the Central Register of Sheep and Goats [ 8 ] . Cattle, sheep, and goats are all subject to identification requirements laid out in the Veterinary

Act . The requirements for bovine animals were updated in 2007 by amending the Veterinary Act and then by u pdating implementation measures to comply with EC requirements for bovine identification and registration (EC Regulations 1760/2000, 494/98, 1082/2003, 499/2004, and 911/2004 ) [ 8 ] . To summarize, c attle have48

48 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest

a unique ID marked by

2e artags, require an individual passport for movement, and are identified to date of birth, sex, breed, mother, and keeper [ 9 , 11 , 45 , 47 ] . If an official veterinarian identifies non- compliance in b ovine identification, per the VA the official veterinarian can prohibit the movement of all animals from the holding; prohibit the introduction of animals onto the holding; order depopulation of the animals, and disposal of the carcass es [ 9 ] . Ordinances outlining the mandatory requirement of identification of sheep and goats, as well as the implementing measures for the sheep/goat ID system, were published in 2007. These ordinances transpose EC regulations for identification and registration of ovine and caprine animals (EC Regulations 21/2004 and 1505/2006 ) [ 8 ] . Sheep and goats are identified and registered similar to cattle, requiring eartag s , ruminal bolus es , and movement passports [ 9 , 45 , 48 ] . On
- farm Presence at Bovine, Ovine, and Caprine holdings Similar to swine holdings, veterinary inspections are mandatory f or farms on which cattle, sheep, and goats are raised. Veterinary inspections can be conducted by a uthorized veterinarians within their own administrative/epizootological unit. Inspections include an annual inventory and assessments of animal health and welfare status, adherence to national program standards, and recordkeeping . Inspection results are reported and filed at the corresponding veterinary office. The methods and frequency o f inspections is set yearly by the VD [ 37 ] . Animal Markets and Livestock Assembly Centers Croatia’s domestic livestock trade is primarily conducted via animal markets (Croatia also has livestock fairs and auctions). Livestock for export are assembled at livestock assembly centers. Animal markets and livestock assembly centers must be approved and registered in the Registry o f Approved Markets and Registry o f Approved Assembly C enters [ 9 ] . Each registered animal market and livestock assembly c enter operates under the supervision of the veterinary inspectors of the county in which it is located (as does a livestock fair or auction) [ 5 ] [9] . Markets and assembly centers must satisfy animal health conditions laid out by animal health officials ; affiliated animal traders and animal haulers must be approved and re gistered, and must comply with conditions stipulated by MAFRD [ 9 ] . Figures 14 and 15 (p. 49 ) depict maps of Croatia’s registered animal markets and livestock assembly centers.49

49 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest Figure 14 : Animal Markets in Croatia [ 8 ] .

Figure 15 : Livestock Assembly Centers in Croatia [ 8 ] .50

50 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest Livestock for Export Animals or animal products destined for export must be inspected, as stipulated by MAFRD, by

an official veterinarian and issued a health certificate prior to export. The veterinary

inspection must determine that the animals or products meet the import requirements of the country o f destination , after which a health certificate attesting the requirements are met can be issued (see section below on “Health Certificates”) [ 9 ] . Moving Livestock MAFRD regulates the commercial and non- commercial movement of cattle, swine, sheep, and goats. As c ommercial livestock movements ty pically involve large numbers of animals and include import and export of animals and animal products , they are the focus of this risk assessment. Livestock can be moved within, into, or out of a county i f they are accompanied by the appropriate movement documents, a passport, and an animal health certificate (see below) . Croatia’s VD has the legal authority to restrict animal movements at the individual animal level , at the group or farm level, at the regional level, or at the country level , and would do so during a disease outbreak or other sanitary restriction, or in order to obtain a certain animal disease status [ 9 ] . Each animal movement must be reported to an authorized veterinarian, who conducts a veterinary

inspection, provides the necess ary documentation, and records the movement in the database [ 8 ] . Swine, for ex ample, require a health certificate to be moved off

-premise s , but only ‘arrival to’ premises is reported and uploaded to the database for swine [ 9 ] . When swine are moved to a market, the market becomes the legally responsible “animal keeper”. Swine can be kept at a market no more than 12 hours . If swine are not sold within 12 hours , the original owner must take it back to their farm [ 6 ] . Of note for cattle, ‘departure from’ and ‘arrival to’ premises are reported and uploaded in the database [ 9 ] . Cattle being shipped directly to slaughter can be issued a movement certificate without a veterinary check [ 37 ] . Health Certificates Croatia uses a health certificate to document that animal inspection and/or disease testing occurred at the holding of origin prior to animals being moved off the premises, and that all conditions listed in the health certificate have been fulfilled, the requirements of which can be found in the Ordinance on veterinary checks of live animals in internal trade and certificate of health condition and place of origin of the animal. All cattle, swine, sheep, and goats traded within Croatia must be moved under a domestic health certificate. Domestic health certificates are procured, by f ee, from an authorized veterinarian. MAFRD regulate s the form and content of domestic health certificates, including traceability requirements , length of time health certificates must be retained on file, associated fees, and any exceptions to the requirement for a domestic certificate. Internal certificates may not be issued if an infectious or parasitic disease that can be transmitted by

the species to be traded is present on the place of origin [ 9 ] . All animals and animal products exported from Croatia must be accompanied by an international health certificate [ 9 ] . Under requirements of the VA, veterinarians may not attest to or confirm on the health certificate any certification statements of which they are not certain, and they may not sign a blank or incomplete certificate. Veterinarians51

51 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest may s ign health certificates based on affidavits or third party information so long as the supporting documentation is presented prior to signing the certificate , or the information supplied by

the third party

can be verified [ 9 ] . APHIS Site Visit to an Animal Market in Vrbovec To confirm information Croatia submitted regarding animal identification, movements, and traceability, APHIS officials visited a livestock market. This livestock market and others like it are the primary avenue s for local livestock trade, with most buyers and sellers from the local area. Livestock sold at these markets are sourced from small commercial farms and hobby producers ; Croatian regulations allow livestock owners to transport animals within a 65km (40 mile) radius without registering as a transporter. At its weekly

sale, this market almost exclusively ( 90%) sells piglets intended for further fattening. It occasionally sells calves, but does not sell sheep or goats. The market falls under the jurisdiction of the Zagreb county veterinary o ffice, and AVO veterinary station Vrbovec. The site visit team visited with State veterinary inspectors, authorized veterinarians, and company personnel. Each animal consignment arriving to the market must be accompanied by a veterinary

health certificate, issued within 30 days prior to movement, indicating veterinary

inspection was performed prior to the animal(s) leaving the farm , as well as a travel document indicating that the transport vehicle underwent C/D. Transport vehicles park on the street outside the market, but it is prohibited to exchange animals there. The official exchange of animals takes place on the market premises, which requires vehicles to cross a disinfection barrier and then offload and exchange animals. Day o f sale paperwork is done by

hand and transactions must be uploaded to the Unique Register of Domestic Animals database within 3 days. While animals are on site, the market is designated as the animal keeper. If animals do not sell, keeper designation is transferred back to the original owner. Although contagious animal diseases have not been reported at this market, market officials and affiliated veterinarians were knowledgeable of swine diseases and appeared prepared to handle an animal disease event. If sick animals were to arrive at the market, officials reported that the animals would be quarantined, examined by the AV, and sampled. The AV would then inform the regional office of VD, and the market would be placed under surveillance. If clinical disease is confirmed by disease testing , animals would be traced back to the farm of origin, upon which animal health officials would implement sampling and control measures. This conforms with Croatian regulations, which, in the event of a disease suspicion or outbreak, subject livestock markets to additional control measures including closure if necessary . During the CSF outbreaks of 200 7 and 200 8 , for example, all livestock markets in Croatia, including the one visited by

the site visit team , were closed. Currently, three counties under CSF related restrictions due to CSF serological activity in wild boar have restrictions on livestock markets (see 4. Active Disease Control Programs) . Discussion ofAnimal Markets, Including Key Risk Issues The animal market that APHI S visited was small, open- air (i.e. lacking a sale barn), situated in town, and its perimeter was only p artially fenced . The site team52

52 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest observe d b iosecurity measures consisting of a disinfection wheelbath for vehicles , a disinfection footbath for people, and the requirement that employees don personal protective clothing prior to entering the sale and transfer part of the market . Biosecurity at this animal market and others like it is particularly important because these markets serve as points of concentration and dissemination for a potentially large number of livestock. If an animal with undete cted infection was received into this market or another like it there is the potential for animal disease transmission and spread within the local area and market chain . However, because livestock for export must be assembled at approved assembly c enters, it is highly unlikely that an animal market would be the source for live animals for export with undetected infection. The risk associated with an infected animal arriving to an animal market i s mitigated by veterinary

inspection and correspondinng documentation prior to animals moving to the market, and the requirement that transport vehicles be disinfected. The risk associated with disease spread is mitigated by the vehicle disinfection requirement, and other control measures that can be implemented in the event that a contagious animal disease is susp ected or confirmed . To the latter, animal disease awareness educational pamphlets and contingency p lans were on display

in the market office , and this market has participated in disease outbreak simulation exercises. Overall, animal market staff and responsible veterinarians were knowledgeabl e of the legal requirements for operating the facility and for affiliated processes (e.g. animal movement controls) . Communication between market staff and local veterinary officials, and between local veterinary o fficials and the Veterinary D irectorate, seemed good. There appeared to be an effective flow of education and outreach materials from central VD officials to their regional offices to livestock market officials (including its assigned AV). APHIS determined it likely that veterinarians overseeing the market are aware of contagious animal diseases, and could detect clinical signs of disease in animals presented to the market. APHI S also determined that veterinary officials have the authority to control animal movements into and out of the livestock market, and surrounding area, and the authority and ability to implement c ontingency procedures in the event of an animal disease outbreak. Hides and Skins F acilitie s that collect, process , preserve , or store raw hides and skins must be approved and registered by MAFRD , and demonstrate compliance with MAFRD regulations for hides and skins. To summarize, facilities must mark the hides and skins, and retain records regarding the origin of purchased skins and furs. F acilities that trade, preserve, treat, process, or store hides and skins must store skins of ungulates and solipeds slaughtered without veterinary inspection and raw skins of dead ungulates and solipeds for which the cause of death has not been confirmed in separate premises [ 9 ] . Meat, Products, By
-Products, Food of Animal Origin, Animal Origin W aste Croatia’s food safety regulations are laid out in the Veterinary Act and the Food Act [ 9 ] . The primary

oversight mechanism for food safety and hygiene are official control programs of affiliated products and establishments . Official control programs f or food safety and hygiene, including facility inspections, are conducted by state veterinary inspectors; authorized veterinarians53

53 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest approved to conduct official control programs; and by “ official control bodies”, which are veterinary

organizations approved and accredited by MAFRD only for the purpose of administering official control programs for food safety or hygiene. Official control bodies must be accredited, usually s erve for a period of 5 ye ars, and can have their accreditation terminated if not appropriately conducting the tasks assigned [9] . All establishments involved in production, processing, or storage of food of animal origin must be registered with MAFRD. Official control s can be implemented in all phases of production, processing, storage, and distribution of food of animal origin, animal products, or animal by-products. Official c ontrol bodies oversee business operators and operations; sources, materials, and ingredients; processes, activities and procedures; and transport. Official c ontrol bodies conduct unannounced inspections in addition to annual and multiannual inspections and program reviews [ 9 ] . Animal carcasses and by-products not intended for human consumption must be incinerated or further processed by rendering . Facilities that treat, process, or store processed or unprocessed animal by-products not intended for human consumption are regulated by

MAFRD; approved facilities are maintained in a registry. The fees and conditions for collection and transport of processed or unprocessed animal by-products are also regulated b y MAFRD [ 9 ] . Site Visit to Croatian Rendering Facility To assess the risks regarding animal by products and animal waste, the APHI S site visit team visited Croatia’s only renderer of animal by

products not intended for human consumption. The facility processes Category 1 and 2 materials, which are higher risk for animal diseases and include, but are not limited to, specified risk materials (e.g. brain and spinal cord); fallen stock; some wild animals; pet, zoo, circus, and experimental animals; and international catering waste from outside the EU. The facility also separately processes Category

3 materials, which are lower risk for animal diseases and include, but are not limited to, animal by-products not fit for human consumption, including slaughterhouse waste (e.g. hides, hair, feathers, bones); industrial food waste; food waste from retailers (e.g. butchers and supermarkets); and catering waste, including domestic kitchen waste. Company protocol stipulates that separate trucks and separate collection containers be used for each waste Category . The rendering facility is IS O 9001:2008 certified and operate s under a Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point (HACCP ) program and under the veterinary oversight of state veterinary

inspectors and official veterinarians
. The company i s registered as a transporter and a processor and c ollects animal origin waste throughout Croatia using a fleet of 35 vehicles and 75 collection containers. There are other registered transporters in Croatia who deliver animal origin waste for rendering to this facility, but only this company is authorized to transport slaughterhouse waste. The other registered transporters collect only carcasses and hunted wild boar hides and waste, which are securely stored until collection, transport, and processing. (Not including the innards of harvested wild boar, which are permitted b y regulation to be buried.) When waste arrives, it is weighed and inspected . If the waste includes animal carcasses, the ty

pe, number, and weight of carcasses is confirmed against the accompanying documentation. If any bovine carcasses are received, the e ar tags are removed . If the bovine carcass is not tagged the official veterinarian is notified, and54

54 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest investigative measures are taken . The waste is unloaded and then processed at 133°C for 20 minutes at 3 bars of pressure . The meat and bone meal end product is exporte d to Asia . The technical animal fat end product is exported to other EU MS for biodiesel . The maximum capacity for both plants is approximately 2 4 tons of raw material per hour ; the facilities on average operate at approximately 5 5 to 60 percent capacity, meaning a surge capacity is available in the event of a disease outbreak . Overall, the site visit team found the facility to be clean and well -maintained, with good biosecurity and thorough veterinary oversight provided by state veterinary inspectors and official veterinarians, who are responsible for official controls. Resources seemed sufficient for needs . Record reviews confirmed that received consignments indicate number and ty

pe of animals, weight, animal and farm ID , and other species specific animal descriptions such as age or gender (for cattle). Disease transmission by

the collectors and transporters of animal origin waste is a risk concern. The company ’s trucks , for example, go farm-to - farm for carcass collection. However, to reduce the risk of disease transmission , carcasses are ty pically s ecurely stored in an easily

accessible location near a gate at the periphery o f the farms. This reduces the number of premises the trucks enter . Additionally, the requirement for all registered transport vehicles, including those from other companies, to undergo C/D prior to leaving the processing facility further mitigates the risk of disease transmission . Trucks are washed and disinfected using a virocidal agent by this company’ s personnel, who document the C/D occurred. Further, in the event of a disease suspicion or confirmation, the company has contingency

measures in place. Officials reported that their farm-to - farm movements would be restricted, and that they would increase the strength and concentration of disinfectants, extend disinfectant exposure time on vehicles and equipment, and implement additional biosecurity measures for C/D that restrict drivers from exiting their truck (a separate crew unloads the waste and performs C/D on the transport vehicle). Overall, APHIS concludes that Croatia has processes in place for effective animal origin waste collection and treatment, including b iosecurity measures to prevent disease transmission and spread by way o f animal origin waste collection or treatment . In the event that an animal disease is suspected or an animal disease outbreak occurs, the rendering company participates in contingency measures to mitigate the risk of disease spread, and has a surge capacity to handle the increased volume of heat proce ssing of animal origin waste. Feral Swine, W

ild Boar, and Croatia’s Hunting Grounds Croatia does have feral swine, which can be epidemiologically relevant in CSF transmission and spread. Croatia’s feral swine density p er municipality is shown in Figure 16 (p. 55) . Croatian animal health officials structure veterinary regulations and control measures to minimize the contact between feral and domestic swine, which reduces the likelihood that contagious animal disease would spread from feral to domestic swine populations. Details about Croatia’s current CSF control program and regulatory

approach for feral swine are available in 4. Active Disease Control Programs
. Wild boars are hunted for meat and sport in Croatia on approximately 1,000 State owned, privately- owned, or hunting association- owned hunting grounds . All hunting of wild boar takes place on hunting grounds, as wild boar cannot be harvested from private55

55 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest land. MAFRD’s Directorate of Forestry, Hunting, and Wood Industry (DFHWI) is the competent authority for most aspects of wildlife and hunting, including authority and oversight of State - owned hunting grounds [ 6 ] . Figure 16 : Population Density of Feral Swine in Croatia [ 8 ] .

