FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

BURRI LAW PA, a Florida 

professional association; DEAN 

ALLEN BURRI, a Florida resident,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

WILLIAM C. SKURLA, an individual; 

KURT RICHARD BURNETT, an 

individual; MILAN LACH, an 

individual; METROPOLITAN 

ARCHDIOCESE OF PITTSBURGH,

BYZANTINE RITE, a Pennsylvania 

non-profit corporation; BYZANTINE 

CATHOLIC DIOCESE OF PARMA, an 

Ohio non-profit corporation; 

EPARCHY OF PASSAIC, a New Jersey 

non-profit corporation; UNKNOWN 

PARTIES, named as: ABC Entities 1–

10 and John and Jane Does 1–10,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 21-15271

D.C. No.

2:20-cv-01692-

DLR

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Arizona

Douglas L. Rayes, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted December 7, 2021

Pasadena, California
2 BURRI LAW PA V. SKURLA

Filed June 3, 2022

Before: Marsha S. Berzon, Carlos T. Bea, and

Jacqueline H. Nguyen, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Berzon

SUMMARY*

Personal Jurisdiction

The panel vacated the district court’s dismissal for lack 

of personal jurisdiction of Dean Burri’s action against three 

bishops of the Byzantine Catholic Church and their 

respective dioceses.

Burri alleged that defendants directed defamatory 

statements about him toward individuals and entities in 

Arizona and tortiously interfered with his contractual 

relationship with the Byzantine Catholic Eparchy of 

Phoenix.

The panel held that the district court erred in dismissing 

for lack of personal jurisdiction over the defendants. Where 

a defendant directs communications that are defamatory 

toward a forum state and seeks to interfere with a forum state 

contract, the defendant has purposefully directed conduct at 

the forum state, and the defendant knows or should know 

that such conduct is likely to cause harm in the forum state.

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It 

has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
BURRI LAW PA V. SKURLA 3

The panel rejected defendants’ contention that the 

ecclesiastical abstention doctrine deprived the court of 

subject matter jurisdiction over the appeal. The panel held 

that the doctrine was not relevant here where Burri was not 

asking the court to adjudicate the sort of issues covered by 

the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine.

The panel applied the Calder effects test to determine 

whether a defendant purposefully directed activities toward 

a forum state. Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 788-89 (1984). 

The panel held that Burri’s claims against defendant William 

Skurla, the Archbishop of Pittsburgh, were on all fours with 

Calder. The panel held that the district court erred in holding 

that Skurla did not purposefully direct conduct at Arizona. 

Taking Burri’s factual allegations as true, the panel held that 

Skurla directed communications toward Arizona that were 

defamatory and were designed to interfere with an Arizona 

lawsuit and an Arizona contract. Such acts targeted the 

forum state itself and such acts were likely to cause harm in 

Arizona. The panel held that the district court erred in 

concluding that Burri, as a Florida resident, could not suffer 

harm in Arizona where Skurla’s statements circulating in 

Arizona would cause Burri reputational harm in Arizona, 

and the communications were designed to undermine Burri’s 

employment contract with the Phoenix Eparchy. Burri 

carried his burden to establish a prima facie case that Skurla 

“purposefully directed” conduct at Arizona. The district 

court did not address the other two components of the due 

process “minimum contacts” inquiry. The panel vacated the 

dismissal of Burri’s claims against Skurla – and by extension 

the Eparchy of Pittsburgh – and remanded for the district 

court to complete the remainder of the jurisdictional inquiry. 

The panel’s analysis regarding Burri’s claims against 

Richard Burnett, the Bishop of Passaic, Milan Lach, the 
4 BURRI LAW PA V. SKURLA

Bishop of Parma, and their respective dioceses was similar, 

with one caveat. The First Amended Complaint contained 

substantially less detail regarding the actions of Burnett and 

Lach. The district court did not address that important 

difference. In addition, the district court’s denial of Burri’s 

motion for jurisdictional discovery rested on the same 

misunderstanding that undermined its analysis regarding 

personal jurisdiction over Skurda – that Burri, as a Florida 

resident, could not suffer harm in Arizona. The panel 

vacated the dismissal of Burri’s claims against Burnett, Lach 

and the Eparchies of Passaic and Parma; vacated the denial 

of Burri’s motion for jurisdictional discovery; and remanded 

so that the district court could assess the questions afresh.

