J-S19035-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

IN RE: K.S., JR., A MINOR

APPEAL OF: K.S., SR., FATHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 366 MDA 2023

Appeal from the Decree Entered February 23, 2023

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lycoming County 

Orphans' Court at No(s): 2022-6820

IN RE: L.S., A MINOR

APPEAL OF: K.S., SR., FATHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 367 MDA 2023

Appeal from the Decree Entered February 23, 2023

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lycoming County 

Orphans' Court at No(s): 2022-6821

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., McLAUGHLIN, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY SULLIVAN, J.: FILED: SEPTEMBER 6, 2023

K.S., Sr. (“Father”) appeals from the decrees granting the petitions to 

involuntarily terminate his parental rights to his children, K.S., Jr. (“K.S.”) and 

L.S. (“L.S.”), a son and a daughter both born in February 2019.

1

 After careful 

____________________________________________

1 By separate decrees on the same date, the Orphans’ Court involuntarily 

terminated the parental rights of C.M. (“Mother”). Mother did not appeal, and 

she is not a party to Father’s appeals. This Court consolidated Father’s appeals.
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review, we affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings

consistent with this memorandum.

As summarized by the Orphans’ Court the relevant facts and procedural 

history are as follows:

The [Lycoming County Children and Youth Services (“the 

Agency”)] first became involved with the family in April of 2021, 

when [K.S. and L.S. (“the children”)] were seen playing alone on 

the playground after getting out of the home. On April 20, 2021, 

the children were later seen playing near and hanging out of an 

open 2nd story window, and were found home alone when Agency 

workers responded. At that time there was a bathtub in the home 

that was overflowing with water.[2] Mother claimed that Father 

was supposed to be in charge of the children at the time. . . .

Father testified that Mother asked him to drive her to the store 

and he assumed Mother’s friend was in the home and would be 

responsible for the children. Father also testified, in an apparently 

conflicting manner, that he was contacted about this incident and 

when he arrived at the scene Mother asked him to lie and say he

was there the entire time but stepped out to take the trash 

outside. A safety plan was implemented on June 2, 2021, wherein 

the paternal grandmother was to stay in the home and Mother 

was not to have unsupervised contact with the children. On July 

1, 2021, Mother violated the safety plan by taking the children to 

Cumberland County without permission and without a supervisor

named on the safety plan. On that date, the Agency was verbally 

granted emergency custody of the children.

A Shelter Care hearing was held on July 2, 2021. Both 

parents attended. Following the hearing, the [c]ourt found that 

sufficient evidence was present to prove that return of the 

[children] to the home of the parents was not in the best interest 

of the [children]. Legal and physical custody of the [children]

____________________________________________

2 The children were then two years old.
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remained with the Agency and placement of the [children]

remained in Foster Care.[3]

A Dependency hearing was held on July 21, 2021, after 

which the [c]ourt adjudicated the [children] dependent. As the 

[c]ourt found that allowing the [children] to be returned to either 

parent’s home would be contrary to the [children]’s welfare, legal 

and physical custody w[ere] ordered to remain with the Agency. 

The [c]ourt noted that both parents should work with their 

Outreach worker and caseworker, and comply with the Family 

Service Plan. The parents were specifically ordered to follow 

through with any services or counseling offered with regard to 

their relationship as there was a history of domestic violence.[4]

A permanency review was held on December 8, 2021.[5] The 

[c]ourt noted that there had been minimal compliance with the 

permanency plan on the part of Mother, in that she and Father 

were in an on again/off again relationship but she was not 

receiving domestic violence treatment. . . . Father was 

incarcerated for the majority of this review period and the [c]ourt 

found him to have no compliance with the permanency plan. 

Father had made no progress toward alleviating the circumstances 

which necessitated placement as he was not participating in 

domestic violence counseling. Father was released from 

incarceration on November 10, 2021, and had made no effort to 

resume visits with the children at the time of the permanency 

review. His attendance rate prior to his incarceration was 

approximately 50%. In its [o]rder, the [c]ourt strongly 

emphasized the need for each parent to participate in counseling 

or other program to address the domestic violence that was 

prevalent in their relationship. Following the hearing, the [c]ourt 

reaffirmed dependency and the [children] remained in the legal 

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3 The court wrote separate, virtually identical opinions concerning K.S. and L.S. 

We cite to the court’s opinions in the singular and refer to the children 

collectively.

4 Mother sought a Protection from Abuse order against Father in August 2019 

but it was dismissed when she failed to pursue it. See N.T., 2/8/23, at 48. 

