COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Chief Judge Fitzpatrick, Judges Willis and Annunziata 

Argued at Chesapeake, Virginia 

KAWASKI BASS, S/K/A 

 KAWASKI LAJUNE BASS 

 OPINION BY 

v. Record No. 2554-98-1 JUDGE ROSEMARIE ANNUNZIATA 

 JANUARY 27, 2000 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NEWPORT NEWS 

Randolph T. West, Judge 

Lyn M. Simmons for appellant. 

Kathleen B. Martin, Assistant Attorney 

General (Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, 

on brief), for appellee. 

Kawaski Bass appeals from his convictions of robbery and 

use of a firearm in the commission of a felony. He contends on 

appeal 1) that the trial court erred in admitting statements of 

his two codefendants as evidence in the guilt phase of the 

prosecution, and 2) that without those statements the evidence 

offered against him at trial was insufficient to sustain his 

convictions. We agree that the statements of Bass' codefendants 

should not have been admitted against him at trial, but we find 

that the admission of his codefendants' statements was harmless 

error. We therefore affirm his convictions. 
- 2 - 

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In the late evening of February 1, 1998, Bass and two 

friends, Maurice Sirls and Julius Scott, drove in Scott's 

mother's car from Hampton, Virginia to a shopping center in 

Newport News. According to the statements of Bass and his 

codefendants, the three planned to rob customers as they exited 

a Food Lion grocery store located in the shopping center. Sirls 

had a .25 caliber chrome handgun with six bullets in it, and 

Scott had an unloaded Smith & Wesson. The three men entered the 

grocery store and identified their intended victims, Robert 

Randolph and his friend, Jacqueline James, who were shopping at 

the store shortly after midnight. Randolph bumped into Bass 

while in the store, triggering a short, innocuous exchange of 

words. When Randolph exited the store and walked toward his 

car, he saw Bass, Sirls, and Scott exit the store from another 

door. One of the three asked Randolph which way he was going. 

The men then moved in different directions, Sirls coming toward 

Randolph while Scott, and possibly Bass, approached from the 

other side of the car. As Randolph unlocked his car door, he 

heard someone behind him. Sirls pointed the small chrome 

handgun at Randolph and "instructed [him] to cooperate," 

threatening to shoot or kill him. Randolph told Sirls his money 

was in the top left pocket of his shirt. Sirls took $8 from 
- 3 - 

Randolph and a "handful of lollipops" from his pants pocket and 

ran from the scene with Scott and Bass. 

At trial, Randolph identified all three suspects, but could 

not testify as to Bass' presence during the robbery. James 

could not identify any of the three assailants; she heard the 

men but did not see them. However, she saw a gun aimed at 

Randolph and felt something "hard" at the back of her head. 

After checking her pockets, one of the men took the bag of 

groceries from her hand before leaving the scene. 

Officer Larry Rilee of the Newport News Police Department 

interviewed Bass and Sirls on April 21, 1998 at the Hanover 

County jail, where they had been detained. He interviewed Scott 

on April 28, 1998, at a detention center in James City County. 

Each of them made lengthy statements to Rilee recounting the 

events of the evening in question and providing an account of 

the robbery that took place. 

Bass stated that on the evening in question he drove 

himself, Sirls and Scott in Scott's mother's car to the parking 

lot of a 7-Eleven store just across the street from a Food Lion 

grocery store located on Warwick Boulevard. Bass admitted that 

he drove his companions there knowing that they were armed and 

intended to commit a robbery. When asked by the police whether 

he, Sirls and Scott discussed committing a robbery while en 

route to the Food Lion, Bass replied, "Yeah." In response to 
- 4 - 

further questioning as to why Sirls and Scott had guns with 

them, Bass answered, "I guess they was going in to do a 

robbery. . . ." He stated that he and his two associates walked 

to the Food Lion and that on the way Sirls "cocked his .25 gun 

back," but Scott "didn't have no bullets in his gun." Bass 

stated that the three men browsed around in the store until they 

saw Randolph and James and that he, Sirls and Scott exited the 

store when they identified Randolph and James as their victims. 

According to Bass, Sirls at this point said to him, "Yo, let's 

get down," which Bass understood to be an invitation to 

participate in robbing Randolph and James. Bass replied, "Naw, 

uh-uh, I'm leaving," and, "Man, I'm turning around." Bass 

described the robbery that took place, however, stating that he 

was "away from the scene" of the robbery, having walked to "the 

end of the street," but admitting he could see tears running 

down James' cheeks when Scott told her to put her hands behind 

her head. Bass further stated that he could still see "the 

tears rolling down [James'] eyes" as the three fled. Bass also 

admitted that he helped Sirls and Scott effect their escape by 

driving them from the scene. In addition, he accurately 

described the clothes worn by Sirls and Scott on the evening in 

question. 

