THE COVER

The cover illustration by Frederick C. Yohn depicts

activity typically performed by the Corps of Engineers and the companies ofsappers and miners during the Revolutionary War. "Col. William

Prescott at the Battle of Bunker Hill,"

Historical Paintings Collection, The Continental Insurance Companies
Engineers of Independence

A Documentary History of the Army Engineers

in the American Revolution

1775-1783

by

Paul K. Walker

Office of History

Headquarters

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Washington, DC 20402
The Library of Congress has cataloged the first printing of this

title as follows :

Walker, Paul K.

Engineers of independence : a documentary history of the

Army Engineers in the American Revolution, 1775-1783 / by

Paul K. Walker. - [Washington, D.C .] : Historical Division,

Office of Administrative Services, Office of the Chief of Engineers : For sale by the Supt. of Docs., U.S. G.P.O., [1981]

xiv, 403 p. : ill . ; 23 cm. - (EP ; 870-1-6)

"October 1981"-P. 4 of cover.

Includes index.

Bibliography : p. 383-388.

S/ N 008-022-00166-2

Item 338-B

1 . United States . Continental Army-History. 2 . United States-HistoryRevolution, 1775-1783-Campaigns and battles. 1. United States . Army. Corps

of Engineers. Historical Division . II . Title . III. Title: ADocumentary history of

the Army Engineers in the American Revolution, 1775-1783. IV. Series : EP

(Washington, D.C .) ; 870-1-6 .

UG23 .W34 81-603908

358'.22'0973-dc 19

AACR 2 MARC

Library of Congress [r85]rev3

Reprinted--1992

EP 870-1-6
Foreword

The U .S. Army Corps of Engineers traces its origins to the ea

moments of our existence as a nation. Soon after assuming command o

Continental Army in July 1775, General George Washington acknowle

the critical shortage of officers with technical skills and made the fi

several appeals for more engineers . He never obtained a sufficient num

But Army Engineers, their ranks filled largely with Frenchmen, erecte

tifications from Boston to Charleston, mapped terrain for their 

manders, laid out encampments, and cleared the way for the Army o

march . They experienced their finest hour at the siege of Yorktown in 

The Revolution clearly demonstrated the necessity for a trained cor

native American officers. That need was finally fulfilled with the estab

ment of the military academy at West Point more than twenty years late

In Engineers of Independence Dr. Walker weaves together a colo

concise narrative with original documents to tell the story of the begin

of the Army Engineers . Many of the documents are reproduced here fo

first time . The resulting account will appeal to general readers and sch

alike.

The Author

J . K. Bratton

Lieutenant General, USA

Chief of Engineers

Paul K . Walker obtained his Ph .D . degree in American history from 

University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill. He is the author of The C

Responds: A History of the Susquehanna Engineer District and Trop

Storm Agnes (1976) and "Business and Commerce in Baltimore on the 

of Independence," Maryland Historical Magazine (1976) . Before joinin

staff of the Historical Division, Office of the Chief of Engineers, 

historian, Dr. Walker taught American history at several colleges i

Baltimore area .
I am grateful to Don Higginbotham and Robert K. Wright, Jr., for their

insights and constructive suggestions.

Billie Walker meticulously edited the manuscript and offered support

and helpful criticism throughout the research and writing stages .

As author, I am solely responsible for interpretations and conclusions

and for any errors of omission or commission .

Washington, D.C . Paul K. Walker
Preface

This collection of documents, including many previously unpublished,

details the role of the Army engineers in the American Revolution . Lackin

trained military engineers, the Americans relied heavily on foreign officers

mostly from France, for sorely needed technical assistance . Native

Americans joined the foreign engineer officers to plan and carry out offen

sive and defensive operations, direct the erection of fortifications, map vita

terrain, and lay out encampments . During the war Congress created th

Corps of Engineers with three companies of engineer troops as well as 

separate geographer's department to assist the engineers with mapping .

Both General George Washington and Maj . Gen . Louis Lebcgue Duportail, his third and longest-serving Chief Engineer, recognized the disadvantages of relying on foreign powers to fill the Army's crucial need fo

engineers . America, they contended, must train its own engineers for th

future. Accordingly, at the war's end, they suggested maintaining 

peacetime engineering establishment and creating a military academy 

However, Congress rejected the proposals, and the Corps of Engineers an

its companies of sappers and miners mustered out of service . Eleven year

passed before Congress authorized a new establishment, the Corps of Ar

tillerists and Engineers .

In editing these documents I have retained the original spelling, gram

mar, and punctuation, with the following exceptions : I occasionally inserte

or removed punctuation for easier reading, always capitalized the first lette

after a period, and changed & to and and &c. to etc. Where feasible, whe

documents were available in both published and unpublished form, th

original manuscripts were used. The glossary explains the many engineerin

terms used . Permission has been received to reproduce all material unde

copyright . Credit lines indicate the sources of documents and illustrations 

Full citations are contained in the bibliography .

The contributions of many persons have enhanced this volume . The staf

of the Historical Division, Office of the Chief of Engineers, gave invaluabl

assistance throughout. Lenore Fine first suggested the project and alon

with Jesse A. Remington provided continued encouragement . John T

Greenwood and Frank N. Schubert read and commented upon the entir

manuscript . Agnes Riedel assisted with research, typing, and proofreading 

Dorothe M. Grande advised on editorial matters . Dale Floyd offered helpfu

criticism . Alfred M. Beck, assisted by Margaret B . Combs, guided th

manuscript through the final stages of production .
CONTENTS

I . THE SEARCH FOR ENGINEER OFFICERS AND THE

FORMATION OF THE GEOGRAPHER'S DEPARTMENT . 

1 . Charles Lee: "It Was Indeed, Impossible for Them to Exist" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

2 . Silas Deane: "He Is a Plain, Modest, Active, Sensible

Man, Perfectly Averse to Frippery and Parade. . . . . . . . . . 

3 . Agreement between Silas Deane and Tronson du

Coudray for Service in the Continental Army . . . . . . . . . . 

4. James Love]]: "There Is Singular Hardship in the Case of

These Gentlemen. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

5 . Louis Duportail: "I Have Here Requested - Nothing But

What Is Absolutely Necessary for Our Service. . . . . . . . . . . 

6 . Louis Duportail : "The Chief Engineer Should Have a

Respectable Rank in the Army. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

7 . Louis Duportail: "We Believed That the Congress Would

Be Sensible. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

8. Robert Erskine Outlines "What May Really Be Accomplished by a Geographer. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

9 . Simeon DeWitt and Benjamin Lodge: "We Are Far from

Wishing to Raise Fortunes by the Calamities of Our

Country,. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

II . THE FORMATION OF THE CORPS OF ENGINEERS AND

THE RECRUITMENT OF ENGINEER TROOPS . . . . . . . . . . 

1 . Rufus Putnam : "With Out a Core of Engeneers . . . the

Works Never will be properly Executed nor don in a

Reasonable time" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

2 . Rufus Putnam Details the First Plan for a Corps of

Engineers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

3 . Louis Duportail Proposes "An Establishment Which Is

Absolutely Indispensable. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

4 . Resolution of Congress: "Their Business Shall Be to Instruct the Fatigue Parties. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

5 . Resolution of Congress: "The Engineers . . . Shall Be

Formed into a Corps. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

6 . Regulations for the Corps of Engineers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
7 . Louis Duportail: "It Would Be Very Advantageous to

Pensilvania to Furnish a Number of These Soldiers. . . . . . . 4

8 . Joseph Plumb Martin : "This Corps of Miners Was

Reckoned an Honorable One. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46

III . BUNKER HILL AND THE SIEGE OF BOSTON, 1775- 1776 51

1 . Peter Brown : "Altho' We Were but Few . . . We Were

Preserved in a Most Wonderful Manner. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53

2 . William Howe: "The Success Is Too Dearly Bought" . . . . 55

3 . George Washington: "We Are As Well Secured, As Could

Be Expected" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58

4 . John Chester: "We Expected . . . the King's Troops

Would Have Advanced on Us, but They Durst Not . . . . . . . 60

5 . Jeduthan Baldwin: The Patriots Entrench on Lechmere

Point . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63

6 . Rufus Putnam Recalls the Decision to Fortify Dorchester

Heights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66

7 . Rufus Putnam : "The Enemy Cannot Take Possession of

Dorchester Hill at Present. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67

8 . James Thacher: "The Amount of Labor Performed During the Night . . . Is Almost Incredible. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70

9 . Rev. William Gordon : "Every One Knew His Place and

Business" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72

10 . Charles Stuart: Their Posts Were "More Like Majick

Than the Work of Human Beings. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73

11 . Richard Gridley: "I Have Exerted Every Nerve to the

Utmost" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77

12 . Richard Gridley's Account of Materials Supplied to the

Boston Forts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80

IV. THE WAR IN THE NORTH: TICONDEROGA TO SARATOGA,1775-1777 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83

1 . John Trumbull: "The Ascent Was Difficult and

Laborious, but Not Impracticable . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85

2 . Jeduthan Baldwin : "I Have My Hands and Mind Constantly Employed Night and Day Except When I am

Asleep and Then Sometimes I Dream. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88

3 . Anthony Wayne : "The General Is Confidant a Spirit of

Emulation Will Animate Each Brigade to Finish the Task

Assign'd Them. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92

4 . Christopher Pelissier's Observations on the Jersey

Redoubt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96

5 . Agreement between Jeduthan Baldwin and a Company of

Artificers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Vlll
6 . Jeduthan Baldwin Reviews Ticonderoga's Needs for 1777 99

7. Jeduthan Baldwin Chronicles the Progress at

Ticonderoga . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102

8 . Du Roi the Elder: "The Rebels Had Kept On Working

Continuously with Unfailing Courage" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104

9 . Court-Martial of Maj. Gen . Arthur St. Clair . . . . . . . . . . . 107

V . A WAR OF POSTS : FROM LONG ISLAND TO TRENTON,

1776 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113

1 . Charles Lee: "New-York . . . May Be Made a Most Advantageous Field of Battle. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114

2 . Jeduthan Baldwin: The Rebels Fortify New York and

Long Island . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117

3 . Robert Erskine Describes His Marine Chevaux-de-Frise . . 119

4 . The Chevalier de Kermorvan: "I Only Wish for Speed in

Operations" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122

5 . The Chevalier de Kermorvan: "The Crucial Point Is to

Bring the Camps on the Coastline Closer Together. . . . . . . 12

6 . Rufus Putnam Reconnoiters the Island of Manhattan . . . 130

7 . George Washington : "I Have Never Spared the Spade

and Pick Ax" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131

8 . David Bushnell's General Principles and Construction of

a Submarine Vessel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

9 . Ezra Lee: "I Thought the Best Generalship Was to

Retreat As Fast As I Could. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

10 . Rufus Putnam : "I . . . Disguised My Apperence As an

Officer As Far As I Could" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140

VI . A HEROIC DEFENSE: THE PHILADELPHIA CAMPAIGN,

1777-1778 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

1 . Tronson du Coudray's Observations on the Delaware

River Defenses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

2 . Tronson du Coudray Calls for Acceleration of the Delaware River Fortifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

3 . Tronson du Coudray: "The Object the Least Pressing Is

the Defense of the Delaware. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

4 . Franjois Fleury: "We Must Have Men, Works, and Be

Enabled to Make Vigorous Sallies. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

5 . Franjois Fleury: "The Greatest Part of the

Bombs . . . Occasion More Fear Than Damage . . . . . . . . . 16

6 . Fran'cois Fleury: "Of What Avail Are Fortifications

Undefended by Men" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

7 . Joseph Plumb Martin : "We Were, Like the Beaver,

Obliged to Repair Our Dams in the Night. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
8 . Franjois Fleury: "Our Ruins Will Serve Us As Breast

Works, We Will Defend the Ground Inch by Inch. . . . . . . 16

9 . Joseph Plumb Martin : "If Ever Destruction Was Complete, It Was Here. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

10 . Louis Duportail: "There Is a Hundred Times More Enthusiasm for This Revolution in a Single Cafe in Paris

Than in All the United Colonies. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

11 . Louis Duportail: "To Justify Such an Enterprise the Success Must Be Almost Certain. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

12 . Louis Duportail: "Wilmington Answers the End of Making the Subsistance Very Difficult to General Howe. . . . . . 17

13 . Louis Duportail: "The Battle of German Town Ought to

Be a Lesson to Us. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

14 . Francis Hopkinson : "Battle of the Kegs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

15 . Frangois Fleury Describes His Plan for Fire Boats . . . . . . . 188

16 . Louis Duportail: "It Is . . . a Principle of War Cautiously to Avoid Doing What Your Enemy Would Have You

Do" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

17 . Louis Duportail: "Here Is a Certain and Immense Advantage" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

18 . The Marquis de Chastellux Reviews the Delaware River

Defenses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

VII . WEST POINT: THE KEY TO THE CONTINENT,

1775-1783 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

1 . Lord Stirling: "Mr. Romans Has Displayed His Genius at

a Very Great Expense, and to Very Little Public Advantape" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

2 . Louis de Shaix La Radiere: "I Still Think Fort Clinton Is

the Better" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

3 . Louis Duportail Finds the Works "Perfectly Fulfil the Object Which Is Proposed" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

4. Louis Duportail: "I Do Not Think Myself Responsible in

Any Manner for the Neglects . . . of That Fort. . . . . . . . . . 22

5 . Rufus Putnam : "I Had Several Fair Observations As the

Sun Passed through the Openings of the Clouds. . . . . . . . . 22

6 . Louis Duportail: "It Would Not Be Prudent to Risk the

Loss of a Great Number of Men, upon Hopes Not Well

Founded" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

7 . Louis Duportail: "Happily, the Time for Fear Is Passed" . 22

8 . The Marquis de Chastellux: "The Most Magnificent Picture I Have Ever Beheld. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

9 . The Chevalier de Villefranche's Report on the Work Required at West Point . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
10 . James Thacher: Villefranche's "Superb Structure . . . Affected the Spectators with Admiration and

Pleasure" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

11 . Joseph Plumb Martin: "I Verily Believe, I Saved the Old

Man's Life" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

12 . George Washington : "The Blot Which Now Stains a Page

in the Records of the Army. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

13 . Joseph Plumb Martin: "We Had Lived Together As a

Family of Brothers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

244

246

249

250

VIII . THE CAMPAIGN IN THE SOUTH: VIRGINIA, THE

CAROLINAS, AND GEORGIA, 1776-1782 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 253

1 . William Moultrie: "I Never Was Uneasy on Not Having a

Retreat" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 255

2 . William Moultrie: "Never Did Men Fight More Bravely,

and Never Were Men More Cool. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

3 . Count d'Estaing: "This Strange Siege Was the Work of

Penelope. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

257

4 . Ferdinand de Brahm Describes the Siege of Charleston,

1780 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 273

5 . Louis Duportail: "In All This the Honor of the American

Arms Is Secure. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 277

6 . Louis Duportail: "I Am Here in a Flat Country Where

Green Stagnant Pools Exhale Corruption. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 279

7 . Henry Lee: A Maham Tower Is Used against Fort Watson 281

8. Henry Lee Recounts the Siege of Augusta . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

9 . Henry Lee: Kosciuszko "Pressed Forward His Approach

with Indefatigable Labour" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

10 . Thaddeus Kosciuszko : "Blind Fortune Not Always Keep

Pace with Curage and Good Cause. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

IX . YORKTOWN : THE GRAND SIEGE, 1781 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

1 . Louis Duportail Advocates a Charleston Offensive . . . . . . 29

2 . Louis Duportail's Estimate of Requirements for a New

York Siege . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

3 . Louis Duportail's Plan for a New York Offensive . . . . . . . 29

4 . Louis Duportail: "We Must Take Cornwallis or Be All

Dishonored" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

5 . Joseph Plumb Martin : "Here Again We Encountered Our

Old Associate, Hunger. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

6 . Capitaine du Chesnoy: "The Entire Place Was Scattered

with Earth Works, Was Bristling with Pointed Stakes" . . . 30

7 . George Washington : Regulations for the Service of the

Siege at Yorktown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
8 . James Duncan : "The Enemy Kept Up an Almost Incessant Fire. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

9 . Joseph Plumb Martin : "The British Were Led to Imagine

That We Were About Some Secret Mischief. . . . . . . . . . . . 31

10 . James Thacher: "I Have a Fine Opportunity of Witnessing the Sublime and Stupendous Scene. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

11 . Joseph Plumb Martin : "I Thought the British Were Killing Us Off at a Great Rate. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

12 . James Thacher: "The Assailants Bravely Entered the

Fort . . . without Firing a Single Gun. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

13 . George Washington Testifies to the Engineers'

Distinguished Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

X. PLANS FOR A PEACETIME ENGINEERING ESTABLISHMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 . Jean Baptiste de Gouvion : "An Officer of Artillery and an

Engineer Want a Great Application to Be Perfectly Instructed" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

2 . Rufus Putnam : "Among the Sea Ports, New York Claims

the First Attention. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

3 . Timothy Pickering: "As Many As Two Engineers Will

Probably Be Always Found Necessary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

4 . George Washington : "A Corps of Able Engineers . . . Cannot Be Raised in a Day. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

5 . Report of a Committee of Congress on a Military Peace

Establishment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

6 . The Chevalier de Villefranche's Observations along the

Route to Canada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

7 . Louis Duportail Urges Uniting the Artillery and the

Engineers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

8 . Pierre L'Enfant: "A Neutral Power Must Be Ready for

War" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

32

NOTES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

GLOSSARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

INDEX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
Illustrations

Eighteenth-Century French Engineering Manual . . . . . . . . . . . . Frontispiec

Richard Gridley's Early Service at Louisbourg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

S6bastien Le Prestre de Vauban . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Benjamin Franklin at the Court of France . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Louis Lebegue Duportail . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Survey of New York and Connecticut . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

RufusPutnam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Louis Duportail's Letter of Acceptance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Richard Gridley's Petition to Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Moses Cleaveland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Commission in the Sappers and Miners . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Battle of Bunker Hill . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

George Washington Takes Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Boston Area Fortifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Chandelier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Putnam's Triangulation of Boston . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

New London, Connecticut . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Entrenchments at Winthrop's Point . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Battery at Groton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Richard Gridley's Pay Warrant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

John Trumbull . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Jeduthan Baldwin's journal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Ticonderoga Defenses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Blockhouse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Mount Independence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Saratoga . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

New York City and Long Island . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Caricature of Charles Lee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Robert Erskine's Chevaux-de-Frise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Battle of Long Island, August 1776 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Sketches of the American Turtle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Northern Manhattan Island, November 1776 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Delaware River from Philadelphia to Chester . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Delaware River Defenses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Fort Mercer, October 1777 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Fort Mifflin, 9 November 1777 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Xlll
Chester, Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180

Camp at Valley Forge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184

Valley Forge Star Redoubt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186

Enemy Fleet at Philadelphia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189

Oath of Allegiance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190

Retreat at Barren Hill . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 196

Army Drill Manual . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 198

Thaddeus Kosciuszko . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 202

Fort Constitution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205

Fort Montgomery Boom and Chain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 208

Hudson River Obstructions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 209

Rocky Hill Redoubt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 214

Highlands and Northern New Jersey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 220

Stony Point, New York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 224

West Point Fortifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 234

Fort Arnold . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 236

West Point Panorama . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 238

The Slote . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 240

Southern Theater of War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 252

Sullivan's Island . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 258

The Chevalier de Cambray-Digny . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 261

Siege of Savannah, October 1779 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 264

Siege of Charleston, 1780 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 272

Gabion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 297

Fascine Knife . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 297

Road From Alexandria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 302

Works at Yorktown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 305

Siege of Yorktown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 308

Redoubt No .10 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 318

Action at Yorktown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 321

Jean Baptiste de Gouvion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 328

Plan fora Corps of Engineers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 348

Society of the Cincinnati Diploma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 362

Badge of the Society . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 364

Army Pension Agreement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 365

Vertical Profile ofa Fortification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 382

When the American colonies went to war with Great Britain in A

1775, they had to do more than fight . They had to build an army. At 

colonial militia units, acting independently, fought the British regulars 

on 14 June 1775 Congress established the Continental Army with Gen

George Washington as Commander in Chief. On July 3 Washington 

sumed command in Cambridge, Massachusetts . His immediate conc

were to strengthen his fledgling army and confine the British to Boston 

enable his forces to check any British advances into the countrys

Washington quickly had to supplement existing earthworks with new one

From the start the predominantly defensive nature of the war convi

Washington he would need trained engineers, but he experienced conti

frustration in his efforts to find them . "The Skill of those engineer

have . . . [is] very imperfect and confined to the mere manual exerci

cannon," he complained to the president of Congress, "whereas the wa

which we are engaged, requires a Knowledge comprehending the Duti

the Field and Fortifications ."' The shortage of qualified engineers wa

acute because formal schooling in siegecraft, the erection of field forti

tions, and technology was practically nonexistent in America . Officers 

technical knowledge had gained it largely through their reading, and 

few officers with engineering experience had acquired it while serving u

British engineers in the colonial wars .

EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY FRENCH ENGINEERING MANUAL.

This page taken from Deidier's Le Parfait Ingenieur Frangais includes

designs for parallel trenches and defensive lines, as well as sketches of

engineer tools and a sap excavation, bottom right. Because no

American training manuals existed, the Continental Army's engineers

had to rely on English and French texts. American editions of

Englishman John Muller's treatises on artillery and fortifications and

an English translation of the Count de Clairac's Field Engineer appeared in the early part of the Revolution.

Deidier, Le Parfait Ingenieur Frangais
RICHARD GRIDLEY’S EARLY SERVICE AT LOUISBOURG. This

plan of the siege of Louisbourg, 1745, was made from sketches by

Richard Gridley (1710-96), who thirty years later would become the

American Army’s first Chief Engineer. An artillery officer in the

Massachusetts forces who had worked as a surveyor and had assisted a

noted British military engineer in the Boston area, Captain Gridley

joined the colony’s expedition against Louisbourg in April 1745. As

the designer of several batteries, Gridley played a major role in the

successful American siege of the French-held fortress. In the years

before the Revolution, Gridley continued to serve Massachusetts as an

2
engineer and artillerist, notably during the French and Indian War.

In 1763 the crown rewarded him with the Magdalen Islands in the gulf

of St. Lawrence-an area a bounding in seal and cod-and half-pay as

an officer for life. In 1770 Gridley bought half-interest in an iron-rich

pond near Sharon, Massachusetts. He soon opened a forge which later

became a source of cannon and mortars for the fledgling Continental

Army. When war broke out in 1775, his decision to side with the rebels

cost him the Magdalen Islands and his life pension. No likeness of

Gridley has been found.

Military Engineer, December 1947
Washington's first Chief Engineer was Col . Richard Gridley, a 65-year

old engineer and artillery veteran of the colonial wars, whom the Massachu

setts Provincial Congress had named in April 1775 chief engineer, colonel o

artillery, and major general of provincial troops. Gridley was the rankin

engineer at the Battle of Bunker Hill, where he enlisted Capt . Jeduthan

Baldwin, another colonial war veteran, as an assistant . Lt . Col . Rufus Put

nam of the Massachusetts forces joined Gridley and Baldwin as an enginee

when Brig. Gen. John Thomas, commander of the American right wing a

Roxbury, needed assistance in erecting defenses.

Clearly Gridley had the most military experience, yet his knowledge was

probably strongest in the field of artillery and limited in the area of fortifica

tions -a situation that troubled Washington . On the other hand, Putnam, 

millwright by vocation, felt himself lacking as an engineer, and was later t

recall :

I informed the General [Thomas] that I had never read a word

on the Subject of Fortification, that it was true that I had ben

Imployed on Some under British Eengeneers [sic] but pretended to no knowledge of Laying works. But there was no excuse would do, undertake I must . 2

Putnam neglected to mention, however, that as deputy surveyor for the pro

vince of Florida in 1774 he had explored and mapped portions of the lowe

Mississippi .

For several reasons Washington was generally unenthusiastic about hi

first Chief Engineer. Gridley's age and a wound received at Bunker Hill kep

him inactive throughout much of the summer and fall of 1775, a time whe

his advice and assistance were needed . In addition, until November 177

Gridley commanded the Continental artillery, a role that diverted much o

his attention from engineering . The fact that Washington had not per

sonally chosen Gridley-he had assumed his position by virtue of his stand

ing in the Massachusetts provincial forces-placed further distance betwee

the Commander in Chief and his Chief Engineer. Gridley's rank of majo

general in the Massachusetts forces proved another thorn in Washington'

side . Wishing to avoid alienating brigadier and major generals who though

Gridley's provincial rank too high to renew in the Continental Army

Washington recommended against a major general's commission f

Gridley . 3

In December 1775 Washington underscored his reluctant acceptance 

Gridley as Chief Engineer . "We have no one here better Qualified, he ha

done very little hitherto in that department," Washington informed Co

gress . "But if the Congress chuse to appoint him, I will take care that he pay

a proper attention to it ." 4 Although Washington developed a strong prefe

ence for Putnam, Gridley continued as Chief Engineer until Washingto
moved to New York City in April 1776 . Thereafter Gridley remained as

chief engineer for the Army's Eastern Department, headquartered in

Boston, and Putnam joined Washington's staff as Chief Engineer .

Even had Washington and Gridley worked together more effectively, the

Commander in Chief's need for more engineers would have been scarcely

less desperate . The engineering crunch affected the states as well as the Con

tinental Army . As most states gradually became convinced of the danger of

attack to their coastlines, rivers, and key port cities, where the majority of

colonial Americans lived, they planned new fortifications or restoration of

defenses that had languished since the end of the Seven Years' War in 1763 .

In some cases the states managed to get technical assistance outside the

Army . Pennsylvania, for example, enlisted David Rittenhouse, a noted inventor, to work on the Delaware River defenses . South Carolina employed

Ferdinand de Brahm, the nephew of a distinguished geographer .

There was so much work to be done that the states clamored for more

engineers, apparently believing that Army engineers should be at their

disposal . The Pennsylvania Committee of Safety, for example, wanted

Washington to dispatch an engineer to plan and supervise the works it had

authorized for Billingsport on the Delaware River . Rhode Island's Governor

Nicholas Cooke wanted similar support at Newport . In both cases the Commander in Chief had to refuse : he had more than enough in New York to

keep his few engineers busy . Actually Washington had to postpone completion of essential fortifications in the Hudson Highlands because of the shortage of Army engineers . 5 In June 1776, nearly a year after first taking command, Washington still lamented that he had "but one [Putnam] on whose

judgement . . . he would wish to depend in laying out any work of the least

consequence ." During that summer four volunteers received commissions as

engineer officers, but still more were needed . 6

Soon most states were required to accept the viewpoint of Maryland's

Charles Carroll, Barrister. "We must . . . avail ourselves of the skill of such

[engineers] as we can meet with among ourselves, though their Knowledge

be not so perfect or complete," he advised the state's Council of Safety.? On

the other hand, Virginia and South Carolina competed successfully with the

Continental Army for engineers . As revealed in the following letter, the two

states offered pay and travel allowances sufficient to win over from Maj 

Gen . Charles Lee the only two engineers in his Southern Department 

Despite Lee's badgering, it was a long time before Congress adequatel

settled the pay for Army engineers or acknowledged his arguments tha

engineer officers were required to travel more frequently than most other of

ficers, usually alone, and hence were entitled to special benefits.
1 . "IT WAS INDEED, IMPOSSIBLE FOR THEM TO EXIST"

Charles Lee to Richard Peters.

Charleston, August 2, 1776

I often represented to Congress how difficult or impossible it would be

to engage, or retain after they were engaged, any engineers of tolerable

qualification on the wretched pay established . The two appointed to my

district have, as I expected, quitted the service. It was indeed, impossible

for them to exist. [John] Stadler, I hear, has entered into the service of

Virginia. [Baron] Massenbaugh is retained by this Province at fifty-four

dollars per month, a servant, rations, and his travelling expenses . He

formerly begged his dismission from me, assuring me, I believe sincerely,

he was zealous in the cause of America; that he would willingly, if I chose

it, enlist as a common soldier; but that to ride about the Continent from

North to South, find horses, and appear like a gentleman, was impossible.

-Force, American Archives, 5th

ser., 1 :721 .

As the hope of reconciliation with Britain faded in late 1775 and it

became clearer that a protracted war was likely, the colonists began to look

abroad for economic and technical assistance . On December 2 Congress

directed its Committee of Correspondence "to use their endeavours to find

out and engage in the service of the united colonies skilful engineers, not exceeding four," but no further action was taken that year. 8

Finally in April 1776 Congress sent Silas Deane, an ambitious excongressman from Connecticut, to France as an agent . His instructions

charged him with arranging the exchange of American goods for needed

supplies; purchasing clothing, munitions, and artillery ; and pursuing the

possibility of an alliance with France . In addition Congress directed Deane

to implement its earlier resolution regarding engineers . Deane's mission

marked the first active recruiting by Congress of engineers across the Atlantic .

As Britain's most powerful enemy and the center of technical education

in Europe, France was the most logical source of engineers for the Continental Army . The French engineer corps was a highly developed branch of the

army with its own rigorous training program provided by the Ecole du Corps
SEBASTIEN LE PRESTRE DE VAUBAN. Most of the foreign

engineers in the Continental Army had studied the principles of this

master of military engineering at the great French engineering school

at Mezieres.

Library of Congress

Royale du Genie, founded in 1749 at Mezieres. This program combined

theoretical instruction with practical exercise.9

At Mezieres, the young officers still keenly felt the influence of Sebastien

le Prestre de Vauban, the great seventeenth-century French engineer and

master of siegecraft. Vauban’s theories on the attack of fortified places emphasized that besieging forces could cut their losses by approaching for-
tresses systematically through a series of interconnected parallel trenches

and that additional protection in the form of temporary earthworks an

other trenches was essential . The best defense was a defense in depth, sub

stituting small-scale forts for the usual projecting outworks attached to th

main enceinte .l 0 Most of the French volunteers who eventually served 

engineers in the Continental Army had been imbued with Vauban's doc

trines at Mezi~res .

Deane's activities in France provoked immediate controversy at home 

He was suspected of profiteering and was criticized for encouraging so man

foreigners to come to America with promises of positions in the Continenta

Army. Literally besieged by volunteers, Deane often proved incapable o

recognizing the best qualified officers among them .

Philippe Charles Tronson du Coudray, 11 a French artillerist and autho

of technical works on gunpowder, metallurgy, and artillery, was an excep

tion . The artillerist combined proven expertise with access to valuabl

military stores . He was a competent, if somewhat headstrong, officer ; and

as described by Deane, his manner and disposition were well suited to t

antimonarchical American cause . That Coudray planned to bring "tw

hundred pieces of brass cannon, with every necessary article for twenty-fiv

thousand men" clinched the argument in his favor .

2 . "HE IS A PLAIN, MODEST, ACTIVE, SENSIBLE MAN, PERFECTLY

AVERSE TO FRIPPERY AND PARADE"

Silas Deane to the Committee of Secret Correspondence .

. . . M . Coudray, the Engineer. . . . obtained liberty last week to go fo

America with as many Engineers as he should choose, and was not onl

assured of M . Beaumarchais 12 being able to procure the stores he ha

stipulated for, but received orders for them, and liberty to take two hun

dred pieces of brass cannon, lest part might be intercepted . M . Coudra

has the character of the first Engineer in the Kingdom, and his manner

and disposition will, I am confident, be highly pleasing to you, as he is 

plain, modest, active, sensible man, perfectly averse to frippery an

parade. My friends here rejoice at the acquisition ; and considering th

character of the man, and at whose hands I in effect received him, I mus

congratulate you on it . Several young gentlemen of fortune, whos

families are nearly connected with the Court, are preparing to embark f

America, by each of whom I shall, without disguise, write you th

characters they sustain here . I have told them that merit is the sole objec

with the Congress . . . .

August 15, 177
. . . M . Coudray was not in the Turkish service as I was informed ; it

was a gentleman [Kermorvan] who proposes accompanying him ; but he is

an officer of the first eminence, an Adjutant-General in the French service,

and his prospects here of rising are exceeding good ; but he is dissatisfied

with an idle life . His proposals in general have been, that he should be

General of the Artillery, and subject only to the orders of Congress or their

Committee of War, or of their Commander-in-Chief of the Army where he

might be . In the next place, that he should rank as Major-General, and

have the same wages, etc ., coming in as youngest Major-General for the

present, and rising of course .

Many other particulars are not yet adjusted ; but considering the importance of having two hundred pieces of brass cannon, with every necessary article for twenty-five thousand men, provided with an able and ex

perienced General at the head of it, warranted by the Minister of this Court

to be an able and faithful man, with a number of fine and spirited young officers in his train, and all without advancing one shilling, is too tempting an

object for me to hesitate about, though I own there is a silence in my instructions. I therefore honestly declare I am at your mercy in this case,

and I have no uneasiness of mind on the occasion ; for should I be

sacrificed, it will be in that cause to which I have devoted my life . . . . The

terms of M . Coudray may be thought high ; but consider a person having a

certain and permanent service and leave his native country, to go he

hardly knows where, and it must be supposed he will ask at least as good

terms as he could have in his own country . . . .

-Force, American Archives, 5th

ser., 1 :1018,1020-21 .

Deane was right : volunteers like Coudray were venturing into the

unknown by joining the Continental Army and they deserved ample

rewards . But the certain alienation of native American officers as well as the

volunteers' self-interested desire ultimately to'advance their own rank in

France were important factors that Deane ought to have weighed more

carefully .

In September 1776 Deane concluded an agreement with Coudray. The

terms were exceedingly generous and sure to evoke renewed controversy 

The agreement gave Coudray the rank of major general and command of

the artillery and the yet-to-be-formed corps of engineers . He was to receive a

pension equal to half-pay ; and when he traveled on duty the Congress was to

supply him with horses and carriages, a benefit Washington and Lee had

been seeking in vain for engineers already in service .
3. AGREEMENT BETWEEN DEANE AND COUDRAY FOR SERVICE IN

THE CONTINENTAL ARMY

September 11, 1776

1 . The Sieur Du Coudray, under title of General of Artillery and Ordnance, and in rank of Major-General in the Forces of the United Colonies,

shall have the direction of whatever relates to the Artillery and Corps of

Engineers, under the order and control only of the Congress of the United

Colonies, their Committee of War, or the Commander-in-Chief for the time

being .

2. The Corps of Artillery and Engineers, as well officers as soldiers

composing the same, shall be under his immediate command, with all the

privileges and authority annexed to such command respecting either

rewards or punishments, and in case of vacancy in said corps by death,

removal, or new creations, it shall be for him to recommend to the Congress, or their Committee of War, the persons proper for filling the same.

3. Whatever relates to the supplying the said corps with provision, to

the construction of artillery and fortification, to any plan or scheme

relative to these objects, will be consulted on with him, and the execution

of whatever may be agreed on committed to him, as within his department

4. His allowance for pay and table shall be the same as to a MajorGeneral in the service of the United Colonies in a separate command

Should he be made a prisoner, the same shall be continued . Should he by

accident of war in the said service be rendered incapable of serving, or

should he choose after six years' service to retire, he shall be allowed an

honourable annual stipend or reward by the Congress, the particular

amount of which Mr. Deane refers to the honourable Congress .

5. Monsieur Du Coudray shall be furnished with an Adjutant, two Aidsde-Camp or one Aid-de-Camp, and a Secretary, and Designer, at the expense and in the pay of the United Colonies .

6. Monsieur Du Coudray's expenses, also those of his servants, in

their voyage to America, shall be refunded him by the United Colonies . . . .

11 . Considering the particular situation of Monsieur Du Coudray as a

foreigner, and his uncommon exertions for and in behalf of the United Colonies, it is agreed, that his pension or annual stipend on his quitting the

service, as afore-agreed, shall be the one-half of his pay and table whilst

serving, or other equivalent gratification .

12. Horses and carriages will be supplied Monsieur Du Coudray, at th

expense of the United Colonies, when he has occasion for removing from

one part of the Continent to another; also to the officers proposing to go
out with him, or advance to him such sum as will be sufficient to procure

them in the Colonies where they are serving.

13. Considering the situation of the American war at this time, Mr.

Deane thinks that two Engineers, four Captains, and four Lieutenants,

with the proposed Adjutant-General will be as many as he can prudently

agree for at present. . . .

-Force, American Archives, 5th

ser., 2:284-85.

In early December 1776 Benjamin Franklin joined Deane in Paris to

negotiate a treaty of alliance with the French. Upon his arrival Franklin

reiterated Congress’s call for engineers to King Louis XVI, who responded

BENJAMIN FRANKLIN AT THE COURT OF FRANCE. Franklin Franklin

spent almost nine years,1776-85, in France, furthering the interests

of America.

Record Group 66, National Archives

11
by ordering the Comte de St . Germain, his minister of war, to recruit 

group of Royal Engineers to serve in America. St . Germain turned to Loui

Lebegue Duportail, an engineer officer whose work the previous summer o

a new set of regulations for the Royal Engineers had earned him the wa

minister's acclaim .

Duportail offered his services to the American commissioners on con

dition that his grade in the Continental Army would be higher than the on

he currently held in the French army . Then on 11 January 1777 he de

manded command of all engineers in America . The next day Duportail lai

down further stipulations : his pay was to begin on the day of his departur

from France and his rank in America was to be higher than his new rank b

brevet upon leaving France. Unlike Coudray, Duportail agreed to pay hi

own passage to America.

As a treaty of alliance had yet to be signed, the king ordered utmos

secrecy surrounding the preparations to send French engineer officers to ai

in the American Revolution . To accompany him to America Duportai

chose three men of lesser rank in the Royal Engineers-Jean Baptiste d

Gouvion, Jean Baptiste Joseph de Laumoy, and Louis de Shaix La Radit-re 

By 17 February 1777 all four volunteers had signed contracts with th

American commissioners .

13 Granted a two-year leave by the king, the

sailed from Nantes under assumed names. The group landed initially a

Santo Domingo ; and from there, except for Laumoy, who was detained b

illness, they made their way first to North Carolina and then to the seat o

Congress at Philadelphia .

Meanwhile, under the terms of the Deane-Coudray agreement, severa

French officers signed up as members of Coudray's staff . They began arriv

ing in America in March and April 1777 . Because Coudray's actions jeopar

dized the secrecy of French aid, the French government ordered him to re

nounce his commission- and stay home . He ignored the order, stole out of th

country, and finally reached America in May. Additional officers hoping t

join the Coudray group crossed the Atlantic of their own accord .

The need for engineers remained acute, particularly in the south, wher

Charles Lee complained with characteristic hyperbole : "There is not a ma

or officer in the Army, that knows the difference betwixt a Chevaux d

Frise, and a Cabbage Garden ." 14 However, the price of attracting engineer

threatened to wreck the chances of obtaining any more . Most members o

Congress and Army officers were revolted to find foreigners granted com

missions that in many cases placed the newcomers above Americans alread

in service . When Coudray presented himself in Philadelphia, his receptio

was chilly . In the eyes of Congress Deane had gone too far.

Washington recognized the problem too and suggested restraint in mak

ing promotions, except in the case of artillerists and engineers . Engineers

wrote the Commander in Chief, "are absolutely necessary and, not to be ha

here, but proper precaution must be observed in the choice of them ." 1

1 2
Washington declared further that he had two engineers (not named) "who,

in my judgment know nothing of the duty of Engineers . Gentlemen of this

profession ought to produce sufficient and authentic testimonials of their

skill and knowledge, and not expect that a pompous narrative of their Services and loss of papers (the usual excuse) can be a proper introduction into

our Army." 16

In July 1777 tensions mounted . On the 5th Duportail and his companions presented their credentials to Congress. The Royal Engineer

grumbled that Coudray had "duped Deane" and "made a . . . bargain fo

himself, and all the officers with him ." 17 At the same time Major General

John Sullivan, Nathaniel Greene, and Henry Knox threatened to resig

because Coudray the newcomer would outrank them .

Still more volunteers, led by the Marquis de Lafayette, a wealth

nobleman inspired by the American cause, also arrived in Philadelphia i

July. They too had promises from Deane . Congress was in a quandary. Th

various groups of French volunteers had besieged James Lovell, a French

speaking member of Congress's Committee on Foreign Applications, fo

assistance. Much to his displeasure, several of the French officers made hi

their interpreter and liaison with Congress . Lovell admitted to fellow con

gressman William Whipple, the "contending endless talkers and writer

have entirely destroyed me," and noted, "there is as much pulling and haul

ing about rank and pay, as if we had been accustomed to a militar

establishment here 150 years." 18 Yet Lovell took up Duportail's cause .

Lovell's support for Duportail was based on his conviction that the fou

Royal Engineers were "the only officers . . . procured by the real politica

Agents of Congress ." The congressman further argued that the fou

"legitimate" engineers were being grossly underpaid and that the nature o

their profession demanded that horses be made available to them . Signifi

cantly, Lovell opposed utilizing "military strangers" except in the case o

engineers and one or two officers to serve as instructors-at-large for th

Army. Once again the critical shortage of engineers and the desperate nee

for their technical services combined to overcome American uneasines

about enlisting foreigners.

James Lovell to George Washington.

Sir

4 . "THERE IS SINGULAR HARDSHIP IN THE CASE OF

THESE GENTLEMEN"

Philadelphia, July 24th (1777

. . . The Corps of Engineers is very honorable in France ; and officers fro

it are sought by different european Powers . These Gentlemen who ar

1 3
come over into our service made an agreement with our Commissioners t

rise one degree from the rank they held at home, upon a supposition tha

the practice of Europe had been regarded here . But when they arrived,

they found instances very different wth . respect to officers in all othe

corps . It was their mishap also to see a Major of Artillery [Coudray] affect

ing to be exalted four ranks, as a Chief in his proper line and theirs also 

They made a representation of these circumstances and appealed to the

Equity of Congress. But, they had arrived at a time when the Infatuation o

some here and the wild conduct of one abroad [Deane] had rendered 

Spirit of reformation absolutely necessary as to the point of rank . The in

genuous, however, must own that there is singular hardship in the case o

these Gentlemen . The only officers ever sent for by us, procured by the

real political Agents of Congress, coming out with the good wishes of the

Fench Ministry, being of undoubted rank and ability in their Profession,

find themselves in the Dilemma of becoming the first examples of our new

reforming Spirit, or else of going home during a Campaign, which thei

high sense of honor will not allow . . . . Mr. Du C[oudray] having created

himself to the Command of Artillery and Engineers, persuaded Mr. Deane

that it would be impossible to get any from the military corps of Engineers

now called royal because their Demands would be so exorbitant; and that

it would be also unnecessary, because we ought not to build fortified

Places in America to serve as secure Holds to our Enemy when once

taken from us ; and that therefore, a few Bridge and Causeway-makers

would answer all the ends of military Engineers . Such he brought with

him ; who were quite ready to fall under the command of an artillery direc

tion ; when not the lowest officer of the royal corps of Engineers would

have submitted to such a novel pretension . . . . Mr. Du C[oudray] has

given full scope to his species of Ingenuity, here [before Congress], as i

LOUIS LEBEGUE DUPORTAIL. Charles Willson Peale painted this

portrait of Duportail (1743-1802), who served as Chief Engineer in

the Continental Army during 1777-83. Born to a noble family in

Pithiviers, France, Duportail attended the French school of military

engineering at Mezieres and was a Royal Engineer when he

volunteered for the American Revolution . He served with distinction

during the Philadelphia campaign and at West Point, frequently

helping Washington coordinate plans with officers commanding the

French forces in America . Captured at Charleston in 1780, Duportail

was exchanged in time to command the engineers at the Battle of

Yorktown . He returned to France in 1783 to become a brigadier

general of infantry andlater secretary of war. His support for

Lafayette during the French Revolution forced him into hiding . To

escape the Reign of Terror, Duportail fled to America and as an

emigne settled on a farm near Valley Forge. Heeding Napoleon's

order that emigr6 officers return home, Duportail sailed for France in

1802. His ship was lost at sea .

Independence National Historical Park Collection

1 4

the Neighbourhood of Mr. Deane. I have been told that he has said, if he

could not be employed himself, he would bring it about that these other

should not. This may be an absolute Falsehood . But, I will own it comes

the nearest of anything, which I can conceive of, to explain the delay

which have taken place in regard to these Engineers, who ought to hav

been sent to your Excellency long ago . They have remained subject to the

crucifying expences of this city, because their employment seemed to in

terfere wth . Mr. Du Coudray's Pretensions, tho' those very Pretensions

had been rejected . Your Excellency would doubtless smile, if you should

ever hear, that even a number of Peasants disputed 3 days about the dif

ference between the consequences of a man's being Colonel in Chief, o

First Colonel, or Colonel to take rank and Command of all heretofore ap

pointed, or Colonel commandant of Engineers . Would not a Brigadier o

Major General of Engineers alike annul the supremacy of the differently

worded commissions? Or rather, do not the 4 different modes give lik

command? I shall pass from rank to pay. These Gentlemen not only fa

from the prophesied exorbitancy in demand of rank, never received one

shilling in France as Gratification ; tho' others who were not sent fo

received large sums, and claim pay from their embarkation, and even pensions for life . But Doctr. Franklin, supposing it would be less trouble to

himself and more agreeable to the Engineers to see to their own pas

sages, stipulated their pay from the 13th . of Febry . As no Regulations

have yet been made in regard to Cavalry or Engineers, these Gentlemen

have received 5 months pay as Infantry; which will not refund the ex

penses of their voyage . I am really uneasy when I find manly honourable

Intentions do not meet with at least equal emoluments with artful suspicious tricking contractors . If these officers do not walk to camp, it is not

because they were furnished by the Board of war with horses upon my application for them : And yet the nature of their Profession demands a provision of this Kind . Are they suddenly to reconnoitre a Camp, a River, a

shoar, or a whole neighbouring country thro' which an army is to march,

and to make the speediest return to the Generals, on foot? I trust your Ex

cellency when asking for Engineers had ideas of something beyond what

the sinister views of an ambitious foreigner has sought to inspire us with

here; which is forming a causeway, or cutting a ditch or planking a bridge 

And I shall consequently rest satisfied that you will receive the Officers

now presenting themselves to you, and secure to them such honors and

emoluments as you shall find them to merit from their education and

abilities exemplified underyourcommand.

No one has been more backward than I in desiring to see foreigners i

our service, to the slight of my countrymen. And, except Engineers, 

could not admit the thought of our wanting any military strangers othe

than one or two veteran Adjutants or Majors, who know our language well

and could serve as instructors-at-large to our spirited and well-attached

young american Officers.

1 6
I wish these Engineers could speak english better than they do; but

they can receive orders and give them in english, and will speedily learn to

speak . . . .

On 29 July 1777, when Duportail, Radiere, and Gouvion reported t

Washington's headquarters near Philadelphia, they found Coudray alread

at work on defenses in the vicinity . Sensing the friction between Coudray

and Duportail, Washington sent the latter back to Philadelphia . He con

fided to Maj . Gen. Horatio Gates, the commander at Philadelphia, "

perceive there is a jealousy between them [Duportail and Coudray] and set

ting them to work together would only create confusion and widen th

Breach ." 19

Throughout the summer of 1777 Duportail continued to press for accep

tance of Lovell's argument : the Royal Engineers were the only engineer

legitimately authorized by Congress . Even though Congress on July 22 at

tempted to soothe Duportail by voting him seniority and command over al

previously appointed engineers, controversy continued to surround Coudray. On August 11 Congress appointed a special committee to defin

Coudray's powers, for the time being depriving him of his command dutie

and naming him to the innocuous post of "Inspector General of Ordnance

and Military Manufactories ."

The Coudray problem aggravated the inherently difficult engineerin

situation until mid-September, when Coudray's nervous horse jumped fro

a pontoon bridge into the Schuylkill River. Coudray drowned .

Coudray's death made Duportail's position secure. Yet in the fall of 177

the Royal Engineers nearly decided to return home because they felt mis

treated. They were particularly disturbed about matters of pay, perquisites

and rank . Having used promises of rank and pay to attract foreign volun

teers, particularly engineers, the rebels were now not fulfilling their pledges 

Although the patriots could ill afford to lose Duportail's services, a numbe

of times during the war they came perilously close to doing just that.

By November Congress had still not paid the French engineers an

Washington was loaning them horses and servants. As demonstrated in th

following two documents, Duportail's response to this situation wa

prompted by a genuine feeling of humiliation and real need. In seeking 

settlement of pay and perquisites, he argued that engineers deserved mor

pay as their duty in comparison to other officers "is much more laboriou

and painful ." Moreover, because engineers were frequently away from cam

and thereby facing higher living expenses, they deserved special compensa

tion . Horses and servants were added necessities .

1 7

-Burnett, Letters of Members

of Congress, 2:417-20.
Although he commanded all engineers, Duportail found the rank of co

onel intolerable. He no longer accepted Congress's argument that h

promotion and those of his companions were being delayed to discoura

claims by other foreigners seeking advancement . In Duportail's view t

Chief Engineer should have been at least a brigadier general to earn respe

for his opinions among the generals he frequently advised and to gain co

pliance with his commands . Moreover, Duportail contended, higher ra

would silence the personal insults leveled by those "who do not love t

french."

5. "I HAVE HERE REQUESTED NOTHING BUT WHAT IS ABSOLUTEL

NECESSARY FOR OUR SERVICE"

Memorial of Louis Duportail to Congress .

I beg to lay before the honourable congress the following requisitio

to be by them determined or to authorize his excellency general washing

ton to Settle them according the knowledge he has of our Service .

1 . To Know what pay is allowed to our rank, I would observe that t

pay of engineers in europe is much higher than any of the other o

ficers, it is, that the duty of an engineer is much more laborious an

painful, in time of war their pay is raised Because in actual Servi

their expenses are much increased, they are obliged to be co

tinually out to acquire a Knowledge of the country, therefore canno

live So cheap as in camp.

2. To fix the number of horses, a lieutenant engineer in france hav

tow [two] horses, I hope it will not Be thought unreasonable when 

ask tow for a lieutenant colonel and tow for a major, I ask three f

me Because it is necessary that I Be always near the general [Wash

ington] .

3. To fix the rations of forage according the number of horses, when 

our rations the number fixed for your officer in the artillery in t

Same rank as our Seems to me Sufficient .

4. As it is impossible to find here Servants, I hope that his excellen

general washington may be allowed to appoint us out of the troops 

5. There are Several Small expences attending our Service, for an 

stance the labourers we are obliged to employ, proper, colours, a

to Be considered, it is our custom to make this a Separate accoun

Signed By the engineer who has employed those things . And aft

By me, and Soon after By his excellency the general washington .

I beg the honourable congress to observe that I have here request

nothing but what is absolutely necessary for our Service, as we must jo

1 8

Fall 177
the army as Soon as possible I hope for an Speedy answer, and if the

requisitions accepted, that we may Be allowed our pay to commence the

13th of february as has Been fixed ; if the honourable congress authorized

his excellency general washington to settle this Business, I ask to the

honourable congress to let me have 200 dollars, and 150 to mr . d e la

radiere and the same to m de Gouvion . We want absolutely that monney to

be provided with every thing for the campain ; for our purses have Been

empty in our passage from france, and what we have received is very far

from that we have expended . . . .

6. "THE CHIEF ENGINEER SHOULD HAVE A RESPECTABLE RANK

IN THE ARMY"

Louis Duportail to the President of Congress.

Sir:

-Papers of the Continental

Congress, roll 51 .

November 13, 1777

When we [the Royal Engineers] entered the Service of the united

States, we publicly declared to the honorable Congress that we would

Serve during this campaign only in the Stations of colonel, lieutenant

colonel and major. . . . The congress found our reasons well grounded ;

but wished that we might, for the present, remain satisfied with our commissions, to give an example and in order to Stop the pretensions and

Claims of the french officers and other foreigners . We were told that it was

intended that the different grades Should be considered and regarded as

on a level with the commissions in the european armies ; and to accustom

to consider them in the Same light, but in the mean time we were promised that we Should not [be] left long with the commissions we then accepted and that the congress only wanted to have an opportunity of Saying that a It colonel in the royal corps of french Engineers had been

Satisfied in this army with the rank of colonel, a major in Said corps with

the rank of It . Colonel, a Captain with that of a major .

As this Scheme of government Seeme'd to us very sound and

Judicious, and that we wished from the very beginning to be useful we

consented to Serve with our present commissions, but as we are to pay a

proper attention to our rank and to the corps we belong to in france, as it

must not be Said against us, that, when the french Engineers are usually

preferred in foreign Courts we have been here worse use'd than the other

french officers, we declared to the honorable Congress, that we would

Serve during this campaign only, with our actual rank.

1 9
Now as the campaign is drawing to its end, and Supposing that, co

trary to our wishes, we Should be induce'd to leave this continent, as w

have hardly time enough left to reach france towards next January (whi

is the time appointed for appearing at our corps if we do not continue t

Service here) I have the honour to present your Excellency with the pr

sent petition, Demanding for me the rank of Brigadier-general, for Mr . d

la Radiere of colonel, for Mr . de Gouvion the rank of It . Colonel .

Intreating your Excellency to convey our demand to the honorable co

gress. I could undouted apply directly to congress Since i ask only the a

complishing of the promises made to me; but i own that the ranks we ca

for would flatter us infinitely more if they were granted to us by the reco

mendation of your Excellency . The motives i have already mentioned on

concern our Selves . But i could add Several relating to the Service . In 

the european armies the Chief Engineer is almost always a general o

ficer, because as he is to take orders from the commander in Chief only 

is fit he Should himself be a general officer . More over the Chief Engine

who has a most essential department Should have a certain weight and 

regarded in the army, as he is continually in the Case of consulti

general officers he ought to be upon an equal footing with them, or el

being oblig'd to Submit to their opinion or Shy of defending his own, h

Zeal Cools by degrees ; he withdraws, and Soon becomes an usele

member in the army.

The execution of the different works requires that the chief Engine

Should have a respectable rank in the army, I must add that it is mo

necessary in this country than elsewhere . Have i not Seen the colonels 

the army and even the militia colonels refusing to follow my directio

about the works . They have been accustomed to Say that they are c

onels as much as I and had no orders to receive from me; according

each of them worked as he thought proper.

I cannot express all the difficulty i met with, and i can Say that i h

need of the largest, Stock of patience and Zeal to be kept from abbando

ing them entirely .

As it is not just that we Should lead a more disagreeable life than t

last officer of the army, i will beg leave from his Excellency to add a f

reasons more . The rank of colonel unless with the command of a regime

is very little respected, because it is given to a vast many people who a

not in the military line. We Suffer very much from this defect in t

establishment and indeed very little regard is paid us in the army . If 

take up quarters we have to contend for them ; the Soldiers even offer 

take them from us and we have often been forced to drive them out . If 

pass before the line, the Soldiers who do not love the french and ev

some ill-bred officers give us bad language, our Servants are insulted, o

Wagoners are chased from every place, and when they mention 

names and ranks of their masters, they are laught at; thus on public S

vice and in private life we meet with anxieties and mortifications which 

2 0
can bear no longer. The rank of general officer which i call for will immediately put a Stop to those inconveniences, as it is respected here it

will give our corps the becoming weight and regard So as to make us take

a liking to our functions and to give us the means to fulfill them in the most

useful manner for the Service of the united States .

Louis Duportail to the President of Congress.

Sir:

21

-Papers of the Continental

Congress, roll 51 .

Congress accepted Duportail's immediate arguments pertaining to rank,

making him a brigadier general on 17 November 1777 . But the issues of pay

and perquisites and that of command relationships among all of the Army's

engineers were not resolved to his satisfaction for some time .

In considering the Royal Engineers superior to all other engineers in

America, whom he viewed as "engineers only by name," Duportail identified a key problem that troubled Washington as well . Whatever his dis

contents, Duportail would serve as Chief Engineer for the duration of the

war.

7. "WE BELIEVED THAT THE CONGRESS WOULD BE SENSIBLE"

Camp White plaines, 27th August 1778

His Excellency Gen . Washington intending to establish in the Department of which I have the honour to be Chief, proper Order and Connection, I must give you notice of a Matter that is only for the Congress to

determine .

When we first Came into the Country (I mean the few french Engineers

sent by the Court) we inquired if there were in the American Army any

Engineers, either born in the Country or Strangers, who had practised

already in that Profession and thought able to do that duty. We learned

that there were not-that all the Gent . who had the title of Engineers had

received it for the first time of the Congress-and they were beholden for

it to the necessity the Congress were under, at the time they were ap

pointed, of giving Commissions in that department to the first gentlemen

that offered their Service.

We then conceived it against Reason and the advantage of your Ser

vice, that we Should be exposed to follow the directions of those new

Engineers; we believed that the Congress would be Sensible, that it would

be unjust and contradictory to ask the Court of france for Engineers and t
place them in their Art under Persons who are Engineers only by nam

that to do so would abase our abilities on a level with theirs, and therefo

hinder our being more useful than they. Thus we required of the Congre

that not any of us Should be ever commanded by them. The Congre

found our request just and reasonable . They made a resolve by wich I w

to command all the Engineers employed in the United States, whatev

might be their Commission . The Same was expressed in my Brevet. As 

the three other french Engineers, it was said to us that their Commissio

were Constructed So, that they had a right to command the oth

Engineers who had not Similar commissions . The difference was that o

gentlemen were Called Col, Lt Col or major of the Engineers whereas t

others were called only Col . Lt. Col . or major Engineer. Thus it w

understood likely, that they were in the Same Case of any office

whatever, either of foot or Horse, that has a commission of Col . or Lt Co

and is not yet Col . or Lt Col . of the Reg[imen]t-l, is Commission do n

hinder him being under the command of the Col . or Lt Col . of the Re

even of the major. Yet Some time ago there happened some difficu

about it-A Col . Engineer, would not acknowledge Mr . d e la Radiere, Co

of the Engineers, for his Superior. It is a matter of importance, Sir, th

these things Should be determined, and I beg you do your endeavors 

have them as Soon as possible . . . .

-Papers of the Continent

Congress, roll 51 .

Though most of the Coudray group ultimately returned to France, Co

gress happily commissioned three of his associates as engineer officers . 21 

addition, three other Frenchmen received engineer commissions during t

first six months of 1778 . 22 Congress issued the last engineer commission to 

foreigner on 2 March 1780 . 23 Despite the influx of foreign volunteers, t

Army never had as many engineers as it needed.

Washington's compelling need for technical assistance also forced him 

seek creation of a separate geographer's department to supplement the wo

of the engineers . Reconnaissance of potential battle sites, camps, areas 

troop movement, and enemy positions was vital . "The want of accura

maps of the country which has hitherto been the scene of war," Washingt

complained early in 1777, "has been of great disadvantage to me ." Whi

the British had a plethora of well-executed maps, inadequate facilities ma

extremely difficult the duplication of what maps Washington's overwork

engineers could produce . To remedy the problem he proposed that t

Army employ men specifically to map "Roads, Rivers, Bridges, and For

over them, the mountains and the passes through them .

"24

As usual Washington had to badger Congress to act on his request 

Army cartographers . Finally in mid-July 1777, he proposed the appoin

22
ment of "a good Geographer to Survey the Roads and take Sketches of the

Country where the army is to Act," and suggested placing the geographer in

charge of the guides, "who must have a head to procure, govern, and pay

them ." 25 For the Army's first geographer Washington nominated Robert

Erskine, a "thoroughly skilled" man who had already assisted the Army as a

mapmaker and who before the war had developed a steam pump, worked

on a centrifugal hydraulic engine, written on rivers and tides, and been accepted into the Royal Society of London .

Erskine readily agreed to the appointment as "geographer and surveyor

of the roads." As revealed in his letter of consent, Erskine possessed a keen

sense of the problems inherent in surveying and mapping. He carefully

outlined the needs and capabilities of his department so "that more may not

be expected than it is practicable to perform ." As assistants he preferred

"young gentlemen of Mathematical genius, who are acquainted with the

principles of Geometry, and who have a taste for drawing." The new

geographer was both eager to begin work and highly qualified .

8 . ERSKINE OUTLINES "WHAT MAY REALLY BE ACCOMPLISHED BY A

GEOGRAPHER"

Robert Erskine to George Washington .

May it please Your Excellency :

. . . It is then perhaps proper to begin with a general view of the nature

of the business in order to shew what may really be accomplished by a

Geographer, that more may not be expected than it is practicable to perform ; and that an estimate may be made of the number of assistants required should the Map of any particular district be required in a given time .

It is obvious that in planning a country a great part of the ground must be

walked over, particularly the banks of Rivers and Roads ; as much of which

may be traced and laid down in three hours as could be walked over in

one ; or in other words a Surveyor who can walk 15 miles a day may plan 5

miles; if the country is open, and stations of considerable length can be

obtained, then perhaps greater dispatch can be made ; very little more,

however, in general can be expected ; if it is considered that the Surveyor,

besides attending to the course and measuring the distance of the way he

is traversing, should at all convenient places where he can see around

him, take observations and angles to Mountains, hills, steeples, houses

and other objects which present themselves, in order to fix their site; to

correct his work; and to facilitate its being connected with other Surveys .

A Surveyor might go to work with two Chain-bearers and himself; but in

2 3

Ringwood, August 1, 1777
this case he must carry his own instruments, and some of them must f

quently traverse the ground three times over at least ; therefore, to preve

this inconvenience and delay, as men enough can be had from Cam

without additional expense, six attendants to each surveyor will be pr

per; to wit, two Chain-bearers, one to carry the Instrument, and three 

hold flag staffs ; two flags, indeed, are only wanted in common ; but thr

are necessary for running a straight line with dispatch ; and the third fl

may be usefully employed in several cases besides . From what o

Surveyor can do, it will therefore appear that in making a plan, like all oth

business, the more hands are employed in it, the sooner it may be a

complished ; likewise, that the director of the Surveyors will have f

employment in making general observations, and connecting the differe

surveys as they come in, upon one general Map; and, at any rate, that 

correct plan must be a work of time .

A great deal however may be done towards the formation of an usef

Map, by having some general outlines justly laid down; and the situation 

some remarkable places accurately ascertained ; from such data, oth

places may be pointed out, by information and computed distances ; 

such a manner as to give a tolerable idea of the Country; especially wi

the assistance of all the maps in being, which can be procured : and thi

perhaps, is as much as can be expected, should plans be required to ke

pace with the transitions of War.

Navigable Rivers, and those which cannot be easily forded, a

likewise the capital roads, should be laid down with all the accuracy poss

ble ; but, in the Map of a country, the general course of fordable rive

need only be attended to; it not being practicable to express small win

ings but on large scale, the same accuracy not being required here whi

is necessary to ascertain the quantity and boundaries of private propert

In general, therefore, the adjacence to, and intersection of, such rive

with roads, will determine their course with sufficient exactness : t

situation of woods and mountains, too, may be remarked in a similar ma

ner.

Young gentlemen of Mathematical genius, who are acquainted with t

principles of Geometry, and who have a taste for drawing, would be t

most proper assistants for a Geographer. Such, in a few days practic

may be made expert surveyors . The instrument best adapted for accura

and dispatch is the Plain-Table; by this, the Surveyor plans as he pr

ceeds, and-not having his work to protract in the evening-may atte

the longer to it in the day. One of these instruments, with a chain and t

iron-shod arrows, should be provided for each of the Surveyors it may 

thought proper to employ. . . .

24

-Heusser, Washington's M

Maker, pp. 163-65.
yy 

ypp

of the Army received pay increments. Despite support for increased p

from both Erskine-who emphasized his department's contributions to 

war effort-and Washington, Congress rejected the surveyors' request . A

result it became difficult to recruit surveyors . 27

Simeon DeWitt and Benjamin Lodge to Robert Erskine.

Dear Sir:

9 . "WE ARE FAR FROM WISHING TO RAISE FORTUNES

BY THE CALAMITIES OF OUR COUNTRY"

As the Directors of our affairs undoubtedly wish to do justice betwe

the Public and its servants, we beg leave to request the favor of you, wh

arrived at Philadelphia, to represent the difficulties under which 

Surveying Department labors at present, which, we flatter ourselves, o

requires to be known to be redressed .

Formerly common Surveyors, whose acquaintance with the busine

was limited by the Needle and Protractor, were paid at least fifteen s

lings per day, exclusive of their expenses; while persons of ackno

edged abilities received from twenty to forty shillings and upwards; whi

was a considerable inducement for those whose genius pointed that w

to qualify themselves for the profession ; whereas, our pay at present is 

more than two Continental Dollars a day, without any kind of allowance 

emolument, except a ration and travelling expences, a charge allowed 

every profession .

The officers in the line of the Army, have received a considerable ad

tion to their pay, under the denomination of subsistance money; besi

the benefit of State supplies: and the wages of other Departments of 

Army, whose pay was formerly less than ours, has been grea

25

Morristown, February 12th, 1

augmented; while we have been entirely overlooked, merely for want of

having proper application in our behalf.

In the present case, we are far from wishing to raise fortunes by the

calamities of our Country; but at the same time we believe our Country is

as far from wishing us to present our fortunes to them, along with our ser

vices, without any prospect of reimbursement, which at present is the

case . Our pay, so far from supplying us with clothes, has not been adequate, for these twelve months past, to the furnishing us with shoes, and

now is not sufficient for washing.

If therefore the continuance of our Service be thought necessary, we

have no doubt that the Surveying Department will be so arranged, as in

some degree to make up for the Depreciation ; and fix our pay in such a

manner, as shall prevent the like inconvenience in future ; the readiest way

to do which, in our opinion, would be to regulate it by the price of Specie .

-Heusser, Washington's Map

Maker, pp. 208-09.

Upon Erskine's sudden death in October 1780, his 24-year-old assistant,

Simeon DeWitt, immediately succeeded him . The following spring Congress

created a new position, geographer general of the southern army . 28 Capt.

Thomas Hutchins, a respected engineer and cartographer, filled the post 

During the climactic Yorktown campaign of 1781, both geographers and

their assistants provided invaluable aid to the Army. After the peace DeWitt

resigned to become surveyor general for New York State ; Hutchins remained with the Army to direct surveys in the Northwest Territory . 29

SURVEY OF NEW YORK AND CONNECTICUT . Under the direction of Robert Erskine (1735 -80), thegeographer's department accomplished a tremendous amount of work . This survey, prepared in

1778 by Erskine with the assistance of William Scull, was one of the

numerous sketches designed to aid Washington. The key, at right,

shows symbols for roads, both surveyed and unsurveyed, and for footpaths, "commanding heights, "and taverns. By 1780 Erskine reported

that "from the Surveys made, and materials collecting and already

procured, I could form a pretty accurate Map of the four States of

Pennsylvania, NewJersey, New York and Connecticut" (Erskine to

Philip Schuyler, 12 February 1780, quoted in Heusser, Washington's

Map Maker, p. 209) .

Courtesy New-York Historical Society, New York City

27
Chapter II

THE FORMATION OF THE CORPS OF ENGINEERS

AND THE RECRUITMENT OF ENGINEER TROOPS

In the autumn of 1776, Silas Deane continued to recruit experience

engineer officers abroad . At home, on September 16, Congress authorize

enlargement of the Continental Army to 88 infantry battalions . Col . Rufu

Putnam seized the opportunity and submitted to General Georg

Washington the first plan to establish a corps of engineers as a permanen

and distinct branch of the Army with its own regulations. In an explanator

letter, Putnam argued that engineer troops comprising artificers and sa

pers and miners were essential if the corps's officers were to execute fortific

tions satisfactorily . As Chief Engineer and a trusted advisor, Putnam press

Washington to act expeditiously.

Keenly aware that technically skilled officers were rare, Putnam r

garded the implementation of his plan as a means of supplying the Arm

with "regular-bred" engineers . As for himself, he said : "I . . . [have] no

the vanity to supose that my knowledge . . . [is] Such as to give me a Clai

to the first rank in a Corps of Engineers ."l He offered to resign in favor of 

more qualified. officer when the time came .

1 . "WITH OUT A CORE OF ENGENEERS . . . THE WORKS NEVER WIL

BE PROPERLY EXECUTED NOR DON IN AREASONABLE TIME"

Rufus Putnam to George Washington .

I Hope the Importence of the Subjects will be as Sufficient appollogie f

the Freedom I take in addressing your Excelency at this time . I have lon

Wondered that no Corps of Engeneers was yet Established . The Numbe

of Works to be Executed ; the Nesesity of Dispatch in them ; the Imposabi

ity for Common hands to be made at once to Comprehend what they ough

to do . With out a Core of Engeneers is Established the Works Never will b

properly Executed nor don in a Reasonable time . And I Cannot give m

Ideas of Such a Core and there duty Better then In the Words of M

29

September 26, 177
Maigrets. 2 Speaking of them ; Subordinary Disepline he Sais the first pa

of the Disepline Consists of the Divition of one Corps Into Several. And t

Subdivition of the Latter into Still less; again: in the Construction of place

that Corps of Workmen are Devided into Several others Who are calle

Bands. The officers of Each of those Companys Should be Engeneer

And tis a Leading Circumstance to the Success of any action that th

Soldiers and there officers Should be acquainted with Each other Befor

hand . And tis from the Engeneers that the former are to Recive ordors f

the Works of attack ; defense; and Construction of places. Tis Evedent tha

the latter ought to be charged With the Conduct and Command of them 

Engineers are the Natural officers of Workmen. Ancient and consten

useage has Confirmed the practise. Again: if teachers Ware appointed t

Each of these priniple Corps, Such a Number of Hopefull youth might b

formed as would be a grate Benifit to the Service. These Work men ar

properly Speeking Soldiers or Rather Both one and tother. Ther

Business Being Either Fighting or Working as ocation Requiers . The fir

Excersise to be taught them is the use of there arms ; the Next is to kee

them to there Business. The third kind of Exercise is the Instructing the

in the Several forms of Dementions and Properties of Works. Again. A

Workmen Imployed in Building of any kind may Serve very well for Work

of Fortification. Again: by this means you may have good Miners and Sap

pers in abundence who in time of Seages may Ease the Engineers an

Even Supply the Want of them up on ocation. Two years Experiance ha

fully Convinced me Sir that till the Engineers are Rendered Intependent o

any other Department for there artificers till they have Miners and Sapper

or persons Seperate from the Common Futeague men to take Care o

Sinking the Ditch properly laying the turf well and to Build the parrape

with its propper Talus . I say till this is don No Engineer will be able to Ex

ecute his Works Well . Nor do them in a Reasonable time. The Service ha

already Suffered Much and will Continue So to do till Some Such Corps a

RUFUS PUTNAM. Millwright, surveyor, and member of a compan

of carpenters during the French and Indian War, Putnam

(1738-1824) served briefly as Washington's ChiefEngineer in 1776.

Despite Putnam's lack of training, the Commander in Chief quickly

grew to regard him as his favorite engineer. Even after taking a line

command at the end of 1776, Putnam continued to give Washingto

engineering advice, occasionally erecting fortifications or engaging 

reconnaissance . After the war Putnam surveyed the Maine territory

and, as a director of the Ohio Company, founded Marietta, Ohio.

President Washington appointed him judge of the Northwest Territory in 1790 and later named him the first surveyor general of the

United States. Theportrait is by Charles Willson Peale.

Independence National Historical Park Collection

30

what I have mentioned is Established and to Convince your Exilency that 

have no Intristed motives but the Common good ; in this adress I Beg leav

. . . to Inst the Department Serve the army are or may be So well Suplye

with Reguler Bread Engineers.

Rufus Putnam to George Washington.

-Washington Papers, roll 38 .

In his plan Putnam designated the carpenters as the largest grou

among the artisans in each company of sappers and miners . He set the ar

tisans' pay lower than that commonly given those hired on contract by th

Army. The regular pay of the Chief Engineer remained unchanged .

2 . PUTNAM DETAILS THE FIRST PLAN FOR A CORPS OF ENGINEERS

October 3, 177

The following establishment of artificers, etc., are in proportion to th

eighty-eight battalions of Infantry as one company to five and a half bat

talions, which I think is as small a proportion as will answer the ends pr

posed . The battalions in general may give fifty each for the works ; th

miners and sappers are in proportion to these nearly as one to ten . Th

carpenters will not exceed, if we are to consider they have in charge th

making of platforms, chevaux-de-frise gates, guardhouses, ordnanc

stores and barracks within the fortifications or necessary for the garriso

of each place, and many other things in the Engineer department. I hav

had no regard to carriages, beds, boxes, and other matters belonging 

the Artillery ; nor wagons or other carriages belonging to the Quarter

master's Department or barracks for the quartering of troops in general

nor any stores for the Commissary (except for the different fortresses

these only come within the Engineer department.) However, if th

carpenters are thought to exceed, there may be a part of them attached 

the Artillery, and the same with regard to smiths, and they may also b

employed in any other department, when the fortifications do not requir

their labou.r . For my own part I should rather choose to increase the

number than lessen them some; if the service does not require the

labour they are not to be paid more than other troops, and subject to li

duty . . . .
Each Company to consist of the following Officers, Artificers, etc ., their pay th

same as in the Batallion service:

In time of siege one-fourth of a dollar .

-Force, American Archives, 5t

ser., 2:892-93.

Noting that "some establishment . . . is highly necessary and will b

productive of the most beneficial consequences," Washington quickly for

warded Putnam's plan to Congress. 3 When Congress failed to act, Putna

resigned his commission as engineer colonel and took command of the 5t

Massachusetts Regiment . Truly dismayed by the loss of his favorit

engineer, Washington protested to Congress: "Altho' he is not a man o

Scientific knowledge, he is indefatigable in business and possesses mor

practicale Knowledge in the Art of Engineering than any other we have i

this Camp or Army. "4

Fleld and Staff Officers

in each Battalion month

Their pay per

in doll[ar]s

Their extra

allowances

Dollars per month

1 Colonel or Chief Engineer 60 15

1 Lieut . Col . or Chief Director 50 15 for a clerk

1 Major or Sub-Director 40 15

1 Surveyor 331/3 30 for 2 clerks

1 Adjutant

1 Chaplain

1 Surgeon Their pay the same

1 Mate as in the Battalion

1 Quartermaster service

1 Paymaster

Their extraordinary allowance per day

when employed in the works [in dollars]

1 Captain or Engineer in ordinary 1/2

1 Capt. Lieut. or Engineer extraordinary 318

1 Lieutenant or Sub-Engineer 113

1 Ensign or Practitioner Engineer 1/4

4 Sentinels or Trainmen of Band 1/6

4 Corporals or 2 Train men of Band 1/7

2 Drums and Fifes for each

30 Carpenters or Wheelwrights 1/8 man

5 Smiths 1/8

6 Masons 118

25 Miners and Sappers 118"

20 Labourers 1/12
Two months after taking command of the Army engineers in Novembe

1777, Brig . Gen. Louis Duportail renewed pressure on Washington a

Congress to establish a corps of engineers on a permanent basis . The Chi

Engineer put forward his first written plan-reproduced below-in Janua

1778 at Valley Forge, where recent experience had convinced him of t

need for additional engineer officers and for engineer troops.

At the outset Duportail stressed the Continentals' "deficiency in t

practice of maneouvres." Requiring added protection in the field, the Arm

had no choice but to employ fortifications . Duportail wisely pointed out t

value of artificial as opposed to natural fortifications : they were adaptab

to all situations . As engineer troops Duportail favored "vigorous Soldier

with "preference . . . given to Carpenters and Masons ."

After less than six months in America, Duportail already recognized t

need for a unified command of the engineer troops and for coordinat

planning of defenses . He urged particular care in selecting officers for t

companies of sappers as t!Ley would replace the French officers when th

returned home. This concern about the future of the engineer corps 

America was an important aspect of Duportail's plan . By proposing that t

sappers and miners be "instructed in every thing that relates to the constru

tion of Field works," he renewed Putnam's linkage of engineering educati

with the formation of companies of engineer troops .

Duportail preferred reassigning men from the line to the sappers a

miners rather than recruiting . Ultimately both approaches were trie

Neither worked very well .

3 . DUPORTAIL PROPOSES "AN ESTABLISHMENT WHICH IS

ABSOLUTELY INDISPENSABLE"

Louis Duportail's plan for an engineering corps .

34

January 18, 17

If fortification is necessary in any Armies, it is peculiarly so in thos

which like ours, from a deficiency in the practice of manoeuvres cann

oppose any to those of the enemy-being necessitated therefore 

receive him on their own ground, they ought always to be protected eith

by a natural or artificial Fortification, if it were only to have (under favor 

the resistance of this fortification) sufficient time to ascertain the Result 

the Enemy's movements-where his principal force is directed-a

where his greatest effort is to be made .

With respect to natural fortification-all situations do not afford it-a

to rely entirely upon it, would involve prodigious restraint in the choice 

Positions and exclude many excellent ones considered relatively to t
operations of War-it is therefore much more advantageous to have

recourse to artificial Fortification which is applicable in all Situations .

The very great difficulties which I experienced in the last Campaign,

both in setting on foot the most simple work and having it executed with

the necessary Conditions, induce me to propose to His Excellency an

Establishment which is absolutely indispensable, if he chooses to derive

hereafter those succours from Fortification which it holds out to him.

I would desire to have companies of Sappers formed-they should be

instructed in every thing that relates to the construction of Field

works-how to dispose of the Earth-to cut the Slopes-face with turf or

sods-make fascines-arrange them properly-cut and fix Palisades, etc .

The Sappers should be distributed in the different works, and a sufficient number of fatiguemen drawn from the line should be joined to them

to work under their direction, by which means the work would be executed

with a perfection and celerity which otherwise will ever be unknown in this

army-it is, I believe, altogether useless to enlarge upon a matter so obvious-I proceed therefore immediately to the principal Conditions on

which the Corps should be formed .

1st. The pay ought to be greater than that of ordinary foot soldiers

because the Service is exceedingly hard-this is the practice in Europe,

and they receive besides extraordinary pay when they work. Choice ought

to be made of vigorous Soldiers and the preference should be given to

Carpenters and Masons.

2. The Non-commissioned officers ought all to read and write, and be

intelligent persons of good characters .

3. The Companies of Sappers ought to be altogether under the Command of the Head Engineer-for if the Major Generals had a right to

employ them as they pleased, each, from a desire of fortifying his Camp in

his own way, would ask for Sappers and they would all be taken from the

Engineers . Besides as such partial works do not enter into the general

plan of the position they are for the most part useless, ill concerted, and

sometimes even dangerous .

4. The Captains of Sappers will be charged with the detail of their Companies, and each of them will be accountable to the Commanding officer

of the Engineers in order that he may always know the State of the Companies, their Strength, etc .

5. Each Company should always have its Tools with it, carried on a waggon provided for the purpose-The Company should be answerable for all

Tools lost-and in case any should be broken the pieces are to be pro

duced to the officer to whom the detail of the Company is to be committed .

The Camp of the Sappers to be assigned by the Commanding officer of

the Engineers adjacent to the place where they are to be employed .

Of the Officers-If it be important to choose the Privates in these Companies-it is much more so to choose the officers-The Congress ought,

3 5
in my opinion, to think of forming Engineers in this Country to replace u

when we shall be called home-The Companies of Sappers now propose

might serve as a school to them-they might there acquire at once th

practical part of the Construction of Works, and if choice be made o

young men, well bred, intelligent and fond of Instruction, we shall tak

pleasure in giving them principles upon the choice of Situations, and th

methods of adapting works to the ground .

If His Excellency approves my Plan-I would advise the speedy execu

tion of it-in order that the Companies may have served their Appren

ticeship before the opening of the Campaign .

These Companies ought not to be composed of Recruits-but Soldier

answering the description above should be taken from the line for the pur

pose . While I am employed in representing the defects of my branch o

the Army-I entreat His Excellency to observe that four Engineers are no

sufficient-of the four, one is always detached and sometimes two, whic

is the case at present-and I am left with only one officer-it is impossibl

for us to do the Service of the Army . . . .

-Kite, Duportail, pp . 47- 50

Although Washington strongly endorsed Duportail's suggestions, Con

gress again delayed action. 5 However, on a recommendation from the Com

mittee for Arrangements in the Army, Congress followed through on th

plans of Putnam, Duportail, and Washington and voted on 27 May 1778 t

establish three companies of engineer troops. The pay scale set by Congres

was considerably higher than that put forward by Putnam . The enginee

troops were to receive instruction in field fortifications . Their duties-th

first engineering duties spelled out by Congress other than those give

specifically to the Chief Engineer-were to guide fatigue parties in erectin

fortifications and to repair damaged works.

4 . "THEIR BUSINESS SHALL BE TO INSTRUCT THE FATIGUE PARTIES

Resolution of Congress .

May 27, 177

Resolved, That in the engineering department three companies b

established, each to consist of60 Privates, each 81/3

36

Dollars pay per month

1 Captain 50

3 Lieutenants, each 331/3

4 Sergeants, each 10

4 Corporals, each ,
These companies to be instructed in the fabrication of field works, as

far as relates to the manual and mechanical part . Their business shall be

to instruct the fatigue parties to do their duty with celerity and exactness:

to repair injuries done to the works by the enemy's fire, and to prosecute

works in the face of it . The commissioned officers to be skilled in the

necessary branches of mathematics, the non-commissioned officers to

write a good hand .

-Ford, Journals of the Continental Congress, 11 :541-42.

On 4 June 1778 Congress conveyed their resolution to the Commander in

Chief with orders to put the new arrangements into effect. He readily complied and in general orders issued on the 9th called for three captains and

nine lieutenants to officer the companies of sappers . These orders amplified

Congress's resolve by stating that "as this Corps will be a school of Engineers

it opens a Prospect to such Gentlemen as enter it and will pursue the

necessary studies with diligence, of becoming Engineers ." 6 Although

nothing was said specifically at the time about the type of curriculum envisioned or how the instruction would be carried out, it was clearly intended

that some sort of education would be available.

Difficulties in finding officers and enlisted men delayed full activation of

the companies of sappers and miners more than two years. Duportail began

interviewing officer candidates at once but volunteers came forward slowly

Of the eleven officers first nominated in March 1779, eight eventually

received commissions .

As Duportail sought officers for the companies of engineer troops, Congress on 11 March 1779 passed a resolution forming the Army engineers into

the Corps of Engineers . The Chief Engineer was required to report regularly

to the Continental Board of War and the Commander in Chief and to propose annually the most advantageous placement of the engineers .

5. "THE ENGINEERS . . . SHALL BE FORMED INTO A CORPS"

Resolution of Congress.

Resolved, That the engineers in the service of the United States shall

be formed into a corps, and styled the "corps of engineers ;" and shall

take rank and enjoy the same rights, honours, and privileges, with the

other troops on continental establishment .

That a commandant of the corps of engineers shall be appointed by

Congress, to whom their orders, or those of the Commander in Chief

shall be addressed; and such commandant shall render to the Com37

March 11, 1779

mander in Chief, and to the Board of War, an account of every matter

relative to his department:

That the engineers shall take rank in their own corps, according to the

dates of their respective commissions :

That every year, previous to the opening of the campaign, the commandant of the corps shall propose to the Commander in Chief and to the

Board of War, such a disposition of the engineers as he shall judge most

advantageous, according to the knowledge which he is supposed to have

of their talents and capacity.

Resolved, That the Board of War be empowered and directed to form

such regulations for the corps of engineers and companies of sappers and

miners, as they judge most conducive to the public service; and that the

Board report such allowances as they judge adequate and reasonable to

be made to officers of the corps of engineers for travelling charges,and

when on command at a distance from camp, or in places where they can

not draw rations .

-Ford, Journals of the Continental Congress, 13:305-06 .

Congress also devised regulations for the Corps of Engineers and the sappers and miners . After reviewing the regulations, Washington submitted

revisions relating to extra pay and travel allowances . Highly sensitive to

arousing jealousy in other branches of the Army, he contended that the

regulations should stipulate extra pay only "in cases of extraordinary fatigue

and danger ." As for travel allowances, he preferred to deal with the

engineers' special needs as part of a general regulation, "for discriminations

always produce discontent ." 7 Congress agreed and incorporated the

changes .

The regulations, which follow, outline the duties of the Chief Engineer

and his subordinates and clarify command relationships . Engineers were

directed to take part in selecting and planning encampments, to make plans

of the works under their direction, and to keep a journal of all sieges . The

sappers and miners' main task was to construct field works as directed by the

engineers, but when stationed at the head of the army on the march they

were to perform the duties of pioneers, clearing the roads of obstructions

and making repairs . Importantly, the regulations again addressed the issue

of education: engineers were to lecture on technical subjects to the sappers

and miners when they were not engaged with other duties .

LOUIS DUPORTAIL'S LETTER OF ACCEPTANCE . In this letter

to the president of Congress, dated 14 May 1779, Duportail accepted

appointment as commandant of the Corps ofEngineers.

Record Group 360, National Archives

39

6. REGULATIONS FOR THE CORPS OF ENGINEERS

From George Washington's general orders.

Record Group 360, National Archives

July 30, August 2, and August 3, 1779

1st. The Commandant of the Corps of Engineers or commanding

Engineer in an army shall render an account to the commanding General

of every thing that concerns the service of the Corps, and shall, in all

cases which relate to the department act under the orders and with the

concurence of the commanding General.

2ndly. Whenever the army is on a march an Engineer shall attend the

Quarter Master General or officer ordered to fix on the place of encamping, to give his advice and opinion thereon, and he shall also as soon as

may be take a plan of the camp and report it to the General .

3rdly. The Commandant of the corps of Engineers and the commanding Engineer in a separate Army shall send plans of the more important

positions and places occupied by the army in which they shall respec

tively serve to the board of War. These plans will of course be delivered to

the Commander in Chief or General commanding a separate army by the

Commandant of the Corps of Engineers or commanding Engineer .

The Subordinate Engineers will also report plans of works intrusted to

them by their superior officers, to such superior officers ; and no plans are

to be communicated by any Engineer to any other person or persons

whatever.

4thly. In the attack of Towns, Forts or fortified Camps of an enemy, by

regular approaches, the commanding Engineer shall direct the operations

under the authority and with the approbation of the commanding General,

to whom he shall daily transmit a plan, marking out the progress of the attack and shall likewise from time to time transmit to the Board of War a

plan of the said attacks together with a journal of the operations.

5thly. In a besieged place the commanding Engineer shall direct the

defence of it under the orders of the commanding officer of the Garrison

and he shall keep an exact journal of all the operations in order that it may

serve for his justification and for that of the garrison in case of a surrender.

RICHARD GRIDLEY'S PETITION TO CONGRESS . In this

memorial dated 13 October 1778, Richard Gridley, chief engineer of

the Army's Eastern Department, complained that Congress had not

increased his original payof $60 per month: "Although all other

Establishments have been enlarg'd, . . . the Corps ofEngineers has

been forgotten. "Asprices had risen, moneyhad depreciated to the

point that he estimated his pay at no more than one-tenth its original

value.

41
Of the Companies of Sappers and Miners:

1st. Until men are inlisted for the purpose, Companies of Sappers a

Miners not exceeding three shall be formed as circumstances may requi

by drafts from the line at the direction of the Commander in Chief and 

under the command of the Commandant of the Corps of Engineers un

otherwise ordered by Congress .

[2ndly.] Each company to consist of a Captain, a Captn. Lieutenant a

a 1st . and 2nd. Lieutenant, four serjeants, four Corporals, one Drumme

one Fifer and Sixty privates.

3rdly. The duty of the Companies of Sappers and Miners shall 

(under the direction of the Engineers) to construct field-works of eve

kind and all works necessary for the attack or defence of places as c

cumstances may require .

4thly. When a company or part of a company of Sappers and Miners 

detached with any body of troops without an Engineer, the officer co

manding the company or part of the company shall take his orders direct

from the commanding officer of the troops, and whensoever an Engine

having the charge of any works shall be absent, the officer of the Sappe

and Miners commanding the detachments employed in constructi

them, shall direct the works agreeable to the plans and instructio

formed by such Engineer.

5thly. When the Companies of Sappers and Miners shall not be suff

cient to perform the duties assigned them, the commanding Engine

shall apply to the commanding General to furnish him with such a numbe

of fatigue men from the line, as the service shall require.

6thly. The officers of the line detached with the command of fatig

parties, for assisting in constructing the works shall not interfere in direc

ing them, but shall be wholly confined to keeping their soldiers employe

and maintaining a proper order and discipline .

7thly. The Sappers and Miners shall, in case of extraordinary fatig

and danger, have such gratuities over and above their pay as t

commanding Engineer with the concurence of the commanding Gener

of the Army shall think they deserve.

Sthly. The officers of Sappers and Miners shall enjoy the same righ

honors and privileges with the officers of the like ranks in the other cor

of the army .$

11 thly. From the time the men are drafted and during their continuan

in these companies they are to be left out of the Pay-Rolls of their respe

tive regiments .

14thly. The Sappers and Miners shall be taught the established manu

Exercise and Evolutions on days when they are not employed in the pa

ticular duties of their department and the same police and discipline sha

be practiced in their companies as in the other parts of the army .

15thly. The Commandant of the Corps of Engineers shall take the mo

effectual and expeditious method to have the Sappers and Miners 

4 2
structed in their duty, and as probably the officers of these companies

whose talents and acquirements fit them for the profession, will be appointed Engineers, the Commandant of the Corps of Engineers shall form

a plan of instructions for these officers which being approved by the board

of War and Commander in Chief shall be carried into execution .

16thly. The Commandant of the Corps of Engineers shall appoint an

Engineer or Engineers whom he shall judge but best qualified, to read lectures on fortification proper for towns or the field ; on the manner of adapt

ing fortifications to different grounds and positions; to regulate their extent according to the number of men intended to be covered ; Upon Attack

and Defence ; Upon the use of Mines and their construction; Upon the

manner of forming plans, reconnoitering a country and choosing, laying

out and fortifying a Camp.

17thly. On a march, in the vicinity of an enemy, a detachment of the

Companies of Sappers and Miners shall be stationed at the head of the

column, directly after the Van Guard for the purpose of opening and mending the roads and removing obstructions .

43

-Fitzpatrick, Writings of

Washington, 16:21-23, 37,

46-48.

Because of repeated complaints from line commanders, Washington

suggested recruitment as an alternative to drafts from the line. 9 Congress offered a bounty of $200 to each enlistee and a $20 commission to the

recruiting officer . In a letter seeking officers and enlisted men in Pennsylvania, Duportail stressed that Pennsylvania would benefit when her sappers and miners returned home, the officers having acquired "all the

knowledge necessary to engineers" and the soldiers having learned "to Construct all the works relative to fortifications ."

To be sure, Duportail had always believed that the sensitive nature of the

engineers' work required officers of proven loyalty, but he rarely expressed

the view with such openness . He was confident that instructors of

mathematics attached to each company would remedy the educational

defects of the young recruits .

7 . "IT WOULD BE VERY ADVANTAGEOUS TO . . . PENSILVANIA TO

FURNISH A NUMBER OF THESE SOLDIERS"

Louis Duportail to Joseph Reed, President of the Supreme Executive

Council of Pennsylvania .

West point, 10th September, 1779

Sir,

Congress some time since ordered the formation of three Companies

of sappers and miners, of which they were pleased to honor me with the
Command . The soldiers for these Companies were originally to be draf

from the line, but his excellency, general washington, finding some 

conveniency in doing it at this time prefers their being raised . In Con

quence he has written to Congress praying them to recommend it to 

different states, to permit this levy, which Recommendation your 

cellency will probably receive. I therefore send Captain McMurraylO 

your state to recruit for these Companies and I intreat that you will 

pleased to give the business all the aid of which it may stand in need .

Cap. McMurray has the regulations made by Congress for these Co

panies . I dare pray you to have the goodness to run them over and you 

see what is to be their service and their instruction ; you will see that 

officers are to have the means of acquiring all the knowledge necessar

engineers, and that the soldiers will learn to Construct all the wo

relative to fortifications . May I therefore be permitted to observe tha

would be very advantageous to the state of pensilvania to furnis

number of these soldiers who, returning into their own Country after be

instructed, may be of the greatest utility to it . As I flatter myself your 

cellency will judge of it in the same manner, and your eagerness to f

every kind of establishment useful to the state which you govern is w

known, I take the liberty to propose to you the formation of one of th

Companies of sappers and miners, to belong to the state itself . This p

has been mentioned .t o general washington and met his approbation 

that case . As there are two vacancies in the Company of Mr. McMurr

they Could be granted to two gentlemen of the the state of pensilvania 

this purpose ; if your excellency should be acquainted with any gentle

disposed to embrace this profession and proper for it, I should esteem 

favor you would send them to me for examination . The qualities necess

for the officers of sappers and miners are in the first place a good edu

tion in general, which will be a security for the integrity of their s

timents . It must be Considered that these officers becoming Engine

and so in a situation to have in their hands the plans of the frontiers of 

fortifications, the memorials concerning them, in a word all that has r

tion to the defence of the state, they ought to be qualified to inspire gr

Confidence in their fidelity and in their attachment to their Country; in 

next place it is proper they should have some mathematical Kno

ledge-the more they have the better; but we may not exact a great d

from young men who do not exceed the age of twenty, who besides h

had a good education, possess a fund of intelligence and show an incl

tion to instruct themselves, they may be the easier dispensed with, 

there will be a master of mathematics attached to the Companies, 

they will be furnished with regard to this object with all the means to s

ply the defects of their education .

44

-Pennsylvania Archives, 

ser., 7:690-91 .
MOSES CLEAVELAND . Known best for founding Cleveland, Ohio,

in 1796, Cleaveland (1759-1806) served during the Revolution as an

officer in the sappers and miners. A native of Connecticut, Cleaveland

graduated from Yale University before entering the Army in 1777.

After the war he practiced law, joined his state's chapter ofthe Society

of the Cincinnati, was a delegate to the Connecticut convention to

ratify the U.S. Constitution, and, as a director of the Connecticut

Land Company, speculated in land.

Library of Congress

45
By the summer of 1780 the companies of sappers and miners still lacke

a full complement of officers and enlisted men. According to the officers

the problem resulted in part because they had never "been put upon a pro

per footing for the recruiting business." 11 Meanwhile, the officers already o

active duty were "acquiring a knowledge of the service to whic

they . . . were destined," but they waited impatiently to perform som

worthwhile service for their country.

12

Endeavoring to salvage the situation and get the troops he still needed,

Washington reinstituted drafts from the line, 13 proposing to take one man

from each regiment. Joseph Plumb Martin, who joined the sappers an

miners as a corporal, was drafted in this manner. His engaging recollection

reproduced below, is the only surviving account by a member of th

engineer troops.

Martin's narrative underscored the youthfulness of his corps, whic

sought "as intelligent young men as could be procured," although "some o

us fell considerably short of perfection." With typical humor, Marti

described the manner of his draft; hungry days without "belly timber" ; an

faithful service to his country, despite her being "a light-heeled wanton of 

wife."

8 . "THIS CORPS OF MINERS WAS RECKONED AN HONORABLE ONE"

From the narrative of Joseph Plumb Martin .

And now there was to be a material change in my circumstances,

which, in the long run, was much in my favor. There was a small corps t

be raised by enlistments, and in case of failure of that, by drafts from the

line. These men were called "Sappers and Miners," to be attached to th

engineer's department . I had known of this for some time before, bu

never had a thought of belonging to it, although I had heard our major (t

whose company I belonged) tell some of our officers (after I had neatl

marked his name upon his chest) that if there was a draft from our regi

ment, he intended I should go, although, he added, he did not wish to par

with me . I, however, thought no more about it, till a captain of that corp

[David Bushneil] applied for a draft of one man from each regimen

throughout the whole army present. The captain was personally ac

quainted with our major and told him he would like to have him furnish hi

with a man from the regiment that he knew was qualified for a non

commissioned officer . The major then pitched upon me .

I was accordingly transferred to this corps and bid a farewell forever t

my old comrades, as it respected any further associating with them, o

sharing in their sufferings or pleasures . I immediately went off with thi

(now my) captain and the other men drafted from our brigade, and joine

the corps in an old meetinghouse at the Peekskill . It was after dark whe

46
we arrived there. I had now got among a new set, who were, to a man, entire strangers to me. I had, of course, to form new acquaintances, but I was

not long in doing that. I had a pretty free use of my tongue, and was

sometimes apt to use it when there was no occasion for it . However, I

soon found myself at home with them . We were all young men and

therefore easy to get acquainted .

I found nothing more here for belly timber than I had in the line, and got

nothing to eat till the second day after I had joined the corps . I have heard

it remarked by the old farmers that when beasts are first transferred from

one place to another, that if they keep them without food for two or three

days, it will go far towards wonting them to their new situation . Perhaps it

might be so thought by our commanders. Be that as it would, I got nothing,

as I have said, till the second day I had been with them . We then drew, if I

remember right, two days rations of our good old diet, salt shad, and as we

had not, as yet, associated ourselves into regular messes, as is usual in

the army, each man had his fish divided out by himself. We were on the

green before the meetinghouse and there were several cows feeding

about the place . I went into the house to get something to put my fish into,

or some other business, and stayed longer than I intended, or rather

ought to have done, for when I came out again, one of the cows was just

finishing her meal on my shad; the last I saw of it was the tail of a fish sticking out of the side of her mouth. I was vexed enough to have eaten the

weight of it off her carcass, but she took care of that, and I had another opportunity (if well improved) of mortifying my body by fasting two days

longer, but I got something among the men, as poorly as they were off, to

sustain nature till I could get more by some means or other. Such shifts

were nothing strange to us .