5 The court appointed the children’s dependency Guardian ad litem as the 

children’s termination of parental rights counsel and found no conflict in the 

dual representation. See Orders, 10/26/22.
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and physical custody of the Agency with continued placement in 

the foster care home.

On March 21, 2022, the [c]ourt granted the Agency’s Motion 

to Modify the [Children’s] Placement, as the [foster] parents 

relocated and were no longer able to be a resource for the 

[children]. A permanency review hearing was held on March 25, 

2022. The [c]ourt found that there had been moderate 

compliance with the permanency plan by both Mother and Father. 

. . . Father was residing with his sister and unemployed at the 

time of the review. Father was consistently late for his visits but 

did attend most of his visits and they reportedly went well. . . . 

[F]ather was found to have made moderate progress toward[]

alleviating the circumstances which necessitated the original 

placement. Following the hearing, the [c]ourt reaffirmed 

dependency and legal and physical custody of the [children]

remained with the Agency for continued placement in the current 

foster home.

A permanency review was held on July 20, 2022. . . . Father 

was found to have minimal compliance with the permanency plan 

in that he continued to reside with his sister instead of obtaining 

independent housing and he changed jobs several times. Father 

was not meeting with Outreach Services and only attended 45% 

of his visits. Father chose not to engage in domestic violence 

counseling because he and Mother were no longer in a 

relationship. The [c]ourt found that both Mother and Father had 

made minimal progress toward alleviating the circumstances 

which necessitated the original placement. The [c]ourt noted [its]

concern with the progress made by Mother and Father in obtaining 

and maintaining suitable housing, and emphasized the need for 

both Mother and Father to act with urgency to obtain and maintain 

suitable housing and employment to be able to support the needs 

of the children, as the children had been in placement for over a 

year. Both parents requested community visits which the [c]ourt 

directed the [A]gency to arrange if that parent attended at least 

90% of his or her visits over the following four weeks. Following 

the hearing, the [c]ourt reaffirmed dependency and legal and 

physical custody of the [children] remained with the Agency for 

continued placement in the current foster home. On August 5, 

2022, the [c]ourt granted the Agency’s Motion to Modify the 
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[Children’s] Placement, as the current resource parents were no 

longer able to be a resource for the [children].

[6]

A permanency review hearing was held on October 14, 

2022. . . . Father had no compliance with the permanency plan, 

in that he was not employed and did not have independent 

housing. Father did not participate in any Outreach Services or 

any type of counseling or domestic violence treatment. Father 

attended only 63% of his visits during the review period, and was 

frequently late when he did attend. Neither parent met the 90% 

attendance goal necessary to progress to community visits. The 

[c]ourt found that Mother and Father made no progress toward 

alleviating the circumstances which necessitated the original 

placement. . . . Following the hearing, the [c]ourt reaffirmed 

dependency and legal and physical custody of the [children]

remained with the Agency for continued placement in the current 

foster home. The [c]ourt approved another Petition for 

Modification of the [Children’s] Placement on October 14, 2022, 

which resulted in the fourth resource home[7] since the [children 

were] placed in the legal and physical custody of the Agency.

Orphans’ Court Opinion, 2/23/23, at 1-6. 

The court conducted a hearing on the Agency’s involuntary termination 

petitions in February 2023. Father’s outreach caseworker, Cory Burkholder, 

testified that after Father’s incarceration from August to November 2021, 

Father did not resume visits to the children until the court ordered him to do 

so in December 2021. See N.T., 2/8/23, at 11-13; see also id. at 30-32. 

Burkholder further testified that Father’s compliance with visitation and 

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6 The Agency filed petitions seeking involuntary termination of Father’s and 

Mother’s parental rights based on 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and 

(b). See Petition, 9/9/22.

7 The court used the terms “foster home” and “resource home” 

interchangeably.
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participation with parenting “tailed off” after he and Mother became estranged, 

when the children were in placement. See id. at 12-13. Father could not 

maintain consistent employment, had several jobs for short time periods, and 

lived primarily with his sister. See id. at 13-15.8 Father did complete the 

parenting program included in his goals. See id. at 17.

Agency visitation caseworker Heather Goodbrod (“Goodbrod”) testified 

that in April 2022 Father was placed on “call-in status” when he failed to appear 

or call to cancel three scheduled visits. Because Father failed to achieve the 

court’s 90% visitation goal, he did not progress to community visits with the 

children and his twice-weekly, one-hour visits remained closely observed or 

supervised at the time of the hearing. See id. at 19, 26-27, 30, 32, 36. 

