J-S59009-15

*

 Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

JEFFREY TODD DEBLASE,

Appellant No. 1619 WDA 2014

Appeal from the PCRA Order September 3, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0009921-2005

BEFORE: BOWES, DONOHUE, AND FITZGERALD,* JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 16, 2015

Jeffrey Todd DeBlase appeals from the order entered September 3, 

2014, denying his post-conviction relief petition filed pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. 

§§ 9541-9546 (“PCRA”). We affirm.

A jury found Appellant guilty of third-degree murder and conspiracy to 

commit murder after a joint trial with his co-defendant, Louis Mann, on 

February 5, 2007. In 1996, when the crimes occurred, DeBlase and Mann 

were cellmates in the State Correctional Institute at Pittsburgh, also known 

as the Western Penitentiary. Appellant and Mann murdered a fellow inmate, 

Timothy Boris, who died of asphyxiation due to strangulation. Since 

Appellant was then incarcerated for another murder, his conviction triggered 

a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9715. The 
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court sentenced Appellant on May 16, 2007, to life imprisonment for the 

third-degree murder charge and imposed a consecutive sentence of ten to 

twenty years incarceration for the conspiracy count. 

Appellant unsuccessfully litigated post-sentence motions, filed a notice 

of appeal, and this Court affirmed his judgment of sentence. 

Commonwealth v. DeBlase, 996 A.2d 4 (Pa.Super. 2010). Our Supreme 

Court denied allowance of appeal. Commonwealth v. DeBlase, 13 A.3d 

475 (Pa. 2010). Appellant timely filed a pro se PCRA petition on December 

21, 2011. The court appointed counsel, who filed an amended petition on 

February 28, 2014. Thereafter, the court issued a Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice 

of intent to dismiss on July 1, 2014, and a final order on September 3, 2014. 

Appellant timely appealed. The PCRA court issued a Rule 1925(a) order 

setting forth that the reasons for its disposition could be found in its notice 

of dismissal. 

Appellant filed a pro se document with this Court seeking to proceed 

pro se. This Court entered an order directing the PCRA court to conduct a 

Grazier hearing.1 PCRA counsel also filed a motion to withdraw with the 

PCRA court. The court conducted a Grazier hearing on April 22, 2015, and 

ultimately declined to permit counsel to withdraw or to allow Appellant to 

____________________________________________

1 This panel did not enter the order, which both PCRA counsel and the PCRA 

court questioned in light of the rule against hybrid representation. PCRA 

counsel also was not served a copy of the pro se filing. 
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proceed pro se because his request was that he be assigned different 

counsel rather than continue pro se. Counsel then filed a motion to 

withdraw with this Court, which was denied. Appellant also subsequently 

filed a pro se application for remand. That request was denied. The matter 

is now ready for our disposition. Appellant presents two issues for our 

review.

I. Whether trial counsel gave ineffective assistance for failing 

to object to inadmissible hearsay testimony?

II. Whether trial counsel gave ineffective assistance for failing 

to argue that the codefendant’s statements were 

inadmissible pursuant to the Confrontation Clause of the 

Sixth Amendment as well as Article I, Section 9 of the 

Pennsylvania Constitution?

Appellant’s brief at 4. 

In reviewing a PCRA appeal, we consider the record “in the light most 

favorable to the prevailing party at the PCRA level.” Commonwealth v. 

Henkel, 90 A.3d 16, 20 (Pa.Super. 2014) (en banc). In performing this 

review, we consider the evidence of record and the factual findings of the 

PCRA court. Id. We afford “great deference to the factual findings of the 

PCRA court and will not disturb those findings unless they have no support in 

the record.” Id. Accordingly, so long as a PCRA court’s ruling is free of 

legal error and is supported by record evidence, we will not disturb its 

decision. Id. Where the issue presents a question of law, “our standard of 

review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary.” Id.
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Both of Appellant’s positions relate to the effectiveness of trial counsel. 

