Filed 12/11/14 In re K.R. CA2/8 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS 

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT 

DIVISION EIGHT 

In re K.R., a Person Coming Under the 

Juvenile Court Law. 

 B252942 

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND 

FAMILY SERVICES, 

 Plaintiff and Respondent, 

 v. 

JESSICA P., 

 Defendant and Appellant. 

 (Los Angeles County 

 Super. Ct. No. DK00111) 

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. D. Zeke 

Zeidler, Judge. Affirmed. 

 M. Elizabeth Handy, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Appellant. 

John F. Krattli, County Counsel, Dawyn R. Harrison, Assistant County Counsel, 

Jacklyn K. Louie, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 

_____________________________________ 
2

 Jessica P. (Mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s dispositional orders 

terminating jurisdiction and granting custody of two of her children, A.M. and K.R., 

to their respective fathers. We affirm the challenged orders. 

FACTS

 Mother has four children: son M.P., born in 2003 with Luis P.; daughter A.M., 

born in 2005 with Mauricio M.; daughter K.R., born in 2008 with William R.; and son 

B.P., born in 2012 with David P. In 2013, Mother lived with David and B.P. The older 

children did not live with Mother as a result of a voluntary placement plan Mother 

entered into in 2011.1

 M.P. lived with the maternal grandmother and A.M. and K.R. 

lived with their respective fathers. Each of the children visited with one another, 

generally at the maternal grandmother’s home, and K.R. had an extended visit with 

Mother and David for approximately two weeks in June and July of 2013. 

 A petition under Welfare and Institutions Code2

 section 300 was filed on July 24, 

2013, alleging David hit A.M. with belts, fondled K.R.’s vagina, and had a history of 

violent altercations with Mother in the presence of the children. It was further alleged 

that Mother knew about the abuse, but failed to protect the girls. The boys were alleged 

to be at risk of harm due to David’s abuse and Mother’s failure to protect. 

 

1 On July 25, 2011, DCFS received a referral for general neglect and abuse. During 

the course of the investigation, the children’s social worker (CSW) observed M.P. and 

A.M. playing in the street while David sat on the porch drinking beer. The CSW also 

noted that two-year-old K.R. was wandering around the house unsupervised while 

Mother, who was pregnant with B.P., slept on the couch. The home also lacked hot 

water. Mother agreed to allow K.R. and A.M. to live with their fathers while M.P. stayed 

with the maternal grandmother. As a result of Mother’s voluntary plan, the referral was 

closed and was never promoted to a case. 

2 All further section references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless 

otherwise specified. 
3

 The petition was precipitated by a call from the Los Angeles Police Department 

(LAPD). On July 20, 2013,William brought K.R. to a LAPD station to report that David 

touched her vagina inside her underpants. K.R. told William and his girlfriend that David 

touched her several times between April and July 2013. K.R. also reported she witnessed 

David choking Mother in April 2013. 

 During the ensuing investigation, the Los Angeles County Department of Children 

and Family Services (DCFS) discovered that David had prior arrests for domestic abuse, 

battery, and possession of narcotics dating back to 1993. Both David and Mother denied 

all of the allegations. When confronted by the CSW about the allegations, Mother said, 

“Supposedly my boyfriend David [P.] touched my daughter [K.R.] on her vagina but I 

don’t believe her! She came a month ago and said that David touched her through her 

panties. Her dad, William [R.] called me and told me that [K.R.] told him this.” In an 

interview on July 21, 2013, A.M. told the CSW that David used to hit her with a belt 

when she stayed with Mother. She also witnessed David choking Mother and on another 

occasion, beating Mother. A.M. denied David touched her inappropriately. A.M. 

confirmed she felt safe in her father’s care. 

 At the detention and arraignment hearing, the juvenile court found a prima facie 

showing had been made that the children were dependents described under section 300. 

B.P. and M.P. were detained in shelter care3

 and A.M. and K.R. were released to their 

fathers. DCFS was ordered to provide family reunification services and family 

maintenance services to all parties. Monitored visits were granted to Mother and David. 

However, they were ordered not to visit the children together and David was granted 

visits only with B.P. 