Goodbrod testified that Father was loving with the children but frequently late 

for visits and did not always change the children’s diapers without being 

prompted to do so, once declaring, “My visit is over. I don’t need to do that.” 

See id. at 34, 39-40. Goodbrod testified that in his visits in the six months 

before the February 2023 hearing, Father sat on the sofa and allowed the 

children to play around him without interacting. See id. at 34-35, 37-38. On 

another occasion, he declined L.S.’s request to be picked up and told her,

“You’ll get me sick.” See id. at 35, 42. Goodbrod had to pick L.S. up because 

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8 Father obtained an apartment in late December 2022 or early January 2023. 

See N.T. 2/8/23, at 16.
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the child was crying so heavily to the point she seemed about to make herself 

sick. See id. 

Pompey Suggs (“Suggs”), a caseworker with the Agency, testified that 

Father had six indicated reports of child abuse, including a report of indecent 

sexual assault of a child. See id. at 44-45, 75-78, 84. Suggs testified the 

Agency was concerned about Mother’s and Father’s use of physical discipline 

on the children and domestic violence counseling was added to the family 

service plan. See id. at 50, 91-92. Suggs testified that the court directed 

Father and Mother to get counseling to address domestic violence concerns, 

but Father was discharged after he attended only two sessions that were 

provided to him at no cost. See id. at 59-60, 64-65, 92, 100, 114-17. Suggs 

testified that Father said he did not need counseling because he was not going

to reconcile with Mother. See id. at 64, 77-78. Suggs testified that Father did 

not send the children any letters or birthday or Christmas presents. See id. 

at 78, 90. Suggs testified that Father did not make himself available for a 

bonding assessment and did not set up a time for the assessment even after 

Suggs provided him the information. Although Father testified he did not 

receive mail or otherwise know about the assessment, he had received, and 

replied to, other mail from Suggs. See id. at 79-81, 91, 93, 128-29. 

The resource mother, with whom the children had been living since 

October 2022, testified that she and her husband took care of all the children’s 

physical and emotional needs, the children were very fond of her ten-year-old 
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daughter, were integrated into Halloween, Thanksgiving, and Christmas family 

activities, and experienced an emotional toll from visits with Father. See id. 

at 54-58. She also testified she and her husband love the children very much 

and were prepared to adopt them if the court terminated Father’s and Mother’s 

parental rights. See id.

Father testified that he had lied on Mother’s behalf and assumed

responsibility for the April 2021 incident, his mother’s death in March 2022 

delayed his ability to reclaim his children and impaired his ability to engage in 

domestic violence counseling seven month later, and L.S. looked malnourished 

for months while with the foster family. See id. at 94-103, 106-114, 125-28, 

137. Father claimed that the court previously supported his attempts to 

concentrate on grief counseling for his mother’s death rather than domestic 

violence counseling. See id. at 115-16. He claimed he later tried to find 

domestic violence counseling but could not. See id. at 117-18. He testified 

that he was not sure why it took thirteen months from his release from prison 

to get his own residence. See id. at 122-23. He also testified that he had a 

new job as of October 2022 and a new apartment, although he had no plans 

for daycare if reunified with the children. See id. Father was not sure why he 

attended only two of the children’s medical and dental visits. See id. at 104-

05. 

By Opinions and Decrees dated February 22, 2023, the court terminated 

Father’s parental rights to K.S. and L.S. Father timely appealed and complied 
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with Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b). The Orphans’ Court thereafter

incorporated its prior opinions and orders as its Rule 1925(a) opinion.

On appeal, Father presents the following issues for our review:

1. The court erred in terminating the parental rights of [Father] 

pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 2511(a)(1) when [Father] has 

not failed to perform parental duties of a period of at least six 

months and made every effort to have a relationship with his 

child.

2. The court erred in terminating the parental rights of [Father] 

pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 2511(a)(2) when there was 

insufficient evidence that the child was without essential 

parental care, control or subsistence necessary and causes of 

the incapacity cannot or will not be remedied as [Father] made 

substantial progress to remedy the incapacity and provide the 

child with essential parent[al] care, control and subsistence 

necessary.

3. The court erred in terminating the parental rights of [Father] 

pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 2511(a)(5) in finding that (1) the 

child has been removed from parental care for at least six 

months; (2) the conditions which led to removal or placement 

of the child continue[] to exist; (3) and termination would best 

serve the needs and welfare of the child when [Father] has 

remedied the conditions and the needs and welfare of the child 

would not be best served by termination.

