About the Report

This report focuses on the different means of dispute 

resolution—from the formal justice sector to tribal 

arbitration—available to citizens in Yemen and how these 

practices were affected by the 2011 crisis and transition phase 

that followed. It is derived from several United States Institute 

of Peace (USIP) studies on how the post-Arab Spring transition 

has affected rule of law, justice, and security in Yemen. USIP 

has been a leader in exploring customary or traditional dispute 

resolution practices and their relationship with formal justice 

mechanisms throughout its areas of work, including 

in Liberia, Sudan, Afghanistan, and Iraq. 

About the Author

Erica Gaston is a senior USIP program officer for rule of law 

in Yemen and Afghanistan, where she has been engaged in 

programming and research on tribal and alternative dispute 

resolution. Nadwa al-Dawsari is a conflict and civil society 

specialist and an expert on tribes and tribal customary law 

in Yemen. She is the founder of Partners Yemen and has 

extensive experience in developing and implementing 

programs in conflict-sensitive environments. 

2301 Constitution Ave., NW • Washington, DC 20037 • 202.457.1700 • fax 202.429.6063

Special Report 345 April 2014

© 2014 by the United States Institute of Peace. 

All rights reserved.

Contents

Introduction 2

Dispute Resolution Mechanisms in Yemen 3

Cooperation and Cross-Pollination 5

Changing Dynamics 8

Future Directions and Programming Options 11

Recommendations 15

Erica Gaston and Nadwa al-Dawsari

Dispute Resolution and 

Justice Provision in 

Yemen’s Transition

Summary

•	 Yemen has long had a vibrant tradition of community-based dispute resolution, particularly tribal dispute resolution, which has become even more dominant in the transition 

period that followed the 2011 Arab Spring protests. 

•	 As the Yemeni state has struggled to regain political equilibrium, rule of law has deteriorated and criminality and armed conflict have increased. State institutions have weakened and now struggle to meet citizens’ demands. 

•	 In response, citizens increasingly turn to traditional or community-based dispute resolution 

for their justice needs. In addition to long-standing actors or mechanisms, a number of new 

dispute resolution actors have emerged. Some areas have seen a retribalization, while in 

others, armed actors dominate. 

•	 Although alternative dispute resolution actors have been an important gap-filler during 

this time, they have also found their authority challenged. The political uncertainty and 

the rise in lawlessness have simultaneously weakened both formal and informal actors’ 

ability to resolve disputes sustainably and to prevent conflict. 

•	 The result has been more limited options for peaceful dispute resolution overall, which 

feeds instability and has the potential to exacerbate broader conflict dynamics and weaknesses in the rule of law. 

•	 Strengthening the options for lower level dispute resolution and conflict prevention are 

critical to restoring stability. Because of the centrality of these community-based justice 

mechanisms in Yemen, efforts to strengthen rule of law must take a more holistic view 

of justice provision to include these mechanisms and practices. 

•	 Program interventions should not preference or target one system over the other but 

instead take an integrated approach and consider the significant role that alternative 

dispute resolution plays.

United States Institute of Peace www.usip.org

SPECIAL REPORT
2 USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 345

•	 Critical elements include supporting greater understanding of and dialogue with dispute 

resolution actors, incorporating alternative dispute resolution into the justice sector 

strategy, and focusing on reforms and adaptions on both sides. 

Introduction

Traditional or customary dispute resolution—particularly tribal dispute resolution—has 

long been prevalent in Yemen. Official statistics are scarce, but an estimated 80 plus percent 

of Yemenis resolve disputes—from an individual murder to a tribal blood feud to a dispute 

over land or property to a car accident—outside the formal justice system.1

These alternative mechanisms have been playing an even more critical role in justice provision and conflict prevention since the transition period began. In theory, the post-Arab Spring 

transition in Yemen should have created opportunities for state institutions to strengthen and 

expand. The Gulf Cooperation Council agreement that ended the Arab Spring protests set a 

number of benchmarks for reforming the Yemeni government, including strengthening rights 

protection and law enforcement and improving the judiciary. However, although the transition 

period has so far involved substantial discussion of institutional reform, the promises have not 

yet materialized. In lieu of a period of statebuilding and greater rights protection, the period 

following the 2011 crisis has seen a fracturing of state control and weaker state institutions. 

As the Yemeni state has failed to reestablish political equilibrium, rule of law and security 

have deteriorated. 

Given the likely continued weakness of the state and formal justice mechanisms, most 

citizens are likely to go beyond the formal justice system for some time to come. Given the 

urgent need for solutions to gaps in Yemen’s rule of law sector, can more be done with these 

alternative dispute resolution (ADR) actors and traditions? 

Methodology and Terms

Since 2012, USIP has been engaged in research exploring how the post-Arab Spring transition has affected security and justice provision in Yemen, primarily funded by the Bureau 

of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs at the United States Department of 

State. In 2011 and 2012, USIP conducted a study of the impact of transition on rule of law 

in four governorates.2 In 2013 and 2014, USIP conducted a mapping of justice functioning

in ten governorates.3 Both of these studies gathered data about how local communities use 

nonstate or alternative dispute resolution in lieu of the formal sector and how such nonstate 

practices have changed in the last two years. In addition to these surveys, USIP conducted 

long-form interviews specific to this paper, including interviews with Yemeni judges, justice officials, and lawyers; tribal leaders, community elders, and others engaged in dispute 

resolution; and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and international donors who have 

engaged in conflict resolution programming. 

Because of the diversity of local practice, no single term accurately describes the 

entire spectrum of nonstate dispute resolution or arbitration. Common descriptors of such 

practices include customary justice, informal justice, alternative dispute resolution, tribal 

dispute resolution, traditional dispute resolution, and community-based dispute resolution. 

Deciding on one descriptor becomes particularly complex in Yemen. Although many dispute 

resolution mechanisms draw from long-standing traditions, norms are constantly evolving, 

as is the landscape of dispute resolution actors. This makes it difficult to describe them 

prima facie as traditional or customary. In addition, the dispute resolution spectrum is fluid, 

The views expressed in this report do not necessarily 

reflect the views of the United States Institute of Peace, 

which does not advocate specific policy positions.

To request permission to photocopy or reprint materials, 

e-mail: permissions@usip.org

About the Institute

The United States Institute of Peace is an independent, 

nonpartisan institution established and funded by Congress. 

Its goals are to help prevent and resolve violent conflicts, 

promote postconflict peacebuilding, and increase conflict 

management tools, capacity, and intellectual capital 

worldwide. The Institute does this by empowering others 

with knowledge, skills, and resources, as well as by its direct 

involvement in conflict zones around the globe.

