## NO. 12-08-00232-CV
IN THE COUR T OF APP EALS
TWELFTH COURT OF APP EALS D ISTRICT

TYLER, TEX AS

IN TH E EST ATE OF § APP EAL FRO

M T HE
J.W. TY NER, § COUNTY COURT A T LAW #3
DE CEASE

D § SMI TH CO UN TY, T EXAS

OPINION L ac ey Westbrook appea ls from an a dverse summary judgme nt rende red in the de clar atory judgme nt action she in i t i at ed to have J .W. Ty ner’ s will construed. Westbrook contends the tr ial court e rrone ously

deter mined that she is not a bene ficiar y under the will, se t the wrongpostjudgment interest rate, er

red in a war d i n g at t o rn ey ’s fe es without trial, and fa iled to hold hearing s or rule on

sever al of he r motions. We modify the judg ment to refle ct the cor rec t postjudgment intere st rate a nd to delete the a

war d of attorne y ’s fe es for postjudgment c ollection and af firm as modified.

B ACKG ROUND Westbrook is the biologica l da ug hter of J.W . Ty

ner’ s adopted son, Gor don. Gordon died on No ve mbe r 1 3, 20 02 . L e ss t ha n tw o w e eks la te r, on

No ve mbe r 2 5, 20 02 , J.W. e xec ute d h is w ill , leavingthe bulk of his estate to his wif e, Ha l l y e. J.W . died Marc h 27, 2006, and his will was admitted to probate. Wes tbr oo k fil e d a

pe tit ion fo r d e c lara

tor y jud g me nt a sk ingthe c ourt to c on str ue J.W.’ s w ill and deter mine that she is a desce ndant as the term is use d in the will and entitled to take under the will. Appellees Ha lly e Ty ner, Z oe Anna

Ty ner, a nd Mitz i Ty

ner Par ks filed a motion for summary2

jud g me nt a

rguin g that th e una mbi g uo us wi ll e xclu de s We stb ro ok or , if the wi ll i s ambi g uo us , extraneous evidenc e esta blishes that the will ex cludes Westbroo k

. Al ternatively , they argued, Westbrook relea sed this claim in a compromise se ttlement ag ree ment signe d in 2005. Westbrook also moved for summary judgme nt, asserting the rig ht to judgment as a matter of law be cause the will, she argues, unambig uously includes her

as a de scenda

nt ent itled to take under the will. The trial court deter mined that the will is not a mbiguous and t h at i t l i m i t s J

. W.’s children to Z oe Anna Ty

ner and Mitz i Ty

ner Par ks; lim its J .W.’s descenda nts to the descenda

nts of Z oe Anna

Ty ner a nd Mitz i Ty

ner Par ks; and excludes Westbrook from being a d escendant and benef iciary u n d e r the will. The court a

war ded Appe llees their attorney ’s fe es and or dere d Westbrook to pay postjudgment intere st at the rate of 7.25%.

S TA N D A R D O F R EVIEW The purpose of a de clar atory judgme nt is to obtain a clarification of one’s rig hts. J.E.M. v. Fid e lit y & Ca s. Co. of

Ne w York , 928 S.W .2d 668, 671 (Tex. App.–Houston [1s t Dist.] 1996, no

wr it) . We re vie w a de c larator y jud g me nt und e r t

he same sta

nd ard s a s o the r j ud g me nts and de c re e s. T EX
. C IV
. P R AC
. & R EM
. C ODE ANN . § 37.010 (Ve rnon 2008). We re view the tria l court’s summary judgme nt de novo. Tittizer v. Union Gas Corp. , 171 S.W .3d 857, 860 (Tex. 2005). To pre vail on a traditional summary judgme nt motion, the m ovant m ust show that no g enuine issue of mater ial fac t exis ts and that she is enti t l ed t o j u dg ment as a matter of law . T EX
. R. C IV
. P. 166a(c) . Once the

mov ant h a s est a

bli sh e d a rig ht to summ ary jud g me nt, the no nmo va nt h a s th e burd e n to re sp on d to th e mo ti o nf

o r s u mm ar y ju d g me n t a

n d p r e s e n t t o th e tr ia l c o u rt a n y is s u e s th a t w o u ld

p r e c lu de summary judgme nt. See City of Ho usto n v . Cl e ar Cre e k Ba sin A uth. , 589 S.W .2d 671, 678-79 (Tex. 1979).

