IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA

No. 17–1415

Filed February 23, 2018

IOWA SUPREME COURT ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY BOARD,

Appellee,

vs.

SEAN JOSEPH BARRY,

Appellant.

On appeal from the report of the Iowa Supreme Court Grievance 

Commission.

An attorney appeals a report of the grievance commission 

recommending we suspend his license to practice law in this state. 

LICENSE SUSPENDED.

David L. Brown of Hansen, McClintock & Riley, Des Moines, for 

appellant.

Tara van Brederode and Susan A. Wendel, Des Moines, for 

appellee.
2

WIGGINS, Justice.

The Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board brought a 

complaint against an attorney, alleging numerous violations of the Iowa 

Rules of Professional Conduct in the attorney’s representation of a client 

in a dissolution proceeding. For fourteen months, the attorney 

misrepresented the status of the dissolution proceeding to his client and 

his client’s brothers. Moreover, the attorney prepared a fraudulent 

dissolution decree, to which he attached a signature page bearing a 

judge’s signature from a different case. A division of the Iowa Supreme 

Court Grievance Commission found the attorney’s conduct violated our 

ethical rules.

Based on the attorney’s violation of our rules, the commission 

recommended we suspend his license to practice law for eighteen 

months. On our de novo review, we find the attorney violated the 

provisions of our rules. However, we disagree with the length of the 

recommended suspension. We suspend the attorney’s license to practice 

law indefinitely with no possibility of reinstatement for one year from the 

date of filing this opinion.

I. Scope of Review.

We review attorney disciplinary proceedings de novo. Iowa 

Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. West, 901 N.W.2d 519, 522 (Iowa 

2017). The Board must prove ethical violations by a convincing 

preponderance of the evidence. Id. “A convincing preponderance of the 

evidence is more than the typical preponderance standard in a civil case 

but less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. We may impose a 

greater or lesser sanction than what the commission has recommended 

upon proof of an ethical violation. Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary 

Bd. v. Vandel, 889 N.W.2d 659, 662 (Iowa 2017). “While we respectfully 
3

consider the commission’s findings and recommendations, they are not 

binding on us.” Id.

II. Background Facts and Proceedings.

On February 7, 2017, the Board filed a complaint against Sean 

Barry alleging multiple ethical violations in his representation of Richard 

Miller in a dissolution proceeding. The Board filed an amended 

complaint on June 5.

On June 30, the Board and Barry filed a stipulation pursuant to 

Iowa Court Rule 36.16, wherein the parties waived a formal hearing on 

the matter and agreed to the facts, rule violations, and mitigating and 

aggravating circumstances. The commission approved and accepted the

parties’ joint stipulation.

Stipulations of facts bind the parties. Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y 

Disciplinary Bd. v. Nelson, 838 N.W.2d 528, 532 (Iowa 2013). We 

construe factual stipulations “with reference to its subject matter and in 

light of the surrounding circumstances and the whole record, including 

the state of the pleadings and issues involved.” Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y 

Disciplinary Bd. v. Gailey, 790 N.W.2d 801, 803–04 (Iowa 2010) (quoting 

Graen’s Mens Wear, Inc. v. Stille-Pierce Agency, 329 N.W.2d 295, 300 

(Iowa 1983)). Because the authority to license and sanction lawyers 

rests with us, we are not “bound by a stipulation of a violation or of a 

sanction in reaching our final decision in a disciplinary case.” Id. at 804. 

Based on the stipulation of the parties and our de novo review of the 

record, we make the following findings of fact.

Barry has practiced law in Iowa since April 2008. He also has a 

license to practice law in Colorado. However, the Colorado court 

suspended his Colorado license on May 1, 2012, for nonpayment of his 

inactive fee. His Colorado license is currently under suspension.
4

At the time of the alleged misconduct, Barry practiced law as a 

partner in the law office of Montgomery, Barry, Bovee & Barry, which is 

located in Spencer. In May 2014, Miller hired Barry to represent him in 

dissolving his marriage. Barry met with Miller and a couple of his 

brothers to obtain all the relevant information to draft Miller’s dissolution

petition and stipulation. Barry prepared the documents, both of which 

Miller signed on May 27. That same day, Barry notarized Miller’s 

signature on the dissolution petition. Barry never filed the petition with 

the court and failed to have the petition served on Miller’s wife.

On August 29, Barry notarized a power of attorney that he had 

prepared for Miller in which Miller designated his brothers as agents with 

general authority to act on his behalf.

From May 27, 2014, to the end of July 2015, when Miller or his 

brothers asked about the status of the dissolution, Barry repeatedly lied 

to them that he had filed the dissolution petition. On one occasion, 

Barry falsely informed one of the brothers that he had Miller’s wife served 

and she had twenty days to answer. After the end of the twenty-day 

period to answer, the brother asked about the next step, to which Barry 

falsely informed him that Miller could seek a default judgment. The 

brother continued to request updates from Barry on the status of the 

dissolution. Barry either failed to return the brother’s phone calls or 

falsely informed him the matter was progressing.

At a meeting, when Miller and his brothers expressed their 

concerns about the prolonged dissolution process, Barry knowingly failed 

to advise them that he had not yet filed the dissolution petition or served 

it on Miller’s wife. After this meeting, they requested updates from Barry 

almost daily. Barry either failed to respond to the requests for updates
5

or, when he did respond, continued to misrepresent the status of the 

dissolution.

In January 2015, Miller’s other brother went to Barry’s office, 

seeking a status update on the dissolution. Despite knowing he had not 

filed the petition, Barry falsely informed the brother “the Judge had 

signed the Decree, but there was a delay in getting them recorded.”

