In The

Court of Appeals

Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

______________________________

No. 06-10-00176-CR

______________________________

ANGELA CHEATWOOD LEE, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

 

On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 2

Angelina County, Texas

Trial Court No. 09-1822

 

Before Morriss, C.J., Carter and Moseley, JJ.

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Moseley
2

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Angela Cheatwood Lee appeals her conviction for the misdemeanor offense of 

harassment.1 After a trial to the court, she was found guilty of harassment for repeatedly sending 

telephonic messages to her former boyfriend, William Chunn. The trial court sentenced Lee to 

three months’ incarceration and a fine of $250.00, but suspended the jail term, placing Lee on 

community supervision for six months. On appeal,2Lee claims: (1) the statute penalizing 

harassment is unconstitutionally vague as it is applied to Lee; and (2) the evidence is insufficient to 

support the judgment of the trial court. After reviewing the applicable law, the evidence, and 

Lee’s brief, we overrule her points of error and affirm the trial court’s judgment and sentence. 

I. A Woman Scorned

For a period ending about two years before trial (which occurred in late spring of 2010), 

Lee and Chunn had engaged in an intermittent relationship for about six or seven years, a 

relationship which Chunn described as both “emotional” and “[m]iserable.” In the middle to 

latter part of 2009, Chunn established a romantic relationship with another woman, Teresa Bobbitt

(to whom reference is made hereafter as Teresa). In August and September 2009, Lee made a 

number of telephone calls to Chunn’s telephone number and left multiple voice messages. Chunn 

 

1TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.07 (Vernon 2003).

2Originally appealed to the Twelfth Court of Appeals, this case was transferred to this Court by the Texas Supreme 

Court pursuant to its docket equalization efforts. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 73.001 (Vernon 2005). We are 

unaware of any conflict between precedent of the Twelfth Court of Appeals and that of this Court on any relevant 

issue. See TEX. R. APP. P. 41.3.
3

testified Lee began to call more frequently around September 26, 2009, when Lee discovered that 

Chunn was seeing Teresa. In addition, Lee telephoned Chunn frequently at his work places, the 

unwanted calls causing Chunn to lose one job. Chunn married Teresa in January 2010.

Teresa testified that the calls and messages from Lee became much more frequent when 

Lee discovered Teresa and Chunn were dating. Teresa said the calls “[n]ever stopped” since May 

2009. Like Chunn, she said the unwanted and repeated contact from Lee strained the Chunns’

relationship. Teresa related that because she and Chunn shared a cell phone, she was aware of the 

multiple text messages sent by Lee to Chunn; oftentimes, Teresa would answer calls to discover 

that the caller was Lee, who would then demand to speak to Chunn. Teresa testified she took the 

cell phone, which bore several messages recorded in August and September 2009, to the police and 

the police recorded the messages which had been left. Teresa testified there were many more 

messages than those she shared with police, but that she provided the police with only those few,

due to the limited number of messages the cell phone could retain. Teresa further testified she had 

on many occasions told Lee to cease the calls, calls which she related were often placed in the late 

night or early morning hours. Teresa also testified that she found the calls placed about 2:00 a.m. 

to be particularly annoying. 

Lee was interviewed by Lufkin Police Detective Ron Stubblefield. The State introduced a 

compact disc, which contained a recording of that interview along with recordings of five 

messages left by Lee on Chunn’s cell phone. Some of these messages are very brief and consisted 
4

of requests by Lee for Chunn to return the call. In contrast to those short messages, another of the 

calls lasts about a minute and twenty seconds and is a rambling soliloquy by Lee wherein she 

declares her love for Chunn and bemoans problems in their past relationship. The following and 

final message consumes a little more than half a minute; in that message, Lee makes reference to 

the prior call, saying both that she did not mean and did mean things she had said in the previous 

message and again wishing she could talk with Chunn about their relationship.3 In the recorded 

interview, Lee told Stubblefield that her repeated efforts to contact Chunn were due to her concern 

for his lifestyle choices (such as alleged drug use) and that the purpose of her calls was to 

encourage him “to straighten up” and “live right.” Also mentioned was an instance in which Lee 

came to a bowling alley to see Chunn and another incident about a year prior to the interview when 

an argument between Lee and Chunn’s sister occurred. 

II. No Unconstitutional Vagueness of the Harassment Statute as Applied

A. Who Possessed the Phone?

In her first point of error, Lee complains the statute is unconstitutionally vague as applied 

to her under these circumstances. 

