OP 28 

Military Interventio

Sierra Leone: Less

From a Failed Sta

Larry J. Woods and Colonel Timothy R

The Long War Series
 

Occasional Paper 28
 

Combat Studies Institute Press 

US Army Combined Arms Center 

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 

OP 28 

Military Interventio

Sierra Leone: Les

From a Failed St

Larry J. Woods and Colonel Timothy R

Combat Studies Institute Press 

US Army Combined Arms Center 

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 
Woods, Larry J., 1949­

Military interventions in Sierra Leone : lessons from a failed state / Lar

Woods and Timothy R. Reese.

 p. cm. -- (The long war series)

 Includes bibliographical references.

 ISBN-13: 978-0-9801236-4-7

 ISBN-10: 0-9801236-4-X

 1. Sierra Leone--History--Civil War, 1991-2002. 2. Sierra Leone--Hist

Military. 3. Intervention (International law) 4. Failed states--Sierra Leo

Reese, Timothy R., 1959- II. Title. III. Series.

 DT516.826.W66 2008

 966.404--dc22

 2008018715 

First Printing: May 2008 

CSI Press publications cover a variety of military history 

The views expressed in this CSI Press publication are those 

author(s) and not necessarily those of the Department of the 

or the Department of Defense. A full list of CSI Press pu

tions, many of them available for downloading, can be fou

http://usacac.army.mil/CAC/csi/RandP/CSIpubs.asp 

The seal of the Combat Studies Institute authenticates this document 

official publication of the CSI. It is prohibited to use CSI’s official seal 

republication of this material without the expressed written permission 

Director of CSI. 
Recognizing the importance of the nations residing on the c

of Africa in an interconnected world, the United States establis

United States Africa Command (USAFRICOM) in October 200

development alone makes it imperative that American military 

understand the problems facing many African states today and t

flicts that have ravaged them in the recent past. Often rich in re

both human and economic, yet uneven in development of gover

institutions and infrastructure, the nations of this large continent re

both a challenge and an opportunity. The challenge can be as com

the removal of a sanctuary for terrorists without excessive violenc

marshalling of resources to alleviate a massive humanitarian cri

opportunity is that constructive engagement at an early stage can 

forestall the expenditure of large sums of blood and treasure to am

a seriously deteriorating situation. In all of these cases, military 

must have an understanding of Africa’s geography, its peoples, 

history. Only through this understanding can the military instrum

applied intelligently and humanely. 

This study by Larry J. Woods and Colonel Timothy R. Reese a

the massive turmoil afflicting the nation of Sierra Leone, 1995-20

the efforts by a variety of outside forces to bring lasting stability 

small country. The taxonomy of intervention ranged from private 

nary armies, through the Economic Community of West African 

to the United Nations and the United Kingdom. In every case, tho

intervened encountered a common set of difficulties that had to b

come. Unsurprisingly, they also discovered challenges unique 

own organizations and political circumstances. Serving soldiers 

ten profit vicariously from the mistakes of others as recounted in 

case studies of historical events. This cogent analysis of recent in

tions in Sierra Leone represents a cautionary tale that political lead

military planners contemplating intervention in Africa ignore at the

CSI—The Past is Prologue! 

William G. Robertson 

Deputy Director, Combat Studies 

This Long War Occasional Paper could not have been written 

the assistance of many individuals. Though the topic originated f

Combined Arms Center Research Priority List, it was the creatio

US Africa Command in October 2007 which provided the impetu

duce this study and to bring the military historical perspective to 

this important region of the world. This is an unusual CSI public

that we worked on this project as co-authors. We owe one anothe

for patience and cooperation along the path from concept devel

research, writing and reviewing. 

We would like to thank Mr. Michael Brooks for his patience

and hard work as our editor as he turned our text into a publishabl

Secondly, we would also like to thank Mr. Kendall D. Gott, Chief of 

search and Publications Team, for shepherding the overall process. 

we need to express our appreciation to Dr. William G. Robertson, 

Director of the Combat Studies Institute, for his advice, mentors

review of the first draft of this manuscript, as well as for his e

foreword. We are indebted to each of them for their assistance, 

errors of fact or analysis are, of course, our responsibility. 

Foreword........................................................................................

Acknowledgements .......................................................................

Introduction...................................................................................

Chapter 1. The Road to External Interventions:
 

Post-Colonial Sierra Leone to 1992 .........................

Origins.........................................................................

Economic Collapse and the End
 

Local Response to Invasion: The Civil
 

European Colonialism .................................................

Independence...............................................................

The Ceremonial Army .................................................

of the Stevens Era .................................................

The Revolutionary United Front .................................

Defense Forces and the Kamajors ........................

The RUF in Sierra Leone ............................................

Child Soldiers..............................................................

Summary .....................................................................

Chapter 2. The First Intervention: Civil War
 

and Mercenaries, 1995–1996 ....................................

National Provisional Ruling Council ..........................

Sierra Leone Army ......................................................

The First Intervention: Executive Outcomes ..............

1996 Elections and a New Government......................

Abidjan Peace Accord .................................................

Summary and Analysis of Executive Outcomes .........
Community of West African States, 1995–2000......

Prelude to Intervention: ECOMOG,
 

Sierra Leone, and Liberia .....................................

Armed Forces Revolutionary Council.........................

Regional West African Community Response ............

Analysis of ECOMOG Interventions ..........................

Summary .....................................................................

Chapter 4. The Third and Fourth Interventions:
 

United Nations and British Forces, 1999–2002.......

United Nations Assistance Mission
 

in Sierra Leone......................................................

Great Britain to the Rescue:
 

Great Britain Returns:
 

Summary and Analysis of the
 

Operation PALLISER ...........................................

West Side Boys ............................................................

Vignette on Operation BARRAS ..........................

Continuing Progress ....................................................

Epilogue ......................................................................

UNAMSIL and UK Missions ...............................

Chapter 5. Conclusion ..................................................................

Acting Early and Decisively .......................................

Understanding the Mission and the “Enemy” .............

Overwhelming Military Force.....................................

The Advantages and Disadvantages of Coalitions ......

The Danger of Leaving Too Soon ...............................

National Military Forces .............................................

viii 
Role of Neighboring Countries ...................................

Cultural Awareness and Dealing
 

with Children Soldiers ..........................................

Final Thoughts.............................................................

Glossary .........................................................................................

Appendix A ....................................................................................

Appendix B ....................................................................................

Bibliography ..................................................................................

About the Author ..........................................................................

The country of Sierra Leone is located in Western Africa, bo

the North Atlantic Ocean between Guinea on the north and Liber

south (Map 1). It was little known to non-African specialists be

1990s when it burst onto the world stage as the scene of more th

cade of brutal civil wars, the use of child soldiers, and widespread 

ties. Sierra Leone was labeled one of the classic examples of the s

“failed state syndrome” that theorists have used to describe nation

simply fail to function at the most elementary level. The anarchy i

Leone led to outside military interventions and United Nations (U

tion in mostly vain attempts to end the human suffering. The atte

the international community to do something about the human suff

Sierra Leone during this period provide a multitude of lessons, bo

tive and negative, about attempts to deal with failed states. 

The region of West Africa that later became Sierra Leone wa

nated by two tribal societies, the Temne tribe in the north and the 

Map 1. Africa and Sierra Leone. 
of the land. In the era of European colonial rivalries that began in 

15th century, Portuguese, French, Dutch, Danish and British ex

traders and colonialists competed for influence. In the early 17th 

Europeans tapped into the existing slave trade and greatly expand

meet their demand for slaves in the New World. Great Britain o

slavery in its empire in 1807 and established a colony in the port 

town to enforce the decree in that part of West Africa. Over time 

established Sierra Leone’s borders and eventually created the Prot

of Sierra Leone in 1896. Between 1896 and 1961 Great Britain co

the Freetown Colony and oversaw the Protectorate. Despite border

did not respect ancient tribal territories, and despite periods of 

ethnic strife, the Protectorate prospered under relatively efficient 

colonial rule. Great Britain granted the Freetown Colony and Sierr

their independence in April 1961. After independence and until 

succession of ineffectual leaders alternated with a series of seve

men” who took their turns at attempting to knit a nation-state o

fractured colonial heritage. Sierra Leone gradually fell victim to co

coups, corrupt and inefficient governments, and economic collaps

Two of the so-called Big Men, Siaka Stevens and his success

eral Joseph Momoh, ruled Sierra Leone for the 24 years between 1

1992. Both men came from the ranks of the All Peoples Congress 

a political party led by ethnic Temnes. The APC was formed in op

to the Sierra Leone Peoples Party (SLPP) which ruled Sierra Leon

first seven years after independence and was dominated by membe

Mende tribe. The rule of the two Big Men was marked by mismana

and corruption which left Sierra Leone in economic ruin, fostere

conflict between the eighteen tribes that made up Sierra Leone, and 

the country in deep financial dependence upon foreign aid and loan

regimes used the country’s chief natural resource, diamonds, as a s

money and power to enrich their own personal coffers. People w

near the capital of Freetown and supported the reign of Stevens a

moh lived somewhat more comfortably than the rest of the countr

was isolated and agricultural. 

Civil war broke out in 1991 when a rebel group, known as the 

tionary United Front (RUF) launched a military offensive from ne

ing Liberia to overthrow the Momoh government. An exiled Sier

nean named Foday Sankoh led the RUF forces. Sankoh organized t

movement in neighboring Liberia under the guidance of another in

West African rebel, Charles Taylor. The RUF’s political platform 

2 
tiparty democracy, and an end to economic exploitation. The RU

alistic platform soon gave way to the same corruption, misrule, an

of civilians as the Sierra Leonean government. RUF forces took 

diamond producing regions of Sierra Leone to finance their rebelli

RUF was supported by the Taylor government in Liberia which w

cut off support to rebels opposed to his dictatorship operating from 

Leone. The diamond trade financed both the RUF and Taylor’s for

brought international interest to the civil war. 

The RUF was particularly cruel, committing atrocities to inclu

der, rape, mutilation, abductions, and destruction of property on 

scale. One of the RUF’s most despicable techniques was the ab

of young children who were indoctrinated into the bizarre RUF id

then used as child soldiers to commit further atrocities. Life in Si

one, already primitive, descended into an unimaginable chaos and 

ing for nearly a dozen years after the 1991 civil war began. Roug

million civilians fled to the neighboring countries of Guinea an

ria, accounting for nearly a third of the population, and over 50,0

killed. Cries for international actions to stop the civil war and a

the human suffering led to a succession of military interventions i

Leone between 1992 and 2002 in attempts to restore order. 

This Occasional Paper is a survey and analysis of the series of 

military interventions in Sierra Leone between 1993 and 2002. 

each of these interventions achieved some local or temporary succ

til late 2000 none of them succeeded in creating a security situat

could foster a political solution to Sierra Leone’s woes. Each inter

ran afoul of Sierra Leone’s ethnic divisions, ineffective and corru

ernments and meddling neighbor states. Equally important to the p

of this study, each of these military interventions was hampered b

nal problems and ineffectiveness. Since 2002 a fragile veneer o

cratic normalcy has been in place, UN programs have disarmed m

70,000 fighters, and the economy of Sierra Leone is recovering

Leone remains, however, one of the very poorest countries in the w

nearly every measure. 

Chapter 1 provides a brief historical overview of Sierra Leo

its pre-colonial origins through 1992 and the start of a decade of c

Chapter 2 examines the years 1993 to 1997 during which the priva

tary organization Executive Outcomes was called in by the Sierr

government in an attempt to restore order and stability. Chapter 3 
the military intervention of the Economic Community of West 

States (ECOWAS) and its military arm, led by its largest member, 

Chapter 4 reviews the international intervention led the by the 

Great Britain between 1999 and 2002. Finally, Chapter 5 provid

conclusions and insights. 

4 
 

The Road to External Interventions:
 

Pre-Colonial Sierra Leone to 1992
 

Like many West African states, Sierra Leone has an intriguing 

marked by unfulfilled potential and strife. This chapter will focu

road to civil war in the 1990s and the era of external military interv

briefly examining the political, social, and military situation. Tra

history of this small country gives an idea of the complexity of th

lems in Sierra Leone which are not unlike other states in this re

Africa. 

Modern Sierra Leone is slightly smaller than the state of Sout

lina with 70 miles of coastline and 27,925 square miles of land. T

is a mixture of mountains rising to 6,000 feet, wooded hills, swam

plateaus. A hilly peninsula dominates the western coast of Sierr

and together with the Sierra Leone river estuary, this region bec

economic and political center of the region. It is a tropical envir

with hot, rainy, humid summers from May to October and dry 

with a cold Saharan wind in December and January. Rainfall is p

on the coast and southern regions, but declines markedly in the n

grasslands. 

Sierra Leone has 373 miles of navigable waterways with 

Bonthe, Freetown, and Pepel. Its infrastructure is extremely limit

only 372 miles of paved highways; 7026 miles of unpaved highw

miles of railways; and 10 airports covering the coast and inland are

one of which is paved at Lungi (near Freetown) with about 10,500 

paved runway.1 The tropical landscape is an incubator for malari

yellow fever, river blindness, and other deadly diseases. With an es

population of 6.14 million people, Sierra Leone is number 176 ou

on the United Nations Human Development Index, with life expe

among the lowest in the world: Men born in Sierra Leone can e

live to an average age of only 41, women to age 45.2 Sierra Leon

in natural resources, including diamonds, gold, oil, iron ore, rutil

ite, and titanium. The economy consists of agriculture, exportation 

materials and light local industry. As late as 2006, after three yea

covery from the dozen years of civil war examined in this study, t

of Sierra Leone was only $5.452 billion, yielding a per capital in

only $900. Only 35% of the population is literate.3 
 

Before its discovery by Europeans, Sierra Leone was an agra

ciety growing rice, millet, yams, coffee, cinnamon, and tobacco

characterized by nomadic ethnic tribes moving in and out of t

Migration patterns reflected a search for fertile ground, warring 

among the ethnic tribes,4

 and the necessity for river transport.5 By 

1400s, some 18 ethnic groups had settled in the region, though they 

a common language with tribal dialects. The Mende tribe in the s

and eastern regions and the Temne tribe in the northern region do

the mix.6 

During this time tribal rulers were selected from those who w

cessful in battle and who could maintain stability in the villages

villages continued to grow, kings were selected from among the v

On the selection of a king elaborate ceremonies were conducted 

the king to the world of his ancestry and to receive the blessing

transcendent authority. The king became the chief justice, land ow

warlord and was expected to be proficient in divination, warfare, an

ing. In return his subjects were expected to pay tribute to him in t

of farm products and simple goods. The king relied heavily on hi

elders, and other members of the ruling class.7 The chiefs and eld

similar functions as the king, but in smaller tribal areas. 

In 1462, Portuguese explorer Pedro da Cintra landed on the 

Sierra Leone and mapped the hills surrounding the harbor, naming 

mation Serra Lyoa or Lion Mountain. As more European explore

to the area a small trading and mercantile class emerged to take i

alongside the agrarian society. A trade corridor grew among villag

interior and the coastal area of West Africa. In the 1560s, British, 

Dutch, and Danish traders also landed in Africa. They became in

in the gold, cattle, salt, cloth, palm oil and rice of Sierra Leone

early 17th century the Europeans exploited the local practice of sl

meet the massive demand for slaves to harvest cotton, rice, and sug

in the New World. In exchange for consumable goods, the kings

and village rulers captured, sold, and traded slaves of all ages a

ders.8 Many of the slaves came from rival tribes as raids were co

on neighboring villages. By 1652 slaves were being brought from 

Leone to the Caribbean and then onto plantations in South Caro

Georgia where their rice-farming skills made them particularly va

The British colonies in the New World were not the only area wh

ployed slaves from Sierra Leone. About 80 percent of the local 

6 
 

This heinous trade lasted for over 100 years. 

Competing religious beliefs further complicated Sierra Leon

ciety during pre-colonial times. Christianity was introduced by C

missionaries from Portugal. Islam came to Sierra Leone primarily 

commercial traders from Arabia and Persia. Both Christianity an

flourished, but both were heavily influenced by local pre-mono

practices. Many villages kept their practice of worshipping nature 

cluded mountains and trees and some held to animistic beliefs. 

common item of worship were icons, such as soapstone figurin

were worn to either ward off bad spirits or provide good luck f

temporal situation such as fertility or battle.10 

European Colonialism 

In 1807 Great Britain outlawed slavery throughout its vast 

with the passage of the Slave Trade Act. As a result of the desire to 

ate slaves to their former land, the British sent 331 freed slaves, 6

female London prostitutes, and several English tradesmen from No

tia and Britain to Sierra Leone. Upon arrival, Captain Thomas Th

purchased a piece of uninhabited land from the local Temne chie

northern end of what would become known as the Freetown Pen

Although half of the ex-slaves died within a year because of dise

tribal wars, this British enclave survived. To improve the settl

chances of longevity for freed slaves, the British government pu

another piece of land near the coast and established a settlement 

as Freetown. In 1808, Freetown became one of Britain’s first col

West Africa.12 

The British Government took responsibility for Freetown and 

naval assets to intercept slave ships of other nations along the We

can coast. Freetown quickly grew in population with both freed sla

“recaptives,” those liberated from the ships. Since the populatio

mixture of cultures and languages, and the former slaves were cut o

their homes and traditions, they assimilated many aspects of the 

style of life. Part of this assimilation was the result of Anglican an

odist missionaries from Britain and the United States who brou

English language and Christianity to Sierra Leone.13 An ethnic gro

themselves, they were known as Creoles. Education was readily a

from Christian missionaries, so the Creoles became a vibrant g

educated professionals including doctors, lawyers, traders, and b
colonial government. 

As a British colony Freetown was expected to pay for itself a

tribute to the economic health of the Empire, primarily through ex

The hinterland regions outside the city of Freetown became the f

the British Government upon the realization that its rich resource

turn a profit. Although disputes over territorial boundaries exi

decades, the British Government reached an agreement in 1896 w

neighboring countries of French Guinea and Liberia to establish its 

rial borders. Soon after the agreement was signed the British Gov

declared the region a protectorate of the British government. Effe

the British now ruled two entities in the same region: the Freetown 

and the Protectorate which included the hinterland (Map 2). 

Map 2. Sierra Leone. 

8 
 

 

primarily because the Protectorate was divided into districts which 

correspond to ancient tribal lands. The chiefs had not been consulte

this arrangement and were informed that they now worked for a 

commissioner who was appointed by the colony. The Temne and 

chiefs and their respective tribes immediately rebelled against 

rule, slaughtering settlers and missionaries, policemen and Creole

out differentiating between them. In response to this rebellion, th

town Colony established a Frontier Police Force, composed of C

Protectorate citizens, and former British Army soldiers. The Fron

lice Force was met with much opposition outside the Freetown Co

the tribal chiefs—who were formerly recognized as African kings

now designated merely as “paramount chiefs.”15 The Freetown 

ruled the hinterland through these paramount chiefs and expected 

comply with the instructions provided by the Frontier Police Forc

The Freetown Colony established a tribal tax, known as the hu

fund the Frontier Police Force and other activities of the admini

to include paying the paramount chiefs. The military governor, 

Frederic Cardew, decreed that the inhabitants of the Protectorate 

be taxed on the size of their huts.16 The hut tax sparked two rebe

1898, one by the Temne, led by Bai Bureh, and the other by the 

led by Momoh Jah. In January 1898, Bai Bureh, a tribal king, 

chiefs refused to pay hut taxes. Consequently, Colonel Cardew 

Frontier Police Force, backed by a battalion of government sold

collect the taxes in each of the villages. If a local chief refused 

payment, the police force often destroyed the rice fields, crops, a

while terrorizing the inhabitants. Bai Bureh’s village militias em

stockades built of palm logs, embedded in the ground and buttress

red dirt to defend their territories. Bai Bureh and his soldiers lay 

the stockade protected in trenches, and fired through openings in t

British troops were eventually able to overcome the stockades and 

Bai Bureh. By the end of May 1898, the Frontier Police had destr

towns and villages and deprived Bai Bureh of his food supply.17 

upon his capture, was immediately deported to Ghana. 

A second anti-British rebellion broke out among the Mende 

1898, after the arrest of Momoh Jah, the Mende paramount chief. R

were dispatched to various villages and told to defend their land an

to pay the hut tax. Christian missionaries in the Mende country

to avoid bloodshed, advocated paying the hut tax and solving th

through peaceful means. The villagers took this as an official al
 

attack.The Freetown administration launched two military exp

to crush the rebellion and by the end of the war hundreds of gov

and tribal members were killed. The Freetown Colony brought 15

leaders and others to trial and executed 96 of the leaders.19 Follow

trials and the executions Freetown Soldiers marched through the 

carrying the British flag as a reminder to the villagers of British 

ity. This pattern of violence between the more prosperous and sett

around Freetown and the rural countryside continues to this day. 

Smaller scale resistance and local uprisings continued against t

ish colony in Freetown but each one failed because of British 

superiority. Most of the early 1900s was unremarkable and the col

relatively peaceful. The economy thrived during the mid 20th centu

large exports of diamonds, palm kernels, coffee, cocoa, and iron

commodities provided the Colony and the Protectorate with a re

buoyant economy. 

British explorers discovered diamonds in Sierra Leone in 1930 

a routine geological survey of the Kono District in eastern Sierra 

More surveys in 1933 and 1934 found diamonds along the lengt

Sewa River, as well as at various portions of the Moa River basi

south. Shortly after these discoveries, the Colonial Government 

the Sierra Leone Selection Trust (SLST), granting this division of 

Beers Corporation exclusive prospecting and mining license cove

whole of Sierra Leone.20 

In the early 1950s the practice of illegal diamond mining was 

prevalent in the Kono area. Between 1952 and 1955, hundreds 

sands of people rushed to the region threatening to destabilize the e

and the country. In 1955 the government imposed a two-fold sol

correct the problems, bring order to the region, and restore its tax 

on which it was heavily dependent. The SLST was ordered to co

mining activities to specific areas while the remainder of the kno

mond fields were licensed to independent diggers. In 1956 the gov

also decided to expel all non-Sierra Leoneans from the Kono distr

action, coordinated with neighboring French colonial authorities a

ported by the local chiefs and the Sierra Leonean political class, e

an estimated 45,000 people from the region.21 

During and after World War II, Sierra Leone consistently e

over million carats of official diamonds per year contributing the v

10 
 

mond resources in the Bo District of Sierra Leone and began to bri

into production. Mining, both official and illegal, was conducted 

most no regard to its environmental impact. Finally, the large 

money that could be made in the diamond industry, when contras

the underpaid and inefficient bureaucracy of Sierra Leone, provide

breeding grounds for corruption.22 

Sierra Leone’s prosperity was used by the British to establish 

schools, build roads into the countryside, and to begin delivering ru

tary health care.23 Consistent with the British decision to dissolve 

the Empire after World War II, power was gradually moved from 

officials to elected Sierra Leoneans between 1951 and 1961. The 

oversaw the creation of political parties, local, regional and then 

governmental institutions. 

