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Strategic Studies Institute

and

U.S. Army War College Press

THE RESURGENCE OF AL-QAEDA IN SYRIA 

AND IRAQ

Azeem Ibrahim

May 2014

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ISBN 1-58487-626-3
v

FOREWORD

By 2010, it was possible to see al-Qaeda as an organization in decline. It had lost militarily in Iraq and 

seemed politically irrelevant to the popular revolts 

during the Arab Spring. However, the Syrian civil war 

has allowed it to rebuild and, in the form of the local 

Al Nusrah Front, use a revised political and military 

strategy. This important monograph considers if these 

apparent gains can be sustained or whether al-Qaeda’s 

ideology will again alienate other salafist groups and 

the wider Sunni population.

Dr. Azeem Ibrahim bases his report on available 

evidence, interviews, and visits to Syria. At the moment, the Assad government seems to be making 

some gains, and the rebel forces are split into three 

broad groups of the Free Syrian Army, the Islamic 

Front (backed by the Gulf States), and two al-Qaeda 

groups (Al Nusrah and the Islamic State in Iraq and 

Syria [ISIS]). ISIS has alienated all the other factions 

and is likely to retreat to Iraq, but the Al Nusrah Front 

is operating in a loose alliance with the Islamic Front. 

What is not clear is if Al Nusrah’s approach of seeking 

to cooperate with other Islamist groups and of trying 

to build popular support will allow it to make the substantial territorial gains that al-Qaeda has been seeking since it fled Afghanistan.

Dr. Ibrahim argues that this attempt is likely to fail. 

Even though Al Nusrah has shown a willingness to 

cooperate with the Islamic Front, the latter is likely to 

have to reject any long-term alliance with Al Nusrah 

if it wishes to retain funding from the Saudis and the 

Gulf States. In itself, ensuring that al-Qaeda remains 

marginalized will do little to help Syrians suffering 

the 4th year of civil war, nor will it eliminate the risk 
vi

of radicalized foreign fighters returning to their home 

countries. However, it does suggest that al-Qaeda’s 

relative resurgence since 2010 will be limited, and the 

organization as a whole will be no closer to its desire 

to reestablish territorial control over a large region 

where it can operate with relative safety.

The Strategic Studies Institute offers this monograph for consideration in the ongoing discussion 

regarding al-Qaeda and the organizations affiliated 

with it.

 

 DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

 Director

 Strategic Studies Institute and

 U.S. Army War College Press
vii

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

AZEEM IBRAHIM served as a Research Fellow at 

the International Security Program of the Kennedy 

School of Government at Harvard, a World Fellow at 

Yale, Fellow and Member of the Board of Directors 

at the Institute for Social Policy Understanding, and 

an Adjunct Research Professor at the Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College. He has met and 

advised a number of world leaders and governments 

on a diverse range of issues ranging from financial investment, to geopolitics, to countering extremism. He 

served as a reservist in the United Kingdom’s 4th Battalion Parachute Regiment. Dr. Ibrahim holds a Ph.D. 

from the University of Cambridge.

ix

SUMMARY

The Syrian civil war has allowed al-Qaeda to recover from its setbacks up to 2010. Its main affiliate in 

the region seems to be testing a new strategy of collaboration with other salafist-jihadist groups and a 

less brutal implementation of Sharia law in areas its 

controls. In combination, this might allow the Al Nusrah Front to carve out the sort of territorial control of 

a region (or state) that al-Qaeda has sought ever since 

its eviction from Afghanistan.

On the other hand, Syria has also seen a civil war 

between two al-Qaeda inspired factions (Al Nusrah 

and the Iraq-based Islamic State in Iraq and Syria) 

and there are indications of limits to al-Qaeda’s ability 

to cooperate with other anti-Assad factions and gain 

popular appeal. 

The extent that the Syrian civil war offers the 

means for al-Qaeda to recover from its earlier defeats 

will determine whether the organization has a future, 

or if it will become simply an ideology and label adopted by various Islamist movements fighting their 

own separate struggles.

1

THE RESURGENCE OF AL-QAEDA

 IN SYRIA AND IRAQ

INTRODUCTION 

The purpose of this monograph is to review the 

current resurgence of al-Qaeda (AQ) in Iraq and Syria. 

Al-Qaeda affiliates now occupy more territory in the 

Arab world than at any time in its history. However, 

this resurgence may be a temporary phenomenon, 

with al-Qaeda taking advantage of the chaos in Syria, 

the weak government response in Iraq, and the simmering discontent in other Muslim countries that has 

followed the Arab Spring. Their recent gains are substantial, but there are reasons to doubt if al-Qaeda’s 

power and appeal within the wider salafi-jihadist 

movement, especially in Syria, can be sustained. Here, 

different coalitions have recently disavowed al-Qaeda 

and, in some cases, are in open conflict with its militias. 

There is a case to argue that al-Qaeda has managed to 

exploit an opportunity but lacks the ability to broaden 

its appeal sufficiently to make long-term gains. 

This report is based on an extensive analysis of 

current national security reports and interviews with 

global experts; the author recently traveled to Turkey and Syria to interview individuals knowledgeable about al-Qaeda. A definitive assessment of the 

significance of al-Qaeda’s resurgence in 2013 remains 

inconclusive, as 2014 brings further turmoil, conflicting information, and shifts and changes with new alliances, leaders being killed or replaced, and territory 

won and lost. 

One conclusion that is emerging, however, is that 

the imposition on civilian communities of extreme 

fundamentalist Sharia law is not welcome or accept-
2

able anywhere, especially if al-Qaeda continues with 

its violent and brutal suppression of other political 

currents within radical Islam. While their goals may 

be similar, the so-called “moderate” salafi-jihadists 

seem to have a better appreciation of how to win over 

the wider population than al-Qaeda. 

Despite the attention paid to the resurgence of alQaeda, the bigger problem dominating the Middle 

East scene is the escalation of the Sunni-Shia divide. 

This split is reflected in the civil wars in Syria and Iraq 

and, in turn, has an international aspect as Shia Iran 

and Sunni Saudi Arabia are fighting a proxy Muslim 

civil war, particularly in Syria. 

It may turn out that al-Qaeda is just one of the many 

pawns in this tragic and explosive situation, and that 

its resurgence will last only as long as the money and 

power behind the conflict continues in a war where 

it increasingly seems that no one can win. However, 

the clear warning from Syria is that al-Qaeda has the 

capacity to exploit any unrest to its own ends, even if 

it fails to then take control of the situation.

BACKGROUND

A common narrative from the U.S. administration 

has been to proclaim the final demise of al-Qaeda. In 

reality, it is still not clear if “we are winning or losing 

the war on terror.”1 Despite the United States spending an estimated $5 trillion2

 on the war on terrorism, 

(including veterans’ costs and interest on borrowing 

the funds), al-Qaeda has managed to reconsolidate itself very quickly in Iraq and Syria. This may be due 

partly to the failure of U.S. policy in dealing with the 

crisis in Syria. However, it indicates that al-Qaeda 

has the capacity to exploit new opportunities. It has 
3

learned from experience and is more organized, better 

funded, more media and public relations aware, and 

more dangerous than ever before.

The failures of Western intervention in Afghanistan, where, in spite of all that has been attempted, 

the situation is fragile, and Iraq, increasingly racked 

by sectarian violence, provides one way in which alQaeda can recover. Add to this, the relative failure of 

the democratic opportunities offered by the events of 

the Arab Spring after 20103

 in Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia means all those states are now facing domestic terrorism and sectarian violence. In addition, the gradual 

shift in Syria from popular revolt to outright civil war 

has created the scope for al-Qaeda to extend its reach 

from northern Iraq and threaten to dominate the opposition to the Assad regime.

One interpretation is that al-Qaeda has recovered 

from its losses in the period up to 2010 and has managed to emerge as a dominant force and ideology 

across the Islamic world, taking advantage of political upheaval and Western failures. However, while 

al-Qaeda, in its most recent manifestation in Iraq and 

Syria, appears to be alive and well, what is not clear is 

how much of the current structure is the old pre-September 11, 2001 (9/11) al-Qaeda, and how much is a 

new organization using the label of al-Qaeda. This has 

led to genuine confusion about exactly what al-Qaeda 

is today, and if it is still a hierarchical organization 

with a leader or a more amorphous ideology which 

people freely adopt and interpret as a brand name and 

set up “franchises” relevant to their national situation. 

If the apparent resurgence is to be understood, then 

paying careful attention to what is, sometimes lazily, 

labeled al-Qaeda is important.
4

Political, economic, or religious differences in 

Muslim countries have created violent opposition to 

the existing dictatorships, whether Western-backed or 

not, and they all tend to be called “al-Qaeda” when 

they should really be seen as either the various regional affiliates of official al-Qaeda or the more pervasive form of salafi-jihadism. Every religious terrorist 

is not necessarily a member of al-Qaeda, and al-Qaeda 

does not represent all groups within the global salafijihadist movement. These differences are becoming 

increasingly apparent in Syria as the civil war rages 

on and fluid alliances are continually being made and 

broken within the opposition to the Assad regime. Jihadism in Syria is revealing the fault lines between 

al-Qaeda and other Sunni freedom fighters and may 

give us a better indication of whether al-Qaeda is surviving, transforming, or slowly dying. 

To survive, al-Qaeda needs leadership, funding, 

and territory in which to operate. This territory needs 

to be within the chaos of failing or transitional states, 

where al-Qaeda can operate outside the law of the 

land, thriving in a civil vacuum. At the moment, Syria 

is the obvious temporary home for al-Qaeda, where 

it can operate with impunity. However, its inability 

to co-opt all the other jihadi factions in the country 

indicates that there are significant limits to its power 

and influence. 

In the Syrian war setting, al-Qaeda followers are 

primarily fighters rather than ideologues, and their 

loyalties are to their immediate brothers in arms 

and leaders in the field. However, these leaders in 

turn swear an oath of fealty or “bayat” to Ayman alZawahiri, who, since the death of Osama bin Laden, 

has been in hiding, probably in Pakistan’s Northwest 

Frontier, the birthplace and the stronghold of not only 
5

al-Qaeda, but the global militant-Islamist movement 

and the Taliban. The same can be said for al-Zawahiri 

that was said about Osama bin Laden:

how to respond to an enemy who is a man and not 

a state; who has no structured organization, no headquarters, and no fixed address; and whose followers 

live in different countries and feel a loyalty not so 

much to that man as to the ideology of militant Islam.4

The war in Syria is becoming “a quagmire of sectarian violence”5

 as the revolutionary opposition has 

been splintered by rival militias turning on each other 

instead of uniting against the Assad regime. 

The leading al-Qaeda faction, the Al Nusrah Front, 

is losing credibility among fellow Muslims who do not 

agree with their mission and have refused allegiance 

to al-Qaeda leaders. The other former al-Qaeda militia (Islamic State in Iraq and Syria [ISIS]) has already 

been discredited and rejected by other rebel coalitions. News from Syria in November 2013 blames the 

recent advances by Assad forces on rebel in-fighting, 

according to the British-based Syrian Observatory for 

Human Rights. This in-fighting is partly a struggle for 

control over arms and resources but also reflects a rejection of the hard line approach to social issues of the 

two al-Qaeda factions in the country. It is also a matter 

of ideology and a struggle for funding from the Gulf 

States among the Islamist and salafi-jihadist militias.

In the short term, the remaining al-Qaeda contingents in Syria are more concerned with establishing an 

Islamic state than defeating Assad’s forces. Equally, 

the newly formed Islamic Front is seen as a move to 

attract funding from the Gulf, to the further exclusion 

of al-Qaeda factions, including the Al Nusrah Front. 

Some more enlightened Al Nusrah leaders have re-
6

sponded to this threat by trying to moderate their 

policies to win hearts and minds, and their success or 

failure will indicate the ability of al-Qaeda to endure 

or whether its hard-line fundamentalism finally renders it irrelevant, unable to appeal to a wide enough 

strata of society to allow it to take real control over a 

state or region. 

AL-QAEDA SINCE 9/11

In his July 18, 2013, testimony to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade, Thomas Joscelyn 

defined al-Qaeda as: 

a global international terrorist network, with a general 

command in Afghanistan and Pakistan and affiliates 

in several countries. Together, they form a robust 

network that, despite setbacks, contests for territory 

abroad and still poses a threat to U.S. interests both 

overseas and at home.6

This is hardly a description of a dying organization.

