J-S42024-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

THOMAS JOHN SCHRAM 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 249 WDA 2022

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered February 14, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Clearfield County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-17-CR-0000529-2021

BEFORE: BOWES, J., OLSON, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED: JANUARY 11, 2023

Appellant, Thomas John Schram, appeals from the February 14, 2022 

judgment of sentence entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Clearfield 

County after the trial court, in a non-jury trial, convicted Appellant of, inter 

alia, driving under the influence (“DUI”) of a drug or combination of drugs.

1

 

We affirm.

The trial court summarized the factual history as follows:

The case at bar involved an incident in Clearfield County[, 

Pennsylvania,] on October 22, 2019. Just before [5:00 p.m.], 

Pennsylvania State Police [("PSP")] received a [911 emergency] 

call from a motorist about an erratic driver in a gray [vehicle]. 

Trooper Kacey Osborne was dispatched to [a convenience store]

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3802(d)(2). Appellant was also found guilty of driving on 

roadways laned for traffic and careless driving. 75 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3309(1) and 

3714(a), respectively.
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in Penfield, [Pennsylvania,] where the driver was reported to have 

stopped his vehicle. Upon her arrival, Trooper Osborne found the 

vehicle pulled into a parking spot, with the driver asleep in the 

driver's seat. Trooper Osborne was able to wake the driver after 

roughly thirty seconds of knocking on [the vehicle’s] window. The 

driver was identified as [Appellant]. After speaking with 

[Appellant], Trooper Osborne suspected [Appellant] was under 

the influence [of drugs or alcohol and asked him to perform] field 

sobriety tests, to which [Appellant] agreed. Following the field 

sobriety tests, Trooper Osborne arrested [Appellant] for driving 

under the influence, and she transported [Appellant] to the 

hospital for a voluntary blood draw. The results of the blood tests 

showed clonazepam, carisoprodol, and buprenorphine in 

[Appellant’s] blood.[2]

Trial Court Opinion, 4/11/22, at 1-2 (extraneous capitalization omitted).

On February 5, 2020, Appellant was charged with the aforementioned 

criminal offenses.3 On November 3, 2021, at the conclusion of a non-jury 

trial, the trial court found Appellant guilty of the aforementioned criminal 

offenses. On February 14, 2022, the trial court sentenced Appellant to 72 

____________________________________________

2 “Clonazepam is an intermediate to long-acting benzodiazepine hypnotic used 

in the treatment of insomnia and in the prevention and treatment of various 

seizure disorders.” Commonwealth’s Exhibit 5 at 3. “Carisoprodol is a 

centrally-acting skeletal muscle relaxant and sedative.” Id. “Buprenorphine 

is a Schedule III controlled synthetic opioid that has both analgesic and opioid 

antagonist activities. . . . While buprenorphine can counteract some of the 

effects of powerful opiates[,] it also has opiate-like effects of its own[, 

including] analgesia, drowsiness, and sedation.” Id. at 2.

3 The criminal complaint also charged Appellant with DUI – of a Schedule II or 

Schedule III controlled substance, as defined by The Controlled Substance, 

Drug, Device, and Cosmetic Act, 35 P.S. § 780-101 to § 780-144, as well as 

DUI – of a metabolite of a Schedule II or Schedule III controlled substance. 

75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3802(d)(1)(ii) and (iii). Prior to the start of Appellant’s 

non-jury trial, the Commonwealth withdrew these two criminal charges.
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hours to 6 months’ incarceration for his DUI conviction. No further sentence 

was imposed for the two remaining criminal convictions. Appellant was 

ordered to pay fines and costs on all three criminal convictions. This appeal 

followed.4

Appellant raises the following issue for our review:

Did the Commonwealth fail to present sufficient evidence to 

establish the crime of driving under the influence of a drug or 

combination of drugs, in violation of 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3802(d)(2), 

where the evidence failed to demonstrate a causal link between 

the prescription drugs detected in Appellant’s blood and his 

purported inability to safely operate his vehicle?

Appellant’s Brief at 4.

Our standard and scope of review of a challenge to the sufficiency of the 

evidence are well-settled.

