CLD-061 NOT PRECEDENTIAL 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 

___________ 

No. 22-2571 

___________ 

LARITA A. BROWN, 

 Appellant 

v. 

KEYSTONE HUMAN SERVICES; CASE MANAGEMENT UNIT; POLICE 

DEPARTMENT; DAUPHIN COUNTY HOUSING AUTHORITY 

___________________________________ 

On Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 

(D.C. Civil Action No. 1:21-cv-00249) 

District Judge: Honorable Sylvia H. Rambo 

____________________________________ 

Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or 

Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 

December 29, 2022 

Before: GREENAWAY, JR., MATEY, and FREEMAN, Circuit Judges 

(Opinion filed: February 13, 2023) 

_________ 

OPINION*

_________ 

PER CURIAM 

*

 This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent. 
2 

Appellant Larita Brown, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, appeals from 

the District Court’s order dismissing her complaint for failure to state a claim. For the 

reasons that follow, we will summarily affirm. 

I. 

In February 2021, Brown filed a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 

against “various” police departments, Keystone Human Services, Case Management Unit 

(“CMU”), and the Dauphin County Housing Authority. Brown’s complaint alleged that 

the Defendants “conspired to deprive me of my civil rights,” and “are making concerted 

efforts to deprive me of my freedom, food, housing, healthcare, safety, income and 

more.” D.Ct. ECF No. 1 at 3-4. Brown asserted that the “police beat me, lied on me and 

framed me,” and that she was “sued/forced off of my housing due to the 

endeavors/fabrications of defendants. All parties have framed me as a suicidal miscreant 

who needs to be institutionalized.” Id. Brown also filed a motion for the appointment of 

counsel. See D.Ct. ECF No. 5. 

A Magistrate Judge screened Brown’s complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(e)(2) and determined that it failed to state a claim upon which relief may be 

granted. See D.Ct. ECF No. 7. Brown was given thirty days to file an amended 

complaint. Because her complaint “as written” lacked arguable merit and did not “allege 

any plausible claim,” her motion for appointment of counsel was denied. D.Ct. ECF No. 

8 at 7. Brown was “invited to file a new motion requesting the appointment of counsel” 

once she filed an amended complaint. Id. 
3 

Despite being granted multiple extensions of time, Brown did not file an amended 

complaint.1

 Accordingly, a Magistrate Judge recommended that the complaint be 

dismissed for failure to state a claim, and that further opportunity to amend would be 

futile given Brown’s failure, despite ample time, to file an amended complaint. See D.Ct. 

ECF No. 18. Brown filed objections to the Report and Recommendation, see D.Ct. ECF 

No. 19, but those objections failed to address any of the deficiencies in the complaint 

noted by the Magistrate Judge. The District Court adopted the Report and 

Recommendation and dismissed Brown’s complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). See D.Ct. ECF No. 20. Brown filed a timely notice of appeal. 

II. 

We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and exercise plenary review 

over a District Court’s sua sponte dismissal of a complaint under § 1915(e). Dooley v. 

Wetzel, 957 F.3d 366, 373 (3d Cir. 2020). To avoid dismissal, “a complaint must contain 

sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 

face.” Talley v. Wetzel, 15 F.4th 275, 286 n.7 (3d Cir. 2021) (cleaned up). “In assessing 

1

 Brown did, however, file a document entitled “Injunction,” in which she alleged that the 

Williamsport shelter was refusing to help her and asserted that they were conspiring with 

the defendants to have her committed to a mental hospital. See D.Ct. ECF No. 13 at 1. 

The motion was deemed withdrawn when Brown did not file a brief in support as 

required by the District Court’s Local Rule 7.5. The District Court noted as well that if 

Brown wished to assert any claim against the Williamsport shelter, she should do so in 

her amended complaint. See D.Ct. ECF No. 17. We discern no error in the District 

Court’s denial of Brown’s request for an injunction, or in the denial of her motion for the 

appointment of counsel. 
4 

the Complaint, we are mindful of our obligation to liberally construe a pro se litigant’s 

pleadings.” Dooley, 957 F.3d at 374 (cleaned up). We may summarily affirm if the 

appeal fails to present a substantial question. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6. 

III. 

Brown’s claims are brought pursuant to § 1983, which “imposes civil liability 

upon any person who, acting under the color of state law, deprives another individual of 

any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United 

States.” Shuman v. Penn Manor Sch. Dist., 422 F.3d 141, 146 (3d Cir. 2005). We agree 

with the District Court’s dismissal of Brown’s claims for substantially the reasons stated 

in the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation. First, even if Brown had 

specifically identified the “various” police departments listed as defendants, her claims 

against them nonetheless fail as a matter of law. While local governmental units may 

constitute “persons” against whom suit may be brought under § 1983, see Monell v. 

Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978), municipal police departments are 

governmental sub-units that are not distinct from the municipalities of which they are a 

part, see Bonenberger v. Plymouth Twp., 132 F.3d 20, 25 n.4 (3d Cir. 1997), and thus 

may not be sued separately under § 1983. 

To the extent that the Dauphin County Housing Authority is a municipal entity or 

other local government unit, Brown has not alleged that the asserted violations of her 

rights were the result of a policy or custom as would be necessary to implicate municipal 

liability under § 1983. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 694 (“[A] local government may not be 
5 

sued under § 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its employee or agents. Instead, it is 

when execution of a government’s policy or custom, . . . inflicts the injury that the 

government as an entity is responsible under § 1983.”). 

Finally, as noted in the Report and Recommendation, it does not appear that 

defendants CMU and Keystone Health Services are state actors, in which case they are 

not proper defendants under § 1983. To the extent that Brown alleges a § 1983 

conspiracy claim involving CMU, Keystone Health Services, and the Dauphin County 

Housing Authority, the District Court properly dismissed it as vague and conclusory. As 

Brown failed to allege any plausible claims relating to the deprivation of her civil rights, 

any conspiracy claim involving the deprivation of those rights by defendants CMU and 

Keystone Health Services likewise fails. 

Accordingly, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment. See 3d Cir. 

L.A.R. 27.4; 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6.