1

STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA

SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS

Ronald C. Davis,

Petitioner Below, Petitioner

vs.) No. 20-0897 (Jackson County 19-C-77)

Donnie Ames, Superintendent, 

Mt. Olive Correctional Complex,

Respondent Below, Respondent

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Self-represented petitioner Ronald C. Davis appeals the October 20, 2020, order of the 

Circuit Court of Jackson County denying his second petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 

Respondent Donnie Ames, Superintendent, Mt. Olive Correctional Complex, by counsel Andrea 

Nease Proper, filed a response in support of the circuit court’s order. Petitioner filed a reply.

The Court has considered the parties’ briefs and the record on appeal. The facts and legal 

arguments are adequately presented, and the decisional process would not be significantly aided 

by oral argument. Upon consideration of the standard of review, the briefs, and the record 

presented, the Court finds no substantial question of law and no prejudicial error. For these 

reasons, a memorandum decision affirming the circuit court’s order is appropriate under Rule 21 

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

On September 23, 2010, petitioner barricaded the front door and windows of a home he 

shared with the victim, Carol Parsons, and set fire to the home. The victim was inside and died as a 

result of the fire. The victim’s daughter and son-in-law lived beside the home and reported that 

they heard pounding and a scream from the victim’s home on the night in question. The victim’s 

son-in-law reported to police that he saw petitioner bend over on the victim’s front porch 

immediately before a ball of flames shot over petitioner’s head. Bystanders attempted to rescue the 

victim, but were unsuccessful. Several witnesses stated that, while they attempted to rescue the 

victim, petitioner watched, petted a dog, barked, laughed, and whittled wood. Petitioner also told

the victim’s family that night that he “burned her alive.” When police arrived on the scene, 

petitioner gave inconsistent accounts of his whereabouts when the fire started. Petitioner was 

indicted on one count of first-degree murder and one count of first-degree arson. After a seven-day 

FILED

August 27, 2021

EDYTHE NASH GAISER, CLERK

SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS

OF WEST VIRGINIA
2

trial, during which the State presented thirty-eight witnesses in support of its case, a jury found 

petitioner guilty on both counts of the indictment. The jury did not recommend mercy on the 

murder conviction. By order entered on September 19, 2011, the Circuit Court of Jackson County

sentenced petitioner to a life term of incarceration, without the possibility of parole, for 

first-degree murder and twenty years of incarceration for first-degree arson, said sentences to run 

consecutively. 

Petitioner filed an appeal from the September 19, 2011, sentencing order, raising eight

assignments of error: (1) unreasonable constraints were placed upon the questioning and 

cross-examination of witnesses at the preliminary hearing; (2) it was error for the circuit court to 

refuse to strike a witness’s testimony; (3) it was reversible error for the circuit court not to admit 

twenty tape recorded conversations between petitioner and the victim into evidence; (4) it was 

error for the circuit court to deny a mistrial after a witness’s testimony was found to be incorrect; 

(5) it was error for the circuit court to admit petitioner’s statements to law enforcement into 

evidence because the statements were made without the provision of Miranda warnings;

1 (6) the 

indictment should have been dismissed due to spoliation of evidence; (7) it was error for the circuit 

court to not give an instruction about spoliation of evidence; and (8) petitioner was coerced by the 

circuit court into making a hasty decision as to whether he would testify on his own behalf. In State 

v. Davis (“Davis I”), 232 W. Va. 398, 752 S.E.2d 429 (2013), this Court rejected petitioner’s 

assignments of error and affirmed his convictions. Id. at 406-16, 752 S.E.2d at 437-47.