Independence 

On 27 April 1961, the United Kingdom granted Sierra Leone 

pendence with a parliamentary system within the British Common

Sir Milton Margai, an ethnic Mende physician, was appointed 

Prime Minister. Margai led the Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP

tory in the first general election in May 1962. After Sir Milton’s 

1964, his half-brother, Sir Albert Margai, succeeded him as Prime M

The initial ethnic balance in government established by the Briti

independence soon gave way. Margai quickly moved to install m

of the Mende tribe in all key positions. For example, Margai in

the representation of the Mende in the Army’s officer ranks from 

cent to 52 percent of the total.24 This upset the delicate ethnic 

for the Mende and Temne each represented about 30 percent of t

population of Sierra Leone. It soon became apparent, through the 

of various laws and personnel appointments, that the Margai gov

strongly favored the Mende at the expense of other groups. Eth

regional tensions seethed beneath the calm exterior. 

With growing popular resentment against the Mende-dominate

the All People’s Congress (APC) party led by Siaka Stevens, won 

jority of seats in the national elections on 17 March 1967. Siaka S

an ethnic Temne, was thus scheduled to become the new Prime M

of Sierra Leone. But as Stevens was about to take office on 21 M

military coup d’etat was launched by Brigadier David Lansana, a 

Army officer who had Stevens arrested. Lansana also took contro
23 March a group of army officers launched a successful count

under the banner of the National Reformation Council (NRC) and 

Lansana.25 Finally, a group of noncommissioned soldiers callin

selves the National Interim Council (NIC) ousted the NRC in a 

counter-coup in April 1968. On 26 April 1968, the NIC returned co

the government to Siaka Stevens who was sworn in as Prime Min

year and two coups after he was elected. 

Stevens moved quickly to establish his power and the powe

Temne tribes under the political cover of the APC party. He replac

net members and senior members of the army with men of Tem

nicity. Stevens had the senior Mende officers and the police lea

arrested and replaced them with his trusted soldiers. By May 1968

all Mende officers were purged from the army and replaced by Te

ficers. To obtain a position in the army, all recruits had to swear all

to the new Temne dominated government.26 

Siaka Stevens remained in control for 18 years. He saw hims

“Big Man,” an African term for the most important person in th

Over the years Siaka destroyed the remaining vestiges of democr

ethnic cooperation in Sierra Leone. In 1971 he changed the politi

tem from a parliamentary system to a republic and declared himsel

tive president. In 1978, Stevens established a one-party state rule

APC, effectively making him a dictator. Political opposition lead

conspirators were arrested, tried, and executed. Newspaper press

destroyed and the editors and publishers were killed if they printed 

come news.27 Such was the repressive nature of the state during S

reign. 

The Ceremonial Army 

Having had his Presidency delayed for a year by a military co

vens distrusted the army even though he had imprisoned most of 

position shortly after taking office. Because of his paranoia of 

military coup, Stevens developed his own security division, know

Internal Security Unit (ISU), as part of the police force guarding t

tal. Stevens used it primarily as an instrument of tyranny and supp

for his one-party state. The ISU became a paramilitary wing of th

Leone Police (SLP) and received training in Guinea and in Cuba. 

ensured that it enjoyed far better pay, equipment and training t

regular army. 

12 
 

 

of Sierra Leone Military Forces (RSLMF) were riddled with fact

valries and were largely incompetent as a military force. It wa

tially a ceremonial army.28 The army, for the most part, did not ev

weapons.29 Nepotism and party affiliation were the basis for s

leaders; merit and dedication to one’s duties were of little impor

rising through the ranks. Officers who engaged in political sycoph

tribal connections were the ones most likely to advance in their 

The army did not conduct regular training exercises and officer

ventured into the field.30 Junior soldiers routinely went without 

several months whereas the senior officers often sold the rations 

soldiers for profit. 

The army consisted of some 3,000 soldiers organized into two 

ions. The First Battalion was made up of some 1,000 old soldier

service dated from the immediate post colonial days. The Seco

talion of about 500 to 600 personnel was located near the capital 

training units operated at Daru and Benguema.31 The army also 

modern equipment such as armored vehicles, supply trucks, com

tion equipment and helicopters. 

Economic Collapse and the End of the Stevens Era 

Sierra Leone’s primary source of foreign exchange is natural 

es, one of which was rutile, a titanium mineral used in guided m

jewelry, and a variety of manufactured goods. Sierra Leone also co

usable gold deposits and diamonds. The Sierra Leone Selectio

(SLST) Company, part of the De Beers cartel, dominated the d

mining industry and provided the money used by Stevens to fina

regime. In 1971, Stevens created the Diamond Mining Compa

MINCO), which effectively nationalized SLST. All important d

were now made by the Prime Minister and his right hand man, 

nese businessman named Jamil Mohammed.32 Private companie

sored by corrupt government officials diverted the mineral trade 

own benefits and bankrupted the state treasury leaving the country 

straits. From a high of over two million carats officially exported 

legitimate diamond exports dropped to 595,000 carats in 1980 and 

only 48,000 in 1988.33 Since diamonds were easy to smuggle, on

estimated that 97 percent of diamonds from Sierra Leone were car

of the country illegally in the 1980s.34 

The elderly Stevens stepped down in 1985 and nominated 
the only candidate in a one-party election and as a member of t

Party he was elected by a very large margin. Upon taking office, 

declared a state of economic emergency, which granted him even 

control over Sierra Leone’s economy than was enjoyed by his pred

Momoh proved corrupt, weak, and inept as a leader. Sierra Leone

omy quickly disintegrated and the country’s currency became ess

worthless. The failing economy led to the collapse of government 

as civil servants went unpaid, schools simply ceased to operate 

basic infrastructure of the state collapsed. Because the governme

not afford to import gasoline and fuel oil, the country often went 

electricity for months.35 In the midst of the slow dissolution of 

and economic life in Sierra Leone, a new force entered the pict

would dominate Sierra Leone’s affairs for the next decade. 

The Revolutionary United Front 

Sierra Leone’s strife gave birth to numerous opposition an

movements in the 1980s and 1990s. Former army corporal Foday 

stands out as the most important among that undistinguished gr

ethnic Temne, he served in the RSLMF in the early 1970s and 

tained the rank of corporal. Upon leaving the army, he worked 

cameraman, but was fired for insubordination. He then became a fr

photographer while attending Freetown College. In college, he b

student activist and demonstrated against the government.36 Sank

briefly imprisoned in the 1970s and upon his release he declared 

would seek revenge on the ruling APC government. 

He joined other West African dissidents in Libya where 

Muammar al-Gaddafi was sponsoring revolutionary movements t

out the world. Sankoh later went to Liberia, where he joined forc

another young and charismatic revolutionary leader, Charles Taylo

he had met in Libya. It was in Liberia that Sankoh further develo

revolutionary ideas and bizarre tactics. Taylor launched a brutal c

in neighboring Liberia in 1989. Sankoh participated in the earlies

of the Liberian civil wars and Taylor noticed his leadership abiliti

Taylor was also seeking revenge against the Momoh govern

Sierra Leone. Momoh was allowing the Lungi airport near Freetow

used by soldiers from the Economic Community of West Africa

Military Observer Group (ECOMOG) in support of Taylor’s rivals 

ria, the United Liberian Movement for Democracy (ULIMO). Mom

14 
 

 

 

known as the Leone Battalion (LEOBATT), to participate in EC

forces that intervened in Liberia in 1990 in a futile attempt to end t

war.37 Taylor thought a revolutionary force in the eastern and south

part of Sierra Leone would provide a buffer zone to impede the p

of ECOMOG and ULIMO while he took control of Liberia.38 Tay

took notice of the rich diamond mines in Sierra Leone. 

Sankoh began assembling his revolutionary force in October 

he was traveling to varying locations on the western border of Libe

tention centers and refugee camps populated by a mix of Sierra L

and other nationalities served as the source of manpower for Tay

Sankoh adopted the technique. Taylor’s National Patriotic Front of 

(NPFL) fighters would beat, molest, and execute civilians in the c

obtain recruits and information. As Sankoh visited these areas, h

separate the Sierra Leoneans from the rest of the group and bl

them into becoming members of the Revolutionary United Front (

return for shielding them from the NPFL.39 Sankoh was also a cha

leader, however, and he persuaded many displaced Sierra Leonean

his cause voluntarily. Many Sierra Leoneans were drawn to this 

tionary movement which appeared to offer an attractive solutio

ethnic conflicts and economic ruin that was Sierra Leone in 1991. 

Sankoh launched his first incursions into Sierra Leone from L

late March and early April 1991 into the districts of Kailahun on t

ern border and Pujehun on the southern border. These incursions 

trated on capturing land, civilians, towns, and equipment. The fo

led by the special forces of Taylor’s NPFL and the vanguard of the 

Of the 2000 attackers, about 1600 came from Liberian forces a

came from Sierra Leone. Sakoh organized his forces into two ba

each with three companies of approximately 60 members each.41 

NPFL and RUF forces launched their eastern attack from the L

town of Foya Kamal, attacking down the main highway from the 

edge towards the interior of Sierra Leone. Their initial objective 

clear the road to Koindu and then to wait for reinforcements to c

to advance.42 Their ultimate objective was to capture the strategic 

barracks, known as Moa Barracks, in the town of Daru located on 

River.43 If the insurgents could capture Moa Barracks they could 

a base for their own operations as they moved south toward Kenem

denying it as a base for the Sierra Leone Army. 
 

hicles and by foot. They were armed with a mix of small arms, m

guns, and rocket propelled grenades (RPG) but lacked heavy w

or air support.44 The RUF dressed in a bizarre combination of 

flage and civilian clothes laced with charms such as shells, net

face paints, and religious symbols. The attackers encountered ve

resistance because RSLMF troops in the area quickly retreated due 

of motivation and ammunition. As the NPFL and RUF combatants 

toward Koindu they went on looting sprees and indiscriminatel

many civilians. As word spread to other villages about these attack

numbers of civilians sought refuge in neighboring Guinea and Lib

Unbeknownst to the attackers, however, ECOMOG forces s

ing the Liberian government had arrived at Moa Barracks to est

Map 3. RUF offensives, 1991. 

16 
 

consisted of only 200 troops from the Guinean Armed Forces (GA

they brought considerable firepower to include artillery and air 

As the lightly equipped NPFL and RUF forces numbering abou

approached Koindu from the east they were routed by the more 

armed and disciplined Guinean troops.45 The offensive ground to 

As the eastern attack stalled, the combined NPLF and RUF in

on the southern front in the Pujehun District met with greater 

They were able to quickly capture the bridge over the Mano River t

vided the rebels with unlimited access into the region. They plunde

captured many towns and villages as they pushed toward the Bo 

containing the second largest city in Sierra Leone. The insurgents m

very little resistance from scattered RMSLF outposts and were 

welcomed by the inhabitants of many villages in the district.46 Mo

Leoneans were initially happy to see an alternative to the mistreatm

corruption of the government. These two offensives were forerunn

decade of scattered fighting between rag-tag military forces, wide 

use of armed civilians as soldiers, indiscriminate attacks on civili

massive refugee flows that came to dominate Sierra Leone for the 

years. 

Local Response to Invasion:
 

The Civil Defense Forces and the Kamajors
 

In response to the attacks by the rebel and the lack of suppo

the army, many loyal towns and villages formed paramilitary u

militias that would eventually become known as Civil Defense 

(CDF). One type of CDF were known as kamajor units. The k

were selected by the paramount chiefs and were known for their a

hunt and trap wild animals. Originally paramount chiefs selected o

kamajors per village, but as the civil war progressed, the need f

kamajors became important. The kamajors mixed self defense wit

cism and inculcated a cult of invincibility. They required their can

to be initiated in secret ceremonies to further their sacrosanct be

the beginning, the only weapons they had were machetes, swords, p

and rocks to fend off the rebels. Using captured NPLF and RUF w

and equipment they soon became a formidable force, actually outn

ing the rebel army in some parts of the country. 

Due to their success in combating the RUF forces, the governm

corporated the kamajor CDF units into to the state security system
armys status and diverted resources badly needed to rejuvenate 

ity to conduct operations.47 CDF units were locally based and thu

not effectively operate outside their local areas. As the kamajors 

numbers, they succumbed to the general lawlessness and lack of di

that plagued every aspect of Sierra Leonean society and governm

paramount chief initially chose the kamajors in each village based 

abilities and therefore held some control over their actions. As th

in number, however, the kamajor began recruiting their own m

Soon, significant numbers of urban street gang members were dra

the CDF, as were many deserters from the RUF and RSLMF. S

kamajor CDF units were involved in corruption, extortion, mistr

or murder of captives, and brutality towards civilians unfortunate 

to be caught in the fighting. 

The RUF in Sierra Leone 

Tension between the RUF and the NFPL leadership eventually 

so intense that Taylor decided to remove his troops from Sierra 

As the NFPL troops left they took all of their weapons and amm

with them leaving Sankoh and the RUF in a vulnerable situation. 

and his soldiers had captured some equipment from the RSLMF, 

enough to sustain operations. Sankoh and the RUF soon discov

importance and value of diamonds. As Sankoh and his soldiers to

mining areas in southern Sierra Leone, he found himself with a 

he could barter. Sankoh approached Taylor about an exchange and 

was interested. Taylor needed a way to finance his operations in 

and diamonds were a commodity not easily traced. He establishe

work of illegal buyers and sellers from various countries and was 

smuggle weapons and ammunition to barter with Sankoh and to 

his war. 

Diamonds became the principle means to fund the war in Si

one for both sides. Diamonds were easy to transport, hide, and 

convert into cash. They were virtually impossible to detect in airp

untraceable as to origin.48 Controlling the mines allowed millions 

lars worth of diamonds to change hands in order to purchase an

for equipment, weapons, and medical supplies. The presence of 

diamonds made it easy for the RUF to channel illegal diamonds to 

Since alluvial diamonds were not mined in the traditional sense, bu

by “panning” in much the same way as miners “panned for gold,” 

it easy to extract them and carry them to buyers in other countrie

18 
 

the workers didnt meet their quota or tried to steal diamonds, th

often executed and dumped in shallow graves.50 

A diamond network was developed from Sierra Leone, going 

Liberia and/or Guinea, and then on to Antwerp, Belgium; Bomba

or New York City using a variety of Lebanese merchants.51 The L

had settled in Sierra Leone in the wake of World War II and op

many import-export shops selling consumer goods, general merch

and electronic products from around the world. Many of these L

merchants exchanged goods for diamonds. If a diamond certificat

thenticity was necessary to identify the country’s origin and leg

bribes would be made to customs officials and certificates issu

scale of the diamonds taken from Sierra Leone and sold through 

licit trade networks was staggering. Although Liberia could only 

200,000 carats of industrial diamonds from its own resources, it e

over 6 million carats a year.52 

The RUF had several objectives in addition to financing and 

ping its forces, but three were most significant: crippling Sierra 

commercial and industrial activities, undermining the physical sec

the state, and attracting international publicity.53 Sankoh believe

he could deny diamond revenues to the state, then he could crip

government and force a negotiation between the RUF and the gove

He carried out raids and ambushes on state controlled diamond min

erations after carefully assessing the situation. He used intelligenc

mation gathered from local infiltrators—often children—and co

stakeouts to ensure success.54 If Sankoh could stop mining operat

could cripple the state’s revenue. 

Second, the RUF whittled away at the Sierra Leone Army and 

mined its credibility. As the RUF captured equipment, its member

dress up in their confiscated army uniforms, move into civilian 

and towns, and conduct operations. Civilians, thinking they were 

the army, let them into their villages and soon found themselves 

of property destruction, mass killings, brutality, rape, and kidnapp

RUF intentionally spread confusion and terror among the civilian 

tion while blaming the army for it.55 

Finally, Sankoh wanted to attract international attention for th

armed struggle and to be part of the negotiation process. Sankoh b

that if he could make life unbearable in Sierra Leone, it would 
suade the media favorably toward his revolution, then he could ev

have a part in the new government. 

Child Soldiers 

The RUF, the RSLMF, and the CDF all adopted the horrific pra

using young children as young as 7 as soldiers during the civil wa

55 percent of the population was under 18 the supply of child sold

plentiful. Many of the child soldiers were abandoned, captured in 

their parents were killed by the RUF. They were hungry, and need

and a place to live. All three military forces eagerly “adopted” them

children were initially used as load-bearers who carried ammo, equ

and food to supply the fighters who had taken them captive. Soon, 

er, children were taught to fire weapons by their captors and place

front lines. Some children fought for revenge. They had lost thei

and friends at the hands of rebel forces and had watched their hom

to the ground. Other children joined the army to feel safe; they ne

feel part of some family social structure and the army provided th

of food, shelter, clothing, and camaraderie in arms. Ishmael Beah

soldier, provided the following account in his now famous memoi

I am from Sierra Leone, and the problem that is affecting us 

children is the wars that force us to run away from our homes, 

lose our families, and aimlessly roam the forests. As a result, 

we get involved in the conflict as soldiers, carriers of loads, and 

in many other difficult tasks. All this is because of starvation, 

the loss of our families, and the need to feel safe and be part of 

something when all else has broken down. I joined the army 

really because of the loss of my family and starvation. I wanted 

to avenge the death of my family. I also had to get some food to 

survive, and the only way to do that was to be part of the army. 

It was not easy being a soldier, but we just had to do it.57 

It was estimated that over half of the RUF combatants were b

the ages of seven and fifteen, both male and female. RUF comm

often preferred to use child soldiers because children were fearles

pliant, and easier to manipulate. A child could be sent into a crowd 

suspicion and have him collect intelligence, or have him throw a 

at soldiers. Children were also considered expendable because t

not have families. There was a division of labor between the sex

were used as fighters and miners whereas girls were used for c

transporting, and sex. 

20 
memoir, Beah described how a lieutenant from the RSLMF tau

child soldiers how to practice killing prisoners. He brought in fi

prisoners with hands tied behind their backs and lined them up be

child soldiers. He instructed the child soldiers, upon command, to 

throat of a prisoner while looking at the prisoner’s face. The winne

contest was the prisoner who died first.58 Ruthless, senseless kill

the standard during the civil war and much occurred at the hands 

soldiers. 

To prevent children from escaping their captors, many were o

tooed, scarred, or branded. If they tried to escape, they would of

death at the hands of soldiers or CDF or even village lynch mo

would recognize the symbols displayed on the child soldier’s body

were recaptured by their own group, they were often made an exam

described by one boy, age fifteen, 

One boy tried to escape, but he was caught. His hands were 

tied, and then they made us, the other new captives, kill him 

with a stick. I felt sick. I knew this boy from before. We were 

from the same village. I refused to kill him and they told me 

they would shoot me. They pointed a gun at me, so I had to do 

it. The boy was asking me, “Why are you doing this?” I said 

I had no choice. After we killed him, they made us smear his 

blood on our arms. I felt dizzy. I felt so sick. They said we had 

to do this so we would not fear death and so we would not try 

to escape.59 

Though the RSLMF and the CDF treated children and captiv

brutality, the RUF was by far the biggest violator of human rights i

Leone. 

Summary 

By 1992, the insurrection had taken a terrible toll on Sierra 

The RUF offensive had been halted, but they remained in control 

swaths of territory. Since the eastern and southern regions of Si

one were the breadbaskets of the country, food production was s

disrupted. Many towns and villages were burned to the ground 

sides during the fighting. Tens of thousands of refugees left Sierr

for neighboring Guinea to live in squalid refugee camps. The RU

successfully occupied the diamond mining area of Kono in easter

Leone depriving the state of its prime source of revenue and fi
for his campaign against the government, Sankohs revolutionary 

ment soon lost credibility and support because of RUF brutality a

ruption.60 Sankoh’s diamond mining operations, his bizarre atte

draw attention to his movement, and the brutality of his tactics 

the population of Sierra Leone to a Hobbsian state of existence. 

effectual leadership of General Momoh in the face of the RUF i

weakened his hold on the army and the APC party. Valentine Str

29-year-old army captain, overthrew General Momoh in a military 

April 1992.61 International human rights organizations, neighborin

tries and the United Nations soon demanded action to end the su

opening ten years of military interventions. 

22 
1. Central Intelligence Agency, “CIA World Factbook–Sierra 

https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sl.h

cessed 18 June 2007). 

2. United Nations, Human Development Reports, http://hdr.u

hdr2006/statistics/countries/country_fact_sheets/cty_fs_SLE.html (

20 June 2007). 

3. Central Intelligence Agency, “CIA World Factbook–Sierra 

https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sl.h

cessed 18 June 2007). 

4. Properly used, the word “tribe” in Africa refers to an ethnic group

nicity is not rigidly bounded; it changes over time and overlaps with ot

tities. No single criterion always works to determine ethnicity or to di

between ethnic groups, but the criteria in Africa are language differe

geographical place of ancestral origin. 

5. Earl Conteh-Morgan and Mac Dixon-Fyle, Sierra Leone at the E

Twentieth Century, (New York: Peter Lang Publishing, Inc, 1999), 11-1

6. Alexander Peter Kup, Sierra Leone, (New York: St. Martin’s Pres

41-113. These two chapters are excellent resources for the history of th

and Temne ethnic groups. The Temne have been around Sierra Leone the 

but the Mende are the largest ethnic group in Sierra Leone today. 

7. Conteh-Morgan and Dixon-Fyle, Sierra Leone at the End of the T

Century, 18-19. 

8. The Atlantic slave trade is marked by the high point of unequal e

between European traders and Sierra Leone counterparts, often chief

lages. The loss of manpower left the area without the means to prod

own land. It is interesting that as the slave trade moves forward, the exc

slaves for guns becomes the most important trade. Put in another way

capital goods (slaves produce other slaves) for consumable goods. 

9. US Department of State, Bureau of American Affairs, Background 

erra Leone, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5475.htm (accessed 13 June 

10. Conteh-Morgan and Dixon-Fyle, Sierra Leone at the End of the T

Century, 13. 

11. Simon Schama, Rough Crossings: Britain, the Slaves and the A

Revolution, (United Kingdom: Ecco Press, 2006). 

12. John L. Hirsch, Sierra Leone: Diamonds and the Struggle for Dem

(Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001), 22-25. 

13. Alexander Peter Kup, Sierra Leone, 114-117, and 156-160. 

14. Kenneth P. Vickery, The African Experience From “Lucy” to 

Course No. 8678. The Teaching Company. CD-ROM. 2007. 
Century, 41. The paramount chiefs, in the long run retained much of th

authority, but they staunchly opposed it. 

16. Arthur Abraham, “Mende Government and Politics Under Colon

A Historical Study of Political Change in Sierra Leone 1890-1937,” The 

tional Journal of African Historical Studies, VII, 1, (1974), http://www.j

sici?sici=0361-7882(1982)15%3A2%3C297%3AMGAPUC%3E2.0.C

H (accessed 18 June 2007). 

17. Ibid. 

18. Richard Gott, “Sierra Leone and New Labor Militarism,” Z M

http://www.zmag.org/crisiscurevts/sierra_leone.htm (accessed 18 June 2

19. Ibid. 

20. Jim William, Donald Sutherland, Kimberly Cartwright and Martin 

Sierra Leone Diamond Policy Study, AMCO-Robertson Mineral Servi

(January 2002), http://www.reliefweb.int/library/documents/2002/dfid_

mond.pdf (accessed 23 April 2008). 

21. Ibid. 

22. Ibid. 

23. David Pratt, MP, Sierra Leone: The Forgotten Crisis, report to C

Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lloyd Axworthy, PC, MP, 23 April 1999. 

