ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS GREG ABBOTT

The Honorable JeffWentworth Chair, Senate Select Committee on Veterans' Health Texas State Senate Post Office Box 12068 Austin, Texas 78711-2068
Dear Senator Wentworth: January 4,2011 Opinion No. GA-0833 Re: Whether a metropolitan transit authority may, under section 451.616 ofthe Transportation Code, charge a withdrawn city for special transit services provided to the city's residents with disabilities (RQ-0899-GA)

Onbehalfofthe City ofWestLake Hills (the "City"), you ask whether CapitalMetropolitan TransitAuthority ("Capital Metro") has "the authority to charge the City for special transit services that Capital Metro provides" to certain residents with disabilities who reside in the City.' You explain that Capital Metro was created in 1985 when voters in Austin and other surrounding municipalities, including the City, approved of its creation. Request Letter at 1. In 1987, the Texas Legislature enacted the predecessorto section 451.603 ofthe Transportation Code, allowingcertain cities to withdraw from ametropolitanrapidtransit authority such as CapitalMetro.2 Pursuant to this statute, the City voted to withdraw effective January 19, 1988. 

### Id. Subsequent to theCity'swithdrawal, the Legislatureenactedsection451.610oftheTransportationCode,requiring that metropolitan rapid transit authorities "continue to provide transportation services for persons with disabilities in a withdrawn unit of election.'" Thus, pursuant to this statute, you tell us that "Capital Metro provides special transit services to certain residents with disabilities who reside in the City" despite that the City has withdrawn from Capital Metro. Request Letter at 1. Alongside section451.610, the Legislatureestablished aprocedurefor funding suchservices: The Comptroller shallwithholdfrom the amount ofsales and use tax revenue refunded to a unit of election that has withdrawn from an IRequest Letter at 1-2 (available at http://www.texasattorneygenera1.gov). 2Act ofMay 22, 1987, 70thLeg., R.S., ch. 790, § 7,1987 Tex. Gen. Laws 2774, 2777 (amended 1989 &1995) (current version at TEx. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 451.603 (West 2007)).

3Act ofMay 27, 1991, 72d Leg., R.S., ch. 503, § 6, 1991 Tex. Gen. Laws 1766, 1767 (amended 1995) (current version at TEx. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 451.610 (West 2007)).The Honorable JeffWentworth

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authority the full amount of the difference between the cost of providing services to persons with disabilities in the unit ofelection and the fares charged during the period in which the sales anduse tax was collected and remit this amount to the authority providing the services. TEX. TRANsp. CODE ANN. § 451.616(a) (West Supp. 2010). You explain that pursuant to this section, the Comptrolleris giving aportion oftheCity'smonthly sales and usetax revenueto Capital Metro as a reimbursement for the cost of providing special transit services to the City's disabled residents. RequestLetter at I. Given that sections 451.610 and451.616 ofthe Transportation Code were enacted in 1991, after the City withdrew from Capital Metro, you question whether these statutes are retroactive as applied to the City in violation ofthe Texas Constitution. 

### !d. at 1-2. Article I, section 16 ofthe Texas Constitution provides, "No
...retroactive law
... shall be made." TEX. CONST. art. I, § 16. "Aretroactive law literally means a law that acts onthings which are past." 

### Suharu of Am., Inc. v. DavidMcDavid Nissan, Inc., 84 S.W.3d 212, 219 (Tex. 2002). When it enacted sections 451.610 and451.616 ofthe Transportation Code, the Legislature imposed a new duty onthe Cityto payfor services providedbyCapital Metro to the City's disabledresidents, but it did so only on a prospective, rather than on a retroactive, basis. Only from the effective date ofthe statute onward were withdrawn cities required to fund these services. Withdrawn cities may have expected to have no further involvement with such authorities after voting to withdraw. However, '"[aJ statute does not operate 'retrospectively' merely because it
... upsets expectations based in prior law.'" 

### Quick v. City of Austin, 7 S.W.3d 109, 132 (Tex. 1998) (quoting

### Landgrafv. USIFilm Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 269 (1994)). No entity has a vested right merely in the continuance ofpresent law in relation to a particular subject. 

### Suharu, 84 S.W.3d at 219 (citation omitted). The Legislature may change laws so long as it does not destroy or prevent the adequate enforcement of vested rights, neither ofwhich it did here. 

### Id. The City argues through its briefthat the Legislature has impaired the City'S vested rights by requiring the City to pay Capital Metro for services provided, which, the City argues, unlawfully deprives the City ofthe use ofits sales and use taxes. 4 However, a municipality "acquires no vested rights against the State." 

### Tooke v. Mexia, 197 S.W.3d 325, 345 (Tex. 2006); 

### Deacon v. City of Euless, 405 S.W.2d 59, 62 (Tex. 1966). As a creation of the Legislature, a municipality has no privileges or immunities which it may invoke in opposition to the will of its creator. 

### Williams v. Mayor of Baltimore, 289 U.S. 36,40 (1933). Wetherefore conclude that sections451.610 and451.616 oftheTransportation Code are not retroactive in violation of article I, section 16 of the Texas Constitution. Capital Metro is not prohibited by that constitutional provision from charging the City for transportation servic.es provided to the City's residents with disabilities pursuant to the Transportation Code.

'See Brieffrom Alan J. Bojorquez, City Attorney at 2 (Aug. 17,2010) (on file with the Opinion Committee).The Honorable JeffWentworth

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### SUMMARY Sections 451.610 and451.616 ofthe Transportation Code are not retroactive statutes in violation ofarticle

### I, section 16 ofthe Texas Constitution. Capital Metro is therefore not prohibited by that constitutionalprovision from chargingthe CityofWestLakeHills for transportation services provided to the City's residents with disabilities pursuant to the Transportation Code.

DANIEL T. HODGE First Assistant Attorney General DAVID J. SCHENCK Deputy Attorney General for Legal Counsel NANCY S. FULLER Chair, Opinion Committee Virginia K. Hoelscher Assistant Attorney General, Opinion Committee