# United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued April 22, 2020 Decided July 21 , 2020

No. 18

- 1337

I NDEPENDENT P RODUCERS G ROUP
, A PPELLANT

v.

C OPYRIGHT R OYALTY B OARD AND L IBRARIAN OF C ONGRESS
, A PPELLEES

A MAZING F ACTS
, I NC
., ET AL
., I NTERVENORS

Consolidated with 19

- 1116

On Appeals from the Copyright Royalty Judges

Brian D. Boydston argued the cause and filed the briefs for appellant.

Martin V. Totaro , Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief was Daniel Tenny , Attorney. Mark R. Freeman , Attorney, entered

an appearance.2

Matthew J. MacLean

, Jessica T. Nyman

, Michael A. Warley

, Gregory O. Olaniran

, Luc y Holmes Plovnick

, Daniel A. Cantor

, R. Stanton Jones

, Michael Kientzle

, Philip R. Hochberg , and Jeremy W. Dutra were on the brief for intervenors in support of appellees.

Before: G RIFFITH and P ILLARD
, Circuit Judges , and S ILBERMAN
, Senior Circuit Judge

.
Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge P ILLARD

.

P ILLARD
, Circuit Judge : Under the Copyright A ct , when a cable or satellite company retransmits programs initially aired on broadcast stations , the Register of Copyrights collects royalty fees under a compulsory licens ing scheme and later redistributes the fees to the appropriate copyright owners. The Copyright Royalty Judges (the Judges) preside over royalty distribution p roceeding s and settle disputes among royalty fee claimants. Appellant Worldwide Subsidy Group LLC dba Independent Producers Group (IPG) , an agent for royalty claimants in these proceedings, challeng es a series of decisions by the Copyright Royalty Judges denying most of its clients’ royalty fee claims for programming in the devotional and program suppliers’ categories that was retransmi tted by cable for 2004

- 2009 and by satellite for 1999

- 20 09 . IPG lost the right to pursue many of its clients’ claims as a result of a discovery sanction and because , after the J udges held that IPG was not entitled to a “presumption of validity” for either its represent ative role or the validity of the royalty claims it proffered , IPG failed to establish for certain claims that it was a duly appointed agent pressing valid claims . IPG challenges the factual grounds for th o se determinations and contends they are so disproportionately harsh as to be an abuse of discretion. It also challenges as arbitrary the Judges’ final distribution3

methodologies for allocat ing the royalties to all eligible claimants

.
We affirm the Copyright Royalty Judges on all three challenges: the revocation of the presumption of validity, the imposition of discovery sanctions, and the final distribution of royalties.

I. Background

A. Statutory Structure

Congress has prescribed a centralized clearinghouse system for collecting royalty fees from anyone who re transmits a copyrighted television program and for distributing the fees to the program ’ s copyright holder. T he Copyright Act allows cable and satelli te operators to retransmit copyrighted programs without permission , requiring only that the operators deposit a statutorily prescribed royalty fee with the Register of Copyrights every six months for programs retransmitted during that period

. See 17 U.S.C. § 111(c), (d) (cable); id. § 119(a), (b) (satellite) . The Copyright Royalty Judges annually decide how to distribute the resulting pool of funds to the relevant copyright hold ers. Id. § 801(b)(3).

Every July, copyright owners (or their agents ) who assert entitlement to certain royalties for transmission of their programming during the preceding year file claim s with the Judges. Id. § 111(d)(4)(A); 37 C.F.R. § 360. 3

. Each fi ling entity must certif y that it is authori zed to file the claim. See U.S. Copyright Royalty Judges, In r e Distribution of 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, & 2009 Cable Royalty Funds

, In re Distribution of 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, & 2009 Satellite Royalty Funds

, Nos. 2012

- 6 CRB CD 200 4

- 09 (Phase II); 2012

- 7 CRB SD 1999

- 20094

(Phase II), Memorandum Opinion and Ruling on Validity and Categorization of Claims 5 (Mar. 13, 2015) (Claims Ruling). Absent any challenge to th at c ertification, the Judges afford the filed claim a “presumption of validity

, ” meaning the y treat the claim as facially valid and the filer as duly authorized

. I d. The Judges review these claims and “determine whether there exists a controversy concerning the distribution of royalty fees.” 17 U.S.C. § 111(d)(4)(B). If there are no disputed claims, the Judges authorize the Librarian of Congress to distribute the fees to the claimants on a proportional basis

. Id. Only if there is a controversy must the Judges conduct a proceeding to resolve disputes regarding the appropriate distribution. Id.

