alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
40577.

#### DAVENPORT et al. v. ROBINSON by Next Friend.

Decided May 21, 1964.

*754
      *Futtbright & Duffey, Harl C. Duffey, Jr.,*for plaintiffs in error.

*E. J. Clower,*contra.

Bell, Presiding Judge.

For a verdict to have been reached on the trial of the case, either for the plaintiff or for the defendant, the first essential detail the jury had to bring to a conclusion was the issue on liability. Liability in this case rested solely on the jury’s determination as to who was at fault in this rear-end automobile collision. The issue was raised by the pleadings and there is in the record at least some evidence addressed to the problem.

The extract from the charge of the court of which the plaintiff complains bears directly on the issue of liability. The extract is a selection of language taken from a paragraph of the instructions which is complete within itself. For this reason we feel the extract should be considered in relation to the whole. The full paragraph as presented to the jury is as follows:

*755
      *“I charge you that the law of Georgia also states that all drivers of vehicles using the highways are held to the exercise of due care.*A leading vehicle has no absolute legal position superior to that of one following. Each driver is required by law to exercise ordinary care in the situation in which he finds himself. The driver of the leading vehicle must exercise ordinary care not to stop, slow up, nor swerve from his course, without adequate warning to the following vehicle of his intention to do so. The driver of the following vehicle in his turn must exercise ordinary care to avoid collision with vehicles, both in front and those behind him. *The mere fact that one vehicle is struck in its rear, while another is not struck, is not in and of itself sufficient to fix liability on the driver of either vehicle.”*(The emphasis is ours and is used merely to identify the portions of the paragraph which were not contained in the special ground.)

This instruction, it is to be seen, is derived almost verbatim from a previous decision of this court delivered in an automobile rear end collision case. *Hay v. Carter,*94 Ga. App. 382, 384 (94 SE2d 755). Having been approved by the court and standing unreversed, there can be no question that it depicts a correct statement of the law.

In this case the extract was addressed to a primary issue which had been raised by the pleadings and the evidence. It expressed legal truths bearing impartially on the defendant and on the plaintiff. In this status the court properly included the extracted portion of the charge in its instructions to the jury. *Brown v. Matthews,*79 Ga. 1, 7 (2) (4 SE 13).

The trial court erred in granting the plaintiff’s motion for a new trial on the' special ground.

*Judgment reversed with directions to tidal court that the final judgment for the plaintiff in the amount of $650 be reinstated.*

*Jordan and Eberhardt, JJ., concur.*
Exhibit 31.2
 
 CONTROL CERTIFICATION
 
 I, Richard K Brock, certify that:
 
 1.  I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-QSB of PLM Equipment Growth Fund V.
 
 2.  Based on my knowledge, this quarterly report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this quarterly report.
 
 3.  Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this quarterly report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this quarterly report.
 
 4.  The registrants other certifying officers and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:
 
 a)  designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared; and
 
 b)  evaluated the effectiveness of the registrants disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation.
 
 5.  The registrants other certifying officers and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal controls over financial reporting, to the registrants auditors and the audit committee of registrants board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):
 
 a)  all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal controls over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrants ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and
 
 b)  any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrants internal controls over financial reporting.
 
 6.  The registrants other certifying officers and I have indicated in this quarterly report whether there were significant changes in internal controls or in other factors that could significantly affect internal controls subsequent to the date of our most recent evaluation, including any corrective actions with regard to significant deficiencies and material weaknesses.
 
 
 
 
 Date: August 12, 2004  By:  /s/ Richard K Brock
 Richard K Brock
 Chief Financial Officer
 (Principal Financial Officer)
§ 585.302 Effective date. ( a ) The term *effective date* refers to the effective date of the applicable prohibitions and directives contained in this part, and with respect to a person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to § 585.201, the earlier of the date of actual or constructive notice that such person's property and interests in property are blocked.
( b ) For the purposes of this section, c*onstructive notice* is the date that a notice of the blocking of the relevant person's property and interests in property is published in the Federal Register.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
This Schedule contains summary financial information extracted from the
Company's Consolidated Condensed Statement of Income and Consolidated Condensed
Balance Sheet for the nine-month period ended March 31, 1997, and is qualified
in its entirety by reference to such financial statements.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-Mos
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JUN-30-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1997
<CASH>                                         192,000
<SECURITIES>                                     5,900
<RECEIVABLES>                                  690,800
<ALLOWANCES>                                   183,900
<INVENTORY>                                    202,600
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             1,174,500
<PP&E>                                         602,900
<DEPRECIATION>                                 360,300
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               1,785,200
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        1,037,600
<BONDS>                                              0
<COMMON>                                           100
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                     28,800  
<OTHER-SE>                                     391,100
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 1,785,200
<SALES>                                      2,202,900
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             2,202,900
<CGS>                                        1,972,200
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                1,972,200
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               4,600
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                246,100
<INCOME-TAX>                                    89,800
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            156,300
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   156,300
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     1.45
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     1.45
        

