J-S18022-20

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

RASHEED BOND 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

No. 652 MDA 2019

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered October 31, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lycoming County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-41-CR-0000467-2016

BEFORE: KUNSELMAN, J., KING, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.: FILED JULY 02, 2020

Appellant, Rasheed Bond, appeals from the judgment of sentence 

entered in the Lycoming County Court of Common Pleas, following his bench 

trial convictions for possession of a controlled substance, possession of a 

controlled substance with intent to deliver (“PWID”), possession of a small 

amount of marijuana, and possession of drug paraphernalia.

1

 We affirm. 

The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows. 

Officer Derr testified that at approximately 7:14 p.m. on 

February 8, 2016, he was on duty in full uniform, alone, and 

in a marked patrol unit. As he drove through the parking 

lot of the convenience store located at the intersection of 6

th

Avenue and High Street, he observed a sedan with heavily 

tinted windows. He continued through the parking lot and 

positioned his vehicle on 6

th Avenue about 80 to 100 yards 

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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(16), (30), (31), and (32), respectively. 
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away. He could not see the driver of the vehicle and 

suspected the driver was inside the convenience store. 

When the vehicle pulled out of the parking lot, the driver did 

not use his turn signal before he drove onto 6

th Avenue. At 

the time, Officer Derr believed the driver had committed a 

turn signal violation, and he was certain that the window 

tint was a violation. As the vehicle drove on 6

th Avenue, 

Officer Derr quickly caught up to it. The vehicle only 

traveled on 6

th Avenue for a short distance before the driver 

pulled the vehicle over to the curb as if to park. Officer Derr 

then activated his lights to conduct a traffic stop for the 

window tint and failure to use a turn signal. The tint was so 

dark that he could not see anything inside the vehicle. From 

only ten feet behind the driver’s door, he could not see 

through the side window.1 

1 Subsequent to [Appellant’s] preliminary hearing, 

Officer Derr learned that [Appellant’s] failure to use a 

turn signal when he exited the parking lot was not a 

traffic violation. 

Officer Derr approached the vehicle and made contact with 

the driver, [Appellant]. [Appellant] seemed “extremely 

nervous.” He talked a lot and browsed all areas of the 

vehicle with his hands and eyes. He was “in and out of every 

console and pocket.” Officer Derr asked [Appellant] if there 

were any drugs or weapons in the vehicle. He also asked 

[Appellant] if there was any “weed” in the car or if he had 

smoked weed. [Appellant] said th[at] he had smoked weed 

within an hour of driving. 

Officer Derr noticed cell phones all over the car. There were 

phones on the floor, in the console, in the glove box and in 

the door pockets. Officer Derr also noticed cash randomly 

placed in those locations. Officer Derr testified that 

[Appellant] did not have a good answer regarding why the 

phones and the cash were throughout the vehicle. Instead, 

[Appellant] became silent and put his head down. Officer 

Derr asked for [Appellant’s] license, registration and 
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insurance.[2] [Appellant] provided an ID card, and he 

showed Officer Derr his insurance card on his phone, but he 

did not provide a registration card. Officer Derr checked on 

the status of [Appellant’s] license and whether there were 

any warrants for his arrest. There were no warrants, but 

[Appellant’s] operating privilege was suspended. 

Officer Derr testified that, in light of [Appellant’s] statement 

that he had smoked weed within an hour of driving, he 

decided to conduct field sobriety tests to determine if 

[Appellant] was driving under the influence of marijuana. 

Officer Derr admitted he had “no idea” that [Appellant]

could be under the influence prior to asking him about 

possessing or smoking marijuana. 

Although he readily admitted that he did not believe 

[Appellant] was armed and dangerous, Officer Derr 

removed [Appellant] from the vehicle and conducted a “pat 

down” of [Appellant] for weapons because it was his practice 

to do so prior to conducting field sobriety tests. [Appellant]

did not threaten Officer Derr or make any movements 

toward Officer Derr or his weapon, and Officer Derr did not 

see any bulges or anything that looked like a weapon in the 

vehicle or on [Appellant’s] person. Furthermore, by the 

time Officer Derr removed [Appellant] from the vehicle and 

conducted the pat down, other officers had arrived and 

surrounded them. 

During the pat down, Officer Derr felt the sharp edge of 

Ziploc bags bundled together, which he immediately 

recognized as narcotics packaging, in [Appellant’s] groin 

area. Officer Derr immediately took [Appellant] into 

custody and placed him in the back of his patrol car. He 

shone his flashlight around in the back seat and floor of his 

patrol car. He told [Appellant] that he had searched his 

patrol car prior to the start of his shift, there was nothing in 

the back of his vehicle, and he would know that anything 

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2 Despite the sequence of events set forth in the trial court opinion, Officer 

Derr testified that he requested Appellant’s license and vehicle information 

and observed the cellphones and cash before asking whether Appellant 

possessed or used any drugs. (See N.T. Suppression Hearing, 1/23/17, at 

28-30).
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found in there was [Appellant’s]. Shortly thereafter, 

[Appellant] summoned Officer Derr back to the vehicle.

