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# 									NSC Preview of the Japan State Visit and the U.S.-Japan-Philippines Trilateral Leaders’ Summit							

FPC Briefing

Mira Rapp-Hooper, Senior Director for East Asia and Oceania, White House    

Tuesday, April 9, 2024, 12:00 p.m. ET

Washington, D.C.

April 9, 2024

## 								Summary							

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President Joe Biden and First Lady Jill Biden will host Prime Minister Kishida Fumio and Mrs. Kishida Yuko of Japan for an Official Visit to the United States, which will include a state dinner, on April 10, 2024. The visit will underscore the deep and enduring Alliance between the United States and Japan, and Japan’s increasing global leadership role. On April 11, President Biden will host President Ferdinand R. Marcos Jr. of the Philippines and Prime Minister Kishida Fumio of Japan at the White House for the first trilateral U.S.-Japan-Philippines leaders’ summit. This briefing previews efforts to strengthen United States’ political, security, economic and people-to-people ties with Japan as well as highlight the deepening trilateral cooperation between the United States, Japan, and the Philippines.  
   

**THE WASHINGTON FOREIGN PRESS CENTER, WASHINGTON, D.C.**

**MODERATOR:**  Welcome, everyone, to the Washington Foreign Press Center.  My name is Miranda Patterson, one of the media relations officers here at the FPC.  I am pleased to welcome back Dr. Mira Rapp-Hooper to the Washington Foreign Press Center this afternoon.  And the purpose of today’s briefing is to preview the official visit of Japanese Prime Minister Kishida Fumio as well as the first U.S.-Japan-Philippines Trilateral Leaders’ Summit along with President Ferdinand Marcos, Jr.  

Dr. Mira Rapp-Hooper is special assistant to the President and senior director for East Asia and Oceania.  She is a top White House advisor responsible for the Indo-Pacific Strategy and many other initiatives. 

A quick reminder of the ground rules for today.  The briefing is on the record.  After her opening remarks, Senior Director Rapp-Hooper has kindly agreed to take questions.  Please raise your hand and I will call on you.  If called for a question, please begin your question by stating your name, outlet, and country.  For our journalists joining via Zoom, if you have a question, please go to the participant field and virtually raise your hand.  We will call on you and you can unmute yourself if you like, turn on your video, and ask your question.  You can also submit questions in the chat box.  If you have not already done so, please take the time now to rename yourself in Zoom – in your Zoom profile with your full name and the name of your media outlet. 

This briefing will end promptly at 12:45.  We will post a video and a transcript of the briefing afterwards on our website, which is fpc.state.gov.  

And with what, I’m going to turn the briefing over now to Senior Director Rapp-Hooper. 

**MS RAPP-HOOPER:**  Thank you so much, Miranda, and thank you to the Foreign Press Center for having me today.  It’s good to see you all.  

As you know, tomorrow, Wednesday, the President and First Lady will welcome to the White House Prime Minister Kishida Fumio and Mrs. Kishida of Japan for an official visit that will include a state dinner.  Since day one of this administration, we have been focused on reinvesting in and reinvigorating our alliances in the Indo-Pacific, and nowhere has President Biden’s strategy paid off more than in this region and with respect to our alliance with Japan.

Our alliances and partnerships have long been critical to securing a free, open, prosperous, and resilient global order, and in the last three years Japan has been working tirelessly and in lockstep alongside the United States as we look to achieve our shared vision for this region and for the world. 

What you’ll see on display over the course of this state visit is that we are strategically aligned and cooperating in every area across every part of the world.  This state visit is a celebration of our bilateral relationship as it evolves into a true global partnership that is a force for peace and prosperity.  

Since both President Biden and Prime Minister Kishida took office in 2021, the two leaders have met nearly a dozen times.  When President Biden welcomed Kishida – Prime Minister Kishida to Washington for the first time in January of 2023, Japan had just published its historic national security strategy, which called for an increase in defense spending to 2 percent of GDP; said that Japan would seek to acquire counterstrike capabilities alongside the United States; and would enhance its cooperation with likeminded partners.  

