# FILED May 13, 1999 Cecil Crowson, Jr. Appellate Cou rt Clerk 

### IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENN ESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

FRED GRIMES and ) JEANETTE GRIMES WOODW ARD, ) ) Plaintiffs/Appellees, ) ) Appeal No. ) 01-A-01-9809-CH-00483 VS. ) ) Maury Chancery ) No. 96-539 DONNIE GRIMES, ) ) Defendant/Appellant. )
APPEALED FROM THE CHAN CERY COUR T OF MAURY

COUNTY AT COLUMBIA, TENNESSEE THE HONORABLE JAMES L. WEATHERFORD, SEN IOR JUDGE

TOM W. MOORE, JR. MOORE & PEDEN 29 Public Square P. O. Box 981 Columbia, Tennessee 38402-0981 Attorney for Plaintiffs/Appellees JERRY C. COLLEY COLLEY & COLLEY P. O. Box 1476 Columbia, Tennessee 38402-1476 Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

AFFIRMED AND REMAN DED

BEN H. CANTRELL, PRESIDING JUDGE, M.S. CONCUR: KOCH, J. COTTRELL, J.- 2 - 

## O P I N I O N

The sole issue in this appeal is whether the parties’ agreement to di vide theirmother’s estate was supported by considerati on. The Chancery Court of Maury County hel d that the ag reement was enforceable.We affirm.

I.

Wilma Brannon Grimes, a resident o f Maury County

had three children. Ms. Grimes owned a farm where she lived in what the parties referred to as the “brick house.” Her son Donnie also li ved on the farm in the “old home pl ace” and raised cattle and hay in a partnership with his mother.

Ms. Grimes was in her

eighties. On May 19 , 1992 the three children met and executed a handwritten agreement on how their mother’s property would be sold to raise mone y for her anticipated medical expenses and how the estate would be divided after her death. Three days la ter, Ms. Grimes executed her Last Will and Testament, in which she left $5,000 to her son Fred, $5,000 plus some miscel laneous personal property to her daughter

Jeanette Grimes Woodward, and the balance of her estate to Donnie.

In 1994 the parties decided to ex ecute a more formal agreement. Fred Grimes and Jeanette Grimes Woodward had a lawy er prepare the following writing: AGREEMENT We the undersigned, being all the children and the onlyheirs-at-law

of Wilma Brannon Grimes, hereby agree as follows: 1. Without regard to any will left by our

mother, Wilma Brannon Grimes, we will divide the est a te of our mother according to this agreement. 2. Donnie Grimes s hal l receive the old home place, the garden and barn j oining it consisting of about- 3 - three (3) acres and the water rights to the spring that now supplies water to the ol d home place. 3. Donnie Grimes shall also rec eiv e all the cattle, f arm machinery and automobiles owned by our mother at the time of her death. 4. All the rest of our mother’s estate, whether real pro perty, personal property or money, shall be divided equally between us,na mely : Fred Grimes, Jeanette Woodward and Don nie Grimes. On September 18, 1994 the three chil dren signed the agreement.

Ms. Grimes died in the spring of 1996. Shortl y thereafter Donnie Grimes repudiated the agre ement. Th e other two children s ued for a declaratory judg ment and the chancellor upheld the ag reement.

II.

Donnie Grimes disputes the val idity of the agreement because of a lack of consideration. It is his contention that he received nothing for this promise to divide the estate with his brother and sister. We disagree. He received their promise t o give him the old home place along w ith the water right

s and then to divide the esta te equally-- even if their mother changed her will. There is a slight dispute in the record about what the parties knew when they signed the first agreement in 1 991, b ut it is clear that they knew in 1994 that Ms. Grimes had a will l eaving nearly ev erything to Donnie. They also knew that she could change the wil l or that her needs might consumemost of her estate be fore her death. In either case, Donnie would get a substantial benefit from the agreement
.

Consideration exists when the promi see does something that he is under no obligation to do or refrains from doing s omething which he has a l egal right to do. Brown Oil

Co. v. Johnson , 689 S.W.2d 149 (Tenn. 1985). The considerati on does not have to be adequate; it need only be valuabl e. Townsend v. Neuhardt , 139 Tenn. 695 (1918). A valuable consideration passes when a party makes a promise- 4 -

to secure himself against a co ntingency tha t ma y never happen. In Richardson v. Snipes , 330 S.W.2d 381 (Tenn. App . 1959), the court quoted the following from Williston on Contracts

§ 112: “A conditional promise m a y be sufficient consideration , and ‘when a man acts in cons idera tion of a conditional promise, if he gets the promise he gets all that he is entitled to by his act, and if, as events turn out, the condition is not satisfied, andthe p romise calls for no performance, there is no failure of conside ration.’” 330 S.W.2d at 385.

We are satisfied that the contrac t was suppo rted b y valuable consideration.

We affirm the judgment of the trial co ur t and remand the cause to the Chancery Court of Maury County. Tax the costs on appeal to the appellant.

_________________________________ BEN H. CANTRELL, PRESIDING JUDGE, M.S. CONCUR:

_____________________________ WILLIAM C. KOCH, JR., JUDGE

_____________________________ PATRICIA J. COTTRELL, JUDGE

### IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENN ESSEE AT NASHVILLE

FRED GRIMES and ) JEANETTE GRIMES WOODW ARD, ) ) Plaintiffs/Appellees, ) Appeal No. ) 01-A-01-9809-CH-00483 ) VS. ) Maury Chancery ) No. 96-539 ) DONNIE GRIMES, ) Affirmed and ) Remanded Defendant/Appellant. )



### J U D G M E N T Th i s cause came on to be heard upon the rec ord on appeal from the ChanceryCourt o

f Maury County , briefs

and argument of counsel; uponconsideration whereo f, this Court is of the opinion that in the decree of the Ch ancellor there is no reversible error.

In accordance withthe opinion of the Court filed herein, it is, therefore, ordered and decre ed by t his Court that the decree is affirmed. The cause is remanded to the Chancery Court of Maury County for the e nforcement of the decree and for t he collec tion of t he costs a ccrued be low.

Costs of this a ppeal are taxed against D onnie Grimes, Principal,and Colley and Colley, Su rety, for which execu tion may is sue if ne cessary.

______________________________________ BEN H. CANTRELL, PRESIDIN G JUDGE, M.S.

______________________________________ WILLIAM C. KOCH, JR., JUDGE

______________________________________ PATRICIA J. COTTRELL, JUDGE