### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT JAC KSON

ST A TE OF TE N N ES SE E v
. A N TH ON Y C R OW E

Circuit Courtfor McNair y County

No. 1465A

No. W2003-00800-C CA-R 3-CD - F iled April 30, 2004

J AM E S C UR W OO D W I T T , J R

. , J

. , d i s s en t i n g.

Irespe ctfully

disag ree with the majority opinion’s conclusion that the def en d ant’s motion to wit hdrawhis plea wa s proper ly denied. I believe that a suffic ient fac tual basis for the defe ndant’s plea

is lacking and that the plea was the r esult of a mistaken be lief re g ardingcriminal liability , such that manife st injust ice pe rmits the plea to be withdra wn. Reg ardingfac ilitation of first deg ree murder, to wh i ch t he def endant plea ded no lo
c on te nd e re , Co de se c tio n 3 9- 11 -4 03 pr ov ide s a s f oll ow s:
Crim inal respon sibi lity for f acilitation of

felon y. -- (a) A person is cr iminally re s p o n s ible for the f acilitation of a f

elony if, knowing that another intends to commit a specific felony , but without the intent require d for c riminal responsibility under § 39- 11-402(2) , the per son k n o wi ng ly

furnishes substantial assistanc e in the
c o m m i s s i o n o f

t h e f e l o n y. (b) The fa ci litation of the commission of a felony is an of fe ns e of the c la ss ne xt b e low the fe lony fa c ili ta te d by the pe rs on so char g ed.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 39- 11-403 (2003)

.

The state’ s rec ital of its proof at the plea submissi on is inadequate , in my opinion, to establish that the defe ndant “knowing ly furnish[ed] substantial assistance in the commission” of the hom ic id e

. B y

a ll a c c o u n ts th a t a

p p e a r in th is r e c o r d

- - th e p le a

s u b mi s s io n , th e p r e s e n te n ce repor t, the sentenc ing he aring , and the p l ea withdrawa l hear ing - - Ms. Bor den and T ommy Poe initiated the confr ontation leading to the death of Mr. Smit h. The rec ord is silent about any thing that the de fe nd a nt m a y

have sa id o r d on e be fo re a rr ivi nga t Mr . Sm ith ’s re sidence, and a ny po ssi ble-2-

animosity betwee n the def

endant and the victim is not evident. The de fenda nt, moreover , did not drive the automobile, nor did he participate in lur ing Mr. Smit h into opening his fr ont door. Nothing in the rec ord sug g ests that the def endant wa s armed or

that he proc ured the b as eball bat f or Poe. L ikewise, the defe ndant clea rly was not involved in the actual r estraint of or violent assault upon Mr. Smit h. Simpl y

stated, the prose cution’s fact u al submissi on is devoid of evidenc e that the defe ndant loaned a

ny assistance t o P o e’s homicidal e ndeavor . By contra st, in State v. John Lee Monholland , No. 03C01-9410-CR-00396 (Te nn. Crim. App., K nox ville, Aug . 16, 1995), the c ourt fo un d th e evi dence su ff

ic ie nt t o p ro ve fa c ili ta tio n o f b ur g lary a nd the ft by a de fe nd a nt w ho wa s a passeng er in the c ar that dropped the thief off in the neig hborhood whe re the burg lary occur red ba sed
on e vid e nc e that th e de fe nd a nt s up pli e d d ir e c tio ns to t he targ e te d h ou se . A c c or din g to t he c ourt , “ Di re c tin g the burg lar t o th e ho us e to b e burg lari zed wo uld be c on sid e re d su bs tanti a l a ssi sta

nc e in committing the cr ime.” Id ., sli p op. a t 6; se e als o Sta te v . B arry W ate rs R og e rs , No. M1999-01358- CCA-R3-CD, slip op. 4-5 (Tenn. Crim. App., Nashville, Sept. 15, 2000) (evidence that defe ndant transporte d perpe trator to a c onven ie nce ma rket to purc hase g asoline and that tape and a hatche t from defe ndant’s truc k wer e used to assemble a Molotov c ocktail was sufficie nt to support conviction for fa c ili ta tio n o f a

rs on ); Sta te v

. Ro be rt Lawr e nc e Sim pk ins , J r. , N o. M1 99 8- 00 12 2- CCA -R 3- CD , s lip op . at 6 ( Te nn . Cr im. Ap p. , N a sh vil le , Jan . 7 , 2 00 0) (e vid e nc e that de fe nd a nt a ssi ste d a ssa ila nt w ith disposing of vic tim’s b ody and vehic le and late r wa ited for a ssailant was suff icient to support conviction for f

acilitation of sec ond deg ree murder)

