Table of Contents 

Foreword

Introduction...............................................................................................................1

The Strategic Environment .......................................................................................2

The Strategic Framework..........................................................................................5

Objectives............................................................................................................. 6

Defend the Homeland ...................................................................................... 6

Win the Long War............................................................................................ 7

Promote Security.............................................................................................. 9

Deter Conflict................................................................................................. 11

Win our Nation’s Wars .................................................................................. 13

Achieving Our Objectives.................................................................................. 13

Shape the Choices of Key States.................................................................... 13

Prevent Adversaries from Acquiring or Using Weapons of Mass Destruction 

(WMD) ........................................................................................................... 14

Strengthen and Expand Alliances and Partnerships ..................................... 15

Secure U.S. strategic access and retain freedom of action ........................... 16

Integrate and unify our efforts: A new “Jointness” ...................................... 17

DoD Capabilities and Means ..................................................................................18

Managing Risk ........................................................................................................20

Operational Risk ............................................................................................ 21

Future Challenges Risk .................................................................................. 22

Force Management Risk ................................................................................ 22

Institutional Risk............................................................................................ 23

Conclusion ..............................................................................................................23
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2008 National Defense Strategy 

Introduction 

A core responsibility of the U.S. Government is to protect the American people – 

in the words of the framers of our Constitution, to “provide for the common 

defense.” For more than 230 years, the U.S. Armed Forces have served as a 

bulwark of liberty, opportunity, and prosperity at home. Beyond our shores, 

America shoulders additional responsibilities on behalf of the world. For those 

struggling for a better life, there is and must be no stronger advocate than the 

United States. We remain a beacon of light for those in dark places, and for this 

reason we should remember that our actions and words signal the depth of our 

strength and resolve. For our friends and allies, as well as for our enemies and 

potential adversaries, our commitment to democratic values must be matched by 

our deeds. The spread of liberty both manifests our ideals and protects our 

interests. 

The United States, our allies, and our partners face a spectrum of challenges, 

including violent transnational extremist networks, hostile states armed with 

weapons of mass destruction, rising regional powers, emerging space and cyber 

threats, natural and pandemic disasters, and a growing competition for resources. 

The Department of Defense must respond to these challenges while anticipating 

and preparing for those of tomorrow. We must balance strategic risk across our 

responses, making the best use of the tools at hand within the U.S. Government 

and among our international partners. To succeed, we must harness and integrate 

all aspects of national power and work closely with a wide range of allies, friends 

and partners. We cannot prevail if we act alone. 

The President’s 2006 National Security Strategy (NSS) describes an approach 

founded on two pillars: promoting freedom, justice, and human dignity by 

working to end tyranny, promote effective democracies, and extend prosperity; 

and confronting the challenges of our time by leading a growing community of 

democracies. It seeks to foster a world of well-governed states that can meet the 

needs of their citizens and conduct themselves responsibly in the international 

system. This approach represents the best way to provide enduring security for the 

American people. 

The National Defense Strategy (NDS) serves as the Department’s capstone 

document in this long-term effort. It flows from the NSS and informs the National 

Military Strategy. It also provides a framework for other DoD strategic guidance, 

specifically on campaign and contingency planning, force development, and 

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intelligence. It reflects the results of the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review 

(QDR) and lessons learned from on-going operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and 

elsewhere. It addresses how the U.S. Armed Forces will fight and win America’s 

wars and how we seek to work with and through partner nations to shape 

opportunities in the international environment to enhance security and avert 

conflict. 

The NDS describes our overarching goals and strategy. It outlines how DoD will 

support the objectives outlined in the NSS, including the need to strengthen 

alliances and build new partnerships to defeat global terrorism and prevent attacks 

against us, our allies, and our friends; prevent our enemies from threatening us, 

our allies, and our friends with weapons of mass destruction (WMD); work with 

others to defuse regional conflicts, including conflict intervention; and transform 

national security institutions to face the challenges of the 21st century. The NDS 

acts on these objectives, evaluates the strategic environment, challenges, and risks 

we must consider in achieving them, and maps the way forward. 

The Strategic Environment 

For the foreseeable future, this environment will be defined by a global struggle 

against a violent extremist ideology that seeks to overturn the international state 

system. Beyond this transnational struggle, we face other threats, including a 

variety of irregular challenges, the quest by rogue states for nuclear weapons, and 

the rising military power of other states. These are long-term challenges. Success 

in dealing with them will require the orchestration of national and international 

power over years or decades to come. 

Violent extremist movements such as al-Qaeda and its associates comprise a 

complex and urgent challenge. Like communism and fascism before it, today’s 

violent extremist ideology rejects the rules and structures of the international 

system. Its adherents reject state sovereignty, ignore borders, and attempt to deny 

self-determination and human dignity wherever they gain power. These extremists 

opportunistically exploit respect for these norms for their own purposes, hiding 

behind international norms and national laws when it suits them, and attempting to 

subvert them when it does not. Combating these violent groups will require longterm, innovative approaches. 

The inability of many states to police themselves effectively or to work with their 

neighbors to ensure regional security represents a challenge to the international 

system. Armed sub-national groups, including but not limited to those inspired by 

violent extremism, threaten the stability and legitimacy of key states. If left 

unchecked, such instability can spread and threaten regions of interest to the 

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United States, our allies, and friends. Insurgent groups and other non-state actors 

frequently exploit local geographical, political, or social conditions to establish 

safe havens from which they can operate with impunity. Ungoverned, undergoverned, misgoverned, and contested areas offer fertile ground for such groups to 

exploit the gaps in governance capacity of local regimes to undermine local 

stability and regional security. Addressing this problem will require local 

partnerships and creative approaches to deny extremists the opportunity to gain 

footholds. 

Rogue states such as Iran and North Korea similarly threaten international order. 

The Iranian regime sponsors terrorism and is attempting to disrupt the fledgling 

democracies in Iraq and Afghanistan. Iran’s pursuit of nuclear technology and 

enrichment capabilities poses a serious challenge to security in an already volatile 

region. The North Korean regime also poses a serious nuclear and missile 

proliferation concern for the U.S. and other responsible international stakeholders. 

