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Special Report 209 September 2008

Special Report

© 2008 by the United States Institute of Peace. 

All rights reserved.

Contents 

What Is SSR? 2

Relationship between SSR and ROL 3

Why SSR Matters 3

Emergence of SSR as a Concept 4

Why SSR Has Been Challenging to Implement 5 

Current SSR Initiatives 7

Gaps in Implementation 16

Recommendations 17

About the Report

This report serves as a primer toward understanding security 

sector reform (SSR) in societies emerging from conflict—a 

rapidly expanding field of urgent importance. The report 

provides background on SSR today. It is based on statements 

by panelists at a public forum held at the United States 

Institute of Peace on May 22, 2008, and on interviews 

conducted by the author with government agencies, 

commercial contract firms, international organizations, and 

host governments that participate in the SSR programs.

Sean McFate helped lead U.S.-sponsored security sector 

reform programs in Liberia, Burundi, and Sudan for 

DynCorp International. Previously, he worked with Amnesty 

International USA and served as a captain and paratrooper in 

the U.S. Army’s 82nd Airborne Division. He holds double BAs 

from Brown University and an MPP from Harvard University’s 

Kennedy School of Government and is completing his 

doctorate at the London School of Economics.

Sean McFate 

Securing the Future

A Primer on Security Sector Reform in 

Conflict Countries

Summary

•	 Since security is a precondition of sustainable development, security sector reform 

(SSR) is essential in the transition from war to peace in conflict-affected countries.

•	 SSR is the complex task of transforming the “security sector”—those organizations 

and institutions that safeguard the state and its citizens from security threats—into 

professional, effective, legitimate, apolitical, and accountable actors.

•	 SSR remains an unmet challenge for the United Nations and the international community, despite the growing demand for it in peacekeeping missions around the 

world. This lack of reform has perpetuated the cycle of violence and prolonged costly 

peacekeeping missions.

•	 Work on SSR remains in its early stages, with most organizations still focusing on 

common definitions and fundamental concepts and on “mainstreaming” their ideas 

within the larger international community.

•	 There is no U.S. government doctrine, best practices, or even common terminology 

concerning SSR. This is primarily due to SSR’s recent conceptual development, the 

inherent difficulty in implementing SSR programs, and the lack of an official interagency policy coordinating committee within the current administration.

•	 A comprehensive approach to SSR is needed if the United States plans to effectively 

support good governance programs in states emerging from hostilities. The United 

States also needs a formal interagency structure for managing SSR programs. 

•	 SSR can be an effective instrument for conflict prevention and conflict management 

in changing threat environments. This report, however, focuses on the post-conflict 

application of SSR, since this is when comprehensive SSR is most often attempted.

United States Institute of Peace www.usip.org
2

What Is SSR?

SSR is a highly political process that must be accomplished in partnership with the country undergoing the reform. International organizations or bilateral partners that attempt 

to implement it in a purely unilateral and technical manner will not succeed. SSR is the 

complex task of transforming the institutions and organizations that deal directly with 

security threats to the state and its citizens. At a minimum, the security sector includes 

actors directly involved in protecting civilians and the state from violent harm (e.g., police 

and military forces and internal intelligence agencies), institutions that govern these 

actors (e.g., ministries of interior, defense, and justice; and national security councils), 

and oversight bodies. The objective of SSR is to institutionalize a professional security 

sector that is effective, legitimate, apolitical, and accountable to the citizens it is sworn 

to protect.

SSR can be an effective means of strengthening transitional or fragile states that verge 

on instability. In such situations, where long-term political violence has not occurred 

but remains a palpable threat, SSR can serve to buttress good governance and improve 

security sector performance. SSR may also be used in developed countries as a means of 

optimizing the security sector—making it more effective and efficient—by building on 

an already strong professional foundation. 

But SSR is most likely to occur in conflict countries that are the subject of peace and 

stability operations. The challenges in such countries are often severe, since the security 

sector often has been destroyed, fragmented, or discredited during the conflict and must 

be reconstructed by an international intervention force. This generally involves training 

and professionalizing personnel, transforming security institutions, and demobilizing nonstatutory forces and creating oversight mechanisms. This “worst-case scenario” serves as 

the focus of this report.

There are several working definitions of SSR, none of them conclusive. One of the 

challenges is defining “security,” which is an evolving concept in the early twenty-first 

About the Institute

The United States Institute of Peace is an independent, 

nonpartisan institution established and funded by Congress. 

Its goals are to help prevent and resolve violent conflicts, 

promote post-conflict peacebuilding, and increase conflictmanagement tools, capacity, and intellectual capital worldwide. The Institute does this by empowering others with 

knowledge, skills, and resources, as well as by its direct 

involvement in conflict zones around the globe.

Board of Directors

J. Robinson West (Chair), Chairman, PFC Energy, Washington, 

D.C. • María Otero (Vice Chairman), President, ACCION International, Boston, Mass. • Holly J. Burkhalter, Vice President, 

Government Affairs, International Justice Mission, Washington, 

D.C. • Anne H. Cahn, Former Scholar in Residence, American 

University, Washington, D.C. • Chester A. Crocker, James R. 

Schlesinger Professor of Strategic Studies, School of Foreign 

Service, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C. 

• Laurie S. Fulton, Partner, Williams and Connolly, Washington, D.C. • Charles Horner, Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute, 

Washington, D.C. • Kathleen Martinez, Executive Director, 

World Institute on Disability • George E. Moose, Adjunct Professor of Practice, The George Washington University, Washington, D.C. • Jeremy A. Rabkin, Professor of Law, George Mason 

University, Fairfax, Va. • Ron Silver, Actor, Producer, Director, 

Primparous Productions, Inc. • Judy Van Rest, Executive Vice 

President, International Republican Institute, Washington, D.C. 

Members Ex Officio

David Kramer, Assistant Secretary of the Bureau of 

Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, Department of State 

• Christopher “Ryan” Henry, Principal Deputy Under Secretary for Policy, Department of Defense • Richard H. Solomon, 

President, United States Institute of Peace (nonvoting) 

• Frances C. Wilson, Lieutenant General, U.S. Marine Corps; 

President, National Defense University.

The views expressed in this report do not necessarily 

reflect the views of the United States Institute of Peace, 

which does not advocate specific policy positions.

To request permission to photocopy or reprint materials, 

e-mail: permissions@usip.org.

Sample SSR Definitions

UK

“SSR is a broad concept that covers a wide spectrum of disciplines, actors, and activities. In its simplest form, SSR addresses security-related policy, legislation, structural 

and oversight issues, all set within recognized democratic norms and principles.”1

United Nations, Secretary-General

“[SSR is] a process of assessment, review, and implementation as well as monitoring 

and evaluation led by national authorities that has as its goal the enhancement of 

effective and accountable security for the State and its peoples without discrimination 

and with full respect for human rights and the rule of law.”2

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Development Assistance 

Committee (OECD-DAC)

“(SSR) seeks to increase partner countries’ ability to meet the range of security needs 

within their societies in a manner consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of governance, transparency and the Rule of Law. SSR includes, but extends well 

beyond, the narrower focus of more traditional security assistance on defense, intelligence and policing.”3

Netherlands Institute of International Relations (“Clingendael”)

“SSR is defined as the process to establish modern, effective, professional, and democratically controlled security structures. Security actors are the bodies authorized to 

use force, civil management and oversight bodies, judicial and public service bodies, 

non-state security force institutions, and civil society bodies.”4
3

century. Another challenge is discerning the exact nature of the “security sector” and its 

relationship to rule of law (ROL) and other aspects of governance. In 2004, the United 

States, along with other member states, endorsed the definition of SSR adopted by 

the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Some but not all 

U.S. government departments and agencies have used this definition. However, there has 

been no official U.S. government definition or statement of policy on SSR, which remains 

under consideration. 

Relationship between SSR and ROL

Increasingly, SSR is seen within the context of overarching efforts to establish ROL and 

a safe and secure environment. Like SSR, ROL is a broad concept that resists common or 

comprehensive definition. There have been numerous attempts to define ROL or at least 

identify the principal elements that constitute the concept. The UN secretary-general has 

defined ROL in these terms: ROL “refers to a principle of governance in which all persons, 

institutions and entities, public and private, including the State itself, are accountable to 

laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated, and 

which are consistent with international human rights norms and standards.”5

Within the overall context of efforts to establish a safe and secure environment and 

the rule of law, programs aimed at reforming the security sector and the justice sector 

(JSR) are interdependent and buttress one another, especially in conflict countries. However, they are not synonymous, since, for example, the reformation of a country’s laws, 

addressing past human rights abuses and crimes against humanity, and the integration of 

traditional and religious systems of justice should not be part of an SSR program. Similarly, justice sector reform should not manage the transformation of the defense sector. 