C ON STRU I N G TH E W I LL I n her f irst issue, Westbrook asser ts that the two sec tions of the will defining “desc endants,” wh e n c on str

ue d to g e the r, un a mbi g uo us ly ind ic a te J.W.’ s in te nti on that sh e inherit un de r t

he wi ll. She argues that J.W . descr ibed some desc endan t s i n Ar t i cle I and then de scribed a dditional de sc e nd ants , th a t is , d e sc e nd ants of a do pte d c hil dr e n, inc lud inghe rs e lf , in Artic le XI . Sh e a lso3

a s s e rt s t h a tJ

. W

. i s t h e “ an c e s t o r d e s i g n a t e d ” an d

t h e “ a d o p t i n g p ar e n t ” r e f e r e n c e d i nA rt i c l e X I, par agr ap h C. She further a rg ues that she, the da

ug hter of G ordon, the a dopted son, is the “lineal blood desce ndant” o f J

. W

. an d there fore elig ible to inherit under the w ill. Bec ause Westbrook’s interpre tation is inconsist ent with the context, we disag ree
. Appli cable Law Our primar

y inquir y i n i n t erp re ting a

will is t o deter

mine the intent of the testator

. Gee v. Read , 606 S.W .2d 677, 680 (Tex. 1 9 8 0). In doing so, the lang uag e of a single clause will not g overn, but must be rea d in the context of the entire instrument. Eld rid ge v . M ar sha ll N at’ l Ba nk , 527 S.W .2d 222, 226 (Tex. App.–Houston [14t h Dist.] 1 9 7 5 , wr i t ref’d n.r.e .). Ever y clause and para g raph should be g iven a c onstructi o n t h at m ak es it consistent with the document as a whole. Blo od wor th v . Bl oo dwo rth , 467 S.W .2d 218, 220 (Tex. App.–Eastl an d 1 9 7 1, writ ref ’d n.r.e .). Fur ther, we deter

mine the testator’ s inte n t from the languag e used w ithin the four cor ners of the instrument. San A nto nio Are a Fo und. v . L ang , 3 5 S. W.3 d 6 36 , 6 39 (T e x. 20 00 ). I f t he wi ll i s unambig uous, courts should not go be y ond its spec ific terms in se arc h of the testator ’s intent. Id. Acc ording ly , in the absence of ambig uity , extrinsi c evidence ma y not be introduce d to show that the testator intended some thing outside of the words used. Id. Discussion I n Article I , para g raph B , J .W. identified his children. Chi ldr e n. Ih av e t wo ch i l dre n , ZOE AN NA T YN E R an d M I T ZI TY NE R PA RK S. A ll r e fe re nc e s in thi s Wil l to “ my

c hil dr e n” are to Z OE AN NATY NE R and MI TZ I TY

NE R PARK S. Al l r e fe re nc e s to

“ my de sc e nd ants ” sh a ll be to my c hil dr e n (a s de fi ne d a bo ve ) and the ir de sc e nd ants

. I n Article X I , para g raph C, J.W . further addre ssed the mea

ning of the term “ desce ndant.”
D e s c e n d a n t s. Refer ence s to “desce ndant” or “desc endants” mean, in additi o n to any

definition set forth in Article I , lineal blood desce ndants of the fir st, second or a ny other de g ree of the a

ncestor de sig nate d; p ro vid e d, ho we ve r, su c h r e fe re nc e s s hall inc lud e , w ith respe ct to any

provision of this W ill , d es ce n dants who have been conce ived at any

specific point in ti me re levant to suc h provision and wh o th e re a ft e r s ur

viv e bir th; and pr ov ide d, fu

rt he r, an a do pte d c hil d and such ad o p t ed child’s linea l desce ndants by blood or adoption4 shall be consider ed under my Wil l a s lineal blood de scenda nts of the adopting pare nt or pare nts and of any one who is by blood or adoption a lineal ance stor of the adopting pare nt or of either of the ad o pting pa re nts

. Article I of the will specif

ically identifies J .W.’s children a nd does not include Gor don, who ha d pr e de c e a se d J.W. Th e re fo re , the te rm “ de sc e nd ants ,” a s us e d in Ar tic le I , c ann ot refer to Gordon’s de scenda

nts. Article X I b eg ins by stating that refe renc es to “de scenda nts” mean linea l blood desce ndants of the “ ance stor desig nated.” Throug hout the will, J .W. spoke in the first person, ref err ing to himself a s “I .” I t is unli kely that he would suddenly re fe r t o h i m self as the “anc estor desig nated.” I n Article XI , para g raph C, he uses the phrases “my Wil l” and “adopting pare nt” in the same sente nce. Ag ain, it is illogica l to interpre t this to me an that J .W. is ref err ing to himself as the “adoptingpare nt.” Fur ther, Ar ticle XI ref ers spe cifica lly

