IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA

2022-NCSC-66

No. 441A20

Filed 17 June 2022

IN THE MATTER OF: A.A.

Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1001(a1)(1) (2019) from an order entered on 

12 August 2020 by Judge Marion Boone in District Court, Surry County. Heard in 

the Supreme Court on 5 October 2021.

James N. Freeman Jr. for petitioner-appellee.

No brief for appellee Guardian ad Litem.

Peter Wood for respondent-appellant mother.

MORGAN, Justice.

¶ 1 In this private termination of parental rights case, we consider issues of the 

trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction and its substantive determinations in the 

proceeding. First, we address the question of whether petitioner, as the stepmother

of the juvenile who is the focus of this matter, had standing to bring a private 

termination of parental rights action against respondent-mother, the child’s 

biological mother. If we conclude that petitioner had standing to initiate the 

termination action, then we must additionally consider respondent-mother’s 

arguments that the trial court erred (1) in finding that the ground of abandonment 

existed for termination of parental rights, and (2) in concluding that termination of 
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respondent-mother’s parental rights was in the child’s best interests.

¶ 2 Upon careful review, we hold that petitioner satisfied the relevant statutory 

requirements to file a private petition for termination of parental rights. We further

conclude that clear, cogent, and convincing evidence of abandonment, as defined in 

both statutory law and case law, was presented at the adjudication hearing to 

establish that this ground existed for the termination of respondent-mother’s 

parental rights. Lastly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that 

it was in the child’s best interests to terminate the parental rights of respondentmother. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order terminating respondentmother’s parental rights.

I. Factual Background and Procedural History

¶ 3 Respondent-mother gave birth to a daughter “Amy” on 5 August 2010.

1 Amy’s

father was granted primary custody of Amy in 2012. Petitioner and Amy’s father 

became involved in a romantic relationship in October 2013, and petitioner, Amy’s

father, and Amy began residing together later in the year. On 30 April 2015, 

petitioner and Amy’s father married each other; the couple had two children together:

a son born in April 2015 and a daughter born in March 2017. Petitioner and Amy’s

father separated in October 2017 and became divorced on 14 January 2019. 

 

1 We employ a pseudonym for the juvenile to protect her privacy and for ease of 

reading.
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¶ 4 On 31 May 2018, petitioner filed an action against respondent-mother and 

Amy’s father in District Court, Surry County, seeking full custody of Amy. In the 

custody complaint, petitioner alleged that respondent-mother and Amy’s father were 

incarcerated in the Surry County Jail at the time of the filing of the action and that 

Amy had continued to live with petitioner since petitioner’s marriage to the father, 

even after petitioner and Amy’s father separated. Petitioner further alleged the 

occurrence of two incidents of domestic violence by Amy’s father toward petitioner in 

the presence of one or more of the children. Petitioner stated that after the father 

exercised visitation with Amy and one of Amy’s half-siblings on 22 January 2018, 

petitioner and Amy’s father had a verbal argument which resulted in a “physical 

outburst” by the father and his destruction of petitioner’s kitchen table and chairs in 

the presence of their youngest child. Petitioner also described an altercation on 1 May 

2018 between the father and their two biological children which transpired during a 

visit to a fast-food restaurant, leading petitioner to seek criminal charges against the 

father and to seek a domestic violence protective order. Amy’s father was arrested 

later in the day after picking up Amy early from school and then, with Amy in his 

car, circling the domestic violence office in Surry County where petitioner was 

discussing the domestic violence incident at the fast-food restaurant which had 

occurred.

¶ 5 On 31 May 2018, petitioner was granted temporary legal and physical custody 
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of Amy, and on 23 July 2018, petitioner was granted exclusive legal and physical 

custody of Amy upon the trial court’s finding that respondent-mother and Amy’s 

father had “acted contrary to their constitutionally protected status as biological 

parents.” Respondent-mother was granted two hours of supervised visitation with 

Amy weekly. However, respondent-mother did not utilize the visitation with the 

juvenile which was available to her and had only one in-person visit with Amy over 

the course of the next eleven months. Although respondent-mother requested a visit 

with Amy on 6 August 2018—the day after Amy’s birthday—respondent-mother was

not punctual in her arrival for the visit at the location where petitioner and 

respondent-mother had agreed that the visit would occur, which was a local library. 

Respondent-mother also failed to attend a court-ordered custody mediation regarding 

Amy in late September 2018. Respondent-mother did have a visit with Amy on 23 

September 2018. On 25 September 2018, respondent-mother requested another visit 

with the child, but when petitioner asked respondent-mother to send a text message 

to petitioner during the following week in order to arrange details of the proposed 

visit, respondent-mother did not do so. The next contact which petitioner had with 

respondent-mother occurred on 12 May 2019, which was Mother’s Day. On this 

occasion, respondent-mother sent the following text message to petitioner: “This is 

[respondent-mother]. Happy Mother’s Day. Thank you for always loving mine and 

treating mine as your own.” 
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¶ 6 On 13 May 2019, petitioner filed a private petition to terminate respondentmother’s parental rights to Amy, alleging willful abandonment of the minor child 

within the meaning of N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(7) as the grounds for termination. 