APHIS Site Visit to a Hunting Ground in Sisak
- Moslavina County To confirm knowledge, awareness, and oversight of feral swine and wild boar issues as they

relate to CSF, and to verify the related elements of Croatia’s CSF control program, APHIS officials visited a hunting ground in Sisak-Moslavina County . This hunting ground is 14,000 unfenced acres that includes a game processing plant. Game management and property management, including oversight of the processing plant, are the responsibility

o f MAFRD’s DFHWI . The site visit team was hosted by the state veterinary

inspectors, AVs , and DFHWIofficials responsible for the facility . This hunting ground has approximately 6 0 - 70 reindeer, 30 fallow deer (bucks), 200 fallow deer (does), and 400 wild boar. Approximately 5 0 hunters enter the grounds per year and harvest approximately 2 00 wild boar, 10 reindeer, 10 fallow deer (bucks), and 50 does per year. The ye arly combined volume of visitors i s approximately 1 00 people, as there is other human traffic onto the hunting ground to manage farming (row crops) and timber production. Hunters must notify

state veterinary

inspectors 48 hours in advance of their hunt. At the conclusion of the hunt, each harvested animal is tagged with a plastic tag (each game ty pe has its own color) containing a unique identification number and the unique ID number for the hunting ground. The animals are field- dressed at the site of kill, the innards are buried, and the hunter or a Forestry official collects blood and tonsils for CSF56

56 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest testing. Every

wild boar killed is sampled; if multiple wild boar are harvested, CSF samples are not pooled. They may, however, be sent to the laboratory as a batch. The carcass is then taken to the processing plant. The carcass is hung, weighed, skinned, and tagged, under a HACCP program, in an outdoor area that is cleaned and disinfected after each use. An AV conducts a post-mortem examination , equivalent to what would be conducted at a s laughterhouse but primarily f ocused on changes to the carcass or meat that would indicate parasites or rot, and samples the carcass for Trichinella . The AV also transports the CSF samples to the CVIin Zagreb for testing (at hunting grounds further away from the CVI, samples are shipped) . The carcass remains at the cutting plant under refrigeration until laboratory results are obtained (usually 2

– 3 days for CSF test results) after which, assuming all tests are negative, it is moved to deep freezer, proces sed, and sold as meat by the DFHWI . The hunter does not take the meat with them at the time of harvest and processing. They c an purchase the meat, but not until negative CSF test results are obtained. Hides are also held until negative CSF test results are obtained, after which they are sent for rendering. If a carcass tests positive for CSF, the carcass is destroyed, MAFRD is notified, and an epidemiological investigation (and other appropriate contingency efforts, if necessary) is launched . Discussio n and Key Risk Issues The key risk issue with feral swine and hunting and harvest of wild boar in Croatia is the potential role that these animals have in CSF transmission and spread, and the risk of spillover of contagious animal diseases from feral to domestic swine. The site visit team observed a high level of veterinary c ontrol and oversight at the State - owned hunting ground. The hunting and harvest of animals is well monitored by species and by

number, as is the placing of carcasses into and out of the processing facility . Carcasses are appropriately segregated based on their disease testing status . The processing facility

was clean and well maintained, and had the layout and resources necessary to adequately conduct all steps in harvesting feral swine and processing and selling meat . The staff seemed competent and knowledgeable of operations, procedures, and legal requirements. There appeared to be close cooperation among DFHWIo fficials , state veterinary

inspectors, and AVs. All documentation was easily accessible, in good order, and demonstrated that harvested feral swine could be traced from tagging to disease testing and results to processing and sale. The site visit team reviewed the following documentation: Trichinella log, animal log, confisc ation/waste log , meat sales log, and the CSF testing log . The CSF testing log included date, ty pe and number of animals, origin/owner, sample ty pe, testing lab, laboratory submission number, and test results. All serological and virological CSF test results were all negative. Overall, APHI S concludes that Croatian officials adequately oversee State - owned hunting grounds and effectively monitor the animal health status of their feral swine . APHI S considers the carcass tagging and testing procedures demonstrated at the State owned grounds capa

ble of detecting CSF should it exist in feral swine subpopulations and capable of preventing disease spread by e ffectively controlling the movement of potentially

infected animal products . Although Croatian officials acknowledged a lack of equivalent oversight at private - owned or hunter association- owned hunting grounds , the same carcass tagging and testing procedures are required there .57

57 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest **9. CSF, FMD, and SVD Surveillance in Croatia**  Disease sur

veillance in Croatia is primarily a f unction of animal owners/keepers and the AVs assigned to their premises. While surveillance planning and oversight come from the VD ’s national level to the field through the VD’s regional offices, it is the AVs who work with swine owners to encourage disease reporting , collect surveillance samples, and transport them to the laboratory . Current CSF Surveillance Strategy and Components The specific objectives of Croatia’s current CSF surveillance program are to detect CSF infection as early as pos sible , to minimize the number of infected farms , to detect illegal vaccination against CSF , and to promote awareness among swine keepers and veterinarians about CSF risks and prevention. The current CSF control program defines a CSF case as “the presence o f the CSF virus as demonstrated directly by virus isolation, the detection of virus antigen or virus nucleic acid, or indirectly b y seroconversion which is not the result of vaccination” [ 49 ] . The current CSF plan includes serological testing, virological testing, and official controls on the implementation of Preventative Biosecurity Measures (PBM) , the latter assessed by

Questionnaire/Response, per the Order on measures to protect animals from infectious and parasitic diseases . Serological testing is primari ly used to detect illegal vaccination of pigs against CSF, and for baseline testing for subclinical disease. Virological testing is used on all herds and premises where clinical s igns associated with CSF are observed, on animals at slaughterhouses that present clinical signs associated with CSF during ante -mortem or post-mortem examination , and on holdings where antibacterial treatment of swine fail s to improve their health status. Virological testing is used to confirm or rule out CSF infection, as bovine viral diarrhea virus and border disease virus antibodies can cross -react with CSF antigen during CSF sero logical testing [ 49 ] . Current CSF Surveillance in Domestic Pigs
- Serological Testing Croatia currently conducts active CSF serosurveillance using baseline random sampling and targeted risk-based sampling . The random sampling plan and the targeted risk-based sampling plan are based on the VD’s risk categorization of swine farms in Croatia. The VD’s risk categorization of swine farms is based on risk factors identified during Croatia’s 2007 - 2008 CSF epidemic s that have been adjusted over time to Croatia’s updated epidemiological circumstances. The risk factors are biosecurity standards on small farms (preventative biosecurity measures, PBM, as stipulated in Order on measures to protect animals from infectious and parasitic diseases, and based on veterinary

check of the holding from 2012) , current movement patterns of pigs, recent occurrence of CSF in wild boar, and recent CSF epidemic s in neighboring countries [ 49 ] . Croatia currently considers the following categories of farms as high-risk for new introduction of CSFv : 1. Commercial farms with > 100 fattening pigs found non- compliant regarding PBMs 2. Farms with > 5 breeding pigs found non- compliant regarding PBM s . 3. Mixed herds with > 10 pigs found non- compliant regarding PBM s . 4. Pigs in V- S , S -M , and Karlovac county located near hunting grounds ; pigs in localities where pasture raising of domestic pigs on pasture is not practiced in accordance58

58 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest with the affiliated regulation (Official Gazette No 135/2011) ; and pigs in localities bordering on the countries in which CSF in domestic pigs have been confirmed in the last three ye ars, and where the CSF status of wild boar is either unfavorable or not sufficiently known [ 49 ] . The 2013 random sampling plan for f arms from categories 1, 2 , and 3 was designed to allow for detection of at least 1 seropositive holding (with 95% confidence, and assuming perfect tests at a herd level) if the prevalence of seropositives is at least 1%. The number of animals to be sampled per holding will allow for detection of: 20% seroconversion with 95% confidence in category 1; and 10% seroconversion, with 95% confidence, in categories 2 and 3. B ased on that design, samples will be taken once annually from holding included in the study as follows: 1. 141 farms, 14 pigs per farm. (Expected samples: 1974) 2. 289 farms, 28 pigs per farm. (Expected samples: 8092) 3. 297 farms, 14 pigs per farm. (Expected samples: 4158 ). Random serological sampling will include approximately 1 3,600 pig holdings and 300,000 animals [ 49 ] . Farms in category

4are not randomly

s ampled. Rather, they are targeted for surveillance based on the previously described risk factors: previous non- compliance with PBMs, current movement patterns of pigs, recent CSF occurrences in wild boar, and recent CSF epidemics in neighboring countries . For category 4 , 15 farms in 60 towns in V- S, S -M and Karlovac County will be selected for sampling. The farms will have 5 - 50 pigs , and an average of 8 pigs (greater than 4 months old) per farm will be sampled twice annually, for a total expected sampling of 14,400 pigs . The number of animals sampled per holding will allow for detection of at least 1 seropositive animal if prevalence of those seropositives is at least 10% (with 95% confidence) [ 49 ] . CSF Surveillance in Domestic Pigs
- Virological Testing Croatia has used virological testing in recent years for CSF confirmation or rule out of CSF suspect cases and to test animals (and occasionally pork or pork products) prior to their movement to other parts of Croatia from V- S, S -M, and Karlovac counties . Updating that strategy, virological testing in 2013 was scheduled for blood and tissue samples taken from pigs (on- farm, presented for import or transit, or at ante - or postmortem inspection) showing clinical signs of CSF , for tissue samples taken from pigs that died or were killed for diagnostic purposes , and for blood samples taken from swine when antibacterial treatment fail s to or only temporarily improve s their health status . All farms in Croatia are eligible for virological testing since Croatian animal health authorities retain legal authority to conduct virological testing on all farms . However, virological testing is used most often to test animals from farms in categories 1, 2 and 3 located in northern Croatia, where Croatia’s commercial pig production is primarily s ituated. This does not include virologically tested animals from farms in category 4, which are located in V- S , S -M and Karlovac county [ 49 ] . Recent CSF Sero logical and Virological Testing R esults in Domestic Pigs Recent CSF serological and virological surveillance results are presented in Tables 2 and 3 (p. 59) .59

59 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest Table 2: Summary

results of Croatia’s CSF surveillance in domesti c pigs from 2007 - 201 1 [ 49 , 50 ] . Number tested, Number positive Year 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Test Test Pos Test Pos Test Pos Test Pos Test Po s Ab -ELISA 105,784 1,719 41,454 229 12,013 23 40,123 91 7,484 -- Ag -ELISA 12,101 603 483 7 253 0 408 0 151 0 Virus isolation 289 154 15 2 0 0 81 0 0 0 RT -PCR 679 162 4 1 2 0 75 0 52 0 Q - RT -PCR 895 280 475 21 196 0 1,181 0 16,670 0 **Total 119,748**  **42,4 31**  **12,464 41,868**  **24,357** Table 3: Croatia’s CSF laboratory activities for 2011 [ 50 ] . Ag ELISA Ab ELI SA VNT * RT PCR Real Time PCR Virus Isolation Total Domestic Swine 151 7,484 182 52 16,670 0 24,539 Wild boar 1 12,885 72 0 10,965 0 23,923 Quarantine 0 256 0 0 0 0 256 ILCT* * 22 22 44 22 22 22 154 Total 174 20,647 298 74 27,657 22 48,872

*Virus neutralization test * * Inter- laboratory comparison tests, organized and administered by EU Reference Laboratories In 2012, there were over 26,000 serological samples tested for antibodies by ELISA. A single test was positive. By the farm categorization that was in place at the time: Category

1 : 658 farms were randomly s elected for CSF serologic testing, with 7,649 pigs tested. All tests were negative. Category 2 : 16,892 pigs from 116 villages and 1,868 farms in high risk areas (predominantly V - S and S -M counties), were tested. 1 sample, from S -M County, was seropositive. Category 3 : CSF serological tests were conducted on pigs from 37 premises where CSF was suspected or needed to be ruled out. The disease was ruled out in all instances. Category 4 : 11,958 pigs, from 583 farms, were tested for CSF prior to the pigs being moved out of V- S, S -M, or Karlovac counties. All tests were negative. The bulk of this testing (427 farms, 8,951 pigs) was conducted in V- S County. (Clinical examination of pigs prior to movement from V- S, S -M, and Karlovac counties is a subset of Category 4 testing. A total of 20,416 pigs from 1321 farms underwent clinical examination prior to movement from V- S, S - M, and Karlovac counties. The bulk of this surveillance -- 1,221 farms, 19,459 pigs -- was also conducted in V- S County .) Also conducted in 2012 were a total of 12,060 virological tests (Q -RT -PCR). There were no positive test results [ 44 ] . These data reflect that Croatia’s CSF surveillance generally aligns with its epidemiological situation. As CSF outbreaks in 2007 and 2008 were detected, controlled60

60 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest and eradicated, the sampling strategy and sampling frequency changed accordingly. From 2007 to 201 1 -- excepting a spike in the number of samples taken and number of seropositives in 2010 -- there was a reduction in the number of CSF samples taken, the number of CSF seropositive samples, and the number of CSF virological positive samples . 2 012 surveillance activities were conducted at a level similar to 2011. The se data demonstrate that CSF was being detected, controlled, and eventually eradicated in domestic swine , and, as a result, Croatia gradually scaled back its CSF surveillance . The data confirms that CSF has not been detected in domestic swine since 2008. Tables 4 and 5 demonstrate the coverage of the surveillance plans for domestic herds and pigs, respectively . Table 4 . CSF sampling: coverage of domestic herds [ 49 ] . Total Herds Herds

under the program Herds

tested P ositive

herds New

positive herds % herds

covered % positive

herds (herd prevalence) % new

positive herds (herd incidence) 2007 105,000 13,074 13,074 128 128 100 0.979 0.979 2008 105,000 4,500 3,117 3 3 69 0.096 0.096 2009 104,000 2,700 1,327 0 - 49 - - 2010 95,000 2,700 1,779 0 - 6 6 - - 2011 95,000 3,850 2,875 0 - 7 5 - - Table 5 . CSF Sampling: coverage of domestic pigs [ 49 ] . Total pigs P igs to be

tested under the program P igs tested P ositive pigs % coverage

at animal level % positive

animals (animal prevalence) 2007 1,600,000 106,815 106,815 1,719 100 1.61 2008 1,550,000 45,000 41,454 229 92 0.55 2009 1,500,000 35,000 12,013 23 34 0.19 2010 1,500,000 35,000 41,518 91 11 9 0.22 2011 1,500,000 35,000 25,562 24 73 0.09 These data confirm the gradual reduction in the number of seropositive herds , the number of seropositive pigs , and the CSF prevalence in Croatia, except for the spike in 2010. Herd- level and animal - level coverage fluctuated from 2007 to 2011 , and overall has dipped slightly . Of note, the herd prevalence of 0 in recent ye ars contrasts to an animal prevalence of > 0. This could be the result of a) test-positive animals coming from holdings that do not qualify as a herd; b) test-positive animals being detected at slaughter and not traced back to a herd; c) the herd prevalence actually reflecting the “program herd prevalence” (in other words, positive animals came from herds not under a particular program); or d) the prevalence could have been factored after an infected herd was depopulated.61

61 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest Conclusions
- CSF Surveillance in Domestic Swine Croatia’s CSF surveillance program for domestic swine is rooted on the CSF epidemic in 2007 - 2008 but has been tailored in recent ye ars to the specific CSF epidemiologic situation at hand . D ata from 2007 to 201 2 confirms that appropriate surveillance program s remained in place , that the surveillance program s were successfully detecting serological positive animals; that virological testing could successfully confirm CSF in swine, and that CSF has not been confirmed in domestic swine in Croatia by

virological testing since 2008. Overall, APHIS considers Croatia’s CSF surveillance programs from 2007

– 201 2, and their planned surveillance for 201 3 , to be appropriate for the epidemiological situation in those years, and a major contributor to Croatia’s success in eradicating CSF. APHIS considers Croatia’s current CSF surveillance plan well developed, well defined, and capable of quickly and accurately detecting CSF in domestic swine should it occur. CSF Surveillance Strategy for Feral Swine Serological and virological surveillance is routinely c onducted in feral swine populations in Croatia using a risk-based approach that targets hunting grounds in Vukovar- Srijem, Sisak- Moslavina, and Karlovac counties . This strategy i s based on the recent history of CSF in Croatia and the current epidemiological situation in these counties, and the fact that CSF infection in feral swine in those counties has not been completely

r uled out [ 51 , 52 ] . Figure 17 depicts this zoned approach to CSF surveillance in feral swine . Figure 17. CSF surveillance strategy in Croatia for 2012 [ 7 ] .

Additionally, and as depicted in Figure 18 (p. 6 2 ) , Croatia plans to conduct in 2013 targeted CSF surveillance in feral swine along the border with Serbia and BiH .62

62 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest Figure 18 . Zoned approach for CSF Surveillance in feral swine for 2013 [ 49 ] .

Recent CSF Surveillance Results for Feral Swine Recent CSF testing results for feral swine are presented in Table 6 (p. 62) . Table 6. CSF Testing in Feral Swine [ 49 ] .

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Tested Pos Tested Pos Tested Pos Tested Pos Tested Pos Ab -ELISA 2,189 13 5,457 118 6,177 64 8,560 75 12,238 23 Ag -ELIS A 1,523 0 398 0 68 0 56 0 - - Q -RT -PCR 60 2 5,278 4 6,964 0 8,797 0 11,965 0 RT -PCR 645 2 265 0 - - - - - - **Total 4,417**  **11,398 13,209**  **17,413 24,203** 

In 2012, 12,862 CSF serological tests (Ab - ELISA) were conducted on samples collected from feral swine. 14 of the tests returned positive results. 7,436 samples were virologically tested using Q -RT -PCR ; none (0 ) were positive. Data was also available for the 2012 - 2013 hunting season, which ran from April 1 2012 to March 31, 2013 (Table 7 , p. 63 ) . During that time, 10,800 wild boar were serologically tested for CSF . 13 of the wild boar were seropositive. All of the 13 seropositive wild boar were from V- S, S -M, and Karlovac counties; 12 of the 13 were from V- S and S -M counties. As expected, these three counties were also where the bulk of the testing took place: 1,198 samples (11% of the total) were taken in V- S County; 3,866 samples (36% of the total) were taken in S -M County; and 1,471 samples (14% of the total) were taken in Karlovac County . All seropos itive wild boar were greater than 6 months old, and 9 of the 13 (70%) were greater than 2 ye ars old [ 44 ] .63

63 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest Table 7. Summary

of CSF serological testing in wild boar for the 2012 - 2013 hunting season (April 1, 2012

– March 31, 2013) [ 44 ] .

As demonstrated by

the data in Table 8 (p. 64) , virological testing found no evidence of the virus in wild boar during the 2012 - 2013 hunting season. Similar to serologic testing, virological testing was focused on V- S, S -M, and Karlovac counties: 6020 of 6663 total samples, or 90%, were taken from those three counties.64

64 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest Table 8. Summary

of CSF virological testing of tonsils, spleen, or kidney samples from wild boar during the 2012 - 2013 hunting season [ 44 ] .

Overall, these data trend opposite the CSF surveillance data for domestic swine. CSF s erologi cal surveillance and virological confirmatory testing in feral swine has generally increased from 2007 to 201 1, and then dropped off in 2012 . T esting levels remain approximately

the same as 2012 for 2013, as the 2013 CSF surveillance plan calls for 12 , 180 Ab - ELI SA serological and 4,650 virological samples to be taken and tested, for a total of 16,830 samples taken and tested . It can be extrapolated from feral swine spatial density

maps and from recent CSF seropositive findings in wild boar (Figure 18 , p. 6 5 ), that Croatia’s feral swine CSF surveillance is being conducted on appropriately targeted animals at or near high risk hunting grounds, or Croatia’s international borders.65

65 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest Figure 18: Spatial density of feral swine sampled in the 2011 and 2 012 hunting season, and distribution of CSF seropositives [ 7 ] .