The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence 

is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light 

most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence 

to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the crime beyond 

a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test, we may not weigh 

the evidence and substitute our judgment for the fact-finder. In 

addition, we note that the facts and circumstances established by 

the Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of 

innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant’s guilt may be 

resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak and 

inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may be 

drawn from the combined circumstances. The Commonwealth 

may sustain its burden of proof or proving every element of the 

crime beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly 

____________________________________________

4 Both Appellant and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. The 

Commonwealth filed a letter with this Court on October 24, 2022, stating that 

it concurred with the trial court’s April 11, 2022 opinion and adopted the same 

in lieu of filing an appellee’s brief.
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circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, 

the entire record must be evaluated and all the evidence actually 

received must be considered. Finally, the trier[-]of[-]fact while 

passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the

evidence produced, is free to believe all, part[,] or none of the 

evidence.

Commonwealth v. Pappas, 845 A.2d 829, 835-836 (Pa. Super. 2004) 

(citation omitted), appeal denied, 862 A.2d 1254 (Pa. 2004); see also 

Commonwealth v. Brown, 52 A.3d 1139, 1163 (Pa. 2012) (stating that, in 

reviewing a claim of insufficient evidence, “the relevant question is whether, 

after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any

rational trier[-]of[-]fact could have found the essential elements of the crime 

beyond a reasonable doubt” (emphasis in original)).

[T]he [trier-of-fact's] individualized assessment of the credibility 

of the trial evidence is, as a general principle, not to be questioned 

by an appellate court as part of its review, even if the evidence is 

conflicting. [C]ourts presume the [trier-of-fact] resolved 

evidentiary disputes reasonably so long as sufficient evidence 

supports the verdict. [M]ere inconsistency and conflicts in 

witnesses[’] testimony, by itself, will not furnish a basis for an 

appellate court to reverse a conviction [] on the grounds of 

evidentiary insufficiency.

Brown, 52 A.3d at 1165 (citations omitted). Rather, the trier-of-fact’s

resolution will only be disturbed “in those exceptional instances [] where the 

evidence is so patently unreliable that the [trier-of-fact] was forced to engage 

in surmise and conjecture in arriving at a verdict based upon that evidence.” 

Id., citing Commonwealth v. Karkaria, 625 A.2d 1167, 1170 (Pa. 1993). 

To preserve a sufficiency claim, the appellant’s Rule 1925(b) statement must 
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specify the element or elements upon which the evidence was insufficient. 

Commonwealth v. Williams, 959 A.2d 1252, 1257 (Pa. Super. 2008).

Section 3802(d)(2) of the Vehicle Code states, in pertinent part, that,

An individual may not drive, operate[,] or be in actual physical 

control of the movement of a vehicle under any of the following 

circumstances:

. . .

(2) The individual is under the influence of a drug or 

combination of drugs to a degree which impairs the 

individual's ability to safely drive, operate[,] or be in actual 

physical control of the movement of the vehicle.

75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3802(d)(2). In order to convict a defendant of a Section 

3802(d)(2) DUI offense, the Commonwealth must prove that “while driving or 

operating a vehicle, [the defendant] was under the influence of a drug to a 

degree that impaired [his or her] ability to safely drive or operate a vehicle.” 

Commonwealth v Griffith, 32 A.3d 1231, 1236 (Pa. 2011) (original brackets 

omitted).

Our Supreme Court in Griffith, supra, held that,

[Section] 3802(d)(2) [does not require] expert testimony to 

establish that the defendant's inability to drive safely was caused 

by ingestion of a drug, even if it is a prescription drug, or drug 

combination. [Rather,] in some cases, depending on the specific 

facts and circumstances, expert testimony may be helpful, or 

perhaps even necessary, to prove causation under [Section]

3802(d)(2), but we decline to hold that the need for expert 

testimony is inherent in the statutory provision and thus 

mandatory in all cases.

Id. at 1238. “The need for expert testimony in a [Section] 3802(d)(2) 

prosecution must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis, taking into account 
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not just the specific drug at issue, prescription or otherwise, but also the 

nature and overall strength of the Commonwealth's evidence.” Id. at 1239. 

“[E]xpert testimony is not necessary to establish impairment under [Section]

3802(d)(2) where there exists other independent evidence of impairment.” 

Commonwealth v. Gause, 164 A.3d 532, 538 (Pa. Super. 2017), appeal 

denied, 173 A.3d 267 (Pa. 2017).

Here, Appellant concedes “that he was operating a motor vehicle, that 

he was observed driving in an erratic manner, [and] that he had the reported 

quantities of prescription medications in his blood” on the day of the incident. 

