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# 									The Indo-Pacific Strategy: 2 Years Later							

FPC Briefing

Camille P.  Dawson, Deputy Assistant SecretaryBureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs

Afreen Akhter, Deputy Assistant SecretaryBureau of South and Central Asian Affairs

Wednesday, February 14, 2023, 11:30am ET

Washington, D.C.

February 14, 2024

## 								Summary							

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Two years following the release of the Administration’s Indo– Pacific Strategy, DAS Camille Dawson and DAS Afreen Akhter will brief on the significant progress and achievements of the strategy so far and outline next steps.  The United States continues to firmly anchor itself in the region and work together with allies and partners to ensure a free and open, connected, prosperous, secure, and resilient Indo–Pacific.   

 
 

**Flickr photos of this briefing for download can be found here:**240214 DCFPC Hybrid Briefing on Indo-Pacific Strategy Anniversary | Flickr. 

**THE WASHINGTON FOREIGN PRESS CENTER, WASHINGTON, D.C.**

**MODERATOR:**Good afternoon, and welcome to the Foreign Press Center.  My name is Miranda Patterson, and I am the moderator for today’s briefing.  Today it is my pleasure to introduce Camille Dawson, who is the deputy assistant secretary in the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs; and Afreen Akhter, who is deputy assistant secretary in the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs.  Today they will be discussing the Biden administration’s Indo-Pacific Strategy on its second anniversary.  

Just a reminder that today’s briefing is on the record, and we will post the transcript and video of the briefing on our website fpc.state.gov later today.  For the journalists joining us via Zoom, please take a moment now to rename yourself in the chat window with your name, outlet, and country.  So now, I would now like to invite DAS Camille Dawson to share some opening remarks.

**MS DAWSON:**Thank you, Miranda, and it’s great to be here with all of you today.  I’ll share some brief remarks and then pass it over to my colleague and friend Afreen.  So we are very proud to be able to celebrate the Indo-Pacific Strategy’s two-year anniversary this week.  Over the past two years we have made really historic progress with our allies and partners to advance our common vision for a region that is free and open, connected, prosperous, secure, and resilient.  

I want to start things off by noting that the United States remains a major economic partner for the region.  U.S. companies continue to be the top source of foreign direct investment in the region, with nearly 1 trillion in U.S. investments, and roughly the same amount invested in the United States by firms from the region.  We also remain a major trade partner with more than 2 trillion in two-way trade, and exports to the region and investments from the Indo-Pacific support almost 4 million jobs in the United States.  

We of course appreciate our partners’ participation in negotiation on supply chains, clean economy, and fair economy issues as part of the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity.  And we welcome the signing of the supply chain agreement and the substantial conclusion of negotiations on the clean economy and fair economy pillars.  Like we need to adjust – is that better?  Okay, try that now.  We also look forward to working with partners on the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework Critical Minerals Dialogue, the IPEF networks initiative, and various other aspects of the framework.  

I also would like to point to a recently published independent analysis by an organization called AidData, which is an independent research lab at the College of William and Mary.  This data shows that U.S. public and private sector economic engagement across the Indo-Pacific – and this includes trade, aid, remittances, and foreign direct investment – grew by 18 percent from 2012 to 2022, and during that period, that it totaled $24.5 trillion.  So this data really demonstrates that our engagement over time has evolved from that of an aid provider to that of an investment partner as economies in the region have grown.  

So with that, I’d like to briefly highlight some of the key accomplishments across the five lines of effort of the Indo-Pacific Strategy, and this is specific to the region I cover, which is the East Asian and Pacific Affairs region.  

So first, under the free and open line of effort, we’ve strengthened global democratic renewal through the Summit for Democracy, and we’ve pushed for accountability on human rights abuses in the PRC, the DPRK, and Burma.  Additionally, in 2023 we launched several inaugural dialogues that focus on this free and open theme, to include the U.S.-ASEAN Dialogue on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, the Australia-U.S. Strategic Dialogue on Gender Equality, the U.S.-ROK Public Diplomacy Dialogue, and the U.S-ROK-Japan Trilateral Meeting on Women’s Economic Empowerment.  We’ve continued our unwavering support for democracy in Burma.  In the three years since the coup, we have provided over 317 million in lifesaving humanitarian assistance, and dedicated 400 million to advance democracy, human rights, and justice.  