On or about July 8, the same brother went to Barry’s office to 

request copies of the decree. Barry gave the brother a document that 

Barry misrepresented as a copy of an original dissolution decree that 

dissolved Miller’s marriage. To create this fraudulent decree, Barry 

copied a signature page from an order setting a hearing in an unrelated 

case bearing Judge Patrick M. Carr’s signature. He altered the case title 

and the case number on this signature page. Without Judge Carr’s 

knowledge or authorization, Barry attached the signature page to the 

fraudulent decree. He inserted the file-stamp data “E-FILED 2015 JAN 

14 11:33 AM CLAY — CLERK OF DISTRICT COURT” on the top of all 

four pages of the fraudulent decree. Barry also inserted the case number 

to the first page of the fraudulent decree.

On July 27, members of Miller’s family went to the office of the 

Clay County Clerk of Court to search for the records relating to Miller’s 

dissolution of marriage. The staff of the clerk’s office could not locate 

Miller’s dissolution decree in the court records. The staff contacted 

Barry’s law office and, in Barry’s absence, spoke with other members of 

the law office to inquire about the dissolution case. The staff 

subsequently sought assistance from the electronic data management 

system support office in Des Moines concerning the fraudulent decree 

Barry had presented to the Miller family.
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On July 30, the clerk emailed Chief Judge Duane E. Hoffmeyer to 

inform him of the situation. Chief Judge Hoffmeyer called the Board and 

subsequently provided affidavits from the Clay County Clerk of Court, a 

letter from the Miller family, and a copy of the forged decree. In a letter 

dated August 6, Barry reported his ethical violations for neglecting the 

dissolution matter and engaging in dishonest conduct.

Based on Barry’s conduct, the Board alleged six violations of the 

Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct—(1) 32:1.3 (lack of diligence);

(2) 32:1.4(a)(3) (failure to keep client reasonably informed); (3) 32:1.4(a)(4) 

(failure to promptly comply with reasonable requests for information);

(4) 32:8.4(b) (criminal act that reflects adversely on honesty, 

trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer); (5) 32:8.4(c) (conduct involving 

dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation); and (6) 32:8.4(d) 

(conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice).

On September 5, 2017, the commission entered its findings of fact, 

conclusions of law, and recommendation. The commission found Barry 

violated all the rules alleged in the Board’s complaint and recommended 

an eighteen-month suspension of Barry’s license. Barry appealed. We 

discuss additional facts as needed.

III. Ethical Violations.

A. Lack of Diligence—Rule 32:1.3. This rule provides, “A lawyer 

shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a 

client.” Iowa R. Prof’l Conduct 32:1.3. An attorney must “handle a client 

matter in a ‘reasonably timely manner.’ ” Vandel, 889 N.W.2d at 667 

(quoting Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Netti, 797 N.W.2d 591, 

598 (Iowa 2011)). “[W]hen an attorney fails to appear at scheduled court 

proceedings, does not make the proper filings, or is slow to act on 

matters[,]” the attorney violates rule 32:1.3. Nelson, 838 N.W.2d at 537.
7

Barry failed to exercise due diligence by never filing the completed 

dissolution petition despite the lapse of fourteen months. Barry had all 

the necessary information to draft the petition and stipulation. Miller

signed both documents, and Barry notarized Miller’s signature on the 

petition. Thus, to commence the dissolution process, all Barry had to do 

was simply file the petition. Barry admitted in his letter to the Board 

that Miller’s dissolution case was “simple” because there were no 

children and no assets of any significant value. Yet he failed to file the 

petition.

In Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board v. Weiland, we 

held a lawyer violated rule 32:1.3 because he delayed filing a dissolution

petition for four months. 885 N.W.2d 198, 208–09 (Iowa 2016). It 

logically follows that Barry’s wholesale failure to file the petition violates 

the rule.

Barry’s lack of diligence extended the case into a fourteen-month 

ordeal when it could have been resolved much sooner. Miller eventually 

retained new counsel who completed the dissolution in less than six 

months. Accordingly, the Board proved by a convincing preponderance 

of the evidence that Barry violated rule 32:1.3.

B. Keep Client Reasonably Informed—Rule 32:1.4(a)(3). This 

rule requires an attorney to “keep the client reasonably informed about 

the status of the matter[.]” Iowa R. Prof’l Conduct 32:1.4(a)(3). Barry not 

only failed to reasonably inform the Millers about the status of the 

dissolution but also misled them about the filing status of the petition

and service of process on Miller’s wife. See Weiland, 885 N.W.2d at 209 

(holding the attorney failed to keep his client updated about the status of 

the client’s dissolution and made misrepresentations about the filing 

status of the petition and service of process on the client’s spouse). 
8

Moreover, Barry created and presented a fraudulent dissolution decree to 

the Millers. Instead of keeping them reasonably informed, Barry actively 

misinformed. We conclude the Board proved by a convincing 

preponderance of the evidence that Barry violated rule 32:1.4(a)(3).

C. Promptly Comply with Reasonable Requests for 

Information—Rule 32:1.4(a)(4). This rule requires a lawyer to 

“promptly comply with reasonable requests for information[.]” Iowa R. 

Prof’l Conduct 32:1.4(a)(4). “A lawyer’s regular communication with 

clients will minimize the occasions on which a client will need to request 

information concerning the representation.” Id. r. 32:1.4 cmt. 4. “When 

a client makes a reasonable request for information,” this rule “requires 

prompt compliance with the request, or if a prompt response is not 

feasible, that the lawyer, or a member of the lawyer’s staff, acknowledge 

receipt of the request and advise the client when a response may be 

expected.” Id.

From May 27, 2014, to the end of July 2015, when Miller or his 

brothers repeatedly asked about the status of the dissolution, Barry 

failed to communicate to them that he had not filed the petition and had 

not served it on Miller’s wife. Clearly, because Barry failed to 

communicate regularly with the Millers, they repeatedly requested 

information concerning the prolonged delay in the dissolution process.