The recruitment and vetting of military forces, the training and equipping of those forces, 

the creation of intelligence and border control services and creation of an integrated 

national security strategy to respond to security threats, and the professionalization of 

defense-related ministries and resource management should be left to SSR experts.

Where SSR and JSR primarily intersect is in the development of criminal justice 

institutions and personnel. A JSR program operating without a commensurate SSR effort 

will likely fail, since criminal justice systems require effective institutions, along with 

professional and accountable personnel, for effective implementation. Similarly, an SSR 

program operating without a corresponding justice reform program will likely doom the 

security sector, since it will be judged in part by the legitimacy of the laws it is tasked to 

uphold and by the fairness of the judiciary and penal institutions. In this way, SSR and 

JSR overlap and are interdependent yet remain distinct.

Why SSR Matters

SSR is vital to global peace and security, especially in post-conflict states and nation 

building. In fragile states, the construction or reconstruction of the security sector is a 

precondition for development, since no other reform—political, economic, or social—can 

take root without security. Additionally, helping failed states recover is critical to global 

security, since they can constitute a chronic international problem; induce regional instability; result in humanitarian tragedy; provide safe havens, training grounds, and bases of 

operation for global terrorists; and abet international criminal organizations that traffic 

in narcotics, people, small arms, terrorist skills, weapons of mass destruction, and other 

illicit products and services. Finally, a competent indigenous security sector is essential 

for the exit strategy from costly peacekeeping missions.

Programs aimed at reforming 

the security sector and the justice sector are interdependent 

and buttress one another.
4

Despite SSR’s importance, a comprehensive and systematic approach to it in peacebuilding and stability operations has been slow to emerge. There is a lack of fundamental 

doctrine, best practices, or even common terminology. The results are needlessly tragic 

as the international community and the U.S. government perpetually waste precious 

resources reinventing the wheel in post-conflict settings while lives are being lost. Recent 

examples of peacebuilding sabotaged by inept, partisan, corrupt, and abusive indigenous 

security forces include Iraq, Afghanistan, Timor-Leste, and Democratic Republic of the 

Congo. An effort to institutionalize SSR practices, capacity, tools, and intellectual capital 

is urgently warranted.

Emergence of SSR as a Concept

SSR is a recent idea that stems from the evolution of the security-development discourse 

following the end of the Cold War. As the international community found itself increasingly 

entrenched in complex peacekeeping missions, the focus on international security shifted 

from “fighting and winning wars” (e.g., defeating the Soviet army at Germany’s Fulda Gap) 

to stabilizing fragile states, which can facilitate regional instability, humanitarian tragedy, 

international criminal organizations, and safe havens for terrorists. In a stark reversal 

of Cold War thinking, the United States’ National Security Strategy in 2002 asserted, 

“America is now threatened less by conquering states than . . . by failing ones.”8

These experiences have caused the concepts of “threat” and “security” to shift from an 

interstate to an intrastate focus. Often the root causes of conflict and insecurity in fragile 

states derive from internal rather than external factors. For example, Liberia’s security is 

threatened less by a Sierra Leonean blitzkrieg than by the failures of development: social 

injustice, absence of rule of law, disproportionate distribution of wealth, political exclusion of groups, economic hardship, ethnic violence, inadequate public security, and failure 

of democracy. Such failures of development give rise to public grievances that may be 

exploited by militias, terrorist groups, and other internal combatants who seek to justify 

their use of violence for political gain. In a world threatened by globalized terrorism, 

this has made intrastate conflict in some fragile states a national security interest for 

the U.S. government. From a development perspective, research conducted by the World 

Bank’s Voices of the Poor project highlights the necessity of physical security in reducing 

poverty. This finding implies the need for accountable and effective security services—

which helped hatch the concept of SSR. Because of this correlation, the development and 

security communities have become increasingly intertwined. 

One outcome of this mixed marriage is a fundamental rethinking of “security,” going 

beyond traditional military definitions and encompassing ideas from development. Beginning in the early 1990s, the focus of security began to shift from the state to the individual, encapsulated in the 1994 UN Development Program (UNDP) report, which termed 

this new paradigm “human security.”9 This controversial concept holds that state security 

“A Problem Not Easily Undone”

Failure to conduct competent SSR often leads to a relapse of conflict and violence. For 

example, Iraq’s national police force has degraded into a sectarian instrument of terror, 

killing civilians, sabotaging peacebuilding efforts, and fomenting sectarian strife. The 

situation became so grim that in 2007 Congress appointed a high-level independent 

commission, headed by retired general James Jones, the former top U.S. commander 

in Europe, to assess the situation. The commission’s recommendation: “we should start 

over.”6 But as an earlier inspector general report on the same topic observed, a corrupt security force that has lost public trust and legitimacy is “a problem not easily 

undone.”7 

Recent examples of peacebuilding sabotaged by inept, 

partisan, corrupt, and abusive 

indigenous security forces 

include Iraq, Afghanistan, 

Timor-Leste, and Democratic 

Republic of the Congo.

In a stark reversal of Cold War 

thinking, the United States’ 

National Security Strategy in 

2002 asserted, “America is now 

threatened less by conquering 

states than . . . by failing ones.”
5

can be achieved only when individuals are secure from “freedom from want” and “freedom 

from fear,” which are principally accomplished through the instruments of development 

rather than military means.10

But achieving such a broad mandate remains an ambitious task. It is more than just 

training and equipping security forces; it is SSR: the transformation of the state’s security 

actors, institutions, and oversight mechanisms as needed to meet threats to that state 

and its population. Such comprehensive reform requires a whole-of-government approach 

to stabilizing fragile states, and the search for holistic modalities for SSR within and 

between donor governments remains a principal challenge today.

Another influence was work surrounding the transition of Eastern European countries 

in the mid-1990s. NATO and European Union (EU) membership require the adherence to 

civil-military relations consistent with the principles of democracy (e.g., civilian control 

of the military), providing incentives for Eastern European countries to transform their 

security sectors. In the developing world, donor countries played a lead role, whereas in 

transitional countries domestic political and security actors largely drove SSR.11 By the 

end of the 1990s, SSR was a legitimate subject of discourse for development donors, but 

the concept remains embryonic in practice.

Why SSR Has Been Challenging to Implement

Great strides have been made in recent years in developing discrete SSR capabilities and 

capacities; however, a comprehensive, systematic, whole-of-government approach is still 

generally lacking. There are several reasons for this. The first is that comprehensive SSR 

is a fairly recent concept, emerging after the end of the Cold War. Before then, SSR was 

viewed mostly as training and equipping foreign forces, which is not comprehensive SSR. 

Interventions of training and equipment alone do not create professional institutions, 

government oversight, the appropriate civil-military relationship, and so forth, which are 

the objectives of SSR. Consequently, few practical models for SSR have emerged. Scholarship has grown substantially since the late 1990s, and though it helped to pioneer the 

topic, it remains highly theoretical.12 Comprehensive practical models are lacking. Some 

countries, notably the UK and the Netherlands, have engaged in policy initiatives to create a systematic SSR capacity, and the United Nations has begun a similar process. Also, 

the OECD has recently published a practitioner-oriented handbook on SSR.13 Notwithstanding significant SSR activities in Iraq, Afghanistan, Liberia, Sudan, Sierra Leone, and 

Democratic Republic of the Congo, the United States and the United Nations have only 

recently begun to develop generic SSR guidance.

The second reason for the lack of a comprehensive international approach to SSR 

is that SSR is difficult. Restructuring a state’s security sector is treacherous, especially 

in post-conflict environments, where instability and violence are never far beneath the 

surface and where the SSR process can easily cause dangerous ripples. In fragile or failed 

states, the security forces are often the de facto dominant institution—and sometimes a 

major contributing factor to the state’s demise. Attempts at reform can result in violent 

reprisals against staff and supporters of reform. Also, rebuilding a security sector that was 

complicit in atrocities might be an unwelcome development for traumatized populations 

and might possibly rekindle violence over unaddressed wrongs.