The regime threatens the Republic of Korea with its military and its neighbors 

with its missiles. Moreover, North Korea creates instability with its illicit activity, 

such as counterfeiting U.S. currency and trafficking in narcotics, and brutal 

treatment of its own people. 

We must also consider the possibility of challenges by more powerful states. 

Some may actively seek to counter the United States in some or all domains of 

traditional warfare or to gain an advantage by developing capabilities that offset 

our own. Others may choose niche areas of military capability and competition in 

which they believe they can develop a strategic or operational advantage. That 

some of these potential competitors also are partners in any number of diplomatic, 

commercial, and security efforts will only make these relationships more difficult 

to manage. 

China is one ascendant state with the potential for competing with the United 

States. For the foreseeable future, we will need to hedge against China’s growing 

military modernization and the impact of its strategic choices upon international 

security. It is likely that China will continue to expand its conventional military 

capabilities, emphasizing anti-access and area denial assets including developing a 

full range of long-range strike, space, and information warfare capabilities. 

Our interaction with China will be long-term and multi-dimensional and will 

involve peacetime engagement between defense establishments as much as fielded 

combat capabilities. The objective of this effort is to mitigate near term challenges 

while preserving and enhancing U.S. national advantages over time. 

Russia’s retreat from openness and democracy could have significant security 

implications for the United States, our European allies, and our partners in other 

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regions. Russia has leveraged the revenue from, and access to, its energy sources; 

asserted claims in the Arctic; and has continued to bully its neighbors, all of which 

are causes for concern. Russia also has begun to take a more active military 

stance, such as the renewal of long-range bomber flights, and has withdrawn from 

arms control and force reduction treaties, and even threatened to target countries 

hosting potential U.S. anti-missile bases. Furthermore, Moscow has signaled an 

increasing reliance on nuclear weapons as a foundation of its security. All of these 

actions suggest a Russia exploring renewed influence, and seeking a greater 

international role. 

U.S. dominance in conventional warfare has given prospective adversaries, 

particularly non-state actors and their state sponsors, strong motivation to adopt 

asymmetric methods to counter our advantages. For this reason, we must display a 

mastery of irregular warfare comparable to that which we possess in conventional 

combat. Our adversaries also seek to develop or acquire catastrophic capabilities: 

chemical, biological, and especially nuclear weapons. In addition, they may 

develop disruptive technologies in an attempt to offset U.S. advantages. For 

example, the development and proliferation of anti-access technology and 

weaponry is worrisome as it can restrict our future freedom of action. These 

challenges could come not only in the obvious forms we see today but also in less 

traditional forms of influence such as manipulating global opinion using mass 

communications venues and exploiting international commitments and legal 

avenues. Meeting these challenges require better and more diverse capabilities in 

both hard and soft power, and greater flexibility and skill in employing them. 

These modes of warfare may appear individually or in combination, spanning the 

spectrum of warfare and intertwining hard and soft power. In some instances, we 

may not learn that a conflict is underway until it is well advanced and our options 

limited. We must develop better intelligence capabilities to detect, recognize, and 

analyze new forms of warfare as well as explore joint approaches and strategies to 

counter them. 

Increasingly, the Department will have to plan for a future security environment 

shaped by the interaction of powerful strategic trends. These trends suggest a 

range of plausible futures, some presenting major challenges and security risks. 

Over the next twenty years physical pressures – population, resource, energy, 

climatic and environmental – could combine with rapid social, cultural, 

technological and geopolitical change to create greater uncertainty. This 

uncertainty is exacerbated by both the unprecedented speed and scale of change, 

as well as by the unpredictable and complex interaction among the trends 

themselves. Globalization and growing economic interdependence, while creating 

new levels of wealth and opportunity, also create a web of interrelated 

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vulnerabilities and spread risks even further, increasing sensitivity to crises and 

shocks around the globe and generating more uncertainty regarding their speed 

and effect. 

Current defense policy must account for these areas of uncertainty. As we plan, 

we must take account of the implications of demographic trends, particularly 

population growth in much of the developing world and the population deficit in 

much of the developed world. The interaction of these changes with existing and 

future resource, environmental, and climate pressures may generate new security 

challenges. Furthermore, as the relative balance of economic and military power 

between states shifts, some propelled forward by economic development and 

resource endowment, others held back by physical pressures or economic and 

political stagnation, new fears and insecurities will arise, presenting new risks for 

the international community. 

These risks will require managing the divergent needs of massively increasing 

energy demand to maintain economic development and the need to tackle climate 

change. Collectively, these developments pose a new range of challenges for 

states and societies. These trends will affect existing security concerns such as 

international terrorism and weapons proliferation. At the same time, overlaying 

these trends will be developments within science and technology, which, while 

presenting some potential threats, suggest a range of positive developments that 

may reduce many of the pressures and risks suggested by physical trends. How 

these trends interact and the nature of the shocks they might generate is uncertain; 

the fact that they will influence the future security environment is not. 

Whenever possible, the Department will position itself both to respond to and 

reduce uncertainty. This means we must continue to improve our understanding 

of trends, their interaction, and the range of risks the Department may be called 

upon to respond to or manage. We should act to reduce risks by shaping the 

development of trends through the decisions we make regarding the equipment 

and capabilities we develop and the security cooperation, reassurance, dissuasion, 

deterrence, and operational activities we pursue. The Department should also 

develop the military capability and capacity to hedge against uncertainty, and the 

institutional agility and flexibility to plan early and respond effectively alongside 

interdepartmental, non-governmental and international partners. 