On February 24, 2014, petitioner filed his first petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the 

circuit court, alleging prosecutorial misconduct and ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The 

circuit court appointed habeas counsel who filed an amended petition on March 17, 2016.2 In the 

amended habeas petition, petitioner alleged ineffective assistance of trial counsel, insufficient 

evidence to sustain petitioner’s convictions, prejudicial pretrial publicity, excessive sentences, and 

knowing use of perjured testimony. At a November 11, 2016, habeas corpus hearing, petitioner 

provided testimony as to additional issues raised in the Losh checklist, 3 which were (1) 

unconstitutional statutes; (2) no offense shown on the face of indictment; (3) mental competency at 

the time of the offenses; (4) language barrier to understanding the proceeding; (5) unintelligent 

waiver of counsel; (6) coerced confessions; (7) falsified transcript; (8) erroneous presentence 

report; (9) irregularities in arrest; (10) illegal detention prior to arraignment; (11) irregularities in 

1

See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

2

At a November 11, 2016, habeas corpus hearing, the circuit court noted that “another 

amended [habeas] petition” was filed on March 16, 2016. Petitioner’s habeas counsel informed the 

circuit court that, due to a modification, the March 16, 2016, amended habeas petition was 

withdrawn in favor of the March 17, 2016, amended habeas petition. 

3

The checklist of grounds typically used in habeas corpus proceedings, usually referred to 

as the Losh checklist, originates from our decision in Losh v. McKenzie, 166 W. Va. 762, 277 

S.E.2d 606 (1981), where we set forth the most common grounds for habeas relief. See id. at 

768-70, 277 S.E.2d at 611-12.
3

arraignment; (12) irregularities in grand jury composition or procedure; (13) failure to provide a 

copy of the indictment; (14) defective indictment; (15) denial of a continuance; (16) refusal to 

subpoena witnesses; (17) prejudicial joinder of defendants; (18) refusal to disclose witness notes; 

(19) use of informers to convict; (20) constitutional errors in evidentiary rulings; (21) prejudicial 

statements by the trial judge; and (22) prejudicial statements by the prosecutor. During 

cross-examination by respondent, petitioner’s testimony was generally to admit that there was no 

factual basis for a claim being raised, to state that he did not know the basis for raising the claim, or 

to rely upon assertions such as “[t]he whole case is wrong” and “it’s wrong, you know, the way 

[the State] done it.” Also, at the habeas corpus hearing, petitioner presented the testimony of one of 

his trial counsels in support of his ineffective assistance claim, and the circuit court took judicial 

notice of the record of the underlying criminal case.

By order entered on December 28, 2016, the circuit court denied the amended petition in 

petitioner’s first habeas proceeding. As an initial matter, the circuit court noted that petitioner 

submitted a Losh checklist at the habeas corpus hearing and found that petitioner “waived all 

[claims] except for those set forth” in the Losh checklist. The circuit court further found that 

petitioner “presented no evidence . . . that would warrant granting the [a]mended [habeas] 

[p]etition[.]” With regard to alleged ineffective assistance of counsel, the circuit court determined 

that petitioner failed to show that “[trial] counsels’ performance was deficient” and that, “[e]ven if 

. . . [trial] counsels’ performance was deficient, [p]etitioner . . . provided no proof whatsoever 

that[,] but for their alleged unprofessional errors, the outcome of the trial would have been 

different.” In rejecting petitioner’s insufficient evidence claim, the circuit court found that

sufficient evidence existed to support his convictions for murder and arson as there was evidence 

that the victim died of smoke inhalation, that petitioner started the fire using an accelerant, and that 

“[p]etitioner made statements at the scene that he burned the victim.” Petitioner appealed the 

circuit court’s denial of his amended habeas petition in Davis v. Ames (“Davis II”), No. 17-0261, 

2019 WL 1765252 (W. Va. Apr. 19, 2019) (memorandum decision), in which he raised five 

assignments of error: ineffective assistance of trial counsel, insufficient evidence to sustain 

petitioner’s convictions, prejudicial pretrial publicity, excessive sentences, and knowing use of

perjured testimony. This Court in Davis II rejected petitioner’s assignments of error and affirmed 

the denial of the amended habeas petition. Id. at *2-6.