Throughout the official visit with state dinner this week, the President will honor and celebrate Prime Minister Kishida’s courageous leadership in the Indo-Pacific, including his domestic reforms to strengthen Japan’s defense posture and increased defense spending; his work alongside President Yoon of the ROK to build a new foundation in Japan-ROK relations; his work to support Southeast Asia and the Pacific Islands; and on the global stage, Japan’s unwavering support for Ukraine.

I’ll briefly highlight just some of the areas where you can expect announcements from our leaders tomorrow.

First, we will bolster our defense and security cooperation to enable greater coordination and integration of our forces to ensure they are optimally postured and linked to one another. 

Second, our leaders will announce some important deliverables on civil space cooperation as we lead the way in space exploration and the return to the Moon.  

Third, our two countries will announce major research partnerships between our leading institutions on critical and emerging technologies in areas including artificial intelligence, quantum, semiconductors, and clean energy.  And all of this will, of course, strengthen our economic ties and our economic security as we announce commercial deals as part of this state visit as well. 

Fourth, Japan is one of the leading providers of economic assistance and budget support to Ukraine and development infrastructure in Southeast Asia and the Pacific Islands.  This visit will highlight Japan’s continued role in global diplomacy and development and will showcase some important deliverables on consequential work the United States and Japan are doing together – in particular in the Pacific Islands. 

And finally, we’ll announce some important new initiatives to further foster our cultural connections and promote closer people-to-people ties, especially amongst our young people.  

Since the beginning of this administration, our theory of the case for the Indo-Pacific has been that we would reinvest in and modernize our alliances and partnerships, and when we did, our allies and partners would seek to step up alongside us.  And we have seen that theory of the case proven many times over.  We are indeed not taking any of these actions alone, but in every case in close partnership with our allies and partners within the region and beyond. 

So while it is undeniable that we are all living in a challenging geopolitical moment, the President continues to prioritize our work in what we see as the critical region for the long term of American foreign policy.  

That’s why in addition to this important state visit this week, the President will also welcome President Marcos of the Philippines for his second visit in as many years to the White House and will also hold the first-ever Trilateral Leaders’ Summit between the United States, Japan, and the Philippines.  As Indo-Pacific nations, the U.S., Japan, and the Philippines share a joint vision for the future of the region, and with this first-ever leader-level trilateral summit, we are continuing to innovate the groupings with whom we’re working closely, adding to the fit-for-purpose latticework that we are using throughout the Indo-Pacific. 

This trilateral format was really innovated by our national security advisors, who met for the first time in Tokyo last year to discuss how we might better work together and cooperate.  And out of that June 2023 meeting, they identified a few critical areas of cooperation amongst the United States, Japan, and the Philippines that our leaders will be taking to new heights later this week.

On Thursday, our leaders will announce new initiatives to enhance energy security, economic and maritime cooperation, partnerships on technology and cybersecurity, and some considerable joint investments in major infrastructure areas.

Our three countries will embark on this new era of trilateral cooperation as equal partners, guided by a shared vision and unwavering commitment to a free, open, peaceful, and prosperous Indo-Pacific.  The events of this week clearly illustrate the President’s continued commitment to strengthening our key alliances and partnerships, innovating around shared challenges, and exploring new areas of cooperation.

With that, I look forward to your questions.

**MODERATOR:**  Thank you, Dr. Rapp-Hooper.  Now we’re going to open up for the question-and-answer portion.  Please be advised that the questions should relate to the information that was just provided to us in opening remarks.

Yes, we’ll have you here in the front row.  Please state your name and outlet.

**QUESTION:**  Thank you very much.  Donghui Yu with China Review News Agency of Hong Kong.  It was widely reported that the AUKUS is considering expanding the security pact that will include Japan in the defense alliance.  Will the U.S.-Japan summit discuss this issue?  And what is the implication of this new movement for the U.S. approach to China?  And is it a new mechanism that is different from other alliance mechanism to deter China?  Thank you.

