UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

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SCOTT GREGORY HATTRUP, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; JULIA 

DENG, a/k/a Julia D. Palmer, 

 Defendants - Appellees.

No. 20-3011

(D.C. No. 5:17-CV-04083-DDC)

(D. Kan.)

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ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

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Before LUCERO, BACHARACH, and PHILLIPS, Circuit Judges.

_________________________________

Scott Gregory Hattrup appeals from the judgment entered following the district 

court’s dismissal all claims against the United States and its grant of summary 

judgment in favor of Julia Deng. Exercising jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1291, we affirm.

* After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined 

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of 

this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore 

ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding 

precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral 

estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with 

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.

FILED

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

February 3, 2021

Christopher M. Wolpert

Clerk of Court
2

I. Background

Hattrup had several years of unpaid federal income tax liabilities. In a 

previous action, the United States obtained district court approval for a judicial levy 

on property that Hattrup owned in Johnson County, Kansas (the “Property”), to 

collect on those liabilities.

In April 2016, the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) provided Hattrup with a 

notice of seizure of the Property. In August of that year, the IRS provided him with a 

notice of sale by public auction (“Notice of Sale”). The Notice of Sale listed 

October 6, 2016, as the scheduled public auction date. It also identified the IRS’s 

Property Appraisal & Liquidation Specialist (“PALS”) for the scheduled sale and 

included a telephone number and address “for information about the sale.” R. at 110. 

The Notice of Sale set forth Hattrup’s statutory redemption rights both before and 

after the sale. As to the latter, the Notice of Sale stated that Hattrup’s right of 

redemption would run for 180 days after the sale and that the redemption price would 

be the amount paid at the sale plus interest at 20% per annum.

The public auction sale of the Property took place, as scheduled, on October 6, 

2016. Hattrup did not attend the sale. Deng was the high bidder for the Property. 

She paid the purchase price the same day and received from the PALS a certificate of 

sale and a letter indicating the sale would be finalized after expiration of the 180-day 

redemption period if the Property was not redeemed by that time.
3

The IRS provided no further notice regarding the sale of the Property to 

Hattrup. He did not communicate with the PALS or any other IRS employee 

regarding the Property or the sale during the redemption period.

In early May 2017, after the redemption period had expired, Deng surrendered 

the certificate of sale in exchange for a quitclaim deed. Deng recorded the quitclaim 

deed in Johnson County, Kansas, on May 15, 2017. She hand delivered to Hattrup a 

notice to quit the premises on May 17, 2017. Hattrup learned of the sale of the 

Property at that time. When he did not vacate the Property, Deng filed an eviction 

action in state court and received a judgment for possession in July 2017.

Hattrup filed this pro se action against the United States and Deng in 

September 2017. While conceding he had received the Notice of Sale, he alleged that 

the United States violated his right to due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth 

Amendments by failing to provide him an additional notice after the sale of the 

Property. Hattrup contended that the Notice of Sale was constitutionally insufficient 

because it did not include all of the information—specifically, the name and address 

of the purchaser and the purchase price—that was necessary for him to exercise his 

post-sale right to redeem. Hattrup sought (1) to enjoin enforcement of the quitclaim 

deed, (2) additional time to redeem the Property, and (3) to quiet title to the Property

in his favor if he did redeem. Alternatively, he sought damages from the United 

States.
4

The district court granted the United States’ motion to dismiss all of the claims 

against the government. As relevant to Hattrup’s contentions on appeal,1 the court 

held that the statutory waiver of sovereign immunity pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2410

did not apply in Hattrup’s case. The district court also granted summary judgment in 

favor of Deng, concluding that the Notice of Sale provided Hattrup constitutionally 

sufficient notice.

II. Discussion

On appeal, Hattrup argues the district court erred in holding the waiver of 

sovereign immunity in § 2410 was inapplicable in his case. Alternatively, he 

contends that a waiver of sovereign immunity is implied in tax sale cases. Hattrup 

further argues that the Notice of Sale was insufficient to satisfy due process with 

respect to his post-sale right to redeem.

We review de novo both the district court’s dismissal of Hattrup’s claims 

against the United States, see Jones v. Needham, 856 F.3d 1284, 1289 (10th Cir. 