Discussion and Conclusions
- CSF Surveillance in Feral Swine APHI S concludes that Croatia is actively c onducting CSF surveillance in f eral swine using serological and virological testing. Surveillance data and spatial density maps suggest that targeted, risk-based CSF surveillance in feral swine is being conducted in well - devised zones, at appropriate level s . APHIS notes that, between 20 07 and 2011 , Croatia’s CSF surveillance in feral swine increased. Surveillance activities in 2012 and planned surveillance activities for 2013 have leveled off. This appears appropriate for the given epidemiological conditions in Croatia, and demonstrates the ability o f animal health officials to effectively tailor their surveillance programs . Virological testing did not confirm CSF virus in feral swine for 2012, or through March 31, 2013. Although V- S, S -M, and Karlovac counties have not had CSF confirmed in wild boar since November 2008 (in S -M county), these counties are considered high risk because the presence of virus cannot be ruled out. These counties represent the bulk of s eropositive feral swine, which occur with reasonable frequency and in pigs of expected ages. Therefore, the emphasis of CSF surveillance on these high risk counties seems appropriate. Similarly, as Croatia has eradicated CSF in domestic swine, and contained it in feral swine to the three high risk counties, shifting the f ocus of their CSF surveillance in feral swine to areas of international border with Serbia and BiH also seems appropriate. APHI S recognizes the additional risk mitigation measures that MAFRD has placed on V- S, S -M, or Karlovac counties should CSF be detected in feral swine. Planned surveillance for CSF in feral swine in these counties is immediately supplemented by additional surveillance activities if feral swine test seropositive for CSF, or CSF is suspected for other reasons. A detailed description and analys is o f Croatia’s66

66 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest epidemiological investigation, differential diagnosis, and emergency response framework is available in Section 11: Croatia’s Emergency Response Capability. Overall, APHI S conclude s that Croatia’s CSF surveillance program in feral swine is ca pable of detecting the disease, accurately and early; and that emphasis on detecting CSF in feral swine is appropriate Croatia’s current epidemiological conditions . CSF Surveillance
- Discussion and Conclusions Croatia’s surveillance plan emphasizes early detection of CSF infection , detecting illegal vaccination or clinically inapparent infections , and promoting awareness amongst swine holders and veterinarians . Overall, Croatia’s CSF serosurveillance program appears sufficient. MAFRD officials at the national and regional level and AVs in the field demonstrated an awareness of CSF control program elements, sampling strategies, risk factors for CSF, and the importance of contributing to and maintaining a robust CSF surveillance program. AVs appear to raise awareness with swine owners about CSF . Croatia conducts active surveillance in domestic and feral swine using a combination of baseline random sampling and targeted risk-based sampling . Targeted risk-based surveillance is focused on high risk premises in Croatia’s high risk counties, and on areas in close proximity to Croatia’s international borders. Generally, the estimated prevalence and confidence levels applied to the surveillance plan are reasonable. The number of farms tested appears to meet the goal s of the sampling design. Coverage of Croatia’s farms and swine seems reasonable. Based on the actions taken to eliminate the 2006 - 2008 CSF outbreak, including post- outbreak surveillance, the current CSF surveillance program, and the absence of confirmed cases of CSF in domestic or feral swine since 2008 , APHI S concludes that Croatia is currently free of CSF in domestic swine. However, APHIS further concludes that the presence of CSF in wild boar cannot be fully r uled out, particularly

in the three high risk counties. APHI S considers Croatia’s risk-based sampling strategy for CSF in wild boar likely

to detect and confirm CSF rapidly in wild boar . Active FM

D, SVD, and Rinderpest Surveillance , and Recent Test Results Croatia conducts active surveillance for FMDv and SVDv, but at a much lower level than CSF. In 2011, the Laboratory f or Serologic al Diagnostics of Viral Diseases (part of the CVI) tested 659 bovine serum samples and 279 milk samples for FMD and SVD, respectively. It also tested 186 and 129 bovine and swine blood samples on quarantined animals for FMD and SVD, respectively [ 50 ] . In 2012 the laboratory tested 207 cattle , 5 sheep , 725 domestic swine , and 58 wild boar for FMD , and tested 819 domestic swine and 58 wild boar for SVD , using Ab - ELISA . All test results were negative [ 53 ] . Croatia’s level of surveillance for FMDv and SVDv reflect the current epidemiological conditions , and that SVD has never been reported in Croatia and FMD has not been reported in Croatia since 1978 . Croatia does not actively conduct rinderpest surveillance . This also reflects the current epidemiological conditions, as rinderpest was last reported in Croatia in 1883 , has been eradicated in Europe since 1960 , and was declared globally eradicated in 2011 .67

67 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest An te- and Post
-

Mortem Veterinary Inspection, Ability to Detect Vesicular Disease Croatia conducts ante - and post-mortem veterinary inspection on most animals presented for slaughter . This is an important surveillance tool for CSF, FMD, SVD, and rinderpest, particularly for detecting FMD , as active serolo gic and virologic surveillance for this virus has decreased in recent ye ars. NOTE: Veterinary inspections are also conducted on live animals presented for import or transit at Croatia’s borders , and on live animals prior to domestic movement. Please see 7. Croatia’s Movement Controls and Biosecurity . The requirements and basic procedures for ante - and post-mortem veterinary inspection at slaughter are outlined in the VA . To summarize, most animals for slaughter must undergo ante - and post

— mortem veterinary inspection. There are exceptions to this requirement, including small quantities of animals slaughtered by f amily- owned agricultural businesses to produce traditional meat and dairy products . Also excepted are healthy animals, excluding cattle , slaughtere d for household consumption. C attle slaughtered for household consumption are not excepted, and must be inspected. Products of animal origin may b e sold only if they

meet corresponding food safety standards, and the VA and supporting regulations also cover animal welfare and residues. Any s ick animal, regardless of how it will be marketed or consumed, must undergo veterinary

inspection prior to slaughter. CSF, FMD, SVD, and rinderpest are notifiable disease in Croatia ; under an official control program, AV s or inspectors conducting veterinary

inspection are required to officially report any c linical signs of these diseases. Detection of clinical signs of vesicular disease on ante - or post-mortem slaughter inspection triggers sampl e collection and submission to the laboratory f or diagnostic testing, and confirmation or rule out of disease. Site Visit to a Slaughterhouse To confirm ante - and post-mortem veterinary inspection processes, and to ascertain MAFRD’s ability to detect and accurately diagnose CSF, FMD, and SVD, APHI S officials visited a slaughterhouse. The site visit team was hosted by the slaughterhouse owner, manager, and staff, and the state veterinary inspectors and AVs assigned to the facility. Under a HACCP program , the facility s laughters and processes cattle and sheep , and processes purchase d whole hog halves to chilled products . The facility runs 3 or 4 days per week and slaughters weekly 30 - 35 heifers, 70 calves, and 20 - 30 lambs . Its maximum capacity is 50 cattle per day, which indicates scale -up potential. Seasonally, and for two weeks only, the facility does slaughter piglets . The heifers , lambs, and piglets slaughtered during the Christmas season are all sourced from Croatia ; the calves are imported from Hungary

and Poland. An AV is present at every s laughter, and at every offloading of imported animals to be slaughtered. The facility i s also inspected weekly for official controls for biosecurity, food safety, and HACCP -related compliance, as required by the official control plan that i s established by the regional office, and once annually b y a state veterinary

inspector. Animals for slaughter are offloaded in the back of the slaughterhouse and penned until slaughter (within 1

– 2 days of arrival). The emptied live -haul truck is cleaned and68

68 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest disinfected on the premises, in the presence of an AV, who i ssues a certificate attesting that the vehicle was cleaned and disinfected . When scheduled for slaughter, animals undergo ante -mortem veterinary inspection, which includes confirmation of animal identification and physical examination ; enter the slaughterhouse and are stunned by c aptive bolt; undergo postmortem inspection (including inspection of the head, BSE sampling and removal of specified risk materials for cattle older than 30 months); and are bled, skinned, halved, and processed into chilled products (which are held for cattle older than 30 months until a negative BSE test result is obtained). S laughterhouse waste is cold- stored in special containers until removed by a registered transporter (see analysis below) and taken to Croatia’s waste collection and processing center. The slaughterhouse is then cleaned and disinfected. Discussion of Slaughterhouse and Veterinary Inspection Procedures Overall, the slaughter facility had excellent biosecurity . The property was fenced and gated . Live animals arrive at the rear of the facility, are slaughtered and processed, and chilled processed products are stored and shipped or stored and sold over the counter from the front of the facility . The interior of the slaughterhouse was clean, well maintained, and fully automated, with contracted C/D and pest control procedures as outlined in the HACCP plan. Every surface is bleached, and all equipment is pressure washed and disinfected. The site visit team reviewed slaughterhouse documentation, and was easily able to trace the flow of live animals to carcasses to products. Facility staff and veterinary o fficials seemed competent and knowledgeable of operations, procedures, and legal requirements. Veterinary o fficials demonstrated adequate knowledge of ante - and post-mortem inspection procedures; demonstrated awareness of the clinical signs associated with CSF, FMD, and SVD ; and demonstrated participation in VD - sponsored training and simulation exercises on highly c ontagious diseases, including vesicular diseases. Ante - or post-mortem inspection resulting in suspicion of CSF, FMD, SVD, or other highly contagious animal diseases , would prompt appropriate action to be taken . Live animals on the property are quarantined; the slaughter line is stopped; no animal products can leave the premises; and no employees are permitted to leave or enter the premises. The state veterinary inspector would be notified and report the incident up to the central level of the VD, which would trigger the appropriate of Croatia’s national contingency

p lans for CSF and FMD . Although Croatia does not have a national SVD contingency

p lan, APHIS considers it likely that SVD or rinderpest would be accurately diagnosed or ruled out if vesicular disease is suspected
. Please s ee 11. Croatia’s Emergency Response Capability
. This facility

only slaughters small swine for local and seasonal markets, but does regularly slaughter and process large and small ruminants. Overall, APHI S was confident that animals slaughtered in this or a like facility would be subject to clinical examination and disease testing requirements prior to moving to slaughter, and undergo ante - and post-mortem inspection at the slaughter facility . APHI S concludes that, collectively, these measures would likely detect contagious animal diseases like CSF, FMD, or SVD and trigger an a

ppropriate emergency

response if one of these hazards was suspected or confirmed . This includes quarantine of potentially infected animals or contaminated69

69 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest animal products, which reduces the likelihood of CSFv- , FMDv- , or SVDv- contaminated animals or animal products could be presented for export to the United States. **10. Croatia**  **’s Diagnostic Laboratory Capacity** Croatian Veterinary Institute Animal disease and food safety testing in Croatia, including testing for CSF, FMD, and SVD, is conducted by the Croatian Veterinary Institute (CVI). The CVI consists of the national laboratory f acility in Zagreb and 5 branch laboratories: Veterinary Institute Split, Veterinary Institute Rijeka, Veterinary Institute Križevci, Veterinary Institute Vinkovci, and the Center for Poultry Farming in Zagreb [ 6 , 50 ] . The main activities of the CVIare diagnosis of infectious animal diseases; laboratory

involvement in other matters of veterinary public health; scientific research and activities; and laboratory services to su pport Croatia’s industries (e.g. bacteriology and mycology

testing for slaughterhouses, the food service industry, and small animal practices) [ 6 ] . CVIstaff serve as members of MAFRD’s expert groups and other advisory committees on animal disease s ; play a critical role in educational outreach, conducting workshops covering various disease diagnostic topics, including but not limited to CSF sampling and surveillance ; and participate in international laboratory testing exerc ises and training for CSF, FMD, and SVD [ 6 , 50 ] . The CVI has 246 employees; 46 have PhDs and 10 have MSc. degrees. Currently, the CVIand branch laboratories are ISO/IEC 17025 certi fied for 132 methods . The CVI ’s funding is primarily supplied by MAFRD (65%) and user fees (28%): animal owners pay for diagnostic testing (although the state budget can but does not always cover the cost of certain veterinary

s ervices, including sampling/diagnostic services) [ 6 , 9 ] . A small portion of funds (7%) are supplied by the Ministry of Science, Education and Sports [ 6 ] . CSF Diagnostic Testing The central laboratory

o f the CVI is the National Reference Laboratory f or Diagnostics of CSF in Croatia [ 50 ] , and it is the primary s ite for CSF testing. T esting is conducted per the Ordinance on the diagnostic manual for CSF, which aligns with Commission Decision 2002/106/EC [ 8 ] . The primary s erological test is a commercially available antibody

enzyme linked immunosorbent assay (AB - ELISA) that detects CSF antibodies specific for the E2 CSF viral glycoprotein (gp). The primary virological test is quantitative real time reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction (qrt-RT -PCR). Both methods have been validated and their specificity and sensitivity

i s 98/99% and 100/100%, respectively [ 49 ] . Serol ogic testing (Ab - ELISA) for CSFv is conducted at the central laboratory in Zagreb and regional laboratories in Križevci and Vinkovci; the latter can only test CSF samples taken from domestic swine. Collectively, the CVI labs are accredited for running Ab - ELISA tests, to ISO 17025:2005 standards, and can collectively run a maximum of 1200 samples daily [ 6 ] . The central laboratory c onducts training courses for the branch laboratories for CSF Ab - ELISA [ 50 ] . All virological testing (qrt-RT -PCR) is conducted at the central laboratory in Zagreb. The central laboratory in Zagreb also runs Ag- ELISAs, with a daily maximum70

7 0 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest capacity o f 900 samples [ 6 , 8 , 50 ] , and, in 2011, introduced the virus neutralization test (VNT) for CSFv [ 50 ] . Since 1999 and 2006 the CVI has participated in proficiency testing for serological testing (Ab - ELISA) and virological testing (qrt-RT -PCR), respectively, with the European Community Reference Laboratory for CSF, the Institute of Virology in Hannover, Germany [ 6 ] . FMD and SVD Diagnostic Testing The CVI ’s Laboratory

f or Serological Diagnosis of Viral Diseases is the National Reference Laboratory

f or Diagnostics of FMD and SVD in Croatia. It is the only laboratory

in Croatia that conducts FMD and SVD testing ; no FMD or SVD testing is conducted at the regional laboratories [ 6 ] . Only s erological tests are routinely conducted for FMD and SVD, using PrioCheck’s commercial kits. The testing method for each are accredited to ISO17025:2007 standards , and the laboratory has a maximum daily

c apacity of 210 samples for FMD and 180 samples for SVD [ 6 , 8 , 50 ] . In 2010 the CVI introduced PCR testing for FMD and SVD; in 2011, it introduced RT -PCR testing for FMD [ 6 , 50 ] . Since 2008, the CVIhas participated in proficiency testing with the European Community

Reference Laboratory for FMD and SVD, the Institute for Animal Health in Pirbright, UK [ 6 , 50 ] . Discussion and Risk Factors Related to Croatia’s Laboratory Capabilities APHI S personnel toured the CVI ’s central laboratory in Zagreb , and identified no specific risks . The laboratory was small, but well - stocked with state of the art equipment. Bios ecurity measures , including restricted access to certain areas of the laboratories and pass -throughs at appropriate places, established a clean/dirty line . Detailed operating procedures are in place for testing and associated activities, including contingencies for abnormal circumstances (e.g. procedures for re - sampling in the rare event that improper or unusable samples are received) . The laboratory staff seemed knowledgeable of requirements for sample processing and testing procedures. Laboratory

managers and subject matter experts were very c onfident that CSFv and FMDv serological test results are reported to the VD and to local veterinary a uthorities within 24 hours of sample receipt at the laboratory, and this was was generally c onfirmed in the APHI S review of epidemiological investi gation files . Overall, the risks associated with diagnostic testing and laboratory c apacity is mitigated by the CVI’s ISO standards, good laboratory practices, and appropriate quality control standards. APHIS considers Croatia’s laboratory s ystem capable of quickly and accurately receiving, processing, and completing diagnostic tests on samples received; able to accurately diagnose CSF, FMD, and SVD, and accurately distinguish them from their differential diagnoses; and capable of quickly and efficiently

c ommunicating test results to the VD and back to the field. Although the volume of samples required to be processed during a CSF, FMD, or SVD outbreak would be high, and would likely stress the CVI’s human resources, Croatia’s laboratory s ystem is capable o f handling the volume of samples processed during an emergency response, as demonstrated during the 2007 and 2008 CSF outbreaks.71

71 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest **11. Croati**  **a’s Emergency Response Capability** If any contagious animal disease is suspected in Croatia, including CSF, FMD, SVD, or rinderpest, the animal holder should immediately notif y veterinary

a uthorities, the facility

i s placed under quarantine, and an epidemiologic investigation is initiated . The European Commission and the OIE are alerted if the suspected disease has mandatory

international notifi cation requirements [ 9 ] . Further Surveillance Events Triggered by CSF Disease Suspicion Immediately

u pon notification of suspected disease , an AV conducts a clinical examination of the suspected pigs( s ) and any other sick or recovering animals ; any p ig s introduced to the holding f rom areas where CSF was confirmed, or from areas of suspect or unknown CSF status ; any pigs kept in other production units that were visited by persons who had contact with the CSF - suspect pigs; and any pigs with previous serological results that might be indicative of CSF. The AV re cords all examination results, and share s a written report with the state veterinary inspector. Any p igs found dead and suspected to have CSF , or euthanized due to suspicion of the disease, are sampled for CSF, as are other pigs on the same premises. The veterinarian samples and submits for diagnostic testing at the CVIat a minimum the tonsils, spleen, or kidneys from u p to 5 pigs on the farm. These samples are tested for viral antigen in accordance with the CSF diagnostic manual. If the tissue samples test negative for CSF, the AV is required to take blood samples from 6 to 10 sick pigs for virological testing, including CSF virus isolation. If the problem persists - i.e. sick pigs do not improve within 5 days when administered antibiotics, or their improvement is only temporary- the AV again submits 6 to 10 blood samples from sick pigs for antigenELISA testing, and, i f possible, submits tissue samples for virus isolation [ 54 ] . Epidemiologic Investigations Epidemiologic investigations are conducted for vesicular dis ease s. The details for an epidemiological investigation and confirmation/rule out of CSF, FMD and SVD are outlined in the respective Croatian Ordinance (s) for each disease [ 8 ] . If CSF , FMD, SVD or other infectious disease is suspected, veterinary a uthorities are notified, the premises is quarantined, and samples are taken and submitted for diagnostic testing [ 9 ] . An epidemiological investigation is conducted using a standardized questionnaire, prepared within the framework of the contingency p lans, to ascertain and analyz e the following general information: length of time the virus may have existed on the holding prior to disease suspicion/notification; possible origin of the disease, and the identification of other holdings in which animals may have become infected or contaminated; any movement of people, vehicles, animals, carcasses, semen, meat or any other materials which could have transported virus to or from any the holdings in question; and additional information on the farm, including size, location, proximity to other farms, number/category o f animals, husbandry

practices, description/prevalence of clinical signs of disease, and date signs were observed [ 8 ] . Disease Confirmation When a disease has been confirmed, control measures are implemented, including but not limited to : quarantine/isolation of animals; suspension of the marketing of72