24. Conteh-Morgan and Dixon-Fyle, Sierra Leone at the End of the T

Century, 78. 

25. Abass Bundu, Democracy by Force?: A Study of International Mi

tervention in the Conflict in Sierra Leone from 1991-2000, (London: U

Publishers, 2001), 41-43. 

26. David Keen, Conflict and Collusion in Sierra Leone, (New York: 

Publishers, 2005), 14-15. At the time, free bags of rice were given to army 

and this made any “buy-in” a lucrative deal. The rice was either used fo

needs or sold to others. The selling of rice became very profitable for sen

leaders. 

27. Conteh-Morgan and Dixon-Fyle, Sierra Leone at the End of the T

Century, 80-81. 

28. Thomas S. Cox, Civil Military Relations in Sierra Leone: A Case 

African Soldiers in Politics, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Pres

207. 

29. Keen, Conflict and Collusion in Sierra Leone, 17. Most of the rif

antiquated. 

30. Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Sierra Leone, Final Repo

Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Sierra Leone, Chapter 3, para 24

trcsierraleone.org/drwebsite/publish/v3a-c1.shtml (accessed 26 July 200

31. Ibid., para 246. 

32. Victor A. B. Davies, Will Sierra Leone Grow Again?; available fro

24 
10 June 2007). 

33. M. A. Sesay, “Interdependence and Dependency in the Political E

of Sierra Leone.” PhD. diss, University of Southampton, 1993, 295-319, 

34. Ian Smillie, Lansana Gberie and Ralph Hazleton, “The Heart of 

ter: Sierra Leone, Diamonds & Human Security” Insights, Partnershi

Canada, January 2000, http://www.sierra-leone.org/heartmatter.html (

8 June 2007). 

35. Hirsch, Sierra Leone: Diamonds and the Struggle for Democracy, 

36. Kwaku Nuarmah and William Zartman, “Intervention in Sierra Le

Military Intervention: Cases in Context for the Twenty-First Century, W

Lahneman (New York: Rowmann and Littlefield, 2004), 133-150. 

37. Ibid., para 248. 

38. Keen, Conflict and Collusion in Sierra Leone, 36-38. 

39. Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Sierra Leone, Final Repo

Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Sierra Leone, Chapter 3, http

raleone.org/drwebsite/publish/v3a-c1.shtml (accessed 8 June 2007). 

40. The term “Special Forces” is understood to denote fighters who h

trained outside of the country they are fighting in. It is not due to specializ

ing. The vanguards were selected and trained by Sankoh. 

41. Hirsch, Sierra Leone: Diamonds and the Struggle for Democracy, 

42. Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Sierra Leone, Final Repo

Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Sierra Leone, para 159. 

43. Ibid., para. 221-222. 

44. Ibid., para. 161. 

45. Ibid. 

46. Ibid. 

47. Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Sierra Leone, Final Repo

Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Sierra Leone. 

48. Eunice Ajambo, “Debate Over al Qaeda’s Connection to West Afri

mond Trade Takes New Turns,” allAfrica.com, 5 August 2004, http://

com/stories/printable/200408050800.html (accessed 12 June 2007). 

49. Sierra Leone Web, “Testimony of Joseph Melrose, 13 February 02

www.sierra-leone.org/melrose021301.html (accessed 15 June 2007). 

50. Greg Campbell, Blood Diamonds: Tracing the Deadly Path of the 

Most Precious Stones, (Bolder CO: Westview Press, 2002), 54. 

51. Donald Temple, “Sierra Leone: An Obscure Battlefield in the Wa

rorism,” The Jamestown Foundation, http://www.jamestown.org/terroris

article.php?articleid=2369857&orubttgus=1 (accessed 15 June 2007). 

52. Campbell, Blood Diamonds: Tracing the Deadly Path of the Worl

Precious Stones, 42-43. Exporting began in 1994–1998. Additional d

were received illegally. 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Sierra Leone, para 422, para 428, p

54. Ibid., para 423. 

55. Ibid., para 422, 428-429. 

56. Ibid., para 424. 

57. Ishmael Beah, A Long Way Gone: Memoirs of a Boy Soldier, (Ne

Sarah Crichton Books, 2007), 199. 

58. Ibid., 124 

59. Human Rights Watch, The Scars of Death, http://www.hrw.org/repo

children/9.htm (accessed 18 July 2007). 

60. Lansana Gberie, A Dirty War in West Africa: The RUF And the De

of Sierra Leone, (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2005), 70-

61. Momoh spent the last years of his life in neighboring Guinea, wher

in exile. 

26 
The First Intervention:
 

Civil War and Mercenaries, 1995–1996
 

After their spring 1991 offensive, the RUF controlled the d

mines of Sierra Leone and their forces operated within 20 mile

capital of Freetown. The Sierra Leone government under General 

controlled little but the old Freetown Colony. State services had co

and the country was in ruin. This chapter will analyze events fro

when a military junta seized control of the government to the 19

djan Peace Accord agreement. Faced with its own defeat, the junt

to mercenaries in an attempt to restore its control over the country

National Provisional Ruling Council 

In April 1992, a group of disgruntled junior officers on leave 

town, led by Captain Valentine Strasser, overthrew President Mom

formed a military junta known as the National Provisional Rulin

cil (NPRC). The military junta consisted of about 100 soldiers dis

rocket launchers, heavy machine guns, and antiaircraft guns. T

was popular at the time, as most Sierra Leoneans were disgruntl

the aging and ineffective APC leadership. Part of the NPRC’s po

had to do with the promise to end the war and to restore peace i

Leone. The coup—marked by widespread looting—recovered ove

lion leones, approximately $13.5 million, from the homes of ex-m

and senior APC cabinet members. Within a week, the RUF, via br

messages, offered a cease-fire and readiness to work with the jun

interest of peace.1

 Captain Strasser and his lieutenants, however, 

think compromise or working with the RUF was in the best intere

government or the people of Sierra Leone. 

Sierra Leone Army 

One of the first goals of the NPRC was to increase the stre

the military in order to drive back RUF forces. To give the army 

start, the administration changed the name of the army from the 

to the Sierra Leone Army (SLA). They appealed to the citizens o

Leone to enlist in the army and become part of the patriotic sol

end the insurgency. Within four years, the army grew from 3,700 

17,000 troops. Unfortunately, many of the recruits were uneduca
 

age. Many of the recruits were also drug users and criminals. T

provided only the most rudimentary military training for two to si

before sending the new recruits to the front lines.2 

As soldiers moved to the frontlines, volunteers came forward 

in the war effort. These voluntary cadres burgeoned into a whole ne

of fighters commonly known as the “irregulars” that were comp

vigilantes, border guards, auxiliary forces and unemployed people

fighters were taught little more than how to fire a gun and how to 

to orders. Some of these irregulars were issued weapons and unifo

placed on the army rolls.3 These new soldiers had little or no dis

Senior officers did not have control of their soldiers and many of 

diers reverted to their old habits of drug use. Military codes of 

existed but were not enforced. The organizational structure was 

professionalism was nonexistent. Many of the recruits didn’t eve

to whom to report. As these soldiers moved into the war-affecte

they quickly resorted to the same brutal practices of their enem

ficers rarely took disciplinary action about complaints from civili

commander was found engaging in some sort of unsavory or unscr

activity, the NPRC simply replaced him with another commander 

the relieved commander back to Freetown to take another position 

the military. 4 

Civilians increasingly referred to the NPRC military forces a

or “soldiers by day, rebels by night.” They found a more lucrative 

making a living than working for the low wages they received. As 

entered villages, towns, and cities in the day, they scouted out w

could steal at night. In some cases, they would evacuate the citize

the homes, and blame the RUF. When the sobels moved into the d

areas, they would often work the mines and profit from smuggling

of the officers organized groups of soldiers and local citizens to w

mines while allegedly conducting military operations for the gove

In some cases, senior officers conspired with rebel groups. In ex

for a portion of the diamond harvest, they would promise not to ta

tary action against the RUF forces. The new government estimated 

many as 20 percent of the soldiers were disloyal.6 

The civil war consumed the NPRC leadership between 1992 an

Sierra Leone’s monetary situation became ever more desperate ov

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) provided loans to the ne

ernment to fund its operations. When the government was unable 

28 
a precondition for additional loans. Strasser, the President of the 

appealed to the UN for military and monetary intervention, but 

considered the civil war an internal problem and exercised its pra

non-interference with member states.7 Strasser desperately searc

alternatives, fully aware of the instability of his government, the 

economy, and the approaching rebels to Freetown. Executive Ou

(EO), a private South African mercenary firm submitted a propos

Strasser government and negotiations began. 

The First Intervention: Executive Outcomes 

In April 1995 the NPRC leader contracted with EO to conduct 

operations in Sierra Leone against the RUF forces. In addition to 

EO $1.8 million per month for their military services, Strasser also 

into an agreement with Branch Energy and its subsidiary Diamond 

EO and Diamond Works were financially linked, though the deta

murky. The plan called for EO to recapture the diamond mines f

RUF, after which Diamond Works would extract the diamonds usi

labor. In exchange for the effort, Diamond Works would pay the 

ment 37.5 percent of the net profits.8 Strasser believed that if h

return the diamond mines to government control he would be abl

EO and have enough cash to run the government. 

EO was founded in 1989 by Edben Barlow, a former South 

Special Forces officer, when the elite 32d Battalion Reconnaissan

of the South African Defense Force was disbanded. EO recruit

of its members from the 32d Battalion, Reconnaissance Comman

Parachute Brigade, and the South West Africa Police Counter-Ins

Unit or the paramilitary Koevoet or Crowbar.

9 EO maintained a 

nent staff of 14 with ready access to over 2,000 recruits. Withi

weeks EO assembled a force of 500 military advisers with 3,000 

trained combat soldiers. This capable force possessing extensive 

experience became mercenaries for the NPRC. 

Strasser’s government handed EO a threefold mission: to e

RUF from areas east of Freetown, to stabilize the diamond min

allowing Diamond Works to open the mines for the government

locate and destroy the RUF headquarters. In addition to the mili

jectives, EO was also charged with employing an information op

program to encourage Sierra Leoneans to support the decision to 

EO in the country.10 
diers. The governments intent was to bring the forces to a standa

that the SLA could operate on its own. In essence, the mission of 

organization was to work itself out of a job. In early May 199

advance team of 30 men arrived in Sierra Leone and began eva

training, and restructuring the SLA. In addition to training the ar

also began training many of the kamajors to operate in support 

infantry units. 

At the same time approximately 150 EO mercenaries set about 

of securing Freetown. EO brought an Mi-8 transport helicopter, 

Hind Russian helicopter gunship, a radio intercept system, two 

727s to transport troops and supplies, and an Andover casualty-

tion aircraft. The government provided them with SLA military un

three APC’s equipped with 30-mm cannons, six Land Rovers m

antiaircraft guns, and other weapons.11 In 10 days of fighting EO w

to drive the RUF approximately 60 miles into the interior of the 

EO decisively overmatched the rag tag RUF units in a skillfully e

combined arms operation.12 

EO’s training program for the SLA soon bore fruit. Their 

communications equipment enabled EO and the SLA to track and 

the whereabouts of the RUF. EO and the SLA used professional 

planning and targeting methods to great effect in their assaults aga

RUF, and they were able to carry out surprise attacks at night using 

ticated night-vision equipment. EO provided the SLA with the kno

weaponry and leadership to operate on the battlefield and gave th

found confidence to face the RUF. 

In August 1995, EO troops and two retrained SLA infantry ba

supported by the Mi-24 helicopter gunship recaptured the Kon

ing district from the RUF. In December 1995, EO/SLA forces ret

Sierra Rutile mine from the RUF, and by January 1996 EO/SLA 

defeated the RUF forces in the Kangari Hills, a major RUF stro

Although combined EO/SLA forces did not capture the RUF head

near Kailahun, the SLA offensive forced Sankoh to cut his losses a

into negotiation with the government for the first time in 5 1/2 year

conducted missions in Sierra Leone for only seven months from M

till January 1996. Yet it was able to restore order to Freetown , re

major diamond mines located in the Kono district, and force the 

seek peace. 

30 
 

Map 4. Executive Outcomes offensives, 1995-96. 

1996 Elections and a New Government 

The government’s military success in late 1995 provided the

the breathing space to move toward elections with the aim of rees

ing civilian rule. This had been the platform upon which Strasser 

NPRC seized power in 1992. The junta set March 1996 as the 

national elections. But Strasser soon upset the process by trying t

the mandatory age requirement of the president, as established by 

stitution, from 45 years of age to one more appropriate to his age, 

attempts to change this policy led to his downfall and in mid Janua

Strasser was himself overthrown in a peaceful coup by his deputy

dier General Julius Bio.14 The UN quickly threatened sanctions 

threatened to leave the country if elections were not held by Ma
place as scheduled.

Political parties and candidates conducted their campaigns in 

freedom. The ruined state of the country, however, hampered com

tions and enforcement of electioneering rules. Reports poured in 

over the country about local bans on rallies, indiscriminate amputa

hands and arms to prevent voting, looting and destruction of prop

the RUF. Despite these many problems, on election day nearly 60 

of the population in Sierra Leone voted. Ahmed Tejan Kabbah, th

of the Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP), defeated John Karefa 

the leader of the United National People’s Party 59 to 41 percent. 

was the first directly elected head of state for Sierra Leone. The 

junta handed power over to Kabbah in an orderly fashion on 29 

1996.16 

Abidjan Peace Accord 

One of Kabbah’s top priorities was to bring lasting peace t

Leone. Bio, in his short reign leading the junta, had persuaded Sa

meet him in the Ivory Coast with UN Special Envoy Berhanu Din

resentatives of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), Great 

and the foreign minister of the Ivory Coast to establish a peace 

President Kabbah continued this peace process for the next eight 

They agreed on 26 of 28 negotiating points but the meetings ende

the RUF demanded withdrawal of all foreign troops, meaning E

and because Sankoh demanded the vice presidency. Since RUF uni

to adhere to the cease-fire during peace negotiations, the new gov

contracted with EO to conduct a second offensive operation to 

the RUF headquarters near Bo, the provincial capital and larges

southern Sierra Leone. In October 1996 the combined EO/SLA/k

forces found and destroyed RUF headquarters and Sankoh admitt

tary defeat. Sankoh signed the Abidjan Peace Accord on 30 No

1996. The agreement included the stipulation that the EO contrac

be terminated but gave Sankoh and the RUF no voice in governm

The signing of the Abidjan Peace Accord between the govern

Sierra Leone and the RUF promised to end Sierra Leone’s 5 1/

of war. Sankoh promised that the RUF would adhere to the acc

both the government and RUF made a commitment to disarm, dem

and resettle all combatants. The war took a huge toll on its citiz

displaced over one and a half million citizens from their homes an

32 
 

were maimed and traumatized. At wars end, and as a promise o

people began migrating back to villages and urban areas seeking 

and support. 

The accord contained 28 articles and a short annex that began 

cessation of hostilities and the priority for peace.18 A National Com

for the Consolidation of Peace (NCCP) was to be established wit

weeks and would become the principle monitoring group for impl

tion. The NCCP was the final authority on all actions between the 

ment and the RUF. Two other monitoring groups were also esta

The first, the Joint Monitoring Group—comprised of equal rep

tives from the government and RUF—was to monitor the encam

disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration process. The secon

the international community, called the Neutral Monitoring Group 

was responsible for preventing breaches of the cease-fire. Once th

deployed to the area, EO was to leave the country within five wee

Articles 13 and 14 of the Agreement specifically dealt with t

duct of RUF personnel. In article 13 they were allowed to regis

political party. The RUF, although not having a clear ideology, 

this was necessary to have appropriate representation in the gove

Article 14 provided RUF and the SLA fighters immunity from p

tion for acts committed by them up to the signing of the accord. 

essence, provided them a pardon from any criminal action they com

during the revolutionary time. Article 20 established an independ

tional Commission on Human Rights to promote human rights ed

monitor violations, and institute legal proceedings as appropriate. 

The accord gave equal treatment to the RUF and the governm

matters relating to war and peace, but not to issues of politics a

ernance. Since free democratic elections with a multi-party syste

held prior to the signing of the accord, and a functioning constitut

in place, the accord accepted both as the will of the people. The R

cepted this provision as long as it was free to establish its own 

party, known as the RUFP. 

The peace accord had the potential to work if both parties were 

about making it work. It contained, however, several unresolve

that would later plague Sierra Leone. First, there was no mentio

CDF and kamajors. Should they remain as armed extensions of th

Leonean armed forces, or should they be dissolved? Second, th
 

 

ians. Men, women, and children were traumatized by mutilation, r

conscription to the war effort, but nothing was mentioned in the 

Third, since the peace commission was composed of eight people, 

divided between the government and RUF, there was no decision-

mechanism in the event of a deadlock. Finally, the commission it

not have a provision to replace members if they were found to be 

able.19 

As early as mid-December 1996, Kabbah and Sankoh began 

agree over how to implement the Abidjan Agreement. Sankoh accu

Freetown government of violating the cease-fire because of an 

with the kamajors. In January the SLA intercepted a RUF radio m

that indicated Sankoh had no intention of keeping the accord: the m

said he signed the peace accord simply to get rid of the military p

From this point on, communication between the two leaders cam

end. In early March 1997, Sankoh traveled covertly to Lagos, 

to purchase weapons, but was detained by Nigerian authorities a

munition was found in his vehicle.20 The Abidjan Agreement wou

peace to Sierra Leone for only a short while. 

Summary and Analysis of the Intervention by Executive Outc

As a military force EO was highly skilled and easily able to ou

ver and outperform the RUF rebels. The insurgents had limited 

strength and equipment and they did not have the training or cap

coordinate their efforts effectively. EO forces expertly used intellig

plan their operations and their combined use of artillery, helicop

mobile light infantry units was something never before seen in the c

The most striking aspect of EO was its ability to deploy to the are

a relatively short time. On acceptance of the contract by both par

provided troops and equipment in less than two weeks and began 

a noticeable difference on the ground within another ten days. 

EO had a well experienced chain of command, recent combat 

ence in South Africa, and acted aggressively to conduct comba

tions throughout Sierra Leone. The average EO soldier was paid 

per month while top helicopter pilots and company commande

paid $7500 per month.21 Another strength of EO was its ability 

and to employ SLA soldiers and kamajors in their operations. Th

jors were familiar with the terrain and had favorable relations w

34 
 

some military planning.

 EO established rules of conduct and rule

gagement, rehearsed operations, and depended on the soldiers to 

was necessary to complete the operation. This highly skilled forc

the balance of power and provided a victory that the NPRC coul

have accomplished on their own. As Canadian General Ian Dougla

negotiator, stated, “EO gave Sierra Leone a sense of stability dur

critical time.”23 

Sierra Leone’s decision to use EO was heavily criticized, de

obvious military success. One of the criticisms concerned the f

relationship between EO and Diamond Works. Although the gov

maintained that they made separate agreements with the two firms

mingling of objectives and financing gave the appearance of impr

Critics of EO argue that they were there only to plunder the ec

resources of the country through their corporate partner. EO insis

they were there to assist a failing government and provided a mo

effective solution than multinational or internationally mandated 

forces.24 Another criticism of the use of EO was the way in whic

directed undermined the effectiveness of the government and its c

ity. Instead of working for the Ministry of Defense and being acco

to the legislature, EO reported directly to President Strasser, who 

as the Minister of Defense.25 

The intervention by Executive Outcomes in the internal affai

erra Leone had achieved its stated objectives in 1995 and 1996. 

by far the superior military force in the country and quickly tur

military tide in favor of the government. The SLA also benefited f

training and expertise provided by EO. The NPRC junta’s milit

cess forced Sankoh and the RUF to the negotiating table and to n

a cease fire favorable to the government. The Abidjan Agreemen

vember 1996 appeared to establish a path towards political and so

unification of the country. Though the combined EO/SLA forces d

the RUF, they did not destroy it and Sankoh remained its fanatic

The internationally brokered peace agreement had many virtues

provisions were utterly dependent on the willingness of the signa

adhere to its stipulations and assumed a common vision for the f

Sierra Leone that did not exist in 1997. 
1. Lansana Gberie, A Dirty War in West Africa: The RUF And the De

of Sierra Leone, (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2005), 70

2. Ibid., 76. 

3. Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Sierra Leone, Final Repo

Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Sierra Leone, Chapter 3, para 32

trcsierraleone.org/drwebsite/publish/v3a-c1.shtml, (accessed 10 June 2

4. Ibid. 

5. William Shawcross, “Sierra Leone Defies Fear and Heads for th

International Herald Tribune, 15 March 1996, http://www.iht.c

cles/1996/03/15/edshaw.t.php (accessed 10 June 2007). 

6. Gberie, A Dirty War in West Africa: The RUF And the Destruction 

Leone, 91. 

7. David Keen, Conflict and Collusion in Sierra Leone, (New York: 

Publishers, 2005), 91-92. 

8. John L. Hirsch, Sierra Leone: Diamonds and the Struggle for Dem

(Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001), 39. 

9. William Bowles, “Executive Outcomes: Tony Blair’s Pet Bulldog? 

rious Case of Tim Spicer,” posted 18 August 2004, http://www.william

info/ini/ini-0266.html (accessed on 11 July 2007). 

10. Michael van Maanen, “Saving the Sum of Things for Pay: E

Outcomes in Sierra Leone,” Incite: Journal of Political Opinion and A

http://www.geocities.com/CollegePark/Square/6130/archive.htm (a

11 July 2007). 

11. Ibid., 94. 

12. Gberie, A Dirty War in West Africa: The RUF And the Destruction 

Leone, 92-93. 

13. Hirsch, Sierra Leone: Diamonds and the Struggle for Democracy, 

14. In a council meeting, after Strasser made a speech, Bio said he w

support him. Bio pulled out a pistol and pointed it at Strasser’s head. A 

ensued but was quickly contained and handcuffs were placed on Strasser

was then flown out of the country to neighboring Guinea, where Joseph 

was also a refugee. The whole operation took less than five minutes. Ju

maintained a statesmanlike demeanor in the midst of personal crisis. T

had captured his two sisters and brother-in-law in 1991. His sisters were s

to continual sexual violence and were forced to do domestic chores. If t

to escape, whoever was left would be killed. Putting nation above self, 

hands with Sankoh during the Abidjan Peace Accord. See Truth and Re

tion Commission of Sierra Leone, Final Report of the Truth and Recon

Commission of Sierra Leone, Chapter 3, para 618, http://trcsierraleone.or

site/publish/v3a-c1.shtml (accessed 6 July 2007). 

36 
Sierra Leone. 

16. Sierra Leone Web, “Sierra Leone News Archive, 29 March 1996

www.sierra-leone.org/slnews0396.html (accessed 8 July 2007). 

17. Tom Cooper and Court Chick, “Western and Northern Africa Data

erra Leone 1990-2002,” Air Combat Information Group Journal, (5 Augu

http://www.acig.org/artman/publish/article_462.shtml (accessed 19 June 

18. “The Abidjan Peace Accord,” 30 November 1996, Peace Agree

tween the Government of the Republic of Sierra Leone and the Revol

United Front of Sierra Leone (RUF/SL), http://www.sc-sl.org/abidjanacc

(accessed 10 July 2007). 