Other challenges abound. Local ownership is essential for SSR sustainability, yet it can 

be difficult to secure. This is especially true where it is needed most, particularly if the 

security forces are a part of the problem or if SSR has the potential to change existing 

power relationships. Also, SSR is resource intensive, especially in terms of funding and 

human capital. Successful SSR demands cooperation from a wide range of actors who may 

have conflicting perspectives, priorities, and objectives, resulting in uncoordinated and ad 

hoc implementation. Additionally, the lengthy time horizon for SSR to produce noticeable 

change may deter donors. Finally, the lack of a coherent framework, common definitions, 

Restructuring a state’s security 

sector is treacherous, especially in 

post-conflict environments, where 

instability and violence are never 

far beneath the surface and where 

the SSR process can easily cause 

dangerous ripples.
6

and technical expertise hampers current efforts, making it difficult for donor countries to 

see the potential of SSR, especially in post-conflict situations.

Beyond these general challenges, SSR presents special problems for the United States. 

For the U.S. government, the myriad structural challenges, interagency issues, and imbalances between military resourcing and civilian authorities significantly hamper SSR efforts 

along with many other aspects of U.S. foreign policy.14 SSR suffers especially, since it 

straddles the security-development nexus, getting lost in the gaps between the Department of Defense (DOD), the State Department, and the U.S. Agency for International 

Development (USAID). If there is a single lesson to be learned from U.S. expeditions 

in Iraq and Afghanistan, it is that achieving sustainable development depends first on 

achieving sustainable security.15 Security as a precondition for development should play a 

central role in formulating a comprehensive approach to SSR.

Unfortunately, in the U.S. government, security institutions and development institutions have been divorced from one another in terms of perspective, priorities, and outcomes. Some within foreign policy circles even quip, referring to the inherently different 

cultures, training, and perspectives, that the State Department and USAID are from Venus 

while DOD is from Mars.16 Part of this schism lies in the fact that USAID has been prohibited by legislation from supporting defense-oriented reform in foreign countries. Although 

this prohibition is now being relaxed, it created an institutional firewall between USAID 

and DOD that in some cases resulted in a strained U.S. toleration of corrupt police forces 

and abusive militaries, which tended to spoil the fruits of development. 

For the Pentagon, SSR was not a strategic priority during the Cold War, which was a 

threat environment defined by the danger of superpower warfare between blocs of states 

led by the United States and the USSR. Today, however, the threat environment is largely 

characterized by intrastate dangers: insurgencies, global terrorism, and other nonstate 

threats. DOD has adapted to this new environment by recognizing the importance of 

building the security capacity of partner nations. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates stated 

in testimony before the House Armed Services Committee in March 2008, “In my view, 

building partner capacity is a vital and enduring military requirement, irrespective of the 

capacity of other departments, and its authorities and funding mechanisms should reflect

that reality.”17

Historically, the State Department, not DOD, had the leading responsibility for foreign 

military assistance programs, such as Foreign Military Financing, International Military 

Education and Training, and the African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance 

program, which trains and equips African militaries in support of peacekeeping operations and humanitarian relief. Similarly, State administered the U.S. commitment for the 

Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI), a multilateral program agreed upon by the G-8 

meeting in 2004, which plans to train 75,000 peacekeepers, mostly in Africa. Despite 

the military nature of these programs, State administered them to ensure that they met 

foreign policy objectives.

A serious imbalance has developed between military resources and civilian authorities due to sustained operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, especially in the provision of 

“nontraditional” security assistance, such as SSR.18 One example to right this imbalance 

is the 1206 program, named after Section 1206 of the National Defense Authorization Act 

of 2006.19 This program gave DOD the authority to spend up to $200 million to train and 

equip foreign militaries to undertake counterterrorism or stability operations. Currently, 

1206 funds are supporting over fifty “train and equip” programs throughout the world. 

This funding mechanism has proved more readily available than traditional Foreign Military 

Financing. The National Defense Authorization Act of 2007 increased the annual funding 

authority from $200 million to $300 million and extended the program for an additional 

year until the end of fiscal year 2008. It also delegated approval authority from the president to the secretary of defense, with the secretary of state’s concurrence. However, some 

members of Congress believe that this program should be funded in the foreign affairs 

budget, which is administered by State, to ensure that the secretary of state has the 

authority to manage foreign policy decisions and bilateral relationships.20

 If there is a single lesson to be 

learned from U.S. expeditions in 

Iraq and Afghanistan, it is that 

achieving sustainable development depends first on achieving 

sustainable security.
7

Structural challenges remain within the U.S. government, and the bureaucratic organizations, authorities, and resourcing need to be examined and, potentially, reorganized—

no small undertaking. 

Current SSR Initiatives

Over the past decade, several SSR initiatives have emerged, mainly within the governments 

of donor countries and multinational organizations. In general, SSR remains in its early 

stages, with most organizations still focusing on common definitions and fundamental 

concepts and on “mainstreaming” their ideas within the larger international community. 

Below is a description of leading SSR efforts. It is not exhaustive.

OECD

The OECD, with its Development Assistance Committee (DAC), has emerged as a leader 

in the policy field. OECD came to SSR in the mid-1990s, noting the correlation between 

effective security and sustainable development. In April 2004, a DAC ministerial meeting 

endorsed a policy statement entitled Security System Reform and Governance: Policy and 

Good Practice, which forms the foundation of OECD’s SSR strategy. Later it published a 

concise policy brief on SSR (www.oecd.org/dac/conflict/ssr).21 In brief, all DAC governments, including the United States, have signed on to a set of SSR guidelines; the DAC 

secretariat has produced a handbook to put these guidelines into operation; and the 

secretariat is currently conducting consultations with donors, partner countries, and DAC 

member countries.

OECD very broadly defines the security system (it prefers the term “system” over “sector”) as encompassing all state and nonstate entities that play some role in the security 

of the state and its people. This includes core security actors, management and oversight 

bodies, justice and rule of law, and nonstatutory security forces. SSR means transforming 

and integrating the security system to operate in a manner consistent with democratic 

norms and the tenets of good governance. 

OECD believes that effective SSR must address four interrelated challenges that face all 

states. The first is developing a clear institutional framework for providing security that 

integrates security and development policy and includes all relevant actors. The second is 

strengthening the governance of security institutions. Third is building capable and professional security forces that are accountable to civil authorities. Fourth is sustainability 

of justice and security service delivery.

To achieve this, the thirty OECD member states have agreed on the following programming principles: (1) a whole-of-government approach is needed by both donors and developing countries; (2) local ownership is critical for program sustainability; (3) government 

commitment is required; (4) parliamentary oversight should be addressed; (5) civil management of the sector is essential; and (6) civil society should be encouraged to engage.

In 2007, OECD published a 250-page handbook that ambitiously attempts to translate 

these principles into practice. The purpose of the OECD-DAC Handbook on Security System 

Reform (SSR): Supporting Security and Justice is to close “the gap between policy and 

practice” so that donor support for SSR is effective and sustainable.22 It is the product 

of two years of research and consultations and is written in an accessible style addressed 

primarily to development, security, and diplomatic personnel of donor states.

The handbook comprises eight sections: (1) introduction; (2) fostering a supportive 

political environment; (3) undertaking security system reform assessments; (4) designing 

support programs for SSR processes; (5) strengthening national capacity; (6) developing 

an integrated approach to SSR in post-conflict contexts; (7) supporting the various sectors 

that make up the security system; and (8) managing international assistance programs. Of 

special value is a substantive chapter (112–234) on implementing SSR sector by sector, 

Structural challenges remain 

within the U.S. government, and the bureaucratic 

organizations, authorities, 

and resourcing need to be 

examined and, potentially, 

reorganized—no small 

undertaking. 
including defense, intelligence and security services, border management, police, justice, 

and prisons.

While the handbook is a singular achievement in the nascent SSR field, it is not universally embraced. In general, it is seen as a useful summary of the issue from the perspective of development donors. It has limitations, however. First, it is written for donors and 

not other stakeholders. Thus, and notwithstanding its rhetoric about local ownership, it 

portrays SSR as something that gets done to developing countries, not something that 

they decide to do—and drive and shape—in partnership with donors. This casts SSR in a 

potentially patronizing shadow for developing countries, which is especially problematic 

for countries with a troubled colonial past, such as those in Africa, where the majority of 

SSR programs will likely occur in the upcoming decade.

Second, the handbook is written from the perspective of development agencies. Conspicuously absent are the integrated perspectives of the military, law enforcement, justice, 

and other sectors vital to successful SSR. This is quite a problem, given the handbook’s 

continual call for a whole-of-government approach. 

