alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
40471.

#### SEYMOUR v. HOUSING AUTHORITY OF THE CITY OF DUBLIN.

Pannell, Judge.

1. The only ground of the amendment to the motion for a new trial assigns error on the failure of the trial court “to charge the jury that the value of the property condemned was to be determined as of the time of taking or as of the time when the condemnor’s right to take the property became complete, which was May 30, 1962.” The trial court did, in a portion of his charge, instruct the jury, “you would have the right to take all of these circumstances into consideration as shown by the evidence in arriving at the fair and reasonable value of *614Mr. Seymour’s (condemnee) property at the time of taking.” A ground of a motion for a new trial which complains that the court did not charge a certain proposition- of law, which he should have given in charge, but which does not show that his attention was especially called to this question, or that a fuller or more particular charge on it than was given was requested, presents no issue upon which this court can pass. *Higgins v. Cherokee Railroad,*73 Ga. 149 (1); *Knight v. Northey,*21 Ga. App. 46 (4) (93 SE 535).

Decided April 24, 1964.

2. Assuming, but not deciding, that the opinion evidence of the witnesses for the condemnor as to the value of the condemned property had no probative value because none of the witnesses gave an opinion as of the time of taking, the finding by the jury, awarding the condemnee damages in the sum of $8,693 was authorized by the evidence even though this be less than any opinion as to value given by witnesses for the condemnee. The tax returns of the condemnee were admitted in evidence and showed that the condemnee in his return to the City of Dublin on February 9, 1962, made affidavit that the market value of the land and buildings condemned was $1,200 and on his return to the county on March 19, 1962, made affidavit that the market value of the property condemned was $300; that the property condemned and the neighborhood in which it was located were described by witnesses with great particularity, both as to its physical condition and its use, and the profits from the business of the owner conducted thereon. In addition, varying estimates of replacement value, or cost of replacement per square foot, were given by the various witnesses. The jury was authorized to take into consideration all of these factors in addition to the final opinion arrived at by a particular witness or witnesses. The evidence authorized the verdict. *Johnson v. Stevens,*19 Ga. App. 192 (2) (91 SE 220); *Westberry v. Hand,*19 Ga. App. 529 (2-b) (91 SE 930); *Georgia Northern R. Co. v. Battle,*22 Ga. App. 665 (1) (97 SE 94); *Great American Co-Operative Fire Assn. v. Jenkins,*11 Ga. App. 784, 785 (5) (76 SE 159).

3. The trial court did not err in overruling the condemnee’s motion for a new trial.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*Felton, C. J., and Frankum, J., concur.*

*615
      *Jones & Douglas, Paul J. Jones, Jr.,*for plaintiff in error.

*Wm. Malcolm Towson,*contra.
#### Commonwealth v. Poley

No. 2

*Richardson Dilworth,*district attorney, for Commonwealth.

*Jacob Kossman,*for .defendant. .

*764June 1, 1954.

Crumlish, J.,

The above matter is before us on petition to quash indictments, answer thereto, a,nd Commonwealth’s petition to dismiss the motion to quash and reply thereto.

Defendant’s original petition to quash came on for hearing before Kun, P. J. It contained 12 reasons why the prayer of the petition should be granted. Kun, P. J., in quashing the indictment (87 D. & C. 129) said, inter alia:

> “The petitioner has raised many interesting questions as to the propriety of the proceeding against him, but we will limit ourselves to the consideration of reason number 8, in which he avers that the hearing on the warrant for his arrest, issued on the complaint of a county detective attached to the district attorney’s office, was illegally held before a magistrate, in his private office, who had no jurisdiction, to hear the charge. If that is so, the proceeding as to. the defendant was coram non judice, null and void and of no effect, and the petition to quash the indictments will have to be granted.”

The Superior Court in reversing opinion by Reno, J., made no references or express rulings on reasons raised by defendant in his petition except the one expressly upheld by the lower court, the so-called “reason number 8”: Com. v. Poley, 173 Pa. Supreme Ct. 331.

What defendant now seeks to do it to argue the remaining 11 reasons raised in his original petition to quash and to secure express rulings thereon.