Next, under the connected line of effort, we have reaffirmed and strengthened our connections both within and beyond the region.  We were thrilled to host the trilateral leaders summit at Camp David last year, which inaugurated a new era of U.S.-Japan-ROK partnership to deepen security, economic, and technology cooperation.  

Through the Quad – which, as you know, is composed of the U.S., Australia, India, and Japan – we continue to deliver concrete benefits for the Indo-Pacific, from vaccines to maritime awareness to scholarships for students.  Notably, in May 2023, we welcomed the launch of the Quad Investors Network, which will help foster co-investment in critical technologies.  We also welcomed the first cohort of the Quad STEM fellows and 1,800 new Quad infrastructure fellowships.  

We have surged our efforts in the Pacific, including with two historic summits for Pacific Island leaders at the White House, opening two new U.S. embassies in the Solomon Islands and Tonga, and establishing the Partners in the Blue Pacific.  

Under the prosperity line of effort, we are supporting regional prosperity by promoting private investment, encouraging innovation, strengthening economic competitiveness, supporting resilient supply chains, and expanding economic opportunity.  The U.S., as you know, successfully hosted APEC in 2023 under the theme of “Creating a Resilient and Sustainable Future for All,” which brought together more than 400 expert-level meetings, 10 ministerial meetings, and the leaders meeting hosted by President Biden, focused on promoting regional cooperation on a range of key priorities, including trade, energy, food security, and women and the economy.

And I’m pleased to note that we successfully signed eight agreements related to the compacts of free association with the Federated States of Micronesia, Palau, and the Marshall Islands.  Pending authorization and appropriation from Congress, once these agreements enter into force, they will enhance economic prosperity and stability and support health, education, and infrastructure for years to come.

Under our security line of effort, we are bolstering regional security by strengthening and modernizing our security alliances and partnerships, increasing joint military exercises, building the ability of countries in the region to monitor their waters in cyberspace, and advancing AUKUS, the Australia-U.S.-United Kingdom partnership.  We’ve also signed defense cooperation agreements with Indonesia and Papua New Guinea, building on decades of bilateral security cooperation, and we’ve established a mechanism for real-time information sharing on DPRK missile threats with Japan and the ROK.

And then finally, under our resilience line of effort, we’re taking steps to build an Indo-Pacific region that is resistant to the impacts of climate change and future pandemics.  Together with Partners in the Blue Pacific, we’ve dedicated funding to launch an initiative on humanitarian warehousing for disaster resilience, as well as an ocean and fisheries research vessel managed by the Pacific community.

So to sum up, over the past two years, we have done a tremendous amount in the East Asian and Pacific region.  We’ve opened new embassies, surged engagement with the Pacific Islands and Southeast Asia, and strengthened our alliances.  All of this strengthens the United States position in the Indo-Pacific, and it advances our interest in and our vision for the region amidst strategic competition.

And with that, I’m happy to turn it over to Afreen.

**MS AKHTER:**  Thank you so much, and thanks to everybody for joining us here today.  We’re really excited to talk about the Indo-Pacific Strategy and our – its two-year anniversary.  So Camille has done a really tremendous job providing examples of how we’re implementing strategy and delivering concrete outcomes within East Asia; I’ll do the same for South Asia.

So starting with free and open, to advance that pillar of the Indo-Pacific Strategy, which is really focused on democratic governance and building democratic institutions, we’ve launched what we call the South Asia Governance Fund, which is a fund that provides grants to dozens of civil society organizations across South Asia to support the development of democratic institutions.  For instance, we’ve worked with agricultural workers in Bangladesh; we do law, judiciary work in Sri Lanka.  And I’m happy to talk about that work in greater detail during the Q&A if you’re interested.

On the second pillar, building connections across the region, Camille talked about some of the missions that we’re opening in the Pacific Islands.  We also opened a brand new mission in the Maldives with our first U.S. Ambassador Hugo Yon, and we have a really ambitious agenda for this new partnership across security, across economic issues, across democracy and governance issues as well.

