NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA SECOND DISTRICT BETTY L. DOWDY, ) ) Appellant, ) ) v. ) Case No. 2D14-5717 ) MICHAEL DOWDY, INTERESTED ) PERSON, ) ) Appellee. ) ________________________________ ) Opinion filed January 6, 2016. Appeal pursuant to Fla. R. App. P. 9.130 from the Circuit Court for Hillsborough County; Martha J. Cook, Judge. Joseph J. Registrato, Tampa, for Appellant. Craig M. Harris and Nancy S. Paikoff of Macfarlane Ferguson & McMullen, Tampa, for Appellee.

NORTHCUTT, Judge. The circuit court issued a temporary injunction directing Bett y Dowdy to deposit proceeds of a property sale into the court registry pen ding the disposition of her stepson's petition for construction of a trust. We conclude th at the stepson's petition has no likelihood of success on the merits. Therefore, the act ion cannot support the temporary injunction, and we reverse it.- 2 - In 2006, Betty and her husband, Dennis, created the Dowdy Fami ly Trust. 1 The corpus of the trust comprised two parcels of real estate. Our limited record does not reflect who owned either property prior to the trust's crea tion. At some point, Betty and Dennis caused the trust to sell one of the properties. Dennis had three children, and Betty had two; the couple did n ot have any children in common. The trust document identified Betty and De nnis as the settlors, the initial trustees, and the initial primary beneficiaries. It ma de provision for revocation or amendment of the trust; appointed children of both settlors as co-successor trustees; provided for distributions to the settlors; and, following the settlors' deaths, provided for liquidation and distribution to the settlors' children. The pet itioner below, Michael Dowdy, is one of Dennis's sons and was named as a co-successor trustee

. Dennis died in 2008. In 2011 Betty amended the trust, removin g Dennis’s children as successor trustees a nd as beneficiaries. She subse quently sold the remaining trust property. Michael learned of the sale and aske d the title company to disburse the sale proceeds to Bett y and him jointly as cotruste es. But the title company delivered the proceeds to Betty alone. Michael then filed a petition in circuit court for constructio n of the original trust. He maintained that Betty's amendment was invalid becaus e it was executed after Dennis's death. The petition asserted that when Dennis died th e revocable trust became irrevocable and that Michael succeeded Dennis as cotrust ee. Michael also sought a temporary inj unction to compel preservation of the pro ceeds of the property

