2023 UT App 3

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH, IN THE INTEREST OF J.E.,

A PERSON UNDER EIGHTEEN YEARS OF AGE.

D.E.,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF UTAH,

Appellee.

Opinion

No. 20210921-CA

Filed January 20, 2023

Third District Juvenile Court, Salt Lake Department

The Honorable Annette Jan

No. 1198329

D.E., Appellant Pro Se

Sean D. Reyes, Carol L.C. Verdoia, and John M. 

Peterson, Attorneys for Appellee

Martha Pierce, Guardian ad Litem

Julie J. Nelson, Debra M. Nelson, Alexandra 

Mareschal, and Kirstin Norman, Attorneys for

Amicus Curiae Utah Indigent Appellate

Defense Division

JUDGE RYAN M. HARRIS authored this Opinion, in which JUDGES

GREGORY K. ORME and MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN FORSTER

concurred.

HARRIS, Judge:

¶1 D.E. (Father) obtained—at least for a while—parental 

rights regarding J.E. (Child) when he and Child’s mother (Mother) 

duly signed and filed a voluntary declaration of paternity (the 
In re J.E.

20210921-CA 2 2023 UT App 3

VDP). Later, however, genetic testing revealed that Father is not 

Child’s biological father. Based on those test results, the guardian 

ad litem (the GAL) appointed to represent Child raised a 

challenge to the VDP, which the juvenile court sustained, later 

issuing an order invalidating the VDP and declaring it “void.”

¶2 Father now challenges that order, asserting that the GAL 

(on behalf of Child) had no right under applicable law to 

challenge the VDP. We first determine that we have jurisdiction 

to consider Father’s appeal. And on the merits, we conclude that 

the juvenile court correctly determined that, under the 

circumstances presented here, Child has statutory standing to 

challenge the VDP. On that basis, we affirm the court’s decision 

to reach the merits of Child’s challenge and to sustain that 

challenge. But the court should not have declared the VDP “void,” 

and we remand for correction of the language used in the court’s 

order and for such other proceedings as might be appropriate. 

BACKGROUND1

¶3 In 2021, Father and Mother were residing together—but 

not married—with three children: then-one-year-old Child and 

his two older siblings. All three children are Mother’s biological 

children, and Father’s paternity had been established as to the 

older two children. At the time, both Mother and Father were 

uncertain whether Father was the biological father of Child, 

because they were both aware that Mother had engaged in sexual 

activity with both Father and another man in 2019, around the 

time Child had been conceived. But neither Father nor any other 

man had established paternity with regard to Child.

1. “We recite the facts in a light most favorable to the juvenile 

court findings.” In re K.J., 2013 UT App 237, ¶ 2 n.2, 327 P.3d 1203

(quotation simplified).
In re J.E.

20210921-CA 3 2023 UT App 3

¶4 In early 2021, Father was arrested and charged with 

aggravated assault involving domestic violence, as well as 

commission of domestic violence in front of a child, related to an 

incident in which Mother accused him of attempting to smother 

her with a pillow in front of the children. The charging document 

labeled Father a “habitual violent offender,” explaining that he 

had previously been convicted of domestic violence against 

Mother in connection with a 2019 incident. Father remained 

incarcerated on these new charges for several weeks. Mother also 

obtained a civil protective order against Father, which remained 

in effect for several months, until she asked for it to be dismissed.

¶5 A few weeks after Father’s arrest, Mother was arrested and 

incarcerated on charges of drug possession. Mother later admitted 

that she had been using methamphetamine. At that point, the 

Department of Child and Family Services (DCFS) filed a petition 

seeking custody of the children, and the court granted that request

at a subsequent shelter hearing.

¶6 A month later, in May 2021, Mother remained 

incarcerated—she was eventually released in August—but Father 

had been released from jail after the criminal charges against him 

were dismissed. The record before us does not disclose the 

reasons for the dismissal of the criminal case, but the dismissal 

occurred on the date set for preliminary hearing, and it was 

entered without prejudice. Neither the State nor the juvenile court 

viewed the dismissal of the criminal charges as an exoneration of 

Father; indeed, the court eventually scheduled an evidentiary 

hearing to consider whether Father had committed domestic 

violence against Mother and, at the conclusion of that hearing, 

found that all three children were “neglected by” Father.

¶7 After his release from jail, Father requested that the 

children be returned to his custody. The court denied that request, 

but did order that Father be allowed supervised visitation with at 

least some of the children.
In re J.E.

20210921-CA 4 2023 UT App 3

¶8 At another hearing a couple of weeks later, the GAL first 

raised the issue of Child’s paternity, and asked that the court 

order genetic testing to determine whether Father was indeed 

Child’s biological father. Neither Father nor Mother opposed this 

request, and the court therefore ordered that genetic testing take 

place, an order that necessarily required that Father, Mother, and 

Child all separately submit to genetic testing.

¶9 On August 5, 2021, Father submitted a biological sample 

for genetic testing. Mother and Child, however, did not submit 

biological samples until August 19. On August 18, the day before 

Mother and Child submitted their samples, Father and Mother 

signed and filed the VDP. On that form, they both swore that they 

“believe[d]” that Father was Child’s biological father. And Father 

answered “no” to a question asking whether “the birth mother, 

child, and biological father” had “submitted to genetic testing.”