72 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest suspected animals and their products; suspension of livestock markets, fairs, livestock sporting events, other exhibitions, and trade; restrictions on movement of people and fomites; emergency vaccination; and other measures not stipulated in the VA but deemed necessary to prevent disease spread . If the scale of the disease outbreak warrants, Croatia’s Ministry

o f Defense is alerted, and Armed Forces can be activated. If the disease is zoonotic, the competent authority for human health services is also notified [ 9 ] . Contingency Plans for CSF and FMD Should an emergency

response for CSF or FMD be necessary, it is legally established by

the VA and conducted under the framework Croatia ’s contingency p lans (CP) for CSF and FMD. The CSF CP, aligned with Council Directive 2001/89/EC, was last revised February

2010; the FMD CP, aligned with EC Council Directive 2003/85/EC, was last revised November 2009 [ 8 ] . The CSF and FMD contingency p lans conform closely

to the provisions of EC requirements and clearly outline emergency response chain of command, including formation of the National Disease Control Center (NDCC ) , Lo cal Disease Control Center (LDCC ) , and affiliated expert groups. The plans provide, in detail, the list of tasks and duties for veterinarians, including stamping out procedures (depopulation and disposal), indemnity

f or livestock depopulation and equipment or resources destro ye d , surveillance schemes and sampling methods, appropriate laboratory diagnostic testing, biosecurity measures, proper establishing and maintenance of protection and surveillance zones (3 and 10km, respectively) , emergency vaccination procedures, and cleaning and disinfection procedures. The contingency p lans also contain templates of notices to the pub lic, and forms to be used when the plan is in effect. Croatia does not have a specific contingency p lan for SVD. However, SVD has never been reported in Croatia, and should vesicular lesions be detecte d it is likely that Croatia’s CSF or FMD contingency plan woul d be triggered. Croatia’s contingency plans for CSF and FMD are thorough , and the CSF contingency p lan has been demonstrated to be effective, so it very

likely that f ollowing either the CSF or the FMD contingency p lan would lead to accurate SVD di agnosis or ruleout . It is likely that Croatia would then implement specific contingencies and an overall emergency response against SVD . Croatia’s Emergency Response Frameworkfor Animal Diseases Croatia’s animal disease emergency response framework i s consistent with and transposes the EU- accepted emergency response framework found in other MS. It is a structure in which emergency response oversight cascades from the National level out to the field, and emergency response implementation and information flow in reverse from the field back to the National level . The framework utilizes disease control centers at the national and local level , expert groups, authorized veterinarians, and the laboratory system. Adiagram of Croatia’s emergency response framework is provided in Figure 19 (p. 73) . Funds to support this emergency response framework are secured in the state budget [ 9 ] .73

73 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest Figure 1 9 : Croatia’s Emergency Response Framework [ 5 ] .

In the case of a rapidly spreading infectious disease or a large scale outbreak, MAFRD can request intervention by local police/law enforcement and/or the Ministry o f Defense/Croatia’s Armed Forces to restrict the movement of people/animals within a region (including national borders) ; prevent trade and marketing of animals ; and to assist in implementing other control/eradication measures [ 9 ] . Protection and Surveillance Zones The EU- accepted emergency response framework, which Croatia implements, is predicated on establishing and maintaining a 3km -radius infected (protection) zone and a 10km-radius endangered ( surveillance) zone. To summarize, upon confirmation of a contagious animal disease outbreak, an infected and endangered zone must be established and applicable measures instituted within each zone. Measures in the infected zone may include daily

c linical exam of susceptible species; sampling for laboratory testing; closed stabling or other confinement of animals; no movement of animals out of the infected zone, and movement restrictions of f eed and bedding; disinfection stations for vehicle traffic; prohibition of assembly c enters, fairs, markets, exhibitions; slaughter of feral animals, and indoor housing of pets; mandatory c leaning and disinfection at slaughterhouses; rendering of slaughter by-products; restrictions on hunting, fishing, and other outdoor recreation; and prohibition of breeding practices, including natural mating, artificial insemination (AI), and embryo transfer. In the endangered zone, control MAFRD (Minister) Veterinary

Directorate (CVO)

AVO s Local Crisis Subunit Croatian Veterinary Institute National Crisis Center Expert Group

Local Crisis Center

(Local Veterinary

Offices)74

74 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest

measures may

include clinical exam of susceptible species every 3 days (up to 9 days); movement restrictions for live animals, excluding animals sent straight to slaughter; restrictions on movement of animal products, including raw materials, waste, and feed; prohibition of assembly centers, markets, fairs, or exhibitions; and restrictions on hunting, fishing, and other outdoor activities . The zoned approach outlined above satisf ies internationally

accepted practices for emergency

response. The principles above are outlined in Croatia’s VA, its CSF and FMD contingency

p lans, and affiliated legislation [ 9 , 55 ] . These measures, if followed, should be effective at minimizing the spread of highly contagious animal diseases. APHI S considers it likely that central - and field- level MAFRD personnel, AVs, and private veterinary

practitioners and animal handlers (particularly those affiliated with intensive industries) are familiar with provisions of the emergency response framework and affiliated contingency plans and can effectively implement control measures . Depopulation, Indemnity, Cleaning, Disinfection, Repopulation The VA and the CSF (and FMD) contingency p lans authorize Croatian animal health officials to depopulate and indemnify animals during an outbreak scenario [ 9 , 54 , 55 ] . Details on stamping- out procedures

—from depopulation to carcass disposal to indemnification

—are provided in those respective documents. APHI S reviewed those documents and overall found Croatia’s framework and processes associated with an animal health emergency response , and their legal authority to implement them, satisfactory relative to internationally accepted practices. The contagious animal disease is considered eradicated when, after slaughter or death of the last infected animal and cleaning and disinfection of the premises, the maximum incubation period for the disease agent has elapsed [ 9 ] . To repopulate a farm post- outbreak and cleaning/disinfection, sentinel animals can be placed. If so, they are randomly s ampled (blood) for serological testing sufficient to detect 10% seroprevalence with 95% confidence in each sub -unit/house on the repopulated holding. Croatian regulations also allow for the farm to be fully restocked, in which case animals must be randomly s ampled for serological serological testing sufficient to detect 20% seroprevalence with 95% confidence in each sub -unit/house on the repopulated holding . In both of these repopulation scenarios, the competent veterinary inspector is responsible for monitoring animals for clinical signs of disease, and if observed, sampling the animals for relevant disease(s) [ 9 , 54 , 55 ] . The VA authorizes the emergency depopulation of infected or suspected animals as necessary

to prevent disease spread, including situations where other control measures are not economically feasible. F or animals killed, slaughtered, or otherwise dead due to control measures, and for any objects damaged or destro ye d by c ontrol measures, the animal holder or owner is entitled to compensation in the amount of the market value on the day that the control measure(s) was implemented. A ssessments to determine market value are carried out by

a c ommission appointed by the VD. Indemnity

decisions must be made within 60 days, and indemnity p ayouts made within 90 days, of implementing the control measure(s) [ 9 ] . Croatian animal owners or holders forfeit their right to indemnity i f they fail to immediately

report disease; did not treat the animal(s) as stipulated; failed to implement control measure(s); transferred the animal from an uninfected area to an infected or75

75 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest endangered zone or vice versa; traded the animal, if the animal disease occurred during import or during a post- entry quarantine period; or if they hav e violated grazing restrictions [ 9 ] . Simulation Exercises and Training Scenarios Croatia has on multiple occasions tested its emergency response capabilities via simulation exercises , with multiple s imulation exercises specific for CSF and at least one simulation exercise specific for FMD . Generally, the simulation exercises have a target audience of official veterinarians, veterinary inspectors, veterinary

epidemiologists, and representatives of prod

ucer groups. The overall goal of the CSF exercises was to increase awareness and knowledge of risks from CSF in wild boar. Training topics included the CSF situation in wild boar in Eastern Europe overall, and in Croatia; Croatia’s CSF surveillance program for wild boar; proper sampling of harvested wild boar, and submission of samples to the laboratory; methods to reduce the lag time between CSF suspici on and official notification/subsequent implementation of control measures ; and ways to reduce CSFv transmission and spread, including biosecurity measures . The second day o f each workshop simulated an outbreak of CSF in wild boar, with specific topics including measures to assess the CSF situation in an affected hunting ground; measures to prevent the spread of CSF out of the hunting ground; measures to prevent introduction of CSF virus into domestic swine; and movement control measures to be implemented on proximate swine farms [ 8 ] . The FMD simulation exercise focused on reviewing and assess ing the FMD Contingency

P lan and Operations Manual, and increas ing stakeholder awareness and knowledge . Tabletop exercises regarding primary and secondary outbreak mitigation measures were conducted, and training was provided on risk analys is and trade [ 8 ] . Site Visits to Evaluate Epidemiological Investig ation Procedures APHI S evaluated the effectiveness of Croatia’s epidemiological investigation procedures on the site visit through review of epidemiologic investigation records conducted at a branch veterinary o ffice in an area previously impacted by

C SF, and at an AVO. Records at the VD branch office clearly demonstrated that the actions taken in epidemiologic investigations conducted by this office were reasonable , followed a logical progression, and were well - documented. The actions and timeframes ty pically consisted of a Day 1 f irst visit, with sample collection and necessary movement restrictions imposed; a Day

2return visit, with additional sampling as necessary and test results as available; a Day

3 visit, if necessary, for culling, depopulation, and more sampling; and a Day 5 visit, incorporating test results to determine next step (s) . Record reviews at an AVO (see below) supported the same general conclusion: that epidemiological investigations to rule out CSF were conducted in a timely and accurate manner [ 6 ] . Discussion of C

roatia’s Emergency Response Capacity APHI S has identified no key risk issues or specific concerns related to Croatia’s emergency

response capacity . The emergency response framework is consistent with internationally

accepted standards for emergency response, and transposes the EUaccepted emergency

response framework found in other MS. APHI S considers this76

76 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest emergency

response framework sufficient for small - scale outbreaks and capable of being ramped-up to deal with outbreaks on a national scale. There is clear evidence from the 2007/2008 CSF outbreaks that Croatia can respond to, control, and eradicate a highly contagious swine disease from its domestic herd. APHI S is confident that MAFRD and its partners in Croatia’s emergency response infrastructure have the capability to ensure appropriate response measures are taken to control and eradicate highly c ontagious animal diseases when they occur . **Entry Assessment Conclusions** APHI S evaluated the C SF, FMD, SVD, and rinderpest status of Croatia based on the version of 9 CFR 92.2 that was in place when Croatia requested these animal health status evaluations . APHIS concludes that: 1. Croatia has sufficient legal authority to and a veterinary infrastructure capable of providing efficient veterinary s ervices, including surveillance, control, and, if necessary, eradic ation programs for CSF, FMD, SVD , and rinderpest . a. The central competent authority f or animal health in Croatia, the Veterinary

D irectorate, retains national legal authority over veterinary services and effectively

administers field veterinary services via a regional staff , authorized veterinary

organizations , and official control bodies . b. Croatia’s CSF, FMD, SVD, and rinderpest strategies and corresponding legal and technical framework are aligned with international standards and EU- level animal health measures. c. Animal health strategies and directives, including CSF - , FMD - , and SVD specific information, are outlined in the Veterinary Act and secondary legislation, and are communicated well from the central level of the VD to Croatia’s network of animal health partners, including but not limited to the Croatian Agricultural Agency, the Croatian Veterinary Institute, other State institutions, private veterinarians, livestock producers, and affiliated industries. d. Veterinary

s ervices in the field are primarily conducted by a uthorized veterinarians or official control bodies. 2. The last reported case of CSF in domestic swine in Croatia was confirmed in M arch 2008. While there are intermittent CSF serological incidents in Croatia’s feral swine and wild boars, there has been no recent virological confirmation of CSF. Croatia last reported FMD in 1978; has never reported SVD; and last reported rinderpest in 1883. a. CSF in wild boar is the central risk issue related to Croatia’s current disease status, as the presence of CSFv in feral swine cannot be completely

ruled out. b. Croatia has in place a number of measures in place to mitigate this risk . ( See 4. Active Disease Control Programs , and other sections ) 3. Croatia is bordered by EU Member States Hungary and Slovenia, by Serbia, by Bosnia and Herzegovina, and shares a very short border with Montenegro . These are77

77 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest countries which APHIS has not evaluated for CSF, which vaccinate against CSF, or which report CSF in wild boar. Croatia is bounded on the west by the Adriatic Sea. a. Croatia’s physical boundaries do not significantly mitigate the likelihood of disease incursions from adjacent regions of risk. b. A potential pathway for CSFv, FMDv, and SVDv introduction into Croatia is incoming passenger traffic and individuals unknowingly or intentionally

transporting contaminated animal products. i. This pathway

includes daily

domestic and international travelers using Croati a’s ferry

s ystem. ii. This pathway

a pplies to rinderpest, but at a much lower likelihood given the global eradication of that disease. c. The primary

risk mitigations for disease introduction into Croatia via this pathway are the interdictions of the Border Veterinary Inspection and International Trade Service and Customs personnel ( See 7. Croatia’s Movement Controls and Biosecurit y), who appear to capably monitor Croatia’s land and sea borders against disease introduction. 4. Croatia’s current disease control pro grams , particularly the control program for CSF , are appropriately designed and implemented to prevent, control, or eradicate the hazards of concern for this evaluation. a. Croatia actively surveys for CSFv in domestic and feral swine using baseline random sampling and risk-based sampling. i. Previous CSF control programs were appropriate for Croatia’s CSF status at the time. ii. There are three Croatian counties considered high risk for CSF, in which Croatia implements higher CSF control program standards. b. Croatia actively surveys for FMDv and SVDv . i. The level of surveillance for FMDv and SVDv are appropriate given Croatia’s current and historical status, and the current risk factors, for these two viruses. c. Croatia does not conduct active surveillance for RPv. This is appropriate, given that rinderpest last occurred in Croati a in 1883, and the global eradication of the disease. d. Croatia passively surveys for contagious animal diseases through veterinary

inspection at import, slaughter, livestock markets, and other points of commingle . i. This surveillance stream would detect rinderpest virus. e. Croatia implements appropriate epidemiological investigations when disease is suspected. 5. Vaccination against CSFv, FMDv, SVDv, or RPv is prohibited, except for emergency purpo ses. a. When vaccination is authorized for emergency purposes, Croatia’s emergency

response framework contains proper guidelines for control and disposal of unused vaccine doses.78

78 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest 6. Croatia’s physical boundaries do not provide a substantial natural barrier. A potential pathway o f entry f or animal disease into Croatia is therefore the natural movement of feral animals from adjacent areas of risk. a. While this pathway include s natural migration of domestic animals in areas where there is shared pasture with neighboring countries, the primary risk consideration is natural movements of feral swine , which could be infected with CSF. b. Mitigations include targeted surveillance in feral swine along international borders with countries that have CSF in their feral swine, or have an undetermined CSF status, particularly in areas of high feral swine density, and cross -border collaboration between animal health authorities in Croatia and neighboring countries. 7. Croatia’s physical boundaries do not provide a substantial natural barrier, nor do they significantly mitigate the likelihood of disease incursions from adjacent regions of risk. The primary

risk mitigation for disease introduction into Croatia is therefore the interdictions of the Border Veterinary Inspection and International Trade Service and Customs personnel. a. Croatia is a net importer of swine and cattle and sheep and goats , and imports certain animal products. b. An entry

p athway o f commercial import or transit of live animals or animal products therefore exists. c. Croatia’s import policies , aligned with EU- level trade requirements, are appropriately restrictive . i. Also mitigating risk of disease incursion into Croatia are the export requirements in the country o f origin, including testing requirements for contagi ous animal diseases, pre - export quarantine, and health certificate endorsement . d. BVIITS and Customs international border interdiction efforts and biosecurity

measures are sufficient to mitigate the risk of CSFv, FMDv, SVDv, and RPv entry into Croatia via the pathway o f commercial consignments of live animals or animal products. e. Additionally, Croatia has stringent internal movement restrictions for domestic animals, including the requirements for animal identification, movement documents, etc. , with the le gal authority to implement an emergency

response framework to control and eradicate disease incursions, should they

occur. 8. F attening hogs , from which the animal products most likely to be exported to the United States would most likely originate , would most likely be sourced from commercial breeding farms and finished, slaughtered, and processed in Croatia’s high intensity, vertically

integrated agricultural sector. a. An APHI S team visited 2 swine farms (1 fattening farm, 1 breeding farm) in Croatia’s high intensity, vertically integrated swine production sector. i. APHI S confirmed a very high level of biosecurity, husbandry, oversight, and record-keeping of production parameters, including79

79 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest specific information for the hazards under evaluation and general indicators of animal health. ii. APHI S considers it unlikely that CSF, SVD, or FMD would enter the commercial swine sector, and likely that if one of these diseases did enter, it would be quickly detected, contained, and eradicated. b. APHI S visited 1 family- operated breeding farm . The farm is predominantly

a f arrow -to -wean operation, supplying small batches of small pigs to local buyers for fattening . The farm demonstrated satisfactory

biosecurity . c. APHI S visited a livestock market, which demonstrated minimal biosecurity

standards. The livestock market is predominantly a marketing avenue for local livestock trade . d. APHI S did not visit a backyard swine holding, given the variability between farms with only 1 or 2 pigs. APHIS considers these farms likely to be terminal points, as single pigs raised on a personal farm are most often slaughtered for personal consumption. i. Croatia does have feral swine, and APHIS considers transmission of CSFv to domestic backyard swine from feral swine a potential disease pathway . 1. Mitigations include minimum biosecurity standards for and targeted CSF surveillance of swine holdings in close proximity to hunting grounds or feral swine in Croatia’s three high risk counties. e. Croatia’s animal identification system and movement controls facilitate trace - forward and trace -back in the event of a disease outbreak. i. Compliance is high in the commercial swine industry, and on semi - intensive farms. ii. Swine operations with less than two pigs are exempt from animal identification requirements. 9. Active disease surveillance for CSFv, FMDv, and SVDv are conducted at appropriate levels in Croatia . Active disease surveillance for RPv is not conducted. a. Croatia’s current CSF surveillance strategy evolved from historical program elements and aims to detect CSFv as early as possible; to detect illegal vaccination against CSF; and to maintain CSF awareness by swine owners, keepers, and veterinarians. b. Croatia actively conducts baseline random sampling and targeted, riskbased sampling for CSFv in domestic swine . c. Croatian animal health officials consider as high risk, and target surveillance accordingly, any c ommercial farm with 100 or more fattening pigs or breeding farm with 5 or more pigs or mixed herd with 10 or more pigs that has previous reported biosecurity noncompliances; and farms in Vukovar- Srjiem, Sisak- Moslavina, or Karlovac county located near hunting grounds or other areas of higher risk for CSF.80