This corps of Miners was reckoned an honorable one; it consisted of

three companies. All the officers were required to be acquainted with the

sciences, and it was desirable to have as intelligent young men as could

be procured to compose it, although some of us fell considerably short of

perfection . Agreeable to the arrangement between my former commander

and my new captain, I was appointed a sergeant in this corps, 14 which was

as high an office as I ever obtained in the army, and I had some doubts in

my own mind, at the time, whether I was altogether qualified for that.

However, I was a sergeant and I think I did use my best abilities to perform

the duties of the office according to my best knowledge and judgment . Indeed, I can say at this late hour of my life, that my conscience never did,

and I trust never will, accuse me of any failure in my duty to my country,

but, on the contrary, I always fulfilled my engagements to her, however

she failed in fulfilling hers with me . The case was much like that of a loyal

and faithful husband, and a light-heeled wanton of a wife. But I forgive her

and hope she will do better in future .

-Martin, Private Yankee Doodle, pp . 194-6,198.

47

By fall 1781 the companies of sappers and miners were fully activated

and ready to participate in the Yorktown campaign . The extent to which

the engineer troops provided technical education is unclear . On 26 May

1780, for example, several officers complained that the regulation regarding

lectures on fortifications and mining was not being carried out . 15 Martin's

detailed account of life within the engineer corps after 1780 said nothing

about officers receiving any type of instruction, even during long periods

when the companies were stationed at West Point and presumably had some

free time . Nor did Duportail's correspondence with the engineer officers

under his command contain orders to read lectures to the sappers and

miners. Apparently what knowledge of fortifications, mining, and reconnaissance the sappers and miners gained was largely the result of their experience in the field .

COMMISSION IN THE SAPPERS AND MINERS . Draft of a commission as a captain in the sappers and miners issued to Moses

Cleaveland on 14 February 1780 but backdated to 2 August 1779.

Western Reserve Historical Society

49
Chapter III

BUNKER HILL AND THE SIEGE

OF BOSTON

1775-1776

At Lexington and Concord, on 19 April 1775 American resistance to

British policies successfully turned from words to arms . The colonists repulsed the British attempt, to capture their supplies, drove the redcoats back

to Boston, and determined to keep them there.

Early in May a reconnaissance party including Col . Richard Gridley,

chief engineer of the Massachusetts forces, surveyed the area surrounding

the main American camp at Cambridge. The group recommended con

structing several redoubts and breastworks including "a strong redoubt on

Bunker Hill," lying on Charlestown peninsula just north of Boston. I Before

long some fortifications appeared near Cambridge, but the patriots postponed work at Bunker Hill and Dorchester Heights southwest of Boston until they were better able to man the positions . Gridley was convinced earthworks were required to keep the enemy "from getting into the Country to lay

it waste," but he was "much embarras'd for want of assistance, as there were

but very few that had any knowledge of . . . [engineering] ." 2

By June about fifteen thousand Americans, the majority of them New

Englanders, had assembled around Boston. Hemmed in, the enemy entrenched and delayed further offensive operations . On the 12th of that

month General Thomas Gage, the British commander, decided to occupy

the unfortified Dorchester Heights. The next day, when they discovered

Gage's plan, the Americans countered with the decision-recommended

earlier-to entrench on Bunker Hill, the highest of the three hills on

Charlestown peninsula .

At six o'clock on the evening of June 16, colonial forces assembled in

Cambridge under orders from the Massachusetts Committee of Safety. Just

before the entrenching started, according to one eyewitness, the chief

engineer participated in a discussion in which it was decided first to fortify

Breed's Hill, also on Charlestown peninsula but closer to Boston, and then

to place a secondary work on Bunker Hill. Gridley objected on grounds that

it was useless to "intrench on Charlestown Hill [Breed's Hill] 'till we had

thrown up some works on the north and south ends of Bunker Hill, to

cover . . . men in their retreat, if that should happen ." 3 But Gridley, over5 1
THE BATTLE OF BUNKER HILL. This lithograph was made in

1875, the year of the Bunker Hill centennial.

Library of Congress

ruled at the scene by Maj. Gen. Israel Putnam, dutifully laid out a redoubt

about forty yards square with a six-foot parapet mounted with gun platforms of earth and wood.

4 Gridley’s redoubt, one British officer later

declared, “must have been the work of some days; it was very regular, and

exceeding strong ."5 The Gentlemen's Magazine of London called the

redoubt “well executed” and described it as follows:

In the only side on which it could be attacked were two pieces

of cannon. In the two salient angles were two trees, with their

branches projecting off the parapet, to prevent an entry being

made on the angles. The two flanks . . . of the intrenchment

were well contrived, as the fire from them crossed within twenty

yards of the face of the redoubt.6

Although British scouts heard the picks and shovels, it was after four in

the morning before they fully realized what the Americans were up to. The

enemy began an immediate cannonade and prepared to outflank the

American left between Breed’s Hill and the Mystic River and then to make a

frontal assault on the rebel redoubt.

While the British slowly set their plan in motion, the patriots, under

Gridley’s direction, erected three fleches and a breastwork on their exposed

left flank. A rail fence further secured the path to Bunker Hill along the left

flank and the Mystic River. In the early afternoon of the 17th, Sir William

Howe, one of four British generals in Boston, landed without opposition on

52
Charlestown peninsula and after a two-hour delay made a frontal assault on

the rail fence and the redoubt .

Holding their fire until the enemy troops were within fifty yards, the colonials managed to turn back the attacks. Minutes later Howe struck again,

focusing this time on Gridley's redoubt . But the colonists' musketfire was

more devastating than before . The British fell back again . A. third assault by

fresh troops ended in hand-to-hand combat as the enemy stormed into the

redoubt and drove the defenders out . Gridley was one of approximately 300

Americans wounded. About 140 Americans died, while British casualties226 killed and 828 wounded-exceeded those of any other battle in the

Revolution .

Despite the outcome, the rebels showed remarkable determination in

defending Breed's Hill from behind their hastily erected defenses . Their performance demonstrated General Putnam's belief that "Americans were not

afraid of their heads, though very much afraid of their legs; if you cover

these, they will fight forever." 7 The quality of leadership and devastating

musketfire of the Americans enabled them to hold out as long as they did.

Peter Brown, a company clerk under Col . William Prescott, commander

of the redoubt on Breed's Hill, left a vivid, though somewhat inaccurate, account of the fortification and ensuing battle .

1 . "ALTHO' WE WERE BUT FEW . . . WE WERE PRESERVED

IN A MOST WONDERFUL MANNER"

Peter Brown to his Mother.

5 3

June 28, 1775

Frydy the 16th of June we were ordered to Parade at 6 o'clock with one

Day's provisions and Blankets ready for a March somewhere, but we did

not know where. So we readyly and cheerfully obeyd, the whole that was

called for, which was these three . . . Reg[imen]ts . . . . About 9 o'Clock

at night we marched down on to Charlesto[wn] Hill against Cox Hill in

Bo[ston] where we entrenched, and made a Fort of about Ten Rod long

and eight wide,8 with a Breast Work of about 8 more. We worked there

undiscovered till about 5 in the Morn and then we saw our Danger being

against 8 ships of the Line and all Boston fortified against us .

(The Danger we were in made us think there was Treachery, and that

we were brot there to be all slain, and I must and will venture to say that

there was Treachery, Oversight or Presumption in the Conduct of our Of

ficers .) And about half after 5 in the Morn, we not having above half th

Fort done, they began to fire, I suppose as soon as they had Orders, pretty

briskly a few Minutes, and then stopt, and then again to the Number o

about 20 or more. They killed one of us, and then they ceased till about 11

o'Clock and then they began pretty brisk again ; and that caused some o
our young Country [people] to desert, apprehending the Danger in 

clearer manner than the rest, who were more diligent in digging and fo

tifyg ourselves against them . We began to be almost beat out, being tir

by our Labour and having no sleep the night before, but little victuals, n

Drink but Rum . . . . They fired very warm from Boston and from on boa

till about 2 o'Clock, when they began to fire from the Ships in ferry Way

and from the Ship that lay in the River against the Neck to stop our Rei

forcemts [which] they did in some Measure. One Cannon cut off 3 Men 

two on the Neck of Land . (Our Officers sent time after Time after the Ca

nons from Cambridge in the Morng and could get but four, the Capt . 

which fired but a few times, and then swang his Hat round three Times 

the Enemy, then ceased to Fire.) It being about 3 o'clock there was a lit

Cessation of the Cannons Roaring . Come to look there was a matter of 

Barges full of Regulars comg over to us: it is supposed there were abo

3000 of them and about 700 of us left not deserted, besides 500 Rei

forcemt that could not get so nigh to us as to do any good hardly till th

saw that we must all be cut off, or some of them, and then they advance

When our Officers saw that the Regulars would land they ordered the A

till[er]y to go out of the fort and prevent their Landg if possible, from whic

the Artilly Capt. took his Pieces and went right off home to Cambridge fa

as he could, for which he is now confined and we expect will be shot for 

But the Enemy landed and fronted before us and formed themselves in a

Oblong Square, so as to surround us [which] they did in part, and Aft

they were well formed they advanced towds us in Order to swallow us u

but they found a choaky Mouthful of us, tho' we could do nothg with o

small Arms as yet for Distance, and had but two Cannon and nary Gunne

And they from Bo[ston] and from the ships a firg and throwg Bombs keep

us down till they got almost round us . But God in Mercy to us fought o

Battle for us, and altho' we were but few and so were suffered to b

defeated by them, we were preserved in a most wonderful Manner f

beyond Expectation, to Admiration, for out of our Regt there was about 

killed, 4 or 5 taken captive, and about 47 wounded . . . . If we should 

called into Action again I hope to have Courage and strength to act my pa

valiantly in Defence of our Liberties and our Country, trusting in him wh

hath yet kept me and hath covered my head in the day of Battle, and th

we have lost 4 out of our Compa[ny] and our Lieutenant's thigh broke a

he taken Captive by the cruel Enemies of America, I was not suffered to 

toutched altho' I was in the fort till the Regulars came in and I jumped ov

the Walls, and ran for about half a Mile where Balls flew like Hailstone

and Cannons roared like Thunder. . . .

-Dexter, Literary Diary of Ez

Stiles, pp . 595-96.
After the battle General Howe provided a detailed analysis of the

American defenses from the enemy's point of view . Howe wondered at the

value of his "victory ." Of particular interest is his conclusion that the rebels'

strategy-fortifying "every post in our way" and waiting, "to be attacked at

every one" while their forces were continually augmented from the countryside-would ultimately succeed .

2 . "THE SUCCESS IS TOO DEARLY BOUGHT"

William Howe (probably to the British Adjutant General, Edward Harvey).

Camp upon the Heights of Charlestown

June 22 and 24 [17751

. . . The troops were no sooner ashore than it was instantly perceived

the enemy were very strongly posted, the redoubt upon their right being

large and full of men with cannon . To the right of the redoubt they had

troops in the houses of Charles Town, about 200 yards distant from the redoubt, the intermediate space not occupied, being exposed to the cannon

of the Boston side battery .

From the left of the redoubt, they had a line cannon-proof, about 80

yards in length ; and from thence to their left, close upon the Mystic River,

they had a breast work made with strong railing taken from the fences and

stuffed with hay, which effectually secured those behind it from musquettry. This breast work about 300 yards in extent-they had made the whole

in the night of the 16th .

As a specimen of our knowledge of service, the centrys on the Boston

side had heard the Rebels at work all night without making any other

report of it, except mentioning it in conversation in the morning . The first

knowledge the General had of it was by hearing one of the ships firing at

the workmen, and going to see what occasioned the firing . Their works

when we landed were crowded with men, about 500 yards from us.

From the appearance of their situation and numbers, and seeing that

they were pouring in all the strength they could collect, I sent to General

Gage to desire a reinforcement, which he immediately complied with, the

remaining Light Companies and Grenadiers, with the 47th Battalion and

1 st of the Marines landing soon after. Our strength being then about 2200

rank and file, with six field pieces, two light 12-pounders and two

howitzers, we begun the attack (the troops in two lines, with Pigott upon

the left) by a sharp cannonade, the line moving slowly and frequently

halting to give time for the artillery to fire .

The Light Companies upon the right were ordered to keep along the

beach to attack the left point of the enemy's breast work, which being carried, they were to attack them in flank . The Grenadiers being directed to

55
attack the enemy's left in front, supported by the 5th and 52d, their order

were executed by the Grenadiers and 2 battalions with a laudable per

severance, but not with the greatest share of discipline, for as soon as th

order with which they set forward to the attack with bayonets was checke

by a difficulty they met with in getting over some very high fences o

strong railing, under a heavy fire, well kept up by the Rebels, they bega

firing, and by crowding fell into disorder, and in this state the 2d line mix

with them . The Light Infantry at the same time being repulsed, there was 

moment that I never felt before, but by the gallantry of the officers it wa

all recovered and the attack carried .

Upon the left, Pigott met with the same obstruction from the fences

and also had the troops in the houses to combat-with, before he could pro

ceed to assail the redoubt, or to turn it to his left, but the town being set o

fire by order at this critical time by a carcass from the battery on th

Boston side, Pigott was relieved from his enemies in that quarter, and a

the 2d onset he carried the redoubt in the handsomest manner, tho' it was

most obstinately defended to the last . Thirty of the Rebels not having tim

to get away were killed with bayonets in it . The little man [Pigot] is worth

of Our Master's [George III's] favour .

But I now come to the fatal consequences of this action-92 officer

killed and wounded-a most dreadful account. I have lost my aid de camp

Sherwin, who was shot thro' the body and died the next day . Our frien

Abercrombie is also gone-he had only a flesh wound, but is said to hav

been in a very bad habit of body . The General's returns will give you th

particulars of what I call this unhappy day. I freely confess to you, when 

look to the consequences of it, in the loss of so many brave officers, I do 

with horror. The success is too dearly bought . Our killed, serjeants an

rank and file, about 160; 300 wounded and in hospital, with as many more

incapable of present duty. The Rebels left near 100 killed and 30 wounded

but I have this morning learnt from a deserter from them that they had 30

killed and a great number wounded .

We took five pieces of cannon, and their numbers are said to hav

been near 6000, but I do not suppose they had more than between 4 an

5000 engaged .

The corps remained upon their arms the night of the action, where w

are now encamped in a strong situation, with redoubts commanding th

isthmus in our front, the enemy being in two corps about one mile and 

half distant from us and both well entrenched ; the principal body bein

upon a height called Summer Hill commanding the way from thence t

Cambridge ; the other called Winter Hill upon the road to Midford (o

Mystich) on the side of Roxbury-they are also entrenched and have arti

lery at all their posts .

Entre nous, I have heard a bird sing that we can do no more this cam

paign than endeavour to preserve the town of Boston, which it is sup

56
posed the Rebels mean to destroy by fire or sword or both-and it is my

opinion, with the strength we shall have collected here upon the arrival of

the 4 battalions last from Ireland (one of which, with Bailey of the 23d,

came in the day before yesterday), that we must not risk the endangering

the loss of Boston-tho' should anything offer in our favour, I should hope

we may not let pass the opportunity.

The intentions of these wretches are to fortify every post in our way;

wait to be attacked at every one, having their rear secure, destroying as

many of us as they can before they set out to their next strong situation,

and, in this defensive mode (the whole country coming into them upon

every action), they must in the end get the better of our small numbers.

We can not (as the General tells us) muster more now than 3400 rank and

file for duty, including the Marines and the three last regiments from Ireland.

-Fortescue, Correspondence

of King George III, III,

221-24. Courtesy Curtis

Brown Ltd., London.

Both sides improved their positions after Bunker Hill. The American

fortifications advanced under Gridley’s direction, with considerable

assistance from his son and from Lt. Col. Rufus Putnam, Captains Jeduthan

Baldwin and Josiah Waters, and Henry Knox.9 Shortly after his arrival in

WASHINGTON TAKES COMMAND. The newly appointed Commander in Chief of the Continental Army is portrayed assuming command at Cambridge, Massachusetts, 3 July 1775.

Record Group 148, National Archives

57
Cambridge as Commander in Chief, General George Washington survey

the progress . He noted that the British were placing strong entrenchmen

on Bunker Hill and Roxbury Neck, the isthmus linking Boston with t

mainland. Their position was enhanced by the presence of stationary a

floating batteries which enabled them to bombard the patriots . Washin

ton's troops had entrenched at Roxbury and held a commanding view of t

enemy's strongest position, the ground on Charlestown Neck taken from t

rebels in June .

In his report to Congress, Washington attested that the Continentals ha

done the best possible job securing the line, given the handicaps of insu

ficient men, tools, and engineers . While supporting the decision "to ho

and defend these Works, as long as possible," he also recognized what was 

become a recurring concern-"the Difficulties which attend the Defence 

Lines of so great extent."

Sir:

3. "WE ARE AS WELL SECURED, AS COULD BE EXPECTED"

George Washington to the President of Congress.

58

Camp at Cambridge, July 10, 17

I arrived safely at this place on the 3d instant; after a Journey attend

with a good deal of Fatigue and retarded by necessary attentions to t

successive Civilities which accompanied me in my whole route . Upon m

arrival I immediately visited the several Posts occupied by our Troops, an

as soon as the Weather permitted, reconnoitred those of the Enemy 

found the latter strongly entrenching on Bunkers Hill about a mile fro

Charlestown, and advanced about half a mile from the place of the last A

tion, with their Centries advanced about 150 Yards on this side the na

rowest part of the neck leading from this place to Charles Town . The

floating Batteries lay in Mystick River, near their Camp, and a twenty Gu

Ship below the Ferry place between Boston and Charles Town . They ha

also a Battery on Copse [Copp's] Hill, on the Boston side, which much a

noyed our Troops in the late Attack. Upon Roxbury Neck they are al

deeply entrenched and strongly fortified . Their advanced Guard 'till la

Saturday, occupied Brown's Houses, about a Mile from Roxbury Meeti

House and twenty rods from their Lines : But at that time a party fr

General Thomas's Camp surprized the Guard, drove them in and burnt t

Houses .

The Bulk of their Army commanded by General Howe, lays on Bunker

Hill, and the remainder on Roxbury neck, except the light Horse, and a f

Men in the Town of Boston . On our side we have thrown up Intrenchmen

on Winter and Prospect Hills, the Enemy's Camp [on Bunker Hill] in f
posted in several small Towns along the Coasts, to prevent the depredations of the Enemy: Upon the whole I think myself authorized to say, that

considering the great extent of Line and the nature of the Ground, we are

as well secured, as could be expected in so short a time and under the disadvantages we labour. These consist in a Want of Engineers to construct

proper Works and direct the Men; a Want of Tools and a sufficient Number

of Men to man the Works in case of an Attack. You will observe by the Proceedings of the Council of War. . . . that it is our unanimous Opinion to

hold and defend these Works, as long as possible . The Discouragement it

would give the Men and its contrary Effect on the Ministerial Troops thus

to abandon our Incampment in their Face, formed with so much Labour

and expence; added to the certain Destruction of a considerable and

valuable extent of Country, and the uncertainty of finding a place in all

respects so capable of making a stand are leading reasons for this Determination . At the same time we are very sensible of the Difficulties which

attend the Defence of Lines of so great extent, and the Dangers which

may ensue from such a Division of the Army. . . .

-Fitzpatrick, Writings of

Washington, 3:320-22.

Gridley was often too ill to serve, but Washington was fortunate to have

Baldwin, Putnam, and Knox to help supervise the works . In fact, the Commander in Chief reported that "most of the Works which have been thrown

up for the Defence of our Several Incampments have been planned by a few

of the Principal officers of this Army, assisted by Mr . Knox." 10 Because of

the shortage of engineers, Maj. Gen. Charles Lee, an officer with wide experience in military affairs, worked "like ten post Horses" on the Boston

defenses. "The undoing what we found done," he wrote in disdain of the

patriots' earlier accomplishments, "gives us more trouble than doing what

was left undone . " 11 Yet Lee believed the enemy would suffer "a considerable

hole in their seven thousand men" should they attack.

59
Despite the disadvantages cited by Washington and Lee, the colonis

persisted in pushing forward their works under the continuous threat of 

British offensive and frequent cannonade. As described by Capt . Jo

Chester, the rebel advance within close range of Bunker Hill, while i

decisive, placed the British at a distinct disadvantage .

4. "WE EXPECTED . . . THE KING'S TROOPS

WOULD HAVE ADVANCED ONUS, BUTTHEY DURST NOT"

A letter of John Chester.

60

Camp at Roxbury, Aug . 28, 177

. . . Last Saturday night a Large Party of 1000 working men and 3000 mor

as a Covering party, under the Command of Major General Lee, advance

from Prospect Hill, or Plowed Hill (as they call it) full Half way to Bunke

Hill . They workd most notably by all acct, and got under cover befor

morning . When the enemy discovered them, they began a Cannonade

which lasted all Day long . I suppose above three hundred shots an

Bombs were sent. I have not been able to Learn that they Killed more tha

two of our people . . . . Two or three [were] wounded . . . .

Every Day since we have had more or less cannonading . The matter di

not disturb us at Roxbury, so but that we went to Church, etc ., as usual

and yet not a canon was fired or Bomb Broke, but what we Could see fro

our encampment. We expected every moment when the King's troop

would have advanced on us, but they durst not. Their Light Horse wer

Paraded, with a Great Show, but nothing done as to coming out . We 

Roxbury have been advancing this same time . When you was here we ha

a slight Gabion Battery across the Road, 100 Rods on this side the Georg

tavern . That was our most advanced work then, and where the main Guar

used to be and is still posted, and is out of sight of the enemy. Since tha

we have intrenched in their sight about 100 Rods South East of that, bu

Lately have advanced North East, and begun a Long intrenchment Just b

the Burying Yard, and continued it along to the North Eastward, on a Ris

ing Ground just out of the marsh, till it comes to the east end of Lamb'

Dam, which is further advanced (I believe) than the George tavern . W

have frequently recd shots while at work but not till we got under cover (fo

we always begin in the night) and so they have killed none of us . We kee

a large piquet guard by Lambs Damm every Night not less usually tha

400, and the main Guard hard by . . . .

-Magazine of America

History, 8:125 .
Although dictated by circumstances-a severe powder shortage-Washington's defensive posture proved controversial . Throughout the

summer, criticism of the army's inactivity mounted ; and the anticipated

departure of most of his troops when their enlistments expired at the end of

the year led Washington, however reluctantly, to diverge from his basic

strategy and propose an attack on Boston in September 1775 . However,

because it believed such a move to be inexpedient at the time, the commander's council of war rejected the plan .

12

Irritated by Washington's reluctance to strike and at odds with the council's decision, Lee confided to a sympathetic Dr . Benjamin Rush:

. . . We might have attack'd 'em long before this and with success, were our Troops differently constituted-but the fatal

perswasion has taken deep root in the minds of the Americans

from the highest to the lowest order that they are no match for

the Regulars, but when cover'd by a wall or breast work . This

notion is still further strengthen'd by the endless works We are

throwing up-in short unless we can remove the idea (and it

must be done by degrees) no spirited action can be ventur'd on

without the greatest risk . 1

But Lee lacked support and Washington and his advisors remained determined to engage the British only under clearly favorable conditions .

Nevertheless, the rebels accomplished much by the fall of 1775 . One

visitor provided this view of the American camp as it appeared in October :

. . . I viewed the camps at Roxbury and Cambridge . The lines

of both are impregnable; with forts (many of which are bombproof) and redoubts, supposing them to be all in a direction,

are about twenty miles; the breastworks are of a proper height,

and in many places seventeen feet in thickness ; the trenches

wide and deep in proportion, before which lay forked impediments; and many of the forts, in every respect, are perfectly

ready for battle . The whole, in a word, the admiration of every

spectator ; for verily their fortifications appear to be the works

of seven years, instead of about as many months .

14

A local newspaper described Rufus Putnam's fortification at Cobble Hill as

"the most perfect . . . that the American army has constructed during the

present campaign ." 15

As Britain's Maj . Gen. John Burgoyne made clear when he viewed the

American defenses at the end of the year, his government never intended to

maintain Boston as a base of operations. The lay of the land and the

patriots' skillful use of the terrain in erecting their defenses were deciding

factors . "It is all fortification," Burgoyne declared. "Driven from one hill

you will see the enemy retrenched upon the next and every step we move

must be the slow step of a siege." 16

Throughout the winter of 1775-76, the American position was precarious : shortages of powder and weapons continued to be acute and enlist6 1

ments expired with little guarantee that replacements would be forthcoming. The British maintained their grip on Boston proper, Charlestown

peninsula, and Boston Neck; the rebels surrounded them from the Mystick

River to Roxbury. Only Dorchester Heights remained unfortified .

On 16 January 1776 Washington convinced his generals to end the stalemate with an attack, but detailed plans were delayed until the uncertainties

of manpower and powder could be overcome . One thing was sure : the

Americans needed to act before spring, when fresh British troops were expected .

A month later Washington proposed crossing the ice-covered Charles

River on foot and taking the enemy by surprise . The plan was fraught with

peril . His generals balked . They favored a move to draw the enemy out of

Boston. Accordingly, the rebels resolved to occupy Dorchester Heights,

believing that the British would not be able to restrain themselves from making an attack .

The following five documents detail the American effort from December

1775 through early March 1776 . Baldwin concentrated on Lechmere Point

(east Cambridge), a position ultimately boasting a bomb battery and two

redoubts. Unknown to Washington, Howe regarded the works at Lechmere

Point as a serious threat . As Baldwin noted, enemy gunfire and frozen

ground were major obstacles.

5. THE PATRIOTS ENTRENCH ON LECHMERE POINT

From Jeduthan Baldwin's journal.

11 . [December 1775] . Finish the Fortification on Cobble Hill .

12. Begun the causey at Leach mor Neck .

13. Began the Covered Way onto Leachmor hill . . . .

14. Workt on leachmor point . Went in the afternoon to Dotchester point

to See the mashine to blow up Shipping, but as it was not finished, it was

not put into the water. . . .

16. Stakt . out the Fort on Leachmor point.

17. Went to work on Leachmor point . It was Very Foggy in the fornoon,

and when the Fog cleared away we had a Very havey fire from the Ships,

and from Boston but thro' Divine goodness we Recd by little damage. Abel

Woods was wounded in the Crotch or thigh . Workt all night, got our men

covered . . . .

19. Went upon Leachmor point to work. A No . of Shot and Shells were

thrown from Bunker Hill and from Boston at us and at Coble Hill, many of

BOSTON AREA FORTIFICATIONS. John Trumbull drew this map

of American positions surrounding Boston in September 1775 .

Trumbull, Autobiography

6 3
the Shot lodgd in our Brest work, and some of the Bumbs Brok high in 

are and 2 near ourworks, but no Mischief done this Day.

20. Went upon Leachmor Point. We recd a No of 24 Ib Shot from Bost

into our breastwork and others Just went over all in a direct line hit 

wall . Several Bumbs burst in the air, one was thrown from Bunker Hill i

Cambg by Phineys Regt . 13 inch which did not bust. . . .

26. Went to Leachmor point. Laid a platform for the Great Morter. Wor

at the bridge, the Day fair and extreem cold . Dind with Genl . Washingt

and Lady. . . .

28. Went to Leachmor point finished the Bridge and 2 platforms in 

loer Baston [bastion] .

29. Laid one platform for a morter in ye loer Baston and a platform fo

cannon in ye upper Baston at Leachmor point. Cold .

30. Cut out two embrasures at Leachmor point. . . .

31. Lords Day. It Rained in the morning. No fateague this Day. Went 

Meeting . Mr. Leonard Preacht from Exodus 111 and 10.

Jany 1, 1776. The Old Troops went of and left the lines bair in So

parts, cold .

2. Took a plan of the Fortification at leachmor point . Warm pleasa

Day.

3. Went with 40 men to work at Leachmor in the forenoon, and to Wate

town in ye afternoon, a warm pleasant Day. . . .

7. Lords Day, wort the Surceler [circular] Battery on Inmans point, a

Cut out the obtuce ambrasure in the upper Bastion on Lechmor point, a

throwd down the Stone wall there. Took a plan of Cobble Hill Fort. . . .

10. Had 5 teems carting Sodds, laid them in the new works, layd t

Abertee [abatis] round the new works, cased the ambrasure in the up

Redout, . . . this Day Excessive cold and windy .

11. Workt at Lechmor point. Drawd in Abatree. Brok ground for the n

work, finished laying out the work with Stones. It raind and Snowd in t

Evning, and was a cold Day.

12. Workt at Lechmor pint. Had 100 Rifelmen to work with us 200 fr

Prospect Hill which made 300 in all, but found the Ground very hard fros

a foot thick in general . The oxen workt well this Day raw cold Chilley win

Col . Miflin gave me a Quire of paper to Draw plans on . . . .

15. Workt at Lechmor point . It was a Raw cold Day and Sno

some . . . . Recd an order from Genl Putnam for wine, the order as follow

viz: . . . Deliver Col . Baldwin fifteen Gallons of Wine, which is necessa

for health and comfort, he being every Day at the works in this Co

Season . . . .

19. Went to work at leachmor pint. The ground was frosen 22 inch

Deep as hard as a rock, and in one night it frose in the trench 8 inch

deep so that we pryed up cakes of frosen Earth 9 feet Long and 3 fe

broad, it was fair but very cold this Day.

64
20. Workt . all Day at Lechmor point this Day clear and cold, could not

dig Sods in the marsh it was so frosen .

21 . . . . It was a cold Day went to Col . Gridleys in the Evning. Drank Coffey, and then went to Genl . Heaths, spent the remainder of the evning.

22. Workt. at Lechmor with a large party. Genl . Washington, Putnam

and Gates, with several other Gentn came down to see the works. The

ground was frosen in 2 feet deep and excessive hard, in some places, the

men got thro the frost, and in other places they did not all, Day rold up an

old wall into a line for a brestwork very cold and high tide this day. . . . [February] 11. Lords Day. Workt at Lechmor pint. It was a cold Day, the

ground frosen very hard 28 inches deep . We made Very large mines under

the frosen Surfice to get Earth to fill the parripets, the outsides of which

was partly raised with Stone and part with timber. . . .

20. Workt. at Lechmor point . Dug round and undermind large pieces of

frosen Earth which we rold out on Skids of Several Tons weight each, in

diging for the Guard house, a fine pleasant Day.

In his memoirs Rufus Putnam recalled deliberations over the choice between attacking the British directly and drawing them out of Boston by

fortifying Dorchester Heights . Putnam himself preferred the latter course

but questioned the feasibility of digging new entrenchments in ground

frozen more than a foot below the surface . The Commander in Chief

challenged his favorite engineer to solve the problem.

In fascinating detail, Putnam related how, under "Singuler circumstances which I call providence," he arrived at a solution-that of using

chandeliers, wooden frames filled with fascines and other material, to raise

walls without breaking ground . Until he read about chandeliers in a borrowed book, Putnam was unfamiliar with the technique .

ACHANDELIER. At Rufus Putnam's suggestion, the rebels used

chandeliers successfully to defend DorchesterHeights in March 1776. Deidier, Le Parfait Ingenieur Frangais

65

-Baldwin, Revolutionary Journal, pp. 17-27.

~'I1C717a7!C /',f'c '"11~011 xE'-2°f"hAZ L1lll7~' i'~1X1?01Y,
6 . PUTNAM RECALLS THE DECISION TO FORTIFY

DORCHESTER HEIGHTS

From Rufus Putnam's memoirs.

1776Januaryand February-During these months the mind of Genera

Washington was deeply engaged on a plan of crossing on the Ice and a

tacking the British in Boston-or endevor to draw them out by takeing pos

sesion of Dorchester Neck.

Now with respect to takeing possession of Dorchester Neck ther

were circumstances which fell within my knowledge, and Sphere of duty

which were so evidently marked by the hand of an overruling providenc

that I think proper to relate them .

As Soon as the Ice was thought sufficiently strong for the army to pas

over (or prehaps rather before) a Council of general officers was con

veaned on the Subject . What there perticuler opinions were I never knew

but the Brigadiers were directed to consult the Field officers of ther

Several Regiments, and they again to feal the temper of the Captains an

subbalterns .

While this was doing I was invited to dine at head Quarters, and while 

diner General Washington desiered me to tarry after diner-and when w

were alone he entered into a free conversation on the Subject of Stormin

the town of Boston .

That it was much better to draw the enemy out to Dorchester, then 

atack him in Boston no one doubted, for if we could maintain our selves o

that point or Neck of Land, our command of the town and Harbour 

Boston would be such as would probably compel them to Leave the place 

But the Cold weather which had made a bridge of Ice for our passag

into Boston, had also frozen the earth to a great depth, especially in th

open country Such as was the hills on Dorchester Neck .-So that it wa

impossible to make a Lodgment there in the usual way, however, th

General directed me to consider the subject and if I could think of any wa

in which it could be don, to make report to him imediately .

And now mark those Singuler circumstances which I call prov

idence .-I left head quarters in company with an other Gentleman, and 

our way come by Genl . Heaths . I had no thoughts of calling untill I cam

against his door, and then I Sais, let us call on Genl . Heath, to which h

agreed . I had no other motive but to pay my respects to the general . Whil

there I cast my eye on a book which Lay on the table, Lettered on the back

Mullers Field Engineer. 17 1 imediately requested the General to lend it me

He denied me . I repeated my requst . He again refused, and told me h

never Lent his books . I then told him that he must recollect that he wa

one, who at Roxbury in a Measure compelled [me] to undertake a bus

ness which at the time I confessed I never had read a word about, and th

66
he must let me have the book. After some more excuses on his part, close

pressing on my part, I obtained the Loan of it . I arrived at my quarters

about dark . It was the custom for the overseers of the workmen to report

to me every evening what progress had ben made during the day. When I

arrived there were Some of them already there. I put my book in the Chest,

and if I had time I did not think of Looking in it that night .

The next morning as Soon as oppertunity offered I took my book from

the Chest, and looking over the contents I found the word, Chandilears .

What is that thought I . It is Somthing I never heard of before, but no sooner

did I turn the page where it was described with its use but I was ready to

report a plan for makeing a Lodgment on Dorchester Neck-(infidels may

Laugh if they please) .

In a few minuts after I had for my Self ditermined Colo . Gridley (the

Engineer who had conducted the work at Cambridge) with Colo . Knox of

the Artillery, who had ben directed to consult with me on the subject ar

rived . They fell in with my plan . Our report was approved of by the Genl

and preperations imediately Set on foot to cary it into effect and every

thing being ready for the enterprise, the plan was put in execution . . . .

Such were the circumstances which Led to the discovery of a plan which

obliged the enemy to Leve Boston . Viz.-a Lodgment made of Chandeliers, Fasciens, etc .

As plans to fortify Dorchester Heights took shape, Putnam made a triangulation of enemy and colonial positions in greater Boston. Given the proximity of enemy guns, he determined that a covered way was absolutely nec

essary ; and, as marsh turf was unavailable, Putnam recommended that the

covered way be made of timber supported by stone and earth . Without

explanation he declared that the enemy was not then in a position to take

Dorchester . The implication was clear: the time was ripe for the rebels to

act .

7 . "THE ENEMY CANNOT TAKE POSSESSION

OF DORCHESTER HILL AT PRESENT"

Rufus Putnam to George Washington .

May it Please Your Excellency :

You have Inclos'd a Chart of some of the most Important Posts and

Riseing ground in and near Boston, which is as Exact as I am able to make

67

-Buell, Memoirs of Putnam, pp .

56-58.

Roxbury, 11 February 1776

from the little Leisure I have had to take Surveys of them, by this Draught it

Appears that the Enemies works on the Neck is nearer the Causway going

to Dorchester Point, than Bunker Hill is to the Cover'd way going on

Leachmoors Point, therefore if a Cover'd way was Necessary in that case,

it will be in this, should your Excellency think proper to order works

thrown up on any part of the point . How this Cover'd way will be made is a

Question . To procure upland or Marsh Turf at this Season is in my Opinion

absolutely Impossible, and nothing short of Timber instead of Turf will

Answer the purpose, the Method I have thot of is to side or Hew the Timber on two Sides only raising a single [Tier?] on the side of the Causeway .

Raising a Parrapet of Stone and Earth next the Enemy. The Timber to be

well Spliced together and if need be a post with a brace in about Fifty feet

to support the Timber against the stone and Earth, I know Stone are bad in

a Parrapet. But as they are easily Procur'd from the walls at Dorchester,

and I think cannot be Driven through the Timber by any shot whatever, I

would place them at the bottom and Cover the top with Earth which might

be procur'd by opening a Pit for that purpose . About 200 Rods is Necessary to be made a Cover'd way which 80 Tons of Timber to Raise one Foot,

and is in proportion to every foot, the Parrapet is High; I have been to the

Swamp I mentioned to your Excellency the other Day. Find it between 12

and 13 Miles from the lines at Dorchester; there is near 100 Tons already

got out besides a number of Mill Logs, the Carting from this place will be

12 [?] Ton, One Hundred Tons more may be had on these lands if the

swamp Does not [break?] and no Doubt but Timber may be had in other

Places, what your Excellency may think of so Costly a work I cannot tell,

'Tis the only method I know of, but wish a better way may be found out, I

hope your Excellency will pardon my Officiousness in suggesting that I

think this work may be Carried on with safety to the people Employ'd and

to the Cause in general, as the Enemy cannot take Possesion of Dorchester Hill at present. Can we by any means have a Cover'd way in this

frozen Season it will be of no small Consequence in taking Possesion of

this Ground in a favorable Hour, the People who have been Employ'd by

Mr. Davis in getting the Timber out of the Swamp will get no more unless

your Excellency gives Orders for it . . . .

-Washington Papers, roll 35.

On 13 February 1776 Gridley and Knox, now a colonel and Gridley's

successor as chief artillery officer, accompanied several American generals

PUTNAM'S TRIANGULATION OF BOSTON . Rufus Putnam executed this triangulation of American and British positions for

General Washington in February 1776.

Washington Papers, Library of Congress

69
to Dorchester, where, according to Maj. Gen. Israel Putnam, Gridley "la

out works enough for our whole army for two years ." 18 Althou

Washington's intelligence reports indicated the British were about to mo

out of Boston, he went ahead with his plan: Boston would be bombard

from Lechmere Point and Cobble Hill near Cambridge while the Dorchest

Heights were being fortified . If the British attacked as expected, a for

would simultaneously move into Boston from Lechmere Point. As a furth

precaution, Washington was prepared to occupy Nook's Hill, the point o

Dorchester Heights closest to Boston . From there the patriots could fi

directly on vessels loading at the town's principal wharves . If the British ha

not been beaten already, the occupation of Nook's Hill would mean the en

After weeks of preparation, bolstered by the procurement of powder an

the arrival of artillery from Ticonderoga, the rebels began fortifying t

Dorchester Heights on the night of 4 March 1776 . They completed their ta

by daybreak . The Americans, Howe reportedly remarked afterward, ha

done more work in one night than his whole army would have done in s

months. 19 Archibald Robertson, one of Howe's engineers, called the co

onists' effort "a most astonishing night's work ." 20

Two eyewitness accounts follow . As noted by James Thacher, a surgeon

mate, barrels filled with sand and stone were intended to make the positio

appear more formidable and complement Putnam's chandeliers . If nece

sary, the rebels would roll the barrels downhill to halt the enemy's advanc

His emotions fired by the "preparations for blood and slaughter," Thache

prayed "that victory be on the side of our suffering, bleeding, country ."

8 . "THE AMOUNT OF LABOR PERFORMED DURING THE NIGHT . . .

IS ALMOST INCREDIBLE"

From James Thacher's journal.

4th [March 1776]-The object in view is now generally understood to b

the occupying and fortifying of the advantageous heights of Dorchester. 

detachment of our troops is ordered to march for this purpose this eve

ning ; and our regiment, with several others, has received orders to marc

at 4 o'clock in the morning, to relieve them . We are favored with a fu

bright moon, and the night is remarkably mild and pleasant ; the prepara

tions are immense; more than three hundred loaded carts are in motion 

By the great exertions of General [Thomas] Mifflin, our Quarter Maste

General, the requisite number of teams has been procured . The coverin

party of eight hundred men advance in front . Then follow the carts with th

entrenching tools; after which, the working party of twelve hundred, com

manded by General Thomas, of Kingston . Next in the martial processio

are a train of carts, loaded with fascines and hay, screwed into larg

bundles of seven or eight hundred weight . The whole procession move

7 0
on in solemn silence, and with perfect order and regularity; while the continued roar of cannon serves to engage the attention and divert the enemy

from the main object.

5th-At about four o'clock our regiment followed to the heights of Dor

chester, as a relief party . On passing Dorchester Neck I observed a vas

number of large bundles of screwed hay, arranged in a line next the

enemy, to protect our troops from a raking fire, to which we should have

been greatly exposed, while passing and repassing . The carts were still i

motion with materials ; some of them have made three or four trips. On the

heights we found two forts in considerable forwardness, and sufficient fo

a defence against small arms and grape shot . The amount of labor per

formed during the night, considering the earth is frozen eighteen inches

deep, is almost incredible . The enemy having discovered our works in the

morning, commenced a tremendous cannonade from the forts in Boston,

and from their shipping in the harbor. Cannon shot are continually rollin

and rebounding over the hill ; and it is astonishing to observe how little ou

soldiers are terrified by them . During the forenoon we were in momentary

expectation of witnessing an awful scene ; nothing less than the carnag

of Breed's hill battle was expected . The royal troops are perceived to be i

motion, as if embarking to pass the harbor, and land on Dorchester shore

to attack our works . The hills and elevations in this vicinity are covere

with spectators to witness deeds of horror in the expected conflict. Hi

Excellency General Washington is present, animating and encouragin

the soldiers, and they in return manifest their joy, and express a war

desire for the approach of the enemy; each man knows his place, and i

resolute to execute his duty. Our breast works are strengthened, an

among the means of defence are a great number of barrels, filled wit

stones and sand, arranged in front of our works; which are to be put in mo

tion and made to roll down the hill, to break the ranks and legs of the as

sailants as they advance . These are the preparations for blood an

slaughter! Gracious God! if it be determined in thy Providence tha

thousands of our fellow creatures shall this day be slain, let thy wrath b

appeased, and in mercy grant, that victory be on the side of our suffering

bleeding, country.

-Thacher, Military Journal,

pp. 46-47.

Rev. William Gordon, pastor of a Congregational church in Roxbur

and Revolutionary chronicler, displayed a cool sense of detachment and 

fine eye for detail as he gathered material for his projected history of t

war.

7 1
9 . "EVERYONE KNEW HIS PLACE AND BUSINESS"

Rev. William Gordon to Samuel Wilson .

April 6, 177

. . . All things being ready [March 4] as soon as the evening admitted 

it, the undertaking went forward . The covering party consisting of 800 me

led the way; then the carts with the entrenching tools ; after that the mai

working body under Gen'I Thomas consisting of about 1200; a train 

more than 300 carts loaded with fascines, presst hay, in bundles of seve

or eight hundred, etc ., closed the procession . Every one knew his plac

and business ; the covering party when upon the ground divided, half wen

to the point next to Boston, the other to that next to the Castle [Cast

William in Boston harbor] . All possible silence was observed . The wind l

so as to carry what noise could not be avoided, by driving the stakes an

picking against the frozen ground (for the frost was still more than a foo

thick, about a foot and a half) to carry, I say, what noise could not b

avoided into the harbour between the town and the castle, so as not to b

heard and regarded by such as had no suspicion of what we were afte

especially as there was a continued cannonade on both sides . Many of th

carts made three trips, some four.

Gen'l Thomas told me that he pulled out his watch and found that b

ten o'clock at night, they had got two forts, one upon each hill, sufficien

to defend them from small arms and grape shot. The men continued wor

ing with the utmost spirit, till relieved the Tuesday morning about thre

The neighbouring militia had been called in for three days to guard agains

accidents, and were in by twelve at night, some before, in the evening 

The night was remarkably mild, a finer for working could not have bee

taken out of the whole 365. It was hazy below so that our people could no

be seen, tho' it was a bright moon light night above on the hills . . . .

-Massachusetts Historica

Society Proceedings, LX

361-64 .

As hoped, Howe planned an immediate offensive just as Gage had don

when the rebels entrenched on Breed's Hill; but contrary winds delayed th

attack long enough to allow the rebels to strengthen their works . Thes

developments, coupled with Howe's troop and supply problems, made h

position untenable. He reconsidered and chose instead to abandon Boston.

When the British departed on March 17, "the inhabitants discovered j

inexpressible . " 21 Though many buildings were damaged, their town was no

burned. In a final gesture of defiance, however, the British blew up Cast

William, the harbor stronghold .

Col. Charles Stuart, son of Lord Bute, a former prime minister, report

the background of the British decision to depart Boston . 22

72
10 . THEIR POSTS WERE "MORE LIKE MAJICK THAN

THE WORK OF HUMAN BEINGS"

Charles Stuart to Lord Bute .

Halifax, April 28, 1776

. . . We perceived two posts upon the highest hills of Dorchester peninsula, that appeared more like majick than the work of human beings . They

were each of them near 200 ft . long on the side next the town, and seemed

to be strong cases of packed hay about 10 ft . high with an abattis of vast

thickness round both . We discovered near 6000 people, most of them at

work ; they opened embrasures before 9 oclock and about 2 oclock had

made a ditch and connected the two hills by a breastwork .

We fired a few shots, but the position was too strong to be affected ; the

General therefore determined to attack it . A quantity of artillery and three

regiments immediately embarked . . . .

. . . God knows whether it was a fortunate circumstance or not, but at

any rate so high a wind arose that it was impossible for the boats to take to

sea.

The next day the General assembled the field officers and acquainted

us that the intended attack had failed through the inclemency of the

weather, that he had consulted the engineers, who declared that the

works had been so strengthened as to render any present attack very

doubtful, and that should the enemy augment their works upon that peninsula from such a commanding height we should inevitably be drove from

the town .

He also told us that there was no more than 6 weeks' provisions in the

garrison, which obliged him to go to Halifax instead of to New York.

The principal citizens, on hearing that the town was to be evacuated,

came to General Howe, and requested that the town might not be burnt 

the General made answer that if the enemy molested him in his retreat he

would certainly burn it ; if not, he would leave the town standing.

This was made known by a flag of truce to the Rebels ; in consequence

of which we made our retreat unmolested . . . .

-Commager and Morris, Spirit

of 'Seventy-Six, pp . 181-82.

British troops never again occupied Massachusetts, but fears that they

might return generated immediate plans to strengthen fortifications i

Boston harbor and in several coastal ports where the superior British navy

might attempt raids. The enemy left behind well-executed works and artil

lery which although spiked was easily put back into service . Responsibility

for overseeing the fortifications fell on Gridley, who remained as chie

engineer in Massachusetts until 1781 .

7 3



Gridley had problems. Upon hearing from Boston near the end of Apri

that the defenses laid out earlier were not complete, Washington exploded :

Who am I to blame for this shameful Neglect, but you, sir, who

was to have them executed? It is not an agreeable Task to be

under the Necessity of putting any Gentn . i n Mind of his Duty ;

but it is what I owe to the Public . I expect and desire, Sir, that

you will exert yourself in compleating the Works with all possible Dispatch, and do not lay me under the disagreeable Necessity of writing to you again upon this subject . 2 s

Believing that Washington had been misinformed by townspeople ig

norant of military works, the engineer quickly countered with his own ac

count of the state of Boston's defenses and of surveys conducted along the

coast north of Boston-surveys Washington had ordered only a week before

he reprimanded Gridley. In Gridley's view, Gloucester was "a place of Great

Consequence to keep possession of," and he accordingly proposed a new for

to secure it . With obvious agitation he dismissed the criticism as the work o

men who were apt "to Prate of things they don't understand," and who i

many cases possessed "a Malignant, Deceitfull disposition ."

11 . "I HAVE EXERTED EVERY NERVE TO THE UTMOST"

Richard Gridley to George Washington.

Boston, May 13, 177

Sir :

I received your Excellencys Orders . . . and have agreeable theret

been to Cape Ann, and made a Critical Survey of the Same. The Plan tha

accompanys this, is a Survey made by Mr. Holland, which I Luckily me

with, and have Examin'd in the Essential parts, and have added the Sound

ings and some Shoals which that plan had not and have been as Correct a

the time woud permit; I have also sent plans of the Several Forts Erecte

at Glocester, which you'l please to Observe by the Red Letters referr'd t

in the Plans ; The Letter H which is at Mussel Point and is a Height wel

adapted for a Fort of Six Battering Cannon, which will greatly annoy an

Ships coming into the Harbour, as they must come near it to avoid a Shoal

and the Battery being on such an Eminence, it cannot be hurt from th

Ships Tops, and the Fort being only an Oblong Square Picketted, will b

easily and gladly made by the Inhabitants, and can be easily Reinforc'd, o

Retreat with Safety: In my opinion this Harbour is a place of Great Conse

quence to keep possession of-at present there is 250 Men to Guard 

but they are dispers'd from Squam Round the Cape to Glocester which is 

Great Extent, and they cant Suddenly be collected together: They wan

Cannon Ammunition and men-Sound there be an Alarm they cannot b

7 7
assisted from any place nearer than Ipswich which is twelve Miles dis

tance : They Inform me four hundred of their men are Inlisted into the

Army, and very few remain fit for Services-Manchester Eight Miles on

this side Glocester is without any Men or Fort, a Company of men and 

Small Ridout (with three or four Cannon) made there at small Expence

woud be the Safety of that place, which place being cutt off, woud greatly

hinder the Communication with Cape Ann, as from that place to Beverly,

there is Water enough for the whole navy of England to Anchor there: 

have mentioned to several members of the court here, the necessity (i

my Opinion) of their furnishing Glocester with Cannon and Men, as a Flee

is daily expected, and may do mischief before the Congress can have time

to Act their pleasure from this Representation-Fort Hill and Dorchester

Point Forts, Charles Town Fort and the Fort on Noddles Island [all i

Boston] are now in a posture of Defence, with platforms Laid and Cannon

Mounted on them, except Noddles Island which will soon be done : Three

Cannon are Mounted on the Works at Castle William, and as soon as an

Embrazure and platform can be finish'd, a cannon will be mounted ; We

shall be most Backward in the Laboratory way,24 which I shall not be backward in hastning with all my Influence .-At Glocester I received your

Excellencys Letter of 28 April, which Surpriz'd me at first, but when I consider'd the Fears of the people in General in this Town, their Ignorance of

military Works, their aptness to Prate of things they don't understand, and

in many of them a Malignant, Deceitfull disposition my surprise ceas'd : 

know 1 have Exerted every Nerve to the utmost in my power to Forward the

Works ; the Soldiers have Complaind their Duty has been more Severe

since the possession of Boston than before, for, the whole were every day

on Duty of Fatigue or Guard . -" I have press'd the members of the Court

and the Inhabitants of this Town to lend their assistance, and after some

Consideration, have Effected their Aid : It is my strongest Inclination to for

ward every thing for the good of the Country Maugre the Insinuation of Detractors-I woud have sent Plans of the Forts here, but have not time at

Present, as I must set forward this day for New London . . . .

-Papers of the Continental

Congress, roll 95 .

GRIDLEY PAY WARRANT. When Richard Gridley became Chie

Engineer in 1775, Congress set his payat $60 per month . Subsequently, other engineer officers received the same pay, with assistan

engineers receiving half that amount. As chiefengineer for the

Eastern Department at Boston, Gridley was still receiving the same

pay when this warrant for three months'pay was issued in January

1777.

Artemus Ward Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society

7 8

An account of lumber and nails provided by Congress for the Bosto

forts in the fall of 1776 reveals the scope of Gridley's effort to upgrade an

maintain the town's defenses .

12 . GRIDLEY'S ACCOUNT OF MATERIALS SUPPLIED

TO THE BOSTON FORTS

4972 feet of Boards

5420 feet of 2-inch Plank

5175 feet of 4-inch Plank

2700 feet of Oak Plank

2700 feet of Pine Joist

10,167 feet of Pine Timber

1675 feet of Oak Joist

672 feet of Oak Timber

2100 Pickets

3454 feet of Oak Plank

2370 feet of Pine Timber

1600 Pickets

220 lbs. of Spikes

Two buildings containing650 feet of Timber

3626 feet of Oak Plank

1130 feet of Pine Timber

200 feet of Pine Plank

1200 Pickets

160 lbs. Spikes

One building containing2626 feet of Oak Plank

912 feet of Pine Timber

1100 Pickets

50 lbs . Spikes

Two buildings containing450 feet of Timber

Fort-Hill, in Boston

2527 lbs . of Spikes and Nails

Two buildings containing12 thousand Shingles

8206 feet of Boards

900 feet of Timber

1200 feet of Joist

8 thousand 10-penny Nails

12 thousand 4-penny Nails

1/2 thousand 20-penny Nails

No. 1 . Fort at Dorchester Point

No. 2. Dorchester, second hill

80

Boston, November 177

800 feet of Oak Joist

3070 feet of Boards

71/2 thousand Shingles

71/2 thousand 4-penny Nails

5 thousand 10-penny Nails

1/2 thousand 20-penny Nails

400 feet of Timber

500 feet of Joist

2250 feet of Boards

51/2 thousand Shingles

51/2 thousand 4-penny Nails

3 thousand 10-penny Nails

No. 3. Fort on Dorchester, southermost hill

600 feet of Joist

2320 feet of Boards

6 thousand Shingles

6 thousand 4-penny Nails

3 thousand 10-penny Nails

1/2 thousand 20-penny Nails
3650 feet of Oak Plank

1710 feet of Oak Timber

2150 feet of Pine Plank

924 feet of Pine Timber

2592 feet of Oak Plank

400 lbs. of Spikes

A building containing200 feet of Joist

344 feet of Timber

288 feet of Oak Plank

156 feet of Pine Timber

1000 Pickets

25 lbs . Spikes

For the Blockhouse, viz:

Fort at Noddle's Island

Fort on Charlestown Hill

Fort on Governour's Island

1395 feet of Pine Timber

800 lbs . Spikes

1342 feet of Boards

3 thousand of Shingles

3 thousand 4-penny Nails

1 1/2 thousand 10-penny Nails

1/2 thousand 20-penny Nails

23 thousand Shingles

23 thousand 4-penny Nails

60 feet of Timber

750 feet of Boards

Painting the Blockhouse

-Force, American Archives, 5th

ser., 3:476-77.

Two years after the British evacuation, Gridley continued work on Boston's defenses in anticipation of an enemy attack . Convinced that the fortifications he had begun at Castle William and on Governor's Island should be

finished speedily in order to close the lines around Boston, he begged for

more men, equipment, and supplies. Noting that many Bostonians would

be ready to blame him for every misfortune, he strongly defended his earlier

labors : "I have hitherto done every thing in my power to forward the

works . . . . I coud not do more . . . for want of Workmen ." 25

When the British, now bolstered by a fleet superior to the French one,

threatened Boston in September 1778, the Army's Chief Engineer, Brig.

Gen . Louis Lebegue Duportail, conceived a plan to stop them . While

attempting to prevent redcoats from leaving New York City, the Continentals, he said, should fortify the main route to Boston and cut off all detours and parallel routes . Duportail advised Washington to send him to

Boston so that all necessary measures could be taken for the city's defense . 26

Washington followed Duportail's advice . On September 29 he ordered

his Chief Engineer to Boston to examine the existing fortifications as well as

those under construction and to "form a plan, from a view of the whole local

situation of the place, . . . best calculated to give . . . the most effectual

security." The Commander in Chief could not resist offering his own suggestions:

8 1
Without intention to lay any restraint which may contradict

your own judgments, I will barely hint my desire in general,

that the works may not be to extensive with a view of embracing

any considerable part of the bay, the heights of Dorchester

which immediately command the town, will strike you as an

object of the first attention, and the possession of them as indispensable; the occupying them, Roxbury heights and such

ground as may cover the inner bason with works capable of obstinate defence will, together with the fortifications of the harbour secure the Town and French Squadron, till the arrival of

this Army. 27

On October 6 Duportail surveyed the works ; and on his advice-in Maj

Gen. William Heath's words-"fatigue parties were employed on the dif

ferent works, and every thing put in the best posture of defence .

"28
Mountain Boys, led by Ethan Allen and Benedict Arnold, ferried two miles

across Lake Champlain and conducted a surprise raid on Fort Ticonderoga .

The fort held valuable military stores-particularly artillery-desperately

needed by the Continental Army outside Boston. High winds and a driving

rain had made the crossing perilous; but on orders from Arnold the raiders

took up their weapons, penetrated the fort's crumbling south wall, and

entered the parade ground . With dramatic flair Allen reputedly demanded

the fort's surrender "in the name of the great Jehovah and the Continental

Congress." After offering only token resistance, the British commander

complied .

Without delay the Continental Congress voted to evacuate the military

stores and then abandon Ticonderoga and nearby Crown Point, which the

Americans had also taken. In the northern colonies a violent outcry greeted

the news . As a result Congress reversed its decision . Ticonderoga became the

main garrison for the Northern Department of the Army, organized in late

June under the command of Maj . Gen . Philip J . Schuyler . Because of its

strategic location on the pathway to Canada, the fort became the base for

Schuyler's abortive invasion of Canada in late summer 1775 .

In November Washington sent Col . Henry Knox, commander of the

Continental artillery, from Boston to get Ticonderoga's big guns. Knox

spearheaded a heroic effort : before the end of January 1776 eighty yoke of

oxen had dragged sixty cannon and mortars 300 treacherous snow- and icecovered miles to the rebel lines outside Boston.

Removal of the captured artillery stores did not signal the end of

Ticonderoga's value to the Americans . The British turned back the rebel invasion of Canada, and by early July 1776 survivors of the campaign began to

arrive back at Crown Point in need of food, housing, and medical attention.

The works at Crown Point were in ruins, so attention turned to

Ticonderoga, several miles south .

Efforts to expand the fort's facilities and strengthen its defenses began

immediately . During the next twelve months the patriots repaired the main

83
JOHN TRUMBULL. Trumbull (1756-1843), a staff officer whose artistic talents led to service as an assistant engineer at Boston and

Ticonderoga, painted this self-portrait in 1777.

Museum of Fine Arts, Boston

84
fortress, improved the outer lines built earlier by the French, and constructed redoubts, blockhouses, and a bridge and boom across Lake

Champlain . However, the most significant change was the fortification for

the first time of a height southeast of Ticonderoga across Lake Champlain

known later as Mount Independence .

During the American occupation of Ticonderoga, John Trumbull,

Jeduthan Baldwin, Christopher Pelissier, and Thaddeus Kosciuszko served

as engineers . Baldwin was the fort's chief engineer, Pelissier the second

ranking engineer . From time to time assistant engineers taken from the line

aided them . A scarcity of rations, equipment, and clothing, combined with

the problems of disease, hostile Indians, and adverse weather, made assignment to Ticonderoga a genuine hardship .

When he arrived at Fort Ticonderoga in July 1776, Colonel Trumbull

had just been appointed deputy to Maj . Gen . Horatio Gates, General

George Washington's adjutant general . Trumbull's account of his tour of

duty at Ticonderoga, where he remained until late that year, included a

description of the initial occupation of Mount Independence and details of

the debate over-fortifying nearby Sugar Loaf Hill (later renamed Mount Defiance by the British) .

Trumbull, the future artist, claimed credit for first recognizing that

Sugar Loaf Hill presented a substantial threat to Ticonderoga . As he recounted years later in the passage from his autobiography below, Trumbull

contended - and demonstrated -that not only was the American position

within firing range of the mount, but also the summit could be reached and

fortified . Even the lame General Arnold joined him in climbing the hill's

steep eastern slope!

Further, Trumbull cogently argued that an adequate defense of

Ticonderoga and Mount Independence would require ten thousand men

and great expense ; on the other hand, a permanent work on the summit of

Sugar Loaf Hill would sharply reduce overall expense and manpower requirements .

Still adhering to his belief that Sugar Loaf Hill could not be scaled, and

hence could not be fortified, Schuyler rejected Trumbull's arguments .

Thus, fortification of the Ticonderoga-Mount Independence complex went

forward under the shadow of still-undefended Sugar Loaf Hill. A year later

the rebels would have cause to regret this missed opportunity .

1 . "THE ASCENT WAS DIFFICULT AND LABORIOUS,

BUT NOT IMPRACTICABLE"

From John Trumbull's autobiography .

My first duty [July 1776] was, in company with Colonel Wayne,1 to make a

second examination of Mount Independence . He joined in the opinion . . . that the ground was finely adapted for a military post. At the north

8 5
ern point, it ran low into the lake, offering a good landing place; fr

thence the land rose to an almost level plateau, elevated from fifty 

seventy-five feet above the lake, and surrounded, on three sides, by 

natural wall of rock, every where steep, and sometimes an absolu

precipice sinking to the lake. On the fourth and eastern side of the pos

tion ran a morass and deep creek at the foot of the rock, which strengt

ened that front, leaving room only, by an easy descent, for a road to t

east, and to the landing from the southern end of the lake . We found ple

tiful springs of good water, at the foot of the rock. The whole was cover

with primeval forest. . . .

Part of the troops, as they arrived from Crown Point, being ordered 

land and take post on this spot, proceeded to clear away the wood, and 

encamp . The exhalations from the earth, which was now, for the first tim

exposed to the rays of a midsummer sun, combined with the fog whi

rose from the pestilent lake, soon produced sickness in a new shape-

fever very nearly resembling the yellow fever of the present time-and 

was not unusual to see the strongest men carried off by it in two or thr

days . The four Pennsylvania regiments, the elite of the army, were post

in the old French lines, which they were ordered to repair; and at all poin

the troops were actively employed in strengthening old works of defens

or in constructing new ones .

In the mean time, reinforcements were earnestly solicited from t

New England states, and promptly sent on, so that the post soon assume

the aspect of military strength and activity. . . .

The position of the army extended from Mount Independence on t

right and east side of the lake, to the old French lines on the west formi

our left, protected at various points by redoubts and batteries, on whi

were mounted more than a hundred pieces of heavy cannon . After som

time, it was seen that the extreme left was weak and might easily 

turned ; a post was therefore established on an eminence, near half a mi

in advance of the old French lines, which was called Mount Hope . Th

our entire position formed an extensive crescent, of which the center wa

a lofty eminence, called Mount Defiance, the termination of that mountai

ridge which separates Lake George from Lake Champlain, and which ris

precipitously from the waters of the latter to a height of six hundred fee

The outlet of Lake George enters Champlain at the foot of this eminence

and separates it from the old French fort and lines of Ticonderoga . Th

important position had hitherto been neglected by the engineers of all pa

ties, French, English and American .

I had for some time, regarded this eminence as completely overrulin

our entire position . It was said, indeed, to be at too great a distance to b

dangerous ; but by repeated observation I had satisfied my mind that t

distance was by no means so great as was generally supposed, and 

length, at the table of Gen . Gates, where the principal officers of the arm

were present, I ventured to advance the new and heretical opinion, th

86
our position was bad and untenable, as being overlooked in all its parts by

this hill . I was ridiculed for advancing such an extravagant idea . l persisted

however, and as the truth could not be ascertained by argument, by

theory, or by ridicule, I requested and obtained the general's permission

to ascertain it by experiment. General (then Major) Stevens2 was busy a

the north point of Mount Independence in examining and proving cannon 

I went over to him on the following morning, and selected a long double

fortified French brass gun, (a twelve pounder,) which was loaded with the

proof charge of best powder and double shotted . When I desired him t

elevate this gun so that it should point at the summit of Mount Defiance,

he looked surprised, and gave his opinion that the shot would not cross

the lake . "That is what I wish to ascertain, Major," was my answer; "

believe they will, and you will direct your men to look sharp, and we too

will keep a good look-out ; if the shot drop in the lake their splash wil

easily be seen ; if, as I expect, they reach the hill, we shall know it by the

dust of the impression which they will make upon its rocky face ." The gun

was fired, and the shot were plainly seen to strike at more than half the

height of the hill . I returned to head-quarters and made my triumphant

report, and after dinner requested the general and officers who were wit

him to walk out upon the glacis of the old French fort, where I had ordered

a common six pound field gun to be placed in readiness . This was, in thei

presence, loaded with the ordinary charge, pointed at the top of the hill

and when fired, it was seen that the shot struck near the summit . Thus th

truth of the new doctrine was demonstrated ; but still it was insisted upon,

that this summit was inaccessible to an enemy . This also I denied, and

again resorted to experiment. Gen . Arnold, Col . Wayne, and several othe

active officers, accompanied me in the general's barge, which landed u

at the foot of the hill, where it was most precipitous and rocky, and we

clambered to the summit in a short time . The ascent was difficult and

laborious, but not impracticable, and when we looked down upon th

outlet of Lake George, it was obvious to all, that there could be no diffi

culty in driving up a loaded carriage .

Our present position required at least ten thousand men, and an hun

dred pieces of artillery, for its doubtful security . I assumed that it would b

found impossible for the government, in future campaigns, to devote s

great a force to the maintenance of a single post; and as there was no roa

on either side of the lake by which an enemy could penetrate into th

country south, he must necessarily make use of this route by water; an

as the summit of Mount Defiance looked down upon, and completely com

manded the narrow parts of both the lakes, a small but strong post there

commanded by an officer who would maintain it to the last extremity

would be a more effectual and essentially a less expensive defense of thi

pass, than all our present extended lines.

On these principles I proceeded to draw up two memoirs, in one o

which was stated the number of men, ten thousand, with the expense o

87
their pay, subsistence, clothing, etc., and of artillery at least one hundr

pieces, with their attirail [attire], ammunition, etc., necessary to 

maintenance of the present system of defense ; in the other, an estima

of the expense of erecting a permanent work on the summit in questio

large enough to contain a garrison of five hundred men, and mounti

twenty five heavy guns, with the ammunition, pay and provisions for t

force for one year. The relative expense of the two systems was as twe

to one nearly . These memoirs I accompanied with plans of our prese

position .

From Jeduthan Baldwin's journal .

8 8

-Trumbull, Autobiography

pp. 29-34.

Lt . Col . Jeduthan Baldwin joined Trumbull at Ticonderoga in J

1776 . After having served as an assistant engineer with the rank of capta

in Boston and New York earlier that year, Baldwin had received a prom

tion and orders to go to Canada. However, by the time he reached Queb

Province in mid-May he encountered the retreating American arm

Baldwin joined the slow trek back down Lake Champlain and along wi

countless others suffered from smallpox on the way. On July 8, when he 

rived at Ticonderoga, he became the fort's chief engineer, and hastily to

on the tasks of laying out defenses, adding buildings, and overseeing sco

of artisans . Like most serving in the Ticonderoga wilderness, Baldw

experienced his share of hardship and illness . On 3 September 1776 Co

gress rewarded him with a promotion to colonel and pay of $60 per month

Excerpts from Baldwin's daily account of his experiences at Ticondero

reveal his tremendous responsibilities, particularly in regard to the artisan

whose accomplishments included saltpeter factories and soap works . 4

2. "I HAVE MY HANDS AND MIND CONSTANTLY EMPLOYED

NIGHT AND DAY EXCEPT WHEN I AM ASLEEP AND THEN

SOMETIMES I DREAM"

7 [July 1776]. Recd . orders to go to Ticondaroga with Som Carpente

and to cary all my Baggage, I collected all the Intrenching tools togeathe

BALDWIN'S JOURNAL. leduthan Baldwin (1732-88), chief

engineer at Ticonderoga, kept a detailed journal. This facsimile i

an entryfor 28 October 1776.

Baldwin, journal

8.Went to Ticonderoga, with Genl . Schuyler and Genl. Gates, Vi

the grounds on the East Side ye Lake with Col . Trumball on one Hill, t

26 Carpenters with me to repair ye Vessels and the Saw mill 

Skeensboro.

9. Viewd the Grounds on the east with Genl . Schuyler and Genl . Gat

round the peninsula, found Water by diging on the top of the Hill . . . .

10. Went over and Marked out a road from the North point to the to

the Hill with Col. Wain [Wayne] and Col . Trumball . Genl . Sulliv

Reconoiterd the Hill with me . I went up East Creek to the Head abou

miles, a muddy bottom .

11 . Went over to the point with 200 Men to Clear a road, Dig well, et

was a Very rainey Day. We returnd about 12 o'clock to camp, V

wet. . . .

18. Visited all my workmen as Usual but found many of them Sick 

great complaints of the want of provision, yt they had only 12 ouz. of p

and 1 1/2 Ib of Flower pr Day.

19 . A Very Heavey Rain last night and continewd the chief of the Da

men of Col . [John Philip] De Haas Regt. were found in there tents drow

ed in warter, many others lay half coverd or Set up all night. Such a hea

Rain is sildom known. This Day by Genl . Gates order I Recd 98 Dol

which will enable me to purchase Cloathing, if I can find them, but they 

very scarce and deer . . . .

23. Laid out the park for the artillery on Rattlesnake Hill, bou

Carpenters tools of Six men and then discharged them.

24 . Dind with Genl . Gates, and in the afternoon we went round the 

French lines with Col . De Haws, which our people were at work Very fas

25. Genl . Gates and several other Officers went over to the point 

me and highly approvd of the works that I had laid out there, and orde

that 220 men Should work daily at least and as many more as could be 

ployed and was in high good humor. . . .

26. . . . This Day there is a supply of fresh provision, and it is orde

that all the troops shall have 4 days fresh and 3 Days Salt meat a week.

27. Went over to the East point with Genl . Arnold and Col . Trumball . 

orderd the encampment of the Briggade to be alterd . Recd . 200 Dollar

pay for Tools, by order of the Genl . . . .

28. This morning I visited all the Artifficers before breakfast as Usu

paid . . . 212 Dollars for Carpenters tools as there is no Quartermas

Genl . at present with this army, I have that duty to do in part, and I have 

intire direction of all the House and Ship Carpenters, the Smiths, 

mourers, Roap makers, the Wheel and Carriage makers, Miners Turne

Coalyers, Sawyers and Shingle makers, which are all togeather 

besides the direction of all the fateagueing parties, so that I have 

hands and mind constantly employed night and Day except when I a

Sleep and then sometimes I dream. . . .

90
30. At Ticonderoga and lodg in the Redoubt East of the Garrison in the

point of Rocks, but as my business calls I am on Mount Independancy

some Days 2 or 3 times in the Day as was the case this Day. . . .

[August] 10. This Day the paymaster Genl . dind with me and the Commisery Genl . with several other Gent. Made up the pay roll for the artifficers of all Trades.

11 . Went over to Independant point with Genl . Gates and Arnold to view

the works. They exprest entire satisfaction . In the afternoon I Recd . (by a

warrant from the genl .) 1262 Dollars to pay the artifficers under my

care. . . .

14. Laid out a redoubt on Independant Mount, which Genl . Gates and

others aprovd . of. . . .

15. Raised the Labratory . Laid out and began 2 Ridoubts on the North

end of the old french lines in the afternoon .

16. Laid out a Redoubt on the North side of the point . . . .

17. Laid out a wharf at the South side of Independant point and orderd a

large Stoer House to be built and also 2 guard housen and then I returned

with Col . Wain and Col . Trumball, went into the woods near the Saw mill by

a Spring where we had a fine dinner, Venison roasted on Sticks Indian

fashon, an Elegant Entertainment. . . .

[September] 7. All hands at work at Daylight prepairing our batteries

against the worst .

8. I was Very poorly this Morning as I had been yesterday and last Night

I Took Camphire that made me Swet all night, this morning took a portion

Rubarb that workt very kindly . In the afternoon I went out to Col . Brewers

and Willards Encampments and laid out a fort on the Top of the Mount,

North of the Mills . . . .

9. I was Very porly with Hard pain in my head and Eyes . At Evning took

a Vomit that workt well but kept me up part of the night. . . .

10. Was so Sick that I did not go abroad, pain in my head across my

Eyes and in my Stomach and Sick at the Stomach but could get nothing to

take and so woried the Day thro . . .

11. Paying of my workmen. . . .

.

I had a Severe fit of Ague and fever that

lasted 9 hours . About Sunset I took a Vomit that workt well and gave Some

Relief, but very faint and weak. . . .

15. This Day I misst. having the ague, but was so faint that I can hardly

walk, my stomack loathing all kinds of food, a little wine and water or Wine

Whey being the chief of what I have taken Since Last Sabath Day. I am

much better this evning but far from being well .

16. Was somthing better and it is of the Lords mercy that I am alive after

Such a hard and constant fatigue being out Early and late Crossing the

water in the thick Fogs, that are peculiar at this place.

17. . . . I was better but no relish for food . Began to repair my

Redoubt . . . .

9 1
19. Took physick, l broak out all over Very full which burnt and is Ve

tedious to bair, but it is probible this may be of great Service for I ha

been better 4 Days from the time I broak out with this Rash .

20. Went a broad a little, but still unwell .

21. Was poorly, went a broad but little . Majr. Hay Came home, has be

down the Lake 45 Miles, brought up a plenty of Sauce for our Mess . 

Says that 314 of all the Inhabitants in this country are Sick, such a time h

not been known before.

22. I took physic, was better a good deal, feel well to what I ha

been . . . .

Octor 1 . Went over to the point with Col . Pal laceer 6[Pelissier] to L

out the fort . We Run Round the work but did not finish . . . .

2. Went with Col . Pallaseer, Capt . Newland and Lt. Dallace over to 

dependant Hill leying out the Fort agreable to a New Plan I had drawn, t

Several Assistant Engineers Dind with me. I Supt . [supped] with G. Gate

-Baldwin, Revolutionary Jo

nal, pp . 58-66, 70, 74-76, 7

Besides strengthening the garrison and its defenses, the artisans help

ready a fleet intended to beat back the British on Lake Champlain . In O

tober 1776 a full-scale encounter finally took place on the lake off Valco

Island . Although the British survived and the rebel fleet was destroyed, 

season was too advanced for the enemy to attempt a move agai

Ticonderoga before spring .

On October 20 Baldwin got Gates's approval to build a bridge acr

Lake Champlain from Ticonderoga to Mount Independence . Immediate

he set to work on a boom and by the 29th the bridge was finished "so th

men could pass ."

General Gates's orders for 1776 recorded by Col . Anthony Wayn

Baldwin's commander, illustrate further the Chief engineer's role 

Ticonderoga . Baldwin directed fatigue parties and artisans, was responsib

for maintaining tools in readiness, and surveyed campsites and redoubts .

3. "THE GENERAL IS CONFIDANT ASPIRIT OF EMULATION WILL

ANIMATE EACH BRIGADE TO FINISH THE TASK ASSIGN'D THEM"

From Anthony Wayne's orderly book.

10 July 1776. Two captains, six subalterns, eight serjeants, eight c

porals, two drums, and one hundred and ninety two privates to para

tomorrow morning at eight oclock, to go on fatigue under the direction 

Lieutenant Colonel Baldwin, Chief Engineer. . . .
11 July 1776. . . . Lieutenant Beal with the house carpenters and Mr .

Noah Nichols with the wheelwrights, are to remain at Ticonderoga, under

the direction of Colonel Baldwin, Chief Engineer. . . .

13 July 1776. Lieutenant Colonel Baldwin will draw provision twice a

week, for all the artificers and take the whole under his direction . . . .

14 July 1776. The chief engineer to order the artificers to get proper

necessary's made over the rock opposite their hutts, that the new encampment may be kept clean against the troops arrival . . . .

19 July 1776. The Chief Engineer is to get all the wood axes helv'd and

ground immediately that they may be ready for use when the weather

clears up . . . .

21 July 1776. As the Chief Engineer will have a sufficient number of felling axes ready to employ a large body of men tomorrow, the General

desires the commanding officers of the three eldest brigades will send as

many men as can be sent from those off duty to clear the ground for the encampment of those brigades . . . .

22 July 1776. The Chief Engineer Colonel Baldwin will order that the

soap deliv'd to the artificers be divided properly between them . . . .

27 July 1776. The commanding officers of regiments the Commanding

Officer of Artillery and the Chief Engineer will be very exact in obliging

their respective surgeons to make an immediate report of every person infected with small pox. . . .

28 July 1776. The comissary will issue eight pounds of soap to every

hundred men pr week now in this camp upon a proper sign'd return being

deliv'd to him by the commanding officer of each corps. The Commanding

Officer of Artillery and Chief Engineer for the Artificers to draw in proportion to their numbers. . . .

30 July 1776. The General is exceedingly astonish'd and concern'd to

find such a supineness and indolence previling in the 3 brigades station'd

upon Mount Independance, as if it was a time of profound peace and no

enemy to contend with, he is therefore oblig'd to represent to B. G.

[Benedict] Arnold, and the colonels commanding brigades and to every

commanding officer of a regiment belonging to those brigades how

necessary it is for them in the present emergency for them by their

authority and example to inspire all under them with a spirit of emulation in

forwarding the works, clearing the ground and preparing to receive the

enemy, the troops upon the Mount should be convinc'd by their last year's

campaigne at Cambridge of the utility of good works; the General trusts

they will loose no time in raising them .

Colonel Baldwin will this day acquaint the commanding officer of each

brigade with the work expected to be done by that brigade, and the

General is confidant a spirit of emulation will animate each brigade to

finish the task assign'd them . . . .

The fatigue parts for the future are to begin work at 6 oclock and have

their breakfast before they begin .

93

They will be dismiss'd at twelve oclock for dinner till one oclock then

work till seven . . . .

31 July 1776. Lieutenant W. Augustus Patterson of Colonel Pattersons

regt. i s appinted an assistant engineer to Colonel Baldwin and is to be

obey'd as such . . . .

16 Aug 1776. The Cheif Engineer to see that all the spades and axes in

store are immediately helv'd, and a party are constantly kept grinding of

axes. . . .

17Aug 1776. The Cheif Engineer, to deliver 15 axes to the field officer,

of the main guard tomorrow morning at guard mounting, they are to be

answerable for those axes, to the officers who reteire them, and those

guards are not to be relieved, until the axes are in good order deliver'd to

the releiving officers . . . .

24 Aug 1776. The Cheif Engineer with Col . St. Clair and Col . Wayne will

tomorrow morning at 10 oclock take a review of the ground near the saw

mill fix upon a spott for the encampment of two continental regts . and the

best situation for throwing up a redoubt to command the pass . The

D. A. G. and Deputy Quarter Master Genl . will also attend Col 

Baldwin . . . .

28 Aug 1776. During the recess from work occasion'd by the rain the

cheif engineer will order as many axes to be ground as possible as soon

as the weather clears up. The commanding officer of each regt may

receive from Col Baldwin 24 axes giveing his receipt for the same. Those

axes are to be distributed to three of the most expert axmen in each company who are to keep them constantly in good order and to be ready t

turn out when call'd for. . . .

29 Aug 1776. The cheif engineer, will order the broken hand barrowst

be repai'd and as many new ones made, as are immediately wanted . . . .

2 Sept 1776. All the spades, pickaxes, and billhooks now in possessio

of the respective regts (except a spade and pickax to each regt) are to b

immediately brought to the Chief Engineer. Those on mount Indepen

dance are to be brought to the landing, those on the West side to Hea

Quarters . . . .

4 Sept 1776. . . . Major Pail of Col Wheelocks Regt. Leiut Ashbeldeli

of Col Winds Regt and Ensign Perold of Col Maxwell's Regt are joyn

Assistant Engineers under Cheif Engineer Col Baldwin . . . .

6Sept 1776. A return of all the axes spades pick axes shovels billhook

and hoes remaining in store to be deliver'd to the Qr M G . at 6 Oclock th

TICONDEROGA DEFENSES . John Trumbull drew this map to show

existing and projected works at Ticonderoga and Mount Independence as of August 1776. Note the fortification proposed for

Mount Defiance (Sugar Loaf Hill), top center .

Trumbull, Autobiography

95
evening . The commanding officers of regts will take notice that the faul

axes lately deliver'd to their respective troops are to be return'd wh

call'd for, and such as are dificient must be paid for, by a stoppage out 

the regimental abstracts. As a considerable body of troops will joyn 

army this week, the Cheif Engineer must take care to provide intrensh

tools sufficient to employ all the working parties. . . .

28 Sept 1776. Mr. Christopher Joseph Delezenne is appointed 

Assistant Engineer under Col . Baldwin, he is to be obey'd as such .

-Bulletin of the Fort Tic

deroga Museum, 11 :94-

passim. Courtesy of F

Ticonderoga, Ticondero

New York.

Like Baldwin, Christopher Pelissier arrived at Ticonderoga that su

mer . A native of France, he had assisted the American cause in Canada 

supplying shells and cannonballs . Forced to abandon his Canadian ope

tion after the American defeat, Pelissier applied to Congress for aid . 

reward was an appointment as engineer lieutenant colonel on 29 July 17

Pelissier went to Ticonderoga as Baldwin's subordinate .

In October 1776, as the British threatened to push down La

Champlain and take Ticonderoga, Pelissier scrutinized the Jersey Redoub

one of the fort's new outworks . He found it to be technically inferior, larg

because the enemy could not be enfiladed from the salient angle on 

north side and because there was insufficient maneuvering room inside 

the troops . What was needed was a second, covering redoubt. In his rep

on the works, Pelissier, whose engineer training is unknown, exhibite

fairly high degree of technical sophistication, particularly in comparis

with Baldwin.

4. PELISSIER'S OBSERVATIONS ON THE JERSEY REDOUBT

96

October 21, 1

It is highly probable that the enemy will attack that redoubt at 

salient angle on the north side, for the following reasons:

Firstly. Their column cannot be enfiladed from that angle.

Secondly. Their left, bearing on the water side, cannot be galled 

that quarter.

Thirdly. That angle is not at all defended .

It is true the next redoubt may fire a little on the right of the column 

the enemy, but nothing stops a column which is not enfiladed .

It is evident that a column cannot be enfiladed from that acute ang

and that, therefore, the column will succeed. The enemy may then for
lodgment in the ditch without being seen either by the guard in the

redoubt, the flanks of which are not defended, or by the next redoubt. And

even though they should be seen from that redoubt, we could not fir

upon them from that without running an imminent danger of firing upon

ourselves . In this case the enemy have two ways left of carrying the

redoubt: 1st. They can blow up that angle by opening a gallery under it 

2dly . By storming it, in which last case every thing will be in their favour 

1 st. They may, unseen, destroy the f raises . 2d . The interiour epaulement,

which is now making within the redoubt, is an insuperable obstacle to the

continual fire which might be made for preventing its being carried ; fo

now there is no sufficient room left between that epaulement and the banquette of the parapet . But even though there should be no epaulement,

there is not room enough between the banquette and the platform of

those guns which fire on the water; so that the troops within cannot perform their manoeuvres .

I judge, therefore, that if the redoubt be attacked it will be at that acute

angle, and that if attacked it must be carried, unless another redoubt

should be made to cover it . And this last redoubt ought to be strong

enough not to be itself carried by the enemy, for it cannot be too much

remarked that the Jersey redoubt on account of its too acute angle, can

not defend it . . . .

-Force, American Archives, 5t

ser., 2:1970.

To attract artisans to the New York wilderness, the wages offered had t

be high. For example, the company of carpenters who concluded the follow

ing agreement with Baldwin in December 1776 were to receive betwee

eight and twelve shillings pay, one and one-half ration, and a gill of rum pe

day . At that rate, the top-paid craftsman made sixty shillings or £3 pe

week, between $7 and $8 in New York currency. Such benefits for the ar

tisans often led to friction with Army regulars who were paid considerabl

less . 7

5 . AGREEMENT BETWEEN BALDWIN AND ACOMPANY OF ARTIFICERS

Head-Quarters, Albany, December 16th, 177

Memorandum of agreement made and entered into this sixteenth da

of December, 1776, between Colonel Jedu'n Baldwin, Chief Engineer o

the Northern Department, of the first part, and Mr . Jedi'h Thayer, of th

State of the Massachusetts-Bay, Gentleman, and Mr . Nathaniel Emerso

and the persons whose names are hereunto subscribed, and seal

affixed, of the second part, all good workmen at the carpenter's business

97
to the number of sixty men; the said parties of the second part, each 

himself, promises and agrees that they will immediately repair to su

place as the said Colonel Baldwin shall direct, and there empl

themselves in constructing such works or buildings as the said Engin

shall order.

That each of the parties of the second part shall, during the time 

shall be in the publick employ conformable to these resolutions, each d

continue at their said work and employment not less than ten hours .

That if any of the said parties of the second part shall leave the s

work, or go from the post where they shall be employed, the leave of 

said Colonel Baldwin, or the commanding officer of the post where 

shall be so employed, being first obtained, he or they so going off sh

forfeit all the wages that shall be due to them on account of their serv

performed in consequence of this agreement.

In consideration whereof, the said Jedu'n Baldwin, Engineer, p

mises and agrees, that the said Jedi'h Thayer shall have and rece

twelve shillings per day, and Nathaniel Emerson ten shillings per day, a

every other of the said parties of the second part the sum of eight shilli

per day, New-York currency, for every day that they shall be in act

employment. That over and above that sum, the said parties of the seco

part shall severally receive one and a half ration of provisions and one 

of rum per day. That the said wages shall commence from the time 

said parties of the second part shall respectively leave their usual plac

of abode, allowing at the rate of one dollar for every twenty miles trav

And the said parties of the first and second part do hereby agree with ea

other, that if any of the said parties of the second part is taken sick duri

the time which they shall be employed as above, the person so taken s

shall not be entitled to wages for the time he absents from working 

reason of sickness, unless the said Colonel Baldwin, or the commandi

officer of the post where they shall be so stationed, shall, on application 

him made, refuse to discharge them, and then they shall be entitled 

wages from the time of such refusal . . . .

-Force, American Archives, 

ser., 3:1250.

In December 1776 the rebels expected a renewed attempt 

Ticonderoga . In a memorandum the chief engineer proposed changes in 

fort's defenses and estimated the supplies needed for the coming year . T

large amount of materials requested underscores the great commitme

made at Ticonderoga. Baldwin appeared anxious to get to work bef

spring; but as always, manpower was the deciding factor.

9 8
6. BALDWIN REVIEWS TICONDEROGA'S NEEDS FOR 1777

Memorandum of sundry Articles that may be necessary to carry on th

Works in the Northern Army in the Year 1777:

300 Augers of different Sizes

150 Handsaws, adzes, and

other Carpenters Tools

30 Dozen of Files of different sort

40 Dozen Gimlets

20 Dozen Nail Hammers

800,00010d . Nails

300,000 6d . [Nails)

Ten Casks of 20d . Nails

Spikes and other Nails as the

Service may determine

A, a large Quantity of Bar Iron Steel

A, 60,000 feet of 3 Inch oak Plank fo

platforms

A,8 2,000 Iron Spades

A, 2,000 Iron Shovels

A, 3,000 Felling axes

A, 500 pick-axes

A, 1,000 Bill-hooks

A, 200 stone Hammers

A, 200 Masons Trowels

A, 20 Crow bars

300 Broad axes

50 Iron Squares

100 pair of Compasses

100 pair of Framing Chisels

A, 400,000 Feet of Inch

pine Board

A, A large Quantity of plank and

Timber for Gun Carriages

The following Works are most suitable to be done during the Winte

should there be Men sent to do it:

Making one hundred Platforms for Cannon.

1,000 Hand Barrows . Repairing of the old wood Axes .

Pickaxes, Shovels, Spades, etc . Making Carriages for Cannon .

To secure the old Fort with Plank by way of Blinds to prevent Surprise 

Building of 3 Block Houses on the Southeast Part of Moun

Independence .

Building of a Block House East of the old Fort near the General'

Quarters, or back of the Store by the Wharf. Building of a Block House o

the Height of the old French Lines.

Driving Piles thro' the Ice across the Lake to strengthen the Boom .

Memorandum of Works to be done near Tyconderoga next Spring:

Building a Fort on Mount Independence with 14 Bastions and a cover

way on the East and South Sides .

Finish the Barbet Battery with Merlons and close the Rear.

To repair the old Fort with Stone and Lime, and build a Block House o

the South West Hill across the Lake .

9 9

December 177

-Papers of the Continent

Congress, roll 30.
In London during the winter of 1776-77, Maj . Gen . John "Gentlema

Johnny" Burgoyne revived the idea of a British thrust from Canada alon

the Lake Champlain-Hudson River route, and King George III heartily e

dorsed the proposal. According to the final plan, approved in late Februar

1777, Burgoyne would command a major offensive aimed at Ticonderog

and Albany, while a diversionary force moved along the Mohawk Rive

toward Albany from the west . Once in Albany the two forces, with a com

bined strength of more than nine thousand men, were to make contact wit

General William Howe in New York City .

Burgoyne returned to Canada in early June. Three weeks later he saile

south on the Richelieu River to Lake Champlain . The campaign was unde

way. Meanwhile the rebels worked feverishly to ready Ticonderoga for th

expected British assault. Baldwin, still chief engineer, again provided th

most detailed account of events at Ticonderoga .

During the spring of 1777 one of Baldwin's major projects was a ne

bridge spanning Lake Champlain from Ticonderoga to Mount Indepen

dence, anchored in stone-filled piers and protected by a boom. The foo

bridge and boom completed the previous October had not survived th

winter. The work was tough: the bridge required strong supports because 

the lake's depth and swift current . Not surprisingly Baldwin suffere

numerous reverses during the course of the operation. He was still workin

on the crossing in July when the British took Ticonderoga . Other project

that spring included a crane for hoisting supplies up the steep cliff on th

western side of Mount Independence, a hospital and an ammunition facto

on Mount Independence, and new redoubts near the old French lines on th

Ticonderoga side of the lake .

On May 12 Lt. Col . Thaddeus Kosciuszko, a Polish volunteer an

engineer officer, joined Baldwin at Ticonderoga . He was fresh from work o

the Delaware River defenses and had been recommended by General Gates

now Ticonderoga commander. Although he expected Kosciuszko "to ser

not supercede" Baldwin, Gates so valued Kosciuszko as an engineer that h

wanted the Pole to examine the Ticonderoga works and make recommenda

tions for necessary improvements and additions .

Inevitably some conflict resulted as Kosciuszko found the fortifications 

Ticonderoga- Mount Independence lacking. He recommended a ne

entrenchment and suggested additional measures to keep ships clear of t

fort. Taking further issue with Baldwin's work, Kosciuszko reported 

Gates: "We are very fond here of making Block houses and they are a

erected in the most improper places." 9 Wishing Kosciuszko's plans to b

A BLOCKHOUSE . Thisplan is of atypical eighteenth-centu

blockhouse, probably similar to those erected on Mount Independence.

Dunnack, Maine Forts

100

adopted, Gates declared, "Colonel Baldwin will gain my affection, a

Esteem, by cultivating the Friendship of that Capable Young M

[Kosciuszko] ."lo After Kosciuszko returned to Ticonderoga in early Ju

following a brief absence, the two engineers collaborated in directing ad

tional works on both sides of the lake . Events at Ticonderoga in the per

March-May, 1777, unfold in selections from Baldwin's journal .

7 . BALDWIN CHRONICLES THE PROGRESS AT TICONDEROGA

From Jeduthan Baldwin's journal .

March 1 [1777] . Began to build the Great Bridge, from Tconderoga 

Independant point. . . .

9. Sunk 10 Cassoons and put down many of the posts. . . .

10. Geting down the Cassoons, the Ice began to fail .

11 . Workt at ye Bridge, rode up East Creek .

12. Drawd. Plans for Hospital .

13. Began to cut timber for Hospitals, the Sleymen went off work.

14. The Ice very Roten, left working at the bridge, went over 

Mount. . . .

16. . . . Began the Plan of the Fort on Mount Independance.

17. Drawing plan . Raised the Roof of the Block house by He

Quarters . . . .

26. One Peer of the Grt Bridge fell to peices .

27. The Bottom of another Peer fell out. . . .

29. So Cold that we could not work at the Bridge . Geting Timber for 

Hospital . . . .

31. Finished giting timber for 4 Hospitals . A warm Day, wind at Sout

Ice fails fast .

April 1. At work at ye Bridge, Raisd ye Bake House.

2. Wrote to Genl . Schuyler and sent a plan of a proposed fort to be bu

on mount Independance, went with ye Or . M. Genl . and laid out a lar

gardin at ye foot of the Mount. . . .

7. . . . Went over to Mount Independance . Lookt out a place to hoist t

provisions out of the Lake on to the Mount with a Rope' and blocks. Din

with Genl . Wayne.

8. At the Bridge and among ye workmen. . . .

14. Rode to the landing with Mrs. Hay, Genl . Wayne, Col . Long, Maj

Hay and Esqr . Winslow, went to accompany her out of camp going to 

bany thinking it not safe to stay at this place as the Lake is now open 

the Enemy and our Numbers inconsiderable by no means Equal to a bo

to defend this place . Drank Tea Punch and wine . . . and live as gayly as 

danger was at a distance . . . .

102
19. 4 Indians fired at by the sentry at the Mills last night . At work at th

Bridge, Block housen and Laying Platforms . . . .

20. Went to the mills and to mount Independance.

21 . One of the piers of the Bridge turnd . over. . . .

24. Raisd . the fraim for the Crane on the edge of the Mount for hoisting

up whatever may be wanted on Independance . . . .

[May] 9. Laid out and began a Redout between the french lines and ye

old fort on high Ground .

10. Carpenters left work at ye Bridge and went to driving a frieze round

the front of the french lines. . . .

11 . Began the Redout on ye Hill at ye french lines. 13 Tories brought

in. . . .

14. Viewd. the Lines . At work on ye Redouts . Afine Day. . . .

15. Went round the lines with Lt. Col . Kosiosko. . . .

16. . . . Drawing plans of ye Hospital and the works at Fort George and

Sent them down to Genl . Gates . Rainey Day.

17. Went round to the works on this side and on Mount Independance. . . . AShowry Day. . . .

19. Raisd . the flagstaff on Mount Independance.

20. Genl . Poor Came in with 600 Men.

21 . Went round the work with Genl . Poor.

22. A large fatigue party at the French lines . . . .

23. At the works on the french lines and at Mt Independance . . . .

24. Majr. Ayres and Capt . Wilcott [Jarius Wilcox] Joind . my works as

Assistant Engineers . . . . A fine pleasant day.

25. The boom and Bridge in a heavey gale of wind gave way and with

some difficulty they were brought back to place. . . .

28. . . . Began another redout on the high ground N. W. from the fort in

ye rear of ye french lines.

29. Work at ye Bridge Anchoring of ye Boom and geting Logs for it 

Laid out a Redout to ye Left between ye old fort and french Lines . . . .

30. Recd . 9,000 Dollars, paid of my workmen. Had 10 Cannon come

from Lake George . . . .

31. Rode to the Mills and round to the workmen. In the afternoon to Mt 

Independ .

Next, an excerpt from the journal of Du Roi the Elder, a lieutenant and

adjutant serving the Duke of Brunswick in Burgoyne's expeditionary force,

offers the best description of Baldwin's "great bridge ." Du Roi the Elde

made his observations after the fall of Ticonderoga . He was considerably

impressed by the rebel accomplishments achieved at such great expense .

103

-Baldwin, Revolutionary Jour

nal, pp. 94-104 .
MOUNT INDEPENDENCE. The position is shown here as it is seen

looking east from restored works on Mount Defiance.

Photograph by Erik Borg, 1968

8. “THE REBELS HAD KEPT ON WORKING CONTINUOUSLY

WITH UNFAILING COURAGE”

From the journal of Du Roi the Elder.

[July 13th 1777.] A bridge of more than 350 feet long, was built from Ticonderoga to Mount Independence, which served not alone for the purpose of communication between the two forts, but also to block completely the passage and entrance for ships to South Bay, a piece of work

which should be noted for curiosity’s sake, and which does honor to

human mind and power. It is only to be regretted that the work was commenced for fighting purposes. It therefore, will hardly be completed as it

deserves. It may be compared to the work of Colossus in the fables of the

heathen. . . .

The width of the water between Ticonderoga and Mount Independence

is, as mentioned before, more than 700 feet, and the depth in the middle

25 feet, which diminishes very little towards the banks, thus allowing even

104
big vessels heavily loaded, to pass. The current is so strong that a pon

toon bridge, or any other kind of floating bridge, could not resist it for an

length of time, not taking into consideration an occasional strong wind 

For supporting and strengthening the bridge 23 caissons (as the rebel

called them), filled with stone, had been put into the water in a straight lin

across. These caissons are made of tree trunks 3-4 feet in diameter an

20-25 feet long, put together in squares . In the beginning they were kep

in place by anchors . After they had been built up above the water, the

were filled with quarry stones, of which there is an abundance . This woul

sink them and keep them in place under water.

