September 5. 1951 

Hon. Robert S. Calvert 

Comptroller of Public Accounts 

Austin, Texas Opinion No. V-1271 

Re: Applicability of House gill 

No. 326, making possession 

of certain gaming devices a 

Dear Sir: 

felony, to “pinball” or “marble” machines which pay off 

the winner in free games 

rather than cash or physical 

property. 

Your recent request for an opinion asks.,in general, 

whether House Bill No. 326, Acts 52nd Leg., 1951, ch. 178, p. 

299 (codified as Article 642a. V.P.C.), makes it unlawful to *own, 

keep or possess” devices commonly known as “pinball” or “marble” machines which automatically deliver free games to the winner instead of cash or physical property. You specifically inquire 

as to whether these “pinball” or “marble” machines are prohibited 

“slot machines,” as that term~is defined in Section 1 of the Act. 

The machines about which you inquire are described in 

your letter as machines “whose users propel balls with a plunger” 

and which are designed or adjusted so that the mechanism “will 

automatically permit a free play when a certain score isreached” 

v&&out the deposit of additional coins therein. You further characterize these devices with the following statement: 

U ‘Pinball’ or ‘marble’ machines do not contain a 

drum or reel with insignia thereon. Rather, they operate primarily through a series of electrical crossconnections, which are set in motion whe.nthe ball 

touches certain trips and switches, and which reflect 

themselves in lights or computers that reveal the 

player’s score.” 

House Bill No. 326 provides, in part, as follows: 
. 

Hon. Robert S. Calvert, Page 2 (V-1271) 

“Section 1. The term ‘slot machine’ as used 

in this Act, means: 

*(a) Any so-called ‘slot machine’ or any other 

machine or mechanical device, by whatsoever 

name known, an essential part of which is a 

drum or reel with insignia thereon, and 

*(l) which when operated may deliver, as 

the result of the application of an element 

of chance, any money or property or: other 

valuable thing, or 

“(2) by the operation of which a person 

may be entitled to receive, as the result 

of the application of an element of chance, 

any money or property or other valuable 

thing; or 

“(b) Any machine or mechanical device designed 

and manufactured or adapted to operate by means 

of the insertion of a coin, token, or other object 

and designed, manufactured or adapted so that 

when operated it may deliver, as the result of an 

application of an element of chance, any money or 

property; or 

‘(c) Any subassembly or essential part intended 

to be used in connection with such machine or 

mechanical device. 

*Sec. 2. Whoever shall manufacture, own. store, 

keep, sell, rent, lease, let on shares, lend or give away, 

transport or possess a slot machine, as defined in Section 1, shall be guilty of a felony and upon conviction 

thereof shall be confined in the State penitentiary not 

less than two (2) years nor more than four (4) years.” 

We agree with your own interpretation of your first question -- that Section l(a) is not applicable to marble machines which 

have no *drum or reel,” and that it is to Section l(b) that we~must 

look to determine whether marble tables and pinball machines are 

included within the Act. 
Hon. Robert S. Calve& Page 3 (V-1271) 

277 

It is obvious that coin-operated marble and pinball 

machines which automatically deliver, as the result of an application of an element of chance, money or physical property, 

are within the definition of the term “slot machine” in Section 

l(b). Your primary concerri is whether such, machines are included within the statutory definition if they pay off the winner 

in free games rather than cash or physical property. This question is phrased by you as follows: 

“SECOND QUESTION: Are ‘pinball’ or ‘marble’ 

machines which do not deliver money or physical property to a’pfayer, but which can be adjusted to award 

free games, ‘slot machines’ within the meaning of the 

above-quoted definition, said definition being the one 

which is contained in Subdivision (b) of Section 1 of 

House Bill 326 ? n 

.We assume that you are interested only in those machine~s which are constructed or adapted to award free games 

rather than t.lz which can be so constructed or adapted. There 

is a difference. Hightower v. State, 156 S.W.Zd’ 327 (Tex. Civ. 

App. 1941). The words of the statute cover only that type of machine which is “designed and manufactured or adapted so that 

when operated it may deliver . . . any money or property.“l Our 

answer to your question will refer only to those machines which 

are designed’ and manufactured or adapted so as to automatically 

release or deliver free games to the winner. 

At the outset, the treatment of these so-called “free 

game” machines in the law and public policy of this State should 

be reviewed in order to keep in mind the nature of the subject 

matter being dealt with by the 52nd Legislature. Marble and pinball machines which pay the winner in free games instead of cash 

have been condemned by previous statutes and court decisions of 

this State the same as gaming devices which pay off in cash or 

physical property. State v. Langford, 144 S.W.2d 448 (Tex. Civ. 

App. 1940); Broaddus v. State, 150 S.W.2d 247 (Tex. Crim. 1941) 

l/ The statute also covers ‘any subassembly or essential 

part-ntended to be used in connection with such machine or mechanical device.” Sec. l(c), supra. 
278 Hon. Robert S. Calvert, Page 4 (V-1271) 

Hightower v. State, 156 S.W.Zd 327 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941); Martin v. State, 162 S.W. 722 (Tex. Crim. 1942). They have noten 

considered mere amusement games for ‘skill or pleasure” by 

previous Legislatures and the Texas Courts. The above cited 

cases held that the keeping or exhibiting of such machines is 

prohibited by Article 619, V.P.C., which fixes a penitentiary sentence for-violation thereof. Article 634, V.P.C., declares the 

mere existence of this type of gaming device “against public policy and a public nuisance.” Williams Mfg. Co. v. Prock, 184 F. 

2d 307 (U.S. Ct. App.. 5th Cir. 1950). 

It is a proper presumption that the Texas Legislature, 

in considering H.B. 326. had knowledge of the fact that previous 

statutes, court decisions and declarations of public policy have 

placed free game pay-off machines in the same category as slot 

machines, gaming tables, and other devices which pay off in money ~;:> or 

or physical property and that the same penalties are provided for 

keeping and exhibiting such machines. 

Therefore, the question which you have posed is whether 

the Legislature, knowing the unlawful and felonious nature of these 

free game pay-off machines, intended by its .wording of Section 1 

(b) to exempt them from the new law prohibiting possession of 

other gaming devices of the same category. Specifically; did the 

Legislature use the word “property” in Section l(b) in its broad 

sense so as to include Yfree games,” or was the word used in the 

narrow sense so as to mean “physical property” and thereby exclude free game machines ? 