Petitioner alleged that respondent-mother did not exercise respondent-mother’s

visitation rights with Amy at any time after 23 September 2018, that respondentmother also chose not to send Amy any gifts, cards, or other correspondence from this 

identified juncture, and that respondent-mother never attempted to communicate 

with Amy by telephone or any other means. 

¶ 7 During the adjudication hearing which took place on 24 July 2020,2 petitioner 

testified that she had heard nothing from respondent-mother for eight months after 

September 2018 until respondent-mother sent petitioner the aforementioned 

Mother’s Day text message on 12 May 2019. On this occasion, however, respondentmother did not ask to speak to Amy or inquire about Amy’s wellbeing. Although 

respondent-mother had a mailing address for Amy and knew petitioner’s telephone 

number, nonetheless Amy never received any cards, gifts, food, clothing, or other 

items from respondent-mother; respondent-mother never assisted with Amy’s school, 

medical, or emotional needs; and in the handful of text messages that respondent-

 

2 At the start of the adjudication hearing, petitioner’s counsel asked the trial court “to 

take judicial notice at this time of the files . . . that were handed up before court began this 

morning . . . [a] child support file, custody files, and . . . a Domestic Violence Protective Order.” 

Counsel for respondent-mother stated that respondent-mother had no objection to the trial 

court taking judicial notice of these court files. 
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mother sent to petitioner—in August 2019, March 2020, April 2020, and May 2020—

respondent-mother never requested a visit with Amy or asked to speak with the child 

after Amy’s birthday on 5 August 2019. In her August 2019 birthday telephone call

to Amy, respondent-mother told the juvenile that respondent-mother had gifts and a 

card for Amy and confirmed a mailing address with petitioner, but no such gifts or 

card were ever received. 

¶ 8 Amy’s father testified at the adjudication hearing that he did not believe that 

respondent-mother had any contact with Amy after September 2018 but

acknowledged that his information was limited in light of the fact that he had been 

incarcerated for eighteen months out of the three years which preceded the 

adjudication hearing. The father also acknowledged that he had maintained control 

of the financial card onto which child support payments made by respondent-mother

for the benefit of Amy were deposited and that he was using the funds himself which 

were deposited on the card, even though Amy had been in petitioner’s sole custody 

for two years. Amy’s father explained that while he was aware that the funds were 

intended for Amy’s support, he believed that the State—not the father—had the 

responsibility to ensure that the child or her custodian was receiving the money which 

was paid for child support.

¶ 9 Respondent-mother testified that “at the end of 2018” she moved from Surry 

County, where Amy resided with petitioner, to Raleigh “to better [her] life.” 
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Respondent-mother related that she had been previously incarcerated on drug 

charges but represented that at the time of the adjudication hearing she had been 

“clean” for six months. Respondent-mother acknowledged that “[t]here isn’t much of 

a relationship” between petitioner and her. When asked during her testimony why 

she had not tried to contact petitioner about Amy more than once after September 

2018, respondent-mother replied, “Honestly, I just had just kind of given up at that 

point. And I didn’t want to cause any more issue or drama or stress.” Respondentmother also testified that her wages had been garnished for six or seven years to 

provide child support for Amy, but respondent-mother admitted that she was aware 

that these funds were going to the father even though respondent-mother also knew 

that petitioner had obtained sole custody of Amy in 2018. 

¶ 10 In a termination order filed on 12 August 2020, the trial court made findings 

of fact regarding, inter alia, the custody complaint filed by petitioner and the 

resulting award of custody, of which the trial court took judicial notice; respondentmother’s repeated failure to attend mediation sessions which were ordered as part of 

the custody proceedings; respondent-mother’s failure to exercise visitation with Amy 

with the sole exception of a visit on 23 September 2018; respondent-mother’s only

telephone call to Amy after July 2018 which occurred on 6 August 2019; respondentmother’s failure to provide clothing, food, gifts, or involvement with Amy’s school, 

counseling, or medical care; respondent-mother’s awareness that her child support 
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payments obtained through garnishment of her wages were actually going to the 

father and not to petitioner as Amy’s custodian for the care and support of the child;

respondent-mother’s choice to move her residence from Surry County to Raleigh, far 

from Amy’s home; and respondent-mother’s acknowledgment that she “basically gave 

up” with regard to contacting petitioner about Amy and was grateful to petitioner for 

loving Amy and “treating her like [petitioner’s] own.” Based upon these findings of 

fact, the trial court concluded that petitioner had proven “by clear, cogent, and 

convincing evidence that [r]espondent has abandoned the minor child within the 

meaning of North Carolina General Statute § 7B-1111(a)(7).” 

