[Cite as Parks v. Parks, 2020-Ohio-5356.]

 

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT 

 MONTGOMERY COUNTY 

POLLY L. PARKS 

Plaintiff-Appellant 

v. 

ROGER PARKS 

 Defendant-Appellee 

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Appellate Case No. 28739 

Trial Court Case No. 2017-DR-875 

(Domestic Relations Appeal 

from Common Pleas Court) 

. . . . . . . . . . . 

O P I N I O N 

Rendered on the 20th day of November, 2020. 

. . . . . . . . . . . 

CHERYL L. WASHINGTON, Atty. Reg. No. 0038012, 10 West Second Street, Suite 2225, 

Dayton, Ohio 45402 

 Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant 

 

NICOLE RUTTER-HIRTH, Atty. Reg. No. 0081004, 2541 Shiloh Springs Road, Trotwood, 

Ohio 45426 

 Attorney for Defendant-Appellee 

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FROELICH, J. 
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{¶ 1} Polly L. Parks appeals from a final judgment and decree of divorce issued by 

the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division. Mrs. 

Parks claims that the trial court erred in failing to grant her a continuance upon allowing 

Mrs. Parks’s counsel to withdraw on the scheduled trial date. Mrs. Parks further claims 

that the trial court erred in failing to award her $20,000 for equity in the couple’s jointlyowned property. For the following reasons, the trial court’s judgment will be affirmed. 

I. Facts and Procedural History 

{¶ 2} The parties married on January 20, 1990, and have children together. Mrs. 

Parks filed a complaint for divorce in October 2017, at which time they had one minor 

child (born in May 2002). 

{¶ 3} The matter initially was set as a non-contested divorce on November 29, 

2017. However, Mr. Parks timely filed an answer and counterclaim. Mr. Parks also 

objected to a temporary restraining order that had been issued to Mrs. Parks, and a 

hearing on that matter was held on November 21; the court issued a modified temporary 

restraining order on November 27, 2017. 

{¶ 4} The court scheduled a settlement conference for March 6, 2018, and a 

pretrial conference for April 10, 2018. After the pretrial conference, the court scheduled 

a final hearing on a non-contested divorce for May 22, 2018. The record does not 

indicate what occurred on May 22, but a few days later, the court scheduled an interview 

with the parties’ minor child for June 26. The final hearing was rescheduled for August 

7, 2018. 

{¶ 5} Again, the record does not reflect what, if anything, occurred on August 7, 
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but on August 9, the court scheduled a telephone pretrial conference for August 23, 2018. 

On August 27, the court scheduled a telephone pretrial conference for September 13. 

On September 17, the court scheduled a telephone pretrial conference for September 21. 

There is nothing in the record between the September 17 scheduling order and February 

19, 2019, when the trial court set a telephone pretrial conference for March 6, 2019. On 

March 7, the court scheduled the final hearing for March 22. On March 28, the final 

hearing was rescheduled for May 24. 

{¶ 6} On April 1, Mrs. Parks filed a motion for a continuance of the March 22 final 

hearing date, stating that the parties needed “a bit more time to reach a complete 

agreement on the terms of the divorce.”1 The motion noted that opposing counsel was 

in agreement and that there had been no prior continuances of this matter. The same 

day (April 1), the trial court granted the continuance and rescheduled the hearing for May 

24, consistent with its March 28 scheduling entry. 

{¶ 7} On May 30, the trial court issued an order scheduling a non-contested 

hearing for July 18, 2019 and/or a trial for October 24, 2019. The following day, the court 

issued a pretrial order, addressing disclosure of expert witnesses, discovery, the filing of 

pretrial statements, and the pending issues. The court noted that the parties and the 

court had a pretrial conference on May 28, during which the parties indicated that issues 

related to spousal support, retirement, and real estate had not yet been resolved. 

{¶ 8} On July 19, the court filed a scheduling entry which changed the noncontested divorce hearing date to August 15; the trial date remained October 24, 2019. 

