Page 101 TITLE 29—LABOR § 254

wage rate less than the minimum required under

such Act, or on a payment for overtime at a rate

less than one and one-half times such minimum

hourly wage rate.

(b) Waiver of liquidated damages under Fair

Labor Standards Act of 1938

Any employee may hereafter waive his right

under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as

amended [29 U.S.C. 201 et seq.], to liquidated

damages, in whole or in part, with respect to activities engaged in prior to May 14, 1947.

(c) Satisfaction

Any such compromise or waiver, in the absence of fraud or duress, shall, according to the

terms thereof, be a complete satisfaction of such

cause of action and a complete bar to any action

based on such cause of action.

(d) Retroactive effect of section

The provisions of this section shall also be applicable to any compromise or waiver heretofore

so made or given.

(e) ‘‘Compromise’’ defined

As used in this section, the term ‘‘compromise’’ includes ‘‘adjustment’’, ‘‘settlement’’,

and ‘‘release’’.

(May 14, 1947, ch. 52, §3, 61 Stat. 86.)

REFERENCES IN TEXT

The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended, referred to in subsecs. (a) and (b), is act June 25, 1938, ch.

676, 52 Stat. 1060, as amended, which is classified generally to chapter 8 (§201 et seq.) of this title. For complete classification of this Act to the Code, see section

201 of this title and Tables.

The Walsh-Healey and Bacon-Davis Acts, referred to

in subsec. (a), are defined for purposes of this chapter

in section 262 of this title.

§ 254. Relief from liability and punishment under

the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, the

Walsh-Healey Act, and the Bacon-Davis Act

for failure to pay minimum wage or overtime

compensation

(a) Activities not compensable

Except as provided in subsection (b) of this

section, no employer shall be subject to any liability or punishment under the Fair Labor

Standards Act of 1938, as amended [29 U.S.C. 201

et seq.], the Walsh-Healey Act [41 U.S.C. 35 et

seq.], or the Bacon-Davis Act [40 U.S.C. 276a et

seq.], on account of the failure of such employer

to pay an employee minimum wages, or to pay

an employee overtime compensation, for or on

account of any of the following activities of

such employee engaged in on or after May 14,

1947—

(1) walking, riding, or traveling to and from

the actual place of performance of the principal activity or activities which such employee is employed to perform, and

(2) activities which are preliminary to or

postliminary to said principal activity or activities,

which occur either prior to the time on any particular workday at which such employee commences, or subsequent to the time on any particular workday at which he ceases, such principal activity or activities. For purposes of this

subsection, the use of an employer’s vehicle for

travel by an employee and activities performed

by an employee which are incidental to the use

of such vehicle for commuting shall not be considered part of the employee’s principal activities if the use of such vehicle for travel is within

the normal commuting area for the employer’s

business or establishment and the use of the employer’s vehicle is subject to an agreement on

the part of the employer and the employee or

representative of such employee.

(b) Compensability by contract or custom

Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection

(a) of this section which relieve an employer

from liability and punishment with respect to

any activity, the employer shall not be so relieved if such activity is compensable by either—

(1) an express provision of a written or nonwritten contract in effect, at the time of such

activity, between such employee, his agent, or

collective-bargaining representative and his

employer; or

(2) a custom or practice in effect, at the time

of such activity, at the establishment or other

place where such employee is employed, covering such activity, not inconsistent with a

written or nonwritten contract, in effect at

the time of such activity, between such employee, his agent, or collective-bargaining representative and his employer.

(c) Restriction on activities compensable under

contract or custom

For the purposes of subsection (b) of this section, an activity shall be considered as compensable under such contract provision or such custom or practice only when it is engaged in during the portion of the day with respect to which

it is so made compensable.

(d) Determination of time employed with respect

to activities

In the application of the minimum wage and

overtime compensation provisions of the Fair

Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended [29

U.S.C. 201 et seq.], of the Walsh-Healey Act [41

U.S.C. 35 et seq.], or of the Bacon-Davis Act [40

U.S.C. 276a et seq.], in determining the time for

which an employer employs an employee with

respect to walking, riding, traveling, or other

preliminary or postliminary activities described

in subsection (a) of this section, there shall be

counted all that time, but only that time, during which the employee engages in any such activity which is compensable within the meaning

of subsections (b) and (c) of this section.

(May 14, 1947, ch. 52, §4, 61 Stat. 86; Pub. L.

104–188, [title II], §2102, Aug. 20, 1996, 110 Stat.

1928.)

REFERENCES IN TEXT

The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended, referred to in subsecs. (a) and (d), is act June 25, 1938, ch.

676, 52 Stat. 1060, as amended, which is classified generally to chapter 8 (§201 et seq.) of this title. For complete classification of this Act to the Code, see section

201 of this title and Tables.

The Walsh-Healey and Bacon-Davis Acts, referred to

in subsecs. (a) and (d), are defined for purposes of this

chapter in section 262 of this title.
§ 255 TITLE 29—LABOR Page 102

AMENDMENTS

1996—Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 104–188 in closing provisions

inserted at end ‘‘For purposes of this subsection, the

use of an employer’s vehicle for travel by an employee

and activities performed by an employee which are incidental to the use of such vehicle for commuting shall

not be considered part of the employee’s principal activities if the use of such vehicle for travel is within

the normal commuting area for the employer’s business

or establishment and the use of the employer’s vehicle

is subject to an agreement on the part of the employer

and the employee or representative of such employee.’’

EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1996 AMENDMENT

Section 2103 of Pub. L. 104–188 provided that: ‘‘The

amendment made by section 2101 [probably means section 2102 of Pub. L. 104–188, amending this section] shall

take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act

[Aug. 20, 1996] and shall apply in determining the application of section 4 of the Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947

[this section] to an employee in any civil action

brought before such date of enactment but pending on

such date.’’

CROSS REFERENCES

Exclusion from hours worked of time spent changing

clothes or washing up, see section 203 of this title.

§ 255. Statute of limitations

Any action commenced on or after May 14,

1947, to enforce any cause of action for unpaid

minimum wages, unpaid overtime compensation, or liquidated damages, under the Fair

Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended [29

U.S.C. 201 et seq.], the Walsh-Healey Act [41

U.S.C. 35 et seq.], or the Bacon-Davis Act [40

U.S.C. 276a et seq.]—

(a) if the cause of action accrues on or after

May 14, 1947—may be commenced within two

years after the cause of action accrued, and

every such action shall be forever barred unless commenced within two years after the

cause of action accrued, except that a cause of

action arising out of a willful violation may be

commenced within three years after the cause

of action accrued;

(b) if the cause of action accrued prior to

May 14, 1947—may be commenced within

whichever of the following periods is the

shorter: (1) two years after the cause of action

accrued, or (2) the period prescribed by the applicable State statute of limitations; and, except as provided in paragraph (c) of this section, every such action shall be forever barred

unless commenced within the shorter of such

two periods;

(c) if the cause of action accrued prior to

May 14, 1947, the action shall not be barred by

paragraph (b) of this section if it is commenced within one hundred and twenty days

after May 14, 1947 unless at the time commenced it is barred by an applicable State

statute of limitations;

(d) with respect to any cause of action

brought under section 216(b) of this title

against a State or a political subdivision of a

State in a district court of the United States

on or before April 18, 1973, the running of the

statutory periods of limitation shall be

deemed suspended during the period beginning

with the commencement of any such action

and ending one hundred and eighty days after

the effective date of the Fair Labor Standards

Amendments of 1974, except that such suspension shall not be applicable if in such action

judgment has been entered for the defendant

on the grounds other than State immunity

from Federal jurisdiction.

(May 14, 1947, ch. 52, §6, 61 Stat. 87; Pub. L.

89–601, title VI, §601(b), Sept. 23, 1966, 80 Stat.

844; Pub. L. 93–259, §6(d)(2)(A), Apr. 8, 1974, 88

Stat. 61.)

REFERENCES IN TEXT

The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended, referred to in subsecs. (a) and (d), is act June 25, 1938, ch.

676, 52 Stat. 1060, as amended, which is classified generally to chapter 8 (§201 et seq.) of this title. For complete classification of this Act to the Code, see section

201 of this title and Tables.

The Walsh-Healey and Bacon-Davis Acts, referred to

in subsec. (a), are defined for purposes of this chapter

in section 262 of this title.

Effective date of the Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, referred to in subsec. (d), means May 1,

1974, except as otherwise specifically provided, under

provisions of section 29(a) of Pub. L. 93–259, set out as

an Effective Date of 1974 Amendment note under section 202 of this title.

AMENDMENTS

1974—Subsec. (d). Pub. L. 93–259 added subsec. (d).

1966—Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 89–601 inserted provision allowing causes of action arising out of willful violations

to be commenced within three years after the cause of

action accrued.

EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1974 AMENDMENT

Amendment by Pub. L. 93–259 effective May 1, 1974,

see section 29(a) of Pub. L. 93–259, set out as a note

under section 202 of this title.

EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1966 AMENDMENT

Amendment by Pub. L. 89–601 effective Feb. 1, 1967,

except as otherwise provided, see section 602 of Pub. L.

89–601, set out as a note under section 203 of this title.

RULES, REGULATIONS, AND ORDERS PROMULGATED WITH

REGARD TO 1966 AMENDMENTS

Secretary authorized to promulgate necessary rules,

regulations, or orders on and after the date of the enactment of Pub. L. 89–601, Sept. 23, 1966, with regard to

the amendments made by Pub. L. 89–601, see section 602

of Pub. L. 89–601, set out as a note under section 203 of

this title.

CROSS REFERENCES

Time when action by Administrator of the Wage and

Hour Division is deemed to be commenced for purposes

of subsec. (a) of this section, see section 216 of this

title.

SECTION REFERRED TO IN OTHER SECTIONS

This section is referred to in sections 216, 217, 256, 257,

262 of this title.

§ 256. Determination of commencement of future

actions

In determining when an action is commenced

for the purposes of section 255 of this title, an

action commenced on or after May 14, 1947 under

the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended [29 U.S.C. 201 et seq.], the Walsh-Healey Act

[41 U.S.C. 35 et seq.], or the Bacon-Davis Act [40

U.S.C. 276a et seq.], shall be considered to be

commenced on the date when the complaint is

filed; except that in the case of a collective or

class action instituted under the Fair Labor