After careful consideration we reached the conclusion that the Superior Court, having, had the entire record before it sur appeal from ruling of Kun, P. J., considered all the reasons assigned originally by defendant and found' them to' be without merit.

Accordingly, we dismissed defendant’s petition to quash and sustained the Commonwealth’s petition.
ARMED SERVICES BOARD OF CONTRACTAPPEALS Appeal of

-- ) ) Clark McCarthy Healthcare Partner II ) ) Under Contract No. W9126G-13-C-0004 ) APPEARANCES FOR THEAPPELLANT:

APPEARANCES FOR THE GOVERNMENT: ASBCA No. 60260

Kevin J. Gleeson, Esq.

Sullivan, Ward, Asher & Patton, P.C. Southfield, MI Harry Z. Rippeon III, Esq.

Smith, Currie & HancockLLP Atlanta, GA Michael P. Goodman, Esq.

Engineer ChiefTrial Attorney Dawn-Carole Harris, Esq.

Engineer Trial Attorney U.S. Army Engineer District, Fort Worth ORDER OF DISMISSAL The appeal has been resolved amicably by the parties. Pursuant to theirjoint stipulation, it is dismissed from the Board's docket with prejudice. Dated: April 22, 2019

TERRENCES S. HARTMAN Administrative Judge Armed Services Board ofContract Appeals I certify that the foregoing is a true copy ofthe Order ofDismissal ofthe Armed Services Board ofContract Appeals in ASBCA No. 60260, Appeal ofClark McCarthy Healthcare Partners II, rendered in conformance with the Board's Charter. Dated:
JEFFREY D. GARDIN Recorder, Armed Services Board ofContract Appeals
#### Ricciardi Estate

*395*Francis S. Goglia*and *Philip Richman,*for accountant.

*Harry S. Abrams*and *Raymond J. Pdrreca,*for specific devisees.

July 1, 1954.

Bolger, J.,

The next objection related to the family exemption of $750 claimed by the accountant. The objection is based upon the fact that the accountant was not a member of decedent’s household and was not dependent upon her. The accountant testified that his mother had owned premises 906 Ells-worth Street and that he had lived with her from the date of his father’s death in 1928 until her death. During a portion of that time claimant was married, but was divorced for several years prior to his mother’s death. Claimant testified that he assisted his mother in collecting rents but that she was in complete control of the household, did the cooking and cleaning. He stated that he never contributed to her support and never paid board. A deed dated February 11, 1948, and recorded May 9, 1950, conveyed title to the prop? erty from decedent to claimant. There was no explanation of the lapse of time between the date of the deed and the date of recording nor was it shown when the deed was actually delivered to the son. Claimant testified that at no time was there any change in the relationship between him and his mother so that until her death she continued to be head of the household.

The auditing judge did not find the testimony of this witness to be credible. Although he acknowledged that he collected rents for his mother, he had no idea of the amount collected. He stated that his business was that of an insurance broker and that he maintained a filing cabinet in the house, but transacted all of his business “on the outside”. He said initially that all of the furniture in the house belonged to his mother and when reminded that he failed to declare any furniture on the inventory, he shifted his ground and said that all of *396the furniture belonged to him excepting the porcelain table and two kitchen chairs. The claim to the exemption is predicated on the fact that decedent, until the time of her death, was head of the household. It is an established fact that either in 1948 or certainly in 1950, title to the property changed. It was no longer decedent’s household except by the suffrance of claimant.

Section 211 of the Fiduciaries Act of April 18,1949, P. L. 512, means what it says in allowing the exemption to “. . . such children as form part of decedent’s household”. This cannot mean such children in whose household decedent resided: Rossi Estate, 69 D. & C. 190.

The objection that the son is not entitled to the exemption because he failed to show dependence is without merit: Gravatt’s Estate, 50 D. & C. 679; Calhoun’s Estate, 72 D. *&*C. 443. .' . .