</TABLE>
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM
CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEET AND CONSOLIDATED STATEMENT OF EARNINGS AND
IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<CIK> 0000724969
<NAME>MINNTECH CORPORATION
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          MAR-31-2000
<PERIOD-START>                             APR-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1999
<CASH>                                          10,134
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   15,615
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                     11,381
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                40,033
<PP&E>                                          36,281
<DEPRECIATION>                                  20,934
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  60,194
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            7,522
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                           339
<OTHER-SE>                                      51,402
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    60,194
<SALES>                                         18,726
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                18,726
<CGS>                                           10,772
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   16,398
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                   385
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  2,563
<INCOME-TAX>                                       872
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              1,691
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     1,691
<EPS-BASIC>                                        .25
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .25


</TABLE>
### I N T H E S U P R EM E C O U R T STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA

2024 ND 152
State of North Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellee

v. Michael Allan Lafayte Prescott, Defendant and Appellant

No. 20230325 Appeal from the District Court of Ward County, North Central Judicial District, the Honorable Stacy J. Louser, Judge. AFFIRMED. Per Curiam. Tina M. Snellings, Assistant State’s Attorney, Minot, ND, for plaintiff and appellee. Kiara C. Kraus-Parr, Grand Forks, ND, for defendant and appellant.1 State v. Prescott No. 20230325 Per Curiam. [¶1] Michael Prescott appeals from a judgment entered after a jury found him guilty of gross sexual imposition in violation of N.D.C.C. § 12.1-20-03(2)(a), which criminalizes sexual contact with a victim less than fifteen years of age. Prescott argues the district court committed obvious error by failing to instruct the jury that the State was required to prove the touching in this case was not justified for the purpose of disciplining the child. [¶2] The district court specifically asked Prescott whether he had any objection to the instructions relevant to this issue, and Prescott responded he did not. A defendant’s decision to not object to a jury instruction when given the opportunity constitutes a waiver of the right to argue on appeal that the instruction was erroneous. State v. Goodale , 2024 ND 120, ¶ 9, ___ N.W.3d ___ (holding claim of error waived by answering “yes” in response to inquiry whether instructions were acceptable); see also City of Grand Forks v. Riemers , 2024 ND 117, ¶ 14, ___ N.W.3d ___ (holding claim of error waived by “I’m satisfied with them” in response to requests for comments or additional instructions); State v. Studhorse , 2024 ND 110, ¶ 25, 7 N.W.3d 253 (declining to review a jury instruction issue waived by defendant’s affirmative statement he had no request for changes to the instructions). Prescott waived this issue, and we summarily affirm under N.D.R.App.P. 35.1(a)(7). [¶3] Jon J. Jensen, C.J. Daniel J. Crothers Lisa Fair McEvers Jerod E. Tufte Douglas A. Bahr
United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 13-3456

___________________________

United States of America

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

Russell L. Ford

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellant

____________

 Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Western District of Missouri - Springfield

____________

 Submitted: July 7, 2014

Filed: July 10, 2011

[Unpublished]

____________

Before GRUENDER, BOWMAN, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges. 

____________

PER CURIAM.

Russell Ford pleaded guilty to one count of failing to register as a sex offender

and was sentenced by the District Court to eighteen months in prison. Ford then 1

The Honorable Beth Phillips, United States District Judge for the Western

1

District of Missouri.
initiated a direct criminal appeal, and his counsel filed a brief under Anders v.

California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and moved to withdraw. Ford thereafter filed a

pro se motion to dismiss his appeal. We now grant Ford’s motion, and we dismiss

this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 42(b). In addition, we grant counsel’s motion to

withdraw.