The Utah Office of Vital Records and Statistics accepted the VDP 

as valid, and that same day issued an amended birth certificate 

for Child, listing Father as Child’s father. 

¶10 Following the filing of the VDP, Father (through counsel)

filed a motion seeking visitation with Child, alleging that DCFS 

had been “not allowing” him to have visitation because the GAL 

“is opposed to the visits.” The GAL filed a response that asked the 

court to postpone its decision on visitation with Child until the 

results of the genetic testing were known. In that same opposition 

memorandum, the GAL raised a challenge to the VDP, specifically 

invoking sections 78B-15-302 and -307 of the Utah Code. In 

particular, the GAL asserted that Father had fraudulently 

answered some of the questions on the VDP, and asserted that, if 

the pending genetic testing excluded Father as Child’s biological 

father, the VDP could also be challenged on the ground that there 

had been a material mistake of fact. In reply, Father asserted that 

the VDP, which had been accepted by the Office of Vital Records 

and Statistics, gave him parental rights as Child’s father, and that 

he was therefore entitled to visitation. He also requested a hearing 

regarding the GAL’s challenge to the VDP.
In re J.E.

20210921-CA 5 2023 UT App 3

¶11 In late September 2021, while Father’s motion for visitation 

was pending, the genetic test results came back and demonstrated 

that Father is not Child’s biological father.

¶12 Eventually, the court held an evidentiary hearing to 

consider Father’s motion for visitation. At that hearing, the court 

heard brief testimony, under oath, from both Father and Mother.

After their testimony, the GAL asserted that Father should be 

denied visitation because, among other reasons, Father was not 

Child’s biological father. In connection with that argument, the 

GAL pressed the challenge to the VDP that she had raised in her

opposition brief and asked for the VDP to “be declared void and 

be rescinded,” specifically asking for that relief to be “entered 

pursuant to [section] 78B-15-623” of the Utah Code (referred to 

herein as “Section 623”), a statutory provision the GAL had not 

mentioned in her opposition brief. Section 623 provides, in 

relevant part, that “[a] child is not bound by a determination of 

parentage” unless “the determination was based on an 

unrescinded declaration of paternity and the declaration is 

consistent with the results of genetic testing.” See Utah Code Ann. 

§ 78B-15-623 (LexisNexis 2018). The GAL asserted that the VDP 

was subject to a challenge by Child because the results of the 

genetic testing indicated that Father was not Child’s biological 

father. In addition, the GAL pressed the arguments that had been 

raised in her brief, asserting that the VDP was fraudulent because

Father had allegedly been less than candid when he stated that he 

“believe[d]” that he was Child’s father and when he answered 

“no” to the question on the form about genetic testing.

¶13 At the conclusion of the hearing, and after a brief recess, 

the court in an oral ruling granted the GAL’s request to invalidate

the VDP, relying on Section 623 and on the fact that the genetic 

testing had conclusively determined that there was no biological 

relationship between Father and Child. Addressing Father, the 

court stated, “[Y]ou are not the father of [Child] at this point.”

And the court declined Father’s invitation to order that he receive 

visitation with Child but, given Father’s established biological 
In re J.E.

20210921-CA 6 2023 UT App 3

relationship with the other two children and given the fact that 

Father was “probably the only parental figure on the male side 

that [Child] has know[n],” the court nevertheless left the door 

open for DCFS to “allow” Father to have visitation with Child if 

DCFS believed that visitation would serve Child’s best interest. 

The court later signed a minute entry reflecting its oral ruling, 

therein declaring that the VDP “is void.”

ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

¶14 Father appeals the juvenile court’s decision to invalidate 

the VDP and to declare it void. At the center of Father’s challenge 

is his assertion that Child, by and through the GAL, does not 

possess statutory standing to challenge the VDP. This question is 

one of statutory interpretation, and on such matters we afford no 

deference to trial courts’ decisions. See State v. Outzen, 2017 UT 30, 

¶ 5, 408 P.3d 334 (“We review questions of statutory 

interpretation for correctness, affording no deference to the [trial]

court’s legal conclusions.” (quotation simplified)). 

¶15 But before reaching the merits of Father’s appeal, we must 

first determine whether we have jurisdiction to adjudicate it.2

“Questions about appellate jurisdiction are questions of law” that, 

2. After recognizing this jurisdictional question, we issued a Sua 

Sponte Motion for Summary Disposition, explaining that this 

appeal was being considered for summary disposition “on the 

basis that this court lacks jurisdiction because the order appealed 

from was not a final, appealable order.” We then ordered the 

parties to submit briefing on the jurisdictional question, which 

they did. Later, we also provided the parties the opportunity to 

submit supplemental briefing on the statutory standing question. 

Father and the GAL submitted supplemental briefs, and an 

amicus curiae submitted a brief on this topic as well. We 

appreciate the assistance of the parties and the amicus curiae in 

submitting supplemental briefing. 
In re J.E.

20210921-CA 7 2023 UT App 3

by definition, arise for the first time in the appellate setting. See

Zion Village Resort LLC v. Pro Curb U.S.A. LLC, 2020 UT App 167, 

¶ 21, 480 P.3d 1055 (quotation simplified); see also Powell v. Cannon, 

2008 UT 19, ¶ 9, 179 P.3d 799 (“The question of whether an order 

is final and appealable is a question of law.” (quotation 

simplified)). 

