Case No. 03-15-00063-CR

In the Court of Appeals for the Third 

Judicial District, Austin, Texas 

EX PARTE JAMES RICHARD “RICK” PERRY

Appeal from the Denial of the Writ of Habeas Corpus 

in the District Court for the 390th Judicial District 

Travis County, Texas, Case No. D-1-DC-14-100139 

BRIEF OF CONSTITUTIONAL AND CRIMINAL LAW EXPERTS AS AMICI CURIAE

IN SUPPORT OF THE APPLICATION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

Eugene Volokh

 California Bar No. 194464

Gary T. Schwartz Professor of Law

UCLA SCHOOL OF LAW

385 Charles E. Young Dr. East

Los Angeles, CA 90095

Tel.: (310) 206-3926

volokh@law.ucla.edu

James C. Ho

 Texas Bar No. 24052766

Prerak Shah

 Texas Bar No. 24075053

Bradley G. Hubbard

 Texas Bar No. 24090174

GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP

2100 McKinney Avenue, Suite 1100

Dallas, TX 75201-6912

Tel.: (214) 698-3264

Fax: (214) 571-2917

jho@gibsondunn.com

pshah@gibsondunn.com

bhubbard@gibsondunn.com

COUNSEL FOR AMICI CURIAE

ACCEPTED

03-15-00063-CR

4945207

THIRD COURT OF APPEALS

AUSTIN, TEXAS

4/20/2015 9:05:19 AM

JEFFREY D. KYLE

CLERK

 RECEIVED IN 3rd COURT OF APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS 4/20/2015 9:05:19 AM JEFFREY D. KYLE Clerk
i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Table of Authorities..................................................................................................ii

Statement of Interest of Amici..................................................................................1

Introduction...............................................................................................................5

Argument...................................................................................................................6

I. Count I of the Indictment Should Be Dismissed, Because It Is 

Both Unconstitutional and Barred by Legislative Immunity. ..............6

A. Count I Violates the Constitutional Doctrine of 

Separation of Powers, Because the Legislature Cannot 

Criminalize the Exercise of a Governor’s Constitutional 

Veto Power.................................................................................7

B. Governor Perry Cannot Be Prosecuted for His Veto, 

Because He Is Entitled to Absolute Legislative Immunity 

for Any Exercise of His Veto Power. ......................................11

II. Count II of the Indictment Should Be Dismissed, Because It 

Criminalizes Speech Protected by the First Amendment of the 

U.S. Constitution. ...............................................................................20

Conclusion ..............................................................................................................31

Certificate of Compliance .......................................................................................33

Certificate of Service ..............................................................................................34
ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

Cases

Armadillo Bail Bonds v. State, 

802 S.W.2d 237 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) ..............................................................7

Bond v. Floyd, 

385 U.S. 116 (1966).............................................................................................27

Camacho v. Samaniego, 

954 S.W.2d 811 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1997, pet. denied)...................................13

Clinton v. Jones, 

520 U.S. 681 (1997)...................................................................................... 17, 18

D’Amato v. Superior Court, 

167 Cal. App. 4th 861 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008)................................................. 14, 15

Doe v. McMillan, 

412 U.S. 306 (1973).............................................................................................14

Dublin v. State, 

742 N.E.2d 232 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000).................................................................14

Duncantell v. State, 

230 S.W.3d 835 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet. 

ref’d).....................................................................................................................26

Ex Parte Gill, 

413 S.W.3d 425 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) ..............................................................8

Forrester v. White, 

484 U.S. 219 (1988).............................................................................................12

Fulmore v. Lane, 

140 S.W. 405 (Tex. 1911)....................................................................................14

Garcetti v. Ceballos, 

547 U.S. 410 (2006).............................................................................................27
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 

(CONTINUED)

Page(s)

iii

Grayned v. City of Rockford, 

408 U.S. 104 (1972).............................................................................................30

Hernandez v. City of Lafayette, 

643 F.2d 1188 (5th Cir. 1981) .............................................................................13

In re Perry, 

60 S.W.3d 857 (Tex. 2001)............................................................... 11, 12, 13, 15

Irons v. R.I. Ethics Comm’n, 

973 A.2d 1124 (R.I. 2009)...................................................................................15

Jenevein v. Willing, 

493 F.3d 551 (5th Cir. 2007) ...............................................................................27

Jessen Assocs., Inc. v. Bullock, 

531 S.W.2d 593 (Tex. 1975)................................................................................14

Jorgensen v. Blagojevich, 

811 N.E.2d 652 (Ill. 2004)............................................................................ 17, 18

Langever v. Miller,

76 S.W.2d 1025 (1934)..........................................................................................8

Meshell v. State, 

739 S.W.2d 246 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) ..............................................................8

Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 

391 U.S. 563 (1968).............................................................................................27

Pickle v. McCall, 

24 S.W. 265 (Tex. 1893)......................................................................................14

Rangra v. Brown, 

566 F.3d 515 (5th Cir. 2009) ...............................................................................27

State v. Dankworth, 

672 P.2d 148 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983)..................................................................15

State v. Hanson, 

793 S.W.2d 270 (Tex. App.—Waco 1990, no writ)......................... 20, 21, 26, 30
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 

(CONTINUED)

Page(s)

iv

State v. Holton, 

997 A.2d 828 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2010)............................................... 14, 18, 19

State v. Neufeld, 

926 P.2d 1325 (Kan. 1996)..................................................................................14

Stockton v. Offenbach, 

336 S.W.3d 610 (Tex. 2011)................................................................................10

Tenney v. Brandhove, 

341 U.S. 367 (1951)................................................................................ 12, 14, 15

United States v. Brewster, 

408 U.S. 501 (1972)...............................................................................................9

United States v. Dowdy, 

479 F.2d 213 (4th Cir. 1973) ...............................................................................15

United States v. Gillock, 

445 U.S. 360 (1980).............................................................................................17

United States v. Mandel, 

415 F. Supp. 997 (D. Md. 1976)..........................................................................16

United States v. Mandel, 

415 F.Supp. 1025 (D. Md. 1976).........................................................................16

United States v. Stevens, 

559 U.S. 460 (2010).............................................................................................25

Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 

552 U.S. 442 (2008).............................................................................................25

Watts v. United States, 

394 U.S. 705 (1969).............................................................................................20

Statutes

TEX. PENAL CODE § 36.03(a)(1) ....................................................................... 21, 27

TEX. PENAL CODE § 39.02(a)(2) ......................................................... 6, 8, 10, 11, 15
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 