COUNSEL

Jamie L. Mayrose (argued) and Deanna R. Rader, Rader 

Mayrose LLP, Phoenix, Arizona, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Stacy K. Luell (argued) and Jeffrey T. Nichols, Crivello 

Carlson S.C., Milwaukee, Wisconsin, for DefendantsAppellees William C. Skurla, Kurt Richard Burnett, 

Metropolitan Archdiocese of Pittsburgh Byzantine Rite; and 

Eparchy of Passaic.

James B. Niehaus (argued) and Klevis Bakiaj, Frantz Ward 

LLP, Cleveland, Ohio, for Defendants-Appellees Milan 

Lach and Byzantine Catholic Diocese of Parma.
BURRI LAW PA V. SKURLA 5

OPINION

BERZON, Circuit Judge:

Dean Burri brought suit in Arizona against three bishops 

of the Byzantine Catholic Church—William Skurla, the 

Archbishop of Pittsburgh; Richard Burnett, the Bishop of 

Passaic; and Milan Lach, the Bishop of Parma—and their 

respective dioceses. He alleges that the Defendants directed 

defamatory statements about him toward individuals and 

entities in Arizona and tortiously interfered with his 

contractual relationship with the Byzantine Catholic 

Eparchy of Phoenix (the “Phoenix Eparchy”).

The district court granted the Defendants’ motions to 

dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and denied Burri’s 

motion for jurisdictional discovery. The court concluded 

that Defendants did not purposefully direct conduct at 

Arizona and that no set of facts could establish that Burri was 

likely to suffer harm in Arizona. We disagree. Where a 

defendant directs communications that are defamatory 

toward a forum state and seeks to interfere with a forum state 

contract, the defendant has purposefully directed conduct at 

the forum state, and the defendant knows or should know 

that such conduct is likely to cause harm in the forum state. 

The dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction therefore 

rested on a legal error.

I.

A. Factual Background

Burri, a Florida resident, owns Burri Law, P.A., a Florida

law firm that specializes in assisting clients associated with 

the Catholic Church with employee benefits issues, 

including Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
6 BURRI LAW PA V. SKURLA

(“ERISA”) issues.1 In late 2015, the Phoenix Eparchy, an 

Arizona resident, hired Burri to investigate the Eparchy’s 

health care benefits plan, draft health plan documents, and, 

if necessary, pursue litigation on its behalf. Those tasks 

required Burri regularly to direct communications toward 

Arizona, meet with his clients in Arizona, and perform work 

in Arizona.

Pursuant to his contract with the Phoenix Eparchy, Burri 

began investigating the Eastern Catholics Benefits Plan (the 

“Plan”), an ERISA health care plan that provided benefits to 

the Phoenix Eparchy. Burri requested original Plan 

formation documents and accounting information from Plan 

administrators, including Skurla, but was refused. Burri 

nevertheless uncovered irregularities in the Plan that 

demonstrated it was not in compliance with applicable law. 

For example, Burri discovered that Plan administrators had 

illegally commingled Plan funds, converted Plan assets, and 

placed Plan funds in offshore accounts. After learning about 

Burri’s investigation, Plan administrators unlawfully sought 

to restructure the Plan by attempting to “merge” it “with 

other health plans from other employers, namely the 

Eparchies of Pittsburg, Passaic, and Parma,” which are led 

by Skurla, Burnett, and Lach, respectively.

After concluding that further negotiation with the Plan 

administrators would not be fruitful, the Phoenix Eparchy, 

represented by Burri, filed an ERISA action against the Plan 

in the District of Arizona. See Complaint, Byzantine Cath. 

Eparchy of Phx. v. Emp. Benefit Servs., Inc., No. 2:18-cv1 Because we are reviewing the district court’s decision to grant the 

Defendants’ motions to dismiss, “we recite the facts as alleged in 

[Burri’s] complaint, and assume them to be true.” Brooks v. Clark 

County, 828 F.3d 910, 914 n.1 (9th Cir. 2016).
BURRI LAW PA V. SKURLA 7

01288-GMS (D. Ariz. Apr. 26, 2018) (the “ERISA action”). 

Two months later, the Phoenix Eparchy filed an amended 

complaint adding Skurla and other Plan administrators as 

defendants. In response, Skurla, Burnett, and Lach—all 

Defendants in this case—commenced a campaign of 

defamation against Burri. To conceal the Plan’s ERISA 

violations, the Defendants sought to have Burri’s contract 

with the Phoenix Eparchy terminated and the Bishop of 

Phoenix replaced before the ERISA action could move into 

the discovery phrase.