Some courts have construed the word “property” in gaming statutes to include free games, and others have said that it 

does not include them. In almost all instances the conflicting court 

decisions are based upon differences of opinion as to the value of 

free games and the variation of public policy with relation to free 

game payyoff devices in the different States. 

We have conducted an exhaustive research of the ‘authorities to determine the fundamental considerations involved in the 

interpretation of statutes of this character. From this research 

we are convinced that the great weight of authority in the United 

States compels a construction of Section l(b) of the Act as including such “free game” devices, and that the considerations given 

effect in such cases are in harmony with the prevailing case law 

in this State construing our gaming statutes. 
Hon. Robert S. Calvert. Page 5 (V-1271) 

awhile the type of prize or award which determines inclusion of these devices within Section l(b) is described as “money or property,” the cases dealing with this and similar expressions are almost invariably bottomed on the conception of the 

particular court as to the’ relative tangibiJity or value of the right 

to amusement. as afforded by the free games. Thus, where the 

court, as in the majority of the cases, considers amusement to be 

of value, the free games are heid to constitute ‘money or property,” 

‘property of value,” -a valuable thing,” etc. Those~courts taking 

a contrary view invariably base the decision on a conception that 

the replay privilege is too inconsequential and trivial to be of 

‘value.” or too intangible to constitute ‘property” within the mean: 

ing of such s.tatutes , and within the evil sought to be, remedied 

thereby. 

The basic divergence in the cases is best comprehended 

by an examination of the decisions on the subject. 

.Rankin v. Mills Novelty Co., 182 Ark. 561. 32 S.W.2d 

161 (1930), is a leading case, and one of the earliest, on the subject. The Arkansas Supreme Court said, at page 162: 

‘In order to constitute a gaming device under 

the statute, it must be one that is adapted or designed 

for the purpose of playing any game of chance or at 

which any money or property may be won or lost, and 

any one who shall bet any money or other valuable 

thing, or”any representative of any thing that is esteemed of value, ’ is guilty. under Section 2634 of Crawford & Moses’ Digest, of betting on a gambling device. 

By section 2640 of the same chapter of the Diges,t ‘gambling’ is defined as the betting of any money or any valuable thing on any game of hazard or skill. It is clear 

from these sections and the entire chapter on gaming 

that the word ‘propertv’. as used in section 2630, and 

.tbe words ‘valuablethin&‘mentioned in other sections.’ 

are used synonymously, and that any valuable thing or 

‘any representative of anv thing that is esteemed .of 

value’ is ‘property’ within the meaning of section 2630. 

supra. The machine in question is one which always 

Gin exchange for a nickel a package of mints, and. 

in addition to the mints, a number of ‘slugs,’ in varying amounts from two to twenty, with which a game may 

be played, there being an element of chance in the number 
Hon. Robert St Calvert, Page 6 (V-1271) 

of slugs obtained for a nickel. Is the right to play a 

game obtained in the above manner ‘property’ or a 

‘thing of value’ within the meaning of our statute prohibiting the setting up of gambling devices and gambling? We think it is. It is a matter of common knowledge that the maintenance of places, having no value 

in themselves, but which are used for amusement only, 

are among the most remunerative kinds of property, 

such as miniature golf courses and other like means 

of amusement, and any thing that contributes to the 

amusement of the public is a thing of value. . . .* 

[Emphasis ours throughout this opinion.] 

Howell v. State, 184 Ark. 109, 40 S.W.Zd 782 (1931), follows the 

Rankin case, supra, which in turn is followed in Steed v. State, 

189 Ark. 389, 72 S.W.2d 542, 543 (1934), wherein the specific 

statute involved in all those cases is quoted as prohibiting various games “at which any money or property may be won or lost.” 

!n Boynton v. Ellis, 57 F.2d 665 (C,C.A. 10th. 1932). 

the player of the device might receive tokens with which the machine could be replayed. Certain of the Kansas Statutes involved 

prohibited certain games and devices played for “money or property,” and other of such statutes prohibited those where cash 

prizes “or other valuable things are given.” The court said, at 

page 666: 

“It seems clear to us that these tokens or checks 

.which are obtained by chance represent some value 

and constitute property. The best reason for this view 

is that the public is thereby enticed into patronizing 

the machines. It is the professed object of installing 

them. The tokens or checks may be likened to theater 

tickets in representing a means of amusement. The 

tickets have value. State v. Blair, 130 Kan: 863, 288 

I?. 729; State v. Haining, 131 Kan. 854, 293 P. 952. 

* 

. . . The value may be slight, but still it is 

propert?. in that it affords amusement to the players 

which entices them into patronizing the machines.” 

The citation to State v. Haining is significant in that it held, in effect, that the amusement at a theater is the thing sold regardless 

of whether tickets evidencing the right to such amusement are sold 
- 281 

Hon. Robert S. Calve&, Page 7 (V-1271) 

to the recipient of the right. 

Boy&on v. Ellis, supra. is followed in Boynton v. Mills 

Novelty Co., 60 F.2d 125 (C.C.A. 10th. 1932). 

Of similar effect is Colbert v. Superior Confection Co., 

154 Okla. 28. 6 P.2d 791 (1931), the import of which is that “money, . . ., checks, credits or any representative of value” are 

class.es of “property” within a statute Using those terms in combination with the term “property.” See, also, Mackay v. State, 

83 P.2d 611 (Okla. Grim. 1938). citing other cases to the effect 

‘that the Oklahoma slot machine statute was intended to prohibit 

play on machines for ‘money or other property.” The court cites 

several cases to the effect that the amusement of additional free 

plays has a value, small though it be. 

People v. Settles, 78 P.2d 274 (Cal. Sup. Ct., App. Div. 

1938). considered whether additional free plays to a winner constituted “property? under a California lottery statute, and held 

that “the duty of the operators of this game to permit the winner to play further games free is an obligation arising from 

contract,” and constituted “personal property.” 

‘~Kraus v. City of Cleveland, 135 Ohio St. 43, 19 N.E.2d 

159 (1939), considered a statute prohibiting devices played for 

‘gain” in connection with another statute prohibiting devices 

played for “money or other property.” After holding that amusement is a thing of value, the court concluded that the machine was 

a gaming device under both ‘statutes: 

Middlemas v. Struts. 71 N.D. 186. 299 N.W. 589 (1941), 

deals with a device under a North Dakota lottery statute where, 

to constitute the offense, it was “essential that the prize or award 

which the player may win shall be property or an inter.est in propperty.” Conceding that a statutory definition of “personal,proper- i 

ty” applied, the court said: 

. . . The language ‘every description of money, 

goods, chattels [and) effects’ is broad enough to include 

every statutory definition of personal property without 

regard to the particular division of our codes in which 

it may be found. The word ‘effects’ is one of broad ’ 

significance. When used alone it has been held to include everything that ‘can be termed of value.’ . . . 
, 

282 

Hon.. Robert S.~ Calvert, Page 8 (V-1271) 

Y 

. . . . 