 

1 It is unclear why Mrs. Parks filed this motion when the trial court had already continued 

the March 22, 2019 final hearing date. 
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On August 16, the court scheduled a pretrial conference for the anticipated October 24 

trial. In October 2019, both parties filed pretrial statements. 

{¶ 9} The parties, with counsel, appeared for trial on October 24, as scheduled. 

At the beginning of the hearing, Mrs. Park’s attorney informed the court that Mrs. Parks 

had expressed the day before that she did not want counsel to represent her at trial. 

Counsel indicated that Mrs. Parks believed that counsel had not provided her with pretrial 

materials. 

{¶ 10} The trial court had a discussion with Mrs. Parks about how she wanted to 

proceed. 

THE COURT: You’re ready to proceed or do you have another lawyer to 

come and represent you? Today is the day for trial. 

 [MRS. PARKS]: Ma’am, I’ve not received the questionnaire today. 

THE COURT: That’s not my question. My question to you is this. Are you 

asking me to let [your attorney] off this case? 

[MRS. PARKS]: Well, I don’t understand the process, so can I ask you a 

couple questions? 

THE COURT: What do you want to know, ma’am? You knew today was

trail [sic] today? 

[MRS. PARKS]: Yes, I did. 

THE COURT: This case has been pending since 2017. 

[MRS. PARKS]: Correct. Too much. I’ve asked her to get documents 

from them. We’ve never had any concrete documents. 

THE COURT: Those are not questions. You can request he – you can ask 
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me a couple questions. I’m going to move forward. This case – this case 

has been pending for a long period of time. It’s been scheduled for trial 

since at least August of this year * * * so I’m ready to proceed with this case. 

I’ve taken my time to hear this case – scheduled to hear this case. [Mr. 

Park’s counsel] has done the same thing. You – all have done the same 

thing. I’m ready to move forward. 

[MRS. PARKS]: I don’t have another attorney coming. 

THE COURT: Okay. Then you’re representing yourself. You want me to 

let [your attorney] off the case; is that correct? 

[MRS. PARKS]: I don’t know how to proceed in this. I’m not an attorney. 

I thought I had one. 

THE COURT: Did you hire [your attorney]? 

[MRS. PARKS]: Yes, I did. 

THE COURT: Okay. Okay. And you figured out yesterday that you – 

[MRS. PARKS]: Because she did not get me the documents I needed for 

today. I’ve been waiting since last week. That’s why I called her. And I 

talked to her on Monday. She said she would e-mail them. 

THE COURT: Ma’am, ma’am, ma’am. As I indicated to you, and 

everybody knows, this case has been scheduled for trial since at least 

August 15 of 2019. 

[MRS. PARKS]: Right. 

THE COURT: It was scheduled for today, October 24th. 

[MRS. PARKS]: Right. 
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THE COURT: You were aware of that, correct? 

[MRS. PARKS]: That’s right. You’re correct. 

THE COURT: And yesterday you contacted [your attorney] and indicated 

you did not want her to represent you or you had some conversation with 

her, correct? 

[MRS. PARKS]: Yes. Correct. Because I tried her [sic] to get me the 

information. 

THE COURT: Okay. 

[MRS. PARKS]: So I guess we go forward with her representing me. I can’t 

represent myself. 

THE COURT: Do you have confidence in [your attorney] representing you, 

ma’am? 

[MRS. PARKS]: Not really. 

THE COURT: Okay. So you don’t want her to represent you, is that 

correct? 

[MRS. PARKS]: I guess. Yeah. 

THE COURT: I’ll allow you to withdraw. 

[PLAINTIFF’S ATTORNEY]: Thank you, Your Honor. 

(Trial Tr. at 3-6.) 

{¶ 11} The trial court confirmed with Mrs. Parks that the issues of parental rights, 

spousal support, child support, and real estate remained unresolved and were matters 

for trial. After Mrs. Parks agreed, the court asked Mrs. Parks to call her first witness. 