19. The problems of the peace accord are part of the written reflection

suf Bangura, “Reflections on the Abidjan Peace Accord,” Africa Deve

vol. XXII, Numbers 3 & 4, 1997, Council for the Development of So

ence Research in Africa, http://www.codesria.org/Links/Publications

tents/3&4_1997.htm (accessed 10 July 2007). 

20. Hirsch, Sierra Leone: Diamonds and the Struggle for Democracy, 

21. Herbert M. Howe, “Private Security Forces and African Stability: T

of Executive Outcomes,” The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol 3

(June 1998), 307-331, http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-278X(199806

2%3C307%3APSFAAS%3E2.0.CO%3B2-4 (accessed 18 May 07). 

22. Ibid. 

23. Ibid. 

24. van Maanen, “Saving the Sum of Things for Pay: Executive Outc

Sierra Leone.” 

25. Howe, “Private Security Forces and African Stability: The Case o

tive Outcomes,” 307-331. 

The Second Intervention: The Economic
 

Community of West African States, 1995–2000
 

By late 1996 Executive Outcomes mercenaries, hired in 1995 

Strasser government, had driven the RUF far into the countryside 

stored the government’s power over much of the country. This o

succeeded in bringing the RUF to the bargaining table with the 

ment holding the stronger hand. The Abidjan Agreement of No

1996 was designed to bring peace to Sierra Leone and gave the 

voice in the Kabbah government which had been elected in March 

year. By mid 1997, however, civil war returned to Sierra Leon

second round of external military interventions was launched by 

Sierra Leone’s West African neighbors. This chapter will focus on 

velopments between 1997 and the controversial Lome Peace Ag

of July 1999. It will specifically look at the intervention by the Ec

Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and their milita

known as the Military Observer Group or ECOMOG. 

Prelude to Intervention: ECOMOG, Sierra Leone, and Liberi

ECOMOG, the military arm of the thirteen West African states 

up ECOWAS, actually conducted its first operations in Sierra Leon

gust 1990 when it intervened in the Liberian civil war to assist the L

government of Sergeant Samuel Doe in defeating the rebel force 

Charles Taylor. Ghana, Guinea, Sierra Leone, Gambian and Nige

tributed troops, with the bulk of the forces and support being prov

Nigeria. ECOMOG forces first deployed into Sierra Leone in May 

attempted to seal the border with Liberia, to cut off one of Charles T

Liberian rebels’ source of supplies and men. ECOMOG used th

airport north of Freetown as their supply base, and ECOMOG troo

stationed at key places in the country to guard their supply line

south. They soon became involved in assisting the Sierra Leone 

ment in its battle with RUF forces being supported from Liberi

situation in Sierra Leone became tenuous in May 1997 when the 

government, which was supported by Nigeria, was overthrown an

MOG suddenly found itself in the midst of a country whose new 

ment demanded their exit. 
As the last of the EO mercenaries departed Freetown on 7 F

1997 in accordance with the Abidjan Agreement, the Sierra Leon

assumed responsibility for law and order in the country. Trying to 

country together soon proved tougher for the Kabbah governme

expected. Fighting continued in the hinterland between varying SL

units and RUF factions, and urban strife continued in Freetown. 

quest to support rebels fighting Charles Taylor in Liberia to th

ECOMOG troops were bound up in the fighting between the Si

one government and RUF units in the southern and eastern part

country. The lack of law and order throughout the countryside aft

of fighting and chaos made it hard for the government to meet t

expectations of Sierra Leoneans and the international community

pounding the problem was the downsizing of the military, lack o

to run government programs, pressure from the IMF to cut gov

spending, continued loss of jobs, rising prices, and declining in

Within a month, Sierra Leone descended again into chaos. 

In May 1997, a group of disaffected soldiers arrested severa

officers, blasted open Pademba Road Prison in Freetown releasin

than 600 convicts, and supplied them with arms. This force then a

the State House and named 33-year old Major Johnny Paul Koro

Pademba Road Prison on treason charges—as ruler of the self-pro

Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC).1 Koroma imm

suspended the constitution, banned demonstrations, shutdown new

and closed radio stations, abolished all political parties, and place

of his soldiers in leadership positions. President Kabbah and his 

ment went into exile into neighboring Guinea on 26 May 1997. 

To justify the AFRC coup, Koroma cited corruption in the gove

erosion of state sovereignty, dependence on foreign nations for f

and failure of the government to adequately address tensions betw

SLA and the kamajors. In a startling move to end the fighting b

the government and the RUF, Koroma invited the leadership of t

to join the AFRC, which they promptly did. Although Sankoh wa

detained by Nigeria, Koroma offered him the vice-chairmanship 

new junta government and he accepted. Sankoh ordered his RUF 

into Freetown to join the soldiers’ revolt.2 US Marines evacuate

1,200 foreign nationals and aid workers from the Mammy Yoko 

Freetown with the assistance of a small ECOMOG detachment in t

40 
Freetown were taken prisoner by the AFRC/RUF forces.

The rule of the joint AFRC/RUF coup was characterized by c

chaos and barbarism. Every state service, to include schools, bank

clinics, commercial services, and government offices ceased to f

The soldiers of the AFRC/RUF alliance intimidated the business 

government ministers, diplomats, humanitarian aid workers, and 

ists of Freetown by confiscating vehicles, merchandize, and mone

and order was replaced by rape, torture, looting, and murder. The c

roads and ferry networks, in bad shape before the war, suffered ev

damage as the rebellion continued. In many places outside Freeto

lages were accessible only by helicopter due to poor road conditi

ambushes. 

Regional West African Community Response 

ECOWAS, African regional organizations and the internation

munity roundly condemned the coup. ECOMOG forces in Sierr

continued to operate along the border with Liberia but after the

attempts in late May, held off from attempting to overthrow the 

RUF government. They also agreed on a three-phase strategy to 

dialogue, sanctions, and the use military force. During the openin

a group of five international members met directly with represe

of the AFRC leadership to demand that the new junta return, pea

power to the Kabbah government. ECOWAS held regional mee

Abidjan, Ivory Coast in July 1997 and at Conakry, Guinea in Octo

delegations representing Koroma and the AFRC/RUF junta. Both 

signed the Conakry Peace Plan on 23 October 1997. Koroma ag

return to power the Kabbah government no later than April 199

change for immunity for him, his followers, and the release of t

leader, Foday Sankoh from Nigeria. The key sections of the ag

stated: 

5. To that end, the Committee of Five and the representatives of 

Major Johnny Paul Koroma adopted an ECOWAS peace plan 

for Sierra Leone and a timetable for its implementation over a 

six-month period with effect from 23 October 1997. 

6. It is recognized that Corporal Foday Sankoh, as a leader of 

the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), could continue to play 

an active role and participate in the peace process. In the spirit 

of the Abidjan Accord and in the context of this agreement, 
his contribution to the peace process. 

7. The ECOWAS peace plan for Sierra Leone provides for: 

a. The reinstatement of the legitimate Government of 

President Tejan Kabbah within a period of six months; 

b. The immediate cessation of hostilities; 

c. Cooperation of the junta with ECOMOG in order to 

enforce the sanctions peacefully; 

d. Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of combatants; 

e. Provision of humanitarian assistance; 

f. Return of refugees and displaced persons; 

g. Immunities and guarantees to the leaders of the coup 

d’état of 25 May 1997; 

h. Modalities for broadening the power base in Sierra Leone.6 

As Koroma contemplated the effect of this agreement on hi

power, he changed his mind and declared that he would remain i

for another two to four years, claiming that the AFRC needed this 

restore normalcy to Sierra Leone. As this was unacceptable to EC

it began the second phase of its strategy—economic sanctions—

fect. The international community isolated Sierra Leone by severin

national ties, enforcing an embargo on international trade, and pla

ditional new sanctions on the AFRC leadership. The strategy of d

and sanctions had little effect on the AFRC. By November 1997 it 

come clear that armed intervention was the only way to remove th

junta and to restore the elected government of Sierra Leone.7

 EC

deployed ECOMOG soldiers to intervene in Sierra Leone in early 

restore the democratic government. 

In February 1998, ECOMOG soldiers comprised mostly of N

soldiers launched Operation SANDSTORM, an offensive to res

Kabbah government to power. As others would do later, ECOMO

the Lungi airport across the bay and north of Freetown where the 

government in exile was still in control. ECOMOG forces then m

the south around the Sierra Leone River estuary that is east of the F

peninsula and established a forward base near the town of Hasting

42 
forces were airlifted to old Hastings airfield. The first phase of th

tion, aimed at the capture of the capital of Freetown and the dep

the AFRC junta under Koroma in Freetown, was launched on 2 F

1998 and was named Operation TIGERHEAD. The three-pronge

on the city was conducted with three Nigerian infantry battalio

assisted by small ad hoc contingents of ex-policeman, military 

and university students who were loyal to the Sierra Leone govern

exile. One battalion attacked north into the eastern part of Freetow

the road from Jui through Calaba Town. The second attacked no

the center of Freetown along the peninsular road coming from W

to Hastings, and the third battalion attacked the western part of F

through the Regent–Grafton axis and headed towards the old Bri

tlement of Wilberforce.8 

Map 5. ECOMOG operations near Freetown, 1998. 
 

sistance from the AFRC and RUF on all three of its routes. EC

forces encountered AFRC fortifications including well placed land 

In addition, Nigerian forces reported that AFRC positions were 

defended by artillery support from Ukrainian mercenaries. EC

leaders spent ten days attacking AFRC positions before getting 

to assault the city. ECOMOG units successfully broke into Freet

12–13 February 1998.9 

In a measure that might have lessened resistance in the city

MOG forces allowed AFRC and RUF fighters to flee Freetown by 

and sea. Civilians in Freetown were once again subjected to an 

atrocities by fleeing AFRC and RUF fighters. ECOMOG later m

regretted the decision to allow safe passage out of Freetown becau

AFRC and RUF forces reconstituted themselves less than a mon

The Government of President Kabbah was reinstated in a ceremon

State House on 10 March 1998 with great fanfare. ECOMOG app

have quickly achieved a stunning success.10 

As ECOMOG moved beyond the outlying areas of Freetown 

the hinterland, however, it met with only marginal success. EC

personnel were able to liberate the cities of Masiaka, Makeni, and 

which lie in a belt around Freetown in the center west part of the 

But the further north or east from Freetown that ECOMOG forc

eled, RUF forces again offered stiff resistance. Due to poor road 

tions and a lack of aircraft, logistical units were unable to keep th

in supplies and ammunition.11 As ECOMOG’s offensive stalled, 

took up defensive positions. 

Prior to the official return of President Kabbah on 10 Marc

the citizens of Freetown carried out numerous executions of colla

and perpetrators of AFRC/RUF atrocities. This short period was 

by mob justice, vigilantes, and basic civil disorder. Civilians made 

ous reports of ECOMOG soldiers using brutality and excessive 

control the situation.12 Until a task force was established to provi

police action, ECOMOG soldiers did not know who the enemies 

the citizens were. Eventually Freetown was brought under con

Kabbah arrived to tend to matters of state. 

Once restored to the presidency by ECOMOG units, President 

immediately took action to hold the AFRC soldiers responsible f

rebellion. Many of the soldiers who perpetrated the coup were con

44 
 

Kabbah also demobilized the entire army and held courts-martia

coup leaders. Following the courts-martial, twenty-four AFRC mil

ficers were executed.13 RUF leader and AFRC co-leader Foday 

was arrested in Nigeria, returned to Sierra Leone, tried, found gu

sentenced to death. His sentence was not immediately carried out. 

On 13 July 1998, the UN Security Council—as requested in th

kry Agreement—established the United Nations Observer Missio

erra Leone (UNOMSIL) with 70 unarmed military observers and 1

cal personnel. Brigadier-General Subhash C. Joshi of India serve

Chief Military Observer under the Chief of Mission, Mr. Francis G

from Uganda.14 Paragraph six of UN Security Council Resoluti

tasked UNOMSIL to: 

a. Monitor the military and security situation in the 

country as a whole, as security conditions permit, and to provide 

the Special Representative of the Secretary-General with regular information thereon in particular with a view to determining 

when conditions were sufficiently secure to allow subsequent 

deployments of military observers beyond the fi rst phase; 

b. Monitor the disarmament and demobilization of 

former combatants concentrated in secure areas of the country, including monitoring of the role of the Military Observer 

Group (ECOMOG) of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in the provision of security and in the 

collection and destruction of arms in those secure areas; 

c. Assist in monitoring respect for international humanitarian law, including at disarmament and demobilization 

sites, where security conditions permit; 

d. Monitor the voluntary disarmament and demobilization of members of the Civil Defence Forces (CDF), as security conditions permit.15 

The resolution also requested ECOMOG to provide security for 

armed UNOMSIL force. 

The executions of some of their leaders by the Kabbah gov

after the Conakry Agreement, and the death sentence imposed on 

in absentia infuriated the AFRC/RUF members and intensified the

for revenge.16 With this as a motivation, the AFRC/RUF regrou

remobilized their forces and trained new recruits. They sent hund
Ukraine, Burkina, Nigeria, Libya, and South Africa. In a return 

previous practices, they captured civilians and children, forcing 

participate in the revolutionary movement. As Amnesty Internati

ported: 

Since their removal from power, the AFRC and RUF have 

wreaked a campaign of terror against unarmed civilians and 

human rights abuses have reached unprecedented levels. Several thousand civilians have been brutally killed or mutilated. 

Hundreds of others have been abducted from their villages and 

forced to join the revolutionary movement.17 

AFRC/RUF devised a bold plan to recapture Freetown. Fir

acquired enough recruits so that when they approached Freetown t

number of participants would overwhelm the weak government 

Second, the AFRC/RUF planned to use women and children to shi

fighters during the fighting around Freetown. The rebels knew th

civilians as shields would catch ECOMOG soldiers off guard and p

in the untenable military situation of being peacekeepers forced 

upon civilians.18 

The RUF deputy commander Sam Bockarie (alias Mosquito) 

the attack to retake Freetown and to free Sankoh from prison in one 

He had many of his rebel forces infiltrate the city prior to his planne

In January 1999, a 10,000 person mob marched toward Freetown

a mixture of civilians and RUF/SLA combatants disguised as civ

Bockarie called the attack Operation NO LIVING THING. Th

able to quickly find unmanned entry points into the city. Under

and less than fully professional ECOMOG forces were in disarray 

able to hold the entry points. For 2 weeks the AFRC/RUF mobs ra

throughout the city in an orgy of looting, amputations, rape and 

Sadly, ECOMOG units proved to be equally ruthless, capturing a

ing anyone they thought was connected with the RUF. Some EC

soldiers also took part in the atrocities against civilians caught u

chaos. The tiny UNOMSIL force departed the country in haste in 

1999 when it became clear that there was no reconciliation to obse

that their lives were in danger.20 

President Kabbah was evacuated to the Lungi airport by th

MOG to ensure his safety. While at Lungi, Kabbah called the N

leader, General Abdulsalami Abubakar, to request additional assis

General Abubaker immediately deployed several additional ba

46 
 

Shelpidi, with General Khobe. Khobe was a general who knew th

and was familiar with urban operations. Within 10 days of their arr

new ECOMOG battalions were on the offensive against the AFR

attackers. The fighting was unusually intense by the standards o

ous conflicts in Sierra Leone when weaker units melted away af

firefights. Every street had to be fought for and both sides suffere

casualties. As the AFRC/RUF forces were gradually forced out 

town they turned the battle into an orgy of looting, destruction, ab

rapes, and killings.22 

After three weeks of fighting Freetown was restored to order b

MOG. An estimated 10,000 people had been killed, including 

members, journalists, and lawyers. Before the rebels were drive

the area, they burned large parts of the city. Over 150,000 peop

now homeless and an additional 600,000 sought asylum in neig

countries. As the rebels departed the city, they abducted over 3,000 

and children.23 

While ECOMOG units were liberating Freetown, CDF milit

up the offensive against RUF units throughout the country. Arm

weapons supplied by Nigeria, they were able to take control of 

areas controlled by the RUF. Although the CDF was fighting for t

ernment to end RUF atrocities, its members also looted villages an

civilians suspected of aiding the rebels.24 Their tactics became as 

as those of the RUF. 

After the Nigerian led ECOMOG force cleared Freetown 

AFRC/RUF rebels it halted its operations; they were not prepared 

did not have a mandate to extend their operations beyond restor

the Kabbah government in Freetown. The government of Nigeria w

anxious to pull away from ECOMOG and begin the process of di

ing its troops from Sierra Leone. Because of the immense civilian s

and the likelihood of more if ECOMOG troops pulled out of Sierr

without a peace deal of some kind, the international community a

tervened to mediate negotiations between the government and reb

United Nations, the United States, Britain, and the OAU sent rep

tives to Lome, the capitol of Togo, to work out a possible solutio

crisis in Sierra Leone. The now familiar pattern of partial military 

by one side, followed by some sort of brokered peace returned. 

In July 1999, the RUF, AFRC, and President Kabbah reached 
 

Appendix B for key excerpts from the Lome Agreement), putting 

arrangements for a shared government. President Clinton and the U

ernment played a key role in pressuring Kabbah to accept a unity 

ment that included RUF participation, which Kabbah was not inc

do on his own. Clinton sent Jesse Jackson as a US special envo

peace negotiations. As part of the agreement, Sankoh was pard

treason, granted the status of vice president which had been den

by the Abidjan Agreement three years earlier, and made chairm

commission with powers to regulate the country’s diamonds. Th

agreement granted amnesty to Koroma and his AFRC troops. In a

the RUF was allowed to form yet another political party, know

Revolutionary United Front Party (RUFP), and hold elected offi

RUFP also received one senior and three other ministry positions 

as four deputy minister posts.25 

In return for recognition as a legitimate political party and partn

government, the RUF was required to dissolve its military forces 

a process of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DD

process would be monitored by a neutral force provided by the 

Nations, representatives of the government, as well as RUF, SL

CDF units themselves. ECOMOG forces were to remain in pla

the UN force deployed to the country, though some of its troop

become part of the new United Nations Assistance Mission in Si

one (UNAMSIL). Lome also called for a new Truth and Recon

Commission as well as a Special Court to deal with human right

tions. The Lome Peace Agreement was not very popular with the 

of Sierra Leone because Foday Sankoh and other RUF leaders w

offered seats in the new government were exempt from prosecu

the Special Court for their crimes against humanity.26 The UN S

Council passed Resolution 1270 on 22 October 1999 authorizin

UN force to be deployed to Sierra Leone by January 2000 (discusse

next chapter). Nigerian and ECOMOG forces were withdrawn from 

Leone in March and April 2000, and formally turned over responsi

the new UN force on 4 May 2000. 

Analysis of ECOMOG Interventions 

The intervention by ECOMOG was an attempt by regional 

nations to solve their own internal problems. In that regard, it w

as an important milestone on the maturation of African states as 

ling their own destiny free of non-regional and mercenary actor

48 
Africans themselves. Under the umbrella of ECOWAS, the mem

tions included Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, G

Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, S

Sierra Leone, and Togo. Although the concept was marred by 

and military shortcomings, ECOMOG was a promising alternativ

UN peacekeeping missions. The experience, training, and resourc

military forces were initially seen as a model for Africa’s security 

Its record in Sierra Leone was mixed. 

ECOMOG’s shortcomings became most evident when it f

halt the advance of resurgent rebel forces into Freetown in Januar

ECOMOG’s leaders had sufficient intelligence dating back to No

1998 that indicated the AFRC and RUF were planning an attack 

city, but ECOMOG’s leaders disregarded the indicators. This fai

Freetown largely defenseless in January 1999 and allowed the reb

to bring havoc upon the citizens. Poor leadership by General Shelp

at the root of the problem.27 

Second, ECOMOG units were plagued by poor morale and p

cipline. Many of the soldiers deployed to Freetown in January 19

the same soldiers who had served in Liberia as part of the ECOWA

vention in that war-torn country. Rank and file soldiers watched 

go home on leave, but they were not allowed the same privilege. A

ally, many of the soldiers were not paid on a regular basis leading 

poor morale, a reluctance to perform dangerous military tasks, 

use of extortion, corruption and diamond smuggling to suppleme

incomes. ECOMOG soldiers also showed the same tendency to 

atrocities against the civilian population as did the AFRC/RUF reb

were fighting. 

Third, the multinational ECOMOG contingent was plagued 

command and control. The force package sent to Sierra Leone i

soldiers from Mali, Guinea, Nigeria, and Ghana. Nigeria was the 

and strongest state in ECOWAS and since it contributed the bulk o

to ECOMOG, it commanded the overall mission. Other national 

gents were reluctant to submit to Nigerian command, and often c

ed their own operations under their own commanders. To make 

worse, the commander of ECOMOG, Major General Maxwell Kho

widely suspected of collaborating with the RUF. He was allegedly 

taken a $10 million diamond bribe from the RUF in exchange fo

arms and light weapons. Other ECOMOG military commanders w
already tenuous command and control situation even more prob

In addition, several states within the ECOWAS pledged to sup

military mission but failed to deliver on their pledges. 

Fourth, ECOMOG units suffered from a variety of operatio

tactical military weaknesses. Most ECOMOG troops were unfamil

the terrain of Sierra Leone and with jungle warfare. Trained to fig

ventional battles, they were vulnerable to ambushes, raids, and sur

tacks. They often relied on the kamajors to conduct operations in 

terlands, which led the kamajors to wonder why ECOMOG was 

at all.29 During most of the eighteen month deployment, ECOM

only enough soldiers to control Freetown. This inadequacy left th

the land in the hands of the rebels. Further, ECOMOG had limited 

sea capability. The lack of transportation severely limited their m

over Sierra Leone’s almost non-existent road network. This lack o

ity caused immense logistical problems as ECOMOG units attem

operate away from their supply bases in Freetown. 

Fifth, funding for the operations was also a problem. The w

costing a million dollars a day and ECOWAS did not have the reso

fund it.30 Nigeria absorbed most of the funding shortfall, but this f

drain eventually led to its departure. ECOMOG was simply not fin

prepared to support military intervention over a long period of tim

Finally, like the Sierra Leone government and Executive Ou

before it, ECOMOG failed to devote enough effort to develop a

new security forces for Sierra Leone to provide law and order o

ternal military forces left the country. Many of the newly trained 

turned against the Nigerians after being sent to the front.31 

Summary 

Like the intervention by mercenaries from Executive Outc

1995 and 1996, the intervention in Sierra Leone by ECOMOG fo

tween 1997 and 1999 brought a fragile peace to the country. The 

server mission, UNOMSIL, was a complete failure in January 19

so much because of its own weaknesses, but because there was sim

peace to observe. Despite the pious wording of the Conakry Comm

the parties to the agreement were clearly not ready to make peace w

another. Though plagued by many military weaknesses of its own

MOG was sufficiently powerful enough to restore the Kabbah gov

50 
limited mandate and military weaknesses left the RUF in control o

of the eastern and southern parts of Sierra Leone. Kabbah was th

forced to make considerable concessions to the RUF in the Lome 

ment of July 1999 in return for an end to the fighting. 

