IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
N O. 2018-CP-01125-COA TRAVIS JAMES THOMPSON A/K/A TRAVIS THOMPSON A/K/A TRAVIS J. THOMPSON APPELLANT

v. STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 06/22/2018 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. DAL W ILLIAMSON COURT FROM W HICH APPEALED: JONES COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: TRAVIS JAMES THOMPSON (PRO SE) ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: LISA L. BLOUNT NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - POST-CONVICTION RELIEF DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 11/26/2019 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: MANDATE ISSUED: BEFORE J. WILSON, P.J., WESTBROOKS AND LAWRENCE, JJ. WESTBROOKS, J., FOR THE COURT: ¶1. Travis Jam es Thom pson f iled a m otion f

o r post-conviction collateral relief (PCR) in the Jones County Circuit Court in June 2018. C hallenging three guilty -plea convictions, Thom p son claim ed the indictm ent was f atally d ef ective and unconstitutional a nd that he had been illegally sentenced as a non v i o l ent habitual of f ender. The circuit court determ ined Thom p son f reely , voluntarily , knowingly , and in t e l l i gently entered t he pleas of guilty and
f ound that the PCR m otion wa s w ithout m erit. T hom pson appeals. W e af

f irm the circuit court’s decision.FACTS

¶2. In October 2016, T hom pson was indicted on t hree counts of possession of controlled substances with intent to sell them within 1,500 f eet of a school. In August 2017, Thom pson
p l e a ded guilty to the three charges and was sentenced as a nonviolent habitual of f ender a s f ollows:
Count I

- (423 gram s of m ariju a n a ) : t e n y ears in MDOC custody , with f ive y ears s uspended, w i t h f

i v e y ears to serve, and f ive y ears of post-release supervision.
Count II - (30 gram s of cocaine): ten y ears in MDOC custody , with f ive y ears suspended, f

ive y e ars to serve, and f

ive y ears of

post-release supervision.
Count III - (69 gram s o f m etham phetam i ne): twenty

- f

ive y ears i n MDOC custody , with ten y e ars suspended, f i f t een y ears to serve, and f ive y ears of post-release supervision. The circuit court set the sentences to run concurrently to one another. ¶3. I n October 2017, Thom pson sent the circuit court a letter that the court treated as a
p e t i t i o n f o r parole eligibility or e arly release. In January 2018, the circuit court denie d Thom p son’s request. In June 2018, Thom pson sent another letter t o the circuit court. This letter was titled “m otion t o quash indictm ent.” The circuit court t reated it a s a PCR m otion and denied it. On July

30, 2018, the circuit clerk received Thom pson’s notice of appeal. ¶4. I n A u g u s t 2 0 1 8 , T h om pson f iled a “m otion to quash illegal sentence and get f ull im m unity reversal.” There i s no indication in the record that the circuit court has ruled on this m otion. Som etim e in October 2018, Thom p son f iled a copy of th i s m o tion as his opening b rief o n appeal. A f ew day s later, T hom

pson f iled a nother notice of appeal, but he did n ot specif

y the order that he intended t o appeal. Consequently , this Court only has

2jurisdiction over Thom pson’s unsuccessf

ul “m otion to quash indictm ent.”
STANDARD OF REVIEW ¶5. A circuit court m ay deny relief and s u mma r i l y d i s m i s s a P C R mo t i on without conducting an evidenti a ry hearing if “it plainly appears f rom the f ace of the m otion, any annexed exhibits and the p rior proceedings in the case that the m ovant is not entitled to any relief

. ” Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-11(2) (Rev. 2 015). “ To s u c c e e d o n appeal, the m ovant

m ust: (1) m ake a substantial s howing of the denial of a state or f ederal right and (2) show that the claim is procedurally alive.” J ohnson v. S

tate , 247 So. 3d 3 00, 301 (¶1) (Miss. Ct. App. 2017). “Th[ e] [ reviewing] [ c]ourt’s applic a b l e standard o f r eview when considering the denial of a [ PCR m o tion] is w ell settled; th[ e reviewing c]ourt will not disturb the f actual
f indings of a trial court in deny ing the petition unless such f i ndings are clearly erroneous.” Rowland v. State , 42 So

. 3 d 5 0 3 , 5 0 6 (¶8) (Miss. 2 010) (citing M oore v. State , 986 So. 2d 928, 932 (¶13) (Miss. 2008)). “However, where questions of law are raised the applicable standard of review is de novo.” Id

. ANALYSIS
I. Sufficiency of the Indictm ent ¶6. Thom

pson asserted in the subject PCR m otion tha t t he indictm ent was insuf f icient because i t was f

orged by the district attorney , the grand jury f oreperson’s signature was not af f ixed t o it, and the phrase “against the peace and dignity of t he state” was om itted f rom it. The State argues that Thom pson abandoned this assignm ent of error on appeal because it was not discussed in his brief

.