¶ 11 The trial court then moved to the disposition stage and ultimately entered an 

order which included, inter alia, the following finding of fact addressing statutory 

considerations as specified in N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a):

2. The [trial c]ourt evaluated the evidence by the standard 

of the best interest of the minor child, and considered the 

statutory criteria located in [N.C.G.S.] § 7B-1110: 

a. Age of the juvenile: The minor child is almost ten 

years old. 

b. The likelihood of adoption of the juvenile: There is 

strong evidence that the minor child will be adopted 

by [p]etitioner. 

c. Whether termination will aid in a permanent 

plan: Adoption of the minor child by [p]etitioner 

would aid in a plan of adoption and provide 

permanence for the minor child. 
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d. Bond between the juvenile and the parent: The 

[trial c]ourt finds that there is a familiarity between 

the minor child and the memory of her biological 

mother, but there is no bond as a mother and child. 

e. Quality of relationship between the child and the 

adoptive parent: The [trial c]ourt finds this 

relationship is very strong. 

f. Any other relevant consideration: The [trial c]ourt 

incorporates the findings of fact from the 

Adjudicatory hearing, and finds that [p]etitioner has 

been the minor child’s mother for all intents and 

purposes.

The trial court then concluded that it was in the juvenile Amy’s best interests to 

terminate respondent-mother’s parental rights to the child. Respondent-mother

entered written notice of appeal to this Court on 27 August 2020, and the matter was 

heard by this Court on 5 October 2021.

II. Analysis

¶ 12 Respondent-mother advances three arguments in her appeal to this Court: 

first, that petitioner did not establish that petitioner had standing to file a petition 

for termination of respondent-mother’s parental rights to Amy; second, that the trial 

court erred in finding the existence of the ground of abandonment pursuant to 

N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(7) which provided the basis for the termination of respondentmother’s parental rights; and third, that the trial court abused its discretion in 

concluding that termination of the parental rights of respondent-mother was in the 

juvenile Amy’s best interests where the guardian ad litem did not recommend 
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termination and Amy did not wish for respondent-mother’s parental rights to be 

terminated. As discussed below, we find each of respondent-mother’s arguments to 

be unpersuasive, and as a result, this Court affirms the order terminating her 

parental rights.

A. Standing

¶ 13 Respondent-mother contends that petitioner lacked standing to file a petition 

for the termination of respondent-mother’s parental rights to the juvenile Amy.

Respondent-mother claims that the termination of parental rights petition did not 

specifically allege that Amy had lived with petitioner for the two years immediately 

preceding the filing of the petition and that the trial court made no finding of fact in 

the termination of parental rights order about petitioner’s standing to initiate the 

action or the duration of time that Amy had lived with petitioner. Respondent-mother

also suggests that Amy might have lived with someone other than petitioner at some 

point during the relevant statutory time period. For these reasons, respondentmother asserts that the trial court erred in allowing petitioner’s termination of 

parental rights action to proceed. After thoughtful consideration of respondentmother’s arguments, the pertinent statutory law and case law, and the record in this 

case, we disagree with respondent-mother’s position.

“Whether or not a trial court possesses subject-matter 

jurisdiction is a question of law that is reviewed de novo. 

Challenges to a trial court’s subject-matter jurisdiction 

may be raised at any stage of proceedings, including for the 
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first time before this Court.” In re A.L.L., 376 N.C. 99, 101, 

852 S.E.2d 1 (2020) (extraneity omitted). However, “[t]his 

Court presumes the trial court has properly exercised 

jurisdiction unless the party challenging jurisdiction meets 

its burden of showing otherwise.” In re L.T., 374 N.C. 567, 

569, 843 S.E.2d 199 (2020).

In re M.R.J., 378 N.C. 648, 2021-NCSC-112, ¶ 19 (alteration in original). One issue 

that could implicate subject matter jurisdiction is the standing of a party to initiate 

a particular action. Id. ¶¶ 21, 41. On the matter of standing, the North Carolina 

Juvenile Code provides that “[a] petition or motion to terminate the parental rights 

of either or both parents to his, her, or their minor juvenile may only be filed by,” 

inter alia, “[a]ny person with whom the juvenile has resided for a continuous period 

of two years or more next preceding the filing of the petition or motion.” N.C.G.S. § 

7B-1103(a) (2019).3 Where challenged, “the record must contain evidence sufficient 

to sustain a finding [of standing].” Mangum v. Raleigh Bd. of Adjustment, 362 N.C. 

640, 647 (2008); see also In re L.T., 374 N.C. 567, 569 (2020). 