If you take into consideration the depth of the water, you can get a

idea of the amount of work involved .

It was first decided to put the bridge on top of these caissons, which

however, had not been completely filled with stone . The middle of th

bridge was intended for a drawbridge for the passage of big vessels 

Smaller boats were to pass underneath, the caissons extending above th

water 10 feet and more . Now this plan was changed, and a floating bridg

of strong beams was made on one side of the caissons . In order to preven

all vessels from passing this bridge, even by force, some sort of a turnpik

had been constructed of beams fastened together with heavy chains thre

inches in diameter, completely blocking all passage . Although the con

struction of the bridge had cost them about 3000 lives in two years, th

men dying from fatigue and fever contracted by the unhealthy location o

the place and the foul water, the rebels had kept on working continuousl

with unfailing courage .

It is well worth mentioning this fact, as such perseverance is seldo

found in the history, except in a republic, where a general participation i

a common cause would inspire and hold it . It is rarely, if ever, found i

monarchies.

-Epping, "Journal of Du Rol th

Elder," pp. 151-53.

On 12 June 1777 Maj . Gen. Arthur St . Clair assumed command at Ti

conderoga . The garrison was critically short of men and supplies . Ye

because Ticonderoga was a symbol of rebel strength-some called it th

"Gibraltar of the North"-it could not be abandoned without a violent pro

test . Thus political considerations outweighed strategic reality. Resolving a

a meeting on the 20th to hold out as long as possible, St . Clair's council o

war decided to upgrade the defenses . During the next two weeks there was 

flurry of activity concentrated on Mount Independence. Although St . Clai

believed Ticonderoga and Mount Independence to be so intimately con

nected that "it will be very dangerous to give up either," he reluctantly sup

ported Schuyler's contention that Mount Independence could outlast Ticon

deroga, perhaps indefinitely . I I

105
By July 1, as the rebels placed themselves in a state of defense, Burgo

positioned his army on the west side of the lake and dispatched the Germ

under Baron Friedrich Adolphus von Riedesel to the east side . The att

began the following day. Mount Hope, guarding the route to Lake Geor

fell first : as the enemy approached, rebel forces burned and deserted 

position.

Next Burgoyne wisely sent William Twiss, his chief engineer, to rec

noiter unfortified Sugar Loaf Hill . Although Kosciuszko had also urged 

tification of the position, his arguments failed to convince Schuyler . Yet 

move was even more crucial in 1777 than it had been a year earlier . None 

the changes made at Ticonderoga-Mount Independence in the interim h

made the 750-foot hill any less menacing . In fact, by allowing Sugar Loaf 

go unfortified, the rebels dangerously exposed their bridge and the fortif

tions atop Mount Independence.

Concurring with the assessments of Trumbull and Kosciuszko, Twiss 

vised his commander to fortify Sugar Loaf Hill . Burgoyne agreed . Resolv

that "where a goat can go a man can go, and where a man can go he 

drag a gun," 12 Brig . Gen. William Phillips took charge of the operation . 

July 6 the British had positioned four twelve-pounders atop the hill, wh

they renamed Mount Defiance in recognition of their success . The ene

did not expect to shower the rebels with sustained gunfire . But the mo

dealt a decisive blow to American morale . St . Clair's council hurrie

decided to abandon Ticonderoga and Mount Independence, a wise decis

militarily if not politically .

Although St. Clair's subordinates managed to bungle his plan of retre

the rebel forces did escape across the bridge from Ticonderoga to Mount 

dependence the night of 5 - 6 July 1777 . They partially destroyed the bri

behind them and withdrew into interior Vermont .

Recalling the circumstances of the American evacuation, Burgoy

stated :

The manner of taking up the ground at Ticonderoga convinces me they have no men of military science . . . . They

seem to have expended great treasure and the unwearied labor

of more than a year to fortify, upon the supposition that we

should only attack them upon the point where they were best

prepared to resist . 13

True, officers like Schuyler had overrated the potentialities of the positi

particularly on Mount Independence . But the rebels would very likely h

had to abandon Ticonderoga no matter which side had fortified Mount 

fiance. The crucial problem for the Americans at Ticonderoga was that 

works exceeded in scale the number of men allotted to defend them-th

thousand regulars and militiamen at the time of the evacuation . Throu

out the rebel occupation the imbalance had never been corrected .

Full details of the final attempt to shore up American defenses at Tic

deroga-Mount Independence and an evaluation of the rebels' chances 

106
holding on to Mount Independence after the fall of Fort Ticonderoga came

out more than a year later in testimony by Kosciuszko and Baldwin at St 

Clair's court-martial . St. Clair was ultimately acquitted of charges of abandoning Ticonderoga and Mount Independence and of failing to place the

forts in the highest state of readiness . Excerpts from the testimony of the two

engineers make it clear that a major effort was undertaken at Ticonderoga

after St. Chair's arrival, and that in abandoning both positions he exercised

sound judgment.

9. THE COURT-MARTIAL OF MAJ . GEN . ARTHUR ST. CLAIR

September 17, 1778

Testimony of Kosciuszko

Colonel Koseiuszko being sworn, General St. Clair's question . Do you

recollect what the strength of the fatigue parties was, that were employed

on Mount Independence on or about the 23d day of June, 1777?

A. About five or six hundred men were employed on the batteries a

Mount Independence as fatigue men, after General Schuyler had been a

Ticonderoga, and had given directions to put new works on Mount Inde

pendence . There was also a party employed in front of the works, in a

thick wood, cutting abbatis ; I do not recollect the number. I remember that

General Fermoy's brigade was employed in the wood cutting abbatis 

General Fermoy himself was there two or three days. Besides these, 

always sent a fatigue party to cut the abbatis.

General St. Clair's question. Do you know whether there was a fatigue

party likewise employed at the time on the Ticonderoga side?

A . I know there was a fatigue party employed on the breast-work .

General St. Clair's question . Did you not, by my orders, make some ad

ditions to the works on the Ticonderoga side?

A . Yes; between the west end of the French lines and the Lake . It was

not quite finished at the time of the evacuation.

General St. Clair's question. Supposing Ticonderoga to have been

abandoned, and the enemy to have been in possession of it, would it have

been possible to have maintained the works on the point of Mount Inde

pendence, that were made for the command of the Lake and the defence

of the bridge?

A . No; as the ground overlooked them about fifty feet.

General St. Clair's question. Do you recollect where the place from

which we got our water was, on Mount Independence side, and the situa

tion of it?

A . On the west side of Mount Independence, on the low ground, nea

the Lake .

General St. Clair's question. Could we easily get at the water?

107
A. No; It was very steep, and I think about one half a mile distant f

the fort .

General St. Clair's question . Supposing the enemy had passed s

of their vessels into South Bay, would it not have been wholly in t

power to have cut us off from the water?

A. The spring would have been exposed to the fire of the enemy.

General St. Clair's question. Do you recollect the distance from 

Lake to East-Creek, beyond the south end of Mount Independence?

A . About one half a mile or three quarters .

General St. Clair's Question. Would it not have been in the enem

power to have annoyed, from the vessels from South-Bay, any troops 

might have been marching across the Isthmus to the relief of Mount In

pendence?

A . It would have been in the enemy's power to have done it on acco

of the passage being narrow, a thick wood, and the possession of 

lake.

General St. Clair's question. Do you recollect whether any works w

begun to improve the redoubt on the high ground, on the point of Mo

Independence?

A. Yes ; by your order I marked out the lines, and prepared 

fascines ; which was after General Schuyler left Ticonderoga .

General St. Clair's question . In what condition was the fort upon Mou

Independence?

A . It was a picketted fort, only for small arms . Picketted all round, so

good and some bad .

General St. Clair's question. How many men could the fort contain w

convenience for the defence of it?

A . About 1000 men .

General St. Clair's question. What batteries had the enemy erec

against Ticonderoga at the time, or before the evacuation took place?

A . One battery was erected against the Jersey redoubt on the oppos

side of the Lake, about half a mile distant, and on higher ground . They 

made some works where they had an encampment against the Fre

lines, about half a mile or three quarters distant . The enemy had a

taken possession of Mount Hope, a retrenched camp, which had been 

cupied by us the campaign before, by which the communication with L

George was cut off. They had taken possession of the mill, burnt 

block-house, and passed on the other side of the creek, where they t

possession of a hill which commanded all Ticonderoga and Mount In

pendence, and had begun a firing on the sloop that was stationed for 

defence of the passage from Lake George. They had also begun so

works on a point on the east side of the Lake, opposite to the bridge . . . 

Q. Court. Could the enemy's vessels lie in South-Bay, in a situation 

command the spring, and not be exposed to our batteries on Mount In

pendence?

10 8
A. There was high ground, and batteries could have been placed ther

to prevent them .

Q. Court. Could the enemy's ships lie in South-Bay, in a situation mos

to annoy a reinforcement going to Mount Independence, without being ex

posed to the fire of our batteries from Mount Independence?

A. They could .

Q. Court. Was there any other spring on Mount Independence, out o

the enemy's fire, that the garrison could have been supplied with wate

from?

A. No other lasting one.

Q. Court. What kind of ground was it on the height on Mount Indepen

dence. Whether stony, difficult of raising a parapet on, or of sinking 

ditch?

A. Very stony and rocky ground, and would require a great deal o

labour to put on the works. A ditch could not be sunk to any proper dept

without blowing the rocks . . . .

Testimony of Baldwin

General St. Clair's question. Do you recollect whether the working par

ties at Ticonderoga and Mount Independence were increased or de

creased on or about the 23d day of June, 1777?

A. They were considerably increased . There were several works tha

were not finished that were ordered to be done, besides a number of ne

ones laid out that the men were ordered to work upon, and we continue

at these works both at Mount Independence and Ticonderoga until the da

we came away, besides a considerable reinforcement to the party at wor

upon the bridge. As the troops increased the working parties increased

we having almost every man upon the ground on duty of one kind o

another . There was a regiment of militia constantly on duty in the woods

under my direction, providing timber for the bridge, that was not include

in the details. I had about 100 men, besides the militia on duty with m

there, that were not included in the details . I had about 30 out of the militi

also making shingles, and a party making brick, not included in the detail

General St. Clair's question. Was the boom that was laid below th

bridge in the Lake fixed in such a manner, that it would have been able t

have resisted the shock of a vessel?

A. The anchors were chiefly lost from it, the cables having been broke

by the ice. I rather think-it would not have stopped their heavy vessels

though it might their smaller ones .

General St. Clair's question . Did you receive directions for building 

general hospital at Ticonderoga, and were you not employed on th

work?

109
A. I did, from General Schuyler. I was at work on it about the 23d of

June, and the greater part of the fatigue-men were then taken from that

work to be put on other works. Some of the artificers were taken off,

though the greater part of them continued at work on it.

-“Trial of Major General St.

Clair,” pp. 58-61, 90-91.

SARATOGA. This view is from the restored American river works at

Saratoga. Speaking of the position, fortified under Thaddeus

Kosciuszko’s direction, the American commander Horatio Gates

declared: “In war, as in Medicine, natural causes not under our control, do much. In the present case, the great tacticians of the campaign, were hills and forests, which a young Polish Engineer was

skilful enough to select for my encampment” (Quoted in Haiman,

Kosciuszko, p. 29).

Once Ticonderoga had fallen Burgoyne had a choice of two routes for

his advance toward Albany. The preferable route led to the head of Lake

George and from there across land for ten miles to the Hudson River at Fort

Edward. A second route reached Fort Edward from Skenesboro and Fort

Ann but involved many potential hazards. Making a crucial mistake, Burgoyne chose the less advantageous route for his troops.

110
Keeping barely ahead of the enemy, rebel work parties directed by

engineer Kosciuszko impeded Burgoyne's advance by felling trees, digging

ditches, and destroying bridges all along the way. The tactic worked : it took

the British twenty days to move twenty-two miles. Shortages of food, horses,

and supplies further afflicted Burgoyne, whose line of communications

stretched precariously nearly 200 miles to Montreal. At Bennington on

August 16 American irregulars halted a bold British foraging expedition

into Vermont . Before the end of the month the enemy suffered another setback as their Indian allies abandoned Col . Barry St . Leger's thrust down the

Mohawk River valley. Despite his failure to get supplies and reinforcements,

Burgoyne persisted with characteristic arrogance in his slow march toward

Albany . On September 13 he crossed the Hudson on a bridge of boats . A

showdown was only days away .

Restored to the command of the Northern Department, Gates prepared

to meet Burgoyne before he reached Albany. Kosciuszko, serving as Gate's

engineer, chose and fortified a position on Bemis Heights overlooking the

Hudson north of Stillwater near the village of Saratoga . On September 19,

in the First Battle of Saratoga, the rebels attacked from trees and underbrush at Freeman's Farm as the enemy attempted to take the American left .

Burgoyne was stopped, but he was not destroyed as he might have been, due

to Gates's reluctance to move out of his entrenched position and his failure

to support Arnold.

On October 7, after days of waiting in vain for reinforcements, Burgoyne launched another assault on the American left . In the ensuing Second

Battle of Saratoga, Gates acted more decisively ; and, defying orders, Arnold

led an attack on the British entrenchments constructed at Freeman's Farm

after the first battle. The results were devastating for the enemy. Burgoyne

withdrew to Saratoga and on the 13th decided to negotiate a surrender.

Four days later, after considerable haggling, Burgoyne accepted Gates's

generous terms and signed the Convention of Saratoga .

g y y 

Revolution, both sides recognized its strategic importance. To th

Americans New York was vital to maintaining control of the whole Hudso

River valley and thereby preventing the severing of New England from th

middle states . The British, on the other hand, not only understood th

point but also dreamed of gaining the active support of New York's Loyalis

population . In 1775 events in Massachusetts required the antagonists to con

centrate their efforts around Boston. As it was then thought that the Revolu

tion would soon extinguish itself (the British view) or triumph (the America

view) in Massachusetts,. concern about New York was minimal .

By 1776, however, the situation had begun to change . In January th

patriots still had the British boxed in at Boston, but American intelligenc

indicated the enemy's fleet was preparing to depart. Maj . Gen . Charles Lee

third in seniority after Generals George Washington and Artemas Ward

strongly urged action . Horrified at the prospect of the British occupyin

New York, he urged Washington to detach him there by way of Connect

icut, where he would raise troops for the city's defense .l Washington com

plied, and on February 4 Lee arrived in New York City. For the next mont

he and Capt. William Smith, an engineer assistant borrowed from duty 

New York City, made surveys and prepared a defense plan .

Lee had no formal engineer training. Yet because of his experience 

both Europe and America as an officer in the British army, his knowledge 

fortifications exceeded that of most American generals at the time . Notably

his plan cites the problem of defending New York without controlling t

surrounding waters . The patriots could never hope to make New York a

impregnable fortress, he argued. Rather their goal should be to fortify t

city so extensively that taking it would cost the enemy dearly.

THE OPPOSING ARMIES AT NEW YORK CITY, 1776. This map,

reproduced from an unidentified book, shows the position of both armies in the area surrounding New York City on August 27.

National Archives
Lee's fear of New York's considerable Loyalist population led him to 

vocate disarming the residents of Staten Island, and, for further safety, 

ing their children as hostagesl

1 . "NEW-YORK . . . MAY BE MADE AMOST ADVANTAGEOUS

FIELD OF BATTLE"

Charles Lee's Plan for the Defense of New York and Long Island .

March, 1

The command of the passage of the Sound [Hell Gate] must be o

This, I imagine, is already effected by the works thrown up at Horn's Ho

but as a further security, batteries and a redoubt must be erected on 

other side, either on Montresor's Island, or on the continent of Lo

Island, as the Engineer and succeeding General shall determine. Th

additional works are not solely meant to shut up to the enemy the pass

through the Sound, but to secure a free, open, and easy communicatio

our own troops, between the continent of New-York and Long-Island 

the city of New-York is almost environed by navigable waters, it is 

doubtedly very difficult to fortify it against a powerful sea armament; 

still I am of opinion that, although troops cannot easily be prevented l

ing under the guns of their shipping, they may be prevented lodg

themselves in it, or converting it into a great place of arms, as they h

done Boston .

The East-River, I am almost persuaded, may be secured in such a m

ner that their ships will scarcely venture into it, or at least they can

keep their stations when in . A battery for this purpose is planned, an

some forwardness, at the foot of the Jews' Burying-Ground . To pro

this battery from the near approach of ships, (which, when close, 

always supposed to be an overmatch for batteries level with the water, 

in a low situation,) guns in barbet, placed on the heights of the Je

Burying-Ground, when in correspondence with a battery I have ordere

an opposite commanding knoll in Long-Island, will certainly be suffici

These two fires will likewise be crossed by a third, of a very considera

range, from a work in the front of our intrenched camp on Long-Isl

which work is likewise answered by a battery sunk in a cellar on the 

posite wharf. Such is our plan with respect to the East-River.

Having attentively examined the fort [Fort George] and great batte

under it, and considered whether they could be of any possible use to 

am of opinion that, as ships of great burden can approach so near the 

ter, it will be dangerous, if not impracticable, to support them . The 

cannot, for the same reason, be defended . But although it is not possi

in our hands, to render it a fortification of offence against the enemy
CARICATURE OF CHARLES LEE.

To his position as major general in the

Continental Army Lee (1731-82)

brought considerable military experience in both America and

Europe, where he had achieved the

rank of major general in the Polish

Army in 1767. Lee came to America

in 1773 and heartily endorsed the

patriot cause. During the Revolutionary War he served in Boston, New

York, New Jersey, and South

Carolina. Always controversial, Lee

was court-martialed in 1778 for insubordination during and after the

Battle of Monmouth. Kosciuszko

made this sketch of “a suspended

Gen'l" after Monmouth.

Historical Society of Pennsylvania

might, in their possession, be converted into a citadel, to keep the town in

subjection. These considerations have induced me to throw down the

North-east and North-west Bastions, with the communicating curtain; so

that, being entirely open behind, and a commanding traverse thrown

across the Broadway, with three guns mounted, it is impossible for the

enemy to lodge themselves in and repair the fort.

The North-River [Hudson] is so extremely wide and deep that it is in

vain to think of any means to prevent the men-of-war commanding the

navigation of it; but it does not appear to me that they have it in their power

to annoy dangerously the town, much less to destroy it. It is true an accidental shell may do great mischief; but the effects of their cannon are

not, I think, much to be apprehended, for there is a most fortunate ridge or

eminence, which not only serves as a screen of protection for the town,

but on which any number of batteries may be erected, to keep the ships at

a distance.

I must observe, once for all, that New-York, from its circumstances,

can with difficulty be made a regular tenable fortification; but it may be

made a most advantageous field of battle-so advantageous, indeed, that

if our people behave with common spirit, and the commanders are men of

115
discretion, it must cost the enemy many thousands of men to get poss

sion of it . The streets must be traversed and barricaded, so as to prev

their coming on our flanks ; and three redoubts thrown up on the th

eminences: Judge Jones's, Bayard's Hill, and either Lispenard's 

Haiderman's house, on Hudson's River. But these measures are not to 

confined to the town . The whole Island is to be redoubted in cert

regular steps, if I may so express it, quite to Kings's Bridge. The

redoubts, redans, or fliches [fleches?] are easily thrown up, and are no 

pense.

The leading roads from Hudson's River, whence the enemy can al

approach, must be obstructed to artillery . King's Bridge must be stron

fortified, to preserve the communication free and open with Connectic

on which Province you can alone depend for succors of men; for 

breadth and depth of the North-River renders the communication w

Jersey too precarious.

The possession and security of Long-Island is certainly of still grea

importance than New-York. I have accordingly marked out a camp, 

tified by a chain of redoubts, mutually supporting each other, and whi

also corresponding with the batteries on the New-York side, will prev

the enemy's entering or remaining in the East-River. This camp is 

tended to contain four or five thousand men. Upon the whole, for 

defence of Long-Island and New-York, eight thousand, at least, reg

troops, will be necessary . . . .

I have now, in a military capacity, to the best of my recollection, m

tioned every circumstance relative to the defence and security of N

York and Long-Island . But I think it my duty to observe that all th

measures will be totally fruitless unless some precautions are taken w

respect to the professed enemies of American liberty, nested in the v

spots where they can do the greatest mischief-Queen's County 

Staten-Island . . . . I would . . . humbly propose that the inhabitant

Staten-Island should, without loss of time, be disarmed, and their a

delivered to some regiment already raised, but unfurnished with muske

I do not imagine that the disarming the Tories will incapacitate t

from acting against us, as they can easily be supplied by the ship

should, therefore, think it prudent to secure their children as hostage

a measure of this kind (hard as it may appear) is not adopted, 

children's children of America may see the fatal omission .

Washington felt Lee's plan "a very judicious one,"2 but fast-mov

developments in March assured the plan would have little chance of be

fully carried out. Lee lacked men and barely saw construction started on 

defenses when Congress gave him command of the newly created South

-Force, American Archives, 

ser., 5:214-15 .
Department of the Continental Army. On March 7 Lee headed south, leav

ing New York City in the hands of Brig . Gen. William Alexander, Lord

Stirling . With Lee's departure the defense of the city entered a new phase.

Capt . Jeduthan Baldwin provided the best account of progress made

under Stirling's command. Baldwin's engineering tasks included drawin

plans, tracing works, and overseeing their construction . That additions t

Lee's plan were already under way was evidenced by Baldwin's work at Re

Hook and Governor's Island, two new locations.

2 . THE REBELS FORTIFY NEW YORK AND LONG ISLAND

From Jeduthan Baldwin's journal .

26. [March 1776] . Rode in Company with my Lord Sterling and Col 

Smith with a No . of other Gentn to view the works round the Sitty and a

the west End of Long Island . Dind with Genl . Thomson . . . .

27. Went round to the Several works in Town and out to the Fort a

Hellgate or Horns hook where we dind .

28. Wrote Mr. John Adams . Laid out some work on Ship batter

Hill . . . .

29. Rode round the works with the Genls . i n ye forenoon, and in th

afternoon gave an order to Capt Bruen for to provide materials for [the

Barrak at fort Ld . Sterling, bought a Cutlass for 16112 Dol .

30. Began the work' on the old Fort to raise the parapet . It snowd thi

afternoon . Genl . Heath came to Town with Col . Groton' and Several othe

Regts .

31. Sunday. The men Excused from fateague and the ground wa

coverd . with snow and water.

April 1 . Begun the old battery . Went round to ye Several works wit

Genl . Heath and others .

2. Went to long Island with Genl . Heath and my Ld . Sterling and others 

Laid out and proposed several works there . In the Evning a party of ou

men, 200, went onto the Island by the Man of war and Set fire to th

buildings, brought off Intrenching tools, fowls, etc . that belonged to Gov

Trion and returnd Safe. . . .

3. Drawd plan for 2 Works on Long Island, bought a Coat and Jaceat f

15 dollars . It raind in the forenoon . No fateague. The Sitizens Excuse

from fateague . Heard that the fleet was Sailed from Boston . Genl Putna

Came to this City.

4 . Went Round to the Several works with Genl . Putnam and the othe

Genl . Officers . In the afternoon I went to horns hook, fort Thomson . A fi

Day but windy .

5. To Long Island . Col . Smith went with Genl . Sterling to ye Gersie

[Jerseys] . I laid out a Battery at ye heighth by ye feray on long Island 
went with Genl . Putnam and Genl . Thomson to Horns Hook.

6. Went to Red Hook.

7. Sunday. No fateague in the forenoon . Fireing over the Bay at ye J

sies, our riflemen took 9 and killd 3 of the Enemy, who came to take 

Warter, with the loss of only one man wounded. Went with Genl . Putna

Thomson, Col . Mifflin and Trumbull upon Governours Island and conclu

ed to fortify that place . . . .

8. Went to Red Hook with Genl . Thomson, laid out a Battery on t

point, and then I went to Governours Island, laid out the Fort . At dark o

thousand men came on with the tools and went to work and before mor

ing we had a fine trench . It raind all night and was Very uncomfor

able . . . .

12. Awet snowey morning. Workt on the Fort and Battery with 400 me

13. Wort at the Battery . Genl . Washington came to town, with Gen

Gates and others.

14. Workt. at the battery. Went to Long Island and to Govenours' Isla

where the troops workt . . . .

16. To Govenours Island . It raind . Recd . orders to get ready for to go 

Quebec .

-Baldwin, Revolutionary Jo

nal, pp. 31-34.

The decision to erect a chain of redoubts and breastworks fr

Wallabout Bay to Gowanus Marsh represented a modification of Lee's pr

posal for Long Island . At first Lee apparently intended to hold the Brookl

Heights along the East River. 3 The new line would be further east .

Washington thought New York City in imminent danger of ene

takeover . He feared that the British, having been driven from Boston, wou

sail for New York rather than Halifax, Nova Scotia, as was widely expecte

Washington warned Stirling : New York "is the Place that we must use eve

endeavour to keep ." Once the British held New York, Washington co

tended, control of the Hudson River would follow. Then the enemy cou

sever communications between the northern and southern colonies, "up

which depends the Safety of America ." 4

As it turned out, the British did sail to Halifax ; but Washington still s

New York as the next field of battle and moved there to join the bulk of h

army . He ordered Col . Rufus Putnam, who had served the Continent

Army in Boston as an engineer, to New York as his Chief Engineer . Over t

next several months Washington relied heavily on the one-time millwright 

lay out and oversee works in New York, New Jersey, and Long Island . "Th

was a Service of Much Feteague," Putnam later recalled, "for my whole ti

was taken up from daylight in the morning untill night in the busines

besides Sometimes going in the night by Warter from New york to Fo

Washington . -5
On June 25, as anticipated, three warships with General William How

and a small contingent of British troops aboard arrived from Halifax 

Several days later, having observed American progress at fortifying Lon

Island, Howe chose Staten Island for his main encampment. Ultimately h

assembled a force of some thirty-two thousand men, including eight thou

sand Hessians (German mercenaries) -"the greatest expeditionary forc

Great Britain had ever sent out from her shores ." 6 That summer of 1776 th

British virtually held the rebels-fewer in number, less well supplied, an

without warships-in the palms of their hands . Yet several times How

failed to move decisively . On July 12, for example, two British warships ad

vanced forty miles up the Hudson . They returned the following wee

relatively unscathed, although under fire from American batteries all alon

Manhattan Island . Having flaunted American defenses, Howe still made n

move against the forces stationed on Manhattan. Although the British com

mander genuinely feared allowing the Americans time to erect fortifie

positions, orders from London restrained him from acting .

The successful movement of British vessels up the Hudson sparke

Robert Erskine, a Ringwood, New Jersey, ironmaster, to propose tha

chevaux-de-frise, generally used in Europe to block troop movements o

land, be sunk under water to inhibit British vessels . Erskine, the futur

United States geographer, designed a model-described in his lett

below-which he forwarded to Brig . Gen. John M. Scott of the New Yor

militia . Erskine felt sure there was still time to employ the obstructions effec

tively in New York, or, at the very least, upriver .

3 . ERSKINE DESCRIBES HIS MARINE CHEVAUX-DE-FRISE

Robert Erskine to John Scott .

Dear Sir:-When I heard that some ships of war, with a fair wind and tide 

flood, had passed the batteries with little or no damage [12 July] ; I coul

not help regretting that the Channel was left open . I know it has been pro

posed to stop it up, but the present exigency requires some contrivance

that shall be both speedily executed and effectual . After canvassing thi

matter a little time, an invention which I beg leave to call a Marin

Chevaux-de-Frise occurred . Of this I have sent you a model . . . .

Supposing, therefore, the Model to be before you, you will observe 

consists of six pieces ; it is made to a scale of half an inch to a foot . Th

pieces then represent beams a foot square and about 32 ft . long . If the

were 13, 14 or 15 inches square, so much the better. The nails which jo

the pieces represent bolts (with a head on one side, to be keyed 

screwed with a nut on the other), about 1 112 inches thick.

Ringwood, July 18th, 177
The Carpenter work is very little, each piece having only two notche

bevelled 60 degrees, or the angle of an equilateral triangle, and cut on o

side about one-third of the thickness. . . . Any carpenter may line, squa

notch and bore such pieces without knowing their use; in the same ma

ner the blacksmith may be directed to make the bolts, and shoe them w

sharp round iron, which is represented by the black upon the model. T

beams could be shod all along like the spare piece, as then the iron wou

render it specifically heavier than water, but if the points are only shod

will be necessary to plank in the . . . Tetrahedron, to contain pig iron 

stones sufficient to sink it .

There is but one right way of putting the model together, which mak

it necessary-though it appears simple-to observe it attentively and co

prehend its construction before it is taken to pieces; when the constr

tion is well understood, its putting together is very easy; if the pieces 

all of the same dimensions and the notches alike-which they shou

be-they will fit any way. But to give a true practical idea of taking it 

pieces and joining it again, please observe that the Tetrahedron has f

horned corners, numbered 1, 2, 3, 4, and three horns to each corn

Place corner No. I uppermost. . . .

Any vessel being swept upon horns within 14 feet of the surface, wou

strike it, which must be attended with some of the following cons

quences: She would either be staked upon it, or her velocity over-set 

the other horns would then rise and take her in the bottom (which proba

would make holes through her and oversett her too), or else she wou

break the "Chevaux-de-Frise" by her weight, which no ship could 

without receiving such material damage as to render her unfit for s

vice . . . .

But I need not further enlarge. I shall be happy if it could be put in pr

tice soon enough to incomode our enemies at New York ; if too late, the

may be practical elsewhere, particularly to prevent the approach of shi

to the forts up the river.

It will naturally occur that this "Fence" should be placed in a chann

commanded by a battery to prevent boats weighing them . Two "Chevau

de-Frise" would reach about 60 feet or 10 fathoms [because the horns 

one would be within twenty feet of the horns of the other], 20 would ma

over a channel of an hundred fathoms . Were they scattered here and the

in a harbour or anchorage ground, it would render it very unsafe. I shall 

happy if this invention could be put in practice soon enough to incommo

our enemies at New York; 20 or 30 carpenters and a proper and a

number of blacksmiths might finish as many as needful in 30 days. Tho

ships which have got up, however, may be fenced in at Kingsbridge, 

elsewhere . They may be used to prevent ships approaching the forts 

the Highlands . . . .

120

-Heusser, Washington's M

Maker, pp. 147-50.
ROBERT ERSKINE’S CHEVAUX-DE-FRISE. Although used for

obstructions in the Hudson River between Forts Washington and Lee,

Erskine's design was deemed impractical for Philadelphia because of

the soft floor of the Delaware River.

American Philosophical Society

121
Erskine's idea soon materialized with the placement of chevaux-de-fr

opposite Fort Washington. But the rebels never finished the line from sh

to shore, and the British continued to pass up and down the river with c

siderable freedom .

A month later Erskine offered his device to Benjamin Franklin for pos

ble use in Philadelphia . Erskine saw great potential in the underwat

obstacles, which, "dropt here and there in anchoring grounds and Ha

bours, would render them very unsafe." Since the current could f

uninhibited under each cheval, it would neither injure the channel nor 

terfere with the tide . Another advantage, Erskine argued, was that 

chevaux could be assembled and stored until needed, as it only require

few hours to rig and sink them . 7

Throughout July and most of August 1776 Washington's men waited 

the British to move on either Manhattan or Long Island, or both . The de

allowed the rebels to enhance their position . Meanwhile, additional defe

sive operations went forward on the Raritan River at Perth Amboy, N

Jersey, across the Hudson from Staten Island, where Brig . Gen . Hu

Mercer's "flying camp"8 based its operations during July-November 17

On July 16 Congress ordered Gilles Jean Marie Roland de Barazer, 

Chevalier de Kermorvan, an engineer lieutenant colonel, to join Mercer

flying camp . Few records of Kermorvan's engineer service to the Army s

vive; but two letters written while he was with Mercer, shed significant li

on defensive operations in New Jersey and reveal something of Kermorvan

character and the problems he encountered.

In the first letter, Kermorvan evinced a fairly sophisticated appreciati

of coastal (in this case, river) defenses. He stressed the importance of placi

an entrenched camp back from the coast to complement the fortifications 

a river's entrance and to serve as a readily accessible retreat . "I am pe

suaded, " he wrote, "that they [the generals] will agree that what I will t

them is worth more than what I see them practicing." He pressed for qui

action by Congress to speed up the operations .

The brief encounter with British vessels that Kermorvan described w

typical of many engagements that occurred during the New York campaig

The Frenchman was impressed by the "good will" and "fine bearing"' of 

American troops .

4. "I ONLY WISH FOR SPEED IN OPERATIONS"

The Chevalier de Kermorvan to Benjamin Franklin.

122

[Perth Amboy] July 26, 17

Sir

. . . I have seen a part of the terrain, and I have busied myself with 

defense; I have found the best of intentions in General Mercer, everyda
go to him to request his orders, and what he wants me to do, that gives me

the opportunity to pose to him some questions on the position of the

troops, on the communication of the patrols between here and Voodbridge [Woodbridge] and from Voodbridge to Elizabeth town, this part

seems to me very weak however since I have spoken of the necessity to

guard and watch over carefully all the points of the coast, I think that

General Roberdeau has gone to Voodbridge to profit by and work up what I

have said . I had passed to Mr . Hancock a general plan for the defense of

the coasts of America, 9 I based it on the idea which I had taken from the

terrain of Amboy and on the forces which we have there . I doubt that you

will be able to put as many in all the parts but it is very necessary to execute it to cover and protect the cities of the interior. We do not have a

stronghold to stop the enemy if he has the least advantage but if we form

some entrenched camps at a mile or a half mile from the coast I defy all the

powers of Europe to penetrate the lands. Especially if we fortify the entry

of the rivers on the two coasts . If you had made these manoeuvres there in

Canada you would not have pulled back farther than your entrenched

camps where you increase the entrenchments in case you may be

attacked and where the troops find an asylum for their courage when

enemy numbers weigh them down . If the Congress feels the necessity of

executing this plan of operation, it must certainly order its generals to do

so, and if they have confidence in me, I will suggest to the generals the

dispositions and manoeuvres to make when the enemy lands, I am persuaded that they will agree that what I will tell them is worth more than

what I see them practicing . On the occasion of the little alarms that we

have had yesterday and the day before yesterday on account of the

passage of some little boats which skirted along Staten Island . I was

delighted by the good will of our troops and by their fine bearing . In truth it

would be a crime for good fellows like them to be victims of bad

manoeuvres or dispositions. The day before yesterday during a big storm

the sentinels noticed a boat which skirted Staten Island under cover of the

night. The lightning bolts which were the only light in the sky discovered it

to the sentinels which shot at it, immediately the whole troop on its own

took up arms and descended to the bank, the boat made its course and we

retired into our quarters . Yesterday four or five other little boats apparently loaded with wheat appeared at four-o-clock in the afternoon, they

kept as far away as they could from our shore, we fired from our poor battery, first with the two little pieces of cannon ; the enemy to protect these

boats cannonaded our battery with three or four huge pieces of eighteen

pound ball . This little combat lasted about two hours, our cannoniers firing

with their little pieces as well as our enemies, they had the best bearing .

During the whole battle I remained on the battery with General Mercer who

had brought our two largest guns with which we touched the sails of one

of these boats at a great distance . The range was too long for our pieces.

123
I only wish for speed in operations, one loses time without do

anything . Since I have been here, with the good will that our soldiers h

for working, I would have already done a great deal of work which wo

have protected the entry of the Brunswick River [Raritan], where 

enemy can draw us in order to make his descent to Amboy : we [?] fea

for the Jersey interior, would bring ourselves quickly there while 

enemy would take over Amboy, in indulgence I ask on bended knees 

the Congress decide to order speed and all will go well in our war. F

extreme slowness in counsels, but the greatest speed in military op

tions . From this campaign here depends the liberty of America.

I forgot to tell you, Sir, that three of our people were wounded yes

day, not on the battery but one in a house and the others on the sh

where they were watching, a horse was killed by a cannonball at a 

fathoms from General Mercer's house .

If they construct the batteries or the fort that I have proposed to b

here on the river, it will be necessary to send iron cannons with ramp

mountings . Those which I have seen in the courtyard of the townh

would be good . Act, I implore you sir, such that they may decide and 

the Congress may decide on swiftness in the operations so that we can 

ready to receive milord [Howe] if he comes on one of our coasts wi

strengthening-piece [gun] such as they say he is bringing . I wish you 

good health and I pray you to accord and continue for me your friend

which I strive to merit as the friend of men and of liberty .

Kermorvan's second letter reflects much greater impatience with C

gress and contains a reminder that European governments were observ

military operations in America . He believed Congress had failed to un

stand his plan-perhaps thinking it too ambitious-and therefore had d

nothing to carry out the small part pertaining to Amboy. Kermor

displayed a considerable knowledge of batteries and river obstructions . M

importantly he detailed problems of command commonly encountered 

engineers while overseeing fortifications, problems that were intensified 

a foreigner .

Kermorvan seemed genuinely committed to the American cause of 

dependence, and in his sharp annoyance with both Congress and the fo

working for him he charged that "they wish almost all to have lib

without acquiring it ."

-Butterfield, "An Episode 

'76," pp. 38-40 . Transl

by Patricia H . Stablein.
5. "THE CRUCIAL POINT IS TO BRING THE CAMPS

ON THE COASTLINE CLOSER TOGETHER"

The Chevalier de Kermorvan to Benjamin Rush .

Perth Amboy, about August 12, 1776

Sir

. . . I have perfectly felt the reasons which compell that it [Kermorvan's

defense plan] will not be executed until the enemy has landed . Your people do not wish to work and see the danger only when the enemy is on

them . The work of an entrenchment camp is nothing . It is the affair of one

day for the troop which is in this camp . It is only an elevation of earth more

or less high, more or less thick according to the terrain ; moreover I had

never meant to entrench 1500 miles of coastline, this work would be as

useless here as the great wall of China which did not preserve that empire

from being conquered by the tartars . All the same when you wish to protect a country, a province, there are no other means than to put, in flat

places void of woodlands and other defenses, an entrenched camp and to

occupy the heights with good artillery and the woodlands with infantry.

Amboy is a place completely void of woods which has a circumference of

two miles . If it is true that in all America the countryside is covered with

woods, you have much less to fear, but in the present circumstance if we

do not manage to keep the enemy from landing in the center of the colonies, we will lose our reputation in Europe which has its eyes wide open

on us ; thus the crucial point is to bring the camps on the coastline closer

together because they are too far apart; then, if unfortunately the enemy

lands, your people, seeing him entrench himself on his arrival, will not

make themselves be begged to work, and, when they have the good will,

you will admit, Sir, that is possible .

As far as forts at the mouths of rivers is concerned, as you do not have

big cannons of 24, 36, and 48, 10 it is virtually useless to construct anything

but simple batteries to stop the landing of troops and the passage of boats

and the best defense of rivers whose mouths are wide will be to have

galleys armed with big cannon or armed boats ; because cannonballs of six

and eight like we have here, have no effect on a ship and do not stop it one

instant from passing. It is equally necessary to sink in the middle of

passages some enchained piers, on the same level as the water but that

will have to be done this winter because it is too late now.

I never would have imagined that if it is true that you cast cannon as

everyone says, you do not cast the two thirds of large caliber, one does

not make war profitably without the large cannon . Thus on a river where
one wants to stop floating citadels, like ships, from passing, it is nece

sary to have only in the narrow places, as at Billingsport,> > some batteri

of large bore cannon, then there is not a ship of the line which dares 

pass under a fire so close . . . we know in Europe that ships do not da

pass under the fire of St. Malo and of Brest . But these advantages are t

dear for a budding republic, just simple batteries to stop boats comi

down ; some galleys or armed boats, sunken masses in the riv

passages-that's all you need as you have very judiciously reflected .

It is not as easy in a republic to execute great things right awa

because the consent of everyone is not easy to gather and all men do n

think equally well in favor of the good cause; I see that they wish almost 

to have liberty without acquiring it . I was more happy with their conduct 

Philadelphia than here, you bourgeois give an example of ill will ve

harmful to our cause . In truth I believe that men are born to be slaves, f

the most part, still they do not merit that one bothers oneself to look aft

their interest and to command them . I have made a battery which is ve

well placed, the cannons will fire and do a good job defending the rive

the fire is well directed, but your people have so badly executed it again

my will that I am embarrassed to have undertaken it . From the first da

they have rebelled and have had it said to me that my way of making the

place the sod and fagots was not to their taste and that they do not wish 

do other than what they have always done, that they do not, moreover

want to work uselessly, that the enemy will not come into the river and th

finally they are not paid to work . All these words and their discontent ove

whelmed me . I had them told to do as they wished ; I have in spite of th

been to see them work twice a day and direct them in the plan of the work

they have placed the sod which has a slovenly appearance and which ca

not sustain itself in a time as dry as summer. Judge, Sir, from my positio

to do a badly executed work, to have a continual fever, to go four miles b

foot every day in a state of weakness, to lie on straw, to have very litt

consideration in a country where genius is useless and his profession 

that of a mason or regarded as such, to be able to do nothing for the goo

of the army and to spare the blood of the americans because I fear 

displease. I have taken the part of telling the things which press most 

be executed through M . du Bois who speaks willingly . Acknowledge, Si

that one must be born for the general cause of humanity and not have an

desire but to see this cause triumph for once, to patiently suffer these a

noyances, but also I will die content, if your independence, establishe

under good laws, is secured and makes an example for the rest of t

world .

I have learned that M . de Woedke 12 died in Canada . . . . If you wish

Sir, to make me inherit from his rank, the right that I would have to pa

ticipate in the counsels of war would give me more influence and mor

right to counsel the better deployments, without having more comman

responsibility which I do not desire at all, but just more ease which 

12 6
necessary to me . I am beginning to speak, be it ever so little, english to

make myself understood, I read it perfectly . . . I am not as familiar with

the spirit of the american people that I know here, this people is the same

everywhere inconstant and flighty, furthermore one needs men of spirit in

whom the people will have some confidence who will speak to them from

time to time about their duty to their country and of the common cause 

Their generals whom they have elected should go see them in their tents

to inspire them ; the wounded should be visited and almost cared for by

the first officers of the army, that is how the patriotic ardor sustains itself

which it is necessary to infuse into the low and common souls .

In a country where there is so much ease it will always be difficult for

you to have paid armies which you can command, it would be better for

you, for a free state, to have an agricultural militia .

You know better than I do, Sir, that it is dangerous to have troops within

your own bosom which are hired, for that is the origin of the corruption of

states and morals of a people, for a free state should only have an

agricultural militia, that everyone may work on the land and do their duty,

and that there are no exemptions except for those who have children

which replace them in their old age . . . .

-Butterfield, "An Episode of

'76," pp. 40-43. Translated

by Patricia H . Stablein .

On August 22 Howe finally acted decisively . A large contingent of

British troops ferried from Staten Island to Long Island, landing virtually

unopposed . The main enemy objective, it now appeared, was Brooklyn; but

Washington still feared for Manhattan and accordingly divided his forces

between New York and Long Island .

The American position on Long Island that August consisted of a line of

five works-Forts Box, Greene, and Putnam, and two unnamed

redoubts-connected by breastworks and stretching from Gowanus Bay to

Wallabout Bay. Star-shaped Fort Greene, mounting six guns and

commanding the American center, was the largest work on the island . Fort

Putnam, a star fort, stood on a hilltop and formed the salient point of the

American line . Behind the line stood Fort Stirling and Fort Defiance (Red

Hook) . Fort Stirling commanded the East River channel, and Fort Defiance,

originally a battery but improved that summer, overlooked the eastern

passage around Governor's Island . Though specific details are lacking,

Rufus Putnam is known from orders issued by Washington to have played a

large role in the erection of the Brooklyn works .

Southeast of the American defenses lay a row of heavily forested hills

overlooking a broad, open plain. The elevation provided an excellent

natural defense that complemented the fortifications behind them . In fact

127
, ms I

BATTLE OF LONG ISLAND, 1776. One of a series of maps

prepared by the Army War College, this map depicts the positions and

movements of the American and British armies.

National Archives

the rebels stationed the bulk of their Long Island forces along the ridge of

hills, hoping to cut off a British advance before it reached the American

works.

On Long Island Howe’s strategy was to divert the American right wing

(Gowanus Bay) while personally leading a large force through the Jamaica

Pass (where one of four roads crossed the elevation in front of the American

line) to attack the weak American left between Forts Greene and Putnam.

On the night of August 26 Howe made his move. The next day American

resistance on the left collapsed. By midday the British forced the rebels to

retreat from their forward positions to a point behind their entrenchments.

Their backs against the East River, the rebels awaited the inevitable storming of the lines, another Bunker Hill.

128
Strong winds and Howe's reluctance to act at Brooklyn as he had at

Bunker Hill very probably kept this first open engagement on the battlefield

from being the last . The ships commanded by his brother, Admiral Richard

Howe, were unable to get behind the American lines where they might have

delivered devastating fire. And General Howe, for his part, held back his

men from a frontal assault . The risks of such an assault were too great,

Howe thought, when it was "apparent that the lines must have been ours at

a very cheap rate by regular approaches ." 13

Howe's memory of the murderous rebel musketfire at Bunker Hill undoubtedly influenced his decision . In later defending the general's action,

Capt. John Montresor, the chief British engineer in America, said : "They

[the American redoubts] could not be taken by assault, but by approaches,

as they were fortresses rather than redoubts ." 14 Within two days the British

constructed their own redoubt several hundred yards from the American left

and began regular siege operations .

Washington called a council of war on the 29th to consider withdrawing

to New York City. Citing as its reasons the division of the army between New

York and Long Island and British control of the waterways, the council

unanimously favored retreat . Washington's generals also were apprehensive

that their lines would not withstand a frontal attack. Contrary to Montresor's assessment, the council argued : "Tho' our Lines were fortified with

some strong Redoubts, yet a Great part of them were weak being only abbattied with Brush, and affording no strong cover." 15

While he seemed to be planning to reinforce his troops, Washington actually was preparing to retreat . The only way out of Brooklyn was across the

East River to Manhattan . The operation would be difficult : more than ten

thousand men and considerable stores had to be moved fast to avoid British

detection, and it required skilled boatmen to master New York's tricky tides

and winds.

Washington was fortunate to have immediately available two units

whose experience suited them well for an amphibious operation. On the

night of August 29-30 he called on Col. John Glover's 14th Continental

Regiment (Marblehead, Massachusetts) and Col. Israel Hutchinson's 27th

Continental Regiment (Salem) to man the boats. These units, composed

largely of sailors and fishermen, 16 met the challenge well.

Under Washington's careful direction the men of Marblehead and

Salem-many of them wearing the blue jackets, white caps and tarred

trousers of their trade-ferried the entire American camp in flatboats and

sloops across the East River to relative safety on Manhattan. The weather

cooperated beautifully . The heavy rain and wind that drenched the

American camp, ruined ammunition, and complicated the crossing also

kept British ships from moving up the East River to cut off the retreat. The

entire operation was completed by seven o'clock the morning of the 30th.

Washington had lost the battle but had skillfully kept his army intact .

129
New York City offered only temporary refuge for Washington's ar

Entrapment was again a real possibility, as the only feasible escape route 

across a bridge at the northern end of Manhattan Island . Washington as

his generals whether he should attempt to hold New York City. The is

was an emotional one involving more than military considerations. Ma

Gen . Nathaniel Greene, who knew the New York-Long Island terrain be

urged evacuating and burning the city.

Chief Engineer Rufus Putnam surveyed Manhattan for Washington a

advised bringing the army together rather than dispersing it throughout 

island . In his report to Washington Putnam properly recognized the imp

tance of British naval and numerical superiority . He favored entrenching 

Harlem Heights and Mount Washington, thereby abandoning any attem

to hold the city, which then was limited to the southernmost tip of Manha

tan Island . Significantly, Putnam saw the defense of the Hudson River a

the Highlands above New York and the maintenance of communications 

the only reasons for keeping forces on the island .

6. PUTNAM RECONNOITERS THE ISLAND OF MANHATTAN

Rufus Putnam to George Washington .

Sir: According to your Excellency's order, I have reconnoitered ev

part about the Island of New-York and the main, as far as Frog's Poi

and, on a full view, find the enemy have such a variety of places to choo

out of, that it's impossible to prevent their landing when they please. Th

have such guides and intelligence of our movements that they can alw

avoid or surprise any parties that are posted to oppose their landing . Th

army is so numerous that they can attack any division of our army wit

superiour force; and yet, while our army is extended from New-York 

King's Bridge, 'tis necessary to have a body of reserve at this place. B

cannot think it would be best, nor have we time, to make fortificatio

since the moment any quarter is attacked, the whole body of reserve

conclude, will be ordered to support it . I should advise the throw

obstructions in the way of landing . That they have one week's provisi

always with them, and teams ready to carry their baggage wherever 

service requires.

I mentioned to your Excellency that I thought your army should be 

lected together in some advantageous place, where supplies might 

had, and a camp fortified in such a manner as the enemy dare not atta

or, if they did, must be repulsed ; and I think so still, if it be possible to 

fect it . And to defend the passage of the North River, which I take to be 

capital object, and at the same time keep open a communication with 

130

Bloomingdale, September 3, 1
Eastern and Southern Colonies, is to press the army from Bundet landing,

on the Jersey shore-Mount Washington and the Heights, south as far as

Colonel Thompson's house, on Harlem River-the Heights we now

possess at King's Bridge, and as far south as the Three Trees. The batteries on the Jersey side to be filled with guns; the battery on the rocks

below Mount Washington completed; a new one built below the hill opposite the sunken vessels . These, well filled with guns and ammunition, if

the galleys also afforded their assistance, would render it very difficult for

ships to pass . If they attempted to force this post, I think they must be

beaten. If they detached into the country on either hand, it must scatter

their army in such a manner that your Excellency must drub them . But if

supplies cannot be had at this place, at the Highlands they may, both by

land and water. I think there has been some proof the ships dare not attempt that passage; but they are not prepared to defend against a landing .

This is surely worth attention ; for if they possess themselves of this

passage, we shall be in a bad box . For my sentiments about that place, I

refer your Excellency to Lord Stirling's report last May. I know that this

doctrine gives up York to destruction, and exposes many other towns to

be ravaged by them . But what are ten or twenty towns to the grand object?

If they once pass the Highlands, I see no way to prevent the junction of

their armies . Burgoyne need never come from Canada. If Howe gets to

Albany, our Northern Army must quit Ticonderoga, or fall a sacrifice.

George Washington to the President of Congress.

-Force, American Archives, 5th

ser., 2:140.

As he pondered evacuating New York City, Washington wrote an extremely revealing letter to Congress. Of particular interest are his comments

on fortifications and the defensive nature of the war. At this point he reluc

tantly conceded the loss of the city but firmly believed that Forts

Washington and Lee and the river obstructions would check any advance

north by the enemy. Washington's letter helps clarify American strategy in

New York and elsewhere .

7. "I HAVE NEVER SPARED THE SPADE AND PICKAX"

Headquarters, New York, September 8, 1776

. . . Before the landing of the Enemy on Long Island, the point of Attack

could not be known or any satisfactory Judgment formed of their Intentions. It might be on Long Island, on Bergen or directly on the City, this

made it necessary to be prepared for each, and has occasioned an Ex-
pence of Labour which now seems useless and is regretted by those wh

form a Judgment from after Knowledge . But I trust, men of discernme

will think differently and see that by such Works and preparations we ha

not only delayed the Operations of the Campaign, till it is too late to effe

any capital Incursion into the Country, but have drawn the Enemy's forc

to one point and obliged them to decline their plan, so as to enable us 

form our defence on some Certainty . It is now extremely obvious . . . th

mean to enclose us on the Island of New York by taking post in our Rea

while the Shipping effectually secure the Front, and thus either by cutti

off our communication with the Country, oblige us to fight them on the

own Terms, or surrender at discretion, or by a brilliant Stroke endeavou

to cut this Army in pieces and secure the Collection of Arms and Stor

which they well know we shall not be soon able to replace . . . 

deliberating on this Question it was impossible to forget, that History, o

own experience, the advice of our ablest Friends in Europe, the fears 

the Enemy, and even the Declarations of Congress demonstrate, that o

our Side the War should be defensive. It has even been called a War 

Posts . That we should on all Occasions avoid a general Action, or p

anything to the Risque, unless compelled by a necessity, into which w

ought never to be drawn .

The Arguments on which such a System was founded were deeme

unanswerable and experience has given her sanction . With these view

and being fully persuaded that it would be presumption to draw out o

Young Troops into open ground, against their Superiors both in numbe

and Discipline; I have never spared the Spade and Pick Ax ; I confess I hav

not found that readiness to defend even strong Posts, at all Hazards

which is necessary to derive the greatest benefit from them . The honor 

making a brave defence does not seem to be a sufficient stimulus, whe

the success is very doubtful, and the falling into the Enemy's hands pro

able. But I doubt not this will be gradually attained . We are now in a stro

Post, but not an Impregnable one, nay acknowledged by every man 

Judgment to be untenable, unless the Enemy will make the Attack upo

Lines, when they can avoid it and their Movements indicate that they mea

to do so . To draw the whole Army together in order to arrange the defen

proportionate to the extent of Lines and works, would leave the Count

open to an Approach and put the fate of this Army and its Stores on t

hazard of making a successful defence in the City, or the Issue of 

Engagement out of it . On the other hand to abandon a City, which h

been by some deemed defensible and on whose Works much Labour h

been bestowed, has a tendency to dispirit the Troops and enfeeble o

Cause . It has also been considered as the Key to the Northern Countr

But as to this I am fully of opinion, that by Establishing of strong posts 

Mont Washington on the upper part of this Island and on the Jersey si

opposite to it, with the Assistance of the Obstructions already made a

which may be improved in the Water, that not only the navigation of Hu

132
son's River but an easier and better communication, may be effectually

secured between the Northern and Southern States . This I believe every

one acquainted with the situation of the Country will readily agree to, and

will appear evident to those who have an Opportunity of recuring to good

maps. These and the many other consequences, which will be involved in

the determination of our next measure, have given our Minds full employ

and led every one to form a Judgement, as the various objects presented

themselves to his view . The post at Kings Bridge is naturally strong and is

pretty well fortified the Heights about it are commanding and might soon

be made more so . . . .

. . . I am sensible a retreating Army is incircled with difficulties, that the

declaring and Engagement subjects a General to reproach and that the

common Cause may be in some measure affected by the discouragements which it be made with any Probability of success, especially after

our loss upon Long Island : but when the fate of America may be at stake

on the Issue; when the Wisdom of cooler moments and experienced Men

have decided that we should protract the War if Possible ; I cannot think it

safe or wise to adopt a different System, when the season for Action

draws so near a close . That the Enemy mean to Winter in New York there

can be no doubt; that with such an Armament they can drive us out is

equally clear. The Congress having resolved, that it should not be

destroyed, nothing seems to remain but to determine the time of their taking Possession .

-Fitzpatrick, Writings of

Washington, 6:27-29, 31-32.

On 12 September 1776 the council of war agreed that New York could

not be held . Washington removed the bulk of his troops to the Harlem

Heights, 17 a plateau lying at the upper end of Manhattan between the

Harlem River and the Hudson, where he projected a series of three lines of

entrenchments . Putnam exercised great responsibility in securing the new

American position. Washington ordered his commanding officers "to turn

out every man they have off duty, for fatigue, and to apply to Col . Putnam

for tools, and directions where and how to work ." 18

On the 15th, after landing successfully at Kip's Bay, the British seized

the entire southern half of Manhattan and barely missed cutting off the

retreat of some of Washington's men . They began building their own fortifi

cations . Once again Washington waited for Howe's next move, and once

again the British general delayed .

That September a vessel known as the American Turtle submerged in

New York harbor several times in an effort to attach explosives to British

ships. The Americans were trying a new tactic-submarine warfare . David

Bushnell, a student at Yale College in the 1770's, had designed and built the

13 3
Turtle at Saybrook, Connecticut, with the assistance of his brother, Ezr

Bushnell operated on the premise that the force of an explosion under wat

would not dissipate itself harmlessly, a premise he tested in several e

periments while at Yale. "They all produced very violent explosions," Bus

nell later recalled, "much more than sufficient for any purpose I had 

view." 19 Having shown the viability of underwater explosions, he ne

developed his submarine, believing it to be the best way to convey explosiv

to a target ship . Finally he designed a powder magazine and a means of 

taching it to the target .

In the spring of 1775 the brothers finished their vessel and quickly wo

support for their idea from Silas Deane, Yale alumnus and Connectic

congressman; Connecticut's Governor Jonathan Trumbull; Maj . Gen. Isra

Putnam ; and, ultimately, George Washington. Washington agreed to fu

nish Bushnell "with money and other aids to carry his plan in

execution. " 20

An underwater vessel presented many design problems. In addition to 

watertight and pressure-resistant hull, the sub needed a reliable steeri

mechanism, vertical stability, variable ballast, and vertical and horizont

mobility. In a letter to Thomas Jefferson, written in 1787 and read elev

years later at the American Philosophical Society, Bushnell described t

Turtle, explained his solutions to the problems of underwater warfare, a

related how he had first tested his vessel .

8. BUSHNELL'S GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND CONSTRUCTION

OF A SUBMARINE VESSEL

The external shape of the sub-marine vessel bore some resemblanc

to two upper tortoise shells of equal size, joined together; the place of en

SKETCHES OF BUSHNELL'S AMERICAN TURTLE. In the left

figure, S indicates the powder magazine, and G the rudder. The

propeller-like projections on the side and top are oars for horizontal

and vertical movement. R, next to the top oar, is the wood screw.

Abbot, Modern Submarine Warfare

134
trance into the vessel being represented by the opening made by the

swell of the shells, at the head of the animal . The inside was capable of

containing the operator, and air, sufficient to support him thirty minutes

without receiving fresh air. At the bottom opposite to the entrance was

fixed a quantity of lead for ballast. At one edge which was directly before

the operator, who sat upright, was an oar for rowing forward or backward 

At the other edge, was a rudder for steering . An aperture, at the bottom,

with its valve, was designed to admit water, for the purpose of descending ; and two brass forcing-pumps served to eject the water within, when

necessary for ascending . At the top, there was likewise an oar, fo

ascending or descending, or continuing at any particular depth-A watergauge or barometer, determined the depth of descent, a compass

directed the course, and a ventilator within, supplied the vessel with fresh

air, when on the surface .

The entrance into the vessel was elliptical, and so small as barely t

admit a person . This entrance was surrounded with a broad elliptical iron

band, the lower edge of which was let into the wood of which the body o

the vessel was made, in such a manner, as to give its utmost support t

the body of the vessel against the pressure of the water . Above the upper

edge of this iron band, there was a brass crown, or cover, resembling a ha

with its crown and brim, which shut water tight upon the iron band : the

crown was hung to the iron band with hinges so as to turn over sidewise,

when opened . To make it perfectly secure when shut, it might be screwed

down upon the band by the operator, or by a person without .

There were in the brass crown, three round doors, one directly in front

and one on each side, large enough to put the hand through-when open

they admitted fresh air; their shutters were ground perfectly tight int

their places with emery, hung with hinges and secured in their places

when shut. There were likewise several small glass windows in the crown,

for looking through, and for admitting light in the day time, with covers t

secure them . There were two air pipes in the crown. A ventilator withi

drew fresh air through one of the air pipes, and discharged it into th

lower part of the vessel ; the fresh air introduced by the ventilator, ex

pelled the impure light air through the other air pipe . Both air pipes were

so constructed, that they shut themselves whenever the water rose nea

their tops, so that no water could enter through them, and opened

themselves immediately after they rose above the water.

The vessel was chiefly ballasted with lead fixed to its bottom ; when thi

was not sufficient, a quantity was placed within, more or less, according t

the weight of the operator; its ballast made it so stiff, that there was n

danger of oversetting. The vessel with all its appendages, and th

operator, was of sufficient weight to settle it very low in the water. Abou

two hundred pounds of the lead, at the bottom, for ballast, would be le

down forty or fifty feet below the vessel; this enabled the operator to ris

instantly to the surface of the water, in case of accident .
When the operator would descend, he placed his foot upon the top 

brass valve, depressing it, by which he opened a large aperture in the 

tom of the vessel, through which the water entered at his pleasure; w

he had admitted a sufficient quantity, he descended very gradually ; i

admitted too much, he ejected as much as was necessary to obtain 

equilibrium, by the two brass forcing pumps, which were placed at e

hand . Whenever the vessel leaked, or he would ascend to the surface, 

also made use of these forcing pumps. When the skilful operator had 

tained an equilibrium, he could row upward, or downward, or continu

any particular depth, with an oar, placed near the top of the vessel, for

upon the principle of the screw, the axis of the oar entering the vessel 

turning the oar one way he raised the vessel, by turning it the other way 

depressed it .

A glass tube eighteen inches long, and one inch in diameter, stand

upright, its upper end closed, and its lower end, which was open, scre

into a brass pipe, through which the external water had a passage into 

glass tube, served as a water-gauge or barometer . There was a piec

cork with phosphorus on it, put into the water-gauge. When the ves

descended the water rose in the water-gauge, condensing the air wit

and bearing the cork, with its phosphorus, on its surface. By the ligh

the phosphorus, the ascent of the water in the gauge was rendered 

ble, and the depth of the vessel under water ascertained by a gradua

line .

An oar, formed upon the principle of the screw, was fixed in the f

part of the vessel ; its axis entered the vessel, and being turned one w

rowed the vessel forward, but being turned the other way rowed it ba

ward ; it was made to be turned by the hand or foot.

A rudder, hung to the hinder part of the vessel, commanded it with 

greatest ease. The rudder was made very elastic, and might be used 

rowing forward . Its tiller was within the vessel, at the operator's r

hand, fixed, at a right angle, on an iron rod, which passed through the 

of the vessel ; the rod had a crank on its outside end, which comman

the rudder, by means of a rod extending from the end of the crank to a 

of tiller, fixed upon the left hand of the rudder. Raising and depressing 

first mentioned tiller turned the rudder as the case required .

A compass marked with phosphorus directed the course, both ab

and under the water; and a line and lead founded the depth when ne

sary .

The internal shape of the vessel, in every possible section of it, ver

towards an ellipsis, as near as the design would allow . . . . The bod

the vessel was made exceedingly strong ; and to strengthen it as muc

possible, a firm piece of wood was framed, parallel to the conju

diameter, to prevent the sides from yielding to the great pressure of 

incumbent water, in a deep immersion . This piece of wood was also a 

for the operator.

136
Every opening was well secured . The pumps had two sets of valves.

The aperture at the bottom, for admitting water, was covered with a plate,

perforated full of holes to receive the water, and prevent any thing from

choaking the passage, or stopping the valve from shutting . The brass

valve might likewise be forced into its place with a screw, if necessary .

The air pipes had a kind of hollow sphere, fixed round the top of each, to

secure the air-pipe valves from injury : these hollow spheres were perforated full of holes for the passage of the air through the pipes : within the

air-pipes were shutters to secure them, should any accident happen to the

pipes, or the valves on their tops .

Wherever the external apparatus passed through the body of the

vessel, the joints were round, and formed by brass pipes, which were

driven into the wood of the vessel, the holes through the pipes were very

exactly made, and the iron rods, which passed through them, were turned

in a lathe to fit them ; the joints were also kept full of oil, to prevent rust and

leaking . Particular attention was given to bring every part, necessary for

performing the operations, both within and without the vessel, before the

operator, and as conveniently as could be devised ; so that every thing

might be found in the dark, except the water-gauge and the compass,

which were visible by the light of the phosphorus, and nothing required

the operator to turn to the right hand, or to the left, to perform any thing

necessary. . .

Description of a magazine and its appendages, designed to be conveyed by the sub-marine vessel to the bottom of the ship. In the forepart of

the brim of the crown of the submarine vessel, was a socket, and an iron

tube, passing through, the socket; the tube stood upright, and could slide

up and down in the socket, six inches: at the top of the tube, was a woodscrew . . . fixed by means of a rod, which passed through the tube, and

screwed the wood-screw fast upon the top of the tube : by pushing the

wood-screw up against the bottom of a ship, and turning it at the same

time, it would enter the planks; driving would also answer the same purpose ; when the wood-screw was firmly fixed, it could be cast off by

unscrewing the rod, which fastened it upon the top of the tube .

Behind the sub-marine vessel, was a place, above the rudder, for carrying a large powder magazine, this was made of two pieces of oak timber,

large enough when hollowed out to contain one hundred and fifty pounds

of powder, with the apparatus used in firing it, and was secured in its place

by a screw, turned by the operator. A strong piece of rope extended from

the magazine to the wood-screw . . . above mentioned, and was fastened

to both . When the wood-screw was fixed, and to be cast off from its tube,

the magazine was to be cast off likewise by unscrewing it, leaving it hanging to the wood-screw; it was lighter than the water, that it might rise up

against the object, to which the wood-screw and itself were fastened .

Within the magazine was an apparatus, constructed to run any proposed length of time, under twelve hours ; when it had run out its time, it

137
unpinioned a strong lock resembling a gun lock, which gave fire to 

powder. This apparatus was so pinioned, that it could not possibly mov

till, by casting off the magazine from the vessel, it was set in motion .

The skilful operator could swim so low on the surface of the water, 

to approach very near a ship, in the night, without fear of being d

covered, and might, if he chose, approach the stem or stern above wat

with very little danger. He could sink very quickly, keep at any depth 

pleased, and row a great distance in any direction he desired, with

coming to the surface, and when he rose to the surface, he could soon 

tain a fresh supply of air, when, if necessary, he might descend again, a

pursue his course . . . .

In the first essays with the sub-marine vessel, I took care to prove 

strength to sustain the great pressure of the incumbent water, when s

deep, before I trusted any person to descend much below the surfa

and I never suffered any person to go under water, without having a str

piece of rigging made fast to it, until I found him well acquainted with 

operations necessary for his safety . After that, I made him descend 

continue at particular depths, without rising or sinking, row by the co

pass, approach a vessel, go under her, and fix the wood-screw . . . i

her bottom, etc ., until I thought him sufficiently expert to put my design 

to execution .

I found, agreeably to my expectations, that it required many trials 

make a person of common ingenuity, a skilful operator . . . .

-Transactions of the Ameri

Philosophical Socie

4:303-09.

The Bushnells had planned to use the Turtle in Boston, but mechani

problems and the need to keep the operator in constant training dela

them more than a year . Then on the night of 6 September 1776 the Tu

made its debut in New York harbor . Sgt . Ezra Lee of the 10th Contine

Regiment, an untrained substitute for Ezra Bushnell, piloted the 

alongside Admiral Howe's 64-gun Eagle but was unable to screw the pow

magazine into the enemy vessel because of an iron plate passing from 

Eagle's rudder hinge and spiked under the ship's quarter . Lee vividly 

counted his experience in a letter written nearly forty years later to Da

Humphreys, a biographer of Maj . Gen . Israel Putnam .

As described by Lee, his task must have been exhausting . He was 

stantly pedaling and cranking, pumping water from the ballast tank, wo

ing about detection, surfacing and submerging again, and all the w

fighting New York's tricky currents and an ebb tide . In his letter to Je

son, Bushnell correctly emphasized the need for a skillful operator, bu

might also have shown greater appreciation . for the sheer strength requir

138
9. "I THOUGHTTHE BEST GENERALSHIP WAS TO RETREAT

AS FAST AS I COULD"

Ezra Lee to David Humphreys .

. . . The first night after we got down to New York with it that was

favourable (for the time for a trial must be when it is slack water and calm,

as it is unmanagable in a swell or a strong tide) the British fleet lay a little

above Staten Island . We set off from the city: the whale boats towed me as

nigh the ships as they dared to go and then case me off . I soon found that

it was too early in the tide, as it carried me down by the ships. I however

hove about and rowed for 5 glasses by the ships' bells before the tide

slacked, so that I could get alongside of the man of war which lay above

the transports . The moon was about 2 hours high, and the daylight about

one . When I rowed under the stern of the ship I could see the men on deck

and hear them talk. I then shut down all the doors, sunk down and came

under the bottom of the ship. Up with the screw against the bottom but

found that it would not enter . I pulled along to try another place, but

deviated a little one side and immediately rose with great velocity and

come above the surface 2 or 3 feet between the ship and the daylight, then

sunk again like a porpoise . I hove about to try again, but on further thought

I gave out, knowing that as soon as it was light the ships' boats would be

rowing in all directions, and I thought the best generalship was to retreat

as fast as I could, as I had 4 miles to go before passing Governor's Island .

So I jogg'd on as fast as I could, and my compass being then of no use to

me, I was obliged to rise up every few minutes to see that I sailed in the

right direction, and for this purpose keeping the machine on the surface of

the water and the doors open . I was much afraid of getting aground on the

island, as the tide of the flood set on the north point .

While on my passage up to the city, my course, owing to the above circumstances, was very crooked and zigzag, and the enemy's attention was

drawn towards me from Governor's Island . When I was abreast of the fort

on the Island, 3 or 400 men got upon the parapet to observe me; at leangth

a number came down to the shore, shoved off a 12 oar'd barge with 5 or 6

sitters and pulled for me. I eyed them, and when they had got within 50 or

60 yards of me I let loose the magazine in hopes that if they should take

me they would likewise pick up the magazine, and then we should all be

blown up together. But as kind Providence would have it, they took fright,

and returned to the island to my infinite joy . I then weathered the Island,

and our people seeing me, came off with a whale boat and towed me in 

The magazine, after getting a little past the Island, went off with a tremendous explosion, throwing up large bodies of water to an immense

height. . . .

139

Lyme [Conn .] 20th Feb'y, 1815

-Johnston, "Sergeant Lee's

Experience," pp. 264-65.
A week later a second try on the Eagle proved fruitless, as did a sub

sequent attempt on a British frigate . Despite these failures, Bushnell earne

himself. the title "father of submarine warfare ."

Advancing enemy control of Manhattan and the surrounding waters

coupled with the continuing problem of currents, made further submarin

efforts too risky . Bushnell tried to transport the Turtle back to Connecticu

on board a sloop ; but the British discovered him, and with a few well-place

cannonballs sank the vessel and its precious cargo . Though he late

recovered the sub, Bushnell never used it again because of his own poo

health, a lack of funds, and the lengthy training period required for operators . Washington later said of Bushnell's venture : "It was an effort of genius,

but . . . too many things were necessary to be combined to expect much

from the issue against an enemy who are always upon guard."" In 1777

Bushnell made two other attempts at utilizing explosives in the water but di

not employ a submarine. His proven ingenuity won him the hearty .endorse

ment of Governor Trumbull for the companies of sappers and miners, 2

which he joined in 1779 .

By mid-October 1776 the Americans seemed about to be cut off from

behind by one of Howe's favorite flanking movements. In a now-familiar

pattern, Washington moved his men still further north, this time to White

Plains in Westchester County. Washington left a garrison behind at Fort

Washington to defend the line of obstructions stretching across the Hudson

from Fort Lee, New Jersey .

When he moved to White Plains Washington needed to know what th

enemy was doing . He ordered his Chief Engineer to find out . Putnam had

conducted surveys and reconnaissance missions before, although seldom

under such dangerous circumstances . Putnam described this particular

assignment in an excerpt from his memoirs . When he stole into White Plains

itself on October 20, Putnam recalled in another passage, "I was induced t

disguise my self by takeing out my cockade, Loping my hat and Secreating

my Sword and pistols under my Loose coat, and then had I ben taken unde

this disguise the probability is that I Should have ben hanged for a Spy.

"23

10 . "I . . . DISGUISED MY APPERENCE AS AN OFFICER

AS FAR AS I COULD"

From Rufus Putnam's memoirs.

October 19th 1776-The British Landed on Pells point and Some Skir

mishing to[ok] place in the afternoon . . . . The next morning by ordor o

the general I Set out from Kingsbridge, to reconnoiter there Position, etc 

Set out in company with Colo . Reed the adjutent general and a foot guar

of about 20 men. When we arrived on the hights of East Chester we Saw 

Small body of British neer the church, but we could obtain no intiligence

the Houses were diserted .

140
Colo. Reed now told me he must return to attend issuing general

orders. I observed that we had made no discovery yet of any consequence, that if he went back I wished him to take the guard back for 

chose to go alone .

I then disguised my apperence as an officer as far as I could, and Se

out on the road to White plains . However, I did not then know where White

plains was, nor where the road I had taken would carry me . I had gon about

1 1/2 mile, when a road turned off to the right, I followed it prehaps 1/z a mile

and came to a house, where I lerned from the woman that this road Lead t

New-Rochell that the British were there and that they had a guard at a

house in Sight. On this information I turned and pursued my rout toward

White plains (the houses on the way all deserted) untill I came with 3 or 4

mile of the place . Here I discovered a House a little a head with men about

it by my glass I found they were not British Soldiers, however I ap

proached them with caution . I called for Some oats for my horse, Set down

and heard there chat Some little time, when I found they were frinds to the

cause of America and then I began to make the necessary enquieries-and on the whol I found that the main body of the Brittish Lay

neer New Rochelle . From thence to White plains about nine mile, good

roads and in general level open country that at white plains was a large

quantity of Stores, with only about three hundred melitia to guard them,

that the British had a detachment at Maniarneck only Six miles from White

plains, and from White plains only five mile to the North River, where lay

five or Six of the enimies Ships and Slops, tenders, etc.

Having made these discoveries I Set out on my return . The road from

Wards acros the Brunx was my intended rout unless I found the Brittish

there, which happly they were not, but I Saw American on the hights west

of the Brunx, who had arrived there after I passed up.-I found it to be Lord

Sterlings Division . It was now after Sunset . I gave My Lord a short accont

of my disoveries took Some refreshment, and Set off For head quarters,

by the way of Philips, at the mouth of Sawmill river, a road I had neve

traveled, among tory inhabitence and in the night . I dare not enquire the

way, but providence conducted me .-I arrived at head Quarter neer Kings

bridge (a distence of about 10 mile) about nine oClock at night. I found the

General alone . I reported to him the discoveries I had made, with a Sketch

of the country. He complained very fealingly of the Gentlemen from New

York from whome he had never ben able to obtain a plan of the coun

try-that from there information he had ordored the stores to White plains

as a place of Securety .-The General Sent for General Greene, and genl 

George Clinton . . . . As Soon as General Clinton came in my [s]ketch and

Statement was Shewn to him and he was asked if the Sittuation of those

places were as I had reported .-Gent . Clinton Said they were .

-Buell, Memoirs 'Of Putnam, pp

61-63.
Howe characteristically delayed attacking, giving Putnam the opportunity several days later to entrench on Chatterton Hill overlooking White

Plains. On the 28th of October the British finally took Putnam's earthworks,

while Washington slipped away to North Castle and hastily erected new

works. 24 "These, to the enemy, in whose view they fully were," recalled Maj

Gen . William Heath, "must have appeared very formidable, although they

were designed principally for small-arms ." 25 Heath further described the

latest American defenses:

There were the stocks of a large cornfield at the spot: the pulling these up in hills, took up a large lump of earth with each.

The roots of the stalks and earth on them, placed in the face of

the works, answered the purpose of sods or fascines: the tops

being placed inwards as the loose earth was thrown upon them,

became as so many ties to the work, which was carried up with

a dispatch scarcely conceivable. 26

As Chief Engineer, Putnam assisted again by "examining the nature o

the country in a military point of view. " 27 For whatever reasons -and the

formidable appearance of the rebel position surely was one -Howe failed t

attack Washington's new position, decamped, and marched southwest 

Isolated Fort Washington was his goal.

Throughout November Washington maintained the post at Fort

Washington largely on assurances from General Greene that it could be held

and, if necessary, safely evacuated . For their part the British assumed the

fort to be strong. Their decision to take it was based on reports of dissensio

among the troops and not on any perceived weakness of the position . 28

Appearances were deceiving . Though located on a bed of rock nearly

200 feet above the Hudson, Fort Washington was actually rather weak . In

July Putnam had laid out the fort and directed its construction but made no

effort to strengthen the position by blasting the underlying rock. The main

fort was a five-sided earthwork lacking a fraise, ditch, barracks, casements,

and a well . Moreover, the outworks were incomplete and the citadel could

easily be besieged . The fort and surrounding batteries mounted thirty-fou

cannon and a pair of howitzers .

A series of earthworks protected Fort Washington to the south where a

infantry approach was easiest . Additional redoubts lay to the north and

east . Another redoubt at Jeffery's Hook, planned by Antoine Felix Wuibert

de Mezi~res, a French volunteer serving as an Army engineer, defended th

western edge of the position. 29 If the outworks fell, the rebels planned t

retreat to the main fort as a last resort .

NORTHERN MANHATTAN ISLAND, NOVEMBER 1776 . Thi

British plan of the American position around Fort Washington,

center, and the route of the Hessian attack shows that south of the

main fort were extensive batteries, surrounded by abatis, and the

rebels' winter barracks.

Courtesy New-York Historical Society, New York City

142

Near dawn on 16 November 1776 Washington crossed the Hudson fr

Fort Lee with Generals Israel Putnam, Nathaniel Greene, and Hu

Mercer, to decide the fate of Fort Washington once and for all . The Brit

were known to be advancing toward the fort, but upon landing the gener

learned that Hessians were at that moment attacking the outer lines . Fea

ing for their safety, the officers returned to Fort Lee and awaited the o

come. Before nightfall Col . Robert Magaw, commander at F

Washington, surrendered . The British took valuable materiel and mo

than 2,800 prisoners, among them engineer Wuibert .

By November 20 the British controlled Fort Lee as well . Closely pursu

by Lord Cornwallis, Washington's army began a retreat across New Jer

that ultimately led over the Delaware River at Trenton into Pennsylvan

The loss of entrenching tools at Fort Washington prohibited construction 

earthworks . Nevertheless, Washington's men placed obstructions in the pa

of the British and destroyed bridges wherever possible. And befo

Washington crossed into Pennsylvania, he ordered all boats in the vicin

gathered up in an effort to hinder Cornwallis's pursuit .

Though it was nearly winter, Washington was not content to end 

campaign of 1776 . The loss of Fort Washington haunted him, and he fear

British designs on Philadelphia, not to mention sagging patriot morale . A

cordingly Washington planned a bold move to retake western New Jersey 

coordinated surprise attacks on British positions at Trenton and Borde

town, outposts Cornwallis had established earlier in December before goi

into winter quarters at New Brunswick .

Christmas night Washington again called on Glover's Marbleheader

this time to ferry the 2,400 men in his main force across the Delaware 

McKonkey's Ferry north of Trenton . Glover's task was a difficult one, 

river being choked with ice. Worse still, winds battered the area and a blin

ing snowstorm developed before morning. Glover's experienced sailors a

fishermen manned Durham boats-black river vessels resembling la

canoes. Eighteen-foot oars propelled the boats downstream, while the oa

men used poles to move upstream . The amphibious operation was 

remarkable success, particularly in the movement of eighteen heavy artill

pieces without loss . (Two simultaneous attempts to cross farther downriv

failed, in one case because the artillery was too heavy.)

Though aiming for midnight, Glover's men understandably complet

the crossing three hours late . The Marbleheaders then joined the rest 

Glover's brigade to march the nine miles to Trenton with Washingt

There the rebels surprised and overwhelmed the poorly entrenched Hess

garrison. By helping to cut off the enemy's retreat, Glover's men prov

their ability on land as well as on water.

On the night of the 26th, the weary Marbleheaders ferried about 

Hessian prisoners and the victorious American forces back to the Penns

vania side of the river . Weather conditions that night were even wor

When the operation was over, Glover's men collapsed from exhaustion .

144
Washington's troops and artillery crossed the ice-jammed Delaware t

New Jersey again on December 30 and 31 . This time Washington hoped t

solidify his position at Trenton and drive the British farther east . At first h

massed his army at Trenton and placed earthworks along the Assunpin

Creek and north of the town. Cornwallis, boasting that he would soon "ba

the fox," moved into Trenton . But on the night of 2-3 January 1777,

Washington left his campfires burning and stole toward Princeton, where

the next morning he surprised the enemy and gained control of the town .

Although Washington wanted to go on to New Brunswick, his men wer

too tired . Sorely disappointed at his inability to take action he felt migh

have ended the war, Washington established winter quarters at Morristown

He was heartened, however, that his bold actions had breathed new life int

the American cause. By the 10th, Howe had withdrawn all his troops to New

Brunswick and Amboy. The campaign of 1776 was over.

The patriots lost New York in 1776 but still held Philadelphia . For how

long no one could be sure . Enemy control of New York City made security o

the Hudson Highlands upriver an American priority . For the remainder o

the war, Washington dreamed of retaking New York. He never succeeded .

William Howes next move . Would Howe at last advance towar

Philadelphia, or would he sail up the Hudson to join Burgoyne at Albany

Though the latter course seemed most likely, Washington prepared for bot

possibilities . For his part Howe complicated Washington's quandary by r

maining unseasonably long in New York.

Finally on July 23 Howe moved out with a fleet of 260 ships and nearl

fifteen thousand men. The fleet's movements perplexed Washington . First

on the 29th, it appeared off the Delaware Capes, but then it turned abou

and sailed for Virginia . Attempting to anticipate Howe, Washington's arm

was "compeld to wander about the country like the Arabs in search 

corn."' Only in late August when Washington heard that the British fle

had been sighted in the Chesapeake Bay did he feel confident tha

Philadelphia was Howe's objective .

Fearing British naval strength but never expecting an attack o

Philadelphia from the west, Pennsylvanians had concentrated their defense

on the Delaware River just below the city. In 1775 they established a nav

and began fortifications . They strengthened an unfinished star fort on For

Island that the British had started under the direction of John Montreso

during the French and Indian War. Pennsylvania's defense plans also i

cluded sinking chevaux-de-frise in the Delaware, an operation which wa

begun in September 1775 and continued until the British arrived two year

later. The chevaux-de-frise used in Philadelphia were large box-like con

tainers, about thirty feet square . The bottoms were floored to hold ston

ballast ; the sides were covered with logs. Posts mounted with iron spea

were attached to the upper parts and faced downriver . Chains stretchi

across the river held the structures together .

THE DELAWARE RIVER FROM PHILADELPHIA TO

CHESTER . This map from William Faden's Atlas of the American

Revolution shows the placement of American fortifications, river

obstructions, and vessels in 1777.

National Archives

147
Attention to the river defenses fluctuated between 1775 an

depending on the perceived threat of British attack . By early spring 

citizenry was sufficiently alarmed to renew its defensive efforts . In F

work began at a site downriver at Billingsport, and in April a f

started at Red Bank.

Until June 1777 local men without experience or training in 

engineering planned and executed the Delaware River defenses . The

Gen . Philippe Charles Tronson du Coudray, the controversial Fre

recruited by Silas Deane to command the engineers, surveyed the d

for the Continental Congress. His report to the Supreme Executive 

of Pennsylvania was extremely critical . He found Billingsport the pre

position, but the plan "very bad" and the execution of the works "

judgment ." The principal role of Billingsport, Coudray argued, sh

to defend the Chevaux-de-frise, and he recommended substantial 

toward that goal.

Coudray virtually dismissed Fort Island ; and while declaring Re

"better conceived, directed, and executed" than either of the ot

forts, he considered it useless for obstructing passage up the river . Co

advice to preserve Red Bank, despite its shortcomings, demonstr

noteworthy appreciation for politial considerations .

1 . COUDRAY'S OBSERVATIONS ON THE

DELAWARE RIVER DEFENSES

To the Pennsylvania Supreme Executive Council.

Jul

Fort at Billingsport

1 . As to the Situation, it is well-chosen, it commands the River 

narrowest Part I have seen, and is the most capable of Defence.

2. As to the Plan or Projection, it is very bad . The Object in View 

to have been to defend the Chain of Chevaux de Frize, which bar the 

For that Purpose 30 or 40 Cannon, well placed, would have bee

cient . The Edge of the Scarp would have afforded room enough ; 

therefore necessary to shut the Gorge of the Battery, so that the 

might be obliged to land and open Trenches, in order to take Poss

of it . . . .

Besides the Length of Time, which the Plan of this Work would 

in the present situation of Affairs, another Inconvenience attends it

is, that it would require for its Defense, a more numerous Garriso

could be spared from the Army. For it would require at least 2000 M

from the Badness of the soil, the Enemy's Cannon would soon mak

Destruction, which must be repaired every Night, to prevent the 

from being stormed.

148
3. As to the execution of these Works, I find it to be without Judgm

The Planks and Piles to support the sand are not half thick enough . 

Piles instead of being inclined to bear against the Bank, have been f

perpendicular and are already overturned . Instead of placing the Batte

destined to fire on the River, on the Border of the Scarp, they have pl

them 7 or 8 Fathoms back, which removes them farther from their Obj

and exposes them to the Enemy's attempt at the Bottom of the Scarp. 

suppose the Works completed, only one Piece of Cannon can do Ex

tion . Instead of making use of the Ground which forms the Border o

Scarp and which is firm on the superfices, and supported at least for s

Depth by the Roots of Trees which grew there, they have raised a g

Part of the Breastwork with loose Sand in the manner before mentio

and have taken the Trouble to sink a Ditch, which might have been sp

as the Scarp answered the Purpose. . . .

To defend the Chain of Chevaux de Frize which bars the River oppo

to the Fort, all dependence for the present must be on the Floa

Batteries and Gondolas which are ready, or which can soon be so . S

use, however, can be made of a Part of the Fort, of which we have 

speaking : and for this Purpose there should be a Battery fixed in eac

the two Demi-Bastions on the side of the River. And by cutting those 

Demi-Bastions by the Gorge and the angle of the Flank, they will eac

transformed into a Redoubt with four Fronts . Each of these Redoubts 

be secured against a Coup de Main by covering them with a double 

and Pallisades in the Bottom of the Ditch . It will then be necessary to 

all those Parts of the Fort which may serve to cover the Enemy. These 

Works by means of 1500 or 2000 Labourers well directed may be exec

in 20 Days : and in my Opinion this is all that can be done in the pre

situation of affairs . . . .

The Fort

The Fort [Mifflin] is badly situated ; the Battery which forms its prin

object is improperly directed, which renders Half the Guns useless 

Embrazures are badly constructed, too open on the inside, and not 

ciently open without: some are directed obliquely without any motive 

interior Slopings are too straight, and by this means begin already to 

ble down .

This Fort cannot prevent the Passage of the Enemy, and when 

have passed, it can be of no use; consequently it can answer no val

Purpose .

Fort of Red-bank

This Fort is better conceived, directed, and executed than eit

those above mentioned . It does the more Honour to Colonel Bull,3 

149
had no other assistance than natural good sence unenlighten

Theory. This is perceivable from a View of it . There are indeed Fau

the Plan, and in the Execution, but they do not render it useless as t

former Forts. If we may judge by the Proportion of the work already 

ed, it is reasonable to expect the whole will be in a State of Defence 

course of a Fort night . What unfortunately renders this Fort of little 

Consequence is this ; its object is, and can be, no other than to preve

Enemy from taking possession of the Highth upon which it is plac

order to establish Batteries and thereby oblige the Gallies and Fl

Batteries employed in supporting the Chain of Chevaux de Fri

retreat. But this case could never happen, unless the Enemy shou

exposed to a Fire from the Floating Batteries and Gallies, which they 

not silence with their ships. . . . But the situation of the Place will no

mit such an idea ; for the River is here so wide that if the States ha

times as many Gallies, Ships and Batteries as they have at this plac

above it, the Enemy, we must think, would still have a superior Fire, 

width of the River would allow them to employ a greater numb

Ships . . . . Therefore 1 look upon this Fort as useless with respect 

Object for which it was intended, viz ., to contribute in obstructi

Passage of the River, and preventing the Enemy from possessin

Highth it commands. This Passage is much too wide to be defended 

present means . I would therefore advise to carry all the means of De

to the Passage at Billingsport . This place is incomparably more capa

support, and it is better to make a respectable stand in one place t

defend two in an indifferent manner. . . . The River [is] much narro

this place than in that of which we have been speaking . The Gallie

Batteries may more easily make Head against the Enemy who will 

able to make so great a Fire, and will be obliged to bear a much n

one, and better supported, than could be opposed to them at Red 

The Cannon at this Fort might partly serve for the Batteries at Billing

I would not, however, advise to demolish the Battery at Red Bank, 

leave there two or three of the poorest of the Cannon .

I would also advise to remove from this Line no more Chevaux de 

than would be judged necessary to secure by three Rows, the Pass

Billingsport .

I also advise to preserve Colonel Bull's Fort [Red Bank] . Thereb

may induce the Enemy to believe they would have a second L

obstacles to encounter, after they had surmounted the first ; and be

for another Reason, which appears to me a very important one espe

in the present Circumstances of Affairs, the Government would e

the Censure inconsideration and mistakes, which the evil-minde

always ready to pass, and the People to adopt, when they see 

which have been erected with much Labour and Expense 

down . . . .

150

-Pennsylvania Magazine

24 :343-47 .
After reviewing Coudray's plans, the Continental Board of War rec

mended that the Pennsylvania council adopt them. But as Howe's design

Philadelphia became clearer, Washington directly entered the picture 

required opinions on the river defenses from several officers, the majorit

whom acknowledged that Billingsport and its line of chevaux-de-frise co

not withstand attack. Washington's advisors felt the chevaux-de-frise at 

Island, despite the fort's weakness, could be more easily defended than 

line at Billingsport .

In a statement to Washington, Coudray held firm in his preference 

Billingsport and, with some exasperation, again urged speedy action by 

"Civil and Military administration" to supply the needed manpower 

tools . He offered his services and those of his men to ready Billingsport, 

Bank, and Fort Island, which he began calling Fort Mifflin in honor of 

friend and associate, Thomas Mifflin of Pennsylvania .

2.000DRAY CALLS FOR ACCELERATION OF THE

DELAWARE RIVER FORTIFICATIONS

August 6, 1

. . . It is necessary to procure some remedy for the present weaknes

the first line, by putting ourselves in a State of protecting the second 

of giving thereby time to the army to arrive.

I offer to continue in this respect my care and that of the commissio

and non Commissioned Officers who attend me; but if his Excellency 

tends that their care should not be useless, and that an invincible disg

should not succeed the most ardent zeal, it is absolutely necessar

cause a change in the conduct, which has been observed hitherto, an

accelerate the slowness of the Civil and Military administration, to wh

the Congress addressed us, to procure the means of execution.

It is necessary . . . that the Honourable Congress themselves o

without delay . 1st. A Thousand effective Workmen every day for 

ingsport who are to work on holy days, and Sundays, under the pro

direction of the Engineers whom I have there . 2nd. The necessary to

as well for these Workmen, as for my Artillery Workmen, whom I s

employ to construct the Batteries, and to repair the Carriages inten

either for this or Mifflin Fort in the actual circumstances ; those that I k

at Billingsport and here for this purpose having not yet been able in s

of my repeated solicitations to obtain this month past neither all the t

they want nor even Clothes. 3rd. 200 other Workmen every day at Fort 

flin and an hundred at Red bank under the same conditions with 

former. Provided this request be granted, I engage to put these t

places in a State of defence in the course of this Month . Viz ., to be defe

ed Billingsport with 400 Men and 80 Cannoniers ; Fort Mifflin with 600 

500 [50?] Cannoniers, Red bank with 200 Men and 20 Cannoniers .
During the same time, I shall employ the rest of my Engineers 

ecute suitably to the examination of the five places of encampment 

taken between Marcus Hook and Philadelphia . . . .

I ask for these Engineers no other assistance, besides the horses

a Man to serve them and carry their instruments. . . .

-Washington Papers, roll 

After personally inspecting the fortifications and sifting the advice 

staff, Washington concluded in early August that the most effective d

could be made at Fort Island. He recommended defending Billingspor

"as a secondary object" and rightly maintained, as had Coudray, th

army should focus its defense "at one point, rather than risk its being 

and ineffectual every where, by dividing our attention and force to dif

objects ." 4 On the other hand, Washington rejected Coudray's arg

that the narrowness of the river at Billingsport was a crucial consider

Washington agreed that the existing works on Fort Island were inade

and accordingly recommended immediate alteration. Though their 

differed, Washington entrusted Coudray with superintending the work 

The day after Washington reported to Congress, Coudray wrote hi

is beyond all dispute, that the situation of Fort Island is more advanta

than that of Billingsport ." 5 Very likely Coudray backed down purpos

conform to Washington's views. The Frenchman still emphasized the 

for speed and insisted that Howe would approach Philadelphia fr

Delaware River. Without orders from Washington, Coudray and 

engineers surveyed and mapped Fort Island and then volunteered to 

same at potential British landing sites between Marcus Hook 

Philadelphia, a task Coudray later completed.

That Coudray never really accepted the arguments favoring Fort M

was apparent in a memoir he prepared on 30 August 1777 . His soundi

the river had convinced him that the claim Fort Mifflin could only 

tacked by three frigates at a time was erroneous . The figure was mor

fifteen . Such a flotilla, the Frenchman warned, could demolish the fo

matter of hours unless it was strengthened . He believed the improve

and supplements to Fort Mifflin that were required to defend the che

de-frise adequately would be too costly and time-cons

"Unless . . . some reasons regarding particularly the State of Pennsy

or the future operations of the Army" required lengthy resistance to 

attack, Coudray maintained, no thought should be given to defendi

river passage at Fort Mifflin .

If Congress would support his plan to finish Billingsport, Coudray 

hire workmen rather than militiamen on a daily basis . The move wou

costs, he argued, because workmen "will work a great deal more a

consume such an immense quantity of tools of all kinds . "6

152
As a consequence of the debate over defending Fort Mifflin or 

ingsport, the army made little progress in fortifying either site during 

summer of 1777 . Attention shifted temporarily away from the Delaware 

August 25 when Howe landed at Head of Elk on the Chesapea

Philadelphia lay fifty-seven miles away . The road there would not be an 

one, for Washington was determined that Howe would not 

Philadelphia without a struggle .

Coudray and his French officers were eager for some action that mi

gain them recognition from Congress and demonstrate their zeal for 

American cause . They were particularly concerned lest Congress s

favoritism toward the rival group of French engineers headed by Col . Lo

Lebegue Duportail . Tension had existed between the two groups ever s

Duportail first reported to Washington on July 19 . Although Washing

used Duportail's engineering skills in the Philadelphia area, he was car

at this point not to allow Coudray to be upstaged .

Coudray's proposals for defense against the approaching enemy cent

on the need for a fortified camp between Philadelphia and Wilmingt

Delaware, where Washington had based his operations . He viewed the 

position as security for the army in case Wilmington had to be abandone

Philadelphia was lost. Coudray's experience as an artillery and ordnance 

ficer was evidenced in lengthy comments (not included in the following 

cerpts) backing up his contention that "artillery is the foundation of 

defensive war."

3. "THE OBJECT THE LEAST PRESSING IS THE

DEFENSE OF THE DELAWARE"

Tronson du Coudray to Congress.

Philadelphia, 7 September 1

. . . It is evident that from the part which the ennemy have taken of mak

a descent in Cesepeak bay, the object the least pressing is the defens

the Delaware .

This being supposed, it is clear that the greatest attention ought t

directed to defend as well as possible, the Route which the Enemy h

determined upon, by their landing in Chesapeak.

It is certain that fixing on this spot to land [Head of Elk], instea

Mark's hook (which General Gates, Mifflin, and myself thought they wo

chuse) will encrease considerably the Posts, which in proportion as 

advance in the Country, they will be oblig'd to establish to keep up a C

munication with their fleet. But the greatest disadvantage attending 

gives not however an entire certainly against the success of their marc

Philadelphia, which I always judged and declared, since my arrival her

be the true object of their Campaign .

15 3
To ensure, as much as possible, the success of this Campaign, 

necessary not to be merely contented with securing the Position of W

ington, where his Excellency has very wisely thought proper to collec

first Efforts .

However strong this position may be supposed by nature, or ma

rendered by Art; it appears to me, after what I have heard, that it wi

possible for the enemy to pass it on the flank, or perhaps force it ; 

sidering especially the small number of Artillery belonging to hi

cellency's army.

It appears to me then prudent for Congress to think of prov

beforehand for their army, another fortyfied Position, which may se

the army in case they are obliged to abandon the first, and where they 

collect new force against an enemy, whom the first success may re

more audacious; more especially as Schuylkill is the only consider

river that impedes their March to Philadelphia ; and that this River offe

Grays-ferry a Passage which no officer can (I should think) propose t

fend .

For this purpose, I offer again my service and that of my officer

hopes that there will result from it an opportunity of our being in ac

which the delay of Congress in pronouncing definitively upon our 

istence in the service of the United States, always removes at a dista

and which probably we might wait for in vain at the forts on the Delaw

at least before our return in France, should this take place. If the Cong

consent to the proposition which I make, to prepare a fortified Camp 

tween Wilmington and Philadelphia, I beg them [First] to communicate 

proposition to his Excellency General Washington .

[Second] To give me, as a principal cooperator, General Mifflin, 

knows perfectly well this country ; who has a very great ascendant ove

Inhabitants, by whom the works would be executed and whose grea

tivity and penetration I have had occasion to observe .