Y 

. . . When the player places his coin in the slot, 

he accepts that offer and acquires thereby an exclusive 

right, as against the owner and all others, to the use of 

the machine for the duration of at least one game. If 

the player is lucky and wins, the right to the exclusive 

use of the machine is continued for an indefinite duration. The right to use such a machine for entertainment purposes is a thing of value. . . . It is a thmg 

subject to ownership and things subject to ownership 

are property. People v. Settles et al., 29 Cal. App.. 

2d Supp. 781, 78 P.2d 274. 

II 

. . . The machine here in suit, therefore, is one 

in the play of which, the player pays a valuable consideration for entertainment and an opportunity dependent chiefly upon chance to win a prize or award 

which is property. . . .” 

In holding that free games are within a statute prohibiting games whereby “money or other thing may be won or lost,” 

the court in Steely v. Commonwealth, 29.1 Ky. 554, 164 S.W.2d 

977 (1942), held that free games are of sufficient value to fall 

within gaming statutes, giving particular attention to cases characterizing prohibited games as those wherein the player “hazards 

his money on the chance that he may receive in return money or 

property of greater value than he hazards.” To the same general 

effect is Giomi v. Chase, 47 N.M. 22. 132 P.2d 7,15 (1942), which, 

in holding that free games are “anything of value,” cites the language of Boynton v. Ellis, supra, that “the value may be slig,ht, 

but still it is property, in that it affords amusement to the~playeri 

which entices them into patronizing the machines.” 

Except for slight difference in legislative history and the 

verbiage of the Texas Act, and subsequent consideration of pe’rtinent Texas decisions, our conclusion might be summed up in the 

comprehens,ive consideration of the point at issue in Co-onwealth v. Rivers, 323 Mass. 379, 82 N,E.2d 216 (1948). The Massachusetts Statute prohibited a lottery to dispose “of any property 

of value. ” The device in question gave only free games. After an 

exhaustive citation of cases considering the meaning of various 

statutory phrases descriptive of prizes and awards or prohibited 

games, the court concludes: 
.HorL Robert S. Calvert, Page 9 (V-1271) 

“By the great we,ight of~authority it is settled as 

to machines or devices by the operation of which free 

plays may,be had by chance ‘or hasard that the free 

plays are,something of value orproperty of valuewithin the meaning of the statutes involved, that it is the 

right to operate the machine an additional time or times 

that is the thing played for, and not the token which represents the value. There are cases in a few jurisdictions where it has been held that free plays are not 

per se things of value, but we are persuaded that the 

contrary view supported by the great weight of authority of other~courts of this country is sustained by the 

reasoning upon which the results of those cases are, 

based, andwe are in accords therewith. In the present 

case’ it seems that no tokens representing free plays 

were delivered by the machine, but rather that the 

machinc~.,operated as to free plays by an automatic recorded score. But as is said in Alexander vi Martin, 

192 S.C.‘176. 183, 6 S.E.2d 20, 23, ‘It matters little 

whether -.. . ~. [the right to play the machine witbout 

addition&cost] was evidenced by.tokens or by an automatic recorded score.’ And as pointed out before,‘it 

is the free play itself that is the ‘property of value’- 

however evidenced.” 

There dare many other cases construing statutes which 

do not use the word “property,” but which discuss the relative 

.value of a free play under statutes which characterize then prohibited prize as. “thing of value* and other synonymous words. 

.Most of these cases characterize the ‘thing:o.f value” with all 

of the attributes’of the term “property” in its broade~r sense, 

and may be readily aligned with the “property” cases on the 

basis of the fundamental concept of the relative value of the 

prize. They are: 

Harvie v. Heise, 150 S.C. 277., 148 SE. 66 (1929), noting 

that since immense sums are paid for amusement it must have a 

value; Gaither v. Cate, 156 Md. 254, 144 A. 239 (1929). comparing 

free game to ticket to moving picture show and seeing no essential 

difference;~State v. Marvin, 211 Iowa 462, 233 N.W. 486 (1930), to 

same effect; Green v. Hart, 41 F.2d 855 (Conn. Dist. Ct. 1930). 

amusement from free play has value; State V. Mint Vending Machine, 

Etc., 85 N.H. 22, 154 A. 224 (1931), comparing free plays to theater 

ticket; White v. Hesse. 48 F.2d 1018 (Ct. of App.; D.C. 1931). value 
- 

Hon. Robert S, Calvert. Page 10. (V-1271) 

is the “right” to replay; Jenner v. State, 173 Ga. 86, 159 SiE. 

564 (1931). comparing free plays’to admission to movie; Sn - 

der. v. City of Alliance, 179 NZ. 426 (Ohio Ct. of App,1931 , 7’ 

“amusement is a thing’of value, for which more money is spent 

perhaps than for any other purpose;” Painter v. State, 163 

Term, 627, 45 S.W.2d 146 (1932), noting that the “right” to free 

play has value; State v. Baitler, 131.Me. 285, 161 A. 671 (1932). 

holding that tokens “evidence right to operate the ‘amusement.’ 

Each was a ticket to part.of the game;” and citing the Rankin 

case, supra, among others; Appeal of Mills Nove,lty Co.. Etc., 

316 Pa. 449, 175 A. 548 (19341, affirming and adopting;opinion 

.. from lower court at 173 Ai 753; citing among other cases Commonwealth v. Goldsmith, 17 Pa., Dist.. 81 Co. R; 145, to the effect 

that tokens’for replay for amusement have intrinsic value; Ci& 

of MiLwankee v. Burns,‘225 Wis. 296, 274 N.W. 273 (1937)., to 

the effect that since tokens could be used in place of nickels to 

replay pinball machine, t&y have value; Alexander v. Martin, 

192 S.C. i76, 6 S.E.2d 2U;(1939), one of first cases dealing with 

matic award of free plays on “pinball” machine, holding 

that “amusertre& iaxecognized by the courts as a thing of value,” 

and citing, among others, w v.. Heise, supra. to the effect 

that the thing actually received is the ‘right” to replay, regardless of whether automatic or evidenced by tokens; People v. 