**MS RAPP-HOOPER:**  Sure.  I’ll start by taking your question by creating an important distinction up front, and that is when we talk about the AUKUS partnership, there are two very distinct tracks of cooperation.  AUKUS Pillar I is a partnership that is exclusively amongst the United States, Australia, and the United Kingdom, and that is the partnership that is focused on providing nuclear-powered, conventionally armed submarines.  That Pillar I track has not, and will not expand – full stop.

There is a second track of AUKUS, which is AUKUS Pillar II, that is focused on the development of additional advanced capabilities projects, which are entirely separate from Pillar I.  The AUKUS defense ministers – that is, the U.S., UK, and Australian defense ministers – yesterday announced that they would begin consultations with a small group of additional partners towards their possible inclusion in some AUKUS Pillar II projects.  What that means is that we will begin consultations with a range of additional partners – including Japan, as was indicated yesterday – towards their possible participation in these additional capabilities projects.

So want to be clear that since the inception of AUKUS, we have always indicated that it would include a Pillar II track.  This is not a new partnership; it is part of AUKUS that has been designed from the beginning.  And what the defense ministers announced yesterday is really just the starting point of a consultation period to understand better which partners might be a good fit for Pillar II.  We expect that work to continue over the course of the next many months, and all decisions about the ultimate composition of Pillar II will be made by the AUKUS defense ministers as a trilateral grouping.

**MODERATOR:**  Thank you.  Let’s go here in the second row, the tan shirt.

**QUESTION:**  Hi, thank you for doing this.  My name is Yuko Mukai from Japanese Yomiuri Shimbun.  My question is about U.S., Japan, and Philippine trilateral summit.  There is a media report that President Biden will stress that the U.S.-Philippine Mutual Defense Treaty Article IV will be applied to Sierra Madre, which is the state of the ongoing conflict between China and Philippines in the South China Sea.  Could you please confirm that?  

And also, I would like to know what specifically does it mean that Article IV will be applied to the Sierra Madre, which means, like, if the Chinese – well, what if the – if there is an attack by the Chinese side, by the coast guard, but – and the result it turned to be a damage to the Philippine side, will it – will it cause the – any kind of a military interference by the U.S. side?  

**MS RAPP-HOOPER:**  What I can say in response to your question is that the United States and President Biden in particular have been consistent and clear for the entirety of this administration that the U.S.-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty applies in the South China Sea, including to Philippines’ vessels underway, including coast guard vessels and including in the South China Sea.  That declaratory policy is consistent from the beginning of this administration, it’s held on a bipartisan basis, and has not changed.  The President last articulated it publicly from the Rose Garden when Prime Minister Anthony Albanese was here in October from his state visit.  And what I imagine you will hear over the course of the next few days is language that is identical to what you have heard in the past.

What the ultimately meaning here is I think is crystal-clear to any observers, and that is the fact that the U.S.-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty applies to the Philippines in the South China Sea – again, to vessels underway, including coast guard vessels.  We stand strongly by our alliance commitments to the Philippines, and that is one of the things we will be talking to President Marcos about when he is in town.

Of course, this trilateral meeting comes at a very important time, as the Philippines has found themselves under increasing pressure from the PRC in the South China Sea.  This should, of course, be taken as a sign that not only President Biden but Prime Minister Kishida wish to show their support and resolve for President Marcos and his handling of this incredibly difficult issue.  I think what you will see is a strong showing of support and solidarity amongst our three leaders for a common vision of a South China Sea that is governed by international law.

**MODERATOR:**  Thank you.  We’re going to turn online real briefly to one of our journalists from the Philippines.  Don Tagala, please unmute yourself and turn on your camera if able.  Ask your question.

**QUESTION:**  Okay.  Don Tagala, ABS-CBN News on the Filipino Channel.  My question is:  What is the status of the Reciprocal Access Agreement between Japan and the Philippines?  And please tell us about the timeline in getting this agreement in operations.  Thank you.  