 DCFS made its jurisdiction/disposition report on August 29, 2013, documenting 

extensive interviews with the parties. In an August 23 interview, Mother indicated she 

believed K.R. lied about the sexual abuse because the accusation came two weeks after 

 

3 Although M.P. lived with the maternal grandmother and she indicated she was 

willing to accept both M.P. and B.P. into her home, maternal grandmother’s home was 

not initially approved because she had a previous referral against her. 
4

Mother refused William’s request to keep K.R. for a longer period of time and to reunite 

with him. William told her she was going to regret not keeping K.R. and not leaving 

David. David denied any sexual or physical abuse, also asserting the accusations 

stemmed from William. However, he believed William was motivated to coach K.R. 

because he wanted full custody and child support from Mother. David observed that 

K.R. was always with Mother, even when Mother was asleep or showering. He also 

stated, “She [K.R.] tends to lie a lot. She lies about everything.” Both Mother and David 

indicated it was suspicious that William allowed K.R. to stay with them for two weeks 

during June and July after the alleged abuse began in April. 

 In an August 26, 2013 interview, K.R. confirmed, “David is my mom’s husband 

and he touched my ‘panito’4

 with his fingers.” She also reported he touched her over her 

clothing and tried to kiss her on the mouth, but she said no, “because you don’t do that.” 

K.R. also reported seeing David and Mother fighting and hitting each other. William 

stated he waited approximately two weeks before reporting the abuse to the police 

because he “wanted to make sure first.” When William confronted Mother about it, she 

told him they were all lies. However, William and his girlfriend confirmed the story with 

K.R. using a doll. 

 K.R. was interviewed over several days in September 2013 by a forensic case 

worker pursuant to court order. During this time, forensic interviewer confirmed K.R. 

knew the difference between what is true and what is not. K.R. then reiterated that David 

tried to kiss her on the mouth and touched her vagina. In addition, K.R. confirmed that 

David put his hands around Mother’s neck, hit her “many times,” and hit B.P. 

 DCFS noted some discrepancies in William and K.R.’s story regarding how and 

when the sexual abuse was disclosed. William stated K.R. initially told the babysitter 

about the abuse and the babysitter reported it to him. The babysitter, however, denied 

K.R. disclosed any abuse to her. Also, William provided inconsistent dates as to when 

K.R. first disclosed the sexual abuse, when he questioned Mother, and when he reported 

 

4 K.R. identified her vagina as “panito” and her buttocks as “nalgas.” 
5

the abuse to the police. K.R.’s story alternated between David touching her over her 

panties and under her panties. 

 As to the domestic violence allegations, DCFS noted that A.M. and K.R. 

consistently described incidents of domestic violence between Mother and David. In her 

interview, A.M. described how David hit her with a belt: “I was crying, I forgot why but I 

was crying really hard and my mom was inside with David in the room. Then he hit me 

with the belt on my bottom.” Although Mother witnessed the incident, “[s]he didn’t do 

anything.” A.M. further recounted that David “hits my mom, one day he choked her. 

I don’t remember why he choked her, but he put her on the wall and my mom went down 

and she was crying. That night, my mom was crying a lot. My brother [M.P.] was there 

but he was outside and I told him. David said that he was going to call the police so they 

can take my mom but I said that it was David that was supposed to go with the police.” 

A.M.’s father indicated he wanted to retain custody of A.M. and was unaware of any 

abuse. Although both Mother and David deny any domestic violence occurred, DCFS 

noted that David’s record showed past incidents of a violent nature. Additionally, other 

family members, including the other fathers, described David as violent or unpleasant. 

The children all reported that they were reluctant to have contact with David. 

 The CSW concluded, “Despite the inconsistencies in [William’s] accounts of the 

child [K.R.’s] disclosure, the child maintains that [David] was fondling her vagina on a 

regular basis and also reported that [David] attempted to kiss the child in the mouth. 

Nonetheless, the mother and [David] uphold that all the allegations have been fabricated 

by [William] who is seeking to gain full custody of the child [K.R.].” 

 At the adjudication hearing on November 15, 2013, the juvenile court heard 

testimony from the CSW, K.R., and A.M., which conformed to the information provided 

in the DCFS reports. It also received stipulated testimony from Mother that she separated 

from David on the day of the detention hearing. She initially lived with the maternal 

grandmother, but then moved in with her friends once the maternal grandmother’s home 

became a placement option. Mother also would have testified she was currently 
6

participating in individual counseling and parenting. She would have denied that K.R. 

told her David touched her inappropriately or tried to kiss her. 

 The juvenile court adjudged the children to be dependents under section 300 and 

found by clear and convincing evidence that substantial danger existed to their physical 

and emotional health. As to A.M. and K.R., jurisdiction was terminated with custody 

orders granting legal and physical custody to their respective fathers. Weekly monitored 

visits were granted to Mother as to all the children. However, Mother and David were 

not to visit together. No reunification services were offered to David as to M.P. and B.P. 