Appellant’s Brief at 11. Appellant contends, however, that the Commonwealth

failed to present sufficient evidence of the causal connection between the 

prescription medications present in his blood and his erratic operation of a 

motor vehicle without the offer of expert testimony. Id. Appellant argues 

that an expert’s testimony was necessary to sufficiently demonstrate that the 

erratic driving observed by the eyewitness who called 911 emergency services

and the balance issues observed by Trooper Osbourne during field sobriety 

tests were caused by the prescription medication Appellant ingested earlier in 

the day. Id. at 13. Appellant asserts that, although the Commonwealth 

presented the testimony of an expert in forensic toxicology, “the 

Commonwealth still failed to present sufficient evidence to permit the 

[trier-]of[-]fact to infer a causal connection between the detected drugs and 

[Appellant’s erratic driving].” Id. at 17.
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In finding sufficient evidence to establish the causation element of the 

Section 3802(d)(2) offense, the trial court explained,

[t]o establish its case, the Commonwealth presented evidence 

from three witnesses. The first witness was [an eyewitness who]

called 911 [emergency services] because of [Appellant’s] erratic 

driving. During the trial, [the eyewitness] testified that he 

observed [Appellant’s] vehicle swerving and weaving, to the point 

that [Appellant’s] vehicle crossed the center line multiple times. 

[The eyewitness] also recalled that the vehicle would repeatedly 

speed up and slow down. At one point, [the eyewitness] observed 

[Appellant’s] vehicle bump into a wall while he [] attempted to 

stop behind a school bus. While following [Appellant, the 

eyewitness] saw [Appellant] pull into the parking lot of [a 

convenience store. The eyewitness pulled his vehicle into the 

same parking lot and] remained in the parking lot until a [PSP] 

trooper arrived. At no time did [the eyewitness] see [Appellant]

leave the parking lot. [The trial] court note[d] that [the 

eyewitness’s] testimony was credible as to his recollection of the 

events that day. Additionally, the Commonwealth presented the 

recording of [the eyewitness’s 911] call, which supported his 

testimony.

The second witness the Commonwealth presented was Trooper 

Osborne. When [Trooper Osborne] arrived to the [convenience 

store parking lot], she found [Appellant] asleep in the driver's seat 

of his vehicle. Trooper Osborne testified that it took roughly thirty 

seconds of knocking on the driver's [side] window to wake 

[Appellant]. While Trooper Osborne was talking with [Appellant], 

she noticed he looked disheveled, drowsy, and slightly confused.

Further, [Appellant] admitted to Trooper Osborne that he had 

taken buprenorphine and carisoprodol earlier that day. Trooper 

Osborne then requested [Appellant] perform field sobriety tests, 

which [Appellant] agreed [to do].

During the field sobriety tests, Trooper Osborne detected multiple 

signs of impairment. [Appellant’s] eyes appeared droopy and 

tired during the horizontal gaze nystagmus test. Trooper Osborne 

noticed [Appellant] had difficulty maintaining balance during her 

instructions for the walk-and-turn test. Additionally, [Appellant]

missed multiple heel[-]to[-]toe steps and used his arms for 

balance. During the one-leg-stand [test, Appellant] dropped his 

leg several times, swayed, and raised his arms for balance. Lastly, 
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[Appellant] displayed eyelid and body tremors during the modified 

Romberg test[.5 Appellant] also calculated 55 seconds to be [the 

equivalent of] 30 seconds. Following completion of the [field] 

sobriety tests, [Appellant] was arrested for driving under the 

influence, and he agreed to complete a blood draw.

The last witness the Commonwealth presented was Donna 

Papsun, a forensic toxicologist[. ]Papsun was found to be an 

expert in the field of forensic toxicology upon the agreement of 

[Appellant. ]Papsun completed the report for the results of 

[Appellant’s] blood test. She testified that [Appellant’s] blood was 

positive for clonazepam, carisoprodol, buprenorphine, and their 

metabolites, which are Schedule III and Schedule IV controlled 

substances. In her expert opinion, [] any of the three substances 

found in [Appellant’s] blood could [impair] a person's ability to

drive. The three substances in [Appellant’s] system are 

depressants, and all three taken together "can have, this additive 

central nervous system depressant effect."

While [] Papsun agreed that the levels within [Appellant’s] blood 

were within the therapeutic range, she also opined that it 

generally takes two weeks for a person to build up a tolerance to 

these types of substances. Until a person's body establishes a 

tolerance, they are likely to experience impairing effects from the 

drugs. [Appellant] presented copies of his prescription records.