to Article I , indicating that the explanation of the term “descenda

nt” is a continuation of the e x planation that beg an in Article I . Construing the two para g raphs tog ether , the term “ desce ndant” in Ar ticle XI means firs t , d es cenda

nts of the anc estor desig nated, that is, the a

ncestor spe cifica lly

named in A rticle I , and second, a dopted childre n of the adopting pare nts, those potential adopting pa rents havingbeen spe cifica lly named in Ar

ticle I

. Considering the four c orner s of the will, we co n cl u d e t h at J .W. int ended to limit the term “desc endants” to mean only children a

nd adopted c hildren of Z oe Anna Ty ner a nd Mitz i Ty

ner Park s. Th e wi ll c ann ot pr op e rl y be int e rp re te d in a mann e r i nc lud ingWes tbr oo k a s a de sc e nd a nt. See Blo od

worth , 467 S.W .2d at 220. Ac co rd i n gl y , the trial cour t corre ctly

deter mined that Wes tbr oo k is no t a

de sc e nd ant a

nd be ne fi c iary

un der J.W.’ s w ill . We ov e rr ule Wes tbr oo k’ s f

ir st issue.

I N TEREST R A TE I n her se cond issue, Westbrook asser ts that the trial court incor rec tly set the pos t

judgme nt interest rate at 7.5% whe n the cor rec t postjudgment intere st rate at the time was 6.00%. Appe llees

conce de that the c orre ct intere st rate is 6.00%. Se c tio n 30 4. 00 3( c ) of the Te xas F ina nc e Cod e pr ov ide s that th e po stj ud g me nt i nte re st r a te is “ the pr ime rate a s p ub lis he d b y the B oa rd of Go ve rn or s o f t

he F e de ra l Re se rv e Sy ste m on the date5

of computation.” T EX
. F IN
. C ODE ANN
. § 304.003(c) (Ve rnon 2006). The F eder al Reser ve B oard prime rate on Marc h 12, 2008, the date of th e j u d gm ent in this case, wa s 6.00%. See http:// www. f

e d e r a lr e s e r

v e
. g o v/r elea ses/h15/data/B usiness_day /H15_PRI ME_NA.txt . We have the authority to modify

incorre ct judg ments when the nece ssary information i s available for us to do so. See T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 4 3. 2( b) ; Mull ins v . M ulli ns , 2 02 S.W. 3d

86 9, 87 8 ( Te x. Ap p. –D a lla s 2 00 6, pe t. denied) . We theref

ore modify the judg ment to refle ct the cor rec t perc entag e. See De es v . St ate , 822 S.W .2d 703, 707 (Tex. App. -- Da llas 1991), aff’d , 8 6 5 S. W. 2 d 4 6 1 ( T e x. Cr im

. A p p
. 1 9 9 3 )

. We sustain Westbrook’s second issue.

A TTOR N EY ’ S F EES I n h e r t hir d is su e , We stb ro ok

c on te nd s th e tr ia l c ourt

e rr e d by award in g attor

ne y ’s fe e s to Ap pe lle e s with ou t f

ir st h a vin g a

he ari ngon

the iss ue . Sh e argue s th a t, i n li g ht o f h e r o bje c tio n to Appellee s’ evidenc e of attorney ’s fe es and he r dema nd for a jury

trial, the amount of attorney ’s fe es
was a fac t question for the jury . She further contends that A p p el l ees’ aff idavit for attorne y ’s fe es
wa s “ fa c tua lly

ins uf fi c ie nt” be c a

us e the a ff

ida vit did no t li st a ny fa c ts o n w hic h the c ourt

c ou ld b a se
an aw ard of $5,000.00 for postjudg ment collection. F inally , she asse rts that the awa rd for collection is m oo t be c a

us e sh e po ste d c a shto s up e rs e de the jud g me nt. I n their motion for summary judgme nt, Appellees a sked the c ourt to order Westbrook to pay their attorne y ’s fe es but offe red no e vidence on fee s at the time. The c ourt signe d an orde r g ranting Appellee s’ motion but specifically stated in the orde r that i t i s interlocutory “bec ause it does not deter mine the amount of attorney ’s fe es t hat should be aw arde d to [ Appellee s.]” The following

mon th, Ap pe llees fi led a mot ion fo r a tto rn e y ’s fe e s su

pp or te d b y an a ff ida vit of the ir a tto rn e y in which he a sserted that the reasonable, nece ssary , and customary fee s for lega l service s in this action total $53,795.00. There afte r, Westbrook filed a motion for attorney ’s f e e s “pursua

nt to the Summ ary

J udg ment that the Court should have g rante d.” The motion was supported by her attorney ’s af

fidavit, setting out the amount of fe es she r equeste d. I n the s ame moti on, Westbrook objected to the fee s reque sted by Ap pe lle e s and

the a ff ida vit fi le d o n th e ir

be ha lf . T he tr ia l c ourt ’s fi nal ju dgmen t g ra nte d b oth Appellee s’ motion for summary judgme nt and their motion for attorney ’s fe es. The c ourt order ed6