The Strategic Framework 

Since World War II, the United States has acted as the primary force to maintain 

international security and stability, leading first the West in the Cold War 

confrontation with the Soviet Union and, more recently, international efforts to 

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confront violent extremism. This has been accomplished through military, 

diplomatic, and economic means. Driving these efforts has been a set of enduring 

national interests and a vision of opportunity and prosperity for the future. U.S. 

interests include protecting the nation and our allies from attack or coercion, 

promoting international security to reduce conflict and foster economic growth, 

and securing the global commons and with them access to world markets and 

resources. To pursue these interests, the U.S. has developed military capabilities 

and alliances and coalitions, participated in and supported international security 

and economic institutions, used diplomacy and soft power to shape the behavior of 

individual states and the international system, and using force when necessary. 

These tools help inform the strategic framework with which the United States 

plans for the future, and help us achieve our ends. 

The security of the United States is tightly bound up with the security of the 

broader international system. As a result, our strategy seeks to build the capacity 

of fragile or vulnerable partners to withstand internal threats and external 

aggression while improving the capacity of the international system itself to 

withstand the challenge posed by rogue states and would-be hegemons. 

Objectives 

To support the NSS and provide enduring security for the American people, the 

Department has five key objectives: 

• Defend the Homeland 

• Win the Long War 

• Promote Security 

• Deter Conflict 

• Win our Nation’s Wars 

Defend the Homeland

The core responsibility of the Department of Defense is to defend the United 

States from attack upon its territory at home and to secure its interests abroad. The 

U.S. Armed Forces protect the physical integrity of the country through an active 

layered defense. They also deter attacks upon it, directly and indirectly, through 

deployments at sea, in the air, on land, and in space. However, as the spreading 

web of globalization presents new opportunities and challenges, the importance of 

planning to protect the homeland against previously unexpected threats increases. 

Meeting these challenges also creates a tension between the need for security and 

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the requirements of openness in commerce and civil liberties. On the one hand, the 

flow of goods, services, people, technology and information grows every year, and 

with it the openness of American society. On the other hand, terrorists and others 

wishing us harm seek to exploit that openness. 

As noted in the 2006 QDR, state actors no longer have a monopoly over the 

catastrophic use of violence. Small groups or individuals can harness chemical, 

biological, or even crude radiological or nuclear devices to cause extensive 

damage and harm. Similarly, they can attack vulnerable points in cyberspace and 

disrupt commerce and daily life in the United States, causing economic damage, 

compromising sensitive information and materials, and interrupting critical 

services such as power and information networks. National security and domestic 

resources may be at risk, and the Department must help respond to protect lives 

and national assets. The Department will continue to be both bulwark and active 

protector in these areas. Yet, in the long run the Department of Defense is neither 

the best source of resources and capabilities nor the appropriate authority to 

shoulder these tasks. The comparative advantage, and applicable authorities, for 

action reside elsewhere in the U.S. Government, at other levels of government, in 

the private sector, and with partner nations. DoD should expect and plan to play a 

key supporting role in an interagency effort to combat these threats, and to help 

develop new capacities and capabilities, while protecting its own vulnerabilities. 

While defending the homeland in depth, the Department must also maintain the 

capacity to support civil authorities in times of national emergency such as in the 

wake of catastrophic natural and man-made disasters. The Department will 

continue to maintain consequence management capabilities and plan for their use 

to support government agencies. Effective execution of such assistance, especially 

amid simultaneous, multi-jurisdictional disasters, requires ever-closer working 

relationships with other departments and agencies, and at all levels of government. 

To help develop and cultivate these working relationships, the Department will 

continue to support the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), which is 

responsible for coordinating the Federal response to disasters. DoD must also 

reach out to non-governmental agencies and private sector entities that play a role 

in disaster response and recovery. 

Win the Long War

For the foreseeable future, winning the Long War against violent extremist 

movements will be the central objective of the U.S. We must defeat violent 

extremism as a threat to our way of life as a free and open society and foster an 

environment inhospitable to violent extremists and all those who support them. 

We face an extended series of campaigns to defeat violent extremist groups, 

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presently led by al-Qaeda and its associates. In concert with others, we seek to 

reduce support for violent extremism and encourage moderate voices, offering a 

positive alternative to the extremists’ vision for the future. Victory requires us to 

apply all elements of national power in partnership with old allies and new 

partners. Iraq and Afghanistan remain the central fronts in the struggle, but we 

cannot lose sight of the implications of fighting a long-term, episodic, multi-front, 

and multi-dimensional conflict more complex and diverse than the Cold War 

confrontation with communism. Success in Iraq and Afghanistan is crucial to 

winning this conflict, but it alone will not bring victory. We face a clash of arms, a 

war of ideas, and an assistance effort that will require patience and innovation. In 

concert with our partners, we must maintain a long-term commitment to 

undermining and reducing the sources of support for extremist groups, and to 

countering the ideological totalitarian messages they build upon. 

We face a global struggle. Like communism and fascism before it, extremist 

ideology has transnational pretensions, and like its secular antecedents, it draws 

adherents from around the world. The vision it offers is in opposition to 

globalization and the expansion of freedom it brings. Paradoxically, violent 

extremist movements use the very instruments of globalization – the unfettered 

flow of information and ideas, goods and services, capital, people, and technology 

– that they claim to reject to further their goals. Although driven by this 

transnational ideology, our adversaries themselves are, in fact, a collection of 

regional and local extremist groups. Regional and local grievances help fuel the 

conflict, and it thrives in ungoverned, under-governed, and mis-governed areas. 

This conflict is a prolonged irregular campaign, a violent struggle for legitimacy 

and influence over the population. The use of force plays a role, yet military 

efforts to capture or kill terrorists are likely to be subordinate to measures to 

promote local participation in government and economic programs to spur 

development, as well as efforts to understand and address the grievances that often 

lie at the heart of insurgencies. For these reasons, arguably the most important 

military component of the struggle against violent extremists is not the fighting we 

do ourselves, but how well we help prepare our partners to defend and govern 

themselves. 

