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S. HRG. 113–154

A PIVOTAL MOMENT FOR THE EASTERN PARTNERSHIP: OUTLOOK FOR UKRAINE, MOLDOVA,

GEORGIA, BELARUS, ARMENIA, AND AZERBAIJAN

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

NOVEMBER 14, 2013

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey, Chairman

BARBARA BOXER, California 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware 

RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois 

TOM UDALL, New Mexico 

CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut 

TIM KAINE, Virginia 

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts 

BOB CORKER, Tennessee 

JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho 

MARCO RUBIO, Florida 

RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

JOHN McCAIN, Arizona 

JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming 

RAND PAUL, Kentucky 

DANIEL E. O’BRIEN, Staff Director

LESTER E. MUNSON III, Republican Staff Director

——————

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut, Chairman

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois 

RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin 

JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming 

(II)

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

C O N T E N T S 

Page

Aslund, Anders, senior fellow, Peterson Institute for International Economics, 

Washington, DC ................................................................................................... 16

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 18

Cohen, Dr. Ariel, senior research fellow, Heritage Foundation, Washington, 

DC .......................................................................................................................... 22

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 24

Johnson, Hon. Ron, U.S. Senator from Wisconsin, opening statement ............... 2

Murphy, Hon. Christopher, U.S. Senator from Connecticut, opening statement ...................................................................................................................... 1

Nuland, Hon. Victoria, Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian 

Affairs, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC ......................................... 2

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 5

Responses to questions submitted for the record by Senator Edward 

J. Markey ....................................................................................................... 44

Wilson, Damon, executive vice president, Atlantic Council, Washington, DC ... 30

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 32

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

Ardouny, Bryan, Executive Director, Armenian Assembly of America, submitted statement .................................................................................................. 48

Gegeshidze, His Excellency Archil, Ambassador of Georgia to the United 

States, submitted statement ............................................................................... 50

Munteanu, Igor, Ambassador of Moldova to the United States, submitted 

statement .............................................................................................................. 51

Suleymanov, H.E. Elin, Ambassador of the Republic of Azerbaijan to the 

United States, submitted statement ................................................................... 46

(III)

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

(1)

A PIVOTAL MOMENT FOR THE EASTERN 

PARTNERSHIP: OUTLOOK FOR UKRAINE, 

MOLDOVA, GEORGIA, BELARUS, ARMENIA, 

AND AZERBAIJAN 

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 14, 2013 

U.S. SENATE, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPEAN AFFAIRS, 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:08 p.m., in room 

SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Christopher Murphy 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Present: Senators Murphy, Shaheen, Johnson, and Risch. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER MURPHY,

U.S. SENATOR FROM CONNECTICUT 

Senator MURPHY. This hearing of the Subcommittee on European 

Affairs will now come to order. 

Pleased to be joined today on our first panel by Assistant Secretary Victoria Nuland. We will hear from her shortly. First, we 

will have some brief opening remarks from myself and Senator 

Johnson. 

Today’s hearing is entitled ‘‘A Pivotal Moment for the Eastern 

Partnership: The Outlook for Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Belarus, 

Armenia, and Azerbaijan. I am very thankful that Ms. Nuland has 

made the time to be here. We are also looking forward to our second panel, in which we will have Damon Wilson, Dr. Ariel Cohen, 

and Dr. Anders Aslund present. 

On November 28 to the 29th, which is about 2 weeks from today, 

European leaders are going to gather in Vilnius, Lithuania, for an 

important summit on the Eastern Partnership. Since its inception 

in 2009, the Partnership has provided an important framework for 

countries that seek a closer partnership with the European Union. 

Nearly 5 years later, the concept of ‘‘more for more’’ will be tested, 

and several partner states who have made significant progress on 

the reform agendas will have the opportunity to sign or initial an 

Association Agreement and Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade 

Agreement. The sentiment I hope we will convey today is that the 

United States strongly supports the institution of the Eastern Partnership, and we will remain deeply involved, as appropriate, to 

support the vision of Europe ‘‘whole, free, and at peace.’’

Now, while these agreements are exclusively between the EU 

and the Eastern Partnership countries, the United States does 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

2

have an interest in furthering democracy and stability throughout 

Europe and Eurasia. We believe, just like the EU, that integration 

of these nations only can happen when key conditions are met by 

applicant nations, particularly around issues related to the rule of 

law, government transparency, and open economic policies. 

And, as we begin negotiations around a new free trade agreement with the EU, both America and these Eurasian nations have 

a lot to gain through the expansion of the EU. Americans will gain 

access to new markets and businesses, and places like Ukraine, 

Georgia, and Moldova will enter an economic community of nations 

representing the most robust consumer economies in the world. 

It is important to note, though, as we talk about this today, that 

the Eastern Partnership does not preclude a relationship with Russia. Indeed, by dint of geography, it makes sense for each of these 

countries to maintain a healthy relationship with the Russian Federation, as well as with the European Union. Unfortunately, it 

seems as though Russia sees this whole contest as a zero-sum 

game and has put considerable pressure on each of the partnership 

countries to discourage them from strengthening relations with the 

EU. We have seen a ban on wine imports from Moldova, chocolate 

from the Ukraine, fertilizer from Belarus, and the list just goes on 

and on and on. This is both unnecessary and counterproductive for 

Russia, because, just as the EU is interested in stable, prosperous 

governments on their border, so, too, should Russia. Ukraine, 

Moldova, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Belarus should be free 

to chart their own future. Our message should be that the door to 

Euro-Atlantic institutions is open, and if you are prepared to meet 

reasonable conditions, we will support you. 

So, we look forward to this discussion on the outlook, on the eve 

of the Vilnius summit. We look forward to talking about the pressures that these countries are facing, our current United States 

strategy toward the eastern states, and what more, if anything, we 

can be doing to help them make progress on their reform agenda. 

With that, let me turn it over to Senator Johnson for opening 

remarks. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RON JOHNSON,

U.S. SENATOR FROM WISCONSIN 

Senator JOHNSON. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I have little to add, other than to welcome Secretary Nuland. We 

look forward to your testimony. 

Senator MURPHY. Great. 

Let me welcome Secretary Nuland, who is the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs. Assistant Secretary Nuland has been on the job since September. I know that 

she has been working very hard and doing a fantastic job in this 

brief amount of time representing the United States. 

I now invite you, Assistant Secretary, to give your testimony. 

STATEMENT OF HON. VICTORIA NULAND, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR EUROPEAN AND EURASIAN AFFAIRS, U.S. 

DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Ms. NULAND. Well, thank you, Chairman Murphy, Ranking 

Member Johnson, and distinguished members of the Senate ForFOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

3

eign Relations Committee. It is my honor to appear before you 

today to discuss the EU’s upcoming Eastern Partnership summit 

and to highlight the opportunities and the challenges we face in 

this part of Europe. 

While the six Eastern Partnership countries have responded in 

different ways to the EU’s offer to integrate into Europe’s common 

structures, the United States strongly supports the process as a 

key ingredient in our effort to cement a Europe ‘‘whole, free, and 

at peace,’’ a shared policy goal of the United States and EU member states since the Berlin Wall fell, almost 25 years ago. 

At the November 28–29 summit in Vilnius, as you said, Chairman, EU members will make decisions whether to sign an Association Agreement and a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement with Ukraine and whether to initial these same agreements 

with Moldova and Georgia. This is a historic moment for all three 

of these countries and a key step toward their dream of one day 

being fully integrated into Europe. All three have worked very hard 

to bring their judicial and law enforcement structures closer to the 

EU standard and to prepare their political systems and their economic and energy markets for greater integration with Europe. 

Ukraine has passed over 18 pieces of implementing legislation 

harmonizing with EU standards to prepare for Vilnius. Georgia 

and Moldova have met the requirements for initialing their AAs 

and completed their respective DCFTA negotiations and embarked 

on key judicial sector reforms. In each case, these reforms have 

required a national political consensus that these countries’ futures 

lie with Europe. 

The United States supports the sovereign right of these countries 

to choose their own future, and we welcome their closer relationship with the EU. We have been working in lockstep with our 

European allies and partners to help Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia meet the tough conditions for a ‘‘yes’’ vote at Vilnius. We have 

also been aligning future U.S. assistance with that of the EU to ensure that these countries can continue on the politically difficult 

but necessary path of reform and economic adjustment, including 

after Vilnius, where there will still be plenty of work to do. 

At the same time, we have been working with the EU and each 

candidate country to anticipate, and to prepare them for, any negative reaction to their choice, whether it comes from inside or outside their countries. I would note, in this regard, that any form of 

pressure to prevent sovereign states from pursuing greater integration with the EU or any organization of their choosing would contravene obligations under the OSCE Helsinki principles and the 

Charter of Paris. The message we are sending in the neighborhood 

is that all countries benefit when their neighbors open their markets and become more stable and prosperous, as you said, Mr. 

Chairman. 

The breadth and depth of U.S. assistance to the Eastern Partnership countries over the past 25 years is well known to this 

committee and to the Senate as a whole. You have been our indispensable partners in shaping our policies and our programs in support of a more democratic and prosperous Europe and Eurasia. We 

ask for that support to continue. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

4

In recent months, as Vilnius approaches, we have kicked our 

political, economic, and technical assistance into higher gear. The 

President gave vital political support to the Eastern Partnership 

Project during the Baltic summit in Washington last August and 

again when he met with his Nordic colleagues in Stockholm in 

September. 

The Vice President has discussed Eastern Partnership in all of 

his bilateral meetings with European leaders over the last months. 

Secretary Kerry underscored the strategic importance of the 

Eastern Partnership when he met with all of the EU Foreign Ministers in Vilnius in August and again at the transatlantic dinner 

that he hosted in New York in September. 

And in the months since then, our Interagency Team on Europe 

has worked with all the parties to build consensus for the most forward-leaning outcome in Vilnius. We have met with decisionmakers in all of the candidate countries to drive home the need to 

make the tough choices and lock in the reforms before Vilnius and 

to show that they are serious about their commitments. We have 

also been in and out of Brussels and key EU capitals, on a weekly 

basis, to fine tune our assistance programs to ensure that they are 

effectively coordinated with those of the EU and that they are supportive of the needs of the countries. 

I would like to briefly outline where we stand on Ukraine, 

Moldova, and Georgia. I have submitted a longer statement, for the 

record, which covers all six countries, and those three in more 

depth. 

As you know, Ukraine still needs to take three important reform 

steps in order to meet the EU’s conditions for signature at Vilnius. 

It needs to pass justice reform legislation, it needs to pass electoral 

reform legislation, and it needs to take action to release jailed 

former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko for medical treatment. 

In the past few months, Ukraine has come under pressure from 

Russia, including bans on chocolate, stoppage of refrigerated goods 

at the border, and reductions in other key imports. We are working 

with the EU on options to help Ukraine make difficult trade adjustments and weather the EU implementation period if Ukraine 

makes the political decisions necessary to sign its Association 

Agreement at Vilnius. We are also discussing ways to broaden and 

deepen the United States-Ukrainian bilateral relationship after 

Ukraine meets the Vilnius conditions. 

Moldova’s initialing of an Association Agreement at Vilnius has 

already been approved by the EU, and it is poised to attain visa 

liberalization from the EU as early as this spring and to sign its 

AA by September 2014, in advance of their next elections. We and 

the EU are working together to try to mitigate the impact of recent 

Russian decisions to block the import of Moldovan wine and other 

agricultural exports. We are also looking at steps to increase 

Moldova’s energy security and to expand its exports to the EU and 

to the United States. 

In 2012 and 2013, Georgia took important steps forward with 

truly competitive national elections resulting in the first peaceful 

democratic transfers of power since it regained independence. But, 

considerable political and economic challenges remain, such as the 

unresolved conflicts in the two Russian-occupied regions of Georgia, 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

5

protracted displacement of people, fragile democratic institutions, 

and the need for further strengthening of the rule of law. With U.S. 

assistance, Georgia has reoriented its trade toward Western markets and increased its energy efficiency and diversity, and we are 

working with the EU to strengthen Georgia’s ability to resist external pressure. 

Finally, as you mentioned, Chairman, in our discussions with 

Russia about the Eastern Partnership, we are encouraging Moscow 

to abide by its commitments in the OSCE and elsewhere regarding 

the rights of its neighbors to pursue any political and economic 

arrangements that they choose. We have also encouraged Moscow 

to see the benefits of deeper integration between its neighbors’ 

economies and the EU’s 500 million customers, including the likelihood that more prosperous neighbors will buy more Russian 

exports. Both the EU and the United States are also interested in 

increasing trade with Russia, and we’re open to further consultations on what might be possible. 

The Eastern Partnership is ultimately about far more than closer 

relations between the EU and several countries in Eastern Europe 

and the Caucasus. It is also a step toward the longstanding vision 

of a more integrated economic and political space stretching from 

Lisbon to Donetsk, animated by market-oriented reforms, growing 

prosperity, and deepening democracy. We strongly support it, and 

I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Nuland follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY VICTORIA NULAND

Thank you, Chairman Murphy, Ranking Member Johnson, and the distinguished 

members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. It is my honor to appear 

before you today to discuss the EU’s upcoming Eastern Partnership Summit and 

highlight the opportunities and challenges we face in this part of Europe. While the 

six Eastern Partnership countries have responded in various ways to the EU’s offer 

to integrate into Europe’s common structures, the United States strongly supports 

the process as a key ingredient in our effort to cement a ‘‘Europe whole and free 

and at peace’’—a shared policy goal of the United States and EU member states 

since the Berlin Wall fell almost 25 years ago. 

At the November 28–29 summit in Vilnius, EU Members will make decisions 

whether to sign an Association Agreement (AA) and a Deep and Comprehensive 

Free Trade Area Agreement (DCFTA) with Ukraine, and whether to initial these 

agreements with Moldova and Georgia. This is a historic moment for all three of 

these countries, and a key step toward their dream of one day being fully integrated 

into Europe. All three have worked hard to bring their judicial and law enforcement 

structures closer to EU standards and to prepare their political systems and economic and energy markets for greater integration with Europe. Ukraine has passed 

over 18 pieces of implementing legislation harmonizing with EU standards to prepare for Vilnius. Georgia and Moldova have met the requirements for initialing their 

Association Agreements, completed their respective DCFTA negotiations and 

embarked on key judicial sector reforms. In each case, these reforms have required 

a national political consensus that these countries’ futures lie with Europe. 

The United States supports the sovereign right of these countries to choose their 

own future, and we welcome their closer relationship with the EU. We have been 

working in lock-step with our European allies and partners to help Ukraine, 

Moldova, and Georgia meet the tough conditions for a ‘‘yes’’ vote at Vilnius. We’ve 

also been aligning future U.S. assistance with that of the EU to ensure that these 

countries can continue on the politically difficult, but necessary, path of reform and 

economic adjustment, including after Vilnius. At the same time, we have been working with the EU and each candidate country to anticipate and prepare them for any 

negative reaction to their choice, whether it comes from inside or outside their countries. I would note in this regard that any form of pressure to prevent sovereign 

states from pursuing greater integration with the EU, or any organization of their 

choosing, would contravene obligations under the OSCE Helsinki Principles and the 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

6

Charter of Paris. The message we are sending in the neighborhood is that all countries benefit when their neighbors open their markets and become more stable and 

prosperous. 

The breadth and depth of U.S. assistance to the Eastern Partnership countries 

over the past 25 years is well known to the Senate and to this committee. You have 

been indispensible partners in shaping our policies and programs in support of a 

more democratic and prosperous Europe and Eurasia. From the Freedom Support 

Act to the Partnership for Peace, the members of this committee have been critical 

players in providing the support these nations have enjoyed from the United States. 

This committee has also participated in our dialogue with our EU partners on the 

importance of keeping the door open to the European and transatlantic aspirations 

and identities of these emerging and sometimes vulnerable states. We ask for your 

continued strong support. 

In recent months, as Vilnius approaches, we have kicked our political, economic, 

and technical assistance into high gear. The President gave vital political support 

to the Eastern Partnership project during the Baltic summit in Washington in late 

August, and again when he met with his Nordic colleagues in Stockholm in September. The Vice President has discussed developments in Eastern Partnership 

countries repeatedly in his bilateral meetings with European leaders. Secretary 

Kerry underscored the strategic importance of the Eastern Partnership when he met 

with all the EU Foreign Ministers in Vilnius in August. At the annual Transatlantic 

Dinner in New York in September, Secretary Kerry again focused his comments on 

the Eastern Partnership, and urged his European counterparts to make bold decisions at Vilnius. 

In the months since, our interagency team on Europe has worked with all parties 

to build consensus for the most forward leaning outcome in Vilnius. We’ve met with 

decisionmakers in all the candidate countries to drive home the need to make tough 

choices and lock in real reforms before Vilnius and to show they are serious about 

their commitments. We’ve also been in and out of Brussels and key EU capitals on 

a weekly basis to coordinate our efforts, and fine-tune our assistance programs to 

ensure they are effectively coordinated with EU programs and supportive of the 

countries involved. 

Now, let me turn to the prospects for each of the EaP countries, their challenges 

and our support. 

Ukraine still needs to take three important reform steps to meet the EU’s conditions for signature at Vilnius including: passage of legislation reforming its Prosecutor General’s Office; passage of legislation reforming its parliamentary election 

code; and the release of jailed former Prime Minister Yuliya Tymoshenko for medical treatment. Since its independence in 1991, the American people have supported 

Ukraine’s transition to democracy and a free market economy with over $5 billion 

in assistance. In FY 2013, our assistance topped $100 million, and much of it went 

to help Ukraine meet European standards in law enforcement, electoral reform, 

business climate and the judicial sector, including key support for Ukraine’s newly 

adopted Criminal Procedure Code. If Ukraine meets the EU’s conditions and signs 

in Vilnius, it will be able to export its goods to the largest single market in the 

world, tariff-free, by early 2014. This should provide a great stimulus to an economy 

which has been in a difficult recession for over a year. In the past few months, 

Ukraine has come under pressure from Russia, including bans on chocolate, stoppage of refrigerated goods at the border, and reductions in other key imports. We 

are working with the EU on options to help Ukraine make difficult trade adjustments and weather the EU implementation period if Ukraine makes the political 

decisions necessary to sign its AA at Vilnius. 

Moldova’s initialing of an Association Agreement at the Vilnius summit has 

already been approved by the EU, and it is poised to attain visa liberalization from 

the EU this spring and sign by September 2014. The United States has provided 

over $1.1 billion in assistance since Moldova’s independence in 1991, with approximately $22 million in FY 2013 dedicated toward improving governance, combating 

corruption, increasing transparency and accountability, strengthening the rule of 

law and the NGO sector, reducing bureaucratic barriers to trade, and improving the 

business environment. The 5-year, $262 million Millennium Challenge Compact 

with Moldova, launched in 2010, supports Moldova’s economy by rehabilitating 

roads and irrigation systems, and providing technical assistance and access to 

finance to Moldovan farmers and agribusinesses. Many of these programs are 

directly aligned with the reforms needed for Moldova to initial the Association 

Agreement in November. Recent Russian actions against the import of Moldova’s 

wine and other agricultural exports have a disproportionate impact on its small 

economy, and could potentially expand into other sectors as the country deepens its 

EU integration. We are exploring ways we can help mitigate vulnerabilities includFOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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ing by increasing Moldova’s energy independence and promoting trade with the EU 

and the United States. 

In 2012 and 2013, Georgia took important steps forward with truly competitive 

national elections, resulting in the first peaceful, democratic transfers of power since 

it regained independence; but considerable political and economic challenges remain, 

such as the unresolved conflicts in the two Russian-occupied regions of Georgia; protracted displacement of people; fragile democratic institutions, the need for further 

strengthening of the rule of law, and an economy that requires additional focus. In 

recent years, Georgia has received $1 billion in post-conflict funds, a second Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) compact, and it is one of the largest annual U.S. 

bilateral assistance budgets in the region. The United States is concentrating efforts 

on democratic institution-building, and the use of innovation, both economic and 

technological, as a way to build institutional and human capacity that further 

strengthens Georgia’s push toward Euro-Atlantic integration. We have also joined 

the EU and NATO in protesting new fences and physical barriers that Russian security forces have built along the Administrative Boundary Lines of the occupied territories in Georgia; this is inconsistent with Russia’s international commitments and 

Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognized 

borders. With U.S. assistance, Georgia has reoriented its trade toward Western markets and increased its energy efficiency and diversity, and we are working with the 

EU to strengthen Georgia’s ability to resist external pressure. 

On September 3, Armenian President Serzh Sargsian announced that Armenia 

would join the Eurasian Customs Union of Russia, Kazakhstan, and Belarus, which 

is incompatible with signing an Association Agreement and a DCFTA. However, 

both the EU and Armenia remain committed to pursuing a deeper relationship, and 

they are examining ways to continue this partnership. The United States will also 

continue broad engagement with Armenia on Euro-Atlantic integration, including in 

the economic sphere. 