We’re also investing more in multilateral institutions and many lateral relationships.  So Camille talked about the Quad.  In South Asia, we’re focused on the Indian Ocean Rim Association, which is a grouping of many different nations.  We had our Deputy Secretary Rich Verma visit the IORA secretariat last May.  We’re dedicating science resources to IORA, and we anticipate greater cooperation in 2024, specifically focused on the issues of maritime security and climate change with IORA’s Small Island Developing States, to include Maldives.  We’re also driving prosperity at home and across the Indo-Pacific region through economic investments, assistance, and trade.  

So with India, which of course is our biggest partner in South Asia, we launched in January of last year the U.S-India Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technology.  We call this iCET.  The goal is to build a resilient semiconductor supply chain, elevate space cooperation, and partner on the next generation of telecommunications – so, again, a really ambitious initiative to build cooperation on critical and emerging technologies with India.  And we’re making huge investments throughout South Asia.  So last fall, the United States and India’s Adani Group announced a half-billion-dollar investment in the Port of Colombo in Sri Lanka.  This investment is intended to expand the capacity of the port, which is already operating at like 90 percent capacity and really enable Sri Lanka to become an even bigger economic player in the region as it sits in this – in this prime shipping route.  

To bolster regional security, we’re always engaging with our South Asian partners and really looking to build out those security relationships in the region.  And we’re doing that through a variety of ways, but one way we’re doing it is, of course, providing our partners with new capabilities.  So in Maldives, for instance, we recently announced the delivery of four new patrol boats to help them monitor their EEZs.  We’ve provided three Coast Guard cutters to Sri Lanka.  And so those are just a few examples of the concrete systems we’re providing to our partners in South Asia.  

As another example, the United States and India have deepened a very broad and multifaceted defense partnership through joint exercises, strengthened defense industrial cooperation, the annual 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue – which is our Secretary of Defense and Secretary of State and the associated ministers on their side – and we’re really focused on building out that defense relationship.  It’s one of the key features of our Indo-Pacific strategy.  

And lastly, I’d like to talk about the final pillar, which is advancing regional resilience to transnational threats. So what does that mean?  We want to talk about it in terms of our work on infrastructure or – and climate change and responding to pandemics.  So under the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment, which is another initiative we announced recently, we’re working with India to deploy multi-billion-dollar climate infrastructure, a new fund that will include a $500 million investment contribution from our Development Finance Corporation.  This will also include 40,000 public e-buses through an innovative payment secured – security mechanism financed by the Government of India, the United States, and our partners of philanthropy.  

And then finally, we also launched the Climate Action Champions Work in South Asia, which is intended to invest in the next generation of climate leaders to support climate advocacy and respond to their needs throughout the region.  So as you can see, we’re deeply engaged with all of our partners across the Indo-Pacific and East Asia and South Asia.  I’ve just shared a handful of the many ways that we continue to look to do so in the future.  Thank you.  

**MODERATOR:**Thank you both.  Our briefers have agreed to answer some questions.  For those of you in the room, if you have a question, please just raise your hand and wait to be called o n and also state your name, outlet.  And as a reminder, for our journalists that are joining us online, please be sure to change your screen name to include your name, outlet, and country.  To ask a question, just click on the raised hand icon.  And so we’ll do some questions from journalists in the room.  I’ll start with you, Farrah. 

**QUESTION:**Thank you so much for doing this.  Obviously (inaudible) past couple years, but there’s obviously a lot of political instability from the U.S. at the moment.  In the past week alone, we’ve seen a former president (inaudible) attacks on certain countries that don’t pay a share, we’ve seen resistance to Indo security – Indo-Pacific security funding in the U.S. Congress, support waning for Ukraine.  Are you concerned that Indo-Pacific nations could be looking at the U.S. right now and asking can we really rely on you as a partner? 

Second to that, if you’ll indulge me, what does the administration see as the next critical steps for the AUKUS submarine pact?  And does that pact remain rock solid (inaudible) if there’s a change in administration at next election?  