(CONTINUED)

Page(s)

v

Constitutional Provisions

TEX. CONST. art. II, § 1 ..............................................................................................7

TEX. CONST. art. III, § 21 .........................................................................................11

TEX. CONST. art. IV, § 14...........................................................................................7

U.S. CONST. art. I § 6 ...............................................................................................11

Other Authorities

Alex Spilius & Jon Swaine, Anthony Weiner Resigns over Lewd 

Twitter Photographs, TELEGRAPH (U.K.), June 16, 2011....................................23

Andrew Ramonas, Doggett: No Retreat on U.S. Attorney Picks, MAIN 

JUSTICE (Oct. 13, 2009), available at http://www.mainjustice.com/

2009/10/13/doggett-no-retreat-on-us-attorney-picks/ .........................................30

Federalist No. 51 (Madison) ....................................................................................20

Hardball with Chris Matthews, MSNBC, Sept. 5, 2007, transcript 

available at http://www.nbcnews.com/id/20623566/ns/msnbchardball_with_chris_matthews/t/hardball-chris-matthews-sept..........................23

Lawmakers Decry Abuses Within Texas Youth Commission, TEXAS 

SENATE NEWS, Feb. 27, 2007...............................................................................23

Neil Munro, Priebus: Obama Executive Amnesty Is A ‘Nuclear 

Threat,’ THE DAILY CALLER (Nov. 7, 2014), available at 

http://dailycaller.com/2014/11/07/priebus-obama-executiveamnesty-is-a-nuclear-threat .................................................................................29

Perry: Board to Resign, WAXAHACHIE DAILY LIGHT, Mar. 15, 2007.....................23

President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President in a Press 

Conference (Nov. 5, 2014), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov

/the-press-office/2014/11/05/remarks-president-press-conference .....................29
1

STATEMENT OF INTEREST OF AMICI

Amici are an ideologically diverse coalition of experts in the fields of 

constitutional and criminal law—including former judges, solicitors general, 

prosecutors, criminal defense lawyers, constitutional litigators, and professors on 

both sides of the aisle. They represent virtually the entire political spectrum and 

have no personal or political stake in this case. They submit this brief for one 

simple reason: They are committed to the rule of law, and do not wish to see the 

law tarnished or distorted for purely partisan political purposes.

Floyd Abrams has served as counsel in many of the highest-profile First 

Amendment cases of the modern era, including representing The New York Times

in the Pentagon Papers case. His most recent book is FRIEND OF THE COURT: ON 

THE FRONT LINES WITH THE FIRST AMENDMENT (2013).

Michael Barone is a Resident Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute 

and the principal co-author of THE ALMANAC OF AMERICAN POLITICS.

Ashutosh Bhagwat is a Professor of Law at UC Davis School of Law. He 

has published extensively on issues relating to freedom of expression.

Jeff Blackburn is the Founder and Chief Counsel of the Innocence Project 

of Texas, an organization dedicated to securing the release of those wrongfully 

convicted of crimes in Texas and educating the public about the causes and effects 

of wrongful convictions.
2

Paul Coggins is a former United States Attorney for the Northern District of 

Texas (1993-2001), appointed by President Bill Clinton.

Alan Dershowitz is the Felix Frankfurter Professor of Law, Emeritus, at

Harvard Law School, and is one of the most well-known civil liberties advocates in 

the country.

Raul A. Gonzalez is a former Justice on the Texas Supreme Court (1984-

1998), appointed by Governor Mark White and later elected as a Democrat.

James C. Ho is a former Solicitor General of Texas (2008-2010) and a

former Chief Counsel to the United States Senate Subcommittee on the 

Constitution (2003-2005).

Daniel Lowenstein is a Professor of Law, Emeritus, at UCLA School of 

Law. He is also the Director of the UCLA Center for the Liberal Arts and Free 

Institutions and a former chair of the California Fair Political Practices 

Commission, appointed by Governor Jerry Brown.

Michael W. McConnell is the Richard and Frances Mallery Professor of 

Law at Stanford Law School and the Executive Director of the Stanford 

Constitutional Law Center. He is also a former Judge on the U.S. Court of

Appeals for the Tenth Circuit (2002-2009).
3

John T. Montford is a former District Attorney for Lubbock County, a 

former Texas State Senator (D-Lubbock), and the first Chancellor of the Texas 

Tech University System.

Michael Mukasey is a former Attorney General of the United States (2007-

2009) and a former judge on the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of 

New York (1987-2006).

Theodore B. Olson is a former Solicitor General of the United States (2001-

2004) and a former Assistant Attorney General for the Office of Legal Counsel at 

the United States Department of Justice (1981-1984).

Harriet O’Neill is a former Justice on the Texas Supreme Court (1999-

2010), a former Justice on the Fourteenth Court of Appeals of Texas (1995-1998), 

and a former Judge on the 152nd District Court of Texas (1993-1995).

Nathaniel Persily is the James B. McClatchy Professor of Law at Stanford 

Law School and served as the Senior Research Director for the Presidential 

Commission on Election Administration formed by President Barack Obama.

Kenneth W. Starr is a former Solicitor General of the United States (1989-

1993) and a former Judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit (1983-

1989).
4

Johnny Sutton is a former United States Attorney for the Western District 

of Texas (2001-2009), appointed by President George W. Bush, and a former 

Associate Deputy Attorney General at the United States Department of Justice.

Eugene Volokh is the Gary T. Schwartz Professor of Law at UCLA School 

of Law. He also runs UCLA’s First Amendment Amicus Brief Clinic and is the 

author of THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND RELATED STATUTES (5th ed. 2013).1

 

1 Amici’s institutional affiliations are provided only for purposes of identification. No counsel 

for a party authored this brief in whole or in part, and no counsel or party made a monetary 

contribution intended to fund the preparation or submission of this brief. No person other 

than amici or their counsel made a monetary contribution to its preparation or submission. 

See TEX. R. APP. P. 11.
5

INTRODUCTION

Governor Rick Perry announced that he would exercise his constitutional 

authority to veto a bill if another political official did not do what he wanted. Then 

he vetoed that bill. For these two ordinary political acts, Governor Perry has been

indicted on felony charges.