Board of Directors

Stephen J. Hadley, (Chair), Principal, RiceHadleyGates, 

LLC, Washington, DC • George E. Moose (Vice Chair), 

Adjunct Professor of Practice, The George Washington University, Washington, DC • Judy Ansley, Former Assistant to 

the President and Deputy National Security Advisor under 

George W. Bush, Washington, DC • Eric Edelman, Hertog 

Distinguished Practitioner in Residence, Johns Hopkins 

School of Advanced International Studies, Washington, DC 

• Joseph Eldridge, University Chaplain and Senior Adjunct 

Professorial Lecturer, School of International Service, American University, Washington, DC • Kerry Kennedy, President, 

Robert F. Kennedy Center for Justice and Human Rights, 

Washington, DC • Ikram U. Khan, President, Quality Care 

Consultants, LLC., Las Vegas, NV • Stephen D. Krasner, 

Graham H. Stuart Professor of International Relations at 

Stanford University, Palo Alto, CA • John A. Lancaster, 

Former Executive Director, International Council on

Independent Living, Potsdam, NY • Jeremy A. Rabkin, 

Professor of Law, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA

• J. Robinson West, Chairman, PFC Energy, Washington, 

DC • Nancy Zirkin, Executive Vice President, Leadership 

Conference on Civil and Human Rights, Washington, DC 

Members Ex Officio

John Kerry, Secretary of State • Chuck Hagel, Secretary of 

Defense • Gregg F. Martin, Major General, U.S. Army; President, National Defense University • Kristin Lord, 

Acting President, United States Institute of Peace (nonvoting) 
USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 345	 3

and individuals may play a state and nonstate role concurrently. For the sake of simplicity, 

this paper will generically use the terms dispute resolution or alternative dispute resolution.

Dispute Resolution Mechanisms in Yemen

ADR has long played a significant role in meeting citizen demands for justice and conflict 

resolution in Yemen. This is not only because community-based or traditional dispute 

mechanisms have been in place for longer—and so are more trusted—but also because of 

the weakness of the formal system, even prior to this transition period. The state has long 

had a limited presence in much of the country. Insecurity, local conflicts, and difficult terrain, as well as social and economic barriers, poor literacy, and poor formal documentation 

make formal justice mechanisms inaccessible for much of the population. The judiciary’s 

reputation for corruption, weak enforcement, and slow decision making leads many citizens 

to strongly prefer other means of resolving disputes. 

Although the tribal system is the most common alternative to formal justice, tribal dispute resolution coexists with other types of ADR, including by local community or religious 

leaders, commercial practitioners, and state officials acting beyond their official duties. 

Tribal Dispute Resolution

Tribal structures in Yemen are strongest in the northern mountains and in the desert along 

the borders with Saudi Arabia, where the population historically belongs to the two major 

tribal confederations, the Hashid and Bakil. In the lower uplands around Taiz and Ibb, and 

along the Red Sea coast up through Hudeida, tribal traditions still exist and are dominant in 

some communities but are overall weaker than in the more northern areas.4

Tribal structures are weakest in south Yemen, particularly in Aden. This is in part due to differences in the terrain and economic resources: Tribes were never as strong here as elsewhere. 

In addition, the Socialist Party, which controlled South Yemen (People’s Democratic Republic of 

Yemen) from 1967 to 1989, took deliberate steps to undermine tribal structures and to increase 

the presence of and reliance on state mechanisms.5 The Marxist region that took over in South 

Yemen in 1976 severely condemned tribalism, perceiving it as synonymous with feudalism and 

as a competitor for state control. As a result, “village headmen, who owned no more than 

anyone else, were murdered by the state as ‘feudal landlords.’ In some cases, a person would 

‘disappear’ for the mere fault of tribalism.” 6 Land previously owned privately by tribal sheikhs 

or collectively owned by tribes was taken by the state. This undermined economic and political 

control by local actors and contributed to a weakened tribal system in those areas. 

Tribal ADR is also less prevalent in urban than in rural areas because urban areas tend to 

have some functioning formal justice mechanisms and other nontribal dispute resolution in 

place (such as commercial arbitration). Nonetheless, even in urban areas, many Yemenis still 

identify with their tribal heritage and may still use tribal customs to resolve their conflicts. 

This is particularly true in Sanaa, which is located in the predominantly tribal area. 

For centuries, the tribal system handled conflicts both among tribes and between tribes 

and the state. Tribal customary law tends to be the most sophisticated and well developed 

of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms in Yemen with detailed and, in some areas, 

partially codified rules addressing different kinds of disputes, processes for appeal, and 

specific enforcement measures. Typically, any low-level sheikh or social figure might deal 

with the initial stage of dispute resolution. Parties get to choose an arbitrator or arbitrators 

and agree on general principles and terms. Once the arbitration process has begun and a 

Insecurity, local conflicts, and 

difficult terrain, as well as 

social and economic barriers, 

poor literacy, and poor formal 

documentation make formal 

justice mechanisms inaccessible 

for much of the population. 
4 USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 345

decision is given, if one or both of the disputing parties rejects the decision, they have the 

option to appeal twice at two higher layers of tribal justice.7

The substance of these practices and procedures varies among tribes, geographic areas, 

communities, and even individual arbitrators. Disputants may choose an arbitrator because 

they agree with his approach to a particular type of issue or with his interpretation of tribal 

law. Thus, there is a level of voting with your feet and popular input into how tribal law 

is applied. Although well-established practices guide certain types of cases, the system is 

flexible enough for arbitrators to develop solutions for conflict emerging from development, 

the presence of corporations, or modern technology.

Tribal dispute resolution is used for all types of cases, from civil, commercial, and personal status issues to criminal justice, intertribal disputes, and conflict mediation.

8 Dispute 

resolution practices in other Islamic countries have often placed significance on the distinctions between haq al-abd (the rights of man) and haq al-illah (the rights of God) under 

Islamic law and argued that for this reason criminal matters should be left in the hands 

of the state.9 In Yemen, there is no general sense that arbitration should confine itself to 

certain types of cases. In fact, those questioned on this point tended to argue that criminal 

cases were more likely to be dealt with through tribal arbitration to contain blood feuds or 

other community repercussions.

Tribes are ultimately responsible for the actions of their members. This collective responsibility element is a strong mechanism for enforcement, though the disputing parties’ agreement to abide by the arbitrator’s decision and the in-kind or monetary guarantees taken are 

also important factors.10

Nontribal Dispute Resolution

Although tribal dispute resolution is the best known and most cohesive form of ADR in 

Yemen, other nontribal actors and practices are common, even in tribal areas. These include 

local community leaders (akls),11 local council members or leaders in a community, or government officials at a district or governorate level acting beyond their formal duties (for 

example, a district director or the governor). This community-level ADR tends to be ad hoc 

and does not follow consistent rules or patterns in the way that tribal ADR does. 

Local religious leaders are also involved in conflict resolution both in tribal areas and 

in more traditionally nontribal urban areas, such as Aden and Taiz.12 They frequently act as 

mediators rather than arbitrators, bringing conflict parties together and persuading them to go 

through a dispute resolution process.13 More broadly, religious leaders play a role in encouraging peaceful conflict resolution and reconciliation.

Finally, in the last decade, an increasing number of arbitrators or “arbitration houses” have 

emerged in urban areas, most focused on commercial matters. A smaller subset may handle 

other matters, such as child custody, family law issues, or land or property rights.

Formal Justice System

Finally, Yemen’s formal justice system is one option for disputants, if an increasingly small 

and unreliable one. Based on both sharia and civil law traditions, the court system consists 

of three tiers: courts of first instance, courts of appeal, and the supreme court.14 The justice system exists in all governorates but has a slim presence outside the main population 

centers. Criticisms of judges as corrupt, unqualified, or ineffective in enforcing the law are 

widespread. Law enforcement mechanisms are ineffective and weak, and case outcomes are 

highly subject to corruption and political interference.