[Third] To bring forward, as soon as possible, the remainder of the 

two pieces brought in the Amphitrite, of which twelve alone are i

northern army, ten, within these few weeks, at the army of his Excell

General Washington ; the rest in Springfield, and, at other Places on 

east side of Hudson's River.

These thirty remaining pieces of the said fifty two, will be so muc

more necessary, as artillery is the foundation of all defensive war; and 

of these thirty pieces, there are twenty one which being of a gr

length than the others, and even any pieces in the army, are for 

reason better for defending the intrenchments. . . .

154

-Ford, "Defences of P

delphia," Pennsylv

Magazine 18:334-37.
Coudray, a keen and competent observer of the Delaware River defens

at a time when sound engineering advice was at a premium, died in mi

September, his plans largely ignored . Later that year, when the Briti

finally did attack these defenses, few remembered his constant insisten

that something be done before time ran out .

Howe's army took a month to get from Head of Elk to Philadelphia . 

the Battle of Brandywine on September 11, Howe employed a turning mov

ment reminiscent of Long Island to defeat the rebels . An important fact

in the American loss was Washington's failure to order necessary reco

naissance . He did have a map of roads in the Brandywine River area, co

piled earlier by James Brown, a surveyer employed by Robert Erskin

geographer of the Army; but more detailed information was required .? St

the enemy failed once again to destroy Washington's army, which was so

ready to take on the invaders.

After Brandywine the eventual British takeover of Philadelphia a

peared certain, but the timing was hardly sure . In fact, through a series 

maneuvers and skirmishes, Washington made the last twenty-six miles to t

capital city exceedingly difficult ones for the British .

Washington spent little time erecting field fortifications during this pa

of the Philadelphia campaign ; but, attempting to delay the British, he pla

ned works at the fords of the Schuylkill River . Washington placed Br

Gen. John Armstrong of the Pennsylvania militia in charge of the operati

and on September 14 ordered Duportail and his officers to assist Armstro

as engineers . Washington did not need works that could withstand a lo

defense, he needed works that could be completed quickly and with li

labor . "Only that part of them which is opposed to cannon, need be of a

considerable thickness," he cautioned Armstrong, "and the whole of th

should be rather calculated for dispatch than any unnecessary Decoratio

or Regularity which Engineer's are frequently too fond of.-8 Often fret

over the lack of competent engineers, Washington now complained that 

least some engineers were too thorough!

Howe finally took Philadelphia on September 26 not by defeat

Washington in battle but by outmaneuvering him . However, capture of 

Quaker City was hardly a decisive blow to the patriots: far fewer Loyali

than expected came out in support of the British, Congress continued 

meet in relative safety at Lancaster, valuable supplies had already be

evacuated, and Washington's army remained intact. Less than a y

earlier, Washington had envisioned that the loss of Philadelphia would h

"the most fatal consequences to the cause of America,"9 but now he 

cepted it as inevitable . News of Gates's success against Burgoyne at the F

Battle of Saratoga (September 19) heartened Washington's men and li

considerable pressure from them to rush to the defense of the Hudson.

The British quickly found that their occupation of Philadelphia 

nearly meaningless without control of the Delaware River . Otherwise Ho

15 5

had to rely on transporting supplies overland from Head of Elk, a per

prospect indeed so long as Washington's army remained ou

Philadelphia. Howe detached troops to clear the patriot defenses alon

Delaware, but the task proved a long and difficult one.

Meanwhile, for the first time, Army regulars took over defense o

river forts from the militia . On September 23 troops under the comman

Col . Heinrich d'Arendt, an officer in the German Battalion, garrisoned 

Mifflin. Early the next month Washington placed Col. Christopher Gr

of the 1st Rhode Island Regiment in command of Fort Mercer at Red 

and assigned Captain Thomas-Antoine de Mauduit du Plessis, an art

officer and engineer, to assist him.

On October 2 the British took undermanned Billingsport witho

fight . At that point "the Delaware defenses were there for the taking," 

Howe proceeded cautiously after his near defeat at Germantown on 

4th. 10 Again his inaction bought more time for the rebels, who tried 

iantly to strengthen their remaining defenses and maintain control o

Delaware . But conditions at Fort Mifflin, for example, had genui

shocked Lt . Col . Samuel Smith, the second in command, when he ar

there on September 27 . In the words of John W. Jackson, one modern

authority, the works "reflected the lack of military engineering, and res

in a fort more suited for frontier defense." 11

Only a few days after Smith's arrival the British pressed forward 

their own plans to reduce Fort Mifflin. They found that Province Is

situated just to the west of the fort, was not, as the Americans believed

impossible location for batteries. Though the island could be floode

removing dikes, enough high ground would remain for batteries . Acc

ingly the British placed several batteries on the island .

Across the river at Fort Mercer engineer Mauduit scaled the existing 

down to the size of the garrison by building a double-board fence filled 

lumber and hay across the fort from east to west . This change helped 

patriots turn back a Hessian attack on October 22 . As a result of murde

gunfire from within the fort that day, Col . Carl von Donop, the Hes

leader, fell wounded and later died . Afterward, John Laurens, an aide

camp of Washington, praised Mauduit's labors at Red Bank : "[He] acq

ted himself so well as to obtain panegyricks approaching to rapture fro

officers who were witnesses of his conduct ." Laurens maintained 

Mauduit's alterations to Fort Mercer revealed that he "had not conf

himself to one branch of military knowledge but had extended his st

with success to one which is generally held as a mystery a

[engineering] .- 12

DELAWARE RIVER DEFENSES. This view ofForts Mifflin and

Mercer and surrounding enemy positions was probably drawn by

Fleury.

Historical Society of Pennsylvania

157

On 14 October 1777 Fransois Louis 't eissedre de Fleury, a Fr

volunteer and engineer captain in the Continental Army, arrived at 

Mifflin as the post's engineer. His first assessment of conditions laid 

ticular stress or. what might have been accomplished before his arrival 

there been enough men. Examination of the enemy's recently erecte

tillery positions convinced Fleury that Fort Mifflin was in grave danger.

4. "WE MUST HAVE MEN, WORKS, AND BE ENABLED

TO MAKE VIGOROUS SALLIES"

Frangois Fleury to Alexander Hamilton .

The whole Front of the Fort now attacked is surrounded by Palisad

the Bank which ought to mask it is too low to cover it from the Battery 

ed on the opposite bank at the distance of 500 Yards-we might when 

Enemy were quiet have raised this Causeway, clear'd the Ditch

the . . . Earth, and have secured our Inclosure if not from Ricochet at 

from horisontal Shot-we might have arm'd our Battery (assailable 

points) by a sloped fraise work placed in a Ditch dug at low water i

Gravel-we might have added to the Fort an interior Inclosure of Earth 

Blinds, in order to renew the Conflict with the Enemy in case they sh

posses themselves of the first-we might have made Loop-holes i

Barracks and Windows-Fougasses constructed in the manner of do

Coffers or Lodgements-we might have raised Epaulements agains

Cannon which might rake our place of Arms-and have formed Blin

shelter us from Bombs and smaller shells-All this might have been 

while the Enemy were intent upon their works which should have 

destroy'd . . . but hands were wanting and now that we could have 

to execute the same works under the Enemys Cannon, we have none

what are 150 Men tired out with watching and Labours-had not thi

treme Weakness prevented you might have heard of night Sallies in a

Boatsto ruin the Enemys Works and spike their Cannon .

Since my arrival I have seconded as much as possible the zeal of 

onel [Samuel] Smith. We have raised three Traverses upon the grand 

tery to guard against the Enemys Richochet that he has cover'd 

FORT MERCER, OCTOBER 1777 . This plan, made at the time of

the Hessian attack, is attributed to Franjois Fleury (1749-1). The fort

was fraised and surrounded by abatis and a ditch. The solid line continuing to the left from the fort indicates the extent of the works as

originallyproposed.

Historical Society of Pennsylvania

159

Oct. 16, 
Powder Magasin with Blinds, and if we can to night we shall raise the 

on the front attack'd to mask our Pallisadoes with this kind of a cov

way.

Our greatest Uneasiness is occasioned by the dread of Surprise

Channel between Pennsylvania and the Fort is altogether clear; 

Galleys have removed the Jersey Side out of all distance for annoying 

Enemy and seconding us . The nights are darken'd by Fogs and all our 

rison must be on the watch to avoid being carried by Storm-I am igno

of the Plans of His Excellency [Washington] . I scarcely allow mysel

form conjectures but if the thing required be to hinder the Enemy 

reaching Philadelphia to cut off their Communication altogether, eve

flat bottom Boats,-which might pass the Chevaux de frise and in a C

nel at 1400 yds. dist . from Redbank (which Place is a mile and a qua

and five perches from Fort Island) our Battery alone can answer . . . 

can you expect from Shot thrown at the distance of 1400 Yards again

moveable object? Red Bank . . . is to serve as a Retreat for our 

rison-but it wants no Retreat-its Refuge is in its Pallisades an

Courage. Let it be reinforced-let it be [?] put out of the reac

Storms-and the Enemy will not be so soon Masters of the River-bu

must have men-works-and be enabled to make vigorous Sallies .

Position of the enemy-16 Octob : at noon-The Enemy have rais

Batteries-One a little behind the Fort upon the Bank which extends a

the River at about 500 yards distance from us-a second at the P

House still more in our rear and at the distance of 2000 Yds.-a third a

Brick House (of which I spoke to His Excellency) situated on the r

ground opposite the Fort at 1 mile 28 perches from us . A fourth a 

lower than the Fort-upon the Bank abovementioned there are bes

two Batteries at the Mouth of Schuylkil which have made our Ships rem

to a greater distance-there are 2 or 3 Mortars and some large Cano

these batteries-the Direction of their Fire was at first uncertain, but 

have rectified it, and it appears to be . . . intended for our Pow

Magasin .

160

-Washington Papers, roll 4

Fortunately Fleury kept an informative and often moving account o

experiences at Fort Mifflin . The journal reveals his frantic efforts to upg

the fort's defenses, a desperate need for more men, and a frustrating la

materiel, including much that was essential to fortification . Enclosed in 

respondence to Washington, Fleury's journal apparently served the C

mander in Chief as an important source of information on developm

along the Delaware .
5. "THE GREATEST PART OF THE BOMBS . . .

OCCASION MORE FEAR THAN DAMAGE"

From Franjols Fleury's journal .

Oct. 15 [1777] . At 8 in the morning, the Enemy unmask'd the 

Superior Batteries of the Bank, and House. They produced no other e

than break[ing] three of our Palisades in half-battering down the Co

of the Buttress Work, and oversetting two Merions . The greatest p

the Bombs extinguish'd by the humidity do not burst, and occasion 

Fear than Damage-at noon they open'd the lower Battery on the ban

15, night. Night pretty quiet except a slight Alarm caused by 

Boats of the Enemys Fleet, which had reachd the point of [Hog] Is

and retired after firing upon the boats of our Galleys-a great Noi

Oars heard behind the Island . The cause of it unknown.

16, the day. The Enemy renew'd their firing this morning with Ca

and continued with Flourishes-their Design seems to be to make 

shells burst in the air, on account of the little effect which the humidi

the Soil suffers them to produce. The few bombs which have been th

for an hour past are intended to fall on our Roofs-some have 

through the two Floorings of our grand Barracks on the right and opp

as you enter, but destroy'd no Life-the Burst[in]g a Shell just now d

me from my Table . . . .

17, day. The Enemy fir'd upon our Barracks a part of the mornin

unhappily about 9 oClock a Bomb kill'd two men and slightly wou

three others-The direction of the shells is not against the magasin i

ticular, but towards the middle of the Fort-the Bombs fall there, an

fires extinguish or they [go?] off without any mischief. . . .

18, the day. Fire renew'd deliberately but without Success-a 

bombs upon our Barracks-some Shot from the pest House have b

two Palisades-they fire at 15 degrees elevation or thereabouts for 

Shot fall in the manner of bombs. . . .

19, day. A little firing 'till noon-a large bomb from the pest Ho

Crush'd and set fire to a Ba[rrack] . It was extinguished immediatel

much for the Enemy.

Our own Transactions1 . We have raised our Bank in the night time-an[d] our Pallisad

the Front attacked, are shelter'd from Cannon.

2. We have staged our Wall in order to flank the Side which the Ga

ought to defend .

3 . We have join'd our Barracks by Ditches before the parapet in 

to make a Second Inclosure.
4. We have raised a flank'd work in the middle of the Fort, ma

Earth and Timber, and barrels flll'd with Sand, surrounded by a Dit

defend the Ground inch by inch .

5 . We have raised some of the Embrasures.

N.B. Part of these works can only be carried on by night . The fire 

Enemy harrassing our Workmen by day.

The Battery is our vulnerable part, I would fraise it with Palisades

Smith says we have neither materials nor hands-and he is 

right-but in its present Situation if it be attack'd, it will be carr[ied?

our own Cannon may be turn'd against us .

The Galleys are on the Jersey Side. . . .

20. We repair'd 10 Palisadoes that had been destroyed b

Bombs-the elevation of the Bank defending them from Cannon Shot 

square work in the middle of the Fort is finished .

The Enemy appear to be raising a work at near a mile and a half fr

at the point of Tinicum, in the direction of Hog Island-there are a 

many people there-The Commodore [Hazelwood] who has been inf

of it has not approached the Shore, but is gone to make a fruitless 

nonade against the Fleet .

The Enemy have kept up a heavy Fire, but happily have kill'd onl

of our men and wounded one.

Evening. For want of Pickets, we have begun a Ditch to surroun

Battery-to morrow night we shall endeavor to make a double Cha

floating Timber, or of Iron Chains taken from the Fire-Ships to hinde

Enemys Landing .

21. Scarce any Fire from the Enemy-I suppose there are few m

their Lines.

We stop't up all the old Loop-holes which were too low, and would 

served the enemy as well as ourselves . We have made others too hi

the Enemy to reach without, and have raised a Banquete for our 

within .

The Enemy appear no longer in the direction of Hog Island at Ti

point . The number of men seen there yesterday must have been a D

barkation from their Fleet .

Night. No fire from the Enemy. We have driven down large Pick

the bed of the River, at the distance of 20 feet from the Battery, and 

distance of 15 feet from each other-they are intended to support the 

ble Chain spoken of above.

Part of the Chain is stretcht . The high Tide and Coldness of the 

have hinder'd us from stretching the whole . We shall close the rema

Interval with floating Beams fasten'd together by their ends.

22. Firing from the Enemy-their Bombs have destroy'd some o

Palisades and we are employed in repairing them .

Night. The Chain which we have got is fix'd . The work is very diff

on account of the necessity of performing it in the water. The En

162
Vessels have got beyond the Bilingsport Chevaux de frise . Red bank i

tacked .

23. Cannonade and incessant Bombardment from Day break-an 

ficer wounded-A large Vessel of the Enemy perferated with our Sh

and those from the Galleys blew up. I know not by what accident . A 

cond ran aground near the Jersey Shoar-The Enemys Vessels ret

We are employed in making Traverses behind the Wall, to cover 

Troops from their Fire . The East north East Block House blew up 

render'd useless a Flank.

Night. I have traced a Ravelin for the defence of the outline flank'

the Blockhouse-it will cover the Entrance and be of more use than 

work which was there before. We have cover'd the left Flank of the Bat

with two Parapets and two Ditches. We are deficient in wood, pickets 

Earth .

24. We continue the Ravelin--make deepe Gaps in the Bank on 

right and left to prevent the Enemy from advancing to the Attack in g

order. Our Garrison is still very weak for so great an extent of Works.

The Enemy are silent on the land side, and in the River . . . .

The Enemy are employed this morning on a Work opposite the 

Ferry . It appears to us to be a Battery and design'd to cover their pass

to the Island-they have made but little progress with it as yet, and 

Galleys might interrupt these if they plaesed .

26. No Firing from the Enemy-we discover men carrying fascine

the old Ferry-I can't form a Judgement whether their Design to e

some work there or prepare for a Descent here-The Commodore say

knows of several Boats being prepared on the Schuylkil . . . .

29. . . . in the morning the Tide added to the Storm and Rain broke 

bank in several Places, especially near . . . the three half ditches w

Baron Arendt order'd me to have made, near the house of the Bar

Master . This prodigious Inundation it is true puts us out of the reach 

Coup de main, the whole Island being under water, but it interrupts 

Communications in the fort and causes among other Inconveniences, 

of covering the ground adjacent to the Wall behind which we use

shelter our men from Bombs and Ricochet Shot.

Yesterday at 3 OClock we had a mind to make some Attempt upon 

Enemy's Batteries overflow'd and unfit for -Service-3 Galleys cam

help us but the want of concert or deficiency of boats disappointed 

Enterprise . The Result of which was only a few Cannon Shot from us 

some Bombs thrown into the Fort. The firing ceased by mutual Consen

The night has been quiet and the Tide more moderate . The same 

which troubled us produced greater Derangement in the projects o

Enemy-Their Bridge over the Schuylkil was broke by it, and 12 of 

Boats six of them large ones, with a number of Plank drifted to us. T

works on province Island appear but little Injur'd-except that they a

the water as we area

16 3
I wish the Banks on province Island could be cut. I think the 

could not continue there .

30. No firing from the Enemy-they have strengthen'd their 

Guards, and we observe frequent Patroles on the Banks . I have pro

to remove all the Earth which forms the old ferry bank, to render it i

ticable as a Landing Place.

In a letter to Washington, written October 28, Fleury poignant

pressed little hope of defending the fort against almost certain 

assault. While lamenting the futility of works insufficiently manne

assured the Commander in Chief, "we shall do all that can be expec

brave men."

6 . "OF WHAT AVAIL ARE FORTIFICATIONS

UNDEFENDED BY MEN"

Franjois Fleury to George Washington .

I have already written to you upon the Subject of my Fears resp

this Post . 14 I repeat that if the Enemy attempt it by way of storm and 

provided with Fascines ; Plank, Ladders, etc ., 300 Men lost in a c

ference of 1200 Paces cannot hinder them from penetrating, especi

they make false Attacks, and a real one in silence-You kno

language is not dictated by Fear, but arises from a Sense of the 

tance of this Post . It is in vain to multiply works-of what avail are For

tions undefended by Men .

The Galleys 15 which ought to be a Security to us are abso

useless-they have withdrawn to the Jersey Shore-the Channel be

us and Province Island is perfectly clear and if the Enemy choose to 

a descent here as I have no doubt they do . We cannot hinder them 

may have two Projects one to take us by Storm and the other to open 

ches in the Island itself at the Extremity of Old ferry bank . . . w

hinder neither, but I am most afraid of the first . You know that the Fo

only weak Ditches and Palisades . The former are soon fill'd with Fasc

the latter easily cut away, and the Fort laid open . The Bombs 

destroyed one of our Block houses. We depend upon a few Militia f

management of our Artillery, and the greatest part of it is useless fo

of hands . Notwithstand such weakness we shall do all that can 

164

-Washington Papers, r

and 45.

28th Octobe
pected of brave men-I have proposed to set fire to the Magasine in 

they should penetrate and blow up altogether-but this is a despe

Resolution .

7 . "WE WERE, LIKE THE BEAVER, OBLIGED TO REPAIR

OUR DAMS IN THE NIGHT"

From the narrative of Joseph Plumb Martin .

-Washington Papers, roll 1

Writing his memoirs long after the war, Joseph Plumb Martin, 

served as a private at Fort Mifflin in 1777 and later joined the sappers 

miners, recalled the fort's condition upon his arrival late that October 

described in the passages below, the extremely muddy ground caused 

hardships, and the enemy's incessant shelling made deathtraps of the 

racks. As the siege progressed, the garrison was obliged to spend the n

repairing-under constant fire-damages the British cannonade infl

by day. Fleury, the vigilant taskmaster, kept the garrison continuous

work.

Well, the island, [Mud or Fort Island] as it is called, is nothing more th

mud flat in the Delaware, lying upon the west side of the channel . 

diked around the fort, with sluices so constructed that the fort can be 

under water at pleasure, (at least, it was so when I was there, a

presume it has not grown much higher since .) On the eastern side, 

the main river, was a zigzag wall built of hewn stone, built, as I wa

formed, before the Revolution at the king's cost. At the southeastern 

of the fortification (for fort it could not with propriety be called) was a 

tery of several long eighteen-pounders . At the southwestern angle 

another battery with four or five twelve- and eighteen-pounders and 

thirty-two-pounder . At the northwestern corner was another small bat

with three twelve-pounders . There were also three blockhouses in 

ferent parts of the enclosure, but no cannon mounted upon them, 

were they of any use whatever to us while I was there. On the wes

side, between the batteries, was a high embankment, within which w

tier of palisadoes . In front of the stone wall, for about half its length, 

another embankment, with palisadoes on the inside of it, and a na

ditch between them and the stone wall . On the western side of the fo

cation was a row of barracks, extending from the northern part of 

works to about half the length of the fort . On the northern end was ano

block of barracks which reached nearly across the fort from east to w

165
In front of these was a large square two-story house, for the accomod

of the officers of the garrison . Neither this house nor the barracks w

much use at this time, for it was as much as a man's life was worth to 

them, the enemy often directing their shot at them in particular . In f

the barracks and other necessary places were parades and walks ; t

of the ground was soft mud. I have seen the enemy's shells fall upon 

sink so low that their report could not be heard when they burst, 

could only feel a tremulous motion of the earth at the time. At other 

when they burst near the surface of the ground, they would throw th

fifty feet in the air. . . .

Our batteries were nothing more than old spars and timber laid 

parallel lines and filled between with mud and dirt . The British batte

the course of the day would nearly level our works, and we were, li

beaver, obliged to repair our dams in the night. During the whole ni

intervals of a quarter or half an hour, the enemy would let off all 

pieces, and although we had sentinels to watch them and at every f

their guns to cry, "a shot," upon hearing which everyone endeavo

take care of himself, yet they would ever and anon, in spite of a

precautions, cut up some of us.

The engineer in the fort [Fleury] . . . . was a very austere man an

us constantly employed day and night; there was no chance of esc

from his vigilance.

Betweenthe stone wall and the palisadoes was a kind of yard or p

the southern end of which was a narrow entrance not more than ei

FORT MIFFLIN, 9 NOVEMBER 1777 . Fleury, chief engineer 

fort, drew this plan on the eve of the enemy's full-scale attack . 

denoted improvements made since his arrival with the letter A

included enemy batteries on the western shore of the Delaware, 

chevaux-de-frise, upper left, and a projected floating chain, ce

On the reverse side Fleury scribbled : "The engineer author of t

perfect draught begg indulgence for it; considering that he has 

paper, pen, rule, neither Circel, and being disturbed bygood m

shells, or cannon's balls, flying in the fort. " Theplan's key, in F

own words, is as follows : A1,2, 3-Traverses to defend the Batt

from Ricochet Shot; A4,5 -Ditches to close the Left of the Bat

which was open; A6 -A double Iron Chain which incloses the 

the battery; A7 -Pits with sharp upright Stakes, to defend the 

proaches to our Inclosure; AS -Banquet raised round the Wal

A9 -Ditches and Parapet of Reunion between our Barracks, w

will make a second Inclosure, and be furnished with loop-holes

A10-Last Retreat in the middle of the Fort made when we ha

120 Men in the Garrison; All -Demilune to flank the front,

substituted to the Blockhouse which was blown up;

A12,13,14 -Fraise-work .

Sparks Collection, Cornell University Libraries

166

ten feet wide, with a ditch about four feet wide in the middle, ext

the whole length of the pen . Here, on the eastern side of the wall, w

only place in the fort that anyone could be in any degree of safety. In

place we used to gather the splinters broken off the palisadoes 

enemy's shot and make a little fire, just enough to keep from suff

We would watch an opportunity to escape from the vigilance of C

Fleury, and run into this place for a minute or two's respite from f

and cold . When the engineer found that the workmen began to 

scarce, he would come to the entrance and call us out. He had alwa

cane in his hand, and woe betided him he could get a stroke at. At 

proach I always jumped over the ditch and ran down on the other si

that he could not reach me, but he often noticed me and as often thr

ed me, but threatening was all, he could never get a stroke at me, 

cared but little for his threats .

It was utterly impossible to lie down to get any rest or sleep on ac

of the mud, if the enemy's shot would have suffered us to do so . 

times some of the men, when overcome with fatigue and want of 

would slip away into the barracks to catch a nap of sleep, but it s

happened that they all came out again alive. I was in this place a fo

and can say in sincerity that I never lay down to sleep a minute in a

time .

The British knew the situation of the place as well as we did . A

their point-blank shot would not reach us behind the wall, they 

throw elevated grapeshot from their mortar, and when the sentri

cried "a shot," and the soldiers, seeing no shot arrive, had become 

less, the grapeshot would come down like a shower of hail about our 

16 8

--Martin, Private Y

Doodle, pp . 86-89 .

Fleury's own account of the siege of Fort Mifflin demonstrat

cumulative damage of the enemy's artillery, the mounting crisis of s

and the continuing shortage of men. One day flying brick fra

wounded Fleury; another time a timber knocked him unconscious and 

a companion . Although the garrison was extremely fatigued and at 

nearly one-half incapacitated, Fleury insisted that the fort could hold 

only he could get more manpower and supplies . That never happene

November 15 Fort Mifflin's garrison withdrew across the river t

Mercer.

As reflected in the excerpts below, Fleury encountered some dif

working with the headstrong Colonel Smith . After reading Fleury's j

entry for November 3, Washington recognized the problem and q

sought to remedy it . Washington's advice to Smith contained a rare 

mentary on the scope of an engineer officer's authority vis-a-vis that 

commanding officer :
. . . His [Fleury's] authority at the same time that it is sub

ordinate to yours must be sufficient for putting into practic

what his knowledge of Fortification points out as necessary f

defending the post, and his Department, tho inferior, being 

a distinct and separate nature requires that his orders should b

in a great degree discretionary, and that he should be suffere

to exercise his judgment .

16

Washington went on to describe Fleury as "a Young Man of Talents

"has made this branch of Military Science [engineering] his part

study," and concluded, "I place a confidence in him."

8. "OUR RUINS WILL SERVE US AS BREAST WORKS,

WE WILL DEFEND THE GROUND INCH BY INCH"

From Frangois Fleury's journal.

3 [November 1777]. For two days past we had suspected tha

Enemys Vessels made different turns in the course of the night t

Augusta's wreck17-either to carry off the Cannon which the Galley

neglected throwing into the water, or taking possession of, or to t

the Hulk-but they had a more important object which they have bee

mitted to execute without interruption-and this morning's day

discover'd to us their two nights' labour-they are raising a batte

heavy Cannon upon the hulk which is aground on the sand bank

Galleys do not disturb them in their work, which if they finish it, w

great injury to our Fort-where you know there is no Shelter fo

Troops-it is important to drive them from that particular spot of the 

and thirteen Galleys with two floating Batteries may do it if they pleas

As we are in want here of Joist, Pickets, Palisades, and even Earth

as it is impossible to fortify a place with water unless one has mea

stop it-1 went yesterday with 20 men to endeavour to get wood o

Jersey Shore, but I could get only a few Pickets, of which I shall make 

sades, if I am permitted to use them according to my Ideas.

When His Excellency approved my Zeal and my remaining at For

flin in quality of Engineer, he did not give me an order to act in that c

ity, and I can only advise without being heard. While Baron Arend

present he understands the Military Art, and my Opinions in point of f

cation were his-but he is absent, 18 and you know there are person

know a great deal without having ever learnt-and whose obstinan

equal to their Insufficiency. However I do not complain of any one, 

fine myself only to observing that my Zeal for your Cause cannot be u

unless I am permitted to display it, in a branch which I have studied, 

spot with which I am well acquainted, by my own Remarks, and tho

many other Engineers skilful and accurate men.

169
Honour commands me to do everything in my power. I hope to 

Duty in whatever way I am made use of-and to die in the br

necessary-but I will observe only that I thought myself employ'd i

ferent capacity from that of a Grenadier.

3d. night. A considerable number of the Enemys boats pass

repass'd in the course of the night, near the Shore of Province Isl

appears that this Communication between their Fleet and Philadel

established, and what will surprise you perhaps, is that it is a sur

there being no Interruption on our part-we cannot cannonade the

the Fort, the shade of Trees prevents our being informed of their pa

otherwise than by the noise of oars, and firing at sounds would be w

pretious Ammunition . . . .

Novem. 5th, 6th . . . . The Enemy seem determined to Winter 

vince Island if they can't take Fort Mifflin. . . . If His Excellency woul

some Enterprise on their Rear, I believe we might make a useful 

sion-as I know the Island I offer to serve as Guide to any party tha

be order'd there, in concert with Col . Smith I intend this night to 

noitre in an arm'd boat the position of their Sentinels, and the safest 

ing places, of which I shall make a Report . . . .

8th . The Enemy have enlarged the upper Battery opposite the Fo

this morning discover 5 Embrasures, masked as yet with Fascine

probable they will all open at once-their project seems to be, to 

down our palisades, and storm our west front between the two 

houses . To cover our palisades on this side we have apply'd to G

Varnum19 to furnish us with fascines which we shall place on the S

of the bank to serve instead of Earth, which is not to be had-I don'

whether we shall be able to procure the Fascines .

10. It is probable that the Enemy will undertake to carry this pl

storm, and I should not fear them if we could fix the floating Chain 

would cover the Front which is likely to be attacked, and by deliver

from our uneasiness for this side, would enable us to post the me

tined for its defence, at the Wall of Masonry which is ten feet high 

not out of the reach of an Escalade, notwithstanding the Ditches, Pi

Stakes, etc ., with which we have endeavour'd to surround it .

The Commodore, Master of the incomparable Chain in questio

poses to stretch it by means of Buoys, between our Island and Pr

Island . I believe this obstacle to the communication between the En

Fleet and Army will be of little consequence, and if he would spare 

Chain, the Enemy would pay dear for their Hardiness if they dared 

us. Colonel Smith wrote this morning to ask this favour, but I am afra

public Interest will suffer by private misunderstandings . I am inte

by the Bombs and Balls which fall thick . . . .

Novem. 11th. The Enemy keep up a heavy fire . . . Our block h

tho' facd with fascines, Joist and well rammed Earth, have not bee

17 0
to hold out-they are laid open and all their Cannon dismounted exc

two-I have endeavour'd to cover them in order to flank us in cas

Assault-but they are not secure and I have no more Joist, Fascine

Palisades-1 have written to Red bank for Supplies in these Articles, 

am rather neglected . . . .

13th. The Enemy have open'd a Battery on old-Ferry-wharf-the W

of our Rounds is destroyed-the Block-houses ruined-Some men Ki

and wounded each day.

I forgot to inform you that a Ball struck against some Bricks the f

ments of which slightly wounded Col . Smith, Capt. George 

myself-those two Gentlemen cross'd immediately to Red-bank-I h

heard that Col . Smith is recover'd but don't know when he'll return .

Our Garrison is exhausted with Fatigue and ill-health, is extremely 

couraged and I fear would make but an indifferent Defence in case 

Storm . At the last Alarm, one half were incapable of Duty . 20

Nov. 13th at night. The Enemy have kept up a firing part of 

night-their shells greatly disturb our workmen, and as the moon rises 

posite to us, her light discovers to the Enemy where we are . As long as 

Workmen would remain with me, I employed them in covering the 

western Blockhouses with Joist within and without and filling the in

stices with rammed Earth . I have closed the breaches made in our P

sades, with Planks, Centry-boxes, Rafters, and strengthen'd the wh

with earth-General Varnum has sent me neither Ax, Fascine, Gabion 

Palisade, altho he promised me all these Articles, I suppose it has 

been in his power-it is impossible howeverwith watry mud alone to ma

works capable of resisting the Enemys 32 Pounders .

14th. . . . Fort Mifflin is certainly capable of defence if the means 

furnished-if they supply us from Red-bank with Tools, Fascines, 

sades, etc., all which they may do in abundance-the Fire of the En

will never take the Fort, it may kill us men but this is the Fortune of W

And all their bullets will never render them masters of the Island, if 

have courage enough to remain on it . . . Fort Mifflin is the important 

ject, it must be maintained and furnish'd with means of defence. M

Earth and Fascines to cover them-Our new Garrison consists of 

Men-what can they do in a circumference of works so extensive 

ours-being weak everywhere, they could make a defence nowhere 

the Fort would be carried-The apparent Project of the Enemy is to deb

on the Island ; either to risque a Storm, or to establish a battery on the 

ferry wharf, or nearer if they can-what means have we of hinder

them-with a Garrison so feeble, can I make any advantage

Sallies-can I dislodge the Enemy-if I raise a battery against their wi

not serve against ourselves in case of attack-for without a suffic

number to defend it, it must be given up-our grand Battery has 19 

brasures and 8 cannon, two of which are dismounted-we must have 
tificers to make Wheels-Fascines and Palisades for breaches. G

Varnum supplies us scantily-We must have men to defend the R

the Fort-our Ruins will serve us as breast works, we will defe

Ground inch by inch, and the Enemy shall pay dearly for every st

we want commanding Officer, ours is absent and forms projects 

defence at a distance. . . .

14th at 7 oClock. The Enemy keep up a great Fire from their F

Battery and the shore . . . .

Our blockhouses are in a pitiful condition, but with fascines I h

cover two pieces in each lower story which will be sufficient to fla

say again the Enemys fire will not take our fort . If they attempt a st

shall still have a little parapet to oppose to them, but we must have 

defend it .

Novem . 14th at noon. We have silenced the Enemy's floating Ba

know not whether we have dismounted her Cannon, or whether h

sent Station exposes her too much, but the firing from her has ce

suspect that she is destined to land men on this Island .

Their grand battery is in little better condition than our 

houses-We have open'd an embrasure at the Corner of the Batter

two pieces here joined to two others on the left which we have rein

throw the Enemy into disorder . . . .

Tonight an Attempt is to be made on the floating battery of the En

Novem. 15. [This last entry was evidently not written by Fleury.] 

break the Enemys batteries began a vigorous fire upon the Fort, a

Fleet set Sail to come up with the Tide . One of their Vessels . . . a

Sloops . . . advanced between Hog Island and the Northern point 

cum near 1000 yards from the grand Battery.

The Six other Vessels and the Galley carrying a 36 pound

proached the Chevaux de frise at the distance of 600 yards from th

We fired upon them with red hot bullets.

At 8 OClock their Fire began responded [to?] by that of the Lan

teries, and a quarter of an hour after many successive broad sides 

our parapet, and dismounted one of our Guns, there being only tw

brasures in that side . The Musquetry . . . hindered the canoniers f

maining on the Platform ; and the land batteries making a cross-fir

the Vessels render'd the right of the battery untenable . However 

Lee who commanded the Artillery, and Major Fleury who command

Infantry appointed for firing . . . did not abandon this part of the r

the battery. All their men were either kill'd or wounded and the C

broken to pieces. . . .

At 11 OClock, Ammunition began to fail, and Major Thayer order

blue Flag to be hoisted as a Signal of distress to the Fleet-Major 

the Commissary and some Volunteers ran to the Magasine and 

172
searching found a 32 pounder Cartridge and Several 18 Pounder C

tridges and the Fire was renewed .

In conformity to Major Thayers order they were lowering the Flag 

order to hoist the Signal of Distress, but Capt . Lee and Major Fleury ra

hinder it, entreating Major Thayer rather to send off boats from the wha

than make a Signal which would discover our weakness to 

Enemy-The Major approved and the Flag was hoisted again-The Ene

had slacken'd their Fire a moment doubtless thinking that we w

prepared to surrender but our Cannon undeceived them . It was 

OClock . Our Ammunition was exhausted-and we had only two Guns 

for use. The rest were dismonated, some even shattered to pieces-

parapet was destroyed-one of the Sloops station'd towards the middl

the Fort, demolished [a?] Bank and level'd our Palisades-a Body 

troops appeared on the opposite Shore ready to embark-our Garri

was [illegible] .

The Major call'd a Council of War at 2 OClock, composed of Major T

bot, Major Fleury, Capt. Lee, Captain Dickinson, and another C

tain-The Result was -Supplies of Amunition or Boats .

The Enemy's Fire continued furiously and ours [languidly ?] from 

Pieces of Cannon-the Wall was half demolished-The Blockhouses f

about in splinters-a Piece of Timber torn from the Block house on 

right, struck down Capt. Lee and Major Fleury who were standing nea

Gun, the former was kill'd and the latter remain'd Senseless .

Major Talbot who ran to their Assistance was wounded with two Gra

Shot in the thigh and Arm .

The Fire continued till Night, and Ferry boats arriving instead of a Re

forcement-The Ammunition, Provisions and Arms were carried off. T

Cannon spiked . The carriages broke . The Barracks set on fire-and at 

after eleven the Garrison evacuated the Fort, and at the same time 

Oars of the Enemys boats were heard-bringing on Troops to attack 

ruined Palisades.

-Ford, "Defences 

Philadelphia," Pennsylva

Magazine 18:472-73, 4

19:72-73, 80-82, 244-

Washington Papers, rolls 

and 45.

As usual, Joseph Martin recounted with dramatic flair the details of 

final day's siege. No fewer than ten British vessels trained their guns on 

fort and met with but feeble response from the American batteries . "Wh

the firing had in some measure subsided and I could look about me," 

recalled, "I found . . . the fort was as completely ploughed as a field ."

173
9 . "IF EVER DESTRUCTION WAS COMPLETE, IT WAS HERE

From the narrative of Joseph Plumb Martin.

We continued here, suffering cold, hunger and other miseries, 

fourteenth day of November [1777] . On that day, at the da

discovered six ships of the line, all sixty-fours, a frigate of thirty-si

and a galley in a line just below the chevaux-de-frise ; a twenty-f

ship (being an old ship cut down,) her guns said to be all brass 

four-pounders, and a sloop of six guns in company with her, both 

pistol shot of the fort, on the western side . We immediately open

batteries upon them, but they appeared to take very little notice of 

heated some shot, but by mistake twenty-four-pound shot were he

stead of eighteen, which was the caliber of the guns in that part of t

The enemy soon began their firing upon us and there was music 

The soldiers were all ordered to take their posts at the palisadoes

they were ordered to defend to the last extremity, as it was expec

British would land under the fire of their cannon and attempt to st

fort . The cannonade was severe, as well it might be, six sixty-f

ships, a thirty-six-gun frigate, a twenty-four-gun ship, a galley and 

of six guns, together with six batteries of six guns each and a bo

tery of three mortars, all playing at once upon our poor little fort, 

might be called .

Some of our officers endeavored to ascertain how many gun

fired in a minute by the enemy, but it was impossible, the fire was 

sant . . . . The enemy's shot cut us up. I saw five artillerists belon

one gun cut down by a single shot, and I saw men who were stoopin

protected by the works, but not stooping low enough, split like fis

broiled .

About the middle of the day some of our galleys and floating bat

with a frigate, fell down and engaged the British with their long 

which in some measure took off the enemy's fire from the fort . Th

nonade continued without interruption on the side of the 

throughout the day. Nearly every gun in the fort was silenced by m

Our men were cut up like cornstalks . . . .

The cannonade continued, directed mostly at the fort, till the d

the evening . As soon as it was dark we began to make preparati

evacuating the fort and endeavoring to escape to the Jersey shore 

the firing had in some measure subsided and I could look about 

found the fort exhibited a picture of desolation . The whole area of 

was as completely ploughed as a field . The buildings of every kind 

hanging in broken fragments, and the guns all dismounted, and ho

of the garrison sent to the world of spirits, I knew not . If ever dest

was complete, it was here .

17 4

-Martin, Private Yanke

dle, pp. 90-92.
The next morning, November 16, British sailors landed on Fort Is

raised their flag, and immediately began a battery to cover the remov

the chevaux-de-frise, the final phase of their reduction of the Dela

defenses. Four days later the rebels evacuated Fort Mercer . Nearly 

months after the British first entered Philadelphia, and at a tremendous 

to them in men and ammunition, they controlled the river.

While Fleury directed the defense of Fort Mifflin, Duportail wa

Washington's side . At the end of October he reconnoitered near Wh

marsh, Pennsylvania, fourteen miles outside Philadelphia, and pronou

the area very satisfactory for an encampment . Once Washington decid

move his headquarters to the new location he assigned Duportail, as C

Engineer, to fortify the position . Much to Howe's distress, this base 

placed Washington within striking distance of Philadelphia .

Atop a hill near Whitemarsh, Duportail constructed a fort consisti

breastworks lined and faced with logs. Redoubts held down the corners . 

engineer designed the position for 300 men and surrounded it with ab

Hills in three directions completed the defenses. The camp was so s

that in December Howe abandoned plans for an attack.

From Whitemarsh on November 12 Duportail provided French 

Minister St . Germain with the following masterful analysis of Howe's 

tion and the American potential for success. The patriots, Duportail wr

benefited greatly from British mistakes, particularly the Burgoyne 

paign ; from Howe's sluggishness and timidity; and from the enemy's fa

to supply the twenty thousand men needed to win the war.

Duportail's view of the Americans was skewed; he found them 

without energy, without vigor, without passion" for their cause. He obse

that they were accustomed to "an abundance of everything necessary 

comf6rtable and agreeable life ." They were idle, loathed war, and dis

being "reduced to lead a hard and an irregular life ." Worth noti

Duportail's certainty that a treaty of alliance between France and the Un

States "would be the best way to ruin everything." His own experiences 

attested to an American hatred and fear of the French that far exce

American hatred of the English .

10. "THERE IS A HUNDRED TIMES MORE ENTHUSIASM

FOR THIS REVOLUTION IN A SINGLE CAFE IN PARIS

THAN IN ALL THE UNITED COLONIES"

Louis Duportail to St . Germain.

12 November 

Monsigneur:

. . . Now it is quite natural, after the experience of this campaig

ask oneself: "Will the Americans succeed in gaining their freedo

not?" In France, without doubt, one can hardly judge only by that w

175
has happened . They will decide in the affirmative, but as for us, wh

witnessed everything it is another affair. It is necessary to speak pla

is not the good conduct of the Americans which won for them a cam

which on the whole has been so happy; it is rather the mistakes 

English . It was an enormous error for the British government to 

General Burgoyne to traverse more than 200 leagues of a country br

with obstacles, almost desert, and consequently of no use to tak

that merely in order to join Generals Howe and Clinton in the center 

country . This project might seem very magnificent in the bureaus o

don, but for those who know the country, it was very defective . This 

ion of mine does not come after the event ; you remember pe

Monseigneur, that I was greatly pleased with the English for oppos

here with only 10,000 men ; that I greatly hoped that General Bur

would only arrive here when the campaign would be possible no l

that his army would be cut in half by hunger, misery, desertion, 

losses on the journey, and our militia, scattered in the woods on his 

and fighting thus in the fashion which is peculiar to them . The resu

more successful than I had hoped .

If the English, instead of making so many diversions, which were 

the detriment of the principal action, had opposed General Washi

with about 20,000 men, I do not know exactly what would have bec

us. Because, for us, in doubling our army we do not double its stren

a great deal, rather do we triple our difficulty . So much for the plan 

campaign .

If we consider next the conduct of General Howe, we shall see t

has not done that which he could have done, as I had the honor of i

ing you after the battle of Brandywine . If the English had followed u

advantage, there would no longer be any question of the ar

Washington ; and since then, General Howe has conducted all his 

tions with a slugginess, a timidity, which astonishes me every day. B

necessary to bethink oneself-they can send another general, and 

we shall not find ourselves so well off.

However, events which depend on the ability of generals (a thi

possible to anticipate) must not be considered in our speculations 

future . Having regard only to the number of troops, I believe that 

English could have 30,000 effectives here, they would reduce the co

A second thing that could hasten this reduction, and even bring it 

almost alone, is the lack of munitions of war. They are in want of 

everything here . Another thing, they must have cloth, sheets, le

rope, salt, brandy, and sugar, etc. These last articles are more imp

than one would at first suppose .

Before the war, the Americans, although ignorant of luxury, h

abundance of everything necessary for a comfortable and agreeabl

Not having much to do they passed a great deal of the day in smokin

17 6
drinking spiritous liquors or tea; that is the fashion of the people he

is, therefore, much against its will that this people finds itself transfo

suddenly into a warlike people and reduced to lead a hard and an irr

life . Moreover, they generally detest war. Also it is easy to see that if 

privations increase to a certain point, they will prefer the yoke of Eng

to a liberty which costs them the comforts of life .

This language astonishes you, Monseigneur-such is, however, 

people . It is soft, without energy, without vigor, without passion 

cause that it sustains only because it is natural for it to follow for a 

time a movement which one has given it . There is a hundred times 

enthusiasm for this revolution in a single cafe in Paris than in all the u

colonies.

It is necessary, therefore, that France, if she wishes to assist 

revolution, furnish the people with everything that they need and no

perience too great privations-it will cost France several millions, 

will be amply repaid by the destruction of the maritime power of Engl

which having no more colonies, will soon have no marine . Her comm

in consequence will pass to France, which will no longer have a 

among the European powers. . . .

One might ask, that in order to terminate the American Revolu

sooner, would it not be better for France to make a treaty with the Un

States, and by mutual consent with them send 12 or 15,000 men? 

would be the best way to ruin everything . This people here, althou

war with England, hate the French more than they do the English, 

prove it every day), and in spite of all that France has done and will d

them, they would prefer to become reconciled with their former brot

than to have among them crowds of men that they fear more. For if 

would consent in a moment, the natural antipathy soon breaking out w

hatch the most fatal quarrels. . . .

P.S . Congress has just raised me to the rank of Brig . Gen .

-Watts, "A Newly Discov

Letter," pp . 103-06.

Duportail's promotion to brigadier general on 17 November 1777 

him new importance not just within the engineer department but also w

the whole Army. He became an active participant in councils of war; hi

as staff advisor to the Commander in Chief on engineering matters was 

a major part of his duties as Chief Engineer . At Whitemarsh on Nove

24 Duportail attended his first council of war. Washington sough

generals' advice on "the expediency of an attack on Philadelphia," an

Chief Engineer joined the majority in recommending against such a

tack.

Duportail's opinion on Philadelphia derived from his fear that fa

might spell destruction for the main Army. "Does it become it [the Arm

177
stake the fate of America upon a single Action?" he asked . Duportai

lined the necessary dispositions for an attack and concluded that succ

quired great harmony, "presence of mind in the Superior officers,

"firmness in the troops." He apparently doubted that all three require

could be achieved simultaneously . Moreover, an attack was extremely 

without more information on the enemy's defenses .

11 . "TO JUSTIFY SUCH AN ENTERPRISE THE SUCCESS

MUST BE ALMOST CERTAIN"

Louis Duportail's first opinion as chief engineer in council of war.

17 8

November 25, 

To attack the Enemy in their Lines appears to me a difficult 

dangerous Project; it has especially this very considerable Inc

nience, the exposing our Army, in case it does not succeed, to a 

Defeat. This is easily demonstrated, one of the principal means propo

is to throw two thousand men in the rear of the Enemy ; if we do not 

ceed, these are so many men absolutely lost; as to the main body o

Army which is to attack in front, it must pass through the intervals le

tween the Abattis and Redoubts, which they say, form very na

passages . If after penetrating, we should be repulsed, can Troo

disorder return easily by the passages through which they were 

duced? Will it not be very easy for the English to cut off their Retreat? 

whole Army may then be destroyed or made prisoners . Now do

become this Army, which is the principal one, to run such Risques? 

it become it to stake the fate of America upon a single Action? I think 

for my part I never would place this Army in a situation where its Rear 

not perfectly free, much less where it will be inclosed on all sides wi

means of retreat, to justify such an enterprise the success must be al

certain . To judge of this, we have only to take a view of the disposi

which must be made for this attack. This view will render the diffic

evident. Ist : two thousand Men are to be introduced by a River, of w

the Enemy are wholly Masters . If we embark them near the Enemy

noise may alarm them ; if at a distance, the cold which they will und

will render the use of their Arms exceedingly difficult in the mor

Besides, can we flatter ourselves that the River side is unguarded ; 

reflect that a single man is sufficient to make this project miscarry 

cause us the loss of two thousand men .

As to the attack in front, these are nearly the dispositions which w

be followed . We should march upon as many Columns as there are R

leading to the Enemy; upon our arrival in their presence, each comm

ing officer of a Column, according to the size of the Works before hi

the number of Men which he judges are contained in them, divide

Troops in two parts, one of which surrounds his Works and attacks 

vigorously, while the other marches boldly through the intervals and 
upon the Troops in the rear; but every one sees how much harmony is 

quired in all these dispositions, how much presence of mind in t

Superior officers, how much firmness in the troops who have to execu

all their manoeuvers under the fire of an Enemy who are in a gre

measure covered .

If the enemy Works are not inclosed, the enterprise would be mu

less dangerous; if they are, the Enterprise is too hardy .

His Excellency, I think, desired us to say a word respecting the oper

tions in Jersey; in general it seems to me, that we can do nothing bet

than to endeavour to attack the Enemys force there with superi

numbers; but there is a very important observation to be made, which 

that we should not weaken ourselves too much here, for we are to co

sider that the Enemy may recross their Troops in one night and attack 

by daybreak with their whole force . . . . If however an attack be det

mined upon, the Enemy's works should be more particularly reco

noitred . 21

Together Washington and Duportail inspected the enemy's wor

Duportail found them so strong that were he in command of such works w

five thousand men "he would bid defiance to any force that should 

brought against him.

"22 That clinched the argument: there would be no 

tack on Philadelphia .

Next Washington turned his thoughts to a suitable location for win

quarters and asked the council of war for recommendations . Duport

favored Wilmington, while other officers suggested the Pennsylvania to

of Chester, Darby, Lancaster, and Reading. The one drawback Duport

found in Wilmington was that the position was so advantageous the ene

would feel compelled to attack. The Chief Engineer saw the upcomi

winter as a time to recondition the army for a fresh start, and "we ought 

to have its Repose preceeded by a Defeat," he counseled . Of particular 

portance in choosing between Lancaster and Wilmington, Duportail wis

pointed out, was the availability of supplies, for "it is much better to 

Soldiers in Combats . . . than to lose them by Disorders, and Desert

arising from their Misery."

12. "WILMINGTON ANSWERS THE END OF MAKING THE

SUBSISTANCE VERY DIFFICULT TO GENERAL HOWE"

Louis Duportail to George Washington .

179

-Washington Papers, roll 25.

December 1, 1

By taking Winter Quarters from Lancaster to Reading we abandon 

the Enemy Jersey and all the Country adjacent to Darby, Chester 

Wilmington, one of the richest Tracts in this part of the Continent

establishing them at Wilmington we cover the Country, and do not so co

pletely abandon that part of it which is before Philadelphia, nor ev

Jersey because our proximity to the Enemy and the ease with. which 

could throw ourselves upon the Rear of their Lines in case the Schuylk

should be frozen, will keep them in respect, and put it out of their powe

send considerable Detachments on the other side of the Delaware f

the fear of weakening themselves too much-and the small detachme

which they may send will be greatly restrained by the Jersey Militia-

Position then of Wilmington answers the end of making the subsista

very difficult to Geni . Howe, who has not only his Army to feed 

likewise the Inhabitants of the Town, and who must besides furnish Pro

sions for the Army of Genl . Burgoyne if he means that they should emba

for England-This position further deprives him of the means of recruit

in the Country, extending himself in it, adding to the number of his P

tisans, in a word, gaining the Country-It has besides the advantage 

rendering his Communication with his fleet difficult, for I imagine 

Vessels will not be able to approach Philadelphia when the Ice prevail

should not omit mentioning a case in which this Inconvenience would 

very considerable . If War should be declared between France 

England, and Genl . How from a dread of finding himself blocked up in 

Spring by a French Fleet should wish to quit Philadelphia, we shall 

within distance at Wilmington for hindering his Embarkation of which 

should have timely notice .

This Position then unites great Military Advantages-but it must 

confessed at the same time that these very advantages ought perhaps 

prevent our taking it-because the Enemy probably will not suffer 

there, and will march out against us-Thus to ask whether the Positio

Wilmington is eligible, is to ask at the same time whether it is eligibl

expose ourselves to an Action, and perhaps more than one.

If the Season were less advanced, I don't see why we should av

them-but at present, what end would be answer'd-if we should gain 

advantage we should be unable to pursue it-if we experience a Check 

run the risque of seeing our Army dissipated in the rude marches con

quent on a defeat-Consistently with the plan which we ought to form 

putting our Army in good condition this winter and preparing it for a g

Campaign, we ought not to have its Repose preceeded by a Defeat.

As to the other points to be consider'd in this Question, whether Wi

ington or Lancaster will be the most proper Situation for furnishing 

Army with every necessary-I cannot decide being ignorant of the Co

try, but it appears to me in general that this point deserves our m

serious attention-it is much better to lose Soldiers in Combats with 

Enemy to whom we cause a loss at the same time-than to lose them 

Disorders, and Desertion arising from their Misery . Misery destroys 

of an Army and leaves the other without Vigour, without Courage, 
without good Will-we should find ourselves then in the Spring w

Body of an Army incapable of any thing, and consequently have no r

expect a successful campaign . 23

Meanwhile, having considerable militia at his disposal, Washingt

early December reconsidered an attack on Philadelphia . He found D

tail still strongly opposed, unless the Schuylkill River were frozen and 

permit a rear assault in combination with a frontal attack. The k

Duportail, who appreciated the significance of the Germantown defeat

not the number of troops but their quality . With an engineer's keen in

he observed that Washington needed "troops that are not astonished a

fering a considerable loss in the first onset, without causing any t

Enemy, for this must be the case in an attack of Intrenchments ."

13. "THE BATTLE OF GERMAN TOWN OUGHT TO BE A LESSON TO 

Louis Duportail to George Washington .

Sir

I have examined anew with all the attention of which I am capable

project of attacking the English, and it still appears to me too dange

the great body of Militia with which we might be reinforced for thi

pose, does not give me any additional hope of succeeding . It is no

number of Troops which is of importance in this case, but it is the qu

or rather, their nature and manner of fighting . The Troops wanted are 

as are capable of attacking with the greatest vivacity, the greatest 

ness . Troops that are not astonished at suffering a considerable l

the first onset, without causing any to the Enemy, for this must b

case in an attack of Intrenchments, although when the Works are c

the chance turns and the loss is on the side of the intrenched . Now

the Militia or even the Continentals capable of undergoing this Tri

which the best Troops in the World cannot always support themsel

am very sorry, in giving the motives for my opinion, to be obliged to 

so unfavorably of our Army; but the Battle of German Town ought t

Lesson to us: if our Army had proceeded with vigour on that occa

would not the English have been completely defeated . The disposito

excellent . Your Excellency in that instance really conquered Ge

Howe, but his Troops conquered yours, if then notwithstanding the a

tage of a complete surprise, notwithstanding the advantages of gr

we were repulsed . What would happen before a Line of Redoubts 

182

-Washington Papers, roll 

Decr . 3d, 
disposed in all appearance, and the intervals of which are closed w

Abbatis.

There is, however, a case in which I think we might attack the Ene

with Success . I mean if the Schuylkill should be sufficiently frozen be

their left to admit of our throwing our greatest force on their Rear, at 

same time that we should make an attack in front. Gentlemen acquain

with the Country must decide this point, if indeed the Schuylkill is su

ciently frozen every year to afford a passage for Columns of Troops w

Artillery . My opinion is fixed, I think the Army ought to be marched to 

other side of Schuylkill to be reinforced with all the Militia that can be 

lected, while we wait for the favourable moment .

I would go more minutely into the subject, if your Excellency did 

order me to send my Answer this Morning . I did not receive your Excell

cy's letter until half after twelve and it is now half after one . 24

18 3

-Washington Papers, roll 45

Washington finally rejected both the Lancaster-Reading corridor 

Wilmington as winter quarters because the former involved dividing 

army among several posts while the latter placed the army outside Pe

sylvania, an outrageous prospect to Pennsylvania and New Je

authorities. Following the advice of Brig . Gen. Anthony Way

Washington compromised on Valley Forge. On December 19 Washingto

men-weary, in rags, and starving-reached their new encampment .

Some generals were horrified at the choice . Maj. Gen. Johann "Ba

de" Kalb, for example, called Valley Forge a desert that "can only have b

put into the head of a commanding general by an interested speculator 

disaffected man." 25 But the site was easily defended . Moreover, it lay twe

miles from Philadelphia and even nearer Congress's temporary seat at Yo

Again, Washington entrusted Duportail with the critical task of fortif

the site . As an enemy attack seemed certain come spring, Duportail ha

complete the works quickly despite frozen ground, a shortage of men 

tools, and "the general misery of the troops from which the workers ha

be chosen ." 26

By late March the Chief Engineer assured the president of Congress 

the encampment was "tenable against the enemy's utmost efforts by t

present powers ."27 The defenses included a line of entrenchments fro

with abatis on' the eastern side, nearest Philadelphia ; fortifications 

Mount joy along the western flank; and a star redoubt on a bluff overl

ing a bridge built on the Schuylkill by Maj. Gen. John Sullivan's men. 

works on Mount joy consisted of an infantry redoubt (Fort Washingto

several redans, and entrenchments that extended to the eastern face of 

mount as well as along its northern face to the heights above 

Schuylkil1 . 28 Washington seems to have preferred an enclosed work on 

summit of Mount joy; but, citing the lack of space to build a new work 

insufficient troops to man it, Duportail recommended against the idea .s 

To be sure, Valley Forge was not impregnable, but Howe never atta

it . To the British, an assault on the American camp, which only remo

threatened Philadelphia, might prove too costly . Howe later recalled : "

ing good information in the spring that the enemy had strengthened 

camp by additional works, and being certain of moving him from th

when the campaign should open, I dropped all thoughts of an attack." 3 o

While the army dug in at Valley Forge, two plans were advance

destroy British shipping in the Delaware. In December David Bushnel

afloat above Philadelphia kegs of powder designed to explode on cont

Unfortunately Bushnell released his floating mines too far from the Br

vessels for the ebb tide to carry them to their intended targets . Instead 

of the kegs caught in the ice or drifted far afield. Eventually one boat 

blow up, with many casualties resulting ; other kegs discharged harmless

the water. Alarmed, the British left nothing to chance . They positi

themselves along the city's waterfront and fired at everything seen floati

the river. Thus ensued the celebrated "Battle of the Kegs ." The affai

spired writer Francis Hopkinson, chairman of the Continental Navy Bo

and a friend of Bushnell, to immortalize the "battle" in humorous verse .

Apoem by Francis Hopkinson, 1778.

14. "BATTLE OF THE KEGS"

Gallants, attend, and hear a friend

Trill forth harmonious ditty.

Strange things I'll tell, which late befell

In Philadelphia city.

'Twas early day, as poets say,

Just when the sun was rising .

Asoldier stood on a log of wood

And saw a thing surprising .

As in amaze he stood to gazeThe truth can't be denied, sirHe spied a score of kegs or more

Come floating down the tide, sir.

THE CAMP AT VALLEY FORGE. This sketch in Duportail's hand

shows the entrenchments heplanned.

Historical Society of Pennsylvania

185
A sailor, too, in jerkin blue,

This strange appearance viewing,

First damned his eyes, in great surprise,

Then said, “Some mischief’s brewing.

“These kegs, I’m told, the rebels hold,

Packed up like pickled herring,

And they’re come down t’attack the town

In this new way of ferrying.”

The soldier flew, the sailor too

And scared almost to death, sir,

Wore out their shoes to spread the news,

And ran till out of breath, sir. . . .

Sir William, he, snug as a flea,

Lay all this time a-snoring;

Nor dreamed of harm, as he lay warm

In bed with Mrs. [Loring].

VALLEY FORGE STAR REDOUBT. This aerialphotograph shows

the remains of the star redoubt designed by Duportail as part of the

Valley Forge defenses.

Courtesy Valley Forge National Historical Park

186
Now in a fright, he starts upright,

Awaked by such a clatter;

He rubs his eyes and boldly cries,

"For God's sake, what's the matter?"

At his bedside, he then espied

Sir Erskine at command, sir;

Upon one foot he had one boot,

And t'other in his hand, sir.

"Arise! arise!" Sir Erskine cries .

"The rebels-more's the pityWithout a boat are all afloat

And ranged before the city.

"The motley crew, in vessels new,

With Satan for their guide, sir,

Packed up in bags, or wooden kegs,

Come driving down the tide, sir.

"Therefore prepare for bloody war;

These kegs must all be routed,

Or surely we despised shall be,

And British courage doubted."

The royal band now ready stand,

All ranged in dread array, sir,

With stomach stout, to see it out

And make a bloody day, sir.

The cannons roar from shore to shore,

The small arms make a rattle ;

Since wars began, I'm sure no man

Ere saw so strange a battle . . . .

The kegs, 'tis said, though strongly made

Of rebel staves and hoops, sir,

Could not oppose their powerful foes,

The conquering British troops, sir.

From morn till night, these men of might

Displayed amazing courage;

And when the sun was fairly down,

Retired to sup their porridge .

An hundred men, with each a pen,

Or more, upon my word, sir,

It is most true would be too few

Their valor to record, sir.

187
Such feats did they perform that day

Against those wicked kegs, sir,

That years to come, if they get home,

They'll make their boasts and brags, sir.

-Moore, SongsandBall

pp. 209-16.

Still serving as an Army engineer but working independent of Bu

FranSois Fleury spent January 1778 below Trenton observing the ene

planning a way to set fire to British ships on the Delaware. He first p

to approach the ships by crossing the river on the ice, but he found t

was not frozen solid . Next he hit upon the idea, detailed below, of us

teries and unmanned fire boats to accomplish his purpose. 3l

15. FLEURY DESCRIBES HIS PLAN FOR FIRE BOATS

188

18 Janua

. . . Two kinds of fire Boats may be employed . The first, wo

Loaden, with tuns powder; and burst in the midle of the fleet . 

could be surely directed, by one strong Racket filled with particula

position ; and fasten'd in the very midle of the head of the boat, to g

direction and velocity . . . One mast sunk in the stern of the boat h

taly under the water and to which one sail would be cicularly bound, 

hinder the Current to drive it out the way.-The head of the boat 

with a strong sharp point of iron would Remain fixed . . . till its b

up . N. B. . . . the expences will be small . Every flat bottom boat 

the purpose. . . .

The Commodore haselwood offers to help me by his knowl

their Construction, and Rectify my idea. . . . He promises to come 

ton, where we Could try, by one boat, before executing by several.

The galleys have salpeter, and powder; i can make the Compo

and one turner will do . . . . i suppose that the park of artillery h[as

quick maches already done .

2d. Kind of fire boat. That second kind is not to be used so so

nord est wind blows very often and very hard in the month of febru

march, and according to the instruction that i have Received of t

men several boats filled with tarr [and] other [Combustibles ?] c

leaded in the night, over the barr below Coopers ferr

philadelphia,-and after the wind and tide would surely drive them 

the wharf of the city where the ships lay.

If his excellency aproves the above schemes, i begg to se

positive orders. . . . The commodore will be glad to Receive the sa
we will work friendly and cordyally together; nor day nor night will be from

our part to justify the truth of his excellency.

-Washington Papers, roll 46.

THE ENEMY FLEET AT PHILADELPHIA. Fleury drew this sketch

to accompany his report to Washington on fireboats in January 1778.

Sparks Collection, Cornell University Libraries

Though skeptical, Washington on January 20 gave Fleury permission for

a test. The Frenchman’s technique compared interestingly with Bushnell’s

submarine, which sought to use an underwater device for the same end. As

no references to Fleury’s fire boat scheme after the test permission have been

found, it is uncertain why the plan was never adopted.

By April 1778 the Continentals longed for action, but Washington proceeded cautiously. He saw three courses of action open to him: recover

Philadelphia, launch a campaign against New York, or remain secure at

Valley Forge until the enemy made a move. He asked his officers for advice.

Most preferred action; but Duportail, supported by Generals Baron von

Steuben and the Marquis de Lafayette, advised restraint. They thought the

enemy position in Philadelphia was simply too strong.

Duportail’s response contains a great deal more than mere answers to

Washington’s questions. The Chief Engineer’s remarks on the strength and

condition of the Continental Army (its troops were too new to be called

189
regulars) are almost as significant as his ardent support for waging a defensive war of posts. It was dangerous, Duportail contended, to consider the

Americans equal to the British militarily or to insist on waging war as European armies did. He warned against assuming that because the patriots had

successfully attacked enemy lines at Saratoga they could do it again in

Philadelphia. The circumstances were just not the same. In the tactics of

Fabius, the Roman general, Duportail saw an appropriate model: avoid

general battle, keep on the defensive, and occupy strong positions.

According to Duportail, to most effectively draw out the British, even

the Valley Forge encampment was too close to Philadelphia. But the

Americans had a clear advantage so long as the enemy had to leave the city

to fight. Interestingly, the Frenchman not only advanced the idea that

retreat is not dishonorable but also stressed the importance of making considered plans for retreat should it be necessary. He further pointed out the

need, even in a defensive war, for small but frequent “enterprises” against

the enemy.

In the supplement to his report Duportail asserted that a military victory

for the English would likely be the result of internal weakness in the

American Army, and he lamented the wretched conditions that had led to

large numbers of desertions.

OATH OF ALLEGIANCE. By order of Congress on 3 February 1778,

all officers were to sign an oath of allegiance to the American cause.

Duportail signed this oath at Valley Forge in May 1778, shortly after

announcement of the French alliance.

Library of Congress

190
16. "IT IS . . . A PRINCIPLE OF WAR CAUTIOUSLY TO AVOID

DOING WHAT YOUR ENEMY WOULD HAVE YOU DO"

Louis Duportail's opinion on attacking the British at Philadelphia.

. . . I do not see that we have established the principles which ou

guide us in war, or, to speak more frankly, it appears to me that we 

adopted defective principles . Almost every one considers the Ame

Army in the same light as the British, thinks it capable of the same t

and would have it act in the same way; thus we see from time to tim

projects formed, rash resolutions proposed, which are the better rec

as they flatter those to whom they are proposed, by shewing them th

Nation is judged capable of vigorous actions-but this flattery may 

fatal consequences, it may ruin America. Let it be our endeavor in th

portant business, to consider things in their true light .

It is an Axiom among Military men, that Troops which are not wha

called Regular Troops cannot make head against regular troops in 

ground or in any Situation that does not offer them very considerab

vantages . The American Army therefore cannot stand against the B

who are composed with British or German troops all Regular. . . 

American Army [being] new in every respect, and not having had a fo

tion of formed officers and Soldiers, cannot as yet claim the Ti

regular Troops, and that it is therefore incapable, as I remarked abo

resisting the Enemy on equal ground . Besides has not exper

manifestly proved it? We were beaten at Brandywine-we were bea

German Town altho' we had the immense advantage of a complete 

prise . . . . Let us therefore avoid committing ourselves in this 

again-for it is farther a principle of war cautiously to avoid doing 

your Enemy would have you do-Now let General Howe be asked wh

he would like to meet the American Army on nearly equal ground f

issue of the present dispute, he will answer that it is the wish 

heart-that he desires only two or three such opportunities to decid

cause of America-because he is sure of beating us, and that the l

general actions will soon have ruined our party without recourse . I 

very well that many persons are not of this opinion, and that they say

having more men than the English and greater facility of procuring 

we cannot fight the Enemy too often because even if we should be be

the loss of the Enemy, though less in itself would be greater relativ

their whole number, and consequently they must soon be ruined-bu

opinion is built upon a foundation altogether false . Our numbers a

superior to those of the English . . . . What we ought to propo

ourselves, is to defend the country inch by inch, to endeavor to hind

enemy from rendering himself master of it, consequently never to re

Apri
him but when we are protected by a natural or artificial fortificat

other words to carry on what is styled a defensive War. This is our tr

and it is so obvious that in Europe, all Military men and even those w

not so, suppose this to be our Conduct-if the Americans could c

the modern daily publications, they should there find that the mo

fered to General Washington is principally Fabius, that wise Roma

ruined Hannibal by refusing to fight him in plain . Fabius howeve

manded Romans, but these Romans had been thrice defeated, the

disheartened, dreaded the Enemy, and were nearly reduced to the 

tion of new and unformed Troops . The Consul conducted himself a

ingly, avoided general Battles, kept himself on the defensive, alwa

cupying strong positions and where the Enemy could not attack h

with considerable disadvantage . . . .

[First Question:) Ought we to open the Campaign by an attack 

Enemy's lines as I hear sometimes proposed?

If the English army were out of its lines at the distance of one 

miles in front, from the reasons just mentioned we ought not to 

them for we should expose ourselves to almost certain Defeat (I s

our army so large as in its last Campaign): and because this a

covered by lines, because it has added to its natural Strength 

Fortification we would attack it? This is manifestly unreasonable. Fo

tion is the means used by the weak to enable them to resist the stro

Engineers count that a good fortified place enable those who defe

resist ten times their own number .-Field Engineering does not 

such considerable advantages, but according as the ground is m

less judiciously chosen, as the Engineer has traced his work with m

less skill, and afterwards as the Profiles are more or less respectab

ecuted with more or less care, this kind of fortification renders one 

to two, three, four, and sometimes more . . . it is a principle in forti

to establish as perfect an equality as possible in the different parts, 

no one be more attackable than another; now by what I have seen 

English Lines, I judge that the defenders may at least hold them 

double their numbers. . . .

I know very well that those who propose to attack the English 

lines, deduce their arguments from the American Troops having at

and carried lines in the North, but let us take care that successes 

North do not occasion defeats here, where the circumstances are 

means the same . The Northern Troops may perhaps have attack

carried some portion of Intrenchments, either illy made or injudi

disposed, or not sufficiently lined with troops ;-or perhaps they at

with vastly superior numbers-but that they ever attacked with a n

nearly equal to that of the enemy (which would be our case), In

ments such as those of the English at Philadelphia, supported o

flank by a River, secure from being turned and attackable only in f

19 2
what I will never believe. I will add to this by way of explaining my idea, 

if I were General Howe, and the Americans should advance to attack m

my lines, I would not give myself the trouble of defending them . I wo

retire some four or five hundred yards in the rear to some covered plac

would only leave a few poppers to deceive them and make them think t

had forced the lines, and when they had once got within and were pre

ing to push their imaginary advantage, I would fall upon them like a t

derbolt. . . .

Second Question: Ought we at the opening of the campaign to 

proach Philadelphia? No . We ought not. We are even too near already, 

for this reason-would we approach the enemy in order to be more cer

of fighting him? This is altogether useless-he will certainly come to s

us. The English Minister does not send Genl . Howe with his army 

America, to remain inactive in Philadelphia. He must fight us-m

endeavor to destroy us . He must conquer the Country ; not to do it, is to 

conquered himself . It is to give gain of cause to the Americans. Theref

General Howe will make it his business to find us. . . .

We ought . . . to keep ourselves between 30 and 40 miles dista

from Philadelphia, and since we have the advantage at present of oblig

the enemy to march to our own ground to fight us, it is our part alway

post ourselves in such a manner as that he cannot attack us but un

considerable disadvantages ; and for this purpose to always choose Sit

tions strong in themselves, and besides avail ourselves of the Succor

Art. We should farther prefer positions in which we might avoid a gene

Battle if we thought proper-we should esteem it an essential qualit

our positions to have the Rear free and an easy Retreat in order that 

unlucky action might not be attended with too extensive consequences 

we should discover in our position any capital Defect which did not at f

appear, or which only became such in consequence of the movements 

the Enemy, we would immediately decamp and go elsewhere .-

should be cautious not to give into the Snare, which our Enemies will 

fail to lay for us, endeavoring by their Raillery on our Retreats, to make 

establish it as a point of honor, rather to keep a bad position than to ma

a retrograde movement. We should not forget that in war, to advance 

retire are neither honorable or dishonorable; that it is at the end of a Ca

paign that the Prize is given, and that Glory is his reward who has gai

his end-besides if the Enemy in the movements which he should make 

try us, to turn us, should give us an opening, should expose any of 

Troops, Posts, Baggage, to be attacked with advantage ; we should ne

fail to do it-for one must not imagine that defensive war consists in ne

forming any Enterprise against the Enemy, but in such war the whole a

(I Confess) should not form enterprises against the whole enemy

army-enterprises are formed with Detachments, whenever you 

assure yourself of attacking with greater numbers-these expediti

19 3
even ought to be sought for, and frequently repeated, for it is thu

new Troops are by degrees enured to War.-Care must be taken, on

to expose them to too severe marches, excessive bad weather or th

of Provisions. It appears to me that this kind of War would greatly e

rass the Enemy: for at length, as it is absolutely necessary that he 

us, he would do it ; but as we are supposed to be always well fortifie

choose positions in which the whole Army cannot be attacked at onc

we support the points only as long as it can be done with advantage

retire whenever the Enemy begins to get too great an ascendancy ov

he is always liable to suffer considerable Loss without procuring de

Success-in fact if we retire, even if the greatest part of the Army s

have been successfully employed in supporting the point attacked

after all no battle-it is a post forced-a particular Corps repulse

this has no consequence-the Retreat is peaceably conducted-an

post is taken hard by, and the business is to begin again-but Ge

Howe has not a sufficiency of Troops, to purchase ground so dearly

easy to see that by these means 20 miles of Country would cost hi

his Army . . . he would be forced to yield the Country to us, and re

shut himself up in his lines-and this is all that we have to desire, be

it would prove to the English their inability to reduce this State, and c

quently America-for what would happen in this State would in like 

ner happen in any other by pursuing the same Conduct . . . . If we 

ourselves upon making war as equal European Armies do, if w

engage in general Actions, attack the Enemy or receive him in any k

ground and unprepared, we shall experience some conside

Check-the Enemy will . . . pursue us vigorously, hinder our 

sembling, dissipate us, drive us from the Pennsylvania State, then av

himself of the disaffection of the majority of the inhabitants, ma

declare for the King, and perhaps take arms in his favor-an event 

greatest consequence relatively to the other States of America, 

would not be unshaken by such an example-relatively to the Englis

would be encouraged by it to make the greatest Efforts . And lastl

sidered with reference to foreign powers who not being near enou

estimate such Events according to their real value-and distinguish

them only a proof of the great Superiority of the English, or inconsta

the Americans, would not perhaps involve themselves further by 

them unavailing Succors.

Supplement. The more i reflect upon the matter above treated

more it seems to me impossible that the English can reduce Ameri

arms, at least so long as the Americans behave hymself properly 

vided also that the Court of france will not Change her political syste

by the awe of War which she gives to England, will hinder its send

America more troops than it has sent hytherto. If there is any ca

reducing it, we should look for that Cause in the American army i

194
have observed just now that in three or four months our army diminis

one half without doubt principally by desertion . That is very frightful 

everybody sees that if it continues so all America will soon be exhaus

of men. There can be certainly many Causes of that prodigious deserti

but the most Considerable and which can be Remedied is the bad si

tion of the Soldiers, the want of cloathing that (besides he must bear 

the intemperatures of the weather) abases his profession in his own e

and makes him disdain it-the want of provisions During many Days 

more hard to be borne as when he has any he has too much-the wan

Cleanliness in his tents which causes us shameful sicknesses that are 

appendices of the extreme misery . . . .

[Duportail lateradded:]

It appears to me that there is a previous important point to be deci

because all our operations ought to be subordinate to it-this point i

know, in case of our army suffering a check and not being able to maint

its ground here, in what direction our Retreat is to be made 

preference-towards the blue mountains?-On the other side of 

Susquehannah?-On the other side of the Delaware?-By determin

this, we shall determine where the grand magazines of the army are to 

formed-and then we shall be governed by these two considerations 

the choice of our positions as well as in all our movements. . . .

Circumstances changed rapidly . In early May 1778 France recogni

American independence and openly allied with the United States. By J

the British appeared ready to make a move . Incredible as it was to 

rebels, the enemy appeared to be contemplating retreat from Philadelp

Washington's officers favored remaining on the defensive. Duportail rec

mended staying at Valley Forge until the enemy acted . To do otherw

might jeopardize the patriots' immense advantage . If the British left Ph

delphia, he said, the Americans should pursue them, striving as always 

avoid General actions-to seek advantageous posts."

17. "HERE IS A CERTAIN AND IMMENSE ADVANTAGE"

Louis Duportail to George Washington.

I think we ought not to quit our position of Valley Forge-before 

enemy has evacuated Philadelphia-he must have lost his reason, to 

main in that city without being in a condition to defend it . Thus, either 

19 5

-Kite, Duportall, pp. 60-

68-72 .

June 18, 1

Intelligence which says there are no more than 2 or 3000 men ther

false-or the English have it in their power by the measures which 

have taken, signals agreed upon, number of boats to recross in suffi

force, in case of our advancing to attack them .

The matter besides is reducible to this-Either the English are 

really going away-or they are-if the former be the case all that 

hitherto been done is a feint on their part, and conceals some snare 

which they would draw us .

If they are really determined to go away-what can we de

more-here is a certain and immense advantage-let us not risk the 

of it, by procuring another, which even should we obtain it, would 

change our affairs .

However, as we have here 12,000 men and that our position ma

defended by a smaller number, I think it would be well to send 1500 

into the Jerseys, to reinforce what is there already-the whole shoul

commanded by a person well acquainted with the Country-they o

not in general to oppose the enemy in front, on his march-but to fo

him on his left flank.

When the English shall have passed the Delaware, we ought in 

opinion to move to the banks of that River-and prepare to pass it 

wise-but certain precautions are necessary-if we learn that the eng

are advancing hastily towards N. York-we may likewise pass with c

ity-but if they should halt, or appear to march slowly-in that case I t

our troops ought not to pursue the Enemy, as fast as they could cross 

River but post ourselves advantageously near the River, and wait til

whole army has passed in order to advance in force .

In Jerseys as well as everywhere else, I think we ought always to a

General actions-to seek advantageous posts-to have the Road

Retreat well reconnoitered, and to have secure communications with 

magazines.

After all, I find it difficult to believe that the Enemy mean to cross 

Jerseys and go to New York-unless there is deficiency of t

RETREAT AT BARREN HILL . Anticipating the enemy's evacuation of Philadelphia, Washington in mid-May 1778 detached a large

force under the Marquis de Lafayette which took up a position on the

Schuylkill River at Barren Hill, halfway between Philadelphia and

Valley Forge. Havinggotten word ofLafayette's advance, the British

encircled him. Theyplanned to destroyhis camp on the morning of

the 20th, but Lafayette learned of the scheme andescaped. Michel

Capitaine du Chesnoy (1746-1804), an engineer officer whoserved

throughout the war as Lafayette's aide-de-camp, provided this map of

the action at Barren Hill.

Historical Society of Pennsylvania

197

ports-but we have the same conduct to observe in case the en

should march down the left Shore of the Delaware to embark below. 32

199

-Washington Papers, roll S0

On June 18 Sir Henry Clinton, Howe's replacement as British c

mander, led the evacuation of Philadelphia . Clinton's army made its 

across New Jersey toward New York; Washington left Valley Forge, r

cupied Philadelphia, and pursued Clinton into New Jersey. At Monmo

Court House on the 28th the two sides met in what proved to be the 

general engagement of the war in the north . The battle ended in a dr

Afterward Clinton once again made New York the British northern str

hold, and Washington went forward with plans for a cooperative effort w

America's new ally, hoping to end the conflict for good .

Though the rebels again controlled Philadelphia, they still feared for 

city's safety. Pennsylvania officials planned to sink new chevaux-de-frise 

improve Fort Mifflin . Indeed, after the Battle of Monmouth Washing

ordered Duportail back to Philadelphia to report on what defenses were 

quired . Realizing that his army might not be able to prevent the enemy f

retaking Philadelphia, Washington hoped Duportail could form a pla

assure American control of the river . As experience had shown, contro

the city was meaningless without control of the river . Washington sugges

that Duportail center his attention on Fort Mifflin .

32

Because Congress did not give Duportail the support he needed in Phi

delphia, little was accomplished until the following year. Congress 

lacked enthusiasm and funds for the project and directed Duportail to 

governor of Pennsylvania for the necessary backing. Duportail got assist

and in February 1779 made a preliminary survey, which he followed up w

proposals for a final survey .

Duportail insisted that he would plan a defense only if he personally c

ducted the survey and soundings of the river . He argued that he could c

plete the job within a few days, "whereas Persons not acquainted w

Engineering will take up several Weeks to make what will be but an 

perfect Report of the Situation of the River." 33

ARMY DRILL MANUAL. During the winter of 1778 Baron von

Steuben, Washington's inspector general, compiled a drill manual for

the Continental Army. Franjois Fleury, an engineer officer serving

then as an assistant to Steuben, helped prepare the text . Steuben

engaged Pierre L'Enfant (1754-1825), another engineer officer, to illustrate it . This watercolor shows the formation of a company and a

regiment. All ofL'Enfant's original art work for the book was included

in the gift copy of the manualpresented to Washington and now in the

possession of the Boston Atheneum . Boston Atheneum
The Chief Engineer wanted the details of the survey kept secret be

himself and his assistant, Col . Louis de Shaix La Radiere . Althoug

noyed by Duportail's penchant for secrecy, the Pennsylvania council 

tinued its support for the project . The council did claim, however, 

many citizens objected to "opening the most important Secrets o

Defence to Persons who have no natural Interest in, or attachment 

Country," a direct reference to Duportail and his companions . 34

With the help of Radiere and Maj . Jean Louis Ambroise de Gento

Chevalier de Villefranche, Duportail completed the survey by 14 May 

For their services Pennsylvania awarded Duportail $2,000, Radiere $1

and Villefranche $600 . In accordance with Duportail's recommendat

the state carried forward work on Forts Mifflin and Billingsport, whi

noring Fort Mercer . In a final gesture of good will toward Pennsylvania

portail left Radiere behind for an additional two weeks to assist in layi

the principal lines of the fortifications .

In 1780 the Marquis de Chastellux, a major general in the Com

Rochambeau's army, visited the Philadelphia fortifications and 

described them in his journal . He was well impressed with the improve

to Fort Mifflin and observed that having learned by experience, 

Americans have provided in the future against the misfortunes whic

them so dear."

18. CHASTELLUX REVIEWS THE DELAWARE RIVER DEFENSE

From the journal of the Marquis de Chastellux.

200

[Philadelphia] December 8, 

. . . As the present situation of affairs does not attract attention t

locality [Billingsport], the fortifications are somewhat neglected . Th

tire battery consisted only of one rather good brass mortar an

eighteen-pounders . . ., which Major [John] Armstrong, who comm

on the river, and who had come to receive us, fired on my arrival . 

America has more money and leisure she will do well not to neglec

post, as well as all those which can serve for the defense of the rive

once this war is terminated, she will see no more European armies o

continent, and all she can have to fear from England, in case of a ru

with her, will be limited to a few maritime expeditions, the sole obj

which will be to destroy shipping, to ravage the country, and even t

the towns within reach of the sea. Unfortunately Billingsport belo

the state of Jersey, which can reap no advantage from it ; and Pen

vania, whose safety it would defend, has no other means to e

towards fortifying it than its own request and the recommendatio

Congress, which are not always attended to . However this may be, 
delphia has taken other precautions for her defense, which depend 

on the state of Pennsylvania, and to this advantage is united that o

excellent position, which will soon be made into an impregnable fort . 

referring to Fort Mifflin, where we went on leaving Billingsport, still as

ding the river. . . .

Taught by sad experience, the Americans have provided in the fu

against the misfortunes which cost them so dear [in 1777] . I saw 

pleasure that they were extending the fortifications of Mifflin's Island

as to enclose the fort on every side, which will also be surrounded o

sides by the Delaware for a ditch ; and as the garrison will have a 

shelter in bombproof souterrains, this fort may henceforth be consid

impregnable. The plan of these works has been drawn up by M . Dupor

Major Armstrong showed it to me upon the spot, and I found that it 

fully equal to the deserved reputation of the author.

-Chasteliux, Travels in N

America, 1 :154-

Copyright 1963 by the 

versity of North Car

Press. Published for th

stitute of Early Amer

History and Culture. By 

mission of the publisher

Efforts to revitalize Philadelphia's defenses lasted until the American 

tory at Yorktown in 1781 . Afterward, Pennsylvania virtually abandone

project .

through a range of mountains known as the Highlands, the highest grou

along New York's eastern waterways. The heights stretch from Stony Poi

in the south to New Windsor in the north. During the Revolutionary War

control of the Highlands was vital to control of the Hudson, and control 

the Hudson was paramount to America's hopes for victory .

Only at the Highlands, where the Hudson forms a series of points, bend

and rocky islands, was the river narrow enough for the rebels' firepower 

be effective in protecting their water obstructions and thereby halting t

northward advance of enemy vessels. The river bisected the population 

the colonies and its crossings were important links in land communicatio

Moreover, the surrounding valley was a valuable source of supplies a

manpower. By stationing his army at a central location on the Hudso

General George Washington hoped to operate on interior lines, that is, 

react to the enemy in all directions, his best hope given British mobility 

the water.

Mastery of the Hudson River was also crucial to enemy offensive oper

tions in the north and to providing their Indian allies access to eastern Ne

York and New England. On the other hand, fear of the Indians was ve

great among the patriots and it reinforced their determination to hold t

Highlands. Little wonder that West Point, lying in the midst of this regio

would eventually be called the "key to the continent."

When the Revolution broke out the rebels held the Hudson, but the la

of defenses made their grasp tenuous. By mid-1775, however, both the Co

THADDEUS KOSCIUSZKO . Trained at Mezieres, Kosciuszko

(1746-1817) was commissioned an engineer colonel in the Continental

Army in October 1776. He served with distinction at West Point, in

the period March 1778-June 1780, and then in the Southern Department. At the end of the Revolution he returned to his native Poland,

where he became a majorgeneral in 1789. For the remainder ofhis

life Kosciuszko was active in the Polish effort to resist Russian domination. Theportrait is by Charles Willson Peale.

Independence National Historical Park Collection

203
tinental and New York Provincial Congresses had taken action that b

the process of fortifying the Highlands . First-hand inspection led a com

tee of the New York Congress to suggest erecting three forts and 

structing a series of booms to block river traffic . New York entruste

project to a group of commissioners, who in August 1775 hired Ber

Romans to direct the operation. A Dutch-born engineer, botanist, a

and mapmaker, Romans had limited military engineering experience 

lofty ambitions. He had assisted Benedict Arnold with repairs to the w

at Ticonderoga and was trying to get Congress to commission him a

engineer officer .

Controversy immediately arose between Romans and his employers 

jecting plans formulated earlier, Romans wanted to concentrate defens

Martalaer's Rock (later known as Constitution Island), and he supporte

use of firepower rather than river obstructions . Feuding caused delays . 

provincial commissioners resented Romans's challenge to their auth

and his attempts to get his plan accepted by the New York Congress . Fi

the Continental Congress sent a special committee to investigate . The 

mitteemen found the fortifications on Constitution Island not nearly s

vanced as they had been led to believe . Even worse, high, unfortified gr

across the river at West Point actually commanded Constitution Island . 

committee recommended that the point be occupied and also advocat

fort several miles south on the northern bank of Popolopen Creek. Muc

the chagrin of the New Yorkers, the insistent Romans took his case to P

aelphia, where Congress supported his plan to fortify Constitution I

while leaving West Point undefended . I

New York relieved Romans of further duties ; and in February 

William Smith, chief engineer in New York City and a more amiable 

than Romans, briefly took charge in the Highlands. Smith traced three 

works, including Fort Montgomery on Popolopen Creek, but did not st

direct their construction . By spring the Continental Army began to as

complete responsibility for the area . Washington's fear of a British inv

of New York City and concern over the lack of work in the Highlands ro

him to action .

In May Washington ordered to inspect the Highlands' fortifica

Brig. Gen . William Alexander, Lord Stirling, the commander in New Y

Col . Rufus Putnam, the Army's Chief Engineer ; and Col . Henry K

commander of the Continental artillery . At the last minute Capt . Wint

Sargeant, another artillery officer, replaced Knox . The three were the 

men with military experience to survey the terrain for defensive req

ments .

As elaborated in his report, Stirling chose a spot on the south sho

Popolopen Creek where it emptied into the Hudson as "the most pr

place . . . to be made the grand post ." There the rebels eventually 

Fort Clinton . Stirling's concern for protecting the Hudson works fro

204
FORT CONSTITUTION. This map, compiled from American Archives, shows fortifications planned for Constitution Island, opposite

West Point, by Bernard Romans. He argued that this position ought

to be the center of the Highlands’ defenses.

Boynton, History of West Point

205
land side would be echoed by others, including Washington. Althoug

full report pointed out the need to fortify West Point, Stirling unacco

ably omitted all reference to West Point in a special summary prepared 

Washington . As a result, no one took action there .

Stirling strongly criticized the works Romans had already erected 

their extravagance and inadequacy, and proposed new works to correct 

weaknesses. Unimpressed with the effectiveness of New York's com

sioners and their artisans, he concluded that "one good engineer, with 

tificers from the army, might . . . do the whole business as well ."

1 . "MR. ROMANS HAS DISPLAYED HIS GENIUS AT AVERY

GREAT EXPENSE, AND TO VERY LITTLE PUBLIC ADVANTAGE"

Lord Stirling to George Washington.

June 1, 

Sir :-Agreeable to your request, I left New York on Sunday last, in ord

view the fortifications on the Hudson's River in the Highlands . I took 

me Colonel [Rufus] Putnam, Chief Engineer, and Captain Sargeant, o

Artillery . The winds were so adverse that we did not reach Fort M

gomery until Wednesday evening ; but, with the help of our boat, 

employed our time in visiting several other parts of the river that appe

proper for fortifying . At the mouth, or south end of the Highlands, a

four miles below Fort Montgomery, there is a post [Stoney Point] whic

me appears well worth possessing on many accounts ; should the en

be in possession of it, we should be cut off from our best communica

with the whole country below the Highlands, eastward as well as w

ward . There is a very remarkable spot of ground [Verplanck's Po

easily fortified, which commands the passage of the river as well as e

of the other posts ; it also commands the mouth and landing of Peek's 

from which there is an excellent road into Connecticut, which is 

twenty miles off ; on the opposite side is an excellent road into New Je

and Pennsylvania. In the passage from this place to Fort Montgomery 

large island, which would be very useful to the enemy in their approa

to that place .

Fort Montgomery is situated on the west bank of the river, whi

there about half a mile broad, and the bank one hundred feet high ; o

opposite shore is a point of land called Anthony's Nose, which is 

hundred feet high, very steep, and inaccessible to any thing but goat

men very expert in climbing . A body of riflemen placed here would 

very great use in annoying an enemy, as the decks of every vessel 

passes must lie open to them .

206
The works begun and designed at Fort Montgomery are open li

and all lie on the north side of a small creek called Pooplopen's Kill, on 

south side of which is a point of land which projects more into the r

commands all the principal works, and is within two and three hund

yards of them . On the top of this point is a level spot of ground, of nea

acre, commanded by nothing but the high, inaccessible mountains

about twelve hundred yards distance; this spot [the future Fort Clinto

think, should by all means be fortified, as well for the annoyance of 

enemy in their approach up the river, as for the protection of the work

Fort Montgomery. Indeed, this appears to me the most proper place I h

seen on the river to be made the grand post; and, in my opinion, should 

a regular strong work, capable of resisting every kind of attack, and of c

taining a grand magazine of all kinds of warlike stores . The whole wo

then command the passage of the river with so formidable a cross fir

would deter any attempt to approach with shipping . Those works built 

all faced with fascines, and filled in with strong, good loam ; but as they 

liable to take fire, the Commissioners who have the care and directio

the works, propose to roughcast the faces of the embrasures with a st

mortar made of quicklime and sharp sand, of which there is plenty at ha

I advised them to try the experiment on part of the work as soon as po

ble . As these open lines are entirely defenceless on the land side, it 

be very proper to erect a small redoubt on the hill, in the rear of them .

Fort Constitution is about six miles above Fort Montgomery, on 

island near the east side of the river, and near the north end of the Hi

lands, which on the west and south sides is bounded by the river, and 

the north and east sides by low marsh and small creeks running throug

The works here consist of four open lines or batteries, fronting the r

the two easternmost command the approach up the river very well ; 

next, or middle line, commands the approach from West Point upwar

the westernmost battery is a straight line, constructed by Mr. Romans, 

very great expense ; it has fifteen embrasures, which face the river 

right angle, and can only annoy a ship in going past ; the embrasures 

within twelve feet of each other; the merlons on the outside are but ab

two feet in the face, and about seven feet deep, made of square tim

covered with plank, and look very neat; he also built a log-house or to

on the highest cliff, near the water, mounted with eight cannon (f

pounders) pointed out of the garret windows, and looks very pictures

Upon the whole, Mr. Romans has displayed his genius at a very great 

pense, and to very little public advantage . The works, in their pres

open condition and scattered situation, are defenceless ; nor is there 

good place on the island on which a redoubt may be erected that will c

mand the whole; . . . yet every work on the island is commanded by 

hill on the West Point, on the opposite side of the river, within five hund

yards, where there is a level piece of land of near fifty acres in exten

20 7
redoubt on this West Point is absolutely necessary, not only for 

preservation of Fort Constitution, but for its own importance on many 

counts. One also is necessary at the west end of the island, to comma

the approach that way, and to prevent a landing at the north side of 

island . An easy communication by land, as well as by water, may be ma

with Fort Montgomery from the West Point. . . .

The direction of the works at both these forts [Fort Constitution a

Fort Montgomery] is in the hands of Commissioners appointed by the P

vincial Congress of New York . Two Commissioners, with four carpente

two blacksmiths and seven attendants, are at Fort Constitution; two Co

missioners, one clerk, fifteen carpenters, and four masons, are at F

Montgomery; the pay of these amounts to at least eight hundred doll

per month, besides their provisions, etc . One good engineer, with 

tificers from the army, might, I think, do the whole business as well . . . 

-Boynton, History of W

Point, pp. 29-33.

At Stirling's suggestion the brothers George and James Clinton, offic

in the New York forces, strengthened Fort Montgomery on the north ba

of the Popolopen and placed a breastwork and battery on the creek's so

bank. In July Washington sent Thomas Machin, a veteran of the British 

tillery and co-planner of Great Britain's noted Bridgewater's Canal, to se

FORT MONTGOMERY BOOM AND CHAIN . Thomas Machin

placed this boom and chain across the Hudson in April 1777, and the

British removed them the following October.

Courtesy New-York Historical Society, New York City

208

A Fort Montgomery. B Fort Clinton . C Poplopin's Kill . D Anthony's 

a Floats to Chain . b b b Booms in front of Chain. c c c Chain.

d Rock at which the Chain was fecured with large Iron Roller . e e Cribs and Anchors 

f Blocks and Purchafe for tightening Chain . g h Ground Batteries for defence of Chain.

S Se6lion fhowing Floats and Chain. c c c Chain. fff Floats .
HUDSON RIVER OBSTRUCTIONS . A drawing depicting the

chevaux-de-frise placed in the Hudson from Plum Point to Pollepel

Island, north of West Point.

Courtesy New-York Historical Society, New York City

with the Clintons as an engineer . Soon a new work, Fort Independence, ro

opposite Fort Montgomery to protect Peekskill.

Accompanied by Col . Rufus Putnam, Washington made his first visit 

the Highlands on 11-12 November 1776 . With some foresight, Washingto

pointed out that it was a mistake to concentrate on the forts along the rive

What about the surrounding hills? he asked. The existing forts would 

useless if an attack were made by land from the rear . Before leaving for Ne

Jersey, Washington directed Maj. Gen . William Heath, Highlands com

mander at the time, to correct the problem. Underscoring his concern

Washington left Putnam to assist . Bitter cold weather and a shortage 

manpower combined to force a delay in implementing Washington's order

While in the Highlands, Thomas Machin also became involved in pla

ing obstructions in the Hudson River . New York leaders had long favor

such obstacles, but nothing had been done, in part because of Romans's o

jections. In mid-1776, however, state officials revived the plan and order

Machin to lay a chain and boom across the Hudson at Fort Montgomery.

Machin worked through the fall and winter on his tough engineeri

assignment. At the chosen spot the river was 1,800 feet wide, 120 feet dee

and subject to strong tides. He needed to perfect a chain strong enough 

withstand the impact of a ship, yet flexible enough to resist the str

brought on by the tide . Machin contracted with Robert Erskine, the futu

United States geographer and owner of a forge, to manufacture the iron 

needed.

209
Machin also placed chevaux-de-frise across the Hudson from Plum Po

to Pollepel Island, a wide, shallow position north of West Point . He 

pressed Loyalists to construct the caissons-structures framed with tim

and filled with rock-that served as foundations for the chevaux . West Po

chevaux, unlike those placed in the Hudson River at New York City, w

made of iron-tipped tree trunks wedged at an angle in the stone-filled c

sons .

By the end of April 1777 Machin's floating chain was in place . Altho

the enemy threatened the still-unfinished Highlands posts more than o

that spring, the rebels maintained control . As a result a false sense of 

curity, ruffled by only brief moments of concern, came to pervade the Hi

lands. At the end of summer, when British designs on Philadelphia bec

clear, attention shifted southward, even though Burgoyne was a real th

in the north .