Azerbaijan is currently negotiating the contours of its own partnership track with 

the EU, and the United States continues to encourage Azerbaijan to build the democratic and economic institutions and conduct the reforms necessary for a deeper 

relationship with the Euro-Atlantic community. We recognize that a democratic, 

prosperous, and secure Azerbaijan will benefit not only the Azerbaijani people but 

also its neighbors. 

Belarus has not pursued any agreements within the Eastern Partnership and is 

a founding member of the Eurasian Customs Union with Russia and Kazakhstan. 

Nonetheless, we have worked closely with the EU to promote the emergence of a 

democratic and prosperous society in Belarus that shares common values, norms 

and standards with the United States and Europe. The United States will continue 

to provide assistance that promotes the open expression of political views, supports 

civil society, and promotes media freedom. 

Finally, in our discussions with Russia about the Eastern Partnership, we are 

encouraging Moscow to abide by its commitments in the OSCE and elsewhere 

regarding sovereign neighbors’ rights to pursue any political and economic arrangements they choose. We have also encouraged Moscow to see the benefits of deeper 

integration between its neighbors’ economies and the EU’s 500 million consumers, 

as well as the significant prospects for economic reform and sustainable growth that 

integration will bring to these countries. For one thing, more prosperous neighbors 

will buy more Russian exports. Both the EU and the United States are interested 

in increasing trade with Russia, and we are open to further consultations on what 

might be possible. 

The Eastern Partnership is, ultimately, about far more than a closer relationship 

between the EU and several countries in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus. It is 

also a step toward the longstanding vision of a more integrated economic space, 

stretching from Lisbon to Donetsk animated by market-oriented reforms, growing 

prosperity and deepening democracy. To this end, the EU and the United States are 

negotiating the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership—which promises 

to support growth, investment, and jobs on both sides of the Atlantic as well as establish a high-standards, rules-based global trading regime. That broader vision of 

Europe’s integrated economic space is becoming increasingly real and attractive and 

could ultimately encompass not only Europe, but the entire Transatlantic space. We 

and the EU believe that investing in the Eastern Partnership is thus in everyone’s 

long-term interest.

Senator MURPHY. Thank you very much. 

We will now begin a round of 7-minute questions. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

8

As you know, a number of members of this subcommittee have 

sponsored a resolution on the issue of Tymoshenko’s release as a 

condition of entering the Eastern Partnership. And you certainly 

touched upon what has been the position of the EU nations, as well 

as the United States. But, this is obviously not just about Tymoshenko, this is about a broader commitment on behalf of the 

Ukrainians to end a practice of selective political prosecutions. And 

what maybe has been most worrying in the last week is not necessarily just the lack of progress on the release of Tymoshenko, but 

new news reports about the detainment of one of Tymoshenko’s 

lawyers for questioning that suggests that this trend is not necessarily abating, notwithstanding the earlier release, this year, of 

several other prisoners that we believe were detained on political 

grounds. 

So, can you talk a little bit—and I would love to have a little bit 

deeper update on where you believe the negotiations stand with 

respect to Tymoshenko’s release, but to talk a little bit about 

whether—even if she is released, are we confident that the Ukrainians have made the commitment to changing the way in which 

they prosecute within their judicial system? 

Ms. NULAND. Well, thank you for that question, Senator. 

First, I would say that a number of the steps that the Ukrainians have taken in the past 6 months—I mentioned 18 pieces of 

legislation—are designed to improve the justice system, improve 

the quality of democracy in Ukraine. This last piece that is still 

pending in the Rada and which the major parties are committed 

to passing is the final piece, in terms of judicial reform, which 

needs to be passed, and it is designed to ensure that the circumstances that led to the judgment that there had been politics in the 

judicial process cannot happen again in the Ukrainian system. 

So, this is one of the great strengths of the EU Association 

Agreement offer, that it allows Western democracies to get in and 

mentor partnership countries in how to strengthen the legal and 

judicial basis in the country to prevent these kinds of things from 

happening in the future. 

But, you are right, we have to stay vigilant in watching what 

happens, including the recent calling in for questioning of Mrs. 

Tymoshenko’s lawyer. 

Senator MURPHY. President Yanukovych has made it pretty clear 

for a long time that he sees his legacy as making Ukraine permanently independent, of orienting it toward much bigger, broader, 

and more prosperous markets to its west. And we hope that

they will initial, or begin the process of initialing, an Association 

Agreement. 

And you mentioned that, at that moment, there will still be a lot 

of work to do. No matter what happens at the Eastern Partnership, 

Ukraine’s economy is still in rough shape. And, of course, the worry 

is that it could be made rougher by increased sanctions from 

Russia, at the top of the list. Their worry always is the cutting off 

of access to gas. 

So, you mentioned that there are things that we can do, in concert with the Europeans, to perhaps abate or address existing sanctions or future sanctions. I wonder if you might talk a little bit 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

9

more about what those steps could be and what steps are being 

taken today. 

But, then the second piece is going to be our communal effort to 

try to have real IMF outreach to the Ukrainians, and that involves 

a whole different set of economic reforms that are tough and painful related to the price of gas and the size of their budget deficit. 

So, what can we do to try to push back on potential Russian 

sanctions and existing Russian sanctions? And then, what can we 

do to try to help Ukraine—what is our proper role in trying to help 

the Ukraine get in a position so that it can qualify for the international support that they ultimately are going to need in order to 

support their weakening economy? 

Ms. NULAND. Well, thank you, Senator. You are right that the 

number one thing that Ukraine needs to do to strengthen its economic position is to work with the IMF on a standby agreement. 

The IMF wants to see a number of significant and difficult reforms 

inside the Ukrainian economy. 

As you probably know, they began discussions in March. Those 

discussions were broken off. They have now resumed discussions. 

We have been encouraging the Ukrainians to improve their offer to 

the IMF, in terms of some of the things that the IMF is looking 

for, which are, frankly, in the long-term and medium-term economic interest of Ukraine—as you said, cutting energy subsidies, 

reducing tariffs, dealing with some of their budget issues. We have 

also been in close consultations with the IMF about the importance 

of this moment and working on a plan that could conceivably 

match action for action. 

If, in fact, there is a successful negotiation between Ukraine and 

the IMF, it will unlock considerable amount of funding from the 

EU and from the EBRD. It will also strengthen our position to continue loaning, through Ex-Im and OPIC, which has been challenging because of the current economic rating of Ukraine. 

And, more broadly, one of our messages to the Ukrainian Government has been that, when they sign their Association Agreement, when they take these hard last steps, including releasing the 

former Prime Minister for medical treatment, we believe—and they 

sign their AA—we believe that the commercial markets will react 

positively to Ukraine. 

As you know, we have a number of U.S. businesses who want to 

do more. They are looking for a signal of confidence. That said, we 

also have a number of major U.S. energy companies who are quite 

close on shale gas deals in Ukraine and a number of other investments. So, that would be the direction we would hope to support 

them on the commercial side. 

We also, as you may know, have not had the strongest of political 

relationships in the last couple of years because of the problems, 

and we have made clear that if Ukraine can get over these hurdles, 

we can really broaden and deepen and get back to good business 

with Ukraine, bilaterally. 

Senator MURPHY. Just—actually, at this point, let me end my 

questioning. I will ask, maybe, a couple more in a second round 

and turn it over to Senator Johnson. 

Senator JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

10

Secretary Nuland, you mentioned the benefits to, not only those 

countries—to the EU, to America—but also to Russia. Can you 

expand a little bit more, in terms of the win-win-win-type situation 

that you are thinking of there? 

Ms. NULAND. Well, as you know, Senator, we are—even as we 

talk about the Eastern Partnership today, we are also in discussions—the United States is—with the 28 members of the EU on 

the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, which is 

designed to reduce tariff and nontariff barriers to trade, to increase 

trade between our countries, to grow our economies. If we are successful in the TTIP context, and if the Eastern Partnership countries are able to begin to gain the benefits of the free-trade offering 

that the EU has, then you could see this greater free-trade space, 

as I said—perhaps all the way from Los Angeles to Donetsk. The 

EU has offered the same kinds of trade benefits to Russia if Russia 

will take the internal reform steps and open its market reciprocally 

to the EU. So, there is an offer on the table to Russia to have the 

same kind of relationship as Ukraine and Georgia and Moldova 

hope to have with the EU. 

We, on the United States side, are also very interested in 

increasing bilateral trade with Russia and reducing barriers. I do 

not have the numbers in front of me, but, given the size of our respective economies, the trade two ways is pretty pathetic, and we 

can do a lot better, but there are a lot of built-in barriers to trade. 

One of the things we have proposed to the Russian Government is 

a bilateral investment treaty, and we are waiting for a response on 

that. 

So, you could see a scenario, if everybody began moving in a 

more free-trade direction, where our market really sets a global 

example for low tariffs, low barriers, and jobs grow everywhere. 

Senator JOHNSON. So, how receptive have the Russians been to 

those, you know, really, words of wisdom? 

Ms. NULAND. It is a work in progress. 

Senator JOHNSON. Are you prepared really to talk about the state 

of the economies of Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova? Have they 

been pretty flat? Have they been declining?—what the potentials 

would be? 

Ms. NULAND. Senator, I do not have statistics in front of me. We 

can get those to your staff. 

Ms. NULAND. The Georgian economy has done better than 

expected. As you know, after the difficulties of 2008 and the Russia-Georgia war and the cutoff of most of Georgia’s exports to Russia, Georgia has worked very hard to diversify its economy, to 

diversify its markets, and now it does most of its trading to the 

West. So, that not only helped it weather that difficult period, it 

also helped it significantly during the larger economic recession 

that we have all been going through. 

That said, the Georgian economy is now not growing at the rate 

that it was, and the next, sort of, tranche of reform, et cetera, and 

market opening, is necessary. 

On the Moldovan side, it is a tiny, tiny market. It is not well 

known, even to Europeans, let alone to Americans. So, I think some 

of you had a chance to meet Foreign Minister Gehrmann when she 

was here trying to put her country on the map, in terms of AmerFOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

11

ican political leaders and American business supporting Moldova. 

We believe that there is quite a bit more that can be done, in terms 

of spurring trade and investment from the EU, but also from the 

United States, in Moldova, and not just in the traditional wine sector, but in other aspects of agriculture and high technology. They 

have got a very educated population. So, we are working with the 

EU on that. But, they definitely need, now, growth West, and they 

need to link their market more tightly to the EU. 

On the Ukrainian side, I do not have the numbers in front of me, 

but it is a pretty perilous situation right now, in terms of their 

ability to borrow on investment markets, in terms of the expenses 

primarily in the energy sector. When I was there, about 10 days 

ago, they were speaking in terms of very, very ambitious projects 

to have energy efficiency programs in their major cities. It was 

already, you know, 20 degrees, but yet you could see government 

buildings with the windows open because the heating and cooling 

does not work properly and they lose a huge amount of money 

every year out the windows. So, a culmination of that, anticorruption, and more markets West so that they are not as dependent 

on one market, will help the Ukrainian economy, plus the IMF 

deal. 

Senator JOHNSON. You mentioned corruption in Ukraine. When 

I was there a couple of years ago, I certainly saw the potential, in 

terms of agriculture, in terms of wheat production, but something 

really holding them back really was the cronyism, the——

Ms. NULAND. Yes. 

Senator JOHNSON [continuing]. The corruption within those—you 

know, those markets, if you want to call them that. Has any 

progress been made, or has it been backsliding? 

Ms. NULAND. Well, again, some of the legislative changes and 

market changes that they have had to make to be ready for the EU 

Association Agreement go to greater transparency in government, 

those kinds of things, but there is more work to be done, and we 

would like to do more with Ukraine on countering corruption. 

The Georgians, I would say, have taken a great leap in countering corruption, largely through efforts to do things like put all 

government contracting on the Internet, those kinds of things that 

could be done in other Eastern Partnership countries. 

Senator JOHNSON. There continues to be a big problem—this is 

just true of fledgling democracies—is a smooth transition of power 

from one government to the other—you know, where you are not 

witnessing political prosecutions. We talked a little bit about 

Ukraine. What about in Georgia? 

Ms. NULAND. Well, Senator, as I said in my opening, I think one 

of the great news stories of the last couple of months is that we 

have had a smooth and democratic transition of power in Georgia, 

for the first time since independence, through the ballot box, and 

the elections were good. So, that is a step in the right direction. 

Senator JOHNSON. OK. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator MURPHY. Senator Risch. 

Senator RISCH. Ms. Nuland, as you probably know, Senator 

Shaheen and I had the honor of going to the—overseeing the first 

elections, just a year and a month ago, I think, in Georgia, and we 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

12

were impressed with the way the elections went and what 

happened. 

Since then, I have to say that—at least I—and I think Senator 

Shaheen would agree with this; we compare notes relatively frequently—that we are getting mixed reports on exactly how smooth 

this transition is. There is a lot of at least internal dissension, it 

seems to me, in Georgia, and there is still some angst as they move 

forward. And some of that has to do, of course, with the political 

prosecutions, which we have underscored as being not the appropriate way to do business. What are your thoughts on that? What 

are your observations on that? 

Ms. NULAND. Well, first of all, thanks to both of you for your 

commitment to Georgia’s democracy. It was very much appreciated 

by the Georgians, as you know, that you made the effort, in a bipartisan way, to go and observe, and it, I think, made a significant 

difference. 

We share your concern about the way former leaders are dealt 

with. We have stressed to the Georgian Government the importance of conducting investigations and prosecutions with full 

respect for due process, in a transparent manner, avoiding any political influence on prosecutorial actions. 

I would say that, in the context of this period that we are in now, 

where Georgia wants to have its Association Agreement and its 

DCFTA initialed, it has been a powerful lever in that conversation 

to remind them that it is not only the EU that is watching, but the 

United States is also watching the way political opponents are 

dealt with. 

Senator RISCH. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator MURPHY. Senator Shaheen. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. 

Thank you very much for being here. 

And let me pick up on what Senator Risch raised about Georgia. 

As you talk about the ability of us to use the trade agreements to 

help encourage Georgia’s positive forward movement, what kind of 

ongoing efforts can we also look at that would help encourage emphasis on rule of law, addressing some of the issues around imprisonment of opposition figures that you mentioned, and concerns that 

have been raised about continued—let me rephrase that—as the 

structure of government and the role of the President and Prime 

Minister transition, to continue to encourage that to transition in 

a positive way? Are there other things that we should be doing in 

the United States to—and with the EU—to help support continued 

positive movement in Georgia? 

Ms. NULAND. Well, thank you, Senator. 

In fiscal year 2013, we have, as you know, allocated about $70 

million in assistance to Georgia. About a third of that goes to programs that strengthen good governance, the justice sector, et 

cetera, rule of law. We have worked with them on some of these 

pieces of legislation that they have had to also implement to be 

ready for the Association Agreement. So, we will stay with them 

as they implement those things. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

13

They have also got—particularly in order to be eligible for visafree travel, they have got more work to do on transparency on their 

judicial system. So, we will stay with them in that regard. 

I think, you know, the fact that we have been in this intensive 

conversation with them, the fact that they know that you are 

watching how they deal with political opponents, that we are and 

that the EU is, I think has had a profound effect. And we have 

seen some of these concerns begin to abate in recent months. 

Senator SHAHEEN. And is there any progress at all on Russia’s 

continued occupation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia? And any ability to help move the continued challenge that Georgia is facing 

with respect to the Russian occupation of those territories? 

Ms. NULAND. Senator, I think, on the contrary, we have now 

seen, as you know, in recent months, an effort to erect fences 

around the administrative border line, in contravention of international obligations and Russia’s own commitments after the Georgia war in 2008. 

The one bright light, I would say, here is that, when Georgia has 

completed all of the work for its Association Agreement, it will be 

eligible for visa-free travel for Georgians to Europe, it will be eligible for these trade benefits and incentives from Europe. As I think 

about the choice that young people in Abkhazia, young people in 

South Ossetia, have to make individually about their future, it is 

going to look a whole lot more attractive to be carrying a Georgian 

passport, whether you are trying to travel to Paris or whether you 

are trying to attract investment to your neighborhood. So, I think 

the EU is playing a potent role in the strengthening of Georgian 

sovereignty with this agreement. 

Senator SHAHEEN. That certainly makes sense, and I would 

agree with that. I think one of the concerns that I have is, How 

do we keep this from becoming another one of those frozen conflicts 

that exists in perpetuity without any movement, and that those 

regions never continue in this sort of in-between status and never 

really rejoin Georgia? 

Ms. NULAND. Again, I think—you know that we have the Geneva 

process, where we sit down with the Georgian Government, we sit 

down with representatives from Abkhazia, and we talk about a way 

forward. Again, I think the most potent force for changing the status quo is going to be the people of those territories themselves and 

the choices that they are going to make. And our hope and expectation is that this association with the EU is going to change the 

prospects for them, it is going to change the outlook for them, they 

are going to see real benefits as citizens of Georgia, and they are 

going to be pushing for change, themselves. But, we will obviously 

stay with this and work as hard as we can to protect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. 

You may have already addressed this, but obviously—or at least 

the reports are that Russia is dead-set against the European partnership. And as we think about how this partnership agreement 

moves forward, are there ways in which we can help the countries 

that are looking at their association with the EU and the West so 

that they can resist the pressure that they are going to get from 

Russia? 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

14

Ms. NULAND. Senator, we have a number of measures we are 

taking, depending upon the country. In Moldova, we are working 

with them on expanding export markets into the EU and into the 

United States. We are also working with them on energy independence—in the short term, more support from their neighbors; in the 

longer term, interconnecter with Romania. 

In the Georgian context, as we talked about, it is about strengthening rule of law, it is about strengthening the economy so we can 

get more direct foreign investment into Georgia, and continuing to 

make it clear that we support their sovereignty and territorial 

integrity. 

In Ukraine, we actually have quite a vibrant U.S. business community that would like to do more. We have got some U.S. majors 

in the energy sector working on shale gas. If that plays out, 

Ukraine will be a very rich country in the not-too-distant future. 

So, we are working on all of those things, as well as encouraging 

the EU to buy some of these Ukrainian exports that have also been 

blocked now at the border. 

Senator SHAHEEN. I know that—or, at least I think you have

already addressed the imprisonment of Yulia Tymoshenko, and 

that we are sending a very strong message about the importance 

of releasing her from prison so that they can send a message that 

they are changing the way they are looking at their opposition as 

they move toward democracy. 

Ms. NULAND. We are, absolutely. As you know, Senator, it is a 

condition for their signing of the association agreement, that 

former Prime Minister Tymoshenko be released for medical treatment outside of Ukraine. 

The EU has made clear, and we have reinforced in our bilateral 

conversations, that they will not have consensus to sign with 

Ukraine if Mrs. Tymoshenko is not released for medical treatment. 

Senator SHAHEEN. And do we have any sense of how they expect 

to respond to that? I understand that Parliament is about to go out 

of session and that they have not passed legislation to address 

that. So, what other options are there, and what do we expect to 

happen? 

Ms. NULAND. There are two routes currently before the Ukrainian leadership to address this issue. One would be Executive action 

by the President. It is in his hands to have that option. I think the 

preference of the Ukrainian Government would be to have broad 

national consensus for it via a bill passed in the Parliament, in the 

Rada. There are currently four or five drafts floating around. As 

you know, the EU’s negotiators, former Presidents Cox and 

Kwasniewski, really went and rolled up their sleeves last week or 

earlier this week with parliamentary factions to try to draft a common bill. Those negotiations, our understanding is, will resume 

now, on Monday. The Parliament will come back into session on 

Monday, and they are going to endeavor to have a clean bill by 

Tuesday. Then we will see whether it gains the support that it will 

need. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for letting me go over my time. 

Senator MURPHY. Thank you, Senator Shaheen. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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It strikes me that, you know, Yanukovych may think that he can 

have it all, here, that he can keep Tymoshenko in jail, that he can 

open up a relationship with the EU and that he can also keep a 

deep political and economic relationship with Russia. And two of 

those three are true, that there is no reason that he cannot orient 

himself toward a relationship with the EU and maintain a relationship with Russia. He cannot keep Tymoshenko in jail. And I know 

you have made that perfectly clear, as we have; we and the Europeans. But, it brings me to just one additional question from me, 

and I know we have a second panel, and I will ask others if they 

have a second round. Is an Association Agreement, initialing or 

signing with the EU, mutually exclusive from joining the Customs 

Union? For instance, we, you know, obviously were surprised by 

Armenia’s decision to do an about-face and join the Customs Union. 

Does that mean that we give up on Armenia as a potential partner 

down the road with the EU? 

Ms. NULAND. There is nothing in the Association Agreement that 

precludes any of the Eastern Partnership states from continuing to 

have strong trade relations with Russia or any of the Customs 

Union countries. There are provisions in the Customs Union that 

preclude Customs Union members from associating with anybody 

else. 

So, you know, the Armenians had a difficult choice to make. 

They have made it. It does not change the fact that both the EU 

and the United States will continue to try to build our economic 

and trade relationship with Armenia. We think that there is more 

that we can do together. But, they are not going to be able to have 

the benefits of an Association Agreement, under Customs Union 

rules. 

