06-5015-cr (L)

United States v. Sattar (Stewart; Yousry) 

### UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 1 2 

### FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 3 4 5 

### At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second 6 

### Circuit, held at the Daniel Patrick Moynihan United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl 7 

### Street, in the City of New York, on the 23 day of February, two thousand ten. rd 8 9 10 

### - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X 11 12 

### UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 13 14 

### Appellee-Cross-Appellant, 06-5015-cr (L), 15 

### 06-5031-cr (con), 16 

### - v.- 06-5093-cr (con), 17 

### 06-5131-cr (con), 18 

### LYNNE STEWART, MOHAMMED YOUSRY, AHMED 06-5135-cr (con), 19 

### ABDEL SATTAR, 06-5143-cr (con) 20 21 Defendants-Appellants-Cross22 Appellees. 23 24 

### - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X 25 26 

### ORDER 27 Following disposition of this appeal on November 17, 28 2009, and prior to the amended disposition on December 23, 29 2009, active judges of the Court requested a poll on whether 30 to rehear the case in banc regarding only the sentence 31 imposed on defendant Lynne Stewart. A poll having been 32 conducted and there being no majority favoring in banc 33 review, rehearing in banc is hereby DENIED 

### . 34 

### Chief Judge Jacobs concurs in an opinion joined by 352



### Jud ges We sle y a nd Hal l; Jud ge Poo ler co ncu rs in a s epa rat e 1 

### opi nio n; and Ju dge Ca bra nes di sse nts in an op ini on joi ned by 2 

### Jud ge Rag gi. 3 4 FOR THE COURT: 5 CATHERINE O’HAGAN WOLFE, CLERK 6 7 8 91 2 

### DEN NIS JA COB S, Chi ef Jud ge, jo ine d b y R ICH ARD C. WE SLE Y a nd 3 

### PET ER W. HAL L, Cir cui t J udg es, co ncu rri ng in the de nia l o f 4 

### reh ear ing in ba nc. 5 

### I c onc ur in the de cis ion of th e C our t t o d eny in 6 

### ban c r ehe ari ng in thi s c ase . But be cau se I d o s o 7 

### not wit hst and ing my ag ree men t w ith th e p ane l d iss ent , I ow e 8 

### an exp lan ati on. 9 10 

### I 11 

### Wit h r esp ect to St ewa rt’ s s ent enc e, the am end ed pan el 12 

### maj ori ty opi nio n i den tif ies a sin gle pr oce dur al err or and 13 

### rem and s s o t hat th e d ist ric t c our t c an hav e a n o ppo rtu nit y 14 

### to con sid er tha t e rro r, and mu ch els e b esi des . The pa nel 15 

### maj ori ty ack now led ges th e u nac cou nta ble ga p b etw een th e 16 

### off ens e c omm itt ed and th e s ent enc e i mpo sed --t he sen ten ce is 17 

### sai d t o b e “ str iki ngl y l ow” --b ut bel iev es tha t r evi ew for 18 

### sub sta nti ve rea son abl ene ss sho uld fo llo w a fte r t he dis tri ct 19 

### cou rt has ha d a n o ppo rtu nit y t o a ddr ess pr oce dur al err or 20 

### (th e o ne ide nti fie d b y t he pan el maj ori ty, th e o nes de tai led 21 

### by Jud ge Wal ker , a nd the on es hyp oth esi zed by Ju dge 22 

### Cal abr esi ). Th is two -st ep is not an nou nce d a s a n i nfl exi ble 23 

### seq uen ce for al l c ase s, whi ch is to the go od, be cau se2 1 

### pro ced ura l e rro r a nd sub sta nti ve err or are pe rme abl e 2 

### con cep ts. B ut in thi s i nst anc e, I t hin k p ost pon ing th e 3 

### con sid era tio n o f s ubs tan tiv e r eas ona ble nes s w as a m ist ake 4 

### and a mis sed op por tun ity . 5 

### The si ngl e p roc edu ral er ror id ent ifi ed by the pa nel 6 

### maj ori ty is the fa ilu re of the di str ict co urt to de cid e 7 

### whe the r S tew art co mmi tte d p erj ury or ot her wis e o bst ruc ted 8 

### jus tic e. At th e s ame ti me, no thi ng in the pa nel ma jor ity 9 

### opi nio n-- as ame nde d-- doe s o r s hou ld pre clu de the di str ict 10 

### cou rt fro m r eth ink ing St ewa rt’ s s ent enc e a nd its co mpo nen t 11 

### con sid era tio ns fro m s cra tch . The pa nel ma jor ity se ems to 12 

### enc our age th at. S o d o I . 13 14 

### II 15 

### Jud ge Wal ker ’s dis sen t i den tif ies se ver al sal ien t 16 

### add iti ona l p roc edu ral er ror s, and I agr ee tha t t hes e 17 

### add iti ona l e rro rs sho uld be ad dre sse d b y t he dis tri ct cou rt 18 

### on rem and . I c ann ot imp rov e o n J udg e W alk er’ s a nat omy of 19 

### the ca se, an d n o p urp ose wo uld be se rve d b y r epe tit ion he re 20 

### or by poi nt- by- poi nt end ors eme nt. I wi ll lim it mys elf to 21 

### thr ee obs erv ati ons . 22 

### [A] T he ter ror ismen han cem ent is the dominant

### Th e p ane l m ajo rit y o pin ion st ate s: “Wh eth er or not 1 

### the di str ict co urt ap pli ed the te rro ris m e nha nce men t t o Ste war t i n i ts Gui del ine s c alc ula tio n m ay be sub jec t t o dis agr eem ent .” Ho wev er, it is cl ear th at the di str ict co urt app lie d t he ter ror ismen han cem ent in it s i nit ial Gu ide lin es cal cul ati on; it de ter min ed a t ota l o ffe nse le vel of 41 , a cri min al his tor y c ate gor y o f V I, and a Gui del ine s s ent enc e of 360 mo nth s. It is al so cle ar tha t t he dis tri ct cou rt lat er dis sip ate d t he ter ror ismen han cem ent ba sed pr ima ril y on (i) th e l ack of ha rm res ult ing fr om Ste war t’s of fen se and (ii ) t he not ion of at ypi cal ity . The di str ict co urt th ere by err ed (wh eth er pro ced ura lly , s ubs tan tiv ely , o r b oth ), whe n it eff ect ive ly eli min ate d t he ter ror ismen han cem ent ba sed on con sid era tio ns tha t s eemhi ghl y d ubi ous fo r t he rea son s for cef ull y s tat ed in Jud ge Wal ker ’s dis sen t. Cf . U nit ed Sta tes v. Re ssa m, --- F. 3d
--- , N o. 09- 300 00, 20 10 WL 347 962 (9t h C ir. Fe b. 2, 201 0) (in a ter ror ismca se, re man din g a s pro ced ura lly de fec tiv e a 22 -ye ar sen ten ce on the gr oun d, int er ali a, tha t t he dis tri ct cou rt was in suf fic ien tly cog niz ant of th e G uid eli nes ra nge of 65 ye ars to li fe) . 3 1 sentencing consideration in this case. The district court 2 erred in discounting it to zero. That is an error both 1 3 procedural and substantive in nature, highlighting one 4 reason that the two-step sequencing of review for procedural 5 and substantive error makes so little sense in this case. 6 Any discount based on the fortuitous lack of harm 7 resulting from Stewart’s offense is error (whether 8 procedural, substantive, or both). For the reasons set 9 forth in Judge Walker’s dissent, I agree that injury and 1 0 death can serve as aggravating factors in sentencing for the 1 1 crime of material support to terrorism, but that the absence4 1 of injury and death cannot serve as mitigating factors. 2 [B] The district court did not decide whether Stewart 3 abused her position of trust, or her special skills as a 4 lawyer. The panel majority recognizes this omission and, 5 without classifying it as procedural error, directs that on 6 remand “[t]he district court should also consider whether 7 Stewart’s conduct as a lawyer triggers the special8 skill/abuse-of-trust enhancement under the Guidelines, see 9 U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3, and reconsider the extent to which 1 0 Stewart’s status as a lawyer affects the appropriate 1 1 sentence.” Like Judge Walker, I do not believe that this 1 2 direction goes far enough. 1 3 Judge Walker observed that Stewart’s violation of the 1 4 Special Administrative Measures jeopardizes an accused’s 1 5 right to counsel, among other rights. I offer a related 1 6 concern, which underscores both the applicability of the 1 7 special-skill/abuse-of-trust enhancement in this case and 1 8 the seriousness of Stewart’s crime. The trust that Stewart 1 9 betrayed was conferred upon her as a lawyer for the purpose 2 0 of assuring that her client would have post-conviction 2 1 access to counsel. That trust was reposed in her as an 2 2 officer of the Court, notwithstanding the horrible security5 1 dangers that would result from betrayal. Her offense tends 2 to erode judicial confidence that lawyers can be entrusted 3 with national secrets--or (as in this case) with the means 4 to trigger or promote a mass slaughter of innocents. 5 Stewart’s misuse of her special skills and her abuse of 6 trust thus transcend the effect in a single case. The 7 defense of certain sensitive criminal cases and the 8 prosecution of certain sensitive cases of constitutional 9 tort are impaired unless counsel can draw upon a fund of 1 0 confidence and trust, and Stewart’s offense has debased that 1 1 currency. See Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 578 & n.11 1 2 (2d Cir. 2009) (in banc) (citing Stewart’s offense to 1 3 demonstrate that “the undertakings of counsel” cannot 1 4 “necessarily abate[]” the “risk” of “inadvertent or 1 5 deliberate disclosure of information harmful to our own and 1 6 other states”). 1 7 [C] The panel majority observes that the district 1 8 court, in its consideration of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) 1 9 factors, “found that Stewart’s opportunity to repeat ‘the 2 0 crimes [for] which she had been convicted will be nil’ 2 1 because she ‘will lose her license to practice law’ and 2 2 ‘will be forever separated from any contact with Sheikh Omar

