COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Baker, Elder and Bumgardner 

VIJAY DATT 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION*

v. Record No. 2413-97-4 PER CURIAM 

 APRIL 21, 1998 

ALEXANDRIA DIVISION 

 OF SOCIAL SERVICES 

 FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF ALEXANDRIA 

Donald M. Haddock, Judge 

 (Gary H. Smith, on brief), for appellant. 

 (Molly A. Smith, Assistant Commonwealth's 

Attorney, on brief), for appellee. 

 Vijay Datt (father) appeals the decision of the circuit 

court terminating his residual parental rights. Father contends 

that the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to prove 

that he (1) could not substantially correct or eliminate within a 

reasonable time the conditions which resulted in his children's 

foster care placement, see Code § 16.1-283(B)(2); and (2) was 

unwilling or unable within a reasonable period of time to remedy 

substantially the conditions which led to his children's foster 

care placement, see Code § 16.1-283(C)(2). Upon reviewing the 

record and briefs of the parties, we conclude that this appeal is 

without merit. Accordingly, we summarily affirm the decision of 

the trial court. See Rule 5A:27. 

 "In matters of a child's welfare, trial 

courts are vested with broad discretion in 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
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making the decisions necessary to guard and 

to foster a child's best interests." The 

trial court's judgment, "when based on 

evidence heard ore tenus, will not be 

disturbed on appeal unless plainly wrong or 

without evidence to support it." 

Logan v. Fairfax County Dep't of Human Dev., 13 Va. App. 123, 

128, 409 S.E.2d 460, 463 (1991) (citations omitted). 

 The Alexandria Division of Social Services (DSS) was 

required to present clear and convincing evidence sufficient to 

satisfy the requirements of Code § 16.1-283. 

 Code § 16.1-283 embodies "[t]he statutory 

scheme for the . . . termination of residual 

parental rights in this Commonwealth" [which] 

. . . "provides detailed procedures designed 

to protect the rights of the parents and 

their child," balancing their interests while 

seeking to preserve the family. However, we 

have consistently held that "[t]he child's 

best interest is the paramount concern." 

Lecky v. Reed, 20 Va. App. 306, 311, 456 S.E.2d 538, 540 (1995) 

(citations omitted). 

Code § 16.1-283(B)

 The trial court found that DSS presented clear and 

convincing evidence that it was in the best interests of the 

children to terminate father's parental rights. The court 

concluded that the neglect suffered by the children presented a 

serious and substantial threat to their life, health or 

development and that it was not reasonably likely that the 

conditions which resulted in their neglect could be substantially 

corrected or eliminated within a reasonable period of time. See

Code § 16.1-283(B)(2). The court also found that DSS presented 
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prima facie evidence of the conditions set out in Code 

§ 16.1-283(B)(2) by proving that father habitually abused or was 

addicted to alcohol to the extent that his parental ability was 

seriously impaired and that father "has without good cause not 

responded to or followed through with the recommended and 

available treatment, which could have improved the capacity for 

adequate parental functioning." See Code § 16.1-283(B)(2)(b). 

 The evidence established that father was addicted to 

alcohol. DSS repeatedly provided father with alcohol-related 

counseling and treatment services. Between May 1996 and 

mid-1997, father attended alcohol abuse programs at the Salvation 

Army, the Alexandria Substance Abuse Program, and the Men's Day 

Support Program. Despite this assistance, father was intoxicated 

during court appearances and visitation times. The evidence also 

demonstrated that father's intoxication placed the children at 

risk. While the court noted that father voluntarily entered 

Alcoholics Anonymous shortly before the trial, the court did not 

believe that effort would fare any better than his previous 

efforts. 

 The evidence also established that the children faced 

neglect and abuse while in the custody of their parents. DSS 

repeatedly identified hygiene, housing, supervision, parenting 

issues, school attendance, and domestic violence as problems 

within the family. The oldest child, who has cerebral palsy, 

regularly came to school with unclean clothing and underwear, an 
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unwashed face, and unbrushed teeth and hair. He was unable to 

feed himself with a fork, and his parents expected him to eat his 

food face down from his plate. His wheelchair was encrusted with 

dead roaches. The younger children had better hygiene, but their 

attendance at school was poor, and they dressed in clothing that 

was inappropriate for the weather. A DSS social worker testified 

that the parents continued to have problems with housing and 

domestic violence. 

 The evidence indicated that the children thrived, physically 

and emotionally, while in foster care. The boy gained weight, 

increased strength, and excelled in school. The two girls, who 

were in the same foster home, were also doing well, and appeared 

bonded emotionally to their foster parents. The children 

expressed the desire to see each other. There was evidence that 

the middle child had some difficulty dealing with father's 

diminished role and would need emotional counselling. 

 The record supports the trial court's finding that DSS 

established by clear and convincing evidence that termination of 

father's parental rights was in the best interests of the 

children and that it was not reasonably likely that the 

conditions which resulted in their neglect could be substantially 

corrected or eliminated within a reasonable period of time. 

Code § 16.1-283(C)

 Code § 16.1-283(C) provides, in pertinent part, that the 

court may terminate residual parental rights to a child placed in 
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foster care as a result of court commitment, an entrustment 

agreement or other voluntary relinquishment, "if the court finds, 

based upon clear and convincing evidence, that it is in the best 

interests of the child" and that the parent, without good cause, 

has been "unwilling or unable within a reasonable period not to 

exceed twelve months to remedy substantially the conditions which 

led to the child's foster care placement," despite "reasonable 

and appropriate efforts" from "social, medical, mental health or 

other rehabilitative agencies to such end." Code 

§ 16.1-283(C)(2). Evidence that the parent failed, without good 

cause, "to make reasonable progress towards the elimination of 

the conditions which led to the child's foster care placement in 

accordance with . . . a [jointly designed and agreed upon] foster 

care plan" is prima facie evidence that the parent was unwilling 

or unable to substantially remedy the underlying conditions. 

Code § 16.1-283(C)(3)(b). 

 DSS presented evidence concerning father's alcohol abuse and 

spousal abuse, and of its efforts to assist father in addressing 

those conditions. Despite extensive intervention, father was 

unwilling or unable to remedy his problems with alcohol. A DSS 

social worker noted that father came to visitation many times 

under the influence of alcohol, including as recently as July 

1997. Credible evidence supports the trial court's findings. 

 Accordingly, the decision of the circuit court is summarily 

affirmed. 
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 Affirmed.