On the other hand, according to White House 

transcripts, President Barack Obama has described alQaeda as having been “decimated,” “on the path to 

defeat,” or some other variation of these phrases, at 

least 32 times since the September 11, 2012, attack on 

the U.S. consulate in Benghazi, Libya.7

 He has since 

had to limit his statement to the Taliban in Pakistan 

and al-Qaeda affiliates in Yemen, whose leadership 

has been decimated by drone attacks. Variously dismissed as “a bunch of guys in caves”8

 or “a ragtag 

group of jihadists,”9

 some commentators seek to dismiss al-Qaeda members today as thugs or criminals, a 

localized but containable problem like the Mafia in the 

1940s or the Assassins of the 12th century.
7

Other counterterrorism analysts suggested that the 

killing of Osama bin Laden had defeated al-Qaeda, 

along with the impact of the successful drone strikes 

in Pakistan’s tribal regions, which have killed 38 alQaeda and Taliban leaders.10 Some claim that al-Qaeda was already on the decline before 9/11, and that 

that one grand atrocity was its last major accomplishment. An alternative to this is that, as Jacob Shapiro 

suggests, the 9/11 attacks were only possible because 

al-Qaeda had the secure space in Afghanistan to operate, organize, and create a hierarchical system to train 

and motivate terrorist operatives. 

When terrorist groups have a great deal of operative 

space and can build large, relatively formalized organizations, they can indeed be quite deadly. Terrorist 

groups, of course, can no longer operate in that manner without attracting a great deal of lethal attention 

from various governments and it is hard to imagine 

such permissiveness will be allowed any time in the 

near future.11

In effect, there is a strong argument that either alQaeda managed one spectacular strike due to luck, or 

to the extent to which it was embedded in secure bases 

in Afghanistan. Since then, it has lost its secure base, 

most of its original leadership, and has been in strategic retreat over the past decade. However, just 1 year 

after the Benghazi attack in 2012, al-Qaeda has been 

described as transformed, reconstituted, or rebuilt, 

and Syria has become key to this resurgence. In effect, 

it is no longer “on the run” but has managed significant gains and, for the first time since it was evicted 

from Afghanistan, has a substantial region under its 

direct control. We are thus faced with a confusing interpretation of the relative strength of al-Qaeda and its 

capacity for future actions.
8

One argument is that the mostly successful counterterrorism actions since 9/11 have meant that alQaeda has never since been able to carry out a similar 

crime with the same impact and terrible loss of life. 

Seventeen Americans have lost their lives to terrorism 

since 9/11, and some consider this as defeat for alQaeda. For example, Thomas Lynch in a New America Foundation debate on October 17, 2012,12 argued 

that al-Qaeda has been defeated, reasoning that apart 

from the death of its charismatic leader, Osama Bin 

Laden, it has failed to achieve its stated objectives, it 

has achieved nothing since 2006, and importantly, it 

has failed to co-opt salafi-jihadists to its ranks. Conversely, other analysts cite the proliferation of terrorist 

attacks all over the world as evidence that al-Qaeda is 

still functional in that it has successfully inspired other 

jihadi movements. They argue that although Osama 

Bin Laden is dead, the al-Qaeda movement lives on 

as “a network, not a hierarchy,” and its resilience and 

adaptability allow it to flourish as localized affiliates 

in many countries around the world. 

For example, Bruce Reidel, director of the Intelligence Project at the Brookings Institution, wrote on 

September 27, 2013:

The horrible attack on a shopping mall in Kenya this 

week, the attack on a natural gas plant in Algeria 

earlier this year and the ongoing growth of al-Qaeda 

franchises in Syria all underscore the remarkable ability of al-Qaeda and associated movements to attract 

volunteers from across the Islamic world to its ranks. 

Al-Qaeda has achieved a long-sought goal of Islamist 

politics: the creation of a pan-Islamist militancy that 

operates across national borders and national politics. 

This transnational quality is one of the keys to alQaeda’s remarkable regenerative capacity, its ability 
9

to survive massive counterterrorism campaigns and 

rebuild operational capability quickly.13

This points to a major problem in understanding 

al-Qaeda. As one writer put it, “Al Qaeda is a lot of 

things. It’s partly an ideology, it’s partly a politicalcultural force, and it is also a state of mind.”14 This 

has led to a degree of fragmentation, especially since 

Ayman al-Zawahiri took over, following the death 

of Osama bin Laden in 2011. The al-Qaeda inspired 

groups that have become established in many parts 

of the world do not necessarily take orders from 

al-Zawahiri, nor are they funded directly by him. 

This implies there are a substantial number of 

salafi-jihadists groups that are not part of al-Qaeda, 

and there are many degrees of influence, inspiration, 

and affiliation. Thus, only those groups which have 

sworn allegiance to al-Zawahiri should legitimately 

be called al-Qaeda. Beyond these few groups, there is 

simply a more amorphous network of al-Qaeda sympathizers, subscribing to the al-Qaeda mythology and 

using the name when it is to their advantage.

One way to understand this nexus of groups is to 

see al-Qaeda as: 

far from being a fly-by-night, fragmented terror organization, Al Qaeda is attempting to behave like a 

multinational corporation, with what amounts to a 

company-wide financial policy across its different 

chapters.15

Thomas Joscelyn’s testimony to a Congressional 

committee in July 2013 described al-Qaeda as a strong 

organization:
10

The backbone of today’s al Qaeda consists of its ‘general command’ in Afghanistan and Pakistan (others 

refer to this as the ‘AQ Core’) and its formal affiliates. 

The established al Qaeda affiliates include: Al Qaeda 

in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), Al Qaeda in Iraq 

(AQI) and the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), Al Qaeda in 

the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and Shabaab in Somalia. All of the affiliates have publicly sworn bayat (an 

oath of fealty) to al-Qaeda’s senior leadership. Jabhat 

al Nusra in Syria should also be included in this list 

as well, because the group has openly proclaimed its 

allegiance to Ayman al-Zawahiri.16

This distinction is made by other commentators, 

such as former National Security Agency and Central Intelligence Agency Director Michael V. Hayden, 

during an appearance on CBS on December 29, 2013, 

who stated that the al-Qaeda movement is divided 

into three layers: “al-Qaeda prime, formally affiliated

and like-minded.” General Hayden told The Washington Times on December 30, 2013, that there are still uncertainties about who precisely executed and ordered 

the attack on Benghazi, but that he could say with 

confidence that the perpetrators were “al Qaeda affiliated if al Qaeda is viewed as a movement, a cause, 

a concept.” 

This is giving the organization a very bureaucratic 

aspect. “They have to have bookkeeping techniques 

because of the nature of the business they are in,” said 

Brookings Institution fellow William McCants, a former adviser to the U.S. State Department’s Office of 

the Coordinator for Counterterrorism. “They have so 

few ways to keep control of their operatives, to rein 

them in, and make them do what they are supposed to 

do. They have to run it like a business.”
11

The picture that emerges is of a rigid bureaucracy, 

with a chief executive, a board of directors and departments such as human resources and public relations. 

Experts say that each branch of the terror group replicates the same corporate structure, and that this strict 

blueprint has helped al-Qaida not just to endure but 

also to spread.17

At the same time, many of the franchises are operating independently, and it is difficult to establish 

which of the jihadist groups are still loyal to the “old” 

al-Qaeda and which have broken away to pursue their 

own actions, independent of funding or even direction 

from al-Qaeda leadership. Joscelyn describes them as 

being outside the formal affiliates but describes them 

as “ideological kinsmen”:

We often cannot see the operational ties between these 

groups because al Qaeda still maintains a substantial 

clandestine apparatus that is tasked with hiding such 

relationships. For some of these organizations, there 

may very well be no concrete ties and their relationship al-Qaeda’s jihad is purely rhetorical.18

The controversy about those responsible for the attack on the U.S. Embassy in Benghazi in 2012 is one 

example of the confusion surrounding the name of 

al-Qaeda. At the time it was often described as an “alQaeda” attack, but The New York Times published an 

article on December 29, 2013,19 stating that, according 

to their extensive interviews with Libyan militants, 

the perpetrators of the attack were not al-Qaeda. 

Guy Taylor of the Washington Times had a somewhat 

different analysis:

Counterterrorism analysts and former high-level officials indicated during interviews with The Washington 
12

Times last summer said that the FBI [Federal Bureau 

of Investigation], which was tasked by the Obama 

administration with carrying out an investigation 

into the attack, had settled on a broad conclusion: The 

attack was carried out by a combination of militants 

with varying degrees of connection to three Islamist 

groups: Ansar al-Sharia, the uhammad Jamal network, 

and Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb.20

This pattern is also emerging in Syria. Here, there 

are different factions of salafi-jihadist fighting forces, 

and the divide between the mainstream Syrian opposition and the extremist jihadi groups is creating 

a war on several fronts with a very volatile situation 

of allegiances that are constantly shifting and changing. With the hard-line al-Qaeda faction (ISIS) now 

denounced by several alliances of jihadist militias, 

al-Qaeda’s resurgence in Syria has suffered a definite 

setback, with implications yet to be revealed. Al-Qaeda’s remaining “official” militia in Syria is now the 

Al Nusrah Front. In combination with the return of 

al-Qaeda in Iraq in the Anbar province, recent events 

in Syria indicate that gaining territorial control is an 

important goal, but that al-Qaeda is having problems 

imposing its will on other salafi-jihadist groups.

One issue is that al-Zawahiri, like Osama bin 

Laden, lacks combat experience but does not have the 

charisma or authority of al-Qaeda’s former leader. He 

remains in hiding and in early September 2008, the 

Pakistan Army claimed that they had “almost” captured him after getting information that he and his 

wife were in northwest Pakistan. Currently, the U.S. 

Department of State is offering a reward of U.S.$25 million for information about his location.

Al-Zawahiri to date has been unable to match the 

organization and funding achieved by Bin Laden, and 
13

his contact with his followers is constrained by his existence as a fugitive. In the videos released at intervals 

to rally his followers, he shows he is aware of the need 

for a better public image. Bin Laden himself in some of 

his later writings acknowledged that al-Qaeda (“base” 

in Arabic) was no longer a good brand name as he was 

failing to attract funding and followers due to general revulsion against his violent and self-defeating 

agenda.21

However, al-Zawahiri is still totally committed to 

his vision of a global caliphate as he explained in his 

2001 autobiography, Knights Under the Banner of the 

Prophet, that the most important strategic goal of alQaeda was to seize control of a state, or part of a state, 

somewhere in the Muslim world, explaining that, 

“without achieving this goal, our actions will mean 

nothing.” In this sense, the struggle to control large 

areas of Syria and northern Iraq are clearly critical to 

al-Qaeda being able to carry out its overall goals.

In October 2013, Ayman al-Zawahiri delivered a 

recorded audio speech on the occasion of the 9/11 attacks, revealing according to Al Arabiya, that he “has 

begun to suffer from frustration and incapability of 

activating al-Qaeda’s strengths.” The most important 

point of the speech was that America will remain “the 

first target of al-Qaeda members’ operations” as per 

the strategy of individual jihad—which is the only 

means left for the organization.22

Al-Zawahiri, from his refuge in Pakistan, has belatedly realized that the militants’ increasing ferocity and 

widespread practice of takfir (declaring other Muslims 

infidels) is not winning over the Muslim world.23 His 

authority has obviously been undermined by events 

in Syria and the defection of ISIS. This may mean his 

attention seems to have shifted instead to Pakistan 
14

rather than Syria. As reported in the Pakistan newspaper, Dawn, on September 19, 2013, he urged fighters 

to “create a safe haven for Mujahideen in Pakistan” so 

that it can become a base for “establishing an Islamic 

system.”24 As William McCants says, “Zawahiri’s inability to manage al-Qaeda’s sprawling organization 

offers a preview of the infighting to come after his 

inevitable death.”25

THE WIDER DYNAMICS OF 

JIHADI TERRORISM

Jihadi terrorism has been in existence for a long 

time, with attacks preceding the formation of al-Qaeda, and not all the resurgent salafi-jihadis in Syria 

choose to call themselves part of al-Qaeda nor wish 

to swear allegiance to al-Zawahiri. Despite its claims, 

al-Qaeda is not aiming to unite all Muslims, as it is 

strictly Sunni and violently anti-Shia. In addition, it 

is not able to gain the loyalty of either all Sunni traditions or even of all Sunni militant groups.

In effect, to understand some of the dynamics in 

Syria means understanding the logic and goals of the 

various groups opposed to the Assad regime. This is 

difficult, as “there is a natural tendency to shy away 

from treating terrorists as rational actors.”26 In particular, there are some differences of opinion as to the 

main motivating force of the salafi-jiahdists, with some 

analysts suggesting that funding, food, and guns are 

more powerful than ideology. “Size, money, and momentum are the things to look for in Syrian insurgent 

politics—ideology comes fourth, if even that.”27 

However, others such as Professor Joshua Landis, 

believe that ideology rules.28 The public statements by 

the various militia leaders are an indication of their 
15

commitment to the cause of first defeating the Assad 

regime, and then establishing an Islamic state. In this 

respect, it is now possible to discern two major strands. 

One is of groups aligned with al-Qaeda, such as the Al 

Nusrah Front and ISIS, and the other are the newly 

formed Islamic Alliance, which is a further consolidation of the merger of two major ideological streams 

within the Syrian rebels—the moderate Islamists and 

the salafists. 