In response to one of Miller’s brother’s reasonable request for 

information, Barry told him Miller’s wife had been served and had twenty 

days to answer instead of informing him of the delay in filing or, rather, 

nonfiling. See Weiland, 885 N.W.2d at 210 (finding the attorney violated 

rule 32:1.4(a)(4) for lying to his client that he had filed the petition when 

the client asked for an update and for continuing to mislead her by 

blaming the delay on the process server). When the brother asked about 
9

the next step after twenty days had elapsed, Barry misled him by 

explaining the process for obtaining a default judgment instead of telling 

him the truth.

Moreover, the Millers went to Barry’s office to convey they were 

upset with the long delay in the whole process. They requested updates 

almost daily thereafter. Barry continued to mislead them by creating a 

fraudulent dissolution decree. Based on the foregoing, we find the Board 

proved by a convincing preponderance of the evidence that Barry violated 

rule 32:1.4(a)(4).

D. Criminal Act that Reflects Adversely on Honesty, 

Trustworthiness, or Fitness as a Lawyer—Rule 32:8.4(b). This rule 

prohibits a lawyer from “commit[ting] a criminal act that reflects 

adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer 

in other respects[.]” Iowa R. Prof’l Conduct 32:8.4(b). “It is the 

commission of a criminal act reflecting adversely on a lawyer’s fitness to 

practice law, not the act of getting caught committing a crime, which 

constitutes a violation of this rule.” Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary 

Bd. v. Taylor, 887 N.W.2d 369, 378 (Iowa 2016). Thus, even if the state 

has not charged, or the court has not convicted, the lawyer of a crime, 

the lawyer does not necessarily escape the ambits of rule 32:8.4(b). Iowa 

Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Lustgraaf, 792 N.W.2d 295, 299 

(Iowa 2010).

The Board found that Barry violated rule 32:8.4(b). In its amended 

complaint, it cited to Iowa Code section 715A.2. Iowa Code section 

715A.2(1) states,

1. A person is guilty of forgery if, with intent to 

defraud or injure anyone, or with knowledge that the person 

is facilitating a fraud or injury to be perpetrated by anyone, 

the person does any of the following:
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a. Alters a writing of another without the other’s 

permission.

b. Makes, completes, executes, authenticates, issues, 

or transfers a writing so that it purports to be the act of 

another who did not authorize that act, or so that it purports 

to have been executed at a time or place or in a numbered 

sequence other than was in fact the case, or so that it

purports to be a copy of an original when no such original 

existed.

c. Utters a writing which the person knows to be 

forged in a manner specified in paragraph “a” or “b”.

d. Possesses a writing which the person knows to be 

forged in a manner specified in paragraph “a” or “b”.

Iowa Code § 715A.2(1)(a)–(d) (2015).

Iowa Code section 715A.2(2) provides,

2. a. Forgery is a class “D” felony if the writing is or 

purports to be any of the following:

. . . .

(3) A check, draft, or other writing which ostensibly 

evidences an obligation of the person who has purportedly 

executed it or authorized its execution.

. . . .

Id. § 715A.2(2)(a)(3).

The evidence in the stipulation is sufficient to show Barry 

committed forgery pursuant to section 715A.2. Barry knowingly and 

intentionally created a fraudulent dissolution decree and presented it to 

the Millers as an original decree signed by a judge without the judge’s 

authority or knowledge. Barry attached the judge’s signature page from 

another case to the decree, changed the case title and case number on 

the signature page, inserted the case number on the first page of the 

decree, and inserted file-stamp data to all four pages of the decree.
11

Barry’s crime of forgery reflects adversely on his honesty, 

trustworthiness, and fitness as a lawyer, even if the authorities never 

charged him with the crime. See Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. 

v. Stowe, 830 N.W.2d 737, 743 (Iowa 2013) (“We have previously 

recognized the crime of forgery, by its very nature, reflects adversely on 

an attorney’s fitness to practice law.”). We therefore find on our de novo 

review the Board proved by a convincing preponderance of the evidence 

Barry violated rule 32:8.4(b).

E. Conduct Involving Dishonesty, Fraud, Deceit, or 

Misrepresentation—Rule 32:8.4(c). This rule prohibits an attorney 

from “engag[ing] in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or 

misrepresentation[.]” Iowa R. Prof’l Conduct 32:8.4(c). “Honesty is 

necessary for the legal profession to function.” Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y 

Disciplinary Bd. v. Haskovec, 869 N.W.2d 554, 560 (Iowa 2015). We take 

rule 32:8.4(c) violations very seriously. Weiland, 885 N.W.2d at 211.

Misrepresentation requires a level of scienter that is more than 

negligent behavior or incompetence. Id. Instead, “the key question we 

must answer is whether the effect of the lawyer’s conduct is to mislead 

rather than to inform.” Id. at 211–12 (quoting Haskovec, 869 N.W.2d at 

560).

Here, Barry knowingly and intentionally misrepresented to the 

Millers that he had filed the dissolution petition when in fact he had not 

filed such a petition. To continue with the guise that the dissolution 

process was underway, Barry told one of Miller’s brother that Miller’s 

wife had been served and had twenty days to answer, all while knowing 

he had not filed the petition. When the brother followed up with Barry 

after twenty days had passed, Barry lied about being able to obtain a 

default judgment.
12

When Miller’s other brother went to Barry’s office seeking 

information on the status of the case, Barry told him a judge had signed 

the decree but there was a delay in getting it recorded. To bury the truth 

even further, Barry created a fraudulent dissolution decree by attaching 

a signature page with the judge’s signature from a different case, 

changing the case title and case number on the signature page, inserting 

the case number on the first page of the decree, and inserting file-stamp 

data to each of the four pages of the decree. See Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y 

Disciplinary Bd. v. Thompson, 732 N.W.2d 865, 867 (Iowa 2007) (“Forging 

a signature involves dishonesty, fraud, deceit, and misrepresentation.”).