In October the enemy shocked the rebels by attacking from the land 

and capturing the sparsely garrisoned Forts Montgomery and Clin

Boldly they cut Machin's chain, sailed north, and broke through 

chevaux-de-frise . Luckily for the rebels, Sir Henry Clinton, commande

the British expedition, failed to take advantage of his gains . After burn

the forts he returned to New York City .

This destruction by the enemy proved a blessing in disguise . Force

rebuild the Highlands' defenses, the rebels approached the whole prob

afresh . The result was a sound, productive reevaluation, unobscured 

blinders of already existing works . "2

The task began immediately . Congress wanted an Army engineer off

to take charge of the Hudson defenses, where civilian engineers and artil

ists had been carrying the burden . Washington dispatched Louis de Sh

La Radiere, second in command of the Army engineers, to do the job . 

agreements promptly arose between the engineer and the generals over 

design of the fortifications and the role of West Point. In addition, Radie

impetuous personality and meticulous habits led him to clash openly w

his commander, the "rough-and-ready" Maj . Gen . Israel Putnam .

After a month-long survey, Radiere recommended concentra

defenses at Fort Clinton, several miles below West Point . Reflecting 

French military training, he envisioned a fortress capable of withstandi

classical siege . Putnam and the other generals in the Highlands, while 

disputing Radiere's technical expertise, felt his judgment in these circ

stances was impractical .

Putnam turned to New York officials for help . They listened to Radie

arguments in favor of Fort Clinton but urged Putnam to proceed at W

Point instead. Not only could West Point be completed sooner than 

Clinton, the New Yorkers argued, but also workers could erect a more ef

tive chain and supporting batteries there . And, after all, the rebels' prim

goal was to close the river .

21 0
Radiere was overruled and he was angry. He had presented several ca

fully prepared reports and sketches supporting his views, only to have all 

arguments rejected . Putnam ordered the French officer, whom he chara

terized as "an excellent paper Engineer, "4 to proceed with the works at We

Point . At the same time the commander reported to Washington: Radie

"seems disgusted that every thing does not go as he thinks proper, even 

contrary to the judgment of every other person."

Radiere decided to take his case to Congress, much as Romans had do

earlier . At this stage he seemed more intent on making a point than on wi

ning the argument. Indeed, after his temper cooled, he concluded that 

was "better to fortify a place less good than to do nothing at all," and agre

to trace the fort at West Point . In the following letter, Radiere spelled o

his reasons for preferring Fort Clinton. Note his concern for West Poin

vulnerability and his conviction that the loss of a fort there would "be mu

worse for the country" than the loss of Fort Clinton .

2. "I STILL THINK FORT CLINTON IS THE BETTER"

Louis de Shaix La Radiere to a member of Congress . 5

At Fishkill, 13 January, 17

Sir:

I am so hurried by the express which General Putnam is sending 

Congress that I cannot write you in English . I wrote to the President 

Congress but as he will surely not understand my English I beg you to 

so good as to explain to him the following details as well as to Co

gress. . . .

A council was held yesterday relative to the fort which is to be built 

the banks of the Hudson River. I read a Memorial upon the subject . It w

resolved to fortify a place called West Point, opposite the old fort Consti

tion six miles above fort Montgomery and eight below New Windsor; t

was done contrary to my advice, which was that fort Clinton w

preferable . As it is better to fortify a place less good than to do nothing 

all, I practically consented since I am going to trace a fort at the place 

dicated ; but I still think fort Clinton is the better. I do not speak at all of t

localities lower down the river since I have never been able, in the inves

gations I have made with the Generals, to descend the river below f

Clinton .

The principal reasons which incline me to fort Clinton are that 

enemy cannot, without great difficulty, lay seige to fort Clinton becau

the ground is narrow and rocky, without earth, so that the Enemy wou

risk every moment to have their communications broken with their sh

unless they disembarked from 10 to 12 thousand men . For this reaso

very small fort would suffice. Also, the situation is such that there will 
no need to build a fort on the opposite bank to hold the chain that bars 

river .

At West Point the enemy can besiege the place and occupy a grou

where he will not be more than a mile from his vessels and can support 

the same time both a siege and an attack. If this fort is taken it will be mu

worse for the country than if it were fort Clinton .

The fort placed at West Point has the advantage of being situated 

place where the navigation is more difficult but it will be necessary to bu

a fort on the opposite bank of the river .

This fort is so situated that it can be taken in fifteen or twenty da

perhaps less . Nevertheless I hope things will not go that far, but i

comparison it is necessary to weigh exactly what is for or against each .

-Kite, Duportail, pp . 86-87.

In a separate note to Washington, the French engineer revealed plan

plead his case at headquarters . But Washington favored the decision to 

tify West Point and was troubled that disputations were dangerously del

ing progress . "We shall lose the Winter," he admonished Radiere, "whic

the only time we have to make preparations for the reception of 

enemy. "6

Begrudgingly Radiere next came forward with elaborate plans fo

massive masonry work, with walls fourteen feet high and twenty-one 

thick, at West Point . An impractical proposal indeed, grumbled 

American commanders . There was too little time, and money was scarce

his capacity as president of the Continental Board of War, Maj . G

Horatio Gates cautioned Putnam that Radiere would not complete 

works "till the next campaign is ended, altho' 5000 men should be at 

direction ." Gates thought Putnam should use Radiere only sparingly 

concluded : "We wish to avoid offense to any foreigners who have intere

themselves in our cause; we would treat them with all possible respect : 

we must not sacrifice or hazard our safety from a point of delicacy ." 7

Throughout the winter of 1777-78, bad weather, changes in comman

problems with workers, and the disagreement between Radiere and 

superiors brought fortification to a standstill . Rather than "hazard his re

tation on Works erected on a different scale, calculated for a short Durat

only," Radiere left the Highlands for camp at Valley Forge.

Lacking confidence in Putnam's ability, Washington appointed a 

commander, Maj . Gen. Alexander McDougall . Washington then persua

Radiere to return to West Point and confidently reported to McDougall 

can safely recommend him [Radiere] to you as a man who understands 

profession, and make no doubt of his giving you satisfaction, both 

projecting and executing the works required for the defence of the Rive

Kind words indeed for a man whose actions had given Washington so m

21 2
concern, but the Commander in Chief could hardly afford to alienate any o

the French engineers serving as volunteers in the Continental Army.

When Radiere returned to West Point at the end of March 1778, he im

mediately found himself in the midst of another controversy . This time it in

volved a new engineer, Thaddeus Kosciuszko of Poland, who had joine

Machin at West Point in Radiere's absence . Unknown to Washington, Con

gress had sent Kosciuszko, a friend of Gates and the engineer hero of Sara

toga, to replace Radiere . McDougall took an immediate liking to the ne

engineer, declaring : "Mr . Kosciouszko is esteemed by those who have a

tended the work at West Point, to have had more practice than Col . Delara

diere, and his manner of treating the people more acceptable ." 9 The la

point was particularly important from the commander's point of view .

Radiere believed it unnecessary to build either redoubts or forts on th

hills behind West Point; Kosciuszko, remembering Ticonderoga, strongl

disagreed . At one point Radiere caustically charged that Kosciuszko did no

know his duty. 10 The two engineers got along so poorly together-they eve

disputed rank-that McDougall did his best to keep them apart . In Apri

Washington finally interceded . He recalled Radiere to Valley Forge, notin

that Kosciuszko seemed "better adapted to the Genius and Temper of th

people." 11

Despite Radiere and Kosciuszko's feud, substantial progress was mad

during April in fortifying the Highlands . The British stayed away becaus

their resources were severely strained now that the French had entered th

conflict . McDougall accepted Kosciuszko's plan to place works around For

Arnold, the main work at West Point . Brig . Gen. Samuel Parsons, com

mander at the point, called Rufus Putnam and his 5th Massachusetts Regi

ment to West Point because of Putnam's proven knowledge of engineering 

In fact, the former Chief Engineer took charge of the largest work planne

by Kosciuszko, a fort 200 feet in diameter atop steep-sided Crown Hill . Par

sons also put some of his own Connecticut troops to work on three redoubt

planned by Kosciuszko for a level ridge below Fort Putnam, as the Crow

Hill work was soon called . James Clinton directed construction of Fort Ar

nold.

At West Point on the last day of April 1778 Machin again demonstrate

great skill in directing the placement of a river obstruction . Pleased with h

earlier performance, New York authorities had engaged him the previou

December to work both on fortifications and on a new chain. Seeking 

avoid problems encountered earlier with the chain at Fort Montgomery

Machin ordered thicker links for the West point, or "great chain," as 

became known . He chose the site with care . Workers painstakingly assem

bled the chain at New Windsor and then floated it on rafts downriver 

West Point .

Over the next several months work proceeded steadily under Kos

ciuszko's direction despite excessive heat, changing command, and shifti

troops. Throughout the summer the Pole commanded several companies 

21 3
blacksmiths and carpenters, as well as fatigue parties drawn from the li

In mid-July he conducted Washington on his first inspection of the 

works at West Point. The batteries-built of dirt and wood because mas

required too much time-now mounted forty-two guns.

Washington said little to indicate dissatisfaction with the state of W

Point's defenses, but he must have felt some disappointment. Only a 

days later Col . William Malcolm, the new commander at the po

ROCKY HILL REDOUBT. After his climb atop Rocky Hill in A

1778, Kosciuszko sketched these plans for a six-sided fortificatio

would be known simply as Redoubt No. 4.

McDougall Papers, New-York Historical Society, NewYor

21 4
declared with obvious exaggeration: "The works are not worth a farthi

Admittedly there was much work to do. Malcolm further complained 

Parsons : "Here I am holding committee among spades and shovels . . . 

more we do the more we find we have to do. Why did you not begin to mo

the mountain, rather than add to its magnitude?" 19

Hoping to retake New York and weary of past disappointments f

working through subordinates, Washington now became directly involve

even the most minute affairs relating to the Highlands . Before long Malc

accepted his task more cheerfully too.

Near the end of August, Kosciuszko climbed atop Rocky Hill, loca

about one-half mile west of Fort Putnam and rising 200 feet higher. He 

once observed the threat posed by that position . Not only could artil

mounted on Rocky Hill control the interior of Fort Putnam, but an atta

ing force could move with ease against the fort unless covered from abo

Just as Kosciuszko's memory of Mount Defiance had earlier convinced 

of the need for Fort Putnam, it now made a redoubt on Rocky Hill obli

tory .

21 5
The next month Washington ordered Chief Engineer Louis Dupo

whose engineering advice he most respected, to evaluate the West 

defenses . Duportail faulted Kosciuszko's layout of Forts Putnam and W

downplayed the need to fortify Rocky Hill, and praised the plan of Fo

nold executed by Radiere . The Chief Engineer also stressed that maso

bricks ought to be used at Fort Arnold, a point argued earlier by Ra

but disputed by Kosciuszko . Constitution Island-earlier the cen

Romans's defensive plans-had been virtually ignored, but Duportai

posed "three small works" there to make West Point "perfectly secure .

Duportail's first report on West Point also underscored a fact some

forgotten : the West Point defenses were primarily designed to prote

great chain. He proposed measures to prevent damage to the chain 

artillery fire, and he suggested postponing work on the New Wi

chevaux-de-frise . Down to several misspellings of Kosciuszko's name

report reflected genuine animosity toward Kosciuszko, who, after al

sharply criticized Duportail's associate, Radiere .

3 . DUPORTAIL FINDS THE WORKS "PERFECTLY FULFIL

THE OBJECT WHICH IS PROPOSED"

Areport to George Washington on the Highlands.

White Plains, 13th September

The Works which are in hand at West Point and some inconsid

ones, which it is necessary to add to theM, will, with the help of the 

perfectly fulfil the object which is proposed,-that of hinderi

enemy's remounting the North River.

Fort Putnam, which is as it were, the key of all the others m

rendered almost impregnable. There is indeed a height, which comm

it [Rocky Hill], but besides that this height may be taken possess

with a redoubt, it would be very difficult for an enemy, even when 

of it to bring heavy cannon there . Besides it would be too far to m

breach . This fort has nothing to fear but a bombardment or escalad

respect to a bombardment, the mean to make it ineffectual is t

bomb-proofs sufficient for three fourths of the Garrison, magaz

hospital, etc .-I am told Col . Koshucsko proposes, at this time to 

one; but which will not suit more than 70 or 80 men. This is far fro

cient. There must be another, the place and size of which, I have p

out to the Captain who conducts the works.-It will contain about tw

dred men-with respect to the escalade, to prevent its success, t

of the fort which looks towards the river and is the most accessib

well as that which looks towards Fort Arnold, must be raised a gre

more than it is, and besides the palisades and chevaux de frise, 

21 6
must be made in front . The roof of the great bomb-proof, which I propos

may be made use of to collect the rain and conduct it into the Cistern . T

will always be a small resource.

Fort Willis [Wyllys] does not appear to me well traced . It ought to be 

entirely upon the declivity which looks towards the River, the force n

Fort Putnam following the ridge of the eminence . In this manner it wou

have overlooked equally all the valley between Fort Putnam and itself a

all its interior would have been under cover of Fort Putnam; the face n

the river would have extended to the very border of the declivity ; and 

work in every respect would have been a great deal stronger . In its pr

ent position it is too large, its parapet makes too large a circuit . It will 

best perhaps to rebuild this fort altogether; if this is not done, to reme

its inconveniences, the face opposite Fort Putnam must be raised not 

as to cover the interior, which I am told Col . Kosciousko propose

because it must be prodigiously elevated to answer that purpose-but 

stead of this, I would prolong the eminence which is in the middle of 

work, and improve it into a Traverse, to extend the whole length of 

work-I would then reject a third of the work on the South as altoget

useless-the bomb-proof will be backed by the traverse above-me

tioned .

I should have preferred to the Redouts which are in front of the Redo

Willis, on the South side, and which require for their defense four or f

hundred man-a small inclosed work to secure the possession of 

eminence and protect the batteries in front-but for the present, matt

may be left as they are .

Fort Arnold appears to me to be pretty well situated and traced-bu

the intention of Col . Kosciusko is to leave the sides next the River at 

present height-(as appears to be the case) I cannot approve it-they 

exceedingly liable to an escalcade-it is proper to elevate them, and ev

to make a small covert way without having good palisades in front, 

secure the body of the place against all surprise .

The scantlin for the Bomb-proof appears to me too feeble-the top 

be almost flat-What is made of earth ought to have been of masonry 

bricks-however I forbear enlarging upon this subject, because time 

hardly admit of a Remedy-the Stuff being squared, and ready to be 

together-observing only that the work should be sunk more in order 

furnish a greater thickness of earth for the roof.

There is below Fort Putnam, a battery nearly round, which is extrem

well placed for battering the Vessels which should approach 

Chain-but its situation likewise exposes it to the fire of the Ships-

least as it is much advanced, the fire of the tops would injure the Gunner

and the more, as by the form of the battery they are collected within a v

small space-it appears to me advisable, to raise the parapet of this b

tery several feet-and to cover the embrasures from the top of one mer

21 7
to another-so as not to interfere with the working of the Guns-altho 

equally necessary to secure the Chain on the left-hand Shore of 

River-it seems to have been little attended to-there is no inclosed w

on this side to hinder the enemy from debarking a sufficient numbe

men to get possession of the ground and cut the Chain-there is on

battery which may answer some good ends-but cannot prevent 

enemy from doing as above mentioned-With three small works we 

render the point perfectly secure-the first to be placed where the b

house [on Constitution Island] stood-it is sufficient for it to contain a

sixty men-its end is to afford an immediate defense to the Chain an

extremity-against a hardy enterprise, which a few men are enga

sometimes to undertake by dint of money or other recompense .

parapets ought to be of wood in order to take less room-and suffici

elevated to cover the area.

The second Redout should be placed on a steep eminence which 

mands all the other rising ground in the island .

The third on an eminence in the rear of the newly constructed 

tery-these two Redouts ought to be made for 150 men or 200 at most

There was a battery, the remains of which are still in existence, (b

Fort Independence)-it was perfectly well placed for battering 

enemy's Ships-it ought to be rebuilt, with a strong parapet of earth

as this battery is low and exceedingly exposed to a plunging fire fro

Tops of Ships-the parapets must be high, and terminated by a Ro

thick plank for the protection of the Canoniers-this battery as well as 

which is just finished, will be interlocked by the three Redouts-and 

perfect safety-With these works we shall be completely masters o

Island .

As to the Chain itself, I would not have it floating on the surface o

Water-which exposes it to be laid hold of by machines prepared fo

purpose, on board the Vessels which may approach-but the gre

danger arising from this would be the breaking it by Cannon Shot-wh

vast number comes to be fired on both sides in a contest betwee

enemys Ships and the batteries-I should think it more eligible ther

to suspend the Chain three feet below the surface of the water-bec

as the greatest number of the Shot, bound when they strike 

water-there would be so many ineffectual in respect to it-besides

matter would be very easily executed-by placing the floats above in

of below the Chain-and having another Chain made fast at each e

the great one, and carried above the floats-by these means the 

Chain may be supported at the depth which is just suitable-if a 

should carry away the Chain, by which the great one is made fast t

floats-the whole mischief that would result, would be that the ch

that place would douse a few feet more .

21 8
There are so many accidents by which an iron Chain may be brok

that it would be prudent to have a stout cable in reserve, to supply its pl

in part for a time.

Every thing that I have explained being finished-1800 men will ren

us completely masters of the River; and put us out of reach of the enem

enterprises. At least, the Resistence that may be made will allow am

time for the arrival of Succours, however remote the Army may be .

The following is the distribution of these Troops as nearly as can 

judged.

For the present moment, if we except the batteries against Ships-t

works are not in a state of defence-but a little time would be sufficient 

completing fort Putnam which is the most important-the Redouts on 

Island on the left-hand shore-are likewise objects of the first attention 

His Excellency had ordered me to give him an account of the expens

arising from all these works to the present time-it is not in my power 

present any thing on this subject, not having seen Col . Kosciousko, w

alone is possessed of these facts-I am going to write to him for this p

pose.

I was likewise at New Windsor-The River appears to me very wide 

this part for a defense of Chevaux de Frise-besides the Chevaux de fr

themselves appear to me to be very weak-and I can with difficulty p

suade myself that a Ship would be much embarrassed by them-and 

deed until West Point is completed-I do not think we should occu

ourselves about New Windsor-I shall therefore forbear adding any th

farther relative to it .

With Duportail's report in hand, Washington soon viewed the works 

West Point and heartily endorsed his Chief Engineer's plans. Customar

kind words from Washington eased Kosciuszko's injured feelings, but th

was no question that Duportail's views would prevail .

14 After the inspect

Kosciuszko reported to Gates : "Conclusion was made that I am not the wo

of Inginier ." 15 As a result of Duportail's suggestions, new construct

21 9

-Washington Papers, roll 51 .

In Fort Putnam [probably fort Arnold] 700

Willis Redout 200

Fort Putnam 400

Small work above Fort Putnam 100

For the Works on the Island or

Peninsula, on the left-hand shore 400

1,800

began on Constitution Island, and Fort Putnam got a larger bombproof a

cistern .

As chief engineer at West Point, Kosciuszko was responsible for ma

tenance of the great chain. During the winter of 1778, for example, 

designed a machine to simplify removal of the chain from the river, a p

cess that had to be repeated each winter. He also refurbished the chain's 

supports with tar and lime and replaced rotten logs.

The West Point fortifications General McDougall viewed at the end 

1778 were well under way ; but considering the expenditure of labor a

money since his last assignment there a year earlier, a surprising amount 

work remained . In truth, incompleteness seems to have been the status q

throughout the Highlands during most of the war . Although regarded as 

"key to the continent" and America's Gibraltar, West Point was comple

slowly and constantly needed maintenance . Many factors were involv

Washington frequently was torn between keeping troops there and mov

them elsewhere . Commanders came and went . The British threat wax

and waned . Winters were harsh and supplies were often wanting .

Beginning in December 1778, Kosciuszko gained an able-and compa

ble-assistant in Lt. Col . Jean Baptiste de Gouvion. Yet Duportail c

tinued to find Kosciuszko's efforts inadequate . In May 1779 the Ch

Engineer made his views emphatically known to Congress, reiterating 

crucial significance of West Point . Of greatest concern to Duportail was 

fear of being blamed should the position fall . He defended himself on 

grounds of not having authority even to require monthly reports from K

ciuszko, and complained of Congress's failure to appoint a commander 

chief of the engineering department and thereby clarify responsibility wit

it .

4 . "I DO NOT THINK MYSELF RESPONSIBLE IN ANY MANNER

FOR THE NEGLECTS . . . OF THAT FORT"

Louis Duportail to John Jay, President of Congress .

Philadelphia, May 11, 1

Honble. Sir

. . . His Excellency the Commander in Chief ordered me last year to 

West Point on the North River, to see in what Condition were the Wo

then Erecting and what new ones it was necessary to add. After I had 

THE HIGHLANDS AND NORTHERN NEW JERSEY . In 1779 the

geographer's department prepared this map of the roads connecting

the Highlands with NewJersey to assist Washington in planning troop

movements in defense of the Hudson.

Historical Society of Pennsylvania

22 1
quainted Geni . Washington with my Observations and imparted him 

Ideas [see preceding document] (which he approved of) I gave, accor

to his Orders, the necessary Directions to the Officer [Kosciuszko] 

trusted with the fortifications of that Place, pointing out the new Wo

that were wanting, those that were the most pressing, the Way of mak

them, etc . I then thought that if the remaining part of the Autumn an

much as possible of the Winter was well employed, West Point might b

a State of Defence against the first of May. But unhappily, I have l

heard, that almost nothing has been done, and all is in nearly the s

Condition as when I left it in September. However, Sir, you are of the S

of New York, Your Excellency is probably acquainted with the Situatio

the place, and you know of what importance it is to us to remain in poss

sion of it . It is the Key of the North River, and if the Enemy is once mas

of its Navigation, the Communication between New England and the o

States is Entirely cut off; this Communication is however necessary to 

Army, which cannot Even Subsist without it, on either side of the Ri

from the want of Cattle on one side and the Want of flour on the ot

Thus the loss of West Point must necessarily Expose a part of the Co

try, to be without Troops for its defence, and perhaps, as I have alr

Said, the whole Continent, by the great difficulty of maintaining an Ar

This is, methinks, a matter highly interesting for the United States, a

make no doubt, that when the English receive sufficient reinforcemen

to come out of New York and open the Campaign, their first Operati

will be against Fort West Point as it is the only Way for them to do anyth

decisive . It should then be our care to put it in a proper State of defence

No doubt Your Excellency is anxious to know, what relation there 

be between these Speculations and my affairs . It is this : If the Enem

happen to take posession of West Point, when the unhappy Circumsta

which must necessarily arise from such an Event, shall have carried g

in the minds of many, it will be natural to seek the cause of that 

fortune, and a person to whom it may be imputed . And perhaps that C

gress or the Commander in Chief will betake themselves to me, and as

me, Why I did not take care that the Works at West Point should be car

on with regularity and dispatch, and why, when they have been in

rupted, I have not given any Notice of it My answer will be this : "I had 

right to demand the necessary informations from the Engineer entrus

with the fortifications of that Place: When I went there in September by 

Commander in Chief's orders,/ requested him to render me an acco

Every month of the Condition of the Works, of the difficulties of every 

that might arise in the Execution :-He has not done it. But that Office

not in any manner to be blamed . He [received] no Orders in writing for 

purpose from Congress or the Commander in Chief . This Winter, G

Washington, who has well conceived of what necessity it was to '

somebody at the Head of the Engineer's Department, has desire

222
Regulation which among other things should establish such an office

The Regulation has been made, and approved both by Congress and th

General, but no Commander in Chief of that Corps has yet been ap

pointed ."

I expect Every Day the resolution of Congress on this account . I hav

often urged the Honorable Board of War to make new representations ; m

reasons have always been that the state of the fortifications of Some ne

essary and important Points for this Campaign, should be known, and pa

ticularly that of Fort West Point. Unhappily a resolution has been delaye

to this instant and I find myself obliged to declare to Congress, that I d

not think myself responsible in any manner for the neglects or interrru

tions which may happen in the Works of that Fort, nor shall think mysel

answerable in the future, as long as I have not the authority to have t

necessary Accounts rendered me, by the Engineers Entrusted with t

Fortifications, and the right to make to the proper persons the necessar

representations, in case of any interruption .

Rufus Putnam to George Washington.

22 3

-Papers of the Continental

Congress, roll 181 .

A few weeks later on June 1, after the rebels abandoned their unfinish

works there, the British took Stony Point without firing a shot . The ene

also captured Fort Lafayette, a completed work across the river on Ve

planck's Point . When Clinton failed to extend this offensive to West Poin

Washington had the British positions below King's Ferry reconnoitered e

haustively to determine the feasibility of retaking them . Although he no

commanded in the line, Rufus Putnam lent his engineering experience 

the effort . Putnam made the following report to Washington .

5 . "I HAD SEVERAL FAIR OBSERVATIONS AS THE SUN PASSED

THROUGH THE OPENINGS OF THE CLOUDS"

Constitution Island, July 13th, 17

Report of observations made at Vanplanks Point taken this Morning .

The Roof of the Block House in Fort De La Fyatte [Verplanck's Poin

taken off Proverbelly with a Designe to add another Story of Timb

work .-The Block house on Stonney hill quite inclosed with a parrepet 

New flash or Redan in a line of there other works Next the Block house 

the North River . A New work on the old Barbitt battery,-built by t

americans Enlarged and Eambrasure made which Rake the beach a
STONY POINT, NEW YORK . Although no longer an engineer officer, Rufus Putnam drew this plan for Washington after reconnoitering the area surrounding Stony and Verplanck's points in 1779.

Historical Society of Pennsylvania

flats towards the bridge . The abbette (abatis) in front of there works co

tinued down the bank and across the beach to Low warter marke.

From the Bridge across the Marsh towards the Stone house is abo

Eighty Rod. The Beach here at low warter, is about three Rod wide near

on a levil with the Marsh where was a Small fier where I apprehend a nig

picket is posted. After you leave the Marsh between the high bank and t

warter the beach is not Quite So wide. The distence to march here befo

you are in the Rear of there line of works is also about Eighty Rod direc

in front and under the Rake of the afore Said american battery which 

Retiered from there line of Works and is built on a part of the Point t

224
projects more in to the bay and Servs as a kind of flank and in front of

which there Encampment must be entered .

I had in my party a Number of intiligent Soldiers of Colo . Nixon Regiment. . . . I proposed to them last eving to pilate me across the crick

below the bridge in ordor as I pretended to take of Some of the out

guards . . . .

. . . I took my Stand this morning before light a few Rods from the old

church . The morning was not So favourable as I could have wished but I

had Several fair observations as the Sun passed through the openings of

the clouds. I could See very little of the works on Stonney Point. Northing

to contradict my observation made from the hill on the west Sid the

River.-On the beach South of the crick that Sepperets Stonney point or

Island from the main I discovered a Small guard Round a fier-and on Vanplanks Point neare the edge of the hill coming onto the Marsh from the

Stone house towards the bridge was also a fier where I conclude they had

225
a picket in the night and from which a Sentry it is most proverble is post

on the beech at or neare the Bridge . Haveing made all the observations 

my power and being determened to come Immediately to camp I march

my party which consisted of fifty (Rank and file) and paraded them in op

Vew Near the church . They maned there works and the guad at the Sto

house Turned out which Consisted of one officer and about 20 men. T

Excessive Rain while I was out prevented my being abel to perform t

Service Sooner. . . .

Its natural surroundings made Stony Point a forbidding target, and t

British thought they had secured it against either a quick thrust or a sie

The audacity of an attack tempted Washington . Thus on 16 July 1779, re

forces using information reported by Putnam and others and command

by Brig. Gen. Anthony Wayne dramatically recaptured Stony Point. T

sometime engineer officer Lt. Col . FranSois Fleury, now also a battali

commander, was the first man to enter the enemy works . His performan

in combat was singular : he stormed over the walls and boldly pulled do

the British flag. Though the rebels abandoned the fort only two days lat

Fleury had earned himself a congressional silver medal, the only foreigner 

honored during the Revolution.

Washington relinquished Stony Point because he lacked enough men 

hold it and take Verplanck's Point as well . The British promptly recover

Stony Point and fortified it more extensively than ever . For a ti

Washington considered another assault but abandoned the idea on the a

vice of his council of war .

As a member of that council, Duportail opposed a renewed attack 

either Stony or Verplanck's Points . This time, Duportail realized, t

Americans would have to confront more formidable defenses . His plan 

menace the British positions was a good one . His view that the enemy wou

soon find themselves overcommitted was remarkably prescient, for on O

tober 21 the British abandoned the fort, leaving it in ashes.

6. "IT WOULD NOT BE PRUDENT TO RISK THE LOSS OF A GREAT

NUMBER OF MEN, UPON HOPES NOT WELL FOUNDED"

Louis Duportail to George Washington.

226

-Washington Papers, roll 25.

July 27, 17

West Point being to us a point which it is of the greatest importance 

preserve and to put once for all in a state of defense. I think that we oug

not to touch the fund of troops necessary to the defence of this Post, in 
present state, and to the construction of the Works already undertak

According to what His Excellency has been pleased to submit to o

views, it appears that we have there about 5000 Men. This is perhaps mo

than sufficient to receive the Enemy 'till the rest of the Army can arrive 

their succour, but it is not too much for the Work we are carrying on 

therefore think it best to leave them there . The question then is, what 

can do with the rest. Can we attack Stony Point or Verplanks point?

The English having augmented considerably the number of th

Troops at Stony Point, labouring to inclose their Works and probably ke

ing themselves more upon their guard than heretofore, I think that 

ought not to attack them because we should be likely to lose a good ma

Men and perhaps without success. Besides, according to my concept

of the matter, we should not have any great advantage by gaining poss

sion of Stony point; because we must be also masters of Verplanks. . . 

we should attack Stony Point, it could only be to possess ourselves of 

Garrison and of the Magazines, but tho' we have succeeded once with

loss, we must not believe, that we should succeed in the same manne

Second time; and it would not be prudent to risk the loss of a great numb

of Men, upon hopes not well founded, who may become very necessary 

us. The arrival of Lord Cornwallis and the strong appearances of 

embarkation, seem to indicate that the English have received, or are s

of receiving a reinforcement, which enables them to send Troops 

Carolina or elsewhere . Perhaps therefore until we know with what numb

of Troops we Shall have to do, it will be proper not to adventure our Tro

in expeditions more than uncertain .

We cannot propose to ourselves, to attack Stony Point by regular 

proaches . The ground which is on a level with it, or which commands i

too distant for the batteries erected there, to be able to batter the Work

advantage and render them more easy to be carried by assault, in whic

must ultimately end . Besides, by the disposition of the Roads, we sho

run great risk of losing our cannon, Mortars, etc .

What I say respecting the attack of Stony Point Sword in hand, appl

itself to Verplanks point . But as to attacks by means of Batteri

Verplanks point is very susceptible of them ; and I think if the ene

should be imprudent enough to abandon Verplanks point to its own fo

and there is no body of Troops near enough to support it, we ought no

hesitate to make the attack, because we risk nothing . If the Enemy arr

in time to bring them succour, we get rid of the business by retiring . I t

therefore that we ought always to be ready for this enterprise .

Though I do not think that we ought to attack Stony point or Verpla

Point by assault or otherwise, unless in some extraordinary circ

stances which may present themselves, nevertheless it appears to 

essential to menace them continually . I should then have been glad if 1

1400 Men had been left at the outlet of the mountains above Stony P

and a like Corps at the Continental Village . These Corps will absolu

22 7
risk nothing unless they should suffer themselves to be surprised, 

even this would be very difficult . They could be turned on neither side 

they have always their communication secure with West Point. By sh

ing themselves always ready to attack the Forts, they oblige the Enem

have within reach to support them, a Corps of at least three thousand M

to have nothing to fear. Then which will appear singular, the possess

which the Enemy have of Verplanks point and Stony Point will turn aga

them and become an advantage to us. For here are 5000 Men employe

maintain a Point, which is of no great consequence to us . Let us ad

these, the number of Men they must have at New York for the Securit

that place, and on this side of Kingsbridge to support readily the t

thousand Men advanced, unless they keep their Men upon the Water; 

we shall see that the Enemy, by having posted themselves at Kings f

have imposed on themselves the necessity of establishing a chai

Posts from Kings ferry to New York, which will prevent their havin

many for distant operations; and thus we shall perhaps save the Cou

from pillage .

Following a now-familiar pattern, Washington renewed his commit

to West Point after the American capture and abandonment of Stony P

He established headquarters at West Point. Then, after viewing Fort 

nam, he decided that Rocky Hill -as well as three additional high poin

the south and southwest and still others across the river-should be fort

immediately. Washington had always appreciated the possibility of a

from the rear, while some advisors had found it impossible to shift 

attention from the Hudson . Yet Kosciuszko had first urged fortificati

Rocky Hill and had even drawn the plans in 1778; fully a year be

Washington's intervention .

In August the Commander in Chief directed Duportail to make 

another survey of West Point's defenses . In a masterful reassessment Du

tail considered the consequences to both sides of losing control of the 

son . After months of anxiety, he now welcomed an attack by the Bri

assured that it would mean ruin and dishonor for them . The rebels sto

a position to weaken the enemy so much that New York City would s

have to be abandoned unless substantial reinforcements arrived .

In his report, Duportail evaluated West Point's defenses by consid

the several courses of action open to the British and the Continentals' p

ble responses to each . He concluded that the most probable approac

the enemy would be to gain control of the heights to the west above Fort 

nam and Webbs and Wyllys redoubts . And, Duportail declared, "we 

assured the defense of this mountain, as much as it is necessary to do 

Hidden beneath his assertion was Duportail's hearty acceptance of wor

originally opposed, works proposed and designed by Kosciuszko :

228

-Washington Papers, roll 
7. "HAPPILY, THE TIME FOR FEAR IS PASSED"

From Louis Duportail's review of British options at West Point.

August 20, 17

To bar the river from the North in a suitable location is one thing the 

treme importance of which everyone is presently aware. It is known t

the depth of this river is considerable enough so that warships or friga

at least can go up it almost to Albany and that the breadth or the nature 

its banks is such that enemy ships would find innumerable spots where 

no manner would it be possible to damage them from the river bank. T

enemy, by constant sailing of its frigates or small armed boats would p

vent communication from the North to the south below Albany . Since 

country above is still quite new sparsely populated and since there 

few roads and besides the enemy, most of the river up to Albany, has 

greatest facilities to reinforce and maintain the army of English, Tor

and savages that he has within reach in these cantons, it follows that 

passages above Albany would soon be in their possession, consequent

all comunication between the lands situated on one side of the river a

those of the other would be completely broken ; which would have v

fatal consequences : the main ones are that all parts of the United Sta

thus separated would be left to their own forces, without being able to 

on any aid one from the other, which would weaken them considerab

against an enemy which can maneuver anywhere he desires . . . . Wh

one reflects on that, one is surprised that the English have not turned th

sights to that point, that they have not undertaken an operation so easy 

a long time and so decisive . They could have done it up to the time of 

May, for at that moment the works at West Point, even though I prepa

them, and until then, there had never been enough troops to make up 

the insufficiency of the works. Thus were we in a constant dilemma 

regard to this valuable post . Happily, the time for fear is passed, and n

far from being apprehensive about seeing the enemy march on this pla

we infinitely desire it, assured that he would find there his ruin and 

dishonor, and we an opportunity to weaken him so as to be unable 

maintain himself any longer in New York, without receiving considera

reinforcements; this is what we are going to try to show by the follow

study :

In order to judge correctly the effect of the fortifications built at We

Point . . . . it is appropriate to examine the different undertakings that 

enemy can plan against this post; the different means by which he 

proceed in his operations, as much by the land as by water, and what 

can contrast with if from our side, we supposing West Point left to its o

forces, that is defending itself with its garrison . . . .

229
[Here Duportail considered four alternatives open to the British be

reaching the following conclusion.]

. . . It must . . . be admitted that the different undertakings that [I] 

just . . . described lead only to breaking the chain in a hurry, without 

ing time to carry it away nor to detach it from the woods in order to si

It is not probable that the enemy would expose himself to so much da

in order to cause a damage that can be easily repaired, if we prepar

means. I am inclined to believe that if he undertakes something ag

West Point it will be in a more solid and decisive way . This will be to 

himself master following operations against all the forts of West 

either to hold them or to destroy them completely and thus procur

himself a free passageway on the river . . . .

Fifth Undertaking. The 5th Undertaking is the probable plan . If on

amines the terrain above Fort Clinton, one will see that the heights w

overlook it or which looks down on each other, are occupied rather e

sively in two directions . On one side Putnam, Rockhill and [a redo

from the other side Webbs, Willys, but also one sees a mountain w

begins at Rockhill and which extends behind Putnam, Webbs and W

and which perfectly dominates these works, so that this array of fort

tions which prescribes a great deal at first look, is reduced to little f

fect, because the enemy, supposedly in possession of this mountain 

establish at the same time cannon and mortar batteries against R

hill . . ., , Putnam . . ., Webbs and Willys . . . these last two works ar

even tenable for very long under these conditions, being too prolong

will be necessary then to abandon them early and consequently 

enemy would advance along the slope . . . and can set up his batt

against Clinton without even having taken Fort Putnam . It is evident 

that the real point of attack against West Point is from the mountain M

in question, since one comes all of a sudden from it to the attack on 

nam instead of making successive attacks on all the Forts above or b

this Fort, as would be necessary coming from the other side . Now 

respect to the difficulty to the enemy to get to this place, if there wer

works, there would be none . This mountain is most accessible from 

side and its slope from the west is such that cannon can easily be bro

there, so that supposing the enemy, disembarked opposite Robinson'

establishes himself on the mountain, sets up his batteries and fire

first cannon shot against Putnam, cannot require more than four o

days (since the batteries can be constructed even while the canno

being brought up) it would be indispensable, then, to occupy this m

tain ; this is what we have done by the two works S,T. . . . I don't th

any longer possible for the enemy to select it as his debarkation point 

true that from there to the first battery . . . is more than a mile ; but 

must consider that it is not a question of firing on a work, on a small s

but on a multitude of boats, ships, horses, carriages, men ; every

conceivable assembled in one spot where all the apparatus of an 

230
munitions of all types being unloaded . It is clear that at a distance of mor

than a mile each cannon round is almost sure and it must always strik

something ; that consequently one cannot select such a point to establis

himself; moreover the enemy, getting off of his ships, will not expos

himself by camping on the plain under the fire of these same batteries, h

must then withdraw to the rear of this point. We can conclude that he wi

prefer to disembark at the other place . . . . This is already an advantage

to move further away the enemy's disembarkation point ; this stretche

still more his communications, gives greater facility to attacking him

renders more difficult the transportation of artillery and munitions .

Let us suppose now that the enemy established on the plain at the r

quired distance and on the mountain (U) opposite our redoubts, what dec

sion will he make then? Will this be to advance on our left under the fir

of [two of our] batteries . . . and those that can be set up on the sam

mountain for the attack on the redoubt Willys, then on Webbs, from ther

to Putnam or Clinton? The absurdity of such a plan is too palpable for ther

to be a need to show its effect . The enemy can do only one of these tw

things . He can advance by the mountain . . . attack redoubt R in order 

march against Rockhill, and from Rockhill against Putnam ; but it must b

noticed that redoubt R, can only be attacked in strength because it 

perhaps impossible for the enemy to bring up large cannon against it a

long as he does not control Redoubts S and T, secondly because it woul

be covered by [a] Battery . . ., against that which one might set up o

posite . . . after having taken redoubt R by strong attack he must likewis

take Rockhill and then Putnam for . . . the enemy cannot find (neither 

the Redoubt R nor at Rockhill) cannon suitable for firing on the works .

The other route that the enemy can take to get to Putnam (which is st

the central point to which he must come) is by the mountain . . . as w

have already pointed out. He must then capture Redoubts S and T. If h

captures only Redoubt T, he can easily establish his troops on the moun

tain, but he could only bring his cannon up there with an extraordinary

laborious and long toil, by the eastern slope; if he captures only Redoub

S he must bring his cannon along the Furnace [?] road, which can b

regarded as almost impracticable, because it cannot be supposed in a

vance that he will bring his cannon through the valley under fire fro

Redoubts T and S and of their batteries . As to the difficulty itself of captu

ing the works, one can only set up batteries against them on the slope 

the mountain opposite at more than 500 Toises, 18 too great a distance 

destroy them with cannon . There will be, moreover, in each of the

redoubts an underground bomb-proof shelter to protect the garrison . T

enemy must then always come to an attack in force and they are in su

condition that the undertaking would certainly be very dangerous.

It seems to me that we have assured the defense of this mountain, 

much as it is necessary to do it, in view of the number of troops the ene

can sacrifice to the attack of West Point . . . .

23 1
Munitions. We have supposed up to the present the post of West Po

left to its own forces, that is, defended by its own fortifications with t

garrisons. We will say a word on how to use the additional troops t

should be on hand when the enemy appears or who should come in 

course of the attack . First, as we have said, the first posts to be occup

are the points of debarkation . Since we think that the enemy cannot co

from King's Ferry by land, one might question that we do not adv

stringing out troops in quantity on the roads and paths which lead f

this area to West Point . Patrols only are necessary to warn that the for

Montgomery not be surprised from the rear .

After that, the mountains opposite the redoubts R, S, T, being the f

posts where the enemy must establish himself in order to push his ope

tions against West Point, it is thus also one of the first that we must g

rison . Some hundred men on these mountains making the approaches 

ficult by abatis will stop the enemy for a long time. We must reconnoit

look for ways to attack them, to dislodge them . In areas of difficult acce

covered with woods and rocks, this is quite long .

I will note here in passing that in a mountainous country if troops 

placed on a mountain which has another one on its flank . . . . it is 

propriate to put some men (as small a number as it might be) on this ot

mountain. This would prevent the enemy, who does not know th

strength, from descending in the valley in order to turn the troops on 

first mountain for fear of finding himself between two, or cut. There 

place to apply this principle in the locations of which I am speaking here 

After occupying the mountains of which it was just a question, the lo

tion of the troops which we have more of as well as the natural retreat 

those forward, if they were dislodged and on the mountain M, O, then t

would place themselves in the rear of the abatis constructed between 

redoubts S .T . and along the eastern and western slopes within range 

defending these redoubts and to oppose themselves everywhere to 

passage of the enemy. These troops, depending on their number, wo

construct in their rear, fortifications in the most favorable locatio

leading to the type of works they can execute; in a word, they must 

everything to defend this mountain for as long a time as possible for o

depends principally the defense of West Point, it cannot be repeated 

much . . . .

-Manuscript Department, 

Military Academy Libr

Translated by Lt . Col. Don

Dunne.

By fall 1779 plans for the West Point defensive complex were comple

With all sixteen enclosed positions either finished or under constructi

only improvements and maintenance were required . Yet such work c

232
sumed considerable time . West Point now boasted a mutually supporting

system of forts, redoubts, and batteries. Their combined effectiveness was

required to achieve the primary goal-the closing of the Hudson to enemy

vessels.

Duportail viewed West Point's scattered defenses with misgivings

because they seemed to violate the dictates of the great French military

engineer Marshal Sebastien le Prestre de Vauban. Yet while Vauban had

stressed the use of single massive fortresses, he had also injected a note o

flexibility by urging that defenses ought to utilize and augment th

surrounding natural terrain . Although most of the foreign engineers i

America had studied at the great French engineering school at Mezieres

where V auban's theories were gospel, only Kosciuszko appears to have

recognized Vauban's flexibility . The West Point system, historian Dave

Richard Palmer has convincingly argued, was "a splendid prototype for th

system of fortifications which were to be built in Europe in the next cen

tury . "19

The enemy did not move against West Point that fall . After the Britis

abandoned Stony and Verplanck's points, Gouvion led a large detachment

of soldiers to level the enemy works at Verplanck's Point . 20 Little else hap

pened in the Highlands throughout the harsh winter of 1779-80 except ef

forts to provide adequate barracks and customary repairs to the great chain 

What little fortification Kosciuszko attempted was frustrated by a lack of ar

tificers and laborers, a recurring problem at West Point . 21

When Washington sent Duportail to help Maj . Gen. Benjamin Lincol

at Charleston, South Carolina, Gouvion left West Point to replace Duportai

at headquarters . Another change occurred in August 1780 when Kosciuszk

departed West Point to serve as an engineer in the south with General Gates 

Maj . Jean Louis Ambroise de Genton, the Chevalier de Villefranche, suc

ceeded Kosciuszko as West Point's engineer. A quick inspection of the poin

with Gouvion convinced Villefranche that improvements were needed.

Soon more than 400 men worked under Villefranche's direction, while 

group of ten musicians eased the laborers' tasks with invigorating martia

tunes . Although the newly formed companies of sappers and miners ough

to have assisted Villefranche, evidence indicates that instead they were sta

tioned with the artillery at Dobb's Ferry until the end of October, when the

moved to West Point for the winter .

Unfortunately Villefranche also had to work with Maj . Gen . Benedic

Arnold, commander at West Point since August 3 . Already engaged i

treason, Arnold outwardly supported Villefranche's plans but actuall

undermined his efforts by detaching sorely needed troops.

22 As constructio

and repairs lagged, the "Gibraltar of America" became weaker . Fortunatel

for the American cause, Arnold's treachery was discovered late 

September, before he could deliver West Point into the hands of the enemy

In late November the Chevalier de Chastellux, one of the Comte d

Rochambeau's major generals, visited the Highlands during his trave

23 3

around America . His journals contain the following graphic description 

the awesome Highlands setting and of the fortifications at West Point an

Stony and Verplanck's points at a time when further combat operations 

the north seemed unlikely . Revealing a Frenchman's bias, Chastellux a

tributed everything about the "beautiful and well-contrived works" 

Duportail and Gouvion and did not even mention Kosciuszko's contrib

tions.

8. "THE MOST MAGNIFICENT PICTURE 1 HAVE EVER BEHELD"

From the journal of the Marquis de Chastellux.

November 21, 1780 . . . . Descending slowly, at a turn of the road, m

eyes were suddenly struck with the most magnificent picture I have ev

beheld . It was a view of the North River [Hudson], running in a deep cha

nel formed by the mountains, through which in former ages it had forc

its passage . The fort of West Point and the formidable batteries which d

fend it, fix the attention on the western bank, but on lifting your eyes y

behold on every side lofty summits, all bristling with redoubts and ba

teries . I leaped off my horse and stood there for a long time looki

through my spyglass, the only method of acquiring a knowledge of t

whole of the fortifications with which this important post is surrounde

Two lofty heights, on each of which a large redoubt is constructed, prote

the eastern bank. These two works have no other name than the Northe

and the Southern Redoubt; but from the fort of West Point proper, which 

on the edge of the river, to the very top of the mountain at the foot of whi

it stands, are six different forts, all in the form of an amphitheater, and pr

tecting each other. . . . General Heath . . . conducted me to the riv

where his barge was waiting to take me across to the other side. As 

were going down towards the river bank a new scene opened to my vie

not less sublime than the former. We were facing towards the north : 

that direction is an island covered with rocks, which seems to close t

channel of the river, but you soon perceive, through a sort of embrasu

which the river bed has formed by separating immense mountains, tha

comes obliquely from the westward, and that it has made a sudden t

round West Point to open itself a passage and rush on to reach the s

WEST POINT FORTIFICATIONS . This plan of the complete

system of defenses at West Point was copied from the original map

drawn in 1780 by the Chevalier de Villefranche . Villefranche

(1747-84), a topographical engineer in France before coming to

America in 1777, served in Pennsylvania and at West Point and Fort

Herkimer in New York . He was one of the best mapmakers in the

Corps of Engineers.

Boynton, History of West Point

235
'r D-P~ 7 A"T3 ~ 0 jj

i ;rat

},ol .wF~col 1'u~,ra

\ il IoIi-m rt, "',

\1 :1 (' .

FORT ARNOLD . This detailed sketch of West Point's main fort is

enlarged from the plan made 6y Villefranche in 1780.

Boynton, History of West Point

236
without hereafter making the smallest bend . The eye looking towards 

north beyond Constitution Island (the island I have been speaking 

again perceives the river, discerns New Windsor on the western bank, a

is then attracted by different amphitheaters formed by the Appalachi

Mountains, whose nearest summits, terminating the scene, are more th

ten leagues away. We embarked in the barge and crossed the river, whi

is nearly a mile wide. As we approached the opposite shore the fort 

West Point which, seen from the eastern bank, had seemed humb

situated at the foot of the mountains, rose before our eyes and itself 

peared like the summit of a steep rock; this rock however was only t

bank of the river. Had I not remarked that the chinks on it, in seve

places, were embrasures for cannon and formidable batteries, I shou

soon have been apprised of this fact by thirteen 24-pounders, which we

fired successively . This was a military salute, with which General Hea

was pleased to honor me in the name of the thirteen states . Never w

honor more imposing nor more majestic; every shot was, after a long 

terval, echoed back from the opposite bank with a noise nearly equal 

that of the discharge itself . When we recollect that two years ago We

Point was an almost inaccessible wilderness, which has since then be

covered with fortresses and artillery, by a people, who six years befo

had scarcely ever seen cannon; when we reflect that the fate of the t

teen states has depended in great measure on this important post, a

that a horse trader, transformed into a general, or rather become a he

always intrepid, always victorious, but always purchasing victory at 

price of his blood ; that this extraordinary man, at once the honor and 

opprobrium of his country, sold and expected to deliver this Palladium 

American liberty to the English ; when, indeed, so many wonders, of bo

the physical and moral order, are brought together, it may easily 

imagined that I had sufficient food for thought, and that my mind was 

idle on the road .

. . . Pressed by dinner time, we went immediately to General Heath

barrack. The fort, which was begun on much too extensive a plan, h

since been compressed by M. Duportail, so that this barrack is no long

within its walls . Around it are some magazines, and farther to the nor

west, barracks for three or four battalions ; they are built of wood a

similar to those at Fishkill . . . .

. . . As soon as we rose from table, we hurried to avail ourselves of 

remaining daylight to examine the fortifications . The first fort we met w

above West Point, on the declivity of the mountain, has been named 

General Putnam . It is placed on a rock very steep on every side ; the r

parts were at first constructed with trunks of trees ; they are being rebu

of stone and are not yet entirely finished . There is a bombproof powd

magazine, a large cistern, and a souterrain for the garrison . Above t

fort, and on reaching the highest peak, you can still see, on three ot

summits, three strong redoubts lined with cannon, each of which wou

23 7
WEST POINT PANORAMA. This view of West Point from the east

side of the Hudson is from a watercolor by Pierre Charles L'Enfant, an

officer in the Corps of Engineers.

Record Group 66, National Archives

require a formal siege . The day being nearly spent, I contented mys

with judging by the eye of the very intelligent manner in which they 

calculated for mutual protection. Fort "Wallis" [Wyllys], whither Gener

Heath conducted me, was nearer and more accessible . Though it 

placed lower than Fort Putnam, it still commands the river to the south 

is a large pentagonal redoubt, built of huge tree trunks; it is picke

(fraise) and lined with artillery. Under the fire of this redoubt, and lo

down, is a battery of cannon to range more obliquely the course of 

river. This battery is not closed at the gorge, so that the enemy may take 

but never keep it ; which leads me to remark that this is the best method 

follow in all field fortifications . Batteries placed in works have two incon

niences : the first is that if these works be ever so little elevated, they 

not graze sufficiently ; and the second, that the enemy may at the sa

time attack the redoubt and the battery: whereas if the battery is exter

and protected by the redoubt, it must be attacked first ; in which case 

supported by troops who have nothing to fear for themselves, and who

fire is consequently better directed and more deadly . A battery still lo

down and nearer to the river completes the security of the southern par

While returning to West Point we saw a redoubt that has been allo

to go to ruin, as being useless, which in fact it is . It was dark when we 

home, but what I still had to observe did not require daylight. This wa

vast souterrain, formed within the fort of West Point [Fort Clinton], whe

not only the powder and ammunition necessary for this post are kept 

reserve, but also the depot for the whole army. These magazines nea

filled, the numerous artillery one sees in these different fortresses, 

prodigious labor necessary to transport and pile up on steep rocks, h

trunks of trees and enormous hewn stones, impress the mind with an i

238
of the Americans very different from that which the English ministry have

labored to give to Parliament. A Frenchman would be surprised that a nation, just rising into notice, should have expended in two years upwards of

twelve millions livres in this wilderness . He would be still more so on

learning that these fortifications cost nothing to the state, having been

built by soldiers, who received not the smallest gratification and who did

not even receive their stated pay; but he would doubtless feel some satisfaction upon hearing that these beautiful and well-contrived works were

planned and executed by two French engineers, M. Duportail and M. de

Gouvion, who received no more pay than their workmen. . . .

November 22, 1780. General Heath, who was detained by business at

West Point, sent Major Lyman to accompany me to Verplanck's Point,

where we did not arrive till half past twelve, after a continuous journey

amidst the immense mountains which cover this country and through

which the bed of the river is the only passage. . . . M. de Gouvion constructed a redoubt at Verplanck's Point [nearly opposite, on the eastern

bank], where we now landed, and where, by a lucky accident, we found

our horses, which arrived at the same time we did . This redoubt is of a

peculiar form, hardly ever used in America: the ditch is within the parapet,

which is made steep on both sides, and picketed (fraise) at the level of the

cordon; lodgings for the soldiers are formed below. The middle of the

work is a reduit constructed of wood, and in the form of a square tower. It

has battlements everywhere and commands the rampart. An abatis

formed of interwoven tops of trees surrounds the whole and is a substitute

for a covered way. We may easily perceive that such a work cannot be surprised, nor taken without cannon. Now as this is backed by the mountains,

of which the Americans are still masters, it is almost impossible that the

English should besiege it . A "creek" which flows into the Hudson river,

and runs to the southward of this redoubt, renders its position still more

advantageous. Colonel [James] Livingston, who commands at King's

Ferry, has established himself there in preference to Stony Point, to be

nearer White Plains, where the English frequently make incursions : . . .

239
THE SLOTE. As part of the Army’s attempt to map crucial terrain,

Captain William McMurray of the sappers and miners drew this plan

in September 1780. The map details the major road connecting New

Windsor with the rebel encampments in northern New Jersey as it

passes through Smith’s Clove, also known as the Slote. It is the only

map known to have been executed for thegeographer’s department by

an officer of the sappers and miners.

New-York Historical Society, New York City

About two o’clock we crossed the river, and stopped to examine the

fortifications of Stony Point. The Americans finding them too extensive,

have reduced them to a redoubt, nearly similar to that of Verplanck’s, but

not quite so good. There I took leave of Mr. Livingston, who gave me a

guide to conduct me to the army, and I set off. . . . On leaving the river, I

frequently turned round to enjoy the magnificent spectacle it presents in

240
this place, where its bed becomes so large, that in viewing it to the so

ward, it has the appearance of an immense lake, whilst the north

aspect is that of a majestic river.

24 1

-Chastellux, Travels In N

America, 1 :89-91, 93

96-98. Copyright 1963 by 

University of North Caro

Press. Published for th

stitute of Early Amer

History and Culture. By 

mission of the publisher.

By the end of 1780 the British still had not attempted a direct assaul

West Point, nor were they to do so for the remainder of the war . In 1781 

Americans concentrated first on turning the British out of New York 

and then on the final strategy against Lord Cornwallis in Virginia that 

minated with the siege of Yorktown. With attention focused elsewhere, 

works at West Point were allowed to deteriorate .

Circumstances changed considerably after the American victory at Y

town, because Washington stationed the bulk of his Army in the Highla

Thus General Heath, the commander, and Villefranche, his engin

planned a hospital and other buildings to house the Army, its equipm

and supplies .

In spring 1782 Washington returned to West Point and found condit

unacceptable. With both Duportail and Gouvion on leave in France

ordered Villefranche to prepare a full report on the requirements for h

ing and protecting the Army . Throughout the war there had always se

to be plenty of work to keep the Army's engineers, artisans, and fatigue 

busy; in Villefranche's view, 1782 was no different . Washington respo

to the engineer's numerous requests by ordering the repairs .

9. VILLEFRANCHE'S REPORT ON THE WORK REQUIRED

AT WEST POINT

West Point, 15 April 

To Complete the several Redoubts and batteries at this post.

Fort Clinton. The fascines which Constitute that work are so very 

that the least sparks of fire is sufficient to set the fort in a blaze ; i 

therfore that those old fascines aught to be taken away entirely and ti

put in the place of them, or good masonry.

The Counterscarp must also be secured, and the Coverd way 

tinued all round the fort and aught to be palissadoed .
A new Bomb proof should be built as large as the Tereplain will admi

The half bastion of the old fort which faces the river ought to be 

ished and a battery establish[ed] upon it, to Command the plain and 

fend the river. This half bastion to be joind to the new fort by a branche

The old fort aught to be demolished quite to the powder magazine .

A barbet Battery is to be Constructed under the protection of the 

for the defense of the Chain .

Fort Putnam. Half of the fort which is built with dry stone wall, ough

be rebuilt in good Masonry. A new Magazine for powder, and barracks 

ficient to quarter the troops of the garrison should be Built; the Cist

must be finished . . . .

Fort Willys. The bomb proof should be Coverd with two feet of ea

The inside of the parapet is to be raised a little, so as to make it four 

four inches higher than the Banquet.

The south part of the wall must be rebuilt. The battery must be join

the fort by two branches of palissadoes.

Fort No. 1 . There must be a bomb proof, a Magazine for powder, 

for provisions, and Barracks for the Garrison . The two batteries are C

pleate .

Fort No. 2. There must be a bomb proof, a Magazine for powder, 

for provisions, and Barracks for the garrison : three quarters of the Bat

only is don therefore aught to be finished .

Fort NoA There ought to be a bomb proof, a Magazine for powder, 

for provisions, and Barraks for the Garrison .

The battery newly began, must be finished and an other establishe

defend the Valley towards the north .

Fort No. 4 . The new breast work, a quarter part of which is don must 

finished, a powder Magazine one for provisions, and barraks for the 

rison, must be built;

There ought also a battery to be Constructed north of the fort .

There must be a Block house Built between No . 3 and 4 .

Constitution Island, Fort No. 5 and 6. Palissadoes are to be erec

upon the parapets, bomb proofs Magazines for powder, and provisio

and Barracks for the garisons, should be Constructed and Batte

erected under the protection of the forts, for the defence of the back 

of the Island, and abatis put all round the forts .

[Constitution Island,] Fort No. 7 . A bomb proof, a Magazine for powd

one for provisions, and Barracks for the Garison are to be Built, and a 

tery is to be erected under the protection of the fort to defend the B

part of the Island ; abatis are to be put alround the fort .

There is a battery begun for the defence of the chain which ought t

finished .
On the east side of the river, the north and south redoubt with ther Ba

teries are Complited . . . .

To put this post in a state of defence, together with an estimate of t

materials requisite.

I don't think the embrasures in this fort, in there present situation, w

beare the exercise of Cannon without the greatest danger of seting t

whole on fire ; it will therefore be necessary to pull down the fascines wi

which the faces of the embrasures are constructed and to built them wi

timber. The necessary articles to make the reparation are the following : 

pieces of timber 10 feet in lenght [sic] and 8 by 8; 12 pieces of timber 

feet in lenght and 8 by 8 ; 12 pieces of timber 18 feet in lenght and 8 by 

108 four inch plank . 8 Carpenters and 16 fatigue men will accomplish it 

15 days .

As the Bomb proof in Fort Clinton is half filled up with powders, t

fascines with which it is surrounded should be replaced by a dry sto

wall . The requisite assistance to accomplish it in 15 days are three teams 

Masons, six miners, 60 fatigue men, and 30 hand barrows . . . .

The Courtin which Covers the powder Magazine is not defended, and 

a shelter for the enemy to Come to the foot of the magazine; i think 

would be proper to profit of the bastion which flanks that Courtin, and 

make a redoubt with it ; the gorge of which should be left open . A blo

house could be erected in the tereplain of the said redoubt, which wou

answer both to augment the defence, and Barrack the troops. A powd

Magazine could also be Constructed under the block house; if your e

cellency thinks proper to have that redoubt erected, i shal give 

estimate of the materials .

Fort Putnam. The powder Magazine is not secure against the shel

Consequently a wall should be built allround it .

That part of the fort which faces the river is very easy to be storm'd, 

little breast work erected on the top of the parapet would add greatly to 

defence, the assistance requisite to Complete these two works in 15 da

are 12 Masons, 8 Miners, 150 fatigue men, 40 . . . hand barrows . . 

[Villefranche continued his report listing in a similar fashion the me

materials, and equipment required to improve West Point's fortifications 

For a brief period in May Villefranche's attention turned to a mo

frivolous concern, the celebration of the birth of an heir to the French ki

Louis XVI. In a passage from his journal, army surgeon James Thach

described the grand festivities at West Point and Villefranche's ingenio

contributions to them . The revelry infused a new spirit into the war-wea

troops.

243

-Washington Papers, roll 84 .
10. VILLEFRANCHE'S "SUPERB STRUCTURE . . . AFFECTED

THE SPECTATORS WITH ADMIRATION AND PLEASURE"

From James Thacher's journal .

June 1st (1782]-Yesterday was celebrated the birth of the Dauphi

France [the eldest son of Louis XVI], by a magnificent festival . The ed

under which the company assembled and partook of the entertainm

was erected on the plain at West Point. The situation was romantic, 

the occasion novel and interesting . Major Villefranche, an ingen

French engineer, has been employed with one thousand men about 

days, in constructing the curious edifice . It is composed of the si

materials which the common trees in this vicinity afford . It is about six 

dred feet in length and thirty feet wide, supported by a grand colonnad

one hundred and eighteen pillars, made of the trunks of trees. The co

ing of the roof consists of boughs, or branches of trees curiously i

woven, and the same materials form the walls, leaving the ends ent

open . On the inside, every pillar was encircled with muskets and bayo

bound round in a fanciful and handsome manner, and the whole int

was decorated with evergreens, with American and French military col

and a variety of emblems and devices, all adjusted in such style a

beautify the whole interior of the fabric . This superb structure, in s

metry of proportion, neatness of workmanship, and elegance of arra

ment, has seldom perhaps been surpassed on any temporary occasio

affected the spectators with admiration and pleasure, and reflects m

credit on the taste and ability of Major Villefranche . Several appropr

mottos decorated the grand edifice, pronouncing benedictions on 

Dauphin and happiness to the two allied nations. The whole army 

paraded on the contiguous hills on both sides of the river, forming a c

of several miles in open view of the public edifice, and at the given si

of firing three cannon, the regimental officers all left their commands 

repaired to the building to partake of the entertainment which had b

prepared by order of the Commander in Chief. At five o'clock, dinner 

ing on the table, his Excellency General Washington, and his lady 

suite, the principal officers of the army and their ladies, Gove

[George] Clinton and his lady, and a number of respectable charac

from the states of New York and New Jersey, moved from Major Gen

McDougall's quarters through the line formed by Colonel Crain's regi

of artillery, to the arbor, where more than five hundred gentlemen 

ladies partook of a magnificent festival . A martial band charmed 

senses with music, while we feasted our appetites and gazed with adm

tion on the illustrious guests, and the novel spectacle exhibited to 

view. The cloth being removed, thirteen appropriate toasts were dr

each one being announced by the discharge of thirteen cannon and 

244
companied by music. The guests retired from the table at seven o'cloc

and the regimental officers repaired to their respective commands . Th

arbor was, in the evening, illuminated by a vast number of lights, which b

ing arranged in regular and tasteful order, exhibited a scene vieing 

brilliancy with the starry firmament . The officers having rejoined the

regiments, thirteen cannon were again fired as a prelude to a general f

de joie, which immediately succeeded throughout the whole line of the a

my on the surrounding hills, and being three times repeated, the mou

tains resounded and echoed like tremendous peals of thunder, and t

flashing from thousands of fire arms in the darkness of evening, could 

compared only to the most vivid flashes of lightning from the clouds . T

feu de joie was immediately followed by three shouts of acclamation a

benediction for the Dauphin, by the united voices of the whole army on 

sides . At half past eleven o'clock, the celebration was concluded by t

exhibition of fire works very ingeniously constructed of various figure

His Excellency General Washington was unusually cheerful . He attend

the ball in the evening and with a dignified and graceful air, having Mr

Knox for his partner, carried down a dance of twenty couple in the arb

on the green grass .

-Thacher, Military Journal,

pp . 372-74.

In July 1782 the Board of War designated West Point a powd

depository. Washington favored a site on the west side of the Hudson for t

powder magazine, but Villefranche disagreed. The engineer got his wa

and a magazine was built on Constitution Island according to the principl

of Vauban.

By the end of the summer West Point had a new commander, Hen

Knox, the chief of artillery ; and members of the sappers and miners cor

had returned to West Point from duty in the south . These engineer troo

immediately began blasting rock for use in repairing the works on Constit

tion Island . "Our duty was not hard," a sergeant in the corps recalled, "b

the engineers kept us busy ." 23 The sappers and miners also built "elegan

new two-story barracks, which, before the new year, they moved into, alo

with part of an artillery regiment and the Corps of Invalids .

After Yorktown the British still held New York City, but no one thoug

West Point was threatened . The sappers and miners' detail was reduced 

the routine tasks of cutting firewood and standing guard duty, which 

some cases they shared with the invalid corps .

24

In these waning months of the war, life in the Highlands was often b

ing and seldom comfortable. Discipline problems began to plague the s

pers and miners. As related with typical cleverness by Joseph Plumb Mar

in the first of the following documents, several incidents, including a plan 

245
"blow up" David Bushnell, revealed how unpopular the captain was wit

non-commissioned officers and enlisted men.

11 . "I VERILY BELIEVE, I SAVED THE OLD MAN'S LIFE"

From the narrative of Joseph Plumb Martin.

In the month of September [1782], while we lay here [Constit

Island] and our tents were pitched about promiscuously, by reason o

ruggedness of the ground, our captain [David Bushnell) had pitche

marquee in an old gravel pit, at some distance from the tents of the 

One day, two or three of our young hotheads told me that they and 

others of the men, whom they mentioned, were about to have som

with "the old man," as they generally called the captain . I inquired 

their plans were, and they informed me that they had put some po

into a canteen and were going to give him a bit of a hoist. I asked th

let me see their apparatus before they put their project in execu

Accordingly, they soon after showed me a wooden canteen with more

judged, than three pounds of gunpowder in it, with a stoppe

touchwood for a fuse affixed to it, all, they said, in prime order. I told 

they were crazy, that the powder they had in the canteen would "h

him out of time, but they insisted upon proceeding . It would only fri

him, they said, and that was all they wished to do-it would make him 

tle more complaisant . I then told them that if they persisted in their d

mination and would not promise me on the spot to give up their sche

would that instant go to the captain and lay the whole affair before hi

length, after endeavoring without effect to obtain my consent to try a 

under his berth, they concluded to give up the affair altogether, and t

verily believe, I saved the old man's life, although I do not think that 

meant anything more than to frighten him . But the men hated him an

not much care what happened to him .

There was the foundation of some barracks which the British had 

in their excursion up the North River in the year 1777; it was compos

stone and lime, perfectly level and, perhaps, a hundred feet long 

bushes had grown up around it, excepting the side next the river 

place formed a very pretty spot for a contemplative evening's walk

captain used frequently, in fine weather, to be seen pacing backward 

forward upon this wall, between sunset and dark . The men observed 

and itched to discommode him but, since they had made me privy to 

roguery, they dare not play any of their tricks upon him without consu

me for fear of being discovered . They therefore applied to me for my 

sent to "cut some caper" with him, as they called it . Their plan now w

set an old musket, which they had somewhere obtained, in the ma

that hunters set them to kill wild animals, charged only with powder. 

246
sented to let them try tii ; :s experiment, but, after all, it never took eff

Either the captain discovered it or it failed by accident or from some ot

cause, for I never heard anything more about it . I did not wish hi

receive any personal injury from their roguery, but I cared very little 

much they frightened him. I did not consider myself as being under v

heavy obligations to him for his civilities to me, and many of the men c

sidered themselves under still less .

One young man, who was the ringleader of this "gunpowder plot," 

a particular grudge against the old man, which urged him on to dev

mischief against him. I imagine that he considered himself justified by 

conscience in doing so, in consequence of several affronts, as he ter

them, which he had received from him. I will mention one or two to whi

was knowing, that the reader may be able to form some judgment as to 

cause he had to be revenged on the poor old captain .

He once purloined a flour barrel, I think, from the baker, for the 

pose of making a washing tub . The pretended owner complained to 

captain, who, apparently, took no notice of it at the time . However, as it 

peared not long afterwards, he did not forget it, for this man, one morn

soon after, went off without leave with some others, who had permissi

across the mountain to New Windsor, eight or ten miles distant, and 

not return till after evening roll call, at which time he was reported as 

sent without leave . The sergeant major (who belonged to our compa

chanced that evening to call the roll . He was a sheer sycophant and wou

at any time, have a man punished if he could by so doing ingratiate hims

with the officers . He therefore, as might be expected, informed the c

tain of the whole affair . The captain ordered the sergeant major to s

the delinquent to him as soon as he returned, which he accordingly 

The captain used but very little reasoning with him before be began to 

harder arguments than words could convey, urged by the weight of his 

tan. After he had satiated his vengeance upon the poor culprit for pla

the truant, he told him that the flour barrel was still to settle for, and t

paid him for that, principal and interest .

Another affair, in which the captain and he differed in opinion, happ

ed while we were lying at West Point . It was as follows. This man u

sometimes to attend on the sergeants' mess, as they were allowe

waiter or cook. He acted as such at the time I mention . One morning a

roll call, we (the sergeants) allowed him, at his own request, to go 

work for a farmer in the neighborhood of the camp. He had done 

before, and it was quite agreeable to us all, for he received his wages 

his work in milk, butter, etc ., which he always brought into the mess 

the day mentioned, he was at work at the farmer's pulling flax . The far

had an orchard close by where our man was at work. The soldiers, as 

passed, used often to pillage some of the good man's apples . To pre

these depredations upon his property, in some measure, he reques

our soldier to take an old musket belonging to the house, loaded 

247
powder only, and when any . . . plunderers passed by, to pretend 

he was a sentinel and drive them off . Not content with going thus far

must put a small plighted apple into his musket for a ball . It was not 

before he had an opportunity to exercise his sentryship, for sev

soldiers coming by and taking the liberty, as usual, to take some fruit, 

were ordered off by our hero, and not obeying as soon as he desired

expected, he fired his apple amongst them, which did not seem to be 

agreeable to their feelings. They knew to what corps he belonged by 

uniform, and ours was the first they came to on entering the garrison 

the poor fellow's ill luck would have it, the sergeant major was the 

they encountered upon entering. They made bitter complaint against 

pretended sentry, and he carried it directly to the captain, without losi

morsel by the way. The captain ordered him to send the man to hi

soon as he came home . The captain's marquee had a shade over 

round the entrance . I was upon quarters guard at a tent in the rear of 

captain's when, just after roll call, I saw poor Pilgarlick repairing to 

captain's tent. I pretty well knew what would be the consequence of 

visit. 1 listened, heard some discourse between them, but the dist

was so great that I could hear but little distinctly, but I soon heard the 

tan in motion again, very plainly . As soon as the action was over, the 

came to me at the guard . I asked him what the captain and he had bee

as they had, to appearance, been very lively . "I will tell you," said he, 

sergeant major had told the captain that I had, deserted, but when he fo

I had not, he sent for me to come and see him, and you cannot conc

how glad he was to see me, and nothing would do but I must dance 

with him . I told him I had much rather not, as, possibly, it might injure 

character to be seen dancing with a private soldier. But it would 

signify, a jig we must have at all events, and he got hold of my hand 

began to whistle and I began to dance, and a fine jig I suppose he tho

we had . The plague seize his old carcass, I wish he was twisted up fi

miles above the seven stars, there to remain till every hair of his head 

a meteor and every limb a comet ." I could not help laughing at his 

foonery, though I thought if I had been in his place I should not have t

ed it off so lightly.

A court-martial in 1783, involving two officers charged with disob

Bushnell's orders, demonstrated further that tension was rife withi

companies of sappers and miners .

-Martin, Private Yan

Doodle, pp. 262-67.
12. "THE BLOT WHICH NOW STAINS A PAGE IN THE RECORDS

OF THE ARMY"

From George Washington's general orders.

. . . The Court after maturely considering the evidences for a

against Captn . Lieut . [Peter] Taulman and his Defence are of opinion t

he did not make out a provision return agreably to a form sent him for t

purpose Decr. the 31st. 1782, by Captain Bushnell his Commanding 

ficer, and also that he did order his Baggage into Captn . Bushne

quarters the first of January last contrary to Captain Bushnells comma

to him, and refused to take it away agreably to Captn. Bushnell's expr

orders in breach of the latter part of art. 5 section 2d . of the rules and 

ticles of war, the Court are also of opinion that Captain Lieuten

Taulmans answer to Captn. Bushnells order to him of the 31 st. Decemb

1782 is indecent and impertinent and unbecoming the Character of an 

ficer in breach of articles the 5th section 18th . of the Rules and articles 

war. On the third charge the Court are of opinion that Captain Lieuten

Taulman did order soldiers to disobey the express orders of Capt

Bushnell on the 1st . of January, in such a manner however as not 

amount to mutinous behavior, but which does amount to very disorde

behavior in breach of Article 5th . section 18th . of the rules and articles 

war.

The court sentence Captain Lt . Taulman to be repremanded in Ge

orders, and be suspended from service for three months.

. . . The court after maturely considering the evidences for and agai

Captain Lieutt . [David] Kirkpatrick and his defence are of opinion t

Captain Lt . Kirkpatrick did on the first of January order soldiers to d

obey the express orders of Captain Bushnell his commanding offi

and also that he did order his baggage into Captain Bushnells Quart

contrary to Captain Bushnells command to him, and refused to tak

away agreably to Captn Bushnells express orders to him . The court acq

Captn. Lieutenant Kirkpatrick of mutinous behavior but find him quilt

disobedience of orders in breach of a part of article 5th . section 2d . of 

rules and articles of war and sentence him to be repremanded in gene

orders.

The Commander in chief approves the foregoing sentences .

Had the transaction's which are the subject of reprehension ta

place at the commencement of our military establishment, want of 

perience, ignorance of the rules of service or someother palliating 

Thursday, February 13, 1
cumstance might have been plead in excuse; and would in some deg

have effaced the blot which now stains a page in the Records of the A

but at this period of the war, when the necessity of subordination, and 

principles of service are generally well understood, and practiced, Ca

Lieutt . Taulman and Captn . Lt. Kirkpatrick could not but have known, 

the improper Conduct, willful disobedience of Orders they have b

guilty of were an outrageous infraction of military Decipline : and 

behavior of Captain Lieutenant Taulman (that officer must be sensi

would have justified a more rigorous and exemplary sentence; with 

consciousness to attend them, the Commander in Chief leaves the yo

Gentlemen to the sting of their own reflections as a punishment for wha

past, and only advises them not to be guilty of any thing of a similar na

in the future .

In April 1783 Congress declared hostilities at an end, but the p

treaty was not signed until September. On June 11 the Corps of Engin

and its companies of sappers and miners finally disbanded by order of C

gress . In a passage from his memoirs, Sergeant Martin recalled the occa

with considerable sadness . The soldiers had formed "as strict a ban

brotherhood as Masons," he wrote, "and now we were to be . . . separ

as though the grave lay between us."

13. "WE HAD LIVED TOGETHER AS AFAMILY OF BROTHERS"

From the narrative of Joseph Plumb Martin.

At length the eleventh day of June, 1783, arrived . "The old man," 

captain [David Bushnell] came into our room, with his hands full of pap

and first ordered us to empty all our cartridge boxes upon the floor 

was the last order he ever gave us) and then told us that if we needed t

we might take some of them again . They were all immediately gathere

and returned to our boxes. Government had given us our arms and 

considered the ammunition as belonging to them, and he had neither 

nor orders to take them from us. He then handed us our discharges

rather furloughs, for they were in appearance no other than furlou

permission to return home, but to return to the army again if required . 

was policy in government; to discharge us absolutely in our pre

pitiful, forlorn condition, it was feared, might cause some difficu

which might be too hard for government to get easily over.

The powder in our cartridges was soon burnt. Some saluted th

ficers with large charges; others only squibbed them, just as each o

250

-Fitzpatrick, Writings of W

ington, 26:130-32.
mind was affected toward them . Our "old man" had a number of the

last-mentioned symbols of honor and affection presented him. Some 

the men were not half so liberal in the use of powder as they were wh

they would have given him a canteenful at once .

I confess, after all, that my anticipation of the happiness I should 

perience upon such a day as this was not realized ; I can assure the read

that there was as much sorrow as joy transfused on the occasion . We h

lived together as a family of brothers for several years, setting aside so

little family squabbles, like most other families, had shared with ea

other the hardships, dangers, and sufferings incident to a soldier's l

had sympathized with each other in trouble and sickness ; had assisted 

bearing each other's burdens or strove to make them lighter by counc

and advice ; had endeavored to conceal each other's faults or make th

appear in as good a light as they would bear. In short, the soldiers, each 

his particular circle of acquaintance, were as strict a band of brotherho

as Masons and, I believe, as faithful to each other. And now we were to 

the greater part of us, parted forever ; as unconditionally separated 

though the grave lay between us . This, I say, was the case with the most

will not say all ; there were as many genuine misanthropists among t

soldiers, according to numbers, as of any other class of people whateve

and some in our corps of Miners, but we were young men and had wa

hearts. I question if there was a corps in the army that parted with mo

regret than ours did, the New Englanders in particular. Ah! it was a serio

time .

Some of the soldiers went off for home the same day that their fett

were knocked off; others stayed and got their final settlement certificat

which they sold to procure decent clothing and money sufficient to enab

them to pass with decency through the country and to appear somethi

like themselves when they arrived among their friends . I was amo

those ; I went up the river to the Wallkill and stayed some time.

-Martin, Private Yankee D

dle, pp. 279-81 .

The American grasp on West Point effectively neutralized ene

occupied New York City . And the Point's defenses very likely deterred 

British from a full-scale attempt to gain control of the Highlands. Clea

Army engineers contributed substantially to the patriot success in hold

the Highlands. Overall the experience at West Point provided a strong ar

ment in favor of a professional army-including a corps of engineers-in 

future .
17 JAN 1781

N

Ninety-Six

O `

Cowpens

S

a

7 0CT 1780

King's Mt

\V-n

18 AUG 1780

Rocky Mount

O

'* Winnsboro

Fort Oranby O

1

n

y

LC ~ .ati.

1C4 ~

Savannah

9 OCT 1779

Fort Motte

Beou~fprl

e41v4II

Charleston

CLINTON

	SIEGE l11it OF CHARLEST

March - May 1780

LINCOLN

Surrendered

12 may,$ \

MILES

WlImihgl

E2F"RLESTON -

Ft. Moutt

6 R` ~tt

a<F

Fl. Johnson u B'4 ~FT

THE SOUTHERN AREA

1778 - 1781

ENGAGEMENT, DATE INDICATED

®HIGH GROUND ABOVE IOOOFEET

0 10 20 3,0 40 50

MILES

0 Charlotte

W haw C.

- --.

29 MAY 1780

X25 APRIL 1761

HObkirk's Hill

X16 AUG 1780

Camden

0 Fort Watson

Cheraw

252

O HIllsboro

A

c
g, 

Southern Department, whose theater of operations comprised Virginia

Carolinas, and Georgia . Only a few weeks earlier Lee had been in New 

directing an ambitious rebel effort to secure that city's defenses . Now h

far away in the new theater where the enemy threatened a major offens

restore royal authority . Lord Dunmore, Virginia's last royal governor

poised menacingly on Gwynn Island near the mouth of the Rappahan

River, where he had taken refuge after burning Norfolk in January 177

As an experienced officer Lee astutely recognized the dangers pres

by the southern states' extensive navigable waterways, which allowe

enemy, as he put it, "with canvas wings" to "fly from one spot to anot

Accordingly, Lee suggested that Virginia adopt measures to secur

rivers from enemy depredations. He recommended building armed 

and floating or fixed batteries, and placing gunproof mantlets alon

shoreline. 2

Achieving an adequate state of defense would not be easy : artifice

carpenters were generally unmotivated and engineers in too short supp

a consequence Lee urged that companies of carpenters, blacksmiths

artificers be established, and he pleaded with Washington for assis

"Had we arms for the minute men and half a dozen good field Engineer

might laugh at . . . [the enemy's] efforts," Lee protested, "but i

article (like the rest of the Continent) we are miserably deficient ." 3

Lee did have two engineers, Baron Massenbach and John St

assigned to his department . Having been advised by Virginia and 

Carolina delegates in Congress that "there was not a single field engin

their Provinces," Lee, in Baltimore on his way to Virginia, had pers

recruited Massenbach . 4 As for Stadler, Virginia had employed him e

Hardly a month after his arrival in the south Lee justifiably worrie

SOUTHERN THEATER OF WAR. This modern map locates

engagements in the South in the period 1778-81 .

U .S . Army Center of Military History

253
both engineers would resign their commissions because they receiv

"wretched pittance" equal to that of "common carpenters or bricklaye

Also, Lee got no cooperation on his request to Congress to send him C

William Smith, who had served him as an engineer in New York City .

With a greater enemy assault threatening in the Carolinas, Lee 

Virginia before mid-May . Stadler stayed behind with Brig . Gen . An

Lewis and erected shore works facing Dunmore's Gwynn Island strong

Dunmore remained there until a rebel assault led by Lewis and support

fire from Stadler's fortifications drove him out on July 9 .

On 1 June 1776 the British fleet, carrying more than three thou

troops commanded by Sir Henry Clinton and Lord Cornwallis, appe

near the islands off Charleston, South Carolina . Lee rushed there, arr

on the 4th with little time to spare in readying the city's defenses.

Fortunately South Carolinians had recognized the potential danger 

had taken steps earlier to protect their fine seaport from attack . In Jan

1776 local authorities led by John Rutledge, president of the South Car

General Assembly, had planned a new fort-a square redoubt with 

tioned corners-to be erected on low-lying, sandy Sullivan's Island, se

miles below Charleston . The rebels hoped that enemy ships would neve

past that point or nearby James Island, where large guns were moun

Although they threw up some breastworks immediately surroundin

city, they concentrated their effort on Sullivan's Island.

Beginning in March Col . William Moultrie of the 2d South Car

Regiment had overseen the construction on Sullivan's Island . Faced w

shortage of laborers, Moultrie utilized large numbers of black slaves 

mechanics . The workers cut logs from the soft wood of locally flouri

palmetto trees, a variety of palm . They placed the logs in parallel line

teen feet apart and filled the intervening space with sand. While wo

walls were generally inferior to stone walls, the resilience of palmetto 

made it . considerably better than hard wood for resisting cannonfire .

When Lee arrived the American defenses on Sullivan's Island wer

from complete, but once again enemy delays and adverse weather c

tions gave the Americans precious time to improve their position. De

grave misgivings about Fort Sullivan, Lee boldly took charge o

Charleston defenses . His presence lifted the townspeople's spirits 

"Courage alone will not suffice in war," he reminded the Charleston

"true soldiers and magnanimous citizens must brandish the pick-axe 

spade, as well as the sword, in defense of their country." 6 Determined 

the army would contribute its best effort, Lee ordered Moultrie to pr

Massenbach with the workmen and materials needed to complete the wo

On Sullivan's Island Lee's major concern was protecting the fort'

(north side) and providing a means of escape to the mainland. Massen

himself was "frighten'd out of his wits" because retreat from Sullivan's I

appeared so precarious .? Lee personally oversaw the addition of a trav

breastwork, banquette, and other works on the fort's vulnerable rear 

254
was particularly concerned that Ferdinand de Brahm, an engi

employed by South Carolina, did not know the degree of talus require

the traversee 9 Lee ordered Moultrie to monitor de Brahm's perform

closely and promised, if necessary, to try to supply someone with more 

perience .

Col . Moultrie's memoirs vividly describe American preparations fo

inevitable attack. Of special importance was Lee's initial view that 

existing fort was "a slaughter pen" which ought to be abandoned . But 

course being unfeasible politically and psychologically, Lee set about to 

vide a means of retreat. Despite the general opinion that two frigates c

reduce the town, Moultrie maintained consistently that the fort could 

against both the fleet and Clinton's land forces .

1 . "I NEVER WAS UNEASY ON NOT HAVING A RETREAT"

From William Moultrie's memoirs.

At this time [April 1776] it was the general opinion, especially am

the sailors, that two frigates would be a sufficient force to knock the t

about our ears : notwithstanding our number of batteries with heavy 

non; but in a few weeks (28 June) experience taught us, that frigates c

make no impression upon our palmetto batteries.

April. General [John] Armstrong arrived from the northward, and 

command of the troops in South-Carolina ; he was a brave man, and a g

officer, but not much acquainted with our manner of defence which 

principally forts and batteries, with heavy pieces of cannon: we had at 

time at least, 100 pieces of cannon mounted in different parts of our 

bor.

May 31 . Expresses were sent to the president1° from Christ-ch

parish, informing him that a large fleet of British vessels were seen 

Dewee's Island, about twenty miles to the northward of the bar; and on 

first of June they displayed about fifty sail before the town, on the out 

of our bar. The sight of these vessels alarmed us very much, all was h

and confusion, the president with his council busy in sending expre

to every part of the country, to hasten down the militia; men running a

the town looking for horses, carriages, and boats to send their familie

to the country ; and as they were going out through the town gates to g

to the country, they met the militia from the country marching into t

traverses were made in the principal streets; fleches thrown up at e

place where troops could land ; military works going on every where, 

lead taking from the windows . . . to cast into musket balls, and e

preparation to receive an attack, which was expected in a few days .

June 4. General [Charles] Lee arrived from the northward, and took 

command of the troops; his presence gave us great spirits, as he 

255
known to be an able, brave, and experienced officer, though hasty 

rough in his manners, which the officers could not reconcile themsel

to at first ; it was thought by many that his coming among us was equal 

reinforcement of 1000 men, and I believe it was, because he taught u

think lightly of the enemy, and gave a spur to all our actions . After G

Lee had waited upon the president, and talked with him upon his pla

defence, he hurried about to view the different works, and give orders 

such things to be done as he thought necessary ; he was every day 

every hour of the day on horse back, or in boats viewing our situation 

directing small works to be thrown up at different places; when he cam

Sullivan's Island, he did not like that post at all, he said there was no 

to retreat, that the garrison would be sacrificed ; nay, he called 

"slaughter pen," and wished to withdraw the garrison and give up 

post, but president Rutledge insisted that it should not be given up . T

Gen . Lee said it was "absolutely necessary to have a bridge of boats f

retreat;" but boats enough could not be had, the distance over bein

least a mile . Then a bridge was constructed of empty hogsheads buo

at certain distances, and two planks from hogshead to hogshead ; but 

would not answer, because when Col . [Thomas] Clark was coming o

from Haddrell's [Point], with a detachment of 200 men ; before they w

half on, it sunk so low, that they were obliged to return : Gen . Lee's wh

thoughts were taken up with the post on Sullivan's Island ; all his lette

me show how anxious he was at not having a bridge for a retreat; fo

part, I never was uneasy on not having a retreat because I never imagi

that the enemy could force me to that necessity; I always conside

myself as able to defend that post against the enemy . . . . Besides 

they made their landing good, the riflemen would have hung upon t

flanks for three miles as they marched along the beach, and not above 

yards from them .

Col. Thompson had orders that if they could not stand the enemy t

were to throw themselves into the fort, by which I should have had 

wards of 1000 men in a large strong fort, and Gen . Armstrong in my 

with 1500 men, not more that one mile and an half off, with a small ar

the sea between us, that he could have crossed a body of men in boat

my assistance, this was exactly my situation ; I therefore felt mys

perfectly easy because I never calculated upon Sir. Henry Clint

numbers to be more then 3000 men ; as to the men-of-war, we should h

taken every little notice of them if the army had attacked us .

Gen. Lee one day on a visit to the fort, took me aside and said, "

Moultrie, do you think you can maintain this post ." I answered him "Y

think I can," that was all that passed on the subject between us: anot

time Capt. Lamperer, a brave and experienced seaman, who had b

master of a man-of-war, and captain of a very respectable privateer m

years ago visited me at the fort after the British ships came over our 

25 6
while we were walking on the platform looking at the fleet, he said to m

"well Colonel what do you think of it now," I replied that "we should be

them ." "Sir" said he "when those ships (pointing to the men-of-wa

come to lay along side of your fort, they will knock it down in half an hour

(and that was the opinion of all the sailors,) then I said, "we will lay behi

the ruins and prevent their men from landing ."

Gen . Lee, I was informed, did not like my having the command of t

important post, he did not doubt my courage, but said "I was too easy 

command," as his letters shew ; but after the 28th June he made me 

bosom friend : our fort at this time was not nearly finished ; the mechani

and negro laborers were taken from all the works about the town, and se

down to the Island to complete our fort, we worked very hard, but cou

not get it nearly finished before the action .

From William Moultrie's memoirs.

257

-Moultrie, Memoirs, 1 :139-44

On the morning of 28 June 1776 the enemy launched an attack again

Fort Sullivan . A surgeon on the British fleet described the rebels' respons

"The Provincials reserved their fire until the shipping were advanced with

point blank shot . . . it was slow, but decisive indeed ; they were very coo

and took great care not to fire except their guns were exceedingly we

directed ." 11 In the observer's view the rebel artillery was "surprisingly we

served" under command of Massenbach and de Brahm . The surgeon f

ther noted that "General Lee had made such a disposition of masked ba

teries, troops, etc . that it is the opinion of all the officers of the A

my . . . that if our troops had attacked, they must have been Cut Off . - 12

As Moultrie explained in his memoirs, an accident doomed the Brit

naval attack on the fort's west side . Had that maneuver succeeded, Moultr

realized, "they would have enfiladed us in such a manner, as to have driv

us from our guns ." Also, as demonstrated elsewhere, unforeseen c

cumstances thwarted Clinton's attempts at a coordinated flanking mov

ment . But it seems clear from Moultrie's account that the fort's palmet

construction and the accuracy of the rebel artillery fire were still crucial 

the outcome.

2. "NEVER DID MEN FIGHT MORE BRAVELY, AND

NEVER WERE MEN MORE COOL"

June, 1776. On the morning of the 28th of June, I paid a visit to our 

vance guard (on horse back three miles to the eastward of our fort) whi

was there, I saw a number of the enemy's boats in motion, at the back 

Long-Island, as if they intended to descent upon our advanced post; at 

same time I saw the men-of-war loose their topsails ; I hurried back to 

fort as fast as possible; . . . I immediately ordered the long roll to beat, 

officers and men to their posts: We had scarcely manned our guns, wh

. . . ships of war came sailing up, as if in confidence of victory ; as soon 

they came within the reach of our guns, we began to fire ; they were s

a-breast of the fort . . . let go their anchors, with springs upon their cabl

and begun their attack most furiously about 10 o'clock, A. M. and c

tinued a brisk fire, till about 8 o'clock, P. M. . . .

The Thunder-Bomb had the beds of her mortar soon disabled ; 

threw her shells in a very good direction; most of them fell within the f

but we had a morass in the middle, that swallowed them up instantly, 

those that fell in the sand in and about the fort, were immediately bur

so that very few of them bursted amongst us: At one time, the C

modore's13 ship [the Bristol] swung round with her stern to the fort, wh

drew the fire of all the guns that could bear upon her: we supposed he 

had the springs of her cables cut away: The words that passed along 

plat-form by officers and men, were, "mind the Commodore, mind the 

fifty gun ships :" most all the attention was paid to the two fifty gun sh

especially the Commodore, who, I dare say, was not at all obliged to us 

our particular attention to him; the killed and wounded on board those 

fifty gun ships confirms what I say . During the action, Gen. Lee paid 

visit through a heavy line of fire, and pointed two or three guns hims

then said to me, "Colonel, I see you are doing very well here, you have 

occasion for me, I will go up to town again," and then left us.

When I received information of Gen. Lee's approach to the fort, I s

Lieut [Francis] Marion, from off the plat-form, with 8 or 10 men, to un

the gate-way, (our gate not being finished) the gate-way was barrica

with pieces of timber 8 or 10 inches square, which required 3 or 4 me

remove each piece ; the men in the ships tops, seeing those men run f

the platform concluded 'we were quitting the fort,' . . . Never did 

fight more bravely, and never were men more cool ; their only distress 

the want of powder. . . .

There cannot be a doubt, but that if we had had as much powder as 

could have expended in the time, that the men of war must have st

their colors, or they would certainly have been sunk, because they c

not retreat, as the wind and tide were against them ; and if they had 

ceeded up to town, they would have been in a much worse situation: T

could not make any impression on our fort, built of palmetto logs and f

in with earth, our merlons were 16 feet thick, and high enough to cover 

men from the fire of the tops: The men that we had killed and wounded 

killed, 24 wounded] received their shots mostly through the embrasure

An author, who published in 1779, says "the guns were at one tim

long silenced, that it was thought the fort was abandoned; it seems 

259
traordinary that a detachment of land forces were not in readines

board of the transports, or boats, to profit of such an occasion ."

The guns being so long silent, was owing to the scarcity of po

which we had in the fort, and to a report that was brought me, "tha

British troops were landed between the advance-guard and the for

was upon this information, that I ordered the guns to cease firing, or t

very slow upon the shipping ; that we should reserve our powder fo

musketry to defend ourselves against the land forces, there being a 

scarcity of powder at this time .

At one time, 3 or 4 of the men-of-war's broadsides struck the fort a

same instant, which gave the merlons such a tremor, that I was appre

sive that a few more such would tumble them down. During the ac

three of the men-of-war, in going round to our west curtain, got entan

together, by which the Acteon frigate went on shore on the mi

ground ; the Sphinx lost her bow-sprit; and the Syren cleared he

without any damage; had these three ships effected their purpose, 

would have enfiladed us in such a manner, as to have driven us fro

guns: It being a very hot day, we were served along the plat-form with 

in firebuckets, which we partook of very heartily : I never had a 

agreeable draught than that which I took out one of those buckets a

time; it may be very easily conceived what heat and thirst a man must 

in this climate, to be upon a plat-form on the 28th June, amidst 20 

heavy pieces of cannon, in one continual blaze and roar; and clou

smoke curling over his head for hours together; it was a very honor

situation, but a very unpleasant one. . . . at night when we came t

slow firing (the ammunition being nearly quite gone) we could hea

shot very distinctly strike the ships: At length the British gave up the 

flict: The ships slipt their cables, and dropped down with the tide, an

of the reach of our guns. . . .

Early the next morning was presented to our view, the Acteon fri

hard, and fast aground; at about 400 yards distance; we gave her a 

shot, which she returned but they soon set fire to her, and qu

her. . . .

THE CHEVALIER DE CAMBRAY-DIGNY . This Italian-born

officer-candidate in the French artillery received his commission 

Continental Army as a lieutenant colonel of engineers in June 177

Brigadier General Lacklan McIntosh's chief engineer, Cambray

(1751-1822) built Fort McIntosh, about thirty miles northwest of

Pittsburgh on the Ohio River, in November 1778 . The fort, whic

abandoned in August 1779, was designed to help curb Indian rai

the frontier. Cam bray also served as an engineer during the siege 

Savannah in 1779 and at Charleston in 1780. Charles Willson Pea

painted this portrait of the chevalier.

Independence National Historical Park Collection

260

The other ships lay at the north point of Morris's Island we could pl

see they had been pretty roughly handled, especially the Commodore

. . .

A few days after the action, we picked up, in and about the 

1200 shot of different calibers that was fired at us, and a great numb

13 inch shells .

Lee, who confessed "I never in my life felt myself so uneasy," 

astonished by the defenders' courage. He attributed the low numb

American casualties to the strength of the works and praised the valia

forts of the South Carolinians .

14 His last-minute drive to fortify Charl

proper had brought the city to a remarkable state of readiness. Even ha

outer defenses fallen, Charleston doubtless could have held on.

The repulse of the British at Charleston was a sweet victory indeed 

two years the enemy declined further action in the south . But at the 

Lee took little comfort in the outcome : as an astute officer he feare

British would soon return and, worst of all, find his countrymen 

prepared . "It is not impossible," Lee cautioned, "that the late repulse 

Enemy may be fatal to us . We seem now all sunk into a most secur

comfortable sleep ." 15 Throughout the war that lethargic tendency to 

port defensive works only in the face of a direct enemy threat-and 

then begrudgingly-was sometimes the rebels' worst enemy . In fac

spent the remainder of his service in the Southern Department trying t

vince local authorities to upgrade their defenses .