The claim for.exemption is disallowed.
www.gpo.gov

### §187b. Oil or gas leases; written relinquishment of rights; release of obligations

Notwithstanding any provision to the contrary in section 187 of this title, a lessee may at any time make and file in the appropriate land office a written relinquishment of all rights under any oil or gas lease issued under the authority of this chapter or of any legal subdivision of the area included within any such lease. Such relinquishment shall be effective as of the date of its filing, subject to the continued obligation of the lessee and his surety to make payment of all accrued rentals and royalties and to place all wells on the lands to be relinquished in condition for suspension or abandonment in accordance with the applicable lease terms and regulations; thereupon the lessee shall be released of all obligations thereafter accruing under said lease with respect to the lands relinquished, but no such relinquishment shall release such lessee, or his bond, from any liability for breach of any obligation of the lease, other than an obligation to drill, accrued at the date of the relinquishment.

(Feb. 25, 1920, ch. 85, §30B, formerly §30b, as added Aug. 8, 1946, ch. 916, §8, 60 Stat. 956; renumbered §30B, Pub. L. 100–203, title V, §5103, Dec. 22, 1987, 101 Stat. 1330–258.)

#### Savings Provision

See note set out under section 181 of this title.

#### Section Referred to in Other Sections

This section is referred to in title 10 sections 7421, 7435.
#### Walter E. BOYD, Appellant, v. Jeannine A. BOYD, Appellee.

No. 78-1372.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Nov. 14, 1978.

Rehearing Denied Dec. 18, 1978.

Horton, Perse & Ginsberg, Miami, for appellant.

*819Don R. Livingstone, South Miami, for ap-pellee.

Before PEARSON and HUBBART, JJ., and CHARLES CARROLL (Ret.), Associate Judge.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed upon authority of *Herzog v. Herzog,*346 So.2d 56 (Fla.1977); and *Shaw v. Shaw,*334 So.2d 13 (Fla.1976).
#### Eddie GOMEZ, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 81-395.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Jan. 26, 1982.

Rehearing Denied March 8, 1982.

*1097Bennett H. Brummer, Public Defender and Bruce A. Rosenthal, Asst. Public Defender, for appellant.

Jim Smith, Atty. Gen. and Paul Mendel-son, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

Before HUBBART, C. J., and HENDRY and FERGUSON, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

There is no showing in the record that the court abused its discretion in denying defendant’s oral motion for continuance of the trial. *Magill v. State,*386 So.2d 1188 (Fla.1980); *Lyles v. State,*312 So.2d 495 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975); Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.190(g).

Appellant’s split sentence of four years of imprisonment followed by four years of probation is invalid, *Villery v. Florida Parole & Probation Commission,*396 So.2d 1107 (Fla.1981), but upon remand for correcting the sentence, the court may, as one of its options, withdraw the sentence altogether and impose a new sentence not to exceed eight years imprisonment (with credit for time served). *Flynn v. State,*(Fla. 1st DCA 1981) (case no. AE-15, opinion filed October 30, 1981); *Alexander v. State,*402 So.2d 485 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981); *Lewis v. State,*402 So.2d 482 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981). In light of this construction placed on *Villery, supra,*which could result in the imposition of a lengthier prison sentence, the appellant may wish to decline correction of his sentence.

The conviction under review is affirmed; the sentence under review is reversed and the cause is remanded to the trial court for resentencing unless the defendant withdraws his request for resentencing, in which event the sentence under review shall stand affirmed.
#### BUTLER AVIATION-PALM BEACH, INC., et al., Appellants, v. David L. REID et al., Appellees.

No. 77-1751.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

Sept. 12, 1979.

Rehearing Denied Oct. 25, 1979.

Sarino R. Costanzo of Walters & Costan-zo, Miami, and John B. McCracken of Jones, Paine & Foster, P.A., West Palm Beach, for appellants.

Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and Harold F. X. Purnell, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, for appellee Department of Revenue.

Jay R. Jacknin of Christiansen, Jacknin & Myers, Palm Beach, for appellee David L. Reid.

John A. Gentry, III of Moyle, Gentry, Jones, Flanigan & Groner, P.A., West Palm Beach, for amicus curiae Air Cab, Inc.

Joseph F. Jennings of Bradford, Williams, McKay, Kimbrell, Hamann & Jennings, P.A., Miami, for amicus curiae Eastern Air Lines, Inc.

PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED. See *Walden v. Hillsborough County Aviation Authority,*375 So.2d 283 (Fla.1979).