**MS RAPP-HOOPER:**Thank you.  I will not suppose to share updates about the timeline for a negotiation that is taking place bilaterally between our Philippines allies and our Japanese allies, but what I can say is that the U.S. Government has consistently expressed its support for those negotiations and for the growing set of ties between the Philippines and Japan, and we’ll continue to do so over the course of this visit.

**MODERATOR:**  Okay, Josie.

**QUESTION:**  Good morning.  My name is Josie Moralidad Ziman from the Radio Mindanao Network in the Philippines, but I’m based here in Alexandria, Virginia  I have several questions, but if you don’t mind I’m going to ask two questions and it’s up to you how to answer it.

Can you share any examples of successful past initiatives or collaborations between the Philippines, Japan, and United States?  This is the first trilateral summit meeting, right?  And what inspires optimism for the outcomes of this summit, and how do you believe the outcomes of this summit will positively impact the lives of people across the Indo-Pacific region?

**MS RAPP-HOOPER:**Thank you.  I’ll be happy to try to take those questions as one.  I think we have many indications of really strong cooperation amongst our three countries in the past.  As you know, while our Japanese friends have been deeply invested across a range of sectors and areas in their support for our Filipino friends for a long time, so this is really a natural fit for our partnership.

One recent example that I’ll highlight that folks in the room may be tracking is that just a couple of days ago the United States, the Philippines, Japan, and Australia conducted their first joint sail in the South China Sea, which was intended to signal our common support for international law in that critical body of water.  And I think over the course of the last many years our ability to better work together in and around the Philippines and with the Philippines had been growing, but we will take that to new heights with our announcements on Thursday.

To your important question about how those deliverables will show that we are delivering for the Filipino people, what I can say is there will be some particularly important announcements related to infrastructure in particular whereby the United States and Japan will agree to cooperate on their investments in the Philippines.  And we do believe that together and working closely with the Government of the Philippines we will be able to deliver for the Filipino people by helping to work together on high-quality, high-standards infrastructure that makes a difference in the lives of everyday people.

**MODERATOR:**  Okay, we’ll go to Song here in the third row, the edge.  

**QUESTION:**  Thank you very much.  My name is Song Sang-ho, reporter from Yonhap News Agency, South Korea.  I’m wondering about if there will be any specific and concrete progress when it – I mean in terms of trilateral cooperation involving South Korea about deterring North Korea from the summit.  I’m talking about between President Biden and Prime Minister Kishida.  

My second question is that you talked about Pillar II of the AUKUS security partnership.   Do you see any possibility that South Korea could be potential partner and pillar to a defense capability project?  Thank you.  

**MS RAPP-HOOPER:**Thanks very much.  Of course, we will primarily be focused on bilateral deliverables in our summit with Prime Minister Kishida, but I will say that there will be a few grace notes in some of our documents marking the fantastic progress we are making in our trilateral relationship with the ROK, including in the defense and security space.  So some of those developments will be noted in the joint leaders statement on the fact sheet that we bring out.

I’ll point to just one area in which we have redoubled our trilateral cooperation since the Camp David summit, and that is in our partnership to monitor and push back against the growing cooperation between the DPRK and Russia, which of course is of grave concern to all three of our countries and should be of concern to anybody who is interested in peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific as well as in Europe.  So we remain very confident and enthusiastic about the work we continue to do together in that trilateral format.

To your question about additional partners, as I have noted, the AUKUS defense ministers did agree yesterday to begin consultations with additional partners towards possible inclusion in Pillar II.  They’ll be talking to a range of highly capable partners who would be good fits for these projects, and I’ll leave those consultations to the defense ministers.

**MODERATOR:**  Okay, we’ll go to Lisa in the front row.  

**QUESTION:**  Thank you.  I’m Lisa with Nippon TV.  We’re based in Tokyo, Japan.  My question is I think President Biden mentioned about his concerns on U.S. steel deal publicly.  Would the proposal – would the proposed merger on Nippon TV — Nippon Steel and U.S. Steel also be one of the topics to be discussed in the meeting?