Mrs. Parks called herself. 
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{¶ 12} Before testifying, Mrs. Parks asked if she could make a motion for a 

continuance. The court responded, “No,” explaining that the case had been continued 

more than 10 times. The court further stated, “This case has been pending since 

October of ’17. It’s not that difficult of a case from the facts that I’ve been given.” Mrs. 

Parks replied, “Okay. That’s fine.” 

{¶ 13} Mrs. Parks then testified to the grounds for divorce and, upon questioning 

by the court, the basis for the court’s jurisdiction. The trial court then re-confirmed what 

issues remained; Mrs. Parks indicated that retirement funds also needed to be divided. 

{¶ 14} At that juncture, the court ordered a brief recess, asking Mr. Parks’s counsel 

if she was “opposed to going outside for just a moment.” Mr. Parks’s counsel said that 

she was not. 

{¶ 15} When court resumed, the parties had reached an agreement on the

disputed issues. Before having the agreement placed on the record, the court 

questioned Mrs. Parks about her self-representation: 

THE COURT: Polly, you voluntarily came to Court or negotiated this case 

without an attorney. 

[MRS. PARKS]: Yes. 

THE COURT: Do you understand you have the right to an attorney?

[MRS. PARKS]: I guess. Yes. 

THE COURT: Is it your desire to go forward today representing yourself? 

[MRS. PARKS]: Yes. 

THE COURT: You’ve had an opportunity to negotiate this case with [Mr. 

Parks’s attorney]; is that correct? 
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[MRS. PARKS]: Yes. 

THE COURT: We’re – in a minute we’re going to read the agreement into 

the record. But you understand and have written down all of the things you 

agree to? 

[MRS. PARKS]: To the best of my knowledge. 

THE COURT: And you are ready to go forward today? 

[MRS. PARKS]: Yes. 

(Trial Tr. at 14-15.) 

{¶ 16} The court then addressed both parties, explaining that once the agreement 

was read, it would ask both parties if this was, in fact, their agreement. The court stated 

that “[o]nce you say yes, you will be bound by the terms and conditions of the agreement.” 

Mrs. Parks asked if she could have an opportunity for another attorney to review the 

agreement “before we settle it once and for all.” The court responded that Mrs. Parks 

could take the agreement to anyone she chose, but the agreement would be final once 

the parties confirmed the agreement in court. Both parties indicated their understanding. 

The trial court again emphasized that if the parties refused to sign the decree that would 

be prepared from their agreement, the court would “not go back and undo an agreement.” 

Both parties again expressed that they understood. 

{¶ 17} Mr. Parks’s attorney read the parties’ agreement into the record. With 

respect to real estate, Mr. Parks’s attorney stated: 

There are three pieces of property. There’s a [B]rownstone property, which 

wife is going to retain. She will be responsible from this point forward to 

pay the home equity line and any liabilities on that property. Husband is 
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going to retain the Rushwood property and he will be responsible for all 

debts on that property. 

There is a property that husband and his family own on [L]ee Hollow 

and husband will get to retain his interest in that property. 

The parties will each sign Quitclaim Deeds quitclaiming their 

interests in the property that the other is awarded, and all those deeds will 

be held until such time that Roger is able to secure $25,000 within 120 days 

at which time he will pay that to wife and then all of the Quitclaim Deeds can 

be recorded. He’s going to pay her, and that represents a settlement for 

all of the real estate and a prepayment of $5,000 in child support. That is 

a property settlement to the wife. * * * 

(Trial Tr. at 24-25.) 

{¶ 18} After the agreement was discussed and stated on the record, the trial court 

asked Mrs. Parks if she had heard and understood everything stated by Mr. Parks’s 

attorney and if that was, in fact, the agreement; Mrs. Parks responded affirmatively. Mrs. 