The Alliance rejects secularism, which it defines as 

dividing religion from life and society, and is developing its own political bureaus and platforms in an 

effort to challenge those of the Syrian National Coalition. While civilian populations have demonstrated 

their opposition to ultra-radical influences, they are 

becoming more supportive of groups that advocate 

the implementation of some form of Sharia law in the 

country.29

The Islamic Alliance stated on Nov. 26 that it wants 

to replace Syria’s regime with an Islamic state, but 

insisted it would protect minorities and not create an 

‘oppressive, authoritarian system’. However, they did 

not provide a clear vision of a post-Assad Syria, perhaps fearing that going into details would splinter the

alliance of seven key Islamist groups which hopes to 

unify the fractured opposition.

The Islamic Front says representative government 

‘is based on the notion that the people have the right 

through institutions to (determine) legislation, whereas in Islam God is the sovereign’. But it adds: ‘This 

does not mean that we want an oppressive, authoritarian system’, saying Syria should be ruled through a 

Shura, or Islamic consultative council. The new coalition includes a Kurdish Islamic faction, and also says 

it rejects ‘any project to partition’ Syria.30
16

Syriacomment.com provides up-to-the-minute information about the fluid nature of the insurgency, 

noting that “powerful leaders are emerging and 

smaller militias are lining up with the larger sharks.”31

The opposition remains extremely fragmented and 

volatile, but salafi-leaning insurgents are the single 

most dominant force in liberated areas. These groups 

may not represent even half of the insurgency but are 

major actors in their areas. 

While ISIS and the Al Nusrah Front attract media 

attention because of their al-Qaeda affiliation, past or 

still existing, the other fighting factions in Syria deserve attention regarding their ideology and makeup 

as “moderate” forces, possible counterweights to alQaeda. The Syrian Islamic Front is the biggest alliance 

of salafi-jihadis, and, while many would like to see 

them as “moderate,” they are committed first to defeating Assad’s troops and then to creating an Islamic 

state, as opposed to al-Qaeda which is committed first 

and foremost to global jihad.

Aron Lund’s recent comprehensive reporting for 

Syria in Crisis32 notes that the Islamic Front wants “to 

establish an independent state where God’s merciful 

law is sovereign and where the individuals of this 

state enjoy justice and a dignified life.” It spurns the 

term “civil state” (dawla madaniya) as misleading and 

rejects democracy and parliamentary rule. They appear to be envisioning “a republican theocracy supervised by religious scholars where there is some degree 

of political competition within sharia-compliant but 

otherwise modern institutions and where the role of 

politicians is to administer a strict application of sharia rather than to make laws of their own.”

The militias who make up the Islamic Front now 

outnumber the Free Syrian Army (FSA). As the new 
17

coalition excludes the two al-Qaeda groups, the Al 

Nusrah Front and ISIS, some would like to see it as 

a more moderate coalition that is marginalizing the 

truly radical factions.33 The jihadi culture has adapted 

with the times, and the fiercely independent Islamic 

Front is now seen to have three main objectives: to further isolate ISIS now that it has created its own downfall; to encourage the Al Nusrah Front to become more 

mainstream; and to create a viable rebel army with 

clear command and control.34

In contrast, an insight into al-Qaeda’s motives and 

strength in Syria was provided by the analyst Cole 

Bunzel in his February 2013 translation of a document 

posted on Shumukh al-Islam, al-Qaeda’s premier online forum. Purporting to be a “comprehensive strategy” for the Al Nusrah Front in the ongoing Syrian 

jihad representing the forum membership’s thinking 

as a whole, the document is particularly revealing in 

two respects:

First, contrary to the triumphalist tone of much Syrian 

jihadi media, the Shumukh members are not upbeat 

in their description of ongoing and anticipated events. 

For the present, there is hope mixed with desperation and fear; for the future, a strong sense that the 

jihadis will suffer strangulation from all sides. In their 

worldview, some form of Western intervention to stymie jihadi success is all but assured; the West, with its 

Israeli and Iranian allies, will seal Syria’s borders and 

proceed to eliminate the jihadi threat, carving up Syria 

and elevating the ‘Islamists’ to power.

Second, Shumukh’s recommendations presuppose a 

very long war in Syria. These include such things as 

rapidly increasing the number of recruits before the 

borders are sealed, making sure to take control of the 

regime’s heavy and unconventional weapons, estab-
18

lishing a unified media organization for more effective 

propaganda, and refraining, at all costs, from allying 

with ‘Islamists’ such as the Muslim Brotherhood, no 

matter how attractive this might seem.35

The Al Nusrah Front (Jahbat al-Nusrah) is directly 

subordinate to al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri. 

The rival ISIS, led by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, despite 

its resurgence in Iraq, is being run as a renegade operation since al-Baghdadi defied al-Zawahiri’s leadership. These two al-Qaeda branches have an estimated 

6,000-7,000 operatives,36 and new recruits are continuing to arrive in large numbers. The other salafist rebel 

groups in Syria total about 100,000;37 thus the proportion of fighters with formal al-Qaeda loyalty is comparatively small. There are many groups who are on 

record as disavowing al-Qaeda, but that adhere to the 

salafi-jihadi objectives, adding to the complexity of 

predicting the strength of al-Qaeda as a distinct ideology, network, and organization.

This would support the view that al-Qaeda is divided effectively from other jihadist groups in Syria. 

Thus, not only is it at war with the regime and those 

who follow the Shia traditions, but is also at variance 

to other radical Sunni groups. In addition, even those 

who directly share its ideology are split into two factions. This may indicate that there are limits to its ability to influence events. However, in combination with 

its resurgence in Iraq, it is clear that al-Qaeda is again 

a major force.

AL-QAEDA’S RESURGENCE IN IRAQ

Al-Qaeda’s resurgence in Syria was preceded by 

its recovery in Iraq, where it was “dead on its feet” in 

2010 and has rebounded strongly since then. A suc-
19

cessful relaunch of the movement in April 2011 led to 

a significant recovery of territory within Iraq’s Sunni 

communities, notably in the Anbar province, making 

the country less stable and cohesive, and effectively 

merging its struggle in Iraq with the Syrian civil war.

The Syrian crisis is strengthening Al Qaeda in Iraq and 

Iraqi militants are in turn, complicating Syria’s future 

path. Operating as the Islamic State of Iraq and alShams (ISIS) Al Qaeda in Iraq has ambitions to dominate the Salafi terrorist scene in Syria.38

Since 2011, the Shia dominated government in 

Baghdad has alienated Iraqi Sunnis by discrimination 

and repression, with the result that many Sunnis have 

moved to the Anbar province, making it an al-Qaeda 

stronghold on the border with Syria. 

The Institute for the Study of War, in an October 9, 

2013, report, assessed that al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) has 

reconstituted as a military force:

Al-Qaeda in Iraq is resurgent. Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) 

reached its apex of territorial control and destructive 

capability in late 2006 and early 2007, before the Surge 

and the Awakening removed the organization from 

its safe havens in and around Baghdad. Subsequent 

operations pursued AQI northward through Diyala, 

Salah ad-Din, and Mosul, degrading the organization 

over the course of 2007-2008 such that only a fraction 

of its leaders, functional cells, and terroristic capabilities remained and were concentrated in Mosul. As of 

August 2013, AQI has regrouped, regained capabilities, and expanded into areas from which it was expelled during the Surge.39

Control of terrain is important to AQI, as it thrives in 

a chaotic environment from which it may emerge as 

the most well-organized contender. AQI seeks to cre-
20

ate this disorderly condition as it pursues control of 

urban terrain presently secured by the forces of the 

Iraqi State.40

The AQI stated aim is to gain control of Mosul to 

destroy popular confidence in the Iraq administration; 

to isolate Mosul’s population and government from 

the state; to exploit the ethnic and social fractures 

within Mosul’s diverse community; to intimidate the 

population into tolerance of AQI’s presence; and then 

later to compete with local and provincial governance 

structures for control. However, the brutality of AQI 

is appalling, with civilian casualties of more than 5,500 

since April, 2013, according to United Nations (UN) 

figures. As of August 2013, AQI has increased the frequency and volume of bombing attacks and has also 

carried out attacks upon critical infrastructure, such as 

the Um Qasr port at Basra. 

The United States has reacted by reaffirming the $10 

million bounty placed on Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the 

leader of AQI, whom officials said was based in Syria 

in August 2013. Targeting AQI’s leader, however, will 

not be effective in halting the organization’s growth. 

AQI is no longer a small cadre based around a single 

leader, but rather an effective reconstituted military 

organization operating in Iraq and Syria.41

Much of the renewed violence has been attributed 

to foreign jihadists who come into Iraq from Syria, creating one large conflict zone, which has also spilled 

over into the Lebanon.42 The situation in Iraq at the 

beginning of 2014 has become increasingly violent. 

Al-Qaeda Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) 

militias seized Fallujah on January 2, 2014, and have 

attacked Ramadi, seeking to consolidate their hold on 

the Anbar province on the border with Syria. The Iraqi 
21

Army and the local tribes are fighting back. Ahmed 

Abu Risha, head of the Awakening National Council—a coalition of tribesmen in Anbar—said “there 

is an open war against ISIL,” with the tribes forming 

a bloc against the al-Qaeda group with the help of 

local police. 

However, the extent of this counterstroke by the 

government is in doubt. A report in Al Arabiya on 

January 3, 2014, reiterates that: 

Baghdad’s failure to recruit the awakening movement’s fighters into the formal army and the exacerbation of the conflict in Syria have encouraged 

al-Qaeda to reemerge in the strategically important 

Anbar province that connects Iraq to Syria, Jordan and 

Saudi Arabia.43

Michael Knight’s December report to Congress states 

that, although al-Qaeda in Iraq has been a fairly insular terrorist group for many years:

Al-Qaeda’s resurgence in Iraq is undeniably damaging to US interests in Iraq, in the broader regions and 

potentially in the homeland security environments in 

Europe and the United States.44

AQI has been self-funding since 2010 through organized crime such as kidnap for ransom; protection 

payments from large Iraqi companies; plus trucking, 

smuggling, and real estate portfolios. However, the 

organization may be in danger of overreaching, as 

Sunni Arabs and tribesmen become resentful of alQaeda as it becomes more powerful. This is culminating in the recent escalation of conflict in Fallujah and 

Ramadi where tribal forces and the Iraqi Army were 

under attack by al-Qaeda militants. 
22

ISIS has now gained a territorial chain of control 

stretching from Ramadi, 100 kilometers (km) west 

of Baghdad, to Al-Raqqah in northern Syria, 160-km 

from Aleppo. Commander Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi 

vows to establish an Islamist caliphate, presenting a 

direct threat to Israel, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Lebanon. Despite these successes, ISIS has been disowned 

by al-Zawahiri and the formal al-Qaeda leadership. 

In effect, particularly in Syria, there are two groups 

that share al-Qaeda’s ideology but are at war with 

each other.

AL-QAEDA IN SYRIA—ISIS AND 

THE AL NUSRAH FRONT

While the civil war is still being waged in Syria and 

it becomes increasingly dangerous for journalists, it is 

difficult to get reliable, detailed information about the 

al-Qaeda organizations operating alongside the rebel 

opposition. 

The rival sides (the supporters and opponents of the 

regime) customarily issue biased and manipulative 

reports whose sole purpose is to further their own interests. Each side claims to be winning and each side 

slanders the other. Another difficulty is the nature of 

the Al Nusrah Front and the Islamic State in Iraq and 

Greater Syria (ISIS). They are both closed decentralized organizations with many rivals and which are 

careful to preserve their secrecy, and do not reveal, 

even to their own operatives, information about their 

leaders or about how they operate.45

To understand the situation, it is necessary to consider ISIS and Al Nusrah as separate organizations, 

even if they essentially share the same ideology.
23

ISIS.

In April 2013, AQI declared itself the ISIS, expanding its historical identity to include Syria. Its leader, 

Al-Baghdadi, had played a key role in establishing the 

Al Nusrah Front and considered Abu Mohammed alGolani, Al Nusrah’s leader, to be his subordinate with 

a duty to obey him. 

Baghdadi attempted to integrate Jabhat al-Nusrah 

(the Al Nusrah Front) into ISIS, with the new organization being called the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham, 

ISIS. ISIS took control of wide areas without much resistance, benefitting from the Jabhat al-Nusrah fighters who defected to ISIS.46 Al-Baghdadi claims descent 

from the Prophet Muhammad and has been described 

as a “philosopher jihadi,” something quite different 

from other al-Qaeda leaders.47 His leadership ambitions and his brutal methods of enforcing Sharia law 

have alienated ISIS from the populace and the Syrian 

Islamic Front. 

