[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 13-10109

Non-Argument Calendar ________________________

D. C. Docket No. 4:12-cv-00065-KOB

J.W. MOON,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBBER COMPANY (THE),

 Defendant-Appellee.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Alabama ________________________

(May 28, 2013)

Before DUBINA, Chief Judge, WILSON and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

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Plaintiff-Appellant J.W. Moon (“Moon”) appeals the district court’s grant of 

Defendant-Appellee The Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company’s (“Goodyear”) 

motion to dismiss his complaint. The district court determined that Moon’s state 

law claims were preempted by § 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act 

(“LMRA”), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a). Thereafter, treating Moon’s claims as § 301 

claims, the court found that dismissal was warranted because Moon failed to 

exhaust the grievance procedures set forth in the collective bargaining agreement 

entered between Goodyear and Moon’s labor union. After thorough review of the 

record and consideration of the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the 

district court. 

I.

Moon worked as a forklift operator at Goodyear’s manufacturing plant in 

Gadsden, Alabama for 37 years. Certain employees at this plant, including Moon, 

were unionized and represented by the United Steelworkers of America (“the 

Union”). In 2009, Goodyear and the Union entered into master negotiations which 

included provisions regarding the out-sourcing of union jobs to non-union 

members. Specifically, Goodyear and the Union agreed that employees whose 

jobs were outsourced would be paid a discretionary separation payment in 

exchange for their agreeing to leave Goodyear. The separation payment was 

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$2,000 for each year of the employee’s service with Goodyear, with a maximum 

payment of $50,000. The terms of this agreement were memorialized in the Fork 

Truck Staff Reduction Agreement (hereinafter the “collective bargaining 

agreement”). 

In December 2010, Goodyear notified Moon he was eligible for a $50,000 

separation payment because his job was set to be outsourced. Moon was presented 

with a Buyout Application Form to apply for the separation payment. The Buyout 

Application Form drafted “FOR BARGAINING UNIT EMPLOYEES OF THE 

GOODYEAR-GADSDEN PLANT” is specifically based upon the “Buyout 

provisions of the [collective bargaining agreement.]” [R. 6 at 11.] It further stated 

that “[the employee] understand[s] that [Goodyear] will make the final 

determination as to whether to accept application in accordance with the [collective 

bargaining agreement.]” [Id.] Moon signed the form as did a Goodyear 

representative. The form stated that Moon’s last day of employment would be 

December 31, 2010.

In anticipation of his impending retirement, Moon cancelled his disability 

insurance, signed up for social security, and sought an alternate healthcare plan. 

Prior to December 31, 2010, however, Goodyear determined it would not 

outsource Moon’s job and refused to pay him the $50,000. As a result, Moon filed 

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suit against Goodyear in Alabama state court for breach of contract. Goodyear 

removed the matter to the Northern District of Alabama contending that Moon’s 

breach of contract claim was preempted by federal labor law. The district court 

denied Moon’s subsequent motion to remand the case to state court. Thereafter, 

Goodyear filed a motion to dismiss Moon’s complaint, which the district court 

granted. Moon then perfected this appeal. 

II.

We review de novo a district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss under 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. Am. Dental 

Ass’n v. Cigna Corp., 605 F.3d 1283, 1288 (11th Cir. 2010). We also review de 

novo “whether § 301 preempts a state-law claim.” Atwater v. Nat’l Football 

League Players Ass’n, 626 F.3d 1170, 1179 (11th Cir. 2010). 

III.

A. Section 301 preemption

We turn first to whether Moon’s state law claims for breach of contract, 

unjust enrichment, and fraud are preempted by § 301(a) of the LMRA. This 

section provides:

Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor 

organization representing employees in an industry affecting 

commerce as defined in this chapter, or between any such labor 

organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United 

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States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount 

in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.

29 U.S.C. § 185(a). Thus, § 301 “grants jurisdiction to federal courts to adjudicate 

employment disputes involving collective bargaining agreements[.]” Bartholomew 

v. AGL Res., Inc., 361 F.3d 1333, 1338 (11th Cir. 2004). Section 301 likewise 

provides the foundation for the preemption doctrine, summarized by the Supreme 

Court in Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 108 S. Ct. 