Parks stated that she had no additions, corrections, or clarifications. The court again 

reviewed with Mrs. Parks that she would be bound by the agreement once she said that 

this was her agreement. Mrs. Parks again expressed her understanding, that this was 

her agreement, and that she was asking the court to adopt the agreement. The court 

asked Mr. Parks the same questions, and he responded similarly.

{¶ 19} On February 13, 2020, the trial court issued its final judgment and decree 

of divorce. Paragraph 3 addressed the parties’ real property. It ordered that Mrs. Parks 

would retain the Brownstone property and that Mr. Parks would retain the Rushwood and 
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Lee Hollow properties. The last sentence of paragraph 3 provided: “To offset equity in 

the property, Roger shall pay Polly a property settlement as stated in paragraph 13 below 

within one hundred twenty (120) days.” Paragraph 13 stated, in its entirety: 

13. Property Settlement: to offset equity in real estate, and specifically 

Roger’s Lee Hollow property, and as prepayment of child support in the 

amount of $5,000, within one hundred twenty (120) days, Roger shall 

secure a loan or other means to pay Wife $25,000 as a property settlement. 

This represents $20,000 in equity in real estate and $5,000 for child support 

(calculated at a rate of $300 per month for 18 months until the child 

emancipates). At the time of the payout, Quit Claim Deeds for all pieces 

of real estate must be recorded. 

{¶ 20} Mrs. Parks appeals from the trial court’s final judgment and decree of 

divorce, raising two assignments of error. 

II. Continuance / Self-Representation 

{¶ 21} In her first assignment of error, Mrs. Parks claims that “the trial court erred 

in refusing to grant [Mrs. Parks’s] request for a continuance and forcing her to represent 

herself at the divorce hearing unaided by counsel.” 

{¶ 22} “The grant or denial of a continuance is a matter which is entrusted to the 

broad, sound discretion of the trial judge.” State v. Unger, 67 Ohio St.2d 65, 67, 423 

N.E.2d 1078 (1981). Therefore, an appellate court must not reverse a trial court’s 

decision to deny a motion for continuance unless it finds that the trial court abused its 

discretion. Id.; Frodyma v. Frodyma, 2d Dist. Greene No. 2013-CA-40, 2014-Ohio-953, 

¶ 26. The term “abuse of discretion” implies that the court’s attitude is unreasonable, 
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arbitrary or unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219, 450 N.E.2d 

1140 (1983). 

{¶ 23} When ruling on a motion for a continuance, “[t]he court must balance the 

needs of its docket against the possible prejudice to the party requesting the continuance 

if it’s denied.” Kelly v. Kelly, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 19263, 2003-Ohio-612, ¶ 15. A 

court should consider (1) the length of the delay requested, (2) whether other 

continuances have been requested and received, (3) the inconvenience to litigants, 

witnesses, opposing counsel and the court, (4) whether the requested delay is for 

legitimate reasons or whether it is dilatory, purposeful, or contrived, (5) whether the 

movant contributed to the circumstance which gave rise to the request for a continuance, 

and (6) other relevant factors, depending on the unique facts of each case. Frodyman

at ¶ 27, citing Unger at 67-68. We previously have held that it does not constitute an 

abuse of discretion for a trial court to deny a motion for continuance filed on the day a trial 

is scheduled to begin. Id., citing State v. Pigg, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 25549, 2013-

Ohio-4722, ¶ 18. 

{¶ 24} In this case, Mrs. Parks requested a continuance at the beginning of the 

scheduled trial, despite her acknowledgment to the court that she knew trial was 

scheduled for that day. Mr. Parks and his attorney had appeared for trial and were 

prepared to proceed with a contested divorce. Mrs. Parks and her attorney both stated 

to the trial court that Mrs. Parks had told her attorney that she (Mrs. Parks) no longer 

wanted her attorney to represent her, a decision she had made the day before. Mrs. 

Parks had not arranged for another attorney, and she did not request a continuance for a 

particular length of time. The trial court could have reasonably concluded that the needs 
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of its docket and the prejudice to Mr. Park and his attorney weighed heavily in favor of 

denying the continuance. 