In particular, Skurla “repeatedly requested that the 

Phoenix Eparchy terminate the contract with” Burri. Skurla 

also stated, among other things, that Burri was “greedy, 

incompetent, and inexperienced” and sought to “make a 

name for himself” through a lawsuit that “had absolutely no 

legal merit.” These statements were communicated to the 

Phoenix Eparchy and third parties through emails, phone 

calls, voicemails, letters, and in-person communications. 

Some of the recipients were in Arizona when they heard or 

read the statements.

Although Burri has the greatest knowledge regarding 

Skurla’s actions, he maintains on information and belief that 

Burnett and Lach repeated Skurla’s false and defamatory 

statements to the Phoenix Eparchy and third parties, and 

“directed” third parties “to urge the Phoenix Eparchy to fire 

[Burri] and terminate the Arizona lawsuit.” And Skurla, 

Burnett, and Lach attended an in-person meeting in Texas 

that included “multiple representatives from the Phoenix 

Eparchy.” At this meeting, “the false statements [about 

Burri] were repeated, and it was communicated to the 
8 BURRI LAW PA V. SKURLA

Phoenix Eparchy” that the ERISA action should be dropped 

and Burri should be fired.2

When these actions failed to produce the desired result, 

the Defendants communicated their displeasure with Burri 

to the Papal Nuncio. Relying on a precept of canon law 

under which church officials cannot sue one another without 

papal authorization, the Pope issued an order requiring the 

Phoenix Eparchy to withdraw the ERISA action and 

terminate its relationship with Burri. Burri also alleges that 

church officials caused a canon lawyer who was “of 

counsel” at Burri Law, P.A. to end his contractual 

relationship with Burri.

Following the termination of the ERISA action, Burri 

submitted a bill for his legal services. The Phoenix Eparchy, 

under new leadership, refused to pay. See Complaint, Burri 

L., P.A. v. Byzantine Cath. Eparchy of Phx., No. 8:18-cv02879-CEH-JSS (M.D. Fla. Nov. 26, 2018). The Phoenix 

Eparchy subsequently filed a malpractice suit against Burri 

in Arizona state court, which Burri removed to the District 

of Arizona. See Notice of Removal, Byzantine Cath. 

Eparchy of Phx. v. Burri L., P.A., No. 2:20-cv-779-PHXROS (D. Ariz. Apr. 22, 2020). Burri filed counterclaims in 

the Arizona malpractice suit to recover his unpaid legal fees.

See Answer and Counterclaims, Byzantine Cath. Eparchy of 

Phx. v. Burri L., P.A., No. 2:20-cv-779-PHX-ROS (D. Ariz. 

Oct. 30, 2020).

2 Burri’s complaint did not specify that the meeting occurred inperson in Texas, but the district court’s decisions and the parties’ briefing 

include those details.
BURRI LAW PA V. SKURLA 9

B. Procedural History

In July 2020, Burri filed this action in Arizona state 

court. His complaint pressed four claims: (1) tortious 

interference with contractual relations; (2) tortious 

interference with prospective contractual relationships; 

(3) unjust enrichment; and (4) defamation.3 Skurla, Burnett, 

and Lach were named in their individual capacities, and their 

respective dioceses were named under a respondeat superior 

theory of liability.

After the Defendants removed the action to the District 

of Arizona, Lach and the Parma Eparchy (the “Lach 

Defendants”) and Skurla, Burnett, and the Pittsburgh and 

Passaic Eparchies (the “Skurla Defendants”) filed separate 

motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Then, 

after Burri filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), the 

district court denied the Defendants’ motions to dismiss as 

moot; the Lach Defendants and the Skurla Defendants again 

filed separate motions to dismiss; and Burri filed a motion 

for leave to conduct jurisdictional discovery. Burri’s motion 

proposed the following discovery requests:

1. Produce all documents related to any 

travel to/from Arizona since 2016.

2. Produce all written communications 

between Defendants and the Eparchy of 

Phoenix, including texts, e-mails, and

letters, since 2016 related to the subject of 

the lawsuit.

3 This appeal focuses solely on Burri’s claims for defamation and 

tortious interference with contractual relations.
10 BURRI LAW PA V. SKURLA

3. Produce all written communications 

between Defendants and co-Defendants, 

including texts, e-mails, and letters, since

2016, related to the subject of the lawsuit.

4. Identify all persons related to the Eparchy 

of Phoenix and/or the Catholic Church 

with whom you discussed Dean Burri or

Burri Law Group, or the instant lawsuit 

(excluding counsel).

Burri also requested leave to depose the Defendants.

