U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

67–707 CC WASHINGTON : 2001

S. HRG. 106–872

THE UNITED NATIONS’ POLICY IN AFRICA

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

JULY 12, 2000

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

JESSE HELMS, North Carolina, Chairman

RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana

CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska

GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon

ROD GRAMS, Minnesota

SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas

CRAIG THOMAS, Wyoming

JOHN ASHCROFT, Missouri

BILL FRIST, Tennessee

LINCOLN D. CHAFEE, Rhode Island

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., Delaware

PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland

CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin

PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota

BARBARA BOXER, California

ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey

STEPHEN E. BIEGUN, Staff Director

EDWIN K. HALL, Minority Staff Director

(II)

CONTENTS

Page

Berman, Eric G., Former Executive Director, United Nations Watch, Belmont,

Massachusetts ...................................................................................................... 40

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 43

Graham, Reverend William Franklin, III, President, Chairman, and Chief

Executive Officer, Samaritan’s Purse, Boone, North Carolina ......................... 33

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 35

Holbrooke, Hon. Richard C., U.S. Permanent Representative to the United

Nations .................................................................................................................. 2

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 12

(III)

(1)

THE UNITED NATIONS POLICY IN AFRICA

Wednesday, July 12, 2000

U.S. SENATE,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,

Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:39 a.m. in Room

SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Jesse Helms [chairman] presiding.

Present: Senators Helms [presiding], Lugar, Grams, Brownback,

Frist, Biden, Kerry, Feingold, Wellstone, and Boxer.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. First of all,

our first witness, we welcome Ambassador Richard C. Holbrooke,

whom all of us know and admire. We welcome him to this morning’s meeting of the Foreign Relations Committee, at which we will

discuss the United Nations and its efforts in Africa. We also welcome my fellow North Carolinian, my good friend Franklin

Graham, and Mr. Eric Berman.

In the spring of 1998, President Clinton traveled to Africa and

proclaimed that a renaissance was under way on that long-troubled

continent. The President, seeking to introduce some positive aspects of Africa to the American people, sort of laid aside the discussions of war and disease and famine. And while there are indeed

events worthy of optimism and support, it is also clear that longtime problems continue to plague many countries in Africa.

In January the United Nations Security Council focused specifically on the African continent during Ambassador Holbrooke’s

Month on Africa. Our distinguished friend Ambassador Holbrooke

stated that the goals of this exercise were: one, to change perceptions about Africa in general; and two, to change traditional notions about security concerns in Africa to include HIV–AIDS; and

three, to help African leaders face up to the many conflicts currently raging on that continent.

Now, today for my part I feel it is important to measure our

progress since January and understand what lessons have been

learned, if any. In particular, I am concerned about ongoing events

in Sudan, the peacekeeping mission in Sierra Leone, the potential

for peace in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and the potential for a United Nations peacekeeping mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea.

Now, Mr. Ambassador, obviously you are not in the position of

making United States foreign policy, but you can have a tremendous and direct impact on how U.S. policy is developed. I therefore

hope to see you play a somewhat more active role in dealing with

2

the horrible crisis in the Sudan, even though it was not a specific

topic discussed during the Month on Africa.

How the United Nations responds to the ongoing conflicts in Sierra Leone and the Congo and to the developing peace process between Ethiopia and other countries will have an obviously significant impact on future UN operations. You are well aware of all of

that, as well as other obvious observations that the United Nations

can ill afford any future failures.

Once again, I welcome you this morning, and I look forward to

hearing the testimony of you and, following you, Franklin Graham.

You may proceed, sir.

STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD C. HOLBROOKE, U.S. PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS ACCOMPANIED BY: NANCY POWELL, ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a great

honor to be back before this committee again today, and especially

to be asked to testify about Africa, which until recently did not receive as much attention from the American public and perhaps

from the American government as is necessary.

I have a formal statement I would like to submit to the record,

and let me make a few brief personal observations in addition. You

listed correctly the goals of the Month of Africa and I think that

we did succeed in fulfilling them, but the goals of a month in the

Security Council do not solve the problems of Africa. Certainly U.S.

perceptions of Africa, the first of the three items you listed, have

begun to change, and I think this hearing is a very important example of that. I also note the fact that Senator Feingold and I traveled to the region for 2 weeks in December and that Senator Frist

chose to spend the 4th of July, not in Tennessee, but in southern

Sudan, in the hospitals in which he spends so much time.

So I think that both the chairman and ranking minority on the

African Subcommittee are showing with great time commitments

their own commitments. I think that is also echoed among members of the House of Representatives, and I would single out Congressman Reuss and Congressman Payne, who have shown similar

commitments.

On the AIDS issue, I am really delighted to be able to report to

you today that an issue which has never been discussed in the Security Council—indeed, no health issue has ever been discussed in

the Security Council in over 4,000 meetings—is now on the Council’s agenda. Starting with Vice President Gore’s appearance in

New York on January 10th, the Council launched the new millennium with a new definition of security that includes health issues

and AIDS. Next Monday, after the Durban conference on AIDS finishes, the head of UNAIDS, Dr. Peter Piot, who I am sure you

know, will be coming to New York to report on Durban. After his

report—and I say this with some pride at American leadership and

at the participation of you, Senator Frist, Senator Feingold, Senator Boxer (who has co-sponsored one of the most important actions

on this), and other members of this committee (Gordon Smith, who

is not here today)—we will pass the first Security Council resolution in history on AIDS or any health issue.

3

With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I brought copies of the resolution which I would like to offer to the committee in advance of

the vote, so that you will see what it is. I do not know who to give

them to, but they are right here if somebody would like to have

them, and may they be introduced into the record in advance of the

vote.

[The material referred to follows:]

UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION ON HIV/AIDS

DRAFT AS OF 07/11/2000 7:01 AM

The Security Council,

Deeply concerned by the extent of the HIV/AIDS pandemic worldwide, and by the

severity of the crisis in Africa in particular (Previous PP2),

Recalling its 4087th meeting of 10 January 2000, chaired by the Vice President

of the United States, on ‘‘the situation in Africa: the impact of AIDS on peace and

security in Africa,’’ in which the President of the World Bank, the Administrator of

the United Nations Development Program, and the Executive Director of the Joint

United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) participated, and welcoming

the 5 July 2000 note from UNAIDS (S/2000/657) which summarizes follow-up actions taken to date; (Previous PP1—amended)

Recalling also the 29 February 2000 special meeting of the Economic and Social

Council, held at the request of the President of the Security Council, on the development aspects of the HIV/AIDS epidemic; (new)

Recalling further the letter of the President of the Council dated 31 January 2000

addressed to the President of the General Assembly (S/xxxx/xxx) proposing that the

General Assembly review the problem of HIV/AIDS in all its aspects and consider

new strategies, methods, practical activities and specific measures to strengthen

international cooperation in addressing this problem; (new)

Welcoming, the decision by the General Assembly to include in the agenda of its

fifty-fourth session an additional item of an urgent and important character entitled

‘‘Review of the problem of HIV/AIDS in all its aspects’’ [and encourages it to consider

convening a special session on this issue]; (new)

[Recognizing that HIV/AIDS is unique in its devastating impact on the economic,

social, political, and demographic patterns of development and security in eroding

productivity, depleting workforces, orphaning millions of children, and consuming

savings and investment in the education and health sectors;] (new)

AND/OR

Recognizing that the spread of HIV/AIDS can have a devastating impact on all

sectors and levels of society, which in many instances has weakened the capacity

of affected countries to maintain [order and the rule of law] [domestic and regional

peace and security], (PP6-a)

Reaffirming the importance of a coordinated international response to the HIV/

AIDS pandemic, [given its possible growing contribution] [given the epidemic’s potential to contribute] to social instability and emergency situations, (PP5)

[Further recognizing that the HIV/AIDS pandemic [not only poses a threat to stability and security, but] is also exacerbated by conditions of violence and instability,

which increase the risk of exposure to the disease through large movements of people, widespread uncertainty over conditions, and reduced access to medical care,]

(PP8)

Stressing that HIV/AIDS poses a global risk to people of all continents, (PP9— amended)

Recognizing the need to incorporate HIV/AIDS prevention awareness skills and

advice in aspects of the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations

training for peacekeeping personnel, welcoming the 20 March 2000 Report of the

United Nations Special Committee on Peacekeeping (S/2000/xxx) which affirmed

this need, and commending the efforts by DPKO already made in this regard,

Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General for the Millennium Assembly

(A/54/2000), and in particular, those sections where he observes that the spread of

HIV/AIDS is rapidly becoming a social crisis on a global scale, [and calls for coordinated and intensified international action to reduce the HIV infection rates in persons 15 to 24 years of age by 25 percent by the year 2010,]

Commending the efforts by UNAIDS to coordinate the work of member states and

international organizations as regards the HIV/AIDS pandemic and to intensify efforts to address HIV/AIDS in all appropriate fora,

4

Bearing in mind the Council’s responsibility for the maintenance of international

peace and security (Previous PP3—amended),

1. Expresses Concern at the damaging impact of HIV/AIDS on international

peacekeeping operations and requests the Secretary-General to ensure the provision of mission-specific training for all peacekeepers on issues related to the

prevention of the spread of HIV/AIDS, and ensure the further development of

pre-deployment and on-going training for all peacekeepers on issues related to

the prevention of the spread of HIV/AIDS,

1. Urges all states to acknowledge the problem of HIV/AIDS directly, including in the uniformed services and military, and to develop, in consultation with the international community and UNAIDS, effective long-term domestic national strategies to educate civilians and uniformed personnel on

the prevention of the spread of HIV/AIDS,

2. Urges all member states to institute voluntary and confidential counseling and testing for HIV/AIDS for civilians and members of the uniformed

services, including the military, especially for troops to be deployed to international peacekeeping missions, because of the proven effects of testing to

reduce high-risk behaviors,

3. Further urges countries to increase international cooperation among

national military organizations to assist with the creation and execution of

HIV/AIDS prevention, voluntary and confidential testing, counseling and

treatment policies,

4. Requests the Secretary General to ensure that UNAIDS cooperates

with member states, including those states that contribute peacekeeping

troops, to establish voluntary consultations and a database to track such

countries’ HIV/AIDS prevention education, testing, deployment, counseling

and treatment policies,

5. Calls upon the leadership of all UN organizations to address the HIV/

AIDS pandemic in the context of their organizations’ respective mandates

and to adjust their organizations’ activities accordingly to ensure that they

are assisting wherever possible in global efforts against the HIV/AIDS pandemic,

6. Decides to continue to seek information and guidance on this issue

from all appropriate sources,

7. Decides to remain seized of the matter.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Mr. Chairman, you said help African

leaders face up to their responsibilities and problems. That is the

dilemma. You have mentioned four issues: Sudan, Sierra Leone,

Congo, and Ethiopia-Eritrea. Let me very briefly address each one

and then I know you will have questions. I would like to defer on

Sudan because I have not worked on the Sudan much in the UN

context and, if there are any questions that are more properly addressed to the Department’s Washington-based representatives, I

am accompanied by Nancy Powell, the Acting Assistant Secretary

for African Affairs. Her boss Susan Rice is in Togo today at the

OAU summit in Lome, working very hard on these same issues, including, very specifically, Sudan.

On Sierra Leone, we are in the middle of a very intense debate

in New York on how to proceed. I would like to submit for the

record a letter that governs our policy on Sierra Leone that I addressed to Senator Gregg. At the end of May, I gave you an advance copy of the letter, as you remember, and now I can update

you on the five parameters of that relationship.

[The material referred to was not available at press time.]

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. But let me say where we are on Sierra

Leone. The situation is not as bad as it was a year ago. It is not

as bad as it was 3 or 4 months ago. But it is not good. The RUF

is still in the field. It still controls most of the diamond fields, although its leader, Foday Sankoh, is in jail, where he belongs. And

we will introduce very soon a Security Council resolution that exVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:00 Feb 07, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 67707 SFRELA2 PsN: SFRELA2
5

tends the international war crimes umbrella of Yugoslavia and

Rwanda to cover him. It will have a slightly different structure, because we do not want to create a third tribunal. They are very expensive, and they are slow. The two existing tribunals cost the UN

system $100 million or more; so, extending the international

unbrella would be preferable to a third tribunal.

We have that resolution here and I am also prepared to share

it with you on a more private basis. I would rather that not be distributed publicly because it is being—its formal introduction is

being delayed pending another problem we have in the Sierra

Leone, and that is the fact that 230 peacekeepers are effectively

being held hostage, although they still have their weapons, in eastern Sierra Leone. Most of those are Indians, but there is at least

one British national in the group and several other nationalities.

That is a very serious problem.

The UN is considering an increase in the size of its forces in Sierra Leone. We have told the United Nations that we will not support an increase when the current deployment is so messed up. We

consider the current UN performance in Sierra Leone below the acceptable standards. It is a command in name only. It is a mess.

Their own report and analysis of the Sierra Leone mission found

it seriously delinquent. It needs to be shaped up.

Our position on the resolution under debate in New York now— a position I took in closed session yesterday and am privileged to

share with you today in this hearing, upon the conclusion of which

I will return to New York and continue the debate—is to not add

any forces to the Sierra Leone operation until the current forces

are structured to perform adequately.

Now, for the record, the current authorization is 13,000 troops,

as notified to the Congress when it was passed. There are about

11,500 in the current command. They do not have an adequate

communications structure. You cannot have that many troops without a single command and control and communications structure.

They are deficient in helicopters. The Russians are going to send

some helicopters, and I think we should all take note in a positive

way that the Russians are going to put a helicopter unit into Sierra

Leone. That is entirely a positive action.

However, we need a more aggressive policy against the machetewielding RUF. We need a UN force which will be more aggressive

and go after them and use the authority it has; and if it needs

more authority, Mr. Chairman, the United States will support a

stronger mandate.

There is a dispute over the mandate. Some people think the current mandate is sufficient, but has not been sufficiently implemented. That is essentially the British position. Some people, and

this would include me, think that because the current mandate has

been not well understood, we should clean up the mandate before

we consider any additional troops.

Either way, I want to state clearly for the record in the presence

of you and your colleagues, so many of whom, including particularly, Senator Feingold, as well as Senator Frist and Senator

Kerry, have raised the question of not only Foday Sankoh, but also

Charles Taylor. I want to be very clear on Mr. Taylor and Liberia.

Last week the Security Council passed another first, the first resoVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:00 Feb 07, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 67707 SFRELA2 PsN: SFRELA2
6

lution on diamonds in the history of the Security Council. I also

have that with me and, with your permission, I would also like to

make that available to your committee for the record.

[The material referred to follows:]

UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION ON HIV/AIDS

DRAFT AS OF 07/11/2000 7:01 AM

The Security Council,

Deeply concerned by the extent of the HIV/AIDS pandemic worldwide, and by the

severity of the crisis in Africa in particular (Previous PP2),

Recalling its 4087th meeting of 10 January 2000, chaired by the Vice President

of the United States, on ‘‘the situation in Africa: the impact of AIDS on peace and

security in Africa,’’ in which the President of the World Bank, the Administrator of

the United Nations Development Program, and the Executive Director of the Joint

United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) participated, and welcoming

the 5 July 2000 note from UNAIDS (S/2000/657) which summarizes follow-up actions taken to date; (Previous PP1—amended)

Recalling also the 29 February 2000 special meeting of the Economic and Social

Council, held at the request of the President of the Security Council, on the development aspects of the HIV/AIDS epidemic; (new)

Recalling further the letter of the President of the Council dated 31 January 2000

addressed to the President of the General Assembly (S/xxxx/xxx) proposing that the

General Assembly review the problem of HIV/AIDS in all its aspects and consider

new strategies, methods, practical activities and specific measures to strengthen

international cooperation in addressing this problem; (new)

Welcoming, the decision by the General Assembly to include in the agenda of its

fifty-fourth session an additional item of an urgent and important character entitled

‘‘Review of the problem of HIV/AIDS in all its aspects’’ [and encourages it to consider

convening a special session on this issue]; (new)

[Recognizing that HIV/AIDS is unique in its devastating impact on the economic,

social, political, and demographic patterns of development and security in eroding

productivity, depleting workforces, orphaning millions of children, and consuming

savings and investment in the education and health sectors;] (new)

AND/OR

Recognizing that the spread of HIV/AIDS can have a devastating impact on all

sectors and levels of society, which in many instances has weakened the capacity

of affected countries to maintain [order and the rule of law] [domestic and regional

peace and security], (PP6-a)

Reaffirming the importance of a coordinated international response to the HIV/

AIDS pandemic, [given its possible growing contribution] [given the epidemic’s potential to contribute] to social instability and emergency situations, (PP5)

[Further recognizing that the HIV/AIDS pandemic [not only poses a threat to stability and security, but] is also exacerbated by conditions of violence and instability,

which increase the risk of exposure to the disease through large movements of people, widespread uncertainty over conditions, and reduced access to medical care,]

(PP8)

Stressing that HIV/AIDS poses a global risk to people of all continents, (PP9—

amended)

Recognizing the need to incorporate HIV/AIDS prevention awareness skills and

advice in aspects of the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations

training for peacekeeping personnel, welcoming the 20 March 2000 Report of the

United Nations Special Committee on Peacekeeping (S/2000/xxx) which affirmed

this need, and commending the efforts by DPKO already made in this regard,

Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General for the Millennium Assembly

(A/54/2000), and in particular, those sections where he observes that the spread of

HIV/AIDS is rapidly becoming a social crisis on a global scale, [and calls for coordinated and intensified international action to reduce the HIV infection rates in persons 15 to 24 years of age by 25 percent by the year 2010,]

Commending the efforts by UNAIDS to coordinate the work of member states and

international organizations as regards the HIV/AIDS pandemic and to intensify efforts to address HIV/AIDS in all appropriate fora,