ISIS is estimated to have about 8,000 soldiers in both 

Syria and Iraq, who were recruited without checking 

the quality of the new members. ISIS started paying 

$200 a month for each fighter, and thousands of men 

in ISIS’s area of control joined the group. Al-Baghdadi 

continues to be openly defiant of al-Zawahiri’s directives and, according to a jihadist source quoted by the 

Iranian news source Alalam:

Baghdadi believes in the necessity of declaring the 

emirate, or Islamic state, immediately and declaring 

its emir as its leader who alone [makes decisions], and 

for the mujahedeen to swear allegiance to that Islamic 

state in the territories [it controls], be they Syrian or 

non-Syrian, and by not recognizing the Sharia com-
24

mittee judges who come from other Islamic factions. 

There should be no law but ISIS’s law. Also, all Islamic factions should swear allegiance to the ISIS emir 

or be considered outside of God’s authority. Military 

cooperation happens only with the battalions that declare exclusive allegiance [to ISIS]. And ISIS preachers 

(mosque preachers) have the right to replace the local 

preachers in all mosques. Moreover, all the spoils and 

financial resources belong to the ISIS’s treasury. The 

other factions, whether or not they are Islamic, have 

no right to that money.48

ISIS has been criticized for attacking fellow rebels 

and establishing its own fiefdom. It fought against the 

FSA, for example, in Azaz, north of Aleppo, so that it 

could take control of the border crossing with Turkey 

to capture revenue and control goods moving to Aleppo. Turkey closed the border crossing in response.49

ISIS also sought to establish a foothold in the northeast section of Syria that borders Iraq. However, this 

is being contested not only by Assad’s forces, but by 

Syrian Kurds who are taking advantage of the unrest 

by planning to form a transitional administration. Iranian Fars News reports on November 27, 2013, that 

Syrian Kurdish fighters have intensified their attacks 

against ISIS and recently seized the sole border post at 

Yarubiya held since March by al-Qaeda-linked groups 

on their border with Iraq.50

By adding the Kurds to their list of enemies, ISIS 

would seem to have too many enemies to be able to 

survive for long. Instead of concentrating on defeating the Syrian Army, it has taken over two towns 

from the FSA forces and seems to be intent on establishing a foothold for an Islamic state, creating in 

Syria’s north a series of fiefdoms run by rival warlords. This self-serving aggressiveness, along with 
25

its brutality, has led, among others, to American alQaeda spokesman Adam Gadhan recommending that 

al-Qaeda publicly sever its ties with the Islamic State 

of Iraq because its sectarian violence tarnished AQ’s 

reputation.51 

Al-Zawahiri, in a broadcast on Al Jazeera TV on 

November 9, 2013, declared that Golani’s Al Nusrah 

Front would continue to function as “an independent 

branch of Al Qaeda that reports to the general command.” He said that al-Baghdadi had “made a mistake by establishing the [ISIS] without asking for our 

permission.” “The Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant 

is to be abolished while the Islamic State of Iraq remains functioning,” al-Zawahiri said.52 Subsequently, 

al-Qaeda has stressed that it: 

has no connection with the group called the ISIS, as 

it was not informed or consulted about its establishment. It was not pleased with it and thus ordered its 

suspension. Therefore, it is not affiliated with al-Qaeda and has no organisational relationship with it. . . . 

Al-Qaeda is not responsible for ISIS’s actions.53

On October 5, 2013, Cole Bunzel of jihadica.com

noted that ISIS persisted “in a state of outright disobedience to its supposed seniors in Al Qaeda Central 

(AQC), Zawahiri among them.”54 Brookings Institution’s William McCants said, “In the 25 year history of 

Al Qaeda, no affiliate has ever publicly disagreed with 

the boss so brazenly.”55

Since the defection of ISIS, both al-Qaeda branches 

have entrenched themselves as independent organizations in the Syrian theater of operations. The split 

has been widely covered on jihadi forums and social 

networking websites, with some supporting the ISIS, 

some the Al Nusrah Front, and others both groups 

equally, for they each are waging jihad against the en-
26

emy. On the ground, however, the Al Nusrah Front 

is attempting to maintain its popular support among 

the Syrian people, whereas ISIS has initiated attacks 

on fellow Muslim rebels and has instituted draconian 

Islamic law in towns it controls. ISIS does not seem to 

have learned from experience in Iraq where al-Qaeda’s 

brutal campaigns have alienated many Sunnis and led 

to its isolation. Since its takeover of the eastern city of 

Raqqa in May 2013, ISIS has focused on solidifying its 

rule through intimidation, creating an economy of dependence, and seeking to integrate eastern Syria with 

its strongholds in Iraq. Minorities have been hounded 

out of the city and foreign journalists and aid workers 

are no longer welcome; dozens are presently in ISIS 

captivity.56

According to Chris Looney, writing for Syria 

Comment:

Its hostility towards minority groups, draconian legal 

system, and brutal repression of dissidents has generated a significant backlash, severely undermining the 

group’s credibility and keeping it from being seen as a 

legitimate part of the opposition. Because of this, ISIS’ 

current governance strategy is likely unsustainable.

Still, ISIS thrives on instability, and as the Syrian 

war reaches its 1,000th day with no end in sight, the 

group is likely to be able to maintain its hold in Raqqa. 

Whether it can learn from its mistakes remains to be 

seen, but absent a dramatic shift in the trajectory of the 

conflict, ISIS is here to stay.57

That dramatic shift has now taken place, with ISIS rejected not only by the al-Qaeda leadership, but also 

the Al Nusrah Front and almost all the other rebel 

factions because of its uncompromising ideology and 

imposition of strict Sharia law on the areas it holds.
27

The Al Nusrah Front.

The Al Nusrah Front was designated by the United States as a Foreign Terrorist Organization in May 

2013. According to a Quilliam Foundation report,58

al-Qaeda sent operatives from Afghanistan to Syria 

as early as 2000 to train them for the fighting in Iraq. 

In March 2011 when the Syrian uprising began, AQI 

sent trained Syrian and Iraqi guerilla fighters back 

into Syria, where they later defined themselves as 

an autonomous organization and strengthened their 

direct links with al-Qaeda, formally becoming an alQaeda branch called Jahbat al-Nusrah (JN), or the 

Al Nusrah Front.

Many cadres of the Al Nusrah Front come from 

the jihadist network of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, which 

was built during the 2000s and centered in Baghdad 

in 2002, following Al-Zarqawi’s arrival from Afghanistan via Iran. Syrians who had been with AlZarqawi in Herat, Afghanistan, in 2000 were sent to 

build branches of his network in Syria and Lebanon, 

with Al-Zarqawi exercising control from Iraq. These 

jihadists established “guesthouses” in Syria to channel would-be fighters to Iraq and the infrastructure 

flourished. During this period, Syria acted as the main 

channel for funding for the network, with Saudi and 

Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) jihadists in the Levant securing financial support from sympathisers in 

their home countries. 

On January 24, 2012, the Al Nusrah Front was formally announced with the objective of establishing an 

Islamist state in Syria and a caliphate in Greater Syria, 

by its leader Muhammad al Golani (also spelled Al 

Julani). His name reflects the fact that he is probably 

from the Golan Heights, and is thought to have close 
28

ties to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and AQI. A secretive 

figure, he has several times been pronounced killed 

in battle,59 yet he appeared recently on Al Jazeera 

TV, his back to the camera, and his face covered by a 

black scarf.

Al-Golani has renounced the FSA, saying it was a 

crime to accept the aid of Western countries in the war 

to topple the Assad regime. He also announced his opposition to Turkey as a U.S. ally and opposes both the 

Arab League and Iran. By refusing to cooperate with 

the pro-democracy opposition, the Al Nusrah Front 

has fragmented the anti-Assad forces, a counterproductive stance as it is also alienating the international 

community.

The Al Nusrah Front is very selective about initiating new members, requiring tezkiyya, or personal 

assurance, from two commanders on the front line, 

stating that the recruit has the necessary skills, religious commitment, and attitude to join the group.60

Recruits are tested in the field for courage and loyalty 

to the Front’s ideology. According to the Quilliam 

Foundation report: 

This is part of the reason JN [the Al Nusrah Front] has 

been so successful—other rebel groups such as the 

Free Syrian Army (FSA) have a policy of mass recruitment which makes them appear strong, but actually 

leaves them chaotic and disunited. 

Another Al Nusrah Front leader, Al-Amir Gazi 

al-Haj, said his group is effective because it has extremely high standards. “We only accept the best of 

the best,” he is quoted in an interview. 

We have pure intentions. We fight only for Allah. We 

do not accept even small deviations [from God’s law], 
29

like smoking. We walk a straight line, and you can see 

the results.

Al Nusrah Front’s new recruits take an oath of allegiance or al-Bay’ah. The religious nature of this oath, 

swearing before God to follow the jihadist leadership, 

makes it a stronger, more personal contract than a 

simple civil oath would be. Breaking this oath carries significant danger, with jihadists in Algeria killed 

for refusing to follow the leaders to whom they had 

pledged allegiance. The religious basis of this oath 

means that recruits have no legal recourse should they 

wish to leave the group, as they have made a vow to 

submit to jihadist leaders entirely, unless their instructions go against the will of God.61

The exact number of foreigners is not known, but 

approximately 7-11 percent of the volunteers come 

from West European countries (mainly the United 

Kingdom [UK] and France) and Muslim countries in 

Central Asia (mainly Chechnya).62 Their motivation 

and ideology differ—some are motivated by sectarian 

considerations, some by a hatred of the Assad regime, 

and some volunteer because of a sense of adventure 

and the heroic image of the rebels. 

Many come to Syria to join the FSA but then transfer to the Al Nusrah Front because of better salaries 

and equipment, organization, and resources. Many 

adopt the salafi-jihadi ideology only after staying in 

Syria, where they undergo an accelerated process of 

radicalization. Concern exists in their home countries 

that when the operatives return, having undergone 

military training and radicalization, they will potentially engage in radical activity and terrorism. But as 

volunteering to fight Assad is not a crime in the volunteers’ countries of origin, authorities have no effective 

way of dealing with the phenomenon.
30

While Syrians continue to suffer, sandwiched between a brutal dictatorship and extremist groups, 

Arab and European jihadists are being indoctrinated 

and trained in the world’s most active battle zone—

experience they may someday bring home.63 The brigades are made up of thousands of volunteers from 

the Arab Muslim world, such as Libya, Tunisia, Saudi 

Arabia, and Egypt who now make up the majority of 

its members. The process of jihadist operatives joining 

the ranks of the Al Nusrah Front is still going on.64

While admitting to receiving help from the Iraq 

branch since the early days of the insurgency, Golani 

said that the Al Nusrah Front would continue operating under its own banner, with loyalty to al-Zawahiri. 

“The banner of the Front will remain the same, nothing will change about it even though we are proud 

of the banner of the (Islamic) State and of those who 

carry it,” he said.65

The Al Nusrah Front leadership is aware of the 

negative publicity that is created by indiscriminate 

attacks killing civilians but are outspoken through 

their own media network, al-Manara al-Bayda, about 

the sectarian nature of their mission; revenge against 

al-Nusayrin (Alawites) for their mistreatment of ahl 

al-Sunna (Sunnis). 

Once the Ba’athist regime falls, JN’s opponents will 

become many and varied. Moderates who support 

the group’s strong stance against Assad may grow to 

be repulsed at the continuing violence and increasingly extreme rhetoric which could follow the fall of 

the regime.66

This has proved to be the case with the excesses 

of ISIS and, while Al Nusrah may be more pragmatic 

in its statements, it clearly represents a mortal threat 
31

to anyone from different confessional groups or who 

hope for a democratic, secular Syria. It remains to be 

seen whether the Al Nusrah Front has learned from 

the ISIS mistakes and will temper its rhetoric and actions in the field. The ability to make the transition 

from being a combat organization to gaining popular 

acceptance will be crucial in determining the limits to 

the current al-Qaeda resurgence.

AL-QAEDA AND POPULAR GOVERNANCE

Al-Qaeda’s efforts at building community trust 

and respect among beleaguered citizens in war-torn 

Syria is an indication of whether it will be a movement 

that prevails, or whether it is simply a wartime phenomenon. Its record of nation-building internationally 

has been negligible, and recent events are proving that 

“significant grassroots hostility is building in liberated 

parts of Syria against foreign-funded extremists and al 

Qaeda affiliates.”67

It would seem vital to al-Qaeda’s survival to have 

the support of the local populace in whatever country 

it seeks to become established, otherwise it simply remains an organization that attracts deracinated young 

men, adventurers, malcontents, and religious zealots 

with a taste for violent adventure. Al-Qaeda has always been associated with violence and destruction, 

unlike the Muslim Brotherhood, which historically attempted to create community loyalty through public 

service. This is important, as Syria has a tradition of 

relative pluralism and tolerance:

Syria has been a pluralistic secular society for decades. 