### Ba sed in pa rt on the di str ict co urt ’s fin din g 2 

### reg ard ing re cid ivi sm, Ju dge Wa lke r i den tif ies pr oce dur al err or in the di str ict co urt ’s ove rva lua tio n o f S tew art ’s per son al cha rac ter ist ics in th e c ont ext of th e s ect ion 355 3(a ) a nal ysi s: “In su m, tho ugh we wi ll rar ely id ent ify pro ced ura l e rro r i n t he wei ght a sen ten cin g j udg e a ssi gns to rel eva nt fac tor s, thi s i s o ne of tho se rar e c ase s w her e t he rec ord of a def end ant ’s per son al cha rac ter ist ics si mpl y can not be ar the we igh t n ece ssa ry to sup por t t he cha lle nge d sen ten ce. ” In foo tno te two of th e p ane l c onc urr enc e, Jud ge Cal abr esi ob ser ves th at “th e a mou nt of wei ght a par tic ula r fac tor ca n b ear ” i s “ nor mal ly con sid ere d [ a] sub sta nti ve jud gme nt[ ].” I ex pre ss no vie w a s t o w het her th e e rro r ide nti fie d b y J udg e W alk er reg ard ing th e l oss of St ewa rt’ s law li cen se is pro ced ura l o r s ubs tan tiv e. Bu t e rro r i t i s; and th is fac tor il lus tra tes my ea rli er poi nt tha t t he two kin ds of err or are pe rme abl e. 6 1 Abdel Rahman.’” The panel majority does not weigh in on 2 this finding. But Judge Walker does: “This is wrong. One 3 does not need a law license in order to materially support 4 terrorism or to defraud the U.S. government.” I agree with 5 Judge Walker. One can assist terrorism in many ways, few 2 6 of which require a license to practice law. While the abuse 7 of her law license is a basis for enhancing Stewart’s 8 sentence, its loss is not a basis for a reduction, at least 9 with respect to the likelihood of recidivism. And as set 1 0 forth below, Stewart is reported as having expressed the 1 1 view that she would do what she did again, but “might handle 1 2 it a little differently” to evade detection. So for her, 1 3 supporting and promoting terrorism remains acceptable;7 1 everything else (law license or not) is technique. 2 3 III 4 Notwithstanding the foregoing discussion, I have voted 5 against in banc review at this juncture for the following 6 reasons. 7 [A] The panel majority opinion makes no law with which 8 I disagree. It identifies one procedural error, which I 9 agree is an error; it encourages the district court to 1 0 consider the errors identified by Judge Walker, as I do; it 1 1 declines to reach substantive error without, however, 1 2 purporting to bind other panels to do the same. In my view, 1 3 the panel majority opinion is a missed opportunity, and 1 4 fails to give the district court sufficient guidance. But 1 5 it does not make law for other cases; it scarcely makes law 1 6 of the case. 1 7 [B] This appeal was under consideration by the panel 1 8 for two full years; additional lengthy delay would be an 1 9 institutional disservice. The district court docket 2 0 reflects that the process of resentencing has been put in 2 1 motion so that it can take place with conscientious speed 2 2 following the issuance of our mandate. Stewart and her8 1 family are entitled to know what her sentence ultimately 2 will be within the half-decade following her conviction. 3 [C] When our remand “effectively undoes the entire 4 ‘knot of calculation’” that fixed the original sentence, 5 “‘the spirit of the mandate’ requires de novo sentencing.” 6 United States v. Rigas, 583 F.3d 108, 118 (2d Cir. 2009). 7 Following such a remand, the “district court [i]s required 8 to resentence [a defendant] in light of the circumstances as 9 they st[and] at the time of [] resentencing.” Werber v. 1 0 United States, 149 F.3d 172, 178 (2d Cir. 1998). Since 1 1 circumstances have changed in the prolonged interval 1 2 following imposition of the original sentence, the district 1 3 court should have the opportunity to consider any 1 4 developments in the first instance. 1 5 Media reports (which require skeptical vetting) reflect 1 6 that Stewart has promoted her criminal conduct as a matter 1 7 of principle and as an aspirational norm of ethical law 1 8 practice. After her conviction and sentencing, Stewart 1 9 participated in a law school conference, “Legal Ethics: 2 0 Lawyering at the Edge, Unpopular Clients, Difficult Cases, 2 1 Zealous Advocates.” It attracted “a standing-room crowd of 2 2 150 people, most of them law students”:

### Th e l aw sch ool pu t o ut tha t S tew art wa s i nvi ted to 3 

### the co nfe ren ce as a “ uni que ca se stu dy” ra the r t han as “a n exp ert in et hic s.” H ofs tra La w, htt p:/ /la w.h ofs tra .ed u/ New sAn dEv ent s/C onf ere nce s/E thi csC onf ere nce /20 07/ ind ex. htm l (la st vis ite d J an. 11 , 2 010 ). Th at dis tin cti on was evi den tly lo st on her . In fai rne ss to the st ude nts , h er rec ept ion wa s s aid to be co ol, an d N ath an Sam uel , t hen a sec ond -ye ar law st ude nt, wa lke d o ut mid way th rou gh Ste war t’s add res s, ret urn ing on ly to pos e a n a ggr ess ive qu est ion . See N. Y. T IME S 

### ar tic le. 9 1 [Stewart] admitted to having been “cavalier” 2 in the way she followed certain regulations 3 governing communications with her client, but 4 argued that the human bond between a lawyer and 5 client is critical to the lawyer’s role as legal 6 adviser. 7 8 “I was representing a client, and I would do 9 it again, but I would do it in a way that would 1 0 better insulate me,” she said. Her main regret 1 1 was having been unaware that the government was 1 2 secretly taping her conversations with Mr. Rahman, 1 3 she said. 14 1 5 Paul Vitello, Hofstra Polite as Lawyer Guilty in Terror Case 16 Talks on Ethics , N.Y. T IME S , October 17, 2007, at B3 1 7 (correction appended) (“N.Y. T IME S article”). If accurately 1 8 reported, these comments call into doubt the district 1 9 court’s finding that Stewart’s offense is an aberration in 2 0 an otherwise admirable career. In addition, these comments 2 1 seek to corrupt the young by enlisting law students in the 2 2 project of degrading legal practice. 3 2 3 Moreover, on the day before she was remanded to prison,

### St ewa rt has th us rep eat edl y a ffi rme d t hat sh e w oul d 4 

### do it aga in. S o m uch fo r J udg e C ala bre si’ s i nve nti ve ide a tha t t he dis tri ct cou rt mig ht con sid er on rem and th at the ter ror ismen han cem ent sh oul d b e a bat ed for of fen ses com mit ted be for e S ept emb er 11, 20 01, wh en the en orm ity of ter ror ismma y n ot hav e b een fu lly ap pre cia ted . Sin ce the pan el maj ori ty inv ite s t he dis tri ct cou rt to con sid er thi s pos sib ili ty, it is wo rth a foo tno te to sho w t hat St ewa rt her sel f h as not ha d a n e pip han y. In dee d, it is har d t o ide nti fy any one in th is cou ntr y w ho wou ld hav e d isc oun ted ter ror ismaf ter th e B eir ut bar rac ks, Kh oba r T owe rs, th e emb ass y b omb ing s, the 19 93 Wor ld Tra de Cen ter at tac k, Okl aho ma Cit y, the U. S.S . C ole , a nd the co nsp ira cy to blo w up the Ne w Y ork Fe der al Bui ldi ng and th e t unn els in to Man hat tan . 10 1 Stewart gave a radio interview in which she was asked: 2 “[W]ould you do anything differently today, would you do 3 anything differently back then, if you knew what you kn[o]w 4 today?” Stewart responded, in part: “I would do it again. 5 I might handle it a little differently, but I would do it 6 again.” Interview by Amy Goodman, Host, Democracy Now!, 7 with Lynne Stewart, in New York, N.Y. (Nov. 18, 2009), available at http://www.democracynow.org/2009/11/18/ 8 exclusive_civil_rights_attorney_lynne_stewart. 9 1 0 I am not in a position to make findings on these 1 1 points, but in my view the district court should consider 1 2 these additional circumstances at Stewart’s resentencing. 4 1 3 Indeed, section 3553(a) requires the district court to 1 4 “impose a sentence, sufficient but not greater than11 1 necessary, to comply with [enumerated] purposes” including 2 “the need for the sentence imposed . . . to promote respect 3 for the law.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A). Stewart’s 4 comments--that she readily would repeat her offense, taking 5 care only to evade detection--also illuminate “the nature 6 and circumstances of the offense” and “the history and 7 characteristics of the defendant.” Id. § 3553(a)(1). On 8 remand, the district court may wish to explore and consider 9 Stewart’s post-conviction and post-sentencing comments as 1 0 part of the section 3553(a) analysis. 1 1 [D] Finally, the issue of substantive reasonableness 1 2 may be obviated or mitigated following the district court’s 1 3 correction of the procedural error identified by the panel 1 4 majority, the district court’s consideration of the 1 5 procedural and substantive errors identified by Judge Walker 1 6 (and underscored in part in this opinion and in the 1 7 accompanying opinion dissenting from the denial of rehearing 1 8 in banc), and the district court’s findings as to subsequent 1 9 developments. In any event, these matters will affect the 2 0 analysis. And this Court may have an opportunity after 2 1 remand to reach issues that are not decided by the panel 2 2 majority.J udg es Guido Calabr esi and Rober t D. Sack, both member s of the pane l majority , are 1 no w s e nio r j ud g e s. As su c h, ne ith e r v ote d in the e n b anc po ll n or