A copyright royalty distribution proceeding has two phases. During Phase I, the claimants group themselves into categorie s based on the type of retransmitted broadcasting. See 37 C.F.R. § 351.1(b)(2)(i) (B); id. § 351.1(b)(ii)(C) . The two categories relevant here are “ program suppliers ” and

“ devotional ” programming. Claims Ruling at 1. The Judges then calculate the total market value of all programming in each category during the relevant year and

, based on its relative value, assign each category a percentage of the annual pool of royalty fees. See id. § 351.1(b)(2)(i)(B). During Phase II, at issue here, the Judges subdivide the fees due to a particular category among the individual claimants in that category. Id.

Each phase follows the same set of procedures, designed to promote expeditious and amic able resolution among the claimants. After the Judges announce the commencement of distribution proceedings in the Federal Register, 17 U.S.C. § 803(b)(1)(A)(i), claimants petition to participate, see id. § 803(b)(1). A claimant may file an individual pe tition or join with other claimants and share representation

. 37 C.F.R. § 351.1(b)(2). The Act imposes a three

- month “voluntary negotiation period” during which participating claimants must5

attempt to reach agreement on their relative shares. 17 U.S.C. § 803(b)(3).

As to disputes the claimants are unable to resolve through negotiation , the Judges accept written submissions, oversee a period for discovery, and order a post

- discovery settlement period. See id. § 803(b)(6)(C); 37 C.F.R. §§ 351.4

- 351.7. F or Phase I, discovery usually involves expert testimony categoriz ing programs and their market shares. For Phase II, discovery involves both proof that individual claimants in fact represent the copyright holders and expert testimony proposing methodologi es for subdivid ing fees among claimants in specific program categories. A fter the post

- discovery settlement period, the Judges hear any remaining disputes and issue final determination s on the merits. See 17 U.S.C. § 803(c)(1); 37 C.F.R. §§ 351.8

- 351.12. The Librarian of Congress publishes th ose determination s in the Federal Register and distributes the royalty fees accordingly . 17 U.S.C. § 803(c)(6).

B. Procedural History

A s noted at the outset, a t issue here are royalty fees for retransmis sion of programming in the devotional and program suppliers categories by cable providers during 2004

- 2009 and by satellite providers during 1999

- 2009

. There are three repeat players who claim to represent the copyright holders of

programs retransmitted v ia both cable and satellite in these categories: Appellant IPG, claim ing royalties for programs in both categories; Intervenors Settling Devotional Claimants (SDC), claim ing only for devotional programming ; and6

Intervenors Motion Picture Association (MPA)

, 1 claim ing only in the program suppliers category.

1. The c laims validity hearings

IPG, the SDC, and MPA did not participate in the Phase I proceeding s but successfully petitioned to participate in Phase
II. See 78 Fed. Reg. 50,113 , 50,114 (Aug. 16, 2013) (cable retransmissions); 78 Fed. Reg. 50,114 , 50,115 (Aug. 16, 2013) (satellite retransmissions). On December 8, 2014, the Copyright Royalty Judges held a five

- day evidentiary hearing to resolve disputes over the validity and categorizati on of claims . T hey heard live testimony from five witnesses and admitted 180 exhibits.

a. Presumption of validity

The SDC argued that IPG should be disqualified from participating, or at least denied the presumption of validity

, because one of the clai ms advanced by IP G was a fraudulent

one on behalf of “Tracee Productions,” a fictitious entity . IPG had purported to represent Tracee Productions in an earlier proceeding and the Copyright Royalty Judges denied IPG’s proffered claims the presumption of validity

. In response to the fraudulent Tracee Productions claim in the proceeding at issue here, the Judges stopped short of debarring IPG from representing claimants

, instead again denying a presumption of valid ity to IPG’s certification of its authority to represent claimants. The Judges based th at decision on two grounds: IPG’s failure to purge its filing of false claims and the Judges’

1 The Motion Picture Association was formerly the “Motion Picture Association of America,” or MPAA. The Judges and other parties commonly refer to it this way, although the correct term now seems to be “MPA.” See Intervenors’ Br. i.7

sua sponte conclusion that Raul Galaz, IPG’s principal witness, gave fals e testimony concerning a document IPG produced in discovery.