The records showed that he received [a] clonazepam 

[prescription] on October 8, 2019, [a] buprenorphine

[prescription] on October 9, 2019, and [a] carisoprodol

[prescription] on October 16, 2019. [Appellant] additionally 

testified that he had been incarcerated until October 8, 2019[,]

and was not taking the medications during his incarceration.

Based on [the] timeline presented, it is likely that [Appellant] was 

still building a tolerance to, at [a] minimum, the carisoprodol, but 

possibly all three substances.

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5 The Romberg test is a field sobriety test in which the suspect puts his or her 

feet together so they are touching and puts his or her arms down along the 

side of the body and, when told to do so, tilts his or her head backward, shuts 

his or her eyes, and estimates the passage of 30 seconds in this position

before ending the test. N.T., 9/24/21, at 32.
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Trial Court Opinion, 4/11/22, at 4-6 (record citation and extraneous 

capitalization omitted).

A review of the record demonstrates that the eyewitness observed 

Appellant’s vehicle swerving “quite a bit.” N.T., 9/24/21, at 8. After observing 

Appellant’s vehicle swerve into the on-coming lane of traffic, the eyewitness 

contacted 911 emergency services. Id. Appellant’s vehicle was “constantly 

weaving,” and “[t]here [were] a few times where [the eyewitness] was sure 

that [Appellant] was going to hit another vehicle.” Id. at 9. At one point, 

while Appellant’s vehicle was coming to a stop behind a school bus, the 

eyewitness observed Appellant’s vehicle strike a retaining wall. Id. at 13-15. 

The eyewitness also testified that “[t]here [were] points where [Appellant] 

was driving fast and he would slow down and [then] he’d speed up and slow 

down.” Id. at 16. The eyewitness followed Appellant’s vehicle into a 

convenience store parking lot where Appellant parked his vehicle, and the 

eyewitness parked his own vehicle a short distance away. Id. at 11. The 

eyewitness maintained his observation of Appellant’s vehicle until the police 

arrived. Id.

Trooper Osbourne testified that she was trained to determine if a 

suspect was under the influence of drugs or alcohol and to administer various 

field sobriety tests. Id. at 19. At the time of the incident, Trooper Osbourne 

was also certified in advanced roadside impairment driving enforcement. Id.

at 20. In response to the 911 call, Trooper Osbourne located Appellant’s 

vehicle in a convenience store parking lot, as reported by the eyewitness who 
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placed the emergency call. Id. at 21. Appellant’s vehicle engine was still 

running, and Trooper Osbourne found Appellant “slumped over asleep in the 

driver’s seat.” Id. Trooper Osbourne was able to wake Appellant after 

knocking on the vehicle’s driver’s side window with her fist for 30 seconds. 

Id. at 22, 24. When Trooper Osbourne advised Appellant that she was 

responding to reports of Appellant’s erratic driving, Appellant responded that 

“he was tired.” Id. at 26. Appellant also admitted to taking several 

prescription drugs earlier that day. Id. Trooper Osbourne described Appellant 

as appearing dirty, disheveled, tired, drowsy, and “a little bit confused.” Id. 

Trooper Osbourne, upon asking Appellant for identification, noted, however,

that Appellant did not fumble or demonstrate any difficulty in producing his 

identification. Id. at 39. After Appellant agreed to perform several field 

sobriety tests, he exited his vehicle and walked towards Trooper Osbourne’s 

police cruiser. Id. at 27. As Appellant was walking towards the police cruiser, 

Trooper Osbourne observed Appellant staggering. Id. at 40.

In performing the field sobriety tests, Appellant was unable to maintain 

his balance during the instruction phase of the walk-and-turn test, and while 

performing the test, Appellant missed multiple heel-to-toe steps and had to 

use his arms for balance. Id. at 30-31. During the one-leg stand test, 

Appellant dropped his leg 3 times, swayed, and used his arms for balance. 

Id. at 31. Finally, during the Romberg test, while Trooper Osbourne did not 

observe Appellant swaying, she did note that Appellant misjudged the 30 

second length of time for performing the test and, instead, performed the test 
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for 55 seconds, which, in Trooper Osbourne’s opinion, indicated Appellant’s 

“internal clock [was] going slow.” Id. at 32. In sum, as Trooper Osbourne 

explained, the field sobriety tests are not pass-or-fail tests, but, rather, allow 

a police officer to observe the suspect for “clues of impairment.” Id. at 31. 

In Appellant’s case, Trooper Osbourne observed several “clues of impairment” 

on each of the tests Appellant performed. Id. at 31-33.