c an b e e xpe c te d to re sp on d to the vie ws e xpre sse d b y

no n- pa ne l ju dg e s. Chief J udg e Jacobs "c oncurr ing" opinion is, i n substance, a dissent from a por

tion of 2 th e v i e w s o nth e m e r i t s o f th e p an e l m a

j o r i ty. 1 POOL ER, J ., concur

ringin the denial of r ehea ringen banc : 1 Re sp e c tf ull y , I c ann ot j oin

in C hie f Jud g e Jac ob s' c on c ur re nc e in t his c a se a s I

be lie ve it mistakenly

asks the district cour

t to apply the pane l’s dissenting opinion, rather than the panel’ s majority opinion. The nostra sponte e n banc poll, pre dicated on the rationale set forth in the dis se nt, did

no t su c c e e d. Th e ma

jority op ini on the re fo re sta

nd s. As po int e d o ut i n th e ma jority opinion, the district court should, of course , take a ccount of the pane l dissent. But the dec ision of the pa ne l is the law o f t

he Cir c uit fo r t his c a se on

re mand and fo r f utu re c a se s, un le ss a

nd until it is overruled by

the Supreme Court or by this Court en banc. Opinions dissenting fr om denial of re hearing e n banc are not uncommon in this Circuit. 2 They are nonetheless oddities. When such an opinion is filed, ther e is an e x tant panel de cision resolvingthe appe al. The a ctive judg es dec lined to revisit that decision en ba nc. The panel decision is there fore the Court' s decision. Other judge s may

have vie ws on the matter, but the
c a se is n ot b e fo re the m, a nd wh at th e y

may sa y a bo ut i t ha s a s mu c h f

or c e of law a s if tho se views we re published in a le tter to the editor of their favorite loca l newspape r. Yet the unsuc cessf

ul reque st for an e n banc r ehea ringbecome s an occ asion for a ny active jud g e wh o d isa g re e s w iththe pa ne l to e xpre ss a

vie w o n th e c a se e ve n th ou g h n ot c a lle d u po n to decide it. By

employing the simple tactic of c alling f or an e n banc poll, ac tive judge s provide themselves with an oppor tunity to opine on a ca se that wa s never befor e them. This amounts to2

an exerc ise in fre e spee ch rather than a n exercise of

any judicial function. Her e, the a

bility of ac tive judge s to seek en banc revie w and then opine on a ca se on which they did

no t si t w or

ks pa rt ic ula r m isc hie f. On c e the mand ate iss ue s, the pa ne l w ill
rema nd for r esente ncing , with an opinion that actively encour ag es the district cour t to pay due reg ard to the pa

nel dissent. It strikes me as inappr opriate f or other me mbers of the Court to add their views a s to what the district court should do on re mand. This case may return to this Court
on a su bs e qu e nt a

pp e a l. Jud g e s who may

ru le on a c a se in t he futur e sh ou ld n ot e xpre ss t he ir views on the outcome of a f uture a ppeal be fore the district court e ven conside rs the issues on
rema nd. The pa nel' s majority

opinion, as commented on by the pane l dissent, provides the district court with ample guidance from this Court, rendering f urther a dvisory

opinions from others
unne c e ssa

ry . B oth Ga ll v . Unit e d St ate s, 55 2 U .S. 38 (2 00 7) , a nd Ki mbr ou g h v . Unit e d St ate s, 552 U.S. 85 (2007), stand squar ely for the pr oposition t hat the district cour t is in t he best position to make dec isions about sentencing . We follow the teac hings of those ca ses best whe n we de fer to t he dis tr ic t c ourt ’s ampl e dis c re tio n. Ha vin gre mand e d to the dis tr ic t c ourt , w e sh ou ld a ff or d it
an o pp or tun ity to u nd e rt ake its ta sk

wi tho ut f ur the r m ud dyingof

the wate rs .Senior Circuit Judge John M. Wal ker Jr., the author of the panel ’s minorit

y opinion 1 con curr ing an d dis s ent

ing inpar t, while n ot

autho r izedto par ti cip ate inth e enban c po ll, has endorsed the views expressed in this opinion. To be clea r, active judg es of this Court requested a poll on whe ther to r ehea r en banc the 2 ju dgm ent of th e pan el o nly in s of

ar as it add r es s ed the s ent enc e im po s ed o n S tewar t b y the D is tr ict Court. There was no request f or a poll, much le ss a vote by the en banc Court, on the judgment in sofa r a s ita ffi rme d th e c onvi ctio n o f St ew a rt o r he r c o-d ef en da nts. Uni te d St ate s v . Stewar t, et al. , N o. 06- 501 5- cr

(d eni al o f e n b anc) J os é A. Ca br anes , Circuit Jud ge, d isse nti ng , wit h w ho m Ju dg e R ee na R a gg i c on cu rs: I res pectfully dissent fr om the order denying rehea ring en banc on the matter of the sentence imposed on defenda nt Lynne Stewa rt. In my view, e n banc rehe aring wa s necessary to 1 finish the job the panel maj ority st arted—to decide , not simply to identify andpas s ov er , the l egal iss ues so vividly presented in the sentencing of Stewa rt. 2 I do no t n eces s ar

ily di s agr ee wi thth e op inio n o f Chief J ud ge J acob s con curr

ing inth e de ni al of r ehe ar ing enban c, at

leas t i ns of

ar as he u s ef

ully i den ti fi es s om e of

th e is s ues th at the p anel maj or it y has avo id ed o r

no t d ecid ed. B ut

I r es pec tf ul ly dis s ent fr omth e de ni al o f e n b anc r evi ew bec aus e I thin k that

th e enban c Cou r t s ho ul d h ave d ecid ed the o ver lo ok ed i s s ues at thi s ti me. J ud ge J acob s bel

iev es th at w e s ho ul d d elay a r ehe ar ing onth e gr ou ndth at “ this Cou r t m ay ha ve an opportunity after r emand to reac h iss ues that are not decide d by the pane l majority.” Jac obs, J. Op. at 1 1. We may

no t, ho weve r , h ave s uchan o pp or tu ni ty , as we d o n ot kn ow whether

either par ty will dee m i t ap pr op r

iat e t o ap peal

th e s ent enc e im po s ed b y the D is tr ict Cou r t af te r r ema nd . J ud ge Jacobs also votes against rehearing en ba nc bec ause the “pa nel majority opinion ma kes no law with whi ch [ he] di s agr ee[ s ]. ” Id

. at 7 . B ut

th e pr ob lemis no t the i s s ues th at the p anel maj or it y do es decide ; it is the iss ues that the panel ma jority does not decide that require rehea ring en banc . In putting off a decision for a speculative “sec ond appea l,” the pa nel and the en banc Court failed toStewa rt was convicted of one count of conspiring to defraud the United States in viola tion 3 of 18 U.S.C. § 371; one count of providing and conc eali ng material support to terr orist s for a con s pi r acy t o m ur der

per s on s ina f

or eign co un tr

y invio lat io n o f 1 8 U. S.C. § 23 39Aand18 U .S. C. § 2; on e co un t o f c on s pi r acy t o p r ov id e andcon ceal

s uchs up po r t i n v

io lat io n o f 1 8 U. S.C. § 37 1; andtw o co un ts of

mak ing f als e s tat eme nt s invio lat

io n o f 1 8 U. S.C. § 10 01. 2 performtheir duty to the Bench and Bar to decide the important issues pr esented to them and thereby cla rify the law of our Circuit. As it st ands, the en banc poll wa s defeated, and the case wi ll return to the District Court f or
r e- s ent enc ing. I n the e ven t that th e cas e do es return t o this Court f or a second appea l, I wish to point out som e of the criticall y important iss ues that the panel ma jority failed to dec ide. I do not pro vi de a ny

de ta il ed di scu ssio n o f wha t ou tc om e t he pa ne l sh ou ld have re a ch ed on the se i ssue s;
r ath er , I mer ely highlig

ht th e ma tt er s th at the p anel neg lect ed, th at the e n b anc Co ur t s ho ul d h ave dec id ed, and , ther ef

or e, that r emainop en f

or po s s ib le d ecis io n i n the f

utur e. I. Th e P an el

Maj orit y’ s Mea ns of

Avo id an ce of

Se nt en ci ng

Issu es S qu ar el

y P r ese nt ed Stewa rt, a member of the legal profession, was convicted of numerous charges, including providing material support to terroris ts, specificall y by fac ilitating c ommunication by the notorious 3 in ca rc er a te d te rrori st S he ik Oma r A bd elR a hm a n to hi s le gi on of w orl dwid e f ol lo we rs. To
un der s tan d the s er