“To plead and prove ineffective assistance of counsel a petitioner must 

establish: (1) that the underlying issue has arguable merit; (2) counsel's 

actions lacked an objective reasonable basis; and (3) actual prejudice 

resulted from counsel's act or failure to act.” Commonwealth v. Stewart, 

84 A.3d 701, 706 (Pa.Super. 2013) (en banc). The failure to meet any of 

these aspects of the ineffectiveness test results in the claim failing. Id. 

A claim has arguable merit where the factual predicate is accurate and 

“could establish cause for relief.” Id. at 707. A determination as to 

whether the facts asserted present a claim of arguable merit is a legal one. 

Id. In considering whether counsel acted reasonably, we do not use a 

hindsight analysis; rather, an attorney’s decision is considered reasonable if 

it effectuated his client’s interests. Id. Only where “no competent counsel

would have chosen that action or inaction, or, the alternative, not chosen, 

offered a significantly greater potential chance of success[,]” will counsel’s 

strategy be considered unreasonable. Id. Finally, actual prejudice exists if 

“there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result of 

the proceeding would have been different.” Id. It is presumed that counsel 

renders effective representation. 

Appellant’s initial ineffectiveness claim is that trial counsel rendered 

deficient representation by failing to object to alleged hearsay testimony 

from Arthur Dixon, an incarcerated individual, who testified for the 
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Commonwealth. Specifically, Dixon testified that he observed the victim 

arguing with Appellant and Mann. According to Dixon, he later spoke with 

the victim. After Dixon was asked what the victim stated, co-defendant’s 

counsel objected, but Appellant’s counsel did not.2 A sidebar conversation 

ensued.

Court: State of mind of the victim? What is he going to say?

Prosecutor: The argument was about drugs, that Jeff gave to 

him some drugs, and Tim got scared and gave it to another guy. 

They had an argument because the guy died.

Court: Your objection is?

Codefendant’s Attorney: Hearsay.

Court: All right. Well, it doesn’t involve your client.

Codefendant’s Attorney: Sort of it does.

Court: Objection overruled.

N.T., 1/31/07, at 251.3

____________________________________________

2 Trial counsel certified below that he had no reasonable basis for not 

objecting. However, the record establishes that Appellant’s counsel, during 

trial stated, “I would ask for the record, and so it is clear, if there be one 

objection from one attorney, that it is for both.” N.T., 1/30/07, at 83-84. 

Hence, the issue is more properly counsel’s failure to articulate a hearsay 

argument relative to his client rather than neglecting to object.

3

 The notes of testimony are contained in a single volume. Trial testimony 

began on January 30, 2007, and the verdict was returned on February 5, 

2007. 
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Dixon then testified that the victim told him that he argued with 

Appellant because Appellant gave him drugs that the victim then provided to 

another inmate. See id. at 252. Dixon added that the inmate who used the 

drugs passed out on the floor and was discovered with the drugs. Appellant 

contends that the testimony that he gave the victim drugs was hearsay not 

falling within any hearsay exception.

The Commonwealth responds that the evidence was admissible to 

establish the victim’s state of mind and was relevant to establish Appellant’s 

motive. It adds that, even if the evidence in question was not admitted, 

Appellant cannot demonstrate prejudice based on the additional testimony 

levied against him that established his guilt. We agree that Appellant cannot 

establish prejudice. 

Dixon also testified that he witnessed Appellant using a chokehold on 

the victim inside Appellant’s cell while Mann was punching the victim. 

Thereafter, Appellant and Mann approached Dixon inside his cell and asked 

for help carrying the victim back to his cell. Dixon declined to help and 

suggested that Appellant and Mann ask two other inmates, Carlos Vasquez 

and Adam Colon, for assistance. Dixon then saw Appellant, Mann, Vasquez, 

and Colon carrying the body of the victim. He testified that the men 

dropped the victim at one point and the victim did not even grunt. Vasquez 

acknowledged hearing an argument in Appellant’s cell and minutes later 
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observed Appellant and Mann carrying the victim to the victim’s cell. 