Bearing in mind the Council’s responsibility for the maintenance of international

peace and security (Previous PP3—amended),

7

1. Expresses Concern at the damaging impact of HIV/AIDS on international

peacekeeping operations and requests the Secretary-General to ensure the provision of mission-specific training for all peacekeepers on issues related to the

prevention of the spread of HIV/AIDS, and ensure the further development of

pre-deployment and on-going training for all peacekeepers on issues related to

the prevention of the spread of HIV/AIDS,

1. Urges all states to acknowledge the problem of HIV/AIDS directly, including in the uniformed services and military, and to develop, in consultation with the international community and UNAIDS, effective long-term domestic national strategies to educate civilians and uniformed personnel on

the prevention of the spread of HIV/AIDS,

2. Urges all member states to institute voluntary and confidential counseling and testing for HIV/AIDS for civilians and members of the uniformed

services, including the military, especially for troops to be deployed to international peacekeeping missions, because of the proven effects of testing to

reduce high-risk behaviors,

3. Further urges countries to increase international cooperation among

national military organizations to assist with the creation and execution of

HIV/AIDS prevention, voluntary and confidential testing, counseling and

treatment policies,

4. Requests the Secretary General to ensure that UNAIDS cooperates

with member states, including those states that contribute peacekeeping

troops, to establish voluntary consultations and a database to track such

countries’ HIV/AIDS prevention education, testing, deployment, counseling

and treatment policies,

5. Calls upon the leadership of all UN organizations to address the HIV/

AIDS pandemic in the context of their organizations’ respective mandates

and to adjust their organizations’ activities accordingly to ensure that they

are assisting wherever possible in global efforts against the HIV/AIDS pandemic,

6. Decides to continue to seek information and guidance on this issue

from all appropriate sources,

7. Decides to remain seized of the matter.

SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION ON DIAMONDS/ARMS

The Security Council,

Recalling its previous resolutions and the statements of its president concerning

the situation in Sierra Leone, and in particular its resolutions 1132 (1997) of 8 October 1997, 1171 (1998) of 5 June 1998 and 1299 (2000) of 19 May 2000;

Affirming the commitment of all states to respect the sovereignty, political independence and territorial integrity of Sierra Leone;

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General of 19 May 2000 (s12000/

455), and in particular paragraph 94;

Determining that the situation in Sierra Leone continues to constitute a threat

to international peace and security in the region;

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations;

A

Expressing its concern at the role played by the illicit trade in diamonds in

fuelling the conflict in Sierra Leone, and at reports that such diamonds transit

neighbouring countries, including the territory of Liberia;

Welcoming ongoing efforts by interested states, the international diamond manufacturers association, the world federation of diamond bourses, the diamond high

council, other representatives of the diamond industry and non-governmental experts to improve the transparency of the international diamond trade, and encouraging further action in this regard;

Emphasizing that the legitimate diamond trade is of great economic impOrtance

for many states, and can make a positive contribution to prosperity and stability

and to the reconstruction of countries emerging from conflict, and emphasizing further that nothing in this resolution is intended to undermine the legitimate diamond trade or to diminish confidence in the integrity of the legitimate diamond industry;

Welcoming the decision taken by the member states of the economic community

of West African States (ECO WAS) at their Abuja summit on 28–29 May 2000 to

undertake a regional inquiry on the illegal trade in diamonds;

8

Taking note of the letter of 29 June 2000 to its president from the permanent representative of Sierra Leone to the United Nations and its enclosure (s/2000/641);

1. Decides that all states shall take the necessary measures to prohibit the

direct or indirect import of all rough diamonds from Sierra Leone to their territory;

2. Requests the government of Sierra Leone to ensure, as a matter of urgency,

that an effective certificate of origin regime for trade in diamonds is in operation in Sierra Leone;

3. Also requests states, relevant international organizations and other bodies

in a position to do so to offer assistance to the government of Sierra Leone to

facilitate the full operation of an effective certificate of origin regime for Sierra

Leone rough diamonds;

4. Further requests the government of Sierra Leone to notify the committee

established by resolution 1132 (1997) (‘‘the Committee’’) of the details of such

a certificate of origin regime when it is fully in operation;

5. Decides that rough diamonds controlled by the government of Sierra Leone

through the certificate of origin regime shall be exempt from the measures imposed by paragraph 1 above when the committee has reported to the council,

taking into account expert advice obtained at the request of the committee

through the Secretary-General, that an effective regime is fully in operation;

6. Decides that the measures referred to in paragraph 1 above are established

for an initial period of 18 months and affirms that, at the end of this period,

it will review the situation in Sierra Leone, including the extent of the government’s authority over the diamond-producing areas, in order to decide whether

to extend these measures for a further period and, if necessary, to modify them

or adopt further measures;

7. Further decides that the committee shall also undertake the following

tasks:

(a) to seek from all states further information regarding the action taken

by them with a view to implementing effectively the measures imposed by

paragraph 1 above;

(b) to consider information brought to its attention concerning violations

of the measures imposed by paragraph 1 above, identifying where possible

persons or entities, including vessels, reported to be engaged in such violations;

(c) to make periodic reports to the Security Council on information submitted to it regarding alleged violations of the measures imposed by paragraph 1 above, identifying where possible persons or entities, including vessels, reported to be engaged in such violations;

(d) to promulgate such guidelines as may be necessary to facilitate the

implementation of the measures imposed by paragraph 1 above;

(e) to continue its cooperation with other relevant sanctions committees

in particular that established pursuant to Resolution 985 (1995) of 13 April

1995 concerning Liberia and that established pursuant to Resolution 864

(1993) of 15 September 1993 concerning the situation in Angola;

8. Requests all states to report to the committee established by resolution

1132 (1997), within 30 days of the adoption of this resolution, on the actions

they have taken to implement the measures imposed by paragraph 1 above;

9. Calls upon all states, in particular those through which rough diamonds

from Sierra Leone are known to transit, and all relevant international and regional organizations to act strictly in accordance with the provisions of this resolution notwithstanding the existence of any rights or obligations conferred or

imposed by any international agreement or any contract entered into or any

licence or permit granted prior to the date of adoption of this resolution;

10. Encourages The International Diamond Manufacturers Association, The

World Federation of Diamond Bourses, The Diamond High Council and all other

representatives of the diamond industry to work with the government of Sierra

Leone and the committee to develop methods and working practices to facilitate

the effective implementation of this resolution;

11. Invites states, international organizations, members of the diamond industry and other relevant entities in a position to do so to offer assistance to the

government of Sierra Leone to contribute to the further development of a wellstructured and well-regulated diamond industry that provides for the identification of the provenance of rough diamonds;

12. Requests the committee to hold an exploratory hearing in new york no

later than 31 July 2000 to assess the role of diamonds in the Sierra Leone conflict and the link between trade in Sierra Leone diamonds and trade in arms

and related materiel in violation of Resolution 1171(1998), involving representaVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:00 Feb 07, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00012 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 67707 SFRELA2 PsN: SFRELA2
9

tives of interested states and regional organizations, the diamond industry and

other relevant experts, requests the Secretary-General to provide the necessary

resources, and further requests the committee to report on the hearing to the

council;

13. Welcomes the commitments made by certain members of the diamond industry not to trade in diamonds originating from conflict zones, including in Sierra Leone, urges all other companies and individuals involved in trading in

rough diamonds to make similar declarations in respect of Sierra Leone diamonds, and underlines the importance of relevant financial institutions encouraging such companies to do so;

14. Stresses the need for extension of government authority to the diamondproducing areas for a durable solution to the problem of illegal exploitation of

diamonds in Sierra Leone;

15. Decides to conduct a first review on the measures imposed by paragraph

1 above no later than 15 September 2000, and every six months thereafter on

the measures imposed by paragraph 1 above, and thereafter every six months

after the adoption of this resolution;

16. Urges all states, relevant United Nations bodies and, as appropriate, other

organizations and interested parties to report to the committee information on

possible violations of the measures imposed by paragraph 1 above;

B

Stressing the need to ensure effective implementation of the measures concerning

arms and related materiel imposed by paragraph 2 of Resolution 1171 (1998);

Stressing the obligation of all member states, including those neighboring Sierra

Leone, to comply fully with the measures imposed by the council;

Recalling the ECOWAS Moratorium on the Importation, Exportation and Manufacture of Light Weapons in West Africa adopted in Abuja on 31 October 1998 (s/

1998/1194, annex);

17. Reminds states of their obligation to implement fully the measures imposed by Resolution 1171(1998), and calls upon them, where they have not already done so, to enforce, strengthen or enact, as appropriate, legislation making it a criminal offence under domestic law for their nationals or other persons

operating on their territory to act in violation of the measures imposed by paragraph 2 of that resolution, and to report to the committee not later than 31 July

2000 on the implementation of those measures;

18. Urges all states, relevant United Nations bodies and, as appropriate, other

organizations and interested parties to report to the committee information on

possible violations of the measures imposed by the council;

19. Requests the Secretary-General, in consultation with the committee, to establish a panel of experts, for an initial period of four months, consisting of no

more than five members:

(a) to collect information on possible violations of the measures imposed

by paragraph 2 of Resolution 1171 (1998) and the link between trade in diamonds and trade in arms and related materiel including through visits to

Sierra Leone and other states as appropriate, and making contact with

those they consider appropriate, including diplomatic missions;

(b) to consider the adequacy, for the purpose of detecting flights of aircraft

suspected of carrying arms and related materiel across national borders in

violation of the measures imposed by paragraph 2 of Resolution 1171

(1998), of air traffic control systems in the region;

(c) to participate, if possible, in the hearing referred to In paragraph 13

above;

(d) to report to the council through the committee with observations and

recommendations on strengthening the implementation of the measures imposed by paragraph 2 of Resolution 1171 (1998), and of those imposed by

paragraph 1 above, no later than 31 October 2000;

And further requests the Secretary-General to provide the necessary resources;

20. Expresses its readiness, on the basis, inter alia, of the report produced

pursuant to paragraph 29 (d) above, to consider appropriate action in relation

to states that it determines to have violated the measures contained in Resolution 1171(1998) and paragraph 1 above;

21. Urges all states to cooperate with the panel in the discharge of its mandate, and underlines, in this regard, the importance of the cooperation and technical expertise of the Secretariat and other parts of the United Nations system;

22. Requests the committee to strengthen existing contacts with regional organizations, in particular ECOWAS and the Organization of African Unity, and

10

relevant international organizations, including Interpol, with a view to identifying ways to improve effective implementation of the measures imposed by the

council in paragraph 2 of Resolution 1171 (1998);

23. Requests the committee to make information it considers relevant publicly

available through appropriate media, including through the improved use of information technology;

24. Requests the Secretary-General to publicize the provisions of this resolution and the obligations imposed by it;

25. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. This resolution is clearly designed to

make clear to the world that we consider the Liberian role in trafficking diamonds unacceptable and Mr. Taylor’s role to be irresponsible and conducive to disruption throughout the area. He must either get those, help get those Indian hostages out and stop this, or

face the international consequences of his behavior.

Right now the reports from Liberia are most distressing. He is

part of the problem; he has not been part of the solution, and that

is simply an unacceptable situation. This resolution on diamonds is

a real first, and I would note for the record that the day after it

was produced DeBeers called it a historic step and said they would

welcome it. So the diamond industry is falling into line behind us.

As some of your colleagues who have pushed for this for over a

year will tell me, we should have done this a year ago, and I agree

with that. This resolution should have been passed a year ago. But

better late than never, and here we are with another first.

We need a very aggressive effort against the RUF, much more

pressure on Liberia to behave; and finally, on Sierra Leone, Mr.

Chairman, we need a very aggressive policy of strengthening Nigeria and other democratic states in West Africa, like Ghana. In that

regard, Mr. Chairman, I want to mention this morning, I do not

know if it has been already announced, if it has not let this be the

announcement, that Secretary Albright is sending a team headed

by Under Secretary Pickering to West Africa tomorrow. Ambassador Pickering is in Tokyo today preparing for the summit in Okinawa. He and an inter-agency team, including NSC, DOD, JCS,

and a representative from our office in New York, will be in Abuja

and other West African countries starting tomorrow.

This team’s main mission, in close consultation with you, is to

come up with a long-term program to strengthen Nigeria, to

strengthen its military. When I say strengthen, Mr. Chairman, I

mean democratize and civilianize and equip and train. You and I

have talked about this privately, as have I with Senator Feingold

and others. Nigeria is one of the most important countries, not just

in Africa but in the whole world. President Obisanjo has brought

democracy back. The military must be modernized and civilianized

and democratized, and it must help us take the RUF down in Sierra Leone.

So I am privileged to call your attention to Mr. Pickering’s trip.

He intends to report to your committee when he gets back. Whatever he proposes will require a joint Congressional-Executive

Branch planning for a long-term program, which I hope will start

this year and be reconsidered by the next administration and the

next Congress.

Moving on to the Congo, the situation in the Congo has deteriorated significantly on two fronts since I last reported to you. One,

11

in Kinshasa, the capital of the Congo, the government of President

Kabila has declared an all-out attack on the national dialogue

facilitator, Mr. Masire, the former President of Botswana. This is

a very serious attack on the Lusaka process. If former President

Masire cannot do his job, the Lusaka peace process laid out by the

African leaders themselves is not going to be able to move forward.

Because of the fact that the Kinshasa government has put itself

against Mr. Masire’s efforts, the Secretary General of the United

Nations, Kofi Annan, has slowed down the deployment under phase

two that you have already approved. Your approval and the letter

you and Senator Feingold and others sent us was contingent on fulfillment of Lusaka. So I think that if you analyze what the Secretary General has done, I think we would all agree that slowing

down the deployments was appropriate. They have not stopped

completely. The Tunisians are in the process of sending a very important headquarters unit into Kinshasa, and we are very grateful

for your support in this regard.

The second problem in Congo is very much more serious. Two of

the forces allied against Kabila, the Rwandans and the Ugandans,

set to fighting each other 2 months ago this week in Kisangani, a

city of 2 million people in the deepest part of Central Africa, probably the most inaccessible large city in the world because you can

only get there by plane. One of the airports is controlled by each

of the contending parties, and these fights were extremely deleterious to the people of the area.

Kinsangani is an important diamond center, incidentally, so that

the diamonds once again are—I think in a way the tragedy of the

Congo, Sierra Leone, and Angola is that they are so rich, and because they are so rich outsiders, first European colonialists and

now thuggish leaders from the region, keep exploiting them.

But in any case, Kisangani has been the subject of a horrific set

of fights. There is a ceasefire in place. The Rwandans and the

Ugandans have pulled back. But two rebel groups, one headed by

Mr. Ilunga, one headed by Mr. Bemba, both of whom Senator Feingold and I met with when we were in Kampala, are threatening to

go at each other’s throats. The Rwandans and the Ugandans have

asked for United Nations forces. The Pakistanis have indicated

readiness to send troops as soon as they are requested, and we are

trying to get the details of such a deployment ready now.

This is a very difficult deployment. It is the classic dilemma. If

we do nothing, the war could break out again and we will all get

sucked into an expensive refugee and relief operation in one of the

most inaccessible places on Earth. If we get involved—by the way,

‘‘we’’ is not the United States; ‘‘we’’ is the UN. But the U.S. is part

of the UN. We are the most important member. If we, parentheses,

‘‘the UN,’’ gets involved, the question is does the UN get involved

without the ability to determine the outcome.

It is a terrible decision. But we should all be grateful to Pakistan

for the willingness to send combat-ready troops to Kisangani. I

want to be up front, as I always am with you, Mr. Chairman, and

state that the United States will encourage the Pakistanis to move

forward while working with them to make sure that we get this

right. This is not easy, but if a country like Pakistan is willing to

12

send combat troops to demilitarize Kisangani and prevent the outbreak of another major war, we should not stand in their way.

We will return to your committee with details when they are

worked out. This is a work in progress.

Finally, Ethiopia-Eritrea. The fighting was inexcusable. The two

leaders do not deserve any credit for a ceasefire for a war that

never should have taken place. I will not go into the details of what

caused it because I will leave those to historians. There is a

ceasefire in place now and the UN is going to be asked to send a

border observer force of a few thousand people. The formal request

will come in next week.

Of all the issues we are talking about today, this is the easiest.

This is a classic UN border patrol operation, where Sierra Leone

and Congo are sort of civil war situations, the kind that any military hates the most, like Kosovo. I mean, Sierra Leone and Congo

are the same thing as Kosovo: Albanians and Serbs or Rwandans

and Ugandans on somebody else’s soil, or the RUF and the Sierra

Leone army.

But this one is pretty clear-cut. We will come to you with a formal notification when we know what it is. It will come in two

forms. The UN is going to send 100 advance observers immediately

and we will notify you formally, but I would hope you would treat

this hearing as the beginning of the formal notification process. We

will give you a written letter from the Secretary of State or Barbara Larkin within a few days on the 100 notification.

Then there will be a larger request for, I am guessing, between

2 and 4,000 observers. This is a low-risk operation, but it is another additional peacekeeping effort by the UN, and I hope in the

questions and answers, Mr. Chairman, I can address the larger

issue of UN peacekeeping in the context of the Helms-Biden reform

package, because it is far and away the issue I spend the most time

on in New York.

Once again, Mr. Chairman, thank you for inviting me. It is an

honor to share the platform with Franklin Graham. I am delighted,

as I know we all are, to hear that his father’s health has been improving, and it is an honor to be here today.

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Holbrooke follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR RICHARD C. HOLBROOKE

Mr. Chairman, it is an honor to be here today to testify before your committee.

Your continued interest in African issues, and this committee’s leadership, are absolutely essential in our common effort to help the people of Africa develop a future

of peace, prosperity and freedom. As you know, Mr. Chairman, along with President

Clinton and Secretary Albright, I have made Africa one of my highest priorities during my tenure in New York. To my mind, there is no collection of states in greater

need—or where our efforts could do more good—than those of Africa.

Beyond a doubt, Africa is the main arena for most of the UN’s operations—whether we’re talking about helping to prevent, stabilize or resolve conflicts; promoting

democracy and rule of law; fighting disease; assisting refugees both internally and

across borders; providing development assistance; or helping establish education and

job training programs. Through the UN and other international institutions, as well

as bilaterally, the United States has a critical role to play. Of course, there is a lot

that the United States does that falls outside the purview of the UN, and we look

for leadership from and work very closely with the State Department’s Africa Bureau, which is ably led by my colleague Susan Rice. Today Susan is in Lome, Togo

to attend the Organization for African Unity (OAU) summit, so I’m pleased to be

joined here by her principal deputy, Nancy Powell.

13

Mr. Chairman, it was just over a year ago that I first testified before this committee in my nomination hearings to become U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations. In those hearings, I pledged that I would do all I could to renew and revitalize

America’s relationship with the United Nations. We agreed that the UN was flawed

but indispensable, and that to warrant continued American support, it needed to implement serious reforms.

While the UN still has a long way to go, the last year has seen some important

progress. Most important, of course, was our agreement last November over our financing for the UN. And as we discussed last January when you, Senator Biden,

Senator Warner and many members of this Committee came to New York, and

again in March, when you hosted the entire UN Security Council for an historic

meeting in this very room, we have an ambitious agenda for UN reform. In recent

months, we have proposed ways to strengthen the role of the Secretary General and

make the Department of Peacekeeping Operations more effective, efficient and financially equitable. I have been intensely ihvolved in negotiations to revise the

peacekeeping scale of assessments, and am hopeful that we will come to an agreement by the end of the year.

