No. 86-398


### IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATEOF MONTANA
1987

INRE THEMARRIAGE OF MURIEL GLEE HUNDTOFT, Petitionerand Appellant, and PALMER LEROY HUNDTOFT, Respondent and Respondent.

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District, In and for the County ofYellowstone, 

### The HonorableWilliam J. Speare, Judgepresiding.
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
ForAppellant: Mary E. Westwood, Billings,Montana
For Respondent:
JockWest, Billings,Montana

Submitted onBriefs: Dec. 11, 1986 Decided: 

### February 3, 

### 1987

ClerkMr. Justice John ConwayHarrisondelivered the Opinion of the Court.

This appeal arises from a marriage dissolution order entered by the District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District, in and for Yellowstone County. Wife challenges several aspects of the court's distribution of the marital estate. We affirm. Muriel and Palmer Hundtoft were married in December 1977. Theirmarriage lasted a little over seven years until December 1984, when Muriel (Wife) filed a petition for the dissolution of theirmarriage. Following a bench trial, the DistrictCourt formally dissolved the marriage inApril 1986. Wife now challenges the distribution of property entered by the District Court. The principal assets 

### in dispute are items of real property contained within the marital estate. The parties themselves largely apportioned their personalproperty and donotnow contest that division. Specifically, Wife asserts that the District Court erred in its property distribution by failing to properly consider those statutorily mandated factors listed 

### in § 40-4-202,MCA. We do not agree. At the outset, we yet again repeat that this Court's function on appeal is extremely limited. Section 40-4-202, MCA, is of necessity a flexible statute which vests a good deal of discretion in the district court. Given the infinite varieties of factual situations presented by parties to dissolution proceedings, trial judges must enjoy the latitude to address each case individually, with an eye to its unique circumstances. Wallace v. Wallace (Mont. 1983), 661 P.2d 455, 458, 40 St.Rep. 430, 434. Upon appeal, this Court's functionsare as limited as a district court's powers are broad. Sitting as a court oferror, we will reverse a lower court's pronouncement only upon a clear abuse of discretion. Under the test we have developed for review of marital estate property distributions, appellant is required to show that the district court acted arbitrarily, without employment of conscientious judgment or exceeded the bounds of reason resulting in substantial injustice. In re the Marriage of Perry (Mont. 1985), 704 P.2d 41, 43, 42 St.Rep. 1101, 1104; In re theMarriage ofRolfe (Mont. 1985), 699P.2d 79, 83, 42 St.Rep. 623, 626; In re the Marriage of Vert (Mont. 19841, 680 P.2d 587, 588, 41 St.Rep. 895, 896. Applying this standard,we cannot say that the District Court abused.its discretion. Appellant first challenges the District Court's failure to render specific findings of those factors listed in 5 40-4-202, MCA. While articulation of these factors is encouraged, the absence of specific findings does 

### not automatically warrant remand: It is not the lack of specific findings which constitutes reversible error, but the lack of substantial evidence to support the judgment. We look both to the District Court's express reasoning and the evidence in the record to determine whether ample evidence exists.

In re the Marriage of Peterson (Mont. 1984), 683 P.2d 1304, 1307, 41 St.Rep. 1252, 1256 (quoting Frazier 

### v. Frazier (Mont. 1984), 676 P.2d 217, 219-20, 41 St.Rep. 233, 236). Our reading of both the record and the court's reasoning persuades us that the court's actions were supportedby sufficientevidence. For example, appellant contests the court's award to Palmer (Husband)of "all the equity'' in the parties' jointly owned realproperty acquired during the marriage. Basically,

### thisproperty in question consistsof two residences,ahouse in Harlowton,and a Billings condominium. The court awarded the house in Harlowton to Husband,provided thathe pay Wife $3,000--one-half the value of the house. Wife receivedhalf the equity of this house. As to the condominium inBillings, the court found that the Husband had adequately proven that the funds used as a downpayment could be traced directly to liquidation of one of his pre-marital assets. This finding is supported by the record. The court did not abuse its discretion in itsdistributionof theseproperties. Appellant also claims that the court failed to consider fully the Wife's non-monetary contributions to the family unit. While no children were born of the marriage, each party had children from a previous marriage. However,both parties worked, and from the testimony of the parties it is clear that each shouldered this burden. The record simply does not contain sufficient evidence on this point to find abuse ofdiscretion. We further are not persuaded by appellant's assertion that the court failed to consider her age, health, future employabilityand lack of income producing assets. The court noted that appellant was regularly employed as a restaurant manager, the same type of job she has held more or less continuously since before thismarriage. Further,the court awardedWife two ofherpre-marital, income producing assets,
a contract for deed receivable arising from the sale of her previously owned cafe and the net equity in two rentalmobile home lots. In short,appellanthas failed to showhow the District Court exceeded the bounds of reason or failed to employ conscientious judgment. Itmatters not how this Courtwould decide were it the courtof first impression. All that is in'paUJr33v *qouprp wyqpur3 aM *uorqaxasrp 20 asnqe leala paqqrwoa qxno~ zaMoT ayq xayqaym sr uorqsanb