Senator MURPHY. I just think that is important to point out, is 

that a decision to join yourselves with the European Union not only 

opens yourself up to the benefit of that association, but does not 

foreclose your ability to continue to negotiate trade agreements 

with a multitude of other nations. Once you are in the Customs 

Union, you are locked in, and you have essentially sealed your fate 

as to essentially tie your economy to one country, and one country 

only. 

Let me just ask one additional question with respect to Armenia. 

Given the fact that this was, to some people, a surprise, that they 

chose to abandon efforts to join the EU, what lessons are there to 

potentially be learned from Armenia’s decision to reorient itself 

toward the Customs Union with respect to the tools that Russia 

used that worked, with respect to the offers that the EU made—

that worked or, in this case, did not work? What lessons are there 

from the Armenian experience, if any? 

Ms. NULAND. You know, I think we are still going to be learning 

the lessons over time. But, for reasons of geography, political 

choice, economics, history, Armenia has, for quite a long time, been 

significantly more dependent, in economic terms, in security terms, 

on its big neighbor, and, frankly, did not—well, I will not speak for 

the Government of Armenia, but, as we have spoken to them, they 

found it a very difficult choice, given how knitted together they are 

with Russia. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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We, as you know, for 25 years since the fall of the Berlin Wall, 

have been seeking to provide all of the countries of Central Europe, 

Eastern Europe, the former Soviet space, with a broad cross-section 

of economic and partner options, and to diversify the way they 

think about their economies, the way they think about their energy 

future, and to provide them the security, if they want it, to make 

independent choices. 

So, I think that is the most important trajectory as we continue 

to work with these countries in the future. 

Senator MURPHY. Senator Johnson? Senator Risch? Senator 

Shaheen? 

Thank you, Secretary Nuland. We appreciate your time. We 

know you are busy, a lot on your plate. Thank you for being here. 

We will excuse you and now have our second panel join us. 

Ms. NULAND. Thanks, to all of you. 

Senator MURPHY. Thank you. 

As our second panel is seated, let me just welcome to the committee and the audience—I know we have—the Ambassadors from 

Georgia, Moldova, and the Ukraine are with us in the audience 

today—welcome them. If there are any other ambassadors that are 

here, let the staff know and we will recognize you, as well. But, we 

appreciate you being here. 

All right, let me welcome our second panel of witnesses. I am not 

going to do long introductions, because we want to get to your testimony and questions, as well. 

We have with us, from my left to right, Dr. Anders Aslund, senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics; Dr. 

Ariel Cohen, no stranger to the subcommittee this year, a senior 

research fellow for Russian and Eurasian Studies in International 

Energy Policy at the Heritage Foundation; and then another good 

friend, Damon Wilson, who is the executive vice president of the 

Atlantic Council. 

Why don’t we start with you, Mr. Aslund, and go down the table. 

Welcome. 

STATEMENT OF ANDERS ASLUND, SENIOR FELLOW, PETERSON INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS, WASHINGTON, DC 

Mr. ASLUND. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Ranking 

Member Johnson, and members of the subcommittee. I would like 

to thank you for this opportunity to speak on what I consider the 

most important political event in Europe this year, the European 

Union Eastern Partnership Vilnius—in Vilnius. 

And, as you know, the EU has planned to sign the longconcluded Association Agreement with Ukraine and initial Deep 

and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement with Moldova and Georgia. It would indicate a substantial European integration of 

Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia. 

The key question, of course, is whether Ukraine will fulfill the 

European demands for political freedom and rule of law. It is 

doubtful. Ukraine’s President Viktor Yanukovych is reluctant, especially, to pardon former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko. He 

defeated her narrowly in the Presidential elections in February 

2010 and had her sentenced to 7 years in prison for no legal 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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reason. If the EU does not accept to sign in Vilnius, the Association 

Agreement remains, and it could be signed after renewed Ukrainian Presidential elections in March 2015. 

My specialty here is economics and Ukraine and Moldova, and I 

will focus on this. 

Russia has reacted strongly against Ukraine’s intention to sign 

the Association Agreement, and, instead, demands that Ukraine 

joins its Customs Union with Belarus and Kazakhstan. Moscow has 

already launched, or threatened with, three forms of sanctions. 

First, trade sanctions, and is threatening with more. It is likely to 

block most imports from Ukraine, to break both financial finances 

and specific pro-European businessmen in Ukraine. The EU has 

responded by offering to give Ukraine increased market access, but 

that remedy will take some time to be effective. 

Because of poor economic policies, the Ukrainian economy is currently vulnerable. The Kremlin has publicly threatened to drive 

Ukraine in default. I was in Yalta in September, and there heard 

how President Putin’s advisor, Sergei Glazyev, publicly threatened 

to drive Ukraine into default. 

And Ukraine’s public finances are so shaky that the country, as 

you have already heard, might need a new agreement with the 

International Monetary Fund. But, so far, the government refuses 

to comply with sensible IMF demands, which are essentially more 

flexible exchange rate, prior gas prices which are now highly subsidized, and a cut in a large budget deficit. And, once again, as in 

January 2006 and January 2009, the Russian state-dominated gas 

company, Gazprom, has threatened to cut its supplies to Ukraine. 

The Government of Ukraine has already responded by stopping its 

gas purchases from Russia. And the country has sufficient gas 

reserves to manage through the winter. 

The United States is well-liked and highly influential in Ukraine. 

It can do a great deal to influence that country’s choice simply by 

speaking out. And I am very happy to see that you are doing that 

here today. 

The main objectives for United States policy on Ukraine should 

be to support democracy. If democracy is secured, Ukraine is likely 

to choose a Western geopolitical orientation. If the United States 

wants to be important, it is important. 

For the European Union, the Moldovan case is much simpler. 

Moldova is more democratic and less corrupt than Ukraine. The 

current Moldovan Government is pro-Western and supports European integration wholeheartedly. The country is poor, but pursues 

a sound economic policy leading to, actually, a high economic 

growth, even today, and no longer requires any IMF support. Yet, 

Moldova is more vulnerable to Russian threats than Ukraine, 

because it is much smaller, poorer, and a part of Moldova as territory Transnistria is controlled by Russian so-called peacekeepers. 

The role of the United States is even more important here than 

in Ukraine. An obvious danger is that Russia would recognize 

Transnistria as an independent state, as it did with the Georgian 

territories, Abkhazia and South Ossetia in 2008. Moreover, 

Moldova is completely dependent on Gazprom for its supply of natural gas, and it could once again face a cut in the Russian gas supply, which would hit Moldova much worse than Ukraine. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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Finally, Moscow can also cause major financial trouble, but the 

IMF could arrange new financing for Moldova since it has been a 

successful client before. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Aslund follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ANDERS A ̊ SLUND

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

On November 28–29, the European Union has planned to sign the long-concluded 

Association Agreement with Ukraine and initial deep and comprehensive free trade 

agreements with Moldova and Georgia at its Eastern Partnership summit in 

Vilnius. No political event in Europe this year is more important than this summit. 

It would indicate a substantial European integration of Ukraine, Moldova, and 

Georgia. 

Yet, it is doubtful whether the EU will agree to sign the Association Agreement 

with Ukraine. Its President Viktor Yanukovych is reluctant to fulfill the European 

demands for political freedom and rule of law. In particular, he does not want to 

pardon former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko, whom he narrowly defeated in 

the Presidential elections in February 2010. He had her sentenced to 7 years in 

prison without any serious legal grounds. If the EU does not accept to sign in 

Vilnius, the Association Agreement could be signed after renewed Ukrainian Presidential elections in March 2015. 

Russia has reacted sharply against Ukraine’s intention to sign the Association 

Agreement with the EU and demands that Ukraine instead joins its Customs Union 

with Belarus and Kazakhstan. Moscow has already launched some trade sanctions 

and is threatening with more. It is likely to block most imports from Ukraine to 

break both the national finances and specific pro-European businessmen. The Kremlin has publicly threatened to drive Ukraine into default. Once again, as in January 

2006 and January 2009, the notoriously unreliable Russian state-dominated gas 

company Gazprom may cut its supplies to Ukraine. It has already made loud complaints about Ukrainian arrears. 

Because of poor economic policies, Ukraine is economically highly vulnerable. The 

EU has offered to give Ukraine more early market access, but that remedy will take 

some time. In the short term, Ukraine has sufficient gas reserves to manage 

through the winter. Ukraine’s public finances are so shaky that the country might 

need a new IMF agreement. 

For the EU, the Moldovan case is much simpler. Moldova is more democratic, 

freer, and less corrupt than Ukraine. The current Moldovan Government is proEuropean and supports European integration whole-heartedly. The country is poor 

but pursues a sound economic policy leading to a high growth rate and no longer 

requires any IMF support. 

Yet, Moldova is more vulnerable to Russian threats than Ukraine because it is 

much smaller, poorer and a part of Moldova’s territory, Transnistria, is controlled 

by Russian ‘‘peacekeepers.’’ An obvious danger is that Russia recognize Transnistria 

as an independent state as it did with the Georgian territories Abkhazia and South 

Ossetia in 2008. Moreoever, Moldova is completely dependent on Gazprom for its 

supply of natural gas, and it could once again face a cut in the Russian gas supply. 

Finally, Gazprom has large claims on Moldova for unpaid gas that has been delivered to Transnistria beyond the control of the Moldovan Government. Moscow could 

utilize this large debt to put Moldova into default. If this would happen, the IMF 

could arrange new financing for Moldova, since it has been a successful client. 

Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Johnson, I would like to thank you for this 

opportunity to speak on an important topic. No political event in Europe this year 

is more important than the European Union Eastern Partnership summit in Vilnius 

November 28–29. The key question is whether Ukraine and the European Union 

will sign the long-concluded Association Agreement. The Ukrainian Government is 

reluctant to fulfill all conditions, leaving the signing in doubt. The Ukrainian economy is in poor shape and most vulnerable, and the Russian Government is threatening Ukraine with draconian sanctions if the country does sign the EU agreement. 

The United States is well liked and highly influential in Ukraine and can do a 

great deal to influence that country’s choice simply by speaking up. The main objectives for U.S. policy on Ukraine should be to support democracy. If democracy is secured, Ukraine is likely to choose a Western geopolitical orientation. If the United 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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States wants to be important, it is important, and in few places is the Unites States 

more appreciated that in Eastern Europe. 

I first visited Ukraine in 1985 and have kept in close touch with the country ever 

since. I worked as an economic advisor to the Ukrainian Government from 1994 to 

1997. I have continued to follow its economic and political development. I have written extensively on Ukraine, including one book of my own and two edited volumes. 

THE IMPORTANCE OF THE EUROPEAN ASSOCIATION AGREEMENT

After Ukraine had become a member of the World Trade Organization in 2008 

under the government of Prime Minister Yulia Tymosehnko, the European Union 

started negotiating a very substantial Association Agreement, which includes a deep 

and comprehensive free trade agreement. President Viktor Yanukovych has maintained a pro-European line and his administration completed the negotiations in 

November 2011, but its signature has been delayed because of European concerns 

about the Ukrainian Government’s poor observation of rule of law, human rights, 

and political freedom. 

This free trade agreement would abolish nearly all customs tariffs between the 

European Union and Ukraine as well as lead to regulatory convergence in technical 

standards, food standards, competition policy, state aid and energy policy. It would 

have a considerable positive impact on the Ukrainian economy. The economists 

Veronika Movchan and Ricardo Giucci have concluded that it would add 12 percent 

to Ukraine’s GDP in the long term, and Oleksandr Shepotylo has assisted that it 

would expand Ukraine’s exports by 46 percent in the long term. 

It is not only a trade agreement but also a far-reaching reform plan for the 

Ukrainian state. The EU has committed itself to considerable technical assistance. 

Sixty state agencies in various EU countries have committed themselves to reform 

their Ukrainian counterparts. This could amount a cleansing of Ukraine’s pervasive 

corruption and the state-building that Ukraine itself so far has failed to accomplish. 

The EU state agencies have already a successful record from the previous enlargements of the Union. 

The European Union and Ukraine are supposed to sign the Association Agreement at the EU summit in Lithuania’s capital Vilnius on November 28–29. The 

problem, however, is that the first declared aim of this agreement is ‘‘to promote 

gradual rapprochement between the Parties based on common values . . .’’ and

European values is not Yanukovych’s comparative strength. He exercises full control 

over courts and law enforcement, utilizing them at will, not least for jailing opposition leaders. In August 2011, Yulia Tymoshenko was arrested and later sentenced 

to 7 years in prison for abuse of power in a blatantly flawed court proceeding. 

Yanukovych has all reasons to sign the Association Agreement. A pro-European 

policy enjoys solid majority support in Ukraine, so he cannot be reelected in March 

2015, if he fails to sign this month. All the leading businessmen are eyeing the 

European market for their future expansion. Russia’s President Vladimir Putin 

seems to keep Yanukovych in such low regard that Yanukovych has concluded that 

they cannot work together. 

For long the EU representatives had in unison demanded that Yanukovych carry 

out several major legal and political reforms, but the President just stonewalled 

them. But evidently Putin really scared Yanukovych’s, and at the end of August 

Yanukovych did not only reconfirm his long-lasting pro-European stance but he 

completely changed his tune on EU conditions. Suddenly, he promised to adopt all 

the legislation that the EU demanded. This involved constitutional amendments on 

the judicial system and the constitutional court, laws on all arms of law enforcement, a new electoral law, and renewed elections where parliamentarians had 

wrongly been deprived of their seats. A slew of laws have been going through the 

Parliament. 

The main stumbling block has been the treatment of Tymoshenko. The EU and 

Yanukovych agreed that she needed medical treatment abroad. The EU has 

demanded that Yanukovych pardons her, which he does not want to do. Yanukovych 

desires to keep her out of the country or in prison without political rights. The 

Ukrainian Parliament, where Yanukovych has complete control over the majority, 

is currently adopting a law that will not be acceptable to the EU. Will Yanukovych 

pardon Tymoshenko or gamble? The EU is not likely to give in. Ukraine is a pervasively corrupt country, and the EU experience is that its main failures have been 

caused by excessive softness. 

POOR ECONOMIC POLICY AND GREAT VULNERABILITY

For years, the Ukrainian Government has pursued a miserable economic policy, 

rendering a serious financial crisis possible or even likely. As most former Soviet 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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states, Ukraine is subject to predatory rule. Its masters have one clear objective: To 

enrich themselves. 

In February 2010, Viktor Yanukovych won free and reasonably fair Presidential 

elections with a narrow margin over then-Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko. He 

represented the Russian-speaking electorate in eastern and southern Ukraine, while 

Tymoshenko found most of her support in the Ukrainian-speaking west and center 

of the country. This balance between west and east has kept Ukraine more open 

and pluralist than Russia. 

Most of all Yanukovych represented the interests of a limited number of big businessmen in Donetsk, his eastern home region and its metallurgical industry. President Yanukovych started off with full control of parliament, government, and courts. 

His first government represented nine big business groups, but he quickly reduced 

their number to three. Instead, friends of his son, Oleksandr, have come to, dominate the government since December 2012. These young businessmen from Donetsk 

hold all key economic posts in the government. 

Yanukovych started his Presidency by adopting an ambitious structural reform program and on that basis he concluded a stand-by agreement with the IMF of $15 

billion for 21⁄2 years. Yet, by November 2010 reform came to an end, and Ukraine received only the first two tranches of this loan of a total of $3 billion. 

Yanukovych’s economic policies have stayed off track. An IMF mission visited 

Ukraine in February 2011, and it set three key conditions that the government has 

not fulfilled. The IMF continues to insist upon them. An additional demand is that 

some sense into the tax system. 

The most important IMF condition is to hike the domestically gas prices. Incred- ibly, Ukraine imports natural gas from Russia for over $400 per 1,000 cubic meters, 

but the Ukrainian Government insists on purchasing natural gas produced in 

Ukraine at the ridiculously low price of $53 per 1,000 cubic meters and it sells gas 

to consumers and utilities at such low prices. The purchased and sold quantities at 

these low prices do not add up. Apparently, somebody is buying gas at the low regulated price and sells it at the higher, making fortunes on this arbitrage. We do not 

know who benefits, but Yanukovych has adamantly opposed raising these prices. To 

sell gas at lower than the purchasing prices causes the state oil and gas company 

Naftogaz losses amounting to 2 percent of GDP each year, which eventually are 

financed by the state budget, that is, the taxpayers. 

The second IMF condition is to reduce the budget deficit. Instead, Yanukovych 

has let it expand because of a variety of populist social expenditures. Competitive 

public procurement has basically ended. Large public contracts are distributed 

among cronies, and the kickbacks or overpricing reported by the independent media 

that still exist is often 50 percent of the contract. Yet, no legal measures are undertaken against the senior officials, who have been singled out for large-scale embezzlement. 

This year, the budget deficit is likely to reach almost 6 percent of GDP, and the 

public debt is set to exceed 40 percent of GDP, which might be more than Ukraine 

can bear. The Ukrainian Government could ignore IMF demands for the last 2 years 

because it could borrow on the international Eurobond market at 10-year yields of 

7.5–9.5 percent, but now these yields have risen to 12–13 percent, depriving the 

Ukrainian Government of access to the international capital market. 

The third IMF condition is that Ukraine introduces a more flexible exchange rate, 

which is a code word for depreciation. The exchange rate of the Ukrainian hryvnia 

is pegged at too high a level. As a consequence, last year Ukraine’s current account 

deficit was 8.2 percent of GDP, though this year it might decline toward 6 percent 

of GDP because of a contraction of imports. As a consequence of the overvalued 

exchange rate, Ukraine’s international reserves have shrunk steadily since September 2011, when they peaked at $38 billion. In October, they fell to $20.6 billion, 

corresponding to only 2.6 months of imports, and they are set to contract further. 

The general market expectation is a depreciation of the hryvnia, which is reflected 

in the low and falling ratings of outstanding Ukrainian credits. 

Rather than following the IMF suggestions, the Ukrainian Government has 

imposed strict currency regulations, to make it exceedingly difficult to take money 

out of the country. It has also pursued very high interest rates. Last year, posters 

with the picture of Gerard Depardieu promised 19.5 percent interest on 1-year time 

deposits in a Ukrainian savings bank. The high interest rates have kept inflation 

at zero, but they have also killed investment and thus liquidated economic growth. 

Output has fallen for the last five quarters. The expected contraction for 2013 is 

now 1 percent, but it might become 1.5 percent. 

This is a truly poor economic policy. The IMF mission just inspected the situation 

October 17–29 and issued a press release that is more scathing than the IMF ever 

is. The only positive observation was some improvements in the still awful business 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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environment. Yet, all relevant top officials from the Prime Minister down met with 

the IMF mission, showing that the Ukrainian Government is anxious to keep the 

doors to the IMF open, so that they call for IMF support on short notice. 

Ukraine is quite likely to end up with a financial crisis at the end of this year. 

The most likely process would be a run on Ukrainian bank deposits and on currency 

exchanges, leading to such a decline in reserves that the country becomes forced to 

a disorderly devaluation, which would be accompanied with plenty of bank and company defaults. 

RUSSIAN THREATS OF SANCTIONS

Since 2009, President Vladimir Putin’s policy toward Ukraine has had one aim: 

to compel Ukraine to join his Customs Union with Belarus and Kazakhstan, which 

is supposed to evolve into a more political Eurasian Union from 2015. Ukraine, however, has persistently opposed such Russian proposals because it would preclude its 

European ambitions. 

For long, the Kremlin did not pay much attention to Ukraine’s dealings with 

Europe, possibly thinking that the EU could not accept Yanukovych’s behavior. But 

in the middle of the summer Moscow started with a trade war with Ukraine. To 

begin with, it blocked exports to the Russian market from a couple of big pro-European Ukrainian businessmen producing steel pipes and chocolate. In August, Russia 

blocked most Ukrainian exports for 2 weeks through redtape at the border. Russia 

has hardly eased up but imposed new trade barriers on for example rail cars, to 

drive Ukraine into default, and to cut gas deliveries once again. Yanukovych and 

his government have pleaded by all means, but President Putin has offered no concessions, only persistent threats. 

Russia is already sanctioning Ukraine and it is threatening with more sanctions. 

They are essentially of three kinds. First, Russia is likely to block all kinds of 

imports from Ukraine with the clear intent on breaking both the national finances 

and specific pro-European businessmen. In 2012, Russia accounted for 26 percent 

of Ukraine’s exports, about as much as the EU. Some of these sanctions are already 

in place. 

Second, President Putin’s Advisor Sergey Glaziev has threatened that Russia will 

drive Ukraine into default. Russia accounts for only 6.5 percent of Ukraine’s external debt, but Russian banks in Ukraine account for 12 percent of Ukrainian banking 

assets. 

Third, once again as in January 2006 and January 2009, the notoriously unreliable Russian state-dominated gas company Gazprom may cut its supplies to 

Ukraine. It has already made lout complaints about Ukrainian arrears. 