The Lome Agreement contained various mechanisms for reb

the country, reconciling its political parties, and disarming the 

armed factions in the country. It was based on the assumption that 

political and military leaders in Sierra Leone were prepared to s

their long standing differences and work together. As was the case 

November 1996 Abidjan Peace Agreement and the October 1997 C

Peace Agreement, the Lome Agreement would also fail to work, le

a third wave of external military intervention in Sierra Leone. Th

vention would itself generate the need for a brief, fourth intervent

Notes 

1. Koroma was in prison since August for an attempted coup on th

government. This coup was part of the “sobel” element in the army, and 

record as an officer “on the take” was well established. 

2. Conciliation Resources, “Profiles–Sierra Leone,” http://www

our-work/accord/sierra-leone/profiles.php (accessed 8 August 2007). 

3. CNN Interactive, “Sierra Leone Fighting Eases, Allowing More Evac

3 June 1997,” Cable News Network, http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/

sierra.leone (accessed 8 August 2007). See also Kwaku Nuarmah and 

Zartman, “Intervention in Sierra Leone,” in Military Intervention: Case

text for the Twenty-First Century, William J. Lahneman (New York: R

and Littlefield, 2004), 133-150. 

4. Nuarmah and Zartman, “Intervention in Sierra Leone.” 

5. Earl Conteh-Morgan and Mac Dixon-Fyle, Sierra Leone at the E

Twentieth Century, (New York: Peter Lang Publishing, Inc, 1999), 143
can States six-month peace plan for Sierra Leone (23 October 1997-

1998), 23 October 1997,” Peace Agreements Digital Collection: Sierr

http://www.usip.org/library/pa/sl/sl_ecowas_10231997.html (accessed 

2007). 

7. Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Sierra Leone, Final R

the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Sierra Leone, Chapter 3, 

850-863, http://trcsierraleone.org/drwebsite/publish/v3a-c1.shtml (

3 August 2007). This section contains the three strategies. 

8. Ibid. 

9. Ibid. 

10. Ibid. 

11. Ibid., sections 880-886. 

12. Ibid., sections 887-889. 

13. Ibid., section 959. 

14. United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, “Sierra 

UNOMSIL,” The United Nations, http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Miss

omsil/UnomsilF.html (accessed 3 August 2007). 

15. Ibid. 

16. Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Sierra Leone, Final Repo

Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Sierra Leone, Chapter 3, sectio

17. Amnesty International, “Sierra Leone: 1998–A Year of A

Against Civilians,” November 1998, http://web.amnesty.org/library/I

gAFR510221998 (accessed 3 August 2007). 

18. Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Sierra Leone, Final R

the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Sierra Leone, Chapter 3, 

981-983. 

19. Ibid., section 1007. 

20. Nuarmah and Zartman, “Intervention in Sierra Leone,” 133-150. T

OMSIL mission was officially ended by the UN in October 1999 whe

replaced by the new UNAMSIL force. 

21. Ibid., para 1028. 

22. Ibid. 

23. David Pratt, MP, Sierra Leone: The Forgotten Crisis, report to C

Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lloyd Axworthy, PC, MP, 23 April 1999. 

24. Greg Campbell, Blood Diamonds: Tracing the Deadly Path of the 

Most Precious Stones, (Bolder CO: Westview Press, 2002), 85-86. 

25. David Keen, Conflict and Collusion in Sierra Leone, (New York: 

Publishers, 2005), 250-252. 

26. Kwaku Nuarmah and William Zartman, “Case Study: Intervention 

Leone,” Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM

www.cissm.umd.edu/papers/files/sera_leone.pdf (accessed 3 August 200

52 
Books Collection, 2004), 231-237. 

28. Dena Montague, “The Business of War and the Prospects for Peace 

Leone,” The Brown Journal of World Affairs,(Spring 2002, Volume IX, Issue 

www.worldpolicy.org/projects/arms/news/brown.pdf (accessed 8 August 20

29. Comfort Ero, “ECOMOG: A model for Africa?” Institute for Secur

ies Monograph Series, no. 46 (February 2000) http://www.iss.co.za/Pub

graphs/No46/Ecomog.html (accessed 10 August 2007). 

30. Adekeye Adebajo, “Building Peace in West Africa: Liberia, Sierr

and Guinea-Bissau,” African Studies Quarterly–Online Journal of Afric

ies, http://www.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v7/v7i4a11.htm (accessed 10 August 2

31. David Leatherwood, The Hazards of Strange Bedfellows: The 

States, Nigeria, and Peacekeeping in West Africa (Washington DC: Nati

College, 2000), http://www.ndu.edu/library/n2/n01LeatherwoodHaz

(accessed 3 August 2007). 

The Third and Fourth Interventions:
 

United Nations and British Forces, 1999–2002
 

The intervention by Executive Outcomes mercenaries in 19

1996, and the intervention by troops from the ECOWAS countries b

1997 and 1999 into Sierra Leone’s civil wars were at best only p

successful. By returning the military balance of power back to the 

ment side, each intervention led to a brokered peace. But since t

rebels were never decisively defeated, RUF leaders and RUF polit

ties were granted significant concessions in those peace agreem

both cases, the government and regional powers were unable to tu

tary success into lasting political success and civil war soon retu

late 1999 the world hoped that the Lome Agreement and UN inter

would bring lasting peace to Sierra Leone. This chapter will ana

third and fourth external interventions, this time led by the United 

and Great Britain, as they attempted to bring order to Sierra Leon

United Nations Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone 

Just over a year after the UNOMSIL effort ignominiously d

Freetown in complete failure, the UN again intervened in Sierra 

This time, the Lome Agreement seemed to hold out real promise fo

between the Kabbah government and the defeated RUF forces. 

learned that a tiny observer force was of little use, the UN in 19

determined to learn from its mistakes. To assist with implement

the July Lome Peace Agreement, the United Nations passed Re

1270 on 22 October 1999. Resolution 1270 authorized the creatio

UN force known as the United Nations Assistance Mission in Sierr

(UNAMSIL), a peacekeeping and monitoring force of 210 observ

6,000 military personnel. Unlike the UNOMSIL mission that was 

an observer force, UNAMSIL possessed significant military pow

Security Council ordered UNAMSIL to assist with the Disarmam

mobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) process conducted in acc

with the terms of the Lome Agreement. Its stated mission was: 

(a) To cooperate with the Government of Sierra Leone and the 

other parties to the Peace Agreement in the implementation of 

the Agreement; 
 

tation of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration 

plan; 

(c) To that end, to establish a presence at key locations throughout the territory of Sierra Leone, including at disarmament/reception centres and demobilization centres; 

(d) To ensure the security and freedom of movement of United 

Nations personnel; 

(e) To monitor adherence to the cease-fire in accordance with 

the cease-fire agreement of 18 May 1999 (S/1999/585, annex) 

through the structures provided for therein; 

(f) To encourage the parties to create confidence-building 

mechanisms and support their functioning; 

(g) To facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance; 

(h) To support the operations of United Nations civilian officials, 

including the Special Representative of the Secretary-General 

and his staff, human rights officers and civil affairs officers; 

(i) To provide support, as requested, to the elections, which are 

to be held in accordance with the present constitution of Sierra 

Leone.1 

Although Resolution 1270 was passed under Chapter VII (Pe

forcement) of the UN Charter which authorizes the use of force, pa

14 of the Resolution limited UNAMSIL’s use of force to “ensu

security and freedom of movement of its personnel and within its c

ties and areas of deployment, to afford protection to civilians un

minent threat of physical violence taking into account the respons

of the Government of Sierra Leone and ECOMOG.”2 The UN S

General Kofi Annan and others clearly hoped that ECOMOG f

Sierra Leone would provide security and that UNAMSIL would i

relatively peaceful situation once it arrived and deployed. As parag

of UN Resolution 1270 stated, the UN: 

Commends the readiness of ECOMOG to continue to provide 

security for the areas where it is currently located, in particular around Freetown and Lungi, to provide protection for the 

Government of Sierra Leone, to conduct other operations in accordance with their mandate to ensure the implementation of 

the Peace Agreement, and to initiate and proceed with disarma56 
 

with UNAMSIL.

As the resolution was being debated and nations were being a

contribute to UNAMSIL, the newly elected president of Nigeria

gun Obasanjo, announced his decision to quickly withdraw the sub

Nigerian contingent of ECOMOG.4 Annan eventually reached an 

ment with President Obasanjo to keep some of the ECOMOG f

Sierra Leone until UNAMSIL was in place. Nigeria also agreed to 

part of UNAMSIL, with funding for the mission provided by the 

Nations. But Nigeria would not lead the new UN force because the 

Nations wanted UNAMSIL to be seen as a neutral force in con

the Nigerian led ECOMOG force that had been called in by the 

government. 

The Security Council selected General Vijay Jetley of India 

as the commander of UNAMSIL. More than half of the 11,000 

that were supposed to comprise UNAMSIL were to come from 

with the rest coming from India, Jordan, Guinea, Kenya, and Zam

UNAMSIL force consisted of six infantry battalions and a rapid 

force. The Nigerian contingent, however, operated independent of 

military commander since it was already on the ground in Sierra L

the UNAMSIL was being organized. Paragraph 12 of UN Resoluti

contained a vague call for unity of effort, stating that the UN “Stre

need for close cooperation and coordination between ECOMOG a

AMSIL in carrying out their respective tasks, and welcomes the i

establishment of joint operations centres at headquarters and, if ne

also at subordinate levels in the field.” This call for cooperation 

short of unity of command. The presence of a large number of N

troops nominally under UNAMSIL command did not reduce the su

among the AFRC and RUF fighters in Sierra Leone that it would f

as a neutral force. 

UNAMSIL suffered from an inauspicious beginning as it d

to Sierra Leone. Soldiers from the various member states arrived 

town in waves over several months beginning in January 2000.

of the national contingents did not bring their own logistical supp

quickly found that there was insufficient infrastructure and logistic

commodate them, particularly when they moved out of Freetown 

countryside. As military equipment was shipped into the port of Fr

it was placed in areas without security. As a result, much of the ini
 

 

 

appropriated by various criminal sources. When they finally receiv

equipment, they began to deploy throughout the country where 40

50,000 combatants were operating. Many of the soldiers spoke d

languages, which caused issues with command and control. 

The security situation was not stable and the DDR process beg

slowly because many armed fighters refused to submit themselve

process.6 The first DDR camps were often ill-equipped and res

prisoner of war compounds in appearance, surrounded by high fen

barbed wire. The presence of Nigerian troops in some of the DDR 

angered RUF and CDF forces. When entering the compound, the 

ant turned in his weapon in exchange for food and clothing to b

six week stay in the DDR camp. The ex-combatants lived in m

tents surrounded by dirt courtyards. Former combatants were d

and took part in job training—primarily in carpentry and masonr

completing the DDR process, UN officials issued each former 

ant an ID card and $15 in transportation vouchers to go anywher

country. Each ex-combatant was expected to obtain his own job

the camps was fraught with unrest and trouble.7 The UN and the 

ment were unable to meet the inflated expectations of Sierra L

who expected the DDR process to provide instant prosperity and 

This caused additional frustration among all parties who were alr

luctant signatories to the Lome Agreement. 

The Lome Agreement guaranteed United Nation officials and U

SIL unhindered and safe access to all areas in the country. Unfort

as peacekeepers deployed to areas outside of Freetown, they often 

tered tense and volatile security situations. The withdrawal of EC

forces and the failure to create effective Sierra Leone police and 

units before UNAMSIL arrived proved fatal. In trying to maintain 

ibility as a neutral force between the government and rebel forces, 

Jetley chose not to grant the authority to use force to compel disar

or even to defend the UN DDR camps from attack. In spite of th

fire agreement, RUF fighters operated freely throughout the coun

peacekeepers were denied freedom of movement and were subj

ambushes and illegal roadblocks throughout Sierra Leone by arme

ers, mostly RUF factions.8 After each skirmish, the RUF leader

Sankoh, was contacted about resolving the problem, but usuall

avail. Instead, Sankoh often blamed the government or UNAMSIL 

skirmishes. It was quite obvious that Sankoh was deliberately un

58 
the DDR process. 

In response to the surprise Nigerian withdrawal from Sierra Le

the lack of ECOMOG cooperation with the UNAMSIL headquar

UN increased the size of UNAMSIL from 6,000 to 11,000 troop

Resolution 1289 which passed on 7 February 2000. This was su

to include an additional six infantry battalions and more UN obse

offset the withdrawal of Nigerian ECOMOG units in the spring.9 E

ing its frustration with the deteriorating security situation, paragrap

Resolution 1289 granted UNAMSIL much wider freedom to use 

force in the performance of its mission: 

(a) To provide security at key locations and Government buildings, in particular in Freetown, important intersections and major airports, including Lungi airport; 

(b) To facilitate the free flow of people, goods and humanitarian 

assistance along specifi ed thoroughfares; 

(c) To provide security in and at all sites of the disarmament, 

demobilization and reintegration programme; 

(d) To coordinate with and assist, in common areas of deployment, the Sierra Leone law enforcement authorities in the discharge of their responsibilities; 

(e) To guard weapons, ammunition and other military equipment collected from ex-combatants and to assist in their subsequent disposal or destruction, authorizes UNAMSIL to take the 

necessary action to fulfill the additional tasks set out above, and 

affirms that, in the discharge of its mandate, UNAMSIL may 

take the necessary action to ensure the security and freedom of 

movement of its personnel and, within its capabilities and areas 

of deployment, to afford protection to civilians under imminent 

threat of physical violence, taking into account the responsibilities of the Government of Sierra Leone.10 

Despite this key change in mandate, however, General Jetley 

to change his policy of strict UNAMSIL neutrality and only allo

units to use force to defend themselves and unarmed civilians if th

under direct attack. Rebel forces grew bolder as the result of UNA

failure to respond to repeated provocations throughout Sierra Leon
 

 

from deploying to the eastern Bendu half of the country.

A repo

the office of Secretary-General of the United Nations described 

many such incidents: 

On 22 April, a group of some 20 RUFP fighters prevented UNAMSIL military observers from entering the premises of the 

disarmament, demobilization and reintegration reception center 

of Magburaka (near Makeni). They also alleged that UNAMSIL soldiers, who were providing security at that location, had 

taken some ammunition belonging to the RUFP. A small-scale 

scuffle ensued, after which UNAMSIL troops at the site decided 

to withdraw temporarily to avoid escalation. The Makeni/Magburaka area remained very tense and subsequently became the 

scene of the first attacks by RUFP on UNAMSIL troops.12 

Nigeria completed the withdrawal of its troops from Sierra L

late April, leaving the country without its largest and most powerf

tary contingent.13 

On 4 May 2000, the very day that ECOMOG transferred its 

sibilities to UNAMSIL, the RUF attacked and “detained” a contin

Kenyan UNAMSIL soldiers in the Kono diamond mining region 

town of Makeni, about 70 kilometers east of Freetown. Some 20

bian UNAMSIL soldiers who had been sent to relieve the captive K

were also taken hostage along with their armored personnel carri

Zambians then surrendered to the RUF on 6 May, bringing the tot

ber of hostages held by the RUF to over 500. 

Soon, RUF forces, using the armored personnel carriers an

weapons seized from the UN forces, began to advance towards Fr

The imminent collapse of the DDR process called for by the Lome 

ment, and the all too obvious shortcomings of UNAMSIL force

calls for a new military intervention to save UNAMSIL and the 

ment of Sierra Leone. On 4 May 2000 the UN Secretary-Gener

Annan, requested that the United Kingdom and other countries in

to save the UNAMSIL mission from collapse. 

Great Britain to the Rescue: Operation PALLISER 

The British government, at the request of the UN and Preside

bah, immediately sent an Operational Liaison and Reconnaissanc

(OLRT) led by Brigadier General David Richards to Freetown on 

60 
 

led a team from the HMS Norfolk that returned the British High C

sioner to his embassy in January 2000.14 The team was directed 

for the possible evacuation of Commonwealth citizens. Richards

arrived in Freetown early on 6 May and quickly determined tha

combatant evacuation operation (NEO) could not be conducted 

troops to secure the airport and the assembly point and requested 

for that purpose. He would also need airlift from the Freetown a

point to Lungi airport across the bay because RUF forces blocked 

called horseshoe road that connected them.15 It was quite clear tha

UNAMSIL forces nor SLA units were capable of providing securi

British soldiers from the Special Air Service (SAS) and the 

talion of the Parachute Regiment (1 PARA) rapidly deployed to a F

Mounting Base at Dakar, Senegal on 6 May. They were alerted 

mission just the day before and were able to complete their deploy

the close of the day on 8 May. British forces were able to take ad

of their newly created Joint Force Headquarters at Northwood, UK

idly deployable, joint military headquarters created for exactly this 

mission. The JFHQ quickly fell in on the OLRT with Brigadier R

as it commander, collocated with the British High Commissioner.

would be supported by sizeable British naval forces. HMS Ocean

copter carrier with Royal Marines led the Amphibious Ready Gro

operating in the Mediterranean, about a week away. Four CH-47 C

helicopters made the 3,500 mile journey from the UK to Sierra 

in only 30 hours. The British force, which eventually numbered 

5000 troops, operated under a Commonwealth mandate rather tha

UN command.17 

Under the command of Brigadier Richards, Operation PAL

began with a helicopter assault led by the troops of the SAS and 

pany of paratroopers of the 1 PARA. The paratroopers quickly sec

Lungi International Airport across the bay from Freetown and esta

their headquarters there on 7 May. Just as quickly, other UK troop

the Freetown peninsula and secured the British high commissione

dence.18 Once on the ground, the UK commander began meeti

officials from the Sierra Leone government and the United Natio

were in complete disarray and near collapse as rumors that RUF 

were less than twenty miles from Freetown and preparing to attac

ards also met with the leaders of various armed factions roaming th

of Freetown. After assessing the situation Brigadier Richards de

greatly expand his mission to include saving the UNAMSIL missi
 

vice and resolve to UNAMSIL units and Sierra Leone Army unit

points in and around the city, including the key town of Waterloo

kilometers south of Freetown on the horseshoe road. He also disc

the armed factions from joining the fighting by demonstrating the 

of the UK and UNAMSIL to remain in control.19 The British nav

was also anchored close off the Freetown harbor while British aircr

ducted demonstrations overhead, including dropping leaflets disco

anyone from interfering with British forces.20 

On 8 May some ten thousand Freetown residents and governm

diers marched on the residence of RUFP leader Sankoh with au

tion of the government. They carried placards with inscriptions 

at Sankoh, such as “No Violence Sankoh,” “Enough is Enoug

“Sankoh: Our People are dying.”21 Sankoh was informed about th

in advance and had over 150 members of the RUF at his home for 

tion. UNAMSIL had also placed 30 armed soldiers around the hou

AMSIL peacekeepers were unable to keep the crowd away from th

and they soon began throwing stones, bottles, and sticks at the hou

AMSIL personnel fired a warning shot in the air in a misguided 

to disperse the mob. RUF soldiers in Sankoh’s resident opened fir

crowd and a battle ensued as armed civilians and soldiers in the cr

turned fire. UNAMSIL soldiers retreated from the area. Many RU

bers were killed by the mob and the house was looted and ransac

the end of the day, over 40 civilians had been killed and severa

wounded. During the panic, Sankoh escaped, dressed as a woman, 

forest behind his house.22 

Because of the deteriorating security situation in Freetown 

8 May riots, the British High Commissioner in Freetown formall

Brigadier Richards to begin the NEO. 1 PARA troops immedia

cured the Mammy Yoko Hotel and on 9 May 2000, nearly 500 of th

British citizens were evacuated by four Chinook helicopters to Se

The other 600 either chose to remain in Freetown because of the 

military presence or lived in outlying areas and considered thei

adequate.24 

With Lungi International Airport secure and the NEO comple

AMSIL and SLA units, with British advice and advisors, began to 

tide against RUF forces. British leaders assisted SLA and UNAMS

with military planning and technical advice and by 15 May, they h

62 
government formally expanded the initial NEO mission to inclu

new tasks (already begun by Brigadier Richards): support to UNA

support to the SLA, and preparation for humanitarian tasks.25 B

Richards moved the main headquarters of the JFHQ from Dakar 

town to join with his forward command element on the 18th and 

May.26 British firepower and resolve quickly put RUF forces on 

fensive and bolstered the flagging morale of UNAMSIL and SLA 

On 17 May, 1 PARA units identified about 40 RUF moving towa

positions near Lungi Lol, just north of Lungi Airport. The rebels e

the PARA position and the British responded with full force. As on

later wrote, “the psychological effect of the engagement was imm

deterring the RUF and in further enhancing the reputation of the 

troops in the eyes of the UNAMSIL and Sierra Leonean forces.”27 

The UN hastily arranged a summit meeting at Conakry in Gui

invited the presidents of Liberia, Guinea, Sierra Leone, and a spec

resentative of the UN. The summit was chaired by President Ko

Mali. Participants condemned the RUF attacks and the detentio

UN peacekeepers. They further mandated that Liberian President 

Taylor become personally involved in the crisis to ensure the re

the detainees and to return the RUF to the peace process.28 RUF 

released their UN hostages beginning on 16 May. In response to th

the UN authorized an additional peacekeeping contingent, bring

total UNAMSIL force to 13,000 with the passage of UN Resoluti

on 19 May 2000.29 

On 17 May 2000, Foday Sankoh and his bodyguard came out o

and into public view. As he was walking around near his house, 

was recognized by local residents who alerted a militia commande

as Black Scorpion.30 Black Scorpion laid an impromptu ambush

Sankoh’s bodyguards and wounding Sankoh.31 Prior to being turn

to British soldiers, he was stripped and forced to walk through th

naked. The humiliated warlord was charged with the murder of th

onstrators in a Freetown municipal court and placed in prison a

trial.32 

The Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) that had departed fro

seilles, France, arrived off the coast of Sierra Leone on May 12th a

The ARG included the HMS Ocean, the Royal Fleet Auxiliary sh

George and Fort Austin, and logistics ships Sir Tristram and Sir Be
 

 

lustrious and its 13 Harrier jet aircraft had departed Lisbon, Portu

joined the ARG off Sierra Leone. The 42 Commando Royal Marin

the ARG took over the mission and relieved the troops of the 1 PA

30 May. Their mission—still under Richards—was to secure the re

the hostages, and strengthen the UNAMSIL and government force

With the hostages released, Brigadier Richards turned his a

to training UNAMSIL and SLA soldiers. Once the planning cell 

tablished, Richards provided key liaison officers, gave technica

on a range of issues, and basically began directing the SLA/UN

campaign plan.34 According to Richards, “the most decisive facto

persuading them, at least temporarily, to move from a peacekeep

conventional defensive posture, and convincing them that the RU

not supermen.”35 Now with a formidable Royal Navy presence 

coast of Freetown, the British were able to quickly sling-load hea

lery and ammunition to the forces in Sierra Leone. Liaison office

exchanged and key meetings were established between SLA and t

ish on a daily basis.36 By the end of May 2000, UNAMSIL, SL

British forces, with the help of a Jordanian Special Forces battalio

the RUF forces far away from Freetown and the Lungi airport. T

had turned in favor of the government and the UN. 