Third, despite the handbook’s mandate to close the policy-practice gap, much of its 

guidance remains in the realm of policy. It lacks the operational specificity found, for 

instance, in military field manuals that explain in granular detail how to conduct an operation from start to finish. Some essential elements of SSR are even omitted altogether. 

For example, the handbook does not explain how to vet candidates for the new security 

sector—a principal component of any SSR program—other than asserting the unexamined 

requirement of “establishing a transparent system of vetting for members of the security 

and justice system” (104). Yet how is this to be achieved in a post-conflict environment, 

where few if any credible public records exist for background checks? Vetting is the constant bane of SSR programs because it is so difficult to accomplish. 

Other obvious omissions in the handbook include methods for sticky issues such as 

leadership selection, balancing ethnicity in the ranks, and using amnesty in recruitment. 

Also overlooked is the difficult problem of sensitizing the public to gain support for the 

program, especially if security forces in the past abused power, committed atrocities 

against civilians, and contributed to the state’s demise. In this environment, reconstituting the security sector will hardly be a welcome activity. These are some of the many 

practical rocks on which SSR can founder, yet that are overlooked in the handbook. 

In sum, the OECD is one of the foremost leaders in SSR thought and has enormous 

potential to develop a comprehensive and “mainstream” approach, but fundamental issues 

remain unaddressed. 

United Nations

SSR is an important and expanding area of engagement for the United Nations, which is 

increasingly engaging in SSR. Currently, many missions are mandated to conduct SSR or 

SSR-related activities and to provide support to national authorities in this crucial area. 

But as member states and UN staff themselves have recognized, in many contexts in recent 

years, the United Nations has been an ad hoc partner for national actors undertaking SSR. 

Field missions often lack capacity and resources to implement SSR-related mandates and 

continue to request technical advice and support on SSR from UN Headquarters. But in 

many situations, UN Headquarters has not been able to provide sufficient support to field 

missions mandated to undertake SSR.

In 2007, shortcomings in the United Nations’ engagement in SSR were acknowledged 

by member states in the Security Council and the General Assembly (more specifically, the 

Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, referred to as the C-34). Member states 

recognized the importance of enhancing the United Nations’ approach to SSR. In its 2007 

Presidential Statement, the Security Council acknowledged the need for a comprehensive 

report of the secretary-general on UN approaches to SSR. In its 2007 report, the C-34 recognized the need for a holistic and coherent approach to SSR within the UN system and 

8

The OECD is one of the foremost 

leaders in SSR thought and has 

enormous potential to develop a 

comprehensive and “mainstream” 

approach, but fundamental issues 

remain unaddressed.

Notwithstanding its rhetoric about 

local ownership, [the handbook] 

portrays SSR as something that 

gets done to developing countries, 

not something that they decide 

to do—and drive and shape—in 

partnership with donors.
recommended the need for an overall strategy to identify and clarify the main elements 

of the concept of SSR. It also requested the secretary-general to prepare a comprehensive report on UN approaches to SSR. In response, the United Nations established the 

interagency SSR Task Force, cochaired by the United Nations Department for Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and UNDP, to meet this request and to work toward developing a 

common UN approach to SSR.

In January 2008, the secretary-general released a report entitled “Securing Peace and 

Development: The Role of the United Nations in Supporting Security Sector Reform.” This 

report is significant in that it is the organization’s first clear articulation of a UN definition of the security sector and the objectives of security sector reform. It was prepared by 

DPKO and UNDP but under the overall guidance of the interagency SSR Task Force and after 

broad consultation with member states, regional organizations, research centers, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), UN field missions, and other stakeholder groups.

The report outlines that the United Nations has assumed a broad or comprehensive 

approach to security, which focuses on security of states and peoples and whose goal is 

to support the maintenance of international peace and security and to help governments 

and peoples build a world where freedom from fear and want is a reality for all. It acknowledges that effective and accountable security institutions are essential for sustainable 

peace and development. With this understanding in mind, the report proposes a broad and 

inclusive definition of the security sector. The report notes that the “security sector” is a 

broad term often used to describe the structures, institutions, and personnel responsible 

for the management, provision, and oversight of security in a country. 

According to the report, security sector reform describes a process of assessment, 

review, and implementation, as well as monitoring and evaluation, led by national 

authorities, which has as its goal the enhancement of effective and accountable security 

for the state and its peoples without discrimination and with full respect for human rights 

and the rule of law. It is founded on a number of core principles: 

•	 SSR will be undertaken only on the basis of a national decision, a Security Council 

mandate, or a General Assembly resolution;

•	 SSR must be anchored in national ownership;

•	 The United Nations’ approach to SSR must be flexible and tailored to each specific 

context; and

•	 The United Nations’ role in SSR will remain modest, while member states and their 

organizations will remain the leading providers of assistance in this area.

Over the past year, the United Nations has made steady progress in putting forward 

its plans for support to national SSR actors, but much more remains to be done. In midMarch 2008, DPKO briefed the C-34 on the secretary-general’s report, and in mid-May the 

Security Council discussed the report and the United Nations’ emerging approach to SSR. 

On the basis of the C-34’s 2008 report and the Security Council’s Presidential Statement 

on SSR, the United Nations is moving forward in a number of priority areas identified 

in the secretary-general’s report and by an interagency program plan agreed by the SSR 

Task Force. These priority areas aim to build UN systemwide capacities to better support 

national authorities undertaking SSR.

The United Nations’ SSR program plan will be managed by the SSR team, which is 

located in the Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions in DPKO. This SSR team will 

continue to expand to a full staff of eight to ten members. The future direction of the 

United Nations’ emerging approach to SSR will be implemented under the overall guidance of the interagency SSR Task Force. Over the coming months, the United Nations will 

become more operationally focused by seeking to deliver tangible support to the field, 

while continuing to build a community of SSR practice across the organization. 

9

The United Nations’ role in 

SSR will remain modest, while 

member states and their organizations will remain the leading providers of assistance in 

this area.
10

World Bank

Despite its early role in recognizing the linkages between security and development, the 

World Bank has been reluctant to engage in SSR activities, especially where they concern militaries. It has interpreted the restrictions on political activities in its Articles of 

Agreement as constraining involvement in security-related issues. However, since the late 

1990s, it has increasingly realized that effective security is critical to reducing poverty 

and achieving economic growth, which are core Bank objectives. The 1997 World Development Report renewed attention to the central role of the state in providing core public 

goods, including security and rule of law.

The Bank has viewed its central contribution to SSR as professionalizing public financial management: helping partner countries fight corruption, creating transparent and 

accountable budgets, and creating instruments for resource management. Additionally, 

the Bank helps reintegrate ex-combatants back into civilian life, but this may or may 

not be a component of an SSR program. In 2004, the Bank conducted a sectoral study 

of public financial management in Afghanistan. In 2007, several initiatives increased the 

Bank’s involvement in SSR: an emergency response policy and associated legal opinion 

widened the Bank’s scope of engagement in security-related issues of conflict-affected 

countries; the Governance and Anticorruption Strategy approved by the board put governance issues, including security, squarely on the Bank’s agenda; and an Issues paper 

was drafted on poverty reduction strategies and the security sector. Despite its reluctance 

to engage in security-related activities, the Bank is recognizing the importance of SSR 

to its mission and is developing ways of supporting SSR chiefly through public finance 

management reform.

Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF)

Another leader in SSR thinking is DCAF, a Swiss government initiative established in 2000. 

DCAF’s mission is to promote good governance and SSR in accordance with democratic 

norms. It conducts research on best practices, encourages the development of standards 

at the national and international levels, makes policy recommendations, and provides incountry advice and assistance programs. DCAF is an international foundation comprising 

fifty member states, including the United States.23

The Working Group on SSR supports the conceptual development of the idea and brings 

together experts from national and international governmental organizations as well 

as NGOs to discuss SSR best practice. Like OECD-DAC, DCAF tends to conduct legalistic 

and donor-oriented research, focusing on standards and norms as they pertain to SSR 

rather than developing concrete methods or strategies for conducting SSR. Examples of 

recent projects and publications include Handbook on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of Armed Forces Personnel, The Security Sector Legislation of the 

Palestinian National Authority, and Security Sector Reform and Gender.24 DCAF also plays 

a role in supporting the conceptual development of SSR for international organizations 

such as the United Nations, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and the 

European Parliament.