Both counts of the indictment are unconstitutional and must be dismissed

immediately. The first count—which criminalizes Governor Perry’s veto of a 

bill—violates the separation of powers enshrined in the Texas Constitution. The 

Legislature is not allowed to criminalize the exercise of powers that the 

Constitution specifically confers on the Governor, including the veto power. 

And the second count—which criminalizes Governor Perry’s threat to veto a 

bill if Travis County District Attorney Rosemary Lehmberg did not resign her 

office—violates the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Article I, 

Section 8 of the Texas Constitution. Governor Perry “threatened” to perform an 

act that the Texas Constitution specifically reserves to him (a veto) in order to 

encourage a public official to engage in a lawful act (a resignation). That is 

constitutionally protected speech.

* * *

We as amici take no position on the politics that led to this indictment. 

Reasonable people can disagree on the political tactics employed by both Governor 
6

Perry and his opponents. But to turn political disagreement into criminal 

prosecution is disturbing. To do so with an indictment riddled with constitutional 

infirmities is even worse. 

The indictment of Governor Perry demands this Court’s swift intervention. 

The writ of habeas corpus should be granted and this prosecution should come to 

an end.

ARGUMENT

I. Count I of the Indictment Should Be Dismissed, Because It Is Both 

Unconstitutional and Barred by Legislative Immunity.

Count I of the indictment essentially alleges that Governor Perry violated 

Section 39.02(a)(2) of the Texas Penal Code when he vetoed a bill that would have 

funded the continued operation of the Public Integrity Unit of the Travis County 

District Attorney’s office. The prosecution alleges that Governor Perry exercised 

this veto “with intent to harm another”—namely, District Attorney Rosemary 

Lehmberg and the Public Integrity Unit.

But this Count suffers from two independently fatal flaws: (1) the 

Legislature is not allowed to criminalize the Governor’s exercise of his veto power, 

and (2) Governor Perry is entitled to absolute legislative immunity for any exercise 

of that veto power.
7

A. Count I Violates the Constitutional Doctrine of Separation of 

Powers, Because the Legislature Cannot Criminalize the Exercise 

of a Governor’s Constitutional Veto Power.

1. The Texas Constitution vests in the Governor the absolute authority to 

veto appropriations bills. See TEX. CONST. art. IV, § 14. The Governor is entitled 

to decide which laws he “approv[es]” and which he disapproves—without any 

constraint from the Legislature, or from special prosecutors. Id.

The Texas Constitution also includes an explicit separation of powers 

provision that sets forth the structure of Texas government:

The powers of the Government of the State of Texas shall be divided 

into three distinct departments, each of which shall be confided to a 

separate body of magistracy, to wit: Those which are Legislative to 

one; those which are Executive to another, and those which are 

Judicial to another; and no person, or collection of persons, being of 

one of these departments, shall exercise any power properly attached 

to either of the others, except in the instances herein expressly 

permitted.

TEX. CONST. art. II, § 1.

This express provision “reflects a belief on the part of those who drafted and 

adopted our state constitution that one of the greatest threats to liberty is the 

accumulation of excessive power in a single branch of government.” Armadillo 

Bail Bonds v. State, 802 S.W.2d 237, 239 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990). “So important 

is this division of governmental power that it was provided for in the first section 

of the first article of the Constitution of the Republic of Texas, and alone it 
8

constituted article 2 of each succeeding Constitution.” Langever v. Miller, 76 

S.W.2d 1025, 1035 (Tex. 1934).

For these reasons, courts have long been vigilant about preventing any 

attempt by one branch of the government to encroach on the authority 

constitutionally secured to a different branch. Accordingly, “any attempt by one 

department of government to interfere with the powers of another is null and void.” 

Meshell v. State, 739 S.W.2d 246, 252 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987). The separation of 

powers provision is violated “when one branch unduly interferes with another 

branch so that the other branch cannot effectively exercise its constitutionally 

assigned powers.” Ex Parte Gill, 413 S.W.3d 425, 431-32 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2013).

Yet the prosecution today claims that Section 39.02(a)(2) criminalizes 

Governor Perry’s veto of an appropriations bill. If that were true, then the statute 

would be plainly unconstitutional. The Legislature cannot make it a crime for the 

Governor to veto appropriations bills, because that would obviously “interfere[]

with another branch so that the other branch cannot effectively exercise its 

constitutionally assigned powers.” Id. Any such outlawing of the use of the veto 

power would unilaterally increase the Legislature’s own power, by eviscerating the 

Governor’s power to veto legislation he does not “approve” of—even though,

under the Texas Constitution, every legislative bill is subject to veto. The 
9

Legislature cannot enact a statute that constrains that gubernatorial power, thereby

enlarging its own.

Nor would the analysis be different if Governor Perry vetoed a bill “with 

intent to harm another.” The Texas Constitution places no limits on the 

Governor’s exclusive power to decide which bills to give his “approval.” So the 

Legislature cannot empower the Judiciary to pass judgment on the Governor’s 

intent behind a veto and accordingly chill the Governor’s exercise of his veto 

power through the prospect of criminal punishment.

2. There are, of course, constitutional limits on the Governor’s veto 

power. The Legislature can override a Governor’s veto with a two-thirds vote. 

The Legislature can threaten not to enact laws that the Governor supports if he 

continues to exercise his veto in a manner with which it disagrees. The Legislature

even has the power to impeach a Governor for a veto. And of course, the people of 

this State could always vote a Governor out of office because of a veto.

The Legislature can also criminalize acts of political corruption, such as the 

acceptance of a bribe in exchange for a veto. Notably, however, the illegal act in 

that circumstance is the acceptance of the bribe—not the veto itself. So a bribery 

prosecution would not trigger any of the separation of powers issues that plague 

this prosecution. See, e.g., United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 526 (1972)

(“There is no need for the Government to show that appellee fulfilled the alleged 
10

illegal bargain; acceptance of the bribe is the violation of the statute, not 

performance of the illegal promise.”). 

None of these constitutionally permissible acts authorizes criminal 

prosecution for the Governor’s exercise of his constitutionally prescribed veto 

power.