Based on the foregoing, we agree with the commission and find the 

Board proved that Barry violated rule 32:8.4(c) by a convincing 

preponderance of the evidence.

F. Conduct Prejudicial to the Administration of Justice—Rule 

32:8.4(d). This rule prohibits an attorney from “engag[ing] in conduct 

that is prejudicial to the administration of justice[.]” Iowa R. Prof’l 

Conduct 32:8.4(d). Actions that “violate well-understood norms and 

conventions of the practice of law and hamper the efficient and proper 

operation of the courts will generally constitute a violation of this rule.” 

Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Liles, 808 N.W.2d 203, 206 

(Iowa 2012). 

Barry undoubtedly delayed court proceedings because his charade 

lengthened the dissolution process for months on end. Moreover, he 

caused court personnel to invest time and energy in searching court 

records, verifying cases, and investigating the matter. See Iowa Supreme 

Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. McGinness, 844 N.W.2d 456, 463 (Iowa 2014) 

(stating a lawyer violates rule 32:8.4(d) when his or her misconduct 
13

wastes judicial resources). Accordingly, the Board proved by a 

convincing preponderance of the evidence Barry violated rule 32:8.4(d).

IV. Sanction.

In determining the appropriate sanction, we engage in a fact-based 

analysis and consider a number of factors, such as “the nature of the 

underlying violation, need to deter, public protection, protection of the 

reputation of the legal profession, and the [lawyer]’s fitness to practice 

law.” Thompson, 732 N.W.2d at 867. We also take into account 

mitigating and aggravating circumstances. Id. There is no general 

disciplinary standard for a particular type of attorney misconduct; 

however, we are concerned with maintaining some degree of uniformity 

throughout our disciplinary cases. See Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y 

Disciplinary Bd. v. Clauss, 711 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Iowa 2006). Yet this concern 

should not run afoul of “the particular facts in each case [which 

ultimately] drive the resulting discipline.” Thompson, 732 N.W.2d at 867.

Although we do not condone Barry’s lack of diligence and other 

violations of our ethical rules, we agree with the commission that the 

forging of a court order is the most egregious of his violations. See Iowa 

Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Grotewold, 642 N.W.2d 288, 

294 (Iowa 2002) (stating “misrepresentation [was] the most serious 

violation in [the] case” among the violations); Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of 

Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Clauss, 530 N.W.2d 453, 454 (Iowa 1995) 

(noting the commission found violations in relatively minor matters but 

choosing to pass on these violations because of the seriousness of other 

violations, such as forging a signature). “The concept of 

[misrepresentation] is repulsive to our system of justice and its very 

presence within our profession supports serious discipline . . . .” 

Grotewold, 642 N.W.2d at 294.
14

Sanctions for attorney misconduct involving misrepresentation 

generally range from a public reprimand to a three-year suspension. In 

some cases, we found a public reprimand sufficient for attorney 

misconduct involving false instruments or forgery. See Iowa Supreme Ct. 

Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Newman, 748 N.W.2d 786, 787–89 (Iowa 2008) 

(publicly reprimanding an attorney with no prior disciplinary record who 

forged a judge’s signature on an approved-but-unsigned order and filed it 

with the court); Comm. on Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Roberts, 312 N.W.2d 

556, 557–58 (Iowa 1981) (publicly reprimanding an attorney who misled 

the court by forging his client’s signature on an affidavit and filing the 

affidavit with the court). However, we also suspended an attorney for 

sixty days. See Liles, 808 N.W.2d at 205, 207 (imposing a sixty-day 

suspension where an attorney, who had received a prior public 

reprimand for a different ethical violation, forged the signature of one of 

the witnesses on a will and filed it for probate).

In other cases, we imposed six-month suspensions. See 

McGinness, 844 N.W.2d at 459–60, 467 (imposing a six-month 

suspension where an attorney fabricated certificates of service to 

corroborate his lie that he had served discovery requests on opposing 

counsel and continued to lie during the district court’s hearing on the 

opposing counsel’s sanctions motion); Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l 

Ethics & Conduct v. Lesyshen, 585 N.W.2d 281, 286, 288 (Iowa 1998) 

(suspending an attorney’s license for six months because, in addition to 

neglecting her client’s lawsuit and having a prior public reprimand, the 

attorney forged her client’s signature to the supplemental answers to 

interrogatories and falsely notarized the signature); Comm. on Prof’l 

Ethics & Conduct v. Bauerle, 460 N.W.2d 452, 453–54 (Iowa 1990) 

(imposing a six-month suspension where an attorney blindly followed his 
15

client’s instructions to backdate several documents and falsely notarized 

signatures).

In Iowa Supreme Court Board of Professional Ethics & Conduct v. 

Rylaarsdam, we suspended an attorney’s license for six months for 

mainly two instances of fraud, among other violations. 636 N.W.2d 90, 

91–93 (Iowa 2001). The attorney forged both of his clients’ signatures on 

a petition to sell a shed belonging to an estate and forged one client’s 

signature on two documents admitting claims filed in the estate. Id. at 

91. Other than the forged signatures, the substance of all three 

documents was true. Id. The attorney then misrepresented to his clients 

that he had closed the estate. Id. One of the clients subsequently hired 

him for a different estate. Id. For this estate, the attorney completed a 

blank letter-of-appointment form and embossed the clerk of court’s seal 

on it without knowledge or consent of the clerk. Id. He then 

misrepresented to his client that the estate had been opened. Id. After 

considering the attorney’s cooperation with the Board, acknowledgment 

of both his ethical misconduct and necessity of a sanction, sincere 

remorse, depression, and lack of a prior disciplinary record, we 

concluded a six-month suspension was appropriate. Id. at 91–93.