¶ 14 In the petition for termination of parental rights, petitioner alleged that she

and Amy’s father “had primary legal and physical custody of” Amy “during their 

marriage,” which the petition further alleged existed from 30 April 2015 to 14 

 

3 This subsection was amended, effective 1 October 2021, while applying to actions 

filed or pending on or after that date, to reduce the pertinent time period of the juvenile’s 

residence with a petitioner from “two years” to “18 months.” Act of Sept. 1, 2021, S.L. 2021-

132, § 1(l), 2021 N.C. Sess. Laws 165, 170. Hence, the law, in its amended form, does not 

apply to the present case.
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January 2019. The petition alleged that Amy continued to reside with petitioner after 

the end of petitioner’s marriage to the father and that the juvenile still resided with 

petitioner as of the 13 May 2019 date of the petition’s filing. In the 31 May 2018 

complaint seeking custody of Amy that petitioner filed against respondent-mother

and the father, of which the trial court took judicial notice in its decision in the instant 

case, petitioner alleged that Amy had resided with petitioner since the separation of 

petitioner and the child’s father in October 2017. These filings alone provide a 

sufficient foundation to support a determination that petitioner had standing to 

initiate the termination of parental rights action based upon the allegations of 

petitioner, and buttressed by the judicial notice of documentation by the trial court, 

that the juvenile Amy had resided with petitioner for a continuous period of two years 

or more next preceding the filing of petitioner’s petition.

¶ 15 In addition to the allegations contained in the termination of parental rights 

petition and in the custody complaint, several trial court orders of which the trial 

court in this case took judicial notice and which are included in the record on appeal 

in this case also show that petitioner’s allegations demonstrate her standing to bring 

this action. The custody order, which was filed on 23 July 2018 and issued by the 

same trial court in which the instant case was pending, awarded full custody of the 

juvenile Amy to petitioner; this custodial arrangement has continued since that date. 

That custody award, in turn, followed an order entered on 31 May 2018 in which 
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petitioner was granted temporary legal and physical custody of Amy. These court 

orders established that petitioner had sole physical custody of Amy for at least one 

year of the pertinent two-year period preceding the filing of the termination petition,

and the trial court orders corroborate the position of petitioner. 

¶ 16 Furthermore, respondent-mother did not introduce any evidence at the 

adjudication hearing which suggested that the child Amy resided with anyone other 

than petitioner during the two years preceding the filing of the termination of 

parental rights petition. Indeed, there was no evidence presented by any party at the 

adjudication hearing, or otherwise introduced into the record, to suggest that Amy 

resided outside of petitioner’s home at any point during the statutory time period. On 

appeal, respondent-mother does not cite any evidence which would support a 

determination by the trial court that petitioner lacked standing to file the petition for 

termination of parental rights and instead relies solely upon an argument that 

standing was not established due to the lack of express statements regarding the 

subject of standing in the termination order. To the contrary, petitioner testified that 

petitioner and Amy’s father began living together in late 2013, along with Amy, who

was three years old at the time and in the sole custody of her father.

¶ 17 In sum, the record in this case indicates that Amy continuously resided with 

petitioner—whether with or without the father—from at least late 2013 through 13 

May 2019, the date on which the petition to terminate parental rights was filed. This 
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period of more than five years not only encompasses but clearly exceeds the 

“continuous period of two years” preceding the filing of the petition as specified in the 

statute which defines those persons who have standing to file a petition for 

termination of parental rights. N.C.G.S. § 7B-1103(a)(5). Nothing in the Juvenile 

Code requires a petitioner to utilize any specific language in a petition for termination 

of parental rights to establish the party’s standing to bring the termination 

proceeding. Similarly, no authority in the Juvenile Code or precedent from this Court 

requires the trial court to make a specific finding of fact regarding a petitioner’s 

standing; therefore, it is of no consequence that the trial court did not elect to enter 

an explicit recognition of petitioner’s standing to initiate the case, especially since 

respondent-mother did not raise the issue during either the adjudication or the 

disposition hearing. 

¶ 18 In light of the evidence of record in this matter, we conclude that petitioner 

had standing to file a petition for termination of respondent-mother’s parental rights 

to Amy because Amy had been residing with petitioner “for a continuous period of 

two years or more next preceding the filing of the petition or motion.” N.C.G.S. § 7B1103(a)(5). Accordingly, respondent-mother’s argument on this issue is unpersuasive.

B. Abandonment as a ground for termination of parental rights

¶ 19 In her second argument, respondent-mother contends that the evidence in this 

case did not support the trial court’s Findings of Fact 14, 15, 20, 21, and 28. She also 
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asserts that Finding of Fact 29 and Conclusion of Law 3 were not proven by clear, 

cogent, and convincing evidence and that both erroneously establish that the ground 

of abandonment existed for the potential termination of her parental rights. See 

N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(7) (2021) (providing that a person’s parental rights may be 

terminated if “[t]he parent has willfully abandoned the juvenile for at least six 

consecutive months immediately preceding the filing of the petition”). Specifically, 

respondent-mother submits that her testimony at the adjudication hearing that she 

maintained communication with petitioner and Amy’s father through text messages 

and telephone calls and “paid child support every month, as court ordered, for Amy” 

was sufficient to prevent the trial court from determining the existence of 

abandonment as a ground for termination of respondent-mother’s parental rights. We 

disagree with this argument.

