## In The Court of Appeals Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

No. 06

- 22

- 00070

- CR

RODRICK DESHON ARKEITH ELLIOTT , Appellant
V. THE STATE OF TEXAS , Appellee

On Appeal from the 124th District Court Gregg County, Texas Trial Court No. 4776 5

- B

Before Stevens , C.J., van Cleef and Morriss , * JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Stevens

––––––––––––––––––– *Josh R. Morriss, III, Chief Justice, Retired, Sitting by Assignment2 

### ME MORANDUM OPINION
Al most four years after the brutal murder of Sa ndy Smith , a Gregg County jury convicted Rodrick Deshon Arkeith Elliott of one count of murder , 1 and the trial court assessed a sentence of life imprisonment. In this appeal, Elliott complains that the trial court reversibl y e rre d when it ( 1 ) failed to su ppress his pre

- arrest interview with law enforcement , ( 2 ) failed to suppress evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant , and ( 3 ) admitted evidence of an extraneous offense . Becaus e Elliott (1) failed to preserve his pre - a rr est interview complaint and (2 ) forfeit ed his complaint regarding the evidence seized pursuant to the search warrant and because (3) any error in the admission of evidence of the extraneous offense was harmless , we affirm the trial
court ’ s judgment.
I. Elliot Did Not P reserve His Pr e - Arre st Interview Com plaint In his first issue, Elliot asserts that the trial court reversibly erred when it failed to

su p press statement s that he made during his pre

- arrest interview

. On appeal, Elliott argues that the context of the int er view showed th at he was not competen t at the time he made the
statements in the interview an d that his incompetency was evident to the officers conducting the interview . As a result, he argues that his statements in the interview w ere not volunt ary. In
sup port of his argume nt, Elliott points t o (1) statements he made regarding other

- wo rldly matters and spirits talking to him, (2) witness es at tri al that referred to such utterances , and (3) the fact that , five months after the interview , the tria l court entered an o rder that found Elliott incompetent to stand trial ba sed on a court

- order ed psychological evaluation.

1 See T EX
. P ENAL C ODE A NN
. § 19.02( b)(1).3

“ Preservation of error is a systemic re quirement on appeal. If an issue has not been preserved for appeal, neither the court of app eals nor [the Texas Cour t of C rimina l Appeals] should address the merits of that issue. Ordinarily, a court of appeals should review preservation of error on its ow n motion. ” Douglas v. State , 489 S.W.3d 613 , 628

– 29 ( Tex. App.

— Texarkana
2016 , no pet. ) (a lteration in original) ( quotin g Ford v. State , 305 S.W.3d 530, 532

– 33 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (cita tions omitted) )

. “ A motion to suppress evidence is a specialized objection to the admissibility of evidence. ” Id

. at 629 (citing Galitz v. State , 617 S.W.2d 949, 952 n. 10 (Tex. Cri m. App

. 1981) )

. “ As such, a motion to suppress is required to meet the re quirements of an objection. ” Id

. (ci ting Carroll v. State , 911 S.W.2d 210, 218 (T ex. App.

— Austin 1995, no pet.) ).

“ To preserve an issue involving the admis sion of evidence for app ellate review, the ob jection is requir ed to inform the trial court why, or on what basis, the evidence should be excluded. ” Id

. (citing Ford v. State , 305 S.W.3d 530, 533 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) ) ; see also
T EX
. R. A PP . P. 33.1(a ) ( 1 ) ( A )

. “ In order to prese rve a complaint on ap peal, ‘ all a pa rty has to do

. . . is to let the tria l judge know what he wants [and] why he thinks himself entitled to it, and to do so clearly enough for the judge to understand him at a time when the trial co urt is in a proper posit ion to do something a bout it. ’ ” Id

. (alteration in original) (quoting Lankston v. State , 827
S.W.2 d 907, 909 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) )

. “ However, the objection must be sufficiently clear so that opposing counsel and the trial court have an opportunity to a ddress or correct the purported deficiency. ” Id

. (citing For d , 305 S.W.3d at 533 )

. As a result, “ a general or imprecise objection will not preserve error for appeal unless ‘ the legal basis for the objection is obvious to the court4

and to opposing counsel

. ’ ” 2 Vasquez v. State , 483 S.W.3d 550 , 554 ( T ex. Crim App. 2 016) (quoting Buchanan v. State , 207 S .W.3d 772, 775 ( Tex. Crim. App. 2 006) )

. “ For this reas on,

‘ shotgun objections ’ citing many grounds for the objection without argumen t will not preserve poin ts on appeal based on authority that is only m entioned in the trial court without argument. ” Dougl as , 489 S.W.3d at 629 (citing Johnson v. State , 263 S.W.3d 287, 290 (Tex

. App.

— Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, pet. ref ’ d , untimely f iled) ). “ Likewise, a form mot ion to suppress asserting multiple groun ds that are not subse quently asserted with argument a t the suppression hearing will not preserve those grounds on appeal. ” Id

. (citing Johnson , 263 S.W.3d at 289

– 90 ). “ Also, an issue o n appeal that does not comport with the objection made at trial presen ts nothing for appell ate review. ” Id

. (citing Ibarra v. State , 11 S.W.3d 189, 197 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) )

. In the trial court, although Elliott asserted that his statements were involun tary and coerced, he never arg ued th at they were involuntary because h e was incompetent . R ather, in his motion to suppress the statements , he argued that his statements were involuntary because he was under arrest or substantially deprived of his freedom by the conduct of the officers and

c ircumstances , that he was not read his Mira nda 3 right s, and that he was de prived of his right to counsel. Likewise , at the pretrial hearing on his motion to suppress, Elliott did not argue that his statements were invol untary because he was incompet ent. Rather, he argue d : [W] e believe that the state ment that was made by Mr . Elliott was involuntary. It wa s coerced and enticed as t o him saying something to the effect, “ God wanted me to do something. ” And he sai d that more than once, or alluded to th at.

2 The trial record m ust “ in di cate [] that the correct ground for complaint wa s o bvio us to the judge and opposi ng counsel ,” Resendez v. State , 306 S.W.3d 308 , 315 ( Tex. Crim. App. 2009) , so that there are “ statements or actions on the record that clearly indicate what the judge and oppo si ng co unsel under stood the argument to be , ” i d

. a t 31 6

.
3 M iranda v. Arizona , 384 U.S. 436 (1966).5 We believe that the

-- that he was deprived of h is rights to counsel. As the Court can see, he was not r ead his rights. And, typical ly, what happens is officers will talk to someone and basically talk to them un til they admit something and then they read t heir rights. And I think that ’ s a bad practic e. They were talking to h im, they

-- Detective Reeves did tell him that he was not unde r arrest, no rights were read. And he

-- you can tell by my client ’ s demeanor , he ’ s sitting there. The point that I think is important is that at 21:50:51 and 21:51:32 , he makes this statement , “ I don ’ t want to talk to you a nymore. ” He makes that explicit. He says it twice. And he ’ s even told by a detective, right after that, t hat, “ You don ’ t have to talk anymore. ”
And th en later

-- the Court hasn ’ t seen it

-- but la ter, the detective comes in and asks him specific questio ns. My client does not make guilty admissions, but he still asks those questions. And that ’ s the import of what I ’ m saying, Judge. I think that

-- I t hink if he

-- my client did not know the magni tude of what the question ing was about. It was very casu al. They were just talking. But, of cou rse, there ’ s an aim here to have him make specific admissions as to guilt. And the admissions he made abo ut God telling them to do something, I think that

-- that ’ s very important to the case. And we just believe, Judge, he was deprived of his right to counsel. He wasn ’ t read his rights, and he did not knowingly waive t hat. And especially, Judge, after 21:5 0:51 a nd he said, “ I don ’ t want to talk to you anymo re, ” and they kept talkin g to him. It ’ s just not fair an d it ’ s not right.

. . . .

. . . . I ’ m contending th at taking him into the back room, the officers are wea ring guns. Judge, he

-- he

– and Detec tive B rinkley, I believe, had left, had given his vi deo camera to Detective Reeves wh en she came in there. A nd I jus t think, Judge, it ’ s a little bit intimidation.

. . . .

