Filed 6/15/16 P. v. Hoiby CA2/6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or 

ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

THE PEOPLE,

 Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

JASON HOIBY,

 Defendant and Appellant.

2d Crim. No. B267533

(Super. Ct. No. 15PT-00419)

(San Luis Obispo County)

Jason Hoiby appeals an order of the superior court committing him for 

treatment as a mentally disordered offender (MDO). (Pen. Code, § 2962.) We conclude, 

among other things, that substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that Hoiby

poses a substantial risk of physical harm to other persons because of his mental disorder. 

We affirm.

FACTS

In 2011, Hoiby was convicted of assault with a firearm and sentenced to a 

state prison term. 

In 2015, the Board of Parole Hearings (BPH) determined that Hoiby met the 

criteria to be committed for treatment as a MDO. Hoiby filed a superior court petition to 

challenge that BPH determination. The trial court appointed counsel for him. Hoiby

waived his right to a jury trial. 
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At trial, Dia Gunnarsson, Ph.D., testified Hoiby has a delusional disorder 

which constitutes a “severe mental illness.” Hoiby’s 2011 commitment offense was for 

assault with a firearm. Neighbors had complained about loud music coming from Hoiby’s 

house. When the police arrived, Hoiby “appeared with a firearm, waved it towards the 

police officer’s head and threatened” the officer. From a window, Hoiby pointed a gun at 

an officer’s head. He was four feet away from the officer. Hoiby called a police dispatch 

center and made threats against the police officers. 

The police called for “required backup” and “air support.” Gunnarsson said 

Hoiby’s mental illness played “a role in his qualifying offense.” Hoiby’s behavior that day 

was “indicative of paranoia.” He believed someone was following him, that the police 

were harassing him “because of a faulty alarm system,” or because someone thought he 

was a bank robber. He did not believe the law enforcement officers who arrived were 

actually police officers.

Gunnarsson said Hoiby’s disorder is not in remission. Hoiby is still 

“demonstrating delusional beliefs.” He believed that “unseen entities” were “stabbing 

him” and that his medications “ruined his immune system.” Gunnarsson said Hoiby meets 

all the requirements for a MDO commitment and poses “a substantial risk of physical harm 

to others by reason of his mental disorder.” She said that Hoiby’s commitment offense 

was “pretty violent, pretty dangerous” and that he lacks insight as to his mental illness. 

Hoiby’s delusional beliefs and substance abuse are risk factors “when he does leave the 

hospital.”

In Hoiby’s defense, Trayci Dahl, Ph.D., testified Hoiby meets all the 

requirements for a MDO commitment, except one—he does not pose a substantial risk of 

physical harm to others because of his mental disorder. She said he had no history of 

violence prior to his commitment offense and he “did not cause any substantial bodily

harm to anyone.” His offense was “very threatening” but “threats won’t harm me.” 

The trial court found Hoiby met all the “requisite criteria” for a MDO 

commitment. It ordered that he be committed to the California Department of State 

Hospitals for treatment as a MDO. 
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DISCUSSION

Substantial Evidence

Hoiby contends there is insufficient evidence to support the trial court’s 

finding that he represents a substantial danger of physical harm to other persons. We 

disagree.

“We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment drawing 

all reasonable inferences in support of the court’s findings.” (People v. Itehua (2014) 227 

Cal.App.4th 356, 359.) “We do not decide the credibility of witnesses or weigh the 

evidence.” (Ibid.) To commit a defendant for treatment as a MDO the People must prove 

that he or she poses a “substantial risk of physical harm” to another person. (People v.

Baker (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 1234, 1247.)

Gunnarsson testified that Hoiby poses a substantial risk of physical harm to 

others because of his mental condition. Her testimony constitutes substantial evidence to 

support the trial court’s finding. She said Hoiby lacks insight about his mental illness.

Hoiby has been resistant to taking the medications that he needs to control his symptoms.

When Gunnarsson asked Hoiby about “continuation of treatment in the community upon 

discharge,” Hoiby told her that “he did not believe he needed any mental health treatment.” 

Hoiby also has a history of substance abuse but he does “not have any insight into his 

problems with substances.” He was “unable to verbalize any relapse-prevention plan.”

Gunnarsson said alcohol and drugs “minimize the effectiveness of psychiatric 

medications” and “aggravate or exacerbate mental health symptoms.”

Gunnarsson testified Hoiby’s commitment offense was violent. Factors that 

played a role in that offense included Hoiby’s “delusional beliefs” and substance abuse, 

and those “are still going to be risk factors when he does leave the hospital.” He was not 

“[medication] compliant in March 2015.” The trial court could reasonably infer Hoiby 

was suffering from the same symptoms he had when he committed his commitment 

offense.

Hoiby cites to evidence that he claims supports his position on appeal. But

the issue is not whether some evidence supports appellant, it is only whether substantial 
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evidence supports the judgment. Here there was a conflict in the testimony of Gunnarsson

and Dahl as to whether Hoiby posed a substantial risk of danger to others because of his 

mental condition. But the credibility of the expert witnesses and the weight given to their 

testimony are matters exclusively determined by the trier of fact. (People v. Itehua, supra, 

227 Cal.App.4th at p. 359.)

The trial court could reasonably question the credibility of Dahl’s conclusion 

about Hoiby’s risk of danger to others given her testimony that she believed his offense of 

assault on a police officer with a firearm was a nonviolent crime. The characterization of 

that offense was not consistent with the facts. Moreover, much of Dahl’s testimony 

supports the court’s finding. She said that when she interviewed Hoiby he “was floridly 

psychotic” and “was talking about all sorts of delusional things.” She conceded that he 

committed a “scary crime” and “he had not been compliant with his medications.” She 

also said Hoiby “doesn’t really appreciate the utility of medications.” The evidence is 

sufficient.

We have reviewed Hoiby’s remaining contentions and we conclude he has 

not shown error.

The judgment is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

GILBERT, P. J.

We concur:

YEGAN, J.

PERREN, J.
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Jacquelyn H. Duffy, Judge

Superior Court County of San Luis Obispo

______________________________

Gerald J. Miller, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant 

and Appellant.

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant 

Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Steven D. 

Matthews, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, and Scott A. Taryle, Deputy Attorney 

General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.