4. The court erred in terminating the parental rights of [Father] 

pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 2511(a)(8) in finding that [(1)] 

the child has been removed from parental care for twelve 

months or more from the date of removal; (2) the conditions 

which led to removal or placement of the child continue[] to 

exist and termination would best serve the needs and welfare 

of the child when [Father] has remedied the conditions and 

the needs and welfare of the child would not be best served 

by termination.

5. The court erred in terminating the parental rights of [Father] 

pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 2511(b), when there is a healthy 

bond between the child and [Father] which would be traumatic 
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if broken and the best interests of the child would not be 

served by termination.

See Father’s Brief at 7-8. 

Father’s issues implicate the involuntary termination of parental rights. 

Pennsylvania’s Adoption Act (“the Act”) governs involuntary termination of 

parental rights proceedings. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2101-2938. We review 

involuntary termination orders for an abuse of discretion, which requires an 

error of law or a showing of manifest unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, 

bias, or ill-will. See In re Adoption of L.A.K., 265 A.3d 580, 591 (Pa. 2021) 

(citation omitted). In applying this standard, an appellate court must accept 

the trial court’s findings of fact and credibility determinations if supported by 

the record. See Interest of S.K.L.R., 256 A.3d 1108, 1123 (Pa. 2021); see 

also In re Adoption of C.M., 255 A.3d 343, 358 (Pa. 2021). This standard 

“reflects the deference we pay to trial courts, who often observe the parties 

first-hand across multiple hearings.” In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 

830 (Pa. 2012).

In considering a petition to terminate parental rights, a court must 

balance the parent’s fundamental right “to make decisions concerning the care, 

custody, and control” of his or her child with the “child’s essential needs for a 

parent’s care, protection, and support.” See C.M., 255 A.3d at 358. 

Termination of parental rights can have “significant and permanent 

consequences for both the parent and child.” L.A.K., 265 A.3d at 591. 

Pennsylvania law requires the moving party to establish the statutory grounds 
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by clear and convincing evidence, evidence that is so “clear, direct, weighty, 

and convincing as to enable a trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without 

hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” Interest of M.E., 283 

A.3d 820, 830 (Pa. Super. 2022). We remain mindful that “a parent’s basic 

constitutional right to the custody and rearing of [his] child is converted, upon 

the failure to fulfill [his] parental duties, to the child’s right to have proper 

parenting and fulfillment of his or her potential in a permanent, healthy, safe 

environment.” In re B., N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 856 (Pa. Super. 2004).

Here, the Orphans’ Court terminated Father’s parental rights to the 

children pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). To 

affirm the decree, we need only agree with the court’s decision as to any one 

section of 2511(a), along with subsection (b). See In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 

380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc). Accordingly, we analyze the court’s 

termination decree pursuant to section 2511(a)(8) and (b), which provide as 

follows:

(a) General rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child 

may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the 

following grounds:

* * * *

(8) The child has been removed from the care of the 

parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement 

with an agency, 12 months or more have elapsed from 

the date of removal or placement, the conditions which 

led to the removal or placement of the child continue 

to exist and termination of parental rights would best 

serve the needs and welfare of the child.

* * * *
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(b) Other considerations.—The court in terminating the rights 

of a parent shall give primary consideration to the 

developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of 

the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated 

solely on the basis of environmental factors such as 

inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and 

medical care if found to be beyond the control of the parent. 

With respect to any petition filed pursuant to subsection 

(a)(1), (6), or (8), the court shall not consider any efforts 

by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein 

which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of 

the filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(8), (b).

To satisfy section 2511(a)(8), the petitioner must establish three 

elements: (1) the child has been removed from the care of the parent for at 

least 12 months; (2) the conditions which led to the removal or placement of 

the child still exist; and (3) termination of parental rights would best serve the 

needs and welfare of the child. See In re Adoption of J.N.M., 177 A.3d 937, 

943 (Pa. Super. 2018). This section focuses on the conduct of the parent. See 

In re C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1004 (Pa. Super. 2008) (en banc). Although we 

have recognized that the application of Section 2511(a)(8) may seem harsh 

when a parent has begun efforts to resolve the problems that had led to the 

removal of a child, we are cognizant that the statute implicitly recognizes “that 

a child’s life cannot be held in abeyance while a parent attempts to attain the 

maturity necessary to assume parenting responsibilities. The court cannot and 

will not subordinate indefinitely a child’s need for permanence and stability to 

a parent’s claims of progress and hope for the future.” In re Adoption of 

R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502, 513 (Pa. Super. 2006); see also id. at 511-12 (holding 
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that a parent’s argument that there was a reasonable probability she could 

remedy the conditions that led to a child’s removal from her care is irrelevant 

under subsection (a)(8)).