. . . . I believe all the questioning was designed simply to elicit testimony aga inst h im in this case. And I think the man should h ave been read his rights right off the bat. They weren ’ t having a casual

-- there was no intention, Judge, of having a casual conversation with this man in the back room.6

The trial court held that any s tateme nts after Elliott said “ I don ’ t want to talk anymore ” were inadmissib le. 4
A lthough Elliott made isola ted reference s to him saying “ God wanted me to do something ” and alleged that he did n ot know the magnitude of what the questioning was about, both o f thos e references were in the context of arguing that the conduct of the officer s and the circumstances showed that he was coerce d into making statements, deprived of his freedom, no t read his Miranda rights , and deprived of the right to counsel. In addi tion , when he questioned the o fficer who had first made contact with him , Elliott nev er asked the officer whether he observed any unusual behavior or statements that may have been mad e by Elliott . Instead, he questioned him about how many officers were pr esent at the time, whether Ell iott was free to refuse to come to the station, whether he was told he might be arreste d , and whethe r he was read his Miranda rights. Further, although the detective who interviewed Elliott testified at the hearin g, Elliott d id not question her. Finally, the record shows that neither the State nor the trial
court understood Elliott to be a rguing that he was incompetent at the time of his interview. Since Elliott did not argue in the trial court that his statement was involu ntary b ecause he was inc ompetent at the time of his interview, an d because his issue on appeal does not comport with the objections that he made at trial, he has presented nothi ng for our review. See Vasquez , 483 S.W.3d at 554; Ibarra v. State , 11 S.W.3d 189, 1 97 (Tex. Crim

. App

. 1999) . We , therefore, overrule this issue.

4 Elliott made the stateme nt approximately s ix minutes after the interview began.7

II. Elliott F orfeited H i s C omplaint R egarding the S eized E vidence
Elliot t asserts that the trial court reversi bly erred when it failed to sustain his motion to suppress certain evidence sei zed pu rsuant to a search warrant. Pursuant to a search warrant, the contents of a black s torage container , which had been identified as contain ing personal items that belonged to Elliott , w ere seized at the Hiway 80 Rescue Miss ion

. Among the contents was a p a i r of white denim p ants that contained blood sta ins that were determined to contain the DNA of both Elliott and Smith

. Elliott filed a motion to suppress this evidence and argued at the pretrial hearing , as he does on appeal, that the search warrant did n o t specifically aut horize the search of the stor age container. 5 The trial court denied the motion to suppress.

“ Gen erally, to preserve error on appeal after a pretrial mo tion to suppress evidence is overruled, the defendant need not later object at tria l to the same eviden ce. ” Harper v. State , 443
S. W.3d 496 , 498 (Tex. App.

— Texarkana 2014, pet. r ef ’ d) (citing Thomas v . State , 408 S.W

. 3d 877, 881 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013 ) )

.

“ But when a defendant affirmatively asserts during trial that he or she has n o ob j e c tion to the admiss ion of the complained

- of evidence, he or she f orfeits any error in the admiss ion of the evidence de spite the pretrial ruling unless the

‘ record as a whol e plainly demonstrates that the defendant did not intend, nor did the trial co urt c o n strue, his “ no obj ection ” statement to constitute an abandonment of a claim of error that he ha d earlier preserved fo r appeal. ’ ” Id

. (quoting Thomas , 408 S.W.3d at 885

– 86 ) . Further, “ if from the record as a whole the appellate court simply canno t te l l whether an abandon ment was intended or understood,

. . . it shou ld regard the ‘ no objection ’ s tatement t o be a waiver o f the earlier

- preserved error. ” Thomas

5 Among other things, the search warrant authorized the search of any “[b]ag, suitca s e, container or other item that [h el d] the person al property belonging to Rodrick Elliot t ” located at the Hiway 80 Resc ue Mission

.8

v. State , 40 8 S.W.3d 877 , 88 5 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013 ) . Thus, an “ affirmative ‘ no objection ’
st a t e ment will, by itse lf, serve as an unequivocal indication that a waiver was both intended and

u nderstood

. ” Id

. at 885

– 8 6. As the State has pointed out, when the denim jean s were offer ed into evidence, Elliott affirmatively stated , “ N o objection, You r Ho n o r . ” Elliott also a ffirmatively stated , “ N o objection, Your Honor ” each time the State offered evidence of the storage c ontainer and its
contents : when it offered photogra phs of the storage container and its contents , when it offered the Forensic Bi olog y L aboratory R eport f rom the Texas Department of Public Safety (TDPS) Crime Lab oratory that samples were collected from the den im j eans and retained for DNA analysis , and when it offered the DNA Laboratory Report from the TDPS Crime Lab oratory that sho wed t h e DNA analysis o f the swab bing from the denim jeans. At no point did Elliott inform t he trial court that hi s affi rmative “ no objec ti on ” to this evidence was subject t o his pretrial objections. Ne ither did the trial court state that it understood
E llio t t ’ s affirmative “ no objecti o n ” to be subject to his pretrial objections