Mother was provided reunification services for B.P. and M.P. and individual counseling 

was ordered for M.P. as needed. The court further ordered K.R. to attend counseling 

until a therapist indicated it was no longer needed. The court indicated Mother was not 

granted services as to K.R. and A.M. because K.R. and A.M. were safely in the care of 

another parent. In any case, the juvenile court noted that Mother would receive services 

in B.P. and M.P.’s case. Twice monthly sibling visitation was also ordered. The court 

expressly noted and overruled Mother’s objection to the dispositional order terminating 

jurisdiction as to K.R. Mother’s counsel argued the DCFS reports showed William did 

not adequately protect K.R., there remained a substantial risk to K.R., and jurisdiction 

should be maintained to ensure her safety. Mother timely appealed. 

DISCUSSION

 Mother does not dispute the juvenile court’s findings. She only challenges the 

juvenile court’s dispositional orders relating to K.R. and A.M. According to Mother, 

substantial evidence demonstrates a need for continued jurisdiction over both girls, 

particularly since the court maintained jurisdiction over B.P. and M.P. Additionally, 

Mother argues it is in the children’s best interests to preserve the family with Mother. 

County Counsel filed a respondent’s brief contending the juvenile court’s orders as to 

A.M. were proper, but it took no position on the court’s orders as to K.R. since DCFS 

recommended continued jurisdiction over K.R. William also filed a respondent’s brief, 

arguing substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s orders as to K.R. Because the 
7

girls are differently situated, we separately address whether the court’s orders as to each 

of them were proper. 

I. Applicable Law and Standard of Review 

 Mother assumes the juvenile court applied section 361.2, subdivision (b)(1)5

 when 

it granted custody of the girls to their fathers and terminated jurisdiction. William agrees 

with Mother that section 361.2 applies because “[K.R.] was technically living with Father 

[William] at the time the proceedings were initiated in juvenile court, however there was 

no custody order in place with either the family law court or the juvenile court. [K.R.] 

had overnight visitation with Mother, in the home she resided in with David, and [K.R.] 

was abused during such visitation in Mother and David’s home. Thus, the incidents 

which brought this matter to the attention of the juvenile court occurred during a time 

when [K.R.] was ‘residing with Mother and David, not Father [William].” County 

Counsel likewise cites to sections 361.2 and 362.46

 as the governing law in this case. 

The juvenile court, however, did not reference section 361.2 or 362.4 in its orders. 

 

5 Section 361.2, subdivision (a) provides that when a court assumes jurisdiction of a 

minor, it must determine “whether there is a parent of the child, with whom the child was 

not residing at the time that the events or conditions arose that brought the child within 

the provisions of Section 300, who desires to assume custody of the child.” If so, the 

court must place the child with that parent unless it finds that doing so poses a risk of 

harm to the child. (§ 361.2, subd. (a).) Once the child has been placed with the 

noncustodial parent, the court has three options: (1) it may simply terminate jurisdiction 

and give the noncustodial parent legal and physical custody of the child with visitation 

rights to the other parent (§ 361.2, subd. (b)(1)); or (2) it may place the child with the 

noncustodial parent and order a home visit be conducted within three months to 

determine whether that parent should have permanent custody (§ 361.2, subd. (b)(2)); or 

(3) it may order reunification services be provided to either or both parents and determine 

at a later hearing which parent, if either, shall have custody of the child (§ 361.2, subd. 

(b)(3)). 

6 Section 362.4 provides, in pertinent part, “[w]hen the juvenile court terminates its 

jurisdiction over a minor who has been adjudged a dependent child of the juvenile court 

prior to the minor’s attainment of the age of 18 years, and . . . an order has been entered 

with regard to the custody of that minor, the juvenile court on its own motion, may 

issue . . . an order determining the custody of, or visitation with, the child. [¶] . . . [¶] If 

no action is filed or pending relating to the custody of the minor in the superior court of 
8

 By its own terms, the options outlined in section 361.2 govern only when the 

dependent child is placed with a parent “with whom the child was not residing at the time 

that the events or conditions arose that brought the child within the provisions of Section 

300[.]” Here, the girls resided with their fathers at the time the proceedings were 

initiated. K.R.’s two-week stay with Mother and David in June and July 2013 was 

merely an extended visit. Although Mother and William agreed that no custody orders 

were issued by any court regarding K.R. and A.M., it is clear the girls lived with their 

fathers and, at a minimum, the fathers shared custody of the girls with Mother. Under the 

Welfare and Institutions Code, the residence of a minor is determined by the residence of 

the person who has custody of the child. (§ 17.1, subd. (b).) Under this scenario, the 

girls resided with their fathers prior to the proceedings and therefore, could not have been 

placed under the terms of section 361.2. 

 Although this case does not fit neatly within its parameters, we nevertheless 

believe the juvenile court derived its powers from sections 362 and 364. (See In re A.L.

(2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 138 [applying section 362 to adjudge a child a dependent of the 

court, but leaving her in parental custody as part of the dispositional order]; In re Gabriel 

L. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 644 [applying section 364].) Section 362 permits a juvenile 

court to “make any and all reasonable orders for the care, supervision, custody, conduct, 

maintenance, and support of the child” if he or she is adjudged a dependent of the court 

under section 300. (§ 362, subd. (a).) Section 364 outlines the procedure when a court 

has determined that jurisdiction under section 300 is appropriate, but “the child is not 

removed from the physical custody of his or her parent or guardian . . . .” (§ 364, subd. 

(a).) “After hearing any evidence presented by the social worker, the parent, the 

guardian, or the child, the court shall determine whether continued supervision is 

necessary. The court shall terminate its jurisdiction unless the social worker or his or her 

 

any county, the juvenile court order may be used as the sole basis for opening a file in the 

superior court of the county in which the parent, who has been given custody, resides. 

The court may direct the parent or the clerk of the juvenile court to transmit the order to 

the clerk of the superior court of the county in which the order is to be filed.” 
9

department establishes by a preponderance of evidence that the conditions still exist 

which would justify initial assumption of jurisdiction under Section 300, or that those 

conditions are likely to exist if supervision is withdrawn.” (§ 364, subd. (c).) When 

proceeding under section 364, the juvenile court is not concerned with reunification, but 

with determining whether continued supervision is necessary in the family home because 

the child is in placement with a parent and the existing custody arrangement is not 

disrupted. (In re Gabriel L., supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at p. 650.) 

 Whether we apply section 361.2 or sections 362 and 364, the standard of review is 

abuse of discretion. (In re Gabriel L., supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at p. 647 [court’s 

discretion under section 364 is similar to the court’s broad discretion as to whether to 

offer services under section 361.2 because in both situations the child is not in out-ofhome placement, but in placement with a parent.] Furthermore, the juvenile court’s 

factual findings are reviewed for substantial evidence. (See, e.g., In re Austin P. (2004) 

118 Cal.App.4th 1124, 1134 [appellate court reviewed record for substantial evidence 

indicating whether there was a need for continuing supervision].) 

 This standard of review comports with the juvenile court’s “broad discretion to 

determine what would best serve and protect the child’s interest and to fashion a 

dispositional order in accordance with this discretion.” (In re Jose M. (1988) 206 

Cal.App.3d 1098, 1103-1104; In re I.G. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 380, 386.) Thus, we 

may not reverse the juvenile court’s dispositional orders in the absence of a clear abuse of 

discretion. 

II. K.R. 

 Mother contends the juvenile court erred in terminating jurisdiction as to K.R. 

because there was sufficient evidence in the record to indicate that continued supervision 

was needed to ensure K.R. was protected. In support of her position, Mother emphasized 

William’s domestic abuse history, pointing to her own statements to DCFS describing 

how William hit her and abused alcohol during their relationship. The family entered 

into a voluntary family maintenance contract from December 2008 to November 2009 

after Mother reported that William slapped Mother. Mother reported it was an isolated 
10

incident and William denied it happened. Mother also highlights the inconsistencies in 

his story about learning of K.R.’s abuse as well as his delay in reporting it. Mother 

contends William may not be committed to caring for K.R. because he asked to extend 

K.R.’s visit with her and he would often call Mother at 11 p.m., asking if she could take 

care of K.R. “because he wanted to go out and have fun.” According to Mother, these, 

along with the fact that K.R. was four years old and had not yet started therapy, were all 

factors favoring continued jurisdiction over K.R. In short, “[t]he question remained 

whether William R. should have permanent custody of [K.R.] and the case closed before 

it could be assured that William R. would follow through with therapy, and [K.R.’s] 

emotional health needs were known to the court.” 

 We find the juvenile court acted within its broad discretion to terminate its 

jurisdiction over K.R. Mother and David were the sole cause of the dependency 

proceedings. There were no allegations relating to William. Instead, the 

jurisdiction/disposition report noted that an inspection of William’s one-bedroom home 

with K.R. showed it to be in adequate condition, with working utilities, and appeared free 

of clutter. The inspector observed sufficient food, toys, and clothing in the home. 