 

3The record does not indicate when these messages were left. The five messages appear in two files on the compact 

disc. The first file is a single message; at the beginning of this message, an automated voice states the length of the 

message and reads a time and date of 11:07 a.m., on August 11, 2009. The other file contains five messages which 

play one after another. At the beginning of the messages, the automated voice says 3:20 p.m., September 29, 2009. 

From witness testimony, it seems that William or Teresa Chunn brought their cell phone to Detective Stubblefield, 

who transferred those messages to his computer or recorded them as the messages were played for him. 
5

A claim that a statute is unconstitutional “as applied” is a claim that the statute, although 

generally constitutional, operates unconstitutionally as to the claimant because of his particular 

circumstances. Gillenwaters v. State, 205 S.W.3d 534, 536 n.3 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); Tex. Boll 

Weevil Eradication Found., Inc. v. Lewellen, 952 S.W.2d 454, 461 n.5 (Tex. 1997).4 Lee raises 

three areas where she believes the statute is vague. 

Lee claims the statute is vague because it allows a conviction where the “evidence offered 

does not show that the phone which received the voice messages was in the possession of William 

Chunn as opposed to Teresa Chunn.” Lee provides no explanation how this situation renders the 

statute vague as applied to her. Teresa testified that when she and Chunn began dating, they got a 

single cell phone and Teresa usually kept that telephone with her. She said many calls came to 

that telephone from Lee, during which Lee asked or demanded to speak with Chunn. Teresa also 

said that she found text messages from Lee to Chunn which had been directed to the telephone. 

Chunn also testified that he received multiple calls and messages from Lee on the cell phone 

within the span of time named in the information and for months after that time span. All of this is 

evidence of voice messages directed to Chunn (irrespective of whether the phone or phones upon 

which the messages were received were in the possession of Chunn, of Teresa, or in their joint 

possession). 

 

4Earlier this year, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals found Section 42.07(a)(4) did not implicate the free speech 

guarantees of the First Amendment, and the statute was not unconstitutionally vague on its face. Scott v. State, 322 

S.W.3d 662, 669–70 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). 
6

Whether the telephone upon which the offending voice messages were received was in the 

possession of the victim (Chunn) named in the complaint and information, or Chunn’s wife, 

Teresa, is not relevant. The statute criminalizes conduct where one, “with intent to harass, annoy, 

alarm, abuse, torment, or embarrass another,” makes repeated telephone calls to another, causing

that person’s “telephone . . . to ring repeatedly or makes repeated telephone communications”

either anonymously or in a “manner reasonably likely to harass, annoy, alarm, abuse, torment, 

embarrass, or offend another.” TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.07(a)(4). There is nothing in the 

proscribed behavior criminalized by this statute which requires the accused to know which or 

whose telephone actually received the offending calls or (also in this case) messages. In this age 

of ubiquitous communication devices, it is certainly possible and is not inconceivable that more 

than one telephone could be caused to ring repeatedly or made to receive communications or 

messages. Lee was not required to know the identity of the person who actually possessed the 

telephone to which she was making the proscribed communications at the time she placed the calls 

or sent the messages so long as the State could prove, under the terms of Section 42.07(a)(4), that 

Lee intended to direct those communications to Chunn, the victim. If the State could prove that 

Lee engaged in the prohibited conduct by intending to make the communications to Chunn, it 

would not exculpate her if the telephone which Lee contacted was actually in the possession of 

Chunn’s wife at the time of the transmission. Had Lee not been satisfied with the sufficiency of 

the notice provided by the complaint concerning the nature of the State’s allegations and how she 
7

was alleged to have violated the law, her remedy was to file a motion to quash the complaint prior 

to trial. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 1.14(b) (Vernon 2005). 

B. Intent

In the same point of error, Lee contends that the statute under which she was charged and 

convicted was vague as applied to her “in failing to define if one such as the appellant can be 

convicted without any offer that she had a specific intent to violate the statute[’]s provisions of 

intending to harass, annoy, alarm, abuse, torment, embarrass, or offend another.” We disagree 

with Lee’s argument. Section 42.07(a)(4) requires proof that the actor engages in one of the 

various forms of prohibited conduct “with intent to harass, annoy, alarm, abuse, torment, or 

embarrass another.” TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.07(a). The statute appears to be quite specific 

in its wording and fits the circumstances described here.5 

In support of her claim that the statute is vague for not requiring “specific intent,” Lee’s 

brief claims that Chunn “believe[d] [Lee’s] intent [was] otherwise.” We find nothing at the 

location in the reporter’s record to which Lee cites to support this assertion, unless she is referring 

to Chunn’s statement that Lee’s harassing calls started when Lee found out Chunn was seeing 

another woman. This neither negates an inference of intent on Lee’s part, nor does Lee offer any 

support for her claim that Chunn did “not indicate he believed [Lee] had a specific intent to harass, 

 

5

If Lee is complaining about the sufficiency of the evidence to prove intent, it is an oft-cited tenet of criminal law that 

intent may be inferred from one’s acts or words. Guevara v. State, 152 S.W.3d 45, 50 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). 