The fraudulent “Tracee Productions” claim has a history in which Galaz played a prominent role

. Galaz in 2002 was criminally convicted of defrauding the Copyright Office in order to obtain cable retransmission royalties belonging to others, and among the criminal acts to which he admitted was fraudulent filing in several proceedings on behalf of the nonexistent “Tracee Productio ns

. ” See U.S. Copyright Royalty Judges, In re Distribution of 1998 and 1999 Cable Royalty Funds , No. 2008

- 1 CRB CD 98

- 99 (Phase II), Ruling and Order Regarding Claims 3 (June 18, 2014) (2014 Claims Ruling) ; Judgment and Commitment, United States v. Galaz

, No. 02

- cr

- 230 (HHK) (D.D.C. Dec. 23, 2002)

. Before that fraud came to light, Galaz had filed a fraudulent claim on behalf of Tracee Productions as part of his claims to the 1999 cable royalty funds for de votional programming. 2014 Claims Ruling at 3. The fraudulent 1999 filing was not part of his criminal conviction but, by the time the Phase II proceedings for the 1998 and 1999 cable royalty funds for devotional programming commenced in 2008

, the facts surrounding Galaz’s conviction were available to the Copyright Royalty Judges and IPG had not withdrawn the fraudulent Tracee Productions filing. The Judges therefore denied IPG the presumption of validity in the 1998 and 1999 proceedings because of its f ailure to withdraw its 1999 fraudulent Tracee Productions claim before or during th os e proceedings

. Id. at 5

- 11. In the instant proceedings, the Judges found especially troubling IPG’s proffer of a Tracee Productions claim in its 1999 satellite retransmission filing because the 1998 and 1999 proceedings put it on notice that it must purge Tracee Productions from its claim submissions

.8

The Judges’ second ground for denying the presumption of validity was Galaz’s false testimony about IPG’s 2008 satellite claims filing. IPG filed separate lists of claims for satellite retransmissions and cable retransmissions. It argued that both lists of claims were identical. But while IPG produced in discovery a copy of its cable claim with consecutive numb er s of 1 to 10, it produced a copy of its satellite claim that appeared incomplete, as indicated by pages numbered 1 to 3 and 6 to 8. Noting the missing pages

, MPA and the SDC had moved to dismiss the claims of the 39 claimants listed on the cable claims filing but not included in the satellite claims filing. When questioned at the claims hearing, Galaz sought to blame the Copyright Royalty Board (CRB or the Board ) 2 for the missing pages

. He testif i ed that he personally had gone to the Board ’s records office to obtain a copy of the claims filing and received from the Board in its incomplete condition the version that IPG produced in discovery. S ee Claims Hrg. Tr. vol. 2, 104 :18

- 1 05 :16 . Galaz testified that he was “certain” IPG had originally f iled a complete version with the Board, and that it was the Board that had lost the missing pages after IPG fil ed its claims but before Galaz retrieved the copy from the Board that (Galaz testified)
IPG then produced in discovery in the Phase II proceeding

. I d. vol. 5, 201 :8

.
The Judges concluded that Galaz testified falsely because the evidence showed that the incomplete copy he claimed to have received from the Board and that IPG submitted in discovery could not in fact have come from the Board

. The Copyright Royalty Board inscribes a sequential number on the first page of any received claims filing. MPA obtained a

2 The Copyright Royalty Board is the institutional entity in the Library of Congress that houses the Copyright Royalty Judges and their staff. 37 C.F.R. § 301.1

.9

certified copy of the claims filing from the Board and produced it in discovery. T he copy submitted by IPG in discovery and the cert ified copy obtained by MPA from the Board

, both lack ing pages 4 and 5, differed in only one respect: MPA’s Board

- certified copy contained a handwritten “193” on the first page, whereas the copy IPG produced did not. Claims Ruling
at 8. The Judges theref ore concluded that Galaz could not have received the incomplete version submitted by IPG from the Board’s files, because a true copy would have included the Board’s handwritten number, as shown by the certified copy obtained by MPA. I nstead , the Judges co ncluded, Galaz must have received it elsewhere, “most likely IPG’s own records.” Id . On th at bas is , the Judges concluded that IPG had failed to submit claims on which it later sought to recover, and that Galaz testified falsely to the contrary

.