Local religious leaders frequently 

act as mediators rather than 

arbitrators, bringing conflict 

parties together and persuading 

them to go through a dispute 

resolution process.
USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 345	 5

The formal justice system is particularly weak in areas with a strong tribal history and 

practice. For example, in the highly tribal governorate of Marib, only three primary courts 

have ever been established in its fourteen districts. Even in more developed governorates, some districts may remain disconnected from formal state services because they are 

heavily tribal. In USIP’s 2013–2014 study, areas of even the more developed governorates

of Hudeida, Taiz, and Sanaa included districts that were so heavily tribal that no court 

had ever been established or the court in that district only acted on a limited (primarily 

notary) basis.15

Reliance on formal justice mechanisms has been stronger in the nontribal, southern 

governorates, particularly Aden. But even in these governorates, systematic weaknesses in 

the justice system also lead many to resolve their disputes through alternative means. The 

weakness of the formal justice system since 2011 has made it even more of a last resort. 

Cooperation and Cross-Pollination

Cross-pollination and interaction is common between formal justice actors and the tribal 

sheikhs, community leaders, commercial arbitrators, or other actors engaged in ADR. Resolution tends to be fluid: A case may originate in tribal arbitration but later be appealed before 

a court or to commercial arbitration or some other combination of the different mechanisms. 

Resort to nonstate mediation or arbitration has been so common historically that it is 

officially recognized under Yemeni law. Although cross-pollination between these types of 

dispute resolution is enabled by Yemeni law, it is predominantly a product of the subordination of justice provision (whether formal or informal) to political actors and dynamics.

Formal Justice Cooperation Under the Arbitration Law

The Law on Judicial Power, which regulates courts, their composition and competence, recognizes that disputes may be resolved through alternative dispute mechanisms outside the 

court, within limitations stipulated under the arbitration law.16 Nonstate arbitration is not 

permitted for Hudud crimes, impeachment and prosecution of judges, matters relevant to 

Table 1. Who does the population turn to outside the state? 

In 2013, USIP researchers mapping how justice is working at a local level in ten governorates assessed 

to whom the population would most likely turn if they wanted to resolve a dispute outside the court: 

Abyan: Popular Committees, to a small extent sheiks

Aden: akls, prominent social figures (political, intellectual)

Hadramawt: akls, sheikhs 

Hudeida: sheikhs, religious leaders

Ibb: akls and religious leaders in the city center, primarily sheikhs elsewhere

Lahj: akls, sheikhs

Mareb: sheikhs

Sanaa: sheikhs and religious leaders

Shabwa: sheikhs

Taiz: sheikhs, prominent social figures (religious, political, intellectual) 

Reliance on formal justice 

mechanisms has been stronger 

in the nontribal, southern 

governorates, particularly Aden. 

But even in these governorates, 

systematic weaknesses in the 

justice system also lead many 

to resolve their disputes through 

alternative means.
6 USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 345

the public order, among others—though in practice neither observance of these limitations 

nor enforcement by the state is evident.17

The arbitration law stipulates that the decision should be documented and the final 

signed by both parties as well as by the arbitrators. In practice no enforcement mechanisms 

for these provisions appear to exist. Official registry of dispute resolution with the state 

is uncommon. (None were identified in this research.) The law itself is vague and does not 

enumerate what such a process should be.

Judges, lawyers, and government officials interviewed for this report almost universally 

noted that under the Yemeni arbitration law, decisions reached through alternative dispute 

resolution are given the same weight as those reached in the court of first instance.18

Decisions can be appealed to the court of appeals, though in practice this is less common than appeal within the tribal system. Under article 53, an arbitration verdict can be 

appealed if the procedures taken or the original agreement were incorrect or invalid, if one 

of the parties is deemed to be incapacitated or not competent under law, if the mediators 

selected did not meet the terms of the agreement, or if a decision overstepped the stipulated terms or mandate.19 The appeal is classified as a civil matter, regardless of whether 

the case is criminal.20 Finally, an arbitration decision and its award may be set aside if it 

violates Islamic law or the public order (undefined), either by appeal from one of the parties 

or by the decision of the court of appeal without a request.21

In practice, members of the legal profession frequently describe ADR positively. It is seen 

as a way to lighten the caseload from the formal system and to prevent and resolve conflict in 

ways the formal system cannot. Yemeni government officials, particularly those who identify 

as tribal, sometimes act beyond their official capacity to resolve disputes among citizens. 

Local governance or justice officials frequently have a strong relationship with sheikhs or other 

dispute resolution actors in communities. Many judges unofficially or informally encourage disputants to resolve cases out of court. Some even argue that it is their duty to moot this option 

because Yemeni law permitting parties to resolve disputes outside the courts. 

In some cases, cooperation between dispute resolution actors and courts can affect the 

formal justice system verdict. In 2007 in Shabwa, for example, a conflict between two subtribes from Aal Baras led to the death of five people from one subtribe. When the case was 

taken to court, the court found that ten people were guilty and sentenced seven of them to 

death. Elders from the two subtribes feared that implementing the court sentence might lead 

to revenge killings. After much negotiation, the conflict parties agreed to implement the death 

sentence on five of the seven. The number of those who were killed from both tribes was thus 

equal, which ended the conflict and the risk of future revenge killings.22

More infrequently, cases may also go from the informal to the formal system when the 

nonstate dispute resolution has failed. In one 2012 case from Marib governorate, a recurring 

conflict between the tribes of Aal Ghanem and Aal Janah led to the injury of members from 

both tribes. Local sheikhs who were tired of handling the numerous conflicts convinced the 

parties to go to court and took guarantees from them to ensure that they would follow the 

court’s ruling. 

Although relations between the formal justice sector and tribal dispute resolution actors 

are frequently constructive, they are not without tension. Local sheikhs pressure judges to 

decide cases outside the court system or to have cases decided in their favor. In the course 

of USIP’s 2013–14 research, courtstaff in nearly all ten governorates noted some example of

intimidation by sheikhs. This ranged from appearing at court with armed men and threatening the judge or prosecutor either implicitly or directly to threats against disputants outside 

Judges, lawyers, and government 

officials interviewed for this 

report almost universally 

noted that under the Yemeni 

arbitration law, decisions 

reached through alternative 

dispute resolution are given the 

same weight as those reached in 

the court of first instance.
USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 345	 7

the court. For example, one prosecutor attached to an urban court in Taiz recounted an 

incident in which a prominent local sheikh went to the head of the prosecutor’s office and 

warned him not to release a person being detained “because this would result in murder.” 

The prosecutor interpreted this as a threat to both himself and the detainee. In several of 

the governorates, court staff noted judges who were transferred or penalized (not given 

promotion or raises) after ruling against the interests of powerful sheikhs or political figures. 

A lawyer from Hudeida noted that he had received death threats when he tried to represent 

clients in tribal areas because it was seen as going against the local sheikh’s authority. 

Cooperation Between Dispute Resolution Actors

Cooperation between other types of actors who engage in dispute resolution is also significant, if ad hoc. Religious leaders may act as a liaison between tribal and state actors or 

between tribal and other community actors. In recent years, some of the arbitration houses 

have begun devoting a great deal of time to mediating between sectors of dispute resolution. Some of these may have tribal ties and act as intermediaries either between tribal 

entities and the formal sector or between tribal entities and commercial interests. 

At a local level, community leaders may mediate between communities and formal justice 

actors. USIP’s 2013–14 judicial mapping found that in many governorates or districts where

the state is weak, akls are responsible for delivering court summons or other official documents to the relevant actors in a community—functions that normally might be taken on 

by judicial police or other state officials. 