Mr. Chairman, the UN needs to implement these reforms so that it is better able

to help people in need in places like Africa. The past year has been one of remarkable hardship for far too many Africans. We’ve seen conflicts fester in Congo, Ethiopia-Eritrea, Sierra Leone, Sudan and Burundi. We’ve seen the HIV/AIDS pandemic

explode, the challenges of refugees and the internally displaced grow even larger,

massive flooding in Southern Africa and a drought of historic proportion in East Africa. And we’ve seen the fragility of democracy in places like Zimbabwe. All this

means that the UN’s commitments—and our responsibilities—to Africa have increased exponentially. And this means that what happens in Africa has greater relevance for the United States.

Mr. Chairman, we have an interest in helping Africa become more peaceful and

prosperous. We have an interest in helping Africans resolve their conflicts and rid

their societies of horrible diseases like HIV/AIDS. And we have an interest in helping Africa’s people build societies based on democracy, liberty and political freedom.

Despite Africa’s profound troubles, we cannot simply build a wall around a continent—particularly in world defined by globalization, where borders are even more

permeable and the old rules of international politics even less applicable. The

mantra ‘‘African solutions for African problems’’ no longer captures either the

breadth of the challenge or the effort required for a solution. Africa’s problems are

the world’s problems—and we have to work together globally to find the right solutions.

We must also not lose sight of Africa’s potential. The transition to democracy in

Nigeria contrasts sharply with the instability of the Congo; for every tumultuous

election, like last month’s in Zimbabwe, there is a smooth process, as in Senegal.

Their success requires regional stability, and therefore, global action.

Perhaps nothing is more illustrative of this point than the scourge of HIV/AIDS

and what it’s doing to Africa. As recently as a year ago, few would have considered

AIDS as part of a discussion of foreign policy (indeed, our idea to hold last January’s

special Security Council session on AIDS was initially met with some resistance, including from inside the U.S. Mission). But today, few doubt that HIV/AIDS is a topshelf national security issue, particularly as it relates to Africa.

Last week in the Security Council, I introduced for the United States an historic

resolution on HIV/AIDS. If passed, it will be the first Security Council resolution

focused exclusively on a health issue. It recognizes that the HI V/AIDS pandemic

is so widespread and menacing that it poses a threat to international stability and

security. The resolution’s ultimate goal is to increase international intensity and coordination against HIV/AIDS and therefore calls for a number of measures to address the pandemic on all fronts, on all continents, in the civilian and military populations.

Our resolution urges UN member states to create effective long-term domestic

strategies to prevent further spread of HIV. It also calls on the UN to ensure robust

training to protect peacekeepers from contracting and spreading HIV, and urges

member states to institute voluntary and confidential testing of all civilians and the

military, especially peacekeepers. Finally, it asks the Secretary General to develop

the means to track nations’ HIV/AIDS policies in military forces around the world.

Mr. Chairman, these efforts exemplify one of the primary purposes for which the

United Nations was created over a half-a-century ago—to galvanize international

action to meet common threats. AIDS is not just the problem of a single country

or a single continent. You cannot deny AIDS a visa; you cannot place in embargo

on it; you cannot a stop it at the border. That’s why it is imperative that we work

together. Today, in Durban, South Africa, international AIDS experts from the

14

around the world are meeting to discuss ways to address this horrible plague. And

in its remaining months in office, the Clinton Administration will continue to work

hard to build on this momentum, and we’ll be looking for your leadership and support.

Mr. Chairman, in addition to HIV/AIDS, one of the greatest challenges the UN

faces in Africa is in conflict resolution. As I’ve said many times before, peacekeeping

is the core task for which the UN was formed, and it is the one upon which the

UN will ultimately be judged. So we must help it get peacekeeping right. Right now

in Africa, the UN is working to reinforce fragile peace agreements in three key

areas: the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia-Eritrea, and Sierra Leone.

Allow me to discuss each briefly in turn:

In the Democratic Republic of Congo, we’re working to revitalize the sagging

Lusaka peace process. Unfortunately, despite major UN efforts both in New York

and the field, the parties have made little progress toward implementing the terms

of the Lusaka Agreement. Fighting continues in Equateur province in violation of

both the Lusaka and Kampala cease-fire agreements. Kabila’s government has persistently blocked organization of the National Dialogue, which is intended to reach

an internal settlement among the Congolese parties. In June, the the Kinshasa government went so far as to order its police to forcibly close the Kinshasa office of

the facilitator, former Botswanan President Masire. And the recent fighting between

Rwanda and Uganda in Kisangani severely undermined the peace process.

In the light of these developments, UN Secretary General Annan has determined

that the UN should not yet move to the next phase of peacekeeping—MONUC personnel do not yet have the security, freedom of movement and cooperation from the

parties necessary for them to effectively carry out their mandate in the Congo. At

this time, therefore, the UN does not intend further deployments of MONUC beyond

the 257 military observers now in the field. We fully support this decision—after

all, we pushed the UN to adopt the phased and conditional approach last winter.

We are also examining alternatives to help stabilize the situation in Kisangani,

which is deplorable. Mr. Chairman, I and six of my Security Council colleagues were

in Congo last May when fighting initially broke out. We were then able to negotiate

an interim cease-fire, and we have worked tirelessly with Presidents Museveni and

Kagame to forge a lasting solution. UN Security Council Resolution 1304 calls on

Rwanda and Uganda to adhere to the demilitarization of Kisangani. It also demands

the departure from the city of the armed rebel Congolese forces allied with either

Rwanda or Uganda.

Mr. Chairman, the good news is that Rwandan and Ugandan troops have withdrawn from Kisangani, monitored by MONUC observers. Moreover, the Ugandans

and Rwandans are now embarked on a serious effort to reconcile their differences.

At the same time, however, rebel RCD-Goma rebel forces remain in Kisangani, concerned that either the government or other rebel forces might seek to take advantage of the military vacuum created by Ugandan and Rwandan withdrawal. The

total demilitarization of Kisangani and a larger MONUC presence in the city are

currently under review in New York.

In Ethiopia and Eritrea, the United Nations should be there when the two sides

decide to bring an end to this deeply tragic and truly unnecessary conflict. While

there is a formal cessation of hostilities agreement in place, much work lies ahead

to nail down a comprehensive and lasting peace. Negotiations have continued, including last week here in Washington, and I think an agreement is in within sight.

In New York, the Security Council and the Secretary General have begun planning for a possible peacekeeping operation focused on the Ethiopia-Eritrea border.

Mr. Chairman, the United States intends to support a resolution in the Security

Council authorizing the deployment in Ethiopia and Eritrea of up to 100 UN military observers. We will soon notify Congress of this. We anticipate that if progress

continues, it could lead to a regular UN peacekeeping operation for Ethiopia and

Eritrea.

And in Sierra Leone, we’re continuing to work to revitalize the UN’s efforts after

the RUF savaged the Lome peace process, took hostages and attacked UN peacekeepers. The situation remains tense, although it has stabilized somewhat since

fighting resumed in May. We are working closely with the British to coordinate next

steps. Two weeks ago I met with Foreign Secretary Robin Cook and other British

officials in London to discuss our common approach. Our main priority right now

is to strengthen UNAMSIL and the Sierra Leone Army (SLA), so they can defend

a perimeter around Freetown and the Lungi peninsula. Eventually, we anticipate

that a revitalized and strengthened UNAMSIL will fill-in behind an advancing SLA.

Our broad objective is to ensure that regional and international forces in Sierra

Leone, together with the SLA, have the capacity to disrupt the RUF’s control of SiVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:00 Feb 07, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00018 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 67707 SFRELA2 PsN: SFRELA2
15

erra Leone’s diamond producing areas and prevent it from threatening Sierra

Leone’s government and terrorizing its people. Right now in New York we are reviewing a draft Security Council resolution and debating the possible modification

of UNAMSIL’s mandate. Without an expanded mandate, allowing for a more robust

force to deal with the growing RUF threat, we do not see the rationale for expanding UNAMSIL to 16,500 troops.

In the meantime, Mr. Chairman, we are actively examining all options for bolstering West African participation in Sierra Leone. We are providing $18 million in

drawdown assistance and $2 million under the UN Participation Act to support

peacekeeping activities in Sierra Leone. Much of it is targeted for the West Africans.

We’re also stepping-up our diplomatic engagement. In two days, Under Secretary

Pickering will lead a week-long, inter-agency mission to West Africa. This is an extremely important mission—one that will, among other things, lay the groundwork

for President Clinton’s visit to Nigeria next month. Under Secretary Pickering and

his team will meet with the leaders in Abuja, Accra, Freetown and Bamako to discuss our common approach and clarify the extent of potential U.S. assistance. They

will also meet with President Taylor in Monrovia, clearly stating our concerns about

that country’s role in Sierra Leone.

We’re also very concerned about assuring that Foday Sankoh and others suspected of major war crimes in Sierra Leone are held accountable. There is wide

agreement that Sankoh and other rebel leaders need to be subject to a legitimate

judicial process; that the trial should have substantial international involvement;

that the proceedings should be based on the principle of law and insulated from politics; and that the process begin quickly. We do not seek to create a third international war crimes tribunal, but we do believe that those accused should be tried

under a system that is part of the international war crimes structure. Our goal is

to create a UN Security Council umbrella over the process and to ensure that there

is accountability for the serious criminal violations against the citizens of Sierra

Leone and the UN peacekeepers.

Mr. Chairman, it is these three conflicts—Congo, Ethiopia-Eritrea, and Sierra

Leone—that comprise the core challenge for UN peacekeeping in Africa today. We

are under no illusions that success in any of these operations will be easy or quick.

These conflicts have been long and bloody and brutal; they’ve left deep psychological

and social wounds that will take some time to heal.

But because these missions will be difficult cannot be an excuse for the UN not

to try. If the UN acts, the odds of success may only be 50-50; but if it steps aside,

failure is almost certain. And we should be careful not to conflate these crises. Each

present unique and daunting challenges; they are as different in scope and kind as

East Timor, South Lebanon and Kosovo. A setback in one does not intrinsically

mean weakness in another.

Mr. Chairman, while the conflicts in Congo, Ethiopia-Eritrea and Sierra Leone

are currently the main focus for UN peacekeeping in Africa, there are other African

conflicts that the UN, the Clinton Administration and this Committee remain deeply concerned about.

In Burundi, we continue to support facilitator Nelson Mandela in his efforts to

implement the Arusha agreement. All of the core issues are now on the table and

are being seriously discussed by the parties. But some fundamental questions are

still far from resolution, confidence and trust levels are still quite low, fighting on

the ground continues, afid the armed rebels have not yet signaled a clear intention

to engage fully into the Arusha process. In short, a lasting peace agreement is within reach but there is still a ways to go.

Sudan is one of the world’s most depressing and distressing stories and, as you

know, has one of the continent’s (if not the world’s) most egregious human rights

records. The indiscriminate bombing of civilians in unacceptable. An already abysmal humanitarian situation there has been made worse by a new influx of refugees

from the fighting in Ethiopia and Eritrea. We also remain very concerned about Sudan’s continuing support for terrorism. Sudan has not yet complied with Security

Council Resolution 1044, which called on it to end support for terrorism. We are engaging in a dialogue with Sudan on this issue, outlining our specific concerns and

requirements. In the meantime, the sanctions on Sudan will remain in place. The

Security Council will consider the future of sanctions toward the end of this year,

and will make a decision based on Sudan’s compliance with Resolution 1044. For

the United States’ part, our position is quite simple: we would be willing to support

a meaningful Security Council response if and only if Sudan takes meaningful steps

to end its relationship with terrorists.

16

And in Angola, more must be done to address the horrible humanitarian situation

there. Last December in Luanda, Senator Feingold and I saw first-hand the truly

harrowing conditions Angola’s people must live under. More than one-sixth of Angola’s population remains internally displaced—which is second only to Sudan. Starvation still takes the lives of hundreds of Angolans a day.

Mr. Chairman, in closing, I’d like to stress that if we expect the UN to get peacekeeping right in Africa and elsewhere, we cannot tie one hand behind its back. If

the African people and their leaders establish peace agreements that are viable, if

they muster the courage to create lasting solutions for their differences, we should

be there to support them.

Unfortunately, rather than providing support, we’re dangerously close to scaling

back. The growing chance that there will be insufficient funds to pay our UN assessments for African peacekeeping is a serious problem. The House mark for FY 2001

for paying UN bills for peacekeeping is a one-third cut from the request and specifically targets Africa peacekeeping. Mr. Chairman, this simply makes no sense: capping UN peacekeeping at $498 million—as the House CJS bill did—ignores the fact

that demands for peacekeeping funding are growing, not shrinking.

Mr. Chairman, lack of financial support to these missions will only weaken them,

and thereby undermine U.S. efforts to advance our interests in Africa. This arbitrary cap will hamper the next Administration in advancing its foreign policy agenda from the very beginning. Also, this Committee knows that UN members follow

the Congressional funding actions closely—you saw this first-hand earlier this year

during your meetings with my fellow UN Ambassadors in New York and Washington. Underfunding our ability to pay UN assessments harms our ability to shape

the peacekeeping agenda and reduces our credibility when we attempt to push for

UN reforms—including those reforms called for in the Heims-Biden legislation. So

I hope that this Committee will work with us toward full funding of our peacekeeping requirements.

Again, I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and this entire Committee for its dedication

and leadership on advancing America’s interests in Africa and at the United Nations. I think we can all agree that what’s happening in Africa today warrants our

concern and action. And I know we agree that we have an interest in making the

United Nations more efficient and effective. The days ahead will require all of us

to make tough decisions, Mr. Chairman, and I look forward to working with you.

The CHAIRMAN. It is an honor to have you here with us, Mr. Ambassador.

Let me recapitulate. I am going to include your prepared remarks and the resolution by the Security Council on HIV-AIDS and

the Security Council resolution on Diamonds and Arms. There was

one more.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. There is a separate resolution I would

like to share with you and your committee privately, but it would

be inappropriate, because of the situation with the Indian hostages,

it would not be fair to the brave Indians to introduce that in public

at this point.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. But since I know some of your colleagues are concerned about it, I want to be clear with all of you

that we are not going to leave Foday Sankoh unexamined by the

international community. In fact, Senator Kerry’s presence here

prompts me to observe that it is his work in Cambodia, which is

extremely important, that has been the model for the structure we

are thinking about, with some adjustments for local circumstance,

in regard to Foday Sankoh. We can go into that in more detail,

Senator, at the appropriate time.

The CHAIRMAN. Fine. Let me say, Mr. Ambassador, that I and

others consider this hearing this morning to be sufficiently important that we have a printed record of everything that is said and

everything that is included in writing, for distribution beyond the

Senate. And by the way, you and Franklin Graham will receive unVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:00 Feb 07, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00020 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 67707 SFRELA2 PsN: SFRELA2
17

doubtedly questions in writing from Senators who could not be here

and I want you to do all that.

Now, we are pressed for time a little bit. We have six, seven,

eight. I tell you what, I am going to forego my questions and we

will have a 5-minute limit, and I am going to tell Senators that if

they are going to make a speech and then ask a question in the

last 10 seconds I am going to rap you out of order if you answer.

All right, I am going to let Senator Lugar.

Senator LUGAR. I will forego my questions, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Senator Biden.

Senator BIDEN. I will wait.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Grams.

Senator GRAMS. I do not have an opening statement, either.

The CHAIRMAN. Questions?

Senator GRAMS. Sure. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Ambassador, welcome. A couple of questions. I know in your

opening statement you said you had not dealt with Sudan in the

UN context. I guess the question would be why not, considering the

humanitarian relief mission is under UN control, you know, OLS.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. I have not dealt with the Sudan personally much until the last couple of weeks, the last month, because there was no operational issue in which I needed to get directly involved. I also had to take the issues in the order of where

my involvement would make a difference. Additionally, the issue

was being handled by the State Department at their request.

However, I have been in contact recently with the Sudanese Ambassador in New York. I have kept Senator Frist and Senator Feingold informed for the subcommittee and the committee. Clearly,

Sudan is moving into the area of issues that we will have to deal

with in the near term future.

Senator GRAMS. The Congo, one of the more difficult areas. Kofi

Annan included in one of his recent reports examples of, and I

quote, ‘‘serious logistical deficiencies in troops already promised for

Congo.’’ He went on to write, ‘‘One country which had undertaken

to provide four airfield crash rescue units subsequently withdrew

the offer and proposed only one unit now instead.’’ Ambassador, do you see this as a lack of interest in providing

troops for a Congo mission, basically as a vote of no confidence in

the UN peacekeeping opportunities in Congo?

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Part of this is Congo-driven, Senator

Grams. But part of it is a fundamental problem with UN peacekeeping as it is now being conducted. The same thing you just

quoted in Congo is true—

Senator GRAMS. It is too thin, do you mean?

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. It is more than that. It is true in Sierra Leone, it is true in—there are problems with the UN peacekeeping operations almost everywhere except maybe East Timor,

where it got off to a very good start and is under brilliant leadership. And I might add, East Timor is going to start drawing down

very soon, which means we are going to have one example of where

peacekeeping does start to head for the exits.

But peacekeeping at the UN, the core function that Franklin

Roosevelt and Winston Churchill conceived the UN to do in 1944–

18

45, is become an obligation that is beyond the current capacity of

the United Nations bureaucracy to carry out. A year ago today

there was no East Timor mission. Today there are 10,000 UN

forces in East Timor. A year ago today there was no one in Kosovo.

Today there are 5,000 UN in Kosovo not counting NATO. A year

ago today, no one in Sierra Leone; today there are over 11,000. A

year ago today, no Congo force; today there is an authorization for

5,000 and a few hundred building up. A year ago today, EthiopiaEritrea was not on the horizon. We are going to get a request next

week. A year ago today, South Lebanon was 4,000 people in a routine maintenance since 1978. Now it is going to build to 8,000.

So of the big six UN peacekeeping operations, five and a half of

them did not exist a year ago today. There has been not one increase of one person in the Office of Peacekeeping at the UN, not

one. They have 410 people. It is a mess. Civilians are doing military work, military are in civilian clothes. There is no clear structure. And that is the equivalent of the defense department of the

UN. There has been no increase in funding.

The administration feels strongly that the peacekeeping account

has been underfunded. We are very troubled by the mark that has

been set in the appropriations process. So when you describe the

situation in Congo, you could be speaking about almost any part

of the world.

The Secretary General has appointed a commission, called the

Brahimi Commission, headed by Ambassador Brahimi of Algeria,

to examine this. Their report will come in at the end of this month

or the beginning of next month. We are pushing very hard for

major reforms. Some of these reforms, I will say frankly, may require an increase in personnel. I do not think 410 people can do

this job. On the other hand, the UN has 800 people in its public

affairs office.

Senator GRAMS. Before I run out of time, do you think that more

training, more personnel, would have helped in these areas or

maybe even prevented the Indian peacekeepers from being taken

hostage, do you think?