2017), and its grant of summary judgment in favor of Deng, see Utah Republican 

Party v. Cox, 892 F.3d 1066, 1076 (10th Cir. 2018). We liberally construe Hattrup’s 

pro se arguments on appeal. See Cummings v. Evans, 161 F.3d 610, 613 (10th Cir. 

1998).

2

1 Hattrup does not challenge on appeal several of the district court’s bases for 

dismissing his claims against the United States.

2 Hattrup was formerly a licensed attorney in Kansas. Although liberal 

construction does not apply to an attorney proceeding pro se, see Smith v. Plati, 
5

A. Dismissal of Claims Against the United States for Lack of 

Jurisdiction

The United States cannot be sued except in strict accordance with the terms of 

a specific waiver of sovereign immunity granted by Congress. See Lane v. Pena, 

518 U.S. 187, 192 (1996) (holding that any waiver of “sovereign immunity must be 

unequivocally expressed in statutory text” and “will be strictly construed, in terms of 

its scope, in favor of the sovereign”). “The defense of sovereign immunity is 

jurisdictional in nature, depriving courts of subject-matter jurisdiction where 

applicable.” Normandy Apartments, Ltd. v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urb. Dev., 

554 F.3d 1290, 1295 (10th Cir. 2009).

Hattrup argues the United States waived sovereign immunity pursuant to 

§ 2410, which provides, in relevant part: 

Under the conditions prescribed in this section . . . for the protection of the 

United States, the United States may be named a party in any civil action or 

suit in any district court . . . to quiet title to . . . real or personal property on 

which the United States has or claims a mortgage or other lien.

28 U.S.C. § 2410(a)(1) (emphasis added). “Section 2410(a) expressly authorizes 

quiet title actions affecting property on which the United States has a lien only

‘[u]nder the conditions prescribed in this section,’” including the pleading 

requirements in § 2410(b). Dahn v. United States, 127 F.3d 1249, 1251 (10th Cir. 

1997) (quoting § 2410(a)). The district court held that § 2410 did not provide a 

waiver of sovereign immunity in this action for two reasons: (1) the United States

258 F.3d 1167, 1174 (10th Cir. 2001), the district court noted that Hattrup’s license is 

inactive, see R. at 69 n.1. 
6

did not have or claim a lien on the Property at the time Hattrup filed this action 

because its tax lien on the Property was extinguished upon the completion of the sale 

to Deng, and (2) Hattrup’s complaint failed to comply with the mandatory technical 

pleading requirements of § 2410(b). Hattrup fails to demonstrate error in either of 

these rulings, but to affirm the dismissal of his claims against the United States we 

need only address the district court’s first reason. 

The waiver of sovereign immunity in § 2410 “must be narrowly construed.” 

Lonsdale v. United States, 919 F.2d 1440, 1443 (10th Cir. 1990). In Dahn, 127 F.3d 

at 1251 (10th Cir. 1997), we affirmed a district court’s denial of leave to amend the 

plaintiff’s complaint to invoke the waiver of sovereign immunity in § 2410. In 

addition to the plaintiff’s failure to satisfy the pleading requirements in § 2410(b),

see id., we noted that her proposed amended complaint did not object to an existing 

lien interest by the United States, but instead challenged collection efforts that had 

already resulted in the sale of her property, see id. at 1251 n.1. We held that “[a]

quiet title claim [under § 2410], first made when any liens involved no longer 

existed, was barred ab initio.” Id.; see also Koehler v. United States, 153 F.3d 263, 

266-67 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding based on “the plain terms of the statute” that a

“taxpayer may maintain a suit under § 2410(a) only if at the time she files suit the 

government had a mortgage or other lien on the property that is the basis of the 

taxpayer’s quiet title action”); Hughes v. United States, 953 F.2d 531, 538 (9th Cir. 