1877 (1988) in stating:

[I]f the resolution of a state-law claim depends upon the meaning of a 

collective bargaining agreement, the application of state law (which 

might lead to inconsistent results since there could be as many statelaw principles as there are States) is pre-empted and federal labor-law 

principles-necessarily uniform throughout the Nation–must be 

employed to resolve the dispute.

Id. at 405–06, 108 S. Ct. at 1881. In determining whether Moon’s state law claims 

require interpretation of the terms of the collective bargaining agreement, we look 

to the elements of each challenged state law claim. Lightning v. Roadway Express, 

Inc., 60 F.3d 1551, 1557 (11th Cir. 1995) (analyzing § 301 preemption of tort 

claims); see also Bartholomew, 361 F.3d at 1338–39 (extending this analysis to a 

breach of contract claim). With regard to Moon’s state tort claims, § 301 

preemption requires the court to determine whether the state law claim “confers 

nonnegotiable state-law rights on employers or employees independent of any right 

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established by contract, or, instead, whether evaluation of the tort claim is 

inextricably intertwined with consideration of the terms of the labor contract.” 

Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 213, 105 S. Ct. 1904, 1912 (1985). 

We hold that Moon’s three state law claims are all preempted by § 301. 

1. Breach of contract 

In Alabama, “[a] plaintiff can establish a breach-of-contract claim by 

showing (1) the existence of a valid contract binding the parties in the action, (2) 

his own performance under the contract, (3) the defendant’s non-performance, and 

(4) damages.” State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Slade, 747 So. 2d 293, 303 (Ala. 

1999) (internal quotation marks omitted). “The basic elements of a contract are an 

offer and an acceptance, consideration, and mutual assent to the essential terms of 

the agreement.” Armstrong Bus. Servs., Inc. v. AmSouth Bank, 817 So. 2d 665, 

673 (Ala. 2001). 

To establish the existence of a contract the court must analyze the terms of 

the buyout provisions contained in the collective bargaining agreement. The 

Buyout Application Form drafted “FOR BARGAINING UNIT EMPLOYEES OF 

THE GOODYEAR-GADSDEN PLANT” is specifically based upon the “Buyout 

provisions of the Fork Truck Staff Reduction Agreement [i.e., the collective 

bargaining agreement.]” [R. 6 at 11.] And to determine whether Goodyear 

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breached the Buyout Application Form, we must determine whether it breached the 

terms supplied in the collective bargaining agreement, as those are the terms 

specifically referred to in the Buyout Application Form. Consequently, Moon’s 

breach of contract claim is preempted by § 301. See Bartholomew, 361 F.3d at 

1339 (“Because the plaintiff’s state-law breach of contract claims are substantially 

dependent upon an analysis of the collective bargaining agreement, they are 

preempted by § 301 of the LMRA[.]”). 

2. Unjust enrichment

Moon can recover for unjust enrichment if he can prove that Goodyear 

“holds money which, in equity and good conscience, belongs to [Moon] or holds 

money which was improperly paid to [Goodyear] because of mistake or fraud.” 

Mantiply v. Mantiply, 951 So. 2d 638, 654 (Ala. 2006) (internal quotation marks 

and emphasis omitted). In his operative complaint, Moon alleges that Goodyear 

“has been unjustly enriched as a result of its inducement of [Moon’s] actions 

followed by its refusal to pay [Moon] the separation amount.” [R. 22 ¶ 16.] 

Hence, Moon claims that Goodyear should have paid him due to his reliance on the 

Buyout Application Form. The Buyout Application Form, however, contains no 

terms of its own, and instead adopts the buyout provisions of the collective 

bargaining agreement. Thus, to determine whether equity and good conscience 

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dictates that Moon recover the money he requests, we must interpret the only terms 

provided—the buyout provisions of the collective bargaining agreement. Because 

determining whether Moon is entitled to the separation amount clearly “depends 

upon the meaning of a collective bargaining agreement,” Lingle, 486 U.S. at 406, 

108 S. Ct. at 1881, Moon’s claim for unjust enrichment is preempted by § 301. 

3. Fraud

The elements of fraud are: 

(1) a false representation (2) of a material existing fact (3) reasonably 

relied upon by the plaintiff (4) who suffered damage as a proximate 

consequence of the misrepresentation. To prevail on a promissory 

fraud claim . . . that is, one based upon a promise to act or not to act in 

the future, two additional elements must be satisfied: (5) proof that at 

the time of the misrepresentation, the defendant had the intention not 

to perform the act promised, and (6) proof that the defendant had an 

intent to deceive.