80 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest d. Croatia actively

s amples feral swine for CSFv, including hunter harvested and road-kill ed wi ld boar. i. This includes a risk-based sampling zone on border areas with countries that have reported CSFv in feral swine. e. Croatia conducts active surveillance for FMDv and SVDv at an appropriate level given the past and current epidemiological conditions for these hazards . f. Passive surveillance for vesicular disease s, including CSF, FMD, and SVD , occurs via ante - and post-mortem veterinary inspection at slaughter. i. An APHI S team visited a slaughterhouse; ante - and post-mortem inspection procedures appear cap able of detecting vesicular disease in large and small ruminants and swine presented for slaughter. g. Serological detection of any of the identified hazards triggers appropriate additional testing and epidemiological investigations . 10. Sampling, testing, and diagnostic laboratory procedures for CSFv, FMDv, and SVDv, are conducted in accord with international guidelines, and Croatia’s laboratory system appears capable of detecting and confirming cases of CSF, FMD, or SVD. a. An APHI S team visited Croatia’s nati onal laboratory (CVI) and confirmed that samples are properly received, processed, stored, and tested, and that results are reported to the VD and back to the field in a timely manner. b. Croatia’s laboratories collaborate internally and with international reference laboratories for the hazards of concern. 11. Should an outbreak of CSF, FMD, SVD, or rinderpest occur, Croatia can implement effective disease control and eradication measures. a. Croatia has in place thorough contingency plans for CSF and FMD . b. Cro atia does not have in place a contingency plan for SVD. i. Ante - and post-mortem inspection would trigger an epidemiological investigation if vesicular disease was observed, which would activate the CSF and/or FMD contingency p lans, either or both of which would lead to epidemiologic investigations capable of identifying SVD and implementing appropriate control and eradication measures. c. Epidemiological investigations procedures are thorough , reasonable, follow a logical progression, and are well - documented . d. Croatia’s emergency response framework meets EU- level criteria, and includes effective communication and information flow from central - level VD staff to regional VD officials and AVs in the field. i. This includes transparent and effective communication with the OIE and trading partners.81

81 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest **Pathway Analysi s**  **- Natural Movement of Feral Swine**  **or other Wildlife into Croatia**  A potential pathway

f or CSFv introduction, and to a lesser extent SVDv introduction, into Croatia is the migration of infected feral swine or other wildlife from neighboring countries. Feral swine of unknown CSF status or CSF - infected status exist in neighboring regions, and natural barriers do not fully prevent movement of CSF susceptible or CSF - infected feral swine into Croatia . Figure 20 . P athway

for disease introduction via migration of wildlife (feral swine) .

AP HI S considers the risk of introducing CSFv into Croatia ’s domestic swine herd via migration of feral swine to be low . The risk is primarily mitigated by EC and Croatian control measures for CSFv in feral swine . Additional mitigations , particularly for Croatia’s intensive swine farms such as breeding farms, semen collection centers, are swine management and biosecurity practices that, if effectively implemented, prevent direct or indirect contact of Croatia’s domestic swine with feral swine. Croatia’s current surveillance programs for domestic swine and feral swine appear capable of detecting C SFv , and its emergency response programs capable of eradicating it, should CSF occur . Overall, these mitigations substantially reduce the risk that CSFv , and to a lesser extent SVDv, would be introduced into domestic swine in Croatia and into the United States via a subsequent export event. **Pathway Analysis**  **- Incoming**  **Vehicle or**  **Passenger Traffic**  **and A** **nimal Products**  **for Personal Consumption**  A potential pathway

f or CSFv introduction, and to a lesser extent FMDv, SVDv, and RPv introduction, into Croatia is by way o f incoming non- commercial vehicular or passenger traffic, including legally or illegally imported animal products for personal consumpti on. Virus could be introduced directly to susceptible animals in Croatia by undetected contaminated animal products that are carried from affected regions for personal consumption , or by infective virus on vehicles or clothing, or indirectly introduced to susceptible animals in Croatia if contaminated animal products are fed as waste to swine. Infected feral swine in so urce country Susceptible animal in Croatia Susceptible domestic swine in Croatia82

82 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest Figure 2 1 . Pathway

for disease introduction via (non- commercial) vehicular and passenger traffic , including animal products for personal consumption.

Incoming vehicular or human traffic

Susceptible wild animal population Infective virus on vehicles or clothing

Infective virus in meat or meat products for personal consumption Infective virus in waste products Susceptible domestic livestock population The risk of CSFv , FMDv , or SVDv being directly introduced to susceptible animals via infective virus on incoming (non- commercial) vehicles or clothing is low . However, meat or meat products carried into Croatia by human traffic for personal consumption present a relatively higher likelihood of introducing CSFv , SVDv , or FMDv into Croatia, as such products may b e unknowingly conveyed into the country and simply

missed during Customs inspections at border crossings 3 and CSFv, FMDv, and SVDv can survive in meat or meat products. CSFv is readily inactivated by c ooking, but it can survive months in refrigerated meat and ye ars in frozen meat, and survive in meat during salt curing and smoking for 17 to >180 days, depending on the process used [ 56 ] . SVDv and FMDv are preserved by refrigeration and freezing [ 57 , 58 ] ; SVDv is resistant to fermentation and smoking processes , and may remain in hams for 180 days, dried sausages for over a ye ar and in processed intestinal casings for over two years [ 57 ] . FMDv is progre ssively inactivated by temperatures above 50°C , and heating animal products to a minimum core temperature of 70°C for at least 30 minutes will inactivate the virus [ 58 ] . Although EC legislation allows individuals to carry personal consignments of products that could transmit CSFv , SVDv , or FMDv from potentially affected countries, the risk of disease introduction into Croatia via this pathway is mitigated by e ffectivel y implementing EU- level and Croatian national policies regarding commodities for personal consumption from those regions, and the interdiction efforts of BVIITS and Customs, including inspection, confiscation, and disposal practices at the point of entry . CSFv- , FMDv- , or SVDv- infected undetected agricultural commodities for personal consumption could result in indirect exposure of susceptible feral swine or domestic swine populations to infective virus via illegal waste feeding. Noncompliance with the waste - feeding ban and exposure of domestic swine to infected wild boar are most likely

to occur on small swine holdings, which may not have effective biosecurity measures to prevent disease exposure, nor rapid disease detection methodologies.

3 Infected meat or meat products may also be intentionally smuggled into Croatia. Please reference the Entry Assessment for assumptions and discussion regarding intentionally smuggled goods.83

83 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest However, these farms are less likely to contribute animals or animal products into the export chain . The risk of CSFv, FMDv, or SVDv transmission to Croatia’s commercial herd, and to the United States via a subsequent export event, is low. **Pathway Analysis**  **- Import**  **or Transit**  **of Commercial**  **Shipments of**  **Infected Live**  **Animals or Contaminated Animal Products** A potential pathway

f or CSFv, FMDv, or SVDv introduction, and to a lesser extent RPv introduction, is by way o f undetected infected commercial shipments of live ruminants or swine, or contaminated swine or bovine commercial products such as fresh meat, meat products, semen, embryos, or ova . Figure 2 2 . P athways for disease introduction via commercial imports of live animals or animal products .

The likelihood of entry of CSFv, FMDv, SVDv, or RPV into Croatia via commercial shipments of live animals, commercial shipments of animal products, and genetic material is mitigated by effectively implementing EU- level and Croatian national border protection measures and import and transit practices , including but not limited to strict enforcement of disease reporting requirements in the country o f origin; proper veterinary

c ontrols in the country o f origin, including diagnostic testing, pre - export veterinary

inspection and quarantine, and corresponding export permit and health certificate ; and Croatia’s effective border veterinary inspection of imported or transiting live animals or animal products . In the event that infected undetected commercial shipments of meat and meat products do enter the country, the likelihood of indirect exposure of feral or domestic swine in Croatia to the identified hazards via illegally f ed waste is mitigated by

Croatia’s waste feeding ban and the concentrated effort of Croatia’ s swine health programs .84

84 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest Although noncompliance with the waste - feeding ban is most likely to occur on small swine holdings, these farms are less likely to contribute animals or animal products into the export chain. The overall likelihood of illegal entry o f undetected infected commercial shipments of live ruminants or swine, or contaminated swine or bovine commercial products such as fresh meat, meat products, semen, embryos, or ova ; followed by disease transmission to Croatia’s domestic swine ; and then a subsequent export event to the United States is low. **E xposure Assessment**  An exposure assessment, as defined by the OIE, describes the biological pathway(s) necessary

f or exposure of animals and humans in an importing country to the hazards released from a given risk source, and estimates the probability o f the exposure(s) occurring [ 4 ] . This exposure assessment focus es on exposure pathways associated with the introduction of the identified hazards to domestic and feral swine in the United States , and APHI S mitigations against foreign animal disease incursions into the United States . Waste feeding A likely exposure pathway o f domestic livestock to CSFv and SVDv is the fee ding of contaminated food waste

—specifically p ork or pork products -- to swine . APHI S analyzed this exposure pathway in 1995 and estimated the likelihood of exposing swine to infected waste via exposure associated with legal imports [ 59 ] . With 95% confidence, APHIS estimated that < 0.023% of plate and manufacturing waste would be inadequately processed prior to feeding to swine. Based on this fraction, less than 1 part in 4,300 (reciprocal of 0.023%) of imported meat is likely to be fed to swine as inadequately co oked waste. APHI S also conducted a survey in 2001 of the U.S. swine waste - feeding sector and estimated that the proportion of plate and manufacturing waste fed to swine diminished by

a bout 50% between 1994 and 2001 due to a significant decrease in the number of waste - feeding premises [ 60 ] . The 2001 study also found that the number of waste - feeding premises in the continental United States decreased by 4 0.5% from 1994 - 2001, and in Hawaii and Puerto Ri co decreased by 3 7.5% and 52.3%, respectively; and that institutions and restaurants provide nearly 9 0% of all plate waste fed to swine. Currently, 22 U.S. States prohibit or regulate the feeding of food waste to swine [ 61 ] . Waste - feeder operations must be licensed and regularly inspected by U .S. Department of Agriculture inspectors ( 9 CFR 166 ). The licensing process requires that producers adequately cook the waste fed to swine using methods designed to destroy f oreign animal disease agents. APHIS considers waste feeding restrictions or regulations on the feeding of plate waste to swine to reduce the likelihood that unprocessed waste is fed to swine. Based on estimate that a very small proportion of food waste is inadequately processed prior to feeding to swine, and the substantial red uction in waste - feeding operations in recent years, APHI S concludes that the likelihood of exposure of susceptible swine to CSF or SVD viruses through inadequately processed food waste is low. Given the low likelihood that infected undetected meat or meat products would be imported or conveyed into the US from Croatia, APHI S can further conclude that the85

85 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest probability

of exposure of susceptible swine to these viruses through inadequately cooked infected meat or meat products imported or conveyed into the US f rom Croatia and then fed as waste to US swine is very low. Imported live animals The likelihood of exposure of susceptible species to infected live swine was evaluated by

reviewing virus persistence and shedding in live swine, as well as U.S. import requirements for this species . The incubation period for CSFv in live swine is 2 - 14 days; virulence of disease and corresponding clinical sy mptoms are related to strain of virus isolate, age of pig and immune status of herd. The virus is highly contagious , and congenitally

infected piglets may

shed the virus for 6 - 12 months before dying [ 56 ] . FMDv has a wide host range, including swine, and is highly c ontagious and transmitted by various modes. However, it usually elicits overt clinical sy mptoms in swine, particularly in young animals, including p yrexia, severe foot lesions and lameness , ve sicular lesions on the snout and limbs , and high mortality in piglets [ 58 ] . For SVDv, most virus is produced in the first 7 days after infection ; virus excretion from the nose and mouth normally

stop s within 2 weeks , and shedding in the feces stops at around 3 months [ 57 ] . However, SVDv also causes subclinical disease, so SVDv may remain undetected without diagnostic testing prior to export. Per the OIE, movement of subclinically

infected animals is the most common means of transferring the disease [ 57 ] . Consequently, APHIS considers this a potential pathway f or disease introduction into the United States . This risk is partially

mitigated by interlocking safeguards in the current U.S. regulati ons , if effectively implemented. Subpart E (“Swine”) of 9 CFR 93 establishes a number of regulatory

requirements for importing live swine4

. These mitigations specifically increase the probability o f disease detection in imported live swine, and generally reduce the risk of disease introduction via imported live swine through interlocking safeguards . 9 CFR 93 .510 , for example, requires a minimum quarantine period of 15 days for all imported swine . 9 CFR 94.24 (“Restrictions on the importation of pork, pork products, and swine from the APHI S - defined European CSF region”) further restricts the sourcing of swine for export from the APHI S - defined European CSF region (which Croatia could become part of) to the United States . Given that APHIS considers the likeliho od of release of CSF or SVD virus via live swine exported from Croatia to be low, and the mitigations listed above reducing the likelihood of exposure of U.S. domestic swine to CSF or SVD from imported live animals, APHI S concludes that the overall likelihood of entry of CSF and SVD virus via infected swine from the Croatia, and subsequent exposure to US swine, is very low. Imported genetic material Genetic material has been implicated in the introduction of foreign animal diseases into susceptible populations, as well as the spread of established disease epidemics over considerable distances [ 62 ] . CSFv survival in semen has been estimated in experimental studies to be 12 - 72 hours at 20 ° C but ranges from 1 month to several ye ars at 4 ° C or below [ 63 ] . APHI S therefore considers the likelihood of exposure of domestic swine to CSFv in infected semen to be high. CSFv survival in embryos and ova
4Im port regulations similar in scope exist for Cattle, Sheep, and Goats in 9 CFR 93 Subpart D - Ruminants.86

86 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest is unknown [ 63 , 64 ] . SVDv survival in genetic material is possible but not considered a primary mode of transmission [ 57 ] . US regulations in 9 CFR 98.38 (“Restrictions on the importation of swine semen from the APHI S - defined European CSF region”), if effectively implemented, reduce the likelihood of exposure of susceptible swine to CSFv or SVDv via infected semen from the APHIS - defined European CSF region, which Croatia could become part of. Given these exposure mitigations, and the findings of the entry assessment, APHI S considers the likelihood of release of contaminated undetected semen, embryos, or ova from Croatia, and subsequent exposure to US swine, to be very low. **Consequence Assessm ent**  APHI S considers the risk of release of CSFv, FMDv, SVDv, or RPv from Croatia to the United States and the exposure of these hazards to the US domestic herd to be low . APHI S recognizes that an outbreak of any of these four diseases in the US would have significant negative impacts. These include, but are not limited to, direct and indirect financial impact to individual producers, their affiliates, and the overall swine and/or ruminant industry

f rom loss of production associated with highly c ontagious animal diseases; direct costs and consequences associated with control and eradication measures, including indemnity, depopulation, and movement restrictions ; and loss of international trading markets. **R isk Estimation**  APHI S concludes from the information Croatia submitted, from publically available information, and from the site visit that Croatia is free of FMDv , SVDv , and RPv . Inreviewing the same information, APHIS cannot conclude with certainty that CSFv does not remain in Croatia’s feral swine population , or in feral swine in neighboring countries that could move naturally into Croatia . APHI S therefore considers Croatia to be low risk for CSF and equivalent in risk profile with respect to CSF to the APHI S - defined European CSF region . APHI S considers the risk of CSFv , FMDv , or SVD being introduced into Croatia’s domestic swine herd to be low, and the risk of RPv being introduced to be negligible. APHI S considers the likelihood that Croatia’s surveillance system would quickly and accurately detect CSF, FMD, SVD, or rinderpest should they be introduced into Croatia to be high, and Croatia’s emergency response system capable of swiftly and aggressively

eradicating these diseases. APHIS considers the requirements of Parts 92, 93, 94 , and 98 of Sub chapter D - Exportation and Importation of Animals and Animal Products , and Part 166 and 167 of Subchapter L- Swine Health Protection of Title 9 of the Code of Federal Regulations, if effectively implemented, to further mitigate the risk of CSFv, FMDv, SVDv, and RPv b eing introduced into the United States via a subsequent export event from Croatia. Given that Croatia is equivalent in risk profile with respect to CSF to the APHI S defined European CSF region, Croatia is eligible to be added to the APHI S - defined European CSF region . Croatia can also be added to the lists of regions that APHI S considers free of FMD, SVD, and rinderpest. The APHIS - defined European CSF region is subject to the conditions in 9 CFR 94.24 for pork, pork products, and swine; and 9 CFR87

87 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest 98.38 for swine semen5

. The provisions of 9 CFR 94.11 for import conditions for meat or meat products from ruminants or swine from FMD - free regions of 9 CFR 94.13 for import conditions for pork or pork products from SVD - free regions should also be applied to Croatia .