A few months later, the district court dismissed the 

claims against the Skurla Defendants and denied Burri’s 

motion for jurisdictional discovery against them. In another 

order, the court dismissed the claims against the Lach 

Defendants and denied the motion for discovery against 

them. The reasoning of the two orders was virtually 

identical—the court stated that it lacked personal jurisdiction 

over Burri’s claims because the Defendants did not 

purposefully direct conduct toward Arizona sufficient to 

satisfy the due process “minimum contacts” inquiry, and no 

discovery could cure that problem. This appeal followed.

II.

The Defendants initially contend that the ecclesiastical 

abstention doctrine deprives us of subject matter jurisdiction 

over this appeal. The ecclesiastical abstention doctrine 

provides that a civil court may not adjudicate “the 

correctness of an interpretation of canonical text or some 

decision relating to government of the religious polity.” 

Paul v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc., 

819 F.2d 875, 878 n.1 (9th Cir. 1987).
BURRI LAW PA V. SKURLA 11

The doctrine is not relevant here. Burri is not asking us 

to adjudicate the sort of issues covered by the ecclesiastical 

abstention doctrine. “Rather, [he] seeks relief for the harms 

[he] has suffered as a result of conduct engaged in by” the 

Defendants, regardless of whether the conduct was 

“consistent with the governing law of the Church.” Id. The 

ecclesiastical abstention doctrine has no application to this 

case.

III.

An exercise of personal jurisdiction in federal court must 

comport with both the applicable state’s long-arm statute and 

the federal Due Process Clause. Chan v. Soc’y Expeditions, 

Inc., 39 F.3d 1398, 1404–05 (9th Cir. 1994). Arizona’s 

long-arm statute permits jurisdiction over non-resident 

defendants to the full extent allowable under the United 

States Constitution. Ariz. R. Civ. P. 4.2(a); Doe v. Am. Nat’l 

Red Cross, 112 F.3d 1048, 1050 (9th Cir. 1997). Due 

process, in turn, requires that non-resident defendants have 

sufficient “minimum contacts” with the forum state such that 

exercising jurisdiction would not offend “traditional notions 

of fair play and substantial justice.” Int’l Shoe Co. v. 

Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v. 

Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).

For cases sounding in tort, as here, a defendant has 

sufficient minimum contacts with the forum state to establish 

specific personal jurisdiction if: (1) the defendant 

purposefully directs activities toward the forum state, (2) the 

plaintiff’s claim arises out of or relates to those activities, 

and (3) an exercise of jurisdiction would be reasonable. 

Dole Food Co. v. Watts, 303 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 

2002); see also Mavrix Photo, Inc. v. Brand Techs., Inc., 

647 F.3d 1218, 1227–28 (9th Cir. 2011). If the plaintiff 

establishes the first two components of this inquiry, the 
12 BURRI LAW PA V. SKURLA

burden shifts to the defendant to “present a compelling case 

that the exercise of jurisdiction would not be reasonable.” 

LNS Enters. LLC v. Cont’l Motors, Inc., 22 F.4th 852, 859 

(9th Cir. 2022) (quoting Axiom Foods, Inc. v. Acerchem 

Int’l, Inc., 874 F.3d 1064, 1068–69 (9th Cir. 2017)).

4

The Calder effects test governs our inquiry into whether 

a defendant has purposefully directed activities toward a 

forum state. It establishes that if a defendant: (1) commits 

an intentional act, (2) expressly aimed at the forum state, that 

(3) causes harm the defendant knew was likely to be suffered 

in the forum state, then the defendant has purposefully 

directed conduct at the forum state. Axiom Foods, Inc., 

874 F.3d at 1069; Dole Food Co., 303 F.3d at 1111; Calder 

v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 788–89 (1984). Jurisdiction may be 

constitutionally maintained in such a scenario even if the 

defendant never set foot in the forum state, if the defendant’s 

contacts with the forum state are out-of-state acts that had an 

effect in the forum. See Dole Food Co., 303 F.3d at 1111;

Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 

803 (9th Cir. 2004).

A district court’s dismissal for lack of personal 

jurisdiction is reviewed de novo. Boschetto v. Hansing, 

539 F.3d 1011, 1015 (9th Cir. 2008). The jurisdictional 

inquiry must decouple defendants, considering whether each 

individual defendant has had sufficient “minimum contacts” 

with the forum state to justify an exercise of jurisdiction over 

that defendant. See, e.g., Sher v. Johnson, 911 F.2d 1357, 

4 Personal jurisdiction may be specific or general. See Dole Food 

Co., 303 F.3d at 1111. Burri does not contend that the Defendants are 

subject to general personal jurisdiction in Arizona, so we do not address 

the analytical framework applicable to general personal jurisdiction 

cases.
BURRI LAW PA V. SKURLA 13

1365–66 (9th Cir. 1990). Before discovery and in the 

absence of an evidentiary hearing, as here, the plaintiff need 

only make “a prima facie showing of jurisdictional facts to 

withstand the motion to dismiss.” Pebble Beach Co. v. 