______________________________

-2-
February 9, 2012

JUDGMENT

The Fourteenth Court of Appeals

DONALD M. HOLDEN, Appellant

NO. 14-11-01045-CV V.

JOHN C. OSBORNE AND THE LAW OFFICES OF JOHN C. OSBORNE, Appellees

____________________

Today the Court heard its own motion to dismiss the appeal from the judgment 

signed by the court below on August 25, 2011. Having considered the motion and found 

it meritorious, we order the appeal DISMISSED.

We further order that all costs incurred by reason of this appeal be paid by 

DONALD M. HOLDEN.

We further order this decision certified below for observance.
40508.

#### ATKINSON et al. v. HARVEY, Next Friend.

Jordan, Judge.

Donald Harvey by next friend filed suit to recover damages for personal injuries sustained in an automobile collision which was caused by the alleged negligence of the defendants. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff and the exception is to the denial of the defendants’ amended motion for new trial. *Held:*

1. “Where an extract from the charge of the court states a complete proposition and is correct in itself, it is not subject to exception merely because of failure to add something else to it. The exception should be to the omission and not to the instruction given.” *Georgia Power Co. v. Chapman,*46 Ga. App. 582 (3) (168 SE 131). The charge to which exception was taken in special ground 4 was a correct and complete statement of the law relating to the non-imputability of negligence of the host driver to a guest passenger, *Hathcock v. Georgia Northern R. Co.,*90 Ga. App. 533, 536 (83 SE2d 329), *Goldstein v. Gee,*76 Ga. App. 637 (2) (46 SE2d 763); and said charge was not subject to exception on the grounds that the court should have charged some other principle of law in connection therewith.

2. “It is proper to so charge the jury as to restrict the recovery to the grounds of negligence alleged in the petition.” *Owens v. Nichols,*139 Ga. 475 (4) (77 SE 635). The trial court in *542the excerpt from the charge complained of in special ground 5 correctly instructed the jury in regard to this principle of law; and said charge was not erroneous for any reasons assigned. See *Dowis v. McCurdy,*109 Ga. App. 488 (136 SE2d ).

Decided April 7, 1964.

*Merritt & Pruitt, Glyndon C. Pruitt,*for plaintiffs in error.

*Lokey •& Bowden, Glenn Frick,*contra.

3. The remaining special ground has been abandoned.

4. The verdict for the plaintiff was supported by the evidence and the general grounds of the amended motion are without merit.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*Bell, P. J., and Eberhardt, J., concur.*
#### § 569.306 Interest.

Except as otherwise provided in this part, the term *interest,* when used with respect to property (*e.g.,* “an interest in property”), means an interest of any nature whatsoever, direct or indirect.
#### Gackenbach Estate

*Morris L. Shafer,*for accountant.

July 12, 1954.

Gearhart, P. J.,

The only problem presented to the court at thé audit was the interpretation of the residuary clause of testator’s will. Testator provided as follows:

“And as to all the rest, residue and remainder of my Estate, real, personal or mixed, of whatever nature or kind, or wheresoever situate at the time of my decease, I' do hereby give, devise and bequeath the same unto my three children, Helen, Miriam, and Ralph, their heirs, executors, administrators and assigns forever, in the following proportions:

> “One share to my daughter Helen

> “One share to my daughter Miriam

> “One-half share to my son Ralph.”

The question has been raised as to whether there is a one-half share undisposed of which must therefore be distributed under the Intestate Act. We think not. . : . ■ • ■ •

In the instant case it is clear that' testator intended to dispose of all of his property, for he uses the expression “all the rest, residue and remainder,” etc. If we would omit the words “in the following proportions,” which we are not warranted in doing, it might appear that there was a one-half share undisposed of. *194However, giving effect to the words “in the following proportions,” Helen and Miriam each receive twice as much as Ralph, for the reason that one share in proportion to one-half share is as two is to one.

Accordingly, we rule that the estate will be divided on a fractional basis, that is, two fifths to Helen, two-fifths to Miriam, and one fifth to Ralph. This disposes of all of testator’s estate and disposes of it in proportion as he indicated.
PUBLIC LAW 106–542—DEC. 11, 2000 114 STAT. 2713

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY—H.J. Res. 129:

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, Vol. 146 (2000):

Dec. 11, considered and passed House and Senate.