The CSW concluded, “At this time, the child appears stable in the care of her father.” 

K.R. also liked living with William, stating, “It’s good, I sleep well.” William denied 

living with anyone else and having any other children. 

 Further, William completed parenting classes and counseling due to the voluntary 

family maintenance contract in 2008 and 2009. There is no indication that domestic 

violence continues to be an issue for William. Mother’s suggestion that William is not 

committed to K.R. is belied by the fact that K.R. has lived with him since 2011 without 

any problems. William has provided for K.R. during this time and ensured she continued 

to have visits with Mother and her siblings. He enrolled K.R. in preschool at Jefferson 

Elementary School and made an appointment for a mental health evaluation of K.R. 

As to the delay in reporting David’s abuse of K.R., William explained that he did not 

want to make such serious accusations until he was sure they were true. 
11

 Mother’s reliance on In re Austin P. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 1124, is misplaced. 

There, the non-custodial father took custody of his son under section 361.2 after he was 

removed from the mother’s home. At the review hearing, the court refused to terminate 

jurisdiction, finding that continued supervision was necessary for several reasons: the 

father knew his son was being abused but had taken no steps to protect him and without 

continuing jurisdiction, the boy’s safety could not be assured; father had sporadic contact 

with his son during the past 10 years and the child was more bonded with his mother; 

there was significant conflict between the parents; the social worker believed the boy 

needed both individual and conjoint therapy with each parent, which could occur only if 

the matter remained open; and the mother was making good progress with her 

reunification plan. (Id. at p. 1134.) The father appealed, contending the dependency 

court should have terminated jurisdiction. The appellate court affirmed, finding 

substantial evidence to support a finding that continued supervision was necessary, thus 

precluding the termination of jurisdiction. (Id. at p. 1135.) 

 Contrary to Mother’s contention, similar facts do not exist here. Unlike In re 

Austin P., there is no question as to K.R.’s safety because the conditions which justified 

assumption of jurisdiction under section 300 no longer exist since K.R. is no longer in 

contact with David. Moreover, there is no indication William is not willing or able to 

protect K.R. He reported the abuse soon after he learned about it and he did not allow 

David contact with K.R. after the initiation of the proceedings. He also has an 

established bond with K.R., who likes living with him, and has provided an adequate 

home for her. Further, the juvenile court ordered individual counseling for K.R., not joint 

counseling with either parent. There is no indication William will not ensure K.R. 

receives counseling. He has already made an appointment for a mental health evaluation 

for K.R. While there may be evidence which shows continued supervision may be 

beneficial in this case, the juvenile court did not make an arbitrary, capricious, or patently 

absurd determination in terminating jurisdiction. 
12

III. A.M. 

Having determined that no abuse of discretion occurred in terminating jurisdiction 

over K.R., we find even less reason to find the juvenile court abused its discretion in 

terminating jurisdiction over A.M. We are persuaded by the analysis in In re A.J. (2013) 

214 Cal.App.4th 525, which found the juvenile court properly exercised its discretion in 

terminating jurisdiction after placing the dependent child out of state with her biological 

and presumed father. The juvenile court’s finding that no protective issue existed which 

would warrant retaining jurisdiction was supported by substantial evidence. (Id. at 

p. 536.) The juvenile court found the father to be a committed, responsible parent who 

could provide a stable, loving, and safe home for the child, and who had taken the 

necessary steps to see that the child would receive all the services, education, and health 

care that she needed. (Id. at pp. 539-540.) 

 A.M. has likewise been provided “a stable home and loving home” by her father, 

Mauricio, since 2011. She has an established bond with him and he wishes to retain 

custody of her. A.M. reports that Mauricio’s girlfriend, with whom they live, treats her 

well. The CSW noted that she appears to be well adjusted in Mauricio’s home. A.M. 

was not abused by David; therefore, she does not require therapy. There is nothing in the 

record to indicate A.M. requires continued supervision. 

 Mother has not presented any evidence of a need for continued supervision, 

arguing instead that it is in A.M.’s best interest to maintain a relationship with Mother 

and her siblings. It is clear, however, that Mauricio has provided ample opportunity for 

A.M. to continue a relationship with Mother and the siblings. He regularly brings A.M. 

to maternal grandmother’s home for visits. The juvenile court properly exercised its 

discretion when it terminated jurisdiction over A.M. after placing her with Mauricio. 
13

DISPOSITION

 The dispositional orders relating to A.M. and K.R. are affirmed. 

 BIGELOW, P.J. 

We concur: 

 RUBIN, J. 

FLIER, J.