. We have found

n othing in the record t hat plainly demonstrat es that Elliott did not intend, or t hat the trial court did not construe , his “ no objection ” to the admission of this evid e n c e to constitute an abando n ment of the pretrial o bjections that he had earlier preserved for appeal

. See i d

. A s a result, Elliott ’ s affirmative “ no objection ” stateme nts “ serve as an unequivocal indication that a waiver was both intended and unders tood

. ” Id

. at 886. Because Elli ot t has forfe ited his complaint, we overrule this issue.9

III. Any Error in t he Admission of the E xtraneous - Offe ns e Evidence Was Harmless Elliott a lso asserts that the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted evidence of

an e x t raneou s offen se during t he guilt/innoc ence phase of the trial

. Before the testimony of Cindy Waddlington, the trial court held a h ea ring out of the presence of the j ury to determine the admissibility of her testimony. The State represent ed that Wa ddli n g t on would testify that th e day before Smith ’ s murder , Elliott came to her store, which was near the location of the mur der, and threa te ned to stab her . Since the murd er involved a stabbing, the State argued that it showed Elliott ’ s state of mind, in tent , m otive, and lack of mista k e . Elliott object ed under both Rule 403 and Rule 404(b) of the Texas Rules of Evidence and pointed out th at the murder happened in a reside nce as opposed to a business and that there was no evidence that Elliott possessed a kni f e on either occasion. 6
Be fore Waddlington ’ s testimony, t he evidence showed that Smith had been murdered at her home on the afternoon of May 3, 2018. An autopsy showed that she had been beaten and that multiple cuts and sta bs to her head, shoulder, ba ck, h a n d, and fo rearm caused her death. Two witnesses testified that they had seen Elliott on the afternoon of the murder leaning on Smi th ’ s fence and that a bigger , whi te woman 7 went out and told him to move on. After Waddlington ’ s testimony , more detai ls o f t he murder came into e vidence

. Elliott ’ s former girlfriend , Shada Lofton, testified that , on the night of May 3, Elliott was at he r house talking about what had h appened. He stated that he had been standing at some lady ’ s fence in Longview

6 Although Smith died as a result of the assailant cutting, slicing, and stabbing her, the murder weapon was not r ecovered

. The State theoriz ed that Elliott m u rd e red Smith with a knife that was remove d from a set of knives in her kitc hen.

7 Smith was 65 inches tall and weighed 267 pounds

.10

and that the l a dy asked him to get off her fen ce . When he asked if he was bothering her, she said that she would c all the police , and he went after her in t o her home, wh er e he hit her, kicke d her , and stabbed her. According to Lofton, Elliott also said that he g rabbe d a knif e out of the kitchen and made s licing motions. After the trial court overruled Elliott ’ s cha llenge to her testimony, Waddlington testi fied. She t es ti fied that , on May 2, 2018 , she worked at Zippy J ’ s convenience store. On that date, Elliot t was “ b umming ” money from cust omers in the par king lot when she went out and told him to stop. Ellio tt then threatened her and told her that he was go ing to kill he r. Although she acknowledged that she may have told the police that he said he was going to st a b her, she did not rememb er hi s exact words. She also acknowledged that she did not see a knife and that he did not reach for a kni fe. A. Admissi bility of Extr an eous - Offense Evidence

“ The general rule is that the defendant is to be tried only for the offe n s e charged, not for
any other crimes or for being a criminal generally. ” Segundo v. State , 270 S.W.3d 79 , 87 ( Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (citing Cran k v. State , 761 S.W.2d 328, 341 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988) , overruled on other grounds by Alford v. State , 866 S.W.2d 619 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) ).

“ However, evidence of extra neous acts of misconduct may be admissible if (1) the u ncharged ac t is relevant to a material issue in the case, and (2) the probative va lue of that eviden ce is n o t signi ficantly outwei ghed by its prejudicial effect. ” Id

. (citing Crank , 761 S.W.2d at 342)

.