On September 30, 2019, petitioner filed a second habeas petition in the circuit court, 

alleging that he was denied an adequate opportunity to be heard because he appeared at the 

November 11, 2016, habeas corpus hearing via video conference and that he was denied effective 

assistance of habeas counsel because habeas counsel failed to either adequately present or failed to 

raise viable habeas claims in Davis II. According to petitioner, habeas counsel was negligent 

because he failed to assert or adequately present the following claims in petitioner’s first habeas 

proceeding: ineffective assistance of trial counsel, prosecutorial misconduct, knowing use of 

perjured testimony, refusal to disclose witness notes, use of informers to convict, irregularities in 

grand jury procedure, no offense shown on the face of indictment, defective indictment, false 

testimony presented to the grand jury, coerced confessions, improper interrogation, and prejudicial 

pretrial publicity. By order entered on October 20, 2020, the circuit court denied the second habeas 

petition. The circuit court rejected petitioner’s argument that his appearance at the November 11, 

2016, habeas corpus hearing via video conference prevented him from fully participating in that 
4

hearing. In rejecting the claim ostensibly raising ineffective assistance of counsel, the circuit court 

reiterated its prior finding that “[p]etitioner executed a ‘Losh List’ by which he knowingly waived 

any grounds for . . . relief not raised [in Davis II]” and further found that habeas counsel raised 

claims on petitioner’s behalf in Davis II, which then became the five assignments of error 

adjudicated by this Court on appeal. Accordingly, the circuit court further found that petitioner 

attempted to use ineffective assistance of habeas counsel in the instant habeas petition as a guise to 

relitigate issues previously waived and/or adjudicated. 

Petitioner now appeals the circuit court’s October 20, 2020, order denying his second 

habeas petition. This Court reviews a circuit court order denying a habeas petition under the 

following standards:

“In reviewing challenges to the findings and conclusions of the circuit court 

in a habeas corpus action, we apply a three-prong standard of review. We review 

the final order and the ultimate disposition under an abuse of discretion standard; 

the underlying factual findings under a clearly erroneous standard; and questions of 

law are subject to a de novo review.” Syl. Pt. 1, Mathena v. Haines, 219 W.Va. 417, 

633 S.E.2d 771 (2006).

. . . .

“‘A court having jurisdiction over habeas corpus proceedings may deny a 

petition for a writ of habeas corpus without a hearing and without appointing 

counsel for the petitioner if the petition, exhibits, affidavits or other documentary 

evidence filed therewith show to such court’s satisfaction that the petitioner is 

entitled to no relief.’ Syllabus Point 1, Perdue v. Coiner, 156 W.Va. 467, 194 

S.E.2d 657 (1973).” Syl. Pt. 2, White v. Haines, 215 W.Va. 698, 601 S.E.2d 18 

(2004).

Syl. Pts. 1 & 3, Anstey v. Ballard, 237 W. Va. 411, 787 S.E.2d 864 (2016). However, because we 

have before us the denial of petitioner’s second habeas petition, we first consider the application of 

Syllabus Point 4 of Losh v. McKenzie, 166 W. Va. 762, 277 S.E.2d 606 (1981): “A prior 

omnibus habeas corpus hearing is res judicata as to all matters raised and as to all matters known 

or which with reasonable diligence could have been known; however, an applicant may still 

petition the court on the following grounds: ineffective assistance of counsel at the 

omnibus habeas corpus hearing[.]”

On appeal, petitioner advances several arguments to show that he deserves “another bite at 

the apple,” i.e., another habeas corpus hearing with the appointment of counsel. White, 215 W. Va. 

at 705 n.9, 601 S.E.2d at 25 n.9 (affirming the denial of a prisoner’s second habeas petition, 

finding that it “is difficult to muster any sound reasoning for giving [him] another bite at the 

apple”). Respondent counters that petitioner has the burden of showing that the circuit court’s 

denial of his second habeas petition was erroneous. We agree with respondent and will address 

herein only those arguments that are arguably meritorious. We summarily reject all other 

arguments as without merit. See Perdue, 156 W. Va. at 467, 194 S.E.2d at 658, syl. pt. 2 (holding 
5

that “[o]n an appeal to this Court[,] the appellant bears the burden of showing that there was error 

in the proceedings below resulting in the judgment of which he complains, all presumptions being 

in favor of the correctness of the proceedings and judgment in and of the trial court”).