[Appellant] told Officer Derr that the package was sliding 

down his leg and he asked Officer Derr to remove it. Officer 

Derr opened the “fly” of [Appellant’s] pants and removed a 

foil Back Woods cigar package, which contained marijuana.

Officer Derr [later] observed seven bundles of heroin inside 

a plastic sandwich bag on the rear passenger floor board of 

his patrol car. 

Officer Derr searched [Appellant’s] vehicle and discovered a 

total of eight cell phones and $348. 

Officer Derr also testified that 6

th Avenue and High Street 

was a “high crime” area. He indicated that he was involved 

in at least a dozen narcotics investigations in that area. He 

also noted there were several robberies, weapon offenses 

and assaults in that area as well. He referred to 

Commonwealth’s Exhibit 1, which depicted the UCR 

reported crimes within 1000 feet of 6th Avenue and High 

Street. 

[Appellant] was charged with possession with intent to 

deliver (heroin), possession of a controlled substance 

(heroin), possession of a controlled substance (marijuana), 

and possession of drug paraphernalia. 

(Suppression Court Opinion, filed May 31, 2017, at 1-4). 

On May 25, 2016, Appellant filed a motion to suppress all evidence 

obtained following the vehicle stop. Specifically, Appellant argued: (1) Officer 

Derr lacked probable cause to conduct a vehicle stop; (2) Officer Derr made 

an illegal arrest; and (3) Officer Derr failed to provide Miranda3 warnings. 

The court held the suppression hearing on January 23, 2017, and it denied 

Appellant’s motion on May 31, 2017. 

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3 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). 
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Following a bench trial, the court found Appellant guilty of PWID and 

related offenses. On October 31, 2018, the court sentenced Appellant to an 

aggregate term of twelve and one-half (121⁄2) months to three (3) years’

imprisonment followed by one year of probation. Appellant timely filed postsentence motions on November 8, 2018. In his motions, Appellant requested 

judgment of acquittal or a new trial, as well as modification of his sentence. 

The court denied the post-sentence motions on March 25, 2019. 

On April 22, 2019, Appellant timely filed the instant notice of appeal.

4

On May 2, 2019, the court ordered Appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) 

concise statement of errors complained of on appeal. Appellant timely filed 

his Rule 1925(b) statement on May 21, 2019. 

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4 Trial courts have 120 days to decide a post-sentence motion before it is 

deemed denied by operation of law. Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(B)(3)(a). After 120 

days, the clerk of courts shall enter an order deeming the motion denied on 

behalf of the trial court and serve copies on the parties. Pa.R.Crim.P. 

720(B)(3)(c). Thereafter, a notice of appeal shall be filed within thirty days 

of the entry of the order denying the motion by operation of law. Pa.R.Crim.P. 

720(A)(2)(b). Here, the trial court’s 120-day period to decide Appellant’s 

post-sentence motions expired on March 8, 2019. However, the clerk of 

courts did not enter an order deeming the post-sentence motions denied by 

operation of law. Ultimately, the court ruled on the motions on March 25, 

2019. Under these circumstances, the clerk of court’s failure to enter an order 

deeming the post-sentence motions denied by operation of law constitutes a 

court breakdown. See Commonwealth v. Patterson, 940 A.2d 493, 499 

(Pa.Super. 2007), appeal denied, 599 Pa. 691, 960 A.2d 838 (2008) 

(explaining that failure to enter order notifying appellant that post-sentence 

motion was denied by operation of law constitutes breakdown in processes of 

court, which excuses otherwise untimely notice of appeal). Accordingly, we 

consider the notice of appeal timely filed. 
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Appellant raises one issue on appeal: 

Did the [trial] court err by failing to suppress evidence

seized following police searching [Appellant’s] vehicle after

a stop for failure to use a turn signal leaving a parking lot

and for dark window tint? 

(Appellant’s Brief at 7). 

Appellant submits a police officer must possess probable cause to 

support a motor vehicle stop premised on excessive window tint, because this 

type of violation is readily apparent and does not require further investigation. 

Appellant insists Officer Derr did not possess probable cause in the instant 

case, in light of certain discrepancies between the officer’s testimony from the 

preliminary and suppression hearings.5 In light of these discrepancies, 

Appellant insists Officer Derr’s suppression hearing testimony was incredible. 

On this basis, Appellant concludes the court should have suppressed all 

evidence obtained as a result of the stop. We disagree. 