DOWNEY, C. J., ANSTEAD, J., and DAUKSCH, JAMES C., Jr., Associate Judge, concur.
```

[Congressional Bills 104th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 2660 Introduced in House (IH)]

104th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 2660

To increase the amount authorized to be appropriated to the Department 
     of the Interior for the Tensas River National Wildlife Refuge.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                           November 17, 1995

 Mr. McCrery introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
                         Committee on Resources

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To increase the amount authorized to be appropriated to the Department 
     of the Interior for the Tensas River National Wildlife Refuge.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. INCREASE IN AMOUNT AUTHORIZED TO BE APPROPRIATED TO THE 
              DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR FOR THE TENSAS RIVER NATIONAL 
              WILDLIFE REFUGE.

    Section 5 of the Act entitled ``An Act to establish the Tensas 
River National Wildlife Refuge'', approved June 28, 1980 (Public Law 
96-285, 94 Stat. 597), as amended by section 2 of Public Law 99-191 (99 
Stat. 1327), is amended to read as follows:
            ``(1) beginning October 1, 1995, not to exceed $20,000,000 
        to the Department of the Interior; and''.
                                 <all>
```
CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT ACCOUNTANTS




We consent to the incorporation by reference in each of the Registration
Statements of Centennial Bancorp's Incentive Stock Option Plan on Form S-8 and
Centennial Bancorp's Nonemployee Directors Stock Ownership Plan on Form S-8 of
our report dated January 22, 1998, on our audits of the consolidated financial
statements of Centennial Bancorp and subsidiaries as of December 31, 1997 and
1996, and for each of the three years in the period ended December 31, 1997,
which report is incorporated by reference in this Annual Report on Form 10-K.



         COOPERS & LYBRAND L.L.P.




Eugene, Oregon
March 20, 1998
Exhibit 32.1



Certification Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002



The undersigned, as Chief Executive Officer of Transcend Services, Inc., certifies that to
the undersigneds knowledge, the Form 10-Q for the quarter ended September 30, 2004, which accompanies this certification, fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d), as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and
the information contained in the periodic report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of Transcend Services, Inc. at the dates and for the periods indicated. The foregoing certification is made
solely for purposes of Title 18, Chapter 63, Section 1350 of the United States Code.



|                       
|-----------------------
|/s/ Larry G. Gerdes    
|Larry G. Gerdes        
|Chief Executive Officer
|                       
|Date: October 28, 2004
HomeDubai Regional Media Hub...Dubai Regional Media Hub  Releases

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        -    Special Briefing  		Telephonic Press Briefing with Special Envoy for Yemen Tim Lenderking	  Timothy A. LenderkingOctober 5, 2022 
        -    Special Briefing via Telephone  		Special Briefing with Ambassador Barbara Leaf, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs	  September 14, 2022 
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        -    Special Briefing  		Telephonic briefing with U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs Daniel J. Kritenbrink	  Daniel J. KritenbrinkAugust 17, 2022 
        -    Special Briefing via Telephone  		Telephonic Press Briefing with Timothy A. Lenderking  U.S. Special Envoy for Yemen	  Timothy A. LenderkingAugust 4, 2022 
        -    Special Briefing via Telephone  		Special Briefing via Telephone on RIMPAC 2022 with Vice Admiral Michael Boyle, Commander, U.S. Navy and Rear Admiral Christopher Robinson, Deputy Commander, Royal Canadian Navy	  August 3, 2022 
        -    Special Briefing via Telephone  		Special Briefing via Telephone with Ramin Toloui, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic and Business Affairs	  Ramin TolouiJune 22, 2022 
        -    Special Briefing via Telephone  		Telephonic Press Briefing with Timothy A. Lenderking  U.S. Special Envoy for Yemen	  Timothy A. LenderkingJune 7, 2022 
        -    Special Briefing  		Special Briefing via Telephone with Vice Admiral Brad Cooper, Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Central Command, U.S. Fifth Fleet, and Combined Maritime Forces	  May 11, 2022 
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No. 00-5819.