5 CFR mitigations include (1) restricting the sourcing of swine and ruminants for live export or slaughter to regions free of the pertinent diseases; (2) prohibiting commingling of live animals, meat, or meat products for export with such commodities from regions not considered free of these diseases; (3) restricting the use of transportation equipment for live swine; and (4) requiring exporting slaughter establishments to be approved by the U.S. Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS). An official veterinarian of the exporting country must certify that these conditions have been met. The CFR provisions do not directly address the risk of exporting infected live animals or animal commodities during the period between virus incursion and outbreak detection. However, 9 CFR 94.24 and 98.38 substantially mitigate this risk by prohibiting sourcing of swine from a restricted zone established because of detection of CSF in wild boar or a CSF outbreak in domestic swine, as well as for the 6 months following depopulation, cleaning, and disinfection of the last infected premises in the zone. In addition, swine semen centers must be approved by the national government of the exporting country, which provides substantial risk mitigation under EC legislation.88

88 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest **A ppendix**  **1: Import Data --**  **Total, and Top 5 Countries --**  **for the Republic of**  **Croatia for**  **Agricultural Commodities**  **Relevant to this Evaluation , 20**  **10 -** **2012 [**  **65 ]**  **.** A. Live bovines (head)

2010 2011 2012 **Total 140,123**  **151,900 120,056**  Romania 57,822 71,465 68,564 Poland 24,728 28,624 20,817 Czech Republic 23,886 22,921 14,340 Slovakia 10,728 12,146 7,333 Hungary 16,032 5,535 6,116 B. Live Swine (head)

2010 2011 2012 **Total 626,126**  **610,886 557,680**  Netherlands 252,012 305,248 300,286 Germany 302,919 248,337 209,122 Hungary 28,674 28,033 30,734 Denmark 0 403 9,380 Belgium 0 4,109 3,480 C. Live sheep and goats (head)

2010 2011 2012 **Total 56,278**  **18,372 6,974**  Romania 40,680 13,777 3,902 Hungary 15,568 4,374 2,727 France 0 0 265 Germany 0 4 45 Czech Republic 0 0 29 D. Beef, fresh or chilled (kg)

2010 2011 2012 **T otal**  **5,259,189 5,074,516**  **6,454,808** Netherlands 4,049,810 4,651,396 5,413,709 Poland 715,450 227,332 515,671 Italy 20 159,384 194,842 Germany 12,734 8,687 128,042 Serbia 0 0 101,650 E. Beef, frozen (kg)

2010 2011 2012 **Total 3,122,105**  **2,563,656 2,62**  **2,712** Austria 842,938 794,528 947,995 Uruguay 762,094 374,084 448,657 Brazil 188,026 200,049 447,57089

89 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest Poland 133,223 143,649 310,562 New Zealand 31,810 38,979 148,541 F. Pork, fresh, chilled, or frozen (kg)

2010 2011 2012 **Total 39,718,845**  **41,692,29 8**  **46,617,252** Germany 10,792,342 15,218,657 17,507,865 Netherlands 9,988,106 8,034,124 8,794,522 Spain 2,601,878 5,434,471 6,275,875 Austria 4,250,494 4,833,635 4,686,567 Hungary 1,776,295 2,330,031 3,220,798 G. Sheep and goat meat, fresh, chilled, or frozen

2010 2011 2012 **Total 1,542,330**  **1,362,754 1,340,725**  Bulgaria 498,445 413,001 536,871 Macedonia 306,514 480,544 502,684 Romania 629,889 364,065 277,040 New Zealand 100,245 85,939 23,114 Italy 0 874 88890

90 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest **References** 1. University

of Texas. Map of the Republic of Croatia . 2010; Available from: http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/europe/croatia_pol01.pdf . 2. APHI S, Recognition of Animal Disease Status of Regions in the European Union; Final Rule. : Federal Register, Monday, April 7, 2003. 68(66): p. 16922 - 16941. 3. APHI S, Classical Swine Fever Status of France and Spain; Final Rule. : Federal Register, Tuesday, April 20, 2004. 69(76): p. 21 042 - 21047. 4. OIE, Section 2, Chapter 2.1, Import Risk Analysis , in Terrestrial Animal Health Code, 22nd edition 2013, World Organization for Animal Health: Paris. 5. MAFRD, Enclosure to Official Letter of July 24, 2009: Clarification of Information Requested for Recognition of a Region
- Republic of Croatia. , 2009a, Ministry of Agriculture, Forestries, and Rural Development-Veterinary Directorate. Zagreb, Croatia. 6. APHI S, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service Site Visit to the Republic of Croatia. , United States Department of Agriculture - Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, Editor 2012. 7. MAFRD, Site visit presentation to the APHIS delegation: Animal Health Status in Croatia (with an emphasis to diseases subject of the APHIS inspection) , 2012: Zagreb, Croatia. 8. MAFRD, Enclosure to Official Letter of July 13, 2010: Clarification of Information Requested for Recognition of a Region. , 2010a, Ministry of Agriculture, Forestries, and Rural Development- Veterinary Directorate. Zagreb, Croatia. 9. MAFRD, Enclosure to Official Letter of July 24, 2009: Veterinary Act. , 2009b, Ministry of Agriculture, Forestries, and Rural Development- Veterinary Directorate. Zagreb, Croatia. 10. MAFRD, Site visit presentation to the APHIS delegation: Organisational structure of the Veterinary Directorate and veterinary infrastrucuture in the country, 2012: Zagreb, Croatia. 11. MAFRD, Site visit presentation to the APHIS delegation: Croatian Agricultural Agency, 2012: Zagreb, Croatia. 12. MAFRD, Enclosure to Official L etter of July 13, 2010: Order on Measures to Prevent the Appearance and Spread of Classical Swine Fever in the Territory of the Republic of Croatia. , 2010b, Ministry of Agriculture, Forestries, and Rural Development- Veterinary Directorate. Zagreb, Croatia . 13. OIE. Classical swine fever, Croatia, disease timeline (WAHID) . 2013 November 2013]; Available from: http://www.oie.int/wahis_2/public/wahid.php/Countryinformation/Country timelin es . 14. OIE. Foot and mouth disease, Croatia, prior to 2005 . Handistatus II 2013 [cited Accessed November 2013; Available from: http://web.oie.int/hs2/sit_pays_mald_pl.asp?c_pays=84&c_mald=2 . 15. OIE. List of FMD free members: FMD free where vaccination is not practised. 2013 [cited Accessed November 2013; Available from: http://www.oie.int/en/animal -health- in-the -world/official - disease - status/fmd/listof - fmd- free -members/ .91

91 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest 16. OIE. Swine vesicular disease, Croatia, prior to 2005 . Handistatus II 2013 [cited Accessed November 2013; Available from: http://web.oie.int/hs2/sit_pays_mald_pl.asp?c_pays=84&c_mald=4 . 17. OIE. Rinderpest, Croatia, prior to 2005 . Handistatus II 2013 [cited Accessed November 2013; Available from: http://web.oie.int/hs2/sit_pays_mald_pl.asp?c_pays=84&c_mald=5 . 18. MAFRD, Enclosure to Official Letter of July 24, 2009: Ordinance on measures for control and eradication of foot
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92 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest 29. OIE. Swine vesicular disease, Bosnia and Herezgovina, prior to 2005 . Handistatus II 20 13 [cited Accessed November 2013; Available from: http://web.oie.int/hs2/sit_pays_mald_pl.asp?c_pays=21&c_mald=4 . 30. OIE. Classical swine fever, Serbia and Montenegro, prior to 2005 . Handistatus II 2013 [cited Accessed November 2013; Available from: http://web.oie.int/hs2/sit_pays_mald_pl.asp?c_pays=216&c_mald=14 . 31. OIE. Classical swine fever, Serbia and Montenegro, disease timeline (WAHID) . 2013 November 2013]; Available from: http://www.oie.int/wahis_2/public/wahid.php/Countryinformation/Country timelin es . 32. OIE. Swine vesicular disease, Serbia and Montenegro, prior to 2005 . Handistatus II 2013 [cited Accessed November 2013; Available from: http://web.oie.int/hs2/sit

_pays_mald_pl.asp?c_pays=216&c_mald=4 . 33. OIE, RESOLUTION No. 18 Declaration of Global Eradication of Rinderpest and Implementation of Follow
- up Measures to Maintain W orld Freedom from Rinderpest. 79th Session of the World Assembly of Delegates, Paris, France., 2011. 34. OIE. Rinderpest, Europe, prior to 2005 . Handistatus II 2013 [cited Accessed November 2013; Available from: http://web.oie.int/hs2/sit_mald_freq_pl.asp?c_cont=4 &c_mald=5 . 35. Roeder, P.L., and Taylor, W.P., Rinderpest. Vet Clin Food Anim, 2002. **18** : p. 515 - 547. 36. MAFRD, Enclosure to Official Letter of July 24, 2009: Plan for the Eradication of Classical Swine Fever in W ild Boar in the Infected Zone in the Vukovar-Srijem County. , 2009i, Ministry

of Agriculture, Forestries, and Rural DevelopmentVeterinary

Directorate. Zagreb, Croatia. 37. MAFRD, Enclosure to Official Letter of July 24, 2009: Ordinance on veterinary checks of live animals in internal trade and certificate of health condition and place of origin of the animal. , 2009k, Ministry of Agriculture, Forestries, and Rural Development- Veterinary Directorate. Zagreb, Croatia. 38. MAFRD, Enclosure to Official Letter of July 13, 2010: Map of BIPs in Croatia. , 2010c, Ministry

of Agriculture, Forestries, and Rural Development- Veterinary Directorate. Zagreb, Croatia. 39. MSTTD, Transport Operational Program 2007
- 2009: Instrument for Pre
Accession Assistance , Republic of Croatia- Ministry of the Sea Tourism Transport and Development, Editor 2007: Zagreb, Croatia. 40. Croatia Road Map. Available at: http://www.croatia-travel info.com/maps/croatia-road-map.htm . [cited Accessed September 18, 2013. 41. Croatiaferries.com., Available at: http://www.croatiaferries.com/ferry
- ports.htm 42. ARCOTRASS Consortium, Study (for the European Commission) on the State of Agriculture in Five Applicant Countries
- Croatia
- Country Report, 2006. 43. Food and Veterinary Organization, Final Report of a Mission Carried in Croatia From 20 to 24 September In Order to Assess the Animal Health Situation Regarding Classical Swine Fever and Disease Con trol Measures, with a View to the Possible Authorization of Imports into the EU of Live Pigs and Certain Pig Products from Croatia , 2010, European Commission- DG(SANCO).93

93 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest 44. MAFRD, Presentation to the EU's Standing Committee on the Food Chain and Animal Health (SCFCAH), Status of classical swine fever in Croatia , 2013: Zagreb, Croatia. Available at http://ec.europa.eu/food/committees/regulatory /scfcah/animal_health/presentation s/14062013_csf_croatia.pdf . 45. MAFRD, Site visit presentation to the APHIS delegation: Livestock demographics and marketing practises in Croatia (Animal I& R legislation, structure, controls) , 2012: Zagreb, Croatia. 46. MAFRD, Enclosure to Official Letter of July 24, 2009: Ordinance on compulsory identification and registration of pigs. , 2009m, Ministry of Agriculture, Forestries, and Rural Development- Veterinary Directorate. Zagreb, Croatia. 47. MAFRD, Enclosure to Official Letter of July 24, 2009: Ordinance on the implementation of the obligatory identification and registration of bovine animals. , 2009l, Ministry of Agriculture, Forestries, and Rural DevelopmentVeterinary

Directorate. Zagreb, Croatia. 48. MAFRD, Enclosure to Official Letter of July 24, 2009: Ordinance on the obligatory identification and registration of ovine and caprine animals. , 2009n, Ministry of Agriculture, Forestries, and Rural Development- Veterinary Directorate. Zagreb, Croatia. 49. EU by

way of MAFRD, Control and monitoring programme for Classical Swine Fever
- Croatia (Approved for 2013 by Commission Decision 2012/761/EU) , 2013: Brussels, Belgium by way of Zagreb, Croatia. 50. Croatian Veterinary Institute, 2011 Annual Report, 2011, Zelijko Cvetnic: Zagreb. 51. DG SANCO, Final Report of a Mission Carried Out in Croatia from 20 to 24 September 2010 in Order to Assess the Animal Health Situation Regarding Classical Swine Fever and Disease Control Measures, with a View to the Possible Auth orisation of Imports into the EU of Live Pigs and Certain Pig Products from Croatia , 2010, Food and Veterinary Office of the European Commission. 52. MAFRD, Enclosure to Official Letter of July 24, 2009: The 2009 Surveillance Program for Classical Swine Fever in Domestic Pigs. , 2009h, Ministry of Agriculture, Forestries, and Rural Development- Veterinary Directorate. Zagreb, Croatia. 53. MAFRD, Data provided via email, 2013. 54. MAFRD, Enclosure to Official Letter of July 24, 2009: Ordinance on the diagnostic manual for classical swine fever. , 2009j, Ministry of Agriculture, Forestries, and Rural Development- Veterinary Directorate. Zagreb, Croatia. 55. MAFRD, Enclosure to Official Letter of July 24, 2009: Classical Swine Fever
National Contingency Plan. , 2 009g, Ministry of Agriculture, Forestries, and Rural Development- Veterinary Directorate. Zagreb, Croatia. 56. OIE. Animal Diseases Data
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NE_FEVER_FINAL.pdf . 57. OIE. Animal Diseases Data
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94 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest http://www.oie.int/fileadmin/Home/eng/Animal_Health_in_the_World/docs/pdf/S WI NE_VESICULAR_DISEASE_FINAL.pdf . 58. OIE. Animal Diseases Data
- Technical Disease Card
- Foot and Mouth Disease . 2013]; Available from: http://www.oie. int/fileadmin/Home/eng/Animal_Health_in_the_World/docs/pdf/F OOT_AND_MOUTH_DISEASE_FINAL.pdf . 59. APHI S, Risk Assessment of the Practice of Feeding Recycled Commodities to Domesticated Swine in the U.S. , 1995, United States Department of Agriculture, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, Veterinary Services, Centers for Epidemiology

and Animal Health. 60. APHI S, 2001 waste
- feeder survey (unpublished data) , 2002, United States Department of Agriculture, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, Veterinary

Services, Center for Epidemiology and Animal Health. 61. APHI S, Swine Health Protection: Map of states that permit and prohibit garbage feeding, 2010, United States Department of Agriculture, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service. Available at : http://www.aphis.usda.gov/animal_health/animal_dis_spec/swine/images/shpa_m ap.jpg . 62. Hennecken, M., J.A. Stegeman et al, Transmission of classical swine fever virus by artificial insemination during the 1997
- 1998 epidemic in The Netherlands: a descriptive epidemiological study. Vet Q, 2000. **22** (4): p. 228 - 233. 63. Floegel, G., A. Wehrend, Detection of classical swine fever virus in semen of infected boars. Vet Microbiol, 2000. **77** (1 - 2): p. 109 - 116. 64. Glossup, C.E., and R. Cameron, Transmission of viruses through pigs and products of pig origin , in Trends in Emerging Viral Infections of Swine , K.Y.Y. A. Morilla, J.J. Zimmerman, Editor 2002, Iowa State Press : Ames, Iowa. p. 3 - 11. 65. Global Trade Atlas. Global Trade Information System, Import Data
-- Total, and Top 5 Countries
-- for the Republic of Croatia for Relevant Commodities, 2010
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95 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest 

### ANNEX	1:	Hazard	identifications	for	CSF,	FMD,	SVD,	and	rinderpest **Hazard	Identification —**  **CSF** The World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) l ists several animal d iseases that are considered primary hazards associated with trade of animals and animal products. APHIS regulations mitigate the risk of introduction of these foreign animal diseases in to the United States. As such, APHIS conducts an import risk analysis addressing hazards of primary concern prior to initiating or resuming trade of animal commodities. APHIS considers classical swine fever (CSF) virus to be a potential hazard associated with trade of live swine and swine products. CSF was eradicated from th e United States in 1976. 

### Causative	agent Classical swine fever, also known as hog cholera, is a highly contagious disease of swine caused by a Pestivirus of the family Flaviviridae [ 1 ] . Only one serotype has been found. 

### Host	range Natural hosts of CSF virus are members of the Suidae family, including domestic and wild swine [ 2 ] . Infected swine are the only reservoir of virus [ 3 ] . The role of wild boar as a virus reservoir and source of infection for domestic swine is well known and epidemiologic al links between CSF infection in wild boar and domestic swine have been reported repeatedly in recent years [ 4, 5 ] . 

### Incubation	period The incubation period for CSF is 2
- 14 days [ 3 , 6 ] . 

### Morbidity	and	mort**ality** Four distinct clinical forms of CSF have been described: acute, chronic, congenital, and mild [ 7 - 9 ] . The acute form is characterized by high fever, anorexia , lethargy, and hemorrhagic lesions and cyanosis of the skin. Death occurs 5 - 25 days after onset of the illness; mortality in young pigs can approach 100 percent. The chronic form, seen primarily with less virulent CSF virus strains or in partially immune herds, presents as fever, dullness, growth retardation, and diarrhea for up to 1 month. Pigs often appear to recover only to relapse and die within about 3 months. Depending on the virulence of the virus strain and the stage of gestation, the congenital fo rm can present at fetal death, resorption, mummification, or abortion. If a live birth, the piglet may exhibit congenital tremor, weakness, and/or poor growth leading to death. Conversely, piglets may be born clinically normal but persistently viremic with intermittent virus shedding (no antibody response). The mild form, which usually occurs in older animals, is characterized by transient fever and loss of appetite with recovery. Infected sows may show no overt clinical signs but continuously shed virus to their young and to other swine they contact. 

### Sources	of	virus	and	transmission Blood and all tissues, secretions, and excretions of sick and dead animals are sources of virus [ 6 ] . CSF virus has been recovered from muscle and lymph nodes of infected pigs, and high titers of96

96 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest CSF virus have been isolated from bone marrow [ 10 ] . The virus may also be present in semen [ 9 ] . Transmission is generally directly from pig to pig, but products inc luding fresh, frozen, or cured pork can infect other pigs via the oral route [ 11 ] . Imported pig products are frequently implicated in the introduction of CSF virus into previously free regions, primarily through the practice of swill feeding [ 12 ] . Dahle and Liess (1992) demonstrated that the oral infectious dose of CSF virus is very low [ 13 ] . Indirect transmission may occur via movement of people, wild animals, and inanimate objects such as live - haul trucks [ 14 ] . In countries that are free of CSF in domestic swine, epidemics in wild boar are often started by feeding of infecte d human food waste. Abnormal mortality and sometimes obviously sick animals are the first indicators of CSF introduction into a wild boar population [ 15 ] . 

### Inactivation	and	survival The CSF virus is quite hardy, being stable between pH 4 and 10 [ 16 ] and also stable at low temperatures [ 17 ] . The virus can survive for long periods in cool, moist, and protein - rich environments such as stored meat: s urvival times of more than 4 years in frozen pork and at least 85 days in fresh, chilled pork have been reported [ 11 ] . CSF virus would likely remain viable in fresh meat even after carcass maturation and is unlikely to be destroyed by transport or cold storage. Survival times in cured or smo ked meat ranging from 17 days to more than a year have been reported. The CSF virus is readily inactivated by detergents, lipid solvents, proteases, and common disinfectants, as well as pasteurization and cooking, although sensitivity to heat can vary am ong strains. The virus can be inactivated by a variety of time/temperatures combinations as well as curing and drying through various processes [ 18 ] . CSF virus is moderately fragile in the environment, but can remain infectious for months in refrigerated meat and years in frozen meat [ 3 ] . 