3. It is not necessary to read Section 39.02(a)(2) in this clearly 

unconstitutional manner. There is no indication that the Legislature intended for 

the statute to be so read. This reading is the prosecution’s own. This Court can, 

and should, avoid this constitutional controversy entirely, by declaring that the 

statute simply does not criminalize Governor Perry’s conduct. As explained in 

further detail in the Governor’s application for a writ of habeas corpus and motion 

to quash the indictment, a Governor simply does not have “custody or possession” 

of a sum of money that starts out in the Texas Treasury, ends up in the Texas

Treasury, and remains throughout in the Texas Treasury. Those funds are always

in the custody of the Comptroller, not the Governor.

Not only would this be the most natural reading of the statutory text, but it 

would also avoid the constitutional infirmities raised by prosecuting Governor 

Perry for his veto. See, e.g., Stockton v. Offenbach, 336 S.W.3d 610, 618 (Tex. 

2011) (“We presume that when enacting legislation, the Legislature intends to 
11

comply with the state and federal constitutions, and we are obligated to avoid 

constitutional problems if possible.”) (quotations and citation omitted).

* * *

The Constitution permits only two options: either (1) read Section 

39.02(a)(2) the way the prosecution does, and then declare the statute

unconstitutional, because it violates the separation of powers doctrine decreed in 

the Texas Constitution; or (2) avoid the constitutional issue altogether, by 

interpreting the statute not to apply to a Governor’s veto of an appropriations bill. 

Either way, Count I must be dismissed.

B. Governor Perry Cannot Be Prosecuted for His Veto, Because He

Is Entitled to Absolute Legislative Immunity for Any Exercise of 

His Veto Power.

Count I also suffers from a separate yet equally fatal flaw: a Governor has 

absolute legislative immunity from any prosecution based on the exercise of his 

veto power. 

1. Legislative immunity is a common law doctrine that flows from the 

Speech or Debate Clauses of the Texas and U.S. Constitutions. See In re Perry, 60 

S.W.3d 857, 859 (Tex. 2001) (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6; TEX. CONST. art. III, 

§ 21). It declares that “individuals acting in a legislative capacity are immune from 

liability for those actions.” Id.
12

The reason for this immunity is simple. As the U.S. Supreme Court has 

explained, and the Texas Supreme Court has endorsed:

“[T]he threat of liability can create perverse incentives that operate to 

inhibit officials in the proper performance of their duties. In many 

contexts, government officials are expected to make decisions that are 

impartial or imaginative, and that above all are informed by 

considerations other than the personal interests of the decisionmaker. 

Because government officials are engaged by definition in governing, 

their decisions will often have adverse effects on other persons. When 

officials are threatened with personal liability for acts taken pursuant 

to their official duties, they may well be induced to act with an excess 

of caution or otherwise to skew their decisions in ways that result in 

less than full fidelity to the objective and independent criteria that 

ought to guide their conduct.”

Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 223 (1988)).

And for precisely those same reasons, the motivation behind a legislative 

act—be it partisan, personal, or parochial—is utterly irrelevant to the privilege of 

legislative immunity: 

The claim of an unworthy purpose does not destroy the privilege.

Legislators are immune from deterrents to the uninhibited discharge 

of their legislative duty, not for their private indulgence but for the 

public good. One must not expect uncommon courage even in 

legislators. The privilege would be of little value if they could be 

subjected to the cost and inconvenience and distractions of a trial 

upon a conclusion of the pleader, or to the hazard of a judgment

against them based upon a jury’s speculation as to motives.

Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 377 (1951). See also Perry, 60 S.W.3d at 

859-60 (“The legislative immunity doctrine recognizes that it is not consonant with 
13

our scheme of government for a court to inquire into the motives of legislators.”) 

(quotations omitted).

2. Notably, legislative immunity extends to any official who is acting in 

a legislative capacity, whether or not the official is a member of the Legislature. 

For example, the Texas Supreme Court has held that legislative immunity protects

the Attorney General and the Comptroller (who are usually executive officials) 

when they perform “legislative functions” as members of the Legislative 

Redistricting Board. Perry, 60 S.W.3d at 860. “Courts have extended the 

legislative immunity doctrine beyond federal and state legislators to other 

individuals performing legitimate legislative functions,” such as mayors, city 

council vice-presidents, and others. Id. Indeed, “[a]ctions to which courts have 

extended absolute legislative immunity include a mayor’s veto of an ordinance 

passed by a city council.” Camacho v. Samaniego, 954 S.W.2d 811, 823 (Tex. 

App.—El Paso 1997, pet. denied) (citing Hernandez v. City of Lafayette, 643 F.2d 

1188, 1194 (5th Cir. 1981)). “[W]hen the mayor of a municipality vetoes an 

ordinance passed by the city’s legislative body, he performs a legislative function 

and is entitled to absolute immunity from a civil suit complaining about actions 

taken in his legislative capacity.” Hernandez, 643 F.2d at 1194. 

Just as a mayoral veto is a legislative act subject to legislative immunity, so 

too is a gubernatorial veto. Texas law is clear that a gubernatorial veto is a 
14

legislative act, not an executive act. See, e.g., Jessen Assocs., Inc. v. Bullock, 531 

S.W.2d 593, 598 (Tex. 1975); Fulmore v. Lane, 140 S.W. 405, 411 (Tex. 1911); 

Pickle v. McCall, 24 S.W. 265, 268 (Tex. 1893). Thus, Governor Perry is immune 

from liability for his veto.

This legislative immunity applies to criminal prosecutions as well as civil 

suits. Indeed, the core principle behind legislative immunity is to enable our

“representatives to execute the functions of their office without fear of 

prosecutions, civil or criminal.” Tenney, 341 U.S. at 373-74 (emphasis added). As 

courts have recognized, the “level of intimidation against a local legislator arising 

from the threat of a criminal proceeding is at least as great as the threat from a civil 

suit,” so “the privilege or immunity enjoyed by local legislators should be extended 

to criminal proceedings.” State v. Holton, 997 A.2d 828, 845, 856 (Md. Ct. Spec. 