ANALYSIS

I. Jurisdiction

¶16 Before we may reach the merits of Father’s appeal, we must 

first assess whether we have jurisdiction to adjudicate it. For the 

reasons discussed, we conclude that we do. 

¶17 “As a general rule, an appellate court does not have 

jurisdiction to consider an appeal unless the appeal is taken from 

a final order or judgment that ends the controversy between the 

litigants.” Copper Hills Custom Homes LLC v. Countrywide Bank, 

FSB, 2018 UT 56, ¶ 10, 428 P.3d 1133 (quotation simplified); see also

Williams v. State, 716 P.2d 806, 807 (Utah 1986) (noting that one of 

the “traditional principles of appellate review” is “the final 

judgment rule,” which generally (subject to a few exceptions) 

prevents appellate courts from reviewing an appeal unless it 

comes “from a final judgment concluding all of the issues in the 

case”). The final judgment rule promotes efficiency by preventing 

the piecemeal litigation and seriatim appeals that would result if 

litigants were permitted, by right, to immediately appeal any 

adverse ruling by a trial court. 

¶18 Conceptually, “the finality of an order in juvenile 

proceedings is determined the same way as the finality of an order 

in other courts.” In re A.F., 2007 UT 69, ¶ 3, 167 P.3d 1070 

(quotation simplified). Indeed, in juvenile courts, as in other 

courts, a “final order is one that ends the current . . . proceedings, 

leaving no question open for further judicial action.” Id.
In re J.E.

20210921-CA 8 2023 UT App 3

(quotation simplified). Certainly, an order in a juvenile court case 

that completely resolved all matters as to all parties would be a 

final order, just as a similar order would be in a district court case. 

¶19 But it is fair to say that, in appeals from juvenile court, 

finality is viewed somewhat more flexibly than in the district 

court context. “In the child welfare arena, the determining factor 

in deciding if an order is final and appealable is whether it effects 

a change in the permanent status of the child.” Id. Because a 

child’s status can change more than once, and because a “juvenile 

court frequently retains jurisdiction over cases [even] after some 

of the issues have been finally resolved,” see In re K.F., 2009 UT 4, 

¶ 36, 201 P.3d 985 (quotation simplified), “in child welfare 

proceedings, unlike traditional civil cases, appeals may be heard 

from more than one final judgment,” In re A.F., 2006 UT App 200, 

¶ 8, 138 P.3d 65, aff’d, 2007 UT 69, 167 P.3d 1070 (quotation 

simplified). Therefore, a determination of whether a juvenile 

court order is final and appealable “requires pragmatic analysis 

of the order itself.” Id. ¶ 9. 

¶20 Under this “pragmatic analysis,” “it is the substance, not 

the form, of the . . . order that matters . . . because the 

determination whether an order is final and appealable turns on 

the substance and effect of the order.” Id. (quotation simplified). 

Any order that effects a “permanent change in the child’s status 

vis-à-vis the child’s parent” is considered final. See In re K.F., 2009 

UT 4, ¶ 36. Particular types of orders that are considered final 

include those “entered upon disposition of an adjudicated 

petition of abuse, neglect, or dependency” and those “terminating 

parental rights,” see id. (quotation simplified), as well as “orders 

that otherwise relieve a party from further litigation,” see In re 

A.F., 2006 UT App 200, ¶ 10. On the other hand, shelter orders and 

orders that “merely terminate reunification services and change 

the child’s permanency goal to adoption” are not considered final 

because they contemplate “further judicial action” regarding the 

parent and the child. See In re K.F., 2009 UT 4, ¶ 37.
In re J.E.

20210921-CA 9 2023 UT App 3

¶21 Father asserts that the juvenile court’s order declaring the 

VDP void is final and appealable because it “effectively 

terminated the parental rights statutorily conferred upon him” 

through the VDP. We agree with Father, as does the State. From a 

finality perspective, the court’s order declaring the VDP void is 

analogous to an order terminating parental rights, because the 

order canceled theretofore-valid parental rights that Father had 

(at least temporarily) acquired by virtue of filing a voluntary 

declaration of paternity that was accepted by the Office of Vital 

Records and Statistics. See Scott v. Benson, 2021 UT App 110, ¶ 22 

n.4, 501 P.3d 1148 (“A [voluntary declaration of paternity] is valid 

and effective if it meets all the basic statutory requirements and is 

accepted by the Office of Vital Records.”), cert. granted, 509 P.3d 

196 (2022). In analogous contexts, we have determined that 

similar orders are final and appealable. See In re A.S., 2007 UT App 

72U, para. 1 (per curiam) (holding that an order dismissing a 

putative father “from the termination case and denying a motion 

for genetic testing” was final and appealable because it 

“dismissed [the putative father] as a party and relieved him from 

further litigation”); see also In re A.F., 2006 UT App 200, ¶ 10 

(stating that “orders that otherwise relieve a party from further 

litigation” are appealable). 

