Filed 10/26/22 Flowers v. Crawford CA4/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

MARIANNE FLOWERS,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

MARY S. CRAWFORD, et al.

Defendants and Respondents.

 D078670

 (Super. Ct. No. 37-2018-

00015752-CU-PO-CTL)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, 

Richard S. Whitney, Judge. Affirmed.

Marianne Flowers, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Lynberg & Watkins, Michael J. Larin, Shant N. Nashalian; Sutton & 

Murphy and Michael S. Sutton, for Defendants and Respondents.

INTRODUCTION

Marianne Flowers alleged she was injured when she slipped and fell on 

water from a freezer leak at a Vons supermarket. Among other defendants, 

she sued Jerry Crawford, the president and CEO of a janitorial company. 

She did so as a self-represented litigant. More than two years after filing her 

complaint, Flowers allegedly served the summons and complaint on Crawford 
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by substituted service. She failed to show proof she mailed Crawford a copy 

of the summons and complaint by first-class mail, as required by California 

Code of Civil Procedure section 415.20, subdivision (b).1 Instead, she filed 

proof of service that she emailed a copy of the summons and complaint to

Crawford’s attorney, who was not authorized to accept service. 

Consequently, the trial court granted Crawford’s motion to quash service of 

the summons. Contrary to Flowers’s arguments on appeal, the trial court’s 

ruling was proper and so we affirm.2 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Flowers filed her complaint against Crawford on March 29, 2018.3 She

filed a proof of service on Crawford on June 29, 2020. According to the proof 

of service, a non-California registered process server left a copy of the 

summons and complaint at an address in Addison, Texas with “John Doe, 

Front Desk in Lobby Hispanic male, 45-50 years old, black hair, 200 lbs, 

5’10”.” That allegedly occurred on January 21, 2020. The proof of service did 

not reflect that the summons and complaint had been mailed first-class, 

postage prepaid to the same location. Box 5.c. on the proof of service

1 All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.

2 Crawford died after Flowers filed her notice of appeal. In July 2022, we 

granted an unopposed motion to substitute personal representatives Mary S. 

Crawford and John Mark Crawford in place of Crawford. (Cal. Rules of 

Court, rule 8.36(a).) For clarity, we refer to Crawford and his personal 

representatives collectively as “Crawford” when discussing the background 

and arguments in this appeal. 

3 She also named as defendants “Vons Headquarters, a corporation,”

“Lawrence A. Del Santo (President CEO), an individual,” “Sedwick[,] a 

corporation,” “David North (President CEO),” “Vons Insurance,” and “King 

Janitorial[,] a corporation.” (Some capitalization omitted.)
3

regarding this mailing requirement was left unchecked and incomplete. 

There is also no evidence in the record to show that Flowers satisfied this 

mailing requirement. 

On July 27, 2020, Crawford specially appeared by filing a motion to 

quash Flowers’s service of the summons and complaint. Crawford asserted 

service was defective because Flowers did not mail the summons and 

complaint by first-class, postage prepaid mail at the place where the 

summons and complaint were allegedly left, as required by section 415.20, 

subdivision (b). 

Flowers did not timely file an opposition to the motion to quash. 

Instead, on January 13, 2021, two days before the hearing on Crawford’s

motion to quash, she filed another proof of service. In that proof of service, a 

registered California process server declared that he served Crawford with

the summons and complaint on January 7, 2021, by emailing “Michael 

Sutton, Attorney, Authorized to Accept on behalf of Jerry Crawford 

(President CEO)” at what purports to be Sutton’s email address. 

Nine days after the opposition deadline, also on January 13, 2021, 

Flowers filed a 15-page document, captioned: “INJURED BRATZ GIRL 

ATIORNEYMARIANNE LOLITA FLOWER HAS TO TEACH ALL 5 PRESIDENT’S 

CEO’S A CORPORATIONS ATTORNEYS WHO LACKS KNOWLEDGE ON THE 

WHOLE CASE. JUDGE JOEL GAVE COUNSEL M FLOWER A CHOICE TO

PLEAD BOTH CASE’S COUNSEL M STATED IT IS NOT THE SAME CASE NOV 

2, 2018. BABY DOLL BARBIE.M. FLOWER. [NO] FRIVIOUL,S MOTIONS 

ALLOWED, [NO] QUASHING A CASE, INVALID ALL PARTIES BEEN SERVED 

PROOF SERVICE AND SUMONS. WHEN ALL 5 CEO’S PRESIDENTS A 

CORPORATION’S HAS NO KNOWLEDGE ON CASE NOTHING, RACISM WHEN 

YOU DONOT EVEN HELP THE CUSTOMER, NO NOTHING, IGNORANCE AND 

MISONDUCT PREJUDICE RACIST ATTACKS TO BRIBE THE JUDGE [NO 
4

FAVORTISM TO CLIENT-JUDGE] FOR PROPOSED ORDERS IS MISCONDUCT 

AND PREJUDICE AND RACISM. YOU CANNOT [ RE-WRITE]-WRITE 

FRIVOULOUS MOTIONS WHEN YOULACK KNOWLEDGE AND YOU DO NOT 

[NO NOTHING.] DURESS.” [sic] In the document, Flowers did not proffer any 

evidence of completing the mailing requirement of section 415.20, subdivision 

(b).