App. 2010), aff’d, 24 A.3d 678 (Md. 2011) (quotations omitted).2

 

2 See also Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 312-13 (1973) (“Congressmen . . . are immune 

from liability for their actions within the ‘legislative sphere,’ even though their conduct, if 

performed in other than legislative contexts, would in itself be unconstitutional or otherwise 

contrary to criminal or civil statutes.”) (citation omitted); D’Amato v. Superior Court, 167 

Cal. App. 4th 861, 871 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (“The district attorney . . . contends immunity 

applies only to civil suits, and does not extend to criminal prosecutions. We disagree.”); City 

of Dublin v. State, 742 N.E.2d 232, 236 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000) (“‘legislative privilege’ 

embodies . . . substantive immunity from civil and criminal liability”); State v. Neufeld, 926 

P.2d 1325, 1337 (Kan. 1996) (“[I]f a legislator’s conduct falls within a legitimate legislative 

sphere, legality of the conduct is not a primary concern.”).
15

So Count I presents a particularly straightforward application of legislative 

immunity. A conviction under Section 39.02(a)(2) requires an inquiry into 

Governor Perry’s subjective state of mind. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 39.02(a)(2)

(requiring “intent to harm”). But “it is not consonant with our scheme of 

government for a court to inquire into the motives of legislators.” Perry, 60 

S.W.3d at 859-60 (quotations omitted). “If the motives for a legislator’s legislative 

activities are suspect, the constitution requires that the remedy be public exposure; 

if the suspicions are sustained, the sanction is to be administered either at the ballot 

box or in the legislature itself.” State v. Dankworth, 672 P.2d 148, 152 (Alaska Ct. 

App. 1983). “The claim of an unworthy purpose does not destroy the privilege. . . . 

In times of political passion, dishonest or vindictive motives are readily attributed 

to legislative conduct and as readily believed. Courts are not the place for such 

controversies.” Tenney, 341 U.S. at 377-78.

3

3. The special prosecutor argues that legislative immunity does not apply 

to a criminal prosecution of a Governor’s exercise of the veto power, relying 

 

3 See also United States v. Dowdy, 479 F.2d 213, 266 (4th Cir. 1973) (“Once it was 

determined, as here, that the legislative function . . . was apparently being performed, the 

propriety and the motivation for the action taken, as well as the detail of the acts performed, 

are immune from judicial inquiry.”); Irons v. R.I. Ethics Comm’n, 973 A.2d 1124, 1131 (R.I. 

2009) (“‘[A]s long as [a legislator’s] challenged actions, stripped of all considerations of 

intent and motive, were legislative in character, the doctrine of absolute legislative immunity 

protects them from such claims.’”); D’Amato, 167 Cal. App. 4th at 869 (“courts cannot 

inquire into the impetus or motive behind legislative action”) (quotations omitted).
16

heavily on a single district judge’s decisions in United States v. Mandel, 415 F.

Supp. 997 (D. Md. 1976), and United States v. Mandel, 415 F. Supp. 1025 (D. Md. 

1976). But that case is inapposite. 

First, a crucial aspect of Mandel is not present here. There, the district judge 

reasoned that “the rationale for immunity from criminal prosecution is wholly 

lacking” when a prosecution comes from the executive branch. Mandel, 415 F. 

Supp. at 1031. As the judge explained, “[t]he executive has no reason to fear for 

its independence as a co-equal branch of government as a consequence of any 

criminal prosecution brought by itself.” Id. 

But the executive branch in Texas is not unitary. The Governor and the 

Attorney General are separately elected. Moreover, the power to bring criminal 

prosecutions in Texas is divided between the Attorney General and local district

attorneys, with the bulk of the authority in the hands of district attorneys. So the 

chief executive of Texas does have reason to fear for his independence—as 

evidenced by this very case, he is subject to criminal prosecution brought by 

officials wholly outside of his authority.

Second, Governor Mandel was not entitled to legislative immunity in any 

event. Mandel concerned the federal prosecution of a state official. As the U.S. 

Supreme Court has made clear, legislative immunity does not apply in that context, 

because immunity derives from the separations of powers within a sovereign, not 
17

between sovereigns. See United States v. Gillock, 445 U.S. 360, 370 (1980). 

Mandel did not involve a state prosecution of a state official and is thus 

inapplicable to this case.

The special prosecutor also cites Jorgensen v. Blagojevich, 811 N.E.2d 652 

(Ill. 2004), and Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (1997), to argue that legislative 

immunity should not apply in this case. But neither of those cases even remotely 

supports that position.

Jorgensen involved a suit against a governor in his official capacity to 

declare an official act unconstitutional. It had nothing to do with holding a 

governor personally liable, either civilly or criminally, for an official 

act. Obviously Governor Perry can be sued in his official capacity when a plaintiff 

is seeking to declare a government action unlawful. That happens all the time. But 

that has nothing to do with trying to hold him personally liable for a legislative act, 

as is the case here. Indeed, Jorgensen itself explicitly acknowledged this 

distinction:

We note, moreover, that the Judges have not sought to hold the 

Governor personally liable for his actions, nor are they attempting to

force him to take or to refrain from taking any particular action. He 

was named in the litigation because he was one of the state officials 

involved in the sequence of events which led to the failure of the 

Judges to receive their FY2004 COLAs. There is nothing unusual 

about his inclusion as a party. Examples of Illinois governors being 

joined as defendants in cases seeking declaratory and injunctive relief

based on alleged violations of state constitutional and legal 

requirements are commonplace.
18

Jorgensen, 811 N.E.2d at 666 (emphasis added).

The special prosecutor curiously omitted this passage from his discussion of 

Jorgensen, even though it appears immediately before the passage that the special 

prosecutor chose to block quote. See Appellee’s Br. 46-47. This omission is 

telling. After all, this passage shows that a governor would have legislative 

immunity if someone were seeking to hold him “personally liable for his actions,”

id.—as the special prosecutor is attempting to do here.

Clinton is not helpful to the special prosecutor either. The Supreme Court 

there said that immunity does not apply to unofficial conduct—but that it would 

apply to official acts. As the Court explained, “[t]he principal rationale for 

affording certain public servants immunity from suits for money damages arising 

out of their official acts is inapplicable to unofficial conduct.” Clinton, 520 U.S. at 

692-93. Here, Governor Perry is being held criminally liable for an official act (a 

veto), not for any unofficial conduct, so he is entitled to immunity. 

* * *

Allowing Count I to proceed would utterly defeat the purpose of legislative 

immunity. Just like legislators, governors acting in their legislative capacity “must 

enjoy the same ability to speak and act in their legislative capacities, without fear 

of retribution, either criminally or civilly, because of what they say or how they 

vote.” Holton, 997 A.2d at 856. Governors “may be called upon to answer for 
19

their legislative conduct to the citizens who elected them, which is what democracy 

is all about.” Id. “[B]ut they may not be compelled to defend their legislative 

conduct to a prosecutor, to a grand jury or to a court.” Id.