Working with and through local actors whenever possible to confront common 

security challenges is the best and most sustainable approach to combat violent 

extremism. Often our partners are better positioned to handle a given problem 

because they understand the local geography, social structures, and culture better 

than we do or ever could. In collaboration with interagency and international 

partners we will assist vulnerable states and local populations as they seek to 

ameliorate the conditions that foster extremism and dismantle the structures that 

support and allow extremist groups to grow. We will adopt approaches tailored to 

8
local conditions that will vary considerably across regions. We will help foster 

security and aid local authorities in building effective systems of representational 

government. By improving conditions, undermining the sources of support, and 

assisting in addressing root causes of turmoil, we will help states stabilize 

threatened areas. Countering the totalitarian ideological message of terrorist 

groups to help further undermine their potency will also require sensitive, 

sophisticated and integrated interagency and international efforts. The Department 

will support and facilitate these efforts. 

The struggle against violent extremists will not end with a single battle or 

campaign. Rather, we will defeat them through the patient accumulation of quiet 

successes and the orchestration of all elements of national and international power. 

We will succeed by eliminating the ability of extremists to strike globally and 

catastrophically while also building the capacity and resolve of local governments 

to defeat them regionally. Victory will include discrediting extremist ideology, 

creating fissures between and among extremist groups and reducing them to the 

level of nuisance groups that can be tracked and handled by law enforcement 

capabilities. 

Promote Security 

The best way to achieve security is to prevent war when possible and to encourage 

peaceful change within the international system. Our strategy emphasizes 

building the capacities of a broad spectrum of partners as the basis for long-term 

security. We must also seek to strengthen the resiliency of the international system 

to deal with conflict when it occurs. We must be prepared to deal with sudden 

disruptions, to help prevent them from escalating or endangering international 

security, and to find ways to bring them swiftly to a conclusion. 

Local and regional conflicts in particular remain a serious and immediate problem. 

They often spread and may exacerbate transnational problems such as trafficking 

in persons, drug-running, terrorism, and the illicit arms trade. Rogue states and 

extremist groups often seek to exploit the instability caused by regional conflict, 

and state collapse or the emergence of ungoverned areas may create safe havens 

for these groups. The prospect that instability and collapse in a strategic state 

could provide extremists access to weapons of mass destruction or result in control 

of strategic resources is a particular concern. 

To preclude such calamities, we will help build the internal capacities of countries 

at risk. We will work with and through like-minded states to help shrink the 

ungoverned areas of the world and thereby deny extremists and other hostile 

9
parties sanctuary. By helping others to police themselves and their regions, we will 

collectively address threats to the broader international system. 

We must also address the continuing need to build and support long-term 

international security. As the 2006 NSS underscores, relations with the most 

powerful countries of the world are central to our strategy. We seek to pursue U.S. 

interests within cooperative relationships, not adversarial ones, and have made 

great progress. For example, our relationship with India has evolved from an 

uneasy co-existence during the Cold War to a growing partnership today. We wish 

to use the opportunity of an absence of fundamental conflict between great powers 

to shape the future, and to prevent the re-emergence of great power rivalry. 

The United States welcomes the rise of a peaceful and prosperous China, and it 

encourages China to participate as a responsible stakeholder by taking on a greater 

share of burden for the stability, resilience, and growth of the international system. 

However, much uncertainty surrounds the future course China’s leaders will set 

for their country. Accordingly, the NSS states that “our strategy seeks to 

encourage China to make the right strategic choices for its people, while we hedge 

against other possibilities.” A critical component of this strategy is the 

establishment and pursuit of continuous strategic dialogue with China to build 

understanding, improve communication, and to reduce the risk of miscalculation. 

China continues to modernize and develop military capabilities primarily focused 

on a Taiwan Strait conflict, but which could have application in other 

contingencies. The Department will respond to China’s expanding military power, 

and to the uncertainties over how it might be used, through shaping and hedging. 

This approach tailors investment of substantial, but not infinite, resources in ways 

that favor key enduring U.S. strategic advantages. At the same time, we will 

continue to improve and refine our capabilities to respond to China if necessary. 

We will continue to press China to increase transparency in its defense budget 

expenditures, strategies, plans and intentions. We will work with other elements of 

the U.S. Government to develop a comprehensive strategy to shape China’s 

choices. 

In addition, Russia’s retreat from democracy and its increasing economic and 

political intimidation of its neighbors give cause for concern. We do not expect 

Russia to revert to outright global military confrontation, but the risk of 

miscalculation or conflict arising out of economic coercion has increased. 

We also share interests with Russia, and can collaborate with it in a variety of 

ways. We have multiple opportunities and venues to mold our security relationship 

and to cooperate – such as in countering WMD proliferation and extremist groups. 

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At the same time, we will seek other ways to encourage Russia to act as a 

constructive partner, while expressing our concerns over policies and aspects of its 

international behavior such as the sale of disruptive weapons technologies and 

interference in and coercion of its neighbors. 

Both China and Russia are important partners for the future and we seek to build 

collaborative and cooperative relationships with them. We will develop strategies 

across agencies, and internationally, to provide incentives for constructive 

behavior while also dissuading them from destabilizing actions.

Deter Conflict

Deterrence is key to preventing conflict and enhancing security. It requires 

influencing the political and military choices of an adversary, dissuading it from 

taking an action by making its leaders understand that either the cost of the action 

is too great, is of no use, or unnecessary. Deterrence also is based upon credibility: 

the ability to prevent attack, respond decisively to any attack so as to discourage 

even contemplating an attack upon us, and strike accurately when necessary. 

For nearly half a century, the United States approached its security focused on a 

single end: deterring the Soviet Union from attacking the United States and our 

allies in what could have escalated into a global thermonuclear catastrophe. To 

that purpose we built our deterrent upon a diverse and survivable nuclear force, 

coupled with a potent conventional capability, designed to counter the military 

power of one adversary. Likewise, our assumptions and calculations for shaping 

deterrence were based largely upon our understanding of the dynamics and culture 

of the Soviet Union alone. All potential conflict was subsumed and influenced by 

that confrontation and the fear of escalation within it. Even so, there were limits. 

Military capabilities alone were, and are, no panacea to deter all conflict: despite 

the enormous strength of both the United States and the Soviet Union, conflicts 

arose; some were defused, while others spilled over into local wars. 