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. I think they need—I think there are

three problems: the financial structure for peacekeeping is a mess,

and here we are using the Helms-Biden reform and your personal

efforts, Senator Grams, to get a change and we are headed for the

denouement at the end of this year. I will be happy to brief on that

later.

Secondly, the operations in the field in Sierra Leone, Congo, and

many other parts of the world are a mess. Sierra Leone is much

worse than Congo in my view, but they are both a mess.

Third, the structure in New York is not a rational structure. We

have to decide, we the UN community, which means in the end the

U.S. because the UN is dependent on the U.S.—if we pull back, it

collapses—whether it is worth our national interest to work part of

our foreign policy through the UN, make the UN more effective,

make peacekeeping more effective. I submit to you that it is. But

it is going to take a tremendous effort.

The Secretary General would not disagree with anything I have

said today, although he would be politer in saying it. We need reform and that is why he has put his mark down. Your comment

19

about the Congo applies equally to the other issues that the chairman wishes to discuss today.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Biden.

Senator GRAMS. Thank you.

Senator BIDEN. I came late, Mr. Chairman. I would be happy to

yield to the Senator from Massachusetts.

The CHAIRMAN. Proceed, sir.

Senator KERRY. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

Mr. Ambassador, welcome. It is good to have you here and I want

to thank you personally for your help the other day with the Secretary General, and I think that that helped us.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. On Cambodia?

Senator KERRY. Yes, and I think that helped us move forward.

Mr. Chairman, thank you also for your help on the AIDS title,

which I am very hopeful we are going to be able to pass through

the Senate in the next weeks. I think that has been critical and

we are very appreciative of it. That is the subject I wanted to raise

in a couple of contexts, if I may. I have three questions. I am going

to ask them right up front and I hope in the time frame you therefore will be able to answer them.

Number one, you and I testified in March before the House

Banking Committee on the World AIDS Prevention Trust Fund

and at that time you made mention of the problem of UN peacekeepers spreading AIDS, and that has been interpreted in various

ways. I thought it might be helpful to have you today clarify exactly how you define that problem and what you think we ought

to be doing about it.

Secondly, many people believe that the NGO’s, the faith-based

organizations, various other entities, can deal with the AIDS problem in sub-Saharan Africa. The Gates Foundation has done a great

deal and we have been working with them very closely in the development of our title and what we are trying to do. But there are

many others who think we need greater bilateral efforts.

I wonder if you would speak to what you think the United States

ought to be doing on a bilateral basis that could make a difference

in the infrastructure-building, the delivery capacities, to deal with

this crisis.

Finally, and this is tied to that second question, the Clinton Administration has now designated AIDS as a security threat, and

some people have difficulty, Mr. Ambassador, understanding the

way the dots are connected, that that in fact is real. I thought it

would be important for you to share with the committee why this

is in fact a security threat and why therefore the United States

needs to think about its own responses to it perhaps differently.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Thank you, Senator Kerry, and thank

you again for coming to New York and going to Cambodia. You had

a real major impact on the Cambodia issue and, as I said a moment ago, it is very helpful in regard to Foday Sankoh and Sierra

Leone.

On your three points, first of all, UN peacekeepers do spread

AIDS. They bring it with them and they take it home with them.

Anyone who thinks differently is misleading themself. Some countries do not insist on testing. The U.S. insists on it—we test every

soldier before he or she goes overseas. If they have AIDS they do

20

not go overseas; they get treated. But that is not true of many

countries.

This is one of these truths that no one wants to utter. We have

made enormous progress since Vice President Gore came on January 10th. As I said before you arrived in the room, on Monday of

next week—and we have invited all members of this committee to

join us in New York for what I think will be another historic day— we will pass the first health Security Council resolution in history.

It is about HIV-AIDS. We will do it—we are waiting until Monday so Peter Piot can come back from the Durban conference to join

us. This resolution will instruct the UN peacekeeping office to take

actions with the peacekeepers.

Now, we cannot order the member states to test every soldier before they go to peacekeeping missions. We cannot get there. But

this is a huge step forward, and it goes beyond peacekeeping. We

have introduced this into the record. By the way, we are ready to

strengthen this between now and Monday if any of you think we

can do so.

I want to stress one last thing, Mr. Chairman. This resolution is

going to be supported by Russia, China, and countries which as recently as 6 months ago did not want to discuss the issue in the Security Council. They are going to vote for it Monday. This is a tremendous step forward for the UN.

This goes to your third question, if I can skip your second for a

minute, Senator Kerry. Why is it a security threat? Well, unless

one wants to define security threats as simply the number of independently targeted warheads on the tip of a missile, unless one’s

definitions of national security are trapped forever where they were

50 years ago—and no one in this room would believe that—we have

to discuss threats to our security.

Does anyone in this room not believe that the spread of AIDS is

a threat to our own economic and social stability? There are reports

the rates are beginning to rise slowly in parts of this country. Does

anyone believe that we can commit triage by continents and put a

wall around Africa and keep AIDS within Africa? It is impossible.

Speak to the Spanish, who are very worried about it slipping up

across the Straits. Even if we could do triage by continents, would

it be politically, morally correct for us to do so?

Today’s Washington Post carries reports of promising new delivery systems. There are all sorts of things going on under the pressure that this committee and the rest of us have brought to bear,

and we will continue.

I would just say one last thing, Senator Kerry. I believe that—

this is a very extreme statement, but I really believe that, of all

the issues, of all the issues that we face in the world today, if you

ask what is the number one problem in the world today, I would

say it is AIDS, despite all the other issues. It is the worst health

epidemic in at least a century, some would argue 6 centuries. It is

continuing unchecked.

All of us, all of us will have to ask ourselves, when our careers

are done, did we address this problem? That is why I think the

support of this committee—Senator Helms’ support—for what Senator Boxer and Senator Smith and you and others have put forward—Senator Feingold, Senator Frist—is historically important. I

21

cannot imagine any of us in public life wanting to leave public office without saying we did what we could.

It is the toughest and biggest of all the issues, not just in Africa.

Africa is just the current epicenter. So I thank you for raising that

question.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Frist.

Senator FRIST. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for

holding— Ambassador HOLBROOKE. I apologize. There was one other question, on the bilateral effort that— The CHAIRMAN. We will catch that on the second round.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. I apologize.

Senator FRIST. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Ambassador, I appreciate your honesty as we address the

Sudan and that less attention than deserved has been placed in

this particular area and that this will be changed in the future. As

was mentioned, I did spend last week in the Sudan in areas that

very few Americans have ever been. I had the opportunity to go to

areas that are the so-called no-go zones, zones where the United

Nations flights for Operation Lifeline Sudan have been banned.

Nothing really substitutes for being on the ground. The areas I

visited were the Nuba Mountains and the Blue Nile regions, where

the United Nations Relief Organization’s Operation Lifeline Sudan

is prohibited from going.

I also went to areas just south of the oil concessions held by

China, Malaysia, and Canadian firms and, although they are not

no-go areas on a permanent basis, access is very restricted. In the

particular area that I visited, there were in the immediate area

7,000 displaced peoples, a total of about 31,000 that had been displaced from an area of these oil pipelines.

The conditions I found were miserable. I say that as a physician,

I say it as a human being. Really appalling, as the government of

Sudan is prosecuting a war in these regions that essentially is ethnic cleansing of black Africans to secure these areas of the oilfields

and the pipelines. As you know and as we have discussed in part,

in going back and looking over the last 11 years I conclude that the

United Nations has not even put up a struggle to the restrictive

terms that have been used to allow these so-called no-go zones: relief not going in and without relief there is no transparency, and

thus Sudan can be hidden, the atrocities, the slavery, the suffering,

and the death.

I recall just 3 days ago being asked as I sat in a region of the

Blue Nile with a very simple statement. The statement was a question really, and the leader told me, he said: ‘‘Are we not humans,

too? Does not the UN cover us as it covers those on the other side

of the arbitrary line the government has imposed?’’

Now we are at a point currently in Washington and in New York

that the government of Sudan is poised to gain significant concessions in the United Nations on two points. Number one is the lifting of sanctions imposed after the attempted assassination of President Mubarak of Egypt and, amazingly to me, assuming a seat on

the Security Council.

While the UN is asked to concede to Sudan, at the same time the

UN relief operations in Sudan still suffer under what, now based

22

on personal observation, I conclude are unacceptable and unjust

constraints which are being used as a tool of Khartoum in the war.

The bottom line is that the UN has had a massive feeding program

for select areas of Sudan, but really not doing anything more.

The United Nations has not used in any way, I believe, its potential to push or compel or otherwise seek peace in Sudan through

relief operations. The UN’s presence has been very generous as you

look over the past in terms of numbers of dollars and amounts of

food, but all of this has effectively become a substitute for real action in terms of peace.

I guess my bottom line is that at the very least, humanitarian

access should be based on need. What I saw, whether it was in the

southern part of Sudan, where flights are not banned, or in the

Blue Nile or in the Nuba Mountains, the needs are exactly the

same in terms of the humanitarian requirements, what is needed.

The terms today seem to be no flights, bans used as an instrument of war. It seems to me that unfettered humanitarian access

is the issue that we can make considerable progress on. My question is is this not a reasonable starting point in an effort to change

the UN from this past really feckless substitute policy into a tool

for achieving peace in Sudan?

Because my time is up, I ask today for your commitment to use

your efforts and that of the administration to end these no-go areas

and the flight bans in Sudan.

The CHAIRMAN. I tell you what I am going to do. I am going to

give you 2 minutes of my time and 2 minutes to John Kerry, Senator Kerry.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Should I reply?

The CHAIRMAN. Proceed.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. First of all, Senator Frist, again I want

to express my admiration for you. Senator Feingold and I wanted

to make a similar trip, but were unable to get authorization from

our security people. I would like to continue the dialogue in private.

I will commit myself to you right here and now to convey all your

views in writing to the Secretary General as you expressed them

and to follow up vigorously and personally. I agree with everything

you have said as I understand the situation. On the ‘‘go, no-go’’

areas, you are absolutely correct.

On the sanctions, I want to be very clear, Mr. Chairman, for the

record where we stand. We were approached last month by several

countries and asked if we would lift the sanctions and they wanted

to introduce a resolution. I told the Sudanese ambassador directly

and the countries that had supported this that we would happily

veto this proposal if they wished to introduce it, and that if they

wished to have a serious dialogue with us in any detailed form,

then it would probably be better to defer this dialogue until after

the election. We are ready to talk now; however, this issue was so

complicated, and it was appropriately something that the new administration, the new Congress, would be seized of. But we are

ready to talk with them.

Our position is clear: They must give up the three terrorists who

tried to kill President Mubarak; they must comply with the sanction provisions; and we must have a cessation of this indiscrimiVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:00 Feb 07, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00026 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 67707 SFRELA2 PsN: SFRELA2
23

nate bombing of things like Samaritan’s Purse Hospital and others.

The Sudanese then withdrew their proposal. So we were ready to

veto and will veto if they put it back in, but I do not think it will

be necessary.

On the UN seat—oh, and I want to stress one more thing. No

deal was made. As Senator Frist and I have discussed privately,

there is no deal whatsoever of any change in policy towards the

Sudan based on their delay. In any case, how could there be, because if the issue is delayed until after the election it falls to another group of people to decide.

Now, to your second point on the UN seat, we will oppose that

with every ounce of effort we have. That is Susan Rice’s main mission at the OAU summit in Togo today. Nancy Powell was on the

phone earlier this morning trying to get an update in case you

asked the question. We will submit it for the record as soon as we

can, Mr. Chairman.

Unfortunately, the OAU may make them their candidate, in

which case we hope there will be an alternative candidate we can

support. We of course will oppose Sudan. If they do get on the Security Council, we will deal with that when that happens.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. Now, do you remember

the second question of Senator Kerry?

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. I sure do. It was on the NGO’s and

greater bilateral efforts on the infrastructure area. Senator Kerry,

your knowledge base on this is far greater than mine. I am not an

expert on health delivery systems. I notice in the Durban reporting

there has been movement in this area. I do not have a clear answer

to you. I would prefer to submit it in writing. I think you probably

know the answers better than I do.

But I would share your view that what Bill Gates and Ted Turner and others are doing through their foundations is enormously

valuable and deserves our credit. But we must have better delivery

systems for the treatment process, that is clear. That is something

that the international community cannot afford to pay for. It must

come from local means.

I am sorry that my answer is inadequate to the import of your

question, but it is above my competence level. I am not an expert

in health delivery systems, and I know you actually know far more

than I do about it.

Senator KERRY. Well, I thank you. I think it would be important

if we could all work through a little bit how we are going to adequately be able to improve the infrastructure and what bilateral efforts we could make. I have some suggestions on that at another

time, Mr. Chairman. But I do think it is critical because I do not

think the NGO’s can do it alone. On the other hand, some of the

governments have faced corruption problems and infrastructure

problems. So it is going to take a very special kind of effort to adequately cope with it, and I think we need to engage in that discussion.

Thanks, Mr. Chairman.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question,

sir?

The CHAIRMAN. Sure.

24

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Has Dr. Piot testified before any of

you? Because I think if you brought Dr. Piot down here to have a

discussion with you on this issue and Senator Frist’s points, I think

it would be very valuable. If you wish, I would be happy to convey

some informal invitation to him next week. I leave this to you, but

a connection between him and you I think would be very valuable.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Senator Biden.

Senator BIDEN. I will be very brief. I have a lot of questions. I

will submit some to you, Dick, Mr. Ambassador, in writing. But I

have one question. The need is obviously overwhelming. It is great,

not only in the health side of the ledger, but in the peacekeeping

side. The capacity is questionable to do anything about it, and yet

you are constantly put in the position of having to make recommendations to the President of the United States and in turn to

us as to how the United States bilaterally should participate in

peacekeeping, and it is a hard sell. It is a very hard sell.

You make a compelling case that there is no infrastructure in

New York, the peacekeeping office is overwhelmed, the capacity,

the technical capacity, the military leadership, the internecine

squabbles that go on make it very—I do not want to be too strong,

but not a particularly competent operation.

How do you square the circle? How the heck do we convince people here we should put money into operations that, if you take a

look at their critique of the way the operation is being conducted

and the structure that oversees the operation, is as bad as it is?

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Senator Biden, I think your question

goes to the core of the dilemma. The current situation in the peacekeeping office is not acceptable, not only to us, not only to your

committee, but to the Secretary General and the people who work

there themselves. They are very brave, hard-working, dedicated

people, but they are overburdened and understaffed.

So we face—since the current situation is untenable—we face

two options: improve and reform it, or let it collapse. If we let it

collapse, it is going to implode and from Sudan to Sierra Leone to

East Timor the problems will mount and the U.S. will get dragged

in directly unilaterally or outside the UN system. It will be much

more expensive.

So my answer to your question—it is not a perfect answer, but

it is the best I can do, and I have thought a lot about it—is to work

with them to improve the system. I would like, with your permission and that of Chairman Helms, to return to the committee after

we have the Brahimi report on peacekeeping and talk to you further about what this entails. It may mean more resources.

But we cannot leave the situation where it is today. We either

have to make the UN carry out functions which are important to

the U.S. (without NATO-level direct U.S. military involvement, in

which case the UN has got to do a better job), or else we have to

decide what we are going to do in these places.

Senator BIDEN. Mr. Ambassador, you have made some significant

contributions already since you have been there. If you somehow

are able to be the catalyst to structurally alter the way in which

peacekeeping is administered, you will be—I mean this sincerely— you will be making the most significant in my view, the single most

25

significant contribution any ambassador has ever made representing this country to the United Nations.

It is the core failure in my view of the institution. I hope others—I will not take any more time because others are to speak and

we have another panel, but I would like to at another time get into

some significant detail with you about whether other major powers

share your concern, whether there is enough interest to generate

a consensus to force the change that needs to be taken, et cetera.

But I do not want you to go into that now because we have other

panels.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Just two sentences, Senator Biden.

One, other countries do share a concern. Two, the meeting that you

and Senator Helms and your colleagues chaired in this chamber

with the Security Council was a seminal event in improving communications and improving our chances of getting the reforms

under Helms-Biden. I cannot—I do not know how far we are going

to get in this area, but we have made huge progress. I know we

are going to return to that in a minute. And we will look forward

to the dialogue.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Feingold.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I will

use most of my time in this round for a statement and if the chairman permits and there is another round I will certainly want to

ask some questions.

I would like to thank the chairman. I want to thank Ambassador

Holbrooke for being here to testify before the committee. As the

Ambassador said, last December I had the pleasure of traveling in

Africa with him, working along side him. I respect his skill and I

admire his courage. One thing I have learned over the years as I

have served on the African Subcommittee is that taking on African

issues means opening oneself to a storm of inevitable criticism from

the many Afro- pessimists who are blind to the region’s vast potential and would prefer to ignore it entirely and also from those who

take in the vast needs of the continent and demand that the U.S.

take the lead to solve every problem.

Given my awareness of these pitfalls, I confess to feeling a little

bit overwhelmed by the topic of this hearing, a bit overwhelmed

and also a little bit concerned. The UN is involved in so many parts

of the vast African continent and each situation is characterized by

its own complexities and its own stakes. While I commend the committee’s desire to explore these important topics, I fear we are in

a little bit of danger of painting with an overly broad brush, drawing sweeping generalizations about the potential for UN success or

failure without considering the nuances of each individual case. In

other words, obviously Sierra Leone is not Congo and it is not Eritrea and Ethiopia and that is not Sudan. These are very different

situations that just happen to be in the same continent, and it is

too easy to generalize.

That said, I think it is possible to draw out some general principles that should guide the U.S. approach to the UN’s work in Africa. Certainly the U.S. should take the lead in encouraging the

United Nations to address these global issues to which it is well

suited, issues like infectious disease and particularly the AIDS criVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:00 Feb 07, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00029 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 67707 SFRELA2 PsN: SFRELA2
26

sis. Again, I really want to commend Ambassador Holbrooke’s leadership and efforts in this area. I saw him take the raw material

from what we saw on our trip and turn it into a real international

commitment and I am very grateful for that.

The U.S. should be a force pushing for accountability when the

UN is faced with conflicts involving terrible atrocities, as is the

case in Sierra Leone and the Congo. Perhaps one of the most important lessons to be drawn from the recent crisis in Sierra Leone

is that the United Nations will fail if the peace it works to enforce

is fundamentally unjust. I look forward to hearing even more during the hearing about what the UN is planning to pursue with regards to accountability in Sierra Leone.

The UN should work to reinforce the role of the regional organizations play in resolving African conflicts. Ultimately, I think these

regional groups bear the burden in terms of troops and stability of

these conflicts, and I am very frustrated by the lack of progress

made by the Joint Military Commission in Congo because that institution has such an important role to play there. And I believe

that a regional force may still have an important role to play in Sierra Leone. On this front, as the Ambassador has suggested, it is

particularly important for the United States to continue to bolster

reform in Nigeria, West Africa’s superpower. The Sierra Leone crisis has clearly illustrated the very real U.S. and international interest in a strong and democratic Nigeria.