Caddy, 453 F.3d 1151, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Doe v. 

Unocal, 248 F.3d 915, 922 (9th Cir. 2001), abrogated on 

other grounds by Williams v. Yamaha Motor Co., 851 F.3d 

1015 (9th Cir. 2017)). In determining whether the plaintiff 

has met that burden, a court must accept as true all 

uncontroverted allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint and 

must resolve all disputed facts in favor of the plaintiff. Id.

A.

The district court held that Skurla did not purposefully 

direct conduct at Arizona, both because his actions did not 

target the forum state itself and because he did not cause 

harm he knew was likely to be suffered in Arizona. In 

coming to that conclusion, the district court reasoned that 

Burri, as a Florida resident, could not suffer an injury in 

Arizona. The district court ended its jurisdictional inquiry 

there, without addressing the other two components of the 

due process “minimum contacts” test.

The district court’s analysis was incorrect. Taking 

Burri’s factual allegations as true, as we must, Skurla 

directed communications toward Arizona that were 

defamatory and were designed to interfere with an Arizona 

lawsuit and an Arizona contract. Precedent establishes both 

that such acts target the forum state itself and that such acts 

are likely to cause harm in Arizona. We therefore vacate the 

dismissal of Burri’s claims against Skurla—and, by 

extension, the Eparchy of Pittsburgh—and remand for the 

district court to complete the remainder of the jurisdictional 

inquiry.
14 BURRI LAW PA V. SKURLA

i.

As explained, the Calder effects test governs whether a 

defendant has purposefully directed conduct at the forum 

state. Here, the first prong of the test, whether the defendant 

committed an intentional act, is plainly satisfied. Skurla’s 

alleged actions—communicating defamatory statements and 

interfering with a contractual relationship—would constitute 

intentional tortious acts. See, e.g., Calder, 465 U.S. at 788–

89; Picot v. Weston, 780 F.3d 1206, 1213–14 (9th Cir. 2015). 

Skurla does not argue otherwise.

ii.

With respect to the second prong of the Calder effects 

test, whether the defendant’s acts targeted the forum state, 

the district court concluded that because Skurla’s alleged 

acts “targeted [Burri’s] professional career,” the actions “did 

not target the forum.” Skurla echoes that conclusion, but for 

a different reason. He argues that even if his alleged acts are 

understood to have targeted the Phoenix Eparchy and the 

Phoenix Bishop, such a finding would be insufficient to 

justify an exercise of jurisdiction in light of Walden v. Fiore, 

571 U.S. 277, 289–90 (2014).

In Walden, a Georgia police officer, working with 

federal agents, seized almost $100,000 in cash from two 

professional gamblers in a Georgia airport. Id. at 280–81. 

The officer also drafted an allegedly fraudulent affidavit 

about the seizure that he sent to the United States Attorney’s 

Office in Georgia. Id. The gamblers, who were residents of 

California and Nevada, filed a Bivens suit in the District of 

Nevada alleging that the officer violated their Fourth 

Amendment rights. Id. at 281; see Bivens v. Six Unknown 

Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
BURRI LAW PA V. SKURLA 15

Affirming the district court’s dismissal of the Bivens suit 

on personal jurisdiction grounds, the Supreme Court 

explained “it is the defendant’s conduct that must form the 

necessary connection” between the lawsuit and the forum 

state. Walden, 571 U.S. at 285. This proposition was fatal 

to the plaintiffs’ suit in Walden, as the Georgia officer had 

“formed no jurisdictionally relevant contacts with Nevada.” 

Id. at 289. He had “never traveled to, conducted activities 

within, contacted anyone in, or sent anything or anyone to 

Nevada,” and the lawsuit was not “tethered to Nevada in any 

meaningful way” aside from the plaintiff’s residency. Id.

at 288–90. Dismissal was therefore required, as the 

residency of the plaintiff, “standing alone, is an insufficient 

basis for jurisdiction.” Id. at 286.