According to Vasquez, the victim looked dead. 

Richard Guy, the victim’s cellmate, also testified that Appellant and 

Mann had approached him and told him that the victim had overdosed on 

heroin and that they had attempted to revive him. When Guy reentered his 

cell, he saw the victim, whom he believed to be asleep. Guy then used 

heroin himself and fell asleep. When he awoke the next morning, the victim 

was unresponsive, bloated, and purple. Guy called for a guard and was 

himself removed to solitary confinement. Later, Mann informed Guy that he 

had an argument with the victim and a struggle ensued before “things had 

gotten out of hand.” N.T., 1/30/07, at 114. An autopsy revealed that the 

victim had abrasions and bruising on his face and back, as well as his neck. 

The victim’s eyes had hemorrhaged and the forensic pathologist concluded 

that the victim had been strangled to death. Based on this evidence, there 

is not a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceeding would 

have been different had counsel objected to Dixon’s statement that the 

victim stated that Appellant gave him drugs on a previous occasion. 

Next, Appellant avers that trial counsel was ineffective for neglecting 

to object to the admission of his co-defendant’s statements to another 

inmate pursuant to Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968). 

Appellant maintains that his federal and state confrontation clause rights 

were infringed. The Sixth Amendment provides that “[i]n all criminal 
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prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . . to be confront with the 

witnesses against him[.]” Similarly, Article I, § 9 of the Pennsylvania 

Constitution reads, “[i]n all criminal prosecutions the accused hath a right . . 

. . to be confronted with the witnesses against him[.]” Bruton held that the 

use of one codefendant’s confession against another codefendant deprived 

the non-confessing defendant of his Sixth Amendment right to confront the 

witnesses against him. Therein, the trial court had instructed the jury that it 

could not use Bruton’s codefendant’s statement against Bruton. The 

codefendant had specifically named Bruton as an individual who helped him 

commit the robbery crime at issue. 

Appellant’s specific objection is to the testimony of Richard Guy and 

Carlos Vasquez. Guy testified regarding what Mann had stated to him about 

the victim as follows, “there had been a tussle between them and things had 

gotten out of hand[.]” N.T., 1/30/07, at 114. Additionally, Vasquez set 

forth that Mann, in discussing Guy’s state of inebriation stated, “[Mr. Guy] 

doesn’t remember anything about the incident, so let’s try to pin it on him.” 

N.T., 1/31/07, at 236. According to Appellant, the references to “them” and 

“let’s” violated Bruton because it implied that Mann was referring to 

Appellant.
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The Commonwealth counters that the reference to another person was 

neutral and omitted specific reference to Appellant.4 It maintains that the 

Supreme Court in Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200 (1987), declined to 

find a federal confrontation clause violation where the non-testifying 

codefendant’s confession had been redacted to omit reference to 

codefendant Marsh. Under Richardson, the neutral redaction, even if it 

could be inferred that the non-confessing codefendant was involved in the 

crime, did not violate Marsh’s confrontation right. According to the 

Richardson Court, the statement must be incriminating on its face and not 

via contextual implication. Id. at 208-209. 

Here, the references Appellant challenges are not facially incriminating 

of Appellant. They do not use his name or refer directly to him. Further, 

this matter does not involve the reading of a confession where there is a 

redaction in the statement via the removal of the defendant’s name and it 

being replaced by a blank space, symbol, or word. See Gray v. Maryland, 

523 U.S. 185 (1998). Only by other evidence introduced can it be inferred 

that Mann’s statements incriminated Appellant. See Commonwealth v. 

Roney, 79 A.3d 595, 627 (Pa. 2013) (no Bruton violation if codefendant’s 

statement incriminates a fellow codefendant only after linkage with other 

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4 We note that the reference to “them” also could have referred to Mann and 

the victim. 
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evidence introduced). Counsel was not ineffective for failing to object since 

no Bruton violation occurred.

Order affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/16/2015