Both Russia and Ukraine are members of the World Trade Organization, Ukraine 

since 2008 and Russia since August 2012, but neither country complies with its 

WTO commitments. For Ukraine, WTO complaints against Russia would take too 

long time to be useful, since the country is in a rampant crisis. The EU can offer 

immediate additional market access as compensation for Russian trade sanctions, 

but Russia and the EU are equally large importers of Ukrainian goods and services, 

each taking one quarter of Ukraine’s exports. 

Rather than complying with the clear and transparent EU conditions, 

Yanukovych went to see Putin at his summer residence in Sochi on October 27. The 

two men reportedly met for 4–5 hours, but came out without agreement. 

NO HAPPY END IS LIKELY

Yanukovych is walking on eggshells as a bull in a china shop. The economic situation is precarious. The risk for a run by ordinary Ukrainians both on banks and 

the Ukrainian currency is apparent. The rating agencies mercilessly downgrade 

Ukraine ever lower, and corporate defaults are all too common. 

In order to survive this winter without major economic disruption, Yanukovych 

needs to pardon Tymoshenko, sign the Association Agreement, and then quickly conclude an IMF stand-by agreement. Russia is all too likely to block Ukrainian exports 

to Russia, cut various forms of bank financing, and probably also gas supplies. Yet, 

there is no sign of him doing what it takes with regard to the EU, the IMF, or 

Russia. 

On November 8, Yanukovych signed a law amending the Tax Code that would 

make it possible to deny Vitaly Klichko, the opposition leader, the right to run as 

a Presidential candidate. Meanwhile, the Parliament is about to adopt a law on 

Tymoshenko that will not be satisfactory to the EU. Just in case, Yanukovych also 

stated that he would not allow any increase in the gas price for consumers. 

As long as Ukraine does not join the Russian-sponsored Customs Union, Russia 

is likely to deliver a triple-whammy to Ukraine, blocking its exports to Russia 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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through trade sanctions, cutting gas exports, and imposing various financial sanctions. The United States can and should protest against such actions. Trade sanctions, as those already deployed, appear to violate Russia’s commitment to the WTO. 

The EU can offer expedited market access. Cuts in exports would mainly harm Russia’s gas company Gazprom. Ukraine has sufficient volumes of gas stored for the 

winter, and Europe can manage by other means. Financial sanctions are best countered through a renewed IMF agreement with Ukraine, which presupposes that 

Ukraine carries out necessary financial reforms. 

MOLDOVA DESERVES ALL SUPPORT

In Vilnius, the Republic of Moldova is supposed to initial the deep and comprehensive free trade agreement it has concluded with the European Union. This 

agreement is of great economic importance for Moldova. It also opens novel perspectives of European integration and government reform. The current Moldovan Government is pro-European and supports the agreement whole-heartedly, so that the 

complications that prevail in Ukraine are not at hand in Moldova. The country has 

currently quite a good economic policy with an expected growth rate this year of 5.5 

percent and it no longer requires any IMF support. 

Yet, Moldova is subject to a greater threat from Russia than Ukraine because it 

is much smaller, poorer, and a part of Moldova’s territory, Transnistria, is effectively controlled by Russian ‘‘peacekeepers.’’ President Putin has appointed Deputy 

Prime Minister Dmitri Rogozin his envoy for Moldova. 

First, Rogozin has demanded that Russia is allowed to open a consulate in 

Transnistria, which the Government of Moldova has refuted. There is a clear danger 

that Russia will recognize Transnistria as an independent state as it did with the 

Georgian territories Abkhazia and South Ossetia in 2008. The United States can 

and should tell the Russian authorities that such a step would be impermissible. 

Second, Moldova is completely dependent on Gazprom for its supply of natural 

gas, and it could once again face a cut in the Russian gas supply. Moldova has 

agreed with Romania to build an alternative gas pipeline, but it will be completed 

only next year. 

Third, Gazprom has large claims on Moldova for unpaid gas that has been delivered to Transnistria beyond the control of the Moldovan Government. Moscow could 

utilize this large debt to put Moldova into default. If this would happen, the IMF 

could arrange new financing for Moldova, since it has been a successful client.

Senator MURPHY. Dr. Cohen. 

STATEMENT OF DR. ARIEL COHEN, SENIOR RESEARCH 

FELLOW, HERITAGE FOUNDATION, WASHINGTON, DC 

Dr. COHEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Johnson. It is a 

great pleasure to testify. 

For centuries, the territory between Germany and Poland 

between the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea were the scene of competition, and at times confrontation, between Western European 

and Russian interests and influences. The South Caucasus was a 

battlefield between the Ottoman Empire, the Persian Empire, and 

the Russian Empire. But, the West and the United States recognized our interests in those parts of the world since World War I, 

and definitely during the cold war and after the end of the cold war 

in support of forces of democracy and independence in Eastern 

Europe and South Caucasus. Ukraine, of course, is the key. This 

is a historic opportunity to turn Ukraine from Russian domination 

that lasted over 300 years to equal interaction between Russia and 

Western Europe. And, in the long term, Ukraine integrated in 

Europe will be a good model for Russia to pursue more European 

integration, more markets, and more democracy. 

Unfortunately for us, we, the United States, has somewhat been 

low key in pursuing the strategic goal of Ukraine’s integration with 

Western Europe—with the European Union. The Russians, on the 

other hand, went full bore and pulled President Yanukovych to two 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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meetings with President Putin at the end of October and on 

November 9, both meetings lasting many hours. 

Putin’s advisor, Sergei Glazyev, and the former Chief of Staff of 

Ukrainian President, Mr. Medvedchuk, have designed a program to 

force Ukraine to join the Eurasian Union led by Russia. That program was leaked. We, at the Heritage Foundation, published a 

backgrounder analyzing it, and this was a multitool effort to force 

Ukraine, through economic blackmail, through soft power, and 

through, if you wish, blackmail, to abandon the Western path. In 

the last several days, there are more and more indications that 

Ukraine will not sign the Association Agreement with EU and the 

Free Trade Area. 

The Russians are also threatening to impose trade sanctions. 

They had a dry run, or had a run, in the summer, when they 

blocked imports from Ukraine. Russia is the largest export market 

for the Ukrainians. And this implacable position gives Mr. Yanukovych, the President, second thoughts, as well as his fear of 

release of Yulia Tymoshenko from jail, which, of course, both the 

Europeans and the United States justly demand. 

We do have a national interest that Ukraine anchors its future 

in Europe, develops the rule of law and appropriate rights and 

becomes a fully democratic country and leads the way for Eastern 

Partnership countries in integration with Europe. 

Moldova has come, also, to severe threats from Russia, including 

Vice Premier Dmitri Rogozin, who threatened that the Moldovans 

will freeze in winter if Russia stops gas supplies. And he said, 

‘‘Moldova’s train en route to Europe would lose its railcars in 

Transnistria,’’ the enclave that Russia supports its claim to independence. Rogozin, in Moldova, said, ‘‘’I hope you won’t freeze.’’ 

Chilling language. Pun intended. 

Georgia has achieved many successes in the last 8 years on the 

road to economic reform and democracy. The current leadership of 

Georgia is trying to balance the country’s position between Moscow 

and the West, but the Georgian public, the Georgian elites, are 

committed to NATO membership and to EU integration. So, we 

hope that Georgia, as Moldova sign, initial the Association Agreement in Vilnius. We also hope that Ukraine signs, but, as I said, 

the chances are not as high. 

To wrap it up, I do believe that Eastern and Central Europe 

have been a national interest priority area for the United States 

for a long time. Since the end of the cold war, we helped the Baltic 

States—Poland, Czech Republic, and others—to accomplish institutional development in the democratic way, and transition to markets quite successfully. And Eastern Europe and South Caucasus 

should not be an exception. 

U.S. overarching interest is expanding participatory government, 

the rule of law, free-market economies. And a weakened leadership 

in the past 5 years, and Russia’s expanding meddling in economic 

and foreign affairs of Western European states, with these postSoviet countries are facing an increased foreign policy conundrum. 

It is wise for the Europeans to take a lead. After all, these countries are their ‘‘near abroad.’’ But, we, too, should support efforts 

to expand economic stability, freedom, and sovereignty of our Eastern European and South Eastern European friends and allies, 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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continuing the bipartisan policy that Bush 1, Clinton, and Bush 2 

administrations continued for a long time. And this administration, 

in our view, should not be an exception. And I hope that we will 

achieve these goals. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Cohen follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ARIEL COHEN, PH.D. 

My name is Ariel Cohen. I am the Senior Research Fellow in Russian and Eurasian Studies and International Energy Policy at The Heritage Foundation. The 

views I express in this testimony are my own, and should not be construed as representing any official position of The Heritage Foundation. 

Thank you for inviting me to testify before you today on the Association Agreement and the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) between the 

Eastern Partnership (EaP) members (Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Belarus, Armenia, 

and Azerbaijan). 

For centuries, the territory between Germany and Poland and between the Baltic 

Sea and the Black Sea was a scene of competition, and at times, confrontation, between Western European and Russian influences and interests. The South Caucasus 

was a battlefield between the Ottoman Empire, the Persian Empire, and the Russian Empire. Western powers also viewed South Caucasus as a crucial geopolitical 

nexus between Central Asia, Europe, Russia, Turkey, and Iran. In Eastern Europe 

and in the Caucasus, indeed geography was the destiny. Today, there may be a 

chance to break this ancient dynamic by signing the Association Agreement (AA) 

and DCFTA between the Eastern Partnership members and the EU. The U.S. has 

national interests in the region, as it supports integration of the EuP members into 

the greater Euro-Atlantic area. Washington has not provided sufficient support to 

the Vilnius process and needs to do so in the remaining 2 weeks. Ukraine is the 

key country in this process. 

Ukraine 

Since the implementation of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA), 

the EU has continued to reach out to Ukraine, requesting Ukrainian political and 

legal reforms in exchange for trade expansion and economic integration with the 

EU, which would bring distinct benefits for Ukraine. However, mounting Russian 

pressure threatens to derail the EU’s decade-long integration efforts. 

At the end of October and on November 9, President Yanukovich met with Russian President Vladimir Putin. Both sides published minimal information about 

these meetings, but a number of signs suggest that Russia’s vehement opposition 

to Ukraine’s AA and DCFTA membership is the key dynamic in the relationships 

between Kyiv and Moscow, and European capitals and Russia. 

The future of the jailed former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko and President 

Yanukovich’s resistance to European pressure to pardon and release her seem to be 

playing a key role in the drama. First, the Ukrainian authorities launched new proceedings against Tymoshenko, which may lead to a jail term of up to 10 years. Second, a senior representative of the ruling Party of Regions announced in Kyiv that 

Ukraine may forgo the Association Agreement with the EU. The ruling Party of 

Regions refused to consider the new legislation allowing prisoners to leave abroad 

for medical treatment. It also pushed through legislation aimed at blocking world 

heavyweight champion Vitaly Klichko from running for presidency in 2014. Finally, 

Tymoshenko’s attorney has been detained on criminal charges. All this suggests 

that Russia’s pressure may have worked, and there will be no deal with the EU. 

Economic factors play a key role. 

Currently, Russia is Ukraine’s largest market for exports ranging from foodstuffs 

to metal pipes. Millions of Ukrainian migrant workers are employed in Russia, with 

families dependent on their revenue. In addition, Ukraine is in debt to its northern 

neighbor for $880 million, mostly to the state-owned natural gas supplier Gazprom, 

which would like to gain control over the Ukrainian gas distribution gas network 

Naftohaz Ukrainy. Russia’s soft power is dominating Ukraine through pro-Moscow 

politicians; popular TV channels and other media; and Russian speakers in the east 

and south of the country, especially in the Crimea. 

This situation offers Russia significant leverage.1 The creation of the Russia-dominated Customs Union, and formation of the Eurasian Union, allow Russia to place 

intense pressure on Ukraine. This is happening not just since the beginnings of the 

trade war we witnessed this summer,2 but also with the earlier promises of economic and political gains. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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Moscow does not demand reforms, including the rule of law and anticorruption 

measures, which the EU does. These demands may annoy some Ukrainian elites 

and high-ranking officials, making domination by Moscow more palatable than 

European integration in the eyes of a myopic few.3

However, Ukraine’s hesitancy to enter the Customs Union with Russia is warranted, as in the long term Moscow envisages subjugation, not cooperation. Its ultimate goals are geopolitical, not just economic. Recent events have made this clear. 

When negotiating over observer status as part of the Eurasian Economic Commission, Ukraine made several requests, including the right to attend all commission 

meetings, to have the texts translated into Ukrainian, and other reasonable safeguards of Ukrainian interests. All of Ukraine’s requests were summarily rejected.4

The implacability of the Russian position and the potential loss of economic and 

eventually state sovereignty defeated Ukrainian elite’s desire, if any existed, to join 

the Customs Union and the Eurasian Union. Yet, Kyiv is understandably apprehensive: if Moscow imposes high import tariffs (up to 10 percent allowed by WTO) and 

nontariff barriers, economic sanctions, as it were, could come into damaging effect 

immediately; while EU and potentially World Trade Organization (WTO) response 

would be painfully—and prohibitively—slow. 

Additionally, many EU members are hesitant to reach out to Ukraine until actual, 

measurable reforms are enacted. This, too, is understandable. The EU places political and legal conditions that are key to the signing of the Association Agreement, 

including the release of imprisoned former Prime Minister Tymoshenko. 

Expert recommendations vary greatly in regards to the EU’s response. Some 

argue that ‘‘the sooner the EU signs the agreements with Ukraine, Moldova, and 

Georgia, the stronger the insurance will be against the vagaries of the East European political weather.’’ 5

Ukraine’s signature on an Association Agreement is crucial to EaP goals, as 

Ukraine is expected to demonstrate the benefits of the EU’s association agreements 

to other EaP countries. However, the signature on an agreement would not immediately resolve the longstanding problems in Ukraine. Whether or not Ukraine signs 

the Association Agreement in Vilnius, ‘‘Ukraine is likely to find itself in uncharted 

waters after November 2013.’’ 6 One possible outcome may be that Kyiv remains sitting between the two chairs: neither signing the DCFTA, nor joining the Customs 

Union. Such an outcome makes the quickly deteriorating economic situation of 

Ukraine particularly bitter. 

Russia has already threatened to respond. Russian Presidential adviser Sergei 

Glazyev publicly stated that numerous articles of the EU-Ukrainian Association 

Agreement would violate several clauses of the Ukrainian-Russian treaty of friendship and cooperation and ‘‘will do serious, irreversible, and long-term harm to us.’’ 7

Russia’s economic and political pressure through high tariffs and import delays, 

the possible implementation of a visa regime, and increased energy costs in the middle of a cold winter are the threats Moscow has held out in trying to prevent Kyiv 

from signing the agreement with the EU. Moscow experts reiterate that if Ukraine 

signs the EU Association Agreement, Ukraine would become a truly ‘‘foreign’’ country to Russia, estranged economically and politically. As I warned in a recent Heritage Foundation Backgrounder, Russia is threatening to retaliate, making the EUdriven process as painful as possible.8

It is in the U.S. national interest that Ukraine anchors its future in Europe; 

develops the rule of law and property rights; and becomes a fully democratic country. Unfortunately, the administration did not view the future of Ukraine with due 

seriousness. It eschewed senior-level state visits; economic deal-making; and highimpact public diplomacy. Once again, in Eastern Europe and Eurasia, the U.S. 

punched below its weight. 

Instead of benign neglect, the administration should have encouraged the Ukrainian leadership to sign the Association Agreement and DCFTA at the Vilnius summit 

in November. The White House should reaffirm the guarantees of Ukrainian sovereignty and independence pledged by the U.S. in 1994, at the highest level, including protection from economic pressure. After all, while Presidents Putin and 

Yanukovich met many times, American officials made their trips to Ukraine scarce, 

and the level of U.S visitors in the country lower than necessary. Nor was the U.S. 

willing to coordinate its policies toward Ukraine with the EU in order to link the 

IMF economic relief package with European integration. 

The Obama administration should have publicly denounced Moscow’s illegal economic pressure on Ukraine to force it to join the Customs Union. The U.S. can and 

should provide technical advice on measures Kyiv can take to oppose such pressure 

in the WTO and other international frameworks. The U.S. should also promote the 

release of former Prime Minister Tymoshenko from prison—a step that would further encourage the Europeans to sign the Association Agreement. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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Provided Ukraine signs the Association Agreement and DCFTA, Congress and the 

Obama administration should expand U.S. and international technical assistance to 

Ukraine, if requested, including steps Kyiv may take in the WTO to defend its trade 

from discriminatory Russian trade practices. The U.S. should offer advice to: facilitate Ukraine’s economic reforms, combat corruption, increase transparency of government decisionmaking, make the civil service smaller and more efficient, privatize 

government services where possible, improve law enforcement practices, enhance 

the work of the courts, assist with the training of judges and prosecutors, deepen 

legal reform, and improve banking practices. The U.S. may lower tariffs on imports 

from Ukraine to compensate partially for the imposition of Russian tariffs on 

Ukrainian goods. 

Finally, the administration should boost public and diplomatic support of 

Ukraine’s Association Agreement and DCFTA with European capitals, signaling 

high-level U.S. attention to this matter, and dispatch senior American officials to 

Kyiv to articulate support through talks with the Ukrainian leadership and public 

appearances. 

Other countries are also under pressure not to join the AA and DCFTA. Moldova, 

too, has been a target of Russian threats. 

Moldova 

Moldova was effectively dismembered by Russia, which supported Transnistria, 

the secessionist Russian-speaking enclave since 1992. Europe’s poorest country, 

Moldova has become the latest victim of Russia’s bullying.9 Nevertheless, it is planning to initial the Association Agreement in Vilnius and sign it in 2014. 

In September 2013, Dmitri Rogozin, Russia’s Deputy Prime Minister in charge of 

the military-industrial complex and special envoy to the breakaway region of 

Transnistria, visited the country. A senior Moldovan diplomat who requested anonymity disclosed that Rogozin has applied pressure and threats during his talks 

with Moldovan officials. ‘‘He said it would be a serious and costly mistake if we concluded an agreement with the EU,’’ the diplomat stated.10

Rogozin threatened to cut Moldova’s trade with Russia, while Moldova’s migrant 

workers could face restrictions on entering Russia. He also said that by moving 

closer to Europe, Moldova would have to give up the secessionist Transnistria, 

which is backed by Russia. 

‘‘Moldova’s train en route to Europe would lose its rail cars in Transnistria,’’ 

Rogozin said during a press conference in the capital, Chis ̨na ̆u, effectively threatening to dismember the country. As a parting shot, Rogozin, a former ambassador 

to NATO, told a closed meeting that European Union integration was linked to integration with NATO, which is entirely untrue. Then he reminded his audience about 

how Moldova is completely dependent on Russia for its energy. ‘‘Energy supplies are 

important during the runup to winter,’’ Rogozin said. ‘‘I hope you won’t freeze.’’ 11

Most recently, in September 2013, Russia implemented a ban on Moldovan fruits, 

vegetables, wines, and spirits, blaming Chis ̨na ̆u, for a ‘‘lack of quality control at its 

wineries.’’ 12 This pattern is similar to the earlier economic sanctions against 

Ukraine. As Moldovan produce, wines, and spirits are very popular in Russia, 

accounting for over 10 percent of the Russian market, and comprising over 50 percent of Moldovan exports, the Russian import ban has a significant impact on 

Moldova’s economy.13 The EU promised to lift quotas on Moldovan wine before the 

end of 2013. 

However, Moldova continues to move ahead with EU integration, although Russia’s efforts may still dissuade Chis ̨na ̆u.14 The dispute with the secessionist Russianspeaking exclave of Transnistria remains unresolved and can be used a foil against 

the country’s sovereignty, while the EU demands that more needs to be accomplished in terms of the rule of law and improvement of the business climate. 

SOUTH CAUCASUS COUNTRIES

Georgia 

Of all the Eastern Partnership countries, Georgia is historically the most firmly 

set on engaging and integrating with the West. Like Moldova, it is planning to initial the Association Agreement with Europe in Vilnius. 

Russia never fully accepted Georgian independence in internationally recognized 

borders. In 1992, Russia provoked a civil war in Georgia that led to the secession 

of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The Five Day War in 2008 completed the breakup, 

leaving over 25 percent of Georgian territory (Abkhazia and South Ossetia) occupied. 

The process of subjugating Georgia may have been further advanced in the election cycle of 2012–2013, when Bidzina Ivanishvili, a former Russian billionaire 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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businessman, captured the majority in the Parliament. On October 27, 2013, Georgians elected Giorgi Margvelashvili, Ivanishvili’s handpicked Presidential candidate, 

as mostly ceremonial President,15 and on November 4, 2013, the Parliament elected 

a close Ivanishvili ally, 31-year-old Irakli Garibashvili, as a powerful Prime 

Minister.16

Moscow seeks to undermine Georgia’s role as an energy transit hub that links 

neighboring Azerbaijan to Turkey and Europe, thereby bypassing Russia and its 

energy monopoly in Eurasia. Almost 5 years after the Russian invasion of Georgia 

in August 2008, Russia has recognized the independence of the Georgian provinces 

of Abkhazia and South Ossetia while approximately 10,000 Russian troops continue 

to occupy them.17 The future of Georgian independence, territorial integrity, and 

sovereignty is severely challenged. 