The majority of its Sunni Muslim population are conservative and have coexisted peacefully alongside the 
32

many other religions and ethnic minorities that make 

up Syria’s diverse society, history, and culture. The 

people of Syria do not aspire to a Saudi sponsored 

Salafi/Wahhabi leadership or doctrine of law.68

The Syrian people would appear to be reluctant 

participants in the attempt to establish an Islamic 

state. The actions of ISIS and the Al Nusrah Front in 

the areas they now control will be an indication of 

their future staying power based on their governance 

of the civilian populations. At present, the establishment of Sharia law and tribunals is the one unifying 

factor of the different rebel factions, and their imposition of Sharia law on civilians seems to be tolerated as 

long as it is not punitive and that public services are 

restored as well.69

Throughout Syria since the very beginning of the 

democratic uprising, communities have attempted 

with more or less success to establish civilian governance and prevent anarchy. The Local Coordination 

Committees (LCC) realized the importance of remaining committed to the original goals of the revolution—freedom, justice and equality for Syrians of all 

backgrounds. A network of 70 coordination groups 

(tansiqiyat) operated by media and street activists connected to the grassroots revolt inside Syria, played a 

key role in organizing anti-regime demonstrations, 

and disseminating information about the revolution.70

Activists in coordination committees across the 

country deplored the actions of warlords who are 

benefiting from the current conflict at the expense of 

the Syrian people. “They are no different from the corrupt regime,” and have “sold the revolution for their 

personal gain,” the grassroots organization said in a 

recent statement.71 However, the dwindling secular 
33

opposition in Syria, whose activists have, in many 

cases, lost hope and fled the country, has given way to 

the uncertain control of the rebels in areas where civil 

services have broken down completely.

Unlike ISIS, the Al Nusrah Front seems to have 

a strong appreciation of the need to win hearts and 

minds to justify their presence in towns and villages 

under their control. They claim to control parts of at 

least a dozen Syrian towns, including sections of the 

ancient city of Aleppo in the northwest. The group’s 

social wing, Qism al-Ighatha (Relief Department), 

provides food and warm clothing to civilians where 

possible, as well as seizing wheat by force to distribute among the hungry in Aleppo. The group has also 

released videos on jihadist websites claiming that it 

is providing services to the people of several towns 

in the governorate of Idlib, which borders the Aleppo 

Governorate to the west. Al Nusrah claims that it is a 

quasi-government and service provider in the towns 

of Binnish, Taum, and Saraqib.72

Aaron Zelin at the Washington Institute for Near 

East Policy says that Al Nusrah’s ability to provide security and basic needs such as bread and fuel to Syrian 

civilians, as well as to reopen shops and restart bus 

services, has won gratitude from people who would 

not usually adhere to its strict ideology.

This seems to demonstrate that we are witnessing the 

building of JN security structures across the country, 

showing that the group are adapting to the changing 

conflict, and making preparations for a post-Assad future by taking steps towards separate security service 

and army structures. JN’s sharia courts are also open 

to Syrian civilians, and non-members have come to 

ask the court’s advice on personal matters. The Free 

Syrian Army (FSA) recently adopted a similar legal 
34

structure, with an FSA member explaining the benefits of establishing a court as a way of maintaining 

law and order.73

The Front’s behavior in Deraa, demonstrated by its 

insistence on collaboration and lack of conflict with 

other rebel groups, indicates that the group is responsive to local conditions and able to “play by the rules” 

in a given battle space.74 This gains it some credibility 

with the exiled opposition leadership who disagree 

with the U.S. designation of the Al Nusrah Front as a 

terrorist organization.75

By contrast, the other al-Qaeda affiliate, ISIS, is despised by many Syrians, as its goal seems to be not to 

defeat Assad but to consolidate its own power in rebel-held areas. This has led to its recent denunciation 

by rebel groups and the demand that it disband and 

leave the country. Syria represented al-Qaeda’s best 

chance of proving its continuing relevance by establishing a new base in the Middle East. ISIS has ruined 

this opportunity by its hesitancy in taking on Assad’s 

forces and by moving in to already liberated areas and 

proving to be more barbaric than the Assad regime.76

In this respect, at least within basically Arab and 

Sunni communities, it may appear that al-Qaeda has 

learned its lessons from Iraq. It has taken from the 

long-established Muslim Brotherhood and groups 

like Hamas and Hizbollah an appreciation of the importance of acting as a source of security and food, as 

well as being a combat force. The problem, of course, 

is that on religious grounds, it can make no appeal to 

Shia, Christian, or secular communities and seems to 

have lost any chance of alliance with the Kurdish communities of northern Syria.
35

SYRIA TODAY

The extent that al-Qaeda can manage this balance 

between gaining at least the tolerance of the wider 

population, and its own core ideology is perhaps the 

key to understanding the true strength of its recent 

resurgence. In early-2013, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) commissioned a workshop of 

experts to assess the future of al-Qaeda. CSIS found: 

“How AQ [al-Qaeda] adapts to the challenges and opportunities that will shape its next decade is a source 

of spirited debate amongst government officials, 

academic experts, think-tank analysts and private 

consultants.”77

The “spirited debate” will persist as the conflict 

in Syria continues to reveal the intransigence and 

the growing isolation of the now discredited and ostracized al-Qaeda faction, ISIS. ISIS retains control 

of various areas in Syria and, according to analyst 

Aron Lund, will probably resist pressure to abandon 

them.78 How the other al-Qaeda faction, the Al Nusrah Front, reacts to this development will be an indication of al-Qaeda’s remaining strength and influence 

in Syria. The Al Nusrah Front is showing more flexibility and cooperation with the other salafi-jihadi alliances as, after all, they share the same ideology. But 

their allegiance to al-Zawahiri sets them apart from 

the other alliances’ command structures. Until they 

embrace the authority of the Sharia tribunals being established, they run the risk of being isolated like ISIS.79

Most Syrians see this as a struggle against the Assad 

regime, not as part of a wider al-Qaeda goal to re-establish territorial control of a significant portion of the 

Muslim world.

In the meantime, the resurgence of AQI is causing great disquiet. A December 2013 report by Dr. 
36

Michael Knights of the Washington Institute for Near 

East Policy stresses the necessity of defeating the alQaeda narrative in Iraq and “splitting the reconcilable 

Sunnis from irreconcilable militants.”80

This is happening in Syria with the now overt battle 

of the jihadist militias against the “irreconcilable militants” of the rebel al-Qaeda affiliate, ISIS. A statement 

from the Front of Syrian Revolutionaries shows its antagonism towards ISIS, which is referred to as Daash, 

the acronym in Arabic for ISIS.81 Jaysh al-Mujahideen 

is a coalition of seven Islamist factions that announced 

its formation on January 2, 2014. Their statement also 

makes it clear that they consider ISIS the enemy:

We, the army of Mujahideen announce that in defense 

of ourselves, our honor, our money and our land, we 

declare war on ISIS so long as it refuses to obey God’s 

law until which time it dissolves and its members join 

other military groups or they leave their weapons and 

quit Syria.82

A January 4, 2014, report out of Beirut by Agence 

Presse added that the Alliance reproached ISIS for: 

spreading strife and insecurity . . . in liberated [rebel] 

areas, spilling the blood of fighters and wrongly accusing them of heresy, and expelling them and their 

families from areas they have paid heavily to free from 

Assad’s forces.

The report went on to say that “At least 36 members 

and supporters of ISIS have been killed since Friday in 

Idlib, and more than 100 have been captured by rebels” in Idlib and Aleppo, the Syrian Observatory for 

Human Rights said.83

Hassan Aboud, political head of the Islamic Front, 

explained the tensions in a recent Al Jazeera interview.
37

We would like these [ISIS] brothers to join their brethren in the Syrian revolution. We see them as nothing 

but another group. They see themselves as a State. 

They need to drop this illusion that they have come to 

believe as an established fact. It causes them to treat allies as opponents. Nusra doesn’t differ in ideology and 

authority from ISIS, but they have been able to work 

hand in glove with the other militias because they 

have followed the rule that no objective has a higher 

priority than pushing back the enemy. So we call on 

ISIS to follow Nusra’s lead.84

The Islamic Front makes it quite clear that the common goal should be of establishing an Islamic state 

and deciding its leadership and governance comes after the defeat of Assad’s forces. The Emir of ISIS, Abu 

Bakr al-Baghdadi, obviously has been premature and 

arbitrary in designating himself the Caliph85 and demanding that others give him allegiance.

It now remains to be seen how the Al Nusrah Front 

fills the vacuum created by the loss of credibility and 

likely demise of ISIS. However, the problems of ISIS 

are not necessarily a blow to al-Qaeda, an affront to its 

leader al-Zawahiri, and a public relations disaster for 

its objective of establishing a global caliphate. Al Nusrah is formally aligned to al-Qaeda and presumably 

sees the principle gain from victory in Syria the establishment of a safe region that has been al-Qaeda’s goal 

since it was evicted from Afghanistan. It is being more 

tactically astute than ISIS in short-term cooperation 

with the wider jihadist alliances in Syria but presumably retains very separate long-term goals.

The other groups may have some awareness of this, 

as the Islamic Alliance has since it was superseded by 

a new Islamic Front, as announced in November 2013. 
38

Seven rebel groups came together in a new configuration that excludes the al-Qaeda affiliated Al Nusrah 

Front. It includes the Tawheed Brigade and the salafist Ahrar al Sham and thus potentially brings together 

tens of thousands of fighters. The leader of the new Alliance is Abu Eissa al-Sheikh, who described the new 

coalition on Al Jazeera as an “independent political, 

military and social formation . . . to topple the Assad 

regime . . . and to build an Islamic state.”86

Since the announcement of the new Islamic Front, 

two new coalitions have been announced in January 

2014, called Jaysh al-Mujahideen and the Front of 

Syrian Revolutionaries, the new configurations being 

formed as a backlash against ISIS. The Syrian Opposition Coalition has also spoken out against ISIS, calling it “a regime inspired organization, designed to 

undermine the revolution and pervert the meaning of 

Islam.”87

The Coalition stands in full solidarity with all Syrians 

rising up against al-Qaeda’s extremism and calls upon 

the international community to recognize the importance of supporting revolutionary forces as partners 

in the fight against al-Qaeda’s extremism and Assad’s 

sponsorship and encouragement of extremist forces.88

Opposed by all other forces in Syria, ISIS seems 

to have backed itself into an ideological corner, leaving the Al Nusrah Front as the remaining al-Qaeda 

standard bearer. 
39

CONCLUSION 

The war in Syria has become a complex network of 

conflicts. The regime has brought in fighters from Hizbollah, threatening to spread the war to Lebanon. The 

anti-Assad opposition is split between secular groups 

such as the FSA, Islamists such as the Islamist Front, 

and the two competing al-Qaeda factions of ISIS and 

the Al Nusrah Front. Division between the FSA, the 

al-Qaeda elements, and the salafi-jihadists has created a tenuous situation, with rival Islamist factions 

intent on establishing their own territorial spheres of 

influence, thus enabling Assad’s forces to regroup and 

fight back. The new alliance against ISIS should help 

to rally support from overseas and to raise morale.

However, it is not just a domestic dispute but has 

become a proxy war between Saudi Arabia and Iran, 

with involvement also of Qatar, Turkey, and Iraq.89

Until all these nations stop funding and arming the 

opposing groups, the war will continue indefinitely 

since it is clear the Assad regime has the capacity to 

resist but lacks the ability to re-establish complete 

control. While the war continues, Syria is an incubator of salafi-jihadist extremism that is threatening the 

internal stability of Muslim countries with Sunni and 

Shia populations. According to Aron Lund, editor of 

the Syria in Crisis website run by the Carnegie Endowment, “the two conflicts in Iraq and Syria are melting 

into one. The more conflicts you pull into the Syria 

war the harder it will be to stop it.”90 But peace should 

be an imperative, not an option. 

As the winter advances and the rebel forces gains 

are countered by Assad forces retaking positions to 

cut rebel supply lines, the war seems to have reached a 

stalemate. The resilience of the Assad regime is dispir-
40

iting the activists who created the revolution nearly 3 

years ago. Disillusioned by the lack of support from 

the West, the corruption of rebel commanders, the disarray and division on their side, and the rising power 

of the Islamist rebels, many are exhausted by the conflict, which has no end in sight.

The battle now is one of survival rather than a fight 

for democracy and civil rights. As many young motivated people are leaving the country, it becomes even 

harder for those who remain. Stories of betrayal and 

disappointment are common, and the only hope for 

Syria today is for negotiations to bring about a ceasefire, while the weakened Assad regime still maintains 

the remnants of statehood and thus represents a body 

with which to negotiate. The revolution has failed, but 

equally so, the Assad regime has failed to win mass 

support.91 The protracted civil war has created a rapidly failing state, a tragic refugee problem, and it is 

estimated that by the end of 2014, more than half the 

population of Syria will be living as refugees, a situation that can only be resolved by the powers who are 

enabling it to continue.92

The United States has provided substantial 

amounts of nonlethal as well as military aid, especially to the FSA. However, this was suspended when the 

FSA lost control of key stocks to the Islamist groups 

and subsequently nonlethal aid was restarted. However, the United States has found another avenue to 

send weapons by sending 15,000 anti-tank missiles to 

Saudi Arabia, at a cost of over $1 billion. The expectation is that Saudi will retain these to modernize its 

forces and will send its older stockpiles to the Syrian 

rebels.93 The Islamic coalitions will welcome the arms 

to continue the war of attrition against Assad’s artillery and air power, with the recent barrel bomb at-
41

tacks in Aleppo suggesting that Assad is running out 

of sophisticated weaponry. However, the insurgents 

are still facing a bleak winter, with erratic supplies 

and with the added complication of ISIS no longer as 

an ally and, in some cases, as the enemy. However, 

this suggests that enough arms will reach Syria to allow the various factions to continue to fight, even if 

there is no longer a realistic hope that the war will end 

by military victory.