**MS RAPP-HOOPER:**What I can say is, of course, our President’s views on the subject are well known.  The President has made clear that he will always stand up for American workers, but he is equally strong in is conviction that he will always stand up for the U.S.-Japan alliance.  I’ll leave it at that.

**MODERATOR:**  Okay, we’ll go here in the third row, black shirt.  

**QUESTION:**  Thank you for this opportunity.  This is Ryo Aoyama from the Asahi Shimbun Japanese daily newspaper.  I have two questions.  Firstly, regarding the command and control between U.S. and Japan, Japan will establish a joint operational command by next year.  So as a counterpart of Japan’s J-JOC, what could be an ideal USFJ command structure in order to promote cooperation between U.S. and Japan?

And separately, regarding the U.S.-Japan cooperation and U.S.-Japan-Philippines strategic cooperation, how much are you hopeful that countries can institutionalize cooperation and deliverables in spite of a potential presidential transition or change of government?  

**MS RAPP-HOOPER:**Thank you.  To your question about Japan’s standup of its Joint Operational Command, we will have more to say tomorrow about the United States approach towards modernizing its own approach to command and control in Japan.  However, I will note that it will take a bit of time for some of these details to be worked out, so tomorrow we’ll give some additional color on these questions, but we are prepared and fully expect to be working closely with the Government of Japan on the question of how best to match up with J-JOC for months to come.

On the question of the U.S.-Philippines trilateral, we are absolutely hopeful about being able to institutionalize this cooperation.  As I mentioned, this trilateral track really began at the national security advisor’s level about nine months ago, but since that meeting, where our national security advisors crafted a joint program of work for us, there have been several additional meetings at other levels and in other formats to include our foreign ministers meeting trilaterally, Vice President Harris meeting with Prime Minister Kishida and President Marcos, and most recently Deputy Secretary of State Kurt Campbell meeting with his Philippines and Japanese counterparts at the vice ministerial level.  So we believe strongly that this format will continue across a range of agencies and different levels and that the program of work that you see unveiled on Thursday will be a project for our three countries for many years to come.  

**MODERATOR:**In the front row, here.  

**QUESTION:**  Thank you, Miranda.  Thank you, Ms. Hooper.  Bingru Wang with Hong Kong Phoenix TV.  So in terms of the trilateral cooperation, the Chinese Foreign Ministry said China opposes cobbling together exclusive groupings.  How do you want China to portray this summit?  Are you concerned a closer U.S.-Philippine military cooperation may trigger escalation in the South China Sea?  Thank you.  

**MS RAPP-HOOPER:**I’m not going to opine too much on China’s portrayal or sort of deign to project how Beijing will portray the summit.  What I will say is what we’ve said throughout the Biden administration, which is that the U.S.-Indo-Pacific Strategy and our groupings of alliances and partnerships are not about being against anyone or anything.  They’re about what we’re for and that’s very clear in our Indo-Pacific Strategy.  We make clear that we stand together for a free and open Indo-Pacific that is prosperous, resilient, and secure, and we welcome into that approach all comers who share in that vision.  The U.S.-Japan-Philippines Trilateral that you will see on Thursday is a perfect representation of three maritime democracies who are aligned in that vision, and we believe that the world will see that summit as such. 

**MODERATOR:**Okay.  Let’s go here in the corner.  

**QUESTION:**  Hi, thank you for this opportunity.  My name is Shincihi Akiyama for Mainichi Newspaper Japan.  I have two questions.  One is for Japan-U.S. security alliance.  As you mentioned, this summit will emphasize their – the merit and the need – necessity to bolster the cooperation, and there is ongoing discussion in the PACOM to establish a new joint task force.  What is the role of this joint task force in terms of the U.S.-Japan alliance?  

And my second question is about the trilateral summit.  What role do you expect for the Japanese Self-Defense Forces to protect their stability in Southeast Asia – southeast – South China Sea?  Yes.