Just as Joseph Stalin, himself a Georgian, drew Georgian borders in order to 

exploit and exacerbate ethnic differences, Russia’s current occupation of South 

Ossetia and Abkhazia reflects Moscow’s desire to divide and conquer Georgia, as it 

supports Abkhazia’s and South Ossetia’s resistance to Tbilisi’s offer to join Georgia 

as full autonomies. 

Former President Mikheil Saakashvili during his two terms intensified the efforts 

of his predecessor and former U.S.S.R. Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, 

seeking to counter Russian influence by cooperating militarily with NATO and economically with the U.S. and the EU. 

Mare`ne Laruelle notes that ‘‘in Georgia, Moscow has soft power instruments that 

it could activate,’’ 18 including pro-Russian politicians, economic ties, and the popular Russian TV channels. The Georgian Dream Party of Bidzina Ivanishvili, the 

Conservative Party of Zviad Dzidzigouri, the Worker’s Party of Shalva Natelachvili, 

the New Right, the Democratic Movement—United Georgia of Nino Burjanadze, and 

the Georgian Party of Irakli Okruashvili all call for a rapprochement with Russia 

in one way or another. 

Moscow has been deeply uneasy with Georgia’s market reforms, democratic elections, and Western orientation. That being the case, Georgia’s strategy has been to 

move toward the EU and NATO, which will inevitably bring Russian ire on Tbilisi. 

Georgia’s strategic dilemma is that while the relations with Moscow improved only 

marginally, the relations with Washington chilled down a lot since 2009. The EU 

was cautious not to anger Russia, its principal gas supplier. 

Georgia’s dogged campaign for NATO integration also played a key role in developing and affirming the country’s desire to join in Western alliance. Apart from its 

ties with the West, Georgia stands alone, shadowed by Russia’s looming threat to 

its national security and sovereignty.19 If allied with and protected by the West, 

Georgia stands a much improved chance of maintaining territorial integrity in the 

long term. 

Trade with Russia represents a significant portion of Georgia’s small economy and 

raises concerns of Georgia potentially falling squarely again under the aegis of Russia. The return to the Russian sphere of influence and economic frameworks would 

be a step backward for Georgian independence.20

Azerbaijan 

Azerbaijan has been caught between Russia and the West for almost 100 years, 

since its short-lived independence in 1918–1920. Strengthening ties between 

Azerbaijan and Russia has become a top priority for Putin, who visited Baku in 

August 2013.21 Azerbaijan and Russia signed a protocol in July 2013 for the reconstruction of the existing bridge at their border and to construct a new bridge across 

the Samur River.22 In June 2013 Azerbaijan agreed to a $1 billion weapons purchase from Russia, equipping Azerbaijani military with updated tanks and armored 

vehicles.23

In addition, SOCAR and Rosneft—Azerbaijan’s and Russia’s respective leading oilproducing companies—have begun negotiations on increasing energy cooperation. 

The two companies are considering resuming and expanding oil supplies to Europe 

via the Baku—Novorossiysk pipeline.24

Yet, Russia’s primary interests in the South Caucasus focus on Armenia, its historic ally as discussed above. Moscow wants to dominate the region militarily and 

strategically and to prevent or control the export of hydrocarbons to the West from 

the Caspian region through the Transcaucasian energy corridor,25 which rests outside of Russian control. Moscow is particularly concerned by the 2012 agreement 

between Turkey and Azerbaijan to build the Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline 

(TANAP)—and its extensions, the Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP), which would connect Turkey, Greece, Albania, and Italy, and Nabucco West, connecting Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, and Austria respectively. This pipeline system would ease 

Europe’s dependence on Russian gas.26

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Under the two Azerbaijani Presidents, Heydar Aliyev, who died in 2003, and his 

son, Ilham, Azerbaijan has pursued a mostly pro-Western policy to date. The country was instrumental in the transit of U.S. military materiel and personnel through 

the Northern Distribution Network—a vital railroad and sea-lane link from the 

Caucasus across the Caspian Sea and Turkmenistan into Afghanistan. Azerbaijan 

is also a unique example of a secular regime in a state with a majority Shia Moslem 

population, which treats its Russian Orthodox, Jewish, and Sunni Moslem minorities quite well. 

With U.S. support, Azerbaijan fiercely protected its sovereignty. In 2012, Aydin 

Aliyev—head of the Azerbaijani State Customs Committee—joined the Georgian 

Government in declining to enter the Eurasian Customs Union. Aliyev announced 

that Azerbaijan is in the process of implementing its own customs code and refused 

to sign the Treaty on the Free Trade Area, signed in October 2011 by the Presidents 

of eight CIS countries.27

Since President Aliyev has not shown interest in EAU membership, Putin has 

attempted to create a counterweight to Aliyev’s internal political and economic 

dominance in Azerbaijan. So far, he has failed. 

The Union of Azerbaijani Organizations of Russia (UAOR)—also known as the 

Billionaires’ Union—has been cited as a new tool that allows Putin to meddle in 

Azerbaijan’s internal affairs. Georgian ex-president Saakashvili believes the UAOR 

was created for the purpose of overthrowing the Aliyev government, while Vafa 

Guluzade, a former senior foreign policy aide to the late President Heydar Aliyev, 

claims to ‘‘see it as one of the forms of pressure against, and intimidation of, the 

Azerbaijani Government, which could be used when Putin needs it.’’ 28 However, the 

Billionaires’ Union failed to launch a viable political alternative to Aliyev, and Putin 

paid a friendly visit to Baku in August 2013. Yet, there is a strong lobby in Baku, 

including in the corridors of power, which advocates abandonment of the Western 

orientation and cozying up to Moscow. Baku is concerned about the refusal of the 

EU to include language about territorial integrity and occupation in the Associate 

Membership Agreement. Some in Baku may be also upset over European critique 

of the levels of democracy, human rights violations, and high levels of corruption. 

Over the past years, Azerbaijan has expressed interest in the EaP because of its 

desire to expand energy exports, including strategic TANAP and TAP gas pipelines 

to Turkey and Europe respectively, as well as a desire to ally with the West, but 

on its own terms. 

As Azerbaijan is not a World Trade Organization member, it does not meet 

DCFTA requirements, but an Association Agreement can still be initialed. This 

would be a positive development that would speak volumes to neighbors north and 

south. With Azerbaijan’s energy resources exported to the European markets, some 

of Eastern Europe’s reliance on Russian energy—and consequent susceptibility to 

Russian pressure—would be diminished. Thus, Europe has a direct interest in negotiating such an agreement with Baku. 

Armenia 

Armenia’s recent capitulation to Russia’s demands 29 illustrates Russia’s willingness to threaten severe retaliation against any former Soviet nation’s attempted 

reorientation toward the West. Armenia needed but a limited push to abandon its 

European path and join the Custom Union. Eventually, Russia would like to see 

Georgia follow suit. If that occurs, Azerbaijan would be isolated by Armenia and 

Iran in the south, and its egress to the Black Sea corked by Georgia. 

Erevan recently entered the Russian-led Customs Union, believing that its alliance with the Kremlin best guarantees its security. However, trading sovereignty 

for security came at a price. In September 2013, European Commissioner for 

Enlargement and European Neighborhood Policy Stefan Fule stated that it was ‘‘difficult to imagine’’ the initialing by Armenia of the Association Agreement at Vilnius 

in November . ‘‘Based on the information we presently have, the compatibility of 

obligations to the Customs Union with those under an Association Agreement/

DCFTA with the EU looks problematic.’’ 30 EU President and Lithuanian Foreign 

Minister Linas Linkevicius echoed similar concern: ‘‘We respect any choice of countries but they cannot enter both organizations at the same time because of different 

tariff requirements.’’ 31

Many analysts see Armenia’s reversal after 3 years of negotiations and a successful completion of talks with the EU a prime example of Russia’s powerful sway over 

the other four members of the Eastern Partnership. 

Armenia was scheduled to sign the formal Association Agreement in November 

2013 at the Vilnius conference. However, due to intense Russian pressures, Armenia 

was forced to abandon EU negotiations and seek entrance in the Russian-led Customs Union, which is likely to lead to membership in the newly formed Eurasian 

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Union.32 Russia’s threats to curb security cooperation and arms supply, in addition 

to ‘‘interfering with gas supplies, pressuring Armenian migrants in Russia . . . or 

reducing Russian support in Armenia’s conflict with Azerbaijan over NagornoKarabakh,’’ have led Armenia to shift its position.’’ 33

Though the prospect of Armenia’s integration with the EU suffered a large setback, the EU invitations to Armenia and Azerbaijan to participate in the Vilnius 

summit suggest that Armenia-EU negotiations are by no means closed. Instead, 

Moscow may force the EU to develop a ‘‘two-tier’’ Eastern Partnership, wherein the 

countries that are fully integrated receive full benefits, while those that only partially comply receive benefits that are more modest.34

Regardless, such a radical and sudden volte-face in Armenia’s position on EU 

involvement demonstrates the dangers that lie ahead in the EU negotiations with 

the other member states of the Neighborhood. 

U.S. INTERESTS IN THE EASTERN EUROPEAN NEIGHBORHOOD

Eastern and Central Europe have been a national interest priority area for the 

United States since World War I. After all, some of Europe’s most pro-American 

countries are located there. The U.S. fought and won the cold war on their behalf. 

The region was also a major battleground in both world wars and before. 

Since the end of the cold war the U.S. has actively assisted democratic forces in 

that part of the world. Democracy triumphed in the Baltic States, Poland, Czech 

Republic, Slovakia, and elsewhere in the region. There is no reason it will not succeed in the European Neighborhood countries. The U.S. is also interested in developing the East-West (‘‘The New Silk Road’’) corridor for trade, transportation, 

energy pipelines, and communications from China to Europe, in keeping the region 

free from outside domination, and for penetration of the ideas of freedom to a part 

of the world which had little experience with it. 

The U.S.’s overarching interest in expanding participatory government, the rule 

of law, and free-market economies in Eastern Europe is well demonstrated. However, due to weakened American leadership in the past 5 years, and because of 

Russia’s expanding meddling into the economic and foreign affairs of the Eastern 

European states, these post-Soviet countries represent an increasing foreign policy 

conundrum. 

It is wise for the Europeans to take a lead in addressing these challenges. After 

all, it is their neighborhood, their ‘‘near abroad.’’ The U.S. should support efforts to 

expand the economic stability, freedom, and sovereignty of our Eastern and South 

East European friends and allies, continuing the bipartisan policy of the both Bush 

and Clinton administrations since 1992.

————————

End Notes

1 ‘‘West or East?’’ The Economist, October 5, 2013, http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/

21587228-european-union-should-sign-deal-ukrainebut-only-if-yulia-tymoshenko-freed-west-or 

(accessed November 4, 2013). 2 Nicu Popescu, ‘‘The Russia-Ukraine Trade Spat,’’ European Union Institute for Security 

Studies, http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/AlertlUkraineltrade.pdf (accessed November 

4, 2013). 3 ‘‘West or East?’’ The Economist. 

4 James Sherr, ‘‘Ukraine and Europe: Final Decision?’’ Chatham House, http://

www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/Russia%20and%20Eurasia/

0713pplsherr.pdf (accessed October 4, 2013). 5 ‘‘Keeping the Eastern Partnership on Track,’’ European Union Institute for Security Studies, 

http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/AlertlArmenia-Russia.pdf (accessed October 4, 2013). 6Sherr, ‘‘Ukraine and Europe: Final Decision?’’

7 ‘‘Glazyev: Ukraine will fail to harmonize regulations with Customs Union if it signs association agreement with EU,’’ Interfax Ukraine, November 4, 2013, http://www.kyivpost.com/content/

politics/russian-presidential-adviser-sergei-glazyev-ukraine-will-fail-to-harmonize-regulationswith-customs-union-if-it-signs-association-agreement-with-eu-331387.html (accessed November 

4, 2013). 8 Ariel Cohen, ‘‘Why the U.S. Should Support Ukraine’s Association and Free Trade Agreements with Europe,’’ Heritage Foundation Backgrounder 2849, October 21, 2013, http://

www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/10/why-the-us-should-support-ukraines-association-andfree-trade-agreements-with-europe. 9 Vladimir Socor, ‘‘Russia and the Moldovan Communists’ Red October,’’ Eurasia Daily Monitor, Vol. 10, Issues 176 and 177, (October 3 and 4, 2013). 10 Judy Dempsey, ‘‘How Russia Bullies the EU’s Eastern Neighbors,’’ Strategic Europe, September 9, 2013, http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/?fa=52903 (accessed November 4, 2013). 11 ‘‘Moldova Says Will Stick to Pro-Europe Course Despite Russian Pressure,’’ Moscow Times, 

September 6, 2013, http://www.themoscowtimes.com/business/article/moldova-says-will-stick-topro-europe-course-despite-russian-pressure/485589.html (accessed November 4, 2013). 

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12 ‘‘Russia Vague on Lifting Moldovan Wine Ban,’’ RIA Novosti, September 20, 2013. http://

en.ria.ru/russia/20130920/183619894/Russia-Vague-on-Lifting-Moldovan-Wine-Ban.html 

(accessed November 4, 2013). 13 Reuters, ‘‘Russia, unhappy with Moldova’s EU drive, bans its wine and spirits,’’ September 

10, 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/10/us-moldova-russia-wine-idUSBRE98916M201

30910 (accessed November 4, 2013). 14Socor, ‘‘Russia and the Moldovan Communists’ Red October.’’ 15David M. Herszenhorn, ‘‘Georgia Elects New President, but Real Power Will Rest With Next 

Premier,’’, The New York Times, October 27, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/28/world/europe/georgia-elects-new-president-but-real-power-will-rest-with-next-premier.html?lr=0 

(accessed November 8, 2013). 16Max Delany and Irakli Metreveli, ‘‘Georgia PM names loyalist minister, 31, as successor,’’ 

Agence France-Presse, November 2, 2013, http://news.yahoo.com/georgia-pm-names-interior-minister-successor-113951447.html (accessed November 8, 2013). 17Luke Coffey, ‘‘Georgia and Russia: The Occupation Too Many Have Forgotten,’’ The Heritage Foundation, The Foundry, May 31, 2012, http://blog.heritage.org/2012/05/31/georgia-and-russia-the-occupation-too-many-have-forgotten. 18Marle`ne Laruelle, ‘‘When the ‘Near Abroad’ Looks at Russia: The Eurasian Union Project 

as Seen from the Southern Republics,’’ Russian Analytical Digest, No. 112 (April 20, 2012), 

http://www.css.ethz.ch/publications/pdfs/RAD-112-8-11.pdf (accessed October 28, 2013). 19 Eastern Partnership Community, ‘‘Georgia,’’ http://www.easternpartnership.org/partnerstates/georgia (accessed November 4, 2013). 20 Ariel Cohen, ‘‘Russia’s Eurasian Union Could Endanger the Neighborhood and U.S. Interests,’’ Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 2804, June 24, 2013, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/06/russias-eurasian-union-could-endanger-the-neighborhood-and-us-interests. 21Donald N. Jensen, ‘‘Putin Brings Disappointment Back from Baku,’’ Institute of Modern 

Russia, August 22, 2013, http://imrussia.org/en/politics/538-putin-brings-disappointment-backfrom-baku (accessed October 28, 2013). 22 Nazrin Gadimova, ‘‘Azerbaijan, Russia Ink Protocol on Construction of Bridge Across Samur 

River,’’ AzerNews, July 24, 2013, http://www.azernews.az/azerbaijan/57293.html (accessed October 28, 2013). 23 ‘‘Defense Minister’s Press Secretary on Russian Supply of Weapons to Azerbaijan,’’ 

Lragir.am, http://www.lragir.am/index/eng/0/politics/21691/30226 (accessed July 28, 2013). 24Gulgiz Dadashova, ‘‘Rosneft, SOCAR Eye Prospects for Co-op under Future Projects,’’ 

AzerNews, July 5, 2013, http://www.azernews.az/oillandlgas/56419.html (accessed October 28, 

2013). 25 ‘‘Connecting Caucasus with the World: Railways and Pipelines,’’ video, The Wilson Center, 

April 2, 2013, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/connecting-the-caucasus-the-world-railwayspipelines (accessed October 28, 2013). 26Trans Adriatic Pipeline, http://www.trans-adriatic-pipeline.com/ (accessed September 9, 

2013). 27 A. Akhundov, ‘‘Azerbaijan Not to Join Eurasian Customs Union,’’ TREND News Agency, 

July 16, 2012, http://en.trend.az/capital/business/2046965.html (accessed October 28, 2013), and 

Sultan Akimbekov, ‘‘The Eurasian Response,’’ http://magazine.asiakz.com/rus/article/1022 

(accessed October 28, 2013). 28Shahin Abassov, ‘‘Azerbaijan: Is the Kremlin up to Old Tricks?’’ Eurasianet.org, March 12, 

2013, http://www.eurasianet.org/node/66677 (accessed October 28, 2013). 29 ‘‘Armenia’s Dependency on Russia Continues to Deepen,’’ Caspian Research Institute, http:/

/caspianresearch.com/2013/10/02/armenias-dependency-on-russia-continues-to-deepen/ (accessed 

October 4, 2013). 30 ‘‘Stefan Fule: Difficult to imagine initialling Association Agreement with Armenia in Vilnius 

as it had been negotiated,’’ News.am, September 6, 2013, http://news.am/eng/news/170092.html 

(accessed November 4, 2013). 31 ‘‘Armenia-EU free trade deal blocked,’’ Global Post, September 3, 2013, http://

www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/afp/130903/armenia-eu-free-trade-deal-blocked (accessed November 4, 2013). 32 Cohen, ‘‘Russia’s Eurasian Union Could Endanger the Neighborhood and U.S. Interests.’’ 33 Caspian Research Institute, ‘‘Armenia’s Dependency.’’ 34 Nicu Popescu, ‘‘Behind—and beyond—Armenia’s choice,’’ European Union Institute for Security Studies, October 2013, http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Alertl35lArmenialUturn.pdf (accessed November 4, 2013).

Senator MURPHY. Thank you. 

Mr. Wilson. 

STATEMENT OF DAMON WILSON, EXECUTIVE VICE 

PRESIDENT, ATLANTIC COUNCIL, WASHINGTON, DC 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Chairman Murphy, Ranking Member 

Johnson. 

In 2 weeks, European leaders will meet in Vilnius to chart what 

is effectively the next wave of European immigration. The United 

States will not have a seat at the summit, of course; however, its 

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results will have strategic consequences for U.S. interests. The outcome of the Vilnius summit will help determine whether the 

nations of the Eastern Partnership will have the option of ultimately joining a Europe ‘‘whole, free, prosperous, and at peace.’’ 

Therefore, I am here to urge Senate backing for a clear U.S. strategy toward Europe’s East and to thank you for your leadership on 

this issue. 

The Eastern Partnership began as a modest means to strengthen 

the ties of Europe’s East to the European Union without offering 

membership. It has now become the leading instrument to foster 

the transformation of post-Soviet nations from Eurasian authoritarian kleptocracy to European democratic prosperity. The Eastern 

Partnership offers political affiliation with the European Union, 

economic integration, and the elimination of barriers to travel. 

These are the ingredients necessary to accelerate the adoption

of European norms and values in post-Soviet nations. Its powerful 

unspoken premise is that true sovereignty requires greater 

democracy. 

So, at issue in Vilnius is whether Ukraine itself will join Moldova 

and Georgia in making major advances in their integration with 

Europe, but the Eastern Partnership’s future itself is also in play. 

The issue is whether European leaders will evolve the partnership 

to become a pathway for successful reformers to pursue membership in the union while keeping open the long-term European 

option for the others. 

And this is where the United States becomes relevant. U.S. leadership has driven each wave of European integration, using NATO 

as the lead and often paving the way for European Union enlargement. The United States has stepped back from this leadership role 

driving this historic process. If the United States sits on the sidelines, this next wave of European integration, and ultimately 

enlargement, will fail. Building a Europe ‘‘whole, free, prosperous, 

and at peace’’ remains in the American national interest as much 

as previous phases of this process have. Indeed, the United States 

remains a European power with enormous influence over this 

process. 

The task today is to develop U.S. strategy to complement and 

indeed support the European Union efforts to integrate its neighbors in Europe’s East. The United States should be an enabler of 

European integration and a driver of future NATO enlargement. 

The EU’s Eastern Partnership Initiative and future NATO 

enlargement do not necessarily overlap, but they can be mutually 

reinforcing. The Eastern Partnership is the latest instrument of a 

common transatlantic strategy. We nearly achieved our post-war 

goals of a Europe ‘‘whole, free, and at peace’’ with the post-cold-war 

enlargement of NATO and the European Unions, the twin instruments of the strategy. But, even as we celebrate that success, we 

must recognize that our work is not yet done. Our renewed U.S. 

strategy for Europe’s East should, therefore, consist of consolidating our gains, preventing rollback of freedoms, and setting the 

stage for this next advance of integration. In this context, the U.S. 

strategy toward Europe’s East could include five elements. 