Al-Qaeda’s future is tied up with these dynamics. 

The attempt by ISIS to create an Islamic state of Greater Syria has been discredited, and its fighters will 

probably eventually retreat across the border to Iraq 

to join the al-Qaeda led insurgency there. The question remains of how long the al-Qaeda resurgence will 

last and whether it has the staying power to remain 

in areas where it now has armed control. Equally, 

although the Al Nusrah Front is formally aligned to 

al-Qaeda’s central leadership, at the moment it is operating in relatively close cooperation with the salafist Islamic Front and is seeking to balance its military 

goals with building a social system in areas it controls.

If al-Qaeda is to be denied a foothold, it will be essential for the new Islamic Front to hold together and 

continue to occupy the moral high ground, so that it 

may increasingly be seen as separate and distinct from 

al-Qaeda, represented now only by the Al Nusrah 

Front. The banishing of ISIS has presumably had the 

effect of weakening the al-Qaeda presence and prestige in Syria and reinforces the ascendancy of coalitions, with or without the Al Nusrah Front. The statement announcing the Islamic Front described it as “an 

independent political, military, and social formation 

that seeks to completely topple the Assad regime in 

Syria and build an orthodox Islamic state.”94 Most of 
42

the participating groups have cooperated in battle in 

the past, and, while one spokesman denied that the 

alliance had been formed to challenge ISIS, it has been 

perceived as a show of force by mainline rebel factions 

against the al-Qaeda extremists.

Former U.S. Ambassador to Syria Robert Stephen 

Ford established contact with the new Islamic Front 

leaders in November, and the Obama administration 

has committed itself to ”an expanded Syrian insurgency that includes the recently-formed Islamic Front.”95

This can be interpreted as a pragmatic decision to ensure that the Al Nusrah Front is marginalized from 

the wider Islamist opposition. However, this suggests 

that the U.S. administration simply does not know 

what to do, or who to support, and that every option 

looks like a bad one. 

“The conflict has become an existential struggle 

for all concerned and not even the fall of Assad will 

bring an end to the violence.”96 Local militias are operating beyond any rules of engagement and have not 

yet come together to make the transition from guerilla 

fighters to a force capable of defeating Assad’s army 

on the ground. Fighting continues with uncoordinated autonomous formations attaining tactical victories 

but unable to alter the situation strategically.

U.S. policy will have to change as nonintervention 

has made the situation worse.97 It is a supreme irony 

that the United States, after spending so much time, 

treasure, and so many lives to defeat terrorism, may 

now have to ally itself with salafi-jihadis to topple 

Assad and end the carnage in Syria. As the Islamic 

Front has not been designated a terrorist organization like the Al Nusrah Front, the United States can 

create closer relationships with secular and moderate 

rebels in the Islamic Front, avoiding any hint of sup-
43

port for Assad and developing an understanding of 

what the grassroots Syrian population has been trying 

to achieve. In the process, it could continue to weaken 

al-Qaeda until it is a marginalized branch of a much 

bigger enterprise of concern—the growing salafi-jihadi movement. In the meantime:

The longer the Syrians fight, the more sectarian the 

conflict becomes, the more savage the fighting, the 

more sectarian cleansing will occur, the greater the accumulation of reasons for revenge, the less likely there 

is to be a political situation.98

This leaves open the future of al-Qaeda and its desire to establish an Islamic state in Iraq and Syria. ISIS 

has failed to impose its will in Syria but remains the 

dominant power in northern Iraq. In turn, the Al Nusrah Front is the dominant al-Qaeda faction in Syria 

but has no influence in Iraq. The traditional al-Qaeda 

approach, typified by ISIS, has little chance of gaining popular support beyond those fully committed. 

Its brutality and sectarianism preclude even tactical 

alliances, and its ideological straightjacket means its 

version of Sharia law loses it any support in regions 

it controls. In this respect, the Al Nusrah Front may 

be a more formidable foe. It seems to have learned the 

importance of building a social support network and 

close cooperation with those who share much of its 

ideology. Equally, it seems to have accepted the Islamic Front’s logic: essentially win the war first, and then 

work out the nature of the state. On the other hand, 

ISIS stressed its differences with any other ideological 

or religious current even while the war with Assad’s 

regime was ongoing.

The U.S. administration’s decision to not proscribe 

the Islamic Front, as well as the Islamic Front’s need 
44

to retain its Gulf backers, may mean the current loose 

alliance with Al Nusrah is doomed. Faced with the 

risk to its funding and arms supplies if it continues to 

operate in tandem, the Islamic Front may well turn on 

its al-Qaeda ally. Equally, the Islamic Front is essentially fighting a domestic struggle in Syria, while Al 

Nusrah, given its allegiance to the core al-Qaeda leadership, presumably sees Syria as simply a means to an 

end—the re-establishment of a safe zone the organization has lacked since it was evicted from Afghanistan.

Even if the alliance is maintained, Al Nusrah will 

struggle to balance its military and social roles. Jacob Shapiro, in his book The Terrorists Dilemma, discusses the problem that terrorist organizations face to 

maintain organizational discipline and management, 

“given the secretive nature and the challenges and 

constraints of communication without detection.”99

Also when commanders in the field become too independent, it is difficult for the leadership to control 

them except by cutting off funds, which further alienates the commanders who then tend to resort to kidnapping, smuggling, or the drug trade to finance their 

operations. This brings the name of salafi-jihadism 

and al-Qaeda further into disrepute among moderate 

peace-loving Muslims.

Shapiro refers to the mundane side of terrorism, 

such as the bookkeeping, the disciplinary procedures, 

and recruiting processes that make them similar to ordinary organizations, yet they are unique in that they 

operate at a tremendous disadvantage. 

The difficult task is achieving the controlled use of violence as a means of achieving a specified political end. 

Using too much violence, or hitting the wrong targets, 

can be just as damaging to the cause as employing 

too little.100
45

The problems of becoming detached from the field 

because of having to maintain security have led to a 

lack of confidence in leadership, resulting in internal 

conflicts and schisms, clearly evident in Syria right 

now. Problems of trust and control have been issues 

plaguing al-Qaeda for many years, according to captured documents in the U.S. Department of Defense’s 

Harmony Database. Based on these documents, 

Shapiro says:

At the end of the day, these examples will highlight 

that terrorists are, for the most part, not nearly as successful or committed as the most successful of their 

kind might make one think. As a result, their organizations are nothing close to the threat that many in the 

policy community once claimed them to be.101

However, even if Al Nusrah is isolated and collapses under the tensions of its contradictions, this assumes that the war continues. One fear now is of fighters from Syria returning to their original countries. 

All those countries whose nationals are at present 

fighting in Syria under various insurgents’ banners 

have a vested interest in not wanting them to return 

home with their dangerous expertise and experience. 

On January 1, 2014, The Meir Amit Intelligence and 

Terrorism Information Center published a definitive 

report on the numbers of foreign jihadis at present in 

Syria and their nationalities, and stressed the potential 

danger to the Western world.102

According to Peter Bergen, CNN’s national security analyst, the widening reach of al-Qaeda in the 

Middle East does not necessarily translate into an immediate threat for the United States as “only a handful 

of Americans have fought in the Syrian conflict along-
46

side al-Qaeda’s affiliates.” However, his January 8, 

2014, report says that hundreds of European citizens 

have been fighting in Syria, and there is a valid concern that the returning veterans of the Syrian conflict 

might launch terrorist attacks in Europe.103 The United 

States and its allies should therefore make a careful 

effort to track the foreign fighters who have joined jihadist groups fighting in Syria. 

Given the consequences of the war continuing, 

urgent consideration must be given to negotiating a 

ceasefire and supporting peace talks. However, the 

rather tenuous statements from the U.S. administration reveal nothing but cautious optimism about the 

current peace talks in Geneva, Switzerland. Apart 

from the Syrian National Council, most factions have 

refused to attend the self-declared “government in 

exile” opposing the regime of President Bashar alAssad. Secretary of State John Kerry called recent negotiations “a big step forward and a significant one,”104

but did not immediately address how the conflicting 

demands would be resolved. At the same time, the 

United States continues to supply weapons indirectly 

to the conflict , as do the Sunni Gulf states and Iran.

One key issue is what the Syrian conflict tells us 

about the trajectory and influence of al-Qaeda. It is 

clear the organization has the capacity to embed itself 

into any conflict, and its trained, motivated fighters 

give it influence beyond its small numbers. There are 

some signs that the Al Nusrah Front has tried to learn 

from the sectarianism that has limited its appeal in 

Iraq where a combination of indiscriminate attacks 

and a harsh interpretation of Sharia law means few 

give the group real support. On the other hand, there is 

ample evidence that the central al-Qaeda leadership is 

struggling to maintain control, and the loss of ISIS is a 
47

warning that local affiliates can become self-sufficient. 

That does not end the appeal of the ideology but does 

indicate that al-Qaeda is now struggling to maintain 

control over its various regional movements. In Syria, 

it is likely that the Islamist Front will turn on its allies, 

not the least as this may be the price paid to maintain 

access to U.S. and Gulf State funds and weapons.

However, even in this case, it is more likely that 

most Al Nusrah fighters and local commanders will 

be co-opted into the Islamic Front rather than driven 

from Syria. Al-Qaeda, as an organization, may well 

find that the Syrian civil war points to the limits of its 

influence. What the Syrian civil war will not do is to 

end the appeal of the wider salafist-jihadist ideology.
48

SOURCES

Al-Qaeda in the United States, Cambridge, UK: The Henry

Jackson Society, 2013.

Council on Foreign Relations, Washington, DC.

Higgins, Eliot. Brown Moses blog, brown-moses.blogspot.com/. 

Institute for the Study of War, Washington, DC. See www.understandingwar.org/.

The International Center for the Study of Radicalization and 

Political Violence, London, UK.

The International Crisis Group, Brussels, Belgium.

Jenkins, Brian Michael. The Dynamics of Syria’s Civil War, 

Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation. Available from www.

rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/perspectives/PE100/PE115/RAND_

PE115.pdf.

Jihadica. Available from www.jihadica.com/.

Landis, Joshua, Syriacomment.com. 

The Long War Journal. Available from www.longwarjournal.org/.

Lund, Aron. Syria’s Salafi Insurgents: The Rise of the Syrian 

Islamic Front. Available from www.ui.se/eng/upl/files/86861.pdf.

The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information 

Center, Gelilot, Israel.

The Middle East Media Research Institute, Washington, DC.

The Quilliam Foundation, London, UK.

“The Resurgence of al-Qaeda in Iraq,” Joint Subcommittee Hearing, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and 

Trade, Washington, DC, December 12, 2013.
49

Shumukh al-Islam, al-Qaeda’s semi-official online forum. 

SITE Monitoring Service. See news.siteintelgroup.com/.

Syria in Crisis. Washington, DC: The Carnegie Endowment 

for International Peace. Available from carnegieendowment.org/

syriaincrisis/?fa=54233.

Syria Untold. Available from www.syriauntold.com/en/story/2013/10/04/5527.

White, Jeffrey, Andrew J. Tabler, and Aaron Y. Zelin. Syria’s 

Military Opposition: How Effective, United, or Extremist? POLICY FOCUS 128, Washington, DC: The Washington Institute, 

September 2013.
50

ENDNOTES

1. Donald Rumsfeld, 2103, quoted in usatoday30.usatoday.com/

news/washington/executive/rumsfeld-memo.htm.

2. See nation.time.com/2011/06/29/the-5-trillion-war-on-terror/#

comments.

3. See www.aljazeera.com/indepth/interactive/2013/12/timelinearab-spring-20131217114018534352.html.

4. Mary Anne Weaver, in a profile of Osama bin Laden, The 

New Yorker, January 24, 2000.

5. Gaith Abdul-Ahad, “Syria is not a revolution anymore—

this is civil war,” The Guardian, November 18, 2013.

6. Thomas Joscelyn “Global al Qaeda: Affiliates, Objectives, 

and Future Challenges,” The Long War Journal, July 18, 2013.

7. See cnsnews.com/news/article/obama-touts-al-qaeda-s-demise32-times-benghazi-attack-0.

8. Barry Rubin, “Why the CIA is wrong, Rethinking Al 

Qaeda,” RubinReports, February 22, 2013.

9. Peter Bergen, “Should we still fear Al Qaeda?” CNN, 

February 6, 2013.