In the contemporary strategic environment, the challenge is one of deterring or 

dissuading a range of potential adversaries from taking a variety of actions against 

the U.S. and our allies and interests. These adversaries could be states or non-state 

actors; they could use nuclear, conventional, or unconventional weapons; and they 

could exploit terrorism, electronic, cyber and other forms of warfare. Economic 

interdependence and the growth of global communications further complicate the 

situation. Not only do they blur the types of threats, they also exacerbate 

sensitivity to the effects of attacks and in some cases make it more difficult to 

attribute or trace them. Finally, the number of potential adversaries, the breadth of 

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their capabilities, and the need to design approaches to deterrence for each, create 

new challenges. 

We must tailor deterrence to fit particular actors, situations, and forms of warfare. 

The same developments that add to the complexity of the challenge also offer us a 

greater variety of capabilities and methods to deter or dissuade adversaries. This 

diversity of tools, military and non-military, allows us to create more plausible 

reactions to attacks in the eyes of opponents and a more credible deterrence to 

them. In addition, changes in capabilities, especially new technologies, permit us 

to create increasingly credible defenses to convince would-be attackers that their 

efforts are ultimately futile. 

Our ability to deter attack credibly also reassures the American people and our 

allies of our commitment to defend them. For this reason, deterrence must remain 

grounded in demonstrated military capabilities that can respond to a broad array of 

challenges to international security. For example, the United States will maintain 

its nuclear arsenal as a primary deterrent to nuclear attack, and the New Triad 

remains a cornerstone of strategic deterrence. We must also continue to field 

conventional capabilities to augment or even replace nuclear weapons in order to 

provide our leaders a greater range of credible responses. Missile defenses not 

only deter an attack, but can defend against such an attack should deterrence fail. 

Precision-guided munitions allow us great flexibility not only to react to attacks, 

but also to strike preemptively when necessary to defend ourselves and our allies. 

Yet we must also recognize that deterrence has its limits, especially where our 

interests are ill-defined or the targets of our deterrence are difficult to influence. 

Deterrence may be impossible in cases where the value is not in the destruction of 

a target, but the attack and the very means of attack, as in terrorism. 

We must build both our ability to withstand attack – a fundamental and defensive 

aspect of deterrence – and improve our resiliency beyond an attack. An important 

change in planning for the myriad of future potential threats must be post-attack 

recovery and operational capacity. This, too, helps demonstrate that such attacks 

are futile, as does our ability to respond with strength and effectiveness to attack. 

For the future, the global scope of problems, and the growing complexity of 

deterrence in new domains of conflict, will require an integrated interagency and 

international approach if we are to make use of all the tools available to us. We 

must consider which non-lethal actions constitute an attack on our sovereignty, 

and which may require the use of force in response. We must understand the 

potential for escalation from non-lethal to lethal confrontation, and learn to 

calculate and manage the associated risks. 

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Win our Nation’s Wars

Despite our best efforts at prevention and deterrence, we must be prepared to act 

together with like minded states against states when they threaten their neighbors, 

provide safe haven to terrorists, or pursue destabilizing weapons. Although 

improving the U.S. Armed Forces’ proficiency in irregular warfare is the Defense 

Department’s top priority, the United States does not have the luxury of preparing 

exclusively for such challenges. Even though the likelihood of interstate conflict 

has declined in recent years, we ignore it at our peril. Current circumstances in 

Southwest Asia and on the Korean Peninsula, for example, demonstrate the 

continuing possibility of conflict. When called upon, the Department must be 

positioned to defeat enemies employing a combination of capabilities, 

conventional and irregular, kinetic and non-kinetic, across the spectrum of 

conflict. We must maintain the edge in our conventional forces. 

Rogue states will remain a threat to U.S. regional interests. Iran and North Korea 

continue to exert coercive pressure in their respective regions, where each seek to 

challenge or reduce U.S. influence. Responding to and, as necessary, defeating 

these, and potentially other, rogue states will remain a major challenge. We must 

maintain the capabilities required to defeat state adversaries, including those 

armed with nuclear weapons. 

Achieving Our Objectives 

We will achieve our objectives by shaping the choices of key states, preventing 

adversaries from acquiring or using WMD, strengthening and expanding alliances 

and partnerships, securing U.S. strategic access and retaining freedom of action, 

and integrating and unifying our efforts. 

Shape the Choices of Key States 

Although the role of non-state actors in world affairs has increased, states will 

continue to be the basis of the international order. In cooperation with our allies 

and friends, the United States can help shape the international environment, the 

behavior of actors, and the choices that strategic states face in ways that foster 

accountability, cooperation, and mutual trust. 

Shaping choices contributes to achieving many of our objectives. It is critical to 

defending the homeland by convincing key states that attacking the United States 

would be futile and ultimately self-defeating. Our deterrence posture is designed 

to persuade potential aggressors that they cannot meet their objectives through an 

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attack on the United States and that such actions would result in an overwhelming 

response. Our posture and capabilities also contribute to deterring conflict of other 

types, particularly with potential adversary states. We can also promote security 

by helping shape the choices that strategic states make, encouraging them to avoid 

destabilizing paths and adhering to international norms on the use of force, the 

promotion of peace and amity, and acting as good stewards of the public good 

within their own borders. 

We shall seek to anchor China and Russia as stakeholders in the system. Similarly, 

we look to India to assume greater responsibility as a stakeholder in the 

international system, commensurate with its growing economic, military, and soft 

power. 

Prevent Adversaries from Acquiring or Using Weapons of Mass 

Destruction (WMD) 

There are few greater challenges than those posed by chemical, biological, and 

particularly nuclear weapons. Preventing the spread of these weapons, and their 

use, requires vigilance and obligates us to anticipate and counter threats. 