Petitioner argues that, due to the poor quality of the video conferencing system, he was 

denied an adequate opportunity to be heard at the habeas corpus hearing in Davis II. “The 

fundamental requisite of due process of law is the opportunity to be heard.” State ex rel. Peck v. 

Goshorn, 162 W. Va. 420, 422, 249 S.E.2d 765, 766 (1978) (internal quotations and citations 

omitted); see Syl. Pt. 2, Simpson v. Stanton, 119 W. Va. 235, 193 S.E. 64 (1937) (holding that “the 

right to be heard” constitutes part of the due process of law guaranteed by the United States and

West Virginia Constitutions). Here, upon our review of the habeas corpus hearing transcript, while 

there were instances when participants needed to repeat themselves and when documents needed 

to be held up to a screen so that petitioner could view them, we find that the one time petitioner 

desired to raise an issue with the circuit court and the attorneys, he was able to do so. Petitioner’s 

trial counsel did not testify in person, but over the telephone. Petitioner initially did not know this

and inquired about his inability to see trial counsel as trial counsel began to testify. Habeas counsel 

informed petitioner that trial counsel was “on the phone,” and both habeas counsel and the circuit 

court asked petitioner if he could hear trial counsel’s testimony. Petitioner answered, “I hear 

him[.]” Therefore, we find that petitioner’s appearance via video conference did not prevent him 

from fully participating in the habeas corpus hearing in Davis II.

Petitioner further argues that he is entitled to another hearing with the appointment of 

counsel because “an applicant may still petition the court on the following grounds: ineffective 

assistance of counsel at the omnibus habeas corpus hearing[.]” Losh, 166 W. Va. at 762-63, 277 

S.E.2d at 608, syl. pt. 4. We disagree as we find that the circuit court properly relied upon Losh to 

deny the instant petition. “A mere recitation of any of our enumerated grounds without detailed 

factual support does not justify the issuance of a writ, the appointment of counsel, and the holding 

of a hearing.” Id. at 771, 277 S.E.2d at 612. Here, petitioner listed the claims he alleged habeas 

counsel failed to raise in Davis II. The circuit court found this recitation of claims insufficient, 

reiterating its finding from the December 28, 2016, order, which was affirmed by this Court in 

Davis II, that “[p]etitioner executed a ‘Losh List’ by which he knowingly waived any grounds for . 

. . relief not raised [in Davis II].” While petitioner disputes the circuit court’s findings in Davis II

and the instant case that he waived all claims not raised, we find that the court’s findings are 

supported by petitioner’s testimony at the habeas corpus hearing in Davis II as to which issues he 

waived or raised in the Losh checklist. Furthermore, as noted by the circuit court, habeas counsel 

raised claims on petitioner’s behalf in Davis II, which then became the five assignments of error 

adjudicated by this Court on appeal. Indeed, petitioner has had claims waived and/or adjudicated 

before both the circuit court and this Court in both Davis I and Davis II. Therefore, we conclude 

that the circuit court properly found that petitioner attempted to use ineffective assistance of 

habeas counsel in the instant habeas petition as a guise to relitigate issues previously waived and/or 

adjudicated.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the circuit court’s October 20, 2020, order denying

petitioner’s second petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
6

Affirmed.

ISSUED: August 27, 2021

CONCURRED IN BY:

Chief Justice Evan H. Jenkins

Justice Elizabeth D. Walker

Justice Tim Armstead

Justice John A. Hutchison

Justice William R. Wooton