British forces departed Sierra Leone on 15 June and Operatio

LISER came to an end. With renewed confidence UNAMSIL a

soldiers were able to take over positions previously secured by 

soldiers and began actively fighting and winning battles with the R

the British main body departed Freetown they left a training co

of about 200 British soldiers stationed at Camp Waterloo, abou

southeast of Freetown, and who were responsible for training S

diers in infantry skills.37 With RUF leader Sankoh in a Freetown 

General Issa Sesay took over control of the RUF Party and RUF 

forces, with Sankoh’s approval. Sesay began to work with UNAM

began to actively work for a peace settlement between the RUFP 

government. Despite being Sankoh’s deputy, the change in leaders

policy caused a split in the RUFP and many deserted its ranks.38 

Unfortunately, fighting continued between UNAMSIL an

groups in outlying areas around Freetown. One such rebel group

as the West Side Boys (WSB), nearly erased the gains made by the 

and the UN. 

64 
The WSB gang included former members of the SLA, forme

bers of the RUFP, criminals from Pademba Road Prison released 

the 1997 coup, and ordinary civilians who were recruited by the reb

members. Many of the rebels were captured children under the ag

who were indoctrinated into the group and forced to commit atroc

ordinary citizens. Some of the children were abducted after watchi

parents die at the hands of the recruiters while others were forced to 

their parents to death.39 

The group was known for wearing bizarre clothing to includ

en’s wigs and flip-flops and being almost perpetually drunk with 

made palm wine. The WSB were heavy users of locally grown m

and heroin bought with alluvial diamonds. Diamonds were also 

purchase many of their weapons, including ZPU-2 antiaircraft gun

7 grenade launchers, 81-mm mortars, AK-47 rifles, and SLR rifle

of their vehicles had been hijacked from UN food convoys or c

from the SLA. The WSB operated in and around Freetown, an

northeastern parts of Sierra Leone, often setting up road-blocks t

money and goods from travelers. During the day, those who enco

the group paid them off with alcohol, drugs, tobacco, or equipmen

in the vehicle. During the evening, when the WSB were high on al

drugs, travelers were often fired upon and killed.40 

Great Britain Returns: Vignette on Operation BARRAS 

On Friday, 25 August 2000, British Major Alan Marshall, stat

Benguema Training Camp decided to make a visit to one of UNA

battalions near the town of Masiaka, about 65-kilometers east o

town. Marshall and his men were part of the stay-behind British 

contingent. Accompanying him on this visit was an SLA liaison 

and 11 soldiers from the Royal Irish Regiment. After visiting with 

Jehad al-Widyan, commander of the UNAMSIL battalion, he de

take his patrol to the WSB base in nearby Magbeni. Marshall rece

intelligence report that only a few rebels were present at the base 

wanted to check out the situation.41 His three Land Rovers wer

with .50-caliber heavy machine guns and the soldiers with SA8

As the patrol approached Magbeni, located 50 miles east of the c

Freetown, the WSB blocked the road and denied them movemen

Marshall tried to reason with them, but they insisted that he wait un

leader, 24-year old “Brigadier” Foday Kallay arrived.42 
 

 

boys and offered them cigarettes. Communication with the base 

guema Training Camp was established via radio and the base ca

informed that the patrol was being detained. Once Kallay arrived, 

ation turned tense. Kallay began issuing orders to his armed sold

came angry with Marshall for entering an unauthorized area witho

dination, and surrounded the patrol with soldiers and a captured SL

mounted with a 14.5-mm heavy machine gun. As Marshall made a

to reason with the WSB, he was physically beaten. Within 5 minu

rest of the Royal Irish soldiers were overwhelmed, disarmed, stripp

taken by canoes upstream, across Rokel River, to Gberi Bana, K

headquarters. 43 

Communication between the WSB leader Kallay and the Brit

was established using the patrol’s radio. Lieutenant Colonel Simo

ham of the Royal Irish Regiment led a team of negotiators from t

istry of Defense, Freetown Police, United Nation personnel, a Spe

Service (SAS) assessment team, and Major Johnny Paul Koroma, 

mer coup leader and now a member of the Sierra Leonean Govern

face-to-face meeting was held on 27 August and the WSB deman

release of Foday Sankoh, the RUFP leader, along with food, med

generator, and a satellite phone in exchange for the detained soldi

team met all of the WSB demands except for the release of Foday 

and the WSB released 5 of the 11 soldiers on 30 August 2000. Th

continued to hold six soldiers and the SLA liaison officer.44 Th

stressed that the other demands needed to be met for the releas

remaining soldiers. 

Negotiations continued with the WSB on 31 August but the si

described by the team on the ground, was becoming delicate and vo

Kallay used the satellite phone to demand the current governmen

erra Leone step down. Unbeknownst to Kallay, the negotiators g

the phone to get a precise location via signal interception on wher

maining hostages were located. As the team made further contact 

WSB, negotiations failed. Kallay threatened to kill the hostages if 

mands were not met. Prime Minister Tony Blair directed the Britis

of Defense Staff, General Sir Charles Guthrie, to devise a rescue p

As the planning mission began, the British established severa

vation posts composed of four man teams of SAS soldiers insert

Rokel River by the Special Boat Service (SBS) to pinpoint locatio

Magbeni and Gberi Bana.46 The SAS soldiers were augmented by 

66 
prepare for a possible hostage rescue mission. The team was to pro

telligence information to include movements around the WSB bas

possible helicopter landing sites, weapons, location of hostages, 

hicles. The intelligence information was conveyed to the higher he

ters planning cell via the patrol’s radio operator using a satellite li

Intelligence reports from the observation points told of the err

havior of Kallay, mock executions, positions of heavy weapons, 

location of the captured vehicles. It was reported that the seven h

were being held at a village named Gberi Bana about 400 mete

from the rebels at Magbeni and across Rokel River. 

In addition, the SAS teams reported that the WSB soldier stre

Gberi Bana and Magbeni was between 50 and 100 in each camp

WSB gang members were armed with AK-47 rifles, rocket propel

nade launchers, 60-mm, 81-mm and 120-mm mortars and Fabric N

(FN) sniper rifles.49 In addition to these weapons, surveillance in

that the WSB had pick-up trucks with mounted machine guns, the 

4-ton captured from the SLA, and the three Land Rovers. In term

sition, the mortars and machine guns in Magbeni secured the app

from the south, and were able to engage targets across the Rokel 

Gberi Bana. 

Map 6. Operation BARRAS area of operations. 
 

tion, mangrove swamps, murky marshland, and low palm woodla

Gberi Bana, due to the defensive positioning of weapons from M

to the south and swamps and dense vegetation on the east and w

only area that needed to be secured was to the north. Only one ro

into Gberi Bana and that road was heavily guarded. Gberi Bana m

excellent prison with very little possibility of escape by foot. Gbe

itself consisted of five low mud and cement buildings. Magbeni c

of a roadway along the Rokel River with 29 war-torn buildings a

areas of jungle vegetation that could provide cover for both defen

offensive operations. 

The UK Ministry of Defense alerted the 1st Battalion, 1 Pa

Regiment on 30 August 2000 for a possible rescue mission. Maj

thew Lowe was selected as the task force commander due to his 

ence in jungle operations. In addition, many of his non-commissio

ficers had just returned from Operation PALLISER and were famil

the situation.50 Other forces were also alerted for possible deploym

cluding the Royal Fleet Auxiliary (RFA) Argus and elements of th

Air Force (RAF). As a contingency plan, two Lynx helicopters we

by C-130 Hercules transport aircraft to Dakar in Senegal and the

Lungi airport near Freetown. The two Lynxes and the three RAF C

already in the country were then deployed to a small airfield at H

about 25 miles south of Freetown. As the planning continued, the 

of the parachute regiment began their field training exercise in En

The British JFHQ in Freetown devised a plan to have the 1 P

attack the Magbeni camp and the SAS troops to attack Gberi Ban

the soldiers were being held hostage. On 3 September the 1 PA

ployed their planners to Dakar, the capital of Senegal, approxima

miles from Freetown, to begin planning their part of rescue missi

team was supplied with maps, aerial photography, intelligence u

as well as intelligence information from the local government re

the surroundings of both Gberi Bana and Magbeni.51 As the plann

continued its operation in Dakar, a similar planning cell began 

Freetown at the British military headquarters. This SAS-led team 

trated on the extraction of hostages. On 6 September, the PARA tas

approximately 150 soldiers, deployed to Dakar for live-fire exerc

miliarization training, and acclimatization. 

The British Ministry of Defense asked journalists in Britain 

speculate about the possible deployment. A news story written 

68 
 

 

 

 

PARA to Senegal actually provided some cover for the SASs op

in and around the objective.52 As the crisis continued, a medic

was positioned in a freight container on the Royal Fleet Auxiliary 

Sir Percivale to conduct possible triage and medical support ope

Alongside the Percivale was the Argyll, a warship complete with 

decks for aircraft. Both ships were anchored off the shores of Free

On 9 September, Kallay insisted that he would not release the h

until a new interim government was established. After 14 days of 

tion, there appeared to be little hope of securing the release of the h

through continued dialogue. British Prime Minister Tony Blair g

order to launch the rescue mission. The JFHQ was also given per

from President Kabbah to conduct an operation against the WSB a

of their choosing.54 All soldiers were moved to Hastings Battle C

final coordination. Hastings was only about 15 minutes by air f

objective. 

H-hour for Operation BARRAS was set for 0616 hours on 10 S

ber. The early morning landing gave an element of surprise and as

that the WSB were at their weakest. Speed and surprise was essent

captives were to be seized before their WSB captors could kill t

H-hour two RAF Lynx and three Chinook helicopters departed H

for the short flight to the WSB camp. The Lynx helicopters, equipp

night vision equipment, heavy machine guns, and thermal night i

provided overhead security for the Chinooks carrying PARA and S

diers. The attack helicopters approached at a very low level along t

to ensure maximum surprise. Once near the target, the two Lynx sp

one attacking from the south and the other from the north.55 A

UNAMSIL units were not informed about the operation, they we

the mission to secure and block positions on the road to Magbeni.

UK planners designed Operation BARRAS as a simultaneou

pronged attack. Two platoons of 1 PARA troopers air assaulted fr

helicopters and landed in the jungle area south of Magbeni. 

Their mission was to neutralize weapons covering Gberi Ban

north, defeat the forces on the ground, secure a landing zone eas

town, and recover the Land Rovers. The PARA landed in marsh

and moved 150 meters to the tree line.57 As a heavy machine g

at the Chinooks from Magbeni, the Lynx helicopter was able to 

the location and raked it with its 12.7-mm machine gun, knocking 
Map 7. Operation BARRAS–Magbeni area of operations. 

heavy machine gun and its gunners. The PARAs moved from t

line to the huts in a west-to-east sweep in three platoon-level atta

quickly accomplished their objective. 

Frogmen of the SBS launched the second prong of the attack b

ing Rokel River underwater and opening fire as they emerged in th

ness. At the same time SAS snipers came from their hiding place

swamps near Gberi Bana and surprised the WSB with a barrage of 

flash-bang grenades. 

As the WSB adjusted to the barrage of fire, they responded w

own fire. A Chinook helicopter carrying the SAS rescue force 

target. While unloading a platoon of SAS soldiers, Brad Tinnion 

the Chinook and was shot by an insurgent. WSB fighters fired R

the Chinook in an effort to destroy it, but both rounds missed. T

troops made their approach to the huts nearby where the hostag

held, killed the WSB members guarding the hut, and escorted the h

and wounded onto the Chinook helicopter. As they swept through t

they also captured Kallay, who was hiding under bedding in on

WSB huts.58 

British forces accomplished the rescue mission, from landing 

Bana and loading hostages onto the Chinook, in only 20 minutes

70 
 

Map 8. Operation BARRAS–Gberi Bana area of operations. 

nearby Magbeni WSB camp, fighting continued and the PARA re

in the area until 1600, scouring the jungle looking for WSB figh

fled the initial assault and recovering the three captured Land Rov

other weapons. British forces killed 25 and captured 18 WSB m

Three of the WSB casualties were women, one of which was the 

ous Mammy Kallay, wife of Foday Kallay, who was a particular

less supporter of her husband.59 As the Chinook returned to the 

Percivale, anchored in Freetown, SAS soldier Brad Tinnon died. 

other soldiers were wounded, but none critically. In addition to the 

hostages, the rescuers freed 22 Sierra Leoneans captives from Gbe

17 men used for forced labor and 5 women abducted for sex.60 O

BARRAS, a brief subset of Operation PALLISER, ended at 1600 w

remaining SAS and PARA withdrew. 
 

Progress made by UNAMSIL and the Sierra Leone governme

the British intervention in May 2000 began to stall by October in 

continued resistance by RUF forces, particularly in the far east

southern parts of the country. The brief capture of British soldier

West Side Boys in September contributed to the sense the combin

AMSIL and SLA offensive had lost momentum. RUF forces cont

receive support from Charles Taylor in Liberia and were beginnin

erate inside the borders of Guinea, plus they continued to control 

mond producing regions of southern Sierra Leone.61 The UN also c

commanders for UNAMSIL during the fall of 2000. Indian Gener

departed Sierra Leone in September after having been stricken 

laria. His deputy, Nigerian General Garbe took command. The p

of a Nigerian officer in command of UNAMSIL appears to have 

the RUF because of Nigeria’s long history of supporting sides i

Leone’s civil war. Indian forces, as well as those from Jordan, w

from UNAMSIL because of the shift of UNAMSIL from strict ne

to enforcement of UN Resolution 1270.62 

In the face of increased RUF resistance and the stalling of UN

operations, the British government announced to the world that it w

pared to return to Sierra Leone to restore UNAMSIL effectivenes

in October 2000 the UK launched Operation SILKMAN, deployin

dier Richards and the Joint Force HQ back to Freetown and disp

the ARG to the shores of Sierra Leone. The six ships of the AR

ducted exercises, and helicopter overflights along the coast. The 

of 42 Commando even marched through the city of Freetown in 

of force. Brigadier Richards and the JFHQ provided military plann

vice, technical support, and another dose of resolve to UNAMSIL 

SLA. Then on 1 November 2001 General Garba was replaced by L

ant General Daniel Opande of Kenya as the new UNAMSIL Com

British Brigadier Alastair Duncan was appointed UNAMSIL’s C

Staff. At the same time, Guinean forces imposed a major defeat 

forces operating in that country and international pressure on Char

lor finally ended Liberia’s open support for the RUF. The RUF fou

on the defensive everywhere, its original backers in Liberia with

their support, and its enemies were growing in strength and resolv

only a month of renewed UNAMSIL and SLA attacks, the RUF 

Issay Sesay, signed another cease-fire agreement at Abidjan, Ivor

on 10 November.63 Sesay later admitted the British interventio

erra Leone and the resulting improvements in the UNAMSIL and 

72 
 

succumbed to the British aim of persuading the RUF of the inev

of defeat.’”64 Operation SILKMAN came to an end and Brigadi

ards departed Sierra Leone for the last time in mid-November, af

six weeks. 

Epilogue 

In 2001 and 2002 the UNAMSIL mission grew in strength and 

17,500 troops, the largest peacekeeping mission in the world at th

and became increasingly effective. The UN finally targeted the ill

mond trade which was the financial source of so much of the fig

Sierra Leone. The UN Security Council adopted Resolution 134

sored by the United States, on 7 March 2001. This resolution de

that the Government of Liberia expel all RUF members, end f

and military support to the RUF, cease direct or indirect import o

diamonds, and ground all Liberia-registered aircraft until registra

ownership could be updated. The Resolution also demanded th

countries refuse to allow so called “conflict diamonds” to enter 

world market.65 The US then led the effort to impose a full scale e

on diamond trading with Liberia. Coupled with renewed UNAMS

sure on remaining RUF forces, these measures broke the back 

resistance.66 

The illegal trade in diamonds that financed much of the ten y

war in Sierra Leone for a brief time attracted the attention of a

terrorists during the UNAMSIL mission. As it had done elsewh

terrorist group saw the opportunity to finance its operations in the 

regions of Sierra Leone that were not controlled by the governmen

las Farrah, the bureau chief for the Washington Post in West Afric

the story on 1 November 2001, relying on information provided to 

a journalist named Cindor Reeves who was the younger brother of 

Taylor’s first wife.67 Reeves identified three of the faces in a m

story as people he met while at the Kono mine, near Kailahun—

were connected to Osama bin Laden’s al-Qaeda terrorist network. 

posure of the al-Qaeda network led to its dissolution. 

The DDR process rapidly became more effective in mid 20

the diamond embargoes took effect and after UNAMSIL began 

aggressively challenge RUF holdouts. When the UN declared th

mament process complete on 17 January 2002, UN officials had c

over 45,000 weapons while over 70,000 fighters completed this 
 

integration phase of the DDR process continued into 2003 but co

to be hampered by a lack of funds and job opportunities in the 

economy. In January 2002 the Kabbah government of Sierra Le

the UN reached agreement to stand up both a Truth and Recon

Commission and a Special Court to facilitate the reintegration proc

restoration of civil society, and to bring justice to those guilty of th

crimes during the previous decade of civil war. 

In March 2003 the Court indicted AFRC/RUF leaders Foday 

Johnny Koroma, Sam Bockarie, Issa Sesay, and many others 

crimes. Bockarie and Koroma were then in Liberia fighting with 

Taylor. Bockarie was killed and Johnny Koroma has disappeared. 

Liberian President Charles Taylor who had provided much of the 

support was indicted in July 2003 but was offered asylum in Nig

President Obasanjo.69 

Sierra Leone and the UN conducted presidential and parlia

elections in May 2002 and President Kabbah was re-elected to pow

over 70% of the vote in what was determined to be a free and fa

tion. During his address at the opening of the new parliamentary as

President Kabbah spoke the following words: 

All Sierra Leoneans, at home and abroad, suffered considerable loss. Some lost their cherished and loved ones, others their 

belongings, and still others, their dignity and honor. The bitter 

experience of armed conflict will linger in our memories for as 

long as we need to remind ourselves of the mistakes that we 

should never ever make again.70 

The civil war in Sierra Leone was officially declared over in 

2003. Former RUF leader Foday Sankoh died peacefully in UN cu

a Freetown hospital on 30 July 2003 while awaiting trial by the UN 

Leone Special Court, thus escaping justice for his crimes.71 Afte

Liberian government was elected in early 2006, the Nigerian gov

announced on 25 March 2006 that it would turn Taylor over to Li

face charges in Liberian courts. Taylor managed to slip away from 

dence in Calabar, Nigeria the following day, but was caught on 29 

attempting to flee to the nation of Cameroon. Nigerian authorities 

him over to the UN in Sierra Leone. The Sierra Leone Special C

quested permission to use the facilities of the International Crimin

in The Hague for Taylor’s trial. His trial began in June 2007 an

March 2008 it is still underway.72 

74 
The UNAMSIL mission to Sierra Leone suffered from a va

problems in early 2000 which led to the need for UK intervention 

cue it. The polyglot nature of UNAMSIL’s military forces presente

of problems. UNAMSIL was plagued by inadequate logistics, equ

and intelligence. The UN DDR mission was also hampered by a lac

sources, further weakening UNAMSIL’s credibility. The chief sh

ing, however, was the mismatch between UNAMSIL’s expansive 

to enforce security, support the government, and assist the UN DD

cess, and the still violent situation in Sierra Leone. 

UNAMSIL forces deployed to Sierra Leone with inadequat

tics capabilities. This lack of capability contributed to the long d

tween the signing of the Lome Agreement in July 1999, the UN S

Council authorization of the mission in late October 1999, and 

tual arrival of UNAMSIL forces in January 2000. Even after these 

upon their arrival in Freetown UN forces lacked basic infrastruct

self-sustainment to include tents, vehicles, and communications 

ment. Gangs, criminals, and others even managed to steal much 

first shipments of UN equipment when it eventually arrived in Fr

These shortages and shortcomings further delayed the start of the

observer mission for several weeks and gave the RUF yet more 

rethink their peace agreement. 

In the fall of 1999 as the UN resolutions authorizing UNAMS

being negotiated, the Nigerian government argued in the UN that 

tary should provide the commander for UNAMSIL forces since t

prior experience and knowledge of Sierra Leone. The United N

however, insisted that Indian General Jetley serve as the comma

all UNAMSIL forces in order to demonstrate the UN’s impartial

ing the DDR process. Nigeria then decided to withdraw its troops 

2000 leaving Sierra Leone with no military force to provide secur

UNAMSIL headquarters and its newly arriving troops had to set u

tions before they could take effective control of the Nigerian EC

forces already in Sierra Leone. That never took place because of th

wording of UN Resolution 1270 regarding ECOMOG’s relation

UNAMSIL. Nigerian troops operated alongside UN troops, but no

any coherent command and control structure. 

UNAMSIL intelligence failings were partially responsible fo

tack of the RUF leader’s home in Freetown that ended UNAMSIL’
nel did not have a plan for crowd control at Sankohs house prio

public demonstration, although they were warned about the nu

people participating in the demonstration. UNAMSIL officials un

the gravity of the situation and allowed the crowd to surge out of 

Although Sankoh was blamed for the murder of the civilians, a

amount of responsibility for the disaster could be placed at the 

UNAMSIL. 

UNAMSIL’s most significant shortcoming was the disconn

tween the chaotic and violent situation inside Sierra Leone and i

peacekeeping mission. UNAMSIL operated under Chapter VII 

United Nations, which could have authorized it to use force to 

plish its missions. But UN Resolution 1270 envisioned UNAMS

neutral force to an agreement between parties already reconciled t

and therefore it limited the use of force to self defense and the pr

of civilians under imminent attack. In contrast, the earlier Nige

ECOMOG interventions operated in support of the Sierra Leone 

ment against the interests of the RUF and other factions. The UN

commander, General Jetley, therefore believed that his units must 

neutral and refrain from using force to avoid giving the appearanc

voring one party over another. 

But given the violent nature of Sierra Leonean politics and t

ence of hundreds of armed groups only nominally under the co

any central leaders, the mission was in fact peace enforcement, n

peacekeeping. Though an agreement had been signed at Lome, arm

tions inside Sierra Leone needed to be persuaded to comply with 

dates. Even after the passage of UN Resolution 1289 in Februa

granted UNAMSIL wider latitude to enforce the provisions of th

Agreement, General Jetley refused to change his rules of engagem

failure of UNAMSIL units to use military force against non-coo

armed groups between February and April 2000 undermined the

ibility in the eyes of all parties. The embarrassing capture of 50

peacekeepers in April 2000 by RUF fighters in Kono essentially 

the mission to a standstill. 

Only the intervention of British troops as part of Operation P

ER in May 2000 managed to set UNAMSIL on the path to succe

ish military power essentially gave UNAMSIL a shot in the arm 

it quickly defeated the armed factions around Freetown that had 

dated UNAMSIL forces. The British forces initially arrived under 

76 
Brigadier David Richards, however, quickly expanded the British 

has come under some criticism for “driving” the British mission f

scene by his independent actions. Though it is hard to argue with 

and Operation PALLISER was stunningly successful. 

The obvious professionalism, audacious leadership, and over

ing military power of British soldiers intimidated the RUF and othe

inspiring UNAMSIL and the government of Sierra Leone. Operatio

LISER was also conducted with great speed. Troops were notified 

day and deployed to a holding area in Senegal the next. They 

Sierra Leone in less than 36 hours and at maximum battle group 

within 64 hours. The remarkable speed at which the British co

operations also contrasted very favorably with the delays and dith

UNAMSIL and forced all factions and forces in Sierra Leone to 

line with UK objectives. 