IPG file d a motion for modification to contest the Judges’ conclusion that Galaz gave false testimony by submitting Copyright Royalty Board records that contained certain irregularities. The Judges rejected the motion, noting that IPG’s new evidence showed that t he Boa rd placed numbers on each of 237 satellite claim filings from 2008, so did “nothing more than prove the point: the CRB numbers every claim that it accepts for filing.” U.S. Copyright Royalty Judges, In re Distribution of 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, & 2009 Cable Royalty Funds

, In re Distribution of 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, & 2009 Satellite Royalty Funds

, Nos. 2012

- 6 CRB CD 2004

- 09 (Phase II); 2012

- 7 CRB SD 1999

- 2009 (Phase II), Order on IPG Motions for
Mo dification 2 (Apr. 9, 2015) (Modification Ruling I)

.

b. Discovery sanctio n

The SDC also argued that IPG’s royalt y claims on behalf of Creflo Dollar Ministries (Creflo Dollar ) , Benny Hinn10

Ministries (Benny Hinn) , and Eagle Mountain International Church, dba Kenneth Copeland Ministries (Eagle Mountain)

, should be struck as a discovery sanction for IPG’s failure to produce to the SDC a particular email responsive to an SDC discovery request

. The SDC sought correspondence between IPG and devotional programming claimants relating to representation agreements. The withheld 2005 email, from a lawyer named David Joe to an IPG representative, concerns representation agreements between Joe’s “clients” and IPG. E

mail from David R. Joe, Brewer Anthony & Middlebrook PC, to Annie Lutzker

, et al. (Nov. 23, 2005) ( J.A. 2037 )

.
The parties dispute whether Joe is in fact an agent of any relevant “clients,” but whether or not these producers are accurately described as Joe’s “clients,” this email appears to refer to agreements between IPG and Benny Hinn, Creflo Dollar , and Eagle Mountain. I n the email itself Joe de scribe d the “matter at hand ” as “ the 1999 cable distribution,” and identified the agreements that we re “ the subject of this discussion ” as “ the sole agreement with Hinn and Creflo, and the second of two agreements with Copeland .” Id. Joe wrote that “I co uld easily support the position that these agreements are not in effect because they have been breached, if you think they have not been unequivocally terminated,” and noted that any plan on IPG’s part to represent these clients at the distribution proceeding “needs to be put to rest immediately, and after it is, you should, in all candor, expect that the termination provisions will be invoked.” Id.

The SDC claimed that the email was responsive to i ts discovery request. The Judges agreed, finding that IPG had failed to produce discovery “relating to claimants’ attempted termination(s) of IPG’s agency,” and disallowed IPG’s claims on behalf of the mentioned claimants, Creflo, Benny Hinn, and Eagle Mou ntain. Claims Ruling at 39. In contrast to the denial11

of the presumption of validity, which was not a sanction but a refusal to afford IPG a presumption that its conduct suggested it did not deserve, the Judges dismissed the se claims as a sanction for IP G’s discovery violation.

IPG twice mo ved to modif y th e discovery sanction, arguing that the email was irrelevant and the sanction too harsh

. T he Judges twice denied IPG’s motions, bolstering their decision by identifying additional discovery requests to which the email was responsive , yet was never produced

.

2. Distribution methodologies hearings

From April 13 to 17, 2015, the Judges held another hearing in which they received evidence and expert testimony regarding appropriate distribution methodolog ies for the royalties in the program suppliers and devotional programming categories. MPA offered a methodology for computing relative royalty shares in the program suppliers category, the SDC offered one for the devotional programming category, and IPG submitted a methodology that it contended should be used for both categories. The Judges faulted MPA and the SDC’s methodologies as supported by insufficient data

, and faulted IPG’s methodology for “its reliance on volume, time of day, fees paid and number of subscribers as measurements of value” U.S. Copyright Royalty Judges, In re Distribution of 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, & 2009 Cable Royalty Funds

, In re Distribution of 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, & 2009 Sat ellite Royalty Funds

, Nos. 2012

- 6 CRB CD 2004

- 09 (Phase II); 2012

- 7 CRB SD 1999

- 2009 (Phase II), Order Reopening Record and Scheduling Further Proceedings 6 (May 4, 2016) (Order Reopening Record). The Judges declined to adopt any of the offered methodolog ies and directed that the record be reopened. Id. at 8. The Judges “set aside” all submissions, evidence, and testimony from the April12

2015 hearing and ordered the parties to submit new evidence for a new hearing

. Id.

