Filed 5/2/16 In re K .R. CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or or dered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

In re K.R., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.
K.R., Defendant and Appellant. G051085 (Super. Ct. No. DL049706)

O P I N I O N

Appeal from a n order of the Superior Court of Orange County, Deborah C. Servino, Judge. Affirmed.

Sarita Ordonez, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland , Kimberley A. Donohue and Kathryn Kirschbaum , Dep uty Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.2 Minor K.R. admitted misdemeanor possession of concentrated cannabis (Health & Saf. Code, § 11357, subd. (a))

. She contends the juvenile court erroneously
denied her motion to suppress evidence (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 700.1)

. We disagree and
affirm the challenged order.
FACTS

Fountain Valley Police Officer Brian Casteel stopped a yellow Toyota
Scion on suspicion of illegally tinted windows. Following the stop, Casteel searched the

car with the driver’s consent and found methamphetamine, concentrated cannabis, and heroin in the glove compartment

. Minor was the front seat passenger

.

In minor ’s pretrial motion to suppress , she argued t he drugs were discovered as a result of a warrantles s search and during an unlawful detention. The district attorney asserted the traffic stop was justified by Casteel’s reasonable suspicion the Scion’s tinted windows violated the Vehicle Code

.

At the hearing, Casteel testified he had been a patrol offi cer for three years
and 10 months , and he had personally conducted over 100 traffic stops involving illegally
tinted windows

. In the early morning hours of March 14, 2014, Casteel saw the Scion
turn left in front of him

. He was about 200 feet away from the car as it drove through a
well

- lighted intersection. Casteel realized that he could not “ see inside the vehicle based
on the tint

. ” Based on his experience and observations, Casteel believed the Scion’s window tinting violated Vehicle Code section 26708

.

Casteel activated his overhead lights and the Scion yielded

. A s Casteel
walked toward the driver’s door , he smell ed the odor of burned marijuana emanat ing
from the passenger compartment

. Casteel recognized the drive r, J.M., from a prior drug

arrest

. Casteel also noticed that J.M. ’ s pupils were dilated, and he was fidgeting and smacking his lips. Based on these facts , Casteel suspect ed J.M. was driving while under
the influence of a drug

. Casteel ordered J.M. and the car’s other occupants , including
minor , to disembark

.3 After J.M. perform ed field sobriety tests, Casteel asked for , and received , J.M.’s consen t to search the car. On the passenger floor board , Casteel found a pipe that
smelled of burn ed marijuana

. In the glove compartment, he found two cigarette cartons

. One carton contai n ed concentrated cannabis, while the other held metha m phe tamine and
heroin

. Minor did not testify, but she called the service manager from a large Toyota dealership to testify that many cars have darkened windows due to standard factory glaze that is legally applied by car manufacturers. A defense investigator testified
the Scion had factory glazing and not illegal custom tinting. However, t he investigator
conceded the best way to determine if a car ’ s tinted windows violate the Vehicle C ode is

to mak e a traffic stop and look

.

T he court denied the motion to suppress and explained :

“ In this instance Officer Casteel had a reasonable suspicion that this was a window tinting violation. He could not see into the car. And the court does find his testimony to be credible regarding that aspect. Th e fact th at he has maybe a mistaken understanding of the law that any type of tinting , not necessarily even glazing, would be a
Vehicle Code violation , is not really at issue here.

“ Really what it is is, even if he had a mistaken factual belief that this car had illegal tinting because he couldn ’ t see through it, but it actually was fac tory glazing that was acceptable with Vehicle Code section 26708, that mistaken factual belief held reasonably and in good faith can still provide a respons ible suspicion for a traffic stop,
which is what the courts have held. ”
DISCUSSION

Minor makes tw o related arguments . First, she argues Casteel did not have a reasonable suspicion the window tinting on J .M.’s car violated the Vehicle C ode.
Second , she asserts Casteel merely used window tinting as a pretext to illegally detain
J.M. We disagree with both points

.4 “ In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress evidence, we view the record in the light most favorable to the trial court ’ s ruling and defer to its findings of historical fact, whether express or implied, if they are supported by substanti al evidence. We then decide for ourselves what legal principles are relevant, independently apply them to the historical facts, and determine as a matter of law whether there has been an
unreasonable search and/or seizure. [Citation.] ” ( People v. Mirand a (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 917, 922 ( Miranda ) .)