10. See www.youtube.com/watch?v=jlubL-dIJ0s.

11. Jacob Shapiro, The Terrorists Dilemma, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2013, p. 15.

12. See www.youtube.com/watch?v=jlubL-dIJ0s.

13. Bruce Reidel, “Kenya Terror Strike Was Part of Al-Qaeda’s 

Latest Global Jihad,” New Age Islam, October 2, 2013.

14. Mary Anne Weaver, in a profile of Osama bin Laden, The 

New Yorker, January 24, 2000.
51

15. The Associated Press, “Al Qaeda records even the most 

minute expenses including 60 cents for cake,” Daily News, March 

17, 2014. Also see www.nydailynews.com/news/world/al-qaeda-documents-show-real-company-infrastructure-article-1.1560804#ixzz2wF7DJ4Pk.

16. Joscelyn.

17. William McCants, as quoted in Ibid.

18. Joscelyn.

19. David Kirkpatrick, “A Deadly Mix in Benghazi,” The New 

York Times, December 28, 2013.

20. Guy Taylor, “Intel community: NY Times wrong, al Qaeda links in Benghazi are clear,” The Washington Times, December 

30, 2013.

21. There is a substantial archive of translated material at the 

Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, NY. One relevant report is available from www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/self-inflicted-wounds.

22. Abdel Moneim Al Moshawah, “Zawahiri speech, though 

confused, shows U.S. is still main al-Qaeda target,” Dubai, United 

Arab Emirates: Al Arabiya Institute, October 8, 2013.

23. See www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/zawahiris-letter-to-zarqawi-english-translation-2.

24. “The Doctor’s advice: Zawahiri issues ‘jihad guidelines’,” 

The Dawn, September 19, 2013.

25. William McCants, “How Zawahiri Lost al Qaeda: Global 

Jihad Turns on Itself,” Foreign Affairs, November 19, 2013.

26. Jacob Shapiro, p. 18.

27. See www.joshualandis.com/blog/#_ftn12.

28. Dr. Joshua M. Landis, Director of the Center of Middle 

Eastern Studies, University of Oklahoma, Norman, OK, telephone 

interview, January 3, 2014.
52

29. Daniel Nisman, “A New Islamist Alliance Among Syria’s 

Rebels. The creation of the Islamic Alliance has the potential to 

make anti-Assad moderates extinct,” The Wall Street Journal, September 26, 2013.

30. Agence-France, “New rebel alliance wants Syria as ‘Islamic state’,” Hurriyet, March 18, 2014.

31. Joshua Landis, Syriacomment.com, October 1, 2013.

32. See carnegieendowment.org/syriaincrisis/?fa=54233.

33. Hassan Hassan, “The Army of Islam is Winning in Syria,” 

Foreign Policy, October 2, 2013.

34. Interview by the author with Michael Weiss, January 

15, 2014.

35. Cole Bunzel, “Al-Qaeda Advises the Syrian Revolution: 

Shumukh al-Islam’s ‘Comprehensive Strategy’ for Syria,” Jihadica, 

February, 25, 2013.

36. The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information 

Center, September 23, 2013.

37. Elizabeth O’Baqy, “Jihad in Syria,” Security Report No. 6, 

September 2012, p. 23.

38. Michael Knights, “The Resurgence of Al Qaeda in Iraq,” 

Testimony to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Washington, DC: U.S. House of Representatives, December 12, 2013.

39. Isabel Nassief, “The Campaign for Homs and Aleppo,” 

Washington, DC: Institute for Study of War, January 28, 2014.

40. “Iraq city seizures illustrate Qaeda group’s resurgence,” 

Space War, January 5, 2014, available from www.spacewar.com/

reports/Iraq_city_seizures_illustrate_Qaeda_groups_resurgence_

999.html.

41. Jessica D. Lewis, “Al Qaeda in Iraq Resurgent,” Washington, DC: Institute for Study of War, September 2013.
53

42. While most foreign attention has been on the Shia Hizbollah, there has been a long-standing problem with al-Qaeda related groups, especially in the northern port city of Tripoli. The 

potential for this division to form the basis of outright conflict in 

Lebanon is substantial.

43. “Fighting in Iraq’s Anbar kills at least 32,” Al Arabiya 

News, January 3, 2014.

44. See foreignaffairs.house.gov/hearing/joint-subcommittee-hearing-resurgence-al-qaeda-iraq.

45. Ibid.

46. See en.alalam.ir/news/1532838#sthash.PxCzHG1F.dpuf.

47. Joas Wagemakers, “Al Qaida advises the Arab Spring: The 

Case for al-Baghdadi,” Jihidica, September 21, 2013.

48. Suhaib Anjarini, “The evolution of al-Qaeda; From Iraq to 

Syria,” Alalam, November 9, 2013.

49. Landis, Syriacomment.com.

50. “Syrian Kurds Regain Control of Strategic Regions in Hasaka Province,” Fars News Agency, November 27, 2013.

51. Cole Bunzel, “The Islamic State of Disobedience: al-Baghdadi Triumphant,” Jihadica, October 5, 2013.

52. See rt.com/news/al-qaeda-syria-disbanded-480/. 

53. BBC, “Al-Qaeda disavows ISIS militants in Syria,” BBC, 

February 3, 2014.

54. Bunzel.

55. William McCants, “How Zawahiri Lost Al Qaeda,” Washington, DC: Brookings Foreign Affairs, November 19, 2013, p. 30, 

available from www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2013/11/19-

how-zawahri-lost-al-qaeda-mccantsw.
54

56. See www.nybooks.com/blogs/nyrblog/2013/dec/27/how-alqaeda-changed-syrian-war/.

57. See www.joshualandis.com/blog/al-qaedas-governance-strategy-raqqa-chris-looney/.

58. Norman Benotman and Roisin Blake, Jabat al-Nusra, London, UK: Quilliam Foundation, September 25, 2012.

59. David Trifunov, “Abu Mohammad al-Golani, leader of 

Jabhat al-Nusra, killed in Syria, state TV claims,” Global Post, 

October 25, 2013.

60. Benotman and Blake.

61. Ibid.

62. Ibid., p. 85.

63. See www.nybooks.com/blogs/nyrblog/2013/dec/27/how-alqaeda-changed-syrian-war/?insrc=wbll.

64. The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information 

Center, Gelilot, Israel.

65. Marian Karouny, “Syria’s Nusra rebels say support Qaeda’s Zawahri,” Reuters, April 10, 2013.

66. Benotman and Blake. 

67. Ibid.

68. Phil Greaves, “Syria: ‘The Army of Islam’; Saudi Arabia’s 

Greatest Export,” Global Research, October 3, 2013.

69. Interview by the author with Aron Lund, January 6, 2013.

70. See carnegieendowment.org/syriaincrisis/?fa=Coalitions&

lang=en.

71. See www.lccsyria.org/category/news.
55

72. See www.cnn.com/2014/01/07/opinion/bergen-al-qaeda-terrority-gains/index.html.

73. Benotman and Blake.

74. Nassief.

75. See www.nybooks.com/blogs/nyrblog/2013/dec/27/how-alqaeda-changed-syrian-war/?insrc=wbll.

76. Interview by the author with Michael Weiss, January 

15, 2014.

77. Joscelyn.

78. Interview by the author with Aron Lund, January 6, 2013.

79. Ibid.

80. See foreignaffairs.house.gov/hearing/joint-subcommittee-hearing-resurgence-al-qaeda-iraq.

81. Joshua Landis, “The Battle between ISIS and Syria’s Rebel 

Militias,” Syria Comment, January 4, 2014.

82. Ibid.

83. Al Arabiya News, January 4, 2014.

84. Landis, “The Battle between ISIS and Syria’s Rebel 

Militias.”

85. R. Green, “The Rift in the Global Jihad Movement,” The 

Counter Jihad Report, February 21, 2014. Note that al-Baghdadi is 

described as having “designated himself as a global leader of the 

jihad fighters in particular and of Muslims in general, and as a 

herald of the Caliphate.”

86. Loveday Morris, “Seven Syrian Islamist Groups form new 

Islamic Front,” The Washington Post, November 22, 2013.

87. Landis, “The Battle between ISIS and Syria’s Rebel 

Militias.”
56

88. See english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2014/01/04/

New-Syria-rebel-alliance-declares-war-on-al-Qaeda.html.

89. Jeremy Shapiro and Samual Sharap, Theguardian.com, November 26, 2013.

90. Interview by the author with Aron Lund, January 6, 2013.

91. Joseph Halliday, “The Assad Regime: From Counterinsurgency to Civil War,” Middle East Journal, March 2013.

92. Brian Michael Jenkins, The Dynamics of Syria's Civil War, 

Santa Monica, CA: Rand Perspective, November 2013.

93. Tony Cartalucci, Syria’s War: The Next Phase, available 

from www.informationclearinghouse.info/article37121.htm.

94. Abu Eissa al-Sheikh, leader of the new entity, as he announced the group’s creation on Al Jazeera.

95. Michel Chossudovsky, “Washington’s New Islamic Front: 

Expanded U.S. Support to Al Qaeda Rebels in Syria,” Global 

Research, January 28, 2014.

96. Jenkins.

97. Interview by the author with Michael Weiss, January 

15, 2014.

98. Ibid.

99. Jacob Shapiro. 

100. Ibid.

101. Ibid., p. 10.

102. See www.terrorism-info.org.il/en/article/20607.

103. See www.cnn.com/2014/01/07/opinion/bergen-al-qaedaterrority-gains/index.html. 

104. See live.aljazeera.com/Event/Syria_Live_Blog?Page=14.
57

APPENDIX

AL-QAEDA IN OTHER PARTS OF THE WORLD

A detailed report by Thomas Joscelyn was presented to the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 

November 21, 2013, regarding al-Qaeda’s network in 

Africa and the threat it poses to the United States. 

AL-QAEDA IN THE MAGREB (AQIM)

AQIM, in his opinion, is still a very viable organization and, like Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) 

in Syria, is restless under al-Zawahiri’s control. The 

leader of one of the AQIM brigades, Mokhtar Belmokhtar, refused to work with other AQIM leaders in 

North Africa and pledged allegiance directly to al-Zawahiri. In August 2012, Belmokhtar announced that 

his group, the al-Mulathameen Brigade, had merged 

with the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa 

(MUJAO).

The AQIM network includes groups that are frequently identified as ‘local’ jihadist organizations. It is widely believed that groups such as Ansar al-Dine and the 

Ansar al Sharia chapters are not really a part of the al 

Qaeda network in North and West Africa.1

However, despite disagreements between the leaders of these various al-Qaeda-linked groups, according to Joscelyn, they are all openly loyal to al-Qaeda’s 

senior leadership, and they have all continued to work 

closely together in Mali and elsewhere. In addition, 

Boko Haram, which was also recently designated a 

terrorist organization, has joined this coalition and is 

“linked” to AQIM.2
58

Ansar al Sharia in Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia 

Two prominent chapters of Ansar al Sharia (Partisans of Islamic Law) have risen in North Africa, one 

in Libya and the other in neighboring Tunisia. Some 

have argued that, while these Ansar al Sharia chapters 

cooperate with al-Qaeda, they have fundamentally 

different goals. Ansar al Sharia is said to be focused 

on purely “local” matters, while al-Qaeda is only interested in the global jihad. But this is simply not true. 

Al-Qaeda’s most senior leaders, including Ayman alZawahiri, have repeatedly said that one of his organization’s chief priorities is to implement Sharia law as 

the foundation for an Islamic state. This is precisely 

Ansar al Sharia’s goal. In addition, there are credible 

reports that the Ansar al Sharia chapters in both Libya 

and Tunisia have provided recruits for al-Qaeda’s affiliates and other jihadist organizations in Syria, the 

new epicenter for the global jihad.

The weight of the evidence makes it far more likely 

than not that the Ansar al Sharia chapters in Egypt, 

Libya and Tunisia are part of al Qaeda’s network in 

North Africa. This has important policy ramifications 

because both groups have been involved in violence, 

with Ansar al Sharia Libya taking part in the Benghazi 

terrorist attack and Ansar al Sharia Tunisia sacking 

the U.S. Embassy in Tunis 3 days later. The Tunisian 

government has also blamed Ansar al Sharia for a 

failed suicide attack, the first inside Tunisia in years. 

While both chapters have been involved in violence, 

they have also been working hard to earn new recruits 

for their organizations and al Qaeda’s ideology. The 

Arab uprisings created a unique opportunity for them 

to proselytize.3
59

This assessment by Joscelyn has been confirmed by 

the Pentagon‘s own terrorism research agency, which 

concluded in August 2012 that “al-Qaeda senior leadership” based in Pakistan was “likely seeking to build 

a clandestine network in Libya as it pursues its strategy of reinforcing its presence in North Africa.” The 

report predicted that AQIM was “likely to join hands 

with the al Qaeda clandestine network.”4

A report by the Council on Foreign Relations, updated on January 8, 2014, notes that “though AQIM 

and its offshoots pose the primary transnational terror threat in North and West Africa, they are unlikely 

to strike US or Western interests beyond the region.”5

Spain and France are its foremost “far enemies” because of colonial history. The report also says that the 

merger with al-Qaeda may have discredited AQIM 

because of its association with the brutal tactics of alQaeda. in Iraq. 