In reviewing the trial court’s suppression ruling, we are guided by the 

following principles: 

The standard and scope of review for a challenge to the 

denial of a suppression motion is whether the factual 

findings are supported by the record and whether the legal 

conclusions drawn from those facts are correct. When 

reviewing the rulings of a suppression court, [the appellate 

court] considers only the evidence of the prosecution and so 

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5 Specifically, Appellant emphasizes Officer Derr’s preliminary hearing

testimony that he stopped Appellant due to excessive window tint and failing 

to use a turn signal when exiting the parking lot. Also at the preliminary 

hearing, Officer Derr did not conclusively state that the amount of tint on 

Appellant’s windows constituted a Motor Vehicle Code violation. 
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much of the evidence for the defense as remains 

uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as a 

whole. When the record supports the findings of the 

suppression court, [the court is] bound by those facts and 

may reverse only if the legal conclusions drawn therefrom 

are in error. 

Commonwealth v. Griffin, 116 A.3d 1139, 1142 (Pa.Super. 2015) (quoting 

Commonwealth v. Johnson, 33 A.3d 122, 125-26 (Pa.Super. 2011)). “It is 

within the suppression court’s sole province as factfinder to pass on the 

credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given [to] their testimony.”

Commonwealth v. Thomas, 179 A.3d 77, 81 (Pa.Super. 2018). 

Our analysis of the quantum of cause required for a traffic stop begins 

with the Motor Vehicle Code, which provides:

§ 6308. Investigation by police officers

* * *

(b) Authority of police officer.—Whenever a police 

officer is engaged in a systematic program of checking 

vehicles or drivers or has reasonable suspicion that a 

violation of this title is occurring or has occurred, he may 

stop a vehicle, upon request or signal, for the purpose of 

checking the vehicle’s registration, proof of financial 

responsibility, vehicle identification number or engine 

number or the driver’s license, or to secure such other 

information as the officer may reasonably believe to be 

necessary to enforce the provisions of this title. 

75 Pa.C.S.A. § 6308(b) (emphasis added). 

“[D]espite subsection 6308(b)’s reasonable suspicion standard, some 

offenses, by their very nature, require a police officer to possess probable 

cause before he or she may conduct a traffic stop.” Commonwealth v. 
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Ibrahim, 127 A.3d 819, 823 (Pa.Super. 2015), appeal denied, 635 Pa. 771, 

138 A.3d 3 (2016). “For a stop based on [an] observed violation of the Vehicle 

Code or otherwise non-investigable offense, an officer must have probable 

cause to make a constitutional vehicle stop.” Commonwealth v. Harris, 176 

A.3d 1009, 1019 (Pa.Super. 2017). See also Commonwealth v. Feczko, 

10 A.3d 1285, 1291 (Pa.Super. 2010), appeal denied, 611 Pa. 650, 25 A.3d 

327 (2011) (stating mere reasonable suspicion will not justify vehicle stop 

when driver’s detention cannot serve investigatory purpose relevant to

suspected violation). 

Additionally, the Motor Vehicle Code provision governing window tint 

prohibits persons from driving “any motor vehicle with any sun screening 

device or other material which does not permit a person to see or view the 

inside of the vehicle through the windshield, side wing or side window of the 

vehicle.” 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 4524(e)(1). “Tint is illegal if, from point of view of 

the officer, he or she is unable to see inside of a vehicle through the 

windshield, side wing, or side window.” Commonwealth v. Cartagena, 63 

A.3d 294, 305 n.26 (Pa.Super. 2013) (en banc), appeal denied, 620 Pa. 728, 

70 A.3d 808 (2013). See also Commonwealth v. Brubaker, 5 A.3d 261, 

265-66 (Pa.Super. 2010) (holding Commonwealth presented insufficient 

evidence to support conviction under Section 4524(e)(1) where officer 

testified he could see into defendant’s vehicle). This Court has also held that

an officer’s observation of a vehicle’s darkly tinted windows provides sufficient 
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probable cause to initiate a traffic stop. See Harris, supra at 1019. 

Instantly, Officer Derr testified that the windows on Appellant’s vehicle 

“were tinted so darkly that you could see nothing through them.” (N.T. 

Suppression Hearing at 10). After observing Appellant’s tinted windows, 

Officer Derr activated the lights on his vehicle to conduct a traffic stop. (Id.

at 25). Significantly, the trial court credited Officer Derr’s testimony regarding 

the amount of window tint. (See Suppression Court Opinion at 5). Regardless 

of any discrepancies between the officer’s statements at the preliminary and

suppression hearings, the suppression record supports the court’s finding that 

Officer Derr’s observations yielded probable cause for the vehicle stop.

6

 See 

Cartagena, supra; Harris, supra. Because the trial court’s factual findings

are supported by the record, we affirm. See Griffin, supra. 

Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 7/2/2020

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6 To the extent Appellant complains about the validity of Officer Derr’s 

explanation for the discrepancies in his testimony, it is within the suppression 

court’s sole province as factfinder to pass on the credibility of witnesses. See 

Thomas, supra.