A police officer may “ legally stop a motorist only if the facts and
circumstances known to the officer support at least a reasonable suspicion that the driver
has violated the Vehicle Code or some other law. [Citations.] ” ( Miranda , supra , 17 Cal.App.4th at p. 926 .) Vehicle Code section 26708, subdivision (a) states, in pertinent part, “ (2) A person shall not drive any motor vehicle with any object or material placed, displayed, installed, affixed, or appli ed in or upon the vehicle that obstructs or reduces the driver’s clear view through the windshield or side windows.” An officer’s opinion based on his or her “ commonsense examination of a vehicle that there is a film placed upon the vehicle ’ s windows in a n unauthorized place or that light is obstructed in the fashion contemplated by the statute, ” constitutes substantial evidence to support a conviction under section 26708 , subdivision (a)

. ( People v. Niebauer (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 1278 , 1292.)

In this case, Casteel, a patrol veteran with 100 prior stops for tinted
window s , testified he believed the window tinting on the Scion violated the Vehicle Code, because it prevented him from seeing in to the passenger compartment. He made
these observations when t he Scion was about 200 feet away and in a well

- lighted intersection. Based on these observations and Casteel’s experience, the court found Casteel reasonably, even if mistakenly, believed the window tinting on the Scion violated
V ehicle Code section 2670 8 . We agree.5 Casteel’s testimony is similar to the police officer’s testimony in People v.
Hanes (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th Supp. 6

. In Hanes, a three

- year veteran patrol officer with approximately 400 stops for tinted window s , testified the window tinting on the defendant’s car blocked his view of the car’s occupants. ( Id

. at p. 9.) The appellate court
determined the officer had an objectively reasonable suspicion the tinted window s violated the law based on his experience . ( Id . at pp. 9

- 10 .)

K .R. relies on People v. Butler (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 602, 607 ( Butler ) , but Butler is factually distinguishable

. In Butler , a police officer wanted to check out the occupants of a car parked near a liquor store because he thought they were planning a robbery

. ( Id. at p. 605.) When t he officer d rove toward the car, it start ed and sped past
him. ( Ibid. ) The officer gave chase and noticed its windows were darkened , which he
testified was an “‘obvious Vehicle Code violation.’” ( Ibid. )

The a ppellate c ourt in Butler concluded the officer ’ s testimony failed to
demonstrate a reasonable suspicion the car’s tinted window s violated the Vehicle Code , because the police officer made his observations from a significant distance and in the
dark , and hi s testimony about an obvious violation , wit hout elaboration, was equivocal and imprecise

. ( Butler , supra , 202 Cal.App.3d at p. 606. )

By contrast here , Casteel , a n almost four

- year patrol veteran with 100 prior stops for tinted windows , testified unequi vocally that he believed the tint ing on the Scion , which he saw from a distance of 200 feet in a well

- lit intersection , violat ed the Vehicle
Code because it prevented him from seeing into the passenger compartment

. The fact he may have been wrong does not render his belief objectively unreasonable.

Further, nothing in the record supports the a ssertion this was a pretext stop. While Casteel admitted he recognized J.M. from a prior drug arrest , that occurred after
the traffic stop . In any event, “ a stop which is reasonable based on the objective facts is not made unreasonable by the officer ’ s subjective hope the stop might yield evidence of
other crimes. [Citations.]” ( People v. Uribe (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 1432, 1438 .)6 F inally , when Casteel smelled burned marijuana, he had a reasonable suspicion of additional criminal activity

. ( See People v. Waxler (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 712, 719

- 720; see also People v. Strasburg (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 1052, 1059 .) In s um , t his was a lawful detention and the consent to search was valid . There was no error.
DISPOSITION
The order denying the motion to suppress is affirmed.

THOMPSON, J.

WE CONCUR:

ARONSON, ACTING P. J.

IKOLA, J.