No. 86-398 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1987 

IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF 

MURIEL GLEE HUNDTOFT, 

Petitioner and Appellant, 

and 

PALMER LEROY HUNDTOFT, 

Respondent and Respondent. 

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District, 

In and for the County of Yellowstone, 

The Honorable William J. Speare, Judge presiding. 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

For Appellant: 

Mary E. Westwood, Billings, Montana 

For Respondent: 

Jock West, Billings, Montana 

Submitted on Briefs: Dec. 11, 1986 

Decided: February 3, 1987 

Clerk 
Mr. Justice John Conway Harrison delivered the Opinion of the 

Court. 

This appeal arises from a marriage dissolution order 

entered by the District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial 

District, in and for Yellowstone County. Wife challenges 

several aspects of the court's distribution of the marital 

estate. We affirm. 

Muriel and Palmer Hundtoft were married in December 

1977. Their marriage lasted a little over seven years until 

December 1984, when Muriel (Wife) filed a petition for the 

dissolution of their marriage. Following a bench trial, the 

District Court formally dissolved the marriage in April 1986. 

Wife now challenges the distribution of property 

entered by the District Court. The principal assets in 

dispute are items of real property contained within the 

marital estate. The parties themselves largely apportioned 

their personal property and do not now contest that division. 

Specifically, Wife asserts that the District Court 

erred in its property distribution by failing to properly 

consider those statutorily mandated factors listed in 

§ 40-4-202, MCA. We do not agree. 

At the outset, we yet again repeat that this Court's 

function on appeal is extremely limited. Section 40-4-202, 

MCA, is of necessity a flexible statute which vests a good 

deal of discretion in the district court. Given the infinite 

varieties of factual situations presented by parties to 

dissolution proceedings, trial judges must enjoy the latitude 

to address each case individually, with an eye to its unique 

circumstances. Wallace v. Wallace (Mont. 1983), 661 P.2d 

455, 458, 40 St.Rep. 430, 434. 

Upon appeal, this Court's functions are as limited as a 

district court's powers are broad. Sitting as a court of 
error, we will reverse a lower court's pronouncement only 

upon a clear abuse of discretion. Under the test we have 

developed for review of marital estate property 

distributions, appellant is required to show that the 

district court acted arbitrarily, without employment of 

conscientious judgment or exceeded the bounds of reason 

resulting in substantial injustice. In re the Marriage of 

Perry (Mont. 1985), 704 P.2d 41, 43, 42 St.Rep. 1101, 1104; 

In re the Marriage of Rolfe (Mont. 1985), 699 P.2d 79, 83, 42 

St.Rep. 623, 626; In re the Marriage of Vert (Mont. 19841, 

680 P.2d 587, 588, 41 St.Rep. 895, 896. Applying this 

standard, we cannot say that the District Court abused. its 

discretion. 

Appellant first challenges the District Court's failure 

to render specific findings of those factors listed in 

5 40-4-202, MCA. While articulation of these factors is 

encouraged, the absence of specific findings does not 

automatically warrant remand: 

It is not the lack of specific findings 

which constitutes reversible error, but 

the lack of substantial evidence to 

support the judgment. We look both to 

the District Court's express reasoning 

and the evidence in the record to 

determine whether ample evidence exists. 

In re the Marriage of Peterson (Mont. 1984), 683 P.2d 1304, 

1307, 41 St.Rep. 1252, 1256 (quoting Frazier v. Frazier 

(Mont. 1984), 676 P.2d 217, 219-20, 41 St.Rep. 233, 236). 

Our reading of both the record and the court's 

reasoning persuades us that the court's actions were 

supported by sufficient evidence. 

For example, appellant contests the court's award to 

Palmer (Husband) of "all the equity'' in the parties' jointly 

owned real property acquired during the marriage. Basically, 
this property in question consists of two residences, a house 

in Harlowton, and a Billings condominium. The court awarded 

the house in Harlowton to Husband, provided that he pay Wife 

$3,000--one-half the value of the house. Wife received half 

the equity of this house. As to the condominium in Billings, 

the court found that the Husband had adequately proven that 

the funds used as a downpayment could be traced directly to 

liquidation of one of his pre-marital assets. This finding 

is supported by the record. The court did not abuse its 

discretion in its distribution of these properties. 

Appellant also claims that the court failed to consider 

fully the Wife's non-monetary contributions to the family 

unit. While no children were born of the marriage, each 

party had children from a previous marriage. However, both 

parties worked, and from the testimony of the parties it is 

clear that each shouldered this burden. The record simply 

does not contain sufficient evidence on this point to find 

abuse of discretion. 

We further are not persuaded by appellant's assertion 

that the court failed to consider her age, health, future 

employability and lack of income producing assets. The court 

noted that appellant was regularly employed as a restaurant 

manager, the same type of job she has held more or less 

continuously since before this marriage. Further, the court 

awarded Wife two of her pre-marital, income producing assets, 

a contract for deed receivable arising from the sale of her 

previously owned cafe and the net equity in two rental mobile 

home lots. 

In short, appellant has failed to show how the District 

Court exceeded the bounds of reason or failed to employ 

conscientious judgment. It matters not how this Court would 

decide were it the court of first impression. All that is in 
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