Here, Barry’s misconduct went beyond lying to his clients. Like 

the attorney in Rylaarsdam, “in an even more calculated and 

unscrupulous attempt to hide his neglect, [Barry] falsified a court 

document.” Id. at 93. However, even worse than the attorney in 

Rylaarsdam who forged his clients’ signatures, Barry forged a judge’s 

signature by attaching a signature page bearing the judge’s signature 

from a different case to a fraudulent dissolution decree. See Thompson, 

732 N.W.2d at 868 (stating “a lawyer may feel a false sense of 

justification as a representative agent” when forging his or her client’s 
16

signature but it is more questionable that “a lawyer could ever possess 

even a momentary sense of justification in forging the signature of a 

judge on a court order”).

In some cases, we imposed a harsher sanction than that imposed 

in Rylaarsdam and concluded three years was the appropriate length. 

See In re Rickabaugh (Rickabaugh I), 661 N.W.2d 130, 130–31, 133 (Iowa 

2003) (per curiam) (suspending an attorney’s license for three years for 

misconduct including fabricating the pleadings and forging a judge’s 

signature); Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Hansel, 558 

N.W.2d 186, 192 (Iowa 1997) (imposing a three-year suspension for 

conduct that included knowledge of a forgery); Clauss, 530 N.W.2d at 

454–55 (imposing a three-year suspension where a lawyer with a past 

disciplinary record forged his wife’s signature on a return of service, 

notarized the forged signature, and falsely stated under oath that his wife 

had signed the return in his presence); see also Comm. on Prof’l Ethics & 

Conduct v. Wenger, 469 N.W.2d 678, 679, 681 (Iowa 1991) (suspending a 

lawyer’s license for three years because the lawyer offered false evidence 

and gave false testimony while under oath at a disciplinary hearing).

In some circumstances, we disbarred attorneys from the practice of 

law in this state. See Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. 

Rickabaugh (Rickabaugh II), 728 N.W.2d 375, 382 (Iowa 2007); see also 

Stowe, 830 N.W.2d at 741, 743 (revoking an attorney’s license for forging 

his client’s signature on two checks the attorney had stolen to transfer 

funds into his personal bank account and factoring into our disbarment 

decision the combination of the felony forgery convictions and conversion 

of client funds).

In Rickabaugh II, we revoked the license of the same attorney who 

was under scrutiny in Rickabaugh I. 728 N.W.2d at 382. Among other 
17

serious ethical infractions, the attorney forged his client’s signature on a 

court document, despite his previous discipline in Rickabaugh I for 

fabricating the pleadings and forging a judge’s signature. Id. In light of 

multiple violations of our disciplinary rules and his “blatant disregard for 

his duty as an attorney to be honest and truthful[,]” we held disbarment 

would best serve both the public at large and the legal profession in 

particular. Id.

In the instant case, the commission weighed two cases that they 

found were most similar to Barry’s conduct concerning the forged 

dissolution decree: Rickabaugh I, 661 N.W.2d 130, and Thompson, 

732 N.W.2d 865. In Rickabaugh I, we suspended an attorney’s license to 

practice law in Iowa for three years. 661 N.W.2d at 133. The Nebraska 

Supreme Court had disbarred the attorney after finding he accepted a

legal matter he was not competent to handle, neglected the matter, failed 

to keep his clients advised of developments in the case, created 

fraudulent pleadings, and forged a judge’s signature. Id. at 130–31. We 

issued a reciprocal discipline notice and order to which the attorney 

objected. Id. at 130.

In our review of the case, we accepted the factual findings from the 

Nebraska proceeding as conclusive. Id. at 131. We stated, “When 

combined with other serious misconduct, tendering a false document to 

the court may warrant disbarment in Iowa.” Id. at 133. However, we 

reasoned the “[attorney’s] action, fortunately, fell short of such fatal 

misconduct.” Id. We weighed into our decision the “minor mitigating 

factor” that “there was no case in which to file the forged document” 

because of the attorney’s neglect. Id. After considering similar 

misconduct by other Iowa lawyers, we suspended the attorney’s license 

for three years. Id.
18

In Thompson, we suspended an attorney’s license to practice law in 

Iowa for nine months. 732 N.W.2d at 869. An assistant county attorney 

prepared an order for hearing on the motion for waiver of juvenile court 

jurisdiction. Id. at 866. He then signed the name of a district court 

judge to the order without the judge’s knowledge or authorization. Id. 

The attorney filed the order with the clerk of court. Id. In determining 

the appropriate sanction, we considered two aggravating factors and one 

mitigating factor. Id. at 868. First, we noted “the forgery was a bold, 

clear[,] and calculated act of dishonesty.” Id. Furthermore, we stated,

Unlike cases involving the forged signature of a client where 

a lawyer may feel a false sense of justification as a 

representative agent, it is hard to imagine how a lawyer 

could ever possess even a momentary sense of justification 

in forging the signature of a judge on a court order. 

Id. Second, we took into account the attorney’s previous ethical rule 

violations, including the alteration of a court document. Id. As for the 

single mitigating factor, we noted the attorney self-reported his conduct 

to the Board and stipulated to the commission that he had violated our 

ethical rules. Id. at 868–69.

Like in Rickabaugh I, the fact that Barry did not and could not file 

the court order is only a minor mitigating factor because there was no 

open case due to his lack of diligence. We note, however, Nebraska 

disbarred the attorney in Rickabaugh I and that case involved reciprocal 

discipline. Here, no jurisdiction has disbarred Barry and this case does 

not involve reciprocal discipline.

We see some differences between Thompson and Barry’s case. 