**MS DAWSON:**I can touch on this first and ask Afreen to add as well.  So on the first part of the question, I think I would say that the Indo-Pacific Strategy itself is a reassurance of commitment to the region from the United States.  And the strategy outlines the way in which we seek to deepen our connections with the region in a way that is lasting and that creates a lattice work of overlapping relationships – bilateral relationships, mini-lateral, and multilateral relationships that when layered together really create this lattice work of partnerships and alliances that are not easily undone, regardless of what U.S. administration might be in power.  

On your second question about the AUKUS partnership and next steps, of course the U.S. Australia, and the United Kingdom continue to work really in lockstep to implement the pathway forward for AUKUS, as was outlined in March of 2023.  A lot of that effort has been directed toward Pillar I, the nuclear-powered conventional submarine technology. 

As we look forward, there is a lot of work in identifying the path forward for Pillar II, which is related to many additional technologies.  So I think that we can look forward to coming information and announcements about Pillar II and what they will mean for the cooperation going forward. 

**MS AKHTER:**  Thanks, and I’ll respond a bit more on your first question.  It’s a great question.  I actually think support for the Indo-Pacific is – enjoys broad bipartisan support by both Republicans and Democrats.  The Trump administration had an Indo-Pacific strategy, large portions that are reflected in the Biden-Harris administration’s Indo-Pacific Strategy. 

If you look at the House and Senate markups for their FY24 budget – I think that’s where we are these days – there was actually a baseline earmark for the Indo-Pacific in both budget bills.  So I think what that clearly demonstrates is a broad commitment both in strategy and resourcing and policy to this region over the course of the next decade, irrespective of who’s in power.  Thanks. 

**MODERATOR:**  Okay. We’ll go here in the front. 

**QUESTION:**  Thank you, Afreen, and thank you, Camilla, for doing this.  And I – I’m sorry.  Mispronounce your name?   

**MS DAWSON:**  (Inaudible.)

**QUESTION:**  Okay.  I’m sorry for that.  So my question – I have a couple of questions on Bangladesh and Indo-Pacific, obviously (inaudible).  How does the U.S. plan to align the Indo-Pacific Strategy with Bangladesh, considering its emergence as an authoritarian regime?  And over the years, we heard harsh criticism from the prime minister about the Indo-Pacific Strategy.  And also, what is – how (inaudible) align with the (inaudible) authoritarian Government of Bangladesh? 

**MS AKHTER:**  (Inaudible) question from you.  (Laughter.)  So I think we are focused, we are incredibly focused, on engaging society in Bangladesh.  Again, the first pillar of the Indo-Pacific Strategy is a free and open Indo-Pacific region.  So I talked about the South Asia Governance Fund.  We’re working with farmers in Bangladesh that were struggling to obtain government services, but that’s just one small facet.  We’re working with labor organizers.  We’re working with a whole range of civil society actors.  And our goal in doing so is to really build up civic space in Bangladesh, preserve civic space, build democratic institutions over a long term. 

We’re also engaged broadly with Bangladesh on broader sets of priorities.  And we were actually pleased to see Bangladesh’s Indo-Pacific outlook, which really mirrors a lot of what we’re trying to do in terms of economic investment, working with Bangladesh on climate change, building out security and defense cooperation between our two countries – Bangladesh is, of course, one of our largest peacekeeping contributors, and we’re very pleased to support that effort. 

So we actually do see broad alignment between our strategy, their outlook.  But in response to your question on how we’re going to continue to engage on democracy and human rights issues moving forward, again our focus is really civil society.  Thanks. 

**QUESTION:**  (Inaudible) commitment to reflecting the will of the people of Bangladesh.  What specific (inaudible) the U.S. consider undertaking to facilitate that return back to democracy?  And we have seen some criticism – and I can (inaudible) – a *Wall Street Journal*piece that U.S. is pushing back from democracy promotion in Bangladesh.  So what is your stance right now as we have seen lot of leverage in Bangladesh for democracy and voting rights and upholding human rights? 

**MS AKHTER:**  I mean, I think I would go back to my point on really wanting to focus on building up the institutions of democracy, the levers of democracy, in Bangladesh.  So that is working with media; so we have a tremendous amount of work ongoing developing free media in Bangladesh, working with civil society, working with labor organizers across the spectrum to build up these institutions of democracy that will enable Bangladesh to become more democratic over the longer term. 