On motion from MPA and the SDC, t he Judges excluded all of IPG ’s evidence from the new hearing for two reasons: First, IPG asserted without explanation that it s sole witness, economic expert Dr. Cowan

, could not appear at the hearing and so would not be subject to cross

- examination . Second, the Judges ’ rules require that a party wishing to rely on the testimony of a witness from a prior proceeding must designate the complete testimony of that witness a nd include a copy of it

, 37 C.F.R. § 351.4(b)(2) , but IPG failed to do so

. IPG’s only evidence aside from Dr. Cowan ’s written testimony consisted of citations to testimony from witnesses in past distribution proceeding s . IPG failed to include transcripts of the designated testimony

, in violation of the Judges’ rules. See Final Distribution Determination: Distribution of 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, and 2009 Cable Royalty Funds; Distribution of 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, and 2009 Satellite Royalty Funds, 84 Fed. Reg. 16,038, 16,040 (Apr. 17, 2019) (Final Distribution Determination). The Judges nevertheless allowed IPG to use Dr. Cowan’s written testimony and IPG’s other exhibits in cross

- examining MPA and the SDC’s witnesses. Id. The Judges denied MPA and the SDC’s motion for summary disposition , instead conducting a hearing with live testimony t o afford IPG the opportunity to

cross

- examine the witnesses. Id.

Following the new hearing in the reopened proceeding , the Judges concluded that MPA and the SDC had fixed the paucity of data identified in the earlier hearing

. Id. at 16,04 3, 16,046

. The Judges adopt ed MPA’s methodology and proposed percentages for the program suppliers category, id. at 16,045, and adopt ed the SDC’s for the devotional category

, i d. at 16,048.13

II. Analysis

A. Standard of Review

We review d ecision s of the Copyright Royalty Judges to determine whether they are arbitrary

, capricious

, contrary to law or unsupported by substantial evidence

. See 17 U.S.C. § 803(d)(3) (incorporating by reference 5 U.S.C. § 706). “ Our review is ‘ highly deferential. ’ ” Settling Devotional Claimants v. CRB , 797 F.3d 1106, 1114 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (quoting Inte rcollegiate Broad

. Sys., Inc. v. CRB , 571 F.3d 69, 79 (D.C. Cir. 2009)). Objections to the Judges’ procedural and evidentiary orders “merge[] into and [are] reviewable” as part of the final determination. Id.

. We review the Judges’ determinations that a claimant violated its discovery obligations “with ‘extreme deference ’ b ecause the ‘conduct and extent of discovery in agency proceedings is a matter ordinarily entrusted to the expert agency in the first instance.’” Indep

. Producers Grp. v

. Librarian of Cong

. , 792 F.3d 132,
13 8

- 3 9 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (quoting Hi

- Tech Furnace Sys., Inc. v. FCC , 224 F.3d 781, 789 (D.C. Cir. 2000)). When reviewing royalty distribution decisions, including distribution methodologies, “we ask only whether the Royalt y Judges’ assigned allocation percentages are ‘within a zone of reasonableness.’” Settling Devotional Claimants , 797 F.3d at 1114 (quoting Christian Broad

. Network, Inc. v. Copyright Royalty Tribunal , 720 F.2d 1295, 1304 (D.C. Cir. 1983)).

B. Presumption of V alidity

IPG does not question the Judges ’ authority to determine when the presumption of validity applies

, but challenges their withholding of the presumption here as an abuse of discretion for want of substantial evidence that Galaz lied

. IPG furthe r contends that it received constitutionally inadequate process to14

contest the denial of the presumption that it was an authorized representative pressing valid claims . N either of these arguments has merit.

IPG produced evidence that the Copyright Royalty Board sometimes makes mistakes, but no thing call ed into question the evidence that the Board numbered every satellite filing it received for 2008, the IPG filing on record with the Board contained such numbe r ing

, and the version IPG produced did

not. IPG identifies a handful of instances in wh ich the Board lost a n entire filing or failed to number one

, and i t is certainly

“ not inconceivable over the course of six years for the [Board] to have misplaced a han dful of pages from a single claim filed by IPG

. ” Appellant’s Br. 46 (emphasis added ). But the mismatch between the claims number on the Board’s certified copy of IPG’s claims and that number’s absence on the copy produced by IPG is substantial evidence o f the falsity of Galaz’s testimony that IPG originally filed a complete copy, and only received the incomplete copy in discovery from the Board

.
The Judges’ decision to deny IPG the presumption of validity based on Galaz’s false testimony and the fraudulent Tracee Productions claim was not so severe as to be an abuse of discretion. The presumption allows efficient distribution of royalties ; without it, the Judges would have to verify agent

client relationsh ips and make copyright

- ownership determinations for each filer seeking copyright royalties.
W hen they are able to rely on the presumption, the Judges need only resolve the particular disputes, if any, that parties may raise concerning the distribution of royalty fees

. The relative efficiency of s uch a system requires the good faith of its participa nts but is seriously threatened by fraud or other abuse of the presumption. The system accommodates the Judges ’ excuse of good

- faith mistakes , but it certainly does not require15

the Judges to treat every irregularity as a good

- faith error. The Judges’ denial of the presumption to claims pressed by claimants who appear not to have act ed in good faith and, in the absence of evidence supporting claims bereft of the presumption

, their grant of royalties only to unquestioned claims and claimants is reasonable and non

- arbitrary.