¶ 20 In an action seeking termination of parental rights, adjudication is the first 

stage of a two-stage process. N.C.G.S. § 7B-1109 (2021). At this initial stage, the 

petitioner bears the burden of proving by “clear, cogent, and convincing evidence” the 

existence of at least one ground for termination as specified under subsection 7B1111(a) of the General Statutes of North Carolina. N.C.G.S. § 7B-1109(f). We review 

a trial court’s adjudication of the existence of a ground for termination as provided in

N.C.G.S. § 7B-1109 “to determine whether the findings are supported by clear, cogent 

and convincing evidence and the findings support the conclusions of law.” In re 
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Montgomery, 311 N.C. 101, 111 (1984). The trial court’s conclusions of law are 

reviewed de novo on appeal. In re C.B.C., 373 N.C. 16, 19 (2019). 

¶ 21 In the context of a termination of parental rights proceeding, the ground of 

“[a]bandonment implies conduct on the part of the parent which manifests a willful 

determination to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims to the 

child.” In re Young, 346 N.C. 244, 251 (1997) (quoting In re Adoption of Searle, 82 

N.C. App. 273, 275 (1986)). Where “a parent withholds [her] presence, [her] love, [her] 

care, the opportunity to display filial affection, and willfully neglects to lend support 

and maintenance, such parent relinquishes all parental claims and abandons the 

child.” Pratt v. Bishop, 257 N.C. 486, 501 (1962). Although a parent’s acts and 

omissions, which are at times outside of the statutorily provided period, may be 

relevant in assessing a parent’s intent and willfulness in determining the potential 

existence of the ground of abandonment, the dispositive time period is the six months 

preceding the filing of the petition for termination of parental rights. In re C.B.C.,

373 N.C. at 22–23; see also N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(7). Here, the six-month time period

preceding the filing of the petition for the termination of parental rights extends from

13 November 2018 to 13 May 2019. 

¶ 22 Respondent-mother offers that there was evidence adduced at the adjudication 

hearing indicating that respondent-mother: contacted petitioner and Amy’s father 

regarding Amy such that petitioner did not fail to “act[ ] as a normal parent would,” 
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which is pertinent to Finding of Fact 14; paid child support in good faith during the 

relevant time period and did not know or willfully intend that those funds would go 

to the father rather than to petitioner to support Amy, which is pertinent to Findings

of Fact 14, 15, and 20; had no duty to act affirmatively to modify the governing child 

support order to redirect her garnished wages to petitioner, which is pertinent to 

Finding of Fact 21; and did not fail to “act[ ] in any other manner consistent with 

being a parent,” which is pertinent to Finding of Fact 28. Respondent-mother is 

correct that such evidence appears in the record; it was introduced at the adjudication 

hearing by means of respondent-mother’s own testimony. However, respondentmother conveniently fails to acknowledge or otherwise address the fact that 

petitioner, Amy’s father, and even respondent-mother herself all provided testimony 

during the adjudication hearing that contradicted respondent-mother’s claims of 

involvement with Amy during the relevant statutory period for abandonment and 

which could support the challenged findings of fact. 

¶ 23 For example, petitioner testified at the adjudication hearing that: respondentmother’s last in-person visit with Amy was in September 2018, which is a point in 

time outside of the pertinent six-month statutory timeframe for determining 

abandonment; respondent-mother’s last telephone conversation with Amy was on 6 

August 2019, also outside of the six-month time period addressed by the statute;

respondent-mother did not ask petitioner about Amy’s wellbeing in the single text 
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message which respondent-mother sent to petitioner during the relevant statutory 

time span; respondent-mother did not send Amy any cards, gifts, or other tokens of 

affection during the six months immediately preceding the filing of the petition; and

petitioner did not have access to any funds garnished from respondent-mother’s 

wages for the support of Amy during this period of time which is statutorily relevant 

to the existence of the ground of abandonment. Respondent-mother related in her 

testimony that she was aware that the funds which were garnished from her wages 

for purposes of child support were going to Amy’s father rather than going to 

petitioner, who had sole custody of Amy during the pertinent time period. And while 

respondent-mother testified that she thought that Amy’s father was giving the 

garnished child support money to petitioner, the father testified that he used the child 

support funds for his own purposes instead of for the support of Amy. Additional 

evidence which was introduced at the adjudication hearing indicated that 

respondent-mother was aware that Amy’s father was incarcerated during most of the 

six-month period preceding the filing of the petition for termination of parental

rights. 

¶ 24 We emphasize that, with respect to its determination of the existence of 

abandonment here as a ground for termination of respondent-mother’s parental 

rights, the trial court properly considered the fact that respondent-mother allowed 

her garnished wages for the support of Amy to be directed to the father rather than 
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to petitioner during the course of the relevant six-month time period regarding 

abandonment when petitioner had sole custody of the juvenile and respondentmother admitted during the adjudication hearing that respondent-mother was aware 

of this arrangement. It is an uncommon circumstance for a parent such as 

respondent-mother to experience court-ordered wage garnishment in order to ensure 

that child support is received for the benefit of the child on one hand, while on the 

other hand the same non-custodial parent subject to garnishment is aware that these 

garnished child support payments are being received by the other parent who also 

does not have custody of the child. Despite respondent-mother’s required compliance 