Politics by Another Name

This level of fluidity between types of dispute resolution is in large part because all justice 

provision in Yemen—whether through the formal system or through ADR practices—tends 

to be used as an extension of political control and authority. The military philosopher 

Carl von Clausewitz was famous for observing that “war is the continuation of politics by 

another means.” In Yemen, dispute resolution is the continuation of politics by another 

means. Local political actors and informal power brokers (from sheikhs to local businessmen) 

frequently try to subvert or control different types of dispute resolution—whether formal 

justice processes, tribal arbitration, or other ADR mechanisms. The Yemeni judiciary has 

long been treated as an extension of the executive branch. Under the former president, Ali 

Abdullah Saleh, this situation was particularly acute. Saleh acted as head of the Supreme 

Judicial Council, which sits at the apex of the judiciary. Military and security actors loyal 

to the regime were appointed as judges despite having no legal background. Judges were 

transferred, removed, or disciplined for rulings against the interests of powerful local or 

national figures. 

The overlap between political control and control of justice outcomes is not limited to 

formal justice provision. Dispute resolution is tightly connected to the political authority of 

a sheikh, local community leader, or leader of an armed group. The ability to mediate conflicts or resolve disputes, and to have decisions abided by, both stems from and reinforces 

existing political or military control. 

Political actors also frequently attempt to co-opt tribal actors or other ADR mechanisms, 

and thus any nonstate mediation or arbitration practices in which they are engaged. For 

example, in addition to trying to control the judiciary, Saleh made deliberate attempts to 

co-opt and control tribal actors. At a local level, examples of local political leaders attempting to do the same are numerous and frequent. 

Dispute resolution is tightly 

connected to the political 

authority of a sheikh, local 

community leader, or leader 

of an armed group. The ability 

to mediate conflicts or resolve 

disputes stems from and 

reinforces existing political 

or military control. 
8 USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 345

Changing Dynamics

Evolving conflict and political dynamics in the past several decades, and particularly since 

the 2011 crisis, have disrupted many long-standing patterns and practices of dispute resolution. Changing conflict and socioeconomic dynamics have weakened the authority of tribal 

structures and traditions. Meanwhile, the political uncertainty and weakened rule of law that 

have followed the 2011 crisis have allowed new actors to emerge. Citizens are increasingly 

resorting to their own means or turning to new power brokers or armed groups for dispute 

resolution. 

Erosion of the Tribal System

Over the last several decades, Yemen’s tribal system has weakened significantly. Conflicts 

have grown increasingly complex in both their geographic spread and nature, making it difficult for a single sheikh to resolve disputes or to ensure that any decisions are enforced. 

Militant and criminal groups have also risen in number in tribal areas. This not only increases 

the number of disputes or conflicts overall but also means that more of the conflicting 

parties are those over whom tribal actors have little control because militant groups and 

criminals are less likely to respect or respond to tribal authority. 

Militant and criminal groups have begun directly targeting sheikhs. Several high-profile 

assassinations and attacks on sheikhs in governorates like Marib and al-Jawf attributed to 

al-Qaeda affiliates have had a chilling effect, making sheikhs less likely to intervene to try 

to stop al-Qaeda or other criminal activities. These assassinations and targeting also make 

sheikhs appear weak. It is taken as evidence of their inability to confront local security 

threats and thus reduces their perceived authority in other spheres. 

Changing political and social dynamics have also undermined respect for sheikhs. Under 

Saleh, sheikhs were co-opted, provided with high salaries and other benefits in exchange for 

loyalty to the regime. As sheikhs spent more time in Sanaa and—with new sources of wealth 

and influence—became less accountable to the population, the credibility of tribal leadership overall was affected.23 Many residents in tribal areas who traditionally relied almost 

solely on sheikhs for dispute resolution and other services now view them with greater 

mistrust, as corrupt and unable or unwilling to address their concerns.24

Increased urbanization and changing migration patterns have altered traditional power 

structures in some tribal areas. Worsening overall socioeconomic conditions, high unemployment, and increasing poverty have contributed to many conflicts over resources and livelihoods. Because these stem from deeper structural issues in Yemen—rather than personal 

conflicts that might be resolved solely through mediation—sheikhs are often unable to resolve 

them in a sustainable way. This has decreased confidence in sheikhs’ ability to mediate disputes and to meet popular demands, which over time has decreased their overall authority. 

Many of those interviewed noted that even within predominantly tribal areas, they have 

seen a decline in sheikhs’ authority. Tribal practices and traditions that have enabled conflict 

resolution are more widely disrespected. For example, tribal principles that forbid violence 

in public places and against those in the company of women or children have increasingly 

been disregarded. Traditionally, tribal arbitrators or mediators are considered immune from 

attack. In recent years, however, the number of reported incidents of sheikhs being killed 

during mediation has risen.25

Declining respect for tribal principles of ‘urf and for tribal authorities is particularly 

acute among youth. Close to half of the Yemeni population are under the age of fifteen and 

another third make up its youth cohort (age fifteen to twenty-nine), so this challenge is 

likely to increase over time.

26

Traditionally, tribal arbitrators 

or mediators are considered 

immune from attack. In recent 

years, however, the number 

of reported incidents of 

sheikhs being killed during 

mediation has risen.
USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 345	 9

Because of all these factors, sheikhs are less willing or able to intervene in conflicts 

than they once were. In addition, as a result of this decreased authority and other economic factors, the transactional costs of using the tribal system are rising. Typically, 

tribal arbitration mechanisms demand up-front guarantees from the conflicting sides 

in the form of either money or valuable assets. In the last decade, the cost of these 

guarantees vis-à-vis the value of the assets in dispute or the overall economic conditions 

has increased significantly. Weaker overall respect for tribal arbitration has lowered the 

social and reputational costs of defaulting, so more money has to be demanded instead 

to guarantee enforcement. The rising costs may in some cases be due to growing corruption in the tribal system. Whether due to corruption or a legitimate need for greater 

enforcement leverage, many are no longer able to afford the cost of tribal ADR.27 As one 

prominent social leader argued, “The money people spend for arbitration costs more than 

the land they have a dispute over.” 28

Because of the higher costs and the inability of sheikhs to fully contain some threats 

(such as from criminal or terrorist groups), calls for state justice and security intervention 

in tribal areas are stronger than in the past. 

Emergence of New Actors

The transition period has also led to significant changes in dispute resolution dynamics, weakening the formal justice sector and giving rise to new actors and practices of ADR. 

The popular protests that erupted in early 2011 triggered violence and civil unrest across 

the country. In many areas, the formal justice system was effectively halted for more than 

a year and still struggles to return to pre-2011 levels of operability. USIP’s mapping study 

found that in 2013, of the ten governorates surveyed, courts were often closed 20 percent of 

the time due to increased insecurity, strikes, and political disobedience.29 In governorates 

like Hadramawt, Hudeida, Ibb, and Lahj—which previously had relatively functional judicial 

systems—spreading insecurity and a higher than average level of strikes may have led to 

many courts being closed 60 percent of the time. 