And dangerous as the prosecution’s theory originally was, it has become 

even more striking with the amended indictment and bill of particulars filed on 

February 13, 2015. Under the theory of that amended indictment, it is now a crime 

for the Governor to veto an appropriation—or for any government official to do 

any official act—for any purpose other than “for the sole benefit of the people of 

the State of Texas,” such as “for the benefit of any private or individual purpose, 

private business, political party, or other.” So if a prosecutor decides that a 

government official did something even in part because it benefited the official’s 

prospect of election to higher office, or improved the standing of the official’s 

party, or just improved his reputation—anything at all other than solely benefiting

the people of Texas—that is enough for a criminal prosecution. 

This is far removed from the wisdom of the Framers, who recognized that 

politicians harbor personal ambitions as well as public-spiritedness; that 

“[a]mbition must be made to counteract ambition”; that “[t]he interest of the man” 

is an important aspect of defending “the constitutional rights” of his office; and 

that so long as men are not angels, the law must actually rely on “the private 

interest of every individual” officeholder, and not just on officeholders’ “better 
20

motives,” as an important part of our political system. Federalist No. 51 

(Madison).

II. Count II of the Indictment Should Be Dismissed, Because It 

Criminalizes Speech Protected by the First Amendment of the U.S. 

Constitution.

Count II of the indictment alleges that Governor Perry violated the law by 

“threatening” to use his veto powers if a government official did not resign her 

post. But he has every right to do just that. Criminalizing Governor Perry’s threat 

to veto legislation violates his right to freedom of speech under the Texas and U.S. 

Constitutions. This Count must also be dismissed. 

1. A political official has the right to threaten to perform an official act 

in order to persuade another government official to engage in some other official 

act. That is not a crime—it is core political speech. See, e.g., Watts v. United 

States, 394 U.S. 705, 707 (1969) (“What is a threat must be distinguished from 

what is constitutionally protected speech.”).

The Waco Court of Appeals said precisely that in a similar case twenty-five

years ago. See State v. Hanson, 793 S.W.2d 270 (Tex. App.—Waco 1990, no 

writ). In that case, a county judge “was charged with having made a threat to take 

action as a public official in an attempt to coerce another public official into 

performing an official act.” Id. at 272. Specifically, the defendant in Hanson

threatened to terminate some of the county’s funding in order to coerce a district 
21

judge to fire a county auditor and to coerce a county attorney to revoke an 

individual’s probation. Id. at 271-72. Both the trial court and the court of appeals

correctly dismissed the charges. As the court explained, in this sort of political 

context, “[c]oercion of a lawful act by a threat of lawful action is protected free 

expression.” Id. at 272.

So too here. Governor Perry has been charged with attempting to “coerce” a 

lawful, official act (the voluntary resignation of a public official) by threatening to 

take a lawful, official act (the veto of an appropriations bill).

4 That is protected 

free expression, and the Governor cannot be prosecuted for it.

The prosecution attempts to distinguish Hanson by suggesting that Governor 

Perry was acting unlawfully when he made his alleged “threat,” because he did not 

have the authority or control to request the resignation of D.A. Lehmberg. 

Appellee’s Br. 25. But government officials are obviously allowed to use their 

powers to influence even those over whom they do not have direct supervision. A

Senator may condition his vote for an appropriations bill on the resignation of a 

Cabinet Secretary, even though only the President can fire the Secretary. A 

President may threaten to veto a bill unless Senators agree to ratify a treaty, even 

 

 

4 We accept here for purposes of argument the special prosecutor’s position that D.A. 

Lehmberg’s resignation would have constituted an official act. But if leaving office is not an 

official act, then the elements of Section 36.03(a)(1) would not be satisfied, since that statute 

refers only to attempts to influence the exercise of “official power” or “official duty.”
22

though the President has no authority to directly mandate the signing of the treaty. 

There is nothing criminal about this sort of political hardball.

2. The consequences of allowing Governor Perry to be prosecuted under 

this law would be both far-reaching and devastating. The prosecution’s theory of 

the case would criminalize a vast swath of constitutionally protected—and

common—political speech. For example, it would make it illegal for:

 a legislator to tell the Governor, “if you appoint John Smith to this 

position, I won’t vote for this law you want me to support”;

 a Governor to tell a legislator, “if you don’t amend this bill in a particular 

way, I’ll veto it”;

 a state legislator to tell a U.S. Senator, “if you vote for this federal bill, 

I’ll vote against this state law that you like”;

 a legislator to tell the Governor, “if you don’t resign, I’ll vote to impeach 

you”; or

 a government employee to tell his supervisor, “if you don’t give me a 

raise, I’ll ask for a transfer to a different department.”

Nor need we limit ourselves to hypotheticals. Consider, for example, what 

happened during the Texas Youth Commission controversy in 2007. Countless 

state legislators across the political spectrum demanded the resignation of the 

commissioners—and threatened legislative action if they refused. “[Senator] 

Ogden said the Finance Committee is prepared to use the power of the purse to 

influence change at TYC . . . . He said significant changes will have to occur 
23

within TYC, enough for him to have confidence to recommend to his committee 

members that ‘any appropriation’ should go to the agency.” Lawmakers Decry 

Abuses Within Texas Youth Commission, TEXAS SENATE NEWS, Feb. 27, 2007. See 

also Perry: Board to Resign, WAXAHACHIE DAILY LIGHT, Mar. 15, 2007 (“[At] a 

meeting of the joint committee charged with addressing problems at the TYC, 

lawmakers asked for the resignation of the board members, going so far as to pass 

a vote of no confidence against the board.”). 

Likewise, when U.S. Senator Larry Craig was arrested for indecent conduct 

in a public restroom, “Republican leaders embarrassed by Craig’s behavior and 

news conference threatened to conduct hearings if Craig did not resign.” Hardball 

with Chris Matthews, MSNBC (Sept. 5, 2007), transcript available at 

http://www.nbcnews.com/id/20623566/ns/msnbc-hardball_with_chris_matthews/t/ 

hardball-chris-matthews-sept.