First, Washington can be clear, help articulate a clear goal to 

complete Europe. Such a vision gives strategic impetus to indiFOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

32

vidual decisions that can at times seem small in impact when considered in isolation. 

Second, U.S. policy can back the EU’s Eastern Partnership Initiative unequivocally in order to mitigate ambivalence with inside 

the European Union while strengthen the hands of its advocates. 

A divided EU will fail in integrating Europe’s East. 

Third, the United States should assume a leading role in 

addressing the security concerns afflicting the eastern partners, 

because security is left unaddressed by the Eastern Partnership 

process. This means, in Moldova, for example, the United States 

should create a Strategic Partnership Council to parallel the structures we have with Ukraine and Georgia, and we should move from 

being observers in the negotiations over Transnistria to being full 

participants. 

Regarding Georgia, Washington should take the lead in restoring 

a strategy for Georgia to join NATO, as long as that country’s leaderships pursue reforms and as long as they do not pursue witch 

hunts, including, particularly, against President Saakashvili. 

Fourth, the United States should be working with the EU now 

to support those nations to take decisive steps toward Europe in 

Vilnius. This means, for example, making clear that the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership would be open to the 

countries of the Eastern Partnership that successfully reach agreements with the European Union, and, at the same time, the United 

States and the EU should be anticipating and countering Russian 

moves to derail these nations’ move toward Europe. 

Finally, the United States should restore a sense of momentum 

to the broader integration process by leading the effort to welcome 

Macedonia and Montenegro into NATO, and Bosnia, Herzegovina, 

and Georgia into NATO’s Membership Action Plan. 

Ukraine presents a particular challenge. President Yanukovych 

is not acting decisively to end selective justice and to release 

former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko from prison. If he fails 

to do so, he should face consequences. Therefore, the challenge in 

Vilnius is to lock in Ukraine’s European choice while gaining leverage to more effectively check antidemocratic behavior and to ensure 

the Ukrainians have a genuinely free choice in their 2015 presidential elections. 

The Eastern Partnership is not meant to create a new dividing 

line in Europe. It can help anchor a vulnerable and insecured zone 

and the certainty of a stable and prosperous Europe. Over the long 

term, the vision of a Europe ‘‘whole, free, and at peace’’ also 

includes a democratic Russia, but the pathway to reform in Russia 

might begin with choices in Kyiv, Chisinau, and Tbilisi, in favor of 

a European future. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Wilson follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DAMON M. WILSON

Chairman Murphy, Ranking Member Johnson, members of the subcommittee, in 

exactly 2 weeks, European Union (EU) leaders will meet in Vilnius, Lithuania, with 

their counterparts from Europe’s East to chart the next wave of European integration. While most EU summits do not merit the attention of the U.S. Senate, this 

Eastern Partnership summit is different. The sovereignty of the nations between the 

European Union and Russia is at stake. The outcome of the Vilnius summit will 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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help determine whether the nations of Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Belarus will have the option of ultimately joining a Europe whole, free, 

prosperous, and at peace. 

The United States will not have a seat at the table at this summit. However, its 

results will have enormous strategic consequences for U.S. interests. Therefore, I am 

here to urge your backing for a clear U.S. strategy in support of the EU’s Eastern 

Partnership. In short, we need a U.S. strategy for Europe’s East. 

Launched in 2008 as a Polish-Swedish initiative prior to the Russian invasion of 

Georgia, European leaders envisioned the Eastern Partnership as a modest means 

to begin to strengthen the ties of the peoples of Europe’s East to the EU, but without offering the goal of membership. At its inception, the Eastern Partnership was 

very much underestimated by the Eastern Partners themselves, as well as many 

inside the EU and indeed in both Washington and Moscow. Within 5 years, the 

Eastern Partnership has become the leading instrument to help foster the transformation of post-Soviet nations away from a future of Eurasian authoritarian 

kleptocracy to one of European democratic prosperity. 

The Eastern Partnership holds the potential to be a driver of reform as it offers 

six post-Soviet nations three enticing elements: political affiliation with the EU 

through Association Agreements, economic integration through deep and comprehensive free trade agreements, and elimination of barriers to travel through liberalization of visa policies. In essence, these are the ingredients to accelerate the 

adoption of European norms and values in post-Soviet nations, creating facts on the 

ground in which individual choices shape a country’s strategic orientation. The 

enduring strength of the Eastern Partnership is that its success is driven by attraction, not coercion. Its powerful unspoken premise is that true sovereignty requires 

greater democracy. 

There are two key issues facing the Eastern Partnership. First, will the Vilnius 

summit mark a major advance in the integration of Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia, 

the three Eastern Partnership nations that aspire to closer integration with the EU 

and have made the most progress in their negotiations? Second, will European leaders evolve the Eastern Partnership to become a pathway for successful reformers 

to pursue membership in the Union, while keeping open the long-term European 

option for the others. 

This is where the United States becomes relevant. 

U.S. leadership has driven each wave of European integration, using NATO as a 

lead instrument and often paving the way for EU enlargement. With the failure of 

NATO allies to reach consensus on the path forward for Georgia and Ukraine at 

the 2008 Bucharest summit, and in the context of the Russo-Georgian War shortly 

afterward, the United States in essence stepped back from its traditional leadership 

role of driving this historic process. 

While European leaders are not considering offering Eastern Partners a membership option, make no mistake that ultimately the process underway at Vilnius is 

about integration. If the United States sits on the sidelines, this next wave of European integration and ultimately enlargement will fail. It could fail because Europe 

remains divided on its objectives, the Russians have chosen to challenge this process, and the most significant obstacles to integration of Europe’s East remain security issues that are beyond the purview of the Eastern Partnership. 

There is no doubt that this next chapter of integration will be more difficult than 

in the past. The bar is higher for today’s aspiring nations as the EU has become 

more integrated and intrusive into the once-domestic affairs of its members. The 

base is also lower as the nations of the Eastern Partnership start further behind 

in reforms than their neighbors in Central Europe. Furthermore, as membership is 

not on offer as of now, the cost of reforms at home can be high in the short-term 

while the long-term reward remains abstract. Furthermore, the Eastern Partnership 

nations are an extraordinarily diverse group of nations, united only by their postSoviet heritage and their European geography. Some indeed do not aspire to greater 

integration with Europe. Finally, there is great reluctance within the EU even to 

broach the topic of future enlargement as the Union struggles with its own economic 

crisis and vacuum in political leadership. 

This is why the so-called ‘‘European project’—building a Europe whole, free, prosperous, and at peace—remains in the American national interest, as much as previous phases of this process have. Indeed, the United States remains a European 

power with enormous influence over this process. 

In recent years, there has been a perception among many in Europe’s East that 

the United States was leading on Russia policy while deferring to the EU on policy 

toward the neighbors. This is overly simplistic of course, but the United States has 

invested more energy and creativity in forging a relationship with Russia than its 

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neighbors. This is a recipe for failure. We must do both. Thankfully, the United 

States Government is beginning to do just that. 

The task today is to develop U.S. strategy to complement and indeed support EU 

efforts to integrate its neighbors in Europe’s East. Yes, the United States wants to 

avoid its efforts in Europe’s East sliding into a U.S.-Russia conflict. But we also do 

not want that fear to lead to U.S. ambivalence or absence in Europe’s East. 

The objective of U.S. policy should be to serve as an enabler of European integration and a driver of future NATO enlargement. The EU’s Eastern Partnership initiative and future NATO enlargement do not necessarily overlap, but they can be 

mutually reinforcing just as NATO and EU enlargements have been in the postcold-war period. 

Indeed, the Eastern Partnership is the latest instrument of a common transatlantic grand strategy. The United States fought in World War II not only to defeat 

the Nazi menace, but to help Europe emerge from war in a way that would never 

force the United States to fight again in Europe. After 45 years of cold war, we 

forged a bipartisan U.S. policy to fulfill our original national aims of 1945. We nearly achieved our goal, with NATO and EU enlargement, the twin instruments of this 

strategy to secure a Europe whole, free, and at peace. 

Even as we celebrate that success, we must also recognize that our work is not 

done. With NATO enlargement having reached a temporary pause, at least looking 

East, and EU enlargement in a slower phase, the Eastern Partnership represents 

the best instrument to keep this vision viable. A renewed U.S. strategy for Europe’s 

East, therefore, should consist of consolidating our gains, preventing rollback of 

freedoms, and setting the stage for the next advance of integration. The Eastern 

Partnership is the key instrument for this strategy. 

In this context, effective U.S. strategy toward Europe’s East in the short-term 

could include five elements. 

First, Washington can help articulate a clear vision and goal: to continue to forge 

a Europe, whole, free, prosperous, and at peace. That is, to complete Europe. The 

power of this simple message can be to restore the prospect of integration and ultimate membership in either NATO or the EU as an engine of reform in aspiring 

nations. Such a vision gives strategic impetus to individual decisions that can seem 

small in impact when considered in isolation. 

Second, U.S. policy can back the EU’s Eastern Partnership initiative unequivocally in order to mitigate ambivalence among many EU member states while 

strengthening the hands of its advocates. Enthusiasm for a coherent EU strategy 

toward Europe’s East varies greatly depending whether you are in Paris and 

Madrid, or Warsaw and Stockholm. The Bucharest summit experience suggests that 

a divided EU, much like a divided NATO, will ultimately fail in integrating Europe’s 

East. 

Third, the United States should assume a leading role in addressing the security 

concerns afflicting the Eastern Partners and which are left unaddressed by the 

Eastern Partnership process. 

In Ukraine, this means intensifying mil-to-mil cooperation, deepening intelligence 

ties, and laying the groundwork for long-term influence with security structures 

which could either advance or undermine Ukraine’s European future. It also means 

supporting Ukraine’s efforts to ensure its energy security and buttress its sovereignty and territorial integrity, including in Crimea. 

In Moldova, the United States should build a security relationship where very little currently exists. While officially neutral, Moldova is keen to forge closer ties with 

the United States and NATO. The United States should target some of its limited 

assistance on security sector reform, as this sector remains an Achilles’ heel for the 

nation’s long-term security. Specifically, the United States could create a Strategic 

Partnership Council with Moldova to parallel the structures the United States has 

with Ukraine and Georgia. Such a move would demonstrate consistent support for 

the three leading nations of the Eastern Partnership. Furthermore, the United 

States with the EU should engage more seriously and creatively in the ‘‘5+2 talks’’ 

on Transnistria, a breakaway region, which Moscow seeks to maintain as a lever 

to complicate Moldova’s aspirations. This would entail the United States (and the 

EU) changing from observer status to full participant in these negotiations and supporting a demilitarization of the conflict. 

Regarding Georgia, Washington will need to support the new leadership if and as 

it pursues democratic and economic reforms, as it asserts it seeks to do. At the same 

time, we must hold the country’s new leadership accountable not to pursue witch 

hunts or politically motivated justice. The new government must understand that 

if it seeks to imprison former President Mikheil Saakashvili, it is freezing its path 

toward the EU and NATO. If Tbilisi focuses on advancing a European future without litigating its past, Washington should take the lead in restoring a strategy for 

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Georgia to integrate with and eventually join NATO, giving credibility to the Bucharest summit decision that Georgia will become a member of the alliance. 

Fourth, the United States should be working with the EU now to support those 

nations that take a decisive step toward Europe in Vilnius. For example, the United 

States should be explicit that as it negotiates a comprehensive Transatlantic Trade 

and Investment Partnership with the EU, Washington aims to extend this landmark agreement to any Eastern Partnership nation that concludes a deep and comprehensive free trade agreement with the EU. Similarly, as leaders in Moldova, 

Ukraine, and Georgia take the right reform decisions and create level electoral playing fields, they should expect to be welcomed in Washington and to receive highlevel visits in their capitals. 

At the same time, the United States and the EU should anticipate and counter 

possible Russian efforts to derail these nations’ move toward Europe. Moscow has 

been vocal and specific in threatening these nations with retaliation ranging from 

bans on imports and mass deportation of labor migrants to energy cutoffs this winter. We know the pressures the Eastern Partners already face and we should be preparing now to assist or counteract such measures where we can. The United States 

and Europe should work hand in hand with governments and societies in the region 

to prevent Russian rollback of freedom’s gains. 

Finally, the United States should restore a sense of momentum to the broader 

integration process by leading the effort to welcome Macedonia and Montenegro into 

NATO and Bosnia and Herzegovina and Georgia into NATO’s Membership Action 

Plan (MAP). These steps can help reinforce the EU’s resolve to continue extending 

its hand to the East. 

Many argue that the United States does not need a strategy toward Europe’s 

East—or rather that the best U.S. strategy is to leave the EU in the lead and 

remain silent. There is a cost to having no strategy. Some leaders in Moscow will 

conclude that they can maximize their efforts to disrupt Eastern Partners’ moves 

toward Europe without consequences. Therefore, inaction increases the chance of 

greater instability in Europe’s East leading to even greater challenges in the future 

for U.S. policy. A clear U.S. strategy in support of Europe now will help advance 

our interests in advancing a free, democratic East and mitigate opportunities for 

mischief-making in the short-term while laying the groundwork for long-term security, stability, and prosperity. 

While Ukrainian President Yanukovych is all but guaranteeing last-minute drama 

at the Vilnius summit, what happens beyond Vilnius is as, if not more, important. 

The Vilnius agreements will begin a process of transforming economies and societies 

in Europe’s East; they do not offer the prospect of EU membership. 

By their next Eastern Partnership summit in Riga, Latvia, in 2015, EU members 

states should aim to offer two tracks to their partners: the prospect of beginning 

the long path to membership for those who make the most progress on reforms, 

while keeping long-term options open for those partners who either do not aspirate 

to membership or fail to deliver on reforms necessary to start to the process. 

Moscow’s reaction to the Eastern Partnership provides clarity on the broader strategic perspective of what will play out in Vilnius. While the EU has been clear that 

the Eastern Partnership is not aimed against Russia, President Putin has decided 

to treat it as a challenge. Putin is clear that his objective is in essence the restoration of a sphere of domination through the creation of a Eurasian Union and an 

accompanying Customs Union (which is incompatible with a deep and comprehensive free trade agreement with the EU). These instruments are not premised on 

equality and respect for sovereignty; rather they would enable Moscow to dominate 

the post-Soviet space. Russia’s strategy, as so clearly illustrated in Armenia’s decision to drop its bid for an agreement with the EU in Vilnius, is based on coercion 

and disruption. Such a strategy may result in tactical wins, but ultimately it is not 

sustainable, as it will not engender the support of individuals in these nations who 

recognize the opportunities lost. Nor is it a formula for long-term stability, as it 

rests on intimidation in the short run and deprivation of the sovereign rights of 

other nations to choose their own future in the long run. 

Ukraine presents a particular challenge in Vilnius. Strategically, Ukraine is by 

far the most important of the Eastern Partners. However, the Yanukovych administration’s perception of Ukraine’s importance is leading it to do the bare minimum, 

if that, to meet EU conditions. Specifically, President Yanukovych is not acting decisively to end selective justice and to release former Prime Minister Yulia 

Tymoshenko from prison. President Yanukovych has the unique ability to unify 

Ukraine around its European choice—that is to deliver the eastern Ukraine electorate in a way a politician from western Ukraine could not. But in the end, 

Yanukovych is a transitional figure; he is not committed to the values of a democratic Europe. Even as he negotiates in favor of Ukraine’s European future, he is 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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manipulating Ukrainian legislation and institutions to help ensure he secures a second term. Therefore, the challenge in Vilnius is to lock in Ukraine’s European choice 

while gaining leverage to more effectively check antidemocratic behavior and ensure 

that Ukrainians have a genuinely free choice in their 2015 Presidential elections. 

The Eastern Partnership is not meant to create a new dividing line in Europe. 

It can help anchor a vulnerable and insecure zone in the certainty of a stable and 

prosperous Europe. Over the long-term, the vision of a Europe whole, free, prosperous, and at peace also includes a democratic Russia. 

But the pathway to reform in Moscow might begin with choices in Kyiv, Chisinau, 

and Tbilisi in favor of their European future.

Senator MURPHY. Thank you. 

Senator Johnson. 

Senator JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Dr. Cohen, I believe what you said was, the United States has 

been way too low key in our support for the Eastern Partnership. 

Mr. Wilson laid out, kind of, a five-point plan. I was going to ask 

you, similarly, What can and should the United States do to be not 

quite so low key so we can be more forthright in our support? 

Dr. COHEN. Thank you, Senator. 

First of all, the visibility matters. Diplomacy is perception and 

symbols as well as actual action. We were lagging behind in visibility. I challenged an administration official to name one senior 

official—Vice Presidential level, Secretary of State level, Deputy 

Secretary of State level—to visit any of these countries to actively 

promote Vilnius process. And I was left lacking. We did not put 

boots on the ground, in terms of high levels of diplomacy. We did 

not link economic assistance with membership. And, in case of 

Ukraine, as we heard from our learned colleague, Dr. Aslund, the 

IMF bailout, the economic help, is absolute vital for the 

Yanukovych administration not to collapse, not to have popular discontent overflowing if they mismanage the economy even further 

beyond the way they mismanage it already. So, I think, linkage of 

economic measures and economic assistance, including the IMF 

pipeline, as well as visibility. Talking to the Russians to dial it 

down, and explaining to the Russians what kind of consequences 

they may have if they do not—not to threaten the neighbors, in the 

worst traditions of the 20th-century European politics—all of these 

avenues were either not explored or explored insufficiently by the 

current administration. 

Senator JOHNSON. So, leadership strategy, more visibility. Is 

there a danger, if we get too aggressive with our support, that it 

might stiffen Russian spine to resist even further or more aggressively? 

Mr. Wilson. 

Mr. WILSON. You know, I think that there are many that the

argument, ‘‘We can’t let this slip into a U.S.-Russian confrontation, 

and so, we should take a backseat, let the EU lead.’’ I understand 

that, to some degree, on tactics, but it cannot be an excuse for 

absence. 

Russia is trying to prevent this from happening, regardless of 

U.S. policy. So, I think it is incumbent upon us—this is the game 

in town, we are at the center of it, and our interests are at stake 

here. So, if you look at the record of Russian behavior in trying to 

undermine these nations, it is actually pretty outrageous, the steps 

that they have taken—explicit blackmail and coercion. And I think 

we should call a spade a spade, and speak clearly about that. At 

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the same time, we need to make the point—we did not choose—this 

is not about trying to confront Russia. Unfortunately, President 

Putin has taken that decision. 

When you talk to educated folks in Moscow today, many of them 

realize that this is an extremely counterproductive policy on the 

part of Russia. President Putin has done more to stiffen the spine 

of the European Union, and probably has done more to stiffen the 

spine of some of those that were uncertain in the Eastern Partnership, because who wants to be dominated by a neighbor, a ruler 

that treats them in thuggish tactics. 

So, there is a role to be savvy about our diplomacy, I understand 

that. But, at the same time, we cannot use that to be quiet or 

absence. 

Senator JOHNSON. For whoever really wants to answer this, 

What does Yanukovych fear in releasing Tymoshenko? Or, why is 

he so reluctant? 

Mr. ASLUND. Well, you can say that President Yanukovych is 

driven by two fears. One is Mr. Putin and one is Tymoshenko. 

Why? Clearly, there is an enormous personal animosity between 

them. According to the opinion polls, Vitali Klitschko is now the 

most popular position leader in Ukraine, and President 

Yanukovych has now lost stride, signed into law an amendment to 

the Ukrainian tax code that means that Klitschko perhaps may not 

fulfill the residence requirement to stand in the next Presidential 

election. 

Yulia Tymoshenko lost by 31⁄2 percent in the Presidential elections, to Yanukovych in February 2010. Elections were deemed free 

and fair. But, of course, President Yanukovych had far larger 

financial resources in that election, and much more media support 

than Prime Minister Tymoshenko. So, he is afraid of her as somebody who could win free elections against him. And President 

Yanukovych popularity rating is likely over 20 percent. 

Senator JOHNSON. OK. 

Mr. Wilson, you want to chime in? 

Mr. WILSON. If I could just add to that. I agree with much of 

what Dr. Aslund just said. I had an opportunity to be the first 

American to visit Yulia Tymoshenko in prison when she was in 

Kharkiv. President Yanukovych let us visit as part of a Freedom 

House delegation. It was clear, her determination from her prison 

bed, to manage the opposition to President Yanukovych. It was 

clear in conversations with him, this is extraordinarily personal. 

And Dr. Aslund is right—he does fear her more than he values 

what he is planning for Ukraine’s future. It is a very personal element of this. He is behind in the polls. He is vulnerable headed 

into the elections. 

The point that I wanted to make is, even as we focus on the 

release of Tymoshenko from prison today, what we really need to 

be focused on is also how he is setting the stage for the 2015 Presidential election, whether it is Tymoshenko in prison trying to disqualify Klitschko because of foreign residency—resident—the way 

he defines ‘‘residency requirements,’’ or pursuing—open a new corruption case against the former speaker of the Rada to disqualify 

him, or to consider other constitutional means. The choice to join 

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Europe is not a technical process that they negotiate in a document. The Ukrainians have done that well. 