The impact of this decline in state law enforcement and judicial functions in terms of 

meeting citizen demands for justice is illustrated by the decline in new cases over this 

period. In Aden, which has long had the highest number of cases per capita, the number of 

new cases brought in 2013 decreased 44 percent since 2010 (from 12,239 to 6,640).30 In 

Sanaa city, it decreased 41 percent (from 22,995 to 12,871), and in Taiz, 35 percent (from

13,032 to 8,464).31

Instead of bringing matters to the courts, citizens are increasingly taking matters into 

their own hands or turning to nonstate power brokers to resolve disputes. Many areas that 

previously did not have strong levels of tribal arbitration have seen retribalization in the 

wake of the formal system’s virtual collapse in 2011.In Taiz, sheikhs, supported by relatively 

well-armed and organized tribal armed groups, played a strong role in the 2011 protests and 

in securing parts of Taiz in the absence of state control. Those factors, combined with the 

weakening of the Taiz judicial and enforcement mechanisms, has led many more citizens to 

turn to sheikhs to resolve conflicts.32 This trend has as much to do with sheikhs’ ability to 

enforce their decisions as with the weakening of the judicial system.33

What is notable about retribalization is not that citizens turn to tribal actors—after all, 

tribal elements have always existed in nearly all governorates in Yemen. It is that citizens 

who do not primarily identify as tribal or who might have relied on state mechanisms are 

now increasingly turning to tribal actors because the state structures can no longer meet 

their needs. This has been happening not only in Taiz but also in Lahj and Hudeida, for 

example.34

The transactional costs of using 

the tribal system are rising... 

many are no longer able to 

afford the cost of tribal ADR.
10 USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 345

Retribalization is but one of the examples of increasing resort to nonstate actors. In 

Aden, retribalization has been less of a phenomenon (although for certain types of disputes—particularly over land—sheikhs from nearby Abyan and Shabwa governorates have 

been asked to intercede). Instead, throughout much of 2011 and 2012, residents relied 

heavily on akls. In neighborhoods where the protests were the strongest, they turned to 

youth leaders who were prominent in the 2011 protest movement or to opposition leaders 

affiliated with al-Hiraak. Religious leaders (particularly the Salafis) have also been playing 

a greater facilitating role.35 “People created these alternatives because justice and security 

deteriorated,” noted Shafee Alabd, a prominent activist and civil society leader in Aden.36

Civil society activists interviewed noted that although it was good that these alternatives 

were available, some of the new ADR actors were themselves the source of conflicts, and thus 

their empowerment was not necessarily a positive development.37 In addition, unlike much 

of tribal ADR, these ADR mechanisms tend to be based only on oral agreement and are not 

deeply vested in local social constructs, so they are highly vulnerable to default. 

The increased prominence of other nontribal local community actors or political figures in 

ADR is not limited to Aden. During the 2011 crisis and for some time after, youth leaders played 

a more prominent role in ADR and mediation in some parts of Taiz. The increased prominence 

of local community actors and akls in dispute resolution was also noted during USIP’s mapping 

study in Lahj, in the more urban areas of Ibb (the rural areas turn more to tribal actors), and 

in Hadramawt. 

Finally, given the breakdown in rule of law and increasing levels of violence across the 

country, armed actors are becoming more dominant, including in dispute resolution. Citizens 

turn to prominent local armed groups—sheikhs, armed factions of political parties, locally 

supported armed groups, and other power brokers—for dispute resolution because they are 

able to enforce decisions. For example, much of Abyan, parts of which were taken over by the 

al-Qaeda-affiliated Ansar as-Sharia (AAS) militant group in 2011, remains in the control of 

the so-called Popular Committees—locally supported, largely pro-government armed groups 

that helped drive AAS out in 2012. Although akls or majeles ahlia (community leaders, not 

usually part of armed groups) mediate some disputes, most other cases tend to be handled 

by Popular Committees because they have the power to enforce their decision making.38 This 

is particularly true of criminal cases or issues between armed groups. 

Peaceful Dispute Resolution Compromised

USIP’s research sampled these trends in only ten governorates, but increasing resort to ADR 

appears to be a widespread phenomenon across Yemen. Although not entirely negative (many 

citizens have long preferred nonstate mechanisms), there are some drawbacks. First, though in 

many cases citizens are happy not to have to deal with the state, many of those interviewed 

were concerned that they did not have the option of doing so. They resorted to nonstate actors 

because they had no choice. Access to justice or different options for justice however defined, 

is unquestionably limited in this period. 

Second, even though many citizens prefer nonstate mechanisms, the success and sustainability of ADR decisions is less likely in this period. As noted earlier, increasingly complex 

conflict dynamics and socioeconomic changes had already eroded traditional structures like 

the tribal system before 2011. The political uncertainty and weaker rule of law since then have 

further undermined local community structures. The Arab Spring protests and the resulting 

removal of Ali Abdullah Saleh was a seismic shift in the political system, upending the power 

balance between Yemen’s key power brokers and factions and causing ripple effects in both formal and informal channels. ADR works best and is most likely to result in sustainable solutions 

Armed actors are becoming 

more dominant, including in 

dispute resolution. Citizens 

turn to prominent local armed 

groups—sheikhs, armed factions 

of political parties, locally 

supported armed groups, and 

other power brokers—for dispute 

resolution because they are able 

to enforce decisions.
USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 345	 11

when it is anchored in and enforced by local social hierarchies and contexts. In the post-Arab 

Spring transition period, those hierarchies and structures have been shattered. At the same 

time, the security vacuum in many areas has given even more breathing space to criminal, terrorist, and other armed groups who often challenge or intimidate local leaders, both tribal and 

nontribal. Together, the political uncertainty and the security vulnerability make traditional 

patterns of authority more open to challenge and more likely to fluctuate. 

These two factors have created a much more tenuous situation for ADR actors who wish 

to contribute to lower levels of conflict at a community level. It is more difficult for them 

to command the authority needed to reconcile parties or to enforce a decision. Where they 

do intercede, decisions are more vulnerable to default.

Thus, at the same time that state rule of law and enforcement structures are at a nadir, 

the authority of tribal and other community actors is also weak. Citizens’ ability to resolve 

disputes or to prevent conflict from developing has been eroded. This carries serious potential to feed instability and larger conflict dynamics. 

Future Directions and Programming Options

Absent stronger leadership and control from the state, the deteriorating security and poor 

law enforcement that have been a hallmark of the transition period seems likely to continue. 

The current transitional government is weak, divided, and hampered by continuing political 

uncertainty. Rather than emerging with a unified consensus on the way forward, the Yemeni 

government emerged from the National Dialogue Conference—the flagship of the transition 

process—as divided as ever. At the time of writing it was not clear whether the many positive resolutions—including those related to judicial reform—would actually be implemented.

Given that justice institutions are not yet at 2010 operating levels, the next step of 

addressing the plethora of access, corruption, and capacity issues that have long plagued 

the Yemeni justice system—and led many citizens to prefer ADR—seems unlikely in the near 

future. Rule of law and the formal justice sector will likely remain weak for some time to 

come. Nonstate dispute resolution will thus continue to be the only reliable alternative for 

communities. This raises the question of what types of engagement might be possible with 

regard to ADR actors to help support justice provision in Yemen.

Programming and Engagement to Date

Research and programming with ADR actors in Yemen has been limited so far. To the extent 

that it has taken place, research and programming have focused on tribal actors’ engagement 

from a conflict resolution framework, rather exploring their role in dispute resolution as it 

contributes to justice provision. Exploration of nontribal ADR has barely happened at all. 

Activities have tended to fall into one of three categories: pure research and assessment, 

training aimed at tribal sheikhs or dispute resolution actors, and on a more limited basis 

trying to develop or create dispute resolution mechanisms. Within the first category, some 

conflict assessments and research have explored the role of ADR in preventing, mitigating, 

or helping resolve local conflicts. Of note, in 2008, the Adventist Development and Relief 

Agency developed a reference guide to local terminologies used in local conflicts in the 

districts of Barat Almarashi and Munabeh districts in al-Jawf and Saadah.39 Other actors 

have engaged in more context- or program-specific mapping or research before beginning 

projects or activities in a community. In 2013, the United Nations Development Programme 

undertook an extensive mapping of the informal system, not limited to dispute resolution. 