1 This trust was created prior to the July 1, 2007, effective dat e of chapter 2006-217, Laws of Florida, and we have not considered the appli cation of section 736.0602, Florida Statutes.- 3 - sale, which the circuit court granted after a hearing. The ord er directed Betty to deposit into the court registry $100,000 from the proceeds. In order to obtain a temporary injunction, the moving party mu st make four showings. Atomic Tattoos, LLC v. Morgan, 45 So. 3d 63, 64-65 ( Fla. 2d DCA 2010). The movant must demonstrate that he will suffer irreparable har m without an injunction, that he has no adequate remedy at law, that he enjoys a substan tial likelihood of success on the merits, and that an injunction would be in furth erance of the public interest. Id. When granting an injunction, the court must mak e factual findings to support each element. Liberty Fin. Mortg. Corp. v. Clampitt, 6 67 So. 2d 880, 881 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996) (citing City of Jacksonville v. Naegele Outdoor Ad vert. Co., 634 So. 2d 750, 753-54 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994) ("If it is to be subject to mea ningful review, an order granting a temporary injunction must contain more than concluso ry legal aphorisms. . . . Facts must be found."), approved, 659 So. 2d 1046 (Fla. 1995)); see also Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.610(c) (mandating that every inj unction shall specify the rea sons for entry). Here, the circuit court's orde r contained no factual findings or legal analysis, and it is vulnerable to reversal for that reason alon e. But we need not decide the case on that basis, because it is clear that Michael was no t entitled to the temporary injunction in any event. The reason is that he cannot prevail in his underlying action. When announcing her decision to g rant the injunction, the circ uit judge focused on the 2011 amendment to the trust, which the judge con sidered to be improper. Indeed, at the hearing below and in this appeal, Mic hael has relied on case authorities that suggest that Betty did not enjoy an unbridled right to amend the trust following the death of the other settlor. But vis-à-vis the pr oceeds of the property sale,- 4 - this argument is for naught unless, but for the amendment, Mich ael was a cotrustee at the time of the sale. This is because article IV of the origin al trust document provided as follows: During the Settlors' lifetime, the Trustees, in the Trustees' sole discretion, may pay, invade, or apply the income or corpus, or so much as they may choose, to or for the benefit, support and maintenance of the initial primary beneficiaries, Dennis R. Dowdy and Betty L. Dowdy, or the survivor, and may add to principal any income not so expended. The judgment of the Trustees, as to propriety and amount of such payment, shall be conclusive. Thus, if Betty was the only trustee following the death of her husband, she had sole and unfettered authority to sell the trust property for her own ben efit. Michael claims to be a successor cotrustee under article III o f the original
trust: A. Initial Trustee The Initial Trustees of this Trust are Dennis R. Dowdy and Betty L. Dowdy, or the survivor, to serve with all of the obligations, powers, and authority contained within this Trust Declaration. B. Successor Trustee In the event of the death of each of the Initial Trustees, Dennis R. Dowdy and Betty L. Dowdy, or if for any reason, such as by resignation or as a result of physical or mental incapacity, as determined by the certificate of two licens ed medical doctors, the Initial Trustees cease to serve as Tr ustees hereunder, the Settlors nominate and appoint Settlors' son and stepson, Michael R. Dowdy [Dennis's son], and Settlors' daughter and stepdaughter, Deborah Ann Andrews [Betty's daughter], as Co-Successor Trustees, without the need for approval by any judicial authority. (Emphasis supplied.) In Michael’s view, the phrase " death of each" meant the death of either initial trustee. Therefore, he asserts that he became a cotrus tee with Betty upon his- 5 - father's death. Notably, however, the trust document also name d Michael's stepsister, Deborah Andrews, as a co-successor trustee, and it did not spec ify that one of them in particular would succeed a particular deceased initial trustee. In other words, whereas Michael claims to have become a cotrustee with Betty when his f ather died, under his construction of article III he would have become one of three c otrustees along with Betty and Deborah. On the other hand, the provision's failure to assign a specifi c successor to a particular deceased initial trustee is consistent with our vi ew that the succession of trustees occurred only upon the death of both initial trustees. This view is confirmed by the use of the same phraseology elsewhere in the original trust document. See Roberts v. Sarros, 920 So. 2d 193, 195 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) (noting that when determining the settlors' intent, the instrument must be read as a whole rather than in isolated words and phrases). Article V provides: After the death of each of the Settlors, the Co-Successor Trustees are directed to liquidate the Trust Estate and immediately pay and distribute the Trust Estate to the children and stepchildren of the Settlors, namely, Michael R. Dowdy, John D. Dowdy, Tracy L. Weston, William Edward Nasrallah, and Deborah Ann Andrews, in equal one-fifth shares, but if any of them shal l predecease the Settlors, then such share shall be distributed to the lineal heirs of that individual, per stirpes. (Emphasis supplied.) Clearly, i n this instance the phrase "dea th of each" must mean the death of both. Otherwise, the article's direction to liqui date the trust estate and immediately distribute it to the settlors' children would nulli fy article IV's grant of authority to invade the income or corpus of the trust for the b enefit of the initial primary- 6 - beneficiaries "or the survivor." Indeed, upon the death of one settlor it would altogether nullify the survivor's status as beneficiary. This, of course, would be an absurd interpretation in complete contravention of a central purpose o f the trust. There is nothing in the original trust document to suggest tha t the phrase "death of each" has a different meaning in article III. To the contrary, that article is otherwise consistent with this interpretation. We conclude, th en, that Michael did not succeed Dennis as a trustee when Dennis died. At all times the reafter, Betty has been the sole trustee and beneficiary of the trust, regardless of th e validity vel non of the 2011 amendment. As such, she had sole authority and discretion to sell the remaining trust property for her own benefit. Because Michael"s lawsuit cannot prevail as it relates to the proceeds of that sale, the temporary injunction must fai l. Reversed.

LaROSE and SALARIO, JJ., Concur.