Egypt

Ansar al Sharia in Egypt has existed for some time, 

run mainly by former members of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ), a terrorist organization headed by 

Ayman al-Zawahiri that merged with al-Qaeda. In 

July 2013, the formation of a new front was announced 

in the wake of Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi’s 

ouster, according to the Search for International Terrorist Entities (SITE) Intelligence Group. The front is 

also called, “Ansar al Sharia in Egypt” and may be “a 

new front with the same name. Or, perhaps it is a new 

brand for an effort that was already in the works.”6
60

Somalia

The al-Shabaab organization in Somalia merged 

with al-Qaeda in early-2012. Bin Laden had cautioned 

against this before his death, noting that al-Shabaab’s 

harsh implementation of Sharia law was alienating the 

Somali population. After Bin Laden’s death, however, 

al-Zawahiri went ahead and accepted a pledge of loyalty from al-Shabaab leader, Ahmed Abdi Godane.

Al-Shabaab today is fractured into multiple rival 

factions, some based along clan lines and others ideological. An Agence France-Presse (AFP) report in June 

2013 stated that al-Shabaab extremists had killed two 

of its own co-founders. In spite of the perception that 

al-Shabaab has been severely weakened inside Somalia, where it has lost territory over the past 2 years, 

Godane has strengthened his control over the group 

with his ruthless treatment of rivals and his new hardline, international agenda. Al-Shabaab has said it carried out the deadly assault on a shopping center in 

Nairobi on September 21, 2013, in which at least 68 

people were killed. 

Brookings Institute analyst Daniel Byman has detailed the extent to which al-Qaeda, through offshoots 

like al-Shabaab, remains alive in Africa and, in his 

opinion, has even prospered. In a paper last year titled 

Breaking the Bonds Between Al-Qa’ida and Its Affiliate 

Organizations, he stated:

. . . Shebaab pledged support for Zawahiri after bin 

Laden’s death and then in 2012 more formally joining 

al-Qa’ida by declaring Shebaab members ‘will march 

with you as loyal soldiers’. Some fighters who had 

trained in al-Qa’ida camps in Afghanistan moved to 

Somalia to train members of the Shebaab, and the two 

groups currently cooperate closely on everything from 
61

indoctrination and basic infantry skills to advanced 

training in explosives and assassination.7

Yemen

On January 14, 2010, Yemen declared open war on 

al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). Yemen 

is currently contending with a Shia insurgency in the 

north and militant separatists in the south, with ensuing waves of violence. In May 2013, Yemen’s main 

oil pipeline was blown up by militants claiming to be 

Ansar al Sharia, or a re-branding of AQAP. The U.S. 

drone strikes in Yemen have caused great controversy, as the successful targeting and killing of militant leaders has also killed an estimated 100-200 civilians, plus 36 children. The outrage against the United 

States is mirrored by outrage against al-Qaeda’s offshoot, Ansar al Sharia, which claimed responsibility 

for killing an estimated 52 people in an attack on a 

military hospital in Sanaa. The United States has improved its drone technology recently, and hopefully 

the rate of civilian casualties will drop in Yemen as it 

has in Pakistan where the Central Intelligence Agency 

and the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) 

also carry out controversial and lethal drone strikes.

United States

The presence of al-Qaeda in the U.S. homeland has 

been thoroughly documented by the Henry Jackson 

Society in its report, Al-Qaeda in the United States, published in 2013 and acknowledged by General Michael 

Hayden as “a remarkable work.” It details how the 

terrorist threat within the United States has developed, by profiling all al-Qaeda or al-Qaeda inspired 
62

terrorists who were convicted in U.S. courts (federal 

and military) or who participated in suicide attacks 

against the U.S. homeland between 1997 and 2011.

Al-Qaeda in the United States profiles 171 individuals 

who were convicted for al-Qaeda related offenses or 

committed suicide attacks between 1997 and 2011. It 

provides statistical analysis on their background (such 

as age, nationality, occupation, education and whether 

they were a religious convert); data relating to types 

of offenses, type of charge and their subsequent sentence; outlines individual connections to other known 

terrorists or designated terrorist organizations; and 

studies whether these individuals had received terrorist training or had combat experience.8

While the total of 171 individuals convicted may 

appear like a “resurgence” in al-Qaeda activity , it also 

represents a reassuring resurgence in successful antiterrorism detection in the United States.

It is conceivable that al-Qaeda activity in Syria and 

Iraq is emboldening al-Qaeda affiliates and sympathizers in Africa, Yemen, and across the Muslim world 

wherever they exist as the increased use of global 

media channels enables more communication and 

publicity. At the same time, increased pushback from 

anti-terrorism forces and increased negative publicity about their reckless brutality and civilian deaths, 

is also bringing al-Qaeda into disrepute. The focus in 

2014, however, will be on Syria, where al-Qaeda has 

been hurt, and its progress has been checked for now. 

But it is far from destroyed.
63

THE NON AL-QAEDA INSURGENTS: 

SYRIA’S SALAFI-JIHADIS

Aron Lund documents in detail the rise of the Syrian Islamic Front (SIF) in his March 2013 report for 

the Swedish Institute of International Affairs. Also in 

his four-part series for the Carnegie Endowment for 

International Peace, he examines in detail the politics 

of the Islamic Front and its emerging strength as the 

most powerful coalition in Syria.

On December 21, 2012, the SIF announced its creation through a video, bringing together 11 factions, 

the most influential being the Ahrar al-Sham network. 

It shares salafi-jihadi ideology but it is clearly focused 

on Syria: 

. . . it also tries to highlight a streak of pragmatism and 

moderation, intended to reassure both Syrians and 

foreign policymakers. In this way, it sets itself apart as 

an Islamist ‘third way’, different from both the most 

radical fringe of the uprising, and from its Westernbacked Islamist mainstream.9

Hassan Abboud, the general head of Ahrar al-Sham, spearheaded the joint position of the new Islamic 

Alliance announced in November 2013, rejecting the 

Syrian National Council (SNC) and U.S. backed exile 

groups, as well as the two al-Qaeda affiliates. However, Abboud pulled out of the council shortly after the 

merger, criticizing “the hegemony of certain factions 

and the exclusion of [other] effective ones,” referring 

to the exclusion of al-Qaeda’s Al Nusrah Front. His 

statements since are seen to be an attempt to include 

the Al Nusrah Front and moderate it, rather than 

alienate it like ISIS.10
64

The success of any alliance or coalition attempting 

to be the “third way” between the Free Syrian Army 

(FSA) and more extremist militias like the Al Nusrah 

Front will depend on its ability to acquire a sufficient 

level of funding to sustain its ambitious bid for salafi 

leadership. Otherwise, it is likely to fragment with 

time, like so many Syrian rebel alliances before it.11

The Islamic Front brought together ideologically 

disparate groups: Ahrar al-Shaam (jihadi-salafi inclination), Suqur al-Shaam and Liwa’ al-Tawhid (Muslim Brotherhood), Jaish al-Islam (salafi and former 

Muslim Brotherhood members with Saudi connections), and Liwa’ al-Haqq,12 to name a few.

Liwa al-Islam, the Army of Islam, is a coalition of 

about 50 insurgent groups operating around Damascus, which merged into Jaysh al–Islam, (Army of Islam). General Commander of Jaysh al-Islam, Zahran 

Alloush, is the son of a Saudi-based religious scholar, 

and his Army of Islam flies the black flag and not the 

Syrian flag. He speaks of resurrecting the Omayyad 

Empire and has little faith in democracy, seeking to 

establish an Islamic state ruled by a committee of Islamic scholars. He is suspicious of the FSA because of 

its links with Western countries. Saudi Arabia seems 

to be central to the new coalition. Liwa al-Islam was 

backed by Riyadh and is the central player in the 

Army of Islam. 

According to Hassan Hassan in a Foreign Policy

article:

Although Liwa al-Islam had been part of the Saudibacked FSA, the spokesman of the new grouping 

told an Arabic television channel that the Army of 

Islam is not part of the FSA. This is likely because 

the FSA has lost the trust of many rebel groups, and 

adopting a religious language will be more effective 
65

in countering the appeal of radical groups—which is 

what happened after the announcement of the merger, 

as various Islamists and moderate groups welcomed 

the move.13

Contrary to the popular narrative emerging in 

Western and Gulf media that this new force will represent a “moderate Islamist” coalition capable of taking 

on al-Qaeda, the majority of Syrians will be repelled 

by the sectarian language and ideologies of Zohran 

Alloush, his group’s overt affiliations, their pandering 

to al-Qaeda ideologues, and his “Army of Islam.”14

Another group in Syria is the Abdullah Azzam 

Brigades, which is not recognized as a formal al-Qaeda affiliate, but it is openly loyal to al-Qaeda, and 

its leaders have long operated as part of the al-Qaeda 

network.15 Majid bin Muhammad al-Majid, the Azzam 

Brigades’ leader, in August 2013 called for Sunnis in 

Lebanon and Syria to unite against Hizbollah, which 

he calls the “party of Iran.” The Azzam Brigades took 

responsibility for firing rockets at Israel and recently 

for the attack on the Iranian Embassy in Beirut, Lebanon, on November 19, 2013. Another example of the 

volatility of the situation is that it was announced on 

December 31, 2013, that Lebanese Armed Forces had 

recently captured Majid bin Muhammad al-Majid. 

A new leader will doubtless be announced for the 

Abdullah Azzam Brigades. 

Some other leaders with broader appeal in the 

Arab and Islamist mainstream, in contrast with the alQaeda leaders, are:16

• Ahmad `Aisa al-Shaykh, or Abu Aissa, commander of Suqour al-Sham Brigade, Falcons of 

Syria Brigade, based in Idlib.
66

• Abdul Qader Al-Saleh was the high Commander of Liwa al-Tawhid (Unity Brigade) based 

in Aleppo and is a large, umbrella movement 

formed out of regional militias numbering 

about 15,000 men. Killed in action in November 

2013, Abdul Qader most likely will be succeeded by Abdelaziz Salame, who was wounded in 

the same attack. In a dispatch for Syria Comment

on November 17, 2013, Aron Lund reported 

that:

Leadership succession might not be an easy 

thing for such a group. It could suffer internal 

divisions and even violent strife, at the loss of a 

central and unifying leader. At a time when the 

Syrian regime is advancing on Aleppo, Saleh’s 

death therefore is very bad news for the opposition. Even if the front holds, Tawhid could 

be drained of cohesion, and end up losing subunits and fighters to other groups.17

• Bashar Al-Zoubi, the Commander of Liwa alYarmouk in the south of Syria around Deraa. 

The Supreme Military Command (the U.S.-

backed leadership of the FSA) has named him 

the commander of the Southern Front. He is the 

only member of these groups who has not expressed a wish to see an Islamist Syria.

ENDNOTES - APPENDIX

1. Thomas Joscelyn, “Al Qaeda and the threat in North Africa,” 

The Long War Journal, November 21, 2013, www.longwarjournal.org/

archives/2013/11/al_qaeda_and_the_thr_1.php#ixzz2lPh2AfWc.

2. Ibid. 
67

3. Ibid.

4. See www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/dec/30/intel-com

munity-still-insists-on-al-qaeda-ties-in-/#ixzz2pAozowT5.

5. “Al Qaeda in the Islamic Magreb (AQIM),” New York: 

Council on Foreign Relations, available www.cfr.org/terroristorganizations-and-networks/al-qaeda-islamic-maghreb-aqim/p12717.

6. See www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/archives/2013/07/a

_new_ansar_al_sharia_in_the_s.php.

7. See www.brookings.edu/blogs/brookings-now/posts/2013/09/alshabaab-somalia-terrorist-nairobi-mall-attack#.

8. See henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/

Al-Qaeda-in-the-USAbridged-version-LOWRES-Final.pdf.

9. See www.ui.se/eng/upl/files/86861.pdf.

10. Interview with Joshua Landis.

11. See www.ui.se/eng/upl/files/86861.pdf.

12. See www.reasonedcomments.org/2014/01/010901-syria-war.

html#.Utw9FtLn-9I.

13. Ibid.

14. See www.globalresearch.ca/syria-the-army-of-islam-saudiarabias-greatest-export/5352638.

15. See www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2013/11/abdullah_

azzam_briga_1.php#ixzz2lDdwGiZn.

16. See www.joshualandis.com/blog/biggest-powerful-militialeaders-syria/.

17. See www.joshualandis.com/blog/.
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Anthony A. Cucolo III

Commandant

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STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

and

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE PRESS

Director

Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of Research

Dr. Steven K. Metz

Author

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