Waddell & Reed, Inc. v. United Investors Life Ins., 875 So. 2d 1143, 1160 (Ala. 

2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). The false representation Moon directs 

the court to is the Buyout Application Form. Whether Goodyear’s failure to pay 

the buyout was fraudulent, however, depends entirely on the terms of the collective 

bargaining agreement, which serve as the terms of the Buyout Application Form. 

Thus, resolution of Moon’s fraud claim “is substantially dependent upon analysis 

of the terms of an agreement made between the parties in a labor contract[.]” AllisCase: 13-10109 Date Filed: 05/28/2013 Page: 8 of 11 
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Chalmers, 471 U.S. at 220, 105 S. Ct. at 1916. Consequently, Moon’s fraud claim 

is preempted by § 301.1

B. Section 301 Claim

After determining that Moon’s state-law claims were preempted by the 

LRMA, the district court analyzed Moon’s claims under § 301. Although an 

employee may sue an employer under § 301 for breach of a collective bargaining 

agreement, the employee first must exhaust the grievance procedures in the 

collective bargaining agreement. Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 

652–53, 85 S. Ct. 614, 616 (1965); see also Mason v. Cont’l Grp., Inc., 763 F.2d 

1219, 1222 (11th Cir. 1985) (“Employees claiming breach of a collective 

bargaining agreement or wrongful termination of employment by their employer 

are bound by that agreement’s terms providing a method of resolving disputes 

between them and their employer.”). Thus, when an employee has not attempted 

to utilize the dispute resolution mechanisms available to him under the collective 

bargaining agreement, his independent suit is to be dismissed. Mason, 763 F.2d at 

1222. 

 

1 Because Moon’s state law claims against Goodyear are all preempted by § 301 of the 

LMRA, the district court properly denied Moon’s motion to remand the case to Alabama state 

court. See Sams v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union, AFL/CIO, CLC, 835 F.2d 848, 

849–50 (11th Cir. 1988). 

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With regard to any potential § 301 claim, we conclude that such claims were 

also appropriately dismissed. Such claims are not cognizable because Moon 

“fail[ed] to make use of the grievance procedure established in the collectivebargaining agreement[.]” Allis-Chalmers, 471 U.S. at 220–21, 105 S. Ct. at 1916. 

The grievance procedure explicitly requires that an employee who has spoken to 

his area manager about a grievance and is unsatisfied, reduce his grievance to 

writing and sign the complaint.2

 [R. 4-1 at 10.] Moon does not contend that he 

followed this mandate. Moon instead argues that he in effect complied with the 

grievance procedures because the Union failed to assist him when he sought their 

help. This contention is not persuasive as the grievance procedures above dictate 

that Moon was responsible for initiating the procedures, not the Union.3

 

Therefore, the district court properly dismissed his § 301 claim.

IV.

 

2 Moon explicitly refers to the 2009 master negotiations in his operative complaint, [R. 22 

¶ 4], and this document is central to his § 301 claim. Therefore, we may consider it at the motion 

to dismiss stage. See Brooks v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Fla., Inc., 116 F.3d 1364, 1369 

(11th Cir. 1997) (“[W]here the plaintiff refers to certain documents in the complaint and those 

documents are central to the plaintiff’s claim, then the Court may consider the documents part of 

the pleadings for purposes of Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, and the defendant’s attaching such 

documents to the motion to dismiss will not require conversion of the motion into a motion for 

summary judgment.”). 

3 Moon acknowledges that his claim is against Goodyear, and is not a hybrid claim 

against Goodyear and the Union. [See Appellant’s Reply Br. at 5.] 

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For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is affirmed. 

AFFIRMED.

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