. The prese ntence repor

t, likew ise, supplies no e nlightenme nt about any thing that the defe ndant might have done to knowing ly furnish substantial assistance to Poe, a nd the def endant’ s leng thy statement to the pre sentenc e investig ator amounts to nothing more than an admission t hat he wa s prese n t when Poe assaulted Mr. Smith and that the defe ndant fled the house bec ause he fea red f or his own phy sical safe ty

. Moreove r, nothing rele vant to f acilitation came out during the sentenc ing hear ing. The trial court found no sentenc ing e nhance ment fac tors, and the state strug g led t o j u s t i fy i t s s en t en ci n g re co m m en d at i o n fo r t h e d ef endant. Prosecution couns el ar gu edt h at al t h o u gh the def endant did not have a re cord, had prese nted favor able witnesses, and had some sy mpathy from the victim’s family , “he’ s down there and a ma n is kill ed” a

nd that the def

endant did not notify

the police about what had happe ned.

Tennes s ee Criminal Procedure Rule 11(f) pla ces a specific obligation on the trial court to satisfy

itself that there is a fac tual basis fo r t h e plea be fore enter ing judg ment upon such plea. See Tenn. R. Crim. P. 11(f). The weig ht or persuasiveness of the state’s e vidence is not the benchma rk, and the state is not require d to formally “prove ” its case ; rather , the foc us is on the
re la tio ns hip be tw e e n th e law a nd the c on du c t th a t th e de fe nd a nt a dmi ts t o h a vin g c omm itt e d. I n th is
case , the def

endant m ad e no st atements duringthe plea c olloquy that constituted an admission of g uilt to facilitation. Rather, the cour t asked if de fense counsel stipulated the fac ts as re cited by the state in its of

fe r of pr oo f. I na smu c h as the state ’s of fe r o f p ro of

wa s, in m y

op ini on , in a de qu a te to establish the offe nse o f fa ci l i t ation, the def ense stipulation “[t] hat is substantially what [the defe ndant’s] positi on is” does not oper ate a s an admission of g uilt to facilitation.-3- I f t he ma jor ity ho ldi ngis t

hat a de fe nd a nt’ s b a re pl ea of “ g uil ty ” or

“ no c on te st” pr ov ide s th e fa c tual basi s c on te mpl a te d b y Cr imi na l Pr oc e dure Rul e 11 (f ), Imus t r e sp e c tf

ull y disag ree . Rule 11(f), r equiring a fa ctual basis to support the plea , would be mea ningle ss if the plea its e lf c re a te d its own

fa c tua l ba sis . Ru le 11 (f ), un le ss i t is to b e re nd e re d s up e rf luo us , mu st contemplate that something indepe ndent of the ple a appe ar of rec ord, which taken as true, shows that t h e d e f e n d a n ti s , i n f

a c t , g u i l t y. Adding to or exacer

bating the “manife st injustice” in this case is the d ef en dant’s testimony at the hea ring on his ple a-w ithdrawa l motion that he did not understand the leg al conc ept of fa c ili ta tio n. He sa id that he tol d f or me r c ouns e l th at he wo uld ple a d to fa c ili ta tio n “ if

it m e a nt I didn’t have nothing to do with the murder of Mr. Smith.” Accor ding to the de fenda nt,

Iwas ther e and I

seen something Ishouldn’t ha ve seen, a nd may be I sh ou ld h a ve c a lle d th e law, bu t whe n I g ot t o a ph on e to w he re Ic ou ld have c a lle d th e law, [Poe ], he wa s r ig ht t he re wi th m e , a nd

Ime a ns , y ou kn o w , a f

te r h e ju s t k il le d a ma

n , I ’ m n o t g o in g to s it the re a nd pick u p a ph one a nd , y ou kn ow , c a ll the law, y ou

kn ow , w ithhim standing rig ht there w ith me.

. . . . . . . See, I am g uilty

of beingt h er e and seeing it, y ou know, and I thought that’ s what I

was plea ding guilty

to. A nd if that’s what the time car

ries just for me be ing the re a nd seeingi t is, y ou know, then I ’m rea dy

to do it. But Ididn’ t have a ny thing to do with the death of Mr. Smith.