3¶7. The M ississippi Suprem e Court has held t h a t w h e r e an assignm ent o f e r ror is not discussed in an appellant’s brief , “it is c onsidered abandoned or waived.” Magee v. State , 542 So. 2d 228, 234 (Miss. 1 9 89). It is well-settled that “a def endant who f

ails to raise an issue i n his PCR m otion b e f ore the trial court m ay not raise that issue f or the f i rst tim e on appeal.” Marshall v. State , 136 So. 3d 443, 4 45 (¶3) (Miss. Ct. App. 2013) (quoting Fluker

v. State , 17 So. 3 d 181, 183 ( ¶5) (Miss. Ct. App. 2009)). Notwithstanding the abandonm ent of these errors as m e ntioned by the State, a review of the record indicates Thom pson’s claim s regarding the indictm e nt are without m erit. T hom pson overlooked or f

ailed to a cknowledge the grand jury f

o reperson’s a f

f idavit and accom

pany ing signature. The record is also clear that the indictm e nt w as signed as a “True Bill” b y A ssistant District Attorney Kristen Martin. Thom p son’s nam e was correctly included in t he charging p ortion of t he indictm ent. W e f ind these claim s to be waived and also without m erit. ¶8. Thom

pso n also argues, f

or the f i rst tim e on appeal, that the i ndictm ent i s def ective because i t d oes not include the phrase “against the peace and dignity of t he state.” Thom p son’s indictm ent i ncludes the phrase “against the peace and dignity

. ” A n d even if that phrase had b een om itted, Thom pson would not be entitled to relief . Article 6, Section 169 of t he Mississippi Constitution provides in p art t hat “all indictm ents shall conclude ‘against the p eace and dignity of the state.’” W hile our courts have enf orced t his constitutional requirem ent, “it is a m atter of the f orm of the indictm ent.” Johnson , 247 So. 3d at 302 (¶5) (citing Brandau v. S

tate , 662 So. 2d 1051, 1055 (Miss. 1995)). Form al def ects are waived by a valid guilty plea. I

d

. The circuit court f

ound that T hom

pson’s guilty pleas were valid.

4A review of the transcript i n t he record bef ore this Court dem onstrates that Thom pson entered his g uilty pleas f

reely , voluntarily , knowingly , and intelligently . W e f ind that these issues were waived and that they are without m erit.
II. Legality of Sentence ¶9. Thom

pson m a intains that he should not have been sentenced as a nonviolent habitual of f ender under Mississippi Code A nnotated section 99-19-81 (Rev. 2 015). He reasons that he is serving illegal sentences. Thom p son’s three prior convictions were listed in an exhibit

to the indictm ent. Further, the sentencing orders related to his p rior t hree convictions were discussed and entered into e videnc e d u ring t he g uilty

- plea s entencing hearing without objection. “ [ F]ailure to object to a habitual-of f ender enhancem ent during sen t e n cing procedurally bars a def

endant f rom raising that issue on appeal.” Martin v. State , 214 So. 3d 217, 220 (¶6) (Miss. 2 0 17) ( citing Cummings v. S tate , 465 So. 2d 993, 995 (Miss. 1985)).
“A plea is considered ‘voluntary a nd intelligent’ when the def endant knows the elem ents of the charge against him , understands the charge’s relation t o him , w hat ef f ect the plea will have, and what sentence the plea m ay bring.” W illis v. State , 66 So. 3d 740, 743 (¶9) (Miss.
Ct. App. 2011) (citing Alexander v. State , 605 So. 2d 117 0 , 1 1 7 2 ( M i ss. 1992)). As previously stated, up on r eview of the record, this Court f inds that Thom

pson f reely , voluntarily , knowingly , and intelligently entere d h i s g u i lty pleas. Thom pson never raised this issue prior to entering such plea. 1 This issue is waived and also without m erit.

1 It is w o r th n o t in g th at T h o m

p so n w as g iv en illeg ally len ien t sen ten ces b ecau se h e w a s n o t sen ten ced to th e “m ax im u m term o f im

p r iso n m e n t,” as req u ired b y sectio n 9 9 -1 9

- 8 1

. T h e M ississip p i S u p rem e C o u rt h as stated t h a t “w h en th e erro r b en ef its th e d ef en d an t in t h e f o rm o f a m o re len ien t sen ten ce, it is h arm less erro r.” S w ea t v. S ta te , 9 1 2 S o . 2 d 4 5 8 , 5III. All of the Rem aining Claim s of Error

¶10. Thom

pson presents several claim s on a p p e a l t h a t w e r e n o t i n cluded in his PCR
“m otion to quash indictm ent.” “This Court declines to consider m atters which were never presented or argued in t he trial court a nd a r e not part of the recor d b e f o r e us today .”
Ham p t o n v
. S t a t e , 1 48 So. 3d 992, 995 (¶7) (Miss. 2014). Any assignm ents of error not raised in the subject PCR m otion are not properly bef o re this Court and will not be addressed. ¶11. AFFIRMED. BARNES, C.J., CARLTON AND J. WILSON, P.JJ., GREENLEE, TINDELL, McDONALD, LAWRENCE, McCARTY AND C. WILSON, JJ., CONCUR.

4 6 1 (¶9 ) (M iss. 2 0 0 5 ). 6