¶22 The fact that litigation regarding Child continues in the 

juvenile court is not dispositive of the question of appealability of 

the subject order. See In re E.L.F., 2011 UT App 244, ¶ 5, 262 P.3d

1196 (recognizing that a “juvenile court’s retention of jurisdiction 

over a child does not necessarily defeat finality”); see also In re K.F., 

2009 UT 4, ¶ 36 (stating that a “juvenile court frequently retains 

jurisdiction over cases [even] after some of the issues have been 

finally resolved” (quotation simplified)). The fact that the juvenile 

court left the visitation door slightly ajar for Father likewise does 

not defeat finality, under the unique circumstances presented 

here; the court’s order deprived Father of all parental rights, 

leaving DCFS with sole discretion to determine whether, and to 

what extent, Father may visit Child. 
In re J.E.

20210921-CA 10 2023 UT App 3

¶23 Applying a pragmatic analysis here, we conclude that the 

subject order, by eliminating all of Father’s claimed parental 

rights, effected a “permanent change in the child’s status vis-àvis” Father, see In re K.F., 2009 UT 4, ¶ 36, and effectively ended 

Father’s involvement in the case. Under these circumstances, the 

order from which Father appeals must be considered final, and 

we therefore have jurisdiction to consider the merits of his 

appellate challenge. 

II. The Merits of Father’s Appeal

¶24 We begin our analysis of the merits of Father’s appeal with 

a discussion of voluntary declarations of paternity, and by 

explaining how Father did—at least for a time—secure valid 

parental rights regarding Child. We then list some of the ways in 

which voluntary declarations of paternity can be challenged, and 

conclude that Child (through the GAL) had standing to raise one 

such challenge, and that Child’s challenge has merit. Accordingly, 

we conclude that the juvenile court correctly sustained Child’s 

challenge to the VDP, but should not have referred to it as “void.” 

A

¶25 There are a number of ways for a parent to establish a 

legally valid parent-child relationship, many of which are “based 

on the notion that parents should generally have parental rights 

regarding their biological children.” See Scott v. Benson, 2021 UT 

App 110, ¶ 18, 501 P.3d 1148, cert. granted, 509 P.3d 196 (2022); see 

also Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 256–57 (1983) (recognizing 

“[t]he intangible fibers that connect parent and child”); Stanley v. 

Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (holding that a biological father’s 

interest “in the children he has sired and raised, undeniably 

warrants deference and, absent a powerful countervailing 

interest,” constitutional protection). “In most cases, parental 

status is established, based on an assumed biological connection, 

simply by presumption of circumstance.” Scott, 2021 UT App 110, 

¶ 19. For example, in the absence of a valid gestational agreement, 
In re J.E.

20210921-CA 11 2023 UT App 3

a mother establishes a parental relationship with any child to 

whom she gives birth. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-15-201(1)(a)(i) 

(LexisNexis 2018). 

¶26 Some fathers also obtain parental rights by presumption of 

circumstance. For instance, a father-child relationship is 

established when a man “and the mother of the child are married 

to each other” when the child is born. Id. §§ 78B-15-

201(2)(a), -204(1)(a). But a father who is not married to the mother 

of the child must take additional steps to establish his paternity. 

¶27 One avenue open to unmarried biological fathers is to 

establish paternity by declaration, an option that—crucially—

requires the written consent of the child’s mother. See id. §§ 78B15-301, -302. A successful declaration of paternity, “duly signed 

and filed, has the same effect as a judicial determination of 

paternity.” In re S.H., 2005 UT App 324, ¶ 15, 119 P.3d 309. To be 

effective, both the mother and declarant father must sign the 

declaration “in the presence of two witnesses” and make several 

statements “under penalty of perjury.” See Utah Code Ann. § 78B15-302(1). Of particular relevance here, the parties must also attest 

that the child “whose paternity is being declared” does not have 

a presumed, adjudicated, or declarant father, and they must “state 

whether there has been genetic testing and, if so, that the declarant 

man’s paternity is consistent with the results of the testing.” See 

id. § 78B-15-302(1)(d), (e). “A declaration of paternity shall be 

considered effective when filed and entered into a database 

established and maintained by the Office of Vital Records.” Id. 

§ 78B-15-302(9).

¶28 Father chose this avenue; he and Mother jointly signed and 

filed the VDP on August 18, 2021, after answering several written 

questions under penalty of perjury. As already noted, they both 

averred that they “believe[d]” Father to be Child’s biological 

father, and Father answered “no” to a question asking whether 

“the birth mother, child, and biological father [had] submitted to 

genetic testing.” The Office of Vital Records and Statistics 
In re J.E.

20210921-CA 12 2023 UT App 3

accepted the VDP as valid, and that same day issued an amended 

birth certificate for Child, listing Father as Child’s father. At that 

point, Father’s parental rights regarding Child were definitively 

established. See id. § 78B-15-305(1) (LexisNexis 2018) (stating that 

“a valid declaration of paternity filed with the Office of Vital 

Records is equivalent to a legal finding of paternity of a child and 

confers upon the declarant father all of the rights and duties of a 

parent”); see also Scott, 2021 UT App 110, ¶ 22 n.4 (“A declaration 

is valid and effective if it meets all the basic statutory 

requirements and is accepted by the Office of Vital Records.”); In 

re S.H., 2005 UT App 324, ¶ 15 (stating that a declaration of 

paternity “duly signed and filed, has the same effect as a judicial 

determination of paternity”).

B

¶29 Declarations can, however, be challenged after they 

have been accepted by the Office of Vital Records and Statistics. 