Based on the number of calls and messages and the span of time over which they occurred, and evidence Lee was told 

on many occasions by the Chunns and police to cease her attempts to contact Chunn, there was ample evidence from 

which the trier of fact could find evidence of Lee’s intent. This contention is addressed in Lee’s second point of error. 
8

annoy, alarm, abuse, torment, embarrass, or offend him.” Lee’s appellate argument in this regard 

would seemingly apply more appropriately to an attack on the sufficiency of the evidence than to 

an argument or explanation of Lee’s contention that the statute is vague as applied to her. 

In her complaint that Section 42.07 is vague as applied to Lee’s circumstances, she 

complains of the statute’s use of the terms “repeatedly” and “repeated.” Interpreting this statute, 

the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals came to the following conclusion on the meaning of 

“repeated” in this context:

The term “repeated” is commonly understood to mean “reiterated,” “recurring,” or 

“frequent.” Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 998 (1988); 2 Oxford 

English Dictionary 2494 (1971). Here, we believe that the Legislature intended 

the phrase “repeated telephone communications” to mean “more than one 

telephone call in close enough proximity to properly be termed a single episode,”

because it is the frequent repetition of harassing telephone calls that makes them 

intolerable and justifies their criminal prohibition. See M. Royall, 

Constitutionally Regulating Telephone Harassment: An Exercise in Statutory 

Precision, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1403, 1430 (1989) (“Prudence may justify a 

hands-off policy for single calls made with the intent to harass, but as harassing 

calls are repeated the state interest in intervening to protect the recipient becomes 

more compelling.”).

Scott, 322 S.W.3d at 669 n.12. In her brief, Lee argues “the assumption that simple repeated 

repetition [sic] can be construed on its face is vague as applied to the four non specific voice 

messages were are [sic] produced.” We take this fairly convoluted statement to mean that Lee 

does not believe that four of the five recordings of telephone messages introduced into evidence 

were sufficient to constitute the “repeated telephone communications” prohibited by the statute. 

TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.07(a)(4). The testimony is not perfectly clear, but Teresa testified to 
9

two telephone calls placed on the morning of September 9, 2009, three such calls about 6:00 a.m. 

September 25, 2009, while there were three calls placed about 2:00 a.m and another two about 1:00 

p.m. on September 26, 2009. Of these calls, Teresa said, “Those were the only ones . . . that I 

got recorded. If I would have kept up with it, there would have been more.” From these rounds 

of telephone calls came the voice messages, which the Chunns presented to police and which were 

introduced into evidence. 

We find in the instant situation, the telephone calls and voice messages described by the 

Chunns, as well as the few actually recorded and introduced into evidence, could qualify as 

“repeated” as that term is used in the statute.6 Lee has failed to establish the statute is vague as 

applied to her situation. We overrule Lee’s first point of error. 

III. Sufficiency of the Evidence

In her second point of error, Lee claims the evidence is legally insufficient to support the 

trial court’s verdict. In reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we review all the evidence 

in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict to determine whether any rational jury could have 

found the essential elements of the charged offense. Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 902 n.19

(Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (4-1-4 decision) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)); 

Hartsfield v. State, 305 S.W.3d 859, 863 (Tex. App.––Texarkana 2010, pet. ref’d) (citing Clayton 

 

6Lee then goes on to claim there is insufficient evidence to support a finding the voice messages were meant to annoy, 

alarm, abuse, torment, embarrass, or offend the recipient, as those terms were discussed in Scott. See Scott, 322 

S.W.3d at 669 n.13. A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is different from a claim the statute is vague as 

applied to Lee. Regardless of how we construe what is arguably a multifarious point of error, Lee has not explained 

how, much less demonstrated, that Section 42.07 of the Texas Penal Code is vague as applied to her. 
10

v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)). Our rigorous legal sufficiency review 

focuses on the quality of the evidence presented. Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 917–18 (Cochran, J., 

concurring). We examine legal sufficiency under the direction of the Brooks opinion, while 

giving deference to the responsibility of the jury “to fairly resolve conflicts in testimony, to weigh 

the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.” Hooper v. 