io us nes s of

St ewar t’ s cr

im e, i t i s im po r tan t t o u nd er s tan d that Rahm an wa s
con vic te d i n the S ou th er n D is tr ict of New Yor k o f l eadi ng a n ex tr aor di nar y t er r or is t c on s pi r acy in te nt onmu r der

ing Egy pt ianPr es id ent

Ho s niM ub ar ak an d b om bi ng tun nel s andbuildings inNew Yor k Cit y, i ncluding the 1 993 bo mb ing of th e Wor ldT r ade Ce nt er . Se e U

nit ed Stat es v. Rahman , 18 9 F. 3d88 ( 2dCir . 19 99) . H is con

vic ti onwas s ecu r ed o nly af te r a lengthy i nv es tigat

io n an d nin emonth tr ial that posed a sufficiently serious thr eat to the life of the trial judge that, for years, the judge a nd his family had to endure a n around-the-clock protective de tail. R ahman w as sentenced toFor comparis on, the Sentenc ing Guideline s r ecommend a 28-month s entence for a 4 r elat ive ly m od es t f

r aud , see U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 (providing for base offense level of 18 a nd 27-33 month s ent enc e f or fi r s t- ti me o ff

end er infr audinvo lvi ng l es s th an $ 200 ,00 0) , o r drug tr ans act

io n, se e i d. § 2D1.1 (providing for same base offense level a nd sentencing range for f irst -time offender in drug cr im e in vo lvi ng l es s th an 4 0 gr ams of her oi n o r les s th an 2 00 g

r ams of coc ain e) . B ut

th e Gu id eli nes signal that any crime promoting terr orismis to be viewed a s extremely serious by pr oviding for a mi ni mu m b as e of

fe ns e lev el o f 3 2. Se e i

d. § 3A1 .4(a). At

th e s ame ti me, th e s tr ong ne ed t o d et er terror ism is evident from the Guidelines recommenda tion that a terroris m defendant be a ccorded a cr imin al his to ry of

VI , the high es t l evel

po s s ib le, witho ut

r egar d t o his actual

cr imin al r eco r d. Se e i

d. 3 life imprisonment and designated to a ma ximum security federal prison, undoubtedly to provide the
s tr onges t p os s ib le d et er r ent , s ho r t o f d eath, to hi s fu r th er pu r s ui t o f t er r or

is m. As Rahm an’ s att orney , St ewar t w as on e of th e f ew p eop le p er mi tt ed t o h ave c on tac t w ith himinpr

is onand , ev en th en, only s ub ject

to cer tai n co ndit

io ns . See United States v. Stewart , N o. 06- 501 5- cr (L

), Slip O p. 778 1, 7905-06 (2d Cir. Dec . 23, 2009) (“ Stewart II ”) (Walk er, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (d et ail ing co ndit io ns un der

whi ch S tewar t w as giv en ac ces s to Rahm an) . St ewar t ab us ed thi s position of trus t to defeat the very purpose of Rahman’ s pr osecution and inca rceration, providing hi m w it h th e m a te ria l su pp ortmo st i mp ort a nt t o h is a bi li ty to c on ti nu e t o p ursu e t er rori st objective s—namely, a means to communicate those objectives to his followers . The Sentencing Guidelines, whic h str

ive to identify the sentenc es generally imposed by judges around the country fo r cr im es falli ng w

ithi n the h ear tl andof

a par ti cul ar

of fe ns e, see g enerally Kimbrough v. United Sta tes , 128 S. C t. 558 (2007), yie lded a rec ommended sentence for Stewart of a term of imprisonm ent of 360 months. Ins tead, the District Court sentenced Stewa rt to jus t 28 months, less than one-tenth of th e adv is or y s ent enc e. See Stewart II

, Slip Op. at 790 3, 7907 (W alke r, J., concurring in part and di s s ent ing inpar t)
. The unreasonableness of this sentence for a crime whose ultimate ob ject —t er r or is m— th r eat ens cou nt

les s in no cen t l

ive s , wo ul d ap pear

ob vio us . I n r evi ewing thi s

4§ 3A1. 4(b).

Of cours e it is common for an appella te court to remand iss ues to the district court for 5 fu r th er con s id er ati onbef

or e the ap pellat e co ur t s peak s to th e is s ue. T hi s cas e, h owe ver , didno t c all fo r s uchact io n. T he i s s ues inthis cas e wer e s er io us , an d i n m os t i ns tan ces hadalr eady bee n addressed by the Distr

ict Court—it was for our

Court to decide e ither that the expressed views of th e Di s tr ict Cou r t w er e aligne d wi thth e law of ou r Cir cui t o r th at they wer e err or . Pu nt ing ina cas e li ke thi s is no t “ ju di cial r es tr ain t. ” J udici al r es tr ain t i s th e r ef us al t o r each ou t t o d ecid e is s ues th at the c as e do es no t p r es ent . T o r ef us e t o d ecid e is s ues th at a r e s qu ar ely pr es ent ed i s an ab di cat

io n o f j udici al r es po ns ib ili ty . 4 sentence, the pa nel majority w as confronted with several questions r ega rding reasonableness that are of vit al i mp or tan ce n ot

only t o t er r or

is m ca s es inpar ti cul ar

bu t t o s ent enc ing pr oce edi ngs ingen er al. R ea di ng the pa ne l m a jo rity’ s op in io n, ho we ve r, o ne fin ds n o a nsw er s to t ho se que sti on s. O ne fin ds, instead, a three-part technique in which the panel a voids making law and, a s a result, r emands witho ut id ent if ying the f ull s cop e of

th e Di s tr ict Cou r t’ s s ent enc ing err or s . In Step One, the pane l majority dec lares uncertainty a bout a particula r legal que stion but
nev er th eles s of

fe r s s pec ul ati

ve an d ge ner al o bs er

vat io ns th at a pp ear

to s tat e the r elev ant

law (this is entirely dic ta, of course, in view of the pa nel’s stated reluctance to decide the issue pr esented). In Step Two, the pane l majority dec ides to remand to the distr ict court for “clarification” of its view on the matters at iss ue in light of the pane l’s tour of the legalhorizon. In Step Thr ee, the pa nel directs th at a ny l ate r

app eals inth e cas e be r ef

er r ed t o the o r

igi nal pan el. By remanding for “clarification,” the panelmajority not only dela ys its decision on the 5

s ent enc ing qu es ti on s clea rly p r es ent ed b ut als o cas ts th os e qu es ti on s as un r ip e f or app ell ate r evi ew, thereby effective ly insulating the pa nel majority’s opinion from review by the e n banc C ourt or by th e Supr eme Cou r t. Andinr et aining co ntr ol ov er any s ub s equ ent

app eal, th e pan el m ajo r

it y en s ur esIn addition to joining the pane l decision to avoid a nswering numerous impor tant questions 6 of se nte nc in g l aw, a nd re ma nd in g t o th e D ist ric t C ou rt fo r “f urt he r c on sid er a ti on ” o f th ose questions—m any a lready c learly a ddress ed in the District Court’s conclusions at sentencing—one member of the panel ma jority has written a concurring opinion that offers s uggestions to the Distr ict Court as to how it might approach these a nd other open questions on r emand. The con curr ing op inio n n ot es th at, des pi te th e pan el’ s r ejec ti onof St ewar t’ s clai m o f s elec ti

ve pr os ecu ti on , Stewart II

, Slip Op. at 782 5-26 (Maj. Op), the Distr ict Court may still consider the po s s ib le r elev ance to St ewar t’ s s ent enc e of th e “dis par

it ies bet ween[S tewar t] andother

in di vid ual s who wer e no t c har

gedat all. ” Stewart II

, Sl ip Op . at 790 0 ( Calab r es i, J ., c on curr ing) . Sp ecif

ically, it is suggested that the Distr

ict Court consider the fact that the U.S. A ttorney did not seek an indictment of Ramsey C lark for the allege dly similar conduct of “issuing a statement to the media on be half of [S hei k] Rahm an. ” Id

. at 7 897 -9 8. I will not expand on Judge Wa lker’s sens ible observations as to how and why the re is no com par is onbet weenSt ewar t’ s con du ct

andth at o f Cl ar k. See Stewart II , Slip Op. at 792 0-25 (Walk er, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). I note simply that the invitation for fur ther inquiry on this point comes without r ega rd for the separation of powers that confers pros ecutorial a uthority exclus ive ly o n the e xecu ti

ve b r anchandnarr owly li mi ts ju di cial in quir y in to th e exe r cis e of

th at autho r it y. See, e.g. , Har

lan A sso cs . v . I nc. Vi ll. o f M ine o la , 273 F.3d 494, 49 9 (2d Cir. 2001) (limiting s elec ti ve p r os ecu ti onchal

lenge t o p r os ecu ti on ’s r eli ance oninvidio us fa ct or s or att emp ts to ham per exer cis e of

con s ti tu ti on al r

igh t)
. 5 th at, if th e qu es ti on s ar e ever

ans wer ed i n thi s Cou r t, th e pan el will b e the o ne an s wer ing them(at least in the first

instance). II. Th e S en te nc in g Is su es Le ftUn de ci de d I hasten to emphasize that this is not a situation in whic h a court has skirt ed a fewminor is s ues or avo id ed r eaching a s ingle , dif fi cul t ques ti onth at i s no t s qu ar ely p r es ent ed f or dec is io n. Despite a record of thous ands of pages and more than twenty -one months of deliberations on appea l, the original Nove mber 17, 2009 opinion of the pa nel majority ide ntified only one e rror (a failu r e t o co ns id er

