Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A04-1708-CR-1734 | December 21, 2017 Page 1 of 5

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Timothy J. Burns

Indianapolis, Indiana 

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Laura R. Anderson 

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Deion Edmond,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff. 

December 21, 2017

Court of Appeals Case No. 

49A04-1708-CR-1734

Appeal from the Marion Superior 

Court 

The Honorable Christina 

Klineman, Judge 

Trial Court Cause No. 

49G17-1706-CM-22066

Brown, Judge.
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[1] Deion Edmond appeals his conviction for domestic battery as a class A 

misdemeanor. Edmond raises one issue which we revise and restate as whether 

the evidence is sufficient to support his conviction. We affirm. 

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On June 9, 2017, Marsha Brown traveled to a parking lot at Eskenazi Hospital 

with her boyfriend Edmond and was going to the emergency room due to an 

issue with her leg. It was nighttime and dark outside. When Edmond and 

Brown were in the hospital’s parking lot, Edmond told Brown that she needed 

to go to another hospital, but she did not want to leave. Brittany Day drove 

into the parking lot at the emergency room and could hear Edmond talking 

loudly. Day began to walk into the emergency room and, when she was 

approximately ten to fifteen feet from Edmond and Brown, heard Edmond say: 

“You’re a dumb bitch. You were never pregnant. You just wanted to keep me 

around.” Transcript Volume 2 at 11. Day heard Brown telling Edmond to 

stop. Day heard “like crying or something” and looked at Edmond and Brown,

observed that Edmond had Brown’s hair wrapped in his arm and was pulling 

her, and heard Edmond say: “You were never pregnant. You lied to me.” Id.

at 12-13. Day then “physically hear[d] him hit her,” looked at them, and 

observed Edmond strike Brown on the side of her face with “like a closed fist.” 

Id. at 13. Brown was crying and said “[g]et off of me.” Id. Day observed that 

Edmond appeared angry and Brown appeared very scared. Day reported what 

she had observed to a security officer in the hospital. When the security officer 

asked Brown if Edmond had hit her, she looked down and said “[n]o.” Id. at 
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16. When the security officer asked Day if she saw Edmond hit Brown, Day 

answered affirmatively, and then Edmond told Day to “mind [her] own 

business.” Id. at 17. 

[3] On June 14, 2017, the State charged Edmond with domestic battery and battery 

resulting in bodily injury as class A misdemeanors. At Edmond’s bench trial, 

Day testified consistent with the foregoing. Brown testified: “[Edmond] told 

me that I needed to go to another hospital and I didn’t want to go and he had 

his hands on me, like this, but he didn’t have no -- it wasn’t near me, like this, 

and I pushed his hand off of me and I said, ‘No. I’m not going to another 

hospital.’” Id. at 8. Brown testified Edmond “was loud, telling me that I 

needed to go to another hospital because my leg was inflamated [sic] . . . .” Id. 

When asked “did [Edmond] strike you at all,” she answered “No.” Id. at 9. 

The court found Edmond guilty of domestic battery as a class A misdemeanor

and not guilty of battery resulting in bodily injury and sentenced Edmond to 

120 days in the Marion County Jail. 

Discussion

[4] The issue is whether the evidence is sufficient to support Edmond’s conviction. 

When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, we 

must consider only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting 

the verdict. Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind. 2007). We do not assess 

witness credibility or reweigh the evidence. Id. We consider conflicting 

evidence most favorably to the trial court’s ruling. Id. We affirm the conviction 

unless no reasonable factfinder could find the elements of the crime proven 
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beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. The evidence is sufficient if an inference may 

reasonably be drawn from it to support the verdict. Id. at 147. The 

uncorroborated testimony of one witness can be sufficient to sustain a 

conviction. Ferrell v. State, 565 N.E.2d 1070, 1072-1073 (Ind. 1991). 

[5] Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1.3(a) provides in part that “[a] person who knowingly or 

intentionally: (1) touches a family or household member in a rude, insolent, or 

angry manner . . . commits domestic battery, a Class A misdemeanor.” The 

State alleged that Edmond did knowingly touch Brown, a family or household 

member, in a rude, insolent or angry manner by striking at and against her with 

his hands. 

[6] Edmond asserts that Brown testified that he did not hit her, that Brown pushed 

his hand off or away while they were conversing, and that, while Day reported 

that she saw him strike Brown, it was dark outside at the time of the incident. 

He argues “the question as to whether an individual had been touched in a 

rude, insolent or angry manner . . . must be answered by that particular 

individual, not a bystander,” “[o]therwise, a witness could completely

misinterpret interaction between two other persons and mistakenly conclude, 

like here, that a crime had been committed when, in fact, the ‘victim’ of the 

‘crime’ does not claim to be victimized,” and “[t]here is no other way to 

interpret this situation.” Appellant’s Brief at 8-9. Edmond does not argue that 

Brown was not a family or household member. The State maintains that 

Edmond’s argument amounts to an impermissible request for this court to 

reassess the credibility of the witnesses. 
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[7] “[W]hen appellate courts are confronted with conflicting evidence, they must 

consider it most favorably to the trial court’s ruling.” Drane, 867 N.E.2d at 146 

(internal quotation marks omitted). The evidence most favorable to the trial 

court’s ruling is that Edmond argued with Brown in the hospital parking lot and 

struck her on the side of her face. The trial court as the trier of fact was free to 

believe the testimony of Day and disbelieve the testimony of Brown. Further, 

the trier of fact was able to assess Day’s testimony in light of her distance from 

Edmond and Brown in the parking lot and the fact it was dark outside. We will 

not assess the credibility of the witnesses or reweigh their testimony. See id. 

[8] Based upon the evidence as set forth above and in the record, we conclude that 

the trial court as the trier of fact could find beyond a reasonable doubt that

Edmond committed the offense of domestic battery as class A misdemeanor. 

Conclusion

[9] For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Edmond’s conviction. 

[10] Affirmed. 

Baker, J., and Riley, J., concur.