The de fenda

nt’s testimony

that he thoug ht he was ple ading g uilty to “ being there and seeingit” is consistent with the s tate’s f actua l rec itation -- which, indee d, portray ed the de fenda nt’s criminal liabi l i t y as stemming f rom nothing more than his prese nce at the crime sc ene. I n other words and not surpr isingly , the state’s ina dequate fac tual basis, combined with th e t ri al cour t’s
acc eptanc e of the plea, c em ented in the defenda nt’s mind the mist aken be lief that he c ould be
c ri min a lly

sanc tio ne d for me re ly be ing pr e se nt. Th is f un dame nta l mi sta

ke or mis un de rs tand ing , in my opinion, c onsidered in c onjunction with the inadequate fac tual basis, cre ate a manifest injustice supporting the withdrawa l of the plea to fac ilitation. Finally , Ido not believe that the tr ial court’s state d rea sons for deny ing the defe ndant’s motion to withdraw his plea support that a ction. The trial c ourt observe d that had the
case g one to trial, it would have be en a jur y question whether

the def endant wo u l d h ave been
c ri min a lly

re sp on sib le fo r the a c tio n of Poe . That ob se rv a tio n, a lth ou g h s e lf -e vid e nt, is i rr e le va

nt. Any time that a ca se proc eeds to jury trial, the jury

is asked to re solve the fa ctual disputes pre sented. L ike wi se , th e tr ia l court ’s state me nt that had the re be e n a tria l, the de fe nd a nt w ou ld h a ve ru n th e ri sk of be ingc on vic te d is a c c ur a te bu t, a g a in, imm a te ri a l. Ab str a c tly sp e a kin g , th e ple a -b a rg a in p ro c e ss-4-

has dis t i n ct ad v antag es to all involved parties. N onetheless, Criminal Proce dure Rule 32( f)
re c og nize s th a t si tuatio ns may e xist w he re in a

de fe nd a nt s ho uld

be a llo we d to wi thd

ra w h is p le a to
corr ect a manifest injustice. Perhaps the most striking feature of the trial court’s rationale for r efusing to allow the de fe nd a nt t o w ith dr a w his pl ea w a s th e state me nt t hat ha d th e c a se g on e to t ri a l, “ the iss ue wo uld have be en then at that time whether or not [t he jury ] believed the defe ndant in his statements about his participation.” O f

c o urse, in his statements, the de fenda nt consistently

denied that he participated
or wa s involved in the victim’s de ath. Although a jury would be entitled to re ject the de fenda

nt’s statements, “disbelief of the def endant is not sufficie nt gr ounds upon which to base a n infere nce of
. . . an esse ntial element of the crime w ith which the state must prove be y ond a re asonable doubt.” Sta te v . Th ad

da e us Me dfo rd , No. W2002-002 2 6 -C C A-R3-CD, slip op. at 31 (Te nn. Crim. App., J ac k s o n , Oc t

. 2 1 , 2 0 0 3 ) ( ci t i n g Sta te v W est , 844 S.W .2d 144, 148 (Tenn. 1992) (“A lthough the jur y is permitted to disbelieve the de fenda nt's te stimony , it may

not construct a t h eo ry b ased on no
e vid e nc e a t a ll. ” )) ; see U nited S t ates v. Tyler , 758 F.2d 66, 70 n.3 ( 2d Cir. 1985) (“When the test im o n y o f a w it

n e s s is n o t b e li e v e d , th e tr ie r o f f a c t ma y s im p ly d is r e g a r d it

. N o r

ma lly , the discredited te stimony

is not considered a

suffici en t basis for dra

wing a contr ary

conclusion.”) (q u o t i n g Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union , 46 6 U. S. 48 5, 51 3, 10 4 S. Ct. 19 49 , 1 96 6 ( 19 84 )) ; Sta te
v

. W il li a m Ea r l Ramsey , No. 03C01-9203-CR-00070, slip op. at 6 (Tenn. Crim. App., Knoxvill e, May 13, 1993). Consequently , I cannot acc ept the trial court’s rationale why the plea to fac ilitation must stand.

Iwould reve rse the trial court’s ruling and permit the defendant to withdraw his plea without prejudice to the state to pr ocee d on its orig inal char g e or ne g otiate an a lternate dispositi on su pp or te d b y a n a de qu a te fa c tua l ba sis

.

________________________________________ J AMES CURW OOD WI TT, J R., J UDGE