Shortly after the victory at Charleston Lee took personal comma

Continental forces in Georgia . He met with state deputies and suggeste

mediate measures for local defense . Lee appealed to the Continental 

gress for money and urged South Carolinians to help out too. O

Georgia frontier Indians were a constant menace . Lee proposed usi

row galleys, armed boats, and small forts or redoubts to protect the 

extensive waterways . In Georgia as in South Carolina he encountered o

one hand reluctance to act and on the other a tendency to propose 

tainable schemes. "I shou'd not be surpris'd," Lee declared in exaspera

"if they were to propose mounting a body of Mermaids on Alligators ." 1

During the summer of 1776 Lee's major concern in South Carolin

to construct a chain of at least four redoubts to bolster Sullivan's Islan

secure the two bridges linking it with the mainland . Without the new 

he believed it would be "a very precarious Post." 17 He assigned Masse

to lav out the new defenses- 18 In view of the plans for Georgia, for Sull

Island, and for some new works at nearby Port Royal, it was little w

that Lee again implored Congress to send him more engineers . "It is 

impossible to carry on the public business without them," he complai

But it was still 1776 : trained engineers were everywhere in short supp

the fall of 1776 Lee returned north .

262

-Moultrie, Memoirs, 1 :17
For the next two years the enemy conceded control of the south to 

rebels, but in late 1778 they began a campaign to conquer the reg

Savannah, Georgia, was their first target . Having gone for months witho

scare, the city had let its fortifications crumble. With defenses weake

and troops hopelessly outnumbered and outflanked, the Americans w

forced to give up Savannah in the final days of 1778 . Quick capture of S

bury and Augusta followed . Royal authority was reestablished in Georgia 

In May 1779 British General Augustine Prevost drove Colonel Moult

from Purisburg, South Carolina, to Charleston . This time Charlest

mainland defenses were more advanced than in 1776 but they were far f

formidable. Col . Charles Senf, 20 the state's engineer, worried that the l

were too weak to hold back Prevost's men. Initially the patriots serio

considered giving up the city but finally resolved to fight it out . 

Chevalier de Cambray-Digny, a lieutenant colonel in the Army Corps 

Engineers, worked feverishly to shore up the lines on the left where they w

weakest. Townsmen labored day and night under his direction to for

Charleston Neck between the Ashley and Cooper rivers . 21 The reb

change of heart discouraged Prevost and he withdrew to Stono Ferry, So

Carolina .

Maj . Gen. Benjamin Lincoln, commander of the Southern Departm

since September 1778, attacked Prevost's entrenched camp on June 20 . W

covered and reinforced, the British beat back the assault. Lincoln was co

dent his men could win by storming the enemy's works, but an unrec

noitered creek running in front of Prevost's redoubts deterred the

Among the wounded at Stono Ferry was Col. Jean Baptiste Joseph, 

Chevalier de Laumoy, commander of the engineers during the attack .

Lincoln's biggest chance came in September 1779 when the French 

miral Count d'Estaing arrived off Savannah with a fleet of thirty-t

vessels . The Americans' hopes of liberating Georgia never seemed brigh

On the 16th d'Estaing demanded surrender. The weakened British garr

cleverly asked for a 24-hour reprieve, managed to get reinforcements, 

decided to defend the city after all . Taking advantage of the delay, C

James Moncrieff, an engineer veteran of the Seven Years' War and the c

British engineer in Savannah, used slaves to strengthen his defenses.

Although Colonel Moultrie favored a direct attack, d'Estaing, advise

his engineers that a siege would take only ten days, opted for the latter 

October 8 d'Estaing was so frustrated by the slow progress of the tren

that he decided to abandon formal siege operations and make an immed

assault on the enemy's right at Spring Hill Redoubt . Reconnaissance rep

by Laumoy and others assured him of success.

Unfortunately Prevost had recognized his vulnerability on the right 

was prepared . The assault ended in disaster for the rebels . Only Bunker 

was bloodier . Wounded, d'Estaing retreated to his flagship, while Lin

withdrew to Charleston.

26 3

Antoine Fransois Terance O'Connor, d'Estaing's chief engineer, kept 

journal of the operation . Later d'Estaing added his own observations to th

account. The combined document-presented below with d'Estaing's com

ments in italics-illustrates some of the difficulties encountered in attempt

at Franco-American cooperation

3. "THIS STRANGE SIEGE WAS THE WORK OF PENELOPE"

From Antoine O'Connor's journal, with observations (in italics)

by Count d'Estaing .

Laying siege to a fortified place defended by a force almost equal t

the one attacking it would seem to be absolutely impossible. My entir

conduct would have been so if I hadpursued objectives other than placin

and supporting batteries as close as possible, intending to breach th

sand works, making an approach by a trench, standing our ground at cap

tured points and assaulting by column at one point an equally stron

enemy, who was waiting for us and six hours earlier had dug to the rear 

new trench supported by cannon. This indisputably would have been a

entirely new chapter in the history of siege warfare.

The incalculable advantage of having cover within 400 yards of th

enemy and of attacking suddenly determined the point of attack . It wa

also better than the other side because it was closer to the mouth of th

Savannah River from which I was expecting large cannon that the men-of

war were to send me.

The Americans volunteered to furnish all the necessary tools and eve

workmen for the trenches. Work was easy in this soft, sandy soil .

On the 23rd [September 1779] the small number of tools that th

Americans supplied together with our own, were scarcely sufficient f

300 workers .

At 7 p .m . I began digging the trench with 300 workers, supported b

600 grenadiers and chasseurs . The enemy only fired a few cannon shot

at random, and despite our close proximity and the bright moonlight, the

did not detect our presence .

During the night I dug a trench 206 yards long and started at the end 

it a parallel trench 80 yards long which was only 300 yards away from the

works.

SIEGE OF SAVANNAH, OCTOBER 1779 . This plan from a survey

by an unidentified officer depicts British fortifications and American

and French siege positions. Spring Hill Redoubt (11) is on the right.

The French and American parallels are in the left center .

National Archives

26 5
At dawn on the 24th the trench commander received orde

withdraw the workers and replace them with half of the guard fo

trenches; the rest remained under arms in the trench and occupie

part of the parallel which was finished .

It is the nature of Americans to promise much and deliver little, th

tion always counts on acquiring whatever it lacks. Most of the tools 

gathered up from houses. They were hardly suitable for digging a t

but the soil was so soft that they sufficed.

At 8 a.m . after a light enemy barrage three or four hundred e

soldiers ambushed us on the left . The cry "to arms" went up as so

they reached the parallel ; our troops abandoned the trench, took 

position on the flank and repelled the enemy after a very hot exchan

musket fire . . . .

Our losses amounted to four officers killed, nine wounded, twenty

chasseurs and grenadiers killed and sixty-six wounded. The ene

could not have been less.

They asked for a cease-fire in order to collect their dead 

wounded. . . .

On the night of the 24th we were supposed to continue the parall

to the barracks, and the Americans were to dig another one up t

point from their side . The smaller number of tools and workers avai

convinced M . le general 23 to construct a battery immediately behin

communication trench and a little above the center of it . In this posit

was only 425 yards away from the barracks.

The placement and construction of this battery have been justi

criticized. The primary defect of its position compromised its e

tiveness. That was recognized too late and later confirmed when we s

there a sufficient number of cannon to open fire on the barracks. On

the left did the battery have the barracks in range. Moved forward 

yards and to an angle, the battery could have blown the barracks to p

and had within its circular range not only the barracks but also the w

line of fortifications as far as the Spring Hill redoubt. Indolence ofte

duces a lack of resourcefulness and too frequently prevents corre

mistakes that are made .

Because the communication trench between headquarters an

siege lines was not safe, M. le general ordered two more perpendi

trenches to be dug to the rear of the first one, and 300 Americans 

busy at it during the night. This work was interrupted by the flight o

workers because of a false alarm . However, they resumed working 

an hour .

It was reserved to this siege, impromptu in its origin, slow in it

gress, and discreditable in its procedure, to do last what we should 

done first. The poor security in the interval between the trench and 

quarters cost several lives. . . . When workers are in short supply

26 6
perience must dictate the necessity of a work project before it is und

taken .

One hundred fifty of our men worked on the left battery, and at da

two 18-pound pieces were erected there at barbette. At 7 a .m . they co

menced firing . M. d e Sane, commander of artillery, was killed . M

general went out and ordered the firing stopped and the cannon remov

from the battery .

M. de Sane, a bright young officer but one who had never experien

a siege, shared the opinion, which was almost universal, even among 

French, that the first discharge of cannon would make the fortress s

render. The night before I inspected the battery that he built. When 1 t

him that it had no communication whatsoever, he responded that he 

enough ammunition for the next day, that he had no reason to leave i

send for anything during the day. 1 reminded him that M. Duportai

system which he was using in that battery at barbette, was good only 

defense and has several other disadvantages in the opinion of 

Gribauval. 24 He multiplied them, when he should have used these f

gun carriages to coordinate the artillery with the engineers . 1 also me

tioned to M. de Sane that the shallow depressions or foxholes betwe

the cannon platforms that this system calls for, were not adequate to g

cover to the cannoniers, and that, according to the same system

semicircular path or small ditch between the recoil mechanism and 

parapet was required so that the gunloaders would not be seen and co

have protection from fire . He promised to carry out my suggestion a

specifically pledged not to fire without an order from me. He sent a 

quest for that order the next morning, and at that precise moment 1 he

the firing begin. I went there and found that it was hardest hit by can

ball andgrapeshot oranyplace I have ever seen.

On the night of the 25th, 100 Americans dug a communication tre

between the main siege line and the left battery, and they finished the 

other communication trenches started the previous night . We closed 

the left battery with embrasures and mounted twelve guns, six 

pounders and six 12-pounders. One hundred fifty of our men w

used . . . .

On the night of the 27th with 150 men we began again a battery eig

yards in front of the beginning of the perpendicular trench running to 

parallel trench dug on the first day. Twelve guns were assigned to it, 

18-pounders and seven 12-pounders. On the same night eighty men du

communication trench to get to it . . . .

Continuation of the battery on the left . On the 28th we started a mor

battery on the left, 800 yards behind the trench . It held nine mortars w

caliber of six and nine inches.

In the Americans' opinion the mortars were the alliance's ark of 

covenant. They would make the walls of Jericho fall . I hoped so; but I 

skeptical.

26 7
The night of the 28th the batteries were continued, and the Americ

began a mortar battery on the left, a redoubt to hold four 6-pounders o

left flank and a post for fifty to sixty men on its right. They were to supp

the mortar battery .

The purpose of this small battery with very light cannon was to pro

the mortar battery and obstruct an attack on its left. The Americans 

this battery very well and very quickly. The embankment of their merl

was made differently than ours, and their seemed better to me. . . .

The night of [October] 2nd was employed in the construction of 

battery and the continuation of three others .

The night of the 3rd, continuation of the same work . We fired 

firebombs on the city and the enemy fortifications .

These 300 firebombs were the prologue to the first mortar shells . 

deserters said that they caused distress; however, the ground was 

sand in the city and the streets were not paved. We chose to begin fi

the firebombs at night in order to make them more terrifying . They are 

frightening in the daytime, but they were supposed to scare even m

the citizens who had to sleep outside the fortifications. We emplo

several other small stratagems. We put too much confidence in them

depend primarily on fear or on the enemy's mistakes is the risk

strategy of war. From the start of this campaign that was the shaky basi

ourplans.

At dawn on the 4th all the cannon were trained on the enemy's gu

and the bombardment began . The Truite flute25 and the two Ameri

galleys also fired on the town to impede communications . The en

responded with very lively fire . At 2 :30 p .m ., the new five-gun battery c

menced firing . . . .

The night of the 4th was used to repair our batteries' embrasures, 

firing became very scattered and weak . Because of the scarcity of t

that the Americans could furnish us and the extreme fatigue of our tro

worn out from moving cannon and munitions, constructing gabions 

saucissons, we were not able to use this night for digging new trenche

On the 5th our batteries continued their fire and annoyed the en

considerably . They responded with only occasional cannon fire .

Here then was the high point of a siege, the moment when you fire 

are no longer fired on, when the works are proceeding rapidly, when c

quest comes almost without risk. Ordinarily it is the occasion of succ

and foreshadows the day of capitulation . Ourposition was quite diffe

The movements we saw in the interior lines told us that we had 

nothing; new trenches were dug while the old ones were neither a

doned nor taken. If we took possession of the top of the walls, it woul

endless. If we tried to pass between the cannon, of which they had mo

we would find them newly placed on our flanks . They would reapp

they would fire, they would exact almost as many casualties as if the 

268
tress had never been taken, and we would find in the interior trenc

new obstacles to overcome. This strange siege was the work 

Penelope. 26

The enemy worked untiringly on the interior lines and moved much 

tillery .

On the night of the 5th nothing was done; the army, fatigued by wo

and by the sickness brought on by the intemperate climate, was not i

position to furnish workers. . . .

On the 6th a hard rain slowed down our batteries' fire . Despite the 

weather, I opened a communication trench that night with 150 Americ

about 160 yards from the enemy battery at the barracks, and I opene

parallel trench at the end of it . At midnight this work was interrupted by 

flight of the workers because of a false alarm . Some of the tools were l

However, I reassembled part of the workers; and, after giving them n

tools, the work continued until dawn . This communication trench a

parallel were ready to hold fifty grenadiers who were stationed there, a

the trench was improved during the day of the 7th .

On the night of the 7th we were supposed to elongate this new parall

to construct a battery on its left to destroy the one at the barracks, and 

build another one further away, to the left of the Spring Hill redoubt . T

lack of tools, the time necessary to construct this new battery, reas

perhaps based on the scarcities suffered by the fleet, persuaded M

general to order an assault on the Spring Hill redoubt on the enemy

right .

The purpose of this new siegework was to attract the enemy's att

tion and our own. It was essential to convince everyone that we inten

to proceed according to the rule of siege warfare and continue our wo

up to that point. The assault was decided upon; General Linc

demanded it. Of course 1 hoped that it would succeed, but I was quite 

from thinking that success was mathematically inevitable . If 1 had been 

myself, l would not have attempted it at all. . . . The besieged had eno

supplies for more than two months, and we did not. To mount a n

regular attack, open a trench on another front and raise batteries the

which we could not support because of their distance from the camp, w

entirely an American idea . Implementation of it would have been impos

ble. To let others think we would do so, however, was my intention . . . 

The different scouting missions that M. de Saumoy [Laumoy], 

engineer presently in the American service, had ordered on that fr

those that he had undertaken personally, the unanimous report of the 

ferent deserters, everything seemed to promise a favorable outcome.

On the morning of the 8th M. le general again went to reconnoiter 

right side of the Spring Hill redoubt. The day was spent making disp

tions for the attack . Twenty-two hundred of our troops and 1

Americans were selected for the attack on that section. The rest of 

269
troops, assigned to the trenches, had orders to make two successive 

ties, the first one on the right and the second one on the left . Five hun

Americans were ordered to penetrate the city to the left of the en

trenches and as close to the river as possible. The two American gal

and a few longboats had orders to make a feint attack by way of 

river. . . .

On the 9th at midnight the army took up arms ; at 3 a .m . we marc

toward General Lincoln's camp where M. le general ordered a halt to 

for the scouts that they were obliged to furnish us . The American gen

could provide only one, and at 4 a.m . the two armies set out togethe

the Spring Hill redoubt, a mile away . Coming out of the woods a half 

from the enemy, a halt was called to close up the columns in accord

with the manner stipulated in the orders . . . . At 4 :30 a .m . the army be

to march . . . . Toward five o'clock we heard the musket fire of the d

sionary attacks on the enemy's left . M. le comte de Bethisy's avant-g

penetrated to the abatis and chopped through it with hatchets. Imm

ately the enemy was within pistol range. A single volley of musketry 

one round of cannon fire caused a great disorder . However, the vang

jumped into the ditch which lay before them and uselessly climbed up 

side . The cannon pieces which defended this ditch took a frig

toll . . . . Brisk grapeshot fire directed toward our left pushed part of 

troops into the marsh . All of this created the greatest confusion, and 

vanguard troops, realizing they had no support, were forced to fall b

They charged a second time without success. Disorder increased ; mos

the officers were wounded; part of the troops coming out of the ma

crowded into the others and confused the order of attack . However, M

general partially rallied them, and the vanguard charged a third time, 

ported by the troops that M . le general had just reassembled . The cha

lasted a long time ; the enemy cannon exacted heavy losses ; the fire of 

Scotch Regiment which protected the redoubt was particularly galling 

le general, wounded a second time by a ball through his leg and witnes

the confusion which began again, ordered the retreat. M. le vicomt

Noailles covered it at the head of the reserve .Our troops suffered gre

in the retreat . M. le vicomte de Noailles formed the rear guard, and 

enemy, who came out to their abatis, did not dare a sortie when they 

the determination and discipline of our rear guard, exposed to their 

non loaded with grapeshot .

The action did not last longer than an hour; it was very violent . 

enemy, almost as numerous as we, as we learned later, had gathered 

greater part of their force around the Spring Hill redoubt; and it app

certain that two American deserters alerted them about the point of at

the day before. That no attention at all was paid to the two feint att

from the trenches is even more reason for thinking so . The diversion 

500 Americans were to attempt on the enemy's left did not take pl

270
They got lost. The two American galleys caused the attack from the ri

to fail . The first one, towed by longboats, dropped anchor. The seco

one was filled full of water, and M. le chevalier Durumain, ship's lieutena

who commanded this operation, could never get upriver as far as t

city . . . .

On the 10th, 11th, 12th, 13th, 14th, 15th, 16th, and 17th we were bu

withdrawing the cannon and all their munitions. We loaded them 

Thunderbolt on the Augustine Creek . All the wounded and the army's ba

gage were also loaded .

On the evening of the 18th the army abandoned the camp befo

Savannah, after the departure of the American army .

27 1

-Kennedy, Muskets, pp . 54-5

59,61-65,67-69.

The failure of the French and American allies to retake Savannah e

couraged British leaders to revive plans to capture Charleston . In fa

before the end of the year, Clinton left New York City on an expedition 

do just that . The second week in February 1780, when Clinton arrived 

Johns Island, thirty miles below Charleston, the city's fortifications were 

shambles . Improvements were needed both north of the city and at For

Moultrie27 (Sullivan's Island) and Johnson (James Island), guarding the e

trance to the harbor . In an attempt to reverse months of neglect, the st

acted quickly. On Charleston Neck, a narrow isthmus connecting the c

with the mainland to the north, the patriots readied a 1 1h -mile line 

defenses . A masonry hornwork known as "the Citadel" stood in the center 

this line . A sixteen-gun redoubt held down the southern tip of the city a

thirteen additional forts were scattered along the Ashley and Cooper rivers 

By April 1 the British were in position to invest the city. Within a we

enemy vessels had sailed past Fort Moultrie . The enemy's first paralle

engineered by Moncrieff, who had been promoted for his contributions 

Savannah, was complete on the 10th. Clinton called on Lincoln to s

render . He refused, so the British general proceeded with a second paralle

Despite heavy American artillery fire, the British continued to push f

ward . An American counterattack on April 24 proved only a temporary s

back . By May 10 Clinton was within thirty paces of the American works, t

firing of the chasseurs, light infantry troops armed with rifles, prov

decisive. The city was doomed . Lincoln capitulated on the 12th . In doing 

he surrendered an army of more than 200 officers, including seven genera

and better than 2,300 non-commissioned officers and privates. The loss w

stunning.

Ferdinand de Brahm, now a major in the Corps of Engineers, left an 

count of the siege, beginning with Clinton's arrival on February 9 . 28 T

journal is the most detailed record by an American engineer officer of t

southern campaign prior to Yorktown.

4 . AN ENGINEER DESCRIBES THE SIEGE OF CHARLESTON, 1780

From Ferdinand de Brahm's journal .

February 9, 1780-The English fleet arrived in Stono Inlet; the al

was fired in Charlestown.

10th-The troops landed .

March 9 and 10, 1780-Seven vessels were sunk near the mouth 

Cooper River, and cables fixed from one to the other, to prevent the 

trance of this river.

13th-The enemy took possession of the land on Ashley River 

posite the town, constructed a battery near the mouth of Wappoo, on 

prolongation of Tradd Street.

21st-The English fleet passed the bar, and anchored in Five Fath

Hole.

25th-Our armed vessels before'Fort Moultrie returned to town; th

cannon were transported into the land batteries.

29th-The English army crossed Ashley River twelve miles above 

town.

30th-The advanced guard of the enemy came within two miles 

Charlestown, when a party of two hundred men, under Colonel Jo

Laurens (and a little while after two field-pieces), went out against the

who, after a skirmish of some hours, returned towards sun-set. The f

tifications of Charlestown were, even at this time, very incomplete. All 

negroes in town were impressed, who, together with the parties detai

from the garrison, were henceforth employed upon the works.

31st-At day-break we observed that the enemy had opened 

trenches in three places .

April 1 and 2, 1780-The enemy's works were a little extended, a

ours augmented.

3d-This morning the battery was discovered upon a height, at Ham

stead . Abattery of four pieces was constructed on our right to oppose t

of the enemy, from which, as well as from all the others, a continued fir

of shot and bombs was kept up the following night along the lines.

4th-This morning, daylight discovered to us the enemy's battery v

much injured .

5th-Last night's fire of our batteries was kept up as heretofore . T

enemy's galley approached the town, and fired upon it all night . We beg

to dig wells in our front, and to close up the gorge of the horn work [

Citadel] .

SIEGE OF CHARLESTON, 1780 . Ferdinand de Brahm, one of

several skillful cartographers in the Revolutionary War Corps of

Engineers, sketched this plan of British approaches and American

defenses as they appeared in 1780.

Engineer Museum, Fort Belvoir, Virginia

27 3
6th-The fire of the batteries and the works continued as before 

day the reinforcement under General Woodford arrived .

7th-Very little fire from our batteries last night, and more on the 

of the enemy. The enemy has prolonged the right of his first parallel 

ourworkmen employed digging wells.

8th-Last night the enemy commenced a battery of six pieces. All 

workmen employed making traverses . A quarter of an hour before 

set, the English fleet passed Fort Moultrie, under a heavy fire on 

sides, and anchored in a line near Fort Johnson. Nobody wounde

killed in Fort Moultrie. The fleet consisted of the following vessels :-

of 50 guns, two of 40, four frigates, two vessels armed en flute, and 

other smaller ones ; one of these armed en flute grounded on a bank ca

"The Green."

9th-The vessel which grounded was abandoned, and burnt by 

crew last night. This morning the commencement of a battery appeare

front of our left . Our workmen employed as heretofore .

10th-The works of the enemy were advanced . Our negroes emplo

in making a battery of five pieces in redoubt, and the soldiers on fatig

making traverses. This evening a parley was received from the ene

demanding the surrender of the town ; it was refused .

11th-Our batteries kept up a great deal of fire last night. The en

had repaired his batteries, and mounted some cannon . Finished the 

tery in the redoubt . Our workmen employed in making traverses, 

strengthening the profiles of some works . This evening Major Gilbank 

accidentally killed, making some experiments with shells .

12th-Very little firing last night. The enemy had more ca

mounted. The workmen employed as before. Our sailors employe

elevating the parapet near Exchange Battery, and making embrasure

it . At 12 o'clock, meridian, three chalops [Shallops] passed Fort Moult

and joined the fleet, although fired upon all the time by the Fort .

13th-Very little firing last night. This morning one of the batteri

the enemy was finished, the others not quite; the trenches extended . 

morning, at 9 o'clock, the enemy opened his batteries, firing bombs, 

casses and hot balls, which were returned with all our force from the 

teries . This lasted about two hours, when the firing was abated on 

sides, till about 5 o'clock, when all the fire was on the side of the en

We had one 18 pounder dismounted, and two houses burnt in town 

workmen employed as before .

14th-A slow fire was kept up on both sides last night . The approa

of the enemy a little advanced . The enemy's galley fired all night. He 

menced another battery opposite the town, on the banks of Ashley Ri

15th-Fire from the batteries and works as before . The enemy h

bomb battery . His second parallel commenced, and manned by the C

seurs, who kept up a continued fire upon our lines .

27 4
16th-In addition to his usual fire, the enemy opened his new batte

Last night we extended from our redoubt a counter-mine with a sma

parallel whence we could return the fire of the enemy's musketry. Th

evening one of our Gallies ascended Cooper river to a place whence s

enfiladed the English camp for several hours, which was briskly answer

by field pieces from the camp .

17th-The enemy enfiladed the town on all sides last night and thre

great quantity of bombs-sometimes from fifteen to twenty at once. W

worked upon our counter mine. We received intelligence from our deta

ment at Lamprieres [Lempriere's Point], that one thousand or fifteen hu

dred of the enemy under General Lord Cornwallis had passed Monk

Corner, Strawberry, Bonneau's Ferry, and Wappetaw, and actually arri

within six miles of the said post. This morning the enemy's second par

lel was prolonged towards our left, supplied with bags of earth and full 

Chasseurs.

18th-Fire from the batteries as heretofore, and a shower of musket

all day; this day like last night very rainy.

19th-Fire from the batteries as heretofore . This evening three of 

enemies Gallies descended from Wappoo down Ashley river to the Fl

under a heavy fire from our batteries; one lost her main mast . This ni

the communication is made from the battery of the French sailors to 

town .

20th-Fire from the batteries as ordinary . This evening the Rave

commenced in front of the horn work .

21st-Fire from the batteries as ordinary. This morning the enemy h

commenced two batteries, near his second parallel .

22d-Fire from the batteries as ordinary ; and from the musketry mo

than ever. This morning a parley was sent to the enemy and the answ

returned about 9 o'clock in the evening .

23d-Fire from the batteries as ordinary . The enemy extended 

saps of his second parallel .

24th-Fire from the batteries as ordinary . This morning at daybreak

party of two hundred men under Col . Henderson made a sortie up on 

enemies works which caused a general fire of musketry on both sid

The party returned in a little while with twelve prisoners . Our loss was o

Captain and one soldier killed .

25th-As ordinary . Last night Col . Parker of the Virginia line was ki

by a musket shot.

26th-As ordinary. The enemy commenced his third parallel . Tro

from a vessel and four gallies, landed at Mount Pleasant, and took poss

sion of a battery of one piece, losing one galley in this affair .

27th-As ordinary.

28th-As ordinary. Last night our Fort at Lamprier's was evacuat

and taken possession of by the enemy to-day . It was not until this mome

27 5
that Charlestown was completely invested ; the enemy having posse

of James Island, Wappoo, Charlestown Neck, Hobcaw Point, Lampri

and Haddrell's Point ; and his fleet anchored in the Road-stead befo

town .

29th-As ordinary. The enemy's third parallel almost finished, 

battery commenced; as likewise a redoubt on our side.

30th-As ordinary.

May 1st, 2nd, and 3rd-As ordinary. Our hospital ship taken b

English and carried higher up the river.

4th, 5th, and 6th-The enemy employed in making three batteries 

his third parallel . And we to make two redoubts .

7th-This morning at eight o'clock Fort Moultrie capitulated . A 

gun ship joined the English Fleet.

8th-As ordinary . Another redoubt was commenced last night in r

our left line . This morning the enemy sent a parley again to deman

town-the truce was prolonged throughout the whole day. In a Coun

War composed of all the officers of the General Staff, it was resolve

majority of votes, to propose a capitulation .

9th-The enemy had cannon mounted in the batteries of his 

parallel . The two commanders not agreeing upon the terms of capitu

the siege commenced this evening at nine o'clock with greater wa

than ever.

May 10th-As ordinary .

11th-As ordinary. The enemy's trenches are extended under t

batis of the advanced battery. This afternoon a parley was sent t

enemy to propose fresh terms of capitulation .

12th-The terms were accepted, and the English army took po

sion of the town . The English have worked very hard upon the for

tions . All that I can learn is, that they have strengthened the profiles 

lines ; that they have constructed a Fort at Hampstead . . . and 

redoubts more advanced ; they have also commenced a batte

Shultz's Folly-but the foundation is scarcely raised .

Among the captured at Charleston was Army Chief of Engineers 

Duportail . In the letter to Congress below, Duportail described the ci

stances of capitulation and the debate over the terms of surr

Throughout he evinced the Frenchman's concern that the situati

resolved without loss of honor. He also pointed out that upon arriving 

April he had judged the city must fall unless relieved . The full coun

war had disagreed and flatly rejected his proposal to evacuate the city 

my part," recounted Duportail, "[evacuation] only appeared to me di

276

-Gibbes, Documentary Hi

2:124-28.
and hazardous and Such as we ought to risk in our present Situation .

he congratulated the Americans for courageously resisting the siege 

long and concluded "the Ennemy have not great Subject to triumph."

Louis Duportail to the President of Congress.

Sir

5. "IN ALL THIS THE HONOR OF THE AMERICAN ARMS IS SECUR

277

Charleston, 17 May 

You will probably heard of the surrender of Charlestown by the 

you will receive this letter . I arrived here the 25th of Apl . 29 at seven 

morning, after having passed during the Night in the Middle of th

nemies, through the Woods with the assistance of good Guides . I f

the Town in a desperate State almost entirely invested by the British 

and Fleet which had passed the Bar and Fort Moultrie . They had 

mounted difficulties which were generally looked upon as insupe

without experiencing scarce any resistence . The Ennemy had br

their trenches upon the Neck within about 120 or 130 Yards from the 

fications ; in a word the fall of the Town was unavoidable unless an 

come to her assistance which then did not appear likely . After havin

amined the Situation of things I thought an evacuation highly advi

and I proposed it-but the Council found an impracticability i

Measure although for my part, it only appeared to me difficult and ha

ous and Such as we ought to risk in our present Situation .

That Plan being rejected the only object was to protract the term o

Capitulation . I have done on my part every thing that was in my pow

fulfill that object in the Same manner that Colonel Laumoy had befor

arrival, but time brought us to lose sight of the term of our resistance 

Ennemy succeeded in draining part of the Ditch which was in front o

intrenchments and raised nine Batteries in their third Parallel . Th

they opened them they Sent a flag with a Letter to summon Genera

coln to Surrender. Upon this a Council of Generals and field officers 

called and after having asked whether terms ought to be proposed 

Ennemy and it was carried in the affirmative by great majority, I mysel

of that number. As the first propositions were from the Ennemy we 

expect advantageous Conditions, I had even Some hope that we 

have Saved the Garrison ; besides a positive refusal to treat with a

nemy who within a few days could have been in a condition of giving 

law appeared imprudent and unreasonable . It was then determin

Council that propositions should be made, but afterwards by an 

ordinary oversight they left to the General Officers the care of determ
what was to be proposed. This is the moment where I left off taking 

part in what has been done being of a contrary opinion to that of the o

Genl . officers. They agreed to propose that the Continental Troops Sh

be prisoners of War. I opposed that measure with all my might . I r

sented that if even our situation required it, it was not our business to 

pose it and that we Showed an ignorance of what is practised in t

cases which would make us appear in a ridicule light . I represented th

had been of opinion with the greatest Number to propose terms to th

nemy, I mean that they Should be honorable terms, both advantageo

the Army and Continent; as for instance to surrender the Town alone 

the Artillery, Store and Ships ; but to save the Troops ; that if the army 

be Prisoners of War it was more eligible to hold out in order to justify S

unfavorable Conditions by a longer resistance and more distressing S

tion . My representations had not the desired affect . The proposit

were made such as you will see them . Fortunately, Such as they were 

majority would not grant them and proposed others less advantag

which General Lincoln did not however think proper to accept. The t

was broke and the operations of the Siege vigorously continued . Bu

second day after the Militia refused to do duty General Lincoln tho

from this that the Capitulation was absolutely necessary and called 

Council who countenanced the Measure; for my own part I thought tha

ought to try before to bring the Militia to their duty by every poss

Means, by acts of authority, and if necessary by exemplary punishme

This was likely deemed impracticable, and the Capitulation took pla

my Great regrete Not that I think we could have held out longer than t

or four days, but that we should have put the Ennemy in Such a Situa

to render a further resistence on our part blamable to every body; then 

defence would have done us much More honor. It is true that in that 

the conditions would not likely have been the Same but I was for Sacr

ing that advantage to a little more glory. Fortunately in all this the hon

the American arms is Secure and the Ennemy have not great Subje

triumph . To remain fourty two days in open trenches before a Town o

immense extent fortified by sandy Intrenchments raised in two mo

without covered way, without out works, open in Several places on 

water Side, exposed every where to attacks and defended by a Garr

which was not sufficient by half to what was necessary, before Su

place I say and display all the appearance of a regular Siege, is not

very glorious . The English General has perhaps followed the ru

prudence in conducting himself so-but at best the troops that he 

manded have assuredly no reason to boast of their ardor or enterpri

spirit ; while on the other hand the American troops gave certain pro

their firmness to support, for more than forty days, a terrible fire-a

remain so long exposed to the danger of surprises, or attacks de 

force, which were certain of success if the enemy took its meas

carefully.

27 8
M. de Laumoy and the engineers whom he has under his orders, h

been so busy constructing the fortifications of Charlestown, both bef

and during the seige that there was no time to make a design of 

plans-this deprives me of the satisfaction of sending them to C

gress-supposing indeed the enemy would permit it .

The British held the Charleston captives nearby at Haddrel's Poi

where Duportail remained until he was exchanged in November 1780 . 

letter to the Chevalier de La Luzerne, the French ambassador to the Uni

States, Duportail starkly depicted the discomforts of his situation.

6. "I AM HERE IN AFLAT COUNTRY WHERE GREEN STAGNANT

POOLS EXHALE CORRUPTION"

Louis Duportail to the Chevalier de La Luzerne.

. . . At this moment, M. le Chevalier, you are doubtless living in one of 

pleasant country houses near Philadelphia . You are enjoying the beauti

season of July-a moderate climate with pleasing prospects . I am s

you walk daily in cool woods-whereas I am here in a flat country whe

green stagnant pools exhale corruption-there is no water fit to drink-

soil is nothing but sand which burns the flat of the foot and blinds o

when the wind blows. Although we are surrounded with woods we are 

allowed to walk in them and they are of a kind of pine that gives no sha

and interrupts the little air one might enjoy . Corn and potatoes are the o

products of the country . . . one sees a few negroes-covered with a f

miserable rags . . . and wretched peasants only a little less dark than th

negroes-who go about barefooted and without education or pol

ness . . . . At night, if one does not have two mosquito nets there is 

hope of closing the eyes . Even so the noise they make keeps o

awake-any way, no matter what is done they manage to enter in an 

finite number of places and the body is covered with bites which obl

one perpetually to scratch with both hands. I have had to stop this le

twenty times for that reason . You will see Monsieur, how we pass our t

here, and you may judge how much I wish to leave this place. . . .

27 9

-Papers of the Continen

Congress, roll 181 .

7 July 1

-Kite, Duportail, pp. 177-78
After Charleston the rebel position in the south reached its nadir. 

British controlled Georgia with redcoats stationed at Savannah 

Augusta, and South Carolina with troops at Ninety-Six, Orangeburg, 

Forts Granby, Watson, and Motte. Leaving Cornwallis behind to 

solidate British strength, Clinton returned victorious to New York .

Over General George Washington's objections Congress appointed 

Gen . Horatio Gates, the hero of Saratoga, to replace Lincoln as comman

of the Southern Department . Gates's mission was to revitalize patriot mo

and win back territory . As evidenced by the disastrous American defea

Camden (August 1780), he failed miserably. Thus in early December C

gress gave the command to Maj . Gen. Nathaniel Greene, Washingt

original choice. Greene acted decisively . Daringly dividing his army, 

went on the offensive .

North Carolina's landscape was laced with rivers that could be e

obstacles to success or instruments of mobility, depending upon cir

stances and Greene's knowledge of the rivers . To learn more, the gen

called on Thaddeus Kosciuszko, his only engineer, 30 to reconnoiter 

Catawba River . Greene also sent Lt . Col . Edward Carrington, an offic

the 1st Continental Artillery detailed to serve as Greene's quarterma

general, to explore the Roanoke and Dan rivers, and Brig . Gen . Edw

Stevens, an officer in the Virginia militia, to explore the Yadkin River . T

orders required reports on the depth and flow of the rivers ; the locati

obstacles such as rocks, shoals, and falls; road conditions ; and the dist

between towns . In short, Greene wanted to know everything pertainin

transportation possibilities on the rivers year-round . The resulting sur

were the earliest made of these rivers . Although the reports do not surv

very likely they were invaluable to Greene's campaign.

Greene entrusted a variety of tasks to Kosciuszko, whom he once ca

"Master of his profession ." 31 When Greene wanted a new camp wher

could rest and train his army and repair equipment, he sent Kosciuszk

find the spot . After exploring the Pedee River in mid-December 1780, 

ciuszko chose an excellent site at Cheraw Hills, South Carolina. O

January 1781 Greene gave Kosciuszko an important new assignment : o

seeing the construction of flat-bottomed boats to be transported overla

wagons and used by the army in amphibious operations .

Lacking enough men to make an effective stand, Greene led Cornwa

on a 200-mile chase toward Virginia . Intending to avoid capture by cro

into Virginia if necessary, Greene dispatched Kosciuszko ahead to 

earthworks at Boyd's Ferry on the north shore of the Dan. Cornwallis 

sisted and on February 14 finally forced Greene to cross into Virg

Greene used some of. Kosciuszko's boats and immediately took cover be

the engineer's hastily erected defenses . Without boats of his own Cornwa

reluctantly gave up the pursuit .

Greene's escape across the Dan was crucial to the survival of 

American cause in the south . Cornwallis had barely withdrawn 

280
Greene's men began moving back across the river . Anxious to reestabl

himself in North Carolina, the American general sent Kosciuszko east 

Halifax on the Roanoke River with instructions to erect fortifications if t

could be done quickly. The trip over bad roads through territory thic

populated with Tories was difficult, but miraculously the engineer mad

in less than three days. Characteristically, Kosciuszko regretted taking 

long. "As I Could not get Horses on the road, and was Obliged to go f

part of the way," he apologized to Greene, "you will be pleased to th

[think] that I have don what I Could. -32 Once at Halifax Kosciuszko was

no time . The morning after his arrival he surveyed the town and conclu

at least six redoubts would be required to defend the place adequately . 

there were few entrenching tools and no militia or Negroes to do the job, 

recommended against fortifications . Only the town's stores and magazi

would entice the enemy to attack . So, in Kosciuszko's opinion, the best so

tion was to evacuate them from the town .

33

Greene spent the next several months recapturing British outposts in 

Carolina backcountry . There were victories and reverses, but by fall 

enemy had been driven to the coast . As Greene asserted, "We fight, 

beat, rise, and fight again." 34 Along the way Kosciuszko selected and 

tified encampments and during most battles directed the erection of fort

cations .

Greene's push against the British was ably assisted by men such as 

Col. Henry "Light-Horse Harry" Lee, commander of Lee's Legion, a co

of three troops of cavalry and three companies of infantry. Lee's Memoir

the War in the Southern Department is a marvelous source for the stor

the successful American campaign to win back the south. Below are excer

dealing with the sieges of British outposts at Fort Watson, Augusta, 

Ninety-Six in the period April-June 1781 .

During the siege of Fort Watson in mid-April the rebels utilized a 

device, a prefabricated log crib with a gun platform, known as a Mah

tower after its designer, Col . Hezekiah Maham, commander of an indep

dent South Carolina dragoon regiment . Maham was not an officer in 

Corps of Engineers but his tower ranks as one of the war's significant inno

tions in siege works . The Maham tower, which rose above the walls of 

British forts, was a very practical solution to the rebels' shortage of artil

and entrenching tools . Success at Fort Watson led to its use at Augusta 

Ninety-Six .

7. A MAHAM TOWER IS USED AGAINST FORT WATSON

From Henry Lee's memoirs.

April 1781. . . . On the evening of the 15th, [Lt . Col . Francis] Mar

and [Lt. Col. Henry] Lee took a position in the open country, with [

28 1
John] Watson to their left, considerably below them, and on the rou

the fort called by his name, which he had erected .

Determined to carry this post without delay, Marion and Lee sat 

before it early in the evening; not doubting, from the information rece

that the garrison must soon be compelled to surrender, for want of w

with which it was supplied from an adjacent lake, and from which th

rison might be readily and effectually secluded . In a very few hour

customary mode of supplying the post with water was completely 

ped; and had the information received been correct, a surrender 

garrison could not have been long delayed. The ground selected b

onel Watson for his small stockade, was an Indian mount, generally 

ceived to be the cemetery of the tribe inhabiting the circumjacent re

it was at least thirty feet high, and surrounded by table land . Ca

M'Koy, the commandant, saw at once his inevitable fate, unless he 

devise some other mode of procuring water, for which purpose h

mediately cut a trench secured by abbatis from his fosse to the 

which passed close to the Indian mount. Baffled in their expectation

destitute both of artillery and intrenching tools, Marion and Lee desp

of success; when . . . Maham, of South Carolina, accompanying 

brigadier, suggested a plan, which was no sooner communicated 

adopted. He proposed to cut down a number of suitable trees i

nearest wood, and with them to erect a large strong oblong pen, 

covered on the top with a floor of logs, and protected on the side opp

to the fort with a breast work of light timber. To the adjacent 

dragoons were despatched for axes, the only necessary tool, of wh

sufficient number being soon collected, relays of working parties 

allotted for the labour; some to cut, some to convey, and som

erect. . . . Maham undertook the execution of his plan, which was 

pletely finished before the morning of the 23d, effective as to the ob

and honourable to the genius of the inventor. The besieged was, li

besieger, unprovided with artillery, and could not interrupt the progre

a work, the completion of which must produce immediate submission 

A party of riflemen, being ready, took post in the Maham tower th

ment it was completed ; and a detachment of musketry, under cover o

riflemen, moved to make a lodgment in the enemy's ditch, support

the legion infantry with fixed bayonets . Such was the effect of the fire 

the riflemen, having thorough command of every part of the fort, fro

relative supereminence of the tower, that every attempt to resist the 

ment was crushed. The commandant, finding every resource cut off, 

out the white flag . It was followed by a proposal to surrender, w

issued in a capitulation . This incipient operation having been happi

fected by the novel and effectual device of . . . Maham, to whom the 

mandants very gratefully expressed their acknowledgment, Mario

Lee, preceded by the legion cavalry under major Rudolph, who had 

282
detached on the day subsequent to the investiture of the fort, turned t

attention to lieutenant colonel Watson, now advancing from belo

relieve his garrison . Knowing that the fall of Camden was closely 

nected with the destruction of Watson, the American commanda

viewed with delight his approach ; and having disposed of the prison

moved to join the cavalry, now retiring in front of the enemy.

8. LEE RECOUNTS THE SIEGE OF AUGUSTA

From Henry Lee's memoirs.

-Lee, Memoirs, pp. 218-19.

May-June, 1781. The works contiguous to the [Savannah] river had 

vanced nearly to the required state, and those which had been s

sequently commenced in the rear of the fort [Fort Cornwallis] began 

assume a formidable appearance yet extreme difficulty occurred in 

consummation of the plans adopted by the besiegers, as the surround

ground presented no swell or hill which would enable them to bring t

six pounder to bear upon the enemy. It was determined to resort to 

Maham tower, the effect of which Lee had so happily witnessed at 

Watson ; and orders were accordingly issued to prepare and brin

timber of such a size as would sustain our only piece of artillery .

Browne35 heretofore had patiently looked on at our approach, 

gently working within his fort, as we discovered by the heaps of fresh 

earth in various directions ; but with what view remained unascertai

Seeing that his enemy's works were rapidly advancing, he now de

mined to interrupt our progress by sallies, however hazardous, which 

foresaw could alone retard his approaching fate-hoping that in the d

he might find safety. On the 28th [May] he fell upon our works in the 

quarter at midnight, and, by the suddenness and vigour of his onset, dr

the guard before him ; but the support under captain Handy coming 

after an obstinate conflict, regained the trenches, and forced the enem

take shelter in the fort. The determined spirit manifested by the foe in 

attempt to destroy our approaches, induced lieutenant colonel Lee to 

propriate his infantry exclusively for their defence at night, relieving t

from any further share in labour and from every other duty. It was div

into two divisions, to one of which was alternately committed the pro

tion of our works . On the succeeding night Browne renewed his attem

the same quarter; and for a long time the struggle was continued 

mutual pertinacity, till at length captain Rudolph, by a combined cha

with the bayonet, cleared the trenches, driving the enemy with loss t

strong hold . On the 30th the timber required to build the Maham tower 

283
prepared and conveyed to the intended site . In the evening we 

menced its erection, under cover of an old house to conceal our o

from the enemy. In the course of the night and ensuing day we 

brought our tower nearly on a level with the enemy's parapet, and b

to fill its body with fascines, earth, stone, brick, and every other c

nient rubbish, to give solidity and strength to the structure . At the 

time the adjacent works, in the rear of the fort, were vigorously push

the enemy's left to connect them with the tower, the point of terminat

Browne's attention was soon drawn to this quarter; and, penetr

the use to which the log building would be applied, he determin

demolish it without delay .

[Brig . Gen. Andrew] Pickens and Lee, well assured from what 

passed that their judicious opponent would leave nothing uness

within his power to destroy their tower-on the completion of which 

expectation of immediate success chiefly depended-determine

prepare before night for the counteraction of any attempt which mig

made . . . . The tower was designated as the peculiar object of atten

and to its defence one company of musketry was exclusively applied 

more than one third of the night had passed when the enemy beg

move ; concealing his real object by renewing his attempt upon the 

quarter, where Rudolph, with his accustomed gallantry, gave him a w

reception . While the contest here was bravely urged, and as bravely 

tained, lieutenant colonel Browne, with the elite of his garrison, fell 

our works in his rear. Here for awhile the militia of Pickens contended 

vigour, but at length were forced by the bayonet out of the tren

Handy, leaving one company at the tower, with his main body hasten

support the militia, who very gallantly united with the regulars, and tu

upon the successful foe. The conflict became furious ; but at length 

Marylanders under Handy carried the victory by the point of the bayo

Upon this occasion the loss on both sides exceeded all which had 

curred during the siege . Browne, finding that every effort to destroy 

works by open war proved ineffectual, now resorted to stratagem . Lee 

omitted to pull down, as was originally intended, the old wooden ho

under cover of which the tower had been commenced, and which b

cidentally taking fire would have probably consumed it . This hous

tracted Browne's notice, and he determined, by burning it, to rid hi

of the tower. He had by this time erected a platform in one of the angl

the fort opposite to our Maham tower, and which, being mounted with 

of his heaviest pieces or ordnance, opened upon it before it was finis

Nevertheless the exertions of the builders, did not slacken, and o

first of June the tower was completed, and was found to overlook 

enemy's parapet . The upper logs having been sawed to let in an 

brasure for our six pounder, it only remained to make an apron upon w

the matrosses36 could draw up their piece to the floor of the tower .

284
This was done in the course of the day, and at dawn on the second o

six pounder was mounted, completely commanding the enemy's fort . F

ley instantly announced his readiness to act by returning the enemy

cannonade, which had been continued without intermission . Before no

the enemy's two pieces were dismounted from the platform, and all the 

terior of the fort was raked, excepting the segment nearest to the towe

and some other spots sheltered by traverses .

-Lee, Memoirs, pp. 243-45.

In laying siege to Ninety-Six, Greene relied on the advice of Kosciuszk

The engineer's decision to concentrate the rebel effort against the s

redoubt-the enemy's strong point-met with sharp criticism from Le

who felt it was more realistic to cut off the town's water supply by seiz

nearby Fort Holmes. Despite this major disagreement, Light-Horse Har

conceded that Kosciuszko was "considered skilful in his profession, a

much esteemed for his mildness of disposition and urbanity of manners ."

As the siege wore on and the enemy garrison appeared on the verge 

receiving reinforcements, Lee deplored Kosciuszko's failure to attack 

enemy's left . Had he done so earlier, Lee believed, the enemy, deprived 

water, would already have surrendered . Kosciuszko, on the other han

maintained that he did not have enough men to lay siege to the enemy's l

and right simultaneously, so "we thought proper to begin against the S

redoubt ." The engineer offered no further explanation for the choice . 

nally Lee personally directed a successful assault against Fort Holmes, bu

proved too late .

All along the enemy's best hope was for fresh troops. When relief fina

appeared within striking distance on 18 June 1781 Greene reluctantly agre

to storm the fort after "his soldiers, with one voice, intreated to be 

against [it] ." As described by Lee, the attack failed and Greene abandon

the siege .

The following accounts of the siege by Lee and Kosciuszko emphasize 

disruptive effect of repeated enemy sorties against the rebel works . Indee

the first night's accomplishments were immediately destroyed . Dur

another British sally the night of June 9, the enemy surprised Koscius

while he inspected a mine shaft he was building near the star fort . Luck

the engineer escaped with only a wound. 37

9 . KOSCIUSZKO "PRESSED FORWARD HIS APPROACH WITH

INDEFATIGABLE LABOUR"

From Henry Lee's memoirs.

Colonel Kosciusko, a Polish officer, at the head of the engineers in 

southern army, was considered skilful in his profession, and mu

285
esteemed for his mildness of disposition and urbanity of manners. To 

officer general Greene committed the designation of the course and m

of approach . Never regarding the importance which was attache

depriving the enemy of water, for which he depended on the rivulet to 

left, Kosciusko applied his undivided attention to the demolition of 

star, the strongest point of the enemy's defence. Breaking ground c

to this fortress,38 he laboured during the first night [21 May 1781] with 

gence, but had not been able to place in great forwardness his incip

works. No sooner was this attempt of the besieger perceived, than lie

nant colonel Cruger39 determined to prepare a platform in one of 

salient angles of the star, opposite to our works, for the reception of t

pieces of artillery, all he possessed, with intention to cover a detachm

charged with the expulsion of our working parties, to be followed by a 

ond for the demolition of the works . Before noon the platform was 

ished, and the artillery mounted in it . The parapet was manned with in

try ; and the sallying party . . . ready in the enemy's ditch, rushed u

our works, covered by the artillery and musketry. [Lt . Col . John] Ro

drove before him our guards and working parties, putting to the bayo

all whom he found ; and was followed by a detachment of loyalists, 

quickly demolished the works, carrying off the intrenching tools . 

enemy sustained no loss in this first exhibition of his decision 

courage, but that of lieutenant Roney, who died of a wound he recei

while gallantly leading on his men.

So judiciously was this sally planned, and so rapidly conducted, t

although Greene instantly sent a detachment to support Kosciusko, 

object was accomplished before support could arrive . Taught by 

essay that his enemy was of a cast not to be rashly approached, K

ciusko was directed to resume his labours under cover of a ravine, and 

more respectful distance [400 yards] . He broke ground again in the n

of the 23d, still directing his approaches against the star redoubt. . . .

General Greene had exerted himself, with unremitting industry

complete the works against the star redoubt ; to which single object 

onel Kosciusko directed all his efforts . The enemy's left had been enti

neglected, although in that quarter was procured the chief supply 

water . As soon as the corps of Lee entered camp [8 June], that officer 

directed to take post opposite to the enemy's left and to comme

regular approaches against the stockade [Fort Holmes] . Very soon 

pushed his ditch to the ground designated for the erection of the batt

under the cover of which the subsequent approaches would be made 

the course of the next day this battery was erected, and lieutenant F

with a six pounder, took possession of it . The besiegers advancing cl

and closer, with caution and safety, both on the right and left, lieute

colonel Cruger foresaw his inevitable destruction, unless averted by 

approach of lord Rawdon. 40 To give time for the desired event, he de

286
mined, by nocturnal sallies, to attempt to carry our trenches, and 

destroy with the spade whatever he might gain by the bayonet. These r

contres were fierce and frequent, directed sometimes upon one quart

sometimes upon another: but so judicious had been the arrangements 

the American general to counteract these expected attempts, that in 

one instance did the British commandant succeed . The mode adopt

was nevertheless pursued without intermission; and although failing to 

fect the chief object contemplated, became extremely harassing to t

American army,-whose repose during the night was incessantly d

turbed, and whose labour in the day was as incessantly pressed . Ignor

of the situation and prospects of the British general as lieutenant colo

Cruger continued to be, 41 he nevertheless indulged the confidence, t

every effort would be made for his relief, and persevered with firmne

and vigour in his defence. As soon as the second parallel was finish

general Greene directed colonel [Otho Holland] Williams, adjut

general, to summon the British commandant ; stating to him his relat

situation, and assuring him that perseverance in resistance would be va

and might produce disagreeable consequences to himself and garris

Cruger returned, by his adjutant, a verbal answer; declaring his det

mination to hold out to the last extremity, and his perfect disregard 

general Greene's promises or threats . Failing in this attempt, our b

teries opened from the second parallel, under cover of which Koscius

pressed forward his approach with indefatigable labour. . . .

Our approaches continued to be pushed with unabated diligence, 

the hope that they might be brought to maturity in time to enforce the s

mission of the garrison, before the British general could make good 

long march.

We now began to deplore the early inattention of the chief engineer 

the enemy's left ; persuaded that had he been deprived of the use of 

rivulet in the beginning of the siege, he must have been forced to s

render before the present hour. It was deemed practicable to set fire 

the stockade fort, and thus to demolish the water defence on the left of 

rivulet. In the succeeding day, a dark violent storm came on from the we

without rain . Lieutenant colonel Lee proposed to general Greene to p

mit him to make the attempt. This being granted, a sergeant with n

privates of the legion infantry, furnished with combustible matter, w

directed to approach the stockade in the most concealed direction, un

cover of the storm, while the batteries in every quarter opened upon 

enemy, and demonstrations of striking at the star redoubt were mad

with the expectation of diverting his attention from the intrepid par

which, with alacrity, undertook the hazardous enterprise . The serge

conducted his gallant band in the best manner; concealing it whenever 

ground permitted, and then exposed to view crawling along upon 

belly. At length he reached the ditch with three others; the whole cl

28 7
behind . Here unluckily he was discovered, while in the act of applying 

fire . Himself and five were killed ; the remaining four escaped unh

although many muskets were discharged at them running through 

field, before they got beyond the nearest rise of ground which could co

them from danger. After this disappointment, nothing remained bu

force our works to maturity, and to retard the advance of the Bri

army. . . .

. . . Major Greene, who commanded in the star with great ability, f

ing that our third parallel was nearly finished, and that a Maham tower 

erecting which would overlook his parapet, very judiciously covered it 

sandbags, to lessen the capacity derived from superior height, lea

between each bag an aperture for the use of his riflemen . Nor were the 

proaches on the left less forward than those on the right; they not 

were directed against the stockade, but also were carried so near 

rivulet, as to render supplies of water difficult and precarious . The fire 

ing the 17th was so effectual, as to induce the enemy to withdraw 

guards established between the rivulet and the stockade ; and partie

the troops on the left were posted in various points, to annoy the c

munication with the rivulet . These arrangements succeeded through

the day completely, and the enemy suffered greatly from this privat

though accomplished too late to produce material advantage . Raw

continued to advance by forced marches . . . .

. . . [Rawdon] baffled all the measures adopted by Greene to delay 

approach . It now became necessary to hazard an assault, to m

Rawdon, or to retire . The American general was disposed to immi

Caesar at Alesia; first to beat the relieving army, and then to take 

besieged town . But his regular force did but little exceed the half of 

under Rawdon, which added to his militia, consisting of the corps of S

ter, Marion, and Pickens, still left him numerically inferior to the Bri

general . Nevertheless confiding in his known superiority of cavalry, 

would have given battle to his lordship, could he have left an adequ

corps to attend to the garrison . Compelled to relinquish this plan, 

determined to storm the fort, although his works were yet unfinished 

our left, our third parallel was completed, two trenches and a mine w

nearly let into the enemy's ditch, and the Maham tower was finished .

On our right, the trenches were within twenty yards of his ditch ; 

the battery directed by lieutenant Finn, gave to the assailant, in 

quarter, advantages which, well supported, ensured success. Gree

anxiously as he desired to conclude his severe toils in triumph, 

averse to the unequal contest to which he must necessarily expose 

faithful troops, and would probably have decided on the safe course, 

not his soldiers, with one voice, intreated to be led against the fort . 

American army having witnessed the unconquerable spirit which actu

their general, as well as the unexpected results of former battles, c

288
not brook the idea of abandoning the siege, without one bold attempt 

force a surrender . . . . Orders were issued to prepare for storming ; a

the hour of twelve on the next day (18th June) was appointed for t

assailing columns to advance by signal from the centre battery.

. . . Fascines were prepared to fill up the enemy's ditch, long pol

with iron hooks were furnished to pull down the sandbags, with eve

other requisite to facilitate the progress of the assailant . At eleven t

third parallel was manned, and our sharp shooters took their station in t

tower. The first signal was announced from the centre battery, upon whi

the assailing columns entered the trenches ; manifesting delight in t

expectation of carrying by their courage the great prize in view .

At the second cannon, which was discharged at the hour of twelv

Campbell and Lee rushed to the assault . Cruger, always prepare

received them with his accustomed firmness. The parapets were manne

with spike and bayonet, and the riflemen fixed at the sand bag aperture

maintained a steady and destructive fire . [Lt . Isaac] Duval and [Lt. Samue

Seldon entered the the enemy's ditch at different points, and [Co

Richard] Campbell stood prepared to support them, in the rear of the par

furnished with hooks to pull down the sand bags . This party had al

entered the enemy's ditch, and began to apply the hook. Uncovering t

parapet now would have given us victory ; and such was the vigorous su

port afforded by the musketry from the third parallel, from the riflemen 

the tower, and from the artillery mounted in battery, that sanguine expe

tations of this happy issue were universally indulged . The moment t

bags in front were pulled down, Campbell would have mounted the par

pet, where the struggle could not have been long maintained . Cruger h

prepared an intermediate battery with his three pieces, which he occ

sionally applied to right and left . At first it was directed against Lee's le

but very soon every piece was applied upon Campbell's right, which w

very injurious to his column .

Major Greene, commanding in the star redoubt, sensible of the dang

to which he was exposed, if the attempted lodgment upon his front curta

succeeded, determined to try the bayonet in his ditch as well as on 

parapet . To captains Campbell and French was committed this bold effo

Entering into the ditch through a sally-port in the rear of the star, they to

opposite directions, and soon came in contact, the one with Duval, t

other with Seldon. Here ensued a desperate conflict . The Americans, 

only fighting with the enemy in front but with the enemy overhead, s

tained gallantly the unequal contest, until Duval and Seldon beca

disabled by wounds, when they yielded, and were driven back with gr

loss to the point of entry . The few surviving escaped with the hookmen 

our trenches, where yet remained Campbell, the sand-bags not be

removed. On the left, the issue was very different. Rudolph gained 

enemy's ditch, and followed by the column, soon opened his way into 

289
fort, from which the enemy, giving their last fire, precipitately retre

Measures were in train on the part of Lee, to follow up his blow by pa

the rivulet, entering the town, and forcing the fortified prison, whenc

left might have yielded substantial aid to the attack upon the star, by 

pelling Cruger to struggle for the town, or forcing him with all his troo

take refuge in the star; a situation not long to be held, crowded as he 

have been, and destitute of water. The adverse fortune experienc

our left column, made the mind of Greene return to his cardinal policy

preservation of adequate force to keep the field .

Charmed with the courage displayed in his view, and regretting it

advantageous application, he sent orders to Campbell to draw off, a

Lee to desist from further advance, but to hold the stockade abandon

the enemy.

Our loss amounted, during the siege, to one hundred and eighty

killed and wounded; that of the garrison to eighty-five . . . .

. . . Gloom and silence pervaded the American camp : every one d

pointed-every one mortified . Three days more, and Ninety-Six must 

fallen ; but this short space was unattainable . Rawdon had approache

vicinity with a force not to be resisted, and it only remained to hol

army safe, by resuming that system which adverse fortune had rend

familiar to us . Greene alone preserved his equanimity; and, h

pleased by the unshaken courage displayed in the assault, announce

grateful sense of the conduct of the troops, as well during the siege 

the attack ; presaging from the past, the happiest result whenever a

portunity should be presented of contending with the enemy upon e

terms-to the attainment of which his best exertions would be invar

directed, relying, as he did, upon the same dAuntless spirit recentl

hibited . Conscious as the army was of having done its duty, it der

consolation from this exhilarating address, and burying in oblivion 

grating repulse, looked forward with the anticipation of soon displa

their courage in a decisive battle .

10. "BLIND FORTUNE NOT ALWAYS KEEP PACE

WITH CURAGE AND GOOD CAUSE"

Thaddeus Kosciuszko's notes on the siege of Ninety-Six .

-Lee, Memoirs, pp. 24

252-57.

[Viewing] the Enmys Works on every side. . . . it apperd that the 

Redoubt upon our left was the Strongest post, not only by been Comp

finished but that Comanded the others two to our right one in whic

Town was inclosed distant at one Hundred and fifty yards and sit

290
near the water and the other smal more upon our right at Three Hundre

and fifty yards. Thos all three redoubts had Comunication with each othe

by Coverd way. . . . Not strong enogh to capture the trenches to our le

and wright at the same time against the Garison of about 500 strong w

thought proper to begin against the Star redoubt. . . .

Accordingly the same night [21 May 1781] the battery was made wit

two fleches to suport it at one hundred and fifty yard from the Sta

redoubt, but as the troops were novice to the operation of that kind an

begon in the night far advanced it was not Complited at a break day 

bring the Canon Pices . . . . The Ennemys vigilant took the advantage an

in the morning at 9 Clock made in considerable nomber the Sallies suport

ing it by the musketery and Artillery from the Fort. . . .

On the 27 of May in the night the Battery was made at 220 yards distan

, with the aproches of Thirty yards farther-[here] the Workmen began to b

exposed to the Continuel of the Enemys fire all night and the [succeeding

but, more danger forseen, was imediatly conteracted by more Exertions 

the Troops .-As the Nature of the Ground was very hard and aproche

very much to Soft Stone the Approches Could not be so fast adwancd.

On the 30th of May the Parallel was half done at one Hundred and fif

yards and [here] the Second Sallies the Enemys made but with small e

fect-Three or four men of both side were killed . The militia now bega

come very fast from the adjacent Countys, which gave oportunity to [open

the Trenches against the smal Redoubt [Fort Holmes] mention(ed) upo

our right-And the same day the Battery was made at 250 yards with th

aproches of 70 yards more advanced .

The 4th of the June upon our left the parallel Complited, the Batter

was made at 180 yards . . . with the fleche 30 yards more adwanced an

the same day in the night the Enemys Trow down the roofs of the house

in the Town and in the Star redoubt and made the Sallies suporting wit

Canon from the work upon our left with no other Sucess then to cut dow

the mantelet wich there was posted to Cover the workmen from Rifle sho

and [quiet] them (the British) if possible by ours .

The Next day upon our left we desmount the Canon in the star Redoub

from the Battery and killed few men in it .

The 6 we [heightened] our Battery Station to 20 feet which oblidge t

Ennemy to intrenche inside half way with the parapet of sixteen fe

high .-We adwanced the aproches but very little and Complit the parale

upon our left at 120 yards . . . .

The same night [June 9] The Ennemys made Sallies with prodigou

fury and killed 4 or 5 men,-on the 12 upon our left the aproches bego

from two places of the Paralell, in side of which the Rifle Battery al

begon to stop the Ennemys Riflem(en) who were so industrious and gre

marksmen that no finger wold be held up half second without been Cut of

On the 14th the Rifle Battery Complited 30 feet high, the Gallery a

wanced 30 yards and the aproches 20 yards and on our left 40 .-On the 

29 1
the Battery was made upon our left .-The Gallery was near to four f

the `Ennemys Dich and the Approches 6 feet.-On the 17th the Ge

reciving the last account of Lord Rawdon coming with 2000 men to r

the Garison of Ninety Six and been sonear that would oblidge us ri

Siedge the next morning. Thoght prudent to try the ardor and enxi

the Troops by the attack upon both redoubts-number of Officer

soldiers hearing the intention of the General present(ed) self as W

teers.But happy lot fell upon few-at 9th Clock in the morning the a

begon-blind fortune not always keep pace with Curage and 

Cause-Colo Lee' upon our right took posesion of the smal redob

very small loss.-But Colo. Campbell upon our left was unsuccessf

this attact-Capt Amstrong and 30 soldiers were killed of which Val

trepidy left us Chearish their memory, regret the loss and bring the 

ple to posterity .

Greene's troops rested for several weeks after the retreat from Ninet

but resumed the offensive in August. In September, at Eutaw Springs, 

Carolina, Greene fought and lost his last major battle. Yet the British 

was so weakened that ultimate American victory seemed only a matt

time. Although the redcoats held on at Savannah until July 1782 a

Charleston until the following December, Cornwallis's defeat at Yorkto

October 1781 (discussed in detail in the following chapter) only left G

the task of countering the enemy's continued yet hopeless resistance .

Throughout 1782 Kosciuszko remained with Greene, serving more 

as an officer of the line than as an engineer . For a while he command

post at Ashley Ferry, where he observed enemy movements at Charle

His duties included acting as an intermediary between Greene an

patriot community in British-occupied Charleston. Kosciuszko p

himself a competent commander . In November he led a surprise atta

enemy troops as they cut wood outside Fort Johnson at the entran

Charleston harbor . This skirmish was a heated affair . His coat to

cannonballs, Kosciuszko narrowly escaped injury.

After the British evacuation of Charleston in December 1782 Kosci

stayed with Greene until spring 1783 . A warm friendship had develop

tween them. As Kosciuszko left the Southern Department Green

pounded on the engineer's "attention, vigilance, and industry" in 

Greene found Kosciuszko to be a man "whom no pleasure could seduc

labor fatigue, and no danger deter ." Above all, in Greene's view, his 

engineer possessed "an unparalleled modesty and entire consciousn

having done anything extraordinary .

"43

-Haiman, Kosciuszko,

pp . 111-14 .
materiel, food and tobacco, a great source of credit in trade with Europe .

Recognizing Virginia's importance, the British tried to weaken her pos

tion as soon as they had the manpower . In May 1779 British Maj . Gen . Ed

ward Mathew conducted successful raids in the area surrounding Port

mouth and Norfolk . Then in December 1780 Brig. Gen . Benedict Arnol

raided plantations along the James River. On 5 January 1781 Arnold cappe

his first assignment since deserting the rebels by capturing Richmond. Sta

authorities were helpless to prevent these strikes, and as a result man

valuable stores were destroyed .

Virginia presented a real problem for the British . Control of the sta

was obviously important, but other regions seemed even more crucial . I

deed, Generals Henry Clinton and Lord Cornwallis disagreed sharply ov

what should be done . Cornwallis wanted troops-detached from New Yor

City if necessary-to start an immediate offensive in Virginia . On the othe

hand, the cautious Clinton refused to jeopardize New York . He wante

Cornwallis to exercise restraint until much-needed reinforcements arriv

from Britain .

Clinton had reason for concern . In the spring of 1781 a major campai

in Virginia was far from General George Washington's mind . Instead, as 

had ever since the painful loss of the city in 1776, Washington dreamed 

recapturing New York . But both Chief Engineer Louis Duportail and t

Comte de Rochambeau, the commander of the French forces dispatched 

Newport the previous summer, were unenthusiastic about Washington

plans . For several weeks in March Duportail met with Rochambeau 

Newport, where they discussed at length the plan to attack New York . In t

following memorial to Washington, Duportail clarified his position on 

New York offensive and advocated instead one against Charleston.

In Duportail's view success at New York depended on the fulfillment 

several basic conditions: the enemy must not receive reinforcements, A

miral de Grasse must control the waters around New York, and the besie

293
ing army must outnumber the enemy by at least three to one . Confiden

the Americans could be masters of the harbor at Charleston, Dupo

recommended that "as soon as it is determined that we cannot unde

any thing against New York, we must embark all the French Troops a

many of the Americans as can be spared . . . and go . . . direc

Charlestown." Evidently he was alone in urging such a move . As pl

take New York progressed, he does not appear to have pressed the issu

ther .

1 . DUPORTAIL ADVOCATES A CHARLESTON OFFENSIVE

Memorial of Louis Duportail to George Washington.

. . . If it is determined that Count De Grasse cannot force the 

[Sandy Hook], but if he is master of those Seas, I suppose 'till Nove

when he must go to the West Indies, it is asked in what case we may 

New York.

I think that if the British at New York have not received any Reinf

ment from Virginia and if Count De Grasse brings 4000 men with h

may undertake to attack New York, to speak more generally, to attack 

York in the case mentioned here, I would have no less than thric

number of Men which we suppose that the Enemy have, because the 

for the siege is determined and if we don't succeed, we lose all our a

tages we could get in other quarters . . . .

Let us suppose now, that the circumstances do not permit to at

any thing against New York, then we must consider these two cases .

Either the Enemy shall have evacuated Virginia entirely or they 

have left a Garrison in Portsmouth .

If the Enemy have evacuated Virginia entirely, I suppose they 

made this distribution of their Troops, they have sent 3000 Men to 

York and 12,000 to Charlestown . I suppose besides, that Lord Rawdo

now 3500 and that in case of an Attack, the British may collect 1500 

that will make 8000 Men in all . Is it advisable to undertake some

against Charlestown so Garrisoned?

I answer that we have here a circumstance like that at New York . I 

that the harbour may be forced, and that by the local circumstances, 

you have forced it, you may Stay in it as long as you please . Althoug

in possession of the Town, so that with a moderate number of Troop

can reduce it by Famine, if not by force .

I cannot say what difficulty we could meet now in the attempt for 

ing the bar; but I observe we must observe it cannot be defended by 

Batteries, it must be defended only by Armed Ships, Frigates, floatin

294

[March 
teries, Gallies, etc. When I was Prisoner near Charlestown, I heard t

British had only sometimes one two or three small Frigates at most, wit

one or two Gallies for that purpose ; if it is the case now, I think that 

should be very easy to force the bar with four or five large Frigates, or be

ter, one or two 44 Gun Ships. Admiral Arbuthnot, 1 in one of his Letters 

Lord Germaine, 2 says there are 19 feet of Water upon the bar at high tide

think this is enough for a 40 Gun Ship. After you have forced the bar an

entrance of the Harbour, you may introduce two or three fifty Gun Ships 

it and then I believe you could brave all the attempts of the Enemy to get 

again, so the whole fleet of Ships of the line may go where they are mor

necessary.

When we are perfectly Master of the Harbour of Charlestown, we the

may choose either to attack it, or to block it up according to our means an

strength .

To block it up, I think 7000 Men are enough on the Land side betwee

James and Ashley Rivers, because we may fortify them if necessary . Th

quantity of Troops we must have on James's Island, and on the othe

sides of Cooper and Ashley, either for the greater security of our Fleet o

from hindering the Enemy from getting Provisions, it depends upon th

how far up the Ships have been able to penetrate into the Harbour and th

Rivers (because the Enemy can make obstructions in some places, but 

the most advantageous case, I think 4000 Men part of which may be Milit

shall fill our object .

So I think that with 1100 [11,000?] Men we can block Charlestown u

entirely .

To attack it I would have at least 4000 More.

A difficulty occurs, is it possible to supply with Provisions, so large 

number of Men in that Quarter .

I believe it is, if the Expedition takes place, it will be before the Rice 

cut, so that we can get plenty either in Carolina or Georgia, where we ma

send a body of Troops for that purpose.

Besides, I observed already that after we are in possession of the Har

bour, the Fleet may go away . I suppose it will go to Chesapeak; so far the

shall cover perfectly well the Transportation of our Supplies . If Count D

Grasse is obliged, in the beginning of November to return to the West I

dies, I do not doubt he will leave a fleet Superior or at least equal to that 

the Enemy, so that our Convoys shall be safe; besides, we know that fro

Chesapeak to Charlestown, there is between the Main and some Island

an interior Navigation which may render the transportation very easy . It 

only necessary to have for that purpose some small Armed Vessels to pro

tect them against Privateers . So I think that on account of the importanc

of the Capture of Charlestown this year, as soon as it is determined th

we cannot undertake any thing against New York, we must embark all th

French Troops and as many of the Americans as can be spared with plent

29 5
Provisions, etc., and go, under the protection of the whole fleet, directly 

Charlestown . . . .

-Washington Papers, roll 26.

In April 1781 Washington sent the Marquis de Lafayette to Virgin

with a force including some of the sappers and miners. Washington 

tended Lafayette to stop Arnold's raids, but the operation was clea

secondary . Meanwhile on May 22 Washington met Rochambeau 

Wethersfield, Connecticut, to discuss the long-awaited joint effort to cru

the enemy . At Washington's insistence their talks focused on plans to reta

New York City .

Washington knew beforehand that both his Chief Engineer and t

French commander were not eager for an attack on New York . Neverthele

Washington included Duportail in the day-long discussions with Rocha

beau . The Commander in Chief evidently had great confidence in his abil

to win the two Frenchmen over. More importantly Washington valu

Duportail's knowledge of the enemy position in New York, his proven abil

to evaluate the rebels' strength, and his camaraderie with fellow French 

ficers like Rochambeau . The Chief Engineer was a valuable asset indeed .

When the conference ended Rochambeau tentatively approv

Washington's plan. Soon Washington got word of new monetary assista

from the French government . Now everything seemed to be in readiness . O

May 28 he instructed Duportail to estimate the engineering department

needs for conducting a siege . In a matter of days the Chief Engine

responded . His evaluation includes a rare calculation of the manpower a

time required to make some of the principal instruments of sie

craft-gabions, saucissons, and fascines .

2 . DUPORTAIL'S ESTIMATE OF REQUIREMENTS

FOR A NEW YORK SIEGE

Plancks for platteformes about 12 inches broad and 2 inches thick .

I make amount to 150 the number of Cannons of different Caliber a

mortars which we Can get and which are necessary whether to batter 

ennemy's lines on new york island or long island or to secure 

Communications and some other things .

We must observe that the french army must be provided by us with 

following articles .

Each piece Requires about 200 feet of plancks; for 150-30,000 f

Saucissons (large fascines) for the batteries-72,000 feet . Gabions 

296

New Windsor, June 2, 1
A GABION. This replica of a gabion

stands behind the restored American

lines at Sara toga National Battlefield

Park.

batteries or trenches-4000 gabions. Fascines for the same-10,000

fascines.

The proportions of these things will be given to the officer appointed to

superintend their Construction.

A man Can make a gabion in one day, so 500 men will make the 4000

gabion in 8 days.

A man Can make 36 feet of saucisson in one day, so 500 men will make

the number Required in 3 days.

FASCINE KNIFE. Sappers and miners used knives of this type to cut

twigs and branches for fascines.

Peterson, The Book of the Continental Soldier

297
500 men will make the 10,000 fascines in 6 days .

Sand bags-30,000. We shall probably want some more but I have b

told the french army have 60 thousand .

Tools : Shovels-5000; Pick axes-2500; Axes-1200; Bill hooks-

If the french army had no[t] enough for them, we must have more than 

Required here .

29 8

-Washington Papers, roll 7

Late in June Washington readied his army for the strike on New Y

Giving his commander the technical advice now expected of a good C

Engineer, Duportail reconnoitered the enemy's works on northern M

hattan Island with Washington. On July 6 Rochambeau's army jo

Washington at Dobb's Ferry, New York. Further reconnaissance of 

enemy's works confirmed that a formal siege would be necessary . Tim

manpower, and the tools to carry out a siege were crucial considerat

The sappers and miners were busy making fascines and gabions and 

quently helped the engineers with reconnaissance .

On July 27 Duportail laid out the final plan for taking New York

counted heavily on support from the French fleet, yet he judged success 

possible without the fleet "if we have many troops and much time." Du

tail was thinking in terms of twenty thousand men . 4

3. DUPORTAIL'S PLAN FOR ANEW YORK OFFENSIVE

July 27, 

If one considers the nature of the ground in the northern part of 

island of New York it will be recognized I think, that it will not be a very 

ficult thing to take a position on the other side of devil's [Spuyton Du

creek; batteries can be established on the mountain on that side st

enough to soon force the enemy to abandon Fort Charles and after tha

will be masters of Kingsbridge. The works on Cox hill are of small acc

by themselves and can easily be taken sword in hand . If however 

enemy were to remain, after the evacuation or the taking of Fort Char

which I do not think likely, the feeble state in which they leave the fo

Cox hill shows they do not intend to defend that part of the island, and 

their veritable defense front is from Laurel hill to fort Tyron [Tyyon] .

Let us suppose that we are masters of Kingsbridge and have t

post on the other side, let us now see how we can progress . Conside

the slope of the ground beyond forts Laurel hill and Tyron, its r

nature, and the position between themselves . . . I do not think it 

ticable to attack them . . . . Doubtless, going at it properly it might suc
but it is hazardous, so I would prefer the following manner to establis

ourselves-which is to go by boats across the Harlem river and boldly tak

a position between New York and Fort Washington at a place impossibl

to determine before arriving on the island .

. . . Two things must be considered-whether we will have a Frenc

fleet in the Sound, or whether we will not . In the first place we need no

fear to be troubled in the Harlem by vessels, galleys or armed boats of th

enemy; we will have a much greater number of boats to transport our men

we can choose the place of debarkation upon a very much wider extent o

ground ; we will have fewer troops to oppose us; because the enemy wil

not be able to spare those on Long Island or even at New York . Succes

therefore seems to me very probable-it is much less so assuredly in th

second case-that of not having a french fleet in the sound but it does no

seem to me impossible even then, if we have many troops and much time 

By the time Duportail delivered his plan to Washington, he realized tha

disappointing news had already reached the Commander in Chief . Given 

choice of destinations by Rochambeau, Admiral de Grasse had chosen th

Chesapeake Bay for a joint operation against the British . Washington too

immediate steps to shift the campaign to Virginia . Time was of the essence 

Not only had de Grasse chosen the far-off Chesapeake for his battleground

but he had also made known his intention to sail back to the West Indies i

less than three monthsl

As Washington made new arrangements, Duportail had words of cau

tion . "Is it not advantageous to pursue the preparations for the attack o

New yourck," he advised, in order "to deceive our army et so th

enemy . . . if the enemy perceived we give up the idea of attacking Ne

York they will reinforce portmouth Virginia, may be before we can ge

there." 5 Washington followed Duportail's advice. Before going south, h

had his men march through New Jersey as if heading for Long Island . H

also left Maj . Gen . William Heath in the New York area to feign furthe

siege preparations and protect West Point .

With incredible speed Washington's 2,500 Continentals and Rocham

beau's entire army marched south . Washington reached Philadelphi

before the end of August, Head of Elk on September 6, and the Virgini

peninsula on the 14th .

On the way south the sappers and miners stopped in Philadelphia fo

several days "proving and packing off shells, shot, and other military stores

While in Philadelphia they received shirts, overalls, and stockings, and eac

got a month's pay in specie . Sgt . Joseph Plumb Martin recalled the men'

amazement: "This was the first that could be called money, which we ha

received as wages since the year '76, or that we ever did receive till the clo

299

-Kite, Duportail, pp. 201-02.
of the war, or indeed, ever after, as wages." 6 The gesture could only h

helped to encourage the sappers and miners to give their best to the com

campaign . And they did just that.

To facilitate the concentration of the French and American fo

against the British in Virginia, Washington gave his two top-rank

engineers special assignments. He dispatched Duportail to alert de Gra

that the allied forces were coming, and he sent Lt . Col . Jean Baptiste 

Gouvion to join Lafayette in Virginia .

The Chief Engineer caught up with de Grasse's flagship at the mouth 

the Chesapeake . With more than three thousand ground troops under 

command, de Grasse had been planning an immediate attack on Cornwal

at Yorktown while the British general was still relatively unprepared . T

meeting with Duportail on board the Ville de Paris changed his mi

Because he had known Duportail's reputation for years, de Grasse t

Washington, "I have not hesitated to open my heart to him and acqua

him with all my resources and my orders." 7 When their first excha

ended, de Grasse acknowledged that because of Washington's letter 

Duportail's advice, "I have suspended my plans until the arrival of 

Generals [Washington and Rochambeau], whose experience in the prof

sion of arms, knowledge of the country and insight will greatly augment 

resources . "8

Duportail made his own report on the meeting with the French admir

Although he recognized the difficulties in making so vast a combined ope

tion succeed, Duportail believed this was the last opportunity "of undert

ing something serious" in the south . He advised that the rebels' chan

would be best if they prevented the enemy from getting provisions, ther

starving them out. His confidence in the "intelligence and good sense" 

Lafayette was marked .

4 . "WE MUST TAKE CORNWALLIS OR BE ALL DISHONOURED"

Louis Duportail to George Washington

Dear general :

I arrived here this morning at five o'clock after a long and tedi

journey on many accounts. But the pleasure I have to see at last a Fen

fleet of 27 sail of line in Your country makes me forget all the hardshi

experienced . Something yet gives me some uneasiness . I am sorry no

find here admiral du barras. 9 Your excellency knows very well all the 

ferent inconveniency's which were according to my opinion in his sta

newport. Now I am afraid he shall not be able to get away. Long while 

300

Cape henry, on board ville de Pa

2 Sept 1
the british must know that the general rendevous is in the Chesapeak. So

they do'nt apprehend anything at new york from Count de grasse'

fleet. . . . Count de grasse being obliged to it appears to be always deter

mined to leave us in the time announced so we have only six weeks t

operate. Unfortunately he cannot provide you with vessels for th

transportation of your troops and the french army, at least in this moment

And if Count de barras does not arrive, your excellency must not expec

any other succor in that respect from the presence of the french fleet i

the bay but the safe navigation of the vessels collected at baltimore an

other places. The enemy have no vessels out of york River. That is entirel

blocked up.

I intend to join too morrow the marquis [Lafayette] . The admiral ha

sent him already the troops he had on board which amount to more tha

3000 men. Now the situation of the marquis appears to me very nice

because on one side he must not according my opinion run any grea

risque till you arrive . That should be entirely improper unless the ennemy

gives a fine opportunity of an attacking against him which never must b

lost. But in another respect it should be very advantageous to confine th

enemy as much as possible that he could not collect provisions becaus

by what I heard of the advantage of his position at york, 6000 men well for

tified shall be forced with difficulty . So if we could join famine to othe

means, we should have better chance of succeeding . But to determine t

what degree it is convenient to aim at each of these different objects re

quires a very great jugment . Fortunately the intelligence and good sens

of the marquis must give us great confidence. I will put myself under hi

orders and second his views as much as I shall be able . But dear genera

come with the greatest expedition . Let us make us[e] of the short stay o

Count de grasse here . We have no choice left, I thinck . When 27 of linel

are in Chesapeak, when great americain and french forces are joined, w

must take Cornwallis or be all dishonoured . Always sorry that for want o

proper measure taken at distance and on account of many circumstance

we cannot thinck of undertaking something serious to the southern afte

this will be over.

[P .S.] in case that admiral du barras should arrive as most of hi

transports are large ships, it would be advantageous that your troops o

stores be at baltimore instead of head of elk, because large ships can g

up there .

-Correspondence of Washing

ton and de Grasse, p

12-14.

On September 2, when Washington dispatched Gouvion to jo

Lafayette, he gave him special instructions . Worried about the roads h

30 1

troops and supplies would travel to the Virginia peninsula, Washingto

ordered the engineer to follow a specific route and report on road condi

tions, particularly any required repairs. "If you could incite the inhabitant

as you passed along to set about this necessary business," Washington in

structed him, "it would facilitate the movement of our waggons etc . whic

must go by land greatly ." 11

Gouvion went by land from Baltimore to Elkridge Landing and then o

to Bladensburg, Georgetown, and Fredericksburg. He arrived at camp nea

Williamsburg on September 10, just four days ahead of Washington an

Rochambeau . Unfortunately none of his reports have been found, nor is 

clear how successful he was in persuading local citizens hastily to repair thei

roads.

Considering the many factors involved, the coordinated concentration o

American and French troops and supplies in Virginia was achieved wit

remarkable ease . Both armies were determined to redeem their alliance 

Even though Cornwallis's men were outnumbered, suffering from illness

protected by less than formidable defenses, and had little chance of escap

ing, the allies decided to undertake a full-scale siege of Yorktown.

Although several of Duportail's engineer officers were still imprisone

following their capture at Charleston in 1780, the allies had more than 

dozen engineers at Yorktown . The progress of the siege reflected th

presence and the influence of Marshal Sebastien le Prestre de Vauban

master of eighteenth-century siegecraft . In just three weeks the siege pro

gressed methodically through several stages: initial investment on Sep

tember 28 ; reconnaissance ; digging of the first parallel and lines of circum

vallation and countervallation ; construction of batteries and a zigzag; heav

artillery fire ; a second parallel completed with the dramatic storming of tw

enemy redoubts; continued heavy artillery fire ; and, on October 19, fina

capitulation by the enemy.

Records of the action at Yorktown abound . From these, several hav

been selected because they best reflect the role of the Continental Army'

Corps of Engineers and its companies of sappers and miners. This sieg

represented the most concerted effort by these units during the entir

Revolutionary War.

THE ROAD FROM ALEXANDRIA. This map ofa Virginia road is

one of twenty maps marking the route from Philadelphia to

Yorktown, prepared by the geographer's department under the direction ofSimeon DeWitt (1756-1884), Robert Erskine's successor as

geographer. These maps helped guide the armies of Washington and

Rochambeau on their march south in 1781 . The route surveyed here

crosses the Great Hunting Creek southwest ofAlexandria, skirts

Washington's Mt. Vernon, and passes Pohick Church to a point (near

Colchester) below the Pohick River.

Courtesy New-York Historical Society, New York City

303
Although he penned his account years after the Revolution, Sergea

Martin of the sappers and miners left a powerful record of the entire sie

Selections from his reminiscences follow throughout the remainder of t

chapter. In the first he described with ready wit the initial preparations 

the siege.

5. "HERE AGAIN WE ENCOUNTERED OUR OLD

ASSOCIATE, HUNGER"

From the narrative of Joseph Plumb Martin.

Soon after landing we marched to Williamsburg, where we join

General Lafayette, and very soon after, our whole army arriving, 

prepared to move down and pay our old acquaintance, the British, 

Yorktown, a visit . I doubt not but their wish was not to have so many of 

come at once as their accommodations were rather scanty. They though

"The fewer the better cheer." We thought, "The more the merrier ." W

had come a long way to see them and were unwilling to be put off with 

cuses . We thought the present time quite as convenient, at least for us, 

any future time could be, and we accordingly persisted, hoping that, 

they pretended to be a very courtly people, they would have t

politeness to come out and meet us, which would greatly shorten the ti

to be spent in the visit, and save themselves and us much labor and tr

ble, but they were too impolite at this time to do so.

We marched from Williamsburg the last of September [1781] . It was 

warm day [the twenty-eighth] . When we had proceeded about halfway 

Yorktown we halted and rested two or three hours . Being about to co

some victuals, I saw a fire which some of the Pennsylvania troops h

kindled a short distance off. I went to get some fire while some of 

messmates made other preparations, we having turned our rum and pe

per cook adrift . I had taken off my coat and unbuttoned my waistcoat, it b

ing (as I said before) very warm . My pocketbook, containing about f

dollars in money and some other articles, in all about seven dollars, was 

my waistcoat pocket . When I came among the stangers they appeared 

be uncommonly complaisant, asking many questions, helping me to fi

and chatting very familiarly . I took my fire and returned, but it was not lo

before I perceived that those kindhearted helpers had helped themselv

to my pocketbook and its whole contents. I felt mortally chagrined, 

THE WORKS AT YORKTOWN . Colonel Gouvion of the Corps o

Engineers drew this plan of the British defenses and the American 

French siege works.

Record Group 360, National Archives

304

there was no plaster for my sore but patience, and my plaster of that

this time, I am sure, was very small and very thinly spread, for it ne

covered the wound .

Here, or about this time, we had orders from the Commander in Ch

that, in case the enemy should come out to meet us, we should excha

but one round with them and then decide the conflict with the bayonet, 

they valued themselves at that instrument . The French forces could 

their part at it, and the Americans were never backward at trying its vir

The British, however, did not think fit at that time to give us an opporun

to soil our bayonets in their carcasses, but why they did not we co

never conjecture; we as much expected it as we expected to find t

there.

We went on and soon arrived and encamped in their neighborho

without let or molestation . Our Miners lay about a mile and a half from t

works, in open view of them . Here again we encountered our 

associate, Hunger. Affairs, as they respected provisions, etc ., were 

yet regulated . No eatable stores had arrived, nor could we expect t

should until we knew what reception the enemy would give us. We we

therefore, compelled to try our hands at foraging again . We, that is, 

corps of Miners, were encamped near a large wood . There was a plent

shoats all about this wood, fat and plump, weighing, generally, from fift

a hundred pounds apiece . We soon found some of them and as no ow

appeared to be at hand and the hogs not understanding our inquiries (if 

made any) sufficiently to inform us to whom they belonged, we made 

with some of them to satisfy the calls of nature till we could be better s

plied, if better we could be . Our officers countenanced us and that was 

the permission we wanted, and many of us did not want even that.

We now began to make preparations for laying close siege to 

enemy. We had holed him and nothing remained but to dig him 

Accordingly, after taking every precaution to prevent his escape, [we] 

tled our guards, provided fascines and gabions, made platforms for 

batteries, to be laid down when needed, brought on our battering piec

ammunition, etc .

-Martin, Private Yankee

Doodle, pp. 228-30.

The following account by Michel Capitaine du Chesnoy12 carried 

story from the placement of troops -Claude Henry, the comte de St. Sim

on the left, Rochambeau in the center, and the Americans on 

right-and focused on engineer activity in the crucial stage of rec

naissance . As Capitaine made clear, reconnoitering was a challenge 

Yorktown. An important development in the early stage of the siege was 

enemy's decision to abandon their advance positions, redoubts at Pig

Quarter along the Goosley Road . The Americans and the French qui

took them over and converted them to their own use .

306
6. "THE ENTIRE PLACE WAS SCATTERED WITH EARTH WORKS,

WAS BRISTLING WITH POINTED STAKES"

From the Yorktown journal of Capitaine du Chesnoy.

On the 29th [September 1781], the American engineers, those of the

army of Rochambeau and those of the division of the Marquis de St

Simon, numbering 13 all told, formed in three divisions, each of four, de

Querenet [Guillaume, Querenet de La Combe] commanding the body o

French engineers (Desandroun [Jean-Nicholas Desandrouins] being

dangerously ill at Williamsburg) ; Duportail, American Brigadier, commanded the engineers attached to the same service . . . .

On the 29th, reconnoissance of the place was made ; a broad, deep

ravine traversed by a swampy brook surrounded half of the place on the

right; for a distance of more than 800 toises (4800 feet), in front the enemy

had placed abbatis on the summit (three quarters of this extent was cut by

deep ravines) ; they had established a large redoubt on the right at the very

crest of the hill, this redoubt was covered with pointed stakes and by 

heavy abbatis which was well made ; in front (nearer us) the enemy had

made the ground difficult (to cross) by trees cut down and left facing us

near the brooks we have just mentioned, which emptied into the Yor

River, [were] two other redoubts, bristling with stakes and palisaded, and

surrounded by an abbatis, spread out towards their center; between them

was the York-Williamsburg road ; they occupied the crest of the highe

ground of the other side of the ravine about 350 toises (2100 feet) from th

center of the town ; in front of these, the terrain sloped towards the coun

tryside ; their left was covered by three batteries distant fro

300 . . . toises (1800 feet) to 400 toises (2400 feet) from the center of th

town, with an abbatis in front of them . This was supported, on one corner

by a body of chasseurs, with a battery near a destroyed mill, which was a

the other end of their left ; for a ditch they had a creek; these batterie

likewise all occupied high ground, and in front of which the plain slope

down and hid from view all the trenches with which they had covered th

town of York.

It can be seen from this description, how difficult it was to make 

reconnoissance of the place; all that could be investigated were the mor

forward fortifications, and even as to these, in several aspects, the detail

were difficult to ascertain, and then it was only imperfectly . They had en

camped part of their troops between the redoubts and the batteries, an

the main town, in a way that indicated they could extend them and defen

them with the advantages of the lay of the land and of the high ground . We

would be obliged to attack them with great force, and we should not hav

been able to do this without great loss, if the enemy had not abandone

these redoubts and batteries .

30 7
This happened on the 29th to the 30th. In the morning of the 30th ou

troops perceiving this, took immediate possession; 100 men entered th

redoubt of Pigeon Quarter and 50 that of Penny Hill, one of the two ba

teries near by was changed into a redoubt, and we constructed a middl

one at the head of the big ravine; this work progressed under the annoyin

fire of the enemy.

Thereafter reconnoissances were more easily made; these we carrie

on until [October] 5th; meanwhile the heavy artillery was unloaded, an

the troops prepared themselves for the work of the siege, and munition

were carried to the artillery park, and in this interval from the 30th 

September to October 5th, Baron Viomenil attacked the advance abbati

of the redoubt on the left, and forced the enemy to withdraw into thei

works.

The entire place was scattered with earth works, was bristling wit

pointed stakes, and enveloped or covered with abbatis, which Lord Corn

wallis had had constructed after the arroval of the army of the Count d

Grasse . It seems that he had not at first expected any attack except fro

the troops commanded by Major General de la Fayette, and the Marqui

de St. Simon; learning, however, of the arrival of the armies of Genera

SIEGE OF YORKTOWN . The drawing depicts Washington and

Rochambeau consulting with staff members at Yorktown.

Record Group 148, National Archives

30 8
Washington and Rochambeau, he . . . constructed detached

works . . . while awaiting the investment . He also had worked meanwhile

upon another trench on his exposed left (his right was protected by a

ravine which could not be crossed) . During the reconnoissance from

September 30th to October 5th, we perceived new works completed at

night, and these he continued to construct up to the very moment our batteries opened fire . . . .

We still continued constructing the trenches, the redoubts and the

communications toward the rear; half of the engineers had mounted the

trenches from the 6th to the 7th, and from the 7th to the 8th, but from the

8th to the 9th they mounted in divisions, and thus continued during the re

mainder of the siege. On the 9th, in the afternoon, some batteries being

found ready to fire, both French and American, a few shots were fired .

-S.W . Jackson Collection, Yale

University Library.

On October 6, as work began on the first parallel, Washington issued

general orders for the conduct of the siege. The orders indicated the manner

in which the trenches would be manned and relieved, delineated duties and

responsibilities, and specified the desired measurements to be used in making gabions, fascines, and hurdles . Sections 43 and 44 defined the responsibilities and authority of the engineer officers.

7. REGULATIONS FOR THE SERVICE OF THE SIEGE AT YORKTOWN

From George Washington's geniaral orders .

1 . The service of the siege will be performed by Divisions alternately

the Fatigue men will first be detailed out of the Division and the remainder

will form Battalions under their respective Commanders to guard the

Trenches; the first night there will be an exception to this Rule; the firs

regiment of each Brigade will that Night form a Divison, Commanded by

Major General Lincoln .

2d. The divisions shall be warned for the Trenches, the preceding

evening, and they are to furnish no guards when they mount the

Trenches .

3d. No Officer or soldier of a Regiment Commanded for the Trenches

will be excused from Mounting unless he be sick; the quarter guard o

each regiment will alone remain in Camp .

4th. The Major General of the Division which Mounts, will be Majo

General of the Trenches, the Brigadiers will Mount with their Brigades .

309

October 6, 1781
5th . The General Officers of the Trenches will reconnoitre carefully 

the Avenues, places of Arms and advantageous Angles, that he m

determine in Consequence the order and position of the Troops, in ca

of attack .

6. The Inspector of the Division which Mounts, will do the duty of Maj

of the Trenches . He will make the detail of the service of the troops duri

the twenty four hours that he shall be there, and attend to the punctu

observance of Orders .

7. He will visit before hand all the Posts of the Trenches, and visit th

again when the troops are posted there in order to make a state of the

and communicate promptly to each the orders of the General Officer : ne

whom he is to keep himself to receive them . Each Brigade to send to 

General of the trenches an orderly Officer .

8. The Major of the Trenches will be instructed by the General Office

of the Alarm posts in case of a Sally, and take care to inform the Troops 

it .

9th . An officer of rank will be appointed by the Commander in chief 

act as superintendant of the deposit of the Trenches, for the following 

portant service during the whole siege vizt . To take charge of all the sa

bags Fascines, Gabions, Hurdles and other Materials deposited at 

place which the Engeneers will appoint and keep an accurate state 

them .

10th . He is to deliver the sand bags and necessary tools for the wor

and take care that the tools are redelivered when they are no lon

wanted . . . .

16. He will above all watch over every thing which relates to order a

regularity in the Trenches, except in the disposition of the Troops, whi

is the particular province of the Major of the trenches .

17. The Trenches shall be releived [sic] every Twenty four hou

unless a particular order to the contrary by the General in which case 

the relief shall be in the rear of the others.

18. The General having fixed the hour for Mounting 

trenches . . . . the parade for assembling the Reliefs [shall] be on 

ground sufficiently before hand to give the General Officers and Adjut

General time for inspection . . . .

25. All the troops either relieving or relieved will March with Dru

beating Colours flying and carry Arms to the place from whence they 

to file off when they will support their Arms .