Even the stunning success of Operation PALLISER, howev

tarnished by the embarrassing capture of some of its soldiers by t

Side Boys in September 2000. Major Alan Marshall and the sol

his patrol were caught unprepared by the child soldiers of the W

Boys. Four months of successful operations in Sierra Leone seems 

given the British patrol a false sense of confidence and security th

mere presence and reputation would deter would be opponents. T

ish troops seemed to have forgotten or underestimated the long s

use of children as soldiers, in Sierra Leone’s civil wars. After nego

failed, British leaders and soldiers executed a nearly perfect raid a

tage rescue in Operation BARRAS. The West Side Boys simply 

prepared for, or capable of, resisting the overwhelming fire pow

skill of the British soldiers of 1 PARA and the SAS. Operation BA

should not, however, have been needed. After the British interve

Sierra Leone in May 2000, both UNAMSIL and the government o

Leone managed to become more effective in implementing the t

the 1999 Lome Agreement. It took further military action by the 

more aggressive UNAMSIL military measures in the fall of 2000

as an international diamond embargo against neighboring Liberi

nally force RUF leader Issay Sessy to capitulate. 
1. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1270 (1999), 22 Octob

United Nations Security Council, http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1999/

(accessed 18 August 2007). 

2. Ibid. 

3. Ibid. See also Mirna Galic, “Into the Breach: An Analysis of th

Nations Mission in Sierra Leone,” Stanford Journal of International R

http://www.stanford.edu/group/sjir/3.1.04_galic.html (accessed 18 

2007). 

4. Kofi Annan, “Eighth Report of the Secretary-General on the United 

Observer Mission in Sierra Leone,” Reports Of The Secretary-Genera

Security Council In 1999, para. 36, http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/repo

sgrep99.htm (accessed 18 August 2007). 

5. Galic, “Into the Breach: An Analysis of the United Nations M

Sierra Leone.” 

6. Shalini Chawla, “United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone: A Se

Peace,” Strategic Analysis: A Monthly Journal of the IDSA, Vol. XXI

(December 2000), http://www.ciaonet.org/olj/sa/sa_dec00chs01.html (

10 August 2007). 

7. Mark Malan, Phenyo Rakate, and Angela McIntyre, “Peacekeeping 

ra Leone: UNAMSIL Hits the Home Straight– Chapter 7: Disarmamen

bilization, and Reintegration,” Institute for Security Studies Monograp

no. 68, http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/Monographs/No68/Chap7.html (

7 August 2007). 

8. United Nations Security Council, Third report of the Secretary

on the United Nations mission in Sierra Leone, S/2000/186, 7 Mar

paragraph 10, http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/reports/2000/sgrep00.htm (

10 August 2007). 

9. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1289 (2000), 7 Februa

United Nations Security Council, http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/2000

htm (accessed 18 August 2007). 

10. Ibid. 

11. General Sir David Richards, “Sierra Leone–‘Pregnant with Lesso

Royal United Services Institute Whitehall Paper 63–Global Challenges 

rica: Bridging Divides, Dealing with Perceptions, Rebuilding Societies 

2004), 9-21. 

12. United Nations Security Council, Fourth Report of the Secretary

al on the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, S/2000/455, 19 M

paragraph 17, http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/reports/2000/sgrep00.htm (

10 August 2007). 

78 
Twenty-First Century, (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc

143-145. 

14. The UK based mercenary firm, Sandline, was also rumored to h

ported the ECOMOG forces that restored President Kabbah to power in th

of 1999. See the unpublished manuscript by Gwyn Prins, “Strategic R

Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS. 

15. Prins, “Strategic Raiding.” 

16. Major General David Richards, “Expeditionary Operations: Sierra 

Lessons For the Future,” Royal United Services Institute–World Defence 

Issue Four, http://www.sovereign-publications.com/wds-4-articles.htm (

10 August 2007). 

17. David Leatherwood, The Hazards of Strange Bedfellows: The Unite

Nigeria, and Peacekeeping in West Africa (Washington DC: National War 

2000), http://www.ndu.edu/library/n2/n01LeatherwoodHazards.doc (

3 August 2007). 

18. William Fowler, Operation Barras: The SAS Rescue Mission: Sier

2000, (London: Orion Publishing, 2004), 84. 

19. Richards, “Expeditionary Operations: Sierra Leone–Lessons For the 

20. Andrew Dorman, “The British Experience of Low Intensity Confl

erra Leone,” Defense and Security Analysis Journal, Volume 23, Numbe

2007), pp. 185-200, http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/routledg/cd

00000023/00000002 (accessed 8 August 2007). 

21. Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Sierra Leone, Final R

the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Sierra Leone, Chapter 3, pa

1337, http://trcsierraleone.org/drwebsite/publish/v3a-c1.shtml, (a

10 June 2007). 

22. Ibid., sections 1406-1422. 

23. Richards, “Expeditionary Operations: Sierra Leone–Lessons For the 

24. Dorman, “The British Experience of Low Intensity Conflict in Sierra 

25. Richards, “Expeditionary Operations: Sierra Leone–Lessons For the 

26. Prins, “Strategic Raiding.” 

27. Gwyn Prins, The Heart of War: On Power, Conflict and Obligati

Twenty-First Century, (New York: Routledge Publishing, 2002), 203. 

28. United Nations Security Council, Fourth Report of the Secretary

on the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, para 76. 

29. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1299 (2000), 19 M

United Nations Security Council, http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/2000

htm (accessed 18 August 2007). 

30. Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Sierra Leone, Final Repo

Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Sierra Leone, para 1466. 
32. Lansana Gberie, A Dirty War in West Africa: The RUF And the De

of Sierra Leone, (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2005), 

trial was suspended after Sankoh was charged by the UN mandated Spec

for crimes against humanity. 

33. Prins, The Heart of War: On Power, Conflict and Obligation in the 

First Century. 

34. Richards, “Expeditionary Operations: Sierra Leone–Lessons For the 

35. Ibid. 

36. Ibid. 

37. Prins, “Strategic Raiding.” 

38. Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Sierra Leone, Final Repo

Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Sierra Leone, para 1502. 

39. David Keen, Conflict and Collusion in Sierra Leone, (New York: 

Publishers, 2005), 232-235. 

40. BBC, “Sierra Leone Timeline–31 August 2000,” BBC News W

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/741070.stm (accessed 10 August 2007). 

41. BBC, “UK Captives ‘Did Not Liaise with UN’–30 August 200

News Web site, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/902266.stm (accessed 1

2007). The deputy commander of the UN peacekeeping force in Sierr

Nigeria’s General Mohammed Garba, challenged Major Marshall’s de

travel in a dangerous rebel area. According to General Garba, the Br

diers decided to check out the area without coordinating this with the UN

later determined that Major Marshall coordinated with Brigadier Gordon 

Commander British Forces in Sierra Leone. 

42. Gberie, A Dirty War in West Africa: The RUF And the Destruction 

Leone, 174. The rank of Foday Kallay is anywhere from Major to Brigad

eral. He is one of the soldiers who plotted and carried out the AFRC c

Johnny Paul Koroma. 

43. Fowler, Operation Barras: The SAS Rescue Mission: Sierra Leone 20

44. BBC, “Sierra Leone hostage talks ‘going well’–4 September 200

News Web site, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/909045.stm (accessed 1

2007). 

45. Fowler, Operation Barras: The SAS Rescue Mission: Sierra Leone 20

46. The exact number of soldiers inserted is not known. The SAS 

disclose information on operations due to their secretive mission. In fa

the Ministry of Defense released a censored version of Operation BARRA

Sierra Leone Press, dated 10 September 2000, no reference is made to th

the Special Forces unit. It is estimated that as many as 100 SAS were inv

this mission, from planning to completion. 

47. Fowler, Operation Barras: The SAS Rescue Mission: Sierra Leone 2000, 

48. Ibid., 126. 

80 
50. Ibid., 114. 

51. Ibid., 121. 

52. Ibid., 122-123. 

53. “Argyll Saves 58 From Drowning” Navy News–Online, http://w

vynews.co.uk/articles/2000/0008/0000082501.asp (accessed 15 August 2

54. Fowler, Operation Barras: The SAS Rescue Mission: Sierra Leone 20

55. Tom Cooper and Court Chick, Court, Western and Northern Afri

base–Sierra Leone 1990-2002, Air Combat Information Group Journa

gust 2004), http://www.acig.org/artman/publish/article_462.shtml (

19 June 2007). 

56. Ibid. 

57. Fowler, Operation Barras: The SAS Rescue Mission: Sierra Leone 20

58. Ibid., 141. 

59. Ibid., 141. 

60. Ibid., 149. 

61. Prins, “Strategic Raiding.” 

62. Dorman, “The British Experience of Low Intensity Conflict in Sierra 

63. Prins, “Strategic Raiding.” 

64. Richards, “Sierra Leone–‘Pregnant with Lessons?’” 9-21. 

65. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1343 (2001), 7 Mar

United Nations Security Council, http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/2001

htm (accessed 18 August 2007). 

66. Dorman, “The British Experience of Low Intensity Conflict in Sierra 

67. Douglas Farah, Blood From Stones: The Secret Financial Network o

(New York: Broadway Books, 2004). 

68. Keen, Conflict and Collusion in Sierra Leone, 287. 

69. Gberie, A Dirty War in West Africa: The RUF And the Destruction 

Leone, 208-214 

70. Sierra Leone Web, “Inaugural Address on the Occasion of the Sta

ing of the First Session of the First Parliament of the Third Republic 

Leone,” (12 July 2002), http://www.sierra-leone.org/GOSL/kabbah-071

(accessed on 15 August 2007). 

71. Keen, Conflict and Collusion in Sierra Leone, 288. 

72. See the Special Court for Sierra Leone website, http://www.sc-sl.o

 

Conclusion 

For the eleven years between 1991 and 2002 terrible civil wa

throughout Sierra Leone. The destruction caused by fighting left th

try without passable roads, destroyed its electric grid, and ruined it

system and medical systems. The wars killed tens of thousands of c

and maimed tens of thousands more, leaving the great majority o

Leoneans destitute. In this eleven year period, national, regional, 

ternational leaders tried a number of military means to end the figh

to create lasting peace. Some of the military operations failed on 

terms while others achieved greater or lesser degrees of their obj

The jury is still out on whether the UN and UK interventions b

2000 and 2002 have brought lasting peace. Nevertheless, the milit

fessional can gain a number of insights from the series of interv

in Sierra Leone reviewed in this study that are relevant not only t

Leone, but to potential future military operations in Africa. 

Acting Early and Decisively 

As General Sir David Richard states in his article, Sierra L

‘Pregnant with Lessons’ “...in essence the international comm

guilty of too much talk and not enough coherent and timely pre-

action.”1 While this is certainly true, it is unlikely that internat

even regional political leaders will act quickly with such a sensiti

as intervening in the internal affairs of a sovereign state. This dec

also the domain of civilian political leaders, not uniformed soldier

tary leaders will in all probability not be called upon to take acti

the humanitarian or military situation has reached crisis proportio

When the decision to intervene with military force is made, h

two of General Richard’s subsidiary points become critical—fir

tary action must be launched with a coherent plan that includes 

military, national, regional and international actors. Second, and 

important, the intervention must be launched with energetic act

with the slowly evolving, haphazard, bureaucratic tendencies so 

during 1999 and 2000 in Sierra Leone. Inter-governmental organ

(IGOs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are notoriou

willing to operate under the control of any military force. At th

time, military forces bring with them an organizational, mission 

ethos that is especially needed during planning and in the early s
coherent approach to combining military and non-military actions 

the common objective. 

Understanding the Mission and the “Enemy” 

It is crucial that any military intervention into a situation like 

Sierra Leone be guided by a clear understanding of the situation 

ground, of the political objectives for the intervention, and of ho

tary forces are to be used to achieve those objectives. The prov

humanitarian relief, the observing of compliance with treaty obli

peacekeeping, peace enforcement or the deliberate attacking of a 

force each require different types of forces and different types o

tions. Shaky cease-fire agreements made between armed faction

international pressure that are not based on the balance of politica

and military power on the ground are especially problematic for th

vening force. 

The UN’s first intervention in Sierra Leone’s civil wars, the U

SIL mission in the summer of 1998, ended in failure. In fairness 

OMSIL, their mission was probably impossible under any circum

While current conflict management theory usually holds that the 

resolution process requires the participation and cooperation of a

nents, the ugly reality of rival conflict often undermines the logic o

After ECOMOG troops restored the Kabbah government to power 

hoped that its UNOMSIL observer force could encourage recon

between the government and its AFRC/RUF enemies and the disar

of private militias. It was clear that the Kabbah government co

only small parts of Sierra Leone and had neither the political ab

military power to exercise as a functioning government. Despi

statements and willingness to attend meetings, it also soon becam

that the RUF was never going to acquiesce to being disarmed an

continued to reject the Kabbah government’s claim to legitimacy

these inalterably opposed realities, UNOMSIL observers had no p

observe, no willing partners to disarm, and no means to bring the 

factions together. 

When the Lome Agreement was reached in July 1999, the U

intervened. The UN had learned some lessons from the year befo

time the UNAMSIL mission was chartered under Chapter VII of 

Charter, was formed around what appeared to be a fairly robust 

force, and was given the mission to directly assist the disarmam

84 
however, the Lome agreement was based on the false assumptions 

RUF was prepared to disarm and share power in a democratic gove

and that the Kabbah government was interested in welcoming the R

its political arm into civil society. The Lome Agreement was also v

popular on the streets of Freetown because RUF leaders were not 

countable for the atrocities they had committed. Secondly, the UN

forces deployed too slowly in Sierra Leone, were poorly equipped

led, and the UNAMSIL commander failed to employ the authority 

been given to use military force when necessary to enforce the agr

The DDR process quickly broke down, UNAMSIL forces were h

and taken prisoner, and by May 2000 the situation was desperate. 

The conditions for reconciliation between the government 

RUF simply did not exist in the first half of 2000. Power sharing 

was not possible, the military balance of power was still roughly eq

UNAMSIL was not prepared to change those dynamics. It was ha

by the UN mandate to operate as an ostensibly neutral force betwe

parties and the reality that most of its forces were Nigerian unit

under ECOMOG had actively favored the Kabbah government aga

RUF. Finally, there is almost universal recognition that the RUF 

have been destroyed, not offered a chance to gain political powe

bargaining table. The RUF, with its nihilistic violence and deliber

of atrocities against civilians was simply beyond the pale. 

Overwhelming Military Force 

The record of DDR efforts in Sierra Leone, whether internall

ternally led, makes it clear that reasonably widespread security, i

or maintained by a superior military force, is a prerequisite for 

Regardless of political agreements and apparent shifts in the milit

ance on the ground, the intervening power must have the capability 

willingness to employ overwhelming military force. Whether it int

to actively support one side against the other, or whether the force 

a neutral party, it must possess military power superior to any a

potential opponents. This is not a question of numbers; it is a m

military effectiveness and combat power. Executive Outcomes m

ies were few in number in 1995 and 1996, but they enjoyed a trem

advantage in combat power, tactical skill, and professionalism o

RUF forces. Both ECOMOG and UNAMSIL who later intervene

erra Leone in relatively large numbers and were better equipped th

opponents, had their effectiveness limited by internal weakness
on the use of force. UNAMSIL only became effective in late 20

British assistance and after its new commander proved willing to 

force’s military power to force RUF holdouts into the DDR proc

military effectiveness of the intervention force must be clearly sup

all factions if there is any hope that they will comply with either th

of any peace agreements or with the mandates of the intervening p

The Advantages and Disadvantages of Coalitions 

Many leaders have encouraged the use of regional economic

cal and military coalitions as the solution to humanitarian crises in 

The mantra has been summarized as, “an African solution to Africa

lems.” Regional and international forces are sometimes able to ass

“moral high ground” and to use that status to accomplish humanit

other objectives not open to individual nations. The Economic Com

of West African States or ECOWAS and its military arm, ECOMO

shown the potential for fulfilling this ideal. The US and European 

have expended significant efforts to improve the military effectiv

African nations in attempts to bring this concept to reality. The 

military forces from which ECOMOG task forces are drawn, h

will need years of additional training before they are ready to op

their own. 

As Napoleon once quipped, “Give me coalitions to fight,” for 

masterful at exploiting their internal political and military weak

Foday Sankoh and other RUF leaders proved adept at exploiting t

in the unity of command and effort among Sierra Leonean, EC

and UN forces. Even the mercenary force from Executive Outco

pears to have suffered from a conflict of interest involving finan

to the illegal diamond trade that financed the RUF forces it was f

Throughout the period covered in this study, the necessity for 

command and unity of effort could not be clearer. Both ECOM

UNAMSIL suffered from a lack of these key elements at differe

during their operations in Sierra Leone. The wording of UN resolu

an extremely delicate art, and the command and control of militar

operating under UN mandates is extremely important if the inte

force is to be effective on the ground. British forces in Operation P

ER and UNAMSIL forces, once stiffened by British resolve and a 

UN mandate on the use of force under a new commander, demo

what could be achieved with a well led military force. 

86 
The military forces which intervened in Sierra Leone showed 

sistent tendency to cease active operations or leave the country too 

after appearing to achieve their immediate military objectives. In la

Executive Outcomes mercenaries had driven RUF units nearly ou

erra Leone but were unable to destroy the leadership. Between 1

2000, ECOMOG forces repeatedly intervened to restore the Kabb

ernment to power after it was deposed by AFRC and RUF troop

time ECOMOG was initially successful but then went on the de

before decisively defeating its opponents. ECOMOG was also u

provide government forces with sufficient internal capacity to se

country, leading to further anarchy. Even British forces who int

in mid-2000 and who righted the failing UNAMSIL mission, soo

themselves having to rescue some of their own troops who had bee

hostage in the flush of an easy but incomplete victory. In the fall o

the UK found it necessary to conduct a significant show of force 

deploy some of its forces to Sierra Leone to secure the capitulatio

RUF. 

National Military Forces 

As many nations have learned in the past and are still learnin

only local security forces can ultimately restore and maintain secu

strife torn nation. While a capable and well led outside military fo

intervene to establish order, they must soon be supplemented w

then replaced by local units. While each of the outside powers ex

in this study made some attempts to train and equip Sierra Leon

serve in government security forces, the efforts were haphazard a

fective. Training and equipping local units is only a short term por

very long term requirement that includes the creation of the institu

modern military forces—schools, training centers, command post

lations, logistics and many others. This is an expensive and long te

cess that temporary coalitions are loathe to accept. Yet without in

in providing the government of a fragile nation with these capabili

likelihood for future interventions will remain high. 

Infrastructure 

Discovering and using key terrain to support military operati

principle as old as military history. Tied to key terrain is the imp
of the world. Sierra Leone provides bountiful evidence of the con

importance of these principles. The Lungi airport, northeast of F

and around the large estuary that separates the Freetown peninsu

the rest of the country stands out as being particularly important. I

as the base of operations, which had to be seized by force in som

for every power that intervened in Sierra Leone. The so called 

shoe” of roads and bridges between Lungi Airport and the cap

of Freetown were also critical throughout this period. Smaller pa

unpaved airstrips across Sierra Leone were also important given t

road network. The old British airfield at Hastings, between Freeto

Waterloo, proved important in several operations as a helicopter 

the case of Operation PALLISER, the British also made excellen

an intermediate staging base in Senegal to organize their assault o

Airport. 

The limited road network in Sierra Leone and the towns that 

lie at the intersection of those roads were of great importance to an

hoping to control the country. The town of Waterloo which sits 

the main road from Lungi Airport to the Freetown peninsula ne

be controlled by any force seeking to control the country. Conve

the intervening force possessed helicopters or naval vessels, the

be used to great effect to provide a decisive mobility advantage o

equipped forces. Off shore bases of operation also afford the in

ing force a secure place from which to command and supply ope

particularly in the earliest phases of the operation. Control of rive

portant since they form much, but not all of, Sierra Leone’s borde

are also important as means of transportation in the interior of the 

The extensive river deltas in the south and southwest of the country 

source of Sierra Leone’s alluvial diamonds that are so vital to its ec

They must be controlled and kept out of the hands of rebels and n

actors. 

Role of Neighboring Countries 

If, as is often the case, non-state actors are the primary sourc

stability that necessitated intervention, they must be deprived of t

ity to retreat to a sanctuary or to draw supplies and other resourc

a sanctuary outside the nation into which the intervention is lau

When the intervening power or powers does include participatio

the affected state’s geographic neighbors, it is critical that those 

bors be required to deny sanctuary to any fleeing factions. The R

88 
lor. Throughout the 1990s Liberia provided both support to the R

sanctuary whenever it suffered temporary military setbacks. Neig

Guinea did not provide active support to the RUF, but neither was i

deny its territory to RUF fighters amidst the swarms of refugees t

there from Sierra Leone. Not until after 2002, when Liberia itself b

stabilize, did the RUF lose it ability to hide and reorganize there. 

Securing the borders of the affected state and supporting neig

countries to deny sanctuary to fleeing hostile forces must be par

objective of an intervention. It is naïve to expect armed bands to 

international borders in many regions of the world, and a peace ag

may do little to change their behavior with regard to borders. Whet

are motivated by political objectives, terrorism, drug profits or sim

nomic exploitation, the intervening power(s) will have to take mea

deal with this reality. In extreme cases, such as Liberia’s aid to th

military force may be needed against another state. Of course, this 

credible complexity to the political process of building political co

and a military coalition to intervene. 

Cultural Awareness and Dealing with Children Soldiers 

Sierra Leone was and remains very much a tribal society. The 

and Mende tribes are the two largest and have alternated in holding 

but there are more than a dozen other tribes around the country that 

taken into account. Irregular military forces such as the kamajors 

an important piece of the security puzzle in Sierra Leone, and the

were organized along tribal lines. Sierra Leone’s politics, econom

security situation simply cannot be understood apart from a solid 

its tribal cultural heritage. 

An unfortunate condition in Sierra Leone, and elsewhere in 

riod, was the widespread use of children as soldiers. Seized at 

age and brainwashed with a variety of fanatical beliefs, they prov

extremely deadly. All sides used children in this way, but the R

particularly brutal in this regard. Many of the atrocities comm

Sierra Leone were committed by child warriors, sometimes drunk

times high on drugs, and sometimes simply fanatical in their actio

military force intervening in Sierra Leone quickly found itself eng

fighting and killing child soldiers. As much as this assaulted civiliz

dards of behavior, any military force that underestimated the thre

children fighters suffered because of their laxity. The British soldie
were taken prisoner by a rag tag mix of irregular fighters and ch

diers. Appropriate rules of engagement must be in place at the star

intervention where this horrific practice is being used. 