Father asserts with respect to subsection (a)(8)9that the dispute in this 

case centers on whether the conditions which led to removal or placement still

exist and cannot or will not be remedied by Father. He asserts that he has 

remedied those conditions and substantially completed his goals, and his 

domestic violence counseling is moot. Without offering any argument, he 

asserts that termination would not serve the needs and welfare of the children.

The Orphans’ Court concluded that sufficient evidence established 

subsection (a)(8) because the children have been in the legal and physical 

custody of the Agency since July 2021, Father had moderate compliance in one 

review period and minimal or no compliance in the other three, Father 

struggled to maintain consistent employment, Father was unable to articulate 

specific reasons for his delay in achieving his reunification goals, and Father

failed to address his domestic violence issues, “which was a primary factor 

leading to the removal of the [children] from the home and placement in foster 

care.” See Orphans’ Court Opinion, 2/23/23, at 16. In finding that termination 

best served the needs of the children, the court noted that Father took fifteen 

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9 Father and the Orphans’ Court combine their analyses of subsections (a)(5) 

and (a)(8). See Father’s Brief at 25-28; Orphans’ Court Opinion, 2/23/23, at 

14-17.
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months to obtain steady employment and almost eighteen months to obtain 

independent housing while leaving the care of children’s physical and emotional 

needs to be met by multiple foster families. See Orphans’ Court Opinion, 

2/23/23, at 16-17.10 The court also highlighted the willingness of the current 

foster family, with whom the children had lived for four months, to give the 

children permanency. See id.

We discern no error of law or abuse of discretion in the Orphans’ Court’s 

determination. At the time the Agency filed the termination petition in 

September 2022, the children had been removed from the parents’ care, at 

least twelve months had elapsed, the conditions that led to placement (Father’s 

housing, employment, and domestic violence concerns) continued to exist, and 

Father, based on his conduct, did not demonstrate a present ability to meet 

the children’s needs and welfare, thereby demonstrating that termination 

would best serve the children’s needs and welfare. See J.N.M., 177 A.3d at

943.

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Father’s second issue implicates the best interest of the children. Section 

2511(b) requires a separate consideration of whether termination will meet the 

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10 The court’s proper focus was on Father’s and Mother’s pre-petition conduct. 

See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b) (stating that in assessing a petition filed under 

subsection (a)(8), the court shall not consider a parent’s remedial measures 

initiated after receipt of notice of the filing of the petition).

11 Father improperly relies on his post-petition conduct when asserting that he 

demonstrated conditions supporting reunification. See n.9.
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child’s needs and welfare. See In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1121 (Pa. Super. 

2010). The Supreme Court has recently re-emphasized that pursuant to 

section 2511(b) courts “shall give primary consideration to the developmental, 

physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. . .. This of course 

requires the court to focus on the child and consider all three categories of 

need and welfare.” Interest of K.T., 296 A.3d 1085, 1105 (Pa. 2023). K.T.

specifically directs courts to “consider the matter from the child’s 

perspective, placing her developmental, physical, and emotional welfare 

above concerns for the parent.” Id. (citation omitted; emphasis in 

original). The child’s emotional needs and welfare include intangibles, such as 

love, comfort, security, and stability. See T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 

2013).12 

When it considers the parental bond, the court must examine whether 

termination of parental rights “will destroy a necessary and beneficial 

relationship, thereby causing a child to suffer extreme emotional 

consequences”. K.T., 296 A.3d at 1110 (quotation marks and citation 

omitted). That focus enables a court to properly prioritize the child’s needs:

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12 Courts considering an involuntary termination petition “must keep the ticking 

clock of childhood ever in mind. Children are young for a scant number of 

years, and we have an obligation to see to their healthy development quickly.” 

K.T., 296 A.3d at 1108 (citation omitted; emphasis in original) (also noting 

that T.S.M. advised courts to move toward an alternative permanent home 

when it is clear the parent will be unable to provide for the child’s basic needs 

in the near future, so as not to impair the bond with pre-adoptive parents).
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[B]y evaluating the impact of severance to determine if it will 

impose more than an adverse or detrimental impact, courts 

correctly refine their focus on the child’s development and mental 

and emotional health rather than considering only the child’s 

“feelings” or “affection” for the parent, which even badly abused 

and neglected children will retain.