See Scott, 2021 UT App 110, ¶ 23 (“Voluntary declarations of 

paternity are, however, subject to challenge.”). Applicable 

statutes permit several different types of challenges to validly 

filed declarations. For example, a declaration may be challenged 

as “void” if it fails to meet certain threshold criteria regarding the 

existence of another potential father. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B15-302(3) (referred to herein as “Section 302”). Alternatively, a

“signatory” of a declaration may rescind it within sixty days, 

without specifying any reason. Id. § 78B-15-306(1) (referred to 

herein as “Section 306”). Further, after the rescission period has 

expired, a declaration may be challenged by certain parties “on 

the basis of fraud, duress, or material mistake of fact.” See id.

§ 78B-15-307 (referred to herein as “Section 307”). And as relevant 

here, Section 623 provides that “[a] child is not bound by a 

determination of parentage . . . unless . . . the determination was 

based on an unrescinded declaration of paternity and the 

declaration is consistent with genetic testing.” See id. § 78B-15-

623(2). 
In re J.E.

20210921-CA 13 2023 UT App 3

¶30 Before the juvenile court, the GAL raised a challenge to the 

VDP and, by the time of the hearing, had elected to ground that 

challenge largely in Section 623.3 The court accepted the GAL’s 

Section 623 argument, and Father challenges that decision here on 

appeal. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the juvenile 

court correctly found merit in the GAL’s Section 623 challenge. 

¶31 Section 623 begins by stating that “a determination of 

parentage is binding on . . . all signatories to a declaration . . . of 

paternity . . . and . . . all parties to an adjudication [of parentage] 

by a tribunal.” Id. § 78B-15-623(1). The next section of the statute 

provides as follows:

3. As noted already, the GAL’s pre-hearing briefing before the 

juvenile court invoked Sections 302 and 307, but not Section 623.

In their briefing on appeal, the parties include some discussion of 

other potential avenues for challenge. No party invokes Section 

306, and both the State and the GAL appear to concede that the 

GAL—apparently because Child is not a “signatory” to the 

VDP—does not have statutory standing to challenge the VDP 

under Section 307. But the State does appear to invoke Section 302 

in connection with its argument that the VDP was “fraudulently 

executed,” and on that basis appears to ask us to affirm the 

juvenile court’s ruling on this alternative ground. We have serious 

doubts about the merits of this argument, primarily because none 

of the three criteria for voidness set forth in Section 302 are present 

here, but also because any evidence of fraud on the part of Father 

or Mother is thin at best: they were not sure whether Father was 

Child’s biological parent, but had a basis to “believe” that he was, 

and Father’s answer about the state of genetic testing was 

technically correct, because on August 18 neither Mother nor 

Child had yet submitted samples for genetic testing. But we need 

not delve deeper into the State’s alternative argument, because we 

affirm the substance of the court’s ruling under Section 623. 
In re J.E.

20210921-CA 14 2023 UT App 3

(2) A child is not bound by a determination of 

parentage under this chapter unless:

(a) the determination was based on an 

unrescinded declaration of paternity and the 

declaration is consistent with the results of 

genetic testing; 

(b) the adjudication of parentage was based on a 

finding consistent with the results of genetic 

testing and the consistency is declared in the 

determination or is otherwise shown; or

(c) the child was a party or was represented in 

the proceeding determining parentage by a 

guardian ad litem. 

Id. § 78B-15-623(2). The precise question presented is whether 

Section 623 gives a child the right to challenge a putative father’s 

duly filed declaration of paternity on the basis that the declaration 

is inconsistent with genetic testing results. We hold that it does.

¶32 The question before us is, at root, one of statutory 

interpretation. “When interpreting a statute, our primary 

objective is to ascertain the intent of the legislature, the best 

evidence of which is the plain language of the statute itself.” 

Taylor v. Taylor, 2022 UT 35, ¶ 28, 517 P.3d 380 (quotation 

simplified). In examining the language of a statute, “we do not 

view individual words and subsections in isolation; instead, our 

statutory interpretation requires that each part or section be 

construed in connection with every other part or section so as to 

produce a harmonious whole.” Penunuri v. Sundance Partners Ltd., 

2013 UT 22, ¶ 15, 301 P.3d 984 (quotation simplified); see also State 

v. Bess, 2019 UT 70, ¶ 25, 473 P.3d 157 (“We read the plain 

language of the statute as a whole and interpret its provisions in 

harmony with other statutes in the same chapter and related 

chapters.” (quotation simplified)). And if this exercise “provides 
In re J.E.

20210921-CA 15 2023 UT App 3

a workable result, we need not resort to other interpretive tools, 

and our analysis ends.” Torrie v. Weber County, 2013 UT 48, ¶ 11, 

309 P.3d 216 (quotation simplified). In accordance with these 

principles, we begin our analysis with an overview of the relevant 

statute’s structure. 

¶33 The statute in question is the Utah Uniform Parentage Act 

(the Act), codified at Title 78B, Chapter 15 of the Utah Code. See

Utah Code Ann. §§ 78B-15-101 to -902 (LexisNexis 2018). Section 

623’s reference to “a determination of parentage under this 

chapter,” then, refers to any determination of parentage made 

under any of the various parts of the Act. See id. § 78B-15-623(2) 

(emphasis added). Part 3 of the Act governs voluntary 

declarations of paternity, see id. §§ 78B-15-301 to -313, and Part 6 

of the Act governs judicial adjudications of parentage, see id.