1992) (“[W]hile a taxpayer may contest the procedural validity of a tax lien under 

§ 2410, he may do so only if, at the time the action is commenced, the government 
7

still claims a lien or a mortgage on the property. If the government has sold the 

property prior to the filing of the suit, and no longer claims any interest in the 

property, § 2410 does not apply.”). Thus, the district court did not err in holding it 

lacked jurisdiction over Hattrup’s claims against the United States because the 

government neither had nor claimed a lien interest in the Property at the time he filed 

this action, as required for a waiver of sovereign immunity under § 2410.3

Hattrup nonetheless asserts that he should be able to pursue his claims against 

the United States under an implied waiver of sovereign immunity that he maintains is 

applicable in tax sale cases. But it is well settled that a waiver of sovereign 

3 Hattrup argues that other courts have held otherwise, but we are bound by the 

decision in Dahn, including its reasoning underlying the holding that the plaintiff’s 

proposed amended complaint failed to invoke the waiver of sovereign immunity in 

§ 2410. See United States v. Meyers, 200 F.3d 715, 720 (10th Cir. 2000) (“The 

precedent of prior panels which this court must follow includes not only the very 

narrow holdings of those prior cases, but also the reasoning underlying those 

holdings, particularly when such reasoning articulates a point of law.”). Nor does 

Hattrup even attempt to distinguish our holding in Dahn. See id. (rejecting a party’s 

attempt to distinguish this court’s prior case law).
8

immunity “cannot be implied but must be unequivocally expressed.” United States v. 

Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399-400 (1976) (internal quotation marks omitted).

We affirm the district court’s dismissal of Hattrup’s claims against the United 

States for lack of jurisdiction because the government did not waive sovereign 

immunity.

B. Summary Judgment in Favor of Deng

In granting summary judgment in favor of Deng, the district court held that the 

notice the IRS provided to Hattrup satisfied due process. The Internal Revenue Code 

requires that, after a seizure of property, a notice of sale must be provided to the 

property owner “specify[ing] the property to be sold, and the time, place, manner, 

and conditions of the sale thereof.” 26 U.S.C. § 6335(b). Hattrup conceded that he 

received the Notice of Sale pursuant to § 6335(b). Although not required by statute, 

the Notice of Sale also informed Hattrup of his post-sale redemption rights pursuant 

to 26 U.S.C. § 6337(b) by quoting that section verbatim. See R. at 111. Hattrup

contended this notice of his redemption rights did not satisfy due process because it 

was provided before the sale of the Property and did not include enough 

information—specifically, the name and address of the purchaser and the purchase 

price—to allow him to redeem the Property after the sale. 

“Procedural due process imposes constraints on governmental decisions which 

deprive individuals of ‘liberty’ or ‘property’ interests within the meaning of the 

Due Process Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment.” Mathews v. Eldridge, 

424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976). But “due process, unlike some legal rules, is not a 
9

technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and 

circumstances.” Id. at 334 (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). Rather, 

“due process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular 

situation demands.” Id. (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, 

“the Due Process Clause has never been construed to require that the procedures used 

to guard against an erroneous deprivation of a protectible ‘property’ or ‘liberty’

interest be so comprehensive as to preclude any possibility of error.” Mackey v. 

Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 13 (1979). Thus, the determination whether due process is 

satisfied in a particular case “requires analysis of the governmental and private 

interests that are affected.” Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334. To that end, the Supreme 

Court has directed courts to consider “three distinct factors”:

First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, 

the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures 

used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural 

safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the function 

involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or 

substitute procedural requirement would entail.

Id. at 335.

More specifically, as it relates to Hattrup’s contention on appeal, due process 

requires “notice [that is] reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to 

apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an 

opportunity to present their objections.” Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 

339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950); see also Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 

791, 798 (1983) (holding a mortgagee was “entitled to notice reasonably calculated to 
10

apprise him of a pending tax sale”). Consequently, once “one is informed that the 

matter is pending,” he “can choose for himself whether to appear or default, 

acquiesce or contest.” Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314.

Considering the Mathews factors, the district court first held that the right of 

redemption is a significant property interest that is entitled to due process protection. 

Thus, the court concluded that the first factor favored Hattrup.