Barry lacks the more colorful disciplinary history of the attorney in 

Thompson, whom we sanctioned in three instances, one of which 

included misconduct for correcting a typographical error on an original 
19

document in a court file without permission. 732 N.W.2d at 866. 

However, Barry forged a dissolution decree, unlike the attorney in 

Thompson, who forged a scheduling order. See id. We agree with the 

commission “the legal nature and consequences to a scheduling order 

are significantly less than that of a dissolution of [a] marriage decree.”

Moreover, in addition to attaching the signature page of a judge 

from another case to the fraudulent dissolution decree, Barry also 

replaced the case title and case number on the signature page, inserted 

the case number on the first page of the decree, and inserted file-stamp 

data on each of the four pages of the decree. Such action requires more 

forethought and strategizing than that of the attorney in Thompson who 

simply forged a judge’s signature. Lastly, Barry perpetuated his 

falsehood for fourteen months while the attorney in Thompson was 

discovered within a short period of time. See id.

Lastly, McGinness is an informative case. 844 N.W.2d 456. In that 

case, an attorney “embarked on a course of dishonest conduct” by

attaching fabricated certificates of service to two discovery requests he 

had never served to opposing counsel. Id. at 459. To fabricate the 

certificates of service, the attorney had photocopied an old certificate of 

service from his response to opposing counsel’s discovery requests in the 

same case. Id. When opposing counsel confronted the attorney, the 

attorney lied that he had prepared and signed the discovery requests. Id. 

The attorney continued to embellish in his filed response to opposing 

counsel’s motion for sanctions. Id. He went so far as to hire a 

handwriting expert to defend his position. Id. At the sanctions hearing, 

the attorney maintained his position and thus lied to the district court. 

Id. at 460.
20

In determining the appropriate sanction, we stated the attorney’s

persistence in continuing his lies was a “remarkable” factor that 

aggravated the sanction that we ought to impose. Id. at 466. We gave

less weight to his remorse and cooperation because he expressed 

remorse and cooperated with the Board only after the district court had 

sanctioned him and had referred him to the Board. Id. at 467. We 

considered other mitigating factors such as his service to the community, 

no prior disciplinary history, and no substantial harm to the client. Id. 

After taking into account the aggravating and mitigating factors, we 

imposed a six-month suspension. Id.

Here, like the attorney in McGinness, Barry exhibited “remarkable 

persistence in pursuing his dishonest course[.]” See id. at 466. 

However, Barry continued his falsehood for fourteen months, a time 

period much longer than the length of the attorney’s falsehood in 

McGinness. Although we do not know if the attorney in McGinness would 

have also perpetuated his falsehood for just as long as Barry did, the fact 

of the matter is that opposing counsel in McGinness swiftly confronted 

the attorney about the fabrication of the discovery requests and 

certificates of service, thereby cutting short the length of the attorney’s 

deception. Moreover, more egregious than the attorney’s misconduct in 

McGinness, Barry forged a judge’s signature by attaching a signature 

page bearing the judge’s signature from a different case to a fraudulent 

dissolution decree. As already mentioned, forgery of a judge’s signature 

is a grave misrepresentation. Finally, unlike the misconduct of the 

attorney in McGinness, Barry’s misconduct caused harm to his 

vulnerable client.

After a comparative analysis of Rickabaugh I, Thompson, and 

McGinness to the case at hand, we conclude the appropriate sanction for 
21

Barry’s ethical rule violations falls on the spectrum between the lengthy 

three-year suspension in Rickabaugh I and the six-month suspension in 

McGinness. Specifically, the appropriate sanction is closer to the nine 

months imposed in Thompson. However, before affirmatively concluding 

on the appropriate length of the sanction, we consider the mitigating and 

aggravating circumstances present in this case.

A. Mitigating Factors. In his August 6, 2015 letter to the Board, 

Barry accepted responsibility for his actions and expressed some degree 

of remorse. We have recognized that an attorney’s acceptance or 

acknowledgment of some wrongdoing constitutes a mitigating 

circumstance. Liles, 808 N.W.2d at 207; Rylaarsdam, 636 N.W.2d at 91. 

Barry also cooperated with the Board, entered stipulations, and waived a 

hearing. Such actions mitigate the sanction we will impose for Barry’s 

violations of our disciplinary rules. Cf. Wenger, 469 N.W.2d at 680 

(noting the attorney’s failure to cooperate with the committee amounted 

to an aggravating factor).

However, Barry’s remorse and cooperation came on the coattails of 

the clerk of court’s discovery of his fraudulent dissolution decree. As the 

commission and the Board reasoned, “[T]here is nothing to suggest that 

Barry was prepared to abandon his course of deception prior to the Clerk 

of Court and Iowa District Court Chief Judge’s contact with Barry’s law 

firm.” In McGinness, we stated the attorney’s remorse and cooperation 

came after the district court entered an order imposing sanctions and the 

Board contacted him concerning a complaint about his misconduct. 

844 N.W.2d at 467. We reasoned “[t]he chronology tends to deflate 

consideration of remorse and cooperation as mitigating factors.” Id.

Here, we agree with the commission that nothing in the record 

suggests Barry was prepared to abandon the path he was traversing but 
22

for the impetus provided by the unraveling of his deception. 

Notwithstanding the chronology of Barry’s self-reporting, because Barry 

expressed some level of remorse and cooperated with the Board, we find 

a deflated degree of mitigation.

Additionally, Barry self-reported his misconduct, although he 

delivered the letter to the Board after the clerk of court had contacted his 

law office inquiring about the dissolution file and it became apparent the 

end of his charade was just around the corner. Admittedly, his selfreporting is simultaneously self-serving and apologetic. Barry apologized 

and stated he understands there should and will be consequences. 