It is, at the end of the day, a fundamental choice about values 

and principles. President Yanukovych has not demonstrated that 

he has made that strategic choice yet. And I think we want to lock 

Ukraine in this path, but we have to continue to hold the leadership accountable, not just what happens at Vilnius, but certainly 

the pathway to the 2015 election. 

Senator JOHNSON. Dr. Cohen. 

Dr. COHEN. Briefly, I am appalled that there is no recognition of 

the historic value and historic significance of this choice. In 1654, 

a quasi-democratic meeting of then-Ukrainian Cossacks and such 

voted to join the Russian Empire. It was called the Council of 

Peryaslav, 1654. And Ukraine lost its independence as a result, 

and we did not see Ukrainian independence then until 1918, for 

over 300 years. This should not be another Council of Peryaslav, 

Mr. Senator. 

Senator JOHNSON. Thank you all for your testimony. 

And thank you, Mr. Chairman, for letting me go out of order. 

Senator MURPHY. Thank you, Senator Johnson. 

So, I mean, let me push back a bit on the contention that the 

United States has been absent. We have been very clear with 

respect to what Yanukovych needs to do with respect to Tymoshenko. Our Assistant Secretary, who just testified, was just recently in the region. And so, I certainly understand your desire for 

more U.S. action. I would draw a little bit of issue with the contention that we have been absent. 

But, what do we do when we have a fundamentally uneven playing field with respect to tactics? Dr. Cohen, you talked about the 

outright blackmail that is happening right now with respect to the 

conversations between the Ukraine and Russia. We talked a little 

bit about the borderization that is occurring right now in South 

Ossetia and Abkhazia. And part of my worry about tactics, such as 

telling the Georgians, for instance, we are going to withdraw our 

aid if they do not join, that we are not going to provide IMF support to the Ukraine if they do not sign an agreement, is that then, 

at some level, our tactics start to look somewhat similar to the tactics that the Russians are using. 

And so, how do we counter tactics, that are clearly way below the 

belt with respect to the Russians, with ones that are true to our 

values and the norms that conventionally underlie the carrot-andstick approach that we give to countries when our national interests are at stake? 

I will ask the panel, and start with you, Mr. Wilson. 

Mr. WILSON. Senator Murphy, thank you very much. 

Just to be clear, I would not make the case that the United 

States has been absent at all. If you look at the diplomacy that is 

played out in Kyiv, the United States has been at the heart of that. 

This was one of the first trips that Assistant Secretary Nuland 

made; indeed, expressly for this purpose. In part, getting her in 

office was a key issue at a key time during the summer. But, I 

think she has very clearly laid out an important strategy for the 

U.S. Government, and, more importantly, led that strategy by providing the overall vision, reestablishing the sense of what we are 

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trying to accomplish here. And the messaging matters, the presence matters in this. 

You are absolutely right, there is a fundamental difference 

between the option looking to a Customs Union or to the Eastern 

Partnership, because it is based on their choice. And we have to 

respect that. Our tactics, our strategies are fundamentally different, because it is based on the sovereignty of the country, the 

decision of the people. And I think what is of concern in a country 

like Georgia or Ukraine is—it is quite clear, at times, where the 

population, where the elites are going, in terms of wanting to see 

their countries join Europe. And it is the influence, because of the 

still lack of maturity of the democratic institutions, but that does 

not always translate to the decision that is playing out today. 

Our strategy has to lead with the offer of what we are—the prospect of what we are offering these countries by moving closer to 

Europe, integrating through long-term economic growth and prosperity. The reality is, a short-term framework, there will be some 

pain for these economies to adjust to European competition. This 

is about long-term benefits, long-term anchoring their countries in 

a society of common values and interests. 

We actually cannot compete with the short-term approach that 

the Russians would pay, whether it is a carrot of putting money 

on the table today or a stick of bribing them. So, I think our tactics 

and methodology are fundamentally different. It has to be premised 

on the choice these countries make, and that is why you see some 

of them—they are not moving in this direction. And we, in the end, 

have to accept that. We just need to make the choice clear that, I 

think, faces them. 

Senator MURPHY. Dr. Cohen, you—maybe I got you wrong, but 

I thought I heard you suggesting that we should threaten to withdraw supports if they do not sign the agreement. 

Dr. COHEN. No, I would put it differently. I would say that we 

would be more positively inclined to provide support if they sign 

the agreement. And I think, Mr. Chairman, in this town, the art 

of realpolitik and the recognition of the realities how this world operates, including Eastern Europe, including the Middle East and 

other parts of the world, is sometimes lacking. And I do believe 

that wrapping our inaction in the rhetoric of values or in the rhetoric of defense of abstract ideas which result, eventually, in loss of 

significant geopolitical assets to this country and to our European 

allies, is misguided and came to bear in this administration more 

than before. 

Senator MURPHY. Mr. Aslund. 

Mr. ASLUND. Yes. There are several legal instruments that the 

United States can use. Russia has now joined the World Trade 

Organization, August last year, and the United States has granted 

PNTR, but Russia is not obeying the rules at all. The United States 

can help various countries bring out these issues in the WTO. It 

will not get fast results. The WTO works very slowly. But, it is an 

important instrument to use. 

Secretary Nuland, previously today, mentioned TTIP, which is a 

very attractive development. And if Ukraine would get the Association Agreement, the assessment is that this would increase Ukrainian GDP in the long term by 12 percent, increase exports in total 

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by almost 50 percent, while, if it joined the Customs Union, GDP 

will decline. And Russia does not have a viable trade alternative. 

The Customs Union is a small and protectionist trade association, 

and the Russian economy is only one-tenth of the EU economy. So, 

the point is that Russia is taking two large costs upon itself, and 

if Ukraine does not join the Customs Union, it does not look viable 

or even sustainable. 

So, I think that Russia is in a corner, where it has put itself. And 

therefore, the United States have a lot of leverage through the various international initiatives and organization. 

Thank you. 

Senator MURPHY. Thank you. 

The Partnership summit in Vilnius represents a very important 

and convenient decision point for these three nations. And, Dr. 

Cohen, at least you expressed some growing skepticism that 

Ukraine may sign there. Do we risk overhyping the summit itself, 

in the sense that, if there is a decision perhaps by Yanukovych to 

continue negotiations, that this process is a little bit more linear 

than we may point out? What happens if we do not get everything 

we want and the Europeans want at the Vilnius summit? How dire 

should we read a failure for all three countries to initial or sign? 

Dr. COHEN. The evaluations I reviewed yesterday are talking of 

a quick decline of probability of signature in Vilnius, from about 50 

percent to 20 percent in a couple of days. 

Senator MURPHY. With respect to Ukraine. 

Dr. COHEN. With respect to Ukraine. 

Senator MURPHY. Right. 

Dr. COHEN. It is a worrisome process. I do not think it is the end 

of the world. But, as I said before, (a) Mr. Yanukovych is going to 

shoot himself and his country and his people in the foot if he does 

not sign; (b) we will need to continue to engage our European 

allies, and the Europeans will have to take a leadership position 

on that, as they have been until now, and bridge their own differences, let us say, between the Polish position that they should 

sign the Association Agreement, no matter what, with Ukraine, 

and the German position that human rights are important. They 

have to work it out. We have to work with them on that issue. 

And yes, of course we should continue working past Vilnius if 

there is no signature with Ukraine. However, the chances of that 

process not coming to fruition will continue to decrease if Vilnius 

brings no resolution, because the Russians will feel strong and will 

continue doing what they are doing with the results that they are 

gaining. 

And I agree with Dr. Aslund, that, without Ukraine, the Customs 

Union loses its viability; but, even without Ukraine, if you will look 

at the Russian plans right now to bring in Kyrgyzstan, 

Tajikistan—small countries, granted—but continue to expend—

Armenia—continue to expend that, and then move to the Eurasian 

Union in 2015 as a fully operational bloc—I think the Russians are 

playing that game. 

And, if I may, sir, I would like my full testimony——

Senator MURPHY. Certainly. 

Dr. COHEN [continuing]. To be included for the record. 

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Senator MURPHY. Yes. And I should have said that. We will have 

all of your full testimony included into the record. 

Building on that point, Mr. Wilson, when Secretary Nuland was 

in Kyiv, she likely saw the proliferation of little European flags all 

around that city, representative of a longstanding belief that 

Yanukovych, as his legacy, was going to deliver on a promise of a 

fully independent Ukraine with an orientation toward the much 

broader, more open market of Europe. If Yanukovych walks away 

from this summit without an agreement, how does he explain this 

to the people of the Ukraine, who, for the most part, have been of 

the belief that this was Yanukovych’s mission, to bring an Association Agreement to fruition with the European Union? 

Mr. WILSON. I think you have hit one of the most important 

points. Ukraine is not a dictatorship. President Yanukovych will 

face retribution from his own electorate and from his own supporters, whether they be oligarchs and the economic structure or 

they be an average voter on the street in a village. First and foremost, would be a missed opportunity for Ukraine, a failure for 

Ukraine—not as much a failure for the United States or the European Union, which have handled this right, have put the right offer 

on the table. But, it does speak to—we have been there before with 

Ukraine. We have experienced missed opportunities, unfortunately, 

on a cycle of repetition that is a little bit too frequent. We saw that 

in the wake of the Orange Revolution. We have seen it on numerous times in Ukraine’s recent history. 

We have to be in this for the long term. President Yanukovych 

is ‘‘a’’ President of Ukraine. He will be a transitional figure. 

Whether he is a transitional figure that demonstrably leads 

Ukraine to Europe or not, I think, is at issue in Vilnius. If not, I 

think that he will have a political challenge on his hands to explain 

that to his own population. And that is, frankly, a good sign of the 

health of the emerging civil society, the emerging, sort of, taste of 

democracy that the Ukrainians are beginning to expect. 

Senator MURPHY. Dr. Cohen. 

Dr. COHEN. Having studied the Russian sources on this subject 

for the last 3 months, I would suggest that Mr. Wilson’s scenario 

holds, provided there is no massive Russian intervention and there 

is no strong pro-Russian leader. If, however, what the Russians 

want is launched and successfully funded and accomplished, they 

may get, either in the person of Yanukovych or in the person of 

somebody else, a strong pro-Russian faction that then starts to put 

the squeeze on the same civil society that both Damon and myself 

admire in Ukraine, and leading to a different Ukraine, a Ukraine 

that would look more like Belarus, for example, the neighboring 

country, with a strong, basically, pro-Russian leader and with 

declining democratic institutions and practices. 

Senator MURPHY. Thank you. 

Go ahead. Mr. Aslund. 

Mr. ASLUND. Yes. Let me pull up on the same line as my colleagues, here. Something that is very important is that there is a 

solid and steady pro-European majority in Ukraine. And, of course, 

the Ukraine now is less free than it was 3 years ago, but it is still 

quite a free country. So, President Yanukovych needs some other 

pro-European votes in order to win the elections in March 2015. So, 

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the main victim, if the Ukraine fails to sign in Vilnius, might probably be President Yanukovych himself, because he has deprived 

himself of the possibility of winning a reasonably free and fair election in 2015 and perhaps even a not very free election. 

Senator MURPHY. The title of this hearing includes Belarus, 

which you referenced, Dr. Cohen, and Azerbaijan. We have not 

spent much time on either, so let me just finish with a rather open 

question on U.S. policy toward those two nations. Obviously, 

Belarus is in a very different position, a member of the Customs 

Union. What are the changes for any increased orientation toward 

Europe in the future, a pro-Russian leader, yet some rocky times 

currently with respect to the fertilizer issue and others? 

And then, in Azerbaijan, maybe I will frame the question this 

way. What does Armenia’s decision to join the Customs Union 

mean for the prospect, in 2015 or sometime thereafter, for Azerbaijan to initial an agreement with the EU? Clearly, they have a 

long way to go, especially with recent reports on the quality of 

these last elections, but a country, especially with their energy 

resources, that would be an important—very important partner, in 

a lot of ways, more important than some of the nations that may 

be at Vilnius, for the European Union. 

So, let me open that up for final comments on the future of 

United States relations and European relations with Belarus and 

Azerbaijan. 

Go ahead. We will go down the line. Mr. Aslund——

Mr. ASLUND. Yes. 

Senator MURPHY [continuing]. First. 

Mr. ASLUND. Let me start with Belarus. Belarus is, today, in an 

awful financial crisis. Belarus gets about $10 billion of subsidies 

from Russia each year, and, even so, as you have mentioned, Mr. 

Chairman, it has a trade war with Russia. Russia prohibits its 

dairy exports. They are fighting over the ownership and all the 

Belaruskali, the, by far, biggest and most valuable company in 

Belarus. And they are also fighting over all the export duties. 

So, President Alexander Lukashenko is very skillful on fighting 

the Russians and get money out of them and staying in power at 

home. But, if Russia would say that, ‘‘You can’t get more than $10 

billion a year from us,’’ it is not clear how Belarus will be sustainable. The reserves are now down to 2 months of imports, which is 

far too little for any country. And President Lukashenko pursues 

a quite capricious economic policy; in particular, increasing salaries 

far too much. So, Belarus should not be considered stable, and the 

problem there is likely to come from the economy rather than from 

the outside. 

Senator MURPHY. OK. 

Mr. ASLUND. Thank you. 

Senator MURPHY. Dr. Cohen. 

Dr. COHEN. I agree with what my colleague said about Belarus. 

I would just add that Russia put that albatross on its own neck, 

and it is stuck with it. And in order to accomplish the number one 

geopolitical goal for Mr. Putin, which is to have the Eurasian 

Union up and running by 2015, they need Belarus, and they need 

Belarus in good enough shape to be there and not fall apart. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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On Azerbaijan, it is complicated, because Azerbaijan is pro-Western, it is culturally Shia, but it is a secular state, and it has a lot 

of oil and gas, and it is supplying Europe, through an alternative 

path, not the path that is controlled by Russia. Both the so-called 

Contract of the Century, which is oil, and the new TANAP Pipeline 

that will be built by 2017 through Turkey, which is gas, with two 

spurs, one called TAP and one called Nabucco West, all going to 

Europe, a gas source outside of Russia. 

What the underwater reef—the problem with the initialing of the 

Association Agreement between Azerbaijan and the EU–AZ was, I 

was told, the reluctance of Europe to recognize the problems of territorial integrity of Azerbaijan and occupation, and concerns about 

the Presidential elections. If Azerbaijan and the Europeans are 

willing to work these differences out, if there is a progress, in 

terms of the rule of law, in terms of democracy, and the two sides 

can resolve that, I think it will be in the interest of Europe, in the 

interest of Azerbaijan, and in the interest of the United States that 

the Association Agreement will be moving forward. And, as a nonmember of the WTO, the Free Trade Area is not on the agenda 

right now. 

Senator MURPHY. OK. 

Mr. Wilson. 

Mr. WILSON. Senator, I would just add that—I would go back to 

first principles—that what we are talking about here, of a Europe 

‘‘whole and free,’’ has, frankly, been our strategy since the end of 

World War II. We are in this for the long term. In Vilnius, we are 

talking about the next chapter of European integration. That is not 

going to include Belarus and Azerbaijan, in this particular chapter. 

So, it goes back to your question about tactics. We do not force 

countries into Euro-Atlantic institutions. That is not, obviously, the 

approach of our—it does not reflect our principles. Those decisions 

reflect the societies, they reflect the countries, they reflect the leaders. And it is clear, in Belarus today, while we are interested in 

an independent and sovereign Belarus, this is not—Lukashenko is 

not a leader that will take his country to Europe. And I think we 

need to be just very up front and aware of that, and do what we 

can to help support democratic opposition in a very difficult 

circumstance. 

And Azerbaijan, as Dr. Cohen said, is quite a different case, in 

that there is quite a strong interest in a relationship with the 

West, and I think it is important that we figure out how to be able 

to engage the right way without doing so—without sacrificing or 

muzzling our own values and concerns about the development of 

democracy there. 

But, we are in this for the long term, and I think we need to 

think about Belarus and Azerbaijan, not as being left out, in 

Vilnius, but as a longer term strategy of forging relationships with, 

frankly, the peoples of those countries. I spend a lot of time with 

students from Belarus at the European Humanities University in 

Vilnius, with students from Azerbaijan. They think about their 

country in a way that is not very different from Ukrainians today. 

And I think we have to keep that perspective. 

Senator MURPHY. I will just note that, in the wake of a lot of 

questions with respect to the elections in Azerbaijan, one very posiFOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

44

tive step that the Azerbaijan Government could make is the release 

of a list of prisoners, both held by the State Department and 

human rights groups, that are being detained currently. 

Thank you, to our panel. 

Let me just finish by including into the record statements that 

we have from the Ambassadors of Moldova and Azerbaijan on their 

countries’ participation in the Eastern Partnership. 

Senator MURPHY. We will keep the record open until 5 p.m.

tomorrow, and, if we get any additional questions, hopefully you 

will respond as quickly as possible. 

With that, this hearing is concluded. 

[Whereupon, at 4:40 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

RESPONSES OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY VICTORIA NULAND TO QUESTIONS

SUBMITTED BY SENATOR EDWARD J. MARKEY

Question. After Armenia and the EU concluded negotiations for an Association 

Agreement (AA) in July, it was widely expected that the deal would be initialed at 

the Vilnius summit. However, President Sargsyan announced in September that 

Armenia planned to join the Russian-led Customs Union—a step the EU warned 

would be incompatible with an AA. What factors led to Armenia’s change of course? 

What economic or other forms of pressure is Russia exerting on Armenia or other 

nations in the region to pull them away from establishing closer ties to the EU?

Answer. While the United States cannot speak for Armenia or the rationale 

behind its decision to join the Eurasian Customs Union, we do know that Armenia 

depends upon Russia for a significant amount of security and economic assistance. 

We have regularly reminded Russia that any form of pressure to prevent sovereign 

states from pursuing greater integration with the EU, or other organizations of their 

choosing, contravenes Russia’s obligations under the Helsinki Principles of the 

OSCE and the Charter of Paris, as well as its obligations under the WTO, which 

includes a commitment to a nondiscriminatory trading system. We will continue to 

work with Armenia on its Euro-Atlantic integration to preserve the progress made 

in the Eastern Partnership over the past 31⁄2 years. The United States continues 

to support Armenia’s democratic, economic, and social reforms designed to promote 

regional stability and a peaceful resolution to the long-running Nagorno-Karabakh 

conflict. These efforts will also help foster rapprochement with Turkey and 

Azerbaijan.

Question. In announcing Armenia’s decision to join the Customs Union, President 

Sargsyan stated on September 3 that the move would not necessarily ‘‘preclude our 

dialogue with the European structures.’’ 1 EU Enlargement Commissioner Stefan 

Fuele also suggested that although Armenia would not be able to sign an AA with 

the EU if it joined the Customs Union, Brussels would be prepared to engage with 

Armenia under a different framework.2 What are the prospects for further cooperation or followup agreements between the Armenian Government and the EU, and 

what forms could such cooperation or agreements take?

Answer. Although Armenia is no longer a candidate for an Association Agreement, 

both the EU and Armenia have stated their desire to preserve the progress and 

reforms made over the past 31⁄2 years. The EU and Armenia are examining ways 

to demonstrate continued cooperation short of an Association Agreement, in areas 

such as visa facilitation, readmission, education, and transport. EU officials have 

publicly stated they are seeking to sign a document to highlight areas of continued 

cooperation, but it is not clear whether such a document locking in this future partnership will be ready in time for the Vilnius summit. The United States will continue to promote Armenia’s Euro-Atlantic integration by supporting its democratic, 

economic, and social reform efforts.

Question. Russia has reportedly increased its arms trade with Azerbaijan to a 

total of around $4 billion.3 This past summer, Russia delivered a package of tanks, 

artillery, and rocket launchers to Azerbaijan worth around $1 billion.4 What are the 

implications of enhanced Russia-Azerbaijan defense relations for Armenia’s security? What are the implications for the conflict over the Nagorno-Karabakh region?

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

45

Answer. As a cochair of the OSCE Minsk Group, we remain committed to helping 

the sides find a peaceful resolution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The United 

States has continued to make clear to Azerbaijan and Armenia, both bilaterally and 

through the Minsk Group, that there is no military solution to the conflict. 

The arms race between these countries decreases trust and leads to increased 

instability on the ground. Russia has a close military relationship with Armenia as 

a fellow Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) member, but sells weapons 

to Azerbaijan as well. In selling arms to both sides Russia has not fundamentally 

changed the military balance, but the arms race it is fueling underscores why a 

peaceful settlement is urgently needed.

Question. There is reason for concern that Russia could take retaliatory measures 

against the countries that plan to complete Association Agreements with the EU—

including the Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia. Do you expect Russia to impose economic sanctions, cut off natural gas supplies, or take other retaliatory actions 

against any of these countries? What steps can the United States and European 

Union take to assist these states in withstanding Russian pressure?