### Vaccination Vaccines against CSF v irus are available in some areas. Vaccination can protect animals from clinical disease but does not prevent infection. Currently available liv e attenuated vaccines are effective in limiting clinical disease but allow the CSF virus to circulate subclinical ly. Vaccination is therefore considered inappropriate in regions where a stamping out policy exists and where the entire swine population is susceptible due to the standard practice of non -vaccination [ 19 ] . In areas where CSF is endemic, w ell - administere d vaccination programs can eventually eliminate the infection from herds [ 3 ] . 

### Laboratory	Diagnosis Laboratory confirmation of infection, essential during an outbreak situation, is complica ted by the close antigenic relationship of the CSF virus with bovine viral diarrhea virus and border disease virus (also pestiviruses) [ 1 ] . Identification of the virus, its nucleic acid, or associated97

97 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest antibodies confirms the diagnosis. The OIE recommends detection of CSF antigen via direct fluorescent antibody test on cryostat sections of organs from infected pigs [ 20 ] . Ap anel of monoclonal antibodies is then used t o differentiate from other Pestivirus antigens. Virus isolation techniques and polymerase chain reaction may also be used. Antigen - capture enzyme linked immunosorbent assays (ELISAs) are useful for herd screening, but should not be used on a single animal basis. Detection of virus - specific antibodies is particularly useful in herds suspected of being infected at least 21 days previously with CSF virus [ 20 ] . Serological methods are essential if a country wishes to be internationally recognized as being free from the disease in the absence of vaccination. Screening tests must be followed by confirmatory tests that are specific to the CSF virus. Certain ELISAs are relatively CSF specific, but the definitive method for differentiation is the comparative neutralization test, which compares the level of antibodies to different Pestivirus species. 

### References 1. Wengler, G., Bradley, D. W., et al. Flaviviridae . in 6th Report of the International Committee on Taxomonmy of viruses . 1995. 2. Moennig, V., Introduction to classical swine fever: virus, disease and control policy. Vet Microbiol, 2000. **73** (2
- 3): p. 93
- 102. 3. Spickler, A.R. and J. Roth, A., eds. Emerging and Exotic Diseases of Animals . 3rd Edition ed. 2006, Iow State University Press. 4. Biagetti, M., Greiser- Wilke, I., et al, Molecular epidemiology of classical swine fever in Italy. Vet Microbiol, 2001. **83** (3): p. 205
- 215. 5. Laddomada, A., Patta, C. et al, Epidemiology of classical swine fever in Sardinia: a serological survey of wild boar and comparison with African swine fever. Vet Rec., 1994. **134** (8): p. 183
- 187. 6. World Organization for Animal Health (OIE). Classical swine fever technical disease card . 2009; Available from: http://www.oie.int/fileadmin/Home/eng/Animal_Health_in_the_World/docs/pdf/CLAS SICAL_SWINE_FEVER_FINAL.pdf . 7. Moennig, V., Floegel - Niesmann, G., et al, Clinical signs and epidemiology of classical swine fever: a review of new kno wledge. Vet Journal, 2003. **165** : p. 11 - 210. 8. Paton, D.J. and I. Greiser- Wilke, Classical swine fever
- an update. Res Vet Sci, 2003. **75** (3): p. 169 - 178. 9. Elber, A.R., Stegeman, A., et al, The classical swine fever epidemic 1997- 1998 in The Netherlands: des criptive epidemiology. Prev Vet Med, 1999. **42** (3
-4): p. 157
- 184. 10. Wood, L., Brockman, S., et al, Classical swine fever: virulence and tissue distribution of a 1986 isolate in pigs. Vet Record, 1988. **122** : p. 391 - 394. 11. Edwards, S., Survival and inactiva tion of classical swine fever virus. Vet Microbiology, 2000. **73** (2
- 3): p. 175
- 181. 12. Fritzemeier, J., Teuffert, J., et al, Epidemiology of classical swine fever in Germany in the 1990's. Vet Microbiology, 2000. **77** (1
- 2): p. 29
-41. 13. Dahle, J.a.L., B., A review of classical swine fever infections in pigs: epizootiology, clinical disease and pathology. Comp Immun Micro, 1992. **20** : p. 261 - 274.98

98 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest 14. Elbers, A.R., Stegeman, J.A., et al, Factors associated with the introduction of classical swine fever virus into pig herds in the central area of the 1997- 1998 epidemic in The Netherlands. Vet Rec., 2001. **149** (13): p. 377
- 382. 15. European Commission, S.C. Classical swine fever in wild boar. in European Commission, 1999 . 1999. Brussels. 16. Depner, K., Bauer, T., et al, Thermal and pH stability of pestiviruses. Rev Sci Tech OIE 11, 1992: p. 885 - 893. 17. Harkness, J.W., Classical swine fever and its diagnosis: a current view. Vet Record, 1985. **116** : p. 288 - 293. 18. Williams, S., Persistance of Disease Agents in Carcasses and Animal Products, L. Scott Williams Consulting Pty, Editor 2003. 19. Merck and Company, ed. The Merck Veterinary Manual . 8th Edition ed. 1998, Merck and Company. 20. World Organization for Animal Health, Chapter 2.8.3. Classical Swine Fever, in Manual of Diagnostic Tests and Vaccines for Terrestrial Animals 2011: Available from: http://www.oie.int/international
- standard - setting/terrestrial
- manual/access
- o nline/ .99

99 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest 

### Hazard	identification **— FMD**  The World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) lists several animal diseases that are considered primary hazards associated with trade of animals and animal products. APHIS regulations mitigate the risk of introducti on of these foreign animal diseases in to the United States. As such, APHIS conducts an import risk analysis addressing hazards of primary concern prior to initiating or resuming trade of animal commodities. APHIS considers foot and mouth disease (FMD) vi rus to be a potential hazard associated with trade of live ruminants and swine, as well as certain products and by- products derived from these species. FMD virus was eradicated from the United States in 1929. 

### Causative	agent FMD is a highly communicable disease caused by an Aphthovirus of the family Picornaviridae . FMD has seven immunologically distinct serotypes — O, A, C, SAT1, SAT2, SAT3, and Asia 1 — which do not confer cross immunity [ 1 ] . FMD virus serotype O (PanAsia strain) is the most preval ent and widely distributed, causing outbreaks in many parts of Africa, Asia, South America, and Europe since 1998 [ 2 -4 ] . 

### Host	range The range of domestic hosts incl udes all cloven - hoofed animals such as cattle, swine, sheep, goats, water buffalo, and yaks [ 2 - 5 ] . All cloven - hoofed wild animals are also susceptible, including bu ffalo, deer, impala, and gazelles; hedgehogs, armadillos, nutrias, elephants, rats, and mice are also susceptible. Camels may be affected by some FMD strains whereas llamas, alpacas, and vicuñas have low susceptibility [ 5 ] . 

### Incubation	period The incubation period of the FMD virus is 2 to 14 days in cattle, depending on the viral strain and dose and the level of susceptibility of the animal [ 6 ] . The incubation period in pigs also varies with the strain, dose, and route of infection [ 7 ] . S erotype O — highly virulent in pigs — can produce clinical signs within 18 to 24 hours, while pigs with low - level exposures may take up to 11 days to develop clinical signs. 

### Morbidity	and	mortality Clinical signs in cattle during acute infection include fever, profuse salivation, and mucopurulent nasal discharge [ 6 ] . The disease is characterized by development of vesicles on the tongue, hard palate, den tal pad, lips, muzzle, gum, coronary band, and interdigital spaces. Vesicles may develop on the teats. Affected animals lose condition rapidly, and there is a dramatic loss of milk production. The animal usually recovers by 14 days post infection provided no secondary infections occur [ 8 ] . Morbidity in unvaccinated herds can be high, but mortality usually does not exceed 5 percent. If an outbreak occurs during the calving season, calf mortality can be100

100 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest considerable [ 9 ] . Young calves may even die before the development of clinical signs usually because the virus attacks the heart muscles [ 6 ] . The most consistent clinical signs in pigs are lesions around the coronary bands and lameness; fever may be inconsistent [ 7 , 10 ] . Pigs may develop vesicles on the tongue and snout, but these may be less conspicuous than lesions seen in ruminants. The severity of clinical disease depends on the age of the infected pig. Adult swine may recover or become chronically lame while younger pigs, especially those less than 8 weeks of age, may die from acute myocarditis without developing other clinical signs. FMD infection in sheep and goats is often subclinical or produces only mild clinical signs that may go unrecognized [ 11 ] . Red uced milk production may be seen in milking animals and death of young stock may occur without clinical signs. 

### Sources	of	virus	and	transmission Sources of FMD virus include (1) incubating and clinically affected animals; (2) breath, saliva, feces, and ur ine; (3) milk and semen (up to 4 days before clinical signs); and (4) meat and byproducts in which pH has remained above 6.0 [ 11 , 12 ] . Transmission occurs by dir ect or indirect contact or by aerosol. Fomites such as feed, drinking water, equipment, animal products, as well as human clothing, transportation vehicles, rodents, stray dogs, wild animals, and birds can transmit FMD over long distances. The five main el ements that influence the extent of FMD spread are: (1) The quantity of virus released; (2) The means by which the virus enters the environment; (3) The ability of the agent to survive outside the animal body; (4) The quantities of virus required to initiate infection at primary infection sites; and (5) The period of time the virus remains undetected [ 13 , 14 ] . The respiratory tract is the usual route of infection, particularly in environments that are heavily contaminated with FMD virus. Infection can also oc cur through abrasions of the skin or mucous membranes. Pigs may become infected through ingestion of FMD virus - contaminated products [ 7 , 11 ] . In cattle and sheep, the earliest sites of virus infection and possibly replication appear t o be in the mucosa and the lymphoid tissues of the pharynx [ 8 , 15 - 17 ] . Following initial replication in the ph arynx, the virus enters the bloodstream. Viremia in cattle lasts for 3 to 5 days, during which the virus spreads throughout the body and establishes sites of secondary infection, localizing in various organs, tissues, body fluids, bone marrow, and lymph no des. Viral replication in cattle may reach peak levels as early as 2 to 3 days after exposure [ 15 , 16 ] . Recent data indicate that the most viral amplification occurs in the epithelia of the skin and mouth, including the tongue [ 18 , 19 ] . Although some viral replication also occurs in the epithelia of the pharynx, the amount of virus produced there is apparently much less than the amount produced in the skin and mouth during the acute phase of the disease. By comparison, the101

101 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest amount of virus (if any) produced in other organs like salivary glands, kidneys, liver, and lymph nodes is negligible. Immunity t o FMD is primarily mediated by circulating antibodies [ 17 ] . The host reaction, including antibody production, occurs from 3 to 4 days after exposure. In infected pigs, the virus is cleared in less than 3 to 4 weeks. In contrast, around 50 percent or more of cattle will develop a low - level persistent infection, localized to the pharynx [ 10 , 20 , 21 ] . 

### Inactivation	and	survival FMD virus is a relatively resilient virus. It can survive up to 15 weeks in feed, 4 weeks on cattle hair, and up to 103 days in wastewater. The survival of the virus in animal tissues is closely associated with the acidity of that tissue [ 22 , 23 ] . For example, in muscular tissues the acidity of rigor mortis, which occurs naturally, inactivates t he virus. The production of lactic acid in these tissues during maturation is considered the primary factor for inactivation. An acid environment where the pH is less than 6.0 will destroy the virus quickly. Several studies showed that in tissues where no acidification occurs (e.g., lymph nodes, bone marrow, fat, and blood), the virus may survive for extended times in cured, uncured, and frozen meat [ 16 , 22 - 25 ] . Heating at 50° C [ 26 ] and up to 155° F [ 27 ] will inactivate the virus. 

### Vaccination Inactivated virus vaccines of varying composition are available commercially [ 12 ] . Many FMD vaccines are multivalent to provide protection against the different serotypes likely to be encountered in a given field situation. The finished vaccine must be shown to be free from resi dual live virus. Live attenuated vaccines are not suitable due to danger of reversion to virulence. Inactivated FMD vaccines may be classified as either standard potency (commercial vaccines) or higher potency (emergency vaccines) [ 12 ] . Standard potency vaccines are formulated with sufficient antigen to have a minimum potency level of 3 PD 50 and provide 6 months of immunity after two initial vaccinations given 1 - month apa rt. Higher potency vaccines are formulated with sufficient antigen to have a minimum potency level of 6 PD 50 to provide for more rapid onset and a wider spectrum of immunity against relevant field viruses. 

### Laboratory	diagnostics Field diagnosis of FMD rel ies heavily on recognition of clinical signs, which are similar to those seen in other vesicular diseases such as vesicular stomatitis, mucosal disease of cattle, bluetongue, and rinderpest. Virus isolation or demonstration of FMD viral antigen or nucleic acid in samples of tissue or fluid is therefore necessary for confirmatory diagnosis. Enzyme - linked immunosorbent assays (ELISA) can be used to detect FMD viral antigens and for serotyping [ 12 , 14 ] . Lateral flow devices can also be used to detect FMD viral antigens. The ELISA has replaced complement fixation in most laboratories as it is more specific and sensitive; in addition, it is not affected by pro
- or ant i - complement factors. If the sample is inadequate or the102

102 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest diagnosis remains uncertain, sample materials can be tested by reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction and/or virus isolation. Demonstration of specific antibodies to structural proteins in n on -vaccinated animals is indicative of prior infection with FMD virus [ 12 , 14 ] . Virus neutralization tests (VNTs) and ELISAs for antibodies to structural protei ns are used as serotype - specific serological tests. Tests for antibodies to some nonstructural proteins (NSPs) of FMD virus are useful in providing evidence of previous or current viral replication in the host, irrespective of vaccination status. Unlike st ructural proteins, NSPs are highly conserved and therefore are not serotype specific, so detection of antibodies to NSPs is not serotype restricted. 

### References 1. Kitching, R., et al, Development of foot
- and- mouth disease virus strain characterization - a review. Trop An Health Prod, 1989. **21** : p. 153 - 166. 2. Knowles, N.J., et al., Pandemic strain of foot
- and- mouth disease virus serotype O. Emerging Infectious Diseases, 2005. **21** (12): p. 1887
- 1893. 3. Knowles, N.J. and A.R. Samuel, Molecular epidemiology of foot
- and- mouth disease virus. Virus Research, 2003. **91** : p. 65 - 80. 4. Sakamoto, K. and K. Yoshida, Recent outbreaks of foot and mouth disease in countries of East Asia. Rev Sci Tech, 2002. **21** (3): p. 459
-463. 5. Torres, A., Foot and mouth disease, in Foreign Animal Diseases, 7th edition , C. Brown and A. Torres, Editors. 2008, Committee on Foreign and Emerging Diseases of the United States Animal Health Association. Boca Publications Group, Inc: Boca Raton, Florida. p. 261 - 276. 6. Kitching, R.P., Clinical variation in foot and mouth disease; cattle. Rev Sci Tech, 2002. **21** (3): p. 499
- 504. 7. Kitching, R.P. and S. Alexandersen, Clinical variation in foot and mouth disease; pigs. Rev Sci Tech, 2002. **21** (3): p. 513
- 518. 8. Woodbury, E.L., A review of the possible mechanisms for the persistence of foot
- andmouth disease virus. Epidemiol Infect, 1995. **114** (1): p. 1
- 13. 9. Seifert, H., Foot- and- mouth disease, in Tropical Animal Health 1996, Kluwer Academic Publishers: London, Massachusetts. p. 418 -431. 10. Kitching, R.P., Identification of foot and mouth disease virus carrier and subclinically infected animals and differentiation from vaccinated animals. Rev Sci Tech, 2002. **21** (3): p. 531 - 538. 11. Alexandersen, S., et al., The pathogenesis and diagnosis o f foot
- and- mouth disease. J Comp Pathol, 2003. **129** : p. 1 - 36. 12. World Organization for Animal Health (OIE), Chapter 2.1.5 Foot and mouth disease, in Manual of Diagnostic Tests and Vaccines for Terrestrial Animals 2011: Available from : http://www.oie.int/international
- standard - setting/terrestrial
- manual/access
- online/ . 13. Mann, J. and R.F. Sellers, Foot and mouth disease, in Virus Infections of Vertebrates, Z. Dinter and B. Morein, Editors. 1990, Elsevier. p. 903 - 912. 14. Thomson, G., Foot- and- mouth disease, in Infectious Diseases of Livestock, Coetzer, Thomson, and Tustin, Editors. 1994, Oxford University Press: Cape Town, South Africa. p. 825 - 852. 15. Selle rs, R.F., Quantitative aspects of the spread of foot
- and- mouth disease. Vet Bull, 1971. **41** (6): p. 431
-439.103

103 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest 16. Cottral, G.E., Persistence of foot
- and- mouth disease virus in animals, their products and the environment. Bull Off Int Epizoot, 1969. **70** (3): p. 549 - 568. 17. Alexandersen, S., Z. Zhang, and A.I. Donaldson, Aspects of the persistence of foot
- andmouth disease virus in animals; the carrier problem. Microbes Infect, 2002. **4** (10): p. 1099 - 1110. 18. Alexandersen, S., M.B. Oleksiewicz, and A.I. Donaldson, The early pathogenesis of foot
and- mouth disease in pigs infected by contact; a quantitative time - course study using TaqMan RT

-PCR. J Gen Virol, 2001. **82** (4): p. 747
- 755. 19. Oleksiewicz, M.B., A.I. Donaldson, and S. Alexandersen, Development of a novel re altime RT - PCR assay for quantitation of foot
- and- mouth disease virus in diverse porcine tissues. J Virol Methods, 2001. **92** (1): p. 23
- 35. 20. Salt, J.S., The carrier state in foot and mouth disease; an immunological review. Br Vet, 1993. **149** (3): p. 207
- 223 . 21. Zhang, Z. and R.P. Kitching, The localization of persistent foot and mouth disease virus in the epithelial cells of the soft palate and pharynx. J Comp Pathol, 2001. **124** : p. 89 - 94. 22. Cottral, G.E., B.F. Cox, and D.E. Baldwin, The survival of foot
- a nd- mouth disease virus in cured and uncured meat. Am J Vet Res, 1960. **21** : p. 288 - 97. 23. Henderson, W.M. and J.B. Broodsby, The survival of foot and mouth disease virus in meat and offal. J Hyg (Lond), 1948. **46** (4): p. 394
-402. 24. Cox, B.F., G.E. Cottral, and D.E. Baldwin, Further studies on the survival of foot and mouth disease virus in meat. Am J Vet Res, 1961. **22** : p. 224 - 226. 25. Lasta, R., et al, Combined treatment of heat, irradiation, and pH effects on the infectivity of foot
- and- mouth disease virus in bovine tissues. J Food Sci, 1992. **57** (1): p. 36
- 39. 26. Green, W. and J.L. Grannis, Economic impact of alternative management strategies for regulating Canadian ruminant/product imports. 2003: p. Unpublished report, Center for Epidemiology and Animal Hea lth. 27. Heidelbaugh, N. and J. Graves, Effects of some techniques applicable in food processing on the infectivity of foot and mouth disease virus. Food Tech, 1968. **22** : p. 120.104

104 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest 

### Hazard	identification **- SVD**  The OIE lists several animal diseases that are c onsidered primary hazards associated with trade of animals and animal products. APHIS regulations mitigate the risk of introduction of these foreign animal diseases in to the United States. As such, APHIS conducts an import risk analysis addressing hazard s of primary concern prior to initiating or resuming trade of animal commodities. A PHIS considers swine vesicular disease (SVD) virus to be a potential hazard associated with trade of live swine and swine products. SVD was once endemic in much of Europe, but its distribution is currently limited to southern Italy. I t has also been diagnosed in parts of Asia, and is still thought to be endemic in some areas [ 1 ] . 