Whenever possible, we prefer non-military options to achieve this purpose. We 

combine non-proliferation efforts to deny these weapons and their components to 

our adversaries, active efforts to defend against and defeat WMD and missile 

threats before they are unleashed, and improved protection to mitigate the 

consequences of WMD use. We also seek to convince our adversaries that they 

cannot attain their goals with WMD, and thus should not acquire such weapons in 

the first place. However, as the NSS states, the United States will, if necessary, 

act preemptively in exercising its right of self-defense to forestall or prevent 

hostile acts by our adversaries. 

Reducing the proliferation of WMD and bolstering norms against their use 

contribute to defending the homeland by limiting the number of states that can 

directly threaten us and dissuading the potential transfer of these weapons to nonstate actors. As we and our partners limit WMD proliferation, we will deny 

terrorists a potent weapon and contribute to bringing the fight against violent 

extremists to a successful conclusion on U.S. terms. 

A number of hostile or potentially hostile states are actively seeking or have 

acquired WMD. Some may seek them for prestige or deterrence; others may plan 

to use them. Preventing such regimes from acquiring or proliferating WMD, and 

the means to deliver them, contributes to promoting security. 

Fortunately, the ranks of the nuclear powers are still small, but they could grow in 

the next decade in the absence of concerted action. Many more countries possess 

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chemical and biological weapons programs – programs that are more difficult to 

detect, impede, or eliminate. These countries will continue to pursue WMD 

programs as a means to deter, coerce, and potentially use against adversaries. 

Shaping the behavior of additional states seeking or acquiring weapons of mass 

destruction will require an integrated, international effort. 

Technological and information advances of the last fifty years have led to the wide 

dissemination of WMD knowledge and lowered barriers to entry. Relatively 

sophisticated chemical agents, and even crude biological agents, are within the 

reach of many non-state actors with a modicum of scientific knowledge. 

Non-state actors may acquire WMD, either through clandestine production, statesponsorship, or theft. Also of concern is the potential for severe instability in 

WMD states and resulting loss of control of these weapons. In these cases, the 

United States, through a concerted interagency and partner nation effort, must be 

prepared to detect, tag and track, intercept, and destroy WMD and related 

materials. We must also be prepared to act quickly to secure those weapons and 

materials in cases where a state loses control of its weapons, especially nuclear 

devices. Should the worst happen, and we are attacked, we must be able to sustain 

operations during that attack and help mitigate the consequences of WMD attacks 

at home or overseas. 

Strengthen and Expand Alliances and Partnerships 

The United States also must strengthen and expand alliances and partnerships. The 

U.S. alliance system has been a cornerstone of peace and security for more than a 

generation and remains the key to our success, contributing significantly to 

achieving all U.S. objectives. Allies often possess capabilities, skills, and 

knowledge we cannot duplicate. We should not limit ourselves to the 

relationships of the past. We must broaden our ideas to include partnerships for 

new situations or circumstances, calling on moderate voices in troubled regions 

and unexpected partners. In some cases, we may develop arrangements limited to 

specific objectives or goals, or even of limited duration. Although these 

arrangements will vary according to mutual interests, they should be built on 

respect, reciprocity, and transparency. 

The capacities of our partners vary across mission areas. We will be able to rely on 

many partners for certain low-risk missions such as peacekeeping and 

humanitarian assistance, whereas complex counterinsurgency and high-end 

conventional operations are likely to draw on fewer partners with the capacity, 

will, and capability to act in support of mutual goals. We will support, train, advise 

and equip partner security forces to counter insurgencies, terrorism, proliferation, 

and other threats. We will assist other countries in improving their capabilities 

15
through security cooperation, just as we will learn valuable skills and information 

from others better situated to understand some of the complex challenges we face 

together. 

We must also work with longstanding friends and allies to transform their 

capabilities. Key to transformation is training, education and, where appropriate, 

the transfer of defense articles to build partner capacity. We must work to develop 

new ways of operating across the full spectrum of warfare. Our partnerships must 

be capable of applying military and non-military power when and where needed – 

a prerequisite against an adaptable transnational enemy. 

Secure U.S. strategic access and retain freedom of action 

For more than sixty years, the United States has secured the global commons for 

the benefit of all. Global prosperity is contingent on the free flow of ideas, goods, 

and services. The enormous growth in trade has lifted millions of people out of 

poverty by making locally produced goods available on the global market. Low 

barriers to trade also benefit consumers by reducing the cost of goods and 

allowing countries to specialize. None of this is possible without a basic belief 

that goods shipped through air or by sea, or information transmitted under the 

ocean or through space, will arrive at their destination safely. The development 

and proliferation of anti-access technologies and tactics threatens to undermine 

this belief. 

The United States requires freedom of action in the global commons and strategic 

access to important regions of the world to meet our national security needs. The 

well-being of the global economy is contingent on ready access to energy 

resources. Notwithstanding national efforts to reduce dependence on oil, current 

trends indicate an increasing reliance on petroleum products from areas of 

instability in the coming years, not reduced reliance. The United States will 

continue to foster access to and flow of energy resources vital to the world 

economy. Further, the Department is examining its own energy demands and is 

taking action to reduce fuel demand where it will not negatively affect operational 

capability. Such efforts will reduce DoD fuel costs and assist wider U.S. 

Government energy security and environmental objectives. 

We will continue to transform overseas U.S. military presence through global 

defense posture realignment, leveraging a more agile continental U.S. (CONUS)-

based expeditionary total force and further developing a more relevant and flexible 

forward network of capabilities and arrangements with allies and partners to 

ensure strategic access. 

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Integrate and unify our efforts: A new “Jointness” 

Our efforts require a unified approach to both planning and implementing policy. 

Iraq and Afghanistan remind us that military success alone is insufficient to 

achieve victory. We must not forget our hard-learned lessons or allow the 

important soft power capabilities developed because of them to atrophy or even 

disappear. Beyond security, essential ingredients of long-term success include 

economic development, institution building, and the rule of law, as well as 

promoting internal reconciliation, good governance, providing basic services to 

the people, training and equipping indigenous military and police forces, strategic 

communications. We as a nation must strengthen not only our military 

capabilities, but also reinvigorate other important elements of national power and 

develop the capability to integrate, tailor, and apply these tools as needed. We 

must tap the full strength of America and its people. 