**MS RAPP-HOOPER:**Thank you very much.  As already indicated, we will have more to say tomorrow about our approach to a future alliance modernization; but as I’ve also already indicated, it’ll take some months to work through the details, so I think it’s premature to opine on any details related to any particular task forces.  

This is a really important set of alliance modernization steps that the Secretary of Defense and our new INDOPACOM commander will be putting a lot of thought into along with the President.  And of course, the primary representation of this progress right now is, of course, Japan’s standup of J-JOC, so we’ll be working closely together to come up with the right fit there.  

On the question of Japan and the South China Sea, we expect that our leaders will have a really fruitful conversation on what more we can do together by way of building our capacity building, our operational integration, and our work to support international law in the South China Sea, but of course, the ultimate contributions are up to the Government of Japan. 

**MODERATOR:**And we’re going to go to the back a little bit.  Second row in the black dress, hand raised.  

**QUESTION:**  Eunjung Cho with the Voice of America.  Earlier, Mr. John Kirby said that North Korea will be on the agenda in the summit between President Biden and Prime Minister Kishida.  Relatedly, Dr. Rapp-Hooper, you earlier said in March that the Biden administration is going to consider interim steps on the pathway to denuclearization.  Will interim steps involve nuclear freeze and capping of the number of missiles?  What is your response to skepticism from both in Washington and Seoul that interim step is a – something that has been tried and failed many times before?  

My second question is that it’s been reported that the summit will discuss the hypersonic glide vehicle.  What can you preview us about the discussions regarding the missile defense against North Korean missile threat?  Thank you.  

**MS RAPP-HOOPER:**Thanks.  I’ll start first with the second part of your question, I think.  We have a long history of cooperation on ballistic missile defense, both with our Japanese friends and with our friends in the ROK.  I’m not expecting any sort of DPRK-specific announcements to come out tomorrow, but we are excited about continuing to further the progress that we make on regional defense – regional missile defense integration more broadly. 

On the question of the DPRK, I want to be clear that the comments you cited are totally consistent with the same policy that we have been articulating for the entirety of the Biden administration, and that is the fact that we remain open to talks with the DPRK without preconditions and on a wide range of topics.  As you know, we have reached out to the DPRK many times and have not had any response.  So the message that was articulated there is that we would like them to come to the table and tell us what they want to talk about, and we’ll be ready to talk.  

The comment about interim steps is often being interpreted in a strict arms control sense of the definition of what interim steps might mean.  We are open to talking about a wide range of topics with the DPRK should they wish to talk to us about things that can make the Korean peninsula and the Indo-Pacific safer. 

**MODERATOR:**Okay.  Back here, the —  

**QUESTION:**  This is Sangmin.  I’m from Radio Free Asia.  Chinese Government announced that their highest official will visit North Korea this week.  I want to know how do you see this visit at this moment?  Why do you think the Chinese Government send their highest official to North Korea at this moment?  

**MS RAPP-HOOPER:**Thank you.  Again, I’m not going to interpret the particular signaling behind a specific visit.  I don’t pretend to know what exactly Beijing’s calculation is here.  What I will say though is part of what I’ve already articulated is that there are a number of areas in which we are concerned about North Korean actions and North Korean rhetoric.  That includes the fact that since the new year, Kim Jong-un has been using more threatening rhetoric about potential actions he might take in and around the peninsula.  We are also deeply concerned about growing DPRK-Russia cooperation, which has clear implications for Ukraine as well as for peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific.  So whatever the reason might be for the Chinese Government wanting to have a high-level touch now, we hope that they will raise these issues in the interest of making the region more peaceful and stable.

**MODERATOR:**Okay, we’ll go front row here, then there.

**QUESTION:**Hi, thanks for doing this.  I’m Wakako Hisaeda from NHK.  Regarding to the South China Sea, this will be a bit broader question, but do you see a link between the Second Thomas Shoal and stability in the Taiwan Strait?