The only effect on IPG of the Judges’ setting aside the presumption was to place a burden on IPG to establish its authority to represent the copyright holders on whose behalf it claimed royalties. “To maintain the viability of this claims distribution process, to preserve the reliability of the information presented to the Judges and to prevent the abus e of asymmetric information by participants, the elimination of the presumption of prima facie validity as to the claims IPG purports to represent constitutes a measured and proper response.” 2014 Claims Ruling at 11. Indeed, t he Judges ’ response was mil d in view of IPG’s repeat filing of fraudulent claims for a “client” previously found to be fictional and Galaz ’s obfuscat ory testimony about IPG ’s faulty filing

. IPG ’s los s of a large number of claims is no draconian sanction but rather the predictable a nd reasonable result of IPG’s failure to document its authority to represent the copyright holders , its failure to fil e a complete set of claims on their behalf , and Galaz’s attempt to cover up the latter failure by blaming the Board

.
There is no question here that the process IPG received was constitutionally adequate. IPG received notice that the presumption might be denied from both the MPA and the SDC’s written submissions requesting that relief . IPG had the opportunity at a heari ng to testify and present evidence in support of its position. The Judges further considered IPG’s position as urged in its motion for modification . IPG had all16

the process it was due. See Indep. Producers Grp. , 792 F.3d at 139 n.5.

C. Discovery S anction

IPG argues that its failure to produce the David Joe email was not a violation of any discovery obligation and that, even if it were, the sanction of dismissing the claims of the three producers IPG purported to represent was an abuse of discretion. It also argues that the Judges could not, consistent with due process principles, impose anything other than a monetary sanction without prior notice to I PG and a finding of prejudice to the SDC

. We hold that the sanction , whi le harsh, was not arbitrary and capricious and did not violate due

process.

Because the Copyright Royalty Judges are closer to the facts at hand and better able to determine what may or may not fall within the scope of discovery, we review the ir determinations that a claimant has violated its discovery obligations with “extreme de ference

. ” Indep. Producers Grp.

, 792 F.3d at 142 (quoting Hi

- Tech Furnace Sys. , 224 F.3d at 789). Even view ing their ruling without such deference, it is plain that the David Joe email is responsive to several of the SDC ’s discovery requests . For exampl e, the SDC’s D ocument R equest Number Six request ed “copies of all correspondence between IPG and Claimants with respect to the Devotional Representation Agreements,” U.S. Copyright Royalty Judges, In re Distribution of 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, & 2009 Cable Royalty Funds

, In re Distribution of 1999

- 2009 Satellite Royalty Funds

, Nos. 2012

- 6 CRB CD 2004

- 09 (Phase II);
2012

- 7 CRB SD 1999

- 2009 (Phase II), Settling Devotional Claimants’ Written Rebuttal Statement on Claims Issues Only 15

- 16 & n.4 (Oct. 15, 2014) (SDC Written Rebuttal Statement)

, and the SDC’s Follow

- Up Request Number Six requested17

documents “relating to termination or attempted termination of IPG by any claimant, ” Modification Ruling I at 5 n.5

. Whether

, as IPG contends, the David Joe email itself announced no termination or attempted termination is beside the point; the email is clearly a communication “ relat ing to ” IPG’s representation agreements and their potential termination . As the Judges noted, the very purpose of requesting all documents “relating to” a disputed issue is that “[t]he producing party does not m ake a judgment call regarding what evidence might be probative, persuasive, or admissible.” Id. at 4. IPG’s failure to produce a plainly responsive document, even accounting for IPG’s own reading of the document as ultimately exculpatory

, was a blatant d iscovery violation.

Whether the imposed sanction was reasonable presents a closer question. We evaluate the choice of sanction under the same standards by which we judge other administrative actions, reversing only if

— taking account of the nature of their authority and the context in which they have exercised it

— “their decision is arbitrary, capr icious, contrary to law, or not based on substantial evidence.” Settling Devotional Claimants

, 797 F.3d at 1114 (citation omitted). It is not for us to determine whether the Copyright Judges’ choice was the one we also would have taken. Just as they are equipped to make the factual determination as to whether a discovery violation has occurred, the Judges are better positioned to evaluate the appropriate severity of a sanction in the context of the discovery violation’s impact on the participants and the overall proceeding.