Wes tbr oo k to pa

y Ap pe lle e s u

p to $5 3, 79 5. 00 , d e pe nd ing on the e xten t of po stj ud g me nt a

pp e llate
a c t i v i t y. When a movant i n cl udes a pr ay er f or attorne y ’s fe es in the summary judgme nt motion, an

a ff ida vit c on sti tut ing e xpe rt op ini on te sti mony c an s uf fi c ie ntl y e sta bli shre a so na

ble a tto rn e y ’s fe e s. Owen Elec. S upply, Inc. v. B rite Day Con str., In c. , 8 21 S.W. 2d 28 3, 28 8 ( Te x. Ap p. Ho us ton [1st Dist .] 19 91 , w ri t de nie d) . T o c re a te a fa c t is su e , th e no nmo va

nt’ s atto rn e y

mus t f ile an a ff ida vit contes t i n g the re asonable ness of the mova nt’s attorney ’s fe e af

fidavit. Id . To constitute proper summary judg me nt e v id ence , an af

fidavit must be made on pe rsonal knowledg e, set for th fac ts which would be admissi ble i n evidenc e, and show the af fiant’s c ompetence . T EX
. R. C IV
. P.166a(f) . The alleg ations must be dir ect, une quivocal, and suc h that perjury is assigna

ble. AU Pha rmac e utic al, Inc. v. Boston , 986 S.W .2d 331, 338 (Tex. App.–Texarkana 1999, no pet.). Thus, a

n aff idavit filed by the movant’s at

to r n e y th a t s e ts forth his qualifications, his opi nion reg ardingrea sonable attorney ’s fee s, and the ba sis for his opinion will be suff icient t o support summary judgme nt, if uncontrover ted. Basin Credit Con sult

ants, In c. v. Obregon , 2 S.W. 3d 37 2, 37 3 (T e x. Ap p. –Sa n A nto nio 19 99 , p e t. denied)

. Appe ll e e s ’ a tt o r

n e y s w o r e u n d e r o a th th at h e is a li c e n s e d a tt o r n e y , h e is f

a mi li ar w ith the

rea sonable a

nd nece ssary

attorney ’s fe es cha

rg ed for appea ls in civil actions such as this case, he has persona l knowledg e of the service s rende red to Appe llees in this matter, and thos e s er v i ces were
rea sonable, nece ssary , and customary

. Thus, Appellee s’ attorney ’s aff idavit suf ficiently established

rea sonable at t o rn ey ’s fee s and is leg ally sufficie nt to support the trial court’s a war d of attorne y ’s fee s. See Colu m bia Rio Gran de Reg’l Hosp. v. Stove r , 17 S.W .3d 3 8 7 , 3 9 7 (T ex . App.–Corpus Chr ist i 20 00 , no pe t.) ; Querner Truck Lines, Inc. v. Alta V erde Indus., Inc. , 747 S.W .2d 464, 468- 69 (Tex. App.–San Antonio 1988, no writ). The burde n then shifted to Westbrook to provide controve rting evidenc e raising an issue of fa ct as to the amount of attorney ’s fe es she should have to pay

. Owen Elec. Supply, In c. , 821 S.W. 2d a t 28 8. Wes tbr oo k’ s e vid e nc e a dd re sse d o nly

he r o wn re qu e st f or a tto rn e y ’s fe e s. Whil e Westbrook objected to Appe llees’ r equeste d attorney ’s fe es and their evide nce, she did not produce

e vid e nc e re g ard ingthe re a so na ble ne ss o f t

ho se re qu e ste d f

e e s. Ac c or din g l y , W e s t

b r o o k d id n ot r a ise a fa ct question trig g eringthe nee d for a n evidentiar

y hear ing be fore a fa ct finder

.7

Westbrook, however , raises a n err or re g ardinga specific awa rd. She asse rts that the awa rd of $5 ,0 00 .0 0 f

or po stj ud g me nt c oll e c tio n is moo t be c a us e sh e po ste d c a shto s up e rs e de t he jud g me nt. Appellee s ag ree , contending that this is not a proper subject for this c ourt’s adjudication. The rec ord in cl u d es an agr eed motion t o fix the amount of sec urity for supe rsede as, but no order . Howeve r, since the pa

rties ag ree that Appellee s are not entitled to an awa rd for postjudgment c ollection, we will acce pt this fact as true

. See T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 38.1(f)

. Acc ording ly , beca use t he trial court did not

err in failing to hold a hear ing on the issue of attorney ’s fee s, we overr ule Westbrook’s third issue to the ex tent of t hat complaint. We modify the trial cour

t’s judgme nt to reflec t that Appellees a re not entitled to an awa

rd for postjudgment c ollection.