**MS RAPP-HOOPER:**I’m sorry, could you repeat the last part of the question?  It was hard to hear you.  

**QUESTION:**Oh, so do you see the link between the Second Thomas Shoal and the stability in the Taiwan Strait?  

**MS RAPP-HOOPER:**I don’t think I’ll connect those two areas too directly except to say that, of course, the United States stands for peace and stability in all of maritime Asia and for a maritime Asia that is governed by international law.  Obviously, these are areas of concern on which we are keenly focused, but I won’t draw further connections between the two of them here.  

**MODERATOR:**Okay, right next to him. 

**QUESTION:**Thank you so much, Senior Director.  Igor Naimushin, RIA News Agency, Russia.  So as Japan plays a really active role in supporting Western sanctions in Indo-Pacific, including price cap on Russian oil, import ban for Russian diamonds, and long list of export bans, are there any plans during the Japanese prime minister visit to discuss additional sanctions on Russia?  And are there any plans to discuss maybe potential transfer of Patriot systems to Ukraine via U.S.?  Thank you.

**MS RAPP-HOOPER:**Thank you.  I won’t get ahead of any private discussions that might take place between our leaders.

**MODERATOR:**Okay, right – let’s see – in the fourth row.  

**QUESTION:**Hi.  This is Tomoko Ashizuka of the Nikkei newspaper.  Thank you very much for doing this.  So the Biden administration has emphasized on the importance of alliances in Indo-Pacific region and in other parts of the world compared to the previous administration.  Just I’d like to know why you think that enhancing and expanding the alliance is critical for the interest of the United States and other countries.  Thank you.  

**MS RAPP-HOOPER:**Thank you.  I certainly tried to speak to this in my opening remarks, but happy to say a little bit more here.  I think as the United States laid out in President Biden’s Indo-Pacific Strategy that was published in February of 2022, we see cooperation with our alliances and partnerships and the expansion of those as critical, because by growing these relationships and improving our ability to work together, we can build what we term collective capacity in the Indo-Pacific.  And that is our ability to deliver on specific concrete results that further our shared objectives in that region.  

So that’s why we put such an emphasis in that strategy on alignment with our alliances and partnerships.  And I’ll note that while of course on display this week you’ll see really strong and concrete cooperation between two of America’s closest and oldest allies in the Indo-Pacific, we feel that this approach to building collective capacity has had appeal with a far broader grouping of countries.  I think we need only look at the fact that the President paid a historic visit to Vietnam to upgrade to a comprehensive strategic partnership last September to appreciate that this rationale for building collective capacity towards common goals has a widespread appeal beyond just treaty partners.  So we’re very gratified that we continue to see steps forward not only with some of our closest allies with whom we know we share a vision, but with a wider range of partners who see some of themselves in that vision.

**MODERATOR:**Okay.  Did Josie have another question?  Yeah, we’ll go here.  

**QUESTION:**My next question is, as advisor in the White House, what do you think is the impact of this trilateral meeting for the people of the Philippines?  As you mentioned before, you mentioned about infrastructure, but how about in the lives of Filipinos?  Right now there is a high rate of poverty, unemployment in the Philippines, and most of these people are also affected by the tension in China.  

**MS RAPP-HOOPER:**Thanks.  I think I’ve opined already and shared a bit about the fact that infrastructure investments from the United States and Japan will make a difference in the lives of everyday people, but do want to be clear that beyond those areas, there’s a number of areas for cooperation which we’ll be discussing with President Marcos that also have the ability to deliver for the Philippines people.  Those include energy security, which of course is a very important focus for this government; they include digital connectivity to make sure that the people of the Philippines have access to reliable, trusted networks; and a number of other areas which, if we can more effectively hone our trilateral cooperation, will make the Philippines economy stronger and will affect the everyday lives of the Philippines people.  