#### Salgado *v.*United States.

C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.
```

[Congressional Bills 104th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 2689 Engrossed in House (EH)]

  1st Session

                               H. R. 2689

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 AN ACT

   To designate the United States Courthouse located at 301 West Main 
  Street in Benton, Illinois, as the ``James L. Foreman United States 
                             Courthouse''.
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
104th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 2689

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 AN ACT

 
   To designate the United States Courthouse located at 301 West Main 
  Street in Benton, Illinois, as the ``James L. Foreman United States 
                             Courthouse''.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. DESIGNATION.

    The United States Courthouse located at 301 West Main Street in 
Benton, Illinois, shall be known and designated as the ``James L. 
Foreman United States Courthouse''.

SEC. 2. REFERENCES.

    Any reference in a law, map, regulation, document, paper, or other 
record of the United States to the building referred to in section 1 
shall be deemed to be a reference to the ``James L. Foreman United 
States Courthouse''.

            Passed the House of Representatives December 18 
      (legislative day, December 15), 1995.

            Attest:

                                                                 Clerk.
```
HomeOffice of the SpokespersonPress Releases...Assistant Secretary of State for Consular Affairs Rena Bitter Travels to the Republic of Korea, Thailand, and Qatar

# 									Assistant Secretary of State for Consular Affairs Rena Bitter Travels to the Republic of Korea, Thailand, and Qatar							

Media Note

Office of the Spokesperson

February 8, 2023

Assistant Secretary of State for Consular Affairs Rena Bitter will travel February 8-17 to Seoul, Bangkok, and Doha. The Assistant Secretary will meet with embassy staff and observe consular operations in all three cities. While in Seoul, she will meet with government officials to discuss a variety of consular issues, including the prevention and resolution of international parental child abduction cases. While in Doha, she will meet with Qatari officials and lead the consular session of the U.S.-Qatar Strategic Dialogue. Her trip underscores our deep and sustained commitment to the protection of U.S. citizens overseas and the facilitation of legitimate travel and immigration to the United States.

For updates on Assistant Secretary Bitter’s travel follow @TravelGov on Twitter.

For press inquiries, please contact CAPRESSREQUESTS@state.gov.

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40651.

#### COX v. WILSON.

Jordan, Judge.

This was a suit to recover damages for breach of contract. The petition alleged that on September 20, 1961, the plaintiff purchased from the defendant a new home and lot located in Floyd County, Georgia, known as 7 Crestridge Drive, the deed conveying said property being recorded in the office of the Clerk of the Superior Court of Floyd County; that as an inducement to get plaintiff to buy the property for the sum of $15,333.50 the defendant did orally agree to repair any defects in the workmanship or materials used in said house which might be discovered within a year after plaintiff purchased the property; and that the oral promise of the defendant was made on or about August 7, 1961, and was accepted by the plaintiff at the time same was made. The petition enumerated certain defects which were subsequently discovered in the premises, alleged that proper notice of the same was given to the defendant, and that the defendant refused to perform his oral agreement to make repairs. Damages were sought in the sum of $1,833.50

The defendant’s general demurrer to the petition was sustained and the exception is to that judgment. *Held:*

Assuming for the sake of argument only, that the allegations of the petition are sufficient to allege that the payment of the purchase price by the plaintiff was consideration for the defendant’s promise, and that such oral agreement was without the operation of the statute of frauds *(Code*§ 20-401 (5)), *653then it must be held under the decision of this court in *Postell v. Hearn,*104 Ga. App. 765, 766 (123 SE2d 13), and the cases therein cited, that the provisions of the alleged oral agreement merged in and were extinguished by the deed subsequently executed by the parties. The allegations of the instant petition are insufficient to bring this case within the exception to the merger doctrine which was recognized in *McKee v. Cartledge,*79 Ga. App. 629 (54 SE2d 665) and applied in *Kollen v. High Point Forest, Inc.,*104 Ga. App. 713 (123 SE2d 10).

Decided May 1, 1964.

*Wright, Walther & Morgan, Robert G. Walther,*for plaintiff in error.

*Matthews, Maddox, Walton & Smith, John W. Maddox,*contra.

The petition did not set forth a cause of action for breach of an oral contract, and the trial court did not err in sustaining the general demurrer.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*Bell, P. J., and Eberhardt, J., concur.*