The United States must work within the UN to reverse the appearance, Mr. Chairman, of a double standard in international affairs, where African crises are somehow less urgent and African

lives somehow less valuable than others. But as Ambassador

Holbrooke has often articulated, staying engaged in Africa requires

getting it right and proving to the pessimists that Africa is by no

means hopeless. Getting it right requires a solid peace agreement,

as we have seen in Sierra Leone with a failure to get it. It means

insisting the conditions of the agreement actually be implemented,

as we are trying very hard to do in Congo.

As this committee embarks on an examination of UN policy in

Africa, it is also important to remember that the United Nations

cannot succeed without United States leadership, as the very troubling recent OAU report on Rwandan genocide so accurately pointed out.

So I look forward to working with my colleagues and the Ambassador to ensure, more than anything else, that failures like Rwanda remain in our past and do not become part of our future.

Mr. Chairman, if there is time I would ask this question: Mr.

Ambassador, when you and I traveled in Africa in December, one

of the hopeful points that struck me about the Congo crisis was

that the Presidents of Zimbabwe and Uganda seemed willing to

work together on the Lusaka Accords and together to pressure

other parties to do the same. How do President Mugabe of

Zimbabwe’s recent choices to disregard the rule of law, the international community, and the long-term stability of his own country

in the name of retaining power affect his role in the Congo conflict?

Is there a way in which he can continue to still play a positive or

constructive role in this situation?

27

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. I appreciate your remarks, Senator

Feingold. On the double standard, I really try to explain to Africans there is no double standard. My best answer is: Every other

part of the world claims they are not getting enough resources, either. But there is always the sense of the double standard in Africa. Africa is tough, but it is not hopeless and we cannot turn our

backs on it.

I think the turnout this morning illustrates to the world, I hope,

that you have 10 percent of the Senate came to this hearing this

morning on Africa. I think that is a very dramatic statement.

On Zimbabwe, Senator Feingold, what has happened inside

Zimbabwe has additionally complicated the situation in the Congo,

but I do not think one affects the other.

On the Sierra Leone regional force, we are in exactly the same

position as you are. My letter exchange with Senator Gregg, which

you and I have discussed, addresses the Nigerian and Ghanaian

role. Ambassador Pickering’s really important trip starting tomorrow I hope will result in him returning to this committee and addressing with you in detail how we can deal with both strengthening Nigerian democracy and dealing with the RUF and Sierra

Leone.

On the JMC, the Joint Military Commission in the Congo, it has

not moved forward since you and I visited its rather sorry headquarters in Lusaka. Most of the work being done in the area now

is being done by the UN, I regret to say.

On accountability in Sierra Leone, I have already addressed that.

We absolutely share your view and I will share with you on a private basis what we intend to do as soon as we can.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, sir.

I know Senator Brownback will forgive me. The distinguished

Senator from California has been here for a great while and I want

to recognize you out of order.

Senator Boxer: That is very kind of you, Senator Brownback,

Senator Helms.

It is always wonderful—[Bell rings.]

Senator Boxer: Is that it?

It is always wonderful to see you, Ambassador Holbrooke. I am

very proud of the job that you are doing.

I want to say, Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you again for really helping us fight this AIDS epidemic. I mean, it is so discouraging and depressing, but yet when it came to this issue where I

was working with Senator Smith you were right there with your

staff and you looked at our request and you put it in the bill.

It just lifts my heart, because when you look at what is happening in Africa and we hear today that life expectancy at birth in

southern Africa, which had risen from 44 years in the early fifties

to 59 years in the early nineties, which is low in and of itself, has

been set back to age 45 in the next 10 years because of this epidemic. We hear if it should continue and we are not successful,

people are saying, Mr. Chairman, the life expectancy could go to 30

years of age. That is childhood. From my perspective, that is childhood.

So I want to thank you so much for what you did. And I want

to say that I have a number of questions, so I am going to run

28

through them very quickly on the AIDS issue. Ambassador

Holbrooke, when the Vice President came to speak to the United

Nations on AIDS he said: ‘‘We must talk about AIDS not in whispers, but openly and boldly.’’ A very hard thing to do. I learned it

in California when I was in the House, very difficult.

But I want to ask you—and I hope you will take notes because

I am going to go quickly on these questions so youhave enough

time—do you feel that the leaders in Africa are beginning to talk

about this in a more honest and open way? What is your assessment of that?

Also, there has been a great new development. We know that we

can stop the transmission from mother to child with this new drug,

Nuveripine. If you give it to HIV-positive pregnant women you cut

the infection way back, maybe by 80 percent. But we know that in

Africa if a woman—because it is the cultural norm to breast feed

your child, breast feeding can undo all the good of the drug. Have

you looked at this issue and do you have any advice on what could

be done to lessen that stigma of saying to a woman, make the sacrifice for your child?

The last question I would—well, two more. One: The hopeful

signs seem to be in Senegal and Uganda. It sort of goes to what

Senator Feingold said about let us not lump all the nations into

one, because there we see that AIDS is not spreading as fast as in

other African countries. What are these nations doing that can be

emulated elsewhere?

Finally, how have the refugees from the many conflicts in Africa

contributed to the spread of AIDS?

Mr. Chairman, when we look at Africa we are looking at death

by wars, 200,000 in 1998; 2.2 million by AIDS. So we are fighting

here, trying to help the fight against disease and against wars.

I would ask you in the remaining time if you could answer those

questions. And thank you again, Mr. Chairman.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Thank you, Senator Boxer. I am always delighted to work with you on these issues.

Number one, are leaders in Africa are more open and honest

than they have been in the past? Well, some are, some are not.

Every leader in Africa now pays lip service to the issue, but some

leaders it is only lip service. Denial is a real problem. Senator Feingold and I saw that on our trip.

Now, that leads to your third question—I will come back to your

second in a minute—why Senegal and Uganda? This is a really important question, and I would add Thailand into the mix, too. Why

did Senegal, Uganda, and Thailand take the rates down while they

soared in neighboring countries? And let us not forget the subcontinent, where it is very serious also in India.

I believe it is a combination of very strong leadership, particularly President Museveni in Uganda, former health minister

Mechai in Thailand, and other leaders, who just understood, Senator Boxer, what you understood a decade and a half ago because

of your experience 2 decades ago in California, and that is the issue

of stigmatization. If you pretend anything other than that the disease is what it is, you cannot get there.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to just recount one incident which I

think illustrates it all. The Prime Minister of Mozambique is a docVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:00 Feb 07, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00032 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 67707 SFRELA2 PsN: SFRELA2
29

tor. In fact, I think he was a gynecologist, Dr. Mocumbe. He came

to New York and he told the most extraordinary story, which I

think answers Senator Boxer’s question and also her previous question about breast-feeding.

He has gone around to the local leaders in Mozambique and he

said: What is the word for AIDS in your native language? And they

say: We do not have any. He says: Well, what do you call it? Then

comes the answer which tells you how serious the problem is. In

most of the areas, he said, it is called ‘‘the disease of women.’’ Now, if you call it the disease of women the game is over before

it has started, because men say they cannot get it or they have

these great myths about how to get rid of it. One of the greatest

myths with the greatest—and forgive my explicitness, but it needs

to be said—one of the greatest myths in parts of Africa is that you

can cure yourself if you have sex with a virgin, when in fact what

you are doing is spreading it. It is horrendous.

Now, the only way to deal with these problems is openly. President Museveni in Uganda did so and the rate dropped from 30 percent to 9 percent. It is not surprising that this is a difficult issue

to educate people on in Africa, where communications and education levels and language are a problem, if you consider that all

of us can remember 15, 20 years ago in the United States the

myths that we were all living with. I remember in New York City

people would not go to certain restaurants because they thought

they would get it from the waiters. Now we have learned how it

is transmitted.

So education is the key, and that brings me to your second question, about mother to child transmission. You are absolutely right,

Senator—and the New York Times did an article on it the day before yesterday—about the cultural pressures for breast-feeding.

There is only one answer to this: education, de-stigmatization.

Women are told that they are failing their family and their clan

if they do not breast-feed. So they will do it even if they know that

they are going to transmit the disease, or they will not get tested

because they do not want to know. Senator Feingold and I saw this

first-hand when we visited the clinics. We visited six very brave

women in Namibia who told us they had the disease, but they

came to us in a covered van, Mr. Chairman, and they met with us

in a room with the curtains drawn, because they said they would

lose their jobs and be thrown out of their families. So it is education, Senator Boxer. It is de-stigmatization.

Finally, the refugee role. Refugees are part of the problem, just

as peacekeepers are, and we have addressed that in the Security

Council resolution, which I think is a major step forward.

Senator Boxer: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. Senator Brownback.

Senator BROWNBACK. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Ambassador, for coming and presenting to us. I appreciate the comments I have heard. Two issues I want to raise

with you. One is, the United States Congress and the President

signed into action a Religious Freedom Commission about a year

ago. It has been active for about a year. Their number one country

of concern, number one country of concern about the lack of religious freedom, the greatest level of religious persecution in the

30

world today that they are concerned about, is the Sudan that they

have put forward in the documents and the findings.

That does not mean that there are not other places around the

world where there is difficulty. They are saying there you have a

conflict of such clarity on ethnic and religious basis that this is the

case that they raise the most.

I would point out to you directly one of the ways that the UN

is being involved in this religious persecution is in the Operation

Lifeline Sudan, where they are allowing food to be flown into certain regions and not into others, and it is resulting in deaths, it

is resulting in genocide, based on an ethnic and religious basis. I

would really hope, really hope, that you would help us out on seeing that that food relief can go everywhere where it is needed.

This is Operation Lifeline Sudan, operated by the United Nations, and it is being used in this horrifying fashion, in a truly horrifying fashion. I have been in the country as well myself, and two

millions deaths that have occurred, have taken place. I do not see

how we can possibly even stand to not confront them on the issue

of slavery that is still in place and there. So I would really hope

that the United Nations would step up on this issue, because it is

being used in such a hideous fashion, the food aid being misdirected.

A second one, and you have addressed it somewhat here earlier,

Senator Wellstone and I have a piece of legislation, it is cleared

through—there is a companion piece that has already cleared

through the House, held several hearings here—on sex trafficking

and the level of that taking place around the world. Our own government estimates around 600,000 primarily young women and

children being moved from one country to another by flesh traders,

moving people for sex trafficking, some for the very thing that you

just talked about earlier: Some people believe that if they have sex

with a virgin that they will get rid of AIDS.

I have met with some of these girls in different countries that

have been returned from being tricked, deceived, forcibly taken

from villages, submitted to these brothels, this sort of trade, and

then coming back, two thirds of the with AIDS and-or tuberculosis,

coming back to die, some cases spreading that in other places.

This is involved in Africa as well. It is being—organized crime

is involved as a part of it in some places. I do not know the extent

that that would be the case in Africa. But this is something that

I think deserves your attention as well, and I would hope that you

would step forward and address that issue, too.

So those two in particular.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Mr. Chairman, Senator Brownback, I

am very grateful for your comments. I would like to ask Nancy

Powell, if she could join me, to add a word on these two issues after

I make a quick comment.

First of all on your sex trafficking bill you and Senator Wellstone

have submitted, we support it. The administration supports it and

we look forward to working with you.

Secondly, in a colloquy I think while you were out of the room

with Senator Frist, we discussed the OLS-UN issue.

Senator BROWNBACK. No, I was here during that.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Oh, I am sorry.

31

Senator BROWNBACK. I just wanted to focus you back that I was

hopeful you would commit that we will get this food into areas that

it is not being delivered to today.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Absolutely. What I will gladly commit

to today is to use this hearing as the leverage point for a written

communication with the Secretary General as soon as he returns

from Africa conveying the concerns expressed today and associating

the administration fully with them.

Secondly, on the no-go zones, on the division between OLS and

non-OLS aid and so on, I lived through the Bosnia situation where

the UN negotiated with the oppressive forces the terms under

which the victims were being held. I found it inexcusable, and what

you have in Sudan is a replay of it at a much higher level of intensity.

Senator BROWNBACK. And numbers.

The CHAIRMAN. That is what I meant, higher level, higher numbers. It is just wrong and it has to be stopped, and we cannot let

the aid be politicized, and I commit myself to working on that issue

aggressively.

With your permission, Senator, I would like to ask Acting Assistant Secretary Powell to add a few words on the overall issue that

you and Senator Frist raised on negotiating with Khartoum, the

sanctions and so on.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, let me say that I welcome the lady, and

please help me to move into the other half of this hearing. We are

happy you are here. We recognize you.

Ms. POWELL. If I could just comment very briefly, the Special

Envoy Harry Johnston to Khartoum has put this among his highest priorities, to work on the issue of access for humanitarian relief, both OLS and non-OLS. The U.S. government has also been

supporting the non-OLS NGOs who have access to some of these

areas to ensure that greater numbers of people are receiving food

assistance from the United States.

We will continue to work with the UN, but Special Envoy Johnston is also working very hard with Khartoum on this issue, also

on the bombing of civilians, particularly hospitals and other civilian targets.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Now, one final note on another subject. Bring me up to date on

the revision or proposed revision of the assessments at the United

Nations.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. In furtherance of my commitment to

you a year ago during the confirmation hearings, Mr. Chairman,

the entire United States Government, not just our mission in New

York, but everyone up to and including President Clinton, is working to revise the scale of assessments. There are two main components to this that are still before us: the regular assessment reduction and the peacekeeping revision.

We have made major progress. We have gotten ourselves back on

the ACABQ, Israel is now back—is now for the first time in 40

years in a regional group, two pledges I made to you a year ago,

both of which we were told by our staff we would not achieve, and

we achieved them both. We are now—we have gotten the peacekeeping scale of assessments on the agenda for the first time in 27

32

years, because we have this outmoded, ridiculous system from

1973, an American proposal, but only designed for one operation in

the Sinai in ’73 by Dr. Kissinger and still in place.

Now, where do we stand? The regular assessment request to go

down is one that I think will be manageable. It will be tough, but

there is not a lot of money involved. The really big one is peacekeeping, Mr. Chairman. We have succeeded in getting it on the

agenda for the first time in 27 years. We now need to get it on the

formal agenda for the session this fall.

We have a lot of support, but some countries are still opposing

a change. What we are seeking to do is broaden the tax base of the

UN. Right now it is like a flat, step pyramid. The bottom rung is

155 countries that pay 2 percent in total. Then there are about 20

countries that pay about 15 percent and about 8 countries that pay

over 80 percent. Those eight countries begin with the U.S. and

Japan, which together pay half, almost half, and then go right on

to France and Germany and the Brits.

Now, it is just not acceptable, and there are certain countries

that have gotten a lot richer since 1973 that ought to pay their

share and a few that have gotten poorer. South Africa wants to pay

less; we agree.

I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the letters you have sent

on behalf of this effort directly to some of the countries in question.

I do not think it would be helpful to our mutual effort to name the

countries in public, but those letters have been received loud and

clear in capitals. I will be traveling to some of these countries. I

have already been to others. President Clinton and Secretary

Albright are deeply engaged in this issue.

No poor country will be asked to pay any more. There is no African country that will have to pay any more under our proposals.

But there are countries that can pay more. Six countries have already voluntarily said they will give up their discounts. You have

already publicly praised them. For the record, however, let us state

who they are: Cyprus, Israel, Hungary, Estonia, Latvia, and in

some ways most importantly, the Philippines, most importantly because the Philippines is the only one of those six whose per capita

income is below the world average. But the Philippines said, we

will be the first Asian country.

So far no OPEC countries have done this and no Gulf State countries, and many rich countries, countries that have a capacity to

pay more, have yet to join. But we have just begun, and we have

growing understanding. We will report to you further. The denouement of this will come in December. That is, the crunch comes in

December. But I can assure you and the committee today that

President Clinton and Secretary Albright will make this a major

agenda item during the General Assembly.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I thank you. I am not going to reiterate

what I attempted to say when I appeared in New York before the

Security Council, but it has a great deal to do with the attitude of

the American people. Good or bad, that is the way it is. It is good

that you came here this morning, nothing bad about it at all. You

are your usual eloquent self and I thank you for doing it, and I

thank you, ma’am, too.

33

So we will move to the second panel. He is an equally distinguished gentleman who happens to be a close personal friend of

mine. But we will give it just a minute to make the change.

[Pause.]

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order, and you folks

who are leaving are going to miss the good part of this hearing this

morning.

Franklin Graham, son of Billy and Ruth Graham, has been a

long-time friend of mine, one whom I have admired as I have admired his daddy and his mama and his sisters and his brothers.

Yours is a great family.

STATEMENT OF REVEREND WILLIAM FRANKLIN GRAHAM, III,

PRESIDENT, CHAIRMAN, AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER,

SAMARITAN’S PURSE, BOONE, NORTH CAROLINA

Reverend GRAHAM. Thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I am so proud of your sister who lives in Raleigh

and she is making her mark.

Just for the record, would you repeat briefly about the development in your father’s health. And pull the mike a little closer to

you.

Reverend GRAHAM. Mr. Chairman, for the last 10 years my father has been diagnosed with Parkinson’s and he has been treated

for that disease. They have recently discovered that that is not the

case. He has what they call normal pressure hydrocephalus. This

is the build-up of fluid in the brain. They have been able to install

two shunts which drain this fluid off the brain. It has made a dramatic difference in his health. He has really improved. He can walk

now better than he has been able to for the last 10 years. He is

much more alert. So we are very grateful, very thankful, to the doctors that have been able to help him.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I am going to mix church and state for just

a minute and say, praise the lord.

Reverend GRAHAM. Thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You may proceed.

Reverend GRAHAM. Mr. Chairman and members of this committee, I want to thank you for this opportunity to be here today

to testify to this committee on the tragedy that is occurring in Africa, especially in the country of the Sudan. As a minister of the gospel of the lord Jesus Christ, I come here because I have seen firsthand some of the tragedies of this land.

Some 136 years ago, our Nation endured a tragic and bloody

Civil War to end slavery once and for all. On November 9th, 1863,

President Abraham Lincoln in his Gettysburg Address reminded us

of the great sacrifices of those who died and the unfinished work

that is before us as a Nation. That unfinished work is still before

us today. The unfinished work of freeing all men and abolishing

slavery forever is still before us in this new millennium.

Any nation that practices, encourages, and condones slavery at

any level, in my opinion that government should be considered an

illegitimate government. The entire world community should come

together to use all influence and power available to bring about a

governmental change in that country so that the words of Abraham

34

Lincoln might be fulfilled, not just in this Nation, but in all nations, for all men.