IPG submits various inadmissible estimations of the proportion of the royalties to which these three producers might otherwise have been entitled , but the Copyright Royalty Board do es not dispute that the dismissal of their claims w as a substantial loss to IPG. IPG contends that, under the standard applicable when a district court dismiss es a litigant’s claims as18

a discovery sanction , the Judges’ sanction was invalid

. In civil litigation in federal court, a sanction of c laim dismis sal must be justified by “(1) prejudice to the other party, (2) prejudice to the judicial system requiring the district court ‘to modify its own docket and operations to accommodate the delay,’ [or] (3) the need ‘to sanction conduct that is disrespectful t o the court and to deter similar conduct in the future.’” Butera v. District of Columbia , 235 F.3d 637, 661 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (quoting Webb v. District of Columbia , 146 F.3d 964, 971 (D.C. Cir. 1998) ) ; see also id. (noting district court authority to sanction pursuant to Fed eral Rule of Civ il P rocedure 37(b)(2) and the court’s inherent power to protect the integrity of the judicial process ).

We do not think that standard is applicable here. The d is covery and sanctions regime in federal district court s is materially different from discovery and claim verification in distribution proceedings under the Copyright Act. The Copyright Royalty Judges do not derive their sanctioning

power from authorities governing Article III courts ; instead, Congress empowe red the se specialist Judges to supervise disbursement of broadcast royalties

. The Act empowers the Judges to “make any necessary procedural or evidentiary rulings” in the royalty proceedings. 17 U.S.C. § 801(c). And their “plenary grant of adjudicative authority” includes power to impose “sanctions when necessary to ensure fairness and maintain [the] integrity” of the copyright claims process. Indep. Producers Grp.

, 792 F.3d at 138 n.4 (citing Atl

. Richfield Co. v. Dep’t of Energy , 769 F.2d 771, 775, 795

- 96 (D.C. Cir. 1985)). In contrast to litigation in federal court, t he copyright royalties distribution process is largely clerical, designed to enable good

- faith participants to recover their royal ties through a streamlined, amicable

, administrative procedure . The administrative hearings backstop the clerical process, and even they stop short of full adversary trial s

.19

Rather, where disputes arise over submitted royalty claims, the Act provides for a period to further encourage amicable settlement and, failing that, discovery and hearing s geared toward expeditious resolution by the Judges. IPG has cited no authority to import discovery

- sanction standards designed for adversarial adjudication in fed eral district court into proceedings crafted by Congress to suit the specific needs of routine royalty disbursement to holders of broadcast copyrights.

The Judges ’ choice of sanction in this case , while severe , was not unreasonable. IPG withheld an ema il plainly responsive to SDC discovery requests

, and the Judges responded by dismiss ing the directly implicated claims

— those mentioned in the ema il

. The Judges “reasonably responded to a blatant discovery violation by IPG,” Indep. Producers Grp.

, 792 F.3d at 138, and so long as the sanction falls within reasonable parameters , we must affirm even if a lesser sanction might have sufficed to preserve the integrity of distribution proceedings. IPG had notice that the Judges might dismiss its clients’ claims becaus e the SDC requested that the claims be struck

. IPG then had the opportunity to argue against dismis sal at a hearing and in two subsequent motio ns for modification, which satisfies the requiremen ts of due process.

D. Distribution methodologies

Finally, IPG objects to the final royalty distribution methodologies selected by the Judges , contending that the Judges had previously rejected th os e very methodologies for insufficient evidence . It also argues that the exclusion of IPG’s expert reports as noncompliant with the Judges’ published rules elevated “form over substance” and , because it left IPG’s cla ims fatally unsupported, was an abuse of discretion. Appellant ’ s Br. 70. We hold that the Judges ’ distribution20

methodology decisions were well “within a zone of reasonableness.” Settling Devotional Claimants , 797 F.3d at 1114 (quotation marks and citati on omitted).

First, the Judges were within their discretion in holding that IPG’s expert reports failed to conform to the Judges’ published regulations in that IPG fail ed to attach copies of prior testimony that it wished to designate in the new proceedin g

. See 84 Fed. Reg. at 16,040 n.12 (citing 37 C.F.R. § 351.4(b)(2) )

. The Judges fairly allowed IPG to use the reports in cross

- examining the SDC and MPA’s experts, but IPG failed to undermine the experts

. When the Judges faulted IPG for lacking evidence or expert analysis to rebut the SDC and MPA’s experts, they w ere not automatically ruling against IPG for its want of an expert, but legitimately noting that “[c]riticism by IPG’s counsel is not a substitute for expert rebuttal testimony.” Id. at 16,046.