At the time of writing, however, it has not yet been published. 

The security vacuum in many 

areas has given even more 

breathing space to criminal, 

terrorist, and other armed 

groups who often challenge 

or intimidate local leaders...

the political uncertainty and 

the security vulnerability make 

traditional patterns of authority 

more open to challenge and 

more likely to fluctuate. 
12 USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 345

Beyond pure research, or assessments, several organizations have sponsored conferences 

or symposiums to explore the role of sheikhs or other nonstate actors in conflict resolution. 

For example, Germany’s Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ, formerly GTZ) 

supported a series of reports, articles, and small workshops to better understand Yemeni 

approaches to peaceful conflict resolution, their underlying principles and values, and differences with Western approaches.40 In 2010 and 2011, Partners Yemen conducted two 

symposiums bringing together key justice sector representatives and sheikhs from Marib and 

Shabwa to discuss ways in which the tribal system could support development and security 

in tribal areas.41

Training has also been a significant category of programming, from training on Yemeni 

or international law to gender sensitivity training to conflict resolution and mediation techniques. Dar As-Salam, a local NGO, engages a network of more than three thousand sheikhs 

and religious figures in direct mediation and awareness-raising activities that attempt to 

reduce levels of violence and mitigate the impact of revenge killing and tribal conflicts.42

Human rights groups have also frequently provided human rights training to tribal sheikhs 

because tribal ADR has a reputation for reaching decisions that violate women’s rights or the 

rights of other marginalized groups and that reinforce discriminatory practices or customs. 

On a limited basis, some organizations have tried to create conflict resolution mechanisms to improve access to and the success of peaceful dispute resolution in a community. 

In one such project, respected local tribal mediators in a community were brought together 

with other actors (local council members, youth leaders, and some civil society figures), 

provided training in conflict resolution techniques and other issues, and encouraged to work 

together to resolve local conflicts. These councils also had some development funding at 

their disposal. In general, these projects were funded for only a year, much of which was 

spent identifying community actors, building trust, and forming the councils. The model, 

those involved argued, would have had more of an impact if it had been supported for a 

longer period. 

Another local NGO (supported by an international donor) developed a project to improve 

linkages between formal justice actors and tribal or other alternative dispute resolution 

actors. Among other components, it would have first trained nonstate actors on correct ways 

of recording the outcome of a dispute and then worked with them to have the final outcome 

registered with the local justice system.43 The project fell apart before it was launched, 

however, because of a management issue early on. 

Future Programming

Promising work remains to be done on dispute resolution mechanisms given the high 

demand for nonstate dispute resolution and the fluid relationship between the formal and 

informal systems. Nonetheless, much more learning and dialogue is needed before constructive pathways can be found. Experiences from previous programming in Yemen, as well as 

similar dilemmas and dynamics in other countries, offer some cautions and caveats on how 

to approach such programming. 

Local context

Where ADR works well, it tends to be either because it is deeply rooted in local cultural 

traditions and community mores and derives legitimacy and enforcement from those traditions or because of the strong personality and reputation of the local actors involved (if not 

a combination of both). Because of these reasons, developing successful models depends 

highly on understanding the local context and actors involved, often down to the immediWhere ADR works well, it 

tends to be either because it is 

deeply rooted in local cultural 

traditions and community 

mores and derives legitimacy 

and enforcement from those 

traditions or because of the 

strong personality and reputation 

of the local actors involved (if 

not a combination of both).
USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 345	 13

ate neighborhood or village level. Any programming must be based on an advance in-depth 

assessment of the local dynamics and practices. 

This local context analysis is important not only for projects that seek to engage with 

ADR actors and practices (for example, developing or supporting local councils directly) but 

also for training and outreach programming. Trainings designed independently of the specific local context and background run the risk of community blowback. For example, NGOs 

interviewed feared that programs that promoted Western rights paradigms without working 

within or contextualizing vis-à-vis existing traditions created the unintended consequence 

of pushing communities further away from the Yemeni state or from a human rights-based 

conception of law.

Longer timelines

The personality-driven and context-specific nature of dispute resolution mechanisms, particularly in tribal areas, may require a longer period of research and trust-building. Projects 

have tended to be short, typically a year or less, without any renewal option. One year was 

typically enough time to identify key actors, build relationships, and begin to change attitudes or to sensitize communities to different approaches but not enough time to significantly change structures, traditions, and relationships of much longer historical duration. 

The longer timelines required should act as a check against the idea that existing nonstate dispute resolution can be a short-term gap-filler for problems in the formal justice 

system. Establishing relationships with, or correcting practices within, ADR mechanisms can 

take as long as addressing problems within state institutions. 

Scaling project objectives

Because these systems are so personality based and so tailored to local context, it may be 

difficult to scale any model developed to a national level. Yemen is diverse, and the dynamics 

of ADR differ from one area of the country to another, between urban and rural areas, and 

even from one community to another. Efforts to improve access to justice or rights compliance 

may be possible in one area but not in another. Also, given available resources and the time 

involved in molding a program to the specific local context, they may be possible in only a few 

areas. Although there has not been a sufficient level of programming to test this scalability 

problem in Yemen, similar dynamics in other countries offer cautionary indicators. For example, 

in Afghanistan, where engagement with informal mechanisms (for either justice or stabilization needs) has been tested at a much broader level, models developed successfully at a local 

level proved difficult to scale countrywide or even regionally with the same effects.44 Due 

to this scalability issue program, interventions motivated by a desire to have a large-scale 

impact on a sectoral level (for example, viewing ADR as a substitute for a functioning formal 

justice sector) may be difficult to accomplish. 

Better fit with objectives

Future projects may also want to pay closer attention to the fit between the activities and 

the problem being addressed. In the past, those engaged in these programs found that the 

source of the disputes was frequently larger structural issues (for example, lack of development, economic, or resource dilemmas). Programs that attempted to address recurrent 

conflict with training or additional resources alone did not get to the root of the problem 

and created bad perceptions among the target audience. Beneficiaries of such trainings have 

grown tired of the same sort of activities without any meaningful results for the problems 

that most concern them. A female civil society activist who engaged in many of the human 

Yemen is diverse, and the 

dynamics of ADR differ from 

one area of the country to 

another...Efforts to improve 

access to justice or rights 

compliance may be possible in 

one area but not in another.
14 USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 345

rights who and conflict resolution trainings noted that “tribal people, community leaders...

they’re fatigued of being ‘trained.’” 45

Programming has also frequently tried to change the awareness and attitudes of sheikhs 

or local leaders to influence the outcome of ADR decisions to be more compliant with Yemeni 

or international legal standards—for example, providing training to sheikhs on women’s rights 

in an effort to reduce discriminatory practices. Although deeper assessments and longitudinal 

studies were lacking, the experience of those engaged in such trainings in the past suggested 

that education alone was not enough to change the behavior of these local leaders. Societal 

pressure to do so was critical. Because these community actors may be more responsive to 

demands from their communities than to external actors, strategies that engage the entire 

community, including sheikhs or community leaders, may be more effective.