with the trial court’s mandated wage garnishment in order to guarantee respondentmother’s payment of child support, nonetheless this consistency of payment of child 

support funds which was known by respondent-mother to be directed by the trial 

court to the father rather than to petitioner neither mandatorily qualifies this 

development as favorable for respondent-mother, nor mandatorily disqualifies it as 

unfavorable for respondent-mother, in the trial court’s determination of the existence 

of the ground of abandonment. These aspects, combined with the trial court’s 

evaluation of respondent-mother’s testimony at the adjudication hearing regarding 

her assumption that the father was passing along to petitioner the child support 

payments which he was receiving and the trial court’s assessment of the father’s 

testimony at the adjudication hearing that he used the child support payments for 
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his own benefit rather than the support of the juvenile, were all proper for the trial 

court to include in its considerations in determining the existence of the ground of 

abandonment pursuant to the principles which this Court has announced in In re 

Young and Pratt v. Bishop.

¶ 25 In light of the evidence which was presented to the trial court regarding 

respondent-mother’s abandonment of Amy as defined by N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(7), we 

determine that the findings of fact and resulting conclusion of law which respondentmother disputes in the adjudication order must be upheld. The trial court was able 

to see and hear witnesses as they testified at the adjudication hearing, while 

assessing the witnesses’ credibility and demeanor, in order to resolve any 

contradictions in the evidence in making the tribunal’s findings of fact. On appeal, 

this Court is “bound by the trial courts’ findings of fact where there is some evidence 

to support those findings, even though the evidence might sustain findings to the 

contrary.” In re M.C., 374 N.C. 882, 886 (2020) (quoting In re Montgomery, 311 N.C. 

at 110–11). Here, there is sufficient evidence to support each of the trial court’s 

challenged findings of fact. The essential underlying findings of fact that would 

support the ultimate finding of fact and eventual conclusion of law that the ground of 

abandonment existed to permit the termination of respondent-mother’s parental 

rights to Amy—that respondent-mother: did not visit with Amy; did not provide Amy 

with any correspondence, gifts, affection, or support; did not in any other manner 
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evince a desire to engage in parental duties or act in a parental manner; and was 

aware that although her wages were being garnished for the support of Amy, these 

funds were going to the father rather than to petitioner, who respondent-mother

knew had custody of Amy—were proven by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence. 

Accordingly, we affirm the adjudication portion of the trial court’s order.

C. Best interests determination

¶ 26 The second stage of a termination of parental rights proceeding, which 

transpires only if at least one ground supporting termination of parental rights is 

found to exist at the adjudication stage, is a consideration of whether the disposition 

would be in the juvenile’s best interests. See N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a) (2021). “If [the 

trial court] determines that one or more grounds listed in [N.C.G.S. §] 7B-1111 are 

present, the court proceeds to the dispositional stage, at which the court must 

consider whether it is in the best interests of the juvenile to terminate parental 

rights.” In re D.L.W., 368 N.C. 835, 842 (2016) (first citing In re Young, 346 N.C. at

247; and then citing N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110 (2015)). “At the disposition stage, the trial 

court solely considers the best interests of the child. Nonetheless, facts found by the 

trial court are binding absent a showing of an abuse of discretion.” In re J.H., 373 

N.C. 264, 268 (2020) (quoting In re N.G., 186 N.C. App. 1, 10 (2007)); see also N.C.G.S. 

§ 7B-100(5) (2021) (“[T]he best interests of the juvenile are of paramount 

consideration . . . .”). An abuse of discretion is shown where a trial “court’s ruling is 
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manifestly unsupported by reason or is so arbitrary that it could not have been the 

result of a reasoned decision.” In re T.L.H., 368 N.C. 101, 107 (2015) (quoting State v. 

Hennis, 323 N.C. 279, 285 (1988)). 

¶ 27 The Juvenile Code provides that 

[i]n determining the best interests of a child during the 

dispositional phase of the termination of parental rights 

hearing, the trial court must make relevant findings 

concerning: (1) the age of the juvenile, (2) the likelihood of 

adoption, (3) whether termination will aid in the 

accomplishment of the permanent plan, (4) the bond 

between the juvenile and the parent, (5) the quality of the 

relationship between the juvenile and the proposed 

permanent placement, and (6) any relevant consideration. 

In re J.H., 373 N.C. at 270 (citing N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a) (2019)). In the present case, 

the trial court made specific findings of fact on each of the above-referenced statutory

criteria. 

¶ 28 Respondent-mother contends that the trial court abused its discretion in 

terminating respondent-mother’s parental rights because the disposition was not in 

the best interests of Amy for several reasons, including: (1) the guardian ad litem did 

not recommend that respondent-mother’s parental rights be terminated; (2) Amy did 

not want respondent-mother’s parental rights to be terminated; and (3) the trial 

court’s decision was arbitrary in that the parental rights of respondent-mother were 
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terminated in this action while the father’s parental rights were not.

4 Upon review, 

none of respondent-mother’s arguments succeed in establishing that the trial court 

abused its discretion in concluding that the termination of respondent-mother’s 

parental rights was in Amy’s best interests. 