The Department of Defense has taken on many of these burdens. Our forces have 

stepped up to the task of long-term reconstruction, development and governance. 

The U.S. Armed Forces will need to institutionalize and retain these capabilities, 

but this is no replacement for civilian involvement and expertise. The United 

States must improve its ability to deploy civilian expertise rapidly, and continue to 

increase effectiveness by joining with organizations and people outside of 

government – untapped resources with enormous potential. We can make better 

use of the expertise of our universities and of industry to assist in reconstruction 

and long-term improvements to economic vitality and good governance. Greater 

civilian participation is necessary both to make military operations successful and 

to relieve stress on the men and women of the armed forces. Having permanent 

civilian capabilities available and using them early could also make it less likely 

that military forces will need to be deployed in the first place. 

We also need capabilities to meet the challenges of the 21st century. Strategic 

communications within the Department and across government is a good example. 

Although the United States invented modern public relations, we are unable to 

communicate to the world effectively who we are and what we stand for as a 

society and culture, about freedom and democracy, and about our goals and 

aspirations. This capability is and will be crucial not only for the Long War, but 

also for the consistency of our message on crucial security issues to our allies, 

adversaries, and the world. 

We will continue to work with other U.S. Departments and Agencies, state and 

local governments, partners and allies, and international and multilateral 

organizations to achieve our objectives. A whole-of-government approach is only 

possible when every government department and agency understands the core 

competencies, roles, missions, and capabilities of its partners and works together 

17
to achieve common goals. Examples such as expanding U.S. Southern 

Command’s interagency composition and the establishment of U.S. Africa 

Command will point the way. In addition, we will support efforts to coordinate 

national security planning more effectively, both within DoD and across other 

U.S. Departments and Agencies. 

We will continue to work to improve understanding and harmonize best practices 

amongst interagency partners. This must happen at every level from Washington, 

DC-based headquarters to the field. DoD, in partnership with DHS, also will 

continue to develop habitual relationships with state and local authorities to ensure 

we are positioned to respond when necessary and support civil authorities in times 

of emergency, where allowable by law. Through these efforts we will 

significantly increase our collective abilities to defend the homeland. 

We will further develop and refine our own capabilities. We should continue to 

develop innovative capabilities, concept, and organizations. We will continue to 

rely on adaptive planning, on integration and use of all government assets, and on 

flexibility and speed. Yet we must not only have a full spectrum of capabilities at 

our disposal, but also employ and tailor any or all of them to a complex 

environment. These developments will require an expanded understanding of 

“jointness,” one that seamlessly combines civil and military capabilities and 

options. 

Finally, we must consider further realigning Department structures, and 

interagency planning and response efforts, to better address these risks and to meet 

new needs. We will examine how integrated planning is conducted within the 

Department, and how to make better use of our own existing capacities. 

 

DoD Capabilities and Means 

Implementation of any strategy is predicated on developing, maintaining and, 

where possible, expanding the means required to execute its objectives within 

budget constraints. Without the tools, we cannot do the job. The Department is 

well equipped for its primary missions, but it always seeks to improve and refine 

capabilities and effectiveness. The challenges before us will require 

resourcefulness and an integrated approach that wisely balances risks and assets, 

and that recognizes where we must improve, and where others are better suited to 

help implement aspects of the strategy. 

The Department will continue to emphasize the areas identified in the 2006 QDR, 

specifically improvements in capabilities for defeating terrorist networks, 

defending the homeland in depth, shaping the choices of countries at strategic 

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crossroads, and preventing adversaries’ acquisition and use of weapons of mass 

destruction. Although these capabilities are not sufficient to address all the 

missions of the Department, they require particular attention. 

The Department’s greatest asset is the people who dedicate themselves to the 

mission. The Total Force distributes and balances skills across each of its 

constituent elements: the Active Component, the Reserve Component, the civilian 

workforce, and the private sector and contractor base. Each element relies on the 

other to accomplish the mission; none can act independently of the other to 

accomplish the mission. The force has been severely tasked between operations in 

Iraq and Afghanistan, and fulfilling other missions and assignments. Although 

we are already committed to strengthening our forces, we also should seek to find 

more ways to retain and tap into the unique skills and experience of the thousands 

of veterans and others who have served and who can provide valuable 

contributions to national security. We will continue to pursue the improvements 

in the total force identified in the 2006 QDR and elsewhere, including the 

expansion of special operations forces and ground forces and developing modular, 

adaptable joint forces. 

Strategic communications will play an increasingly important role in a unified 

approach to national security. DoD, in partnership with the Department of State, 

has begun to make strides in this area, and will continue to do so. However, we 

should recognize that this is a weakness across the U.S. Government, and that a 

coordinated effort must be made to improve the joint planning and implementation 

of strategic communications. 

Intelligence and information sharing have always been a vital component of 

national security. Reliable information and analysis, quickly available, is an 

enduring challenge. As noted in the 2006 QDR, DoD is pursuing improved 

intelligence capabilities across the spectrum, such as defense human intelligence 

focused on identifying and penetrating terrorist networks and measurement and 

signature intelligence to identify WMD and delivery systems. 

Technology and equipment are the tools of the Total Force, and we must give our 

people what they need, and the best resources, to get the job done. First-class 

technology means investing in the right kinds of technology at the right time. Just 

as our adversaries adapt and develop new tactics, techniques, and procedures, we 

too must be nimble and creative. One area of particular focus is developing the 

means to locate, tag and track WMD components. We also must continue to 

improve our acquisition and contracting regulations, procedures, and oversight to 

ensure agile and timely procurement of critical equipment and materials for our 

forces. 

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Organization also is a key to the DoD’s success, especially as it brings together 

disparate capabilities and skills to wield as a unified and overpowering force. 

Concepts such as “net-centricity” can help guide DoD, linking components of the 

Department together and connecting organizations with complementary core 

competencies, forging the Total Force into more than the sum of its parts. The goal 

is to break down barriers and transform industrial-era organizational structures 

into an information and knowledge-based enterprise. These concepts are not a 

panacea, and will require investments in people as much as in technology to 

realize the full potential of these initiatives. 