Conflict dynamics

The constantly evolving conflict and political dynamics in Yemen can challenge traditional 

ADR practices in ways that are harmful to peaceful dispute resolution or do not reflect 

community perceptions of justice. This is frequently a problem where armed groups become 

prominent in local ADR. Because armed actors’ position vis-à-vis ADR is by virtue of their 

political control or physical coercion (rather than community legitimacy or specialization 

in tribal codes or other sources of knowledge), when the power balance fluctuates, all of 

the ADR agreements negotiated by that armed actor may be void, leading to the renewal 

of local conflicts and disputes. In addition, where militia groups appear to have captured 

the political space and are engaged in ADR, dispute resolution is frequently accompanied by 

reports of abuse of power. Programming in these contexts risks unintentionally empowering 

or supporting these actors, thus legitimizing negative power dynamics or restricting access 

to justice. For this reason, donors should be extremely cautious about engaging with ADR 

in these environments, and certainly not without extensive and continuous appraisal of the 

local conflict dynamics.

In other countries, ADR actors have been envisioned as a potential counter to militant, 

terrorist, or criminal groups in areas beyond the state’s control.46 Given the security dynamics and gaps in state control, it is easy to imagine a similar objective for ADR engagement in 

Yemen. However, studies of similar dynamics in other countries caution against this: Nonmilitarized, traditional civilian actors are generally powerless to temper the negative reach of armed 

groups.47 As witnessed with the targeting of sheikhs in places like Marib, those who challenge 

these actors’ authority—even on a dispute resolution basis—are more likely to be killed or 

silenced, chilling the potential for alternative civilian sources of authority for some time. 

Legal framework

One tempting direction for future work is to build on existing connections between the 

formal sector and ADR actors. The Yemeni legal system, through its arbitration law, offers 

baseline recognition for disputes resolved outside the formal system. That this legal baseline and relationship already exists enables more dialogue and discussion between the two 

sectors. This could in turn lead to an accepted practice of law that takes a more holistic 

approach to justice provision, perhaps integrating more of the advantages of local practices 

but going further than existing practice in allowing practical rights of appeal or other alternatives to engaging in ADR. 

The benefits of such formal-informal cooperation has its limits, however. A frequent programmatic response in such situations is to try to further clarify the relationship between 

formal and informal justice provision in law—for example, delineating the jurisdictional 

Because armed actors’ position 

vis-à-vis ADR is by virtue of 

their political control or physical 

coercion...when the power 

balance fluctuates, all of the 

ADR agreements negotiated by 

that armed actor may be void, 

leading to the renewal of local 

conflicts and disputes.
USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 345	 15

boundaries of ADR in positive law or formalizing the relationship through specific fusion 

mechanisms. Overlegalizing the relationship between ADR and the formal system can 

backfire. Local communities often value these alternative processes precisely for their flexibility and adaptability to local norms. Although yet untried in Yemen, efforts to increase 

jurisdictional limitations on ADR and to formalize nonstate dispute resolution practices in 

law has had negative results in Liberia and Sudan.48 One study of such strategies in Sudan 

noted that these efforts limited the flexibility and perceived local fairness of customary 

justice and ran the risk of enshrining one group’s interpretation of local justice in law at the 

expense of others.49

Recommendations

By both preference and necessity, the majority of the population will continue to rely on ADR 

for some time. It could take decades for formal justice institutions to expand services and 

meet popular expectations. Consideration of nonstate justice provision is therefore essential 

in any engagement with rule of law and justice provision in Yemen. However, engagement 

with ADR should not be viewed as a quick alternative or a substitute to long-term formal 

justice investment. Improving justice outcomes for the population and building rule of law 

institutions in Yemen requires the engagement of both formal and informal stakeholders, 

but in either case it is a long-term process. Program interventions should not preference or 

target one system over the other but instead take an integrated, long-term approach. 

A number of elements are critical:

•	 Supporting greater documentation, research, and understanding of dispute resolution 

mechanisms, particularly the impact of changing political and security dynamics on these 

practices. 

•	 Encouraging dialogue between dispute resolution actors, the formal sector, and civil society. 

Over time this may contribute to stronger coordination and rights protection based on mutual 

social reinforcement. 

•	 Being cautious of turning to nonstate actors and dispute resolution mechanisms as a 

substitute for the formal system or as a tool for stabilization. 

•	 Ensuring that any outreach, education, or linkages efforts with dispute resolution mechanisms 

allow for substantial variation at both a regional and local level. Programs that succeed in 

one area may fail in another. Extensive research and assessment of each context is crucial to 

determine the most appropriate interventions for each local context. 

•	 Integrating alternative dispute resolution within justice sector assessments, program 

design, implementation, and evaluation. Dispute resolution should not be treated as a 

separate set of program interventions but instead incorporated into the general justice 

sector strategy. 

•	 Approaching rights education and awareness with dispute resolution actors or traditional 

leaders as one component (and an important target group) in a broader legal awareness 

strategy, rather than as a way to reform the outcome of dispute resolution decisions as a 

whole in the short term. 

•	 Focusing, when efforts to develop linkages or relationship between the formal system 

and dispute resolution are attempted, on reforms or adaptations on both sides. Particular 

attention should be given to how the formal justice sector can better support ADR actors 

to reduce conflict, a frequent request of those interviewed. 

Consideration of nonstate justice 

provision is essential in any 

engagement with rule of law 

and justice provision in Yemen. 

Improving justice outcomes for 

the population and building 

rule of law institutions in 

Yemen requires the engagement 

of both formal and informal 

stakeholders. 

USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 345	 17

Note

1. Laila Al-Zwaini, The Rule of Law in Yemen: Prospects and Challenges (The Hague: HiiL Rule of Law Quick Scan 

Series, September 2012), 50, www.hiil.org/data/sitemanagement/media/QuickScan_Yemen_071212_DEF.pdf; 

HiiL Innovating Justice, “Building Rule of Law in Yemen: A Need for More Focus on Informal Justice Processes,” 

www.hiil.org/insight/builiding-rule-of-law-in-yemen-a-need-for-more-focus-on-informal-justice-processes.

2. Erica Gaston and Nadwa al-Dawsari, “Waiting for Change: The Impact of Transition on Local Justice and Security 

in Yemen,” Peaceworks no. 85, United States Institute of Peace, April 2013.

3. Erica Gaston and Nadwa al-Dawsari, “Local Justice in Transition,” United States Institute of Peace, forthcoming 

spring 2014, copy on file with authors.

4. 	 Elham Manae, “Yemen, the Tribe and the State,” Albab, June 25, 2007, www.al-bab.com/yemen/soc/manea1.

htm#before.

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid.

7. More experienced sheikhs, of a level that would deal with appeals, are often referred to as azzawaya. 

8. Yehya Almawri, “Role of Tribal Traditions in Promoting Stability and Development” (paper presented at the 

Symposium on Reviving the Tahjeer Traditions as a Tool to Reinforce Rule of Law Efforts, Sanaa, March 22–23, 2011).

9. For example, in Afghanistan, this concept has morphed into a common interpretation that criminal cases should 

be left to the state, not to the informal sector. This division of labor is widely espoused by both tribal leaders 

and state officials in Afghanistan but in practice is frequently violated.

10. Nadwa al-Dawsari, “Tribal Governance and Stability in Yemen” (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for 

International Peace, 2012), http://carnegieendowment.org/files/yemen_tribal_governance.pdf. 

11. Akls also often take on community service functions, such as raising issues with power cuts, shortage of water 

supply, and other services. In some areas, akls may have some more formal deputization and relationship with 

the government, including modest financial stipends. 

12. In tribal areas, religious leaders are involved in arbitration only if they have status or experience as tribal 

arbitrators in addition to their religious orientation. Local Aden leaders and civil society activists, meeting, 

February 7, 2012, Sanaa.