¶ 29 The portion of the trial court’s order which addressed disposition included a 

finding of fact acknowledging that the guardian ad litem had not recommended the 

termination of respondent-mother’s parental rights. In so doing, the trial court 

indicated that it had “considered the report and testimony of the guardian ad litem. 

The court, however, was not bound by that recommendation.” In re A.U.D., 373 N.C. 

3, 11 (2019) (emphasis omitted) (citing In re D.L.W., 368 N.C. at 843, for the 

proposition that the trial court must “consider all the evidence, pass upon the 

credibility of the witnesses, and determine the reasonable inferences to be drawn 

therefrom”). While the role of the guardian ad litem is critical in every juvenile case, 

with the testimony and reports of the guardian ad litem serving as important 

evidence at every phase of a case’s proceeding, nonetheless a guardian ad litem’s 

recommendation regarding the best interests of a juvenile at the dispositional stage 

 

4 Respondent-mother also contends that the trial court abused its discretion in finding 

that the termination of her parental rights was in Amy’s best interests because the trial court 

erred in concluding that a ground existed to permit the termination of parental rights as 

specified in N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110. Having previously discussed the reasons why we reject 

respondent-mother’s challenge to the trial court’s determination that the ground of 

abandonment existed in this case, we do not revisit the issue here.
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of a termination of parental rights case is not controlling. Rather, “because the trial 

court possesses the authority to weigh all of the evidence, the mere fact that it elected 

not to follow the recommendation of the guardian ad litem does not constitute error,”

let alone an abuse of discretion. Id. (emphasis added). 

¶ 30 With regard to respondent-mother’s claim that Amy did not want respondentmother’s parental rights to be terminated, respondent-mother’s own presentation of

the evidence on this circumstance is not as supportive of respondent-mother’s stance 

concerning the juvenile Amy’s wishes as respondent-mother unequivocally 

represents. Respondent-mother has submitted to this Court the following passage 

from the guardian ad litem’s testimony at the trial court hearing:

[W]hen I spoke to [Amy] about the termination she was 

very upset. The first thing in her mind she thought of is 

that she could possibly be taken out of [petitioner’s] home. 

And so she did not want to be removed. However, when I—

and at this time that I was speaking to her in terms of a 

termination about [respondent-mother] and [the father], 

because they were both still pending at that time, and 

[Amy] seemed to be upset about the idea of the termination, 

about not being able to speak to [respondent-mother and 

the father] again. She didn’t have anything bad to say 

about either one of them. It was obvious that she 

understands that [petitioner] is her caregiver, her 

provider. But she had fond things to say about both 

[respondent-mother] and [the father]. And so when I asked 

her about not, you know, did she understand that if their 

rights were terminated that they wouldn’t be her mom and 

dad anymore, and that, you know, she didn’t have to speak 

to them, she may not, you know, be allowed to speak to 

them anymore. And she got visibly upset over that. 

So I felt—that bothered me, that it hadn’t been 
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discussed with her, because she was so mature for her age. 

And maybe, you know, somebody should have went over 

that with her, especially before I popped in and, you know, 

broke, broke the news to her. 

While respondent-mother gratuitously gilds this testimony of the guardian ad litem 

to indicate that Amy did not want respondent-mother’s parental rights to be 

terminated, the guardian ad litem’s account of Amy’s reaction to the prospect of the 

termination of parental rights is more accurately depicted as the juvenile’s 

apprehension about the legal and practical impact of such an outcome. Neutrally 

recounted, the guardian ad litem related that Amy feared being removed from 

petitioner’s residence; that Amy made fond comments about respondent-mother and 

the father; that Amy was upset by the idea that Amy would not be able to speak to 

respondent-mother and the father if their parental rights were terminated; and that 

Amy should have had the legal proceeding and its effects reviewed with her prior to 

the hearing’s occurrence. There is nothing in this segment of the guardian ad litem’s 

testimony which is cited by respondent-mother to indicate that Amy did not want 

respondent-mother’s parental rights to be terminated and nothing from which we can 

conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in determining that the termination 

of respondent-mother’s parental rights was in the juvenile Amy’s best interests.

¶ 31 Respondent-mother’s remaining argument regarding the best interests 

determination by the trial court is that the forum abused its discretion in that “[t]here 

is an overall inequity in allowing [the father] to maintain a relationship with Amy 
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while terminating [respondent-mother’s] rights. . . . [Respondent-mother] was not a 

worse parent than [the father]. Treating her differently amounted to an abuse of 

discretion.” The proper focus of the trial court at the dispositional phase of the case 

was on the best interests of Amy, not the equities between the parents. In re J.H., 373 

N.C. at 268. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in this regard.

¶ 32 We conclude that the trial court properly exercised its discretion to make a 

reasoned decision regarding the issue of whether termination of respondent-mother’s 

parental rights was in Amy’s best interests. 