{¶ 25} Mrs. Parks argues that she requested the continuance for a legitimate 

reason. Mrs. Parks told the court that she had lost confidence in her attorney because 

she had not received documents that Mrs. Parks had asked her attorney to provide to 

her. Mrs. Parks suggests on appeal that her attorney’s conduct during the 

representation violated three of Ohio’s Rules of Professional Conduct. However, Mrs. 

Parks’s attorney disputed Mrs. Parks’s claim, telling the trial court that she had sent Mrs. 

Parks the pretrial materials. 

{¶ 26} Mrs. Parks acknowledges that the case had been pending for a long time, 

but she asserts that the trial court had continued the case sua sponte several times. She 

notes that she had previously requested a continuance once, in April 2019, to allow the 

parties to attempt to negotiate a settlement. Mrs. Parks argues that she “should not be 

faulted for [the trial court’s] unilateral rescheduling of the divorce hearing to repeatedly 

accommodate its own schedule.” 

{¶ 27} The record does not reflect how many conferences actually were held 

between the court and the parties during the pendency of the case,2 nor does the record 

explain the reasons for the scheduled pretrial conferences. The trial court reasonably 

noted that the case had been pending for a significant period of time without the parties’ 

reaching a resolution on several issues. 

{¶ 28} Mrs. Parks emphasizes that she was prejudiced by the trial court’s denial of 

 

2 Mr. Parks claims in his appellate brief that there were nearly a dozen telephone 

conferences. 
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a continuance, because it required her to proceed without counsel, to her detriment. She 

notes that she expressed to the trial court that she was not confident in her ability to 

represent herself. Mrs. Parks states in her appellate brief that her husband had a 

“decided advantage, as undecided issues remained concerning the settlement 

agreement, and [she], a layperson, faced an experienced negotiator in trying to work out 

the details.” Mrs. Parks cites to case law concerning the right to counsel in criminal 

cases. 

{¶ 29} A party to a divorce action does not have a guaranteed right to counsel in a 

domestic relations proceeding. E.g., Wielgus v. Wielgus, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 95214, 

2011-Ohio-1569, ¶ 11; Rue v. Rue, 169 Ohio App.3d 160, 2006-Ohio-5131, 862 N.E.2d 

166, ¶ 65 (2d Dist.). While it may be unwise for a party to a divorce action to proceed 

pro se, Mrs. Parks had been represented by counsel for approximately two years and had 

decided, the day before trial, that she no longer wanted her attorney to represent her. 

Given the timing of Mrs. Parks’s decision regarding her attorney and of her request for a 

continuance, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the continuance, even 

though the result of that decision meant that Mrs. Parks proceeded pro se. 

{¶ 30} Mrs. Parks’s first assignment of error is overruled. 

III. Property Settlement 

{¶ 31} In her second assignment of error, Mrs. Parks claims that “the trial court 

erred in failing to grant [Mrs. Parks’s] marital equity in jointly-owned property.” Mrs. 

Parks asserts that the trial court’s judgment and decree of divorce did not provide her 

$20,000 for her equity in the Rushmore property and that the judgment needs to be 

corrected to credit her with that amount. 
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{¶ 32} The record belies Mrs. Parks’s claim that she was not properly credited with 

$20,000 representing her equity in marital property. The parties’ agreement, as stated 

in the October 24 transcript, indicates that Mr. Parks agreed to pay $20,000 to Mrs. Parks 

as “a settlement for all of the real estate.” That agreement was incorporated into the final 

judgment and decree of divorce in paragraphs 3 and 13. 

{¶ 33} Mrs. Parks cites to portions of the October 24 transcript that discussed the 

mechanics of that payment and the recording of deeds. Specifically, she references the 

following discussion: 

[MR. PARK’S COUNSEL]: * * * Each party’s going to retain any liabilities for 

the real estate which they are awarded. Husband will be taking her name 

off of any – is she’s [sic] on the mortgage or home equity line? 