The court next considered the risk of an erroneous deprivation of Hattrup’s 

property interest due to the notice the IRS provided. It noted that he received notice

of his statutory post-sale redemption rights in advance of the sale, as well as the date 

and location of the sale and the PALS’ contact information to answer any questions 

he had regarding the sale. Yet he neither attended the sale nor contacted the PALS to 

inquire whether the Property had been sold. The district court held that “due process 

does not require notice of every detail about every incremental step of the foreclosure 

process. Instead, it requires notice ‘reasonably calculated, under all the 

circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford 

them an opportunity to present their objections.’” R. at 234 (quoting Mullane, 

339 U.S. at 314). The court concluded that the Notice of Sale—which was delivered 

to Hattrup before the 180-day right to redeem began—“was reasonably calculated 

under all the circumstances to apprise plaintiff both of the pending sale and 

commencement of his time-limited, post-sale redemptions rights.” Id. at 235. 

Further, his choice “not to determine the status of the sale does not mean that the 

pre-sale [Notice of Sale] did not comport with due process.” Id. at 236.
11

The district court next considered “the probable value of additional

safeguards.” Id. at 238. It concluded that a second, post-sale notice would not 

materially reduce the risk that Hattrup would be erroneously deprived of his 

redemption rights because he had already been notified that those rights were at risk 

and were expected to expire 180 days after the sale, and because the Notice of Sale 

provided enough information for Hattrup to take steps to redeem if he so chose. The 

court held that “[t]he value of an additional post-sale notice confirming the sale 

results does not nullify the conclusion that the initial notice informed plaintiff of his 

redemption rights. It was reasonably calculated to provide constitutionally adequate 

notice under the circumstances.” Id. at 240. Thus, the court held that the second 

Mathews factor heavily favored the United States because the risk of erroneous 

deprivation was low where Hattrup received actual notice of the sale and his 

redemption rights but “simply failed to take any steps to preserve his rights.” Id.

Finally, the district court briefly considered the third Mathews factor—the 

burden on the government of requiring a second, post-sale notice—and concluded it 

did not favor Hattrup. Having already found that the Notice of Sale satisfied 

constitutional due process requirements as to Hattrup’s redemption interest, the court 

held that providing notice of his redemption rights in the Notice of Sale “conserves 

taxpayer resources and minimizes administrative burden by providing actual notice of 

the sale and the redemption rights together.” Id. at 243.

Thus, after considering all of the Mathews factors, the district court held that 

Hattrup did not have a constitutional right to post-sale notice of his redemption rights 
12

under the circumstances presented. It therefore granted summary judgment in favor 

of Deng on Hattrup’s claims stemming from the alleged due process violation.

Hattrup argues that all three Mathews factors weigh in favor of requiring the 

government to provide an additional, post-sale notice providing the name and address 

of the purchaser and purchase price. He contends that due process requires such 

notice at a bare minimum, but he cites no authority for this proposition.4

 Hattrup 

also argues that the Notice of Sale was insufficient because it failed to state how he 

could obtain the information necessary for him to redeem after the sale. On the 

contrary, the Notice of Sale provided him two avenues to obtain that information: by 

attending the sale or by contacting the PALS. Hattrup contends the Notice of Sale

improperly shifted to him the burden of obtaining that post-sale information. But due 

process requires only notice of the pending proceeding and an opportunity to act in 

response. And Hattrup received such notice via the Notice of Sale. Finally, Hattrup 

argues that a post-sale notice “could easily be prepared by the IRS staff while 

working on the other [post-sale] documents required.” Aplt. Br. at 16-17. But he 

ignores the district court’s other bases for concluding that the final Mathews factor 

weighed against him.

In sum, Hattrup received notice that the sale of the Property was pending. He 

chose not to attend the sale or otherwise exercise the opportunity to act in response to 

4

Although Hattrup cites one case in which taxpayers received a post-sale 

notice of redemption rights, he provides no authority holding that such notice is 

constitutionally required.
13

that notice. See Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314 (noting that, once informed, a person “can 

choose for himself whether to appear or default”). Hattrup fails to demonstrate error 

in the district court’s holding that the Notice of Sale was sufficient to satisfy his right 

to due process. We therefore affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment 

in favor of Deng.

III. Conclusion

The district court’s judgment is affirmed.

Entered for the Court

Gregory A. Phillips

Circuit Judge