On January 15, 2021, Flowers filed a declaration captioned

“Declaration of Attorney Marianne Flowers Is Opposing In Regard to 

Defendant Jerry Crawford’s Motion to Quash Service of Process.” 

(Capitalization omitted.) In it, she stated that “Attorney Marianne Flowers 

had Michael Sutton served on behalf of . . . Jerry Crawford . . . because 

Michael Sutton is and was the attorney for Jani King Headquarters, a 

Corporation Owner and for the President CEO Jerry Crawford.” She further 

stated, “Attorney Marianne Flowers called Attorney Michael S. Sutton’s office 

on January 4, 2021 and obtained Michael S. Sutton’s email address by 

stating that I wanted to serve case papers by email. Attorney Michael S. 

Sutton’s office gave me the email address to serve documents by email.” The

record is otherwise silent on Sutton’s authorization to accept service of the 

lawsuit against Crawford. 

On March 5, 2021, Flowers timely appealed. 

DISCUSSION

I.

Crawford’s Motion to Dismiss Is Denied

Before we turn to the merits of the appeal, we discuss, and reject,

Crawford’s contention that we should dismiss this appeal. 

First, in a motion to dismiss, Crawford contends we should exercise our 

discretion to dismiss this appeal because Flowers’s opening brief fails to 

articulate a legal argument. Although we ultimately do not find merit in her 
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position, Flowers has articulated a claim that she properly served Crawford

by substituted service and by serving his attorney, whom she contends was 

authorized to accept service. The motion to dismiss is denied.

Second, in his respondent’s brief, Crawford contends this appeal should 

be dismissed as moot. The argument goes that because Crawford has passed 

away before service was perfected, service can never be effected on him. Not 

so. As acknowledged in the respondent’s brief, “[o]n motion, a court shall 

allow a pending action . . . against the decedent that does not abate to be 

continued against the decedent’s personal representative.” (§ 377.41.) And

this court granted respondent’s motion to substitute Crawford’s personal 

representatives, Mary and John Crawford, in his place. (Cal. Rules of Court, 

rule 8.36(a).) Thus, service can be effected on the personal representatives. 

Finally, Crawford asserts that Flowers’s three-year deadline to 

effectuate service of process expired on March 30, 2021, and so it is argued 

that Flowers’s action must be dismissed by the trial court. (§§ 583.210, subd. 

(a) [“The summons and complaint shall be served upon a defendant within 

three years after the action is commenced against the defendant.”], 583.250, 

subd. (a)(2) [“If service is not made in an action within the time prescribed in 

this article . . . [t]he action shall be dismissed[.]”].) But Crawford overlooks

section 583.240, subdivision (c). That provision provides that “[i]n computing 

the time within which service must be made . . . , there shall be excluded the 

time during which . . . [¶] [t]he validity of service was the subject of litigation 

by the parties.” (§ 583.240, subd. (c).) Thus, Crawford’s filing of the motion 

to quash on July 27, 2020 tolled the three-year deadline, and the time within 

which service must be made will not expire until this appeal has resolved. 
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II.

The Trial Court Properly Granted Crawford’s Motion to Quash

On a motion to quash, it is the plaintiff’s burden to prove by a 

preponderance of the evidence that jurisdiction exists. (Simons v. Steverson 

(2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 693, 711.) Where the jurisdictional facts are not in 

conflict, we are presented with a question of law and independently review 

the trial court’s ruling. (Ibid.) As an appellant who represents herself, 

Flowers “is entitled to the same, but no greater, consideration” as any other 

attorney or litigant on appeal and is required to follow the rules of appellate 

procedure. (Nelson v. Gaunt (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d 623, 638; McComber v. 

Wells (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 512, 523 [“Although [appellant] is representing 

herself in this appeal she is not entitled to special treatment and is required 

to follow the rules.”].) Chief among these rules is that Flowers, as the party 

seeking reversal, carries the burden to affirmatively demonstrate error. 

(Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 608–609 [“a fundamental principle of 

appellate procedure [is] that a trial court judgment is ordinarily presumed to 

be correct and the burden is on an appellant to demonstrate, on the basis of 

the record presented to the appellate court, that the trial court committed an 

error that justifies reversal of the judgment”].) Flowers has failed to do that 

here.

Section 415.20, subdivision (a), sets forth the process for effecting 

service in lieu of personal service of the summons and complaint. It provides 

that “a summons may be served by leaving a copy of the summons and 

complaint during usual office hours in [the person’s] office or, if no physical 

address is known, at his or her usual mailing address, other than a United 

States Postal Service post office box, with the person who is apparently in 

charge thereof, and by thereafter mailing a copy of the summons and 
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complaint by first-class mail, postage prepaid to the person to be served at 

the place where a copy of the summons and complaint were left.” (§ 415.20, 

subd. (a), italics added.) Here, it is not disputed that Flowers failed to 

demonstrate she mailed a copy of the summons and complaint to Crawford,

at the Texas address where a copy of the summons and complaint was

allegedly left. Without the mailing, service of the summons is not deemed 

complete. (§ 415.20, subd. (a) [“Service of a summons in this manner is 

deemed complete on the 10th day after the mailing.”].) 

Flowers contends she served Crawford by emailing the summons and 

complaint to his attorney of record, Sutton. Section 416.90 provides “[a] 

summons may be served on a person . . . by delivering a copy of the summons 

and of the complaint . . . to a person authorized by him to receive service of 

process.” (Italics added.) But Flowers has failed to demonstrate Sutton was 

“authorized” to accept service of process on Crawford’s behalf. Simply acting 

as a party’s attorney does not make that individual an authorized agent for 

service of process. (E.g., Summers v. McClanahan (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 

403, 411−412 [“ ‘such agent must be one who is authorized by law or 

appointment to receive service of process, and the agent of an individual for 

other purposes is not necessarily authorized to receive such process’ ”]; 

Warner Bros. Records, Inc. v. Golden West Music Sales (1974) 36 Cal.App.3d 

1012, 1018–1019 (Warner Bros.) [where lawsuit alleged that defendants sent 

reports and checks to third parties in envelopes furnished by their attorney 

and containing their attorney’s address, court held “[t]his factor . . . standing 

alone . . . does not demand a conclusion that [their attorney] was their

ostensible agent to receive service of process”].) 

More is required than just being the attorney of record. In Warner 

Bros., for example, the court stated “[t]he essential factor . . . [wa]s that [the 
8

attorney’s] relationship with the individual defendants may have been 

sufficiently close and enduring to make it reasonably certain that they would 

be apprised of the service on [their attorney] upon their behalf.” (Warner 

Bros., supra, 36 Cal.App.3d at p. 1018, italics added.) Here, Flowers has not 

demonstrated Sutton had such a relationship with Crawford. She has also 

not demonstrated Sutton, or anyone in his office, told Flowers that Sutton 

was authorized to accept service of process on behalf of Crawford. Nor is 

there anything in the record to suggest that Sutton was registered as an 

agent for service of process for Crawford, or his business, with the California 

Secretary of State.

For these reasons, service of the summons and complaint on Crawford 

was defective as a matter of law. Without proper service of process, the court 

does not have jurisdiction over the defendant. (Dill v. Berquist Construction 

Co. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1426, 1444 [“[C]ompliance with the statutory 

procedures for service of process is essential to establish personal 

jurisdiction.”]; Kappel v. Bartlett (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 1457, 1464 [service of 

process, including the summons, is the means by which a court obtains 

jurisdiction over the defendant].) The trial court’s ruling granting the motion 

to quash was proper.4

4 Flowers’s opening brief asserts a number of other arguments that are 

beyond the scope of our review. These arguments include, for example, 

complaints about the trial judge’s purported conflict of interest, the validity of 

service on defendants other than Crawford, and Crawford’s second motion to 

quash filed in February 2021. These matters were not before the trial court

at the relevant motion to quash hearing, and they are based on alleged facts 

that are not part of the appellate record. So we disregard them. (See, e.g., 

Lona v. Citibank, N.A. (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 89, 102 [“Factual matters that 

are not part of the appellate record will not be considered on appeal and such 

matters should not be referred to in the briefs.”].) Additionally, “[s]tatements 

of facts not supported by references to the record may be disregarded as a 
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DISPOSITION

The January 15, 2021 order is affirmed. Each party is to bear his or 

her own costs. 

DO, J.

WE CONCUR:

O’ROURKE, Acting P. J.

DATO, J.

violation of rule 8.204(a)(1)(C) of the California Rules of Court.” (Princess 

Cruise Lines, Ltd. v. Superior Court (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 36, 45.)