St ewar t’ s perju ry) andeither ign or ed al to gether

or s kim medov er

at l eas t f ive
s ent enc ing is s ues of

par amo un t i mp or tan ce. See United States v. Stewart , No. 06-5015-cr(L), Slip Op. 7525, 7623 (2d Cir. Nov. 17, 200 9) (“ Stewart I ”) . O n D ecem ber

23, 200 9, the p anel

maj or it y f ile d an
ame nd ed o pi ni onth at b r

ief ly i den ti fi ed some of thes e issues but still left them undecided. 6More tr oubling still, the suggestion fails to explain how the public would be well served by

remedying the e xecutive ’s failure to pros ecute a second person who may hav e committed a c rime by hav ing the j udici ar

y mi tigat e the s ent enc e of

a per s onwho s e co mmis s io n o f the c r im e was pr ov ed beyond a reasonable doubt. If any compa rison s hould be done in this ca se by the Distr ict Court (an d, fo r th at m att er , the g ene r al p ub lic), I r es pec tf ully s ub mi t that

it s ho ul d b e t o co mp ar e St ewar t’ s sentence wi th the array of criminal defenda nts actually c harged a nd convicte d of material support t o te r r or is m. See Ap pe nd ix B. 6 See Appendix A . Ea ch of these iss ues, which I summarize below , should have bee n taken up by the en banc Court in light of the panel ma jority’s r elucta nce or inability to decide them. A. Th e Re aso na bl en ess o f S te war t’ s Se nt en ce Mos t notably, the pa nel majority de clined to a ss ess the subst antive rea sonableness of St ewar t’ s 28- mo nth s ent enc e inlig ht of th e s er io us nes s of

her cr im e of con vic ti on . T he p anel majority did finally

say, in its amended opini on, that “Stewa rt’s sentence is str ikingly low in light of what the district court corr ectly de scribed as the ‘irreducible core of [her] extraordinarily severe
cr imin al co nd uct .’” Stewart II , Slip Op. at 787 6 (Maj. Op.) (quoting Sent’g Tr. 118). But despite its belate d glanc ing observation that it had “serious doubts ” about the sentence ’s reasonableness, the pan el m ajo r

it y eve n i n i ts s eco nd(am end ed) op inio n co ul d m anag e t o s ay no mo r e thanth at i t “th[ought ] i t ap pr op r

iat e t o h ear

fr omth e di s tr

ict cour t f ur th er bef or e de ciding the i s s ue. ” Id
. at 788 2. I n f

act , ther e is no r eas onto hear fu r th er fr omth e Di s tr

ict Cou r t. T he r eco r d m akes clea r that Stewa rt’s sentence wa s carefully considered and fully expla ined by the District Court. Indeed, both in its or

iginalNovember 17, 2009 opi nion and in its amende d Decembe r 23, 2009 opinion, the pan el we nt

well ou t o f i ts way t o ce leb r ate th e pr es iding ju dge inth e Di s tr ict Cou r t f or hi s meticulousness and attention to detail—“W e would be remiss if we did not, at the outset, commend the di stri ctco urtfor i ts th oro ughn ess, tho ughtf ul ne ss, a nd ef

fe ctiv en ess i n th e c on du ctof t he se
un us ually l engthy, dif

fi cul t, ands ens it

ive pr oce edi ngs . M uchof what fo llo ws s im ply r epo r ts what itJudge Ra ggi a nd I do not need to be reminded that Gall v. Uni ted States, 552 U.S. 3 8 (2007), 7 and Kimbrough v. United Sta tes , 552 U.S. 8 5 (2007), teac h deference to district courts ’ broad discretion ins ent enc ing, see, e.g

. , United Sta tes v. J

ones , 531 F.3d 163, 17 0-74 (2d Cir. 2008), a lthough we note that this Court had to convene en ba nc to make tha t lesson the lawof the Circuit, see Cavera , 55 0 F.3 d 1 80 . A s Jones recognize d and Ca vera r eaf fi r med , h owe ver , Gal

l and Kimbrough

do not “grant 7 di d an d tr acks what

it s aid .” Stewart I

, Sl ip Op . 75 27- 28; Stewart II

, Sl ip Op . 77 83- 84. T he D is tr ict Cou r t c lear

ly d ecid ed that

th e lac k o f h ar m at te nding St ewar t’ s s up po r t an d v ar io us cir cum s tan ces
r elat ing t o h er car eer andheal ths up po r te d a minim al s ent enc e. See Sen t’ g T r at 1 13- 14, pas

si m . In these circumstances, it is the res ponsibility of an appel late c ourt to decide whethe r, on the “tho r ough[

]” r eco r d p r es ent ed, Stewart I , Slip Op. 7527, the identified fac tors could bea r the extr aor di nar

y mi tigat ing weight

as s ign ed t o themby the D is tr ict Cou r t. See United States v. Ca vera , 550 F. 3d180 , 19 1 (

2dCir . 20 08) (e n b anc)
. Ob s er ving all of this , o ne migh t b e dr awn t o the c on clu s io n that what th e ma jo r it y r eall y ho pes to “he ar ” f

r omth e Di s tr

ict Cou r t af te r r ema ndis no t a f

ur th er exp lan ati onfo r

th e s ent enc e im po s ed, bu t r ath er , the p r on ou nce men t o f as ent enc e s uf fi cien tly highe r

th an the o r

igi nal s o that the important iss ues relating to the mitigation of terroris m crimes can be avoided. But an appe llate court does not identify s ignifica nt sentencing error by winks and nods that it hopes the district court will u nd er s tan d an d act

onwhe n co r r ect

ing le s s s ignif

ican t e r r or s id ent

if iedas th e bas is fo r

r ema nd
. In any eve nt, in declini ng to decide the issues before it, the panel ma jority miss ed a rare opportunity to clarify the law of sentencing. Indeed, if there ever was a c ase that afforded an opportunity to fu r th er dev elo p the “ abu s e of

di s cr et io n” a nd“s ho cks th e co ns cien ce” s tan dar d, see United States v. Rig as , 58 3 F .3d108 , 12 3 (

2dCir . 20 09) , it

was this cas e, wh er e the D is tr ict Cou r t s ent enc ed t o o nly 28 mo nth s in pri son ame mb erof t he ba r who aid ed apa rti cu la rly ne fa rio us a nd no torio us te rrori st to c on ti nu e p ursuin g h is d ea dly o bj ec tive s. 7di s tr

ict cou r ts ‘a b lan k ch eck t o i mp os e wh ate ver s ent enc es s ui t thei r

fa ncy .’” Ca vera , 55 0 F .3dat 1 91 (quo ti ng Jones

, 531 F.3d at 174). “ At the subst antive stage of reasonableness review, an a ppella te court may consider whether a fa ctor relied on by a sentenc ing court can be ar the weight assigned to it
. . . un der th e t ot ali ty

of cir cum s tan ces inth e cas e.” Ca vera , 55 0 F .3dat 1 91. Ons uchr evi ew, “ we do no t c on s id er

what weig ht we wo ul d o ur s elv es hav e gi vena par ti cul ar

fa ct or .” Id

. W e wil l re ve rse as subs tantively

unreasonable only

those “outlier” sentences demonstr ating such “a ctual a buse of a di s tr ict cou r t’ s con s id er abl e s ent enc ing di s cr et io n, ” see J ones , 531 F.3d at 174, as to “shock the con s cien ce,” se e Ri

gas, 58 3 F .3dat 1 23. No t s urpr is ingly , we r ar ely s ee s uchcas es . T hi s , h owe ver , is one of them. The Supreme Court, in Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 3 38, 362 n.2 (200 7), reviewe d for 8 “reasonablene ss ” of the sentence a s a whole, without dist inguishing “substantive” from “pr oce du r al” e r r or s . O th er Cir cui t c ou r ts hav e no te d the dis ti nct io n i s a mat te r

of lab els , r ath er

th an on e of th e me r it s of th e err or . See, e.g. , Uni

te d St ate s v . En gl e , N o. 08- 449 7, 2 010 WL 1 149 44, at * 4 n .1 (4th Cir. Jan. 13, 2010) (noting that ev en though the gove rnment described its arguments as going to th e s ub s tan ti

ve r eas on abl ene s s of

th e s ent enc e and , inth e Cou r t’ s view, tho s e argum ent s challenged procedural reasonable ness, the Court would, “of course, consider the government’s arguments on 8 T he p anel maj or it y de cli nedto r evi ew the “ s ub s tan ti ve” r eas on abl ene s s of

St ewar t’ s s ent enc e apparently

based on a notion that this iss ue could not be rea ched on a firs t appea l. But there is no reason for sentencing revie w to require two or more appeals. The panelmajority—and the e n banc Court—did have the ability to revie w for both “procedural” and “substantive” reasonable ness, on this app eal. See, e.g. , Uni

te d St ate s v . Re ss am , No. 09-30000, 201 0 WL 347962 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding procedural and substantive unreasonablene ss in the sentence imposed on a convicte d terror ist, and
no ti ng that

th e di s tr ict cou r t’ s er r or s ands par s e r eco r d m ade a pp ell ate r evi ew o f s ub s tan ti ve reasonablene ss difficult, but nonetheless identifying the sentence a s s ubstantively unreasonable and providing the district court with numerous citations to ins tances of subs tantive unreasonable ness f or gui dan ce o n r ema nd