Cerniglia, 11 N.Y.S.td 5 (N.Y. City Magistrates Ct. 1939), free 

play is a “thing of value; ““Couch v. State, 110 P.2d 613 (Okla. 

’ Grim. App. 1941). discussing value of free plays under statute 

classifying “amusement” along with *property, tangible or intangible . . . or anY,ne+tsuthtive of value or any other thing;” 

State v. Wiley, 232 bwa 443,A N.W.2d 628 (1942). contains exhaustive,,,‘cit$tions, inclaQfng I- cases, aupra, aroemg the “great 

majority,‘“: compares the automatic free game davicea~ %a “token” 

devices, notes that free plays on mint vending machines- are incidental to ,the sale of mints, while if ‘a coin is inserted Iin the. 

pinball machine solely for amusement, the value of free plays is 

measured by the value of the coin, and that “the rule is the same 

whether the machine emits disks with wls%& it can be replayed or 

works automatically;” Hunter v. Mayor, etc., pBl8J.L. 164.24 

A.2d 553 (lq42), citing cases holdtng that amusement has value, 

and followed in Stafford v. Garrett, 128 N.J.L. 623, 28 Ai2d 289 

(1942); People v. One Pjnbali Machine, 44 fi.E.2d 950 (Dl. App. 

Ct., 1942). :dontains exhaustive citations noting that the “valuable thing” won is the “right” to play additional games regardless - 

of how +&right is evidenced; State v. Betti; 34 A.2d 91 (hI.3. ,~. 

Disk. Ct.: 1943), reversed at 42 A.2d 648. infra. .free game:amuser 

- 
. 

285 

Horn Robert S. Calvert, Page 11 (V-1271). 

ment -a valuable thing;” Oatman v. Davidson, 310 Mich. 57, 16 

N.W.2d 665 (1944),~observes that since the plays would ordinarily cost the player five cents each, the opportunity to have 

free plays is a thing of value, ‘and that there is no difference 

in principle between a trade check and a free play;” Thamart 

v. Moline. 66 Idaho 110. ~156 P.Zd 187 (1945), containing exhaustive discussion of cases and holding “right% free play is 

a right of value. 

.Cases in the contrary category warrant closer analysis 

than the limits of this opinion permit in order to fully appreciate 

the basic divergence from the majority and the prevailing trend 

of Texas decisions, as hereafter demonstrated. However, significant points therein will be noted.’ 

-Davies v. Mills Novelty Co.. 70 F.2d 424 (C.C.A; 8th, 

1934). was concerned with a Nebraska Statute. which had not been 

construed by the state courts, prohibiting games of chance for 

“money or property” which the court construed to mean ~“money 

or other thing of va,lue” but it follows certain minority decisions, 

hereafter noted, that mere amusement does not offer a sufficient 

incentive to gambling and that the machine “has no’element of 

gain or loss, financial or otherwise.” 

Chicago Patent Corporation v. Genco, Inc., 124 F.2d 

725 (C.C.A; 7th 1941), was a patent infringement case involving 

similar pinball machines, wherein defendant contend.ed that the 

device was a gambling machine and beyond the protection of the 

patent laws. On the basis of Davies v. Mills Novelty Co..*, 

the court defined a gaming device as one played for “gain,” the 

test being whether it was designed for splay for ‘money or propersty.” ~~Obscovipg tsrat~~%aothing~ of :monetary..value, nothingsusceptible of purchase and sale passes to the, successful player” [an 

obviously inaccurate statement], the opinion concluded that since 

issuance of a patent creates a prima facie presumption of utility, 

the absence of any showing by defendant to overcome such presumption and the findings of the trial court that the machine may 

be operated “without gain being a factor” and that it was capable 

of legitimate use, the court could not hold as a matter of law that 

it was inherently a gambling device. 

.State v. Waite, 156 Kan. 143, 131 P.2d 708 (1942). dealt 

with automatic award of free plays on a “pinball” machine ,under 

a statute prohibiting machines “designed for the purpose of play- 
286 Hon.~ Robert S. Calvert, Page 12 (V-1271) 

ing any game of chance for money or property” and with which, 

persons are induced or permitted “to bet or wager any money 

or other things of value.” The court noted that no “tangible” 

property was awarded, and rested its decision on whether such 

free plays constituted *property.‘ It applied a rule of strict 

construction. Observing that the Kansas Statutes defined property, it would not resort to general definitions of the term. It 

then meticulously dissected the statutory definition of “personal 

property” as meaning “goods, chattels, effects, evidences of 

right in action, and all written instruments by which any pecuniary obligation, or any right or title to property, real or personal, 

shall be created, acknowledged, assigned, transferred, increased, 

defeated, discharged, or diminished,” Andy concluded that “property” as there used meant tangible property -,-’ something that 

could be carried physically. The court declined to discuss cases 

from other jurisdictions with the observation that they usually 

involved materially different statutes. 

In re Wigton, 30 A.2d 352 (Pa. Super. 1943), involved the : 

phrases “money or other property of value” was used in one statute and “money or other valuable .thing” as. used in another statute, 

and held that free games were neithe~r “property of value: nor 

“other valuable thing. ” The decision applies a rule of strict conotruction and concludes that something tangible like “money” is 

contemplated ,by the combination of such words, expressly giving 

the terms a narrow meaning. It conceives the mischief to be remedied by the statute as not including the award of free games. 

Washington Coin Machine Ass’n v. Callahan,. 142 F.2d 97 

(C.A.,D.C., 1944), involved the ph,rase “money or property” as 

used in the penal statutes of the District. On the basis of the foregoing cases in this categoryand others, the court concluded that 

free games were not of tangible or. material value,. 

Like Commonwealth v. Rive,rs, stlpra, on the other side of 

the question, State v; One ‘Jack and Jill” Pinball Machine, 224 S. 

~W.2d 854 (MO. Ct. of App.1949). sums up the conception that free 

games are not Ymoney or property* with exhaustive annotations and 

analysis of the cases. The Arkansas c,ases are given special attention and the main distinction drawn is that the Rankin case, supra, 

concluded that the terms “property” and “valuable thing” are used 

synonymously, while the Missouri Statute does not contain the 

phrase “valu,able thing” or equivalent wo,rds. A rather lengthy dis.- 

cussion of the basis of the court’s conclusion that free games are 
Hon. Robert S. Calvert, Pa,ge ~13 (V-1.271) 

.not property may be summed up in the following paragraph from 

the opinibn,~ at page, .S61: 

.‘,Does the player receive anything of financial or 

economic value ? Rather isn’t this so-called recreation and* amusement, the ‘antithesis of value 7 If one’s 

time is worthanything. it is a loss .instead of gain, a 

waste instead of reward. Hope of reward or gain,,above 

the amount risked, is the lodestone of gambling.. The 1 

fact that one has paid five cents for it does not conclusively fix that, or any other sum,, as its value or any 

value at all.” 