§§ 78B-15-601 to -623. Indeed, the term “determination of 

parentage,” as used in Section 623, has a specific statutory 

definition: our legislature has provided that a “determination of 

parentage” means either (a) “the establishment of the parent-child 

relationship by the signing of a valid declaration of paternity 

under Part 3,” or (b) “adjudication [of parentage] by a tribunal” 

under Part 6. See id. § 78B-15-102(9).

¶34 In this case, any parental rights claimed by Father are 

derived not from any judicial adjudication of paternity but, rather, 

from the VDP. Indeed, the Act is clear with regard to the effect of 

a properly filed declaration of paternity: “a valid declaration of 

paternity filed with the Office of Vital Records is equivalent to a 

legal finding of paternity of a child and confers upon the declarant 

father all of the rights and duties of a parent,” without the 

necessity of initiating judicial proceedings or obtaining a court 

order. See id. § 78B-15-305(1); see also In re S.H., 2005 UT App 324, 

¶ 15 (stating that a declaration of paternity “duly signed and filed, 

has the same effect as a judicial determination of paternity”). 

Phrased in the language of Section 623, then, the “determination 

of parentage” at issue here took place pursuant to Part 3, not Part 

6, and it occurred not in any courtroom but at the front counter
In re J.E.

20210921-CA 16 2023 UT App 3

(or its metaphorical online equivalent) at the Office of Vital 

Records and Statistics. 

¶35 As noted, Section 623 provides that “[a] child is not bound 

by a determination of parentage” unless at least one of three 

criteria are met. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-15-623(2). With regard 

to the specific “determination of parentage” at issue here, none of 

the three listed criteria are met. 

¶36 First, the “determination of parentage” at issue in this case 

was not “based on an unrescinded declaration of paternity” that 

is “consistent with genetic testing.” See id. § 78B-15-623(2)(a). To 

be sure, the determination of parentage here was based on an 

“unrescinded declaration of paternity”; after all, Father’s only 

claim to paternity was made through the VDP, and neither Father 

nor Mother had exercised any rights they had, pursuant to Section 

306, to rescind the VDP within sixty days of signing it. See id.

§ 78B-15-306. But the unrescinded VDP at the heart of Father’s 

paternity claim turned out to be entirely inconsistent with the 

genetic test results that came back in September 2021. For this 

reason, the “determination of parentage” at issue here was not 

based on a declaration of paternity that was “consistent with the 

results of genetic testing.” Id. § 78B-15-623(2)(a) (emphasis 

added). Thus, the first criterion is inapplicable. 

¶37 The second criterion is likewise inapplicable, for two 

reasons. First, this criterion applies only to an “adjudication of 

parentage,” see id. § 78B-15-623(2)(b), and no such adjudication 

occurred here, where Father’s parental rights, if any, are derived 

under Part 3, from the VDP,rather than through a judicial process. 

And second, this criterion also depends upon “genetic testing” 

being “consistent with” the adjudication of parentage and, as 

already noted, the genetic testing in this case excluded Father 

from any biological relationship with Child. See id.

¶38 Finally, the third criterion has no application either. That 

criterion applies if “the child was a party or was represented in 
In re J.E.

20210921-CA 17 2023 UT App 3

the proceeding determining parentage by a guardian ad litem.” 

Id. § 78B-15-623(2)(c). To be sure, Child was represented by the 

GAL in the proceedings before the juvenile court, and is 

represented by the GAL in this appeal. But Child was not 

involved, in any way, in the “proceeding determining parentage” 

at issue here. Again, that “proceeding” occurred on August 18, 

2021, when Father and Mother appeared at the Office of Vital 

Records and Statistics to fill out the VDP, and when that office 

accepted the VDP they filed. That proceeding took place entirely 

outside of court, and Child had no voice or representation therein. 

Accordingly, the third criterion is likewise inapplicable. 

¶39 Because none of the three exceptional criteria apply here, 

Section 623 provides that Child is “not bound by [the] 

determination of parentage” in this case. See id. § 78B-15-623(2)

(emphasis added). In our view, this language must necessarily 

mean that Child has the right to challenge the VDP.4

¶40 The words “not bound by” are not defined in the Act. In 

such a situation, we “interpret the statutory language according 

to the plain meaning of its text.” See O’Hearon v. Hansen, 2017 UT 

App 214, ¶ 24, 409 P.3d 85 (quotation simplified). And in doing 

so, we give the words the meaning they are given in ordinary 

daily usage. See State v. Rincon, 2012 UT App 372, ¶ 10, 293 P.3d 

1142 (“When construing a statute, words that are used in 

common, daily, nontechnical speech, should, in the absence of 

evidence of a contrary intent, be given the meaning which they 

have for laymen in such daily usage.” (quotation simplified)). 

¶41 In our view, the words “not bound by” must include a right 

to challenge the determination of parentage. A child who has no 

4. After all, Part 6 of the Act expressly provides that “the child” 

may maintain “a proceeding to adjudicate parentage,” and 

thereby challenge a parent’s paternity. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B15-602(1). All parties to this appeal agree that a child has statutory 

standing under Part 6 to challenge a parent’s paternity. 
In re J.E.