). T o s ugg es t, as th e pan el m ajo r it y di d, th at c ou r ts of

app eals ar e ef

fe ct ive ly
r equ ir ed t o u nd er tak e a t

wo- s te p ap pellat e r evi ew wh ene ver any s ent enc ing is s ue i s id ent if iedas “procedural” is to muddle the law of our Circuit and to promote a rigid and unw orkable distinction be tw ee n “ pro ce du ra l” a nd “su bsta ntive ” i ssue s. 8their merits , without regard to whether the gove rnment attached the c orrect descriptive label to

th os e argum ent s ”)
. The attempt to rigidly separate “substantive” and “proce dural” questions is as old as the com mo n l aw, an d o ne l ong ago r eco gni zedas well -nighim po s s ib le. See Guaran ty Tr ust Co. of N.Y. v. York , 32 6 U. S. 9 9, 1 09 ( 194 5) (“ M att er s of ‘s ub s tan ce’ a ndmat te r s of ‘p r oce du r e’ ar e mu ch t alk ed abo ut inth e bo ok s as th ough they def in ed a g r eat di vid e cu tt ing acr os s th e wh ol e do mai n o f l aw. B ut , o f c ou r s e, ‘ s ub s tan ce’ a nd‘p r oce du r e’ ar e the s ame key- wor ds to ver y di ff er ent pr ob lem s . . . . Eachim pl ies di ff er ent var iab les dep ending up onth e par ti cul ar pr ob lemfo r

whi ch i t i s us ed. ”) ; id. (n ot ing that , inth at c as e, i t w as “im mat er ial whe th er s tatut es of

limit ati onar e ch ar act er

izedas ‘s ub s tan ti ve’ or ‘p r oce du r al’ ”) ; Hann a v. Plum er , 380 U.S. 4 60, 472 (1965) (ac knowledg ing that some matters are capable of “falling wi thin the uncertain a rea betwe en subst ance and procedure” a nd “are r ati on ally cap abl e of

clas s if icat io n as either ”)
. Comp are Rita v. United States, 12 7 S. Ct. 245 6, 2 473 (2 007) (St even s , J ., c on curr ing) (n ot ing that a s ent enc ing co ur t’ s exp lan ati onfo r is s ui ng as ent enc e bas ed o n i ts di s lik e f

or Yank ees fa ns wouldgo t o “s ub s tan ti ve” r eas on abl ene s s ), wi

th i d. at 2 483 n. 6 (Scalia , J., concurring in part and conc urring in the judgment) (contending that precisely the same expla nation for a sentence woul d be a ma tter of “pr ocedural” reasonablene ss).
9 Un der th e app r oachtak en b y the p anel maj or it y, the p r es enc e of

any “ pr oce du r al” e r r or s in a sentence would nec essitate a remand to the district court and then, pe rhaps, a second—maybe
evena thir d, or

fo ur th ? —ap peal

to exci s e each“pr oce du r al” e r r or bef or e the ap pellat e co ur t c an (f in ally, at lo ng l as t) r evi ew f

or “s ub s tan ti

ve” r eas on abl ene s s . I nd eed , the p anel maj or it y wo ul d appea r to s uggest a second a ppeal for subs tantive unreasonable ness even in the circumstance w here an appe llate pa nel finds procedural error and whe re correction of that err or would not result in a
s ignif ican t s ent enc e mo di fi cat

io n, bu t the p anel

has “s er io us do ub t” abo ut

th e s ent enc e’s s ub s tan ti

ve
r eas on abl ene s s . As it hap pen s , ther e is no def

init ive r ul ing by th e Supr eme Cou r t o r

ou r Cir cui t that

r equ ir es any such el aborate, w asteful, and time-consuming process. I n Gall v. Uni ted States, the Supreme Court explai ned that an a ppella te court “must f irst ensure that the distr

ict court committed no
s ignif ican t p r oce du r al err or

. . . [an d,] [a]s s uming that

th e di s tr ict cou r t’ s s ent enc ing de cis io n i s10

procedurally sound, the appe llate c ourt s hould then consider the subs tantive reasonable ness of the
s ent enc e im po s ed. ” 55 2 U. S. 3 8, 5 1 ( 200 7) . T he S up r eme Cou r t didno t, ho weve r , r equ ir e a paso doble of s ent enc ing. Gal

l states only that if a sentence is free from“procedural” e rror s, then the app ell ate cou r t s ho ul d p r oce ed t o co ns id er th e “s ub s tan ti

ve” r eas on abl ene s s of

th e s ent enc e imposed. There is no bas is for suggesting that Gal

l s tat es th e co nv er s e—that if a s ent enc e is pro ce du ra ll y u nre a son a bl e a co urtsho ul d n ot p roc ee d to co nsi de r th e su bsta ntive un re a son a bl en ess of th at s ent enc e. See, e.g. , Res sam , No. 09-3000, 2010 WL 347962, at *33 (“The procedural e rror s identified in the district court’s decision rendered the sentence imposed on Ressam both procedurally a nd subs tantively unreasonable.” ). In any eve nt, in United Sta tes v. Cavera we s tat ed: “Whe r e we f

in d s ignif ican t p r oce du r al
error , one pr op er

cou r s e wo ul d b e t o r ema ndto th e di s tr ict cou r t s o that

it can e ither

exp lai n wh at i t was trying to do, or correct its mistake and ex ercise its dis cretion anew , rather than for the appe llate
cou r t t o p r oce ed t o r evi ew the s ent enc e f or s ub s tan ti ve r eas on abl ene s s .” 5 50 F .3dat 1 90 (emp has is added; c itation omitted). The en banc C ourt in Ca vera di d n ot ho ldth at atw o- s te p ap pellat e r evi ew is th e only pr op er

cou r s e. T hu s , n othi ng i n o ur exi s ti ng s ent enc ing law

pr even te d the p anel maj or it y—o r th e enban c Cou r t— fr omr ul ing onbo thth e “p r oce du r al” a ndth e “s ub s tan ti ve”
r eas on abl ene s s of

St ewar t’ s s ent enc e inth e co ur s e of this (f ir s t) app eal. While a t wo- s te p ap pellat e r evi ew m ay be “on e pr op er cour s e,” id. , in some cases, it was not the proper cours e here. First, as I have note d, where a n appell ate court is presented with a lenie nt
s ent enc e that

is s uchan ex tr eme var

ian ce f r omth e Gu

id eli nes ina cas e in

vo lvi ng “ ‘ex tr aor di nar

ily
s ever e cr imin al co nd uct ,’” Stewart II , Slip Op. at 787 6 (Maj. Op.) (quoting Sent’g Tr. 118), theI no te , o n thi s po in t, th at i n s ent enc ing de fe nd ant s fo r mat er ial s up po r t o f t er r or

is m af te r 9 United Sta tes v. B ook er

, 54 3 U. S. 2 20 (

200 5) , dis tr

ict cou r ts hav e gen er ally im po s ed s ent enc es of at leas t 1 20 m on th s per

mat er ial s up po r t c ou nt , wi thcon s id er ably highe r to tal s ent enc es th an S tewar t’ s 28 m on th s . See App endix B
. In Rig as , 583 F.3d at 123, we revie wed the sentenc es imposed by the distr ict court using 10 th e s tan dar d o f whether

th ey wo ul d co ns ti tu te a “m ani fe s t i nj us ti ce,” “s ho ck the c on s cien ce,” or “other wis e co mp el a c on clu s io n that th ey ar e s ub s tan ti

vely un r eas on abl e.” We als o ev alu ate d whether the district court’s decision “[could] be locate d within the r ang e of permi s s ib le d ecis io ns .” Id
. ; see also T ravellers I nt’l, A.G. v. Tr

ans W orld Airlines, Inc. , 41 F.3d 1570, 15 74 (2d Cir. 1994) (quoting United Sta tes v. U.S. Gypsum Co. , 33 3 U. S. 3 64, 395 (1 948), fo r th e les s pi thy s tan dar d o f whether an app ell ate cou r t i s “le ft

with the d ef

init e andfi r m co nv

ict io n that a mi s tak e has bee n co mmit te d” i n holding a finding

by the district court t o be “cl early e rroneous ”).
11 app ell ate cou r t c an an d s ho ul d d ecid e wh ether th e s ent enc e “s ho cks th e co ns cien ce.” Stewart II , 9 Slip Op. at 7942 (Walk er, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“T he ‘informed intuition of th e app ell ate pan el’ has a pl ace i n ap pellat e r evi ew.” (q uo ti ng Rig as , 58 3 F .3dat 1 23) ); see also Gerard E. L ync h, Letting Gui

delines Be Guidelin es (and Jud ges B e Judges) , Ohio St. J. Crim. L. Amici: V iews from the Field, Jan. 2008 , at 5 (“[A]ppel late revie w of reasonablene ss of sentences can pla y a va luable part in [the sentencing] process . . . .”). The “shocks the conscience” standard is dif ficult to define, but of cours e courts apply it routinely, just as they also routinely appl y, whe re necessary, the conc epts of “abuse of discretion,” “arbitrary and ca pricious,” and “mani fest injus tice.” An opportunity to 10 clar if y thes e s tan dar ds was mi s s ed h er e. Finally, e ven if the line be tween “ procedural” a nd “subst antive” error s can be drawn with pre ci sio n i n so me ca ses, in thi s ca se a ny po te nti a l “ pro ce du ra l” er rors so in fe ct ed the sen te nc in g a s a who le that

it is vir tu ally im po s s ib le t o s epar ate “pr oce du r al” f r om“s ub s tan ti

ve” un r eas on abl ene s s . As discuss ed in more detailbelow, the panel de clined to de cide w hether the Distr ict Court
co mmi tte d se ve ra l c ritic a l “ pro ce du ra l” er rors i n se nte nc in g t he de fe nd a nt t o 2 8-m on ths’12

im pr is on men t. T o h ave ad dr es s ed whether th es e wer e, i n f

act , “p r oce du r al” e r r or s wouldhav e be en par t an d p ar cel o f d et er mi ni ng whether th e de fe nd ant ’s 28- mo nth s ent enc e was “s ub s tan ti vely”
un r eas on abl e. B. Th e “ N at ur e” an d “ Se rio us ne ss” of St ewa r t’ s O ff

en se No tab ly, th e pan el m ajo r

it y als o f ail ed t o d ecid e wh ether

th e Di s tr ict Cou r t e r r ed pr oce du r ally inas s es s ing the “ natur e” an d “s er io us nes s ” of