In 2008, DCAF introduced its International Security System Advisory Team, which 

“brings together policy and operational security sector reform (SSR) expertise, from the 

developmental, security, defense and diplomatic domains, in order to provide donors and 

the international community with comprehensive advice both on the technical and the 

process aspects of supporting SSR.”25 Its objectives are to undertake and coordinate SSR 

assessments, provide guidance on program design, monitor and evaluate SSR programs, 

develop training and capacity, and provide other support services, such as developing a 

roster of experts, country monitoring, and sharing lessons learned. Now the four-person 

team’s activities are limited to short workshops on SSR capacity building, on parliamentary oversight and policy recommendations, on the role of gender in SSR, and on adherence to the principles outlined in the OECD-DAC handbook.

The [World] Bank has viewed its 

central contribution to SSR as 

professionalizing public financial 

management: helping partner 

countries fight corruption, creating transparent and accountable 

budgets, and creating instruments for resource management. 

Like OECD-DAC, DCAF tends to 

conduct legalistic and donororiented research, focusing on 

standards and norms as they 

pertain to SSR rather than 

developing concrete methods 

or strategies.
11

Other Multinational Organizations

Other multinational and development institutions are just beginning to address SSR. 

Examples include the normative frameworks of the African Union and the Economic Community of West African States, the Organization of American States, and defense sector 

governance (NATO). Their efforts are thus far embryonic.

EU

Though the EU has not to date developed a robust SSR or ROL program or policy, the 

Council of the European Union initiated two programs related to strengthening ROL in 

post-conflict countries. Both missions claim to be integrated member operations, with 

fifteen participating EU countries, focused on ROL training. These programs, run by 

the EU’s European Security and Defense Policy, focus on the criminal justice sector and 

address police, prosecutors, judges, and prison managers in a comprehensive fashion. 

The EU Integrated Rule of Law Mission for Iraq (EUJUST-LEX) currently deploys in Iraq, 

while a separate mission, the EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX Kosovo), deploys 

in Kosovo. EUJUST-LEX in Iraq responded to an invitation by the Iraqi prime minister to 

offer training activities in 2005 for the ROL sector, while EULEX Kosovo was launched by 

the EU Council in 2008 to help the Kosovar security sector.

Though EULEX activities claim to give priority to indigenous community involvement, 

the majority of EUJUST-LEX activities take place inside the EU rather than in the field. 

Headquarters are located in Brussels, though each mission maintains small field liaison 

offices that are charged with host-country coordination. Indigenous professionals with 

ROL mandates receive training and development courses in EU countries. EUJUST-LEX also 

offers “work experience secondments,” in which program participants shadow and work 

alongside their EU counterparts to gain on-the-job training. This program claims to have 

trained 1,654 Iraqi senior criminal justice officials since its inauguration in July 2005.

UK

The UK was an early pioneer in SSR, and one of the first major donor states to recognize 

its potential. The Labour party’s election victory in 1997 ushered in significant changes to 

the UK’s approach to security and development. This included promoting its development 

agency to full departmental status, with a cabinet-level position, and renaming it the 

Department for International Development (DFID). Its first secretary, Clare Short, gave a 

speech in 1998 articulating a new initiative to tackle security issues from a developmental 

perspective using “security sector reform.”26 Since then, the UK has emerged as one of 

the “market leaders” in SSR, employing a strategic approach to programming, promoting 

joint approaches, influencing partner governments and other members of the international community, and seeking to coordinate international SSR efforts.

Because of SSR’s complex nature, the UK government has taken a collaborative 

approach, creating two conflict prevention pools, one for Africa and one for the rest of 

the world. In March 2001, it established the Global Conflict Prevention Pool (GCPP), a 

joint effort of the Ministry of Defense (MOD), the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and 

DFID (arguably the dominant agency regarding SSR). GCPP’s objective is to integrate the 

expertise of the UK’s security and development agencies in order to reduce the number of 

violent conflicts worldwide. This includes the formulation of SSR strategy, which entails 

four functions: (1) analysis and research for policy development, (2) effective institutional reform through advice and technical assistance to partner countries, (3) capacity 

building through networking and strengthening partner country and multilateral agency 

capabilities, and (4) mainstreaming SSR into multilateral institutions and other donors 

and informing those organizations’ policies and activities. 

Since its inauguration in July 2005, 

EUJUST-LEX’s program claims to have 

trained 1,654 Iraqi senior criminal 

justice officials.
12

The second group is the African Security Sector Network (ASSN), a small Internetbased community of African scholars and practitioners (www.africansecuritynetwork.org.) 

Established in 2003, it grew out of locally owned efforts to develop subregional networks 

and then integrate them in an effort to harmonize the various African organizations 

involved in SSR. ASSN’s strategic objectives are to support and facilitate SSR in Africa, 

help build capacity within the security sector in Africa, enhance security sector literacy 

in Africa, support security sector policy development through applied research, and serve 

as a continental information repository. To date, however, ASSN’s activities have been 

limited.

In addition to its work in strategy formulation, the GCPP funds two important programs 

in support of SSR. The first is the Security Sector Development Advisory Team, which provides in-country technical advice on SSR to countries that request it, in accordance with 

UK strategic priorities. The second is the creation of a community of experts through the 

Global Facilitation Network on SSR (GFN-SSR). This initiative is managed by the University 

of Birmingham and is largely an Internet-based community. The GFN-SSR Web site (www.

ssrnetwork.net) serves as a virtual colloquium for exchanging ideas on SSR and also publishes papers such as “A Beginner’s Guide to Security Sector Reform.”27

The challenges confronting the UK’s efforts are emblematic of SSR challenges in 

general. The multifaceted nature of SSR demands innovative strategies for interagency 

synergy, something that evolves over time. Even after ten years of discussion, there is no 

clear consensus on the definition of “security,” what should and should not be included in 

the security sector, and exactly who provides security and justice. Recent efforts by the UK 

government, especially DFID, include playing a major role in the OECD’s development and 

adoption of a comprehensive SSR policy, in an effort to mainstream SSR thinking. Despite 

this, the UK, surprisingly, lacks a formal SSR policy on how the British government as a 

whole intends to advance an SSR agenda and how the different institutional actors can 

help achieve government objectives in this area.

Netherlands

The Netherlands has aspirations to become a major SSR participant. This interest has 

grown, in part, from an emphasis within Dutch Development Cooperation programs in 

fragile states, particularly Afghanistan, Burundi, Democratic Republic of the Congo, 

Sudan, Palestine, Pakistan, Guatemala, and Colombia. Of these, the first four are seen as 

priorities for SSR engagement, and in June 2008 the government held a four-day workshop at The Hague for Burundian stakeholders. 

The Netherlands lacks a formal SSR policy but maintains a working document on SSR, 

drafted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and the MOD. Also, a steering group 

on security cooperation and reconstruction has been established with representation 

from MFA (including Development Cooperation), MOD, Interior (including police), Justice, Finance, and Economic Affairs. The group participates in SSR decision making 

and may commission a policy or strategy paper outlining key issues and the roles of 

governmental actors.

Also, the Netherlands Institute of International Relations, known as “Clingendael,” 

conducts research at the request of the Netherlands Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Clingendael’s work on preventing and managing intrastate conflict led it to SSR as a potential 

solution in the late 1990s. Since then, it has advised the government on management, 

control, and oversight of security forces. Clingendael also facilitates security sector 

reviews, development of institutions, management best practices, developing strategies 

for change, and training civilian defense, military, police, and intelligence staff.

The Dutch have also recognized that their SSR interventions to date have been too 

discrete, nonstrategic, and unsustainable to achieve their SSR objectives. One foray into 

this effort was a 2007 Clingendael publication entitled From Project to Program: Effective 

Programming for Security and Justice, which offers practicable guidelines for SSR planners. 
13

Drawing on lessons learned from other SSR programs, the publication discusses four factors that underpin the environment for effective programming in fragile and post-conflict 

countries (section II). It suggests ways to balance immediate justice and security needs 

with designing and implementing a long-term strategic program (sections III–VI). This 

multilayered approach posits methods of supporting state and nonstate justice and security providers and concludes by discussing some of the management requirements of their 

approach (section VII).28

A major theme throughout the Netherlands’ approach is that justice and security development is a highly political endeavor requiring transformations in service delivery, organizational structures, and institutional arrangements that produce sustainable improvements 

in performance.