13. 	 Abdullah al-Aqeeli, interview, February 4, 2012, Sanaa; Shawqi al-Qadhi, member of parliament and religious

leader, interview, January 30, 2013, Sanaa. 

14. 	 Laila al-Zwaini, Rule of Law.

15. Courts operating on a limited basis appeared to be open only part of the time, or were predominantly dealing 

with administrative or notary functions rather than, for example, criminal cases or complex property disputes. 

Although this was sometimes due to lack of resources and poor performance by personnel, in the heavily tribal 

districts it appeared primarily due lack of demand. Erica Gaston and Nadwa al-Dawsari, “Justice in Transition or 

Justice in Decline,” 2014, copy on file with author.

16. Al-Zwaini, Rule of Law, pp. 21, 44–46.

17. Yemeni law codifies seven hudûd crimes: revolt (baghy), apostasy from Islam (ridda), armed robbery (hirâba), 

theft (sariqa), unlawful intercourse (zinâ), false accusation of unlawful intercourse (qadhf), and alcohol beverage 

(shurb al-khamr) (Article 12). For more, see Laila al-Zwaini, “State and Non-State Justice in Yemen” (paper 

presented at the Conference on the Relationship Between State and Non-State Justice Systems in Afghanistan, 

Kabul, December 10–14, 2006), 11, www.usip.org/sites/default/files/ROL/al_zwaini_paper.

18. One lawyer interviewed for this paper argued that the Arbitration Law was intended to apply only to officially 

certified arbitrators, but neither the text of the law, nor the statutory history support that interpretation. See 

also Laila al-Zwaini, “State and Non-State Justice,” 11–12. Judges and Ministry of Justice officials interviewed 

said the outcome of arbitration has the same weight as a judgment in the court of first instance. 

19. Arbitration agreements often stipulate that arbitrators should have certain qualities or qualifications. In addition, 

article 23 of the arbitration law stipulates that unqualified arbitrators can be removed upon appeal to a court. 

20. See al-Zwaini, “State and Non-State Justice,” 12. 

21. Article 53 stipulates that an award can be voided if it violates Islamic law and public order but not based on a 

violation of the Code of Civil Procedure and the Commercial Code. 

22. In tribal traditions, revenge killing can end when the number killed from the two parties is equal. 

23. Al-Dawsari, “Tribal Governance.”

24. Nadwa al-Dawsari, Daniela Kolarova, and Jennifer Pedersen, “Conflict and Tensions in Tribal Areas in

Yemen” (Brussels: Partners for Democratic Change International, 2011), www.pdci-network.org/wp-content/

uploads/2013/10/baseline-assessment-without-annexes.pdf.

25. A mediator was killed in the context of a tribal dispute in Marib in 2009, which led to a series of revenge killings 

between the al-Ashraf and Jahm tribes that still has not been resolved. http://ye.vlex.com/vid/memory-shareifsalem-messenger-touched-60268026

26. International Labor Organization, “A National Employment Agenda for Yemen: Towards an Employment Strategy 

Framework” (Beirut: ILO/Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor for the Arab States, 2009).

27. Abdulhakeem al-Ofairi, expert on Yemeni tribes, interview, January 26, 2013, Sanaa.

28. 	 Abdullah al-Aqeeli, Endowment and Guidance Ministry, interview, February 4, 2013, Sanaa.

29. Gaston and al-Dawsari, “Local Justice in Transition.”

30. The Ministry of Justice issues an annual statistical report of cases. Copies on file with author. 

31. Ibid.

32. Gaston and al-Dawsari, “Waiting for Change.” Hamoud Almekhlafi, Mohammed Naeif, and Abdullah Saber were 

three main sheikhs mentioned by locals as being increasingly involved in resolving local conflicts.
18 USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 345

33. Ibid.

34. 	 Gaston and al-Dawsari, “Local Justice in Transition.”

35. Researcher, interview, February 7, 2013, Sanaa. 

36. Local Aden leaders and civil society activists, meeting, February 7, 2012, Sanaa.

37. Local Aden leaders and civil society activists, meeting, February 7, 2012, Sanaa.

38. In January 2013, after heavy petitioning from the councils, the governor issued a decree formally recognizing the 

efforts and role of so-called Ahlia committees in dealing with local governance issues, including civil disputes. 

Local Abyan activists, interview, February 3, 2013, Sanaa. 

39. Aref Al-Mekhlafi, Guide to Customary Terminology Used in Dealing with Local Conflicts (Silver Spring, MD: Adventist 

Development and Relief Agency, 2008).

40. 	 GIZ, “Advisory Service on Conflict Prevention and Conflict Transformation (CPAS) Resource Pack,” 2009.

41. 	 Partners Yemen conducted a symposium for Shabwa on February 13–14, 2011, and for Marib on March 22–23,

2011. 

42. 	 Abdurrahman al-Marwani, interview, February 10, 2013, Sanaa.

43. 	 Nongovernmental organization, interview, October 22, 2012, Sanaa.

44. 	 Erica Gaston, Arne Strand, and Akbar Sarwari, “Lessons Learned on Traditional Dispute Resolution in Afghanistan,”

United States Institute of Peace (April 2013), 32–33, www.usip.org/sites/default/files/Traditional_Dispute_

Resolution_April2013.pdf. 

45. 	 Nongovernmental organization, interview, October 13, 2012, Sanaa.

46. 	 In Afghanistan, donors have looked to informal justice actors—particularly tribal actors—as an important

counterinsurgency strategy, an alternative to “Taliban justice” or a way to supplement deficits in government 

justice provision that led the population to embrace antigovernment armed groups. See Noah Coburn, 

“Informal Justice and the International Community in Afghanistan,” Peaceworks no. 84, U.S. Institute of Peace,

April 2013, www.usip.org/sites/default/files/PW84-Informal%20Justice%20and%20the%20International%20

Community%20in%20Afghanistan.pdf

47. 	 In the chapter discussing customary justice in Afghanistan, the authors note that “Customary law has little

impact on powerful militia commanders who can afford to ignore community sentiments and act as they wish.” 

Deborah H. Isser, Customary Justice and the Rule of Law in War-Torn Societies (Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of 

Peace, July 2011), 174–75, 331–32.

48. 	 Ibid., 225–32, 358–61.

49. 	 Cherry Leonardi, Leben Nelson Moro, Martina Santschi, and Deborah H. Isser, “Local Justice in Southern Sudan,”

Peaceworks no. 66, U.S. Institute of Peace, 2010, 66.

Of Related Interest

•	 Transitional Justice in Balance: Comparing Processes, Weighing Efficacy by Tricia D. Olsen, Leigh A. 

Payne, and Andrew G. Reiter (USIP Press, 2010)

•	 Yemen in Transition: Between Fragmentation and Transformation by Philip Barrett Holzapfel 

(Peaceworks, March 2014)

•	 Process Lessons Learned in Yemen’s National Dialogue by Erica Gaston (Special Report, February 

2014)

•	 Waiting for Change: The Impact of Transition on Local Justice and Security in Yemen by Erica 

Gaston and Nadwa al-Dawsar (Peaceworks, April 2013)

•	 Security Sector Transformation in North Africa and the Middle East by Mark Sedra (Special Report, 

November 2011)

•	 NGOs and Nonstate Armed Actors: Improving Compliance with International Norms by Claudia 

Hofmann and Ulrich Schneckener (Special Report, July 2011)

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information on the subject.