And when it was revealed that U.S. Representative Anthony Weiner had sent 

sexually themed photographs of himself via Twitter, “his fate was sealed . . . when 

party leaders in Congress and President Barack Obama began vociferously calling 

for him to go and threatened to remove him from various committees.” Alex 

Spilius & Jon Swaine, Anthony Weiner Resigns over Lewd Twitter Photographs, 

TELEGRAPH (U.K.), June 16, 2011.
24

According to the prosecution in this case, it would have been a crime under 

Texas law for any of those officials to demand the resignation of other officials,

and then to inform the other officials of potential retaliatory legislative actions if 

they refused. That cannot be correct. What the Texas legislators did in 2007, what 

the U.S. Senate Republican leadership did in 2007, and what the U.S. House 

Democratic leadership did in 2011 was neither criminal nor capable of being 

criminalized—it was protected political speech. 

And so too here. Just as Texas legislators were entitled to demand the 

resignation of the members of the Youth Commission, and just as members of 

Congress were entitled to demand the resignation of a Senator and a 

Representative who had disgraced their offices, Governor Perry was entitled to 

demand the resignation of an official who he felt was no longer serving the best 

interests of the Texans he was elected to represent—and to promise to use his 

constitutionally prescribed veto power to achieve his goal. That is protected 

speech, and the State cannot criminalize any of it.

3. The vast amount of protected speech that would be deemed criminal 

under the prosecution’s theory reveals another fundamental problem with this 

Count: the statute is unconstitutionally overbroad and therefore facially 

invalid. Thus, even though Governor Perry engaged in constitutionally protected 

expression, in fact no one can be prosecuted under this statute.
25

A law is unconstitutionally overbroad if “a substantial number of its 

applications are unconstitutional, judged in relation to the statute’s plainly 

legitimate sweep.” Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 

442, 449 n.6 (2008) (quotations omitted). And the possibility of prosecutorial 

discretion cannot save an overbroad statute. “[T]he First Amendment protects 

against the Government; it does not leave us at the mercy of noblesse oblige. We 

would not uphold an unconstitutional statute merely because the Government 

promised to use it responsibly.” United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 480 

(2010). Here, the law—as interpreted by the prosecution—would plainly capture 

an overwhelming amount of protected speech. It is accordingly unconstitutionally 

overbroad.5

The prosecution does argue that the statute is not overbroad, because 

coercive threats are not entitled to First Amendment protection. Appellee’s Br. 14 

& nn. 30-32 (citing Duncantell v. State, 230 S.W.3d 835, 843-44 (Tex. App.—

 

5 The prosecution argues that “if the court can identify any factual circumstance in which the 

statute is valid, the facial challenge must fail”—and accordingly provides hypothetical 

applications of the statute that it claims would not violate the First Amendment. Appellee’s 

Br. 15-16. But that is the opposite of the overbreadth doctrine, which provides that a law 

must be facially struck down so long as a “substantial number”—not all—of its applications 

are unconstitutional. “[T]he possible harm to society in permitting some unprotected speech 

to go unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that protected speech of others may be 

muted.” Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612 (1973). The overbreadth doctrine is, in 

that sense, an exception to the traditional approach to facial challenge to statutes—an 

exception that the prosecution seems to have forgotten.
26

Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet. ref’d)). But threatening to engage in an official act 

in order to “coerce” someone to take an official act is not a punishable threat; it is

protected political speech. See Hanson, 793 S.W.2d at 272.

And Duncantell provides no different. That case made the simple point that 

interfering with a police officer while he is on the street performing a law 

enforcement function is not expressive activity. See Duncantell, 230 S.W.3d at 

844 (addressing interference with a “peace officer performing a duty imposed by 

law, such as investigating an accident or arresting a criminal suspect”). It does not

mean that, for instance, a newspaper can be punished for harshly criticizing the 

police, even when that interferes with officers’ authority and thus makes it harder 

for them to perform their duties. It does not mean that a legislator can be punished 

for voting against a bill that would better fund police officers, because that too 

would make it harder for police officers to perform their duties. Likewise, it does 

not mean that a Governor can be punished for demanding the resignation of a D.A.

simply because that would mean the D.A. would no longer be performing the 

duties of a D.A.

4. The prosecution argues, for the first time on appeal, that Governor 

Perry’s speech is actually “government speech”—and thus any regulation of his 

speech is wholly exempt from First Amendment scrutiny. See, e.g., Appellee’s Br. 
27

9-10 & nn. 11-18 (citing Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 422 (2006); Pickering 

v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968)).

But the speech of elected officials at issue here is simply not government 

speech as defined by the Garcetti line of cases.

6 Indeed, common sense demands 

that it not be government speech. Does the special prosecutor truly believe that the 

Legislature could, with a veto-proof majority, prevent the Governor from saying 

anything at all on particular topics? Of course not—yet that is precisely what the 

Legislature could do if Governor Perry’s speech were deemed government speech.

Moreover, even if this Garcetti argument is taken seriously, it is further 

undermined by the fact that Section 36.03(a)(1) is not limited to speech by elected 

officials. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 36.03(a)(1) (“A person commits an offense if 

. . .”) (emphasis added). It would also apply to newspaper publishers, advocacy 

groups, and average citizens who make legal statements in an attempt to influence 

legal acts (such as what Governor Perry did here). Criminalizing such speech is 

 

 

6 See, e.g., Jenevein v. Willing, 493 F.3d 551, 558 (5th Cir. 2007) (“We are persuaded that the 

preferable course ought not draw directly upon the Pickering-Garcetti line of cases for 

sorting the free speech rights of employees elected to state office.”); Rangra v. Brown, 566 

F.3d 515, 523-24 (5th Cir. 2009) (“None of the Supreme Court’s public employee speech 

decisions qualifies or limits the First Amendment’s protection of elected government 

officials’ speech.”), on reh’g en banc, 576 F.3d 531 (5th Cir. 2009) (mooted). “The manifest 

function of the First Amendment in a representative government requires that legislators be 

given the widest latitude to express their views on issues of policy.” Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 

116, 135-37 (1966).
28

plainly unconstitutional—and Section 36.03(a)(1) is thus unconstitutionally 

overbroad.

5. The prosecution also declares that “[t]he ‘Coercion of a Public 

Servant’ statute does not make the favored/disfavored expression distinction that 

would raise constitutional [content-discrimination] concern.” Appellee’s Br. 20. 

But the prosecution offers no explanation for this statement—which is 

unsurprising, because the statute is plainly content based. It specifically singles 

out speech that is intended to affect an act by a public official.