III. Conclusion

¶ 33 In conclusion, this Court holds that petitioner established her standing 

pursuant to statutory requirements to bring the underlying petition, that the 

evidence before the trial court sufficiently demonstrated the existence of a statutory 

ground for termination, and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 

concluding that termination of respondent-mother’s parental rights was in the 

juvenile Amy’s best interests.

AFFIRMED.
Justice EARLS concurring.

¶ 34 I agree that petitioner has standing to bring this action against respondentmother for the reasons articulated by the majority. I write separately on the question 

of whether the trial court’s findings of fact support its legal conclusion that: 

“Petitioner has proven by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence that Respondent has 

abandoned the minor child within the meaning of North Carolina General Statutes § 

7B-1111(a)(7).” We have recently held that “[i]f a parent withholds his presence, his 

love, his care, the opportunity to display filial affection, and willfully neglects to lend 

support and maintenance, such parent relinquishes all parental claims and abandons 

the child.” In re E.H.P., 372 N.C. 388, 393 (2019) (emphasis added). Applying that 

precedent to this case, the challenge is that respondent-mother consistently paid child 

support of $216 a month during the relevant six-month period preceding the filing of 

the petition for termination of parental rights, that is, from 13 November 2018 to 13 

May 2019. Indeed, she had been regularly paying child support monthly for seven 

years before the termination hearing and was not in arrears.

¶ 35 I write separately because in my view, fidelity to our precedents requires 

that we acknowledge that fact as cutting against, rather than supporting, the 

ultimate legal conclusion that respondent-mother abandoned her daughter. On 

balance, the trial court’s other findings are sufficient to support a conclusion of 

abandonment, and thus I agree with the majority’s ultimate conclusion on this 
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issue. However, I do not agree with the majority that respondent-mother’s 

awareness that her child support payments, which were paid pursuant to a 

court order and directly garnished from her wages, went to the child’s father 

and not directly to petitioner, are evidence of her abandonment of her 

daughter.

¶ 36 While the statutory language does not support a conclusion that 

payment of child support alone during the relevant six-month period is an 

absolute bar to a finding of abandonment, the Court of Appeals has considered 

the payment of child support as one factor to be considered. In In re T.C.B., for 

example, the court recited the facts regarding a father’s payment of child 

support and concluded that “[t]hese findings regarding the payment of child 

support further serve to undermine the district court's conclusion of willful 

abandonment.” In re T.C.B., 166 N.C. App. 482, 488 (2004). Similarly, in In re 

K.C., the fact that respondent-mother had paid court-ordered child support 

was one factor, among others, such as attending nine visitations during an 

eighteen-month period and speaking with her son on the phone several times, 

showing that her actions “are not consistent with abandonment as defined 

under North Carolina law.” In re K.C., 247 N.C. App. 84, 88 (2016). 

¶ 37 To be sure, the Court of Appeals has also found that abandonment may 
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occur even when child support was being paid or was paid inconsistently. See, 

e.g., In re C.J.H., 240 N.C. App. 489, 504 (2015) (affirming finding of 

abandonment despite the fact that respondent made “last-minute child support 

payments and requests for visitation,” because during the relevant period 

“respondent did not visit the juvenile, failed to pay child support in a timely 

and consistent manner, and failed to make a good faith effort to maintain or 

reestablish a relationship with the juvenile”); In re Adoption of Searle, 82 N.C. 

App. 273, 276 (1986) (evidence of one $500 payment by respondent — without 

any other activity during the relevant time period — was sufficient to support 

determination that father willfully abandoned child). But all these precedents 

together stand for the proposition that payment of child support, whether by 

court order or otherwise, is a relevant factor to consider in determining 

whether the statutory ground of abandonment has been established.

¶ 38 Here, the majority concludes that it was proper for the trial court to 

consider testimony about what respondent-mother knew regarding whether 

the father was using her child support payments for the benefit of the child, 

but maintains that evidence of consistent child support payments is not 

“mandatorily” favorable or unfavorable to respondent-mother on the question 

of abandonment. However, the trial court’s order includes a “Finding of Fact” 
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that “[r]espondent had an affirmative duty to do something, and her failure to 

do so is further evidence forsaking her parental responsibilities.” This is not a 

“fact,” nor is it an accurate statement of the law. Rather, our case law 

establishes that petitioner has the burden of proving, for the ground of 

abandonment, that respondent-mother “willfully neglect[ed] to lend support or 

maintenance,” among other things. See In re E.H.P., 372 N.C. at 393. 

Petitioner must put forward clear and convincing evidence that respondentmother’s conduct “manifest[ed] a willful determination to forego all parental 

duties and relinquish all parental claims to the child.” In re Young, 346 N.C. 

244, 252 (1997). In this case, respondent-mother had an affirmative duty to 

comply with the court order regarding payment of child support, which she did. 

She did not have “an affirmative legal duty to do something” more. The fact of 

her consistent child support payments does not bar the ultimate conclusion of 

abandonment here, but the majority errs in failing to acknowledge that this 

factor weighed in respondent-mother’s favor.