Id. The subsection (b) inquiry must consider not only the parental bond, if 

any, but also the child’s need for permanency, the length of time in foster 

care, whether the child is in a foster home and bonded with foster parents, 

and whether the foster home meets the child’s developmental, physical, and 

emotional needs, including intangible ones. See K.T., 296 A.3d at 1106. 

With respect to section 2511(b), Father argues that he has a bond with 

children and the breaking of that bond would be traumatic, he did not 

intentionally fail to comply with the bonding assessment, and the children have 

not been with current foster family long enough to have developed a parental 

bond with them.

The court rejected Father’s claim because Father had a poor attendance 

rate of visits with the children, and the court found termination of parental 

rights would not cause irreparable harm to the children because the children 

had “clearly bonded with the resource parents.” See Orphans’ Court Opinion, 

2/23/23, at 18-19.

Following our review, we conclude that the Orphans’ Court abused its 

discretion when rendering its involuntary termination decision without properly

considering the 2511(b) factors which the Supreme Court highlighted in K.T. 

At the outset, the record fails to disclose any meaningful testimony concerning 
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the nature of the bond between the children and Father or the effects of 

termination on the children. The Agency’s witnesses described Father’s 

declining interest in the children during visits in the six months before the 

hearing but did not elicit any evidence concerning the child-parent bond, 

beyond some sense of the children’s engagement during visits with Father and 

the emotions, or lack therefore, at the end of those visits. We note that at 

least some testimony suggested that the children continued to seek Father’s 

attention and care and were upset when he did not respond. See N.T., 

2/23/23, at 35, 41. As K.T. explains, a child’s developmental and mental and 

emotional health are the critical subjects of inquiry rather than their feelings 

or affection for a parent. See K.T., 296 A.3d at 1110 (noting that even abused 

and neglected children may retain feelings or affection for the parent). K.T.

requires a fuller exploration of the nature of the bond, if any, between the 

children and Father than occurred here. 

Additionally, the court did not have enough information concerning the 

nature of the children’s relationship with the current “resource” mother to 

comply with K.T.’s direction to consider the matter from the child’s 

perspective, placing their developmental, physical, and emotion welfare 

above concerns for the parent. See K.T., 296 A.3d at 1105. The court heard 

no testimony from a social worker or anyone else about whether the children 

had a bond with resource parents. Instead, the court heard only resource 

mother’s testimony about her deep affection for the children, that she had 
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incorporated the children into her family and family activities, the children and 

their resource sibling had a close connection, and she attended to the children’s 

daily dietary, emotional, and medical needs. We further note that she testified 

the children were suffering an emotional toll from visits and she received 

reports of “behavior” following those visits from the children’s preschool. See

N.T., 2/23/23, at 57. However, resource mother only had the children for four 

months before the hearing, none of the Agency’s witnesses testified that the 

children had bonded with the resource family to such a degree that termination 

of Father’s parental rights would have no detrimental effect on the children’s 

development, emotional, and physical needs, and the court heard nothing from 

the children themselves. K.T. requires the court to focus on the child’s

perspective, not adults’, see K.T., 296 A.3d at 1105. The trial court therefore 

could not give proper weight to the children’s perspective with the evidence 

before it.

We note that the Agency made a referral for a bonding evaluation. See

N.T., 2/8/23, at 80. The record is not entirely clear why the evaluation did not 

occur. There is some evidence to suggest that Father knew about the 

evaluation but declined to cooperate, see id. at 80-81, 91-93, but the Orphans’ 

Court declined to make a specific finding about Father’s knowledge. See

Orphans’ Court Opinion, 2/23/23, at 18. There was some evidence that a more 

formal bonding evaluation would have assisted the court. Given the lack of 

analysis of the factors that K.T. states are critical and the enormous 
J-S19035-23

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consequences of involuntary termination on Father and the children, it is 

appropriate to remand this case for the court to conduct a more detailed inquiry 

into the best interests of the children, at which the Agency may provide 

additional evidence concerning the children’s needs and any bond they have 

with Father and/or resource parents. See R.J.S., 901 A.2d at 516 (holding 

that remand is proper where the evidence of record is insufficient to permit an 

assessment of the emotional bonds between parent and children). We thus 

affirm the Orphans’ Court’s finding as to subsection (a)(8), vacate its decision 

as to subsection (b), and remand for further proceedings consistent with this 

decision. 

Case remanded for proceedings consistent with this decision. Jurisdiction 

relinquished. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 9/6/2023