Referring now. to those decisions which, while snot. discussing the character of free plays as “property,” do support the 

contrary viewpoint that such free games are of inconsequential 

value, we briefly note them: 

Overby v. Oklahoma City,, 287, P.796 .(Okla. Crim. 1930), 

holding that slugs good for free plays were not “something of value” 

[it is noted that the case was tried on an ag,reed statement of facts 

which recited that the ,slugs had no value] ; People v. Jennings, 257 

N.Y. 196, 177 N.E. 419 (1931). speaking of free plays won on a device. observes that “the product, however. is valueless from a 

monetary standpoint, perhaps, if not from any other,” and that the 

omission of the phrase ,“other things ,of value’! from the particular 

statute spe.aking of “money, or any check or ~memoranda calling for 

money” limits its application to thinga of money value; Mills Novelty Co. vW Farrell, 64 F.2d 476 (C.C.A.2d 1933, affirming 3 F.Supp. 

555). holding in effect that the ‘insubstantial amusement feature of 

the machine” in aid of the sale of mints was not ‘any valuable 

thing ,” under.:a ConnecticuLQatute. .and observing.&& *one may 

not suppose that a person desiring to gamble would put up money in 

the hope of obtaining tokens which can be used only to produce insignificant humorous sayings. The amusement feature of the machine does not make the machine a gambling device;” Mills Novel-~ 

ty Co. v+ Bolan. 3 F. Supp. 968 (N.Y.. D.C. 1933). reluctantly following People v. Jennings, supra, holding that tokens usable for 

free games are not of value. [The decision was affirmed at 68 

F.2d 1009, on the authority of the Jennings and Farrell cases, suE, but, as noted in Petition of Superintendent of Police, etc. 17 

A. 753, 758. and State v. Wiley, w, the United States Supreme 

Court granted certiorari, later reversing without prejudice after 

the New York statute was amended. which action casts a cloud on 
. 

Hon. Robert S. Calvert, ~Page 14 (V-1271) 

the New York cases as authority on the subject.] ; Commonwealth 

v. Rling, 13 A.2d 104 (Pa. Super. 1940). citing Pennsylvania cases, 

holds that slugs good for replay have no “intrinsic” value contemplated by statutes as theretofore construed; Gayer v. Whelan, 138 

P.2d 763 (Cal. Dist. Ct. of App. 1943). cites cases to the effect 

that free plays are not of “material value,” “sufficient value,” or 

“tangible value, ” to constitute “things of value,” and concludes that 

intangibles .are not contemplated by the particular statute which 

speaks of winning or losing “merchandise, money, or articles of 

value, checks, or tokens, redeemable in, or exchangeable for money 

or any other thing of value;” State V. Betti. 42 A.2d 649 (N.J. Ct. of 

Quarter Sessions 1945). reversing 34 A.2d 91, D, holds free 

games to be of recreational or amusement value only and not within 

statute condemning plays for “money or other valuable thing.” 

The foregoing amply demonstrates the basic considerations upon which the decisions in other states turn. A brief examination of the Texas cases should sufficiently indicatetheir consonance with the first line of authorities set out. I 

The first Texas~ case of significance is State v. Langford, 

e, considering free game “marble machines” under Article 

619c’V.P.C., which prohibits gaming devices where “money or anything of value is bet thereon.” Noting that the Arkansas Statutes 

are “similar in practically all respects” to the Texas Statutes, the 

court quotes at length that portion of the opinion in the Rankin case 

concluding that “property” and “valuable thing” are used synonymously and that “any valuable thing or ‘any repres.entative of any 

thing that is esteemed of value’ is ‘property’ within the meaning of 

the ,Arkansas Statutes.” The opinion also quotes at length the discussion in the Rankin case of the value of amusement places which 

“are among the most remunerative kinds of property,” [See complete 

quotation from the Rankin case at page 5, supra.] For this and other 

reasons,,the machines were held to be gaming devices. 

The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in Broaddus v. State. 

s, arso held free game marble machines to be in violation of 

Article 619, V.PiC. The court quotes verbatim the opinion in the 

Langford. case, including the extended quotation tbereirrfrom the 

Rankin case indicating the property characteristics of amusement. 

In holding that “pinball” machines awarding free games 

were used to bet “money or anything of value/ as prohibited by 

Article 619, the court in Hightower v. State, sa evidently with- 
Hon. Robert S. Calve& Page 15 (V-1271) 

out the benefit of the Broaddus case, also cited. the Rankin and 

Langford cases, as well as. others previously noted in that line of 

authorities. The citations to the Rankin case and Kraus v. City 

of Cleveland, z, are of particular signific~ance in that they 

hold free games to be “property.” 

The Court of Criminal Appeals followed the Broaddns 

case on its next consideration of the marble machines’in Martin 

v. State, 6~ where it also held that the trial court need not define a gambling device in its charge where the undisputed evidence 

showed that free plays are awarded by the machine. 

-To the same effect is Williams Mfg. Co. v. Prock; 86 F. 

Supp. 447 (N.D. Tex. 1949). citing the Hightower and Broaddus 

cases. The P&ock case was affirmed at i84 F.2d ‘30 

1950), the la-urt observing that to defeat a note given in payment for such free game pay-off devices it need only be shown: 

” 

. .r. that by the law of that State [Texas,] they were, 

when exhibited, gambling devices, and their ‘existence’ 

contrary to the public policy, as well as the specific law 

of that State.” 

Lastly, in this regard, we call attention to the attitude of 

the Texas Courts on lottery and similar schemes where, by a process of disassembling the stages of a gift enterprise, attempts 

have been made to classify the prizes given a,s “free” awards, and 

to remove the element of consideration from such schemes by socalled “free’ tickets and registrations for the drawing. As best 

illustrated by the cases cited in Hoffman v. State, 219 S.W.2d 539 

(Tax. Civ. App. 1949), the courts of this State do not hesitate to 

I: 

i. 