Second, the Judges reasonably adopted the SDC and MPA’s methodologies once they both fixed the evidentiary problems the Judges had initially identified. T he Judges must apportion royalties among rightsho lders for specific programs
in each program

- category pool. To do so, they must determine the relative marketplace value of those programs

— a calculation highly dependent on viewership. See Indep. Producers Grp. , 792 F.3d at 142. For cable and satellite

r etransmission royalties, the relevant viewership data quantify distant viewershi p , as the royalties are for retransmissions elsewhere of locally aired programs. The Judges initially faulted MPA and the SDC for lacking data showing a correlation between local ratings and distant viewership sufficient t o justify quantifying distant viewership as a function of local ratings. See Order Reopening Record at 2

- 5.21

MPA’s methodology apportion ed royalties in the program suppliers category based on the respective number of hours that cable and satellite subscribers viewed MPA

- represented and
IPG

- represented programs. 84 Fed. Reg. at 16,042. Because obtaining distant viewership data for every year was prohibitively expensive, MPA’s expert i nitially used local viewing data from 2000 to 2009 and distant viewing data from 2000 to 2003 to calculate the relationship between them and

use d that formula to predict distant viewership for the years such data were unavailable. See Order Reopening Record at 3. The Judges held that there were too many reasons the relationship between known local and distant viewing data from 2000

- 2003 would not validly project unknown distant viewership based on known local viewership data for the 20 04

- 2009 period. They found the eviden ce inadequate without either (1) more contemporaneous data from which to derive a relationship or (2) other evidence that could persuade the Judges such data were not needed for the methodology to be reliable. Id. at 4. In the new hearing, MPA supplied distant viewership data from 2008

- 2009, 84 Fed. Reg. at 16,042, and its expert relied on the new and previously submitted data to explain that the relationship between local and distant data observed from 2000 to 2003 d id not change significantly for the period from 2008 to 2009, see id. at 16,04 3. The Judges reasonably held that the additional two years of distant viewing data beyond what was submitted in the initial hearing satisfied their first concern, and the similarity of the relationship rendered reliable the expert’s extrapolation regarding the years for which data remained unavailable

. See id. The Judges reasonably accepted the new evidence as remedying their earlier evidentiary concerns and adopted the methodology.

The Judges had initially faulted the SDC’s methodology for similar problems, as its expert , extrapolating from local data from the periods in question, relied on distant viewing data22

limited to February 1 999 for what the expert claimed was a statistically significant correlation between local and distant viewership. Order Reopening Record at 5. The Judges concluded that the SDC’s methodology suffered from a “critical lack of data,” both because there was no evidentiary basis to conclude that a correlation “in the 1999 data continues unchanged throughout the entire succeeding decade” and because

, even for the local data, the SDC’s expert had relied on evidence from a single month in each year from 1999 to 2003. Id. As it had with MPA’s data, the Judges held the SDC’s methodology faulty absent more contemporaneous distant viewing data and more local ratings data, or grounds to

conc lude such data were not necessary. Id.

In the reopened proceeding, the SDC remedied both th o se evidentiary deficiencies to the Judges’ satisfaction. The SDC’s expert added distant view ership data from 1999 through 2003

at four different times during i n each year . 84 Fed. Reg. at 16,045. And he gathered complete local data for the years 2004 to 2009 and used the data to demonstrate that program ratings from a single month ( i.e. , February) were representative of ratings throughout the year.

The Judges held that the SDC and MPA ’s additional data “present ed a quantum of persuasive evidence and analysis demonstrating a positive correlation between local ratings and distant viewing that is consistent over time .” Id. at 16,046 (emphasis added)

. IPG has offered no evidence or argument that call s into question the reasonableness of th e Judges’ conclusion

, other than to raise a broadside objecti o n to any viewership

- based methodology in Phase II proceedings

— an objection that we have repeatedly rejected. See, e.g.

, Settling Devotional Claimants v. CRB , Nos. 15

- 1084, 15

- 1093, 2017 WL 1483329, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 10, 2017); Indep. Producers Grp. , 792 F.3d at 142.23

* * *

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the final determination of the Copyright Royalty Judges and the underlying orders challenged on appeal.

So ordered.