26. When the Troops shall have taken their post in the trenches, 

standard bearrers will plant their standards upon the Epaulments and s

tries will be posted with proper intervals, with orders to give Notice 

whatever they may see coming out from the place and of the shells t

may be thrown by the Enemy, but no notice to be given or any moveme

to be made for Cannon shot.

31 0
27. The sand-bags will be desposed on the Epaulments of the

Trenches, to coverthe sentries.

28. The officers will cause each soldier to work in his place to enlarge

the trench and strengthen the Epaulments .

29th. No honor to be rendered in the trenches when the Commander in

Chief and Generl . Officers of the Trenches visit them ; the soldiers will

stand to their Arms facing the Epaulment and ready to mount the banquet.

30. When the Troops retire from the Trenches, they will March in

reversed Columns. . . .

33. The Infantry are to make the number of Gabions, etc ., ordered

them .

34. The Gabions are to be three feet high including the end of the Pecquetts [pickets] which are to enter the ground, they are to have two feet

and a half diameter and be formed of Nine Picquetts, each of two and a

half inches circumference interlaced with branchery, striped of leaves to

be equally closed at top and bottom, in order that they may not be larger at

one end than the other.

35. Hurdles shall be six feet long and three feet wide and shall be made

of Nine Picketts, each of two inches and a half to three inches circumference, equally distant from each other and interwoven with stronger

Branchery than that employed for the Gabions .

36. The Fascines are to be six feet long and six inches through, to be

made of branchery, the twigs of which are to be crossed, to be bound with

Withs and each end and in the middle, to each fascine, three picketts of

three feet long and two or three inches diameter.

37. The Brigades shall always have at the head of their Camp, the

stated Number of fascines which they will replace in proportion as they

are used .

38. The Commandants of Corps shall be responsible for the observance of the dementions of the Materials employed in the trenches inattention in this point being very pernicious to the service .

39. Each soldier going to the Trenches either to mount Guard or Work

shall take with him a fascine to be left at the Deposit of the Trenches . . . .

43. The fatigue men are to March near each other and Observe the

greatest silence when the Engineers place them .

44. The Officers who Command the fatigue parties will be constantly

with their detachments and exactly observe the directions of the

Engineers .

45. When the work is Commenced they are to walk constantly along

their detachments to make the soldiers perform their duty obliging them

to coverthemselves with alacrity and afterwards to perfect the work.

46. The Officers of covering parties will cause their soldiers to si

down, hinder them from quitting their Musquetts which they are to hold

before them, the butt on the ground .
47. The advanced posts of such Detachments as are Commanded 

Non Commissioned Officers will remain prostate untill the trench is suf

ciently deep to cover a man to the waist; when the Detachment with th

advanced Posts will retire into the trenches, to Occupy the Head of 

Work which shall have been made .

48. In the saps, Batteries and other places adjacent to the deposits 

powder no soldier is to be permitted to smoke.

49. In case of a sally, the Fatigue men are to retire briskly into so

part of the Trenches where they may not embarrass the Troops, they 

to retire in preference to the place where their Arms were lodged .

50. The Troops will march briskly out of the Trenches and repair to 

place of Arms, batteries, Angles and Avenues which shall have be

designated to them from whence they may defend it more advantageous

and take the enemy in reverse or flank, taking particular care not to 

cupy the banquet for the defence of the Epaulment : but always to p

themselves in the reverse of the Trenches .

51 . During the sally all the Batteries will direct their fire upon the fr

of attack in order to desperse the besieged .

52. When the troops shall have repulsed the Enemy, they are not 

pursue them but wait the orders of their General Officers to resume th

posts in the Trenches .

53. As soon as the attack is finished, the Officers of fatigue will rec

duct their detachments to Work and call the rolle, that any absent soldi

may be punished at return to Camp.

54. At the hour for withdrawing the fatigue, the Detachments are 

return in good order and the Officers are to report to the Commandant 

the Regiment what has been the conduct of the soldiers.

55. Besides the fatigue men of the trenches a sufficient detachme

shall be given to the superintendant of the Deposit in the Trenches who

service shall be for twenty four hours: this officer is to employ them in c

lecting the tools, in making the different distributions, in going with 

Litters, and bringing the wounded to the hospital of first dressings .

31 2

-Fitzpatrick, Writings 

Washington, 23:179-85.

The journal of Capt . James Duncan, a company commander in Colo

Moses Hazen's regiment, described siege preparations from the point of v

of an officer performing fatigue duty under the engineers' direction . S

accounts are rare. The following excerpt carries the story through the op

ing of the first parallel and on to the opening of the American batteries 

October 9 . Enemy artillery fire was intense as the trenches were dug, 

soon the trenches were so deep that scarcely any harm resulted . Dunc

reiterated "that the enemy by evacuating their [advance) works had give

an amazing advantage."
8. "THE ENEMY KEPT UP AN ALMOST INCESSANT FIRE"

From James Duncan's Yorktown diary.

October 1[1781]-About 8 o'clock this morning the French grenadiers

attacked and carried a small battery, with the loss of four killed and six

wounded. Ten companies were ordered out early this morning for fatigue,

of which I had the honor to command one. Until 11 a.m . we were employed

in cutting and stripping branches for gabions. On being furnished with

shovels, spades, pickaxes, etc., we were ordered up to the lines, where

we continued inactive until about an hour before sunset . In the meantime,

the engineers were employed in reconnoitering the enemy's works, and

fixing on proper places to break the first ground . Let me here observe that

the enemy by evacuating their works had given us an amazing advantage,

as the ground they left commanded the whole town, and nothing but the

reasons before alleged could have justified them in so doing, as by contrary conduct they must have very much retarded the operations of the

siege .

The engineers having fixed on and chained off the ground in two dif

ferent places to erect their works within point blank shot of the enemy, the

parties were called on. Five companies were ordered to an eminence on

the right and five to another on the left . It happened to be my fate to be stationed on the left, a place the most dangerous of the two, as it was nearest

to the enemy, and more exposed to the fire from the enemy's batteries .

We were now conducted to a small hollow near the ground . Five men

were ordered by the engineer to assist him in clearing away the rubbish,

staking out and drawing the lines of the work. This was in the face of open

day, and the men went with some reluctance ; a little before this we had a

shot from the enemy which increased their fears . At dusk of evening we al

marched up, and never did I see men exert themselves half so much o

work with more eagerness . Indeed, it was their interest, for they could ex

pect nothing else but an incessant roar of cannon the whole night. I must

confess I too had my fears, but fortunately for us they did not fire a sho

that whole night. I am at a loss to account for it, for the moon shone bright

and by the help of their night glasses they must certainly have discovered

us . We were relieved about daybreak, and scarcely had we left th

trenches when the enemy began their fire on both works from thre

pieces .

October 2-The works were so far finished in the course of th

preceding night that the men worked in them this day with very littl

danger, although the enemy kept up an almost incessant fire from tw

pieces of artillery . A drummer, rather too curious in his observations, wa

this day killed with a cannon ball . . . .

October 5-We had more firing from the enemy last night than an

night since the commencement of the siege, but don't learn that they di

31 3
any other harm than delay the operation of the works. This day the re

ment was employed in cutting and making fasscines, and a regiment f

every brigade in the army ordered out for some extra fatigue duty t

evening . . . .

October 7-The regiments ordered for the extra duty were last ni

employed in drawing the line of circumvallation . This line extends itself 

the river on each side the town, and at all places nearly equally distant a

better than 200 yards in front of the former works. The enemy discover

us, although the night was pretty favorable, but the chief of their fire w

directed against the French . They were, no doubt, much astonished in 

morning to find themselves so completely hemmed in on all sides, a

trenches so deep that we could sustain little or no harm from th

fire . . . . Our orders were this night that if the enemy made a sortie and 

tempted to storm the trenches we were to give them one fire from 

ba[n]quet, rush over the parapet and meet them with the bayonet. . . .

October 8-The fire of the enemy was this day chiefly directed agai

the parties employed in erecting batteries . We were relieved about 

o'clock and sustained no harm during our tour excepting two men ba

wounded; but we had scarcely left the trenches when a man working 

the parapet had his arm shot off. . . .

October 9-Last night the troops in the trenches as well as great par

this day, were busily employed in finishing the batteries, and abou

o'clock this afternoon an American battery was opened . . . .

From the narrative of Joseph Plumb Martin .

31 4

-Pennsylvania Archives, 

ser., 15:749-50 .

Joseph Plumb Martin preferred duty in the trenches every third day 

the intervening two days in camp, where "we had nothing else to do but 

tend morning and evening roll calls and recreate ourselves as we please

Martin's penchant for action was reflected in his vivid portrayal of eve

during the same period covered by Duncan above . Here is an account fi

with drama : General Washington, unrecognized, visiting the trenches 

then ceremoniously breaking ground ; the troops entrenching under the n

of the sidetracked enemy; and rebel batteries opening fire on the enemy 

the French troops shout, "Huzza for the Americansl"

Martin also clarified the role of the sappers and miners in laying out 

lines and described the rebels' success in surprising the enemy .

9. "THE BRITISH WERE LED TO IMAGINE THAT WE WERE

ABOUT SOME SECRET MISCHIEF"

On the fifth of October [1781] we began to put our plans into execution.

One-third part of all the troops were put in requisition to be employ

in opening the trenches . A third part of our Sappers and Miners w
ordered out this night to assist the engineers in laying out the works. I

was a very dark and rainy night. However, we repaired to the place and

began by following the engineers and laying laths of pine wood end-to

end upon the line marked out by the officers for the trenches. We had no

proceeded far in the business before the engineers ordered us to desist

and remain where we were and be sure not to straggle a foot from the spot

while they were absent from us . In a few minutes after their departure,

there came a man alone to us, having on a surtout, 13 as we conjectured, 

being exceeding dark, and inquired for the engineers. We now began t

be a little jealous for our safety, being alone and without arms, and withi

forty rods of the British trenches. The stranger inquired what troops we

were, talked familiarly with us a few minutes, when, being informed whic

way the officers had gone, he went off in the same direction, after strictl

charging us, in case we should be taken prisoners, not to discover to th

enemy what troops we were. We were obliged to him for his kind advice

but we considered ourselves as standing in no great need of it, for we

knew as well as he did that Sappers and Miners were allowed no quarters

at least, are entitled to none; by the laws of warfare, and of course shoul

take care, if taken, and the enemy did not find us out, not to betray ou

own secret. 14

In a short time the engineers returned and the afore-mentione

stranger with them . They discoursed together some time when, by the of

ficers often calling him "Your Excellency," we discovered that it wa

General Washington . Had we dared, we might have cautioned him for ex

posing himself too carelessly to danger at such a time, and doubtless h

would have taken it in good part if we had. But nothing ill happened t

either him or ourselves.

It coming on to rain hard, we were ordered back to our tents, an

nothing more was done that night . The next night, which was the sixth o

October, the same men were ordered to the lines that had been there th

night before . We this night completed laying out the works . The troops o

the line were there ready with entrenching tools and began to entrench

after General Washington had struck a few blows with a pickax, a mer

ceremony, that it might be said "General Washington with his own hand

first broke ground at the siege of Yorktown ." The ground was sandy an

soft, and the men employed that night eat no "idle bread" (and I questio

if they eat any other), so that by daylight they had covered themselve

from danger from the enemy's shot, who, it appeared, never mistruste

that we were so near them the whole night, their attention being directe

to another quarter. There was upon the right of their works a marsh. Ou

people had sent to the western side of this marsh a detachment to make 

number of fires, by which, and our men often passing before the fires, th

British were led to imagine that we were about some secret mischie

there, and consequently directed their whole fire to that quarter, while w

were entrenching literally under their noses.

31 5
As soon as it was day they perceived their mistake and began to fi

where they ought to have done sooner . They brought out a field piece 

two without their trenches, and discharged several shots at the men wh

were at work erecting a bomb battery, but their shot had no effect and th

soon gave it over . They had a large bulldog and every time they fired h

would follow their shots across our trenches. Our officers wished to catc

him and oblige him to carry a message from them into the town to h

masters, but he looked too formidable for any of us to encounter .

I do not remember, exactly, the number of days we were employe

before we got our batteries in readiness to open upon the enemy, b

think it was not more than two or three . The French, who were upon o

left, had completed their batteries a few hours before us, but were n

allowed to discharge their pieces till the American batteries were read

Our commanding battery was on the near bank of the [York] river and co

tained ten heavy guns ; the next was a bomb battery of three large mortar

and so on through the whole line . The whole number, American an

French, was ninety-two cannon, mortars and howitzers . Our flagstaff wa

in the ten-gun battery, upon the right of the whole . I was in the trench

the day that the batteries were to be opened . All were upon the tiptoe 

expectation and impatience to see the signal given to open the whole li

of batteries, which was to be the hoisting of the American flag in the te

gun battery. About noon the much-wished-for signal went up . I confess 

felt a secret pride swell my heart when I saw the "star-spangled banner

waving majestically in the very faces of our implacable adversaries . It a

peared like an omen of success to our enterprise, and so it proved in rea

ity . A simultaneous discharge of all the guns in the line followed, t

French troops accompanying it with "Huzza for the Americans!" It wa

said that the first shell sent from our batteries entered an elegant hous

formerly owned or occupied by the Secretary of State under the Briti

government, and burned directly over a table surrounded by a large par

of British officers at dinner, killing and wounding a number of them . Th

was a warm day to the British .

-Martin, Private Yanke

Doodle, pp. 230-34 .

Continental Army surgeon James Thacher, in his journal, emphasiz

again the rigors of opening the trenches and the horror of working und

artillery fire . The following excerpt contains a particularly evocat

description of the view from the trenches of the bombshells, which "in 

night . . . appear like a fiery meteor with a blazing tail . . . gradua

descending to the spot where they are destined to execute their work 

destruction ." When the American batteries were ready on October 

"Washington put the match to the first gun, and a furious discharge of ca

non and mortars immediately followed ."

31 6
10 . "I HAVE A FINE OPPORTUNITY OF WITNESSING

THE SUBLIME AND STUPENDOUS SCENE"

From JamesThacher's journal .

7th [October 1781]-A large detachment of the allied army, under command of Major General Lincoln, were ordered out last evening, for the purpose of opening intrenchments near the enemy's lines . This business

was conducted with great silence and secrecy, and we were favored by

Providence with a night of extreme darkness, and were not discovered

before day light . The working party carried on their shoulders fascines

and intrenching tools, while a large part of the detachment was armed with

the implements of death . Horses, drawing cannon and ordnance, and

wagons loaded with bags filled with sand for constructing breast works,

followed in the rear. Thus arranged, every officer and soldier knowing his

particular station, orders were given to advance in perfect silence, the

distance about one mile. . . .

Our troops were indefatigable in their labors during the night, and

before day light they had nearly completed the first parallel line of nearly

two miles in extent, besides laying a foundation for two redoubts, within

about six hundred yards of the enemy's lines . At day light the enemy

having discovered our works, commenced a severe cannonade, but our

men being under cover received no injury . . . .

8th, and 9th-The duty of our troops has been for several days ex

tremely severe ; our regiment labors in the trenches every other day and

night, where I find it difficult to avoid suffering by the cold, having no othe

covering than a single blanket in the open field . We erected a battery las

night in front of our first parallel, without any annoyance from the enemy

Two or three of our batteries being now prepared to open on the town, hi

Excellency General Washington put the match to the first gun, and 

furious discharge of cannon and mortars immediately followed, and Ear

Cornwallis has received his first salutation . . . .

10th-15th-We have now made further approaches to the town, by

throwing up a second parallel line, and batteries within about three hun

dred yards, this was effected in the night, and at day light the enemy were

roused to the greatest exertions, the engines of war have raged wit

redoubled fury and destruction on both sides, no cessation day or night 

The French had two officers wounded, and fifteen men killed or wounded,

and among the Americans, two or three were wounded. I assisted in am

putating a man's thigh . The siege is daily becoming more and more for

midable and alarming, and his Lordship must view his situation as ex

tremely critical, if not desperate. Being in the trenches every other nigh

and day, I have a fine opportunity of witnessing the sublime and stupen
REDOUBT NO. 10. The photographs provide two views of the

restoration at Yorktown showing fraisework of the redoubt captured fraisework

by Americans during the siege.

318
dous scene which Is continually exhibiting . The bomb shells from th

besiegers and the besieged are incessantly crossing each others' path i

the air. They are clearly visible in the form of a black ball in the day, but i

the night, they appear like a fiery meteor with a blazing tail, most beauti

fully brilliant, ascending majestically from the mortar to a certain altitude

and gradually descending to the spot where they are destined to execut

their work of destruction . It is astonishing with what accuracy an ex

perienced gunner will make his calculations, that a shell shall fall within 

few feet of a given point, and burst at the precise time, though at a grea

distance . When a shell falls, it whirls round, burrows, and excavates th

earth to a considerable extent, and bursting, makes dreadful havo

around .

-Thacher, Military Journal,

pp . 337-40.

Amajor aspect of the allied siege was the storming of Redoubts Nine an

Ten, two works standing about 300 yards in front of the main enemy line

Control of these positions was essential to completion of the second parallel .

Beginning on October 11 the French constructed an epaulement as nea

as possible to the two enemy redoubts . Then artillery was moved into place

On the 14th subordinates told Washington all was in readiness for a direc

attack. The Americans, led by Lt. Col. Alexander Hamilton, would tak

Redoubt Ten, the French would take Redoubt Nine. At eight in the even

ing, an unusual hour for an attack that was chosen deliberately to achiev

surprise, prearranged gunfire gave the signal . The allies moved forwar

simultaneously. Each force met with resistance but each succeeded.

Hamilton's unit included a contingent of sappers and miners charge

with clearing the way for the infantry through the protective abatis . Marti

was one of the besiegers . His depiction of the action is his best chronicle an

among the finest of the Yorktown accounts.

11 . "I THOUGHT THE BRITISH WERE KILLING US OFF

AT AGREAT RATE"

From the narrative of Joseph Plumb Martin .

The siege was carried on warmly for several days, when most of th

guns in the enemy's works were silenced . We now began our secon

parallel, about halfway between our works and theirs . There were tw

strong redoubts held by the British, on their left [Redoubts Nine and Ten] 

31 9
it was necessary for us to possess those redoubts before we could com

plete our trenches. One afternoon [14 October 1781 J, I, with the rest of o

corps that had been on duty in the trenches the night but one before, wer

ordered to the lines . I mistrusted something extraordinary, serious 

comical, was going forward, but what I could not easily conjecture .

We arrived at the trenches a little before sunset. I saw several office

fixing bayonets on long staves. I then concluded we were about to make 

general assault upon the enemy's works, but before dark I was informe

of the whole plan, which was to storm the redoubts, the one by t

Americans, and the other by the French . The Sappers and Miners wer

furnished with axes and were to proceed in front and cut a passage for t

troops through the abatis, which are composed of the tops of trees, t

small branches cut off with a slanting stroke which renders them as sha

as spikes . These trees are then laid at a small distance from the trench 

ditch, pointing outwards, and the butts fastened to the ground in such 

manner that they cannot be removed by those on the outside of them . It 

almost impossible to get through them . Through these we were to cut 

passage before we or the other assailants could enter .

At dark the detachment was formed and advanced beyond t

trenches and lay down on the ground to await the signal for advancing 

the attack, which was to be three shells from a certain battery near wher

we were lying . All the batteries in our line were silent, and we lay an

iously waiting for the signal . The two brilliant planets, Jupiter and Venus

were in close contact in the western hemisphere, the same direction th

the signal was to be made in . When I happened to cast my eyes to th

quarter, which was often, and I caught a glance of them, I was ready 

spring on my feet, thinking they were the signal for starting . Our watc

word was "Rochambeau," the commander of the French forces' name, 

good watchword, for being pronounced Ro-sham-bow, it sounded whe

pronounced quick, like rush-on-boys .

We had not lain here long before the expected signal was given, for 

and the French, who were to storm the other redoubt, by the three shel

with their fiery trains mounting the air in quick succession. The word u

up, was then reiterated through the detachment . We immediately move

silently on toward the redoubt we were to attack, with unloaded musket

Just as we arrived at the abatis, the enemy discovered us and direct

opened a sharp fire upon us . We were now at a place where many of o

large shells had burst in the ground, making holes sufficient to bury an 

in . The men, having their eyes fixed upon what was transacting befo

them, were every now and then failing into these holes . I thought t

British were killing us off at a great rate. At length, one of the holes ha

pening to pick me up, I found out the mystery of the huge slaughter .

As soon as the firing began, our people began to cry, "The fort's o

own!" and it was "Rush on boys." The Sappers and Miners soon clear

320
a passage for the infantry, who entered it rapidly. Our Miners were

ordered not to enter the fort, but there was no stopping them. “We will

go,” said they. “Then go to the d--l,” said the commanding officer of our

corps, 15 “if you will.” I therefore forced a passage at a place where I saw

our shot had cut away some of the abatis; several others entered at the

same place. While passing, a man at my side received a ball in his head

and fell under my feet, crying out bitterly. While crossing the trench, the

enemy threw hand grenades (small shells) into it. They were so thick that I

ACTION AT YORKTOWN. A French artist made this lithograph to

portray the taking of Yorktown by the allied forces.

Library of Congress

at first thought them cartridge papers on fire, but was soon undeceived by

their cracking. As I mounted the breastwork, I met an old associate hitching himself down into the trench. I knew him by the light of the enemy’s

musketry, it was so vivid. The fort was taken and all quiet in a very short

time. Immediately after the firing ceased, I went out to see what had

become of my wounded friend and the other that fell in the passage. They

were both dead. In the heat of the action I saw a British soldier jump over

the walls of the fort next the river and go down the bank, which was almost

perpendicular and twenty or thirty feet high. When he came to the beach

he made off for the town, and if he did not make good use of his legs I

never saw a man that did.

All that were in the action of storming the redoubt were exempted from

further duty that night. We laid down upon the ground and rested the re321
mainder of the night as well as a constant discharge of grape and canist

shot would permit us to do, while those who were on duty for the day com

pleted the second parallel by including the captured redoubts within it . W

returned to camp early in the morning, all safe and sound, except one 

our lieutenants, 1 s who had received a slight wound on the top of t

shoulder by a musket shot . Seven or eight men belonging to the infant

were killed, and a number wounded.

From James Thacher's journal .

-Martin, Private Yanke

Doodle, pp. 234-37.

Thacher provided another view of the assault, stressing the reasons wh

the Americans suffered fewer casualties than their French counterpart

Clearly one reason for the difference was that the Americans barely waite

for their sappers and miners to clear the way, while the French-"perhap

because they were formalists"-let their own pioneers completely finish th

job . 17

12 . " THE ASSAILANTS BRAVELY ENTERED THE FORT . . .

WITHOUT FIRING ASINGLE GUN"

The enemy having two redoubts, about three hundred yards in front 

their principal works, which enfiladed our entrenchment and impeded ou

approaches, it was resolved to take possession of them both by assaul

The one on the left of the British garrison, bordering on the banks of th

river, was assigned to our brigade of light infantry, under the command 

the Marquis de la Fayette . The advanced corps was led on by the intrepi

Colonel Hamilton, who had commanded a regiment of light infantry durin

the campaign, and assisted by Colonel Gimat . The assault commenced 

eight o'clock in the evening [14 October 1781], and the assailants brave

entered the fort with the point of the bayonet without firing a single gu

We suffered the loss of eight men killed, and about thirty wounded . . 

The other redoubt on the right of the British lines was assaulted at th

same time by a detachment of the French, commanded by the gallan

Baron de Viominel . Such was the ardor displayed by the assailants, that a

resistance was soon overcome, though at the expense of nearly one hun

dred men killed and wounded. [In a note Thacher provided the followin

explanation : ]
The cause of the great loss sustained by the French troops in compariso

with that of the Americans, in storming their respective redoubts, was tha

the American troops when they came to the abattis, removed a part of 

with their hands and leaped over the remainder. The French troops o

coming up to theirs, waited till their pioneers had cut away the abatti

secundum artem, which exposed them longer to the galling fire of th

enemy. To this cause also is to be ascribed the circumstance, that th

redoubt assailed by the Americans, was carried before that attacked b

the French troops. The Marquis de la Fayette, sent his aid, Major Barbou

[William Barber] through the tremendous fire of the whole line of th

British, to inform the Baron Viominel, that "he was in his redoubt, and t

ask the Baron where he was." The major found the Baron waiting th

clearing away the abattis, but sent this answer, "tell the Marquis I am no

in mine, but will be in five minutes ." He instantly advanced, and wa

within or nearly so, within his time .

Of the defenders of the redoubt, eighteen were killed, and one captai

and two subaltern officers and forty two rank and file captured . Our sec

ond parallel line was immediately connected with the two redoubts no

taken from the enemy, and some new batteries were thrown up in front o

our second parallel line, with a covert way, and angling work approachin

to less than three hundred yards of their principal forts . These will soon b

mantled with cannon and mortars, and when their horrid thundering com

mences, it must convince his Lordship, that his post is not invincible, an

that submission must soon be his only alternative . Our artillery men, b

the exactness of their aim, make every discharge take effect, so that man

of the enemy's guns are entirely silenced and their works are almost 

ruins .

16th-A party of the enemy, consisting of about four hundred men

commanded by Colonel Abercrombie, about four in the morning, made 

vigorous sortie against two unfinished redoubts occupied by the French

they spiked up seven or eight pieces of cannon, and killed severa

soldiers, but the French advanced and drove them from the redoubts

leaving several killed and wounded.

The same night that the allies took Redoubts Nine and Ten they worke

feverishly to extend their second parallel to incorporate the captured work

By dawn on the 15th the task was finished-a remarkable twelve-hou

accomplishment . Cornwallis valiantly continued his fight for survival, bu

the loss of the two redoubts was decisive . Furthermore, the position of th

allied artillery improved considerably .

-Thacher, Military Journal,

pp . 341-43.
On the 16th a last-ditch effort by the redcoats to retreat to Glouceste

across the York River, Long Island-style, failed . The next morning the alli

bombarded the main British position with such force that the enemy's work

began to collapse, rendering them incapable even of returning the fir

Thacher described the situation on the 17th :

The whole peninsula trembles under the incessant thunderings of our infernal machines ; we have leveled some of their

works in ruins and silenced their guns; they have almost ceased

firing . We are so near as to have a distinct view of the dreadful

havoc and destruction of their works, and even see the men in

their lines torn to pieces by the bursting of our shells . But the

scene is drawing to a close .

18

Later that same day, a British officer carried a white handkerchie

before the enemy lines . Firing ceased . By sunset terms of surrender had bee

exchanged . They were formalized the next day and signed officially tw

days later.

At two o'clock on the afternoon of 19 October 1781-allegedly to th

tune "The World Turned Upside Down" - British troops marched slowl

onto the Yorktown battlefield to lay down their arms before the assemble

allied troops . "It was a noble sight to us," recalled Joseph Martin . "Th

British paid the Americans, seemingly, but little attention as they passe

them, but they eyed the French with considerable malice depicted on the

countenances ." 19

As Duportail was quick to point out and Washington readi

acknowledged, officers in the Corps of Engineers and the companies of sap

pers and miners had made significant contributions to the siege . Afterwar

the Chief Engineer spoke highly of Colonel Gouvion-"great marks of sati

faction can scarcely be denied this officer ." He further requested promo

tions for himself, Gouvion, and Capt . Etienne [Stephen] Rochefontaine, 

French volunteer serving as an engineer since 1778, "according to the usag

established in the European service .

"20

To Congress Washington wrote respectfully of Duportail :

His judgment in council, and well-conducted valor in the

field claim the highest applause, and have secured to him the

esteem and confidence of the army. His plan and conduct of

the late attacks in the . . . successful siege of York . . . afford

brilliant proofs of his military genius, and set the seal of his

reputation ; while they entitle him to my warmest thanks- 21

Gouvion, in the Commander in Chief's words, had acted "with that ener

and precision which constitute the great Engineer." 22 Although Washingt

recognized that promotions for the three engineers who had served him 

Yorktown might affect "the tranquility of the Army, "2s he endorsed them .
Sir

13. WASHINGTON TESTIFIES TO THE ENGINEERS'

DISTINGUISHED SERVICE

George Washington to the President of Congress.

Head Quarters near York, October 31, 178

. . . I should conceal Sentiments with which I am very strongly impres

sed, and do Injustice to very conspicuous Merit, if I did not upon the pre

sent Occasion, offer my Testimonies to the distinguished Abilities an

services both of Genl . Du portail and Lt . Colo . Gouvion ; their Claim to th

particular Attention of Congress, at this Juncture, is founded upon th

practice of Europe; a Siege being considered as the particular province 

the Corps of Engineers, and as entitling them, when attended with a Suc

cess, important in itself, and in its Consequences, to the great Militar

Rewards. These Officers besides are supported by a series of Conduct 

the Line of the Department, which makes them not depend merely upo

the present Circumstances . For these reasons I am induced to recom

mend Genl . Du portail's Memorial to Congress for the grades which h

specifies, and the leave of Absence; the latter being by no means incom

patible with the good of the Service at the present period, as I am reduced

notwithstandg. all my Efforts, to the Necessity of retiring into Winte

Quarters .

The appeal succeeded. Duportail became a major general, Gouvion 

colonel, and Rochefontaine-who would become Chief Engineer in 1794-

major . With Congress's blessings, Duportail and Gouvion hurried home 

France to enjoy a much-deserved leave.

Duportail recommended that either the Chevalier de Laumoy or t

Chevalier de Cambray-Digny serve as Chief Engineer in his absence . Bu

since both were still prisoners, the Chevalier de Villefranche assumed co

mand and retained it until Laumoy's release in August 1782 . Duportail d

not return until late that year. Kosciuszko remained in the Southern Depart

ment and Rochefontaine returned north with Washington.

After Yorktown Washington returned to West Point with the mai

elements of his Army, including the sappers and miners. Some two thousa

regulars headed south to reinforce Greene, and Rochambeau's arm

regrouped at Newport . De Grasse had commitments in the West Indies an

-Fitzpatrick, Writings 

Washington, 23:307-08.
in early November, despite Washington's entreaties that he stay, the a

miral sailed away .

In retrospect, the war was clearly over with the surrender at Yorktow

but in 1781 that fact was not immediately evident to the rebels . The ene

still held New York City, Savannah, Charleston, and Wilmington, Nor

Carolina . After several months, however, events confirmed that t

Yorktown defeat had indeed dealt the British the final decisive blow.
When the Revolutionary War ended Americans were faced wit

perplexing decision: should they maintain a standing army in peacet

They had a longstanding fear that armies threatened individual libe

and no tradition of a standing army . However, many citizens-led 

strong-willed group of nationalists in the Congress and most officers in 

Continental Army-argued that the experiences of the Revolutionary 

demonstrated the need for a change . To a man they believed the mil

alone incapable of meeting the defensive needs of their new nation. Yet 

this group stepped back from the traditional European idea of a large st

ing army led by a clique of aristocratic officers.

In April 1783, as the nationalists' influence waned, Congress appoi

a committee to consider the thorny question . Alexander Hamilton, an 

supporter of a peacetime military establishment, served as chairman. 

committee immediately called on General George Washington for adv

He in turn sought suggestions from his staff .

In the resulting reports there were many similarities . For each office

secure frontier assumed great importance . The west held the promise of 

future but Indians and squatters were a constant menace. Hence ar

forces were required to protect new settlers, and those forces had to be 

tional in character . With Revolutionary War experiences fresh in 

minds, Continental Army officers urged a "professional army compose

career officers trained in the science of warfare."' The continuing need

frontier and coastal security, they argued, mandated a peace establish

which would form the nucleus of a much larger army in time of war.

Engineer officers were quick to recognize that the peacetime arra

ments under consideration would require an engineering department a

means of training its officers . Happily the peace establishment proposal

four Army engineers- Duportail, Putnam, Gouvion, and L'Enfant-

vive.

Chief Engineer Maj . Gen. Louis Duportail first addressed the subje

a peace establishment in a memorial dated April 1783 . Unfortunately 

document has disappeared. From statements made by Washing

however, it is known that Duportail proposed the "extensive" fortificati

327
frontier posts and harbors and the establishment of military academies.2

Duportail revealed that he had based the plan on “hints” Washington had

given him while at headquarters. “I beg your excellency to let me know if i

have been happy enough to meet with your ideas,” Duportail told

Washington when he sent the plan to him in May, “wishing not to propose

anything to Congress but through you and what you approve of."3

When he finally saw Duportail’s report, Washington exclaimed to the

president of Congress:

The more attention will be due to the sentiments expressed

by . . . [Duportail] because they appear not only to be the

production of a well informed mind, and the result of much experience, aided by great professional knowledge, but because

they seem also to be dictated by a disinterested zeal for the

future tranquility and happiness of the United States.4

The Commander in Chief passed on the report to Congress with the hope

that Duportail’s recommendations would be utilized “so far as they may be

found practicable with our means, and applicable to our local circumstances."5 Actually Duportail had submitted his plan to Congress even

before showing it to Washington.

Col. Jean Baptiste de Gouvion, a top-ranking engineer, also contributed

to the peace establishment debate. In a proposal dated 16 April 1783, Gouvion stressed the need for securing America's frontier and her harbors, and

he favored a continental army over individual state establishments. He

JEAN BAPTISTE DE GOUVION.

One of three Royal Engineers the

French govemmen t sent to America

with Duportail, Gouvion (1747-92)

distinguished himself during the siege

of Yorktown. This engraving is by Jacques Cordier.

Contenson, Societe des Cincinnati de France

328
focused on thorough training for artillerists and engineers, whose "Servic

of So important a nature, and of Such a consequence in the field ."

Gouvion deemed a military academy essential and detailed extensiv

its structure and the type of instruction required . Included in his propo

training program were rigorous field exercises as a prerequisite for enter

a regiment.

Gouvion joined other engineer officers in urging that the artillery 

engineers be united into one corps . He envisioned at least two regiment

the corps, each composed of companies of gunners, bombardiers, sapp

and miners, and artificers . Of special interest is Gouvion's view that offi

should only be detached as engineers after service in each of the f

separate companies in the corps. The need to maintain a high degree of p

ficiency among officers through continual instruction and exposure to ma

experiences was a crucial consideration behind Gouvion's plan.

Gouvion was careful to note that France's attempt to unite the artil

and engineers had failed because it was done in time of war (1755-58) 

the officers were unprepared to assume new roles . The French experien

then, was no reason to fear for the success of a similar move in the Uni

States.

1 . "AN OFFICER OF ARTILLERY AND AN ENGINEER WANT

AGREAT APPLICATION TO BE PERFECTLY INSTRUCTED"

Jean Baptiste de Gouvion's recommendation for a peace establishmen

329

Newburg, April 16, 1

How large must be the continental Army to be Kept after this war is 

an easy matter to determine in the present moment, it depends from 

different and distinct objects which comprehend a very extensive p

The first is the number of forts absolutely wanting Garrison for the pro

tion of the frontiers, and opposing the indians in case they would Keep 

their hostile invasions or renew it at any time . The Second is the garr

of the harbours for the continental navy, which being destined to cont

Stores of great value and importance, are not to lay open to an invasio

case the United States should happen to be at war with any power. . . .

Each regiment to be Kept or to be raised ought not to belong to 

particular State, but to the continent at large, the officers and men to 

taken indifferently from any part, it is to be feared that if the contrary 

exist the officers would always use all their influence to be always 

tioned in the State they Should belong to, and in a Short time be lik

habitants to the great detriment of discipline and military Spirit .

A regiment or part of it ought never to keep garrison more than e

teen months in the Same place, in a longer length of time they get 
many acquaintances, injurious to the Service, and being in a mann

tled neglect their duty to employ themselves about their own 

niences.

Promotion by Seniority is the destruction of emulation, because 

officer is Sure to be promoted according to his rank, also many wor

ficers are fit to be captains but not to be field officers . So that 

ought to be left aside. Merit, activity and attention constantly pay'

struction, duty and discipline must be the only recommendation f

motion above the rank of captain . A board of Superior officers 

Judge of it, and the necessary precautions to be taken to hinder pri

terest from prevailing .

As the number of troops Keept on foot during the time of peace 

be inadequate to that necessary in time of war, they must be alwis 

best and most regular order, So that being destributed amon

regiments raised for a war they Should bring with them discipline, i

tion and enable the other men to perform in a Short Space of time 

part of a Soldier's duty with propriety.

The young officers who Should be willing to acquire Some m

knowledge ought to be permitted to follow the after mentioned m

academy and proper encouragement given to them . Those to be ad

in the quarter master departement ought to be obliged to it, becaus

not easy to perform their duty in all its different parts chiefly when an 

of Some extent has to move in a difficult country.

It is not very difficult to form an officer of foot, or of horse, it do

require a long Space of time, but an officer of Artillery and an Eng

want a great application to be perfectly instructed in all the dif

branches of their Service . Being more acquainted with the duty of 

two Corps than of any other I will particularise as much as in my pow

different methods to be followed for the instruction of their officer

the regulations to be established to attain it . Their Service is of So 

tant a nature, and of Such a consequence in the field, that no pains 

to be Spared to have them fully acquainted with the theorical and pra

parts of it .

The military operations of these two corps have Such a connectio

it is not possible to be a good officer of Artillery without having a 

extensive knowledge of the Service of an Engineer, and this one to 

with Some reputation must be acquainted with the principle parts of 

tillery Service . Then I think it Should be advantageous to the good 

Service to have these two corps united, to form one only, and that ea

ficer Should acquire the necessary Knowledge to be able to perform

propriety what belong to one or the other of these two duties, accord

what circumstances Should require from him.

Awell established military academy and Kept up with great care, 

basis which is to Serve to raise that corps to the pitch of instruction 

330
sary to it . Officers of Knowledge, carefull and attentive must be put at t

head of it . They must consider that the pains they Shall take are to form o

ficers who are to have charge after wards of important operations, whi

require Sometimes great military talents. There must be attached to it 

good professor of mathematicks, and another of drawing . Every youn

gentleman to be admitted in the Said academy must have had a liber

education, and be previously instructed in arithmetick, geometry 

cluding trigonometry . At his coming in, his Knowledge of mathematic

must be carry'd to perfection, he Shall receive instruction about the d

ferent machines employed by the artillery or the engineers; their co

struction ; the forces to be employed to put them in motion, and their e

fect. He Shall be taught to Survey by every method, and to draw exact

the ground Surveyed by him, to make plans and profils of the works a

buildings in the greatest detail . The above mentioned parts belong e

tirely to the professors. What follows must be [taught] by the commandin

officers .

The young gentlemen Shall be instructed how to choose positions f

an army in consequence of the part of the country to be covered and t

communications to be Kept open . They will learn to fortify them by fie

works depending from the nature of the ground, the number of troo

Supposed to be employed to deffend them, and the Strength of the e

nemy. They Shall be taught to determine the most advantageous batteri

on a field of battle, and their construction in the most expeditious manne

They are to be instructed in the greatest detail of all what relates to f

tify'd towns including the maritime places, their tracing, construction, a

the estimate of the quantity of work and expences . Those parts can not 

attended to with too much care, because the least blunder is often 

tended with infinite bad consequences . They Shall receive instructi

concerning the Subterraneous fortification, the attack and defense 

works by the means of mines . They Shall be taught how to reconnoitre 

enemy's fortification, lay it on the paper, and determine exactly the d

ferent distances from it . Every year the commanding officer of t

Academy Should make choice of a piece of ground fit to lay out a front 

fortification, the direction and the height of the works should be mark

with poles . He should explain to the young gentlemen, the use of ea

part of it, and the reasons which have determined the direction of it . Th

part being finished they will proceed to the attack of it . All the batteri

and works necessary from the opening of the trenches to the reduction 

the place are to be lay'd out, and Some parts of it to be done to give th

an idea of the different construction made use of in those occasions . Th

will pay a particular attention to the advantages afforded by the nature 

the ground, also to the means the besieged could employ to oppose t

approaches with Success . That being performed every young gentlem

is to Survey that front and its attack and make a copy of it, also a memori

331
on its construction, its attack and defense, adding to it an estimate 

artillery Stores, and ammunitions necessary for the besieged 

besiegers in consequence of the Strength of the fortification, and 

Supposition of the time the Siege would last . When perfectly instruc

all the different parts here above mentioned, of which the General 

manding the corps, and the officers at the head of the academy are 

the Judges he is to be admitted into one of the regiments of artiller

continent cannot Keep less than two, and are to be composed as fo

Eight companies of gunners, two companies of bombardiers, one of 

pers and Miners and one of Artificers.

The regiments are to be exercised twice a week to the firing of c

mortars, etc ., a field officer to be alwis present and report t

Commanding officer of the regiment when absent from the field of 

cise .

The Subalterns ought to receive twice a week a lesson abou

theorical parts of the artillery and a captain to be present to it to mai

the good order and preside to the instruction, and from time to time 

Should be exercised again about what they have learned in the Acad

The Captains and field officers ought to have two times a week a 

ference where they Should treat of all the parts concerning art

fortifications, manufactures of arms, powder mills, castings of ca

Shells, balls, the best dimensions to be given to the pieces and carri

in Short their object Should be to carry the instruction and Service o

corps to the greatest perfection . The Commanding officer should 

memorial from every officer on the interesting points he would have 

posed for discussion .

Besides the officers on duty with the regiments there Should be 

tain number to perform the duty on Engineers where necessary, but 

Should be Sent for that purpose unless he had been employ'd 

cessively in the four distinct Sorts of companies forming a regiment

Should be perfectly acquainted with their Service . He could not be o

command for more than three years, after which time he Should 

regiment and be relieved by another officer Sent to the Same effect .

A company ought not to be detached from the regiment for more 

two years, because it is to be feared that (in a longer Space of tim

men would loose the greatest part of the instruction acquired wit

regiment, if too a long time absent from it .

The companies of Sappers and miners should have a particular 

cise relative to their duty in the field, but their officers Should also pa

of the general instruction of the corps of artillery.

It is absolutely necessary that the officers of the companies 

tificers Should be intelligent, attentive, and industrious. They ough
only take rank with those of the others companies, but their places Shoul

be considered as places of trust and confidence .

There ought to be Some officers (extra of the number of those with th

regiments) detached in the different manufactories of arms, places fo

casting canons, and powder mills, to Superintend the works . They Shoul

be relieved from time to time by others coming from the regiments . Thos

stations are to be looked upon as of great importance.

A field officer Should be in every district at the head of the fortifica

tions, and Judge of every thing to be proposed, he could not remain ther

when promoted but Join a regiment .

It is of the utmost consequence that an officer of artillery attached to 

brigade with Some field pieces, Should be perfectly acquainted with th

different manoeuvres of the troops, So it is a part which is not to b

neglected .

The plan I propose here to form but one corps of those of artillery an

Engineers was put in execution in france, but as it was in time of war Som

Engineers were sent to the Army to do the duty of the Artillery, and Som

officers of artillery to Serve as Engineers, but having not had time to b

perfectly acquainted with the details of a Service of which they had but 

general Knowledge, it was found proper after a little while, to let every on

of these officers Serve in the line they formerly belong to, and the tw

corps were disunited . But I am confident that if the reunion had take

place in another circumstance, So that the officers of each corps Shoul

have had time to acquire what Knowledge was wanting to them of the Ser

vice they did not at first belong to ; that plan would have Succeeded, an

found afterwards very advantageous .

-Washington Papers, roll 91 .

Brig. Gen. Rufus Putnam, Duportail's predecessor as Chief Engineer

joined Gouvion in advocating fortification of America's seaports and fron

tiers . Putnam even specified five ports whose defense Congress should con

trol . He chose them for strategic reasons rather than for their size and com

mercial importance . The remaining harbors were deemed safe in the hand

of the states.

Putnam singled out the Lake Champlain-Hudson River corridor fo

congressional attention. He saw West Point as the "Grand Arsanal o

America," where the art of gunnery and fortification would be taught an

from which companies of artillery-he did not specifically mention th

engineers-would be detached to the field . To the west on the Ohio River h

proposed a chain of eight posts designed to make the Indians submissive an

encourage settlement - a venture Putnam was soon to become personally i

volved in.
2. "AMONG THE SEAPORTS, NEW YORK CLAIMS

THE FIRST ATTENTION"

Rufus Putnam's thoughts on a peace establishment .

April 25, 

America is by no means to place her principle Security in walled To

and the Multitude of her Fortresses, nor is she in time of Peace to be a

expence of a reguler Army Sufficient for the defence of every part o

Territorys, Should they be invaided . Yet unless her harbours (at leas

principle ones) are Secured by Fortifications and Small Garissons, 

Sea Ports are liable to be Surprised, plundered and burnt, or laid u

contributions by a few Ships of War; and if aided by land Forces an En

might in some of them, So establish him Self in a very Short time 

render it very [difficult] to drive him out.

Her frontiers, Should also be So Secured, by Forts and Gariso

such maner as at least might retard the opperations of an Enemy til

Force of the country may be collected to oppose him .

Among the Sea Ports, New York claims the first attention, No Spo

the Continent the possession of which is of So much consequence t

United States as that, and with a very little expense, compared wit

object, may be rendered perfectly Secure against any Surprise or I

whatever.

Falmouth [modern-day Portland] in the province of Main is the 

Harbour eastward that ought to claim the attention of Congress . It is i

very Neighbourhood of Halifax . 6 The Country but thinly Settled the 

bour is deep and Spacious, the Town on a peninsula, and Shoul

enemy establish him Self there the whole eastern Country would 

danger of being lost.

Penobscot . . . is Still further east has also a Spacious Harbour a

the Source, I am told, from whence the eastern States are to expec

most of their Masts Spars and Lumber. There are also in the Back Cou

Several Tribes of Indians .

From New york Southward Charles Town and Savanna are the 

suppose Intiteled to the Notice of Congress, they have the Spaniard

their Right and Savages in the Rear, are properly the Frontier, on 

quarter and I am told the Country is but thinly peopeled .

Their are other Harbours and Sea ports of very great consequence 

think they will be perfectly saif in the hands of the States, to which 

belong and Should Congress Interfeir in the matter it might give very 

Jealousy at least to Some of them .

In point of Importence Next to the Citty and Harbour of New york

North River and the Commun[ication] between New york and Ca

ought to Claim the first attention, for whoever attempts the Conque

334
America will in my opinion, if he acts right, endever to Establish him 

on the Hudson and by a chain of Posts in that quarter to Seperate 

eastern from the midle and Southern States, on this . . . then Congr

Should always keep an eye and Never Suffer an enimy, Foreign 

domistic to fix himself on any part of it .

West Point is perhaps as well Sittuated for the Grand Arsanal 

America as any place whatever and by dismanteling most of the out wor

a much Smaller Garison will be required then in its present State, 

Garison should consist Chiefly of Artillery men and Include also one C

pany of Artificers . Here Should all the Carage and apperatis for the 

tillery be made, here should the Art of Gunnery and Fortifications 

Taught, and from hence Should the artillery Companys detached to ot

posts be releved at least once in three year. Besides West Point there 

undoubtedly be other Arsinals established both east and West that will 

quire Small guards .

I consider Stoney point as an appendage to West Point whither 

former remain in its present State or a reguler Fortification be built th

which is a Subject worth consideration .

In order to prevent a [surprise] from Canada by way of Lake Champla

if the Sittuation will admit a Fort Should be built at Wind mill Point or P

au Feir, or Some where near the Forty fifth degree of Lattitude and 

River or Lake so obstructed as forever to Shut the British out of it . T

matter I concive to be worth attention and examenation, for if practic

then in case of a War with Great Briton it will prevent their makeing t

Selves masters of the Lakes and at the Same time it will give great Se

rity to . . . that part of the Country called the Hanphere [Hampshi

Grants [Vermont] and other Setlers Near the Lake and will also aide u

Introduceing an Army into Cannada when ever that Should be thought 

per. In the mean time it will be a means of checking any Illicit trade in 

quarter, interrupt the wicked Corrispondence and be a good means to 

vent the revolt of the Virmonteres Should they have it in Contemplation 

But if no place can be found Sutable for a Fortification further No

ward, then Crown Point then that Should be fixed on. The Lake is Nar

here its pasage esily obstructed, and the Sittuation elligable for an 

dependent Strong Work of any Size you please .

The Necessity of a Fortress Some where on Lake Champlain to pre

any Sudden Eruption from Cannada into the provence of New york I t

is obvious and if one is established there, Some Intermediate Posts wil

necessary between that and Albany for the Lodgement and Security of 

Stoars that may be Sent northward, viz, one at Fort George and anoth

the Landing at the further end of Lake George but a Block House or ev

Stockade with a very few Troops as a Guard will be Sufficient .

Albany will no Doubt requier Some Troops as it will be the plac

Lodging at least for a time the Stores designed for the Northern 

We[stern] Fronterrs .

335
To keep the Western Savages in Awe to protect and regulate our T

with them and prevent any insidious practices of our British and Spa

Neighbours as far as posable, Some Fortresses and a Small reg

Establishment is absolutely necessary .

The British Used to Send their Supplys to Niagara from Canada

course are under no necessity of keeping a Post at Oswego, but in 

present Sittuation I concieve that all our Supplys for the Country on 

Lakes must pass that way, and besides in order to protect the 

[French] Settelments above Detroit, Encourage their emigrations 

Cannada and Secure the posts in that Quarter from Surprize our F

Should be much greater even in time of peace then what the British U

to keep . They had only the Savages to guarde against we have them 

the Savages Both to look to.

If we wish to Secure the people of Illinois from the Surprize of 

Spaniards our Force There Should always be equal to theirs .

To Secure the Communication between Fort Pitt and Illinoise to 

Protection to the Inhabitents . . . on the warters of the Ohio to awe 

Southern Indians and check any attempt that may be made up that Ri

belive Several Small Post on or near the Ohio will be found Necess

Perhaps the place where Fort Massac Stood, 46 miles from the Mout

the Ohio, may be found a proper Spot for one of those Intermediate po

In time of War a Navel Superiorety on the Western Lakes may be 

likely to fall to the Share of the British then to us, or at least the Super

iety is uncertain . I wish therefore to Suggest the propriety of ope

Some other Communication with Lake Erie, then that through Lake 

tario, by which Niagara Detroit, etc ., etc ., may recive Supplys in cas

Necessity, for besides the Idea of the British haveing a Navel Superio

in Lake ontario Should Niagara by any Misfortune be taken with it we 

loose the whole Western World, unless Some other Communicatio

opened with it then at present.

This Communication may be made from Fort Pitt to Presque Isle, 

think the Most Elligable is From Fort Pitt by Big Bever Creek Kishku

and Cayahoga or Down the River from Fort Pitt to yallow Creek from t

by Tuscarawas to Cayahoga and Lake Erie.

But I wish to propose for Consideration a much more exten[sive] 

attended with very little additional expence and when considered i

extensive point of vew I concieve to be of very great consequence, V

fix a post at the mouth of the Cayahoga River; a 2d at the one mile por

between the Heads of the Cayahoga and Muskingum Rivers ; a 3

Tuscarawas ; a 4th at the Forks of Munkingum; or Delleware Town ; a 

near Wills Town ; a Sixth near the Mouth of Muskingum; a 7th near 

Hockhocking; an 8th on the Great Kanhawa. Some Such Chain of Pos

that Quarter I concive would give Such Encouragement not only to t

who have lands on this Side the ohio but also to Such as may obtain gr

336
on the other Side as would Induce Such Emigrations to that Quarter, tha

within a few years the Country West of the Allegheny Mountains would no

only be able to feed all our Garisons in the Western World, but render tha

Frontear perfectly Secure. The Savages about the Waters of the Mohawk

Susquehannah Oswego and Ohio when they See them Selves encom

passed with forts and garisons would undoubtedly behave very Submis

sive or move further afeild .

The expence of Building these Posts will be very Small, a good

Stocade with proper Flankers will be abundently Sufficient in all instence

except the one at the Mouth of the Cayahoga, which will require mor

attention, Nor will it require any Considirable, if any, increase of Troops a

Fort Pitt and some other Posts will require a less number in this case the

would be other wise necessery . . . .

-Washington Papers, roll 91 .

Several officers outside the Corps of Engineers also recognized the nee

for officers trained in the art of war. Brig. Gen . George Clinton, governor o

New York, proposed that professorships in military science be set up in eac

state to assure a continual "succession of officers well versed in the tactics o

war." 8 By contending that officers must attend a stated number of course

and lectures and be admitted to degree candidacy before receiving thei

commissions, Clinton envisioned a highly professional army.

In his peacetime recommendations, Col . Timothy Pickering-a studen

of military history and tactics, author of a 1775 drill manual, one-time adju

tant general, and later quartermaster general -acknowledged a limite

need for engineers . He also favored a military school at West Point.

3 . "AS MANY AS TWO ENGINEERS WILL PROBABLY

BE ALWAYS FOUND NECESSARY"

Timothy Pickering to George Washington .

33 7

April 22, 178

. . . For the purpose of fixing the posts on the frontiers, it will b

necessary to retain two or three engineers ; each of whom, having 

separate duty, should be accompanied, on this service, by an officer o

ability . These may be field officers, and vested with the Command of th

standing troops, who may be formed into one regiment of four battalions 

the regiment to be commanded by a colonel or lieutenant colonel, an

each battalion by a lieutenant colonel or major. . . . To erect these posts i

the first instance, a competent number of the three-years-men9 wil

doubtless be retained in service, unless others can be engaged o

cheaper terms.
As many as two engineers will probably be always found neces

for visiting the posts and repairing fortifications or erecting new o

circumstances shall require.

It is hardly to be expected that the arsenals will be constantly k

proper order, unless they are subject to visitations, at least annuall

visitor may most properly be an artillerist, who is both practical

scientifically acquainted with his profession . He may be one of the f

ficers of the regiment. For I see no necessity keeping the infantry a

tillery distinct . . . .

If anything like a military academy in America be practical at this t

might be grounded on the permanent military establishment for ou

tier posts and arsenals; and the wants of the states, seperately, of of

to command the defences on their seacoasts .

On this principle it might be expedient to establish a military scho

academy, at West Point. And that a competent number of young g

men might be induced to become students, it might be made a ru

vacancies in the standing regiment should be supplied from t

Those few instances excepted where it would be just to promote 

meritorious sergeant.

For this end the number which shall be judged requisite to s

vacancies in the standing regiment must be fixed ; and the student

are admitted with an expectation of filling them limited accordingly 

might be allowed subsistance at the public expense. If any other 

desired to pursue the same studies, at the military academy, they 

be admitted, only subsisting themselves. Those students whould 

structed in what is usually called military discipline, tactics, and the 

and practice of fortification and gunnery. The commandant and one 

other officers of the standing regiment and the engineers, making 

Point their general residence, would be the masters of the academ

the inspector general superintend the whole. . . .

Having weighed the advice of his staff, Washington submitted h

peace establishment plan to Hamilton's committee on May 2 . At th

the Commander in Chief was "quite in the dark" regarding all aspects 

future of the Army in the United States. 10 He sincerely hoped that th

gress would at least heed some of his suggestions, which drew heavily 

proposals made by his advisors. His plan was "an even-handed docu

mindful of the country's deeply ingrained suspicions of men in unifor

For Washington the issue was one of scale. A large army was "dan

to . . . liberties" but a small force was "indispensably necessary ." He 

ficer and troop requirements at 2,631 . In one part of his proposal, 

cluded below, Washington stipulated that four regiments of infantry

338

-Washington Papers, roll 
comprising 477 men, would be garrisoned at fifteen specific locations else

where and at an undetermined number of posts on the Carolina an

Georgia frontiers . He placed the remaining 723 men in a single artille

regiment . Washington proposed that an additional force of artificers b

blended with the artillery and that the Corps of Invalids be retained to hel

guard magazines and garrison West Point .

12

As demonstrated in the following selections from Washington's plan, h

supported the union of the artillery and engineers into one corps . More im

portant, he strongly urged the establishment of at least one academy "f

the Instruction of the Art Military; particularly those Branches of it whic

respect Engineering and Artillery, which are highly essential, and t

knowledge of which, is most difficult to obtain." Military education 

crucial, he said, "unless we intend to let the Science become extinct, and 

depend entirely upon the Foreigners for their friendly aid ."

The Commander in Chief was acutely aware that most of his be

engineers during the Revolution were foreigners with formal training. I

deed, in a letter written earlier to Duportail, Washington had admitted th

"it will doubtless be necessary for us to retain some of the French Enginee

in America," at least while the proposed military academies and manufac

tories were in their infancy. 1 3

That Washington dispatched his peace establishment plan to Congre

before receiving a copy of Duportail's recommendations for the engineeri

department probably accounts for Washington's sketchy references to t

engineers .

4. "A CORPS OF ABLE ENGINEERS . . . CANNOT BE

RAISED IN ADAY"

George Washington's sentiments on a peace establishment .

A Peace Establishment for the United States of America may in 

opinion be classed under four different heads Vizt :

First . A regular and standing force, for Garrisoning West Point a

such other Posts upon our Northern, Western, and Southern Frontiers, 

shall be deemed necessary to awe the Indians, protect our Trade, preve

the encroachment of our Neighbours of Canada and the Florida's, a

guard us at least from surprizes; Also for security of our Magazines.

Secondly. A well organized Militia ; upon a Plan that will pervade all 

States, and introduce similarity in their Establishment Manoeuvres, Ex

cise and Arms.

Thirdly. Establishing Arsenals of all kinds of Military Stores .

Fourthly. Accademies, one or more for the Instruction of the 

Military; particularly those Branches of it which respect Engineering a

33 9

May 2, 17
Artillery, which are highly essential, and the knowledge of which, is m

difficult to obtain. Also Manufactories of some kinds of Military Stores.

Upon each of these, and in the order in which they stand, I shall 

my sentiments as concisely as I can, and with that freedom which 

Committee have authorized .

Altho' a large standing Army in time of Peace hath ever been c

sidered dangerous to the liberties of a Country, yet a few Troops, un

certain circumstances, are not only safe, but indispensably necessa

Fortunately for us our relative situation requires but few. The same 

cumstances which so effectually retarded, and in the end conspire

defeat the attempts of Britain to subdue us, will now powerfully ten

render us secure . Our distance from the European States in a g

degree frees us of apprehension, from their numerous regular forces 

the Insults and dangers which are to be dreaded from their Ambition .

But, if our danger from those powers was more imminent, yet we 

too poor to maintain a standing Army adequate to our defence, and 

our Country more populous and rich, still it could not be done with

great oppression of the people. Besides, as soon as we are able to r

funds more than adequate to the discharge of the Debts incurred by 

Revolution, it may become a Question worthy of consideration, whet

the surplus should not be applied in preparations for building and equi

ing a Navy, without which, in case of War we could neither protect 

Commerce, nor yield that Assistance to each other, which, on such an 

tent of Sea-Coast, our mutual Safety would require.

Fortifications on the Sea Board may be considered in two point

view, first as part of the general defence, and next, as securities to D

Yards, and Arsenals for Ship Building, neither of which shall I take into 

plan ; because the first would be difficult, if not, under our circumstanc

impracticable ; at any rate amazingly expensive . The other, because it 

matter out of my line, and to which I am by no means competent, as it 

quires a consideration of many circumstances, to which I have never p

attention .

The Troops requisite for the Post of West Point, for the Magazines, 

for our Northern, Western and Southern Frontiers, ought, in my opini

to amount to 2631 Officers of all denominations included; besides 

Corps of Invalids . If this number should be thought large, I would o

observe; that the British Force in Canada is now powerful, and, by rep

will be increased ; that the frontier is very extensive; that the Tribes of 

dians within our Territory are numerous, soured and jealous ; that C

munications must be established with the exterior Posts ; And, that it 

be policy and economy, to appear respectable in the Eyes of the Indi

at the Commencement of our National Intercourse and Traffic with th

In a word, that it is better to reduce our force hereafter, by degrees, t
to have it to increase after some unfortunate disasters may have h

pened to the Garrisons ; discouraging to us, and an inducement to 

Enemy to attempt a repetition of them . . . .

That an Institution calculated to keep alive and diffuse the knowled

of the Military Art would be highly expedient, and that some kinds 

Military Manufactories and Elaboratories may and ought to be establish

will not admit a doubt; but how far we are able at this time to go into gr

and expensive Arrangements and whether the greater part of the Milit

Apparatus and Stores which will be wanted can be imported or Manufa

tured, in the cheapest and best manner: I leave those to whom the obs

vations are to be submitted, to determine, as being more competent, 

the decision than I can pretend to be. I must however mention so

things, which I think cannot be dispensed with under the present or a

other circumstances ; Until a more perfect system of Education can 

adopted, I would propose that Provision should be made at some Post 

Posts where the principle Engineers and Artillerists shall be stationed, 

instructing a certain number of young Gentlemen in the Theory of the 

of War, particularly in all those branches of service which belong to the 

tillery and Engineering Departments. Which, from the affinity they bear 

each other, and the advantages which I think would result from 

measure, I would have blended together; And as this species 

knowledge will render them much more accomplished and capable of p

forming the duties of Officers, even in the Infantry or any other Cor

whatsoever, I conceive that appointments to vacancies in the Establis

Regiments, ought to be made from the candidates who shall have co

pleted their course of Military Studies and Exercises. As it does in 

essential manner qualify them for the duties of Garrisons, which will 

the principal, if not only service in which our Troops can be employed 

time of Peace and besides the Regiments of Infantry by this means 

become in time a nursery from whence a number of Officers for Artill

and Engineering may be drawn on any great or sudden occasion .

Of so great importance is it to preserve the knowledge which has be

acquired thro' the various Stages of a long and arduous service, that I c

not conclude without repeating the necessity of the proposed Instituti

unless we intend to let the Science become extinct, and to depend 

tirely upon the Foreigners for their friendly aid, if ever we should again 

involved in Hostility. For it must be understood, that a Corps of a

Engineers and expert Artillerists cannot be raised in a day, nor made su

by any exertions, in the same time, which it would take to form an 

cellent body of Infantry from a well regulated Militia. . . .

34 1

-Fitzpatrick, Writings 

Washington, 26 :374-

396-97.
Issued in mid-June 1788, the Hamilton Committee report indicate

extent to which the remaining nationalists in Congress shared the Arm

ficers' views . The committee both affirmed the need for fortifications 

argued for a federal establishment to maintain them . The wording o

report clearly indicates the supporters' political hopes that the p

establishment would help achieve national cohesion . The committee 

heeded arguments made by Washington and assuredly reiterated by Du

tail as well : a corps of artillery and engineers was a peacetime necessity .

As the committee saw it, the corps required "science and 

preliminary study" and could not be simply thrown together in respon

an emergency . Moreover, the fortifications proposed on the frontier 

along the coast required the skills of artillerists and engineers . Withou

established engineer and artillery branch, the Army would be in the 

advantageous position of employing foreigners in wartime. The commi

recommended combining the two groups into a single unit-called the c

of engineers-in part because separation gave "rise to frequent dis

about the respective duties of each ."

The Hamilton Committee report outlined the corps's structure and 

down a few regulations . Believing that Duportail's recommendations 

"in general sound and just," the committee proposed that the C

Engineer survey the sites to be fortified and draw up a general plan to 

out the work. Notably the congressmen rejected the idea of a mil

academy . They maintained that having professors attached to the cor

engineers was sufficient .

The Chief Engineer, who would be paid $250 plus subsistence 

month, was to be one of three members of the general staff and as such 

to assist in revising Army and militia regulations . As for the corp

engineers in general, both its pay and the number of officers in propor

to troops would be higher than in other units .

5. REPORT OF A COMMITTEE OF CONGRESS ON A MILITARY

PEACE ESTABLISHMENT

Philadelphia, June 18, 

The Committee, are of opinion, if there is a contitutional [sic] pow

the United States . . . . that there are conclusive reasons in favo

federal in preference to state establishments .

First there are objects for which separate provision cannot co

niently be made; posts within certain districts, the judisdiction [sic] 

property of which are not yet constitutionally ascertained-territory a

taining to the United States not within the original claim of any o

states-the navigation of the Missippi and of the lakes-the rights o

fisheries and of foreign commerce; all which belonging to the U

342
States depending on the laws of nations and on treaty, demand the j

protection of the Union, and cannot with propriety be trusted to separ

establishments .

Secondly, the fortifications proper to be established ought to be c

structed with relation to each other on a general and well-digested sys

and their defence should be calculated on the same principles . This 

equally important in the double view of safety and economy. If this is 

done under the direction of the United States, each state following a p

tial and disjointed plan, it will be found that the posts will have no mut

dependence or support-that they will be improperly distributed, a

more numerous than is necessary as well as less efficacious-of cou

more easily reduced and more expensive both in the construction a

defence.

3dly. It happens, that from local circumstances particular states, if 

to take care of themselves, would be in possession of the chief part of 

standing forces and of the principal fortified places of the union ; a 

cumstance inconvenient to them and to the United States. . . .

4thly. It is probable that a provision by the (Congress) of the for

necessary to be kept up will (be based) upon a more systematic a

economical plan than a provision by the states separately . . . .

5thly. There must be a corps of Artillery and Engineers kept on foo

time of peace, as the officers of this corps require science and l

preliminary study, and cannot be formed on an emergency; and as 

neglect of this institution would always oblige the United States to h

recourse to foreigners in time of war for a supply of officers in this ess

tial branch-an inconvenience which it ought to be the object of every 

tion to avoid . Nor indeed is it possible to dispense with the service of s

a corps in time of peace, as it will be indispensable not only to have po

on the frontier ; but to have fortified harbours for the reception and prot

tion of the fleet of the United States . This corps requiring particular inst

tions for the instruction and formation of the officers cannot exist up

separate establishments without a great increase of expence.

6thly. It appears . . . to be the concurrent opinion of the Commande

Chief, the Secretary at War, the Inspector General and the Chief Engine

not only that some militia establishment is indispensable but that it ou

in all respects to be under the authority of the United States as well 

military as political reasons . The plan hereafter submitted on conside

tions of economy is less extensive than proposed by either of them .

The Committee upon these principles submit the following plan .

The Military peace establishment of the United States to consist of f

regiments of infantry, and, one of Artillery incorporated in a corps 

Engineers, with the denomination of the corps of Engineers . . . .

The Corps of Engineers to consist of one Regiment or two batalion

Artillery, each batalion consisting of four companies, each company 

sixty four rank and file ; and of a corps of Artificers . . . .

343
The promotion in the Engineers to be distinct and according to seni

ity in that corps.

Provided that no officer whatsoever shall consider it as a violation 

his rights, if another receives an extra promotion in the corps on acco

of brilliant services or peculiar talents .

And in order that such extra-promotion may not depend on misrep

sentation, it shall not be made but on the recommendation of the Co

mander of the army, accompanied by the facts and reasons upon whic

is founded, and with the opinion of the officer commanding the corps 

which the promotion is to be made, all which shall be reported to C

gress, by the secretary at war with his opinion concerning the same .

All non commissioned officers and privates to be engaged for 

years; with this condition that if a war should break out during the ti

they shall be obliged to serve to the end of it .

Fortifications

The fortifications necessary to be kept up are of two kinds, land a

naval ; the first for internal security the last for the protection of the fle

of the United States .

As to the first kind, there are many important posts already existi

several of which it will be essential to occupy and guard 'till more per

nent provision can be made on a general plan . For this Congress h

already made temporary provision by their resolution of the [blank]. If 

time therein limited should be likely to expire before a general system 

be adopted, it can be prolonged.

The Committee are of opinion that the principles laid down by Ma

General Du Portail, Chief Engineer, in . . . [his peace establishm

memorial] annexed to this report, so far as they respect merely the art

of fortifications are in general sound and just; and that it will be expedi

for Congress, so soon as they have determined on the establishmen

the corps of Engineers, to instruct the head of that corps to make a sur

of the points proper to be fortified and to digest a general plan prop

tioned to the military establishment of the United States to be laid bef

Congress for their consideration . . . .

Military Academies

The Committee are of opinion that the benefit of such institut

rarely compensates for the expecee-that military knowledge is best 

quired in service, that with respect to those branches of service which 

of a more scientific nature, the professors proposed to be attached to 

corps of Engineers, will produce substantially all the utility to be expec

from academies-that at all events institutions of this kind can only be 

object of future consideration . . . .

344
General Staff

The Committee are of opinion that a general staff in time of peace (e

cept a General officer to command the troops another to command t

corps of Engineers and Artillery and an Inspector General) ought to 

dispensed with as all the purposes may be answered by the war depar

ment, by contracts, and by the Regimental staff.

The pay of the officers here mentioned and other emoluments to be 

follows : General Commanding the troops-300 dollars pay per mont

General commanding Engs-250 dollars per month pay and subsistenc

Inspector General-250 dollars per month pay and subsistence.

In time of war two Regiments to compose a Brigade and a Brigadi

General to be appointed to each brigade with 200 dollars pay per Mon

and 5 rations of forage per day. . . .

The Committee are of opinion that with a view to either of the propos

establishments, it will be proper to direct the Commander in Chief to a

point a board of officers, the Inspector General, Commandant of Artill

and Chief Engineer being members, to revise the regulations for the ar

of the United States, and to digest a general ordinance for the service 

all the troops of the United States, and another for the service of t

militia ; and to transmit both with his observations to Congress for th

consideration ; the latter when approved to be recommended to t

several states . . . .

Remarks

A. Corps of Engineers . The artillery and Engineers are united in o

corps from the great analogy in the service which when the corps a

separated gives rise to frequent disputes about the respective duties 

each, very injurious to the service ; there is a great resemblance in t

preliminary studies and qualifications requisite to form the officers 

both, and the Union is conducive to economy. There is an extra number 

serve as Engineers .

B. The pay of this corps is generally higher than of any other ; becau

there is much preparatory study and labour to qualify an officer, and p

motion is much less rapid .

C. There are a great number of officers in proportion to the me

because artillery are chiefly in detachments and are of so much cons

quence in military operations that the pieces ought rarely to be trusted 

non commissioned officers . . . .

-Syrett, Papers of Hampto

3 :381-83, 387, 389-9

395-96.
While the Hamilton Committee had acted with speed to submit 

report in June the full Congress-increasingly antinational in 

ment-balked . Even a visit to Congress by Washington in late Augus

to get results.

Meanwhile, Washington went ahead with plans to transfer Briti

forts to American custody . He sent Maj . Gen . Baron von Steuben to C

to confer with General Frederick Haldimand, the British commande

Louis Ambroise de Genton, the Chevalier de Villefranche, who 

panied von Steuben, recorded his own observations regarding e

British works and plans for peacetime fortifications on Lake Champla

his report Villefranche, a lieutenant colonel in the Corps of Enginee

parently agreed with Rufus Putnam's assessment : the 

Champlain-Hudson River corridor remained as crucial in peace as 

been in war.

6. VILLEFRANCHE'S OBSERVATIONS ALONG THE ROUTE TO CA

The Chevalier de Villefranche to George Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to send to your excellency my observations whi

general baron de steubens ; they are very counteracted, and beside

not warant their exactness, owing to the general being in a very 

haste, to get to Canada, we did not stop to any of those positions o

champlain which it had been very interesting to examine ; and i w

permitted to go on Shore at Pisle aux nois and st . john . . . .

Observations. Of all the positions that i have seen on lake champl

appears to me that wind mills' point is the only one advantageous 

fortify'd, in order to deffend its entrance. At that place it is but abo

mile wide, i Could not be inform'd exactly were the chanel passes, 

supposing it to be in the middle, the distance would not be too great 

very much the ships at their passage under the firing of the wor

might be erected there .

As far as i Could guess wind mills' point advances about three qu

of a mile into the lake, its foremost part is about 7 or 800 yard bro

become narrower as it joins the Continent; there is no Comma

ground round that position, the Country at that place is very level

was told that in great increases of water it is overflowed at a ver

siderable distance, excep the point, which never is from wind mills

to the 45° . 14 The lake grow narrower and the Country is very 

perhaps would it be more advantageous to take a position more adv

principally if the channel passes near its banks, it is what i could no

formed of.

346

West point, September 1
At about 8 miles this side of wind mill's point is Pisle la motte, 

northerly point of that island is but about 1 114 of a mile distant from 

southern part of point au fer between those two points, is a small is

which is not marked on the chart; the East channel of Pisle la motte is 

about 500 yards distant from its northern point ; if this point that of poin

feu, were fortifyed and a battery erected on the above mention'd islan

would render it very difficult for vessels to go up the lake.

The British have two posts this side of the 45° . The first on long isle 

place Call'd dutch mans point. From the informations i have taken (for 

did see the works but at a distance of at least 4 miles) i have learn'd 

they have only a strong Block house where are no other troops 

refugees Commanded by a doctor smith, they have there well built 

racks for about 800 men.

The second post is at point au fer, at about 3 miles this side of w

mills' point, it is very trifling, it Consist in a stone house at the 4 angle

which they have erected tambours. The whole is surrounded by paliss

in a square form, at the angles of which are small bastions made 

palisade tow.

Beyond the 45° [in Quebec Province] the 1st post you meet with i

Pisle aux nois before this war it was allmost nothing, but it seems that 

British will now make of it one of their main forts . . . . L'isle aux noi

small, extremely flat as well as the opposite shores, the northern part 

swampy. Small boats Can only pass on the west side, the ship channe

on the East. The old fortifications which . . . stand . . . are in a Very 

tered situation, they Consist in a [sodded] fort situated in the middle of 

island, it is surrounded with block houses ; they are Erecting th

redoubtes at this time; . . . two on the East and one on the west s

those redoubts are built with timbers, and seemed to me to be 15 o

feet high and Each large enough to Contain 3 or 400 men. They are all

Compleated . The British have at that place large magazins, and Barra

for 1500 men. Having taken my observations from on board of the s

where i was i Cannot warrant for the absolute exactness of them .

St. john is the 2d . post on the river chambly, it appears to me that 

very much neglectected [sic] . It Consist in two soded redoubts 

several planked embrasures, they are situated on the Bank of the riv

was told that they were joind by palissade at the beginning of this war, 

it remain nothing of it . It appeared to me that St. john on the land sid

surrounded with pickets with a parapet behind it 3 or 4 feet thick; 

Country round seems to be very flat . I can't say no more of it being 

board of a ship from which it was allmost impossible to see any thing .

Chambly is the 3d . post on the river . It is but an old Castle flancked 

4 tours 30 or 35 feet high . The walls are not more than 3 feet thick, it 

no deffence against artillery; it was formerly built just to deffend aga

indians. 300 men may be lodged in that Castle .

347
Sorrel is the last post that is to be met on the river it is not fortify'd 

British have at that place barracks for 1500 men and verry Consider

magazins .

By fall 1783 the full Congress at last seemed to be moving slowly to

consideration of the peace establishment question . Duportail wanted t

home, so Hamilton's committee requested a second, more detailed re

from him on the engineering department . The result-forwarde

Washington on September 30-was a strong position paper, the only su

ing personal record of Duportail's thoughts on a peace establishment .

The Chief Engineer began emphatically with a call to unite the arti

and engineering departments . Among the reasons he cited were the 

relationship of the two in training and practice; great monetary savings ; 

the elimination of existing disputes over authority . As Gouvion had d

earlier, Duportail noted that the French had tried unsuccessfully to u

their artillery and engineers . But, Duportail contended, the union coul

achieved more easily in America, "where there is not yet private Interes

passions of the Corps to combat ."

PLAN FOR A CORPS OF ENGINEERS AND ARTILLERISTS

Presented by Louis Duportail

September 1783

-1st District Director'

-2nd District Director

-3rd District Director

Commander of the Academyt

Director General or Commandant

Ist RegimentColonel, Lt . Colonel, Major,

Paymaster-adjutant, Quartermaster, 2 Surgeons, Sergeant

Major, Drum Major, 6 Fifes and

Drums.

5 Companies Gunners, 1 Company Bombardiers, 1 Company

Sappers and Miners, 1 Company

Artificers .

Each company having a Ist and

2nd Captain, a Ist and 2nd Lieutenanttt, 3 Sergeants, 6

Corporals, and 24 Privates .

L2nd RegimentWith the same officers and companies as the Ist Regiment .

' A Brigadier General or Colonel

to field officer assisted by a captain

ttFour officers because of the need to detach officers without troops

PLAN FOR A CORPS OF ENGINEERS. This chart outlines the

structure of the peacetime engineering establishment proposed by

Chief Engineer Duportail in September 1785.

348

-Washington Papers, roll 9
In the conclusion of his report, Duportail again joined the chorus favo

ing a military academy, which he regarded as "the Nursery of the Corps 

The retiring Chief Engineer outlined the academy's structure and propos

leaving vacant the position of second lieutenant within each company of t

engineering department's two regiments. The academy's first studen

would then fill the vacancies, and "Men of Theory and Knowledge" wou

be more quickly put into service .

The full Congress ignored Duportail's final proposal as it had every oth

peace establishment proposal .

7 . DUPORTAIL URGES UNITING THE ARTILLERY AND THE ENGINEE

Louis Duportail's recommendations for the engineering department 

the army.

. . . What I think best for the united States to do . . . is to unite the Depar

ment of the Artillery with that of the Engineers So that after the Uni

every Officer Should be without any Distinction an Artillery Officer and 

Engineer. There are many Reasons for the Operation which I propose ; T

following are the principal ones.

1st. The preliminary Knowledge necessary for an Artillery Officer or 

Engineer, as the different Branches of Mathematics, the natu

philosophy, etc ., are the Same.

2ndly. The very great Relation between the professions themselve

The most important use of Cannon, that one which requires most Skill a

Knowledge of the Art is for the Defence of fortified Places or the Attack 

them . When an Engineer combines the different lines and Angles of a f

tification between themselves and the Surrounding Ground to make t

fortification of the most advantageous Defense; when to the Contrary 

349

September [30], 17
frames the Plan of the Attack of it, and lays out his Trenches and o

Works, he has principally in View to prepare the use of the Arti

facilitate its Effects and make them as great as possible. So he mus

personally acquainted with the Nature of that Arm and have really on 

Point all the Knowledge of the Artillery Officer. It is true the Thing i

reciprocal and that the Artillery Officer when he is not Engineer a

Same time and is confined to the Execution of his Cannon does not 

to have the Knowledge of the Engineer; But why not make him acqu

Since he has already all the Preliminary Knowledge and the practise o

Artillery ; and So he wants only to add the Study of the Art of fortific

Do we not See clearly that to do otherwise is to make two Professio

what ought to be the Object of one only.

3rdly. The great Economy which results from that Union. Wher

there is any fortification there is an Engineer to have the Charge of it

there is an Artillery Officer for the Artillery. But very often each of t

Officers has not a Sufficient Employment in Departmment and i

Departments were united one Officer could do the Duty of the two wit

greatest Ease . I think one third of Officers might be Spared upon 

whole without the least inconveniency for the Service.

4thly. That great Relation which we said to take Place between th

Professions of the Artillery Office and the Engineers is the Cause o

quent Disputes and Dissentions amongst them, because the li

Separation cannot be drawn exactly, principally for the most delicat

cumstances in War, and the more Knowledge and Talents each C

possesses, the more Difficulties arise between the individuals, bec

they have more pretensions . So that reciprocal Envy and Enmity mak

very qualities which Should be conducive to the Good of the Service 

against it .

For those Reasons and many less important the Departments of th

tillery and of the Engineers are united in European States ; and in t

where they are not Plans for uniting them are proposed every Da

france that Union has been executed once and if it did not last it 

because the time was not proper (in the middle of the war), and the Op

tion was formed upon a bad Scheme . Besides the private Interes

many Individuals principally of the first Officers were much hurted 

Add to this that, as those Corps, in France exist a long while ago, ea

them has acquired a particular Spirit which makes it very averse to 

Union . However, every Officer of Experience almost, is persuaded o

Advantage of it, and that it will take Place one Day or another . But 

where there is not yet private Interests or passions of the Corps to 

bat, the Congress must avail themselves of a happy Circumstance w

may never return to make at once their Establishment upon the Pla

Experience Show to the old Peoples of Europe to be the best, alt

they cannot always follow their Notions .

350
Establishment of the Corps ofArtillery and the Engineers

I suppose here, according to the letter which is Excellency Gene

Washington has honored me with, the present Establishment must 

calculated only for the Want of the Frontiers against the British for if 

united States intended to have fortified Harbours, what I am going to p

pose Should be insufficient .

I propose two Regiments each to be composed of five Companies 

Gunners, one of Bombardiers, one of Sappers and Miners, one 

Artificers, each Company in time of peace Shall be composed o

Sergeants, 6 Corporals, 24 privates, commanded by a first Capt. a sec

Capt. one first Lt . and one Second Lieutenant. (In time of war the num

of privates may be doubled.)

The Regiment Shall be commanded by one Colonel, one Lt. Col . 

Major, adding to this, one pay master adjutant, one Quarter Master 

Surgeons, one Sergent Major, the Drum major, 6 Drums and fifes, wh

would make the whole of the Regiment altogether of 327 Men and the 

Regiments of 654.

I propose four Officers in each Company because it is necessary 

have Some to detach without Troops to different Places for Erection 

Care of Fortifications Sunderies, etc. Thus one of the Captains 

Lieutenants, may be detached that makes 16 Officers for the 

Regiments, one of the field Officers, the Lt. Col . or the Major may 

detached also, so in all there will be eighteen which will be sufficien

this Moment.

I propose to divide the whole extent of the frontiers in three Parts at 

Head of which there Should be an Officer of the Rank of Brigadier or 

onel to have the Direction of all what concerns the Artillery or the fortif

tions erected or to be erected and generally of all the Establishme

relative to that Department.

Above all there must be a Commandant, Director General of the 

tillery and the fortifications of the united States . To the Director Gener

the three Directors of the Districts mentioned Shall be accountable 

every thing, as the Colonels of the Regiments and every Person emplo

in that Department .

Through him Shall the Orders of Congress or of the Board of War 

transmitted to the Corps . Such an Office appears to me absolut

necessary, to have that important Branch of the Administration gover

upon the Same plan and constant Principles . Let us remember that a g

many Things tend to break the Union between the american States, all 

continental Establishments ought to be calculated to reinforce that Un

Thus, if in this Instance, there were, at the Head of the Department of 

Artillery and fortifications many Officers independent one from anot

great inconveniences might result from it . These Officers would diff

Opinion and Soon be Jealous and enemys of one another; Some might 

35 1
quire more influence with Congress than others . So in the Establish

of fortifications, in the Distribution of the Means of Defense, each S

might be treated, not according to what its Situation, its importance 

quires, but according to the Credit of the Officer who has the Directio

that Department.

Some Persons will perhaps imagine that the three Directors of Distr

proposed are not necessary, that, for the Sake of Economy, the Colo

and the Lt. Col . of the Regiments may be charged with the function

tributed to those Directors. But if they observe, those functions Shall b

make under the Direction of the Director General, an exact Reconnoitr

all the frontier, to Search for the most proper Places for the forts and fo

the Establishments relative to War, after that to plan those Es

lishments, preside over their Erection . They will confess probably, 

the Directors of the Districts Shall have enough to do, without clog

them with the particular Command and Care of a Regiment, which 

could never attend to . But, as we have mentioned, a field Officer of e

Regiment Shall be detached with the directors of the [District?] to as

them and have under them the Command of the Captains and Subalt

employed in the Busyness above indicates .

I do not think it necessary here to expatiate myself upon Talents 

Knowledge which the Duty if attributed to the Directors of the District

quires of them as well as of the Director General . I take the Liberty to 

on that Head to the Memorial, wherein I endeavored to Sketch what 

be done. A Vauban ( . . . the greatest engineer France and Eu

had . . . ) should be necessary in this Moment to the united States 

nobody unless he thinks himself as able a Man as that famous Marsh

can undertake, without the greatest Diffidence, that difficult Work. An

who would undertake it, without any fear, proves that he has not the 

idea of it .

Academy

The necessity of an Academy, to be the Nursery of the Corps, i

obvious to be insisted upon . The Academy must be commanded (u

the Director General) by a field Officer, assisted by a Captain . It requi

Master of Mathematics and natural Philosophy, one of Chymistry, and 

of drawing ; as for Military Matters, it belongs to the Officers of the He

the Academy to give those Kind of Instructions . This is not the Pla

enlarging upon this Subject. The Student ought to Spend three Yea

least at the Academy.

According to the total number of Officers of the Corps, ten or tw

Students Should be Sufficient to keep the Corps compleat ; But as it is 

advantageous to introduce in it, the Soonest possible, Men of Theory 

Knowledge, I will propose here to leave in each Company the place of 

ond Lieutenant vacant, to fill those Vacancies with the first Students w

will receive their instruction at the Academy. So the Number of Stud

352
in this Moment, might be of twenty, and I do not doubt that it Shall remai

Such afterwards, because if the Union of the States [is?] durable th

Establishment proposed here Shall be found certainly too Inconsiderable

and if 1 propose it So, it is only to fall in with the present Circumstance

and Dispositions.

. . . It is not improper perhaps to observe here that according to th

calculations i made the total establishment-such as i propos

it-including the academy, the Rations and Cloathing will not Cost muc

more than two hundred thousand Dollars . Only i lessen a little the pay 

the soldiers which is Really too high .

Still hoping for a peacetime army and particularly concerned with ge

ting adequately trained artillerists and engineers, Washington pressed Du

portail to convince at least a few French officers to remain in America . Th

Chief Engineer himself preferred not to stay, 15 but he felt sure other me

might want to. However, they would require that the United States giv

them "an honorable, solid employment" and "show themselves to be a gre

respectable empire, or at least take proper measures for becoming so ." A

matters stood, Duportail maintained, anyone choosing to stay would clear

be making a blind choice. 16 Congress's continued inaction tied Washing

ton's hands. By the end of the year Duportail and Gouvion had returned 

France.

In late 1784 Maj . Pierre Charles L'Enfant, a Revolutionary Wa

engineer officer who would later achieve great fame as the designer of t

nation's capital, made another vain appeal for a peacetime engineer corp

Earlier L'Enfant had been led to believe that he would head the postwa

engineering department, but now there was no department to command 

Worse still, he had already forfeited the chance for an engineering appoint

ment in France.

In his detailed, well-reasoned memorial, L'Enfant did not advocate 

European-style army for the United States, but he recognized the need for 

general system of defense planned and maintained by army engineers . Hi

preference for continental rather than state engineers and for a centraliz

system of fortifications was clear. He feared the states were insufficient

aware of the potential threats to their security. "It is neither the number no

extensiveness of forts . that Secure a country," L'Enfant insisted, "but the

well combined Situation ."

To a greater degree than anyone else, L'Enfant elaborated the qualific

tions of engineers and their training, organization, and duties. Although 

attested that "real Knowledge of Several Sciences" was prerequisite to su

cessful performance, L'Enfant curiously did not specifically recommend 

35 3

-Papers of the Continenta

Congress, roll 45 .
military academy. The engineer required qualities that could not be obt

ed through study -a "cool and active disposition," pride, and sobriety.

In light of later Corps of Engineers responsibilities, L'Enfant's plan 

remarkably prescient . As he specified them, the engineers' duties were to 

clude operation of all fortifications, direction of all military and civil c

struction, maintenance of public roads and bridges, and general surv

Each of the three proposed engineer brigades would be assigned t

separate geographical area . States could request assistance through 

Chief Engineer. To assure quality construction and maintenance, L'

fant proposed constant inspections of the corps's work, including an 

nual inspection of the most important projects by the Chief Engineer.

In L'Enfant's view the Chief Engineer's other duties included perso

direction of the construction of key works and preparation of an ann

report and an estimate of future expenses . The Chief Engineer also had c

tracting and financial responsibilities . First, he was to see that no major 

ject "be contracted for privately but advertised to those who will give 

most reasonable proposals," then he was to certify accounts and autho

payments .

Considering L'Enfant's later career, one of his arguments for 

engineering establishment was especially interesting. The corps, he s

would be excellently equipped to build public buildings-such as a home 

Congress-once a permanent capital was decided upon . Like earlier 

posals for a peacetime engineering department, L'Enfant's fell upon d

ears .

8. "A NEUTRAL POWER MUST BE READY FOR WAR"

Pierre L'Enfant's peace establishment plan.

. . . Under the flatering expectation of your Indulgence I will endeav

to hold up to your consideration some Reflections on the present Stat

America and Suggest such measures as are most immediately necess

to be taken as well to Secure the benefits of the peace which the Uni

States so happily enjoy as to promote their internal tranquility during 

troubles of any new Contest that may arise . . . . A neutral power it wil

said receives the benefits of an universal trade, has his possessi

respected as well as his Colours by all powers at war; this may be said 

powerful Nation but this America is not to expect, a neutral power mus

ready for war and his trade depends on the means of protecting 

making his Colours respected; America neutral without Navy wit

troops or fortified harbours could have nothing but calamity to expect, 

coast her Sea towns exposed to the insult of the first advanturer wo

354

December 15, 1
often becom the prey of the fortunate one who from a premeditated int

tion or forced by necessity entering in a defenceless harbour Soon 

lowed by his adversary would without other Regard than that of his o

Safety change in an instant the pleasant Seat of peace into a theatre 

Sanguine Exertion, then when her Coasts were wasted and her tow

plundered Should She call for protection or attempt to obtain Redress 

only would it prove useless but Even any measures She might take to p

-vent repetition of Such flagrant Evils will be suspected for th'o not in fac

motive for difference they may become from a Watchful Enemy a means 

covering under apparent Excuse some unexpected and offensive Unde

taking . As a power taking an active party alliance Would be entered in

fleets to protect the Coast may be depended upon trade will flourish, p

per measures being taken to guard the frontier against sudden invas

no inland war being to be feared, privateering maybe encouraged . Rich

Honour and plenty will ensue.

War or peace is the option and no dependance may be made in eit

choice, such are the Evils and advantages which America has to c

sidere . . . . Opposition to the levy of permanent troops and neglect in f

tifying and garrisoning proper posts must not only become prejudicial 

tranquility but ruinous and destructive to liberty and independence: pow

to Resent [and] ability to protect are the only means to secure Natio

faith . These are the points which America has to attend to and upon whi

her credit as a Nation is to depend . Proper forts arsenals Magazines an

well disciplined body of troops are of most important and urgent Nece

sity . No Nation whatsoever having right to expect to be free from th

calamities to which ambition and jealousy constantly expo

them . . . . Considering America with regard to the respective States a

Valuable tract of land held in common by a Society whose general int

ests do not depend on the security of its internal division but entirely 

that of the whole of its circumferences whose expences of fencing or wa

ing are to be at the general charge and consequently necessary to be c

culated on a general principle ; from that comparisons the respect

States being to consider themselves interested in securing not only t

portion of the frontier which makes a part of thier possession, but ev

that which has the same Reciprocity with the other States of the Conf

eration, it being evident that the neglect of one of them may occasion 

Ruin of the other; care and attention in guarding them cannot be 

pended upon but by trusting the security of the frontier in general to 

supreme power representative of the Confederate States as to the o

more directly interested in preserving the whole : what I Said of the front

I not only understood the inland Boundary but I speak of all the Sea Co

and meant every harbour and Entrance whose present situation can

but be alarming not only with respect to the Honour credit and tranquil

of each of the States in particular but to that of the United States in g

35 5
eral, it being incontestible that any insult offered on that side would b

more capital consequence; . . . a general plan of defence is to 

adopted . . . to be under the direction of an Engineer in chief truste

the care of officers of continental description who Should have the c

and inspection of all the fortifications, magazin[es], etc . . . . alre

erected or to be built. This mode will not only prevent inconveniency 

save the Expenses which would arise to the different States from hav

Engineers of thier own and yet the States individually receive the sa

benefit the Engineers of continental establishment being divided in 

ferent brigades or departments would have the directions of Every w

which the States Should considere as necessary to add to thier stren

and tho those continental officers Should be under the laws and discip

of the Continental troops they Should be bound to follow Such directi

which agreeable the general interests Should be given to them by 

Executive power of the State where they shall make thier residence 

Should be made responsible for the Safety of the posts under their 

spection ; this mode of having Every object of the same description un

a single chief and same department will not only be a real means 

avoiding unnecessary expences but will enable Gouvernment to rece

better information and form a more just idea of the advantages or defe

of Such and Such places which may happen to be injured . . . .

. . The danger of the defenceless State of the frontier being evide

and considering that it is indispensable to have the Situation number 

extensiveness of forts combined to enable a proper calculation of 

number of troops which are to garrison them . Engineers whose duty i

be independent of that of other Regiments ought from circumstances 

more immediate necessity to be appointed previously to the levy of 

body of troops and supposing that obstacles will hinder the appointm

of a Sufficient number, a chief with aides may be provisionally appoin

and proper assistance and directions given to him to reconnoitre the f

tier which will enable him to project proper plans, from whose view may 

obtained a more just idea of the differents importance of the Seve

points where fortifications may be necessary for the better security of 

indian trade, of the different harbors as well as protection to the Emigra

who can only receive Encouragement to settle in the desert frontier . 

from a particular attention in protecting them . These plans of the posit

and nature of the forts proposed Being examined Should as already m

tioned when adopted remain in the hands of the Continental power 

commited to the care of the Engineer in chief . . . .

. . . Jealous to give particular proofs of the attachment, I bear to 

welfa[re] and happiness of America I Shall With eagerness conti

longer Spending my time in her service if persuaded by the Evidence 

considerations of the advantages of the proposed corps of Engineers y

Honorable Body will favour me with further directions concerning its 

356
mation which I look up [on] as the only one from whose assistance a

Knowledge can be obtained the requisite points for which fortificati

are inten[ded], parting from the principle or maxim that it is neither 

number nor extensiveness of forts that Secure a country but their w

combined Situation calculated with the means of procuring Supplys a

the number of men trusted with their defences . . . .

Observations upon the qualifications requisite in an Engineer and with

which they could not be Considered as such.

Previous to enter into the particular concerning the duty of Engine

and to propose any Schemes for the better formation of a body up

whose attention the Safety and quiet of Every nation generally depend

is necessary to reflect upon the qualification which it is requisite that t

Should be possessed of, the good performance of their duty being to 

pend upon their real Knowledge of Several Sciences which are necess

to be considered .

Arthmetic-Is necessary for enabling them to make an exact mensurat

of all work together with a proper Estimate of Expences, etc .

Geometry-Without a perfect Knowledge of which no dependance can 

made upon any Survey nor upon any draught of any work 

building whatsoever .

Mechanism [Mechanics]-Which is necessary to forme a Sound idea a

establish any Confidence in the Strength or Composition of 

machine whatsoever, etc.

Architecture-Whose Knowledge is essential in Every building und

taking, etc .

Hydraulics-Which relate to water works and give the means of raising 

changing the course of water, etc .

Drawing-Without the assistance of which no plans no Schemes what

ever can be well explain written explanation being insu

cient . . . to give a just idea of the local and particular Situation 

any place, work building, etc .

Natural-Philosophy [Chemistry and Physics]-Natural philosophy be

necessary to judge of the nature of the Several materials wh

are used in building as that of the quality of the Elements tha

the water and of the air being necessary to judge of their wh

some qualifications with a vi[ew] to avoid making establishmen

any places which might be injurio[us] .

Many persons who to not reflects upon the Relations which all th

Sciences have to one another Will object that a Knowledge of thems 

cannot be expected in the same person but as the Knowledge of one fa

itates the acquiring of another. Men of intelligence will soon obtain a su

35 7
cient idea of their general Rules and principles. For besides those qua

cations which are to be acquired by Study an Engineer Should be 

sessed of goods natural parts, of a cool and active disposition, Pride 

sober: he must befit for performing his duty in war with as much and 

more attention than in peace Considering that in war a man possesse

all the acquired Knowledge possible will be but little able to reduce it 

practice without this quiet and active disposition, etc .

Duty of Engineers and Rules to Which they must be Subject, etc.

Every Engineer Shall be a Continental and a body shall be formed 

ject to the laws and discipline of the armies of the united States but no 

pendant of any particular corps or Regiments, being to work however 

the other officers according to the Date and terms of their commiss

and susceptible of command in Every places where they were senio

the other officers .

The duty of the said Corps shall be to attend to and have the direc

of all the fortified places that of all military and civil building, the m

tenance of the Roads bridges and Every Kind of work at the public cha

surveys of the several places Shall be by them made and properly dr

with a view to make out an atlas of the whole Continent from which 

Supreme power may be able to obtain a more just idea of its situation 

forme a distinct opinion upon its advantages and defects to these p

Shall be added proper Notes and Remarks with Schemes for taking ad

tage of good positions or of preventing the defects of some unavoid

inconveniency .

These officers shall be divided into three brigades each of which 

have under their care a proportioned number of the severals States.

The several States individually shall have a right to call for their a

tance upon which they are to depend provided that a direct applicatio

made to the Engineer in chief whose attention will be necessary to 

vent an abuse of the said liberty which might become injurious to the 

gress of Continental undertakings .