-hold ~that any&direct consideration, such..asadded..patronage to a 

1;. 

place of business, moving from any of the participants to then giver 

of the prize, will support the charges of conducting a lottery. The 

1 : 

analogy here is in the substance which the courts accord to other- 

[ 

wise intangible and elusive values in giving effect to the antigambling statutes. As said in a quotation in the Hoffman case of 

such a scheme, “there is an indirect consideration paid and received. * The Hoffman case is also in point on free games, being 

“things of value, “‘and cites the Langford and Hightower cases. 

The Texas cases, deal primarily with:Article 619,~V.P.C.. 

which says that any of the described devices shall be considered 

as used for gaming “if money or anything of value his bet thereon.” 
Hon. Robert S. Calvert, Page 16 (V-1271) 

In arriving at the determination that free games are “of value,” 

the Texas Courts have accepted and followed the reasoning of the 

Rankin case that they are “property” and that in gaming s,tatutes 

the word “property” is synonymous with “thing of value.” We 

cannot es,cape the Texas Court’s observation in State v. Lang.- 

ford, supra, that the Arkansas and Texas Statutes are “similar 

inpractically all respects” and the fact that the Texas Court 

quoted with approval these wo,rds from the Rankin cas,e: 

“Is the right to play a game obtained in the above 

manner ‘property’ or a ‘thing of value’ within the meaning of our statute prohibiting the setting up of gambling 

devices and gambling? We think it is.” 

These same words were recopied by the Texas Court of 

Criminal Appeals in Broaddus v. State, supra, and their use in 

that case led a former Texas Attorney General, in Opinion No. 

O-6431, May 22. 1’945, to conclude: 

“It would follow from this then that the right to 

play the machine is ‘Property’ or ‘a thing of value,’ 

therefore, ‘one who deposits a coin and receives only 

one play gets value received in the form of amusement, in like manner, as one who pays a fee to play 

a game of miniature golf or other game of amusement. . ..” 

It is proper to assume that the Legislature knew ~of these 

decisions by the Texas Courts and that the Legislature used the 

word “property” in the sense of its previous judicial interpretation 

in this State-~ .Smithv. Texas Co., 53 S.W.Zd 774 (Tex. Comm. App. 

1934); Blanscet v. Palo Duro Furniture Co., 68 S.W.2d 527 (Tex, 

Civ. App. 1934). 

Either “property” or “other valuable thing” would include 

free g,ames under these decisions, and it would be improper and 

unreasonable to assume that the Legislature, in selecting the word 

“property” in Section l(b), intended to adopt the restricted sense 

applied by a minority of the States rather than the broad sense applied by the Courts of Texas, the Attorney General of Texas, and 

the great weight of authority in the United States. 

I... 

:-The word “deliver” may suggest the idea that “property” 

awarded by prohibited devices is. intended to mean physical property. 
291 

Hon. Robert~S. Calvert. Page 17 (V-1271) 

Neither term is so restricted in the statute and both are very 

generally used in the broader sense. Webster’s New international Dictionary, 2d Ed., gives as the first definition of the~word 

‘deliver:” “To set free from restraint; to set at liberty; to release; to liberate, as from control; to free.” Other definitions 

given are: “To give or transfer; to yield possession or control 

of; to part with; . . . to surrender; . . . to communicate; impart.” 

The synonym given is “release.” Free games are delivered to 

the winner on marble and pinball machines by the automatic release of the mechanism for replay. 

If the Legislature had desired to limit the term “property” to physical property, it could have written the word “physical” into the definition. This it did not do, and we are not constrained to do so by interpretation. Such a construction would in 

effect hold that the Legislature intended to exempt free game 

pay-off machines from the new law although their only possible 

use is a penitentiary offense under Article 619, V.P.C., and their 

mere existence is declared *against public policy and a public 

nuisance” in Article 634, V.P.C. This would be an unreas,onable 

construction and one which conflicts with the public policy of this 

.State with reference to these precise machines. Statutes should ) 

be construed so as to harmonize with the public policy of the State 

as expressed in other statutes relating to the same type of gaming devices. McBride v. Clayton, 140 Tex. 71, 166 S.W.2d 125 

(1942); Dolan v. Walker, 121 Tex. 361, 49 S.W.2d 695 (1932);Freels 

vi Walker, 26 S.W.2d 627 (Tex. Comm. App. 1930). In the McBride 

case the court quoted the following language from 59 C-J.. p. 1038, 

Ei 616: 

“All statutes are presumed to be enacted by the 

legislature with full knowledge of the existing condition 

of the law and with reference to it. They are therefore 

to be construed in connection and in harmony with the 

existing law, and as a part of a general and uniform 

system of jurisprudence, and their meaning and effect 

is to be determined in connection, not only with the common law and the constitution, but also with reference to 

other statutes and the decisions of the courts.” 

Therefore, we conclude that the Legislature used the 

word “property” in the broad sense which includes free games, 

and that no other words were necessary either in Section l(a) or 

l(b) to bring free games within the definition of a slot machine. 
292 Hon. Robert S. Calvert, Page 18 (V-1271) 

We have been submitted very able briefs by interested 

attorneys who contend that a contrary interpretation is proper 

because they say *other valuable thing ” is the term which covers 

free games and that it was used in Section l(a) and purposely 

omitted from l(b). This entire argument is based upon the erroneous assumption that “valuable thing” is synonymous with 

“free games” and used in Section l(a) for the sole pu.rpose of 

covering free games. As heretofore shown, the term ‘property” 

in l(a) and, l(b) is broad enough to cover frees games. The addition of the term “other valuable thing” in Section l(a) must have 

been for the purpose of covering something other than free games. 

The devices covered by l(a),and commonly known as the one-arm 

or console slot machines, do not ordinarily pay off in free games. 

The term “other valuable thing” might have been placed in Section l(a) to make certain that it covered slot machines which delivered any conceivable, prize other than money, tokens, free games 

and merchandise, or in an attempt to prevent their existence and 

possession for amusement play even when no prize of any nature 

is awarded. Whatever the reason, we cannot say that it was solely 

for the purpose of preventing payment of free games and that its 

inclusion in l(a) and omission in l(b) was intentional on the part of 

the Legislature for the purpose of condemning free game prizes on 

machines described in l(s) and exempting them from condemnation 

as prizes on machines described in l(b). 