U.S. Government 

In recent years, the U.S. government has made important advances in SSR capabilities and 

capacities, but these advances are limited to discrete SSR functions. U.S. military forces 

have engaged in training and equipping foreign military forces in partner countries. The 

State Department’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL)

and the Justice Department’s International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance 

Program train and equip police in peace operations and in emerging democracies. An 

integrated, coordinated, and comprehensive interagency approach to SSR, however, is still 

wanting. Such a full-spectrum approach is urgently needed, since SSR is at the heart of the 

United States’ nation-building strategies in Iraq and Afghanistan. In fact, little planning 

was done for SSR in advance of the interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan; this resulted in 

ad hoc efforts with disappointing results that have prolonged both wars. 

In Afghanistan, U.S. efforts to train and equip the new Afghanistan Army have made 

progress. But efforts to establish an Afghan National Police (ANP) have been hampered by 

an uncoordinated multinational endeavor by donor countries, resulting in confusion about 

the role and mission of the police, ineffective training programs, inappropriate staffing 

and problems with corruption, lack of funding for police salaries, and critical equipment 

shortfalls. Since 2005, the DOD, with State Department support, has directed U.S. efforts 

to develop the ANP into a force capable of enforcing the rule of law and supporting actions 

to defeat insurgency. In 2008, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) found that 

although the ANP has reportedly grown in number since 2005, after an investment of more 

than $6 billion, no Afghan police unit (0 of 433) is assessed by DOD as fully capable of 

performing its mission, and over three-fourths of units (334 of 433) are assessed at the 

lowest capability rating. While the ANP has reportedly grown in number to nearly 80,000 

personnel, the Afghan Interior Ministry remains corrupt, dysfunctional, and incapable of 

managing a national police organization.29

The situation in Iraq is not much better. Belated U.S. efforts to train Iraqi security 

forces began only after the insurgency was under way. The United States has made some 

progress in creating the new Iraqi military, but after five years, Iraqi forces are still dependent on embedded U.S. advisers and the U.S. military for logistics, transport, and air and 

fire support. A 2008 GAO report found that only 10 percent of Iraqi forces were able to 

perform operations without U.S. assistance.30 Iraqi police forces have been infiltrated by 

militia groups and have been responsible for sectarian violence and death squad activities. As of May 2008, the Iraq Interior Ministry, which supervised the police and border 

control services, remained corrupt and dysfunctional; only nine of eighteen provinces had 

made the transition to Iraqi control, and the other nine remained under the control and 

protection of U.S. forces. This is disappointing after five years, $20 billion, and thousands 

of American lives expended for Iraq’s reconstruction.

Beyond Afghanistan and Iraq, U.S. efforts at SSR are fragmented and stovepiped within 

the bureaucracy, with large portions outsourced to the private sector. Responsibility for 

U.S. police, judicial, and corrections assistance programs in post-conflict interventions 

rests with the State Department’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement 

A major theme throughout the 

Netherlands’ approach is that 

justice and security development is a highly political 

endeavor requiring transformations in service delivery, 

organizational structures, and 

institutional arrangements.

While the ANP has reportedly 

grown in number to nearly 80,000 

personnel, the Afghan Interior 

Ministry remains corrupt, dysfunctional, and incapable of managing 

a national police organization.
14

Affairs. In turn, INL has relied on DynCorp International and other firms to provide contractors to staff U.S. police contingents in UN police forces. In Central America, Haiti, 

and the Balkans, INL relied on the U.S. Justice Department to direct training programs 

for local police.

For Iraq and Afghanistan, however, President Bush issued a presidential directive 

assigning responsibility for police, judicial, and corrections assistance programs to the 

Defense Department and the U.S. military training commands in both countries. In Iraq 

and Afghanistan, the U.S. military has used a mix of soldiers, military police, and civilian 

contract personnel hired through the State Department to train and advise local police 

and judicial personnel. Putting the military in charge of the civilian components of SSR 

has been highly disappointing. Defense would like to return this responsibility to State, 

but it is not clear that the State Department could handle these multibillion-dollar programs, given its lack of personnel and material resources and the difficulties of operating 

in conflicted environments. 

The lack of SSR preparation for the post-conflict phase of U.S. operations in Iraq 

and Afghanistan stems, in part, from the military’s focus on combat operations rather 

than conflict prevention or post-conflict transition. The military has generally eschewed 

non-combat missions, preferring to prioritize fighting and winning wars, its traditional 

mission. However, this is changing. The situations in Iraq and Afghanistan have made it 

patently evident that lethal force alone is no longer the decisive variable in military campaigns. To this end, in 2005 the White House issued National Security Presidential Directive 

(NSPD) 44, which recognizes the primacy of reconstruction and stabilization operations.31

That same year, the Pentagon released DOD Directive 3000.05, which defines post-conflict 

stability operations as a “core U.S. military mission” that “shall be given priority comparable to combat operations.”32 This new focus represents a seismic shift in military 

thought, as it prioritizes noncombat functions equal to traditional warfighting missions 

in the pursuit of durable security. 

Just as significant, the military is also focusing increasingly on conflict prevention, 

which underscores the requirement for SSR. Strategic thinkers have introduced a new 

concept called “Phase Zero” into campaign planning. Phase Zero encompasses all activities that the military can do to avert conflicts from developing in the first place, such 

as utilizing SSR to professionalize foreign militaries to uphold the rule of law.33 Most 

significantly, DOD has made defense and security sector reform an explicit mission as one 

of the eight primary security cooperation focus areas in its new Guidance for the Employment of the Force (GEF). The GEF is the primary DOD operational guidance and planning 

document and supersedes the former “Contingency Planning Guidance and Security Cooperation Guidance” documents. 

Consistent with these new strategic mandates, the new U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) aspires to provide SSR support as a means of helping stabilize fragile states in Africa. 

AFRICOM’s mission is to coordinate and manage all DOD programs in Africa (except Egypt, 

because of its relationship with the Middle East). The principal objective of AFRICOM is 

to secure Africa by helping Africans through “security cooperation,” which will entail a 

major focus on defense reform. DOD regional centers such as the Africa Center for Strategic Studies also play an important role in advancing SSR development. The blueprints for 

AFRICOM were in part drawn from U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), which manages 

DOD programs in Central and South America. SOUTHCOM has linked regional security and 

development in its programs and has engaged in limited SSR in Colombia. 

Concerning the development of SSR doctrine, in 2008, the U.S. Army will release an 

updated version of Army Field Manual FM 3-07, Stability Operations, which will feature 

SSR in chapter 6. A draft of this chapter reveals substantial improvements over previous 

versions, which lacked serious mention of SSR. This draft stresses a whole-of-government 

approach, offers definitions and terms, discusses the military’s role in SSR, and provides 

planning considerations for SSR. It should be noted that these definitions and concepts 

represent the perspective only of the U.S. Army, not of the U.S. government, which cur-
15

rently lacks a definition or policy. The chapter also offers stabilization and reconstruction guidance for justice and rule of law reform, such as in police and prisons—which 

some observers may deem an inappropriate role for the military in SSR. Finally, it quickly 

outlines the military’s role in disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration, which is 

often linked to SSR in post-conflict settings but may not necessarily be embedded in an 

SSR program. This chapter represents a notable beginning, not an end, in the quest for 

SSR “military doctrine.” SSR deserves its own field manual. To effect a true whole-ofgovernment approach, civilian actors, such as the State Department and USAID, also need 

to develop commensurate “civilian doctrine.” This notwithstanding, FM 3-07 is the most 

advanced articulation of SSR in the U.S. government to date. 

USAID has also investigated the potentiality of SSR but is hobbled by decades of 

legislation forbidding it from security-related activities. This has resulted in a dearth 

of security expertise within the agency, limiting SSR analytical capability and program 

capacity. To help formulate an approach, USAID commissioned papers on SSR and 

met with representatives from DFID.35 In general, USAID’s perspective closely mirrors 

those of DFID and OECD-DAC: development focused, donor oriented, with a whole-ofgovernment approach.

Since early 2006, an informal U.S. government interagency SSR working group has 

convened in Washington, D.C., about once each quarter. This group is composed of a 

dozen or so representatives from USAID, State, DOD, and the Department of Justice and 

is led by three cochair, from State, USAID, and DOD. The working group has drafted a 

“3D” policy paper on SSR, which is undergoing interagency review and clearance. Perhaps 

in the next administration, the working group hopes to be designated by a presidential 

decision directive as part of the interagency process and to include representatives from 

all relevant agencies and offices.