Final Thoughts 

The history of Sierra Leone during the period of this study i

unrelenting suffering and destruction punctuated by a series of mil

terventions which sought to restore order and provide humanitaria

Sierra Leone was buffeted by all of the forces that lead to the phen

known as a failed state, in which civil government simply disap

is so ineffective that it cannot perform the most rudimentary func

a nation state. In such circumstances, political leaders have and 

doubt continue to employ military force in attempts to alleviate 

man suffering. The study of the military interventions in Sierra Leo

vides ample insights, both from failures and from successes. The r

military interventions in Sierra Leone is littered with failures. Th

also demonstrates however, that with proper awareness of the s

and an appropriate mandate, with effective military capabilities, a

sufficient resolve, a military intervention can be successful in pr

security and humanitarian relief. 

Notes 

1. General Sir David Richards, “Sierra Leone–‘Pregnant with Le

in Royal United Services Institute Whitehall Paper 63–Global Challen

Africa: Bridging Divides, Dealing with Perceptions, Rebuilding Societies 

2004), 9. 

2. For a discussion of the role of sanctuaries, see Thomas A. Brus

Occasional Paper 17–Out of Bounds: Transnational Sanctuary in Irregu

fare, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2006). 

90 
 

 

 

AFRC Armed Forces Revolutionary Council/Armed For

Ruling Congress 

APC/APP All Peoples’ Party, also known as 

APC, All Peoples’ Congress 

CDF Civil Defense Force, Sierra Leone local militia fo

DDR Disarmament, Demobilization and Rehabilitation

A program established under both the Abidjan an

agreements. These were intake centers to disarm 

train former soldiers 

ECOMOG ECOWAS Military Observer Group 

ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States 

EO Executive Outcomes, a South African private 

military company 

IMF International Monetary Fund 

ISU Internal Security Unit, Siaka Steven’s 

private security force 

JFHQ Joint Force Headquarters 

Kamajor Local leaders, head of CDF and militia units 

throughout Sierra Leone 

LEOBATT Sierra Leone Battalion sent to Nigeria 

NEO Noncombatant Evacuation Operation 

NIC National Interim Council, established in 1968 

as a second counter-coup replacing the NRC. 

NPRC National Provisional Ruling Council 

NFPL National Patriotic Front of Liberia 

NRC National Reformation Council, established in 196

as a counter-coup attempt prior to Stevens taking 

NGO Non-governmental organization 

OAU Organization of African Unity 

PARA Parachute Regiment, elite British infantry unit 

RFA Royal Fleet Auxiliary, British Navy ship 
 

 

 

 

RUF Revolutionary United Front 

RUFP Revolutionary United Front Party 

SAS Special Air Service, elite British Army Special Fo

SBS Special Boat Service, elite Royal Marine Special 

SLA Sierra Leone Army 

SLP Sierra Leone Police 

SLPP Sierra Leone Peoples’ Party 

SOBEL sobels or ‘soldiers by day, rebels by night 

ULIMO United Liberian Movement for Democracy, rebel 

fighting to overthrow Liberian ruler, Charles 

ULIMO operated from within Sierra Leone 

UNAMSIL United Nations Assistance Mission in Sierra Leon

UNOMSIL United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone 

UNMO United Nations Military Observer 

AFRICOM United States Africa Command 

WSB West Side Boys, Sierra Leone militia group 

92 
Sierra Leone Chronology
 

1462 Portuguese navigator maps the geography of Sierra Le

calls it “Lion Mountain.” 

1787	 British settlers buy land from tribal leaders and use it for 4

slaves. 

1898	 Hut tax imposed on 27 April sparks rebellion. Britain de

protectorate. 

1914	 Railroad links Freetown with the interior region mines. 

1935	 De Beers obtained diamond mining rights for 99 years. 

1947	 The British introduce proposals linking the Crown Colony 

protectorate. 

1961	 27 April–UK grants Sierra Leone independence. 

Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP) and All Peoples C

(APC) parties formed. 

1962	 Sir Milton Margai, head of the SLPP, elected President in 

1964	 Milton Margai dies, succeeded by his brother, Sir Albert M

1967	 APC leader Siaka “Big Man” Stevens wins disputed pres

election in March.
 

Stevens arrested by Chief of Armed Forces after elect

declares martial law.
 

1968	 Armed Forces Chief ousted in March by senior military o

April–Army NCOs stage a counter coup and declar

Stevens as President. 

1971 April–Sierra Leone declared itself a republic. 

1978	 Stevens declares Sierra Leone to be a single-party state wit

constitution. 

1985	 November–Joseph Saidu Momoh succeeds Stevens as APC 

and President. 

APC domination of diamond trade begins, massive corru

government. 

1989 Charles Taylor begins a rebellion in Liberia. 

Revolutionary United Front (RUF) formed in Liberia. 
1991 March–RUF guerrillas invade Sierra Leone. 

Liberian fighters and mercenaries loyal to Charles Taylor 

eastern Sierra Leone. 

RUF forces take over diamond rich areas in east and so

Sierra Leone. 

1992 Sierra Leone government services collapse. 

April–Sergeant Valentine Strasser stages a coup that topple

dent Momoh. 

National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) led by Str

formed. 

1994 NPRC enlists children to fight the RUF. 

1995 May–Sierra Leone hires Executive Outcomes (EO). 

December–EO defeats RUF rebels. 

1996	 January–Strasser ousted in a coup by Brigadier Julius Maad

Bio restores the 1991 Constitution; elections declared. 

March–Ahmed Kabbah of the SLPP elected President. 

October–Second EO offensive against the RUF. 

November–Abidjan (Ivory Coast) Agreement. A general a

is granted to the RUF. 

1997	 Executive Outcomes leaves Sierra Leone. 

May–military officers overthrow Kabbah government. 

Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) led by 

General Koroma.
 

Kabbah flees to Guinea, sets up government in exile.
 

US Marines conduct two refugee evacuations.
 

RUF leaders join the AFRC junta. Foday Sankoh nam

chairman.
 

23 October–Conkary Communique signed between EC

and AFRC/RUF leaders.
 

1998	 March–Nigerian led ECOMOG forces oust AFRC/RUF 

Freetown. 

Ahmed Kabbah’s SLPP government restored to power. 

94 
13 July–UN Resolution 1181 establishes UNOMSIL mi

Sierra Leone.
 

Widespread atrocities throughout Sierra Leone.
 

1999 January–RUF launches “Operation NO LIVING THING” 

on Freetown.
 

January–UNOMSIL force flees Freetown with Kabbah 

ment.
 

February–ECOMOG liberates Freetown and restores 

government to power.
 

July–Lome Peace Agreement signed between RUF and 

government.
 

October–UN Resolution 1270 authorizes UNAMSIL pea

ing force. 

2000 January–UNAMSIL begins deployment into Freetown, 

Jetley in command.
 

February–UN Resolution 1289 increases size and mandate 

AMSIL.
 

April–ECOMOG forces leave Sierra Leone.
 

April–RUF members seize UN workers in Makeni, Kaila

Magburaka.
 

4 May–UK begins Operation PALLISER to rescue UNAM

May–RUF leader Sankoh captured in Freetown and turned 

British.
 

June–General Issa Sesay named new RUF leader.
 

15 June–RUF defeated, Operation PALLISER ends, UK 

mission begins.
 

25 August–British soldiers seized by the “West Side Boys

10 September–Operation BARRAS frees captive British so

September–New UNAMSIL commander installed.
 

October–UK launches Operation SILKMAN, show of sup

UNAMSIL.
 

10 November–Abidjan Agreement, remaining RUF forces 
2001 March–UN embargo on Liberian arms and diamond trade

US leads worldwide ban on import of Liberian diamonds. 

2002 17 January–UN declares the DDR process complete. 

January–UN establishes Special Court to try war crimes. 

January–UN establishes Truth and Reconciliation Commi

May–Ahmed Kabbah, SLPP, wins election as President o

Leone. 

2003	 March–Foday Sankoh and other AFRC/RUF leaders indi

war crimes. 

March–Charles Taylor, ex-president of Liberia, indicted 

crimes. 

30 July–Sankoh dies in UN hospital in Sierra Leone. 

2004	 July–War crimes trials begin. 

2005	 Last UN forces withdraw from Sierra Leone. 

2006	 March–Charles Taylor arrested in Nigeria and turned ove

in Sierra Leone. 

2007 June–Trial of Charles Taylor begins. 

August–Disputed elections between the APC and SLPP. 

September–Ernest Bai Koroma of the APC declared Pres

Sierra Leone. 

96 
Excerpts Of The Lome Peace Agreement
 

Having met in Lome, Togo, from the 25 May 1999, to 7 Ju

under the auspices of the Current Chairman of ECOWAS, P

Gnassingbe Eyadema; 

Recommitting themselves to the total observance and complian

the Cease-fire Agreement signed in Lome on 18 May 1999, and ap

as Annex 1 until the signing of the present Peace Agreement; Hereb

as follows: 

Part One: Cessation Of Hostilities 

Article I: Cease-Fire 

The armed conflict between the Government of Sierra Leone 

RUF/SL is hereby ended with immediate effect. Accordingly, the tw

shall ensure that a total and permanent cessation of hostilities is o

forthwith. 

Article II: Cease-Fire Monitoring 

1. A Cease-fire Monitoring Committee (hereinafter termed th

to be chaired by the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra 

(hereinafter termed UNOMSIL) with representatives of the Gov

of Sierra Leone, RUF/SL, the Civil Defense Forces (hereinafter ter

CDF) and ECOMOG shall be established at provincial and distric

with immediate effect to monitor, verify and report all violation

cease-fire. 

2. A Joint Monitoring Commission (hereinafter termed the JM

be established at the national level to be chaired by UNOMSIL w

resentatives of the Government of Sierra Leone, RUF/SL, CDF, an

MOG. The JMC shall receive, investigate and take appropriate a

reports of violations of the cease-fire from the CMC. The parties 

the definition of cease-fire violations as contained in Annex 2 wh

stitutes an integral part of the present Agreement. 

3. The parties shall seek the assistance of the International Com

in providing funds and other logistics to enable the JMC to carry 

mandate. 
The Government of Sierra Leone and the RUF/SL, recogniz

right of the people of Sierra Leone to live in peace, and desirous 

ing a transitional mechanism to incorporate the RUF/SL into gov

within the spirit and letter of the Constitution, agree to the follow

mulas for structuring the government for the duration of the pe

fore the next elections, as prescribed by the Constitution, managin

public resources for the benefit of the development of the people o

Leone and sharing the responsibility of implementing the peace. 

these formulas (not in priority order) is contained in a separate A

this Part of the present Agreement; and may be further detailed i

cols annexed to it. 

Article III Transformation of the RUF/SL Into a Political Part

Article IV Enabling Members of the RUF/SL to Hold Public O

Article V Enabling the RUF/SL to Join a Broad-Based Govern

National Unity Through Cabinet Appointment 

Article VI Commission for the Consolidation of Peace 

Article III: Transformation of the RUF/SL Into a Political Par

1. The Government of Sierra Leone shall accord every facilit

RUF/SL to transform itself into a political party and enter the mai

of the democratic process. To that end: 

2. Immediately upon the signing of the present Agreement, th

SL shall commence to organize itself to function as a political mo

with the rights, privileges and duties accorded to all political p

Sierra Leone. These include the freedom to publish, unhindered a

the media, freedom of association, freedom of expression, freedom 

sembly, and the right to mobilize and associate freely. 

3. Within a period of thirty days, following the signing of the 

Agreement, the necessary legal steps shall be taken by the Govern

Sierra Leone to enable the RUF/SL to register as a political party. 

4. The Parties shall approach the International Community wit

to mobilizing resources for the purposes of enabling the RUF/SL 

tion as a political party. 

98 
1. The Government of Sierra Leone shall take the necessary 

enable those RUF/SL members nominated by the RUF/SL to hol

office, within the time-frames agreed and contained in the presen

ment for the integration of the various bodies named herein. 

2. Accordingly, necessary legal steps shall be taken by the Gov

of Sierra Leone, within a period of fourteen days following the sig

the present Agreement, to amend relevant laws and regulations t

constitute an impediment or bar to RUF/SL and AFRC personnel 

public office. 

3. Within seven days of the removal of any such legal imped

both parties shall meet to discuss and agree on the appointment of R

members to positions in parastatal, diplomacy and any other pub

tor. 

Article V: Enabling the RUF/SL to Join a Broad-Based Gover

of National Unity Through Cabinet Appointments 

1. The Government of Sierra Leone shall accord every opport

the RUF/SL to join a broad-based government of national unity 

cabinet appointments. To that end: 

2. The Chairmanship of the Board of the Commission for the M

ment of Strategic Resources, National Reconstruction and Deve

(CMRRD) as provided for in Article VII of the present Agreeme

be offered to the leader of the RUF/SL, Corporal Foday Sankoh. 

purpose he shall enjoy the status of Vice President and shall ther

answerable only to the President of Sierra Leone. 

3. The Government of Sierra Leone shall give ministerial p

to the RUF/SL in a moderately expanded cabinet of 18, bearing 

that the interests of other political parties and civil society organ

should also be taken into account, as follows: 

(i) One of the senior cabinet appointments such as finance, 

affairs and justice; 

(ii) Three other cabinet positions. 

4. In addition, the Government of Sierra Leone shall, in the sam

make available to the RUF/SL the following senior government po

Four posts of Deputy Minister. 
1. A Commission for the Consolidation of Peace (hereinafter 

the CCP), shall be established within two weeks of the signing of t

ent Agreement to implement a post-conflict program that ensures r

iation and the welfare of al parties to the conflict, especially the vi

war. The CCP shall have the overall goal and responsibility for sup

and monitoring the implementation of and compliance with the pro

of the present Agreement relative to the promotion of national rec

tion and the consolidation of peace. 

2. The CCP shall ensure that all structures for national recon

and the consolidation of peace already in existence and those prov

in the present Agreement are operational and given the necessary re

for realizing their respective mandates. These structures shall com

(i) the Commission for the Management of Strategic 

Resources, National Reconstruction and Develop

(ii) the Joint Monitoring Commission; 

(iii) the Provincial and District Cease-fire Monitoring 

Committees; 

(iv) the Committee for the Release of Prisoners of Wa

Non-Combatants; 

(v) the Committee for Humanitarian Assistance; 

(vi) the National Commission on Disarmament, 

Demobilization and Reintegration; 

(vii) the National Commission for Resettlement, 

Rehabilitation and Reconstruction; 

(viii) the Human Rights Commission; and 

(ix) the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. 

3. The CCP shall have the right to inspect any activity or s

nected with the implementation of the present Agreement. 

4. The CCP shall have full powers to organize its work in any 

it deems appropriate and to appoint any group or sub-committee 

deems necessary in the discharge of its functions. 

5. The Commission shall be composed of the following memb

(i) Two representatives of the civil society; 

(ii) One representative each named by the Governm

RUF/SL and the Parliament. 

100 
The Part of the present Agreement Consists of the following A

Article IX Pardon and Amnesty 

Article X Review of the Present Constitution 

Article XI Elections 

Article XII National Electoral Commission 

Article IX: Pardon And Amnesty 

1. In order to bring lasting peace to Sierra Leone, the Govern

Sierra Leone shall take appropriate legal steps to grant Corpora

Sankoh absolute and free pardon. 

2. After the signing of the present Agreement, the Government 

ra Leone shall also grant absolute and free pardon and reprieve to 

batants and collaborators in respect of anything done by them in pu

their objectives, up to the time of the signing of the present Agree

3. To consolidate the peace and promote the cause of nationa

ciliation, the Government of Sierra Leone shall ensure that no of

judicial action is taken against any member of the RUF/SL, ex-AF

SLA or CDF in respect of anything done by them in pursuit of thei

tives as members of those organizations, since March 1991, up to 

of the signing of the present Agreement. In addition, legislative an

measures necessary to guarantee immunity to former combatant

and other persons, currently outside the country for reasons relate

armed conflict shall be adopted ensuring the full exercise of their c

political rights, with a view to their reintegration within a frame

full legality. 

Article X: Review Of The Present Constitution 

In order to ensure that the Constitution of Sierra Leone repres

needs and aspirations of the people of Sierra Leone and that no 

tutional or any other legal provision prevents the implementatio

present Agreement, the Government of Sierra Leone shall take t

essary steps to establish a Constitutional Review Committee to 

the provisions of the present Constitution, and where deemed appr

recommend revisions and amendments, in accordance with Part V, 

108 of the Constitution of 1991. 
1. The Government of Sierra Leone and the RUF/SL, recogniz

the maintenance of peace and security is of paramount importance 

achievement of lasting peace in Sierra Leone and for the welfa

people, have agreed to the following formulas for dealing with p

flict military and security matters. Each of these formulas (not in 

order) is contained in separate Articles of this Part of the present 

ment and may be further detailed in protocols annexed to the Agre

Article XIII: Transformation and New Mandate of ECOMO

Article XIV: New Mandate of UNOMSIL 

Article XV: Security Guarantees for Peace Monitors 

Article XVI: Encampment, Disarmament, Demobilization a

Reintegration 

Article XVII: Restructuring and Training of the Sierra Leone 

Armed Forces 

Article XVIII: Withdrawal of Mercenaries 

Article XIX: Notification to Joint Monitoring Commission 

Article Notification to Military Commands. 

Article XIII: Transformation And New Mandate of ECOMOG 

1. Immediately upon the signing of the present Agreement, 

ties shall request ECOWAS to revise the mandate of ECOMOG i

Leone as follows:

 (i) Peacekeeping; 

(ii) Security of the State of Sierra Leone; Protection of U

SIL; Protection of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegrat

sonnel. 

2. The Government shall, immediately upon the signing of t

ent Agreement, request ECOWAS for troop contributions from 

two additional countries. The additional contingents shall be deplo

later than 30 days from the date of signature of the present Agr

The Security Council shall be requested to provide assistance in 

of ECOMOG. 

3. The Parties agree to develop a timetable for the phased wit

of ECOMOG, including measures for securing all of the territor

erra Leone by the restructured armed forces. The phased withdr

102 
restructured armed forces. 

Article XIV: New Mandate of UNOMSIL 

The UN Security Council is requested to amend the mandate 

OMSIL to enable it to undertake the various provisions outline

present Agreement. 

Article XV: Security Guarantees For Peace Monitors 

1. The Government of Sierra Leone and the RUF/SL agree to 

tee the safety, security and freedom of movement of UNOMSIL 

Observers throughout Sierra Leone. This guarantee shall be monit

the Joint Monitoring Commission. 

2. The freedom of movement includes complete and unhind

cess for UNOMSIL Military Observers in the conduct of thei

throughout Sierra Leone. Before and during the process of Disarm

Demobilization and Reintegration, officers and escorts to be prov

both Parties shall be required to facilitate this access. 

3. Such freedom of movement and security shall also be acco

non-military UNOMSIL personnel such as Human Rights Officer

conduct of their duties. These personnel shall, in most cases, be ac

nied by UNOMSIL Military Observers. 

Article XVI: Encampment, Disarmament, Demobilization 

and Reintegration 

1. A neutral peace keeping force comprising UNOMSIL an

MOG shall disarm all combatants of the RUF/SL, CDF, SLA and p

tary groups. The encampment, disarmament and demobilization 

shall commence within six weeks of the signing of the present Ag

in line with the deployment of the neutral peace keeping force. 

2. The present SLA shall be restricted to the barracks and the

in the armory and their ammunitions in the magazines and place

constant surveillance by the neutral peacekeeping force during the 

of disarmament and demobilization. 

3. UNOMSIL shall be present in all disarmament and demob

locations to monitor the process and provide security guarantees t

combatants. 

4. Upon the signing of the present Agreement, the Governmen
sist with the provision of the necessary financial and technical re

needed for the adaptation and extension of the existing Encampme

armament, Demobilization and Reintegration Program in Sierra 

including payment of retirement benefits and other emoluments 

former members of the SLA. 

Article XVII: Restructuring And Training Of The Sierra Leon

Armed Forces 

1. The restructuring, composition and training of the new Sierr

armed forces will be carried out by the Government with a view t

ing truly national armed forces, bearing loyalty solely to the State o

Leone, and able and willing to perform their constitutional role. 

2. Those ex-combatants of the RUF/SL, CDF and SLA who 

be integrated into the new restructured national armed forces ma

provided they meet established criteria. 

3. Recruitment into the armed forces shall reflect the geo-

structure of Sierra Leone within the established strength. 

Part Six: Implementation Of The Agreement 

Article XXXII: Joint Implementation Committee 

A Joint Implementation Committee consisting of members 

Commission for the Consolidation of Peace (CCP) and the Comm

Seven on Sierra Leone, as well as the Moral Guarantors, provide

Article XXXIV of the present Agreement and other international s

ers shall be established. Under the chairmanship of ECOWAS, t

Implementation Committee shall be responsible for reviewing and 

ing the state of implementation of the Agreement, and shall meet 

once every three months. Without prejudice to the functions of th

mission for the Consolidation of Peace as provided for in Article 

Joint Implementation Committee shall make recommendations 

necessary to ensure effective implementation of the present Ag

according to the Schedule of Implementation, which appears as A

104 
The parties request that the provisions of the present Agreem

fecting the United Nations shall enter into force upon the adoptio

UN Security Council of a resolution responding affirmatively to 

quest made in this Agreement. Likewise, the decision-making b

the other international organizations concerned are requested to ta

lar action, where appropriate. 

Article XXXVII: Entry Into Force 

The present Agreement shall enter into force immediately u

signing by the Parties. 

Done in Lome this seventh day of the month of July 1999 in twe

original texts in English and French, each text being equally authe

Alhaji Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, President of the Republic of Sierra 

Corporal Foday Saybana Sankoh, Leader of the Revolutionary 

Front of Sierra Leone 

His Excellency Gnassingbe Eyadema, President of the T

Republic, Chairman of ECOWAS 

His Excellency Blaise Compaore, President of Burkina Faso 

His Excellency Dahkpanah Dr. Charles Ghankey Taylor, Pres

the Republic of Liberia 

His Excellency Olusegun Obasanjo, President and Comma

Chief of the Armed Forces of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 

His Excellency Youssoufou Bamba, Secretary of State of Cote 

His Excellency Victor Gbeho, Minister of Foreign Affairs 

Republic of Ghana 

Mr. Roger Laloupo, Representative of the ECOWAS Special Repres

Ambassador Francis G. Okelo, Executive Secretary of the 

Nations Secretary General 

Ms. Adwoa Coleman, Representative Organization of African 

Dr. Moses K. Z. Anafu, Representative of the Commonwealth of N

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Studies Institute in May 2007. Prior to his retirement, he serve

Chaplain Corps Branch with the great Soldiers of the US Army in 

assignments around the world, including Operation IRAQI FRE

He received his Bachelor of Arts in Philosophy from Ottawa Un

his Master of Divinity in Church History from Central Theologica

nary, and his Master of Business Administration in Military Mana

from Touro University. He is currently working on his Master of 

History from American Military University. He resides with his fa

Leavenworth, Kansas. 

Colonel Timothy R. Reese is an Armor officer and Army h

He was commissioned in 1981 from the United States Military A

and has held a variety of command and staff positions in the United 

Germany, Kosovo, and Afghanistan. Colonel Reese holds a Master 

tory degree from the University of Michigan and a Master of N

Security Studies from the US Army War College. He has been th

tor of the Combat Studies Institute since 2005 and will deploy to 

2008. 

The Long War Series
 

Occasional Paper 28
 

Combat Studies Institute Press
 

US Army Combined Arms Center
 

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas