IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 18-1612

Filed September 11, 2019

BENAIAH MABLIN,

Applicant-Appellee,

vs.

STATE OF IOWA,

Respondent-Appellant.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Clinton County, John D. Telleen, 

Judge.

The State appeals the district court’s grant of postconviction relief to 

Benaiah Mablin. REVERSED AND REMANDED.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Timothy M. Hau, Assistant Attorney 

General, for appellant State.

John J. Wolfe, Clinton, for appellee.

Considered by Mullins, P.J., Bower, J., and Vogel, S.J.*

*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 (2019).
2

BOWER, Judge.

The State seeks reversal of the district court’s ruling granting postconviction 

relief (PCR) to Benaiah Mablin on the ground the court failed to properly analyze

the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims. Because we conclude Mablin has 

failed to prove the requisite prejudice, we reverse the district court and remand for 

dismissal of the PCR application. 

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

On December 13, 2007, at 5:02:57 p.m., a 9-1-1 caller reported finding 

blood in the building elevator leading to an apartment (Apartment #3) where 

neighbors found a bloody body after the resident’s child opened the door for them. 

Officers were dispatched to the apartment, found Sandra Chambers-Singh dead, 

and took statements from the neighbors.

Neighbors Jeff Howard and Shelia Grant informed the officers they believed 

Chambers-Singh was selling or using crack cocaine. Howard also told the officers 

to speak with the tenants of Apartment #1 because they were friends with 

Chambers-Singh. Howard also informed the officers he had seen the male tenant 

who lived in Apartment #1, Corey Campbell, knock on Chambers-Singh’s door 

earlier in the day around 1:00 or 2:00 p.m. Another neighbor, Janet Domer, 

informed police that if Chambers-Singh was dead then “either C-Note or Ren killed 

her.” C-Note—Carley Campbell Sr.—was Corey Campell’s uncle. Ren—Lorenzo 

Dodd—was Chambers-Singh’s ex-boyfriend. 

An officer interviewed Ginger Noble, who stated that at about 4:00 p.m. on 

December 13, she entered the elevator on the second floor of the apartment 

building and encountered a black male bleeding from his facial area. She stated 
3

the black male was approximately six feet tall, wore a red stocking cap, and a blue 

“puffy” winter coat.

Corey Campbell gave a statement to Officer Michael Adney, whose report 

provides, in part:

On 12/13/07, I interviewed Corey Campbell at . . . 

Apartment #1. Corey told me he lived with his grandmother in 

that apartment since October 2007.

Corey told he left the apartment at 1700 hrs. Corey said 

he got back to his apartment somewhere between 1730 and 

1800 hrs. He said he went out to get his hair braided, but did 

not find anyone to braid it.

I asked Corey if he knew who lived in apartment #3. He said 

a black girl named “Sandra”. He said he knew Sandra since about 

December 2006. He met her through a girl named “Jasmine”, 

Corey Campbell’s uncle Carley Campbell’s girlfriend.

I asked Corey Campbell if he heard any yelling or noises. 

Corey said between 1630 and 1640 hrs., he heard arguing and 

went to his apartment door. The yelling came from Sandra’s 

apartment, so he knocked on her door. Corey said he knocked on 

Sandra’s Apartment, #3, between 1640 or 1650 hrs. He felt unsure 

on the time. When he knocked on the door, Sandra’s son . . .

opened the door. Corey saw Sandra sitting on her bed in the 

bedroom, crying. Corey said he walked in the apartment and stood 

by the refrigerator while he spoke with Sandra. Corey said he did 

not see anyone else in the room at the time and did not see any 

blood. Sandra told Corey she was fine. Corey left.

Corey said he returned between 1730 and 1800 hrs. As he 

passed by #3, he knocked on the apartment and no one answered, 

so he assumed no one remained in the apartment.

. . . .

I asked Corey if he knew if Chambers-Singh owned a vehicle. 

Corey said she drove a white or tannish minivan.

Carley Campell Jr. (son of Carley Campbell Sr.) was interviewed by 

Officer Dannie Howard at about 7:45 p.m. Carley stated he arrived at 

Apartment #1 at about 5:00 p.m. and used the stairs to get to the second floor. 

He stated he did not remember seeing anyone in the hallway or the stairway 

when he arrived. He told the officer he visited with Corey and another person 
4

and, when he was leaving at about 6:08 p.m., police asked him to remain in 

the apartment. Carley stated he had not seen Chambers-Singh on December 

13.

Meanwhile, at 5:03 p.m., Officer Dan Sager was dispatched to a hospital to 

investigate a man who claimed to have been assaulted. Officer Sager met the 

man, Mablin. In his report, Officer Sager notes:

Mablin said he was an informant for the police department, 

which I knew from previous encounters. He told me, he was out near

the railroad tracks by Hy-Vee on 11th Avenue South and 4th Street 

and said he was picked up in a gray Cadillac and was going to 

purchase some cocaine from a guy he knew as “B.”

. . . .

Mablin said he got into the car, sat in the rear passenger seat, 

was told to get out and get up in the front driver’s side. Mablin said

at this point, they drove under an underpass, under the tracks. He 

said it was out past Hy-Vee, going into south Clinton. He told me 

once they made it under the under pass, they took an immediate left

and then took another immediate left into a curve. He said they drove 

slowly back here. He said the driver was on the cell phone the whole 

time and the subject he knew as “B” was calling him a “snitch”, calling 

him a “cop” and said “F him up like this”. Mablin told me at this point 

he was in fear of his safety as they were going into an area he wasn’t 

familiar with in Clinton.

. . . .

Mablin said the driver grabbed at his arm. I asked which arm 

and he said it was the left. I did not see any marks on his arm. He 

then said somebody grabbed his neck. Mablin then opened up the 

passenger side door and he told me he rolled out. I asked him how 

he got the marks on his face and the cut on his hand. He said he did 

not know. 

Mablin told Officer Sager he had $347 with him and had given it to one of 

the people in the car because he was going to buy crack. The officer “asked if it 

was okay if l could take his clothes with me as they were part of the assault scene 

and I thought there may be blood on from the suspects on the clothes.” Mablin 
5

agreed, and Officer Sager “placed them into some bags I had from the hospital 

and took them to my squad car.” 

Mablin’s aunt, Sharon Holmes, had accompanied Mablin to the hospital and 

told Officer Sager that Mablin arrived at her home at 4:30 p.m. and was bloody. 

Mablin told her he was in a car with some people, had some money taken, and 

was pushed out of the car. Holmes said that when Mablin entered he asked to 

wash his clothes, which included a blue “puffy” winter coat, an orange swimsuit, 

tan pants, blue polo shirt, underwear, and a pair of socks. Holmes gave Mablin 

clothes to wear and took him to the hospital. 

Mablin was taken to get x-rays. While Officer Sager was in the waiting 

room, he received a call from Officer Dean Ottens, “telling me Mablin may be 

involved in an incident on South 3rd Street.”

Officer Brian Pohl arrived at the hospital about 7:30 p.m. and spoke with 

Mablin’s aunt. Holmes told Officer Pohl that Mablin arrived at her house about 

4:30 p.m. and she saw that his left hand was bleeding. He was wearing brown 

pants and a “black puffy coat.” Mablin asked if he could wash his clothes and he 

“put all his clothes in the washing machine” and started it. Holmes gave Mablin 

some of his uncle’s clothes (Leon Holmes) to put on and then drove him to the 

emergency room. 

Officer Pohl spoke with Mablin:

I went in to speak with Mablin. I noticed his left [hand] wrapped 

and a significant amount of blood on the bed sheet, underneath his 

left hand. I asked Mablin what happened. He stated he got robbed.

Mablin indicated he left work from Wal-Mart around 0100 hours on 

12/13/07. He walked to Leon Holmes’ house, knocked, but nobody 

answered the door. He ended up with Charles LNU, whom he 

described as a black male living somewhere off Bluff. Mablin 
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indicated he partied with Charles for a period of time. He received 

his wages from Wal-Mart on 12/13/07.

Mablin stated the next morning, sometime after he woke up, 

he walked toward the bread store, down 4th Street, and located “B”, 

driving a silver or gray Cadillac. Mablin indicated he got in with “B”, 

in the front seat. Mablin stated he planned to purchase crack cocaine 

from “B”. Mablin stated two other people sat in the back seat. Mablin 

indicated they drove around for a short period. “B” drove the vehicle 

and started accusing of him of being a “narc”. Mablin indicated they 

started fighting, took his billfold, and took the money out of it. Mablin 

indicated he opened the passenger door and jumped out of the 

vehicle. In the process, Mablin cut his hand on the door. This 

happened near the Dairy Queen on Camanche Avenue.

Angel, who described herself as a former crack addict, approached Officer 

Pohl at the hospital and stated she knew Mablin, knew he got off work at about 

1:00 a.m., and knew he did not show up at the Victory Center after work on 

December 13. She told the officer she knew “B” or “Big Lord,” his real name was 

Flinda, and he drove a gray colored Cadillac. 

Officer Pohl’s report indicates, “I asked Mablin to come down to the police 

department. I asked if his aunt or uncle could give him a ride. He agreed to go, if 

they gave him a ride.” Leon Holmes agreed to give Mablin a ride, and Sharon 

informed Officer Pohl she was taking her two small children home. Officer Pohl 

told Officer Sager to take Sharon Holmes back to her residence and asked Holmes 

“not to disturb any of Mablin’s clothing or blood.” Officer Pohl spoke again with 

Mablin, informed him “Leon planned to bring him to the police department. He 

agreed to come.” 

Officer Pohl’s report indicates he remained at the emergency room until 

Mablin’s release and “Mablin got into Leon’s vehicle.” Officer Pohl arrived at the 

police station at “2044 hours.” 
7

Mablin and his uncle drove to the police station to provide Mablin’s 

statement about the robbery. Officers Pohl and Department of Criminal 

Investigations Special Agent Matt George were instructed by their superior to 

speak with Mablin. A partial transcript of the interview is provided, though the 

transcriber begins with the caveat, “The first 23:04 minutes of the recording are 

unintelligible.” No times are indicated on the transcript and we are not provided 

the original recording.

At 11:25 p.m. Officer Pohl read Miranda warnings to Mablin. A search 

warrant for Mablin’s tennis shoes, DNA buccal swabs, samples of pubic and head 

hairs, and fingernail scrapings was obtained by Corporal Reid and, at about 1:15 

a.m., Officer Howard obtained DNA swabs, Mablin’s sweatpants, and his tennis 

shoes. Mablin was transported back to the hospital emergency room where the 

biological samples were obtained. 

The next morning, December 14, 2007, Chambers-Singh’s minivan was

found near the house of Mablin’s aunt. State v. Mablin, No. 08-1180, 2009 WL 

2185552, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. July 22, 2009). There were blood stains on the 

driver’s side door and inside the minivan. Id.

Pastors Ray Giminez and Rob Miltenberger, the executive director and 

assistant pastor of the Victory Center, the shelter at which Mablin was staying, 

questioned Mablin at the shelter about what happened when he returned there at 

about 8:30 p.m. on December 14. 

While in Pastor Miltenberger’s office, Mablin admitted to the two men 

that he had not told the truth to the detectives. Mablin indicated that 

the lack of an attorney was the reason he had not told the truth, but 

now he was ready to come clean.
8

Mablin related a different version of events to the pastors. He 

told them he and Chambers–Singh had gone to Davenport and 

bought drugs, and then returned to her apartment. They proceeded 

to take the drugs and have sex. At that point, Mablin claimed that a 

couple of unidentified men entered the apartment. One of them hit 

Mablin hard on the back of the neck. Mablin pulled up his pants and 

ran out of the apartment, driving off in Chambers–Singh’s minivan. 

As he was leaving the apartment, Mablin said he heard the victim 

screaming and felt bad for not going back to save her. According to 

Mablin, the minivan ran out of gas and he had to walk part of the way 

to his aunt's house. While en route, he fell, cutting his hand. After 

listening to this story, Pastor Giminez told Mablin he “needed to tell 

the truth,” and Mablin volunteered to go to the police station. Pastor 

Miltenberger phoned the Clinton Police Department, made 

arrangements for an interview, and both pastors accompanied 

Mablin to the station.

Id. at *2.

Mablin then went to the police station with Miltenberger and Giminez and 

spoke with Captain Randy Meier and Officer Howard. Mablin was read Miranda

warnings. He was informed Chambers–Singh was dead. Mablin stated he did not 

know that and “I shouldn’t have left, I know.” He stated he was sorry for her death. 

At this point, Captain Meier stated:

No, that’s . . . that’s not what you’re telling me. You caused 

her death, Ben. We know that. Okay. We know that you caused 

her death? The question we need to have answered is are you sorry 

you caused her death. Because if you’re a man who is sorry, if you’re 

a man who has a heart, than that’s somebody we can work with.

. . . .

I only want to talk with somebody who’s truly sorry . . . .

. . . .

Because I know exactly where the blame rests and so do you. 

Okay. And that’s what I’m interested in hearing.

Mablin then stated that he and Chambers-Singh purchased some rock 

cocaine and went back to her apartment to get high. While there, Mablin “got hit 

in the back of the neck while I was having sex.” He continued with his rendition of 

the afternoon events, stating Chambers-Singh’s child was somewhere in the 
9

apartment but Mablin did not see the child. He repeated that while the two of them 

were having sex, someone hit him on his back, he ran out of the apartment, and “I 

was in [Chambers-Singh’s] car and I drove the car from there down the street and 

it had no gas.” When asked what he was wearing, he said he had on “my blue 

coat and I had on my blue shirt and I had on my brown pants.” He had not removed 

his pants to have sex, just pulled them down. When asked to describe his coat, 

he stated, “it’s like a bubble coat.” He later said he saw two men in the apartment, 

whose faces he avoided looking at, as he ran out. The person in the bedroom had 

“a little black figure in in his hand” that “looked like a gun to me.” He was able to 

get to the elevator and was bleeding—“I had thought he had chopped my fingers 

off and he shot me or something.” When asked how he got the keys to Chambers–

Singh’s vehicle, Mablin stated, “I had got the keys from her earlier when we was 

together.” When asked why he had stopped the van where he did, Mablin stated:

Because I looked and it didn’t have no gas and I didn’t want to be 

stuck. So I didn’t want to bleed to death or nothin’, so I tried to get 

the closest I could so I went to walking up the street. . . . I didn’t know 

even really where I was at. I was so confused . . . . 

Mablin acknowledged lying to Sharon Holmes when he arrived at her 

residence. He acknowledged lying to police during his previous encounters. 

Captain Meier then told Mablin he was not telling the truth, stating, “I’m 

coming to the realization that I can’t work with you.” Captain Meier made a few 

more statements, “that’s not what I want to work with, okay” and “I want to work 

with somebody who is willing to . . . completely bare their soul.” Captain Meier 

then stated, “And until you can take responsibility for that, I don’t . . . I can’t . . . I 
10

don’t think there’s anybody that can work with you.” He told Mablin to take 

responsibility and “when you do that, you’re gonna feel a lot better for it.” 

At this point (around 11:15 p.m. on December 14), the Clinton 

Police Department captain who was leading the interview confronted 

Mablin. He made it clear that he did not believe this story. 

Thereafter, Mablin slowly began to provide yet another version of 

events. Mablin said that after he had done drugs and had sex with 

Chambers-Singh, they had had a disagreement. Chambers-Singh 

wanted some additional rocks of crack cocaine that were in Mablin’s 

coat, and Mablin resisted. Chambers-Singh came after him in the 

bedroom with a knife that she had obtained in the kitchen. According 

to Mablin, he did not even notice that she cut him. Mablin then picked 

up the same knife. He admitted stabbing Chambers-Singh 

numerous times. Mablin said he was “swinging.” Mablin admitted 

that “I could have walked away, but I wasn’t thinking.” After Mablin 

was done stabbing Chambers-Singh, he left the apartment, drove off 

in her minivan, and proceeded to his aunt’s house—intentionally 

leaving the minivan some distance from the house.

Id. at *3 (footnotes omitted). 

Following the December 14 to 15 interview, Mablin was arrested. When 

Mablin was fingerprinted by Officer Daniel Broderick, Mablin stated, “I didn’t mean 

for her to die. I can’t believe she is dead. A man can’t defend himself these days.” 

It was later determined Chambers-Singh had died after suffering eighteen 

to twenty stab wounds, including wounds to her chest, face, skull, and neck and 

“defense wounds” to her wrists and hands. Several of the wounds were located 

on the back of Chambers-Singh’s neck. DNA analysis was performed later, and it 

was determined the blood in the apartment came from both Chambers-Singh and 

Mablin. Id. at *1.

On December 17, 2007, Mablin was charged with one count of first-degree 

murder for the stabbing death of Sandra Chambers-Singh. 

Mablin’s trial counsel filed a one-paragraph motion to suppress
11

all testimony or other evidence of any statements made by the 

defendant to law enforcement personnel or their agents, as such 

were a result of defendant’s being under the influence of a controlled 

substance, an unduly protracted series of interviews, promises of 

leniency and the defendant’s misplaced reliance on advice from his 

Pastors.

The motion was heard on May 14, 2008. Officers Howard and Pohl testified, 

and Mablin’s counsel admitted into evidence the audio recording of the interview 

Mablin attended on the afternoon of December 14. 

On May 19, the motion was denied upon the following findings of the trial 

court:

The court determines the credible evidence shows that 

[Mablin] was interviewed four times by officers between the dates of 

December 13 and 14 of 2007. The first interview took place at Mercy 

North Hospital on the evening of December 13, after [Mablin] had

presented there for treatment of his injuries. That interview took less 

than one half hour. [Mablin] was next interviewed later in the evening 

on December 13 at the Clinton Police Department for a period of 

more than one hour. The third interview occurred on the afternoon

of December 14 at the Victory Center, which is a Christian outreach 

and religious center in Clinton. This interview also was more than 

one hour in length. It should be noted that during these first three 

interviews [Mablin] was free to go and in fact left the interview site on

each such occasion. 

The final interview took place at approximately 10:30 p.m. on 

December 14 at the Clinton Police Department, after [Mablin]

contacted officers and told them that he wanted to speak with them.

Although the evidence is unclear as to who all was present during 

the second interview on December 13, it is clear that during the two 

interviews on December 14 [Mablin] was accompanied by two 

pastors from the Victory Center, and that both pastors stayed with 

[Mablin] during the entirety of both of those interviews. 

The evidence demonstrates that during all of the interviews 

[Mablin] did not appear to be under the influence of alcohol or drugs, 

that he was oriented to time and place and responded to questions 

accordingly. The evidence does not show that the officers employed

any promises of leniency to [Mablin], and the interviews themselves 

were not so frequent or lengthy as to suggest that [Mablin’s] will was 

overborne or that his capacity for self-determination was affected. 

The evidence further reflects that the atmosphere during all the 
12

interviews was not coercive, and that [Mablin] was not deprived of 

his freedom in any way.

After a jury trial, Mablin was found guilty of the lesser-included offense of 

second-degree murder. He was sentenced to a fifty-year prison term. 

On appeal, Mablin alleged statements he made to his pastors at the Victory 

Center, and about which Pastor Giminez testified at trial, violated the priestpenitent privilege. Id. This court determined we need not consider the issue 

because “[w]e believe that Mablin was not ‘injuriously affected’ by the alleged error, 

which . . . was not of constitutional dimensions.” Id. at *5. We stated:

In this trial, as in any trial, some items of evidence loom larger 

than others. Here we believe the critical evidence consisted of the 

physical evidence of Chambers-Singh’s wounds, and Mablin’s final 

recorded interview, which the jury viewed in its entirety. Pastor 

Giminez’s testimony took up only nine transcript pages, and the State 

referred to it only briefly in closing argument. Even without Pastor 

Giminez’s testimony, the State would have proved that Mablin told a 

false story about jumping out of a car at least five separate times. 

The State would have proved that with two pastors by his side, 

Mablin told an elaborate forty-minute lie to the detectives about 

having been hit on the back of his neck by an unknown assailant, a 

story that he proclaimed was the “honest to God” truth and at the end 

of which he broke down in tears of regret for having supposedly left 

Chambers-Singh to this assailant and other unknown individuals.

Id. 

Mablin filed a PCR application on October 16, 2009. After a several-year 

delay and amendments made to the application, Mablin claimed trial counsel was 

ineffective in (1) failing to move to suppress testimony from an emergency room 

paramedic, Steve Paulsen (who testified Mablin stated that he had been kidnapped 

and robbed and had gotten injured when jumping from car); (2) in failing to 

obtaining suppression of a December 13, 2007 interview of Mablin at the Clinton 

Police Department; (3) failing to obtain suppression of the second December 14, 
13

2007 interview of Mablin at the Clinton Police Department (claiming promises of 

leniency were made); (4) failing to investigate alternative suspects (the occupants 

of apartment #1); and (5) failing to move to suppress the search warrant that was 

signed and executed at the conclusion of the December 13, 2007 interview 

(claiming there was no probable cause to believe the “elevator man” noted in the 

warrant was Mablin).

The PCR trial was held on August 23, 2017. The district court granted 

postconviction relief, ruling trial counsel did not adequately investigate, noting trial 

counsel “spent a total of ten hours preparing for a first-degree murder trial, with 

dozens of potential witnesses, information regarding potential alternative suspects 

and yet performed no independent investigation.”

1

 The court ruled:

The court finds that the minimal effort [Attorney] Ingham put forth in 

communicating and advising [Mablin] and failure to conduct any 

investigation or depose any witnesses fell below the standard of a 

reasonably competent practitioner. In addition, irrespective of 

whether stemming from his lack of his communication with his client, 

Ingham’s failure to investigate or follow up with multiple parties 

breached an essential duty of counsel. It is unreasonable for counsel 

to not investigate statements that could provide a defense to their 

client. In the same light, the statements that Corey and Carley Jr. 

provided to police were not consistent with each other, and did not 

correspond with the timeline for Sandra’s death. Thus, to not explore 

these statements—especially when Corey’s statement would have 

made him the last person to see Sandra alive—was wholly 

insufficient, and cannot be considered to meet the standard of a 

reasonably competent attorney.

The PCR court next addressed the motion to suppress, noting trial counsel

“filed a one-sentence motion to suppress defendant’s statements to the police, 

 

1 Counsel testified the hours noted on the “partially filled out case closing sheet” did not 

accurately show the time he spent on a case. He stated, “I was paid a salary. Whether I 

billed a client or not was of no consequence to my income.” 
14

including defendant’s eventual confession, and did not see fit to provide the trial

court with the lengthy video recorded interrogations nor the transcripts of the 

interviews to provide a basis for his motion.” The PCR court addressed both the 

December 13 interview at the police station and the second December 14 interview 

Mablin requested. 

With regard to the December 13 interview, the PCR court stated:

In this case, [Mablin] made it clear that he did not want to go to the 

[police station] [(CPD)] from the hospital. The officers stated that if 

he refused to go voluntarily that he would be taken to the CPD. 

Moreover, they provided him with a police escort to the CPD. Once 

at the CPD, [Mablin] was kept in an interrogation room and always in 

the presence of officers. Although the officers informed [Mablin] that 

the purpose of the interview was to address the alleged robbery, in 

reality it was so they could obtain a search warrant as [Mablin] was 

a suspect in Sandra’s murder. The officers told [Mablin] he was free 

to leave, but he was in a hospital gown, and the officers would not let 

him leave with his shoes or pants. Therefore, if the trial court had 

been provided with a thoroughly developed record regarding these 

facts there is a reasonable probability that the court could have found 

the December 13, 2007 interview was a custodial interrogation, and 

that the Applicant’s Fifth Amendment rights were violated. . . . It is 

not necessary for this court to determine at this junction that the 

outcome would have in fact been different. The point is that this 

argument was never even developed or raised for the trial court to 

consider.

As for the December 14 evening interview, the PCR court found that most 

telling of trial counsel’s lack of diligent effort was that he had not provided the 

transcripts and the recordings of the interviews to the court at the suppression 

hearing. The court concluded, 

In order for there to be any chance whatsoever for the trial court to 

properly analyze whether the language used during an interview 

amounted to a promise of leniency the trial court of course needed 

to be given the relevant information—the actual transcript or the 

video recording of the December 14, 2007 interrogation.

The court noted, 
15

[Attorney] Ingham testified that he did not provide support for the 

motion to suppress or call a witness at the suppression hearing 

because the burden was on the State. Although theoretically true, 

when counsel does not put forth any effort in drafting the motion to 

suppress, and then does not provide any evidence at the 

suppression hearing, the State can easily meet their burden.

. . . .

. . . [T]he only evidence in front of the trial court was Officer 

Howard’s testimony that no promises of leniency were made. 

Although Ingham cross-examined Officer Howard, this performance 

falls below the standard of a reasonably competent attorney. Ingham 

was in possession of the evidence that was necessary for the trial 

court to find promises of leniency, yet failed to provide it to the trial

court. Thus, without the necessary evidence, the trial court could not 

determine whether law enforcement officers adopted the pastor’s 

statements that everything would go away if [Mablin] told the truth.

Further, the trial court could not properly analyze the context of the

officer’s statements that referenced working together because 

Ingham did not inform the trial court that [Mablin] was working for the 

CPD as a confidential informant at the time of the interview. 

Therefore, since Ingham did not provide the trial court with any 

evidence that would have allowed them to rule in his favor, his 

performance fell below that of a reasonably competent practitioner.

The PCR court determined Mablin had established the necessary prejudice:

Beginning with Ingham’s failure to investigate, Ingham testified that 

he did not interview any of the witnesses because he knew how they 

would testify. Furthermore, he asserted that he did not interview the 

Campbell family because, even if they were drug dealers, he did not 

think they would kill a customer. However, the defense counsel is

under duty to investigate all mitigating circumstances, and to bring to 

light credible defense arguments. See Strickland [v. Washington], 

466 U.S. [668,] 669 [(1984)].

Ingham’s lack of effort in investigating left many facts 

undeveloped. For instance, Sandra’s neighbors reported that they 

believed she was either selling or using drugs, and multiple

neighbors indicated that Sandra was close with the people who lived 

in or frequently visited Apartment #1. Domer suspected that Sandra 

was killed by one of the frequent visitors of Apartment #1, Carley Sr.

The other people from Apartment #1, Corey and Carley Jr., provided

patently false statements to police regarding their actions and 

whereabouts during the afternoon of Sandra’s murder. Therefore, to 

not depose, or have an investigator interview the witnesses resulted 

in serious prejudice to [Mablin]. See U.S. Const. amend. VI; Iowa 

Const. art. I, § 10. If Ingham had presented this evidence to the jury, 

or even slightly developed this evidence, there is a reasonable 
16

probability that the result would have been different as he could have 

put on a credible defense to the jury. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 

695. The prejudice that resulted by failing to investigate a possible 

defense becomes more evident when considering it in conjunction 

with Ingham’s failure to move to suppress evidence. The overall 

situation here brings to mind the famous quote from Donald 

Rumsfeld: “we don’t know what we don’t know.” 

Like Ingham’s inadequate investigation, the court must also 

examine if trial counsel’s failure to effectively move to suppress 

resulted in prejudice. As noted above, defense counsel failed to 

move to suppress [Mablin’s] statements or actions from the 

December 13, 2007 interrogation—despite credible arguments 

existing regarding custodial interrogation. Consequently, at trial 

Special Agent George was allowed to testify. His testimony allowed 

the State to use the multiple different statements that [Mablin]

provided to law enforcement regarding Sandra’s murder, and his 

unwillingness to voluntarily surrender his shoes or pants to infer guilt. 

Suppressing [Mablin’s] statements and actions during the December 

13, 2007 interview would have had a substantial effect on the trial. 

Hence, [Mablin] was prejudiced because Ingham did not assert 

credible suppression arguments regarding the testimony from the 

December 13, 2007 interrogation. 

The other failure to suppress argument concerned the motion 

to suppress that Ingham did file concerning the December 14, 2007 

interview. As stated previously, Ingham did not provide the trial court 

with the transcript or video recording necessary to make a principle 

ruling on the motion to suppress. The trial court would have had the 

opportunity to at least analyze whether there were promises of 

leniency had Ingham written a more detailed motion, called a 

witness, provided evidence, provided the transcript, or used the 

transcript to cross examine the officer. If the trial court found that 

[Mablin’s] confession was induced by a promise of leniency then it 

would not be admissible. Moreover, the officer’s testimony and the 

pastor’s testimony surrounding the December 14, 2007 interrogation 

would have been suppressed as well. [Mablin] was clearly 

prejudiced by the lack of effort that Ingham put forth in drafting and 

arguing his one sentence motion to suppress. Furthermore, there is 

a reasonable probability that the result would have been different had 

the trial court been provided with the information that would have 

allowed them to make a decision.

The PCR court granted Mablin a new trial. The State appeals.
17

II. Scope and Standard of Review.

“Our review of postconviction-relief proceedings is typically for correction of 

errors at law. But when we are reviewing an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel 

claim, we do so de novo because such claims are constitutional in nature.” Ruiz 

v. State, 912 N.W.2d 435, 439 (Iowa 2018).

III. Discussion.

In its ruling on the motion to enlarge, the PCR court made the following 

specific findings: “That a reasonable probability exists that, but for trial counsel’s 

deficient performance during his representation of Mablin” (1) the trial court would 

have suppressed evidence or testimony concerning Mablin’s alleged 

December 14, 2007 confession from being used against Mablin at trial on the 

grounds that the “confession was elicited by the use of promissory leniency”; 

(2) “the trial court would have suppressed testimony or evidence concerning law 

enforcement officers’ December 13, 2007 custodial interrogation of Mablin . . . on 

the grounds that said custodial interrogation violated Mablin’s rights”; (3) that “trial 

counsel could have presented a defense case at Mablin’s jury trial inculpating the 

victim’s next door neighbors as viable suspects, which defense case would have 

corroborated Mablin’s testimony that he fled the victim’s apartment after two men 

entered the victim’s apartment and attacked him”; and (4) “but for trial counsel’s 

deficient performance the result of Mablin’s jury trial would have been different.” 

On our de novo review, we are unable to agree with the PCR court’s sweeping and 

unexplained conclusions. 

To succeed on [an] ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, 

[Mablin] must prove (1) counsel failed to perform an essential duty 

and (2) prejudice resulted. To establish the first prong, [Mablin] must 
18

show [his] counsel “made errors so serious that counsel was not 

functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth 

Amendment.” We approach the first prong with the presumption

counsel performed [their] duties competently; “we measure counsel’s 

performance against the standard of a reasonably competent 

practitioner.” Although not required to predict changes in the law, 

“counsel must ‘exercise reasonable diligence in deciding whether an 

issue is ‘worth raising.’” Counsel is not burdened with the duty to 

raise an issue that has no merit. The second prong—prejudice—

results when “there is a reasonable probability that, but for the

counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would 

have been different.” 

State v. Brown, 930 N.W.2d 840, 855 (Iowa 2019) (internal citations omitted). “The 

claimant must prove both elements by a preponderance of the evidence.” State v. 

Madsen, 813 N.W.2d 714, 724 (Iowa 2012). An applicant’s failure to prove either 

element by a preponderance of the evidence is fatal to a claim of ineffective 

assistance. State v. Polly, 657 N.W.2d 462, 465 (Iowa 2003). We conclude Mablin

has failed to prove there is a reasonable probability that the result of the criminal 

trial would have been different.

Because Mablin has not established his statements about stabbing 

Chambers-Singh were improperly induced by promises of leniency, we discuss 

that claim first. 

Mablin’s PCR application alleges Captain Meier’s following statements 

(emphasis as added by Mablin) during the interview on the evening of December

14 constitute promises of leniency: “Because if you’re a man who is sorry, if you’re 

a man who has a heart, than that’s somebody we can work with,” “when you’re a 

sinner, than I don’t want to work with that kind of guy and I don’t want to talk to 

you”; “But I’m coming to the realization that I can’t work with you because I don’t 

think . . . I think your heart is cold”; and “that’s not what I want to work with, okay, 
19

I don’t want to work with somebody who isn’t sorry for what they did. I want to 

work with somebody who is willing to completely bare their soul and say I made 

the biggest mistake I could.” 

At the PCR trial, Mablin testified Captain Meier said something to the effect 

of “if you wanted to work for me, in order for you to be working for me and I believe 

for us to be working together that [he] needed to be honest or tell the truth.” Mablin 

stated he believed Meier’s “work with” statements during the interview was in 

reference to his work as a confidential informant. Mablin had previously made an

undisclosed number of controlled buys and stated he saw Captain Meier “mainly 

in the briefing before” one of the buys he performed. But he stated he had “never 

really seen him after it went through or whatever,” and that Captain Meier was only 

at the briefing “a couple of times.” Mablin opined that Captain Meier knew him and 

knew he was an informant. Mablin testified that on the date of the interview he 

believed if he told the police what they wanted to hear that he “would get to go 

home and they would probably let me have a better role as an informant than what 

I was having at first.” Mablin also testified he wanted to give up selling drugs to be 

a police officer. 

In its ruling on the motion to enlarge, the PCR found: “That a reasonable 

probability exists that, but for trial counsel’s deficient performance during his 

representation of Mablin,” the trial court would have suppressed evidence or 

testimony concerning Mablin’s alleged December 14, 2007 confession from being 

used against Mablin at trial on the grounds that the “confession was elicited by the 

use of promissory leniency.” The PCR court ruling includes this rationale:
20

[Attorney] Ingham was in possession of the evidence that was 

necessary for the trial court to find promises of leniency, yet failed to 

provide it to the trial court. Thus, without the necessary evidence, 

the trial court could not determine whether law enforcement officers 

adopted the pastor’s statements that everything would go away if 

[Mablin] told the truth. Further, the trial court could not properly 

analyze the context of the officer’s statements that referenced 

working together because Ingham did not inform the trial court that 

[Mablin] was working for the [police department] as a confidential 

informant at the time of the interview.

We presume the PCR court is referring to the “working together” statements 

alleged in the application.

Iowa employs an evidentiary rule of excluding confessions induced by 

promises of leniency. State v. Howard, 825 N.W.2d 32, 40 (Iowa 2012). “The test 

‘is whether the language used amounts to an inducement which is likely to cause 

the subject to make a false confession.’” Id. (citation omitted). The court has 

cautioned, “‘[T]he law cannot measure the force of the influence used or decide 

upon its effect on the mind of the prisoner,’ and therefore excludes the declaration 

if any degree of influence by force or other inducement has admittedly been 

exerted upon him.” Id. (citation omitted). In Howard, the court found

Detective Hull’s repeated references to getting help combined with

his overt suggestions that after such treatment Howard could rejoin 

Jessica and A.E. conveyed the false impression that if Howard 

admitted to sexually abusing A.E. he merely would be sent to a 

treatment facility similar to that used to treat drug and alcohol 

addiction in lieu of further punishment.

Id. at 41. 

As noted by Mablin, it is an objective test, “The use of a per se exclusionary 

rule eliminates the need for the court to attempt to read the mind of defendant to 

determine if his confession, in fact, was induced by or made in reliance upon the 

promise of leniency.” Madsen, 813 N.W.2d at 726.
21

The Madsen court outlined how the evidentiary test has been applied in 

other cases where confessions were found to have been induced by promises of 

leniency or threats:

In [State v.] Polk, we held “the [officer] crossed the line by 

combining statements that county attorneys ‘are much more likely to 

work with an individual that is cooperating’ with suggestions [the 

defendant] would not see his kids ‘for a long time’ unless he 

confessed.” 812 N.W.2d [670,] 676 [(Iowa 2012)]. In [State v.]

McCoy, we required a new trial because the defendant confessed 

after the detective told him twenty-five times that “if he didn’t pull the 

trigger, he wouldn’t be in any trouble.” 692 N.W.2d [6,] 28 [(Iowa 

2005)]. . . . In State v. Kase, we reversed a conviction because the 

defendant confessed after a Division of Criminal Investigation agent 

told her “that if she told him what she knew about Vaughn’s death 

and signed a consent to search her apartment no criminal charges 

would be filed against her; otherwise, she was told, she would be 

charged with murder.” 344 N.W.2d 223, 226 (Iowa 1984). In State 

v. Hodges, we held that defendant’s confession was inadmissible 

when he was told “that a lesser charge would be much more likely if 

he gave ‘his side of the story.’” 326 N.W.2d 345, 349 (Iowa 1982).

In Hodges, we offered some parameters:

An officer can ordinarily tell a suspect that it is better to 

tell the truth. The line between admissibility and 

exclusion seems to be crossed, however, if the officer 

also tells the suspect what advantage is to be gained 

or is likely from making a confession. Ordinarily the 

officer’s statements then become promises or 

assurances, rendering the suspect’s statements 

involuntary.