On top of that, of course, what we’ll be showing on Thursday is that amidst the tensions with the PRC in the South China Sea, the Philippines people, not just President Marcos, have the support of the United States and Japan.  So we think that between these very concrete deliverables, some of which have significant economic implications, and those statements and demonstration of resolve, this is indeed not just about three leaders but about all their people.

**MODERATOR:**  Does anyone new – okay – have a question?  Yes, we’ll go in the back.

**QUESTION:**  Hello.  I just wonder if Taiwan will be – oh, David Smith of the Guardian – just wonder if Taiwan will be on the agenda in the discussion between the President and prime minister tomorrow.  We’ve heard the President in the past say that if Taiwan was attacked, yes, the U.S. military would defend it.  Is it the expectation that Japan would join in that operation?  And finally, is the President concerned that if Congress fails to send more military aid to Ukraine, that sends a worrying signal about whether the U.S. really would help Taiwan?

**MS RAPP-HOOPER:**  Thank you.  I think the United States and Japan have crafted a common position on Taiwan that’s very clear.  It has appeared in our last many leader statements, and I think you’ll see similar language over the course of this visit.  Our leaders often talk about the importance of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait, but I don’t have more to share for you than that at this point.  I do think that, of course, the President is very hopeful that Congress will pass the sup for a wide range of reasons, to include its important implications for Indo-Pacific security beyond security in Europe.

**MODERATOR:**  And we’ll go back here, in the beige.

**QUESTION:**  Hi.  Yuko Mukai from Japanese Yomiuri Shimbun.  Just follow-up question about Taiwan.  So you earlier mentioned that you don’t connect South China Sea and Taiwan too directly, but do we expect, like, in the trilateral meeting that the leaders will discuss about, like, Taiwan Strait issues, like in the context of, like, peace and stability?  

And also, it’s my understanding that the reason, like, Japan finds this trilateral framework is more meaningful is because Japan is facing the same kind of pressure by China in the East China Sea.  Does East China Sea issues will be discussed by the leaders?

**MS RAPP-HOOPER:**  Thanks.  Again, I’m not going to go into too much depth on private conversations amongst our leaders that haven’t happened yet.  What I will say, however, is that the United States is totally consistent in reaffirming the fact that our Mutual Defense Treaty and Article V apply to the Senkaku Islands.  You will see that position reaffirmed by the President in relevant language, as it always is.  I don’t have any further detail to share on the East China Sea at this time, but again, we often discuss the importance of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait, and we have a well-crafted series of common positions.

**MODERATOR:**  Okay.  This is going to end the question-and-answer portion of the briefing, but I did want to give Dr. Rapp-Hooper a chance to say any concluding words.

**MS RAPP-HOOPER:**  Thanks.  Really appreciate the strong and detailed set of questions today, and appreciate all the engagement from this great group of reporters.  Again, we think that what you’ll see on display this week is of course a series of visits that are very consequential in their own right, whether that’s with the Japan official visit with state dinner really serving as the capstone of three years of extraordinary alliance modernization between the U.S. and Japan; or the U.S.-Philippines-Japan trilat demonstrating that we continue to innovate our work with allies in the Indo-Pacific towards common cause and common goals.

But overall, beyond just the symbolism and the significant deliverables that will come out of these two visits, I think we hope that what the world will take away, again, is the fact that investing in alliances and partnerships and working in close coordination with our key allies and partners has paid dividends and will reaffirm the fact that we will continue to do so under President Biden’s leadership, because the theory of the case for his Indo-Pacific strategy will never be more clear than it will be this week.

**MODERATOR:**  Thank you so much.  This concludes our briefing.  I want to give another special thanks to our briefer for joining us here again, Senior Director Rapp-Hooper, and for sharing her time with us today.  I know it’s a busy week for everyone.  And to those of you who participated, you can find the transcripts and this briefing and more about our programs online later today at fpc.state.gov.  Thank you very much.

**MS RAPP-HOOPER:**  Thanks.

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Bureau of East Asian and Pacific AffairsDistrict of ColumbiaForeign Press CentersForeign Press CentersJapanNew YorkPhilippines

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