“ Because the propensity to commit crimes is not a ma terial f act in a criminal case, Rule 404(b) explicitly prohibits the admission of uncharged acts to prove c o nduct i n conformity wi th a bad11

character. ” Id

. at 87

– 88 (citing T EX
. R. E VID
. 404(b)). In o ther words , the extraneous

- offense evidence “ must be relevant to a material issue in the case other than the [defendant ] ’ s character. ” Rogers v. Peeler , 1 46 S. W

. 3 d 765 , 7 74 ( Tex. App.

— Texarkana 2004 , no pet. ) (citing Morrow v.
State , 735 S.W.2d 907, 90 9 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, pet. ref ’ d) )

. When the admi s si on of extraneous

- offense evidence is challenged, the proponent of the evidence must pers uade t h e court “ t hat it tends to establish some elemental fact, such as identity or intent; that it tends to establish some evidentiary fact, such as motive, opportu n it y or preparation, leading inferentially to an elemen tal fact; or that it rebuts a defens ive t h e o ry by sh owing, e.g., absence of mistake or accident. ” Montgomery v. State , 810 S.W.2d 372, 387

– 88 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (op. on reh ’ g) ). A material issue, su ch as identity or intent , “ may be placed in dispute by the defendant ’ s opening statement or c r o s s - examina tion, as wel l as by affirmative evidence offered by the defense

. ” Segundo , 270 S.W.3d at 86. On appeal, Elliott argues that the incident with Waddli n g ton was not sufficiently similar to the charged offense to be admissible. Citing Segund o , he a r gues that , to be admissible, “ the pattern and characteristics of the charged crime and t he un charged misconduct [m ust be] so distinctively similar that they constitu te a ‘ signature. ’ ” Id

. at 88 (citing Beets v. State , 767 S.W.2d 711, 740

– 41 ( Tex. Crim. A p p. 1 9 87 ) (op. on reh ’ g) ). Elliott points out that , while the two incidents have some general similarities, the differences are too significant for the
appro priat e admission of Waddlington ’ s testimony. The State also relies on Segundo and argues
t hat t h e similarities in the two incidents were sufficient to render the testimony admissible to show identity, motive, and absence of mistake.12

In Segundo , the Texas Co urt of Criminal Appeals addressed the requirement of di stinctive similarity of the char ged o f f e nse and the uncharged misconduct when extraneous

offense evidence is offered to prove the identity of the offender. See id

. at 86

– 88. In this case, Elliott p la ced both identity and intent in dispute in his opening statement when he alerted the ju ry
to n o te his state of mind when he talked with the po lice and emphasized that the State had the burden to prove that Elliott, and no on e else, committed the murder

. In his cross

- examination of the State ’ s witnesses, Elliott continued to challenge ident i ty an d e mphasized that he had not threatened ot hers

. In his final argument , he used the state

- of

- mind evidence to challenge the adequacy of the State ’ s proof that he inte nt ionally or knowingly murdered Smith. On appeal, neither Elliott nor the State a ddr essed w h ether Waddlington ’ s testimony was adm issible to rebut Elliott ’ s defensive theor y that his state of mind rendered him incapable of intentional or knowing murder or t hat he was not a threatening individual

. 8 Nevertheless, we need not address those
t heori e s because , even if th e trial cou rt erred in admitting the testimony, such error was harmless.
B. Analysis of Harm
A trial court ’ s error that violates an evidentiary r ul e “ is non

- constitutional and will be disregarded unl ess it affected the a ppellant ’ s s u bs ta n t ial rights

. ” Russ ell v. Stat e , 155 S.W.3d 176, 181 (Tex. Crim. App . 2005) (citing T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 4.2( b) )

. An appellate court “ will not overturn a criminal convi ct ion for non

- constitutional error if the appellate court, after examining the record a s a w h ole , has fair assurance that the error did not influence the jury, or influenced

8 “We will uphold an evidentiary ruling if it was correct on any theor y of la w applicable to the case.” Flowers v. State , 43 8 S. W

. 3d 96 , 103 (Tex. App.