In the process of so holding, Walden expressly 

distinguished Calder. Calder’s jurisdictional analysis was 

sound, the high court explained, because it focused on the 

relationship between the defendants, the forum, and the 

litigation, “examin[ing] the various contacts the defendants 

had created with California (and not just with the plaintiff),” 

including making phone calls to California and circulating 

false statements in California. Id. at 287. Moreover, the 

false statements had “a California focus” because they 

concerned “the plaintiff’s activities in California.” Id.

at 286–88. The effect those out-of-state actions had in 

California justified exercising jurisdiction over the Calder 

defendants. Id.

Burri’s claims against Skurla are on all fours with 

Calder. Some of Skurla’s allegedly defamatory 

communications—including phone calls and written 

correspondence—were sent to Arizona, circulated within 

Arizona, and had an Arizona “focus,” as they concerned 
16 BURRI LAW PA V. SKURLA

Burri’s activities in Arizona. Skurla’s actions were therefore 

aimed at the forum state itself.

In addition, Skurla’s acts were allegedly intended to 

interfere with an Arizona lawsuit and an Arizona contract. 

Brainerd v. Governors of the University of Alberta, 873 F.2d 

1257 (9th Cir. 1989), establishes that if the purpose of an act 

is to cause harm in the forum state, the act has targeted the 

forum state. There, a University of Alberta faculty member, 

Brainerd, was accused of misusing grant funds. Id. at 1258. 

He entered a settlement agreement with the University which 

provided that, in exchange for his resignation, University 

representatives would respond to any future job-related 

inquiries about Brainerd with a pre-approved statement. Id. 

Brainerd then applied for and accepted a position at a college 

in Arizona. Id. After hearing unsavory rumors about 

Brainerd, the associate dean at Brainerd’s new job called a 

University of Alberta administrator, Meekison, to ask about 

Brainerd’s tenure at the school. Id. Meekison told the 

associate dean that Brainerd misused federal research funds 

and travel funds during his time at the University of Alberta. 

Id. Meekison also stated that he “would not hire Brainerd.” 

Id. Later, Meekison exchanged letters with the provost of 

the Arizona college in which he refused to answer any 

further questions. Id.

After learning about these communications, Brainerd 

filed suit in Arizona against Meekison and the University of 

Alberta for breach of contract, breach of the covenant of 

good faith and fair dealing, defamation, and tortious 

inference with contractual relations. Id. On appeal, the 

Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal for lack 

of personal jurisdiction. Id. at 1260–61. The panel held that, 

under Calder and its progeny, Meekison’s “communications 

were directed to Arizona, even though he did not initiate” the 
BURRI LAW PA V. SKURLA 17

conversations, because “where acts are performed for the 

very purpose of having their consequences felt in the forum 

state, the forum will have personal jurisdiction over the 

actor.” Id. at 1259–60.

Here, Skurla communicated the statements at issue, 

allegedly, “for the very purpose of having their 

consequences felt in the forum state.” The alleged purpose 

of the statements was to convince the Phoenix Eparchy both 

to terminate its Arizona employment contract with Burri and 

to drop the Arizona ERISA action. Thus, as in Brainerd, the 

second prong of the Calder effects test is met. See Calder, 

465 U.S. at 788–89; Dole Food Co., 303 F.3d at 1111.

iii.

We also disagree with the district court’s reasoning on 

the final prong of the Calder effects test. This prong asks 

whether Skurla knew or should have known that his actions 

were likely to cause Burri harm in the forum state. Dole 

Food Co., 303 F.3d at 1111; Calder, 465 U.S. at 788–89. 

The district court concluded that, as a Florida resident, Burri 

could not suffer harm in Arizona, so Skurla “would have had 

no reason to believe [his] actions were likely to cause [Burri] 

harm in Arizona.” Not so.

Beginning with Burri’s defamation claim: Keeton v. 

Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770 (1984), establishes that 

defamation causes harm to “the subject of the falsehood” in 

the state where the defamatory material circulates, whether 

the subject of the statement resides there or not. Keeton, 

465 U.S. at 776–77. In Keeton, a non-resident defendant 

circulated a magazine in the forum state that contained 

defamatory statements about the non-resident plaintiff. Id. 

The plaintiff was found to have suffered an injury in the 

forum state. Because defamation causes harm to the victim’s 
18 BURRI LAW PA V. SKURLA

reputation in the forum where it circulates, “[t]he tort of libel 

is generally held to occur wherever the offending material is 

circulated.” Id. at 777; see also Calder, 465 U.S. at 785. In 

this case, some of Skurla’s statements circulated in Arizona, 

so he knew or should have known that his conduct would 

cause Burri reputational harm in Arizona.

Turning to Burri’s tortious interference with contractual 

relations claim, Brainerd again controls. In Brainerd, the 

communications between Meekison and the administrators 

at Brainerd’s new job in Arizona were likely to have a 

negative influence on Brainerd’s employment contract. 