20210921-CA 18 2023 UT App 3

right to challenge the determination in question, even in a case 

where none of the three statutory criteria applied, would 

effectively be bound by it. Stated another way, in order to be “not 

bound by” something, there must exist a way to get out from 

under its obligations. After all, the words “not bound by” would 

be deprived of all effective meaning if a child had no right to 

challenge the determination of parentage at issue. Even Father 

and the amicus curiae both acknowledge, in recently filed briefs,

that Child has statutory standing to challenge the VDP under Part 

6. For these reasons, we conclude that Section 623 provides Child 

the right to challenge the VDP—an unrescinded declaration of 

paternity upon which Father’s claim to paternity is based—on the 

ground that the declaration is inconsistent with “the results of 

genetic testing.” See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-15-623(2)(a). 

¶42 Once it is established that Child has the right to mount a 

challenge to the VDP, we must turn to the merits of that challenge. 

And Father, here on appeal, does not seriously contest the merits 

of Child’s attack on the VDP. Father instead acknowledges, as he 

must, that the genetic testing excluded him as Child’s biological 

father, and that the genetic testing is, therefore, inconsistent with 

his claims to paternity under the VDP. Accordingly, the juvenile 

court correctly determined that Child’s Section 623 challenge to 

the VDP was meritorious. 

¶43 But while the juvenile court’s ruling is correct on its merits, 

the court used incorrect nomenclature to describe the effect of its 

ruling. The court ruled that the VDP “is void,” thereby apparently 

purporting to invalidate it ab initio and render it without force or 

effect from the date it was filed. This was incorrect. A challenge to 

a declaration of paternity based on inconsistency with genetic 

testing is a challenge alleging “a material mistake of fact.” See id.

§ 78B-15-307(5) (stating that “genetic test results that exclude a 

declarant father . . . constitute a material mistake of fact”). And as 

we explained in Scott, the effect of a successful challenge on this 

basis—as opposed to a challenge grounded in Section 302 or 

Section 306—is “not that the declaration of paternity is rendered 
In re J.E.

20210921-CA 19 2023 UT App 3

void from its inception” but, instead, that the “declaration will be 

set aside, on a going-forward basis.” See 2021 UT App 110, ¶ 40. 

¶44 In our view, a challenge brought by a child under Section 

623 alleging that genetic testing is inconsistent with a declarant 

father’s declaration is substantively similar to the type of 

challenge we examined in Scott. Neither challenge is grounded in 

Sections 302 or 306, statutory provisions that expressly provide 

that voidness will result from a successful challenge. And both 

challenges arise from the same set of circumstances, namely, 

genetic testing that does not match a putative father’s claims to 

paternity. We therefore hold that, where a child makes a 

successful Section 623 challenge to a declaration of paternity, the 

result is that the declaration “will be set aside, on a going-forward 

basis,” and will not be declared void from the date of its inception. 

See id. As applied to this case, these principles dictate that Father 

had legal parental rights for some three months, from August 18 

through November 16, 2021, but that his parental rights ended, 

prospectively, with entry of the court’s order sustaining Child’s 

Section 623 challenge.

¶45 Finally, both Father and the amicus curiae—in recently 

filed supplemental briefs—raise the potential applicability of 

section 78B-15-608 of the Utah Code (referred to herein as “Section 

608”), a statutory section that allows a court, under certain 

conditions, to “disregard genetic test results that exclude the . . . 

declarant father.” Father asserts, for the first time in his 

supplemental brief, that he should be entitled to a hearing to 

determine whether the genetic test results eliminating him as 

Child’s biological father should be “disregarded” pursuant to 

Section 608. But Father makes this request for the first time in this 

recent brief; he did not raise a Section 608 defense to the GAL’s 

challenge before the juvenile court, nor did he mention Section 

608 in either his opening or reply brief on appeal. Under these 

circumstances, Father has raised this legal theory far too late for 

us to consider it in the context of this appeal. Cf. Viertel v. Body 

Firm Aerobics LLC, 2022 UT App 96, ¶ 11, 516 P.3d 791 
In re J.E.

20210921-CA 20 2023 UT App 3

(“Appellants are not permitted to raise matters for the first time 

in a reply brief.” (quotation simplified)). 

¶46 The amicus curiae, for its part, asserts that it was 

“mandatory” for the juvenile court to have conducted a Section 

608 inquiry, including a “best interest of the child” analysis, even 

in the absence of a request by Father for it to do so; in this vein, 

the amicus curiae argues that the juvenile court committed plain 

error by not engaging in that analysis sua sponte. In particular, 

the amicus curiae rests its argument on statutory language stating 

that the court “shall consider the best interest of the child.” See

Utah Code Ann. § 78B-15-608(2) (emphasis added). But in our 

view, the amicus curiae overreads the statute. 