### Causative	agent SVD virus is a member of the viral family Picornoviridae, genus Enterovirus. One serotype and several strains have been identified [ 1 , 2 ] . SVD virus isolates from Europe a nd Japan have been classified into at least four distinct groups, with two groups containing older isolates, and two groups containing more recent European isolates [ 1 , 3 , 4 ] . T he different groups may represent distinct SVD virus introductions int o Europe from Asia [ 3 , 5 ] 

### Host	range Swine are the only natural hosts of SVD virus [ 2 , 6 ] . I nfections have been reported in humans working with SVD virus in the laboratory and in experimental mice, but these species are not significant in the epidemiology of the disease [ 1 , 6 - 8 ] . 

### Morbid **ity	and	mortality** The primary significance of SVD is its clinical similarity to foot and mouth disease [ 1 , 6 ] . Clinical signs include fever, sudden lameness, and vesicles with subsequent erosions along the snout, feet, and teats [ 2 , 6 ] . Signs can range from absent to mild to severe, depending on virus strain, route of infe ction, age of the animal, and husbandry. Morbidity rates may be low throughout an entire herd, but high in certain pens. Clinical recovery usually occurs with 2 to 3 weeks, though a dark horizontal line may persist on the hooves due to a temporary disru ption in growth [ 1 , 2 , 6 , 7 ] . Production losses are not severe, and SVD causes essentially no mortality [ 1 , 2 , 9 ] . Persistence of SVD virus infection is rare [ 7 , 10 ] . Some strains of SVD virus produce only mild clinical symptoms or are asymptomatic and detected only through laboratory surveillance [ 6 , 7 ] . For example, a 2002 outbreak of SVD in Italy involved subclinical infection in all but one of 10,312 affected pigs [ 11 ] . 

### Incubation	period The incubat ion period for SVD is generally 2 to 7 days [ 2 , 6 ] . Large amounts of virus can be present in nasal and oral secretions and feces up to 2 days prior to the appearance of clinical signs [ 1 , 2 ] .105

105 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest 

### Sources	of	virus	and	transmission Blood and feces of sick animals, as well as epithelium from vesicles and vesicular fluid, are good sources of SVD virus. The period of highest shedding occurs during the first week after infection [ 1 , 2 ] . The virus can be detected in the blood 2 days after exposure and subsequently in most other tissues and semen [ 2 , 3 , 12 , 13 ] . Alt hough SVD virus does not appear to have a tropism for skeletal muscle cells, it is viable and infectious in meat for long periods of time [ 1 , 2 , 14 ] . Persistent infection is rare, but persistence of some strains in tissu e for up to 100 days and fecal shedding for more than 4 months has been reported [ 2 , 3 , 7 , 10 ] SVD may be introduced into a herd by feeding garbage containing infected meat scraps, by introducing infected animals, or by fomites (su ch as an improperly cleaned livestock truck). High environmental stability is a key feature in the epidemiology of SVD. The SVD virus enters the body via broken skin, mucus membranes, or ingestion. After initial introduction into a herd, the disease spre ads due to contact of susceptible pigs with infected pigs and feces [ 1 - 3 , 7 , 14 ] . 

### Inactivation	and	survival SVD virus is very stable in the environment. It is highly resistant to desiccation and freezing, and can survive for up to 11 months at
- 20° C to 12 ° C [ 3 ] . It is stable at pH2.5 - 12 [ 1 - 3 ] , and is therefore unlikely to be destroyed by the post
- mortem decrease in muscle pH that accompanies carcass maturation. SVD virus is also resistant to fermentation and smoking processes, and may remain in ham for 180 days, dried sausage for more than a year, and processed intestinal casings for more than 2 years [ 2 ] . The virus is resistant to many common disinfectants [ 3 ] . Inactivation can be achieved by heating at 60° C for 10 minutes [ 3 ] . 

### Vaccination No vaccine against SVD is av ailable [ 6 ] . 

### La**boratory	Diagnostics** Serologic (antibody detection) tests can be used to confirm clinical cases of SVD and detect subclinical infections. Since many cases of SVD are subclinical, the disease is often first suspected based on positive results on serologic t ests performed for surveillance or export certification. T he virus neutralization test is the OIE prescribed test for use in international trade. E nzyme - linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA) tests are also used: they can be performed more quickly than the virus neutralization test and IgM/IgG isotype specific ELISA’s are useful for determining the time of infection. An animal that is positive on ELISA and negative on follow
- up virus neutralization can be considered uninfected. A small proportion of normal, uninfected pigs will display a positive result on serological tests for SVD, often presenting as the single positive animal in a herd that has no clinical signs or exposure history. These “singleton reactors” can be differentiated by retesting the positiv e animal and its herd mates [ 3 , 6 ] . Polymerase chain reaction (PCR) and ELISA are appropriate screening tests for SVD antigen detection, while virus isolation is the reference antigen detection test and should be used for confirmation. I n the presence of clinical signs, demonstration of virus in lesion material or106

106 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest vesicular fluid via ELISA is sufficient to make a diagnosis of SVD. Testing of fecal samples from pen floors via PCR or virus isolation is us ed to detect subclinical infection [ 6 ] . 

### References 1. The Center for Food Security and Public Health: Iowa State University. Swine vesicular disease . 2007; Available from: http://www.cfsph.iastate.edu/Factsheets/pdfs/swine_vesicular_disease.pdf . 2. World Organization for Animal Health (OIE). Swine vesicular disease technical disease card . 2009; Available from: http://www.oie.int/fileadmin/Home/eng/Animal_Health_in_the_World/docs/pdf/SWIN E_VESICULAR_DISEASE_FINAL.pdf . 3. Escribano - Romero, E., M.A. Jimenez - Clavero, and V. Ley, Swine vesicular disease virus. Pathology of the disease and the molecular characteristics of the virion. Anim Health Res Rev, 2000. **1** (2): p. 119
- 126. 4. Brocchi, E., et al., Molecular epidemiology of recent outbreaks of swine vesicular disease: two genteically and anitgenically distinct variants in Europe, 1987--4. Epidemiol. Infect., 1997. **118** : p. 51 - 61. 5. Zhang, G., et al., Molecular evolution of swine vesicular disease virus. J Gen Virol, 1999. **80** : p. 639 - 651. 6. World Organization for Animal Health (OIE), Chapter 2.8.9 . Swine Vesicular Disease, in Manual of Diagnostic Vaccines and Tests for Terrestrial Animals 2011: Available from: http://www.oie.int/international
- standar d - setting/terrestrial
- manual/access
- online/ . 7. Lin, F. and R.P. Kitching, Swine Vesicular Disease: An Overview. Vet J, 2000. **160** : p. 192 - 201. 8. Brown, F., D. Goodridge, and R. Burrows, Infection of man by swine vesicular disease virus. J Comp Pathol, 19 76. **86** (3): p. 409
-414. 9. Bellini, S., et al., Swine vesicular disease in northern Italy; diffusion through densely populated pig areas. Rev. sci. tech, 2010. **29** (3): p. 639
- 648. 10. Lin, F., et al., Persistent infection is a rare sequel following infection of pigs with swine vesicular disease virus. Epidemiol Infect, 2001. **127** : p. 135 - 145. 11. Brocchi, E., et al. Swine Vesicular Disease in Italy during 2002: epidemiological and diagnostic aspects . in 2002 Session of the Research Group of the Standing Techinical Committee of EuFMD . 2002. Cesme, Izmir, Turkey. 12. Guerin, B. and N. Pozzi, Viruses in boar semen: detection and clinical as well as epidemiological consequences regarding disease transmission by artificial inseminiation. Theriogenology, 2005. **63** : p . 556 - 572. 13. Maes, D., et al., Diseases in swine transmitted by artificial insemination. Theriogenology, 2008. **70** : p. 1337 - 1345. 14. Mackay, D.K.J., Swine Vesicular Disease, in Infectious Diseases of Livestock, J. Coetzer and T. Tunstin, Editors. 2004, O xford University Press: Cape Town, South Africa. p. 1313
- 1318.107

107 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest 

### Hazard	identification **— Rinderpest**  The World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) lists several animal diseases that are considered primary hazards associated with trade of animals and anima l products. APHIS regulations mitigate the risk of introduction of these foreign animal diseases in to the United States. As such, APHIS conducts an import risk analysis addressing hazards of primary concern prior to initiating or resuming trade of animal commodities. APHIS considers rinderpest (RP) virus to be a potential hazard associated with trade of ruminants, small ruminants, swine, and their products. Rinderpest has never been reported in the United States. 

### Causative	agent RP virus, a Morbillivirus , exists as a single serotype [ 1 ] . T he virus is molecularly grouped into three distinct lineages (African lineage 1, African lineage 2, and Asian lineage 3) based on evolutionary divergence [ 1 , 2 ] . 

### Host	range Although cattle are the primary reservoir, RP virus causes severe disease in many species of wildlife [ 1 ] . The acute form of disease has been observed in cloven - h oofed animals such as the buffalo, eland, giraffe, lesser kudu, and warthog [ 3 ] . However, th ere is no evidence that wildlife serve as a reservoir for the virus. Rather, it is believed that cattle are the maintenance hosts, and if the virus is not present in cattle, it will die out in wildlife [4 ] . The incidence of rinderpest has declined significantly over the course of the last 20 years and its ge ographic distribution has been confined over the last decade. I n May 2011, based on the conclusion that rinderpest has ceased to circulate in animals, the OIE announced its recognition of global rinderpest freedom [ 5 ] . 

### Morbidity	and	mortality Rinderpest typically presents as an acute disease with overt signs including fever, oculonasal discharges, mucosal necrosis and erosions, and ulcerations in the d igestive and upper respiratory tracts [ 6 ] . It is characterized by fever, necrotic stomatitis, gastroenteritis, profuse diarrhea, and dehydration [ 6 , 7 ] . The acute form can result in 80 - 90 percent mortality in cattle, buffalo, yaks, and many wildlife ungulat e species [4, 8 , 9 ] . A mild form of rin derpest, with wide variations in disease frequency and intensity, has been observed. Morbidity and mortality rates vary, both ranging from 0 - 10 percent, and classical clinical or epidemiological features may be lacking [ 6 ] , which poses a challenge for disease detection. T he mild form of rinderpest is most clearly demonstrated in lineage 2 viruses from East Africa [ 10 ] , but has been observed with all three RP virus lineages [ 1 ] . Outbreaks of the mild form of rinderpest have occurred in Egypt (African lineage 1), Kenya (African lineage 1), northern Iraq (Asian lineage 3), and the Somali pastoral ecosystem (African lineage 2) [ 1 ] .108

108 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest The mild form of rinderpest has been observed in highly endemic areas and in populations with some inherited resistanc e [ 6 ] . W hen rinderpest first occurs in a naïve population, its virulence increases, and when the virus becomes endemic, its virulenc e decreases [ 8 ] . A ccordingly, the selection pressure for rinderpest virulence is affect ed by the disease situation and immune status of potential hosts in an area, with populations of naïve cattle presenting a selection pressure for virulence, and populations of partially immune cattle presenting a selection pressure for attenuation [ 8 ] . 

### Incubation	period RP virus has an infectious period of 1 - 2 weeks; for international trade p urposes, the incubation period is assumed to be 21 days [ 7 ] . RP virus has no latency period and does not result in persistent infection [ 11 ] , nor does infection induce a carrier state [ 1 ] . 

### Sources	of	virus	and	transmission During periods of clinical disease, RP virus can be found in expired air, nasal and ocular discharges, saliva, feces, semen, vaginal discharges, urine and milk [ 7 ] . S hedding of small amounts of virus in tears, nasal secretions, saliva, urine, feces and milk begins 1–2 days before pyrexia and subsequent onset of clinical signs; similarly, blood and tissues are infectious before the appearance of clinical signs. Close contact is required for viral spread; the most common means of introduction of rinderpest virus into free a reas is by way of infected animals [ 7 ] . The virus is not vertically transmitted and there are no arthropod vectors [ 4 ] . A single incident in which pigs were fed meat scraps from infected animals and contracted the disease has been docume nted [ 1 ] ; however, animal products are not a common source of infection [ 12 ] . 

### Inactivation	and	survival Rinderpest virus is not very stable and probably does not survived in dried secretions, excretions, or carcasses for more than a few days [ 12 ] . It is relatively heat sensitive, with a half
life of 5 minutes in cattle blood, spleen, or lymph node at 56°C. The virus is inactivated at temperatures above 70°C [ 13 ] . Only sma ll amounts of virus resist 56°C for 60 minutes or 60°C for 30 minutes [ 4, 7 ] . Rinderpest virus strains vary in their pH stability. At 4°C, RP virus is most stable at pH 7.2 - 7.9, with a half
- life of 3.7 days [ 14 ] . Generally, the virus is stable between ph 4.0 and 10.0 [ 7 ] , and rapidly inactivated (10 minutes) at pH 2 and 12 [ 15 ] . Maurer reported in 1946 pH 7.0 as the optimal value for RP virus survival [ 16 ] . The length of persistence of RP virus in the meat of infected animals is a subject of controversy. One report suggests that RP virus - infected carcasses are rendered safe relatively quickly [ 17 ] , whereas another report indicates that RP virus survives more than 9 days in chilled meat and could persist 33 days or even 18 weeks [ 18 ]109

109 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest Rinderpest virus is rapidly inactivated by heat, light, ultraviolet radiation, and drying, but does remain viable for long periods in chilled or frozen tissues [ 4, 7 , 18 ] 

### Vaccination A full description of vaccination techniques is ava ilable from the OIE’s Manual of Diagnostic Tests and Vaccines for Terrestrial Animals . G enerally, v accination against RP virus yields lifelong immunity. H owever, in conjunction with the OIE’s drive for global eradication of rinderpest, vaccination in rec ent years was considerably curtailed and replaced by active and passive clinical and serological surveillance [ 3 ] . 

### Laboratory	Diagnostics A full description of applied laboratory techniques is available from the OIE’s Manual of Diagnostic Tests and Vaccines for Terrestrial Animals . Generally, laboratory confirmation is based the presence of the virus, virus - specific RNA or precipitating antigens in samples from the spleen, lymph nodes, or ocular or nasal secretions. To accomplish this, the OIE describes virus neutralization, reverse -transcription polymerase chain reaction (RT
- PCR), agar gel immun odiffusion (AGID), and direct and indirect enzyme - linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA) techniques. Virus neutralization is considered the ‘gold standard’; a competitive ELISA is the prescribed test for international trade [ 3 ] . 

### References 1. Roeder, P.L., and Taylor, W.P., Rinderpest. Vet Clin Food Anim, 2002. **18** : p. 515 - 547. 2. Chamberlain, R.W., Wamwayi, H.M., Hockley, E., Shaila, M.S., Goatley, L., Knowles, N.J., Barrett, T., Evidence for different lineages of rinderpest virus reflecting their geographic isolation. J Gen Virol, 1993. **74** (12): p. 2775
- 2780. 3. World Organization for Animal Health (OIE). Manual of Diagnostic Tests and Vaccines for Terrestrial Animals 2011, Chapter 2.1.15., Rinderpest . Available from: http://www.oie.int/eng/normes/ mmanual/2008/pdf/2.01.15_RINDERPEST.pdf . 4. Saliki J and Wholstein P, Rinderpest in Foreign Animal Diseases, 7th Edition Revised 2008, Committee on Foreign and Emerging Diseases of the United States Animal Health Association. Boca Publications Group, Inc: Boca Raton, FL. 5. World Organization for Animal Health (OIE). Resolution No. 18, 'Declaration of Global Eradication of Rinderpest and Implementation of Follow
- up Measures to Maintain World Freedom from Rinderpest'. Available from: http://www.oie.int/fileadmin/Home/eng/Media_Center/docs/pdf/RESO_18_EN.pdf . 6. Wohlsein, P., and Saliki, J., Rinderpest and Peste des Petits Ruminants - The Diseases: Clincal Signs and Patho logy, in Rinderpest and Peste des Petits Ruminants: Virus Plagues of Large and Small Ruminants 2006, Thomas Barrett, Paul - Pierre Pastoret, and William P. Taylor, eds. Elsevier: New York, NY. 7. World Organization for Animal Health (OIE). Rinderpest- Animal Diseases Data - Technical Disease Card . Available from: http://www.oie.int/fileadmin/Home/eng/Animal_Health_in_the_World/docs/pdf/RIND ERPEST_FINAL .pdf .110

110 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest 8. Scott, G.R., Rinderpest. Adv Vet Sci, 1964. **9** : p. 113 - 124. 9. Rossiter, P.B., Hussain, M., Raja, R.H., Moghul, W., Khan, Z., and Broadbent, D.W., Cattle Plague in Shangri- La: Observations on a Severe Outbreak of Rinderpest in Northern Pakistan 1994 - 1995. Vet Rec, 1998. **143** (2): p. 39
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