The briefs submitted by counsel who urge the contrary 

view insist that the definitions in the Texas Act are borrowed from 

the Federal Anti-Slot Machine Act [P.L. 906. Elst Congress of the 

United States,19501 except for the addition of “other thing of value” 

in Section l(a); that the Federal Act omitted the words “other thing 

of value” and used only ‘“money or property” so as to exclude free 

game machines from the Federal law; that the history of the Federal 

Act, as shown by the House Committee hearings and report, shows 

that “money or property” was not intended to cover free game payoff machines; that in borrowing the definitions of the Federal Act 

the Texas Legislature must be presumed to have intended the term 

to mean the same as Congress intended in the Federal Act; and that 

by adding “other valuable thing ” in Section l(a) and omitting it in 

l(b) the Texas Legislature intentionally excluded free game pay-off 

machines from H.B. 326. 

There are many reasons why we cannot give controlling effect to this aid in interpreting legislative intent. In the first place. 

we do not~believe that the wording of the Texas Statute is ambiguous so 
. 

293 

Honr RobertS. Calvert; Page 19 (V-1271) 

as to require the application of this. aid in its construction. Even 

so, the rule-that a legislative act borrowed or adopted from the 

laws of another jurisdiction will ordinarily be given the same construction in Texas that it had previously received in the jurisdiction from which it was borrowed, applies only when there has been 

previous judicial interpretation of the law in the other jurisdiction. 

We know of no such interpretation of the terms ‘money or property” 

in Public Law 906. Even when conditions of the rule have been met, 

the rule is a mere aid in legislative interpretation and is by no means 

binding or conclusive. Snoddy V. Cage, 5 Tex. 106 (1849); Paragon 

Oil Syndicate v. Rhoades Drilling Co., 277 S.W. 1036 (Tex. Comm. 

App. 1925). When there are conflicting court decisions in other 

jurisdictions, Texas Courts are free to adopt a reasonable construction of the meaning of the terms in question. Howth v. J., I. 

,.Case Threshing Machine Co., 280 S.W. 238 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926, error ref.). 

Secondly, in no instance have we found the rule applied 

when the courts of the borrowing state have previously given a contrary interpretation and meaning to the words used in the borrowed 

phrase or sentence. A State Legislature is presumed to know of 

the decisions ,9f its own courts and ~to intend the meaning previously 

attributed by them to the same words in similar legislation. Smith 

.v. Texas Co.,, .s; Blanscet v. Palo Duro, supra. Further, the 

rule of applying a foreign meaning to borrowed phrases never applies when suah constiuction is’contrarv to the spirit and. nolicv of 

the jurisprudence of Texas. Paragon Oil Syndicate v. Rhoides, supra; Edwards.hffg. Co. v. Souper 

Civ. App. 1926’):. It is certain that the construction placed on the 

terms of the Federal Act (restricted use of the word ‘property” 

* so as to exclude free game~pay-off marble and pinball machines) is 

contrary to the spirit and policy of Texas law on the subject of gaming. See Articles 619 and-634, V.P.C.; State v. Langford. supra; 

Broaddus v. State, SE, Hightower v. State, supra; Martin v. State, 

supra; and Prock v. Williams Mfg. Co., 184 F.2d 307 (C.C.A. 5th 

1950). 

Finally, there are other aids to statutory construction of 

equal standing and of far more importance in this instance in determining the intention of the Legislature. These include the public 

policy of the State with reference to the subject matter, which has 

already been discussed, the old law. the evils sought to be cured, 

and the legislative history of the particular Act under consideration. 

The old law, which was not repealed, classifies free game pay-off 
294 

Hon. Robert S. Calvert, Page 20 (V-1271) 

machines with all other gaming devices as unlawful and against 

public policy in Texas. The evil sought to be cured by H. B. 326 

is the mere possession or existence of “illegal gaming devices 

. . . kept and operated in this State and taking money from school 

children and others in large sums . . . and the fact that present 

laws are not adequate to suppress their profitable operation . . . .” 

.,I 

Sec. 9, H.B. 326 (Emergency Clause). ;;g 

-c: 

It is a matter of common knowledge from the public press Y$; 

and public statements of those sponsoring H.B. 326, and the com- .i_ 

panion Senate Bill (S.B. 323), that free game marble and pinball ‘Tt 

machines were one of the evils intended to be more effectively sup- ;;i 

pressed by the Act. While H.B. 326 was pending before its passage ~7; 

by either House, one of its authors, Representative James B. Adarns,:&~: 

,made a public speech explaining the purpose and scope of the pro- .,$ 

posed law to a conference of the State’s prosecuting attorne s called ‘>y~ 

by the Attorney General of Texas in Austin on March 30-31. 3 In the :c 

course of his explanation of the evils proposed to be remedied by H. ‘MY 

~B. 326, Mr. Adams said: ,,f 

,,;; 

“Then under section (b) we go down and take in any 

machine or mechanical device manufactured or adapted 

to operate by means of the insertion of a coin, token, or 

other object, and designed, manufactured, or adapted so 

that when operated it may deliver, as the result of an application of an element of chance, any money or property. 

Well, as you know, our Court of Criminal Appeals has held 

that free plays on a five-ball pinball machine does-con&itute something of value and, therefore, under our present 

law every five-ball pinball machine placed in operation in 

youid~rugstores, your bus stations, and places like that, 

they do constitute a violation of our present gaming laws. 

“” j. 

“Many people said, ‘Well, they are just an amusement 

device.’ But we felt otherwise on that; and. as a result of 

studying the’crime reports of the different crime commissions, we have had it pointed out to us time and time again 

where pinball machines, so-called harmless amusement devices only, are utilized for opening up closed territory to 

2/ Proc$edings of the Attorney General’s Conference of 

Dist&t and. County Attorneys on Organized Crime, 1951, pp. 

58-63. 
. -- 

Hon. Robert S. Calve& Page 21 (V-1271) 

295 

gambling. They start off with those, and then through 

a steady process they get the people acclimated to gaming. Then they can bring in their regular one-armed 

bandits and consoles. 

~ *Now under this law. under Section (2) if they take 

th:counting devices off of the machines -- every.slot 

machine manufacturer since 1946, as most of you know. 

has had two little devices under the machine. One of 

them, every time you win a free play. registers. You 

have a button on the left which is your re-play button. 

Every time you push that button it registers on one of 

the counters ovei here. Then when a man pays you off, 

it has a sepagate counter over here. If you just re-play 

it, the re-plays show on this one. But if it pays you off, 

he reaches under the back at another button, presses it, 

and it registers on an automatic counter. Therefore,when 

the local coin machine operator comes around to his establishment, they raise up the machine and look at the 

counter and see how many games have been won on the 

machine. Then, if he is in the habit of paying off his customers when they win, they look at this other counter and 

they can determine just how much this man paid out in 

cash. 