When you look at the Sudan today, black Africans are still

bought and sold into slavery. We see burned-out villages, we see

mutilated bodies, families torn apart, religious persecution, equal

to that of the Holocaust. Ethnic cleansing has forced millions to

flee their homes and land for their lives. A lot of this is due to the

oil exploration. The government of Sudan has purposely targeted

Christians and minorities of other faiths. Over the last 15 years in

the Sudan, the current government has overseen the annihilation

of more than 1.9 million southern Sudanese.

I come today to speak about what I know and what I have witnessed. Sudan is one of Africa’s largest nations. We have already

had the privilege of working in a few places in this great country.

But the stories of atrocities are all too familiar. Wherever we work,

stories of rape, children, women, and young men being abducted

into slavery by the government militias, pastors who have been

crucified, amputations, and others.

At Samaritan’s Purse we have worked for the last 10 years to relieve some of the pain and suffering of the southern Sudanese. I

chose to be involved because I believe it is the right thing to do.

It is certainly not the most popular. Only a few show interest outside the Christian community. Our current administration and

news media have all but forgotten the call of freedom from the

black Africans of the southern Sudan.

While working in the Sudan, our desire has been to help position

the people to help themselves. We have provided chickens, farm

tools, seeds, relief supplies, and medical assistance. We currently

operate one of the largest hospitals in the southern Sudan, helping

more than 100,000 people, some who have walked as many as 4

days to reach us.

For our efforts, the government of the Sudan for the last few

months has bombed our civilian hospital in Lui on five separate occasions. Every time our personnel hear the drone of engines, they

run for cover, fearing the bombs are coming. Our personal experience at being bombed has cost the lives of innocent civilians on the

ground. It has caused damage to our hospital, struck fear in the

hearts of the people, and made us question our purpose and our

commitment to the black Christians of the southern Sudan.

As a minister and a leader of this organization, I bear the responsibility for the safety of my team. I have offered to evacuate

those who may want to leave. To date, we are thankful to God that

our hospital remains open and our team is still in place. It is only

by the grace of God and by his strength that we continue.

The suffering that we have encountered is minuscule compared

to the suffering that the entire population of the southern Sudan

has endured. We have been mere spectators. Our hands on occasions seem tied. We have little financial and material resources

compared to the need. The lines for logistical support are long.

Food, medicine, and personnel have to be flown in at our expense

from neighboring nations. Our planes are subject to the threat of

constant attack and, due to the lack of bridges, convoys by road are

almost impossible. Basically, the only way in and out is by air.

35

Last week, Senator Bill Frist visited our hospital, performed surgery, and Senator Frist noted the war is getting worse and peace

may be further away because of the fighting around the oilfields,

and that after 17 years of conflict and 11 years of international relief operations supplying food to the starving the war is no closer

to a resolution.

Indeed, the crisis has only grown stronger in recent years due to

the oil money that has fueled Khartoum’s immoral campaign. One

of the largest North American oil companies doing business in the

Sudan is Talisman Energy, headquartered in Calgary, Alberta,

Canada. On May 1st I met with Talisman’s President, Jim Buckey.

I asked the president, Jim Buckey, before the annual shareholders

meeting that if he would use his influence to meet with the government of Khartoum to try to get them to end their atrocities against

their own people. The Talisman shareholders voted to give the company one year to show progress on its commitment to improving

the plight of the Sudanese people.

Obviously, much more needs to be done. The governments of the

world could alleviate much of the plight of the southern Sudanese.

When several thousand white Kosovars were killed and ten thousands displaced, the world called it genocide. But sadly, when 1.9

million black Africans are killed and millions more displaced, tortured, and even sold into slavery, our world leaders remained

strangely silent and western governments not only failed to take

punitive action, such as imposing sanctions or initiating military

intervention, they continue to trade openly with the government of

Sudan.

I hope and pray that the words of Abraham Lincoln will not be

in vain and that we as a Nation will not turn our backs on the unfinished business that is still before us, the freeing of all slaves and

the idea that all men are created equal.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Reverend Graham follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF REV. FRANKLIN GRAHAM

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to

testify before this committee on the tragedy in the Sudan. As a minister of the Gospel of the Lord Jesus Christ I come today because I have seen firsthand some of

the tragedies of this land.

Some 136 years ago our nation endured a tragic and bloody civil war to end slavery once and for all. On November 9, 1863, President Abraham Lincoln in his Gettysburg Address reminded us of the great sacrifices of those who died and the unfinished work before us as a nation. That unfinished work is still before us today—

the unfinished work of freeing all men and abolishing slavery forever is still before

us in this new millennium.

Any nation that practices, encourages, and condones slavery—at any level—in my

opinion, that government should be considered an illegitimate government. The entire world community should come together and use all influence and power available to bring about a governmental change in that country so that the words of

Abraham Lincoln might be fulfilled—not just in this nation—but in all nations, for

all men.

When you look at the Sudan today, black Africans are still bought and sold into

slavery. We see burned-out villages, mutilated bodies, and families torn apart and

religious persecution equal to that of the holocaust. Ethnic cleansing has forced millions to flee their homes and land for their lives. The government of Sudan has purposely targeted the Christians and minorities of other faiths. Over the last 15 years

in the Sudan the current government has overseen the annihilation of more than

1.9 million southern Sudanese.

36

I come today to speak about what I know and what I have witnessed. Sudan is

Africa’s largest nation. We have only had the privilege of working in a few places,

but the stories of atrocities are all too familiar wherever we work: stories of rape,

children, women, and young men being abducted into slavery by government militias, pastors being crucified, amputations, and others.

At Samaritan’s Purse we have worked for the last ten years to relieve some of

the pain and suffering of the southern Sudanese. I chose to be involved because I

believe it is the right thing to do. It is certainly not the most popular. Only a few

show interest outside the Christian community. Our current administration and

news media have all but forgotten the call of freedom for the black Africans of

southern Sudan. While working in the Sudan our desire has been to help position

the people to help themselves. We have provided chickens, farm tools, seeds, relief

supplies, and medical assistance. We currently operate one of the largest hospitals

in the southern Sudan, helping more than 100,000 people—some who have walked

as many as four days to reach us. For our efforts, the government of Sudan over

the last four months has bombed our civilian hospital in Lui five times. Every time

our personnel hear the drone of engines they run for cover for fear that bombs are

coming.

Our personal experience has shown us that the bombing has cost the lives of innocent civilians on the ground. It has caused damage to our hospital, struck fear in

the hearts of the people and has made us question our purpose and our commitment

to the black Christians of southern Sudan.

As a minister and the leader of this organization, I bear the responsibility for the

safety of my team. I have offered to evacuate those who may want to leave. To date,

we are thankful to God that our hospital remains open and our team is still in

place. It is only by the grace of God and by His strength that we continue. The suffering that we have encountered is miniscule compared to the suffering that the entire population of the southern Sudan has endured. We have been mere spectators.

Our hands on occasion seem tied. We have little financial and material resources

compared to the need. The lines for logistical support are long. Food, medicines, and

personnel have to be flown at our expense from neighboring nations. Our planes are

subject to the threat of constant attack. Due to the lack of bridges, convoys by road

are almost impossible. Basically the only way in and out is by air.

Last week, Senator Bill Frist visited our hospital and performed surgery. Senator

Frist noted that ‘‘the war is getting worse and peace may be further away because

of the fighting around the oil fields. After 17 years of conflict and 11 years of international relief operations supplying food to the starving, the war is no closer to a

resolution.’’

Indeed, the crisis has only grown stronger in recent years due to oil money that

has fueled Khartoum’s immoral campaign. One of the largest North American oil

companies doing business in Sudan is Talisman Energy, headquartered in Calgary,

Alberta, Canada. On May 1st I met with Talisman president Jim Buckee just before

their annual shareholders’ meeting and challenged him to use his influence to appeal to the Khartoum government to end these atrocities against their own people.

Talisman shareholders voted to give the company one year to show progress in its

commitment to improving the plight of the Sudanese people. Obviously, much more

needs to be done in this direction.

The governments of the world could alleviate much of the plight of the southern

Sudanese. When several thousand white Kosovars were killed and tens of thousands

displaced, the world called it genocide. But sadly, when 1.9 million black Africans

are killed and millions more displaced, tortured, and even sold into slavery, our

world leaders remain strangely silent. And Western governments not only fail to

take punitive action such as imposing sanctions or initiating military intervention,

they continue to trade openly with the government of Sudan.

I hope and pray that the words of Abraham Lincoln will not be in vain and that

we as a nation will not turn our backs on the unfinished business that is still before

us—the freeing of all slaves and the idea that all men are created equal.

The CHAIRMAN. Franklin, I am confident that the taping of this

hearing is continuing, and I want to thank you for coming here

and, as the old saying goes, telling it like it is, because the media,

here and there they will mention it and have a story and so forth,

but they are too interested in too many conventions to confront

what is going on.

Now, for the record and so that those here and those who may

be listening on television, I want you to tell me a little bit about

37

Samaritan’s Purse. I have talked about Samaritan’s Purse that you

have founded and the tremendous job you are doing all over the

world. And I do not mean for you to be embarrassed at this question, but it needs to be known what a private Christian entity can

do, and you are doing it and I praise the lord for you.

Now, when did you found Samaritan’s Purse?

Reverend GRAHAM. Mr. Chairman, the organization was actually

started in 1970 by the late Dr. Bob Pierce. He died in 1978 and

I took the leadership of that organization in 1978 and have been

trying to give the leadership since that time. It has grown considerably over the years. We have had the opportunity to work in this

past year in over 70 countries.

Our focus is to take war areas and famine areas of the world, to

help people that the world has passed by, and do it in the name

of God’s son, the lord Jesus Christ. We believe that Christ gave the

example of the good samaritan, the story of a man who was beaten

and robbed and left for dead and others saw and chose not to get

involved and passed him by, but samaritan stopped and helped him

and got him on his feet and got him going again.

That is really our mandate, is just to take people along the ditch

of life’s road and help them and try to strengthen them and get

them on their way again. That is what we are doing in the Sudan,

is try to help these people that are in a terrible ditch and to try

to help them to strengthen themselves, to feed themselves, and

when we can to bandage their wounds, and do it in the name of

our lord and savior Jesus Christ.

The CHAIRMAN. You and I have talked about your work there

and I have undertaken to help you as best I can as a Senator. But

I do not see how you address as many problems as you do. For example, Honduras, just to pull one country in this hemisphere. They

had a disaster there, and I want you to tell me a little bit, not

boastfully because that is not your nature. You are not a boastful

man. But I think the people ought to understand what you did and

got no credit for in the media.

Reverend GRAHAM. Well, our support, Senator, comes from the

private sector, from Christians, churches, around the world. So we

have a lot more freedom than some agencies or some groups, because we respond to the areas we feel God is calling us to. We feel

that he helps us, enables us. Anything that we do, Senator, is because God has given us the ability and the strength and the people

and the resources from his church around the world to help us to

do it.

On Honduras, after the storm we felt the greatest need for the

people in that nation was shelter. People needed homes. Homes

were destroyed. The infrastructure of the country was in a mess.

Bridges were gone. We put a helicopter down there to help in the

transportation. But our greatest goal was to put people back into

houses.

The first year we were able to build over 3500 homes. These

would be cement block with a steel roof. We have—USAID now is

helping us with the second 3500 homes. The first came from the

private sector, but they saw what was done. So we give God the

glory and we thank him for their help and their support.

38

But the work continues. So that will be well over 6,000 houses,

we believe, by the end of this year that we will have been able to

build in about 11 different communities in Honduras.

The CHAIRMAN. I am just picking the little threads out of the fabric. What do you do at Christmas for children all over the world?

I want you to talk about the shoe boxes.

Reverend GRAHAM. Senator, that is very kind of you to mention

that. We have a program called Operation Christmas Child, where

we ask churches and families to take an empty shoe box and fill

them with items for a child. We started this about 10 years ago.

We collected—at that time we were working in Bosnia. That was

the height of the war. In our first year we took 11,000 boxes to Bosnia to the children. These boxes came from, again, churches and

families in thiscountry.

This past year we were able to do, if I am not mistaken, it is a

little over 3 million boxes, and this year we are trying to go for 4

million boxes. But these boxes are distributed in over 60 countries.

We work with churches. We are still working in Bosnia. We still

take them there. We go to Kosovo. We will be in the Sudan with

these gifts, North Korea, all over the world.

The CHAIRMAN. What percentage would you estimate of the children who get these boxes would not get anything at all for Christmas had it not been for Samaritan’s Purse?

Reverend GRAHAM. Well, if it was not, I think, for the Christian

families and the churches that have provided these gifts, it would

be well over 90 percent of these children will have never gotten a

gift in their life, much less a gift at Christmas. This would be the

first gift they have ever had in their life.

The CHAIRMAN. I have got to tell you, I had in my office one day

last year when I called you, I had a lady named Molly Broad, who

is the President of the Greater University of North Carolina. She

had come to talk to me about East Carolina University, which was

hit hard by Hurricane Floyd. I had just gotten a report from Governor Hunt that the roads and highways all over that part of eastern North Carolina were impassible because trees had fallen, telephone poles, live wires, and all the rest of it.

They said, what are we going to do, what are we going to do?

This is almost an impossible job. So I said, I am going to call

Franklin Graham.

Do you remember that call?

Reverend GRAHAM. Yes, sir, I sure do.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you remember what you told me?

Reverend GRAHAM. I do not remember that, no, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You said: Well, I have got three cargo planes

loaded with chain saws and I have got several hundred Christians

from the southeastern United States flying in to operate the chain

saws to grind up the trees and clear the roads and so forth. And

you had already done that before any government even did anything about it. I have used that example many, many times as the

power of what you are doing in the lord’s name.

Now, I am going to be criticized for being this casual, I suppose,

but I want you to know I admire you very, very much, and I think

you already know that, and I have loved your dad and mama. A

39

lot of people are surprised to learn that your mother was born in

China.

Reverend GRAHAM. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. The daughter of a great medical missionary.

One final thing. I want you to discuss what you did in North

Korea, which I think did more than any government diplomat has

done in the last 10 years toward bringing that country around toward moving in the direction of peace. Now, whom did you meet

with and what did you do there?

Reverend GRAHAM. It actually began about 7 years ago when my

father was invited by Kim Il Sung, the late dictator, the president

of the country, to visit North Korea. For some reason, Kim Il Sung

liked my father and said he was the first American he met that he

liked. He called my father family, and he really meant that, for

some strange reason. He has welcomed since then my mother. He

welcomed my father back for a second trip.

Of course, he passed away and his son, Kim Il Jil, is now president of the country. I was invited to come and I met with the foreign minister. We met with various—the number two man of the

country at the time. I am trying to think of his name. These Korean names are difficult for me, Senator Helms.

But Mr. Chairman, the point of our work in North Korea is to

help them with tuberculosis. They have a tremendous problem in

that country. We are targeting 10,000 people for drug therapy over

the next 6 months, and we believe that we will be able to cure

about 95 percent of these people over the next 6 months. Then we

are going to target another 10,000. They estimate there is well over

a million people in the nation that have tuberculosis, but you start

somewhere, someplace.

But they treated us in a tremendous way. We flew a private aircraft. It was the first private aircraft ever to go into North Korea.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand that.

Reverend GRAHAM. They were very gracious and, Senator Helms,

they want relations, better relations with this country. They really

do want peace. They are in a mess financially. Their country is

backwards and is going backwards, not forward. They realize that

and they know it, and they would like to have a better relationship

with this Nation and they are not quite sure how to get there.

I told them that I had a friend and his name was Senator Helms

and I am sure that he would be glad to lend his hand if he could

to better relations. But I think as a minister of the gospel of the

lord Jesus Christ, wherever I go not only am I ambassador for this

country, which I am proud of my Nation and I love my Nation, but

I am also an ambassador of the king of kings and the lord of lords.

I believe that wherever we go we should try to do our best to build

bridges of understanding, better relationships, and even if they are

our enemies, and we have many disagreements with North Korea,

but we need to begin a dialogue of at least talking to these men

and hearing their side of the story.

There is a lot of good things in North Korean society, Senator

Helms. I asked, who takes care of elderly people? Do you just put

them off on a farm or a commune? Oh, no, the elder son has to take

care of the mother and father. What happens if the elder son does

not? Oh, that is just unheard- of; that would not be permitted.

40

Is there divorce? Oh, no, very little divorce. What happens if

there is divorce? Well, the community does not accept it.

So there are some things we used to have in this Nation, strong

family values that we have lost, that they still hold very dear in

that part of the world, which I found to be extremely interesting.

So I think there is a lot in North Korea that we can build on and

some relations that we can develop there.

The CHAIRMAN. I have a feeling you are absolutely correct.

Mr. Berman, forgive me for this personal relationship with our

friend here. I apologize for not calling on you earlier, but we will

be glad to hear from you, sir.

Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Chairman, thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. And pull the mike a little closer to you, please.

STATEMENT OF ERIC G. BERMAN, FORMER EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, UNITED NATIONS WATCH, BELMONT, MASSACHUSETTS

Mr. BERMAN. I appreciate having been given the opportunity to

speak before you today on the United Nations role in peacekeeping

in Africa. I will focus my remarks this morning on Sierra Leone,

as I visited Freetown and regional capitals in May and June, but

I request that my full statement be submitted as part of the public

record.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. BERMAN. Until recently, UN peacekeeping had been reduced

to a shadow of its former self, especially in Africa. Whereas more

than 75,000 Blue Helmets served worldwide in 1993, by June 1999

there were fewer than 12,000. The corresponding numbers in Africa

were some 40,000 and fewer than 1600.

The UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), established last

October to replace a smaller observer force there, has seen its authorized strength doubled to more than 13,000 troops, as Ambassador Holbrooke mentioned earlier this morning. It is now larger

than the global UN peacekeeping presence 12 months ago and

there is discussion of enlarging the force still another 20 percent

to 16,500.

The UN Security Council’s robust response to the setback in Sierra Leone represents a significant and welcome shift from its recent disengagement from African peacekeeping. Unfortunately, its

decision to send an increasing number of UN Blue Helmets to Sierra Leone will not likely help resolve that conflict and could erode

support for worthwhile peacekeeping initiatives elsewhere in Africa.

Counterintuitively, the threat posed by the Revolutionary United

Front (RUF) will grow along with the number of UN peacekeepers

sent to defend Freetown. As the UN force gets closer to impinging

on the RUF’s lucrative diamond mining operations, the rebels and

their external supporters will attack UNAMSIL with greater intensity. The RUF needs to be engaged militarily and made to understand that there are consequences to its actions. If the RUF routinely suffered casualties, many of its soldiers would be more willing to risk the wrath of their commanders and surrender or run

away. To date, UNAMSIL has too often been seen as a source of

weapons for the RUF rather than as a professional military force

deserving its respect.

