[Cite as State v. Rivas, 2014-Ohio-833.]

Court of Appeals of Ohio

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA 

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION 

No. 100044

STATE OF OHIO

PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE

vs. 

MICHAEL E. RIVAS

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 

JUDGMENT: 

AFFIRMED

Criminal Appeal from the 

Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas 

Case No. CR-570724 

BEFORE: S. Gallagher, P.J., E.A. Gallagher, J., and Stewart, J. 

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: March 6, 2014 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 

Michael P. Maloney 

24441 Detroit Road 

Suite 300 

Westlake, OH 44145 

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Timothy J. McGinty 

Cuyahoga County Prosecutor 

By: Denise J. Salerno 

Assistant Prosecuting Attorney 

Justice Center - 8th Floor 

1200 Ontario Street 

Cleveland, OH 44113 
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, P.J.: 

{¶1} Appellant Michael Rivas appeals from his conviction for two counts of 

felonious assault with notice of prior conviction and repeat violent offender 

specifications, and one count of misdemeanor assault. For the following reasons, we 

affirm. 

{¶2} On January 12, 2013, Rivas had several people at his house, including the 

victim, the victim’s sister, and her boyfriend. Everyone was drinking. Sometime during 

the evening, an argument arose over beer money. The argument turned physical, and 

Rivas hit the victim over the head with a beer bottle. After the altercation, the trio left 

Rivas’s home, but the victim soon realized he left his cell phone behind. 

{¶3} The trio returned to Rivas’s home to collect the cell phone. Probably 

because of the altercation, the boyfriend walked to Rivas’s door and asked for the return 

of the victim’s cell phone. Rivas pushed the boyfriend down the front door stairs, 

causing the victim’s sister to approach the home and attempt to effect the return of the 

phone. She suffered the same fate as the boyfriend. After seeing his sister and her 

boyfriend shoved by Rivas, the victim exited the car and walked up the driveway. Rivas 

met the victim in the driveway armed with a kitchen knife. A fight ensued, and the 

victim, defending himself with only his fists, sustained severe injuries to his face, hand, 

and leg. 

{¶4} Rivas agreed to waive a jury and proceed with a bench trial. After hearing 

all the evidence, the trial court found Rivas guilty of two counts of felonious assault with 
notice of prior conviction and repeat violent offender specifications, and one count of 

misdemeanor assault. The trial court proceeded straight to sentencing and sentenced 

Rivas to four years in prison. As made pertinent to this appeal, at the sentencing hearing, 

Rivas, through his attorney, notified the court of his mental health treatment for bipolar 

disorder, which began after the incident. Nothing in the record indicates when Rivas was 

clinically diagnosed with the disorder. 

{¶5} It is from this conviction that Rivas timely appeals, advancing two 

assignments of error. Rivas’s first assignment of error provides that the trial court erred 

by failing to order, and therefore review, a presentence investigation report in light of 

Rivas’s psychiatric history. Rivas’s first assignment of error is without merit. 

{¶6} Crim.R. 32.2 states, “In felony cases the court shall * * * order a presentence 

investigation and report before * * * imposing community control sanctions or granting 

probation.”1

 This rule facially requires a presentence investigation only as a prerequisite 

to the imposition of community control, and not as a prerequisite to imposing a prison 

term. State v. Davis, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 95722, 2011-Ohio-1377, ¶ 9. If probation 

or community control sanctions are not imposed, there is no affirmative obligation to 

order the report prior to sentencing. Id., citing State v. Bowman, 7th Dist. Belmont No. 

03-BE-40, 2004-Ohio-6372, ¶ 24; State v. Cyrus, 63 Ohio St.3d 164, 166, 586 N.E.2d 94 

 1

We also note that there is no other statutory authority requiring the trial court to order a 

presentencing investigation report prior to the imposition of a term of imprisonment on a felony 

offense. Both R.C. 2951.03 and 2947.06 either require the report prior to the imposition of 

community control, or make the report discretionary. 
(1992). Accordingly, the trial court did not err in proceeding straight to sentencing in 

light of the fact that the trial court sentenced Rivas to a term of imprisonment and did not 

impose community control sanctions. 

{¶7} Rivas further claims that the trial court should have considered his mental 

health issues diagnosed after the date of the incident. The record reflects, however, that 

both defense counsel and Rivas were afforded the opportunity to address the court and 

offer circumstances for the court’s consideration prior to the imposition of sentence. 

State v. Richmond, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 98915, 2013-Ohio-2887, ¶ 32 (both the 

defendant and his attorney had the opportunity to address the court and provide any 

information for the court’s consideration before imposing the sentence). More 

important, the trial court was made aware of Rivas’s bipolar disorder treatment and 

expressly considered all other sentencing factors. Rivas’s first assignment of error is 

overruled. 

{¶8} In Rivas’s second assignment of error, Rivas claims that his trial counsel was 

ineffective for failing to request the appellant’s case be referred to the court’s mental 

health docket. Rivas’s argument is without merit. 

{¶9} In order to substantiate a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the 

appellant must show that (1) counsel’s performance was deficient and (2) the deficient 

performance prejudiced the defendant so as to deprive him of a fair trial. State v. 

Trimble, 122 Ohio St.3d 297, 2009-Ohio-2961, 911 N.E.2d 242, ¶ 98, citing Strickland v. 

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Judicial 
scrutiny of defense counsel’s performance must be highly deferential. Strickland at 689. 

 In Ohio, there is a presumption that a properly licensed attorney is competent. State v. 

Calhoun, 86 Ohio St.3d 279, 289, 1999-Ohio-102, 714 N.E.2d 905. The defendant has 

the burden of proving his counsel rendered ineffective assistance. State v. Perez, 124 

Ohio St.3d 122, 2009-Ohio-6179, 920 N.E.2d 104, ¶ 223. 

{¶10} Rule 30.1 of the Local Rules of the General Division of the Common Pleas 

Court of Cuyahoga County provides that the “[m]ental health dockets shall include cases 

where the defendant has a confirmed serious mental illness[,]” which is defined as the 

defendant being clinically diagnosed, within the previous six months prior to arraignment, 

of having a severe mental illness with a psychotic feature. In this case, Rivas was 

diagnosed with bipolar disorder, but even if facially considering his argument, there was 

no clinical diagnosis of the bipolar disorder with a psychotic feature as required by Rule 

30.1. Rivas’s claim was limited to the generic argument that he was diagnosed with 

bipolar disorder. There is no specificity within this record regarding his diagnosis, much 

less any indication that the bipolar disorder was accompanied with a psychotic feature. 

Accordingly, his trial counsel was not deficient for failing to attempt to have Rivas’s case 

referred to the court’s mental health docket. Relying on our review of the facts, Rivas 

would not have qualified for the mental health docket based on the record provided for 

this appeal. See State v. Hawthorne, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 89932, 2008-Ohio-2049, ¶ 

24 (a reviewing court is limited to the facts presented upon the record of appeal and 

cannot consider facts outside that record). Rivas’s final assignment of error is overruled. 
{¶11} We affirm Rivas’s conviction and the judgment of the trial court. 

It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed. 

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common 

pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant’s conviction having 

been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case remanded to the trial court 

for execution of sentence. 

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of 

the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

SEAN C. GALLAGHER, PRESIDING JUDGE 

EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, J., and 

MELODY J. STEWART, J., CONCUR