Answer. The Department of State fully shares your concerns about Russian pressure on several Eastern Partnership countries, including Ukraine, Moldova, and 

Georgia. We have been working with the EU and each candidate country to help 

them in their efforts to anticipate and prepare for any negative reaction to their 

choice, whether it comes from inside or outside their countries. We cannot speculate 

on what steps the Government of Russia might, or might not, take if certain countries completed Association Agreements with the EU. 

The United States strongly believes every country has a sovereign right to choose 

its international relations. We have made this publicly clear, as well as in our private discussions with EaP and EU countries at the highest level. Through our 

assistance and actions, we have supported EaP countries in exercising their choice 

to move closer to Europe and assist them as they implement the reforms they need 

to sign and initial Association Agreements. We will continue to work with the EU 

to strengthen these countries’ ability to resist external pressure. 

Any form of pressure to prevent sovereign states from pursuing greater integration with the EU, or any organization of their choosing, contravenes obligations 

under the OSCE Helsinki Principles and the Charter of Paris. 

The U.S. Government provided over $260 million in assistance to the Eastern 

Partnership region in FY 2013, the majority of which is used to promote democratic, 

economic, rule of law, and other reforms that are consistent with the Eastern Partnership’s objectives. 

We are continuing to consider ways to target our assistance to EaP countries to 

strengthen their ability to resist external pressure aimed at discouraging their 

European trajectory. For example, we are exploring ways to help Moldova become 

more energy independent, and we are coordinating with the Georgian Government 

as it identifies how the international community can best assist those affected by 

Russia’s ‘‘borderization’’ of the Administrative Boundary Lines of the occupied territories in Georgia. Also, with the support of U.S. assistance, Georgia has reoriented 

its trade toward Western markets and increased its energy efficiency and diversity. 

Our assistance to the region will also be targeted to help speed up the implementation of the EU’s Association Agreement and the Visa Liberalization Action Plan, 

so that the EaP countries, and most importantly their citizens, will sooner see tangible outcomes and enjoy the benefits of living in a democracy.

Question. In the State Department’s latest human rights report, I was concerned 

by the judgment that Ukraine has seen a ‘‘marked increase in discrimination, social 

stigma, and violence against LGBT individuals.’’ 5 The Ukrainian Parliament seems 

torn on this issue: one bill under consideration would amend the Labor Code to ban 

workplace discrimination based on sexual orientation 6; yet another would prohibit 

‘‘dissemination of any positive information about same-sex sexual relations.’’ 7 The 

EU has demanded progress on LGBT rights before allowing Ukrainians visa-free 

travel around Europe.

♦ What are the prospects for legal reform measures to improve conditions for 

Ukraine’s LGBT community? How can the United States and European Union 

support such reform efforts?

Answer. Lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) individuals are stigmatized in Ukrainian society. Although in May 2013 Ukraine allowed its first LGBT 

‘‘Equality March’’ (Pride), LGBT individuals continue to face discrimination in education, the workplace, and in medical treatment, including impeded access to information on the prevention of HIV/AIDS. LGBT individuals have been the targets of 

violence and abuse by police and members of the public. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

46

During the last year, the Ukrainian Parliament continued deliberations on four 

conflicting draft laws relating to LGBT rights: Two bills propose to criminalize the 

publication, broadcast, or distribution of so-called ‘‘homosexual propaganda.’’ A third 

bill would ban international adoptions of Ukrainian children by couples in same-sex 

marriages. The fourth, which is required to fulfill a visa liberalization agreement 

with the European Union, proposes to prohibit employment discrimination based on 

sexual orientation. Since May 2013, none of the draft bills has passed the first reading in the Parliament; i.e., they have only been introduced, and not yet voted out 

of committee. 

In 2013, Embassy Kyiv used a multifaceted approach to promote the human 

rights of LGBT people, including providing organizational support to civil society 

activists, engaging the Ukrainian public with cultural programming, and the targeted use of grants and exchange programs to build LGBT NGO capacity in 

Ukraine. In advance of the first successful national Pride March in Kyiv in May 

2013, then-Ambassador Tefft released a statement of support for those choosing to 

march. 

We continue to work publicly and behind the scenes to encourage the Ukrainian 

Government to protect the civil and human rights of all its citizens, including LGBT 

persons. The EU, for its part, will continue to engage Ukraine through the European Parliament’s Intergroup on LGBT rights. Ukraine’s proposed legislation is both 

incompatible with the European Convention on Human Rights and an obstacle for 

Ukraine achieving visa-free travel to the EU.

————————

End Notes

1http://www.eurasianet.org/node/67482. 

2http://www.rferl.org/content/eu-armenia-fuele-russia-/25105412.html. 

3http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-08-13/azeri-russian-arms-trade-4-billion-amid-tensionwith-armenia.html. 4http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/06/18/us-russia-azerbaijan-arms-idUSBRE95H0KM201

30618. 5http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm?year=2012&dlid=204349#

wrapper. 6http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/11/04/dispatches-be-or-not-be-anti-discrimination-and-lgbtrights-ukraine. 7http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/04/16/ukraine-reject-discriminatory-lgbt-laws. 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY H.E. ELIN SULEYMANOV, AMBASSADOR OF THE

REPUBLIC OF AZERBAIJAN TO THE UNITED STATES

Thank you for this opportunity to present the perspective of Azerbaijan on this 

pivotal moment for many of the nations of Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus. 

Relations between the European Union (EU) and Azerbaijan, which were established shortly after our independence, have been steadily progressing toward closer 

partnership during the last two decades. The Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between our nation and the EU, which entered into force in 1999, established 

a firm legal ground for these relations and identified a wide range of areas for 

mutually beneficial cooperation. 

These relations deepened with Azerbaijan’s participation, first, at the EU’s European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), which has been ongoing since 2004, and then, 

through the Eastern Partnership initiative (EaP), launched in 2009. Meanwhile, in 

2006, Azerbaijan and the EU signed a Memorandum of Understanding on a Strategic Partnership in the field of energy. This agreement paved the way for, among 

other developments, the adoption of a Joint Declaration on the Southern Gas Corridor during the visit of the President of the European Commission Jose ́ Manuel 

Barroso to Baku in January, 2011. 

The development and strengthening of a long-term partnership with the EU in 

political and economic fields, as well as in people-to-people contacts, bears particular 

importance for Azerbaijan. We see these relations as close cooperation, coordination 

and interaction between equal partners, based on the principles of mutual recognition and respect. Azerbaijan’s approach to European integration stems mainly from 

our aspiration to raise the level of development in all spheres of our country and 

society in accordance with European standards, rules and legislations. 

Anticipating the next Eastern Partnership Summit in Vilnius, Azerbaijan assesses 

its relations with the EU quite positively. This view was highlighted during the visit 

of President Ilham Aliyev to Brussels on June 21, 2013, where he met with the 

European Council President Herman van Rompuy and the European Commission 

President Jose ́ Manuel Barroso. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

47

Speaking more specifically on our cooperation agenda during the runup to the 

Vilnius Summit, let me briefly stress the following points:

—The negotiations on the Association Agreement between Azerbaijan and the EU 

are continuing, and progress is being made gradually. We view these negotiations 

as a very serious and continuous learning curve in our dialogue with the EU. We 

believe that the document on the table should be as comprehensive and viable for 

our bilateral relations as possible. There is no lack of desire on our part to conclude the agreement with the EU. However, the Azerbaijani government and 

Azerbaijani society have reasonably ambitious expectations. More definite and 

clear language from the EU and its member states on a few crucial issues may 

result in a substantial breakthrough in negotiations of this legally binding document. From this perspective the EU’s commitment to the principles of Azerbaijan’s sovereignty, territorial integrity and inviolability of borders is of key significance for the future of our relations. 

—Azerbaijan is pleased to have completed negotiations on the Visa facilitation and 

Readmission Agreements with the EU, which have been already initialed on July 

30. We hope very much that everything will be done in order to sign at least the 

Visa facilitation agreement at the Vilnius Summit. These agreements, especially 

the understanding on visa facilitation, will have a tangible impact on the life of 

Azerbaijani citizens, allowing them to travel to EU countries with fewer difficulties. Once entered into force, these arrangements will provide valuable contributions to the development of people-to-people contacts and, ultimately, will prompt 

a faster integration of Azerbaijan into the European family of nations. It should 

also be noted that the Readmission agreement with the EU will be the first-ever 

legal document of this kind signed by Azerbaijan. This testifies to the trust that 

my country puts in its relations with the EU. 

—We have three additional documents that have been discussed with the EU. The 

first is the Mobility Partnership between Azerbaijan and the EU, which will foster 

bilateral cooperation in the field of migration and migration-related issues 

through several projects. We expect that these activities, combined with the 

implementation of the visa facilitation and readmission agreements, will pave the 

way for complete visa liberalization between the EU and Azerbaijan. Hopefully, 

this document will also be signed during the Vilnius Summit. If not, then we 

would expect its signature during the first quarter of the next year.

The second document is the Strategic Partnership Program for Modernization, 

which intends, among other things, to extend the existing strategic partnership in 

the energy field to other spheres that are important for ensuring a holistic approach 

to the development of the country. This matrix document is not legally binding, but 

rather encompasses a set of guidelines for programs for meeting some of Azerbaijan’s immediate needs and addressing our priorities. 

The third document is the Framework Protocol on Azerbaijan’s participation in 

EU programs and agencies. Azerbaijan has already joined FRONTEX (European 

Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders), 

and the necessary work is being undertaken to facilitate our participation in 

EMCDDA (European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction) within the 

coming months. Based on this protocol, we expect that Azerbaijan will join the 

activities of more EU programs and agencies, with education programs among the 

very first objectives. 

Meanwhile, our strategic partnership on energy is developing quite well. Azerbaijan continues to demonstrate our interest in contributing to European energy 

security by offering diversified sources of supply. 

The birth of the TANAP (Trans Anatolian Pipeline) project demonstrated Azerbaijan’s dedication to the development of the Southern Gas Corridor, providing a 

vital link between the EU countries and the Caspian basin. This means that Azerbaijani natural gas will have a direct export route toward Europe and that Azerbaijan will remain politically committed to further explore opportunities to increase 

its role in European energy security. 

Finally, the decision of the Shah Deniz Consortium to select the Trans Adriatic 

Pipeline (TAP) in late June was also of particular importance for the opening-up of 

the Corridor, through which Azerbaijan will gradually and substantially increase its 

presence in the European energy market. The decision was based on the previously 

announced selection criteria: commerciality, project deliverability, financial deliverability, engineering design, alignment and transparency, safe and efficient operability, scalability and public policy considerations. Azerbaijan is grateful to the EU 

Commission for its support during the entire selection process. Azerbaijan and its 

partners are investing in a 50 billion Euro mega-project. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

48

We do so not only with our share of capital, but also with politically sensitive 

responsibilities. Hence, our cooperation embraces all areas of common interest. In 

this regard, the EU should take into account Azerbaijan’s priorities and needs in 

areas such as agriculture, tourism, information and communications technology 

(ICT) and others. Azerbaijan is also very interested in working more closely with 

the EU in the field of human capacity-building, including education, research and 

youth development, as a foundation for our future development. 

Azerbaijan considers the comprehensive and viable resolution and settlement of 

the conflicts within the EaP geography as an essential part of the political association with the EU. When protracted conflicts in the EaP area are discussed in 

various international fora, we expect the EU to demonstrate firm support for the 

territorial integrity and inviolability of the internationally recognized borders of all 

partner countries. In the same vein, the EU should vigorously reject any occupation 

and ethnic cleansing, and actively work for the peaceful solution of conflicts where 

they exist. 

In the case of the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict, it is important that the EU goes 

beyond simply supporting the activities of the OSCE Minsk Group, and expresses 

a clear position based on the norms and principles of international law and relevant 

international documents adopted in this regard. 

In conclusion, I wish to stress our belief that the 3rd EaP Summit in Vilnius (28–

29 November 2013) should accomplish several important deliverables, paving the 

way for further progressive development of the EU’s engagement in the region of 

Eastern Europe and South Caucasus. Among others, it should provide adequate, fair 

and just mechanisms of response to the existing stability, security and development 

challenges in the European neighborhood and reiterate the credibility of the EaP 

agenda of the EU. 

These goals are important to the United States, as well as Azerbaijan and the EU, 

and I appreciate the opportunity to present this perspective to the Senate Foreign 

Relations Committee. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF BRYAN ARDOUNY, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR,

ARMENIAN ASSEMBLY OF AMERICA

Chairman Murphy, Ranking Member Johnson, and distinguished members of the 

subcommittee, the Armenian Assembly of America welcomes the opportunity to 

express its views regarding this important and timely hearing. 

Established in 1972, the Armenian Assembly is the largest Washington-based 

organization promoting public understanding and awareness of Armenian issues. 

Working closely with key government agencies, officials, and charitable organizations, the Assembly appreciates the opportunity to share its perspective on how to 

advance, not only EU goals, but also U.S. policy objectives in the South Caucasus. 

We believe that it is now more critical than ever to deepen the ties between Armenia and the United States, as there is no Russian-U.S. competition in Armenia, and 

the ties between America and Armenia are historic and permanent. In fact, I would 

like to express our appreciation for the ongoing assistance the United States provides to Armenia and Nagorno Karabakh. Armenian-Americans remember well the 

response of the United States and its relief effort to help Armenia after the devastating 1988 earthquake that struck its second-largest city leaving 25,000 dead. 

America’s humanitarianism and core values are also reflected in our support for 

Nagorno Karabakh’s fledging democracy, the passage of Section 907 of the FREEDOM Support Act, which requires Azerbaijan to cease its aggressive actions against 

Armenia, as well as America’s proud record and ground-breaking intervention during the Armenian Genocide of 1915. 

The enduring and natural bonds that exist between the U.S. and Armenia are 

readily apparent in Armenia’s ongoing support for America. Armenians in Armenia 

and Nagorno Karabakh consider the United States a close friend and ally. Today, 

this relationship is underscored by Armenia’s continued strategic partnership with 

the United States in extending its full support for U.S.-led peace-keeping deployments in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Kosovo. In addition, Armenia has tripled its deployment of troops to the NATO International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan. 

Given its central location, Christian heritage, entrepreneurial spirit and western 

value system, Armenia can play a pivotal role in helping the United States achieve 

its stated policy objectives in the region, including a ‘‘Europe whole and free and 

at peace.’’ Thus, the Assembly remains concerned that the shared objectives of the 

U.S. and EU in terms of regional cooperation and economic integration in the South 

Caucasus continues to be undermined by Azerbaijani and Turkish policies against 

Armenia. For example, the ongoing blockade of Armenia (the last closed border of 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

49

Europe), Azerbaijan’s interference with the 2009 protocols between Armenia and 

Turkey, Azerbaijan’s ongoing war rhetoric and repeated cease-fire violations in the 

Nagorno Karabakh conflict, and Azerbaijan’s pardon of an Azeri soldier, Ramil 

Safarov, who was convicted of brutally murdering an Armenian officer, Gurgen 

Margaryan, with an axe while the latter was sleeping during a NATO Partnership 

for Peace training program in Hungary in 2004 represent counterproductive actions 

taken by Turkey and Azerbaijan in particular against Armenia. In the case of 

Safarov, he was not only pardoned, but was promoted, received back pay for time 

spent in jail, given a new condo residence in Baku and heralded as a national hero 

for his crime. 

The Assembly remains deeply troubled by Azerbaijan’s egregious violation of 

international norms with respect to the Safarov pardon, its continued move away 

from democracy and growing authoritarianism, its excessive military buildup, 

including a recently concluded $1 billion weapons purchase from Russia with arms 

trade between the two countries for 2013 totaling $4 billion, and the resulting 

impact on the region, particularly on America’s ally Armenia. Striving for stability 

in the region, Armenia’s President Serzh Sargsian in September of this year 

announced that Armenia would join the Eurasian Customs Union led by Russia. 

With the ongoing developments in the Caucasus, the Armenian Assembly believes 

that now more than ever the United States and the European Union should continue to pursue—and moreover—redouble their engagement and deepen their relationships with Armenia on a broad range of issues, especially in the economic 

sphere. 

As a leader on the world stage, the United States can and must do more to ensure 

Armenia’s Euro-Atlantic integration and that the last closed border of Europe is 

finally open. We, therefore, urge the United States to work with its European counterparts to: secure an end to Turkey’s and Azerbaijan’s blockade of Armenia; 

increase trade opportunities, including through the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership; as well as press for stronger democratic reforms, respect for 

human rights and protection for minorities within the framework of the Europe’s 

Eastern Partnership initiative. 

In conclusion, we commend you for holding this hearing and look forward to working with you and members of the subcommittee on these important objectives, as 

well as the challenges that confront us in the runup to the Vilnius Summit, including its continued implementation in the months that follow. As Armenia expands 

its relations with Europe, it is incumbent upon the United States to further 

strengthen and expand its relationship with Armenia. We stand ready to assist you 

in any way. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

50

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER


Archil.eps

STATEMENT 

OF HIS EXCElLENcY ARCHIL GfGESHIOlf 

AMBASSADOR OF GEORGIA TO THE UNITED STATES 

FOR THE CONGRESSIONAL RECORD FOLLOWING THE 

HEARING AT THE EUROPE AND EURASIA SUstOMMITIEE, COMMlnn ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

A Pivotal Moment for the Eastern Partnership: Outlook for Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Belarus, 

Armenia, and A~erbaijan · 

Thur~day, 14 NovemDer 2013 

We are grateful to the Subcommittee INdership for convening the hearing at this important time for 

Georgia as the country prepares to initial Association Agreement with the Euro~an Union at the 

Eastern Pannership Summit in Vilnius, 28·29 NovemDer 2013. This hearing marks yet another step in a 

long·lasting suppan that the U,S. Congress ha~ Deen providing to Georgia's exerciSing her sovereign 

right to define her future. 

Georgia firmly upholds her path loward integration in European and Euro·Atlantic inslitutions. This has 

Deen also manifested in the country's suC(essful implementation of al l prerequisites for prompt and 

effective completion of the process that leads to Initialing an Association Agreement. 

Georgia remains committed to funher democratic consolidation. The conte.t and outcome of the 

parliamentary and presidential elections conducted over last two years demonstrated that the country 

has been suC(essful in establishing a peaceful and democratic practice of transfer of power. 

We are thankful for the unwavering suppon of the United States being expressed in many statements 

by the U.s. Congress members, The White House and US State Department officials. Through Georgia's 

further Integration into European familv of nahons we hope that the country will become part of a 

larger Transatlantic Alliance and contribute to advancing a Europe whole, free and at peace . 

... 
51

Æ

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER


Moldova.eps

EMBASSY O F T ilE JU:J'tl8 U C OF MOU>OVA 

WAS H!:<CTOS. 0 C. 

The Honorable Christopher Murphy 

Chairman of Subcomm~tee on European Affairs 

U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 

The Honorable Ron Johnson 

Ranking Member of Subcommittee on European Affairs 

U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 

Dear Senator Murphy and Senator Johnson: 

On behalf of Mo do~an Government and Moldovan people, I would like to express my sincerely 

gratitude for organizing today the first round of Hearings on Eastern Partnership in the U.S. 

Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and bringing the needed allention to the latest 

de~elopments back in the region. 

First of all, let me reiterate to the audience that an ambttious agenda of domestic structural 

reforms is being implemented in Moldo~a aiming to accelerate the harmonization of the national 

legislation and practices with the European Union standards and ooild up on a truly democratic 

state. With fully completed negotiations on the DCFTA (Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade 

Area) and positive mon~oring reports on the implementation of Visa liberalization condrtions. 

Moldova is closer today than ever 10 initial and sign its Association Agreement with the EU. 

We are positive that an Association Agreement with EU WI ll definitely set up for us the so called 

'irreversibility line' of integration with EU. in deepening political dialogue. ensuring a functional 

mar1o;et economy. based on the rule of law and respect for the basic civil and political freedoms. 

As you know, Moldova people share a genuine European identity. which makes our path towards 

EU a natural ct1oice. We recognize a long European history, based on common cuHural markers 

reflected in our language. faith and aSpirations. but also in our strive for freedom, which explains 

our current objective to build up a more stable, se<:ure and prosperous European continent. We 

hope that the EU Vilnius Summit. to be held on November 28-29. 2013. will be a historical 

moment. which will pave the way towards an explicit recognition of our European perspective. 

We are finn in believing that both the DCFTA and Visa liberalization Agreements wi ll represent 

the most essential bricks in building up a larger and more hospita~e EU. 

Finally and most signmcantly. I would like to emphasize the essential role that the USA may want 

to play in supporting Moklova and the entire region of the Eastem Europe during this crucial time. 

A stronger voice of the USA support for the ongoing democratic transrtion can further strengthen 

the irreversibility of the political refoons, ensure regional stability and guarantee that Moldova, and 

other countries in Eastern Europe. may freely associate with the EU. in spite of the existing 

hurdles or other factors proclivity 10 derail this trajectory. With your support. we'lI succeed. 

Sincerely, 

- ~q < 

Igor Munteanu 

Ambassador of Moldova to US