“Well, if they take all those off and fix the five-ball 

pinball machines where they do not show a re-play, -- : 

where after you get so many thousands in score on the 

machine ,it shows ‘a re-play up on the board, -- well, if 

they take those devices off, then they would not come under 

then terms of this act. However, if they do go that far, then 

you can rest assured that it is an amusement device because a man has to put a nickel in it every time he plays 

it. And also, even if the man does say, ‘Well, if you get so 

many thousand I will pay off over the counter,’ you can eliminate about 90 per cent of the gambling, unless the man owns 

the machine. No operator is going to trust the local drugstore 

owner or local beer joint operator to tell him how much he 

paid out because, as we have been previously shown, there 

is no honor among thieves; and if they don’t have that automatic element of being able to tell exactly how much was 

paid off, well.then we will eliminate the gaming aspects from 

these amusement-only machines.” 

Both the evils to be remedied by and the history of H.B. 

326 vary greatly from those of the Federal law. The Federal author 
Hon. Robert S. Calvert, Page 22 (V-1271) 

ities and most of the Federal courts have not considered free game 

machines an evil to be eliminated. They do not consider free games 

to be either “property” or ‘a thing of value.“. The history of Public 

Law 906 shows that machines awarding free games or amusement 

only were to be excluded from the use of the words ‘money or property. m In Texas it was quits different, Free games have long been 

considered “property” or “a thing of value” and free game machines 

have been condemned as gaming devices and against public policy. 

The history of H.B. 326 in the Texas Legislature shows that free 

game machines were intended to, be included rather than excluded 

from the Act. The best recorded evidence of this fact is the defeat 

of an amendment on the floor of the House which had as its purpose 

the exemption of certain free game machines from Section l(b) of 

the Act. 

Representative Beno Tufares offered the amendment to 

Section l,(b) as follows: 

“Amend HiB. 326, line 34, after ‘property’; and before ‘or’ by inserting the following: ‘except pinball machins:of 5 balls which allow free games up to 10. band free 

games only.’ n3 

This amendment was tabled by a vote of 104 to 28. It is 

strong evidence that the Legislature considered the word “property” 

as including free games and that there was no desire ‘to exempt any 

type of free game machines. It~has been argued that it is just as 

reasonable to conclude that free game machines were already excluded and the amendment was therefore unnecessary. To be sure 

that our interpretation is not in conflict with what actually transpired on the floor of the Houses in connection with this amendment, 

we have obtained statements from the author of the amendment, 

Representative T.ufares, and from Representative Adams, who. as 

author of H.B.. 326, moved to table the Tufares amendment. Evidence as to what was said in legislative debates by sponsors of a 

bill is sometimes admissible to aid in construction of an ambiguous statute.. Ex parts Peed,, 170 S.W.,749 (Tex. Grim. App. 1914). 

.Since this aid is being used here only for the purpose of countering arguments based upon similar evidence {statements made in 

Congressional Committees] as to the intent of Congress’ in Public 

Law 906, we feel free to consider and quote the written statement 

2/ ,House Journal, 52nd Legislatur;, page 1369. 
Hon. Robert S. Calve& Page 23 (V-1271) 

of Mr. Tufares, affirmed by Mr. Adams, as follows: 

“Representative Jimmie Adams, the author of 

the bill, in explaining the purpose and object of the act 

and what was covered thereby, said on the floor of the 

House that it would make unlawful all slot machines, 

marble tables and pinball tables which paid off in mon-. 

ey, free games, or any other type of property. He said 

the definition of Section l(b) covered ‘free game’ machines because the Texas courts had held- any token or 

free game to be property under the Texas gambling flaws. 

He said that ‘five,ball’ marble machines which paid’off 

in free games would’be prohibited under this bill; Con-~ 

sidering a’ five ball marble table to be” a; game. of skiii” ~ 

rather than a game of chance. I offered the amendment. 

reported in the Journal excluding those that offered~ up 

to 10 free games. I told the House in debate that my 

amendment was’ necessary to exclude, five ball ‘free 

game’ marble tables’~ (up to 10 free games) from the a& ” 

upder consideration.~ No one made ‘any.argument that 

free game machines’werealready excluded under ‘then ’ ,. ., 

bill,and no one disputed the author’s statement that they. 

would come under the act as worded. The author did say 

that if the free game device was eliminated from the five 

ball machines, they could still be possessed and operated. 

Rep. Adams opposed my amendment with the argument on 

the floor that permissionof 10 free games on marble tables .might lead to conversion of slot machines to .that 

method of operation, and my amendment was defeated.” 

Consideration of the suggested aids in construction of ambiguous statutes merely confirms our interpretation of the plain 

words of the statute.itself;~ 

You are therefore advised that coin-operated pinball or 

marble machines which are designed, manufactured or adapted, ~’ 

so that when operated they may deliver to the winner, as a result of the application of an element of chance, money, free games, 

or other~property are included within the provisions and penalties 

set out in H.B. 326. :. 

SUMMARY 

The keeping or’exhibition of coin-operated pinball 
298 Hon.. Robert S. Calvert, Page 24 (V-1271) 

or marble machines which pay off the winners automatically in money or free games have been held by 

the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals to be in violation 

of Article 619,.V.P.C.. and therefore a felony offense. 

Under Article.634, V.P.C.. they are declared to be 

against the public policy and a public nuisance, Williams 

Mfg. Co. v. Prock, 184 F.2d 307 (U.S. Ct. App., 5th Cir. 

1950). 

The manufacture, ownership, transportation, possession, etc., of coin-operated pinball or marble machines 

which are designed, manufactured or adapted so as to 

deliver to the winner, as a result of the application of an 

element of chance, money, free games, or any other. 

property, are prohibited by H.B. 326, 52nd Legislature, 

1951 (Art. 642a. V.B.C.). 

The term “property” is used in Section l(b) of H.B. 

326 (Art. 642a, V.P,C.) in its broad sense so as to include free games, this construction being in accord with 

~Texas court decisions ,and the weight of authority in other 

jurisdictions. 

Yoys very truly, 

PRICE DANIEL 

Assistants 

NMcD/JF J/mf 

~Considered and approved in conference this 5th day of 

September, 1951. 

Attorney General