The officers of the several Brigades or departments shall follow th

rections given them by the Senior Engineers at the head of the respec

brigades and Shall be accountable to them for the performance of thei

ty . They shall receive no orders from any other persons nor shall un

take any work without their Knowledge and consent, and the head o

different departements shall give them no orders without the authori

the Engineer in chief who is to be under the Controul of the Sup

power. They Shall be answerable for the goodness of the work under 

direction as well as for their maintenance and Shall inspect once in t

months. Every objects under their care being to be assisted by the 

cers in the several places or the other persons to whom Should be 

mitted any magazines Aarsenals . Of the State of which they Shall sen

358
account to the Engineer in chief with a proper return of the damage whi

may have happened with Notes upon the differents nature of the work a

of the materials considered necessary for Repairs with an Estimate of 

time and number of men it will require . No work to be undertaken previ

to its urgency Being acknowledged by the Secretary at War or other p

sons] in that department. With the Single exception of a Capital injury 

place of importance requiring immediate repair in Which case only 

remedy Shall be instantly applied, giving notice of the urgency of the Ca

and having it certified by the officer commanding in the place .

The Engineer in chief will have the direction and inspection of 

whole and Shall in the course of Every year visit the more important pla

he Shall Keept up the most exact And Severe disipline amongst his o

cers and be made answerable for all matters committed to their care, 

Shall attend in person to the execution of the more capital works and 

the end of Every year shall give an account of the progress of those whi

may have been undertaken and a general State of the whole with a ret

of the expences they Should have occassioned and an Estimate of th

which will result from the undertaking of the works proposed for the 

suing Season, he may project and draw Every plan which he shall ju

proper and submit them to the examination of the Supreme power-as 

those of other persons by him appointed, none but his own plans or th

he Shall have approved and signed Shall be susceptible of being 

ecuted : all persons who Shall draw any maps plans of their own or 

copies Shall add their names with mention of the case : none Shall be p

sented to the Supreme power without having been communicated to 

Engineer in chief who Shall certify the Same . An Exact account is to 

Kept by him of all the plans maps, etc., which Shall be deposited in 

War office and for which receipts are to be given to him as well as for Ev

Memorial . Return account, etc., he Shall adjust at the end of Every y

the quarterly accounts which he Shall have received from the heads of 

severals departments . Shall compare them with those of provisions a

furniture and according to their exactness will giver Certificates .

He Shall Keept an exact account of all tools and defferent sorts of 

materials which Shall be in Every Store at the openning of every Seas

for the year preceeding, from the account of the several works wh

should have been done he Shall judge of the proper employment of th

which Should haven been taken out and if necessary make proper appli

tion to have them replaced before the opening of the ensuing Season 

Shall pay attention to the furniture that it be of a good quality-and 

serve that none of a Capital nature Shall be contracted for privately 

advertised to those who will give the most reasonable proposals and s

as can be had in the vicinity of the place where wanted Shall have the p

ference . By th[is] means useless expenses will be avoided resulting f

a double employement of men and carriage . He Shall certify all Set

35 9
men[ts] of accounts and no money Shall be given upon any return 

Signed by him.

All Labourers and journeymen employed in his departaments Shal

Subject to the laws and discipline of the armies at the united States fo

time they Shall remain under their directions. And in order to avoid 

pences and prevent the inconveniency resulting from hired labourer

practised in the civil line a number of workmen of all descriptions Sh

be inlisted as Soldiers and formed into three campagnies equally Sh

among the Several departments and Should remain under the immed

command of the respective officers of the Severals Brigades. Which w

reunited the three Should form a Battalion headed by the chief Engin

These men Shall be Cloathed armed and Exercised like other foot 

ments of the united States. Their pay being only to differ . The duty 

Shall perform the hardship they are to undergo requiring a higher 

whose amount however not being to be compared to the Expenc

Keeping hired men will prove beneficial not only considering the mon

will Save but the good which must result from the better dependance t

placed upon the Skill of men constantly employed in the same ligne o

ty commanded by officers who from a habit of living with them will hav

peated oportunities of juging of their ingenuity and consequently can 

on their attendance. The officers pay Shall be regulated with the Sam

gard to the duty they are to perform which duty will require that they 

all the Conveniencies of life considering also the frequent journeys 

must make and the expence of Keeping horses it being necessary 

they be always ready for marching and not forced when called to du

wait for Supplies of money or of other matter of which they Should ha

to be in need all delay being to be avoided in the execution of thier or

and performance of their duty to which, they are to attend without 

pretence to particular rewards which they are to expect only when 

ployed for the benefit of a particular state in which case the Said S

Shall give additional pay to the men and officers according to the time 

have served and the nature of the duty performed .

As to the denomination of the several officers with respect to 

Rank they Shall be commissioned as the officer of the other Regim

holding differents rank, with that attention that considering the misun

standing which arises from discontent and and is the result of the Re

tance with which officers th'o jealous of well performing their duty at

to the opinion of men whom they considere as inferior in rank . It is ne

sary that the heads of each Brigades or department be field officer of 

nomination under that of the Engineer In chief who Should be a gen

one, which title it is the more proper he Should be possessed of to en

him to perform the different lines of his duty, and make him consider

all the places or posts he is to inspect and for whose safety being m

answerable it is consequently indispensible that his opinion be 

360
dominant over that of other officers who th'o trusted with the defence o

such and such places are not to be supposed as possessed of the Know

ledge and qualifications requisit in an Engineer whose Superiority of Ran

cannot be in the least injurious to other officers in the Army the nature 

their duty being entirely different and necessary to be independant 

others. . . .

Formation of the Corps of Engineers as proposed and considered in t

Scheme for new modeling it :

100 men

100

100

300 men

10

Formation of a Battalion of Workmen under the denomination of Sappe

and miners:

1 Company of the center commanded 

a Captain and Lieutena[n

belonging to that brigade

1 Company Of the right commanded b

Capt and Lt. belonging to t

brigade

1 Company of the left commanded by 

capt and Lt. of that Brigade

3 Companies forming a Battalion which when c

lected Shall be commanded by the Engineer 

chi[ef] as Colonel the Lt Colonel Major and its o

cers .

36 1

Numberof

Officers Their Rank

The Brigades they are

to be attached to

1 Brigadier Having the center and

general being Engineer in chief

1 Lt Colonel Having the right

1 Major Having the left

3 Captains One in each

3 Lieutenants One in each

1 Adjutant . . . aid and Secretary

to the Engineer in chief

Division of each Company. Each Company-2 divisions and each divisi

2 platoons the first division commanded by the Capt. . . . the Second 

the Lieutent. Each platoon by a Subaltern ranking as mentioned in the mi

tary Establishment .

The Service which is to be Expected from such an Established corp

will prove a mine to Save more than the said third of Expences in a

underta[king] what soever. Advantages which will turn to the immedia

benefit of the United States by comiting to the Said corps the Execution 

all building underta[king] such as those of a Congress, who were Ever t

Seat of his permanent residence is to be agreed upon will necessitate 

have Erected proper building whose local to Enforce the object of thi

destination are to be combinated in Such a maner as to give an idea of t

greatnes of the empire, as well as to Engrave in Every mind that Sense 

respect due to a place which is the Seat of a Supreme Sonverainty . . . .

-Papers of the Continent

Congress, roll 98.

Although Congress shelved the peace establishment proposals 

1783-84, the ideas they contained remained alive . Peace establishment a

vocates merely retreated to the background and waited until they were in 

better position to gain acceptance of their ideas. Strong opposition co

tinued, forcing supporters to move cautiously . Thus over the next eighte

years, a peacetime American Army took shape piecemeal .

Despite their valuable wartime contributions, by the end of 1783 t

Corps of Engineers and its companies of sappers and miners were allowed 

muster out of service along with all but Col . Henry Jackson's Continent

Regiment and a unit of artillery stationed at West Point . On 2 June 17

Congress abolished Jackson's regiment, retaining only the unit of artillery 

guard West Point, Fort Pitt, and a few magazines. However, the next d

Congress voted a new.force of 700 men that became the 1st American Reg

ment under the command of Lt . Col . Josiah Harmar, assisted by Capt . Jo

Doughty, commander of the surviving artillery unit . Over the next seve

years the 1st American Regiment built several new forts on the western fro

tier. Trained engineers were not involved . The new forts offered vital pr

tection for the settlers, Indian agents, and land surveyors who poured i

the Ohio region.

SOCIETY OF THE CINCINNATI DIPLOMA. In May 1783, to

perpetuate the memory of the Revolution and maintain lasting friendships, a group of Continental Army officers formed the Society of the

Cincinnati . Pierre L'Enfant of the Corps of Engineers designed the

society's diploma . The one shown here belonged to Ferdinand de

Brahm.

Private Collection of Dr . Robert A. Stein

36 3
BADGE OF THE SOCIETY. L'Enfant designed this badge for the

Society of the Cincinnati, which many of the engineer officers joined.

French veterans established a branch of the organization in Paris.

Society of the Cincinnati, Washington, D.C.

364
ARMY PENSION AGREEMENT. Responding to demands from the

Army, Congress in March 1783 proposed giving officers full pay for

five years in interest-bearinggovemment securities rather than a pension of half-pay for life as originally promised in 1780. By signing this originally

document in May 1783 a majority of the engineer officers, all

foreigners, accepted Congress’s plan.

Record Group 360, National Archives

Although Congress balked at the idea of a postwar establishment with an

engineering department, it did see the need for a geographer and surveyors.

Thus in 1785 Thomas Hutchins became geographer general and immediately undertook his biggest assignment-surveying “Seven Ranges” of

townships in the Northwest Territory as provided by the Land Ordnance

Act of 1785. For two years Harmar’s troops offered Hutchins and his surveyors much-needed protection from Indians.

365
When the new government under the Constitution was launche

1789, Secretary of War Henry Knox recommended "a small corps of w

disciplined and well-informed artillerists and engineers ." Nevertheless, 

engineers served the Army until March 1794 . At that time Cong

authorized President Washington to appoint temporary engineers to di

the fortification of key harbors . Among those named were L'Enfant 

Maj . Stephen Rochefontaine, another veteran of the Revolutionary 

Corps of Engineers.

The following May, heeding the much earlier advice of Duportail 

others, Congress established a single Corps of Artillerists and Engine

consisting of one regiment . Rochefontaine assumed command of the 

Corps . At the same time a school to train Army officers was set up at W

Point .

As war with France threatened in 1798, Congress added a second 

ment to the Corps of Artillerists and Engineers, with John Doughty, n

lieutenant colonel, as commander. In 1802 Congress again reduced the 

tary establishment and designated separate regiments of artillerists and 

gineers. The union which so many Revolutionary War engineers had 

ported was short-lived indeed . Yet even with the reduced peacetime for

regiment of engineers was retained and a military academy permanentl

tablished at West Point.
1 . Washington to the President of Congress, 10 July 1775, in John C. Fit

patrick, ed., The Writings of George Washington From the Origin

Manuscript Sources, 1745-1799, 3 :325 .

2 . Rowena Buell, comp ., The Memoirs of Rufus Putnam and Certain Offici

Papers and Correspondence, pp. 54-55 .

3 . Washington to the President of Congress, 4 August 1775, in Fitzpatric

Writings of Washington, 3 :391 .

4 . Washington to the President of Congress, 31 December 1775, in ibid., 4:19

5 . Washington to the Committee of Safety of Pennsylvania, 17 June 1776, 

ibid ., 5 :154; Washington to Nicholas Cooke, 28 April 1776, in ibid., 4:528 

6 . Washington to the Committee of Safety of Pennsylvania, 17 June 1776, 

ibid ., 5 :154 . The new volunteers were Gilles Jean Marie Roland de Baraze

the Chevalier de Kermorvan; Antoine Felix Wuibert de Meziere

Christopher Pelissier ; and a Monsieur St. Martin .

7. Carroll to the Maryland Council of Safety, 27 July 1776, in Peter Force, ed

American Archives, 5th ser., 1 :614 .

8. Resolution of Congress, 2 December 1775, in Worthington C. Ford, ed

journals of the Continental Congress, 3 :400-401 .

9. For more detail see Frederick B. Artz, The Development of Technical Ed

cation in France, 1500-1850, pp . 98-99.

10. Henry Guerlac, "Vauban: The Impact of Science on War," pp . 39-4

Unfortunately, after Vauban's death in 1707, his supporters progressive

corrupted his thought on defenses by emphasizing geometric rather than ta

tical considerations, thereby losing touch with Vauban's characteristic flex

bility . As a result, when engineer officers evoked the memory of Vauban

they failed to comprehend the real significance of his work. For a definiti

of enceinte and other engineering terms used in this work, see the glossary .

11 . Variable spellings of Coudray's name have been found. Mark Mayo Boatn

cites French authority Andre Lasseray's use of "de Coudray" (Encycloped

of the American Revolution, p. 1118). However, most contemporary doc

ments used "du Coudray" and that form has been adopted here . In any cas

all seem to agree in referring to him more commonly as "Coudray."

367
After 1715 French military theorists debated the virtues of the ordre 

fond (organization in depth) and the ordre mince (thin lines), as well a

role of artillery . Coudray gained his reputation as a theorist with his L'

lerie nouvelle and with L'ordre profond et Fordre mince considerees par 

port aux effets de Fartillerie . Coudray supported Jean Baptiste Vaquet

Gribeauval's new system of artillery which placed emphasis on mobi

Coudray's arguments on the overall effectiveness of artillery were convin

See Robert S . Quimby, Background of Napoleonic Warfare, pp . 228 ; 

n. 29; 359 ; 360, n . 32 .

12 . With the approval of French authorities, Pierre Augustin Caron de 

marchais provided clandestine aid to America through his firm, Rode

Hortalez & Cie.

13 . Unfortunately copies of the contracts have not been found .

14 . Lee to the President of Congress, 7 May 1777, in [Charles Lee], Lee Pa

2 :18 .

15 . Washington to Richard Henry Lee, 17 May 1777, in Fitzpatrick, Writin

Washington, 8 :76 .

16 . Ibid .

17 . Lovell to Whipple, 3 June and 7 July 1777, in Edmund Cody Burnett, 

Letters of Members of the Continental Congress, 2 :394, 403 .

18 . Lovell to Whipple, 7 July 1777, in ibid ., p . 403 .

19 . Washington to Gates, 29 July 1777, in Elizabeth S . Kite, Brigadier-Ge

Louis Lebegue Duportail, p . 30.

20 . See "Clermont-Crevecoeur Journal" in Howard C. Rice, Jr ., and Anne 

Brown, eds. and trans ., The American Campaigns of Rochambeau's A

1780, 1781, 1782, 1783, 1 :50 . This version of Coudray's death is more pl

ble than the one more generally provided which contends that Coudr

horse leaped from a ferry. In a gesture of friendship, Congress pai

Coudray's burial .

21 . They were FranSois Louis Teissedre de Fleury ; Jean Louis Ambroise de 

ton, the Chevalier de Villefranche ; and Pierre Charles L'Enfant.

22 . They were Louis Antoine Jean Baptiste, the Chevalier de Cambray-Di

Etienne Nicholas Marie Bechet, Sieur de Rochefontaine ; and Jean Ber

Gauthier de Murnans.

23 . He was Jacob Schreiber.

24 . Washington to the President of Congress, 26 January 1777, in Fitzpat

Writings of Washington, 7 :65 .

25 . Washington to Philip Livingston, Elbridge Gerry, and George Clymer

July 1777, in ibid ., 8:443 .

26 . Erskine to Philip Schuyler, 7 May 1780, in Albert H. Heusser, Ge

Washington's Map Maker; A Biography of Robert Erskine, ed . Huber

Schmidt, pp . 208-09 . It is difficult to compare the value of the $4 give

skine with the $5 set value of a guinea gold piece . The difference, 

dicated by Erskine's comments, was probably more than $1 per day .

27 . Resolution of Congress, 8 March 1782, in Ford, Journals of Cong

22:120, by which an assistant geographer with the same pay was appoi

His pay was $2 and one ration per day.
28 . Ibid ., 20 :476 . On July 11 Congress designated both individuals 

"Geographers to the United States of America ." See also ibid ., p . 738.

29 . For details on the development of the geographer's department during t

Revolution, see Silvio Bedini, Thinkers and Tinkers: Early American Men 

Science, chapter 11, especially pp. 251-55 . This department was t

predecessor of the Corps of Topographical Engineers established in 1818 .

Notes to Chapter II

1 . Rowena Buell, comp., The Memoirs of Rufus Putnam and Certain Offici

Papers and Correspondence, p . 60 .

2 . Putnam was quoting from Traite de la surete et conservation des etats, par 

moyen des forteresses (pp . 394-401) written by a Monsieur Maigret, a st

dent of Vauban and an engineer and chevalier of the Royal and Milita

Order of St . Louis. Maigret's work "became the standard work dealing wit

the strategic significance of fortifications" and was used as a text at t

French engineer school (Henry Guerlac, "Vauban: The Impact of Science o

War," p . 46) .

3. Washington to the President of Congress, 5 October 1776, in John C . Fit

patrick, ed ., The Writings of George Washington From the Origina

Manuscript Sources, 1745-1799, 6 :160 .

4 . Washington to the Board of War and Ordnance, 29 July 1776, in ibid 

5 :348.

5 . Washington to the Committee of Congress with the Army, 29 January 1778

inibid ., 10 :399 .

6 . Washington, general orders, 9 June 1778, in ibid ., 12:40 .

7 . Washington to the Board of War, 4 April 1779, in ibid ., 14 :332-33.

8 . Regulations 9, 10, 12, and 13 for the sappers and miners are not reprinted 

Fitzpatrick and have not been found elsewhere .

9 . Washington to Duportai1,,27 July 1779, in ibid ., 15 :491-92 .

10 . The reference is to Capt. William McMurray of the sappers and miners.

11 . William McMurray, et al . t o Washington, 26 April 1780, roll 6

Washington Papers, Library of Congress; James Gilliland to Alexande

Hamilton, 28 January 1780, Tench Tilghman Miscellaneous Mss, New-Yor

Historical Society .

12 . Washington to the President of Congress, 26 January 1780, in Fitzpatric

Writings of Washington, 17 :444 .

13. Washington, general orders, 22 July and 3 September 1780, in ibid ., 19 :22

497 .

14. Records indicate that Martin was a corporal at this point and probably a

tained the rank of sergeant later .

15 . William McMurray et al . t o Washington, 26 April 1780, roll 66, Washingt

Papers .

369
Notes to Chapter III

1 . Richard Frothingham, History of the Siege of Boston, and of the Bat

Lexington, Concord, and Bunker Hill, p. 115 .

2. Gridley to Congress, 8 July 1786, roll 54, Papers of the Continental Con

National Archives .

3. Frothingham, Siege of Boston, p. 123; Samuel Gray to Mr. Dyer, 

1775, in ibid ., "Appendix," p . 394.

4 . The precise size of the redoubt is open to question as different accounts 

it between 45 and 100 square rods.

5 . Gentleman's Magazine (London), quoted in Frothingham, Siege of B

pp. 197-98.

6 . Ibid ., pp. 198-99 .

7 . Quoted in ibid ., p. 116.

8 . See note 4 above.

9 . William Heath, Memoirs ofMajor-General William Heath, pp. 15-16

10 . Washington to Jonathan Trumbull, 2 November 1775, in John C

patrick, ed., The Writings of George Washington From the Or

Manuscript Sources, 1745 -1799, 4:61 .

11 . Lee to Robert Morris, 27 July 1775, in [Charles Lee], Lee Papers, 1 :19

12 . See Christopher Ward, The War of the Revolution, 1 :111-12.

13 . Lee to Rush, 19 September 1775, in Lee Papers, 1 :206 .

14 . Quoted in Frothingham, Siege of Boston, p . 274 .

15 . Essex Gazette, quoted in ibid ., p . 269 .

16 . Henry Steele Commager and Richard B . Morris, eds ., The Spirit of 'S

Six, pp . 173-74.

17 . Rufus Putnam was referring to John Muller's edition of L'Ingenieur de 

pagne, or The Field Engineer (1773) by Clairac . A check of this wo

vealed that only passing reference to chandeliers was made, indicati

Putnam may have incorrectly recalled the title of the book he used.

18 . [John Chester], "Extracts from Private Letters of Captain John Che

p. 127 .

19 . Rev . William Gordon to Samuel Wilson, 6 April 1776, in Commage

Morris, The Spirit of 'Seventy-Six, p. 178 .

20 . Ibid ., p . 174 .

21 . Heath, Memoirs, p . 36 .

22 . See also Howe to the Earl of Dartmouth, 21 March 1776, in Peter Forc

American Archives, 4th ser ., 5 :458-59 .

23 . Washington to Gridley, 28 April 1776, in Fitzpatrick, Writin

Washington, 4:528-29.

24. Gridley was noting the absence of adequate manufactories for shells .

25 . Gridley to Heath, 9 March 1778, Heath Papers, Massachusetts His

Society .

26. [Duportail], "Proposals for Preventing a British Blockade of Bost

September 1778, roll 25, Washington Papers, Library of Congress .

37 0
27 . Washington to Duportail, 29 September 1778, in Fitzpatrick, Writin

Washington, 12:521-22.

28. Heath, Memoirs, p. 180.

Notes to Chapter IV

1 . At the time Col . Anthony Wayne commanded the 4th Pennsylvania 

talion at Ticonderoga . He assumed command of the garrison the foll

November .

2. The reference is to Captain Ebenezer Stevens of Knox's Continental Arti

Regiment . Stevens was the senior artillery officer at Ticonderoga and di

become a major until 9 November 1776 .

3. Resolution of Congress, 3 September 1776, in Worthington C . Ford, 

journals of the Continental Congress, 5 :732.

4. Charlotte S . J . Epping, ed., "journal of Du Roi the Elder," p . 153.

5 . Brig. Gen . John Sullivan led reinforcements to Canada in the spring of 

and assumed command of the retreating American army after the dea

Maj . Gen . John Thomas . He commanded the army in the Northern Dep

ment until Gates's arrival .

6. Pelissier arrived at Ticonderoga on September 18. See Jeduthan Bald

The Revolutionary journal ofJeduthan Baldwin, 1775-1778, p . 76 .

7 . Donald Barr Chidsey discusses the matter of artificers' pay (The War i

North, p. 87).

8 . The meaning of A has not been determined .

9 . Kosciuszko to Gates, May 1777, quoted in Miecislaus Haiman, Kosciusz

the American Revolution, p . 15. Gates was in Philadelphia attempti

resolve a command dispute with Schuyler.

10 . Gates to Brig. Gen . John Paterson, 23 May 1777, quoted in ibid ., p. 16 .

11 . Ibid ., p. 18 .

12 . Quoted in Christopher Ward, The War of the Revolution, 1 :410 .

13. See The British Invasion From the North : Digby's Journal of the Campa

of Generals Carleton and Burgoyne from Canada, 1776-1777, n., p . 20

Notes to Chapter V

1 . Lee to Washington, 5 January 1776, in [Charles Lee], Lee Papers, 1 :234

2 . Washington to Lee, 14 March 1776, in John C. Fitzpatrick, ed ., 

Writings of George Washington From the Original Manuscript Sou

1745-1799, 4:398.

37 1
3 . Henry P . Johnston, The Campaign of 1776 Around New York and Brookl

p . 78 .

4 . Washington to Lee, 14 March 1776, in Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washingt

4 :397 .

5 . Rowena Buell, comp ., The Memoirs of Rufus Putnam and Certain Offi

Papers and Correspondence, p . 58 .

6 . Christopher Ward, The Warof the Revolution, 1 :209 .

7 . See Erskine to Franklin, 16 August 1776, quoted in John W. Jackson, 

Pennsylvania Navy, 1775-1781 : TheDefense of the Delaware, p. 374 .

8. Congress authorized the "flying camp" in June 1776 to give Washingto

mobile reserve of militia . Mercer's unit was composed of men from Pe

sylvania, Delaware, and Maryland . They were active in fortifying New Yo

9 . Unfortunately this plan has not been found .

10 . Cannon known as 24-, 36-, and 48-pounders were the largest in use at 

time of the Revolution . The numbers referred to the weight of the cann

balls .

11 . Kermorvan's advocacy of Billingsport should be compared with the sim

view of Coudray . See chapter 6 .

12 . Brig . Gen. Frederic William, Baron de Woedtke, was a Prussian officer s

ing as a general in the Continental Army .

13 . Quoted in Ward, War of the Revolution, 1 :231 .

14 . Quoted in Johnston, Campaign of 1776, p. 74 .

15 . Washington to the President of Congress, 31 August 1776, in Fitzpatr

Writings of Washington, 5 :508 .

16 . James A. Huston, The Sinews of War: Army Logistics, 1775-1953, p. 13 

17 . Buell, Memoirs of Putnam, p . 60 . Putnam explicitly recommended su

move on September 3. Perhaps justifiably, he claimed that land surveys c

pleted by himself and Brig . Gen. Thomas Mifflin between King's Bridge 

Morrisania on that day were crucial to the council's decision .

18 . Washington, general orders, 20 September 1776, in Fitzpatrick, Writing

Washington, 6:79 .

19 . [David Bushnell], "Bushnell's General Principles and Construction of a S

marine Vessel," pp. 303-12 .

20 . Quoted in Henry L. Abbot, comp ., The Beginning of Modern Submar

Warfare under Captain-Lieutenant David Bushnell, Sappers and Mine

Army of the Revolution, p . 5 .

21 . Ibid .

22 . Trumbull to Washington, 29 May 1779, in ibid ., "Addendum," p . 1 .

23 . Buell, Memoirs of Putnam, p . 64. Putnam's concern for being "hanged f

Spy" was very real . Nathan Hale, a company commander in Knowlt

Rangers who had gathered intelligence of enemy fortifications on L

Island, had been executed the previous month.

24. Ibid ., pp . 64-65 .

25 . William Heath, Memoirs of Major-General William Heath, p. 73 .

26. Ibid ., pp . 73-74 .

27. Buell, Memoirs of Putnam, p. 65 .
28. See diary of Capt. Frederick Mackenzie, in Henry Steele Commager an

Richard B. Morris, eds., The Spirit of 'Seventy-Six, p . 492 .

29 . A good description of Fort Washington is in Douglas Southall Freeman

George Washington, vol. 4, Leader of the Revolution, p . 243.

1 . John R. Alden, The American Revolution, 1775-1783, p. 122 .

2 . The report was actually submitted on June 21 .

3 . In February 1777 the Pennsylvania Council of Safety appointed Col . Joh

Bull to oversee the works at Billingsport .

4 . Washington to the President of Congress, 9 August 1777, in Worthington C 

Ford, "Defences of Philadelphia in 1777," 18:179, 174-75 .

5 . Coudray to Washington, 10 August 1777, roll 25, Washington Papers

Library of Congress.

6. [Coudray], "Memoir on the Defense of the Two Passages of t

River- Billingsport and Fort Island," 30 August 1777, roll 25, Washingto

Papers.

7 . Silvio Bedini, Thinkers and Tinkers: Early American Men of Science, p

251-52 . See also, Douglas Southall Freeman, George Washington, vol. 

Leader of the Revolution, p. 485 .

8 . Washington to Armstrong, 14 September 1777, in John C . Fitzpatrick, ed

The Writings of George Washington From the Original Manuscript Sources

1745-1799, 4 :398 .

9 . Quoted in Freeman, Leader of the Revolution, p . 499 .

10 . John W. Jackson, The Pennsylvania Navy, 1775 -1781 : The Defense of t

Delaware, p . 134 .

11 . Ibid ., p . 157 .

12 . John Laurens to Henry Laurens, 14 January 1778, in William Gilmo

Simms, ed ., The Army Correspondence of Colonel John Laurens in t

Years 1777-8, pp. 106-07 .

13 . This reference is to a hospital abandoned by the rebels and taken over by t

British .

14 . Fleury to Washington, 26 October 1777, roll 45, Washington Papers .

15 . These vessels were part of the Pennsylvania navy under Commodore Haze

wood. Fleury, as did other Army officers, criticized the navy's performanc

on several occasions during the siege .

16 . Washington to Smith, 4 November 1777, in Fitzpatrick, Writings 

Washington, 10:8 .

17 . The British frigate Augusta ran aground on October 21, caught fire, a

blew up as a result of shelling by the Americans.

Notes to Chapter VI

37 3
18. Because of illness, Arendt frequently left Smith in command.

19 . In November Washington placed Brig. Gen. James Varnum in comman

Forts Mifflin and Mercer .

20 . Fleury wanted to make conditions known clearly to Washington so he wo

not be thought guilty "in case of bad event" (Fleury to Washington, 

November 1777, roll 45, Washington Papers).

21 . For the opinions of others, see Ford, "Defences in Philadelphia," 20 :95-

105-15 . Duportail's opinion also is reprinted, pp . 103-05 .

22. John Laurens to Henry Laurens, 26 November 1777, quoted in Elizabet

Kite, Brigadier-General Louis Lebegue Duportail, p . 39 .

23. For the opinions of others, see Ford, "Defences in Philadelphia," 20 :228-

24 . For additional opinions, see ibid ., 20 :520- 51 and 21 :51-71 .

25. Christopher Ward, The War of the Revolution, 1 :383 .

26 . Kite, Duportail, p . 53 .

27. Henry Laurens to a friend, 7 April 1778, quoted in ibid .

28 . See John F. Reed, Valley Forge: Crucible of Victory, pp . 19-20 .

29. Duportail to Washington, 13 April 1778, quoted in Kite, Duport

pp . 54-55 .

30. Quoted in Troyer Steele Anderson, The Command of the Howe Brot

During the American Revolution, p . 300 .

31 . See also Fleury to John Laurens, 7 April 1778, roll 46, Washington Paper

32. See also "Instructions to Duportail," 30 June 1778, in Fitzpatrick, Writ

of Washington, 12:134-35 .

33. Board of War to Joseph Reed, 8 March 1779, in Pennsylvania Archiv

(1853):228.

34. Reed to Board of War, 8 March 1779, in ibid ., 229 .

Notes to Chapter VII

1 . Actually Romans had originally projected a blockhouse and a small bat

for West Point .

2 . Dave Richard Palmer, The River and the Rock: The History of Fort

West Point, 1775-1783, p. 131 .

3 . Hugh Hastings, ed ., The Public Papers of George Clinton, 2 :712.

4 . Israel Putnam to Washington, quoted in Elizabeth S . Kite, Brigad

General Louis Lebegue Duportail, p . 85 .

5 . The reference is probably to James Lovell, a member of the Committee 

Foreign Applications, who understood French and had many contacts 

French volunteers in the Continental Army.

6 . Kite, Duportail, p . 89 .

7 . Gates to Putnam, 5 March 1778, quoted in Palmer, The River and the Ro

p. 145 .

8 . Kite, Duportail, p . 92 .

9 . McDougall to Washington, 13 April 1778, quoted in ibid ., p . 94 .

37 4
10 . Miecislaus Haiman, Kosciuszko in the American Revolution, pp. 51-52.

11 . Washington to Sullivan, 19 August 1778, quoted in Kite, Duportail, p. 95 

12 . Haiman, Kosciuszko, p. 51 .

13 . Quoted in Palmer, The River and the Rock, pp . 169-70 .

14 . Washington to Duportail, 19 September 1778, in John C . Fitzpatrick, e

The Writings of George Washington From the Original Manuscript Sourc

1745-1799, 12 :469 .

15 . Thomas Froncek, "Kosciusko," p. 8 .

16 . Duportail made several letter references to positions in this document s

gesting that a map originally accompanied this report . The map has 

been found .

17 . Robinson's Landing was located on the east bank of the Hudson near Beve

Robinson's house . The house was used frequently as headquarters by co

manders in the Highlands .

18 . One toise equaled about six feet .

19 . Dave Richard Palmer, "Fortress West Point: 19th Century Concept in 

18th Century War," p . 174 .

20 . Joseph Plumb Martin, Private Yankee Doodle, p. 164. Martin, who la

became a member of the sappers and miners, served on fatigue duty un

Gouvion .

21 . Kosciuszko to Col . Richard K. Meade, 23 March 1780, quoted in Haima

Kosciuszko, p . 86 .

22 . Villefranche to Franks, 19 August 1780, roll 69, Washington Papers.

23 . Martin, Private Yankee Doodle, p . 262 .

24 . Ibid ., p. 273 . In July 1777 Congress organized the Corps of Invalids with C

onel Lewis Nicola as ' commander. The Corps was supposed to serve a

military school for young men, but evidence shows that it never fulfilled t

role and performed largely as a guard unit.

Notes to Chapter VIII

1 . Lee to Washington, 10 May 1776, in [Charles Lee], Lee Papers, 2:18.

2 . Lee to Richard Henry Lee, 12 April 1776, in ibid ., 1 :416-17 ; Lee to 

mund Pendleton, 9 May 1776, in ibid ., 2 :15-16.

3 . Lee to Washington, 10 May 1776, in ibid ., p . 18.

4 . Lee to John Hancock, 21 March 1776, in ibid ., 1 :360 .

5 . Lee to Washington, 10 May 1776, in ibid ., 2 :18 . By August 2 both Mass

bach and Stadler had left the Continental service . See document 1, chap

1 .

6. Charles Lee, general orders, 19 June 1776, in ibid., p . 74 . John Rich

Alden states that South Carolinians found the necessary physical labor 

tasteful and had Negro slaves do most of the work (General Charles L

Traitor or Patriot?, p. 121).

7 . Lee to Rutledge, 25 June 1776, in Lee Papers, 2:83 .

37 5
8 . Charles Lee, general orders, 24 June 1776, in ibid ., pp . 81-82 .

9 . Lee to Moultrie, 21 June 1776, in ibid ., pp. 78- 79 . De Brahm later join

the Continental Army as an engineer officer .

10 . The reference is tb John Rutledge, president of the South Carolina Gener

Assembly .

11 . Henry Steele Commager and Richard B . Morris, eds., The Spirit of 'Seven

Six, p . 1067 .

12. Ibid ., p . 1066 .

13. The commodore was Sir Peter Parker.

14 . Lee to Washington, 1 July 1776, in Lee Papers, 2 :101 .

15 . Lee to Rutledge, 1 July 1776, in ibid ., p. 105 .

16 . Lee to John Armstrong, 27 August 1776, in ibid., p. 246 .

17 . Lee to Armstrong, 15 August 1776, in ibid ., p. 231 .

18 . Ibid ., p. 230.

19 . Lee to the Board of War and Ordnance, 27 August 1776, in ibid., p . 245 .

20 . Senf's name also appears in contemporary documents as "Senff ."

21 . Benson J . Lossing, The Pictorial Field-Book of the Revolution, 2 :553 .

22 . Lincoln to Moultrie, 20 June 1779, in William Moultrie, Memoirs of 

American Revolution, So Far As It Related to the States of North and Sou

Carolina, and Georgia, 1 :491-92 .

23 . As was customary in French overseas operations, d'Estaing was both vi

admiral and lieutenant-general . In 1778 he was given command of 

"Armees de Terre et de Mer ."

24 . In the mid-1760s Jean Baptiste de Gribeauval, famed French gener

reorganized the French artillery . Gribeauval stressed mobile guns with 

proved range and accuracy. See Robert S . Quimby, The Background 

Napoleonic Warfare. The Theory of Military Tactics in Eighteenth Centu

France, pp . 146-47 . D'Estaing may have been referring to Duportai

regulations for the Royal Engineers [1776] . The exact source 

Gribeauval's criticism is unclear .

25 . A flute was a warship converted to a partially armed naval transport by d

mounting the main guns .

26 . Penelope was the faithful wife of Odysseus in Greek mythology . Wh

besieged by suitors in her husband's absence, she promised to make a de

sion among them only after weaving a shroud. To postpone the decisi

each night she unraveled the preceding day's work.

27 . After the successful defense of Sullivan's Island in 1776, South Carolini

renamed the island's fort in honor of William Moultrie .

28 . Other sources give the date as February 11 .

29 . Moultrie, Memoirs, 2:80, gives the date as April 26.

30 . Six engineers had been captured at Charleston the previous year.

31 . Miecislaus Haiman, Kosciuszko in the American Revolution, p . 122.

32 . Ibid., p . 109 .

33 . Ibid., pp. 109-10 .

34 . Quoted in Don Higginbotham, The War of American Independen

Military Attitudes, Policies, and Practices, 1763-1789, p. 372 .

35 . Col. Thomas Brown was the British commander at Fort Cornwallis .

36 . Matrosses were privates in artillery units .

37 6
37 . Although wounded, Kosciuszko was back at work the following day on a subterranean gallery adjacent to the mine.

38 . The rebel trench was only seventy yards from the abatis .

39. Lt . Col . John Cruger, commander of the British garrison at Ninety-Six,

belonged to a prominent New York family . He commanded one of the

Loyalist battalions organized by Oliver De Lancey.

40 . Lt. Col . Francis Hastings-Rawdon commanded a provincial regiment comprised largely of the volunteers of Ireland . Later he served under Cornwallis

at Yorktown.

41 . Earlier Rawdon had lost Camden and urged Cruger to abandon Ninety-Six,

but Cruger never received the communication .

42 . On June 7 Rawdon left Charleston to relieve Ninety-Six .

43. Quoted in Thomas Froncek, "Kosciusko," p . 78 .

Notes to Chapter IX

1 . Admiral Marriot Arbuthnot was noted for his unwillingness to cooperat

with General Clinton and for his lack of aggressiveness in battle .

2 . George Sackville, Lord Germain, was the British Secretary of State for th

American colonies during 1775-82.

3 . Joseph Plumb Martin, Private Yankee Doodle, p . 219 .

4 . Elizabeth S . Kite, Brigadier-General Louis Lebegue Duportail, p . 202 .

5 . Duportail to Washington, 15 August 1781, in ibid .

6 . Martin, Private Yankee Doodle, pp . 222-23. Washington's whole army wa

paid in specie supplied by the French .

7 . De Grasse to Washington, 15 August 1781, in Kite, Duportail, p . 206 .

8 . Ibid .

9 . Admiral Jacques-Melchior Saint-Laurent, Comte de Barras, commande

the French fleet at Newport when the Yorktown campaign opened . He wa

slow to cooperate with Washington and Rochambeau . On September 10

de Barras finally entered Yorktown harbor in support of Rochambeau.

10 . "Of line" refers to ships, usually mounting 74 or more guns, capable o

taking a position in the line of battle .

11 . Washington to Gouvion, 2 September 1781, in Kite, Duportail, p . 205 .

12 . Although commissioned as a captain in the Corps of Engineers on 16 Apri

1778, Capitaine had never served with the engineers but rather had served a

Lafayette's aide-de-camp . He did not consider himself among the engineer

at Yorktown .

13 . A surtout is a man's close-fitting overcoat or frock coat .

14 . By eighteenth century military custom, being entitled to quarters mean

having one's life spared and receiving good treatment upon surrender . Thu

the sappers and miners, being "allowed no quarters," were subject to execu

tion .

37 7
15 . James Gilliland, David Bushnell, and David Kirkpatrick each commande

company of sappers and miners . It is unclear which commander Martin 

referring to here.

16 . The reference is probably to David Kirkpatrick, who was wounded at Yo

town but held rank of captain at the time .

17 . Quoted in Mark Mayo Boatner, Encyclopedia of the American Revoluti

p . 1245 .

18 . James Thacher, A Military Journal During the Revolutionary War, Fr

1775 to 1788, p . 343 .

19 . Martin, Private Yankee Doodle, pp. 240-41 .

20 . Duportail to Washington, 29 October 1781, in Kite, Duportail, p . 219 .

21 . Washington to the President of Congress, 31 October 1781, in ibid., p. 22

22 . Washington to Gouvion, 31 October 1781, in John C. Fitzpatrick, ed., T

Writings of George Washington From the Original Manuscript Sourc

1745-1799, 23 :314 .

23 . Washington to Duportail, 26 October 1781, in Kite, Duportail, p . 215 .

1 . Richard H. Kohn, Eagle and Sword : The Federalists and the Creation of 

Military Establishment in America, 1788-1802, p . 44.

2 . Washington to the President of Congress, 7 June 1783, in John C . F

patrick, ed., The Writings of George Washington From the Origi

Manuscript Sources, 1745-1799, 26 :479-80.

3 . Duportail to Washington, 25 May 1783, in Elizabeth S . Kite, Brigadi

General Louis LeWgue Duportail, pp . 259-60 .

4 . Washington to the President of Congress, 7 June 1783, in Fitzpatri

Writings of Washington, 26 :479 .

5 . Ibid .

6 . As the only remaining British naval base in North America, Halifax, N

Scotia, was an important consideration in postwar American planning.

7 . "The wicked Corrispondence" and the "revolt of the Virmonteres" refe

attempts by the Allen brothers to align Vermont with the British .

8 . Clinton to Washington, 17 April 1783, in Jared Sparks, ed ., Corresponde

of the American Revolution, 4:30 .

9 . "Three-years-men" were men whose enlistments were expected to conti

after the end of the war, as opposed to men enlisted "for the duration" w

were to be discharged at the conclusion of peace negotiations .

10 . Washington to Lt. Col . William Stephens Smith, 21 April 1783, in F

patrick, Writings of Washington, 26 :345 .

11 . Don Higginbotham, The War of American Independence. Military 

titudes, Policies, and Practices, 1763-1789, p. 441 .

12. Washington, "Sentiments on a Peace Establishment," 2 May 1783, in 

patrick, Writings of Washington, 26 :381-82.

Notes to Chapter X

37 8
13. Washington to Duportail, 23 April 1788, in Kite, Duportail, p. 257 .

14. The 45th parallel marked the boundary of the United States and Queb

Province .

15. Duportail informed Washington that if Congress truly wanted to it could g

his continued services or those of Gouvion and Laumoy by reapplying to t

French government . This statement indicated some willingness to stay, b

he rightly felt Congress would have to make the first move.

16 . Duportail to Washington, 30 September 1783, in Kite, Duportail, p . 264.
Glossary

ABATIS. Obstacles having the effect of barbed wire, formed by cutting down tr

sharpening and entangling the branches, and turning them toward the enem

ARTIFICER. A soldier or civilian mechanic who performed skilled labor w

troops in the field.

BANQUETTE. A step on the inside of the parapet for troops to stand on when 

ing.

BARBETTE . A raised platform enabling guns to fire over a parapet without 

opening being cut for them . Guns set in this position are en barbette .

BASTION. The part of a fortification that projects at an angle toward the fi

enabling defenders to sweep their fire along the face of the main wall .

BATTERY. Afortification mounted with artillery.

BERM. A narrow ledge between the ditch and the parapet which serves a

passageway and also prevents earth from rolling into the ditch.

BLIND. Ascreen made of branches for concealing troops .

BREACH. An opening made anywhere in a fortification by the besiegers prior 

direct assault .

BREASTWORK. A defensive work hastily constructed above ground, usua

breast high, to protect defenders while standing .

CARCASS. An incendiary projectile.

CASEMATE . A bombproof structure.

CHAIN (surveying) . Achain with standardized links used in measuring distances 

the ground .

CHANDELIER . A timber frame filled with fascines .

CHEVAL-DE-FRISE. A timber frame inserted with iron-tipped lengths of wo

The marine version was weighted and sunk to the river bottom to obstruct 

passage of enemy vessels . Generally used in a series (chevaux-de-frise) .

CIRCUMVALLATION, LINE OF . An earthen wall and trench placed betw

the besieging troops and the field to provide protection from an attack b

relieving army.

COUNTERSCARP . The exterior slope of the ditch .

COUNTERVALLATION, LINE OF . An earthen wall and trench placed by 

besiegers between themselves and the fortress to provide protection f

counterattack.

COVERED (COVERT) WAY. A flat space above the exterior slope of the dit

usually with its own banquette and wall terminating in a slope toward the fie

CURTAIN. The part of a wall that joins two bastions, towers, or like structures .

DEMI-BASTION . A bastion with one face andone flank.

DEMI-LUNE. See ravelin.

380
DITCH. Alarge, deep trench surrounding a fortification .

EMBRASURE. An opening at the top of a wall through which cannon may fire .

ENCEINTE. The main wall or "body" of a fortress, including the rampart with 

parapet.

ENFILADE . A position exposed to fire along its whole length ; to fire along t

length of a trench .

EPAULEMENT . A type of breastwork providing cover from flanking fire .

ESCALADE . An attack on a fortified position using ladders.

FASCINE. A bundle of small branches used to fill ditches and strengthen eart

works.

FLANK. The part of a bastion extending from the curtain to the face .

FLECHE . A V-shaped earthwork erected in the field .

FOSSE. A ditch, usually filled with water.

FOUGASS. Asmall mine .

FRAISE. A defense made of pointed stakes that are generally placed obliquely 

horizontally on the outward slope of an earthen rampart.

GABION . A bottomless, cylindrical wicker basket filled with earth and used in fie

fortifications .

GALLERY. An underground passage connecting the inner and outer works of a fo

tification ; the largest type of mine tunnel .

GLACIS. An earthen bank sloping gradually toward the field from the top of t

counterscarp or covered way to help make the attackers visible from the par

pet .

HORNWORK. An outwork consisting of two bastions joined by a curtain.

HURDLE. A rectangular wicker construction used to strengthen batteries, aid 

crossing shallow water, and protect workmen. See gabion .

LUNETTE. Awork consisting of a salient angle with two flanks that are open to t

rear.

MANTLET. A movable screen placed at the head of a sap for protection.

MERLON . The solid part between two openings in a wall.

PALISADE . A fence-like defense formed of pointed stakes (also known as palisade

set several inches apart in the ground.

PARALLELS. A series of trenches placed in front of and parallel to the face of 

fortress to provide cover for the attackers.

PARAPET. An elevation of earth or other material on the main wall .

PERCH. Aunit of measure equal to ten feet .

PIONEERS. Troops detailed to clear obstructions placed in the line of march 

before enemy fortifications, dig trenches, and construct bridges and roads.

PLANE TABLE. An instrument, used to plot maps, consisting of a wooden pan

mounted on a tripod .

RAMPART. The broad earthen wall on the interior side of a ditch surrounding 

fortified place .

RAVELIN. A crescent-shaped outwork, usually placed between two bastions, a

called a demi-June.

REDAN. A V-shaped work often joined with other works to form a simple fortifi

tion .

REDOUBT. An enclosed work used to defend a prominent point in the field .

REENTRANT. An angle projecting into a fortress from the field .

38 1
REMBLAI . Material, usually the earth excavated from the ditch, that is us

erecting the rampart and the parapet .

REVETMENT. A masonry covering providing protection for an earthen emb

ment .

SALIENT . An angle projecting from a fortress into the field .

SAP . A deep, narrow trench forming an approach to a besieged place .

SAPPERS. Engineer troops who dig trenches (saps) and mine galleries . Us

referred to as sappers and miners.

SAUCISSON . A large fascine .

SCANTLING . A small piece of lumber.

SCARP . The inner slope of the ditch .

SLEEPER. The undermost timber of a gun battery .

SOUTERRAIN . An underground passage .

TAIL. The point of a trench where the besiegers first break ground .

TALUS. The slope of the face of a work.

TENAILLES. Low works placed in the ditch in front of the curtain .

TERREPLAIN . The flat part of the wall on which cannon are placed .

TRACE. The ground plan of a fortification ; to make such a plan.

TRAVERSE. An embankment to provide protection from the sweeping fire o

enemy, usually placed across the covered way .

TRIANGULATION . A surveying technique employing triangles to deter

distances between points .

ZIG-ZAG. The winding pattern of approach trenches designed to prevent 

besiegers from being swept by gunfire .

VERTICAL PROFILE OF A FORTIFICATION . The mass of earth,

a-h, forms the rampart with its parapet, e-g ; a, b is the interior slope

of the rampart; b,c is the terreplain ; d,e is the banquette; g,h is the

exterior slope of the parapet; h,i is the revetment; h,k is the scarp;

i-m is the ditch; l, mis the counterscarp; m,n is the covered way; n-p

is the covered way banquette; and r,sis the glacis.
Published Sources

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388
Abercrombie, Colonel, 323

Acteon, 260

Adams, John 117

Albany, 100, 110, 111, 229, 335

Alesia, 288

Alexandria, map of route from, to Colchester, 302

Allegheny Mountains, 337

Allen, Ethan, 83

American Philosophical Society, 134

American Turtle, 133, 138 ; sketch of, 134

Amphitrite, 154

Anthony's Nose, 206

Appalachian Mountains, 237

Arbuthnot, Admiral Marriot, 295

Arendt, Col . Heinrich d', 157, 163, 169

Armstrong, Brig. Gen. John, 155, 200,

201, 255, 256

Arnold, Brig. Gen. Benedict, 83, 85, 87,

90, 91, 93, 204, 233, 293

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Fatigue parties

Artillery, as foundation of defensive war,

153-154

Artisans, 171-172, 206, 214, 253, 335; in

the Corps of Engineers, 32-33; at

Ticonderoga, 90, 93, 97-98, 110; lack

of, 233; needed at West Point, 243; in

postwar army. 360. See also Artificers ;

Fatigue parties

Ashley Ferry, 292

Ashley River, 263, 271, 273, 274, 275, 295

Assunpink Creek, 145

Augusta, 169

Augusta, 263, 280, 281 ; siege of, 283-285

Augustine Creek, 271

Baldwin, Jeduthan, at Bunker Hill, 4; at

Boston, 57, 59; describes fortification

of Lechmere Point, 63-65; at Ticon

deroga, 85, 93, 95, 100; describes work

Index

389

at Ticonderoga, 88-92, 102-10

agreement with a company of ar

ficers, 97-98 ; reports Ticonderoga

needs for 1777, 99; disagreement wi

Kosciuszko, 100, 102 ; testifies at S

Clair's court-martial, 107, 109, 11

describes fortification of New Yo

City and Long Island, 117-118

Baltimore, 253, 301, 303

Barber, William, 323

Barras, Comte de, 300, 301

Barren Hill, 197

"Battle of the Kegs", 185-188

Beal, Lieutenant, 93

Beaumarchais, Pierre Augustin Caron de, 

Bemis Heights, 111

Bennington, 111

Bergen, 131

Bethisy, Viscount de, 270

Beverly, 78

Big Beaver Creek, 336

Billingsport, 126, 148, 150, 151, 15

153, 157, 163, 200, 201

Bladensburg, 303

Bordentown, 144

Boston, 138 ; American fortifications a

51-59 passim; map of American pos

tions (1775), 62 ; Washington's pl

to attack (1776), 61, 63, 66, 7

British evacuation of, 72-73 ; forti

cation of, by Gridley, 80-81 ; arriv

of cannon from Ticonderoga, 83

Boyd's Ferry, 280

Brandywine, Battle of, 155, 176, 191

Brandywine River, 155

Breed's Hill, 51-52, 53, 71, 72

Brewer, Colonel, 91

Bridges, at Ticonderoga, 100, 102-10

109 ; at Philadelphia, 163 ; 

Charleston, 256

Bridgewater's Canal, 208
Bristol, 259

Bronx, 141

Brooklyn Heights, 118, 127

Brown, James, 155

Brown, Peter, 53-54

Brown, Col. Thomas, 283, 284

Bruen, Captain, 117

Brunswick, Duke of, 103

Brunswick River, 124

Bull, Col. John, 149, 150

Bundet Landing, 131

Bunker Hill, 60, 69 ; siege of, 5, 51 ;

British fortification of, 58; compared

with siege of Long Island, 128-129 ;

compared with siege of Savannah,

263

Burgoyne, Maj. Gen. John, 100, 103,

106, 110, 131, 147, 155, 176, 181,

210 ; describes American works at

Boston, 61 ; comments on American

engineering at Ticonderoga, 106 ;

advances toward Albany, 110-111

Bushnell, David, 140, 188, 189; uses submarine in New York harbor, 133,

138, 139; sketch by, of American Turtle, 134; praised by Washington, 140 ;

sets kegs afloat in the Delaware, 185;

as commander of the sappers and

miners, 246-248, 249-250

Bushnell, Ezra, 133, 138

Caesar, Julius, imitated by Nathaniel

Greene at Ninety-Six, 288

Cambray-Digny, Louis Antoine Jean

Baptiste, Chevalier de, 325; biographical sketch of, 260; portrait of,

261 ; erects fortifications at Charleston (1779), 263

Cambridge, 61, 63, 93

Camden, S.C ., 280, 283

Campbell, Col. Richard, 289, 290, 292

Canada, 83, 88, 100, 123, 126, 131, 334,

335, 336, 339, 340, 346

Cape Ann, 77, 78

Capitaine du Chesnoy, Michel, 197, 306 ;

Yorktown journal of, 307-309

Carrington, Lt . Col. Edward, 280

Carroll, Charles, Barrister, 5

Castle William, 72, 78, 81

Catawba River, 280

390

Cayahoga River, 336, 337

Chambly, 347

Chandelier, illustration of, 65; us

Dorchester Heights, 65-67

Charleston, 233, 254, 262, 263, 27

292, 293, 294, 295, 296, 303

early attempts to fortify, 254; 

(1780), 271, 273-276 ; Briti

provements after capture, 27

of, advocated by Duportail, 2

postwar fortification of, urged

Charleston Neck, 271, 276, 277

Charlestown, Mass., 78, 81

Chasseurs, 271, 274

Chastellux, Frangois Jean de Bea

Chevalier de, 200

Chatterton Hill, 141

Cheraw Hills, 280

Chesapeake Bay, 153, 295, 299, 3

Chester, 179; sketch of, 180

Chester, John, 60

Chevaux-de-frise, 119, 121, 166

199, 216, 219 ; Erskine's desc

of, 119-120 ; at Philadelphia

148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 16

175; at West Point, 209; a

Point and New York City, 

pared, 210

Chief Engineer, duties of, durin

41-43, 93, 95, 177 ; proposed 

in peacetime, 342, 344, 345

356, 359-360

Christ-Church Parish, 255

"Citadel, The" (Charleston), 271

Clark, Col. Thomas, 256

Cleaveland, Moses, biographical 

and portait of, 45

Clinton, Brig. Gen. George, 20

337

Clinton, Sir Henry, 176, 199, 21

254, 256, 257, 271, 280, 293

Clinton, James, 208, 213

Coastal defenses, Kermorvan's p

122-127

Cobble Hill, 61, 63, 64, 70

Confederation, 355

Connecticut, 116, 206

Constitution Island, 204, 216, 21

237, 246 ; map of forts plan

205 ; report on condition of 
242-243 ; as site of powder repository, 245. See also Martalaer's Rock

Continental Army, 1, 189, 191, 204, 287,

327; peacetime establishment of,

considered, 327-366 passim

Continental Board of War, 151, 212, 223

Continental Congress, 153, 154, 155,

199, 204, 223, 250, 262, 280, 328,

338, 344, 346, 348, 349, 353, 363,

365 ; orders hiring of engineers, 6;

issues commissions to foreign engineers, 22 ; sends committee to investigate Hudson River fortifications,

204

Continental Navy Board, 185

Continental Regiment, 363

Continental Village, 227

Cooke, Nicholas, 5

Coopers Ferry, 188

Cooper River, 263, 271, 273, 275, 295

Cornwallis, Charles, Lord, 144, 227,

241, 254, 280, 292, 293, 300, 301,

303, 308, 317, 323, 324

Corps of Artillerists and Engineers, 366

Corps of Engineers, 29, 303, 342, 344,

358, 363 ; arguments in favor of establishing, 29-30, 32; Putnam's plan

for, 32-33; Duportail's plan for,

34-36; Resolution of Congress establishing, 37 ; regulations for, enacted

by Congress, 41-43, 222-223 ; disbandment of, 250; duties at Yorktown defined, 309-312 ; role at Yorktown, 324-325; praised by Washington, 324, 325; proposals to unite

Engineers and Artillerists, 329, 330,

333, 339, 340, 342, 343, 345, 349,

350 ; need for, in peacetime, 343 ;

organization in peacetime, proposed, 360, 361

Corps of Invalids, 245, 339, 340

Coudray, Philippe Tronson du, Deane's

comments on, 8-9; terms of service

in the Continental Army, 9 ; agreement for service in the Continental

Army, 9-12 ; arrives in America, 12 ;

complaints against, 13-14, 16;

dispute with Duportail, 16-17 ; death

of, 17, 155 ; survey of Delaware

River defenses, 148-150 ; on Dela39 1

ware River fortifications, 151-1

proposals for defense against How

153-154

Council of War, 129, 177, 276

Cox Hill, 298

Crain, Colonel, 244

Crown Hill, 213

Crown Point, 83, 86, 335

Cruger, Col . John H., 286, 287, 289, 2

Dallace, Lieutenant, 92

Dan River, 280

Darby, 179

Dauphin, of France, birth celebrat

244, 245

Deane, Silas, 148 ; mission to France, 

8-12, 29 ; criticized by Congress, 

criticized by Lovell, 14, 16 ; suppo

use of submarine, 134

De Brahm, Maj. Ferdinand, 5, 255, 25

271, 363; siege of Charleston, jo

nal of (1780), 273-276 ; siege 

Charleston, plan of (1780), 272

De Haas, Maj. Gen. John Philip, 90

Delaware Capes, 147

Delaware River, 144, 147, 152, 153, 1

157, 165, 181, 185, 188, 195, 199

Delaware Town, 336

Delezenne, Christopher Joseph, 96

Desandrouins, Jean-Nicholas, 307

Detroit, 336

Dewee's Island, 255

De Witt, Simeon, 303; appeals for hig

pay, 25, 27 ; becomes geographe

27 ; map of route from Alexandria 

Colchester, 302

Dickinson, Captain, 173

Dobb's Ferry, 233, 298

Donop, Col . Carl von, 157

Dorchester Heights, 51, 63, 65, 70, 

82 ; fortification of, described by P

nam, 66-67 ; fortification of, d

cribed by Thacher, 70-71 ; Brit

view of American fortification of, 

account of materials used to fort

80

Doughty, Capt. John, 363, 366

Duncan, Capt . James, 312, 314; acco

of siege of Yorktown, 313-314

Dunmore, Lord, 253, 254
Duportail, Maj. Gen. Louis Lebcgue,

189, 199, 201, 233, 235, 237, 241,

267, 276, 293, 294, 296, 300, 307,

327, 328, 333, 339, 342, 344, 348,

353, 366 ; conditions of service in

America, 12; arrives before Congress, 13 ; biographical sketch of, 14;

portrait of, 15 ; commands engineers,

17 ; dispute with Coudray, 16-17,

153; seeks settlement of pay, 18-19;

desires rank of brigadier general as

Chief Engineer, 20-21 ; on rank of

assistants, 21-22 ; plan for a corps of

engineers (1778), 34-36; seeks officers for sappers and miners, 37,

43-44 ; letter of acceptance as commander of Corps of Engineers, 38 ;

plan to defend Boston, 81 ; ordered to

assist in defense of Philadelphia, 155 ;

reconnoiters Whitemarsh, 175 ; comments on the American cause,

175-177 ; promoted to brigadier

general, 177 ; opinion on attacking

Philadelphia, 178-179; inspects

works at Philadelphia, 179; opinion

on winter quarters for 1777-1778,

179-182 ; Chester, sketch of, 180 ;

opinion on attacking Philadelphia

(1777), 182-183, (1778), 191-195 ;

fortifies Valley Forge, 183 ; Valley

Forge, sketch of, 184 ; favors tactics

of Fabius, 190, 192 ; recommends remaining at Valley Forge (1778), 195,

197 ; surveys Delaware River

defenses, 199-200; on West Point

defenses, 216-219, 221-223,

228-232 ; opinion on renewed assault

at Stony and Verplanck points,

226-228 ; praised by Chastellux, 239;

captured at Charleston, 276; opinion

on surrendering Charleston,

277-278 ; on conditions as a prisoner

of war, 279; advocates Charleston offensive (1781), 294-296 ; estimates

requirements for siege of New York

City, 296-298 ; reconnoiters northern

Manhattan Island, 298; plan for

New York offensive, 298-299; meets

with de Grasse, 300; praises work at

Yorktown, 324 ; praised by Washington for role at Yorktown, 324, 325 ;

392

plan for peace establish

327-328, 348, 349-353

Durham boats, 144

Du Roi the Elder, 103 ; describes wo

Ticonderoga, 104-105

Durumain, Chevalier de, 271

Duval, Lt . Isaac, 289

Eagle, 138, 140

East Chester, 140

East Creek, 90, 102

East River, 114, 116, 118, 128, 129

Elizabeth, 123

Elkridge Landing, 303

Emerson, Nathaniel, 97-98

Engineers, shortage of, 1, 5, 12, 1

59, 155, 253, 262 ; pay, inade

of, 5, 16-17 ; recruitment of, ab

6, 8-12, 29; training of, in Fr

6-7 ; training of, inadequac

America, 12-13, 29, 51 ; on u

foreign engineers, 16; role of, 

Army, 29-30, 31 ; educatio

34-36, 37, 49, 329, 330-332, 

338, 339, 357; inadequacy of, 

goyne on, 106; officers, duties 

peacetime, proposed, 332-333, 

354, 358-359 ; postwar dispositi

proposed, 333, 337-338, 343

training of, in states, proposed, 

officers, engineer and artillery 

pared, 350

England, 181, 194, 200

Erskine, Robert, 155, 209 ; nominat

geographer, 23 ; on contributi

geographers, 23-25; assistants a

for higher pay, 25, 26 ; death o

designs chevaux-de-frise for de

of New York, 119-120; illust

of, 121 ; offers chevaux-de-fri

Franklin, 121 . See also Geograp

Department

Estaing, Charles Hector, Comte d'

comments on siege of Sav

(1779), 265-271

Eutaw Springs, 292

Exchange Battery, 274

Fabius, tactics of should be us

America, 190, 192

Falmouth, postwar fortification u

334
Fascine knife, illustration of, 297

Fatigue parties, 93, 241 ; use of at Ticonderoga, 107, 109, 110 ; use of at West

Point, 214, 243; regulations regarding, at Yorktown, 310-312; account

of fatigue duty, at Yorktown,

313-314, 317 . See also Artificers ; Artisans

Fermoy, Brig. Gen. Matthias Alexis de

Roche, 107

Fifth Massachusetts Regiment, 213

Finn, Lieutenant, 286, 288

First American Regiment, 363

First Continental Artillery, 280

First Rhode Island Regiment, 157

Fishkill, 237

Five Fathom Hole, 273

Fleury, Lt. Col. Fran~ois Louis Teissedre

de, 157, 164, 166, 168, 169, 172,

173, 175, 199 ; assesses Fort Mifflin,

159; siege of Fort Mifflin, journal of,

161-164, 169-173; on conditions at

Fort Mifflin, 164-165 ; plan of Fort

Mifflin, 166-167; plans use of fire

boats on the Delaware, 188-189; the

enemy fleet at Philadelphia, sketch

of, 189 ; leads attack on Stony Point,

226

Florida, 339

Fort Ann, 110

Fort Arnold, 213, 216, 219; Villefranche

plan of, 236

Fort Box, 127

Fort Charles, 298

Fort Clinton, 204, 206, 230-231, 238;

destroyed by British, 210; new works

recommended by Radiere, 210-211 ;

report on condition of (1782),

241-242, 243

Fort Constitution, 208, 211 ; plan of,

205; destroyed, 207

Fort Cornwallis, 283

Fort Defiance (Long Island), 127

Fort Edward, 110

Fort George (Long Island), 114

Fort George, 103, 335

Fort Granby, 280

Fort Greene, 127, 128

Fort Herkimer, 235

Fort Holmes, 285, 286, 291

Fort Independence, 209, 218

393

Fort Island, 147, 148, 151, 152, 160, 16

(Mud Island); described by J .P 

Martin, 165-168; British landing on

175. See also Fort Mifflin

Fort Johnson, 274, 292

Fort Lafayette, 223

Fort Laurel Hill, 298

Fort Lee, 121, 131, 140, 144

Fort McIntosh, 260

Fort Massac, 336

Fort Mercer, 157, 200 ; plan of, 158-159

evacuation of, 175

Fort Mifflin, 149, 151, 152, 153, 157

159, 164-165, 168, 175, 199, 200

201 ; siege of, journal, 161-164

169-173 ; described by J.P . Martin

165-168. See also Fort Island ; Mu

Island

Fort Montgomery, 204, 209, 211, 213 

described by Stirling, 208; destroye

by British, 210

Fort Motte, 280

Fort Moultrie, 271, 273, 274, 277

Fort Number 1 (West Point), report o

condition of (1782), 242

Fort Number 2 (West Point), report o

condition of (1782), 242

Fort Number 3 (West Point), report o

condition of (1782), 242

Fort Number 4 (West Point), report o

condition of (1782), 242

Fort Pitt, 336, 337, 363

Fort Putnam (Long Island), 127, 128

Fort Putnam (West Point), 213, 215, 221

228, 238; Duportail on, 216-217

219, 230-231 ; report on condition 

(1782), 242, 243

Fort Stirling, 127

Fort Sullivan, attacked by British, 257

259-260, 262 . See also Sullivan

Island

Fort Tryon, 298

Fort Washington (Mount Joy, Valle

Forge), 183

Fort Washington (New York City), 11

121, 122, 131, 140, 142, 299; Briti

decision to capture, 142 ; descripti

of, 142; reconnaissance of, by Wash

ington, 144; surrendered to Britis

144
Fort Watson, 280, 281, 283 ; siege of, 281-

283

Fort Wyllys, 216, 219, 228, 230-231, 238;

Duportail on, 217 ; report on condition of, 242

Fortifications, role of, in a defensive war,

34-35, 192-194; on frozen ground,

64-65 ; American, described by the

British, 73, 129; on coastal defenses,

122-124, 125-127 ; on inadequacy of

without proper manpower, 164; on

advantage of exterior batteries, 238 ;

reluctance of states to build, 262,

263 ; Maham tower, use of, 281-282 ;

of seaports and frontiers, urged in

peacetime, 329, 333, 334, 355, 356;

need for instruction in, 335 ; plan for

postwar system of, 343, 351 . See also

individual sites and battles

Fourteenth Continental Regiment (Marblehead, Mass.), 129

France, 154, 177, 181, 194

Franklin, Benjamin, 121 ; mission to

France (1776), 11-12, 16

Fredericksburg, 303

French Alliance, 175, 190, 195

French, Captain, 289

French fleet, 181, 298, 299, 300

French and Indian War, 147

French troops, 294, 295, 303 ; storm Redoubt Nine (Yorktown), 323

Frog's Point, 130

Gabion, illustration of, 297

Gage, Gen. Thomas, 51, 72

280

General staff, 345

Geographer's Department, creation of,

22, 23, 25, 27; contributions of,

23-25 ; assistants appeal for higher

pay, 25, 27 ; maps by members of,

220, 302

George, Captain, 171

George III (King of England), 100

Georgetown, 303

Georgia, 253, 262, 263, 280, 295, 339

Germain, Lord George, 295

German Battalion, 157

394

Germantown, 157, 182, 191

Gilbank, Major, 274

Gimat, Colonel, 322

Gloucester, Mass., 77

Gloucester, Va., 324

Glover, Col . John, ferries troop

treat from Long Island, 12

troops across the Delaware, 

Goosley Road, 306

Gordon, Rev. William, 71

Gouvion, Lt . Col . Jean Baptiste 

300, 301, 304, 327, 333, 3

chosen to accompany Duport

Duportail seeks promoti

20-22 ; joins Kosciuszko 

Point, 221 ; at Verplanck'

233 ; praised by Chastellu

reconnoiters route to Yorkto

siege of Yorktown, plan 

praised for role at Yorktow

325 ; proposal for peace e

ment, 328-333

Governor's Island (N .Y.), 117, 1

139

Governour's Island (Boston), 81

Gowanus Bay, 128

Gowanus Marsh, 118, 127

Grasse, Adm. Frangois Josep

Comte de, 293, 294, 295, 2

301, 308, 325 ; meets Duporta

301

Gray's Ferry, 154

Great Chain (West Point), 216, 2

Duportail's proposals for, 

Kosciuszko works on, 221

Greene, Col. Christopher, 155

Greene, Major, 288, 289

Greene, Maj . Gen. Nathaniel, 

285, 286, 287, 289, 292, 32

burning Manhattan, 130; a

Plains, 141 ; assures that For

ington can be held, 142 ; join

ington on reconnaissance 

Washington, 144 ; goes on 

in South, 280 ; as fr

Kosciuszko, 292

Gribeauval, Jean Baptiste Vaque

267

Gridley, Richard, 59, 65, 69 ; plan 

of Louisbourg (1745), 2 ; 

Chief Engineer, 4; at Bunker 

Gates, Maj. Gen. Horatio, 17, 65, 85,

86, 90, 91, 92, 100, 102, 110, 111,

118, 153, 155, 212, 213, 219, 233,
Washington's opinion of, 4, 77; protests pay, 40; favors fortifying

Bunker Hill, 51 ; constructs redoubt

on Breed's Hill, 51-52; Gridley's redoubt, British comment on, 52 ;

wounded, 53 ; fortifications at Dorchester, Israel Putnam's comments

on, 70; assumes responsibility for

fortifications after evacuation of

Boston, 73 ; fortifications, plans of,

74-76 ; defends his work at Boston,

77-78 ; pay warrant, copy of, 79; account of materials for Boston forts,

80-81

Groton, Colonel, 117

Gwynn Island, 253, 254

Haddrell's Point, 256, 276, 279

Haldimand, Gen. Frederick, 346

Halifax, N.C ., surveyed by Kosciuszko,

281

Halifax, Nova Scotia, 118, 119, 334

Hamilton, Lt . Col. Alexander, 159, 319,

322, 327, 338, 342

Hamilton Committee, 342, 346, 348

Hampstead, 273, 276

Hancock, John, 123

Handy, Captain, 283, 284

Hannibal, 192

Harlem Heights, 130, 133

Harlem River, 131, 133, 299

Harmar, Lt. Col . Josiah, 363, 365

Hay, Major , 92

Hazelwood, Commodore, 162, 170, 188

Hazen, Col. Moses, 312

Head of Elk, 153, 155, 157, 299, 301

Heath, Maj. Gen. William, 66, 82, 117,

209, 235, 237, 238, 239, 242, 299;

describes fortifications at North Castle, 142

Hell Gate, 114

Henderson, Colonel, 275

Hessians, 119 ; at Trenton, 144; attack

Fort Mercer, 157

Hobcaw Point, 276

Hockhocking River, 336

Hog Island, 161, 162

Hopkinson, Francis, 185

Horn's Hook, 114, 117, 118, 119

Howe, Adm. Richard, 129; ship Eagle

attacked by submarine, 138-139

395

Howe, Sir William, 58, 72, 100, 124, 1

140, 145, 147, 151, 152, 157., 1

176, 181, 182, 191, 193; lands 

Boston, 52-53 ; on American 

trenchments at Charlestown, 55-

evacuates Boston, 73 ; arrives in N

York, 119; invades Long Isla

127 ; Long Island strategy, 128-1

invades Manhattan, 133; delays 

tack on White Plains, 141 ; moves 

Fort Washington, 142 ; lands 

Head of Elk, 153 ; conduct at Bat

of Brandywine, compared with Lo

Island, 155 ; captures Philadelph

155 ; decides not to attack Val

Forge, 185

Hudson Highlands, 130, 131, 145, 2

209, 210, 233, 235, 241, 245, 2

fortifications, 204, 206, 207, 2

report on, by Duportail, 216-2

map of, 220

Hudson River, 110, 111, 113, 115, 1

132-133, 140, 141, 144, 147, 1

155, 203, 208, 209, 216, 221, 2

239, 247, 333, 334, 335, 346; as v

communications link, 118, 130, 2

221, 229 ; described, by Chastell

235, 240-241

Humphreys, David, 138, 139

Hutchins, Thomas, 365 ; becomes g

grapher general of southern arm

27

Hutchinson, Col . Israel, ferries tro

to Manhattan, 129

Ile aux Noix, 346, 347

Ile la Motte, 347

Illinois 336

Indians, 203, 262, 327, 329, 333, 3

336, 337, 340

Inspector General, 345

Jackson, Col . Henry, 363

Jackson, John W., 157

Jamaica Pass, 128

James Island, 254, 276

James River, 293, 295

Jay, John, 221

Jefferson, Thomas, 134, 138

Jeffery's Hook, 142

Jersey militia, 181
Jersey Redoubt, 96-97, 108

Johns Island, 271

Kalb, Maj. Gen. Johann de, 183

Kanawha River, 336

Kermorvan, Lt . Col . Gilles Jean Marie

Roland de Barazer, Chevalier de, 9 ;

joins Mercer's "Flying Camp" as

engineer, 122 ; on coastal defenses,

122-124; 125-127; on difficulties of a

republic, 127 ; complains about

workers, 127

King's Bridge, 116, 130 ; 131, 133, 140,

141, 228, 298

King's Ferry, 223 ; 228, 232, 239

Kip's Bay, 133

Kirkpatrick, Capt. David, court-martial

trial of, 249-250

Knox, Maj. Gen. Henry, 13, 57, 59, 69,

204, 245, 366; removes cannon from

Ticonderoga, 83

Knox, Mrs. Henry, 245

Kosciuszko, Thaddeus, 106, 110, 221,

235, 325 ; at Ticonderoga, 85 ; 100,

103; conflict with Baldwin, 100, 102 ;

testifies at St . Clair's court-martial,

107-109 ; impedes enemy advance

toward Albany, 111 ; fortifies Saratoga, 111 ; Charles Lee, sketch of,

115; portrait of, 202 ; biographical

sketch of, 203 ; at West Point,

213-233 passim; disagreement with

Radiere, 213 ; plans fortification on

Rocky Hill, 215, 228 ; criticized by

Duportail, 216-219, 222; goes South

with Gates, 233 ; as engineer with

Gates, 280-281 ; as engineer at siege

of Ninety-Six, 285-292 ; commands

post at Ashley Ferry, 292 ; as friend

of Greene, 292

Lafayette, Marquis de, 189, 197, 296,

300, 301, 304, 308, 322, 323 ; arrives

in Philadelphia, 13

Lake Champlain, 83, 85, 86, 88, 92, 96,

100, 333, 335, 346

Lake Erie, 336

Lake George, 86, 87, 106, 108, 1.10, 335

Lake Ontario, 336

Lake Oswego, 337

396

Lamperer, Captain, 256

Lancaster, 155, 179

Land Ordnance Act of 1785, 365

Laumoy, Col . Jean Baptiste J

Chevalier de, 325 ; accom

Duportail, 12 ; commands eng

during attack on Stono Ferry

reconnoiters Savannah, 263 ; a

of Savannah, 269; at Charl

277, 279

Laurens, John, 157, 273

Lechmere Point, 63-65, 69, 70

Lee, Captain, 172, 173

Lee, Maj. Gen. Charles, 116, 117

253, 254, 255, 256, 257; on 

benefits for Engineer office

loses engineers, 6; on inadequ

engineers, 12 ; in Boston, 5

criticizes inaction at Boston

urges defense of New York 

113 ; plan for defense of New 

City (1776), 114-116 ; biogra

sketch of, 114; recommendatio

defense of Virginia, 253 ; 

charge of Charleston defenses

opinion of, as commander, 2

Charleston, 259, 262

Lee, Sgt. Ezra, pilots Bushnell's 

marine, 138-139

Lee, Lt. Col. Henry "Light-

Harry", 281, 282, 283, 284, 

290, 292; criticizes Kosciusz

Ninety-Six, 285, 287 ; describe

of Ninety-Six, 285-290

Lee's Legion, 281

Lempriere's Point, 275, 276

L'Enfant, Pierre, 353, 366; illu

Steuben's drill manual, 199 ; 

Point, sketch of, 238 ; peace 

lishment, proposal for, 353, 35

363 ; designs diploma and bad

the Society of the Cincinnati

364

Lewis, Brig. Gen. Andrew, 254

Lincoln, Maj. Gen. Benjamin, 233

269, 270, 271, 277, 278, 280

317

Livingston, Col. James, 239, 240

Lodge, Benjamin, 25

Long Island, 114, 116, 117, 118
131, 133, 155, 299; number of troops

required for defense of, 116; American fortification of, 117-118, 127 ; invasion of, 127-129 ; evacuation of,

129

Long-Island (Charleston), 259

Long Island Sound, 114, 299

Louis XVI (King of France), 243, 244

Lovell, James, supports Duportail in dispute with Coudray, 13-17

Loyalists, 155, 281, 286 ; in New York

City, 113, 114, 116

Luzerne, Chevalier de la, 279

Lyman, Major, 239

McDougall, Maj. Gen. Alexander, 212,

221, 244; praises Kosciuszko, 213

Machin, Thomas, 213; as engineer in the

Highlands, 208, 209; places boom

and chain across the Hudson,

208-209,210

McIntosh, Brig. Gen. Lacklan, 260

McKonkey's Ferry, 144

M'Koy, Captain, 282

McMurray, Capt . William, recruits officers for the sappers and miners, 44;

map by, 240

Magaw, Col . Robert, 144

Maham, Col . Hezekiah, 281, 282

Maham tower, use of, in siege of Fort

Watson, 281-282 ; in siege of Augusta, 283-285 ; in siege of Ninety-Six,

286, 288

Maigret, Monsieur, 30

Malcolm, Col. William, 214-215

Manchester, 78

Manhattan Island, 119, 122, 127, 129,

140, 298 ; forts proposed (1776),

130-131 ; invaded by British, 133 ;

map of, 143 . See also New York City

Marbleheaders, See Fourteenth Continental Regiment, John Glover

Marcus Hook, 152, 153

Marion, Lt. Francis, 259, 281, 282, 288

Martalaer's Rock, 204. See also Constitution Island

Martin, Sgt . Joseph Plumb, 173, 245,

299, 305, 314, 324; on service in sappers and miners, 46-47 ; at Fort Mif

flin, 165; account of siege of Fort

39 7

Mifflin, 174; describes life at We

Point (1782), 246-248; on disban

ment of sappers and miner

250-251 ; describes preparations f

Yorktown, 305-306 ; siege of Yor

town, described, 314-316, 319-322

Massenbach, Baron, 6, 253, 254, 25

262

Mathew, Maj. Gen. Edward, 293

Matrosses, 284

Mauduit du Plessis, Capt. Thoma

Antoine, as engineer at Fort Merce

157

Memoirs of the War in the Southern Depar

ment, 281

Mercer, Brig. Gen. Hugh, 122, 12

124, 144

Mezieres, 233 ; French school 

engineering at, 7

Mifflin, Maj. Gen. Thomas, 64, 70, 11

151, 153, 154

Military academy, need for, discusse

328, 329, 330-331, 338, 339, 34

344, 349, 352-353 ; course of instru

tion proposed, 331, 339, 340. See a

West Point

Militia, 127, 291, 294, 295, 327, 341

Mississippi River, 342

Mohawk River, 100, 111, 337

Moncrieff, Capt . James, 263, 271

Monmouth, Battle of, 115

Monmouth Court House, 199

Montresor, Capt. John, 147 ; on Amer

can fortifications at Long Island, 1

Montresor's Island, 114

Morris's Island, 262

Morristown, 145

Moultrie, Col . William, 254, 255, 25

263 ; describes British attack on Fo

Sullivan, 257, 259-260, 262

Mount Defiance, 86, 94, 215 ; fortific

tion of, by British, 106

Mount Hope, 86, 106, 108

Mount Independence, 85, 86, 91, 92, 9

95, 99, 100, 102-103, 104, 105, 10

107, 108, 109

Mount joy, 183, 185

Mount Washington, 130, 131, 132

Mud Island, 165; described by Marti

165-168. See also Fort Island ; Fo

Mifflin
Muskingum Town, 336

Negroes, use of, as laborers, 254, 257,

273, 274, 281 ; use of, by British,

263 ; observations on, by Duportail,

279

New Brunswick, 144, 145

New England, 203

New Hampshire, 335

Newjersey, 117, 118, 122, 123, 124, 131,

132, 144, 160, 164, 179, 181, 183,

197, 199, 200, 206, 209, 299; maps

of, 220, 240

Newland, Captain, 92

Newport, 293, 325

New Rochelle, 141

New Windsor, 203, 211, 213, 216, 219,

237, 240

New York City, 112, 113, 130, 139, 147,

189, 197, 199, 203, 204, 222, 228,

229, 241, 245, 251, 253, 271, 280,

293, 294, 295, 296 ; plan for defense

of, 114-116; use of chevaux-de-frise

for defense of, 119-121 ; plans to

recapture (1781), 294-299 ; postwar

fortification of, urged, 334 . See also

Manhattan Island

New York Provincial Congress, 208; fortifies Hudson, 204

New York State, 326, 335

Niagara, 336

Nichols, Noah, 91

Ninety-Six, 280, 281, 285, 292; siege of,

described, by Henry Lee, 285-290;

siege of, described by Kosciuszko,

290-292

Nixon, Colonel, 225

Noailles, Louis Marie, Vicomte de, 270

Noddle's Island, 78, 81

Nook's Hill, See Dorchester Heights

Norfolk, 253, 293

North Carolina, 253, 254, 280, 281

North Castle, 142

Northern Department of the Army, 83

North River, See Hudson River

Northwest Territory, 365

Oath of Allegiance, 190

O'Connor, Antoine Fran~ois Terance,

398

265; siege of Savannah, journa

(1779), 265-271

Ohio River, 260, 333, 336, 337

Orangeburg, 280

Oswego, 336

Palmer, Dave Richard, 233

Palmetto logs, use of, at Charleston, 

259

Parker, Colonel, 275

Parsons, Brig. Gen. Samuel, 213, 21

Patterson, Lt . W. Augustus, 95

Pedee River, 280

Peekskill, 206, 209

Pelissier, Lt . Col . Christopher, at Ti

deroga, 85, 92, 96; appointed 

tenant colonel, 96; on Je

Redoubt at Ticonderoga, 96-97

Pell's Point, 140

Penelope, 269

Pennsylvania, 147, 152, 183, 194, 

201, 206

Pennsylvania Committee of Safety, 5

Pennsylvania Supreme Executive Co

cil, 148, 200

Penny Hill, 308

Penobscot, postwar fortification 

urged, 334

Perth Amboy, 122, 123, 124, 125, 14

Peters, Richard, 6

Philadelphia, 126, 145, 147, 153, 

170, 177, 181, 183, 185, 188, 

190, 195, 197, 199, 200, 204, 2

279, 299 ; Washington fears Bri

attack on, 144 ; Duportail's opin

on attacking, 178-179, 182, 190-

Phillips, Brig. Gen. William, 106

Pickens, Brig . Gen. Andrew, 284, 28

Pickering, Col. Timothy, 337; rec

mends peace establishment, 337-

Pigeon Quarter, 306, 308

Pigot, Gen. Robert, at Bunker Hill, 55

Pittsburgh, 260

Plum Point, 210

Point au Fer, 335, 347

Pollepel Island, 210

Poor, Brig. Gen. Enoch, 103

Popolopen Creek, 204, 207, 208

Port Royal, 262
Portsmouth, 293, 294, 299

Powder, shortage of, 61 ; at Charleston,

259, 260

Prescott, Col. William, 53

President of Congress, 183, 211

Presque Isle, 336

Prevost, Gen. Augustine, 263

Princeton, 145

Province Island, 157, 163, 164, 170

Purisburg, 263

Putnam, Maj . Gen. Israel, 52, 53, 59,

64, 65, 70, 117, 118, 138, 212, 237 ;

supports use of Bushnell's sub

marine, 134; reconnoiters Fort

Washington, 144; dispute with

Radiere, 210-211

Putnam, Lt . Col. Rufus, 327, 333, 346;

at siege of Boston, 4, 57, 59 ;

becomes Chief Engineer, 5 ; plan for

a corps of engineers, 29-30, 32-33 ;

biographical sketch of, 30 ; portrait

of, 31 ; resigns from Corps of

Engineers, 33 ; fort built by at Cobble Hill, described, 61 ; on fortifying

Dorchester Heights, 65-69; suggests

use of chandeliers at Dorchester

Heights, 66-67 ; makes triangulation

of Boston, 67-69; as Chief Engineer

in New York City, 118; fortification

of Long Island, 127 ; reconnoiters

Manhattan Island and proposes fortifications, 130-131 ; fortifies Harlem

Heights, 133 ; reconnoiters White

Plains, 140-141 ; reconnoiters New

Castle, 142 ; lays out Fort

Washington, 142 ; inspects

Highlands forts, 204, 206, 209 ; called to West Point to direct fortifications, 213 ; reconnoiters positions

below King's Ferry, 223-226; peace

establishment plan of, 334-337

Quebec, 347

Queen's County, 116

Querenet de la Combe, Guillaume, 307

Radiere, Louis de Shaix la, 200; accompanies Duportail, 12 ; promotion

sought for, 20-22 ; sent to Hudson

399

Highlands, 210 ; disagrees with 

Putnam, 211 ; prefers Fort Cl

211-212 ; fortification at West 

plan for, 212, 216 ; disagrees 

Kosciuszko, 213

Rappahannock River, 253

Raritan River, 122, 124

Rawdon, Francis, Lord, 286, 290, 

294

Reading, 179, 183

Red Bank, 148, 151, 163, 171 ; for

tion at, 149-150, 157, 160. S

Fort Mercer

Red Hook, 117, 118, 127

Redoubt Nine, 319, 323

Redoubt Ten, 319 ; photos of, 318 ; s

ing of, 321

Reed, Col . Joseph, 140, 141

Regiments, American : 1st, 363 ; C

nental : 10th, 138; 14th, 129 ; 

129 ; Massachusetts : 5th, 213 ; R

Island : 1st, 157 ; South Carolin

254

Richelieu River, 100

Richmond, 293

Riedesel, Baron Frederick Adolphus 

106

Ringwood, 119

Rittenhouse, David, 5

River obstructions, 126, 203, 208, 

210, 213 . See also, Chevaux-de-f

Robert Erskine; Great Chain

Roanoke River, 280, 281

Roberdeau, Brig. Gen. Daniel, 123

Robertson, Archibald, 70

Rochambeau, Jean Baptiste Donati

Vimeur, Comte de, 200, 233, 

296, 298, 299, 300, 303, 306, 

309

Rochefontaine, Maj. Etienne Nic

Marie Bechet de, 324, 325, 36

Rocky Hill, 216, 230-231 ; sketches o

tifications planned for, 214

decision to fortify, 228

Romans, Bernard, 206, 209, 216; hi

erect forts in Highlands, 204; 

forts for Constitution Island, 

works criticized by Stirling, 20

Roney, Lt. Col. John, 286, 288
St . Clair, Maj. Gen. Arthur, 105; decides

to abandon Ticonderoga, 106 ; courtmartial of, 107-110

St. Germain, Comte de, 12, 175

Saint John, 346, 347

St. Leger, Col. Barry, 111

St . Simon, Claude Henry, Comte de,

306, 308

Sandy Hook, 294

Sane, Monsieur de, 267

Sappers and Miners, 233, 303, 304; role

in the Army, 30 ; Duportail on,

34-36, 43-44; resolution of Congress

establishing, 36-37 ; as a school of

engineering, 37, 49 ; regulations for,

39, 42 ; recruitment of, 43-44 ; qualifications for, 44 ; draft of, 46 ; commission in, 45 ; map drawn by officer

of, 240; at West Point (1782),

245-248; disbandment of, 250-251,

363 ; preparations for Yorktown,

299, 304-306; siege of Yorktown,

role in, 314-316, 319-322, 324; instruction proposed for, 332 ;

peacetime establishment of, proposed, 349, 351, 361, 363 . See also

Joseph Plumb Martin

Saratoga, 111, 190, 280 ; battle of, 155

Sargeant, Capt. Winthrop, 204, 206

Savannah, 263, 280, 292, 326; siege of,

260, 264 (map), 265-271 (journal);

postwar fortification of, urged, 334

Savannah River, 265, 283

Sawmill River, 141

Saybrook, 133

Schuyler, Maj. Gen. Philip J ., 83, 85, 90,

102, 105, 106, 107, 108, 110

Schuylkill River, 154, 155, 160, 163, 181,

182, 183, 197

Scotch Regiment, 270

Scott, Brig. Gen. John M., 119

Scull, William, survey by, 26-27

Second South Carolina Regiment, 254

Secretary of War, 359

Seldon, Lt. Samuel, 289

400

298; regulations for siege of 

town, 309-312 . See also Vauban 

vidual sites

Skenesboro, 90, 110

Slote, The (Smith's Clove), map o

Smith, Lt. Col. Samuel, 159, 162

170, 171 ; on conditions at For

flin, 157

Smith, William, 113, 204

Smith, Capt . William, 254

Society of the Cincinnati, 363 ; di

and badge, illustration of, 362

Sorrel, 348

South Bay, 104, 108, 109

South Carolina, 253, 254, 255, 26

South Carolina General Assembly, 

Southern Department, 116-117, 

263, 280, 325

Southern Theater of War, map of, 

Sphinx, 260

Springfield, 154

Spring Hill Redoubt, 263, 265, 266

270

Spuyton Duyvil, 298

Stadler, John, 6, 253, 254

Staten Island, 114, 116, 119, 122

127, 139

Steuben, Friedrich Wilhelm von, 

199, 346

Stevens, Ebenezer, 87

Stevens, Brig. Gen. Edward, 280

Stillwater, 111

Stirling, Brig. Gen. William Alex

Lord, 117, 118, 131, 141, 20

ports on Highlands' defenses (

206-208

Stono Ferry, 263

Stono Inlet, 273

Stony Point, 203, 206, 223, 233, 

239 ; reconnaissance of, 225; p

224-225 ; attacked by rebels (

226; Duportail opinion on atta

227-228; description of, 240 ; po

fortification of, proposed, 335

Strategy, British comments on Amer

57 ; Washington's strategy at 

Roxbury, 58-59, 60, 61, 82 Serif, Col. Charles, 263

Rudolph, Major, 282, 283, 284, 289 Seven Years' War, 263

Rush, Benjamin, 61, 125 Shultz's Folly, 276

Rutledge, John, 254, 256 Siegecraft, on making siege works, 
criticized, 61 ; Washington's comments on defensive war, 132 ; Duportail on nature of war, 192-194 ; for attacking Philadelphia, 197 ; for attacking Cornwallis, 301

Stuart, Col. Charles, on British evacuation of Boston, 72-73

Submarine warfare, general principles of,

134-138 ; sketch of submarine, 134;

use of, in New York harbor,

138-139 ; fireboat . scheme compared

with, 189. See also American Turtle ;

David Bushnell

Sugar Loaf Hill, 85, 94, 106; fortification

of, by British, 106 . See also Mount

Defiance

Sullivan, Maj. Gen. John, 13, 90, 183

Sullivan's Island, 254, 256, 262, 271 ;

British attack, illustration of, 258

Sunbury, 263

Surveying, 23-27

Susquehanna River, 195, 337

Syren, 260

Talbot, Major, 173

Taulman, Capt. Peter, court-martial of,

249-250

Tenth Continental Regiment, 138

Thacher, James, 243, 316, 322, 324; account of fortification of Dorchester

Heights, 70-71 ; describes celebration

at West Point, 244-245; siege of

Yorktown, account of, 317, 319,

322-323

Thayer, Jedidiah, 97-98

Thayer, Major, 172, 173

Thomas, Brig. Gen. John, 4, 58, 59, 70,

72

Thompson, Colonel, 256

Thompson, Brig. Gen. William, 117, 118

Thunder-Bomb, 259

Ticonderoga, 70, 131, 213 ; American

raid on, 83; improvements at, 83,

85 ; American fortification of, de

scribed, 85-88, 90-92, 92-93, 95-96

102-103, 104-105; map of, 94; bridge

at, 100, 102-103, 104-105 ; British

fortification at Sugar Loaf Hill, 106 ;

decision to abandon, 106; condition

on eve of British takeover, 107-110

40 1

Tinicum Island, 172

Tinicum Point, 162

Tools, 171 ; shortage of, 59, 151 ; at T

conderoga, 95-96, 99 ; captured 

Fort Washington, 144; at Savanna

265, 266

Tories, See Loyalists

Tradd Street, 273

Trenton, 144, 188

Truile, 268

Trumbull, John, 106, 118; map of Bosto

(1775), 62 ; portrait of, 84; describe

fortifications at Ticonderoga, 85-8

at Ticonderoga, 85, 90; map 

Ticonderoga defenses, 94

Trumbull, Gov. Jonathan, supports us

of submarine, 134; recommend

Bushnell for sappers and miners, 14

Tryon, Gov. William, 117

Tuscarawas, 336

Twenty Seventh Continental Regimen

(Salem, Mass.), 129

Twiss, William, 106

Valcour Island, 92

Valley Forge, 189, 190, 195, 197, 199

212, 213 ; selected as winter quarter

(1777-1778), 183 ; sketch of, b

Duportail, 184; star redoubt a

(photograph), 186

Varnum, Brig. Gen. James M., 170, 17

Vauban, Sebastien le Prestre de, 233

252 ; theories of siegecraft, 7-8; in

fluence at Yorktown, 303

Vermont, 335

Verplanck's Point, 206, 223, 226, 233

235, 240 ; report on, by Putnam

223-226 ; Duportail on attacking

227-228 ; described by Chastellux

239, 240

Ville de Paris, 300

Villefranche, Maj. Jean Louis Ambrois

de Genton, Chevalier de, 200, 241

243, 325, 346 ; as engineer at Wes

Point, 233, 241 ; West Point fortifica

tions, plan of, 234; West Point forti

fications, report on (1782), 241-243 

builds edifice at West Point, 244

builds powder magazine on Consti

tution Island, 245
agreement, 17 ; on need for geographer's department, 22-23; appoints

Erskine as geographer, 23 ; on loss of

Putnam as Chief Engineer, 33 ; endorses Duportail's plan for corps of

engineers, 36; approves recruiting of

Engineer troops, 43 ; reinstitutes

drafts ; 46; surveys Boston, 58-59 ;

proposes attack on Boston (1775),

61, (1776), 63 ; on defense of Boston

(1778), 81-82 ; on Lee's plan to defend New York City, 116; fears

British attack on New York, 118;

prepares for Long Island retreat,

129 ; defensive war, on virtues of,

132 ; supports use of submarine, 134 ;

on use of submarine in New York,

140; reconnoiters Fort Washington,

144 ; retreats across NewJersey, 144 ;

crosses Delaware and captures Trenton, 144-145 ; captures Princeton,

145 ; on Delaware River defenses,

152 ; on Fleury as an engineer, 169 ;

first visit to Highlands, 209; on controversy between Radiere and

Kosciuszko, 213; personal involvement at West Point, 215; endorses

Duportail's plan to fortify West

Point, 219 ; renews commitment to

402

Yadkin River, 280

Yale College, 133, 134

Yellow Creek, 336

York, 183

York River, 301, 307, 316, 3

333, 337, 338, 366

Wethersfield, 296

Whipple, William, 13

Whitemarsh, 177; reconnai

fortification of, by Duport

White Plains, 239 ; Washingto

140 ; reconnaissance of, 

140-141 ; entrenchments 

Willard, Colonel, 91

Williams, Col. Otho- Ho1land, 

Williamsburg, 303, 304, 307

Wilmington, Del., 153, 154

quarters (1777), 179, 181

Wilmington, N. C., 326

Windmill Point, 335, 346, 34'

Woedtke, Frederick William, 

126

Woodbridge, 123

Woodford, Brig. Gen. Willia

Wuibert de Mezieres, Antoine

doubt at Jeffery's Hook (

ington), 142 ; captured at 

ington, 144

Viomenil, Baron, 308, 322, 323

Virginia, 241, 253, 254, 280, 293, 299,

West Point, 228; plans to 

York, 293, 296, 298, 

300, 303 Gouvion to Yorktown, 3

Virginia militia, 280 in trenches at Yorktown, 

Wallabout Bay, 118, 127

Duportail's conduct at 

Wallkill, 251

324-325; proposal for p

Wappoo, 273, 275, 276

lishment, 338-339, 339

standing army, 340

Ward, Maj. Gen. Artemas, 113 Waters, Josiah, 57

Washington, General George, 29, 64, 65, Watson, Lt . Col . John, 282, 

71, 113, 118, 147, 151, 153, 154, Wayne, Brig. Gen. Anthony, 

155, 160, 164, 175, 176, 179, 182, 91, 92, 93, 102, 183, 22

183, 189, 192, 195, 199, 203, 204, Webb's Redoubt, 228, 230-2

206, 208, 210, 211, 212, 214, 222, West Indies, 295, 299, 325

223, 226, 233, 241, 244, 245, 280, West Point, 203, 204, 205, 206

293, 300, 301, 303, 309, 314, 316, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 

325, 327, 328, 342, 346, 348, 350, 221, 222, 223, 226, 228, 

353 ; takes command, 1 ; opinion of 231, 232, 233, 235, 236, 

Richard Gridley, 4, 77; on in- 239, 241, 243, 244, 245, 

adequate training of engineers, 1, 299, 325, 333, 335, 339, 

12-13 ; on Coudray-Duportail dis- 366 ; as site for military 
Yorktown,

303 ;

;

of

;

of,

;

siege
EP 870-1-6

October 198 1

US Army Corps

of Engineers