6. The prosecution oddly argues that the law is constitutional because 

“[w]here one public servant is threatened by another public servant . . . the 

possibility that the public servant speaker may assert First Amendment protection 

is precisely what makes the coercive threat so effective in seeking to influence the 

public servant listener.” Appellee’s Br. 8. The prosecution concludes that “[t]his 

precisely is the legitimate basis for courts allowing the State to regulate and put 

limits on a public servant’s speech with greater latitude than regulating speech of a 

private citizen.” Id.

But that cannot be right. Is the prosecution really arguing that if a public 

official has a First Amendment right to say something, the Legislature actually has

a greater basis for regulating that speech? If anything, the opposite is true: the 
29

First Amendment is particularly crucial when the Legislature is trying to restrict 

protected political speech in an attempt to diminish its effectiveness.

* * *

Last year, President Obama threatened to issue various executive orders if 

Congressional Republicans refused to pass comprehensive immigration reform. 

See, e.g., President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President in a Press 

Conference (Nov. 5, 2014), transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/thepress-office/2014/11/05/remarks-president-press-conference; Neil Munro, Priebus: 

Obama Executive Amnesty Is A ‘Nuclear Threat,’ THE DAILY CALLER (Nov. 7, 

2014), available at http://dailycaller.com/2014/11/07/priebus-obama-executiveamnesty-is-a-nuclear-threat.

The President later followed through on that threat. To be sure, those 

executive actions are highly controversial and are currently the subject of 

litigation. But no one could seriously argue that President Obama’s political 

statements regarding those actions are unprotected by the First Amendment and 

subject to potential criminal prosecution.

So too here. Just as President Obama can tell Congressional Republicans (as 

he did at an official White House press conference): “You send me a bill that I can 

sign, and those executive actions go away”—Governor Perry can tell a convicted 
30

government official essentially the same thing: “You resign, and my veto goes 

away.”

Moreover, if this prosecution is not immediately dismissed, the chilling 

effect on political discourse will be disastrous. Any public official who seeks to 

drive criminally or disgracefully behaving officials out of office will now rightly 

fear that a district attorney from the other side of the political spectrum would 

prosecute him—just as Governor Perry is being prosecuted here today.7

If Governor Perry is forced to endure a criminal trial, then the damage will

already be done—even if he is ultimately acquitted. The mere knowledge that an

indictment can be maintained would itself chill a vast spectrum of constitutionally

protected political speech by other political officials. See Hanson, 793 S.W.2d at 

273 (“A vague statute that potentially could punish protected political debate 

violates due process because of its chilling effect on the exercise of that essential 

right.”) (citing Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972)).

The special prosecutor argues that there is no chilling effect, both because 

the statute has been on the books for decades and because no speech has been 

chilled since the start of Governor Perry’s prosecution. Appellee’s Br. 16-17. As 

 

 

7 See, e.g., Andrew Ramonas, Doggett: No Retreat on U.S. Attorney Picks, MAIN JUSTICE (Oct. 

13, 2009), available at http://www.mainjustice.com/2009/10/13/doggett-no-retreat-on-usattorney-picks/ (quoting statement of U.S. Representative Lloyd Doggett recommending 

“LULAC-supported Michael McCrum” for appointment as U.S. Attorney by President 

Obama).
31

to the first reason, of course the mere existence of the statute did not chill free 

speech. After all, until this special prosecutor came along, no one would have 

thought that they could be prosecuted for engaging in constitutionally protected 

political speech (as Hanson confirmed).

As to the second reason, the special prosecutor might actually be correct that 

Governor Perry’s prosecution has not yet chilled any speech—but that is only 

because most people (though not the special prosecutor and the district court) 

expect the case to promptly end because of its obvious constitutional flaws. But if 

it does not end immediately, that certainty will be shattered and the constitutional 

rights of public officials everywhere will be chilled. 

That is why an immediate writ of habeas corpus is necessary in this case. 

This Court should announce—right now—that it is unconstitutional to prosecute 

Governor Perry for his protected political speech.

CONCLUSION

The flaws in this indictment strike at the heart of the separation of powers 

doctrine enshrined in the Texas Constitution, as well as the freedoms protected by 

both the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Article I, Section 8 of the 

Texas Constitution. So this prosecution must end immediately. The application 

for a writ of habeas corpus should be granted.
32

DATED: April 19, 2015

Eugene Volokh

 California Bar No. 194464

Gary T. Schwartz Professor of Law

UCLA SCHOOL OF LAW

385 Charles E. Young Dr. East

Los Angeles, CA 90095

Tel.: (310) 206-3926

volokh@law.ucla.edu

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ James C. Ho

James C. Ho

 Texas Bar No. 24052766

Prerak Shah

 Texas Bar No. 24075053

Bradley G. Hubbard

 Texas Bar No. 24090174

GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP

2100 McKinney Avenue, Suite 1100

Dallas, TX 75201-6912

Tel.: (214) 698-3264

Fax: (214) 571-2917

jho@gibsondunn.com

pshah@gibsondunn.com

bhubbard@gibsondunn.com

COUNSEL FOR AMICI CURIAE
33

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

I hereby certify that this brief satisfies the word-limit requirements for 

amicus briefs contained in the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, because it 

contains a total of 7,244 words, excluding the portions that can be excluded 

pursuant to those same rules.

/s/ James C. Ho

James C. Ho
34

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that, on April 19, 2015, a true and correct copy of the 

foregoing was served via electronic mail on the following counsel of record for all 

parties in this case:

Michael McCrum

District Attorney Pro Tem

Travis County, Texas

700 N. St. Mary’s St., Suite 1900

San Antonio, TX 78205

David M. Gonzalez

Assistant District Attorney Pro Tem

Travis County, Texas

206 East 9th Street, Suite 1511

Austin, TX 78701

Counsel for the State of Texas

Anthony G. Buzbee

THE BUZBEE LAW FIRM

JPMorgan Chase Tower

600 Travis Street, Suite 7300

Houston, TX 77002

Thomas R. Phillips

BAKER BOTTS LLP

98 San Jacinto Boulevard, Suite 1500

Austin, TX 78701

David L. Botsford

BOTSFORD & ROARK

1307 West Avenue

Austin, TX 78701

Counsel for Applicant

/s/ James C. Ho

James C. Ho