813 N.W.2d at 726–27. 

The December 14 interview was instigated by Mablin. It began with Captain 

Meier reading Miranda warnings. Mablin was informed, “there’s been a crime 

committed and I’m investigating that crime and I’m investigating your participation 

in that crime.” Mablin asked that the two pastors be allowed to be in the interview 

with him. Mablin acknowledged to Captain Meier he had twice talked to police and 

lied “cause I was scared.” 
22

While the statements made by Captain Meier about “working with” Mablin 

are similar to those noted in Polk (county attorneys “are much more likely to work 

with an individual that is cooperating”), those statements were not combined with 

any advantage to be gained, as they were in Polk or in Howard. The only mention 

by Captain Meier of an advantage to be gained is this statement, “[W]hen you do 

that, you’re gonna feel a lot better for it.” We do not find Captain Meier’s 

statements constituted promises of leniency objectively “likely to cause the subject 

to make a false confession.” State v. Mullin, 85 N.W.2d 598, 602 (Iowa 1957).

It is no surprise, then, that Mablin attempts to tie the captain’s statements 

to Pastor Miltenberger’s statement, “What did you do with it [the knife] after you 

took it from her? We’re right there man, and then everything goes away.” He 

argues in his brief, “Considering the extent to which [Officers] Meier and Howard 

allowed [Pastors] Giminez and Miltenberger to participate in [Mablin’s] 

interrogation, the officers’ failure to correct or in any way repudiate Miltenberger’s 

statement could be and should be considered an implicit endorsement of the 

statement.” We, however, are unable to conclude that the pastors Mablin brought 

with him to an interview (an interview he requested) and asked to be allowed to 

stay with him in the interview were acting as agents of the police. Cf. State v. 

Nelson, 325 N.W.2d 118, 120 (Iowa 1982) (discussing and rejecting claim that a 

cellmate “assumed the role of a state agent” such that statement made to him were 

impermissibly obtained in violation of the defendant’s right to counsel and thus 

inadmissible). Even if we would agree with the PCR court that trial counsel could 

have more effectively prepared for the suppression hearing, because we conclude 
23

a motion to suppress Mablin’s statements made during the December 14 interview 

would not have been successful, Mablin cannot prove he was prejudiced. 

We note Mablin’s blood was found at the scene of the killing, a man wearing 

a blue puffy coat was seen leaving the victim’s apartment and bleeding as he rode 

down the elevator, there was blood from the elevator to the victim’s apartment 

door, Mablin admitted knowing Chambers-Singh before he was told she had died,

and her van with blood on the driver’s door—consistent with a left hand injury—

was parked within the vicinity of Mablin’s aunt and uncle’s residence where Mablin 

arrived bleeding. Upon his arrival, he asked to wash his clothes. He told varying 

stories about his injuries to his aunt and uncle, medical personnel, the police, and 

the pastors of Victory Center. 

The PCR court also noted “trial counsel could have presented a defense 

case at Mablin’s jury trial inculpating the victim’s next door neighbors as viable 

suspects, which defense case would have corroborated Mablin’s testimony that he 

fled the victim’s apartment after two men entered the victim’s apartment and 

attacked him.” The court wrote:

[Attorney] Ingham testified that he elected not to follow up with 

Domer because he did not find her credible. Additionally, Ingham 

knew Dodd was a cocaine dealer, but decided not to question him 

either. Lastly, Ingham knew Officer Adney worked for the drug task 

force; yet he did not contact him. If Ingham had reached out to Officer 

Adney he would have learned that Carley Sr. was Carley Jr.’s father 

and Corey’s uncle. Moreover, he would have learned that Carley Sr. 

was under investigation for conspiracy to deliver large quantities of 

crack cocaine, and that his whereabouts during Sandra’s murder 

were unknown.

The Supreme Court has rejected a requirement that an applicant merely 

show that the errors “impaired the presentation of the defense,” finding such 
24

standard “provides no workable principle.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693. “Since any 

error, if it is indeed an error, ‘impairs’ the presentation of the defense, the proposed 

standard is inadequate because it provides no way of deciding what impairments 

are sufficiently serious to warrant setting aside the outcome of the proceeding.” Id. 

“Instead, the Court crafted the governing question to be ‘whether there is a 

reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the fact finder would have had a 

reasonable doubt respecting guilt.’” Ledezma v. State, 626 N.W.2d 134, 143-44 

(Iowa 2001) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695)).

The PCR court’s ruling is partially grounded on its finding that trial counsel 

failed to present a “credible defense” concerning Carley Campbell Sr. Mablin

points out that Janet Domer informed police that if Chambers-Singh was dead then 

“either C-Note or Ren killed her.” C-Note, aka Carley Campbell Sr., was being 

investigated for trafficking crack cocaine at the time of Chambers-Singh’s death 

and, several years later, was indicted for a murder elsewhere. But Mablin has not 

presented any evidence Campbell committed the stabbing of Chambers-Singh. 

We acknowledge that “[t]he failure to investigate the only reasonable and realistic 

defense” has been found to render trial counsel’s assistance ineffective. See id. 

at 146. But the PCR court’s statement that trial counsel is “under the duty to 

investigate all mitigating circumstances, and to bring to light credible defense 

arguments” is an overbroad statement.

As to the December 13 interview, we find that even if counsel committed an 

error, the resulting prejudice on its own does not rise to a level undermining our 

confidence in the result of Mabin’s trial. Based on our review of the record, we 

conclude the PCR court erred in finding Mablin established the requisite prejudice. 
25

We reverse and remand for dismissal of the application for postconviction relief. 

See Madsen, 813 N.W.2d at 730.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.