Nevertheless, his letter portrays himself as a victim, rather than the 

perpetrator, and paints the Millers as relentless clients who pressured 

him for updates on the case and made threats against him for his slow 

handling on the matter.

As a whole, the letter contains an oxymoronic, but all too familiar, 

combination of self-serving justifications and sincere explanations for his 

actions. Despite the ambivalent nature of his letter, we give some 

deflated credit to him for detailing his misconduct in the letter.1 See 

Thompson, 732 N.W.2d at 866, 868–69 (finding an attorney’s self-report 

as a mitigating circumstance even though the attorney notified the Board 

of his misconduct only after the judge whose signature was forged 

instructed him to report the matter to the Board). But see Clauss, 

530 N.W.2d at 454 (“[The attorney’s] sudden candor was prompted, not 

by his discovery of new facts, but by the knowledge of the imminent 

revelation of the actual facts.”).

 1Chief Judge Hoffmeyer reported Barry’s misconduct to the Board in a letter 

dated August 7, 2015. However, according to the stipulations, Chief Judge Hoffmeyer 

telephoned the Board and later provided supporting documents. We are unsure of the 

date of this phone call. The Board received Barry’s letter on August 6, 2015.
23

In addition, Barry performed community service at an orphanage 

in Haiti. See McGinness, 844 N.W.2d at 467 (recognizing service to the 

community as a mitigating factor). Additionally, Barry has been 

suffering from depression. Illness does not reduce the serious nature of 

Barry’s ethical rule violations, but it influences the severity and type of 

discipline we will impose. Nevertheless, “we will not excuse ethical 

violations because of an attorney’s ill health, emotional problems, 

personality disorders, or the general stress of a busy law practice.” 

Hansel, 558 N.W.2d at 191.

We have recognized depression as a mitigating factor. Thompson, 

732 N.W.2d at 868. In Grotewold, we stated “depression can take hold of 

a person without his or her knowledge or understanding of the need for 

treatment.” 642 N.W.2d at 294. Furthermore, “these symptoms too 

often appear before the disease is diagnosed and treatment is sought.” 

Id. at 295. If what he claims in his letter is true, Barry worked for the 

past few years with undiagnosed and untreated depression. This is an 

important mitigating factor. However, absent evidence of the relation 

between the depression and the misconduct, we cannot understand “the 

full extent of depression as a mitigating circumstance in the imposition 

of discipline.” Id.

In his letter to the Board, Barry somewhat established a 

relationship between his depression and his ethical rule violations by 

explaining how his depression prevented him from pressing the “send” 

button after doing the substantive work because he “just became 

paralyzed and couldn’t do it.” Such an explanation explains his lack of 

diligence in filing the dissolution petition but loosely explains his 

misrepresentations to the Millers. See id. at 296 (stating the record 

contained plenty of evidence to explain the relationship between the 
24

depression and the neglect of professional duties but reasoning the 

evidence did not explain the relationship between the depression and the 

false statements to the court, although acknowledging the two 

circumstances coexisted).

Moreover, Barry has not been receiving treatment from a licensed 

mental health professional. The record contains a letter from Rita Henry 

with Inner Prosperity and treatment records. Such information does not 

provide any details on Henry’s credentials.

Furthermore, since self-reporting the matter to the Board in 

August 2015, Barry only attended seven counseling sessions with Henry 

and eight other sessions, such as “one-day healing intensive.” In 2017, 

Barry only attended three counseling sessions, once in March, April, and 

May, respectively. In light of the fact that Barry claimed in his letter that 

the debilitating symptoms of depression adversely impacted his ability to 

work, like the commission, we express concerns about the adequacy of 

the frequency of counseling Barry received.

To be fair, at the time of his letter, Barry stated he was on the 

waiting list for inpatient treatment at the Turnaround House in Ojai, 

California. Although subsequent recovery efforts are important as a 

mitigating factor, we decline to speculate on the question of whether 

Barry is now receiving treatment at Turnaround House and, if not, 

whether he has recently sought help from a licensed health professional, 

such as a psychiatrist or psychologist. Accordingly, Barry’s depression 

plays a minor mitigating role in the sanction we ought to impose.

Additionally, Barry’s law office was in transition at the time of the 

Miller case because his father and uncle, both partners at the office, were 

in the process of retiring. Thus, Barry and his other law partner 

absorbed extra work. The stress of a law practice does not excuse 
25

Barry’s misconduct, but we do consider his stressful situation as a 

mitigating factor in determining the proper discipline. See Weiland, 

885 N.W.2d at 215 (considering the attorney’s testimony that his mother 

was in and out of the hospital, his car broke down during that time, he 

had issues with city inspectors and his apartment, and he was working 

on other time-consuming cases); Wenger, 469 N.W.2d at 680–81

(considering the attorney’s increased workload because of his law 

practice’s transition from a two-lawyer to a sole practitioner office, his 

new responsibility as the primary caretaker of his newborn child because 

of his wife’s hospitalization, and his depressive disorder).

Lastly, Barry claimed he placed his license in inactive status 

following his self-reporting. We view an attorney’s voluntary cessation of 

law practice as a mitigating factor. See Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y 

Disciplinary Bd. v. Lickiss, 786 N.W.2d 860, 871 (Iowa 2010).

B. Aggravating Factors. We now turn to the aggravating factors. 

We emphasize “[w]hat should dictate the sanction in this case is the 

nature, number, and seriousness of the ethical violations[.]” Hansel, 

558 N.W.2d at 192. Barry’s misconduct implicates “two core values of 

our profession”: “honesty and integrity[.]” Id.