“Meekison knew the injury and harm stemming from his 

communications would occur in Arizona.” Brainerd, 

873 F.2d at 1259–60. The same is true here. The 

communications in this case were designed to undermine 

Burri’s employment contract with the Phoenix Eparchy. 

Skurla knew or should have known that the communications 

would cause Burri harm in Arizona.

iv.

Skurla raises a final counterargument, one that falls 

outside the Calder framework. He argues that exercising 

jurisdiction over this case would be improper because the 

termination of Burri’s contract was ultimately effectuated by 

non-parties, including the Pope. Causation is a merits 

question, not an issue relevant to the jurisdictional inquiry. 

Skurla may assert arguments going to the merits of Burri’s 

causes of action at later stages of the proceeding, such as 

through a Rule 12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a claim. 

We express no view on such issues. At this time, our inquiry 

is focused solely on whether jurisdiction may be 

constitutionally maintained over this action. At this stage of 

the case, Burri has satisfied his burden to make a prima facie 

showing that Skurla’s alleged acts satisfy the “purposeful 
BURRI LAW PA V. SKURLA 19

direction” component of the minimum contacts inquiry. See 

Pebble Beach Co., 453 F.3d at 1154–56; Calder, 465 U.S. 

at 788–89.

* * *

In sum, Skurla directed intentional acts at Arizona that 

he knew or should have known were likely to cause Burri 

harm in Arizona. Burri has carried his burden to establish a 

prima facie case that Skurla, and by extension the Eparchy 

of Pittsburgh, “purposefully directed” conduct at Arizona. 

As the district court did not address the other two 

components of the due process “minimum contacts” inquiry, 

we remand for the court to complete the jurisdictional 

analysis.5

B.

Our analysis regarding Burri’s claims against Burnett, 

Lach, and their respective dioceses is similar, with one 

important caveat. The FAC contains substantially less detail 

regarding the actions of Burnett and Lach. The district court 

did not address that important difference; its reasoning was 

virtually identical with respect to each of the three bishops. 

And its denial of Burri’s motion for jurisdictional discovery 

rested on the same misunderstanding that undermined its 

analysis regarding whether there is personal jurisdiction over 

Skurla—that Burri, as a Florida resident, could not suffer 

5 In most cases where the plaintiff’s allegations satisfy the 

purposeful direction test, the “arise out of or relate to” prong of the 

minimum contacts inquiry will also be satisfied. The purposeful 

direction test ordinarily subsumes the less-exacting “arise out of or relate 

to” inquiry. See, e.g., Dole Food Co., 303 F.3d at 1114 (holding that 

because purposeful direction was established, it was “obvious” that the 

second prong of the minimum contacts test was also satisfied).
20 BURRI LAW PA V. SKURLA

harm in Arizona. We therefore vacate the dismissal of 

Burri’s claims against Burnett, Lach, and the Eparchies of 

Passaic and Parma; vacate the denial of Burri’s motion for 

jurisdictional discovery; and remand so that the district court 

may assess these questions afresh.

The FAC contains specific allegations of statements 

Skurla made that were directed at Arizona and circulated 

within Arizona. In contrast, although the FAC states that 

“the majority of the tortious conduct, events, acts, and 

omissions alleged in [the FAC] occurred within or were 

directed to Maricopa County, Arizona,” and Burri’s briefing 

before this Court maintains that statements made by each of 

the Defendants circulated within Arizona, the FAC does not 

expressly state whether Burnett and Lach directed their 

statements at Arizona, as opposed to directing statements at 

representatives of the Phoenix Eparchy when those 

representatives were in other places.

It may be that, at this juncture of the proceedings—where 

all reasonable inferences must be drawn in Burri’s favor and 

his burden is to establish only “a prima facie showing of 

jurisdictional facts,” Pebble Beach Co., 453 F.3d at 1154 

(quoting Doe, 248 F.3d at 922)—Burri has alleged sufficient 

facts reasonably to infer that some of Burnett and Lach’s 

statements circulated within Arizona.6

 The district court did 

6 We note it is not clear that in-forum direct circulation by the 

defendants is essential. Brainerd states that “where acts are performed 

for the very purpose of having their consequences felt in the forum state, 

the forum will have personal jurisdiction over the actor.” Brainerd,

873 F.2d at 1260. And Walden demonstrates that, when determining 

whether a defendant purposefully directed conduct at a forum state, 

courts may consider whether the defendant’s communications had “a 

[forum state] focus” in that they concerned the “plaintiff’s activities in 

[the forum state].” Walden, 571 U.S. at 287–88. It may be that, even if 
BURRI LAW PA V. SKURLA 21

not address this question, as it began from the erroneous 

premise that Burri could not be harmed in a state where he 

did not reside.