**MODERATOR:**  Okay.  I’m sorry.  We have questions – behind you.  Khushboo, please – no, you.  Yeah. 

**QUESTION:**  Yeah, my question – I have a little follow-up on the COFA money, which is not coming in.  The renewals were signed last year, but the money hasn’t come through.  The president of Palau, a few months back he said that he’s finding it is a constant battle to prove his people that the partnership with the U.S. is worth it since the money is not coming in.  What are the efforts that you are making to make sure that this money comes through?  And do you think allies like Japan, Philippines, which are closer to the country can also chip in when it comes to preventing China’s influence in that part, which is actually facing a lot of economic distress? 

And my second question is about the embassy (inaudible) body.  If you could share anything with us regarding the negotiation and if countries like Tuvalu are on the list of future embassies in terms of negotiating and opening an embassy in country like (inaudible).  Thank you. 

**MODERATOR:**  Your outlet? 

**QUESTION:**  I’m with South China Morning Post.  Thank you. 

**MS DAWSON:**  Okay.  Thank you.  So on the COFA discussions, I would simply say that the State Department, the White House, we continue to advocate for the authorization and appropriation of funds.  We feel it’s critically important to continue to work in close concert and in support of the Freely Associated States.  

The next part of that question related to other partners in the region, supporting not only those countries but the broader Pacific Islands, we absolutely think that others within the region and beyond have an important role to play in supporting the Pacific Islands’ own vision for their future.  And so we do work closely with many of our partners and allies, through entities, such as the Pacific Islands Forum, existing regional architecture, also through Partners in the Blue Pacific that includes partners in Europe as well as the Indo-Pacific region.  The United States, Canada are all participating in support of listening to the priorities that the Pacific Island countries themselves state as the most important, and then identifying the ways in which we can collectively utilize our resources to help build up capacity that they have identified as being necessary.

On the last part of the question about new embassies, as I noted, we in really record time have opened new embassies in the Solomon Islands and in Tonga.  We are in the process of working towards opening in the very near future an embassy in Vanuatu, and we are in discussions about opening a new embassy with Kiribati.  I won’t get into internal private discussions, but those are ongoing. 

**MODERATOR:**  Okay.  I think maybe we might have time for one short question – one more short question right here.  Sorry, the gentleman in the back. 

**QUESTION:**  Thank you.  My name is Shinichi Akiyama, working for Mainichi newspaper, Japan.  I have a few questions related to Japan.  One is, when it comes to the trilateral cooperation, obviously Japan, U.S., South Korea; Japan, U.S., Philippines; Japan, U.S., Australia – such relationships have improved a lot.  But there is one missing part, is Taiwan.  How do you think about the include Taiwan into this multilateral, like, framework?  Is it difficult or is there any specific problem?  

And the second question is about the regional tension, especially East Asia.  There is now tension raised between, like, Japan, U.S., ROK and Russia, China, North Korea.  How much are you concerned about this tension and how we can deal with it? 

**MS DAWSON:**  Sure.  On the first question related to Taiwan and engagement with Taiwan, the United States of course, as you know, maintains an unofficial relationship with Taiwan. Taiwan we see as a democratic, likeminded, and very capable partner, and we encourage countries to expand their engagement with Taiwan and to enable Taiwan’s involvement in the international space.  

On the second question about concerns – the concerns you cited: DPRK, Russia – absolutely, we are concerned about what appears to be a growing alignment between the DPRK and Russia.  We, along with our likeminded partners, have expressed our concern about that.  We believe that likeminded countries need to come together to use all tools available to deter any kind of aggression or provocation along those lines. 

**MODERATOR:**  Okay.  Thank you.  Our briefers have another engagement, so we’re going to conclude the briefing.  But if you do have a question, just send it to me and I’ll try and make sure it gets answered for you.  So this concludes our briefing.  A special thanks to our two lovely briefers for sharing their time with us today, and for all of those who participated.  Thank you.

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Bureau of East Asian and Pacific AffairsBureau of South and Central Asian AffairsDistrict of ColumbiaForeign Press CentersForeign Press CentersIndo-PacificIndo-Pacific StrategyNew YorkTreaties and International Agreements

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