41

The existing mandate for UNAMSIL, though limited to self- defense, does permit UN troops to use deadly force and it will have

to suffice. The lethal and professional response of the Jordanians

two weeks ago to an RUF ambush shows what can be achieved

within the existing rules of engagement. However, waiting to be attacked before fighting back demands a level of discipline and selfsacrifice that few countries will accept. Should the Jordanians and

other UN contingents suffer serious casualties, they would likely

leave the mission.

Providing UNAMSIL with a peace enforcement mandate is not a

viable solution, as it would be very difficult to find countries willing

to contribute troops to such a mission. It is unlikely that Blue Helmets will prove equal to the task of engaging the guerrillas. The

RUF’s recent detention of some 400 troops of the Zambian battalion

is a case in point. It had little to do with the alleged failure of the

UNAMSIL Force Commander to prepare the battalion adequately

for its mission. First and foremost, the Zambian contingent’s performance against the RUF is explained by an understandable reluctance to fight and die in someone else’s war.

Providing weapons to the Sierra Leone Army (SLA) and its progovernment allies, as is being done right now, the Civil Defense

Force (CDF), is likely to prolong the conflict, not end it, given the

country’s tenuous and shifting alliances. The SLA and the

Kamajors, the civilian militia that forms the backbone of the CDF,

have little respect for the central government, which is universally

perceived as weak.

The recent decision by Johnny Paul Koroma to support President

Kabbah is further reason for concern. Koroma, who as leader of the

Armed Forces Revolutionary Council overthrew Kabbah in May

1997, has not since embraced the rule of law. Rather, he has developed a greater political savvy. His closeness to Kabbah is a reflection of his distance from, and disdain for, his former ally, the RUF

and its leader Foday Sankoh.

Ironically, the Sub-Regional Force, replaced because of its shortcomings by the UN, represents the best long-term prospect for promoting peace. The Nigerian-led Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), is widely regarded as a

largely ineffective and corrupt force. Whether or not the Regional

Force’s abilities were inextricably linked to its resources (or lack

thereof), two things are clear: First, the July 1999 Lome Peace

Agreement foresaw that ECOMOG would play the central role in

overseeing the military aspects of its implementation; and second,

the West failed to fulfill ECOMOG to support the role envisioned.

Since ECOMOG’s strengths and weaknesses were well known before Lome, the UN and the international community either should

have authorized and deployed a sizable UN force to replace

ECOMOG from the outset, or enabled ECOMOG to do the job requested of it, much as was done, albeit belatedly, in Liberia.

The resulting delays strengthened the RUF by making it more

difficult for the rank-and-file to take advantage of the amnesty and

financial inducements to demobilize. Now that it is abundantly

clear that the RUF must be engaged militarily and not just diplomatically, ECOMOG looks increasingly attractive because of its

42

proven willingness to incur and inflict casualties on a scale others

will not tolerate.

Having said this, it is not clear if ECOMOG can fight such a war

without committing too many excesses, as it did in response to the

rebel attack on Freetown in January 1999, or if the United Nations

will be able to accept such an imperfect and bloody solution.

To be effective, however, an ECOMOG force would need significant UN supervision and Western assistance. To dispel disturbing

allegations that many ECOMOG troops were more interested in entrepreneurial undertakings than in keeping the peace, ECOMOG

must be monitored more closely. Nigeria’s lamentations that its

support for ECOMOG was costing it a million dollars a day did little to sway international public opinion, given persistent reports

that Nigerian officers in ECOMOG were benefiting from the diamond trade.

Nigerian troops, which formed the bulk of ECOMOG, must be

better paid, better equipped, and better led. The prompt payment

of salaries would improve morale and discipline in the short term.

Sustained and generous Western assistance would be needed to

help overcome shortcomings of command and training.

The Council should give the UN a mandate and the resources to

provide the logistical, air, signals, and medical units that the West

African troops lack. The UN should also play a much more active

role in disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of ex-combatants. The reliance on the government of Sierra Leone in the

DDR program was excessive. A strict and detailed accounting of

each weapon should be made to help trace the weapons’ origins.

Weapons that were taken from UNAMSIL troops, with the exception of Guinea, should be returned to the troop contributor in question so that the UN does not have to reimburse them. Other weapons captured or turned in should be destroyed or disabled in situ.

Regulations must be created and strictly enforced to ensure that

any benefits package as part of the DDR program does not create

a financial incentive to procure weapons, which has been the case

in the recent past.

An ECOMOG force coupled with a significant UN operation, but

one much smaller than the current one, would also benefit the UN

Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

(MONUC). To date, as Ambassador Holbrooke mentioned, only

some 200 of MONUC’s authorized strength of more than 5,500

troops have been deployed. It will be difficult to gain international

support for expanding the UN presence in the DRC if the UN operation in Sierra Leone is seen to be bloated and directionless.

Despite the inherent difficulties and significant expenses an expanded UN peacekeeping presence in the DRC would represent, a

failure to act would also be costly. The Council should cautiously

move beyond its limited deployment of military observers and liaison officers and send a sufficient number of formed units to

Kisangani.

The decision of Rwanda and Uganda to pull back their troops

from the city is a welcome development. It has created new uncertainty, however, about who will control the city. If the UN does not

fill the vacuum, then a new humanitarian crisis might develop as

combatants seek to extend their influence. The Council must auVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:00 Feb 07, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00046 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 67707 SFRELA2 PsN: SFRELA2
43

1 Eric G. Berman and Katie E. Sams, Peacekeeping in Africa: Capabilities and Culpabilities,

Geneva: United Nations, 2000, 572 pp.

thorize and member states must provide appropriate forces, both in

numbers and equipment, to accomplish this task.

I should just reflect on Ambassador Holbrooke’s comment earlier

today about Pakistan, which has agreed to deploy troops. That is

very important, but it is also important to be able to provide them

with the equipment that they need, which right now they lack.

There is understandable unease that attempts to make progress

in such a piecemeal fashion will increase the possibility of a permanent split within the DRC. Nevertheless, the UN should seize on

this chance to stabilize the situation in Kisangani, which is the

country’s third largest city.

As for the possible UN mission in Eritrea and Ethiopia, the UN

assessment team has yet to provide its findings and recommendations, so it is not clear what Secretary General Kofi Annan will

propose to the Security Council and what the Council will authorize. One would hope that a relatively small observer force would

prove sufficient. There are no rebel groups to contend with and

both armies are well disciplined.

Regardless of the UN force’s eventual size, some way should be

found to engage the Organization of African Unity (OAU) so that

it might play a more active and capable role. A mission along the

Eritrean-Ethiopian border is an excellent opportunity for the Addis

Ababa-based Conflict Management Division of the OAU to gain invaluable experience and develop much-needed expertise. It is reasonable and desirable to expect the OAU to eventually take over

for the UN mission and plans for such an eventuality ought to be

worked into the mission from the outset.

To conclude, as President of the Security Council in January of

this year, Richard Holbrooke acknowledged the challenges facing

Africa. He highlighted many of the fundamental issues that contribute to instability and made the resolution of African conflicts a

higher item of concern on the U.S. and international agendas. This

is an important achievement.

Despite efforts by African countries to develop indigenous capabilities to promote peace and security on their continent, they still

require significant assistance, much more than existing programs

provide. Notwithstanding the setback in Sierra Leone, the UN and

the West must play a more active role, directly through UN peacekeeping and indirectly by properly supporting regional undertakings.

Mr. Chairman, thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Berman follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ERIC G. BERMAN

Mr. Chairman, My name is Eric Berman. I am the co-author with Katie Sams of

Peacekeeping in Africa: Capabilities and Culpabilities, which the United Nations

published in April 2000.1 The book represents the culmination of a two-year project

to review and analyze African peacekeeping experience, African efforts to develop

structures to respond to armed conflict on the continent, and Western capacitybuilding programs to develop African peacekeeping abilities. I appreciate having

been given the opportunity to speak before you today on the United Nations’ role

in peacekeeping in Africa.

44

2See UN Document S/RES/1306 (2000), 5 July 2000.

Until recently, UN peacekeeping had been reduced to a shadow of its former

self—especially in Africa. Whereas more than 75,000 Blue Helmets served worldwide in 1993, by June 1999 there were fewer than 12,000. The corresponding numbers in Africa were some 40,000 and fewer than 1,600. The UN Mission in Sierra

Leone (UNAMSIL), established last October to replace its small observer force

(UNOMSIL), has seen its authorized strength double to more than 13,000 troops.

It is now larger than the global UN peacekeeping presence 12 months ago. There

is discussion of enlarging the force another 20 percent to 16,500.

The United Nations Security Council’s robust response to the setback in Sierra

Leone represents a significant and welcome shift from its recent disengagement

from African peacekeeping. Unfortunately, its decision to send an increasing number

of UN Blue Helmets to Sierra Leone will not likely help resolve that conflict, and

could erode support for worthwhile peacekeeping initiatives elsewhere in Africa.

SIERRA LEONE

Counterintuitively, the threat posed by the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) will

grow along with the number of UN peacekeepers sent to defend Freetown. As the

UN force gets closer to impinging on the RUF’s lucrative diamond mining operations, the rebels and their external supporters will attack UNAMSIL with greater

intensity.

The RUF needs to be engaged militarily and made to understand that there are

consequences to its actions. if the RUF routinely suffered casualties, many of its soldiers would be more willing to risk the wrath of their commanders and surrender

or run away. To date UNAMSIL has too often been seen as a source of weapons

for the RUF rather than as a professional military force deserving of its respect.

The diamond areas must be retaken by force and returned to the government of

Sierra Leone. Last week’s Security Council resolution to prohibit the indirect or direct import of rough diamonds except for those controlled by an as-yet-non-existent

‘‘Certificate of Origin’’ regime represents a political achievement and an important

precedent.2 Its effectiveness in weakening the RUF will be negligible in the short

and medium terms. The RUF will continue its purchase and delivery of weapons

with diamonds because those diamonds will remain available to them; governments

and individuals involved will continue to deal in the illegal trade because the rewards are great and the risks slim. For any effort to control the trade of Sierra

Leonean diamonds to be effective, Liberia must either be forced or cajoled into compliance. Presently, Charles Taylor will not comply voluntarily.

The existing mandate for UNAMSIL, though limited to self-defense, does permit

UN troops to use deadly force, and will have to suffice. The lethal and professional

response of the Jordanian troops two weeks ago when they came under an RUF attack near Mile 91 shows what can be achieved within existing rules of engagement.

However, waiting to be attacked before fighting back demands a level of discipline

and self-sacrifice that few countries will accept. Should the Jordanians and other

UN contingents suffer serious casualties, they would likely leave the mission. It

would be very difficult to find enough countries willing to contribute troops to a mission in Sierra Leone with a peace enforcement mandate.

It is unlikely that Blue Helmets will prove equal to the task of engaging the guerrillas. The RUF’s recent detention of some 400 troops of the Zambian battalion is

a case in point. It had little to do with the alleged failure of the UNAMS1L Force

Commander to prepare the battalion adequately for its mission. The Zambian President publicly took the Force Commander to task for sending newly-arrived Zambian

troops out to Makeni (where a detachment from the Kenyan battalion had come

under attack) without maps and without an appreciation for the mandate. But the

explanation for what happened lies elsewhere. A team of unarmed UN Military Observers (UNMOs) familiar with the terrain accompanied the Zambians to Lunsar,

a town 40 miles west of Makeni. The UNMOs warned the Zambians to prepare for

a possible RUF ambush and to defend themselves. First and foremost the Zambian

contingent’s performance against the RUF is explained by an understandable reluctance to fight and die in someone else’s war.

Providing weapons to the Sierra Leone Army (SLA) and its pro-government allies

the Civil Defence Force (CDF) is likely to prolong the conflict, not end it, given the

country’s tenuous and shifting alliances. The SLA and the Kamajors (the civilian

militia that forms the backbone of the CDF) have little respect for the central government, which is universally perceived as weak. The recent decision by Johnny

Paul Koroma to support President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah is further reason for concern. Koroma, who as leader of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council overthrew

45

3 Using private security companies to assist the government represents an intriguing policy

option. Executive Outcomes, which the Sierra Leonean government hired in 1995, proved effective in countering the RIJF. Given mercenaries’ storied and sordid reputations on the continent,

however, it is unlikely that private security companies can be a part of viable official policy mix

at present. 4The Guinean battalion was relieved of its weapons on the way to joining UNAMSIL. UN and

Western government officials familiar with the incident believe it was a commercial transaction

rather than a hold up by the RUF.

Kabbah in May 1997, has not since embraced the rule of law. Rather, he has developed a greater political savvy. His closeness to Kabbah is a reflection of his distance

from and disdain for his former ally, the RUF and its leader Foday Sankoh. Plans

to restructure and professionalize the SLA are a worthwhile initiative but their effects are not going to be realized for a long time.

Ironically, the subregional force replaced because of its shortcomings by the UN

represents the best long-term prospect for promoting peace. The Nigerian-led Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) is widely

regarded as a largely ineffective and corrupt force. Whether or not the regional

force’s abilities were inextricably linked to its resources (or lack thereof) two things

are clear. First, the July 1999 Lome Peace Agreement foresaw that ECOMOG would

play the central role in overseeing the military aspects of its implementation. Second, the West failed to support ECOMOG to fulfil the role envisioned. Since

ECOMOG’s strengths and weaknesses were known well before Lome, the UN and

the international community either should have authorized and deployed a sizeable

UN force to replace ECOMOG from the outset, or enabled ECOMOG to do the job

requested of it (much as was done, albeit belatedly, in Liberia). The resulting delay

strengthened the RUF by making it more difficult for the rank-and-file to take advantage of the amnesty and financial inducements to demobilize. Now that it is

abundantly clear that the RUF must be engaged militarily—and not just diplomatically—ECOMOG looks increasingly attractive because of its proven willingness to

incur and inflict casualties on a scale others will not tolerate.3 Having said this, it

is not clear if ECOMOG can fight such a war without committing too many excesses

(as it did in response to the rebel attack on Freetown in January 1999), or if the

United Nations will be able to accept such an imperfect and bloody ‘‘solution.’’

To be effective, however, an ECOMOG force would need significant UN supervision and Western assistance. To dispel disturbing allegations that many ECOMOG

troops were more interested in entrepreneurial undertakings than in keeping the

peace, ECOMOG must be monitored more closely. Nigeria’s lamentations that its

support for ECOMOG was costing it a million dollars a day did little to sway international public opinion given persistent reports that Nigerian officers in ECOMOG

were benefitting from the diamond trade. Nigerian troops (which form the bulk of

ECOMOG) must be better paid, better equipped, and better led. The prompt payment of salaries would improve morale and discipline in the short term. Sustained

and generous Western assistance would be needed to help overcome shortcomings

of command and training. The Council should give the UN a mandate and resources

to provide the logistical, air, signals, and medical units that the West African troops

lack.

The UN should also play a much more active role in disarmament, demobilization,

and reintegration (DDR) of ex-combatants. The reliance on the government of Sierra

Leone in the DDR program was excessive. A strict and detailed accounting of each

weapon should be made to help trace the weapons’ origins. Weapons that were

taken from UNAMSIL troops—with the exception of Guinea 4—should be returned

to the troop contributor in question so that the UN does not have to reimburse

them. Other weapons captured or turned in should be destroyed or disabled in situ.

Regulations must be created and strictly enforced (with particular attention to

group weapons, anti-personnel mines, and grenades) to ensure that any benefits

package as part of the DDR program does not create a financial incentive to procure

weapons.

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

An ECOMOG force coupled with a significant UN operation—but one much smaller than the current one—would also benefit the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC). To date only some 200 of

MONUC’s authorized strength of 5,500 troops have been deployed in the Democratic

Republic of the Congo (DRC) and regional capitals. It will be even more difficult to

gain international support for expanding the UN presence in the DRC if the UN

operation in Sierra Leone is seen to be bloated and directionless.

46

5Shortly after Angola, Namibia, and Zimbabwe sent troops to the DRC in support of President

Laurent Kabila, those four countries signed a mutual defense pact. The possibility that Angola

might wage war against Zambia, which Luanda has accused sporadically of supporting Jonas

Savimbi is cause for concern.

The situation in the DRC is sufficiently volatile and complex to raise legitimate

questions as to the wisdom of supporting an expanded peacekeeping operation there.

MONUC is faced with enormous logistical and political challenges. The UN was

having a difficult time securing sufficient interest and capabilities among UN Member States before the most recent fighting between Rwandan and Ugandan troops

in Kisangani. Several countries that had pledged troops to the mission are now reconsidering their offers.

Despite the inherent difficulties and significant expenses an expanded UN peacekeeping presence in the DRC would represent, a failure to act would also be costly.

The continued success of the Interahamwe as a capable fighting force can be attributed in large part to three separate Security Council decisions in 1994: first, the

Council decided to drastically reduce the UN peacekeeping operation in Rwanda;

second, it authorized Operation Turquoise; and third, it failed to support the Secretary-General’s call for either a UN police or military observer presence to provide

security for the refugee camps. In 1996 the Council authorized but did not field a

military force in then Eastern Zaire, which led to what some have described as ‘‘a

second genocide,’’ this time against ethnic Hutus. In 1998 the UN ill-advisedly left

it to the Southern African Development Community (SADC) to respond to the rebellion in the DRC. Before long, troops from nine countries were fighting there. Moreover, a split has developed within SADC that threatens the subregion’s peace and

security.5

The Council should cautiously move beyond its limited deployment of military observers and liaison officers and send sufficient numbers of formed units to

Kisangani. The decision of Rwanda and Uganda to pull back their troops from the

city was a welcome development. It has created a new uncertainty, however, about

who will control the city. if the UN does not fill this vacuum then a new humanitarian crisis might develop as combatants seek to extend their influence. The Council must authorize and Member States must provide appropriate forces—both in

numbers and equipment—to accomplish the task. There is understandable unease

that attempts to make progress in such a piecemeal fashion will increase the possibility of a permanent split within the DRC. Nevertheless, the UN should seize on

this chance to stabilize the situation in Kisangani, the country’s third largest city.

ERITREA AND ETHIOPIA

As the UN assessment team has yet to return with its findings and recommendations, it is not yet clear what Secretary-General Kofi Annan will propose to the Security Council and what the Council will authorize. One would hope that a relatively small observer force would prove sufficient. There are no rebel groups to contend with and both armies are well disciplined.

The Council should support a UN mission as the OAU is not yet ready to assume

such a responsibility. The OAU, like several subregional organizations on the continent, has made progress in the past decade to assume a greater role in promoting

peace and security. In the early 1990s it fielded a small peacekeeping operation in

Rwanda, which was notable given its earlier failure in Chad. The OAU subsequently

established the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, a

smaller decision-making body called the Central Organ, and a separate Peace Fund.