If, applying the proper analytical framework, the district 

court determines that the FAC’s factual allegations are not 

sufficient to support an exercise of jurisdiction, the question 

will arise whether Burri should be permitted to amend his 

complaint, conduct jurisdictional discovery, or both. These 

three questions are closely intertwined. Burri’s counsel 

stated at oral argument that, if the current record contains 

insufficient information to support a finding that jurisdiction 

is proper, Burri could amend his complaint to include 

pertinent facts that have recently come to light in other legal 

proceedings. Burri’s counsel also maintains that his 

“limited, targeted” discovery requests are tailored to uncover 

additional information in support of his position, such as 

emails or phone calls that Burnett and Lach directed at 

Arizona and were circulated in Arizona.

Generally, plaintiffs should be granted leave to amend 

their complaints unless “it is clear, upon de novo review, that 

the complaint could not be saved by any amendment.” 

Sonoma Cnty. Ass’n of Retired Emps. v. Sonoma County, 

708 F.3d 1109, 1118 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Polich v. 

Burlington N., Inc., 942 F.2d 1467, 1472 (9th Cir. 1991)). 

Jurisdictional discovery should be permitted “where 

pertinent facts bearing on the question of jurisdiction are 

controverted or where a more satisfactory showing of the 

Burnett and Lach’s statements were made to individuals who were not 

in Arizona at the time they read or heard the statements, the statements 

nevertheless satisfy the purposeful direction test on the ground that 

Burnett and Lach knew the communications—made to Arizona residents 

and concerning an Arizona contract and an Arizona lawsuit—would be 

repeated in and have an impact in Arizona, and intended that result.
22 BURRI LAW PA V. SKURLA

facts is necessary.” Boschetto, 539 F.3d at 1020 (quoting 

Data Disc, Inc. v. Sys. Tech. Assocs., Inc., 557 F.2d 1280, 

1285 n.1 (9th Cir. 1977)). A denial of a motion for 

jurisdictional discovery is reviewed for abuse of discretion. 

Id. If the trial court applied an incorrect legal rule in the 

course of denying a motion for jurisdictional discovery, its 

decision must be vacated. See United States v. Hinkson, 

585 F.3d 1247, 1261–62 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc).

Here, the district court denied Burri’s motion for 

jurisdictional discovery on the ground that no sets of facts 

could establish that Burri, a Florida resident, suffered harm 

in Arizona. More specifically, the court stated that “[e]ven 

if the proposed discovery were to reveal additional incidents 

in which Defendants allegedly defamed [Burri] and 

interfered with [his] relationship with the Phoenix Eparchy, 

the harm suffered by Mr. Burri occurred in Florida.” Once 

again, that proposition is not correct. For the reasons 

explained with regard to Skurla, if Burnett and Lach directed 

statements at Arizona that were defamatory and sought to 

undermine Burri’s contract with the Phoenix Eparchy, then 

Burri suffered harm in Arizona. See supra Part III.A.iii. The 

district court’s denial of jurisdictional discovery therefore 

must be vacated. See Hinkson, 585 F.3d at 1261–62.7

In sum, we vacate the district court’s dismissal of Burri’s 

claims against Burnett, Lach, and the Eparchies of Passaic 

7 The district court also expressed a suspicion that Burri sought 

discovery on a baseless “hunch” that some of the Defendants may have 

committed “bad acts” while physically present in Arizona. This 

reasoning suggests that the district court may have believed that the 

Defendants needed to commit an act while present in Arizona for the 

court to sustain jurisdiction over Burri’s suit. If so, that belief was 

mistaken, as we have explained. See Dole Food Co., 303 F.3d at 1111; 

Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 803.
BURRI LAW PA V. SKURLA 23

and Parma, as well as the denial of Burri’s motion for 

jurisdictional discovery. If the district court determines on 

remand, applying the proper framework, that the FAC, as 

presently constituted, lacks sufficient factual allegations to 

support an exercise of jurisdiction over Burnett, Lach, and 

their respective dioceses, the district court should decide 

whether Burri should be permitted to amend his complaint, 

conduct jurisdictional discovery, or both.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, we VACATE the district 

court’s dismissal of Burri’s claims and REMAND to the 

district court for further proceedings consistent with this 

opinion. Costs are awarded to appellants.