¶47 As we interpret it, Section 608 does not compel a juvenile 

court, in every instance in which any challenge to a VDP is 

sustained, to undertake a Section 608 analysis even if none of the 

parties request it. Litigants are entitled to select the specific 

defenses they raise to an opponent’s claim. The general rule, 

applicable in both district and juvenile courts, is that parties must 

request specific relief in order for a court to award it. Our judicial 

process ordinarily does not require courts to step in and examine 

legal theories that the parties have not themselves raised. See State 

v. Johnson, 2017 UT 76, ¶ 14, 416 P.3d 443 (“Under our adversarial 

system, the parties have the duty to identify legal issues and bring 

arguments before an impartial tribunal to adjudicate their 

respective rights and obligations.”). In this case, Father—who was 

represented by counsel at the time—elected to defend against the 

GAL’s challenge to the VDP by calling into question the GAL’s (or 

Child’s) right to even mount the challenge. Father did not raise 

Section 608 as a possible defense, and he did not ask the juvenile 

court—in the event it concluded that the GAL had standing to 

challenge the VDP—to disregard the results of the genetic testing 

pursuant to Section 608. 

¶48 We take the amicus curiae’s point that, whenever a party 

does specifically invoke Section 608 and ask a court to disregard 
In re J.E.

20210921-CA 21 2023 UT App 3

genetic test results, that court must “consider the best interest of 

the child” in determining whether to do so. See Utah Code Ann. 

§ 78B-15-608(2). But courts do not have an obligation to sua sponte 

raise Section 608, and undertake its concomitant best-interest 

analysis, in every case in which they are asked to consider a 

challenge to a VDP.5 See Utah Stream Access Coal. v. VR 

Acquisitions, LLC, 2019 UT 7, ¶ 41, 439 P.3d 593 (stating that 

“judges are neutral arbiters—not advocates,” and that judges 

“keep [themselves] out of the business of second-guessing the 

pleading decisions of the parties”); cf. Scott, 2021 UT App 110, ¶

43 (noting that the lower court, in that case, turned to a Section 

608 analysis only at the “request” of one of the parties). If a 

putative parent wants a court to take the rather drastic and 

5. The amicus curiae runs into the same problem with its other 

best-interest related argument. It points out that guardians ad 

litem have authority created by statute, and that they are 

appointed “to represent the best interest of a minor.” See Utah 

Code Ann. § 78A-2-803(1)(a)(i) (LexisNexis Supp. 2022). It asserts 

that the GAL in this case, by challenging Father’s paternity, acted 

outside Child’s best interest, pointing out that Child has no other 

father figure in his life, and offering its view that “it is difficult to 

see how it can be in a child’s best interest to challenge the 

paternity of the only father figure participating in the case.” We 

acknowledge this argument, and agree with the amicus curiae 

that guardians ad litem have a statutory obligation to carefully 

consider whether the actions they take on a child’s behalf are in 

the child’s best interest. But ordinarily any challenge to a guardian 

ad litem’s actions as being outside a child’s best interest must 

come from one of the parties rather than from a court sua sponte, 

and must be raised in the first instance in the district or juvenile 

court. No such challenge was levied here by any party before the 

juvenile court, rendering the merits of any such challenge 

inappropriate for appellate review. 
In re J.E.

20210921-CA 22 2023 UT App 3

unusual step of disregarding the results of genetic testing, it will 

ordinarily be the parent’s responsibility to raise the issue. 

¶49 And even assuming, for the purposes of the discussion, 

that plain error review is available here, see Kelly v. Timber Lakes 

Prop. Owners Ass’n, 2022 UT App 23, ¶ 42 n.10, 507 P.3d 357 

(suggesting that plain error review may be available in certain 

types of civil cases, including termination of parental rights cases), 

we reject the amicus curiae’s assertion that, on the record before 

us, the juvenile court committed plain error by not invoking 

Section 608 sua sponte. Plain error occurs only when a court 

commits an obvious prejudicial error. See Johnson, 2017 UT 76, 

¶ 20. Here, the juvenile court committed no obvious error. 

Nothing in Section 608 indicates that it is to be applied in every 

case, even sua sponte, regardless of whether any party ever 

invokes it. And the amicus curiae cites no appellate court case that 

so indicates. Where the law is not clear, a court does not commit 

obvious error. See State v. Dean, 2004 UT 63, ¶ 16, 95 P.3d 276 (“To 

establish that the error should have been obvious to the trial court, 

[a litigant] must show that the law governing the error was clear 

at the time the alleged error was made.”). 

¶50 For these reasons, the juvenile court did not plainly err by 

not sua sponte undertaking an analysis pursuant to Section 608. 

And because Father did not raise that issue either before the 

juvenile court or in his initial brief, we decline to address Father’s 

argument that the court should have conducted such an analysis. 

We offer no opinion, however, regarding whether the issue could 

properly be raised after remand, especially given the fact that the

juvenile court left the door open to Father’s involvement in the 

case going forward. 

CONCLUSION

¶51 We have jurisdiction to consider the merits of Father’s 

appeal, because the juvenile court’s order canceled the parental 
In re J.E.

20210921-CA 23 2023 UT App 3

rights that Father had temporarily acquired by filing the VDP and 

thereby effected a permanent change in Child’s status regarding 

Father. But on the merits of that appeal, we conclude that the 

juvenile court correctly sustained the GAL’s Section 623 challenge 

to the VDP, even if the court should not have used the word 

“void” to describe the result of its ruling. We therefore affirm the 

juvenile court’s decision to sustain the GAL’s challenge to the 

VDP, but remand with instructions for the court to modify its 

order to indicate that it has prospective effect only, and for such 

other proceedings as may be appropriate.