Æ

Public Law 106–542

106th Congress

Joint Resolution

Making further continuing appropriations for the fiscal year 2001, and for other

purposes.

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the

United States of America in Congress assembled, That Public Law

106–275, is further amended by striking the date specified in section

106(c) and inserting ‘‘December 15, 2000’’.

Approved December 11, 2000.

Ante, p. 2571.

Dec. 11, 2000

[H.J. Res. 129]
#### § 544.408 Charitable contributions.

Unless specifically authorized by the Office of Foreign Assets Control pursuant to this part, no charitable contribution of funds, goods, services, or technology, including contributions to relieve human suffering, such as food, clothing, or medicine, may be made by, to, or for the benefit of a person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to § 544.201(a). For the purposes of this part, a contribution is made by, to, or for the benefit of a person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to § 544.201(a) if made by, to, or in the name of such a person; if made by, to, or in the name of an entity or individual acting for or on behalf of, or owned or controlled by, such a person; or if made in an attempt to violate, to evade, or to avoid the bar on the provision of contributions by, to, or for the benefit of such a person.
www.gpo.gov

### §4182. Termination of new commitments for rental assistance

After September 30, 1997, financial assistance for rental housing assistance under the United States Housing Act of 1937 [42 U.S.C. 1437 et seq.] may not be provided to any Indian housing authority or tribally designated housing entity, unless such assistance is provided pursuant to a contract for such assistance entered into by the Secretary and the Indian housing authority before such date. Any such assistance provided pursuant to such a contract shall be governed by the provisions of the United States Housing Act of 1937 (as in effect before the date of the effectiveness of this chapter) and the provisions of such contract.

(Pub. L. 104–330, title V, §503, Oct. 26, 1996, 110 Stat. 4043.)

#### References in Text

The United States Housing Act of 1937, referred to in text, is act Sept. 1, 1937, ch. 896, as revised generally by Pub. L. 93–383, title II, §201(a), Aug. 22, 1974, 88 Stat. 653, which is classified generally to chapter 8 (§1437 et seq.) of Title 42, The Public Health and Welfare. For complete classification of this Act to the Code, see Short Title note set out under section 1437 of Title 42 and Tables.

For the date of the effectiveness of this chapter, referred to in text, as Oct. 1, 1997, except as otherwise expressly provided, see section 107 of Pub. L. 104–330, set out as an Effective Date note under section 4101 of this title.

#### Effective Date

Section effective Oct. 26, 1996, see section 508 of Pub. L. 104–330, set out as a note under section 4181 of this title.

#### Section Referred to in Other Sections

This section is referred to in section 4183 of this title.
Exhibit 32.2

Certification Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

The undersigned, as Chief Financial
Officer of Transcend Services, Inc., certifies that to the undersigneds knowledge, the Form 10-Q for the quarter ended March 31, 2006, which accompanies this certification, fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
15(d), as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the information contained in the periodic report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of Transcend Services, Inc. at the dates
and for the periods indicated. The foregoing certification is made solely for purposes of Title 18, Chapter 63, Section 1350 of the United States Code.



|                       
|-----------------------
|/s/ Lance Cornell      
|Lance Cornell          
|Chief Financial Officer
|                       
|Date: May 8, 2006
Exhibit 32.2

Certification Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

The undersigned, as Chief Financial
Officer of Transcend Services, Inc., certifies that to the undersigneds knowledge, the Form 10-Q for the quarter ended March 31, 2009, which accompanies this certification, fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a)
or 15(d), as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the information contained in the periodic report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of Transcend Services, Inc. at the
dates and for the periods indicated. The foregoing certification is made solely for purposes of Title 18, Chapter 63, Section 1350 of the United States Code.



|                       
|-----------------------
|/s/ Lance Cornell      
|Lance Cornell          
|Chief Financial Officer

Date: May 11, 2009
www.gpo.gov

### §403. Repealed. Pub. L. 93–608, §1(12), Jan. 2, 1975, 88 Stat. 1969

Section, act Mar. 25, 1948, ch. 146, §3, 62 Stat. 85, required Secretary of the Interior, acting through Bureau of Mines, to report to Congress on activities, expenditures, etc., of laboratory.