Misrepresentation is a “grave and serious breach of professional 

ethics.” Rickabaugh II, 728 N.W.2d at 382 (quoting Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. 

of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Stein, 603 N.W.2d 574, 576 (Iowa 1999)). We 

have repeatedly recognized “[f]undamental honesty is the base line and 

mandatory requirement to serve in the legal profession.” Bauerle,

460 N.W.2d at 453. In fact, “the paramount need for lawyers to be 

trustworthy” forms the foundation for “[t]he whole structure of ethical 

standards.” Id. Thus, Barry’s misrepresentation of the status of the 

dissolution case to the Millers and forgery of a judge’s signature 
26

constitute serious breaches of the fundamental concepts we hold dear to 

our justice system. See Stowe, 830 N.W.2d at 743 (“Forgery strikes at 

the very heart of an attorney’s trustworthiness and honesty.”). When our 

court officers circumvent the truth, whether in their own interests or for 

the sake of their clients’ interests, they damage the court system itself 

and the public’s confidence in the court system.

Moreover, “[a] lawyer has a very special responsibility for candor 

and fairness in all his dealings with a court” because “[a]bsent mutual 

trust and confidence between a judge and a lawyer—an officer of the 

court—the judicial process will be impeded and the administration of 

justice frustrated.” Lesyshen, 585 N.W.2d at 288 (quoting Iowa Supreme 

Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Plumb, 546 N.W.2d 215, 217–18 (Iowa 

1996)).

Even in light of mitigating circumstances, “[t]he controlling 

consideration is the absolute necessity for lawyers to be absolutely 

honest.” Clauss, 530 N.W.2d at 455. In fact, cases involving false 

statements or misrepresentations to the court usually result in more 

severe disciplinary sanctions. West, 901 N.W.2d at 528. Additionally, as 

we stated in Thompson, we consider forging a judge’s signature as a more

serious crime than forging a client’s signature. See 732 N.W.2d at 868.

Furthermore, Barry’s perpetuation of his deception “is a 

remarkable aggravating factor.” McGinness, 844 N.W.2d at 466 (stating 

the attorney repeatedly lied to opposing counsel and to the district court 

and, despite having a number of opportunities to withdraw from his 

deception, he “simply dug himself into a progressively deeper ethical 

pit”). In fact, forging a fraudulent dissolution decree was “merely the last 

step in a dishonest scheme” that lasted for fourteen months. Iowa 
27

Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Kallsen, 814 N.W.2d 233, 238 (Iowa 

2012).

Prior disciplinary action is a significant aggravating factor. 

Weiland, 885 N.W.2d at 215; see also Lesyshen, 585 N.W.2d at 288 

(considering the attorney’s prior public reprimand). “This is particularly 

true when the current rule violations involve the same type of conduct as 

the prior conduct subject to discipline.” Weiland, 885 N.W.2d at 215; 

accord Thompson, 732 N.W.2d at 866, 868 (noting the similarity between 

the attorney’s most recent forgery and his history of discipline, 

particularly prior misconduct involving alteration of a court document).

In 2013, Barry failed to file an appellate proof brief and designation 

of appendix, causing the dismissal of his client’s appeal. The Board 

admonished Barry for neglecting his client’s appeal, in violation of rules 

32:1.3 (lack of diligence) and 32:3.2 (failure to expedite litigation). It is 

apparent that our past admonition has not improved Barry’s conduct in 

pursuing his client’s matters with diligence. We note this prior 

misconduct involved no misrepresentations.

Harm to a client is also an aggravating factor. West, 901 N.W.2d 

at 528; Weiland, 885 N.W.2d at 215. Miller’s dissolution took well over 

fourteen months to reach completion even though Barry testified the 

dissolution was “simple.” Miller’s new counsel finalized the dissolution

in just a few months.

Lastly, vulnerability of the client is an aggravating factor. Weiland, 

885 N.W.2d at 215. Barry stated in his letter that Miller’s wife was 

abusive toward Miller, and Miller wanted her to leave him alone. 

Additionally, Miller has been low functioning since birth. Miller’s 

brothers were present to help him throughout the dissolution process. 

Barry knew of Miller’s situation and his vulnerability, yet deceived the 
28

Millers and failed to act with diligence in filing the dissolution petition. 

See Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Stowers, 626 

N.W.2d 130, 133 (Iowa 2001) (“Each time an attorney betrays a client’s 

trust by failing to fulfill professional obligations, and then compounds 

the damage by intentionally concealing the failure, public confidence in 

our profession is diminished.”).

C. Appropriate Sanction. We find Barry’s misconduct is more 

egregious than those in McGinness and Thompson because of the 

continuous nature of his misconduct over a long period of time. Rather 

than owning up to his lack of diligence, Barry covered it up by forging a 

divorce decree. His actions not only caused the client but also the staff 

of the clerk’s office to expend time and resources to investigate Barry’s 

deception. Furthermore, Barry took advantage of a client who was in a 

vulnerable position. However, we find his misconduct is less egregious 

than that in Rickabaugh I. Accordingly, we suspend Barry’s license to 

practice law in Iowa for an indefinite period with no possibility of 

reinstatement for one year from the date of filing of this opinion. As an 

additional requirement for reinstatement, Barry must provide an 

evaluation from a licensed health care professional verifying his fitness to 

practice law.

V. Disposition.

We suspend Barry’s license to practice law in Iowa for an indefinite 

period with no possibility of reinstatement for one year from the date of 

filing of this opinion. The suspension applies to all facets of the practice 

of law. See Iowa Ct. R. 34.23(3). Barry must comply with the 

notification requirements of Iowa Court Rule 34.24. To establish his 

eligibility for reinstatement, Barry must file an application for 

reinstatement meeting all applicable requirements of Iowa Court Rule 
29

34.25 and provide an evaluation from a licensed health care professional 

verifying his fitness to practice law. We tax the costs of this action to 

Barry in accordance with Iowa Court Rule 36.24(1).

LICENSE SUSPENDED.