St ewar t’ s mat er

ial s up po r t o ff

ens e un der 18 U. S. C . § 35 53 (a

)(1 )-(2 ) w he n th e D ist ric t C ou rt e ffe ctiv el y d isre ga rde d th e e le me nt o f te rrori sm after recognizing

the nature of her offens e, sentencing Stewa rt as if

her offens e involve d more benign c riminal ac tivity. In its or iginalopinion, the pane l majority said nothing wha tsoever about this is s ue. See Appendix A . In its amende d opinion, rather than deci de the straightfor ward question of whe th er th e Di s tr ict Cou r t c om mi tt ed e r r or

inthis r es pec t, th e pan el m ajo r it y de s cr ib es hypothetica l instances in which the Distr ict Court “might have ” erred, conjec turing that if the Di s tr ict Cou r t c on du ct ed i ts analys is incer tai n en um er ate d way s , “i t w ould
. . . be e r r or .” Stewart II , Slip O p. at 7 880 n. 37 (

M aj. Op .)
. See Appendix A . Incredibly, this additional te xt offers no
con clu s io ns of

law an d p r ov

id es no ans wer s , an d i t i s par ti cul arly i r onic i n l igh t o f J ud ge Cal abr es i’s adm onit io n ag ain s t i s s ui ng a dv

is or y op inio ns . Id

. at 7895 (C ala bresi, J., concurring). This affords no guidanc e to the Distr

ict Court as to whether it can rea sonably ac cord no weight w hatsoever to the te r r or is m el eme nt

of St ewar t’ s mat er

ial s up po r t c r

im e, m uchles s whe th er

a 28 -m on ths ent enc e f

all s within the range of reasonable sentences for criminal conduct a s s erious as Stewart’s. T his iss ue could hav e bee n, and should have been, ta ken up by the e n banc C ourt.While we do no t “ cat ego r ically p r os cr

ib e” a s ent enc ing co ur t f

r omcon s id er

ing the f ull 11 range of facts relevant to a de fendant and the c rime of conviction in dec iding on an a ppropriate s ent enc e, see Cavera , 55 0 F .3dat 1 91 (exce pt ing only i nv

idio us fa ct s ), we will c on s id er whe th er a f act “canbear th e weight

as s ign ed t o i t u nd er

th e t ot ali ty

of th e cir cum s tan ces inth e cas e,” id. I n thi s case, the District Court and the gene ral public a re entitled to a cl ear dec ision fr om our Court as t o whe th er or no t the D is tr

ict Cou r t e r r ed— either

pr oce du r ally or

s ub s tan ti vely—i n as s igning he avy mitigating w eight to the lac k of harm res ulting from Stewart’s material suppor t of terr orism
. 13 C. Lack of Actual Harm The panel ma jority decline d to decide w hether it was error f or the District Court to r ely on the lac k of actual ha rm r esulting from St ewa rt’s actions as a basis for a downward varianc e. In its
or igi nal op inio n, th e pan el m ajo r

it y s tat ed i n a f

oo tn ot e: “ As a pr oce du r al m att er , we c on clu de that a di s tr ict cou r t m ay r ely o n the f

act th at n o h ar m r es ul te d f

r omth e cr

imin al act at i s s ue. ” Stewart I

, Slip O p. at 7 604n. 33 (

M aj. Op .)
. It pr ovided no further explanation a nd did not apply its conclusion to Stewa rt’s case or the Distr ict Court’s handling of the issue. The diss ent, howev er, fo r cef ully ex pl ain ed why l ack o f h ar m—par ti cul arly wh en a c on s equ enc e of vig ila nt law enf or cem ent ef fo r ts —can no t b ear

mi tigat ing weight

inas s es s ing the s er

io us nes s of

a mat er ial
s up po r t o f t er r or

is m cr im e. See Stewart I

, Slip Op. 7644 (W alke r, J., concurring in part and 11 di s s ent ing inpar t) ; see also Stewart II , Sl ip Op . 79 03 (

Walk er , J ., c on curr

ing in par t an d dis s ent

ing in part). In its amende d opinion, the pane l majority take s even less of a st ance on the issue, pus hing th e ma tt er in s te ad t o the D is tr

ict Cou r t— agai n wi th ou t f

ur th er in s truct io n o r leg al an alys is
. See App endix A . T he p anel

maj or it y claim s only that

it “m ake[ s ] n o rul

ing onth [e] is s ue n ow[,] . . . not[ing] simply that it is a ser ious iss ue to be give n consideration by the district court upon
r eevalu ati ng S tewar t’ s s ent enc e.” Stewart II , Slip Op. at 787 9-80 (Maj. Op.). Inasmuch as no additionalfact-finding is needed or even reque sted, this approach to a ppella te14

dec is io nm aki ng— dec iding t o av oi d d eciding—w as an i nad equ ate r es po ns e t o the “ s er io us is s ue” in question. The en banc C ourt s hould have stepped in and stepped up. D. Abu se o f T r us t As J ud ge Wal ker

no te s inhi s s epar ate op inio n, th e pan el m ajo r it y “p r op erly f

aul ts th e di s tr

ict court for failing to ‘ex plain howand to wha t extent the sentence reflec ted the seriousnes s of the crimes of conviction in light of the fact that Stew art was . . . a me mber of the bar when she
com mi tt ed them .’” Id

. at 7 933 (Wal ker , J ., c on curr ing inpar t an d dis s ent

ing inpar t) (quo ti ng id. at 787 7 ( M aj. Op .) ). B ut

as J ud ge Wal ker

ob s er ves , thi s “do es no t g o f

ar eno ugh .” Id

. Rath er , o nce agai n the p anel

maj or it y id ent if ies an i mp or tan t i s s ue— “is s ue s po tt ing,” inth e par

lan ce o f l aw school exam settings—but fails to decide it, stating only (and tenta tively), in a footnote, that the Distr ict Court “ ma

y add r es s this is s ue o n r ema nd .” Id
. at 7 877 n. 37[ s ic] (M aj. Op .) (e mp has is add ed)
. As th e pan el m ajo r

it y r eco gni zes , “[

t] he q ues ti on. . . r emain s whe th er , b ecau s e [S tewar t] was an experienc ed and de dicate d lawy er acting a s s uch whe n she broke the law in the manner that she did, her pu ni s hm ent

s ho ul d h ave b eengr eat er

th an i t w as .” Id

. at 7 877
. Yes , in dee d, th e qu es ti ondo es “remain.” A nd it too could have been, a nd should have bee n, answered, if not by the pa nel then, by th e enban c Cou r t. E. “O th er

Issu es” Fi nally, inaddit

io n t o the n um er ou s is s ues alr eady fl agge d ( bu t l ef t u nd ecid ed) , the p anel majority in its amended opinion i nscrutably allude s to “other is sues” r aised in the separate opi nions of Ju dg es W a lk era nd C a la bre si ( a dd in g, quix oti ca ll y, tha t th e m a jo rity o pi ni on ’s “ sil en ce ” o n th ose is s ues do es no t “ mea n that th e ma jo r it y has ado pt ed J ud ge Cal abr es i’s views or r ejec te d J ud ge Walk er ’s ”)
. Id