Without knowing additional information, the Commonwealth’s expert in 

forensic toxicology testified that she was unable to provide an opinion to a 

reasonable degree of scientific certainty as to whether the controlled 

substances detected in Appellant’s blood on the day of the incident impaired 

his ability to operate his motor vehicle. Id. at 55. The expert explained that 

an impairment assessment, such as an assessment of Appellant’s ability to 

operate his vehicle, requires knowledge of, inter alia, the person’s history with 

the controlled substance, how long the person has been prescribed or using 

the controlled substance, and whether there has been any change in the use 

regimen or dosage. Id. at 57. The expert did opine, however, that, in 

general, a controlled substance, such as the controlled substances found in 

Appellant’s blood, could have an impairing effect on a person when the person

first starts using the controlled substance, and this impairment continues until 

the person develops a tolerance for the adverse effects of the controlled 

substance. Id. at 55, 59. A person develops a tolerance against the adverse 

effects of the controlled substance, the expert explained, generally after two 

weeks but that tolerance period can be prolonged if the person starts using 
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additional controlled substances or if there is a change in the dosage of the 

controlled substance. Id. at 60-61. When asked about the specific drugs 

detected in Appellant’s blood, the expert stated that they were the “types of 

drugs that have central nervous system depressant effects.” Id. at 55. In 

her toxicology report, the expert detailed that, based upon DUI related case 

studies involving each of these three drugs, all three of the drugs detected in 

Appellant’s blood were found, in general, to have impaired a driver’s ability to 

operate a motor vehicle. See Commonwealth’s Exhibit 5 at 2-3.

Appellant testified that he was released from prison on October 7, 2019, 

and immediately began using buprenorphine. Id. at 66. Prior to his release 

from prison, Appellant was not using the three drugs that were detected in his 

blood on the day of the incident. Id. at 70. A report from Appellant’s 

pharmacy confirms that Appellant filled prescriptions for, inter alia, 

buprenorphine on October 8, 2019, carisoprodol on October 16, 2019, and 

October 21, 2019, and clonazepam on October 8, 2019, and October 21, 2019. 

See Defendant’s Exhibit B. As such, the incident occurred within two weeks 

of Appellant starting to use these three drugs.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, 

as verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence to enable the trier-of-fact to find 

a causal connection between Appellant’s use of the aforementioned drugs and 

his inability to safely operate his motor vehicle, even in the absence of expert 

testimony as to the issue of causation. It is uncontradicted that on the day of 

the incident, Appellant ingested, and had present in his blood, the three 
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aforementioned drugs. Some time after Appellant ingested these drugs, an 

eyewitness observed Appellant operating his motor vehicle in an erratic and 

unsafe manner, and Appellant admitted to erratic operation of his motor 

vehicle. Upon engaging Appellant, Trooper Osbourne observed ordinary signs 

that Appellant was under the influence of a drug or combination of drugs, 

including her finding Appellant “slumped over the steering wheel asleep” while 

his vehicle engine was running, and her observations of Appellant staggering 

while he walked and appearing drowsy with drooping eyes, as well as

confused. Moreover, based upon her training, Trooper Osbourne testified that 

Appellant exhibited multiple “clues of impairment” during the field sobriety 

tests, including his inability to main a one-leg stand, use of his arms for 

balance, and several missed steps in the heel-to-toe test. Appellant’s 

drowsiness, drooping eyes, and inability to perform the field sobriety tests 

properly, coupled with direct and undisputed observations of erratic driving,

are ordinary signs of impairment discernable by laypersons.

6

 Expert 

testimony was, therefore, not required in the case sub judice to show a causal 

connection between Appellant’s drug use and his impaired ability to safely 

____________________________________________

6 Unlike Gause, supra, where the Commonwealth’s evidence of impairment 

was body and eye tremors, the evidence in the case sub judice involves widely 

understood indicia of impairment discernable by a layperson. See Gause, 

164 A.3d at 539 (stating, “staggering, stumbling, glassy or bloodshot eyes, 

and slurred speech” are “originally signs of [impairment] discernable by a 

layperson”); see also Griffith, 32 A.3d at 1240 (finding that, a person’s 

unsteadiness and inability to perform field sobriety tests are widely 

understood indicia of impairment discernable by a layperson).
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operate his motor vehicle. Accordingly, Appellant’s issue as it relates to the 

element of causation is without merit.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 1/11/2023