— Texarkana 2014, pet. ref ’ d) (citing De La Paz v. State , 279 S.W.3d 336, 344 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009)).13

the jury only slightly. ” Barshaw v. State , 342 S.W.3d 91, 93 (Tex. Crim. App. 201 1) (quoting Schutz v. State , 63 S.W.3d 442, 444 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) ). “ In consider i ng t h e potential to harm, the focus is not on whether the outcome of the trial was proper despite the error, but whether the error had a substantial or injurious effect or influence on the jury ’ s verdict

. ” Id

. at 93

– 94 (citing Wesbrook v. Stat e , 29 S.W.3 d 1 03 , 119 (Tex. Crim

. App. 2000) )

. In our determination, we review the record as a whole, “ including any testimony or physical evidence admitted for the jury ’ s consider at ion, the nature of the evidence supporting the verdict, the character of the alleged er ro r , and how it might be consider ed in connection with other evidence in the case. ” Motilla v. State , 78 S.W.3d 352, 355 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002)

. We “ may also consid er the jury instructions, the State ’ s theory and any defensive theories, cl osing a rgume n ts [, ]

a nd even voir dire, if appli cable , ” as well as “ whether the State emphasized the error. ” Id

. at 355

– 56. In addition, “ the evidence of the defendant ’ s guil t is a fa ctor to be considere d in any thorough harm analysis. ” Id

. at 358.
Here , the re w a s s ubstan t ial evidence of Ell iott ’ s guilt. As previously noted, the evidence showed that Smith had been murdered at her home on the afternoon of May 3, 2018 , and a n autopsy showed that she had been beaten and that multiple cuts and stabs to her head, s ho u ld e r, bac k , hand, and forear m caused her death . Two witnesses, who had interacted with Elliott the day before the murder , testified that they had s een Ell io tt leaning on Smith ’ s fence on the afternoon of the murder and that a bigger , wh ite woman wen t o ut and told h im to move on. The evidence also showed that , on the night of the murder , Elliott went to his former girlfriend ’ s house and talked about wh at happ en ed. He stated that he had been standing at the fence of some14

lady in Longview w h o asked him t o g et off he r fence. When he asked if he was bothering her, she said that she would call the police, and he went after her into her home, where he hit her,
k icked h er , and stabbed her. Elliott also said that he grabbed a knife out of the kit chen and ma de

s l ic i ng mot i ons. Lofton also testified that Elliott showed her a photograph on his cell phone that he claimed was the wom an he killed

. She described the wom an a s l ay ing in blood and wearing a blue dres s , the same color dress that Smith was weari ng whe n sh e wa s murd e red. In addition, a pair of white denim jeans were rec overed from the bin used by Elliott at the

m ission

. Those jeans contained blood stains th at were d etermined to contain th e DNA of both Elliott and Smith. 9 Fur ther, Gary Rider , w ho wa s a r esid ent at the m ission in May 2018, testified that , on the evening of May 2, 2018, he retrieved his cell phone from where it was being charged. As he retrieved it, he hea rd some on e on bunk numbe r three 10 speak on his ph one and say, “ If you found out I k il l ed s omebod y, would you still love me as much? ” T he jur y also h eard the recording of a telephone call between Elliott and Curt Krohn that took place after E lliott was arrested. O n that recording , Elliott can be hear d telling Krohn that God told him t o mu r der

someon e and tha t he did it. He went on to give deta ils of the murder and repeat several times that God had told him to do it and that he did it.
W addlington ’ s testimony was a very small part o f the trial. T he Sta te spent very little time quest io ni n g he r abou t the inci dent

. In its charge , the trial court included an instruction that

9 C lare Moyers, the DNA section supervis o r at the TDPS Crime Lab oratory , testif ied that a swabbing from the blood stains on th e j eans cont a i ned a mixture of DNA from three individuals that was 16.6 undecill ion times more likely to have co me from Elliott, Smith, an d one unknown individual tha n from three unknown individuals

. She exp lained that one undecillion is a one with thir ty

- s i x ze roes b ehind it.

10 Elliott had been assigned bunk number three at the m i ssion

.15

limited the jury ’ s use of extraneous

- offense evidence to in cidents t he jury found happened beyond a reasonable d ou bt. The Stat e only mentioned the testimony when d is cu s sing this inst ruction in its closing

. Elliott also mentioned Waddlington ’ s testimony in his closing and noted that , after time had passed , she really did not remember much. Based on this record , we have more th an a fair assurance t hat any error in th e a dmis sion

o f Waddlington ’ s testimony did not influence the jury or had just a slight effect. See id

. at 359. As a result, we find that the error, if any, was harmless. We , therefore, overrule thi s i ssue. IV. Conclus ion
For the reasons stated, we affirm th e t rial court ’ s judgment.

Scott E. Stevens Chief Justice Date Submitted: December 27, 2022 Date Decided: January 9 , 2023
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