M OT I ONS I n h e r f ourt h is su e , We stb ro ok a sse rt s the tr ia l cou rt e rr e d in fa ili ngto h old

he ari ng s o r r

ule on her motion to compel dis cover y , motion to strike evidence, moti on for continuance, supple mental motion for continuance , and spec ial exceptions to Appellees’ motion for summary judgme nt. The four motions all relate to Westbrook’s reque sts for discover y . Be cause the summary

judgme nt was pr op e rl y de c ide d, any

c on tr ov e rs y

re g ard ingthe se mot ion s c e a se d to e xist. Th e re fo re , th e iss ue is moot as to these motions. See Wil lia ms v. La ra , 52 S.W .3d 171, 184 (Tex. 2001). West b rook filed special exceptions to Appellees’ motion for summary judgme nt asserting that th e mot ion

do e s not cl e arl y state the g ro un ds on wh ic h s umm ary

jud g me nt i s so ug ht. She a lso

exc ep t ed t o cer

tain para g raphs be cause they ref er to e x trinsic evidenc e, contr overte d evidenc e, hear say , and fa ctual and le g al conc lusion s
. S h e did not specific ally identify the evidenc e or conclusions to which she r efe rre d. She did not, in that document, ask the court to set a hear ing on her spe cial exceptions. On the same day that she filed her specia l exceptions, she filed a motion for

c on tin ua nc e a sk ing

the c ourt to r e se t the su

bmi ssi on da

te so that sh e ha d a de qu a te no tic e and tim e to complete discove ry
. T h re e m o nths later, the tria l court sig ned an inter locutory summary judgme nt in favor of Appellee s without addressing the spec ial exceptions. The trial cour t did n o t s i gn an order specific ally

addre ssing Westbrook’s specia l e x ceptions. Howeve r, the fina l judgment include s the statement that all re lief not expressly g rante d is denied. Specia l exceptions that a re not c alled to the8

trial court’ s attention and on which the rec ord does not show that the tria l court ac ted ar e wai ved. R.I.O. Sys., Inc. v

. Union C

arbide Corp. , 780 S.W .2d 489, 491 (Tex. App.–Corpus Christi 1989, writ denied) . Westbrook had the burde n to obtain a hearing to prese nt her special ex ceptions t o the trial court a

nd obtain a ruling on them befor e it ruled on the summar y judgme nt that was the subjec t of the spec ial exceptions. H er failure to do so resulted in waive r of he r complaint. F urthermor e, due to a lack of specific ity , her specia l e x ceptions fa ll short of the standar d mandated by Texas Rule of Civil Procedur e 91. That rule requires the party filing a specia l exception to point out the particula r pleadingexcepted to and to point out intelligibly and with pa

rticularity the defe ct or insufficie ncy in the alleg ations in the pleading excepted to. T EX
. R. C IV
. P

. 91 ; C a s t a n o v. San F

elipe Agric., Mfg., & Irrigat

ion C o. , 147 S.W. 3d 44 4, 45 3 ( Te x. Ap p. –Sa n A nto nio 20 04 , n o p e t.) . We ov e rr ule Westbrook’s fourth issue.

C ONCL US I ON I n his unambiguous will, J .W. Ty ner limited the term “ desce ndants” in a ma nner that
ex clu des Wes tbr oo k. Th e re fo re , th e tr ia l c ourt c or re c tly de te rm ine d th a t We stb ro ok is n ot a desce ndant and be nefic iary under J.W

. T y

ner’ s will. W e m odify

the judg ment to refle ct that Westbrook is to pay

postjudgment intere st at the rate of 6.00% and to delete the $5,000.00 awa rd of

a tto rn e y ’s fe e s f

or e nf or c ingand

c oll e c tin g the jud g me nt. As m odified , we af

fi rm the tr ia l c ourt ’s jud g me nt.



### BRIAN HO Y LE J ustice

Opinion delivere d J une 10, 2009. P a n e l co n siste d

of W o rth e n , C .J

., H o y le , J., B a ss, R e tiredJ

u stice , T w elf t h C o u rt o

f A p p ea l s, Tyl er , s i t t i ng by as si

gnm ent . (PUBL I SH)