[MR. PARKS]: Yes. 

[MR. PARK’S COUNSEL]: For your property? 

[MR. PARKS]: Yes. I just need her to – when I leave here today, I need 

her to sign off. 

[MR. PARK’S COUNSEL]: Everybody will cooperate. 

[MR. PARKS]: Yes. 

[MR. PARK’S COUNSEL]: Okay. So he may ask you to sign some papers 

to get you off the mortgage. You’ll do that and vice versa. Everybody will 

cooperate in doing that. 

THE COURT: So he can get a loan to pay you. He needs you to sign off 

on the mortgage that he has right now. You don’t want the mortgage in 

your name anyway. 
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[MRS. PARKS]: Right. I’m just signing off on the mortgage, or not the 

deed? 

THE COURT: No, he will not get the deed until you’ve been paid all of your 

money. 

[MRS. PARK]: Okay. 

[MR. PARKS’S COUNSEL]: The Quitclaim Deed may be part of the 

closing process to close on his new loan, but it will not be recorded until she 

is paid. Once she is paid her money then all the Quitclaim Deeds will be 

recorded. 

THE COURT: Do you understand that? 

[MRS. PARKS]: Yes. 

(Trial Tr. at 26-27.) The trial court’s final judgment and decree of divorce is consistent 

with this discussion and Mr. Parks’s attorney’s additional representations about the 

parties’ agreement concerning the real property. Mrs. Parks was to receive $20,000 

from Mr. Parks as a settlement of the real estate property, and the trial court’s judgment 

provides for that monetary payment. 

{¶ 34} We note that paragraph 13 of the final judgment and decree of divorce 

indicates that the property settlement was “to offset equity in real estate, and specifically 

Roger’s Lee Hollow property,” plus a prepayment of child support. (Emphasis added.) 

This reference to Lee Hollow appears to come from Mr. Parks’s pretrial statement, in 

which he proposed to resolve the real estate issue, in part, by “securing a loan for Wife’s 

equity in Lee Hollow for $25,000 to be paid to Wife within 120 days.” 

{¶ 35} Mr. Parks’s pretrial statement further indicated, however, that the Lee 
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Hollow property was inherited by Mr. Parks and his sister and, thus, was his separate 

property; Mr. Park did not provide the amount of marital equity in that property. Mrs. 

Parks’s pretrial statement claimed marital equity of approximately $74,000 (half the 

property’s total value). At the October 24 trial, the parties agreed that Mr. Parks would 

retain the Lee Hollow property, which was “property that husband and his family own.” 

(Trial Tr. at 25.) 

{¶ 36} The parties’ pretrial statements agreed that the parties had equity of 

approximately $80,000 in the Rushwood property, which Mr. Parks retained after the 

divorce. Their pretrial statements disagreed as to the amount of equity in the 

Brownstone property, which Mrs. Parks retained following the divorce. Mrs. Parks’s 

pretrial statement asserted that the equity in the Brownstone property was approximately 

$66,000; Mr. Parks asserted that it was higher. 

{¶ 37} At trial, the parties told the trial court that Mr. Parks had agreed to pay 

$20,000 to Mrs. Parks as a property settlement for “all” of the real estate. Based on that 

statement, the trial court’s inclusion of the phrase “and specifically Roger’s Lee Hollow 

property” perhaps did not accurately reflect the parties’ intention at trial that the $20,000 

resolve the equity issue for all of the properties. Nevertheless, the trial court ordered Mr. 

Parks to pay $20,000 to Mrs. Parks as a property settlement for the real property, as the 

parties had agreed on October 24. 

{¶ 38} Mrs. Parks’s second assignment of error is overruled. 

IV. Conclusion 

{¶ 39} The trial court’s judgment will be affirmed. 

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DONOVAN, J. and WELBAUM, J., concur. 

Copies sent to: 

Cheryl R. Washington 

Nicole Rutter-Hirth 

Hon. Denise L. Cross