Within the State Department, the Bureau of African Affairs has acquired significant 

experience in SSR with programs in Liberia, Sudan, Burundi, Democratic Republic of the 

Congo, and elsewhere. The Joint U.S.-Liberia Security Sector Reform program is perhaps 

the most advanced SSR effort being conducted by the U.S. government today. Since 2004, 

the State Department has worked in partnership with the Liberian government to fully 

demobilize and then reconstitute de novo the Armed Forces of Liberia and the Ministry of 

Defense.36 This is noteworthy because the armed forces were complicit in human rights 

abuses during the fourteen years of civil war, one of the most egregious conflicts in African post-colonial history. The State Department is conducting this program, somewhat 

controversially, by outsourcing the task to DynCorp International and Lockheed Martin. 

The program’s many achievements include completely demobilizing the legacy armed 

forces, 13,770 soldiers, without significant incident—a feat almost unprecedented in 

Africa. For comparison, in 2002, an attempted coup d’etat was triggered in neighboring 

Côte d’Ivoire when the government attempted to demobilize 750 soldiers, causing France 

to intervene with soldiers to help quell the violence.37

The Joint U.S.-Liberia SSR program also devised numerous innovations: a comprehensive recruiting and selection system; a pioneering human rights vetting method for 

post-conflict environments; wide-ranging training for all members of the military force 

and defense ministry, including civics and human rights education (later excised for cost 

reasons); a new force structure and table of organization and equipment; the refurbishment of military bases; the wholesale replacement of equipment and arms; and fielding 

the force in a sensitive post-conflict setting. The end state will be a two-thousand-person 

professional army that is modeled on U.S. military doctrine and supports the national 

objectives of the Liberian government by September 2010. The program has suffered time 

and cost overruns for several reasons, including the challenging operational environment, 

the unique nature of the task, erratic program funding by the United States, and complications due to outsourcing the program to private companies.38

The lack of U.S. government SSR capability and capacity has led to the outsourcing of 

most operational aspects of SSR programs to private security companies (PSCs).39 ComUSAID has also investigated the 

potentiality of SSR but is hobbled 

by decades of legislation forbidding 

it from security-related activities.
16

panies such as DynCorp International, MPRI, and Pacific Architects and Engineers (PA&E) 

have conducted SSR activities in Iraq, Afghanistan, Liberia, Nigeria, Colombia, and Sudan. 

Furthermore, until recently, the State Department outsourced the GPOI program entirely to 

PSCs. In 2006, the State Department awarded a contract collectively to MPRI, Blackwater, 

and Northrop Grumman, with a ceiling of $500 million through 2011, to support GPOI.40

However, this contract was canceled in 2008, and the State Department did not disburse 

any money to these companies.

The use of PSCs is controversial, and a full analysis of this complex topic is beyond 

the scope of this paper. In general, PSCs are seen as an economy of resources because 

they can provide efficient solutions to challenging problems such as battlefield logistics, 

post-conflict reconstruction, and SSR. But there are problems with this unregulated 

multibillion-dollar industry vested in conflict. These problems include normative issues 

regarding legitimacy and the erosion of the state’s monopoly of force; economic issues 

such as fostering an industry vested in conflict in conflict-prone areas; oversight issues 

such as the dearth of meaningful regulation; legal issues such as the PSCs’ ambiguous 

status in conflict zones; policy ramifications due to the growing codependence between 

the government and industry regarding policy planning and implementation; and potentially irreconcilable differences between profit motives and public policy.41 With a few 

notable exceptions, there has yet to be a serious discussion within the U.S. government 

about appropriate spheres of activity for this burgeoning multibillion-dollar industry; its 

effective regulation and oversight; and its impact on foreign policy articulation, implementation, and outcomes.

Gaps in Implementation

The U.S. government has made significant strides in SSR, but fundamental gaps remain:

• No commonly accepted SSR framework, strategy, common doctrine, or interoperability. The current lack of an internationally accepted SSR framework has significantly hampered SSR outcomes. Common terminology does not yet exist, which 

demonstrates the slow pace of progress since the 1990s, when the concept of SSR 

was first articulated. The absence of an integrated, coordinated, and comprehensive 

approach to SSR has produced ad hoc programs with limited and, at times, counterproductive impacts. This has jeopardized the international community’s ability to 

achieve sustainable stability and development in societies emerging from conflict.

• Lack of integrated training and lack of an SSR practitioner corps. The lack of a 

comprehensive approach to SSR has resulted in the training of few bona fide SSR 

experts, trainers, and practitioners. While progress has been made in some areas, 

implementation continues to fall to individuals lacking a broad background in 

security sector transformation, resulting in well-meaning but less than successful 

SSR programs. 

• Policy-to-practice gap. SSR is articulated in theoretical terms at headquarters but 

programmed at the field level. Missing is an implementation strategy at middlemanagement levels to translate abstract ideas into concrete reality. This is partly 

because SSR has been articulated mostly by academics, lawyers, bureaucrats, and 

others lacking SSR field experience. There has also been a failure by practitioners 

to relate their experience back from the field. An integrated perspective from those 

who design and enact SSR programs is needed to create implementable doctrine and 

effective programs. 

• Asynchronous interagency efforts. SSR is multifaceted reform, requiring significant 

interagency cooperation and frustrated by conflicting bureaucratic perspectives, 

methods, cultures, and objectives. Experience has shown that if one agency dominates an SSR program, that agency’s interests and perspective will dominate the 

Common terminology does not 

yet exist, which demonstrates 

the slow pace of progress since 

the 1990s, when the concept of 

SSR was first articulated.
17

agenda, to the exclusion of others. This produces a highly fragmented approach that 

can undermine the ultimate objectives of SSR. Also, it incites interagency recalcitrance to engage in SSR, which is an inherently whole-of-government effort.

• Lack of management tools. International institutions and donor governments need 

to develop SSR-tailored tools if they want to move from ad hoc efforts of limited 

impact to durable SSR outcomes. Performance metrics are required to monitor, review, 

and evaluate SSR programs. This should take into account citizens’ perceptions as well 

as consider quantitative data. 

• Failure to engage host governments and their citizens. Most of the work on SSR 

has been undertaken from the perspective of international providers, with little attention given to the potential reaction from host governments and local citizens. From 

the outset of an SSR reform effort, it is essential to engage those most affected and 

develop programs in partnership to incorporate their views and objectives into SSR 

programs. 

Recommendations

1. Achieve consensus on SSR definition. Before attempting to build capacity in the 

U.S. government to conduct SSR programs, key policymakers and stakeholders need 

to agree on a common description for SSR goals and a terminology for SSR activities. 

The U.S. government’s approach should take into account other definitions for SSR 

from allies such as the UK and the Netherlands, as well as international organizations 

such as the United Nations, the OECD, and the World Bank.

2. Formalize U.S. government work on SSR. The U.S. government needs to move from 

ad hoc SSR projects to a comprehensive, whole-of-government approach to SSR. This 

effort should begin with the formal establishment of a policy coordinating committee (interagency working group) chaired by a senior member of the National Security 

Council staff and including stakeholders from relevant agencies and departments. 

Responsibility for leadership for SSR programs should be vested in a single department of government, which can provide the secretariat for the interagency working 

group.

3. Produce common civil-military–approved doctrine. A comprehensive and institutionalized U.S. approach to SSR should include doctrine at the strategic level, 

implementation guidelines at the operational level, and specific programming tools 

at the tactical level. Because SSR falls within the security-development nexus, this 

doctrine should bridge civilian and military expertise and skills. It should also clarify 

the distinction between, and responsibility for, ROL and JSR activities and establish 

priorities for implementation. A common doctrine should also take into account the 

need for local ownership of SSR programs and for alignment with other activities, such 

as democracy and governance strengthening and economic growth.

4. Engage with the United Nations and the international community on SSR issues.

In building its own SSR capacity, the United States should seek to integrate and 

incorporate the knowledge base and policy guidance from international organizations, such as the OECD, that have already made substantial progress in the SSR field. 

Engagement includes doctrine review, incorporation of best practices and lessons 

learned, creation of information-sharing mechanisms, and exchange programs with 

existing SSR programs in the field. Simultaneously, engagement should focus closely 

on policy harmonization to minimize future redundancies in programming and avoid 

undermining other SSR initiatives at the policy level and in practice in the field.

5. Develop a U.S. and international corps of professionally trained and interoperable practitioners. International and national security institutions are still designed 

The United States should seek to 

integrate and incorporate the knowledge base and policy guidance from 

international organizations, such as 

the OECD, that have already made 

substantial progress in the SSR field. 