Strengthening our burgeoning system of alliances and partnerships is essential to 

implementing our strategy. We have become more integrated with our allies and 

partners on the battlefield and elsewhere. Whether formal alliances such as NATO 

or newer partnerships such as the Proliferation Security Initiative, they have 

proved their resiliency and adaptability. These relationships continue to evolve, 

ensuring their relevance as new challenges emerge. Our partners provide 

resources, knowledge, skills, and capabilities we cannot duplicate. 

Building these partnerships takes resources. DoD has worked with its interagency 

partners and Congress to expand the portfolio of security cooperation and 

partnership capacity building tools over the last seven years and will continue to 

do so. These tools are essential to successful implementation of the strategy. We 

will also work with Congress and other stakeholders to address our significant 

concern with growing legal and regulatory restrictions that impede, and threaten to 

undermine, our military readiness. 

DoD will continue to implement global defense posture realignment, transforming 

from legacy base structures and forward-garrisoned forces to an expeditionary 

force, providing greater flexibility to contend with uncertainty in a changing 

strategic environment. 

Managing Risk 

Implementing the National Defense Strategy and its objectives requires balancing 

risks, and understanding the choices those risks imply. We cannot do everything, 

or function equally well across the spectrum of conflict. Ultimately we must make 

choices. 

With limited resources, our strategy must address how we assess, mitigate, and 

respond to risk. Here we define risk in terms of the potential for damage to 

national security combined with the probability of occurrence and a measurement 

of the consequences should the underlying risk remain unaddressed. We must 

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hedge against changes in the strategic environment that might invalidate the 

assumptions underpinning the strategy as well as address risks to the strategy. 

First, there are risks associated with the indirect approach that is fundamental to 

the Long War. We must recognize that partner contributions to future coalition 

operations will vary in size, composition, competence, and capability. Some 

partners will have the political will and the capacity and capability to make 

significant contributions across the spectrum of conflict. Other partners will 

demonstrate more restraint in the type of operation (e.g., counter-terrorism, 

stabilization, traditional combat operations) in which they will participate. We 

must balance the clear need for partners – the Long War is ultimately not winnable 

without them – with mission requirements for effectiveness and efficiency. 

Additionally, the strategic shocks identified above could potentially change the 

rules of the game and require a fundamental re-appraisal of the strategy. 

 

Second, the strategy must account for four dimensions of risk: 

• Operational risks are those associated with the current force executing the 

strategy successfully within acceptable human, material, financial, and 

strategic costs.

• Future challenges risks are those associated with the Department’s capacity to 

execute future missions successfully against an array of prospective future 

challengers.

• Force management risks are those associated with managing military forces 

fulfilling the objectives described in this National Defense Strategy. The 

primary concern here is recruiting, retaining, training, and equipping a force 

and sustaining its readiness.

• Institutional risks are those associated with the capacity of new command, 

management, and business practices.

Operational Risk 

To address the potential for multiple contingencies, the Department will develop a 

range of military options for the President, including means to de-escalate crises 

and reduce demand on forces where possible. Addressing operational risk requires 

clearly articulating the risks inherent in and the consequences of choosing among 

the options and proposing mitigation strategies. 

U.S. predominance in traditional warfare is not unchallenged, but is sustainable for 

the medium term given current trends. The 2006 QDR focused on non-traditional 

or irregular challenges. We will continue to focus our investments on building 

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capabilities to address these other challenges, while examining areas where we can 

assume greater risk. 

Future Challenges Risk 

An underlying assumption in our understanding of the strategic environment is 

that the predominant near-term challenges to the United States will come from 

state and non-state actors using irregular and catastrophic capabilities. Although 

our advanced space and cyber-space assets give us unparalleled advantages on the 

traditional battlefield, they also entail vulnerabilities. 

China is developing technologies to disrupt our traditional advantages. Examples 

include development of anti-satellite capabilities and cyber warfare. Other actors, 

particularly non-state actors, are developing asymmetric tactics, techniques, and 

procedures that seek to avoid situations where our advantages come into play. 

The Department will invest in hedging against the loss or disruption of our 

traditional advantages, not only through developing mitigation strategies, but also 

by developing alternative or parallel means to the same end. This diversification 

parallelism is distinct from acquiring overmatch capabilities (whereby we have 

much more than an adversary of a similar capability). It will involve pursuing 

multiple routes to similar effects while ensuring that such capabilities are 

applicable across multiple mission areas. 

Force Management Risk 

The people of our Total Force are the greatest asset of the Department. Ensuring 

that each person has the opportunity to contribute to the maximum of their 

potential is critical to achieving DoD’s objectives and supporting U.S. national 

security. An all-volunteer force is the foundation of the most professional and 

proficient fighting force in the world. It also underlines the necessity to innovate 

in providing opportunities for advancement and growth. Our civilian and military 

workforce similarly possesses skills that are highly prized in the private sector, 

thus requiring a concerted strategy to retain these professionals. 

Retaining well-trained, motivated military and civilian personnel is key. Financial 

incentives only go so far. Our military and civilian personnel elect to serve their 

country unselfishly. It is the responsibility of our senior leaders to recognize that 

fact and provide the means for personnel to grow, develop new knowledge, and 

develop new skills. 

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23

Institutional Risk 

Since 2001, the Department has created new commands (integrating Space and 

Strategic Commands, establishing Northern and Africa Commands) and new 

governance structures. DoD is already a complex organization. We must guard 

against increasing organizational complexity leading to redundancy, gaps, or 

overly bureaucratic decision-making processes. 

Conclusion 

The strategy contained in this document is the result of an assessment of the 

current and future strategic environment. The United States, and particularly the 

Department of Defense, will not win the Long War or successfully address other 

security challenges alone. Forging a new consensus for a livable world requires 

constant effort and unity of purpose with our Allies and partners. The Department 

stands ready to fulfill its mission.