The OAU has since authorized observer missions in Burundi, the Comoros and the

DRC, but all have been small and have suffered from logistical and administrative.

problems.

Regardless of the UN force’s eventual size, some way should be found to engage

the OAU so that it might play a more active and capable role in the future. The

OAU’s Conflict Management Division remains understaffed and overstretched.

While improvements to the physical plant were necessary, greater attention needs

to be paid to developing the human capital. A mission along the Eritrean and Ethiopian border is an excellent opportunity for the Addis Ababa-based Conflict Management Division to gain invaluable experience and develop much-needed expertise. It

is reasonable and desirable to expect the OAU to eventually take over for the UN

mission and plans for such an eventuality ought to be worked into the mission from

the outset.

47

RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING PEACEKEEPING IN AFRICA IN GENERAL

Besides the suggestions made above concerning UNAMSIL, MONUC and the proposed UN peacekeeping operation in Eritrea and Ethiopia, the following recommendations relate to strengthening peacekeeping in Africa in general. They represent an abridged selection of those Katie Sams and I offered in our book, Peacekeeping in Africa.

Concerning Actions to be Taken by African States and Organizations

• African states must place a greater emphasis on staffing their organizations with

sufficient personnel to assume new responsibilities.

Subregional organizations are creating mechanisms with inadequate regard for

the ability to run them. In the Economic Community of West African States

(ECOWAS) Secretariat, for example, the ‘‘Department’’ of Legal Affairs, which has

also been responsible for supporting ECOWAS peace and security initiatives, consists only of a Director and a Deputy Director. Similarly, staff of the OAU’s Conflict

Management Division has not grown commensurately with the new demands it has

been asked to meet. Fifteen people, including both professional and support staff,

are insufficient to run the Conflict Management Centre’s 24-hour Situation Room,

let alone the entire Division. African organizations must recruit and train adequate

qualified personnel to handle the greater demands being placed on their secretariats.

• African states need to concentrate on making incremental progress and resist the

temptation to jump from one ambitious plan to another without effect.

African regional and subregional organizations should be more pragmatic about

what they can and cannot accomplish in the short and medium terms. Overly-ambitious plans divert scarce resources from more realistic projects. For example, the

Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) has created overlapping

and ill-defined peace and security structures with insufficient regard for how they

will operate and how its Secretariat will service them. Rather than creating new

mechanisms, ECCAS members should now concentrate on making existing ones

operational. In the short term, efforts to secure funding for joint peacekeeping training exercises or to establish an Early Warning Mechanism should be abandoned;

member states should focus instead on developing the Council for Peace and Security in Central Africa (COPAX) and strengthening the ECCAS Secretariat.

ECOWAS has also initiated several projects that appear far-fetched in view of

present and foreseeable limitations. Its Sub-Regional Security and Peace Observation System, which is to comprise four Observation Monitoring Zone field offices,

seems well beyond the organization’s current capabilities, as does a standing peacekeeping force. ECOWAS members would be better served to forestall such plans and

first concentrate on developing other aspects of the Mechanism, particularly the proposed Mediation and Security Council and numerous reforms to strengthen the Secretariat.

• African multilateral military inteiventions need to be placed firmly under civilian control.

In the past, the OAU and African subregional organizations failed to adequately

supervise the military activities of member states that were ostensibly acting in

their name. Designating a civilian official to oversee the mission is a possible means

of addressing this deficiency. Although the OAU and ECOWAS have both assigned

Special Representatives for some of their operations, they have not always been effective. Financial and other organizational constraints make it difficult to provide

these officials with appropriate staff. As President Amadou Toumani Toure proved

in the Inter-African Force to Monitor the Bangui Agreements (MJSAB), however, a

strong-willed, active, and respected individual with an appropriate mandate can

achieve much with minimal support. Ensuring that consistent communication channels are established between the Secretariat and the field—a recurring problem for

the OAU and ECOWAS—could also minimize misunderstandings and promote civilian control.

Concerning Actions to be Taken by Non-African Countries and Organizations

• Non-African capacity-building programs need to more generously support the

hiring and training of additional qualified personnel within African regional

and subregional organizations.

Although some non-African countries and organizations have financed additional

posts within African organizations and helped train their staff, such assistance is

rare and is conducted on a relatively small scale. The UK, which stands out among

its peers as being particularly active in this regard, has paid for the secondment

48

of OAU officers to the UN Secretariat and more recently has agreed to fund three

political desk officers at the OAU Conflict Management Center’s Situation Center

for a three-year period. The European Union has underwritten the employment of

short-term staff to assist the OAU Conflict Management Division. The United States

has supported an exercise designed to test preparedness of the OAU Crisis Management Centre. Such initiatives should be expanded in order to enhance the operational capabilities of African regional and subregional organizations.

• Donor countries should provide funding for conflict resolution efforts first and

‘‘early warning systems’’ second.

At present, the greatest challenge in promoting African peace and security is to

find a meaningful response to existing conflicts and working to contain them. Broadly speaking, preventive diplomacy is a worthwhile and intelligent policy option. Several programs billed as ‘‘preventive,’’ however, have been oversold—particularly ‘‘early warning systems.’’ Yet many donor countries and organizations devote significant scarce resources to these initiatives—often at the expense of more pressing and

deserving conflict resolution efforts. Providing funding for peacekeeping missions to

manage and resolve ongoing conflicts should take priority over providing funding for

elaborate and expensive initiatives to collect and analyze data.

• More non-African states should provide specialized training to African contingents preparing to deploy to regional peacekeeping operations.

Most non-African capacity-building programs offer general peacekeeping training

to troops and officers, covering basic skills. Western states have rarely given mission-specific instruction to African contingents preparing to participate in particular

peacekeeping operations. Given that African regional peacekeeping operations often

lack the resources and civilian support to properly brief and prepare participants

upon arrival to the mission area, such training would fill a void. One of the criticisms leveled against current Western capacity-building programs is that recipients

may never actually use the training they receive in a peacekeeping operation. By

providing training to contingents that have already committed to participate in

peacekeeping operations, this concern would no longer hold.

• Western states and organizations should more freely share their data and analyses on African conflict areas with the UN or African regional organizations.

Many Western states and organizations have devoted substantial resources to

monitoring and analyzing threats to peace and security on the African continent. Individual western countries have shared their findings with African states and organizations—albeit rarely. This type of assistance can be extremely helpful to regional

peacekeeping initiatives in Africa as evidenced in Sierra Leone, where the UK has

shared intelligence with ECOMOG commanders on the ground and provided the

force with detailed maps of the area. It is understandable that much of this information cannot be shared given its sensitivity and the need to protect sources. However,

there is much useful information gathered that is not of a sensitive nature that nevertheless is not divulged. This describes, for example, much of the reporting and imagery on African conflicts and crises that the Western European Union (WEU) Satellite Center has produced. The WEU should consider making some of this information available to either African states and organizations or to the UN.

• The US African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) should engage subregional organizations directly and not limit its support to individual states on a bilateral

basis.

Working directly with subregional organizations has numerous benefits. It

strengthens the role of the organizations’ secretariats, which is important given the

additional responsibilities the UN Security Council is asking those bodies to play

in the promotion of peace and security. A subregional approach could also enable

countries with small military forces to receive training that might not otherwise be

possible. Smaller national units could train alongside contingents from other countries. These joint units could also serve as the basis for confidence-building measures among countries that have a history of distrust.

• France’s program of pre-positioning materiel in Africa to support regional peacekeeping operations should be expanded.

From its stocks in Senegal, France has provided vehicles and medical equipment

to African peacekeeping operations in the Central African Republic and in GuineaBissau. RECAMP’s long-term plans include establishing four more depots for such

pre-positioned materiel—in Gabon, Djibouti, and tentatively Cote d’Ivoire and Reunion. Ideally, the depots should be spread out around the continent to better ensure the equipment’s rapid availability. It may not prove practical to pre-position

49

equipment on Reunion, for example, given its location. If France were to develop

this aspect of RECAMP in closer collaboration with African regional or subregional

organizations, that might encourage other donor nations to contribute materiel to

supplement France’s own supplies. The standard equipment package could also be

enlarged to include greater numbers of vehicles and spare parts. Additional non-lethal supplies such as communication equipment, generators, tentage, and rations

could be provided as well.

• The UK’s decision to use development funds for non-military training and assistance to foreign security forces and relevant civilian bodies is a worthwhile initiative that merits replication by other countries.

The Security Sector Reform Programme of the UK Department for International

Development (DFID) is a bold experiment with potentially significant results for African countries. Reforming the security sector is a new domain for development

agencies, which have often restricted their support to non-military undertakings.

Through the DFID initiative, substantial development aid will be used to train foreign security forces with the goal of rendering them accountable to civilian democratic authorities. Although it is still too early to know whether the Security Sector

Reform Programme will make a notable impact, the effort provides adequate financial means for serious programs to be undertaken.

Concerning Actions to be Taken by the United Nations

• The Security Council must provide greater oversight and guidance to regional

arrangements that intervene militarily in the promotion of peace.

While it may not always be practical or possible for the Security Council to give

prior authorization for a regional organization or ad hoc initiative to deploy troops,

the Council should require all such undertakings to provide it with timely and relevant information on their activities and the situation on the ground. Reporting requirements should be reasonable and clearly stated. Regional forces must be better

sensitized to the needs and activities of international humanitarian relief organizations that work alongside them.

• The Security Council should review its practice of authorizing small military observer missions to serve alongside regional peacekeeping forces.

The deployment of UN military observers to complement non-UN peacekeeping

forces is more likely to create new tensions than to serve as either a useful check

and balance or a confidence-building measure. The regional force feels that it is

being unfairly scrutinized, if the UN observer mission is critical in its reporting, tensions will increase. Because the small observer mission is dependent on the larger

regional mission for security, there is a tendency to withhold criticism to maintain

good relations. When security is not or cannot be provided, UN observer missions

withdraw—at great financial and political cost Another problem of this approach is

that such small, largely ineffective observer forces provide the Council with a pretext that it is meaningfully engaged in trying to resolve a conflict when it is not.

• The Security Council should authorize specialized UN contingents to serve within regional peacekeeping forces.

Ask an African regional organization or a coalition of ad hoc states what kinds

of UN assistance would best support their peacekeeping initiatives, and they are not

likely to answer ‘‘military observers.’’ Yet that is exactly what the Council offers.

Military observers responds to the Council’s concerns, not those of the regional force.

What African countries lack are specialized units with sophisticated or expensive

materiel, such as aircraft, communications or engineering equipment. A wellequipped and trained signals unit would be an especially welcome addition to African operations, given that such initiatives often lack reliable communication links

between headquarters and contingent or sector commands. Similarly, a wellequipped logistics unit would also be helpful in light of the operational shortcomings

African operations face. While the command structure of the force would potentially

be a delicate issue, it is not insurmountable. Under such a scenario, the Council

would be making a much better investment as formed units cost the UN much less

than similar numbers of military observers. In addition, the Council would create

a more symbiotic relationship between the UN and the regional or force.

As President of the Security Council in January of this year, Richard Holbrooke

acknowledged the challenges facing Africa. He highlighted many of the fundamental

issues that contribute to instability and made the resolution of African conflicts a

higher item of concern on the US and international agendas. This is an important

achievement. Despite efforts by African countries to develop indigenous capabilities

to promote peace and security on their continent, they still require significant assistVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:00 Feb 07, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00053 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 67707 SFRELA2 PsN: SFRELA2
50

ance—much more than existing capacity-building programs provide. Notwithstanding the setback in Sierra Leone, the UN and the West must play a more active

role, directly through UN peacekeeping and indirectly by properly supporting regional undertakings.

The CHAIRMAN. A very excellent statement. I commend you.

I have been hogging the stage here. One of you two gentlemen.

Senator FRIST. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Berman, you heard much of the discussion earlier about

Sudan in terms of the role of the United Nations Operation Lifeline

Sudan, and a little bit about Samaritan’s Purse’s efforts. The war

in Sudan is a longstanding one and a complicated one in some

ways, in some ways much simpler than people think, especially

when you see the various entities that are fighting and the things

that can be done.

Could you comment on how you see the United Nations playing

a role in negotiating and participating and encouraging a peaceful

settlement of that war?

Mr. BERMAN. Senator, thank you. I must confess that I am not

an expert on the situation in Sudan. I did live in Nairobi for 6

months in 1998 and am familiar with a little bit of Operation Lifeline Sudan. I have listened to the remarks carefully this morning

and I share with you the same concerns you have, that the current

status quo is perpetuating an injustice.

I think the UN has to be engaged in a different way than it has

been and I do not believe that we should be relying to the extent

that we now are on the regional organization, IGAD, which is right

now taking the main role in trying to settle that conflict. But I do

not have any—while I have concrete suggestions for UN policy and

U.S. policy in other parts of the continent, I do not have it for

Sudan. I am sorry.

Senator FRIST. Thank you.

Mr. Chairman, it has been fascinating for me. A fellow by the

name of Kenny Isaacs in mid-1997, who is here today, basically explored the southern Sudan, probably not knowing exactly what he

would find, about 4 months after his initial traveling through the

southern Sudan began and initiated Samaritan’s Purse’s involvement in a hospital there in Lui. In January 1998 I had the opportunity to travel with Kenny and Dr. Richard Furman from Boone,

North Carolina, who has been instrumental in a group called World

Medical Mission, now a part of Samaritan’s Purse, which puts

about 500 physicians around the world every year in short-term

missions.

That was fascinating because over the 2 years in a community

where there was nothing, where people had this sense of fear and

would not come together, because there was a hospital, a hospital

that attracted people, through that the health care, commerce

began and a sense of community. That was for 2 years.

Then in March of this year—and I was just there last week, operating once again. In March and April of this year, 42 different

bombs—Reverend Graham mentioned 5 different days. Well, we

were able to actually count the number of bombs that fell. About

3 days ago I was standing in a crater 8 feet deep from one of these

bombs. There was death, there was tragedy, all in an area where

Samaritan’s Purse has made a huge contribution.

51

It is this needless bombing of civilians that is tolerated indirectly

by the United States, and that is why this commitment today from

Ambassador Holbrooke I think is terribly, terribly important.

I just want to congratulate Samaritan’s Purse for the real

progress that has been made. Samaritan’s Purse also in the past

week, when I talk about the Blue Nile, about four tons of seed and

medical supplies were introduced to an area that, simply because

there is a flight ban there, have not seen that sort of delivery of

supplies, again due to Samaritan’s Purse. In an area which I mentioned earlier, Peguong, which is a fly zone, but limited access,

where there are about 31,000 people displaced, again Samaritan’s

Purse over the last 3 weeks has delivered 20 tons of seed, not food

but seed and fishhooks—a very self-reliant people—so that they

can take care of themselves.

Having had the opportunity to see on the inside this group work

under some pioneering leadership has been a great privilege for

me. It is very important, I think, to take that work and elevate it

so other people can see, because we can change the policies which

will open up these areas and change the destiny of that country.

The CHAIRMAN. I am going to make a personal observation, Senator, that this committee and, I do not think, I know, the entire

Senate is proud of you for what you have done and the way you

have conducted yourself. I am proud to be a Senator serving with

you.

Senator Brownback.

Senator BROWNBACK. Let me second that as well. I am proud to

be able to sit by a person that has done so much, and also to be

able to share with being here with Dr. Graham and the work that

your organization has done, the comments that have been made

here.

I am puzzled, is really where I am today. I am puzzled. I come

from a State that fought to become a part of the Union on the issue

of slavery, ‘‘Bleeding Kansas.’’ We fought and the battle was raging

around our State whether we would be a free or a slave State. That

was 150 years ago and people of faith then came out, moved out

to Kansas. They did not really come out to farm at that point in

time. They stayed to farm, but they came out to fight. They came

out to fight for freedom in places like Lawrence, and the New England Immigrant Aid Society and people of faith moving people

there into Oswatamie, Kansas, and into Topeka.

My mother is from Oswatamie. I have gone to school in Lawrence. I live in Topeka now. These are all very familiar things to

me. Guerrilla warfare killed 200 people in some of these initial battles that began the Civil War. But they just found slavery so abhorrent, so abhorrent, that they would give up everything that they

had to move to an unknown place to fight for freedom.

We are 150 years later. We have freedom—we have slavery staring us in the face in the Sudan. Dr. Frist has seen it, I have seen

it, you have seen it. And it is as if we are blind in the eye to it,

that we will not even recognize it, we will not even see it. It is just

so much in our past that we just, we cannot see it. It is like it is

the elephant right here in the room.

I am just puzzled. I do not understand it, why we cannot stand

up and fight against slavery today, the slavery that is taking place

52

in the Sudan. Maybe you can lend some light to why you think that

this is not being addressed today. Maybe what we need to have is

a new—and I am part of the one that is burgeoning now—a new

abolitionist movement of people saying, I am a freedom fighter, I

am going to fight against slavery, and we just start and push and

call on people for this new abolitionist movement, that the fight

against slavery is not over with.

I would appreciate your thoughts on my ramblings and my puzzlements, Reverend Graham. Also, you are always welcome in Kansas. Any time you or any members of your family—you are good

North Carolinians and you just recently tried to take one of our

good Kansans to North Carolina in our basketball coach. But you

are welcome any time.

Reverend GRAHAM. Thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. We could not get your coach, though.

Senator BROWNBACK. No, thankfully.

Reverend GRAHAM. Mr. Chairman, the question of slavery disturbs me probably more than any other issue in Africa, that a nation would be permitted to continue doing this, why the world community has not said this is wrong, this is an outrage, and used its

power. Why has not this government stood up, this government

that has stood for freedom around the world in the past, why we

have not stood beside the black Christians of the south and defend

them against a racial war, a war that is Arab against black, Moslem against Christian? And why has the world not said anything?

I do not know.

But we do know that Sudan is not the only nation that practices

slavery in Africa or in the Middle East. There are nations that

have quite a bit of oil that western countries do business with and

it has been well known for many years that slavery is still practiced in some of these countries. Not as much as it was at one time,

but it is still done.

So maybe that is one of the reasons, maybe it is oil, that we turn

our back and close our eye. But I hope, Mr. Chairman, that this

could become an issue once again in the halls of Washington, a call

for freedom for our black brothers and sisters in Africa. If we do

not speak on their behalf, who will?

The CHAIRMAN. Amen.

Any further comment? [No response.]

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I thank both of you for being here and for

your patience. Ambassador Holbrooke is always an interesting witness and very informative. But I think both panels were just exemplary today and I am proud of both of them, and I am grateful to

you and to you and to the Senators who came today.

Thank you very much. If there be no further business to come

before the committee, we stand in recess.

[Whereupon, at 12:47 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

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