The U.S. government needs to move 

from ad hoc SSR projects to a comprehensive, whole-of-government 

approach to SSR.
18

to counter Cold War threats. Also, development practitioners and diplomats continue 

to work in stovepiped agencies with missions, reporting structures, and programs that 

lack the capacity for interoperability. The lack of SSR subject-matter experts can be 

addressed by creating educational opportunities and new positions at the national 

and international levels to work in the security-development nexus. 

6. Develop tools and flexible programming for SSR activities. As donor countries 

continue to build a cadre of SSR professionals and allocate funding for SSR activities, 

planning for SSR should take into account the unique requirements of post-conflict 

scenarios. The type of support and level of commitment by intervening states should 

be tailored to specific conditions on the ground and thus requires a broad toolbox of 

programs, flexible types of assistance, and responsiveness to local concerns.
19

Notes

1. UK Global Conflict Prevention Pool, Security Sector Reform Strategy: 2004/05, section 1.4.

2. UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General: Securing Peace and Development: The Role of the 

United Nations in Supporting Security Sector Reform S/2008/39, January 23, 2008.

3. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Security System Reform and Governance, DAC 

Guidelines and Reference Series (Paris: OECD, 2005).

4. Nicole Ball, Eric Scheye, and Luc van de Goor, From Project to Program: Effective Programming for Security 

and Justice (The Hague: Clingendael Institute and Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2007).

5. United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General: The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and PostConflict Societies, UN Doc. S/2004/616 (August 23, 2004). See also David Tolbert and Andrew Solomon, 

“United Nations Reform and Supporting the Rule of Law in Post-Conflict Societies,” Harvard Human Rights 

Journal 19, Spring 2006, www.law.harvard.edu/students/orgs/hrj/iss19/tolbert.shtml (accessed July 21, 

2008).

6. “US Panel to Urge Overhaul of Iraq Police,” Reuters, August 31, 2007.

7. U.S. Department of State and Department of Defense, “Interagency Assessment of Iraq Police Training,” 

Joint Inspector General Report (Washington, D.C., July 15, 2005), 22.

8. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (September 2002), 1, www.whitehouse.gov/

nsc/nss/2002/nss.pdf (accessed July 28, 2008).

9. UNDP, “New Dimensions of Human Security,” Human Development Report, 1994, http://hdr.undp.org/en/

reports/global/hdr1994 (accessed July 20, 2008).

10. For more information on “human security,” see Neil MacFarlane and Yuen Foong Khong, Human Security 

and the UN: A Critical History (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2006).

11. For more information, see Nicole Ball and Dylan Hendrickson, “Trends in Security Sector Reform (SSR): 

Policy, Practice and Research” (paper prepared for New Directions in Security Sector Reform workshop, 

International Development Research Centre, Peace, Conflict and Development Program Initiative, Ottawa, 

Canada, November 3–4, 2005). 

12. For more information, see Ball and Hendrickson, “Trends in Security Sector Reform.”

13. OECD-DAC, The OECD-DAC Handbook on SSR: Supporting Security and Justice, DAC Guidelines and Reference 

Series (Paris: OECD-DAC, 2007), www.oecd.org/dac/conflict/if-ssr (accessed July 21, 2008).

14. Several initiatives, such as the Project on National Security Reform (www.pnsr.org), are addressing these 

challenges. For more information, see Robert Andrews, Mark Kirk, J. Stephen Morrison, and Kathleen Hicks, 

Integrating 21st Century Development and Security Assistance (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and 

International Studies, 2008); Frederick Barton, Karin von Hippel, Derek Chollet, Mark Irvine, and Bradley 

Larson, A Steep Hill: Congress and U.S. Efforts to Strengthen Fragile States (Washington, D.C.: Center for 

Strategic and International Studies, 2008).

15. For more information on the preconditions of nation building, see James Dobbins, Seth G. Jones, Keith 

Crane, and Beth Cole, The Beginner’s Guide to Nation-Building, RAND Corporation monograph MG-557 

(Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2007).

16. See, for example, Rickey L. Rife, Defense Is from Mars, State Is from Venus: Improving Communications and 

Promoting National Security (white paper, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Penn., 1998).

17. Hearing of the House Armed Services Committee, “Building Partnership Capacity and the Development of 

the Interagency Process,” Washington, D.C., April 15, 2008.

18. For more information, see Andrews, Kirk, Morrison, and Hicks, Integrating 21st Century Development and 

Security Assistance.

19. National Defense Authorization Act of 2006, Pub. L. no. 109–63, § 1206. 119 Stat. 3136, 3456–58.

20. GAO, Section 1206 Security Assistance Program—Findings on Criteria, Coordination, and Implementation,

GAO-07-416R (Washington, D.C.: GAO, 2007).

21. OECD-DAC, “Security System Reform and Governance: Policy and Good Practice” (policy brief, Paris, May 

2004), www.oecd.org/dataoecd/20/47/31642508.pdf (accessed July 21, 2008).

22. OECD-DAC, The OECD-DAC Handbook on SSR.

23. The United States is represented by the Army and Defense Attaché, American Embassy, Bern.

24. For these and other DCAF publications, see www.dcaf.ch/publications/kms/index.cfm?nav1=5 (accessed 

July 21, 2008).

25. DCAF, The International Security Sector Advisory Team Factsheet, www.dcaf.ch/issat/_docs/ISSAT-factsheet.pdf (accessed July 21, 2008).

26. Clare Short, “Security, Development and Conflict Prevention” (speech to the Royal College of Defense 

Studies, May 13, 1998).

27. Global Facilitation Network on Security Sector Reform, “A Beginner’s Guide to Security Sector Reform,” 

December 2007, www.ssrnetwork.net/documents/GFN-SSR_A_Beginners_Guide_to_SSR_v2.pdf (accessed 

June 21, 2008).
28. Ball, Scheye, and van de Goor, From Project to Program.

29. Charles Michael Johnson Jr., testimony before the Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs, 

Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, House of Representatives, GAO-08-883T, June 18, 

2008.

30. GAO, “Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq Progress Report: Some Gains Made, Updated Strategy 

Needed,” GAO-08-837, June 2008.

31. National Security Presidential Directive/(NSPD)-44: Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization, December 7, 2005.

32. DOD Directive 3000.05: Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations,

November 28, 2005.

33. Charles Wald, “The Phase Zero Campaign,” Joint Force Quarterly 43 (4th Quarter 2006). 

34. For more information on AFRICOM and SSR, see AFRICOM’s homepage, www.africom.mil; Lauren Ploch, 

“Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests and the Role of the U.S. Military in Africa,” Coordinator for 

Reconstruction and Stabilization (CRS) report for Congress, May 16, 2007; Sean McFate, “U.S. Africa Command: A New Strategic Paradigm?” Military Review (January–February 2008): 10–22. 

35. See, for example, Nicole Ball, “Promoting Security Sector Reform in Fragile States,” PPC Issue Paper no. 11, 

April 2005, www.ssrnetwork.net/uploaded_files/3200.pdf (accessed July 26, 2008); Rachel Neild, “USAID 

Program Brief: Anticorruption and Police Integrity Security Sector Reform Program,” May 2007.

36. It should be noted that the United Nations and the United States agreed to share SSR responsibilities, with 

the UN Mission in Liberia agreeing to transform the Liberian National Police and other law enforcement 

while the United States transforms the military.

37. Ofeibea Quist-Arcton, “Overnight Skirmishes in Bouake, French Troops Head North,” allAfrica.com, September 23, 2002, http://allafrica.com/stories/printable/200209230706.html (accessed July 21, 2008).

38. It should be noted that the author was a principal architect of the Joint U.S.-Liberia SSR program. For 

more information, see Mark Malan, Security Sector Reform in Liberia: Mixed Results from Humble Beginnings 

(Carlisle Barracks, Penn.: Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College, 2008).

39. The term “private military company” is also often used to describe this industry. For the purposes of this 

paper, the term “PSC” is assumed to be generic and all-encompassing.

40. For more information about GPOI, see Nina M. Serafino, “The Global Peace Operations Initiative: Background and Issues for Congress,” CRS Report RL32773, June 11, 2007, 1–11, fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/

RL32773.pdf (accessed November 10, 2007).

41. For more information, see Deborah Avant, The Market for Force (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 

2005); James Cockayne, “Commercial Security in Humanitarian and Post-Conflict Settings: An Exploratory 

Study,” March 2006, ssrn.com/abstract=917876 (accessed November 10, 2007).

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