State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318–19).

Legal sufficiency of the evidence is measured by the elements of the offense as defined by 

a hypothetically-correct jury charge. Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 

1997).7 As charged in the information, the State was required to prove that (1) on or about 

September 26, 2009, (2) Lee, with intent to harass, annoy, alarm, abuse, torment, or embarrass 

Chunn, (3) sent repeated voice message communications to Chunn, (4) in a manner reasonably 

likely to harass, annoy, alarm, abuse, torment, embarrass, or offend another person. TEX. PENAL 

CODE ANN. § 42.07(a)(4). 

Lee argues that the evidence is legally insufficient to prove that she had the specific intent 

to harass, annoy, alarm, abuse, torment, or embarrass Chunn. Intent may be inferred from 

circumstantial evidence such as acts, words, and the conduct of the appellant. Guevara, 152 

S.W.3d at 50. While it is true that only five of the messages were introduced into evidence to 

prove the information’s charge that Lee harassed Chunn by leaving voice messages, there was also 

testimony that Lee left many more messages than were preserved and presented to Detective 

 

7This test is used for bench trials as well as jury trials. Malik, 953 S.W.2d at 240.
11

Stubblefield. Teresa said she only preserved the five messages she presented to Stubblefield, but 

there were more. Although Chunn said that Lee had left fifteen to fifty messages, he did not 

specify a time period. Also, Chunn and Teresa both said there were a high number of calls, with 

Chunn estimating fifty to a hundred. The testimony heard by the court was that Lee had made 

multiple calls to Chunn at work and Chunn said he had lost one job due to Lee’s calls. Lee told 

Stubblefield that she contacted one of Chunn’s employers to tell the employer Chunn had falsified 

a drug test. This allegation, in addition to the number of calls and messages over time, support an 

inference that the messages Lee left on or about September 26 were made with the intent to harass, 

annoy, alarm, abuse, torment, or embarrass Chunn. 

Both of the Chunns used the word “annoy” to describe their feelings about Lee’s conduct in 

making the calls and leaving the messages. Chunn said the calls were “very annoying”; and 

Teresa said she was annoyed by Lee and her conduct. Chunn and Teresa both said they told Lee 

not to call “several times” because Chunn did not want to speak to Lee. Listening to the 

recordings of the messages admitted into evidence could further yield an inference they were made 

with the intent to harass, annoy, abuse, torment, or embarrass Chunn. Two of the messages are 

rambling professions of Lee’s love for Chunn and her regret that their relationship had terminated. 

Both Chunns testified that Lee’s repeated calls and messages placed a strain on their relationship, 

and both said the calls did not begin or at least achieve the high number until Lee became aware of 

the relationship which existed between Chunn and Teresa. There was evidence the Chunns 
12

contacted Lee and asked her to cease her calls. Lufkin Police Officer Stephen Dickens testified 

he told Lee on June 19, 2009, that Chunn wanted her contacts to cease, and Dickens asked Lee not 

to call Chunn any more. Likewise, Detective Stubblefield also said that he had told Lee to stop 

contacting Chunn. Although Stubblefield did not say exactly when he told Lee to stop, he said 

that he told her before the interview with her which occurred on October 5, 2009, and “prior to the 

last set of phone calls that were made.” 

Viewed in totality, a rational finder of fact could conclude that Lee had the intent to harass, 

annoy, alarm, torment, or embarrass Chunn (even if the content of the calls, when contact was 

made, consisted of professions of love and pleas for forgiveness), and that she made repeated 

telephone communications8reasonably likely to harass, alarm, annoy, abuse, torment, embarrass, 

or offend Chunn. The evidence is sufficient to support the trial court’s judgment. Lee’s second 

point of error is overruled.

 

8The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in Scott concluded text of Section 42.07(a)(4) “suggests that it covers ordinary 

voice (and therefore voice mail) communication involving an ordinary telephone.” Scott, 322 S.W.3d at 668. Lee 

does not question whether the use of “voice messages” in the charging instruments alleges an offense under Section 

42.07(a)(4). 
13

We affirm the trial court’s judgment. 

Bailey C. Moseley

Justice

Date Submitted: December 30, 2010

Date Decided: January 14, 2011

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