. at 7 882 -8 3. O nce agai n, th e me s s age h er e t o the D is tr ict Cou r t an d t o the p ub lic is15

tha t th e si le nc e o f th e p a ne l m a jo rity i s go ld en —a nd wi tho ut si gn ifi ca nc e. The ex ist en ce of t he se “other is s ues ”—what ever

th ey m ay be —cl early s ugg es t the n eedfo r an enban c r evi ew that unflinchingly

would dec ide all of the issues pr esented by this case as to the reasonablene ss of St ewar t’ s 28- mo nth s ent enc e. * * * T he o nly s ent enc ing err or s qu ar ely f

ou ndby the p anel

maj or it y was th e Di s tr

ict Cou r t’ s failure to consider Stewart’s allege d perjury on the stand. In identifying this s ingle proce dural error, the panelmajority mana ges to remand this case for r esentencing w hile le aving unresolved e ach of th e s er io us is s ues , cen tr al t o S tewar t’ s mat er ial s up po r t o f t er r or

is m, s um mar

izedabo ve. M aybe th e Di s tr

ict Cou r t w ill un der s tan d the w

in ks andno ds con

veye d b y the p anel maj or it y inth e di r ect

io n o f s om e of

th es e s er io us er r or s . I f n ot , m aybe th e go vernm ent will ap peal th e Di s tr ict Cou r t’ s s ent enc ing de cis io n; andif s o, maybe the p anel

will co nf r on t thes e is s ues squarely after Stewa rt has been resentenced. And ma ybe the e n banc C ourt will have a chanc e to
r evi s it th em ther eaf

te r . M aybe
.1 Appendix A T he c hanges fr omth e or

igi nal op inio n t o the am end ed o pi ni ondem on s tr ate ho w the p anel ma jo rity f ail ed to a dd re ss sev er a l i mp ort a nt i ssue s:
Iss ue or Error Panel Majorit y’s Treatment of the Issue inth e O rigin al Opinio n Panel Majorit y’s Treatment of the Issue inth e Am en de d Opinio n Whether th e Di s tr ict Court erred in failing to decide whether the a bu se- of- tru st enhanc ement appli es to St ewar t’ s cas e. “The question . . . remains whe th er , b ecau s e s he w as an exp er ien cedanddedicat ed lawy er acting a s s uch whe n she br ok e the l aw inth e ma nn er that she did, her punishment s ho ul d h ave b eengr eat er

th an i t was .” Stewart I

, Sl ip Op . at 762 1. No alteration.

Whether th e Di s tr ict Court erred in failing to decide whether Stewa rt com mi tt ed p er ju ry at tr ial
. “[B]y declining to decide whe th er St ewar t c om mi tt ed perju ry or other wis e ob s truct ed justice, the district court pr oce du r ally err ed. ” Stewart I , Slip O p. at 7 623
. No alteration.

Whether th e Di s tr ict Court erred by relying on th e lac k o f h ar m ca us ed by St ew a rt’ s crim e a s a basis for its downward var ian ce. “As a pr oce du r al m att er , we

conclude that a district court may rely on the fact that no harm r es ul te d f

r omth e cr

imin al act at i s s ue. ” Stewart I

, Slip Op. at 7 604n. 33. Additional te xt: “This Court ma kes no ruling on[the] iss ue [of whether it was error to use the lack of ha rm as a basis f or downwa rd variance] now , in the cir cum s tan ces of

St ewar t’ s cas e. We note simply that it is a serious is s ue to be g iven co ns ide rat io n by the distr ict court upon reevalua ting St ewar t’ s s ent enc e.” Stewart II , Sl ip Op. at 7879-80 (empha ses added).2 Appendix A (continued) Iss ue or Err or Panel Majorit y’s Treatment of the Issue inth e O rigin al Opinio n Panel Majorit y’s Treatment of the Issue inth e Am en de d Opinio n Whethe r the District Court er r ed i n f ail ing t o p r op erly a pp ly the “t he te rrori sm enhanc ement” or by failing to apprecia te the seriousnes s of St ewar t’ s of

fe ns e. No t ad dr es s ed i n the o r igi nal opinion. Addit io nal te xt :

“ It see ms possible that, in fact, the distr ict court rejected the te r r or is m enhan cem ent

. . . based on Uni

te d St ate s v . Cr o sby

. . . .” Stewart II

, Sl ip Op . at 788 0 n .37
.

“ If the di stri ctco urt[d id thi s] . . . it wo uld

, we c onclude, be er r or .” Id
.

“ It is possible to read the record to in di cat e that

. . . .” Id
.

“ Pe rh aps th e co ur t thenr eli ed

. . . .” Id
. “This t oo would be er r or

. . . .” Id
. (all empha ses added). Whethe r Stewart’s 28-month s ent enc e was r eas on abl e. “St ewar t’ s s ent enc e is s tr iki ngl y lo w inlig

ht of what th e di s tr ict cou r t c orr ect

ly des cr ib ed as th e ‘i r r edu cib le cor e of [h er ] ex tr aor di nar

ily s ever e cr imin al co nd uct ,’ Sen t’ g T r . 11 8, ‘whi ch w as com mi tt ed o ver

an ex te nd ed per io d o f t im e, i nv ol ved repeated a cts of deception, and involve [d] significant pl anning.’ ” Stewart I

, Slip Op. at 7619 (cita tion omitted). Additional te xt: “[ T ]h e di s tr ict cou r t s ho ul d fu r th er con s id er th e ov er all qu es ti onwhe th er

th e s ent enc e to be g ive n i s app r op r

iat e in view of the ma gnitude of the of fe ns e, whichth e co ur t i ts elf has exp lic it

ly r eco gni zed .” Stewart II , Sl ip Op . at 788 2. “We h ave serio us doubts that the s ent enc e gi

venwas r eas on abl e, but th ink it ap

propriate to hear fr omth e di s tr

ict cou r t f ur th er bef or e de ciding the i s s ue. ” Id
. (emphasis added).3 Appendix A (continued) Iss ue or Err or Panel Majorit y’s Treatment of the Issue Original Opinion Panel Majorit y’s Treatment of the Issue Amended Opini on “O th er is s ues ” “[ T ]h e di s tr ict cou r t m ay consider, or r econsider, any addit io nal mat te r th at m ay bear up onSt ewar t’ s s ent enc e.” Stewart I , Sl ip Op . at 762 4. Repl ace ment text:

“Other iss ues are raised by J ud ge Wal ker , wh o f

in ds th at th ey r es ul te d i n p r oce du r al er r or ands ub s tan ti

ve unreasonablene ss , and a dd re ssed by

Jud ge C a la bre si inr es po ns e. T o the e xt ent we did not discuss or rule on those iss ues in this majority op inio n, ou r

s ile nce s ho ul d not be construed by the distr ict court, or by others relying on this opinion, to mea n that th e ma jo r it y has ado pt ed J ud ge Cal abr es i’s views or r ejec te d J ud ge Walk er ’s . We h ave n ot .” Stewart II , Sl ip Op . at 788 2- 83.T he m axi mu m s ent enc e availab le i s 180 mo nths per M S co un t. See

18 U.S.C . §§ 23 39A(a), 1 233 9B (a) (1 ). We as s um e f or pu rpo s es of

this op inio n that

th e t er ms wer e or der ed t o b e s er ved con curr ent

ly. Appendix B “In material support convictions after United Sta tes v. B ook er , 543 U.S. 2 20, 245 (2005), distr ict courts have gene rally imposed sentences of at l eas t t en y ear s pe r mat er ial su ppo rt co unt , with con s id er ably highe r

to tal s ent enc es .” Stewart II

, Slip Op. 7908 n. 4 (Wal ker, J., concurring in part and di s s ent ing inpar t)
. The fol lo wi ng

a re the sen te nc es t ha t ha ve be en give n fo r ma te ria l su pp ortof t er rori sm (“ M S”) fo llo wing Boo ker

: Case Total Sentence Months per MS Count 1 United Sta tes v. Ar

ef No . 04 -CR- 402 , 20 07 WL 804 814 , at *8 ( N. D. N. Y. M ar . 14 , 20 07) 180 mo nths fo r each of t wo de fe nd a nts. 180 months on each of 16 MS

co un ts. Uni te d St ate s v . P ara cha No. 03-CR -1197, Docket E ntry No. 88 (S.D .N .Y. J uly 21 , 20 06) 360 months. 180 months on each of 2 MS co un ts. Uni te d St ate s v . A li No. 05-CR -53, Docket Entry No. 397 (E. D. Va. A pr . 17 , 20 06) 360 months. 120 months on each of 4 MS co un ts. Uni te d St ate s v . al -M o av ad No. 03-CR -1322, Docket E ntry No s . 19 7, 2 05 (

E.D .N .Y. Sep t. 14, 200 5) , re v ’d o n o the r g

ro unds , 54 5 F .3d 139 (2 d Ci r . 20 08) 900 months for Def end ant On e; 5 40 months f or Defendant Two. 180 months on each of 5 MS

cou nt s fo r Def end ant On e; 1 80 months on each of 3 MS counts for Defendant Two. Uni te d St ate s v . Lak hani No. 03-CR -880, Docket E ntry No. 99 ( D. N. J . Se pt . 12 , 20 05) 564 months. 180 months on 1 MS count.

Uni te d St ate s v . Gamarr a-M ur ill o No. 04-CR -349, Docket E ntry No. 59 ( M .D . F la. Aug . 9, 200 5) 300 months. 180 months on 1 MS count.United Sta tes v. Roy er

No . 0 3-C R -29 6, Do ck etE ntry N os. 600 -0 2 (E.D . Va. J uly 29 , 20 05) 120 months for Def end ant s On e; 1 20 months f or Def end ant T wo; 97 months f or Def end ant T hr ee. 180 months on each of 2 MS

cou nt s fo r Def end ant On e; 1 80 months on each of 2 MS counts for Defendant Two; 97 months on 1 MS count for D efendant T hr ee. Compare those sentences with the sentence s given in United Sta tes v. Stewart : De fe nd an t Gu id elin es R eco m m en da ti on Act ual S en te nc e Stewa rt 360 months 28 months Sattar Impr isonment for

life 288 months Yousry 78 months 20 months
So ur ce: Stewart II

, Sl ip Op . 79 07- 08, 790 8 n .4 ( Walk er , J ., c on curr

ing inpar t an d dis s ent

ing inpar t)
.