Sirls stated that he went to the Food Lion in company with 

Bass and Scott and that Bass drove them to the 7-Eleven parking 
- 5 - 

lot in Scott's mother's car. According to Rilee's testimony, 

Sirls also stated that while driving to the store "they planned 

to do a robbery," in which they intended "just to pick a target 

at some point." He admitted that he and Scott were armed, and 

stated that Bass was unarmed. Sirls stated that he carried a 

.22 or .25 chrome handgun and that Scott was armed with a 

"wooden" or "antique" gun. Sirls described the robbery, 

indicating that once Randolph and James exited the Food Lion, 

Sirls approached Randolph, produced the chrome handgun, and 

robbed Randolph while Scott held a gun on James and checked her 

pockets for cash. He also accurately described the clothes worn 

by Bass and Scott. When asked where Bass was positioned during 

the robbery, Sirls stated that he "could have reached and 

touched [Bass], that's how close he was." 

In his statement, Scott likewise stated that Bass drove the 

three defendants to the 7-Eleven parking lot, from which they 

walked to the Food Lion, and that while en route they discussed 

committing a robbery. He also stated that Bass alone of the 

three was unarmed, that Sirls carried a chrome handgun, and that 

he was armed with an old, "wooden" gun. He recounted how Sirls 

robbed Randolph while he robbed James, taking a bag of groceries 

from her, and that Bass fled the scene with him and Sirls. He 

finally noted that once they returned to the car they ate some 

of the groceries stolen from James. 
- 6 - 

Bass, Sirls and Scott were tried together, and none of them 

testified at trial. The Commonwealth offered the statements of 

all three men made in response to police questioning as evidence 

against Bass, introducing the statements through the testimony 

of Officer Rilee, and through a transcript of Bass' statement. 

Bass' objection to admitting the statements of his codefendants 

against him was overruled, in reliance upon our decision in 

Randolph v. Commonwealth, 24 Va. App. 345, 353, 482 S.E.2d 101, 

104-05 (1997) (codefendant's hearsay statement admissible as a 

declaration against penal interest, a "'firmly rooted'" hearsay 

exception (quoting Raia v. Commonwealth, 23 Va. App. 546, 552, 

478 S.E.2d 328, 331 (1996))); see also Chandler v. Commonwealth, 

249 Va. 270, 455 S.E.2d 219, cert. denied, 516 U.S. 889 (1995); 

Morris v. Commonwealth, 229 Va. 145, 147, 326 S.E.2d 693, 694 

(1985); Lewis v. Commonwealth, 18 Va. App. 5, 8, 441 S.E.2d 47, 

49 (1994); Scaggs v. Commonwealth, 5 Va. App. 1, 4-5, 359 S.E.2d 

830, 832 (1987). The court also denied Bass' motion to strike 

the evidence on the ground the Commonwealth had failed to 

present evidence connecting him with the offense. 

HEARSAY ANALYSIS

Whether evidence is admissible falls within the broad 

discretion of the trial court, and the court's ruling will not 

be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. See Blain 

v. Commonwealth, 7 Va. App. 10, 16, 371 S.E.2d 838, 841 (1988). 
- 7 - 

By definition, when the trial court makes an error of law, an 

abuse of discretion occurs. See Taylor v. Commonwealth, 28 

Va. App. 1, 9, 502 S.E.2d 113, 117 (1998) (en banc). 

An accomplice's custodial confession that incriminates a 

codefendant is presumptively unreliable in the context of an 

alleged Confrontation Clause violation. See Lilly v. Virginia, 

119 S. Ct. 1887, 1900 (1999) (plurality opinion); Lee v. 

Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 541-43 (1986) ("[A] codefendant's 

confession is presumptively unreliable as to the passages 

detailing the defendant's conduct or culpability because those 

passages may well be the product of the codefendant's desire to 

shift or spread blame, curry favor, avenge himself, or divert 

attention to another."). "[A] confession by an accomplice which 

incriminates a criminal defendant" should be considered a 

distinct category of hearsay for the purpose of determining its 

admissibility under the Sixth Amendment, Lee, 476 U.S. at 544 

n.5, and this category of statements is not a "firmly rooted 

exception" to the hearsay rule.1 See Lilly, 119 S. Ct. at 1897 

(plurality opinion). 

 1 The Supreme Court noted in Lilly that hearsay statements 

against the penal interest of the declarant are recognized as 

constituting "a firmly rooted exception" to the hearsay rule in 

Virginia. See 119 S. Ct. at 1894. The Court emphasized, 

however, that it does not regard accomplices' custodial 

confessions as falling within that exception in determining 

admissibility of such statements under the Confrontation Clause. 

See id.
- 8 - 

The presumption of unreliability attaching to an 

accomplice's confession implicating a defendant may be rebutted,2

although the bar for rebuttal of the presumption is set very 

high.3 See id. at 1900; Lee, 476 U.S. at 543. The confession 

must be "supported by a 'showing of particularized guarantees of 

trustworthiness.'" Id. at 543 (quoting Ohio v. Roberts, 448 

U.S. 56, 66 (1980)). The particularized guarantees of 

trustworthiness necessary to rebut the presumption of 

unreliability must "be drawn from the totality of circumstances 

 2 In Lilly, the Supreme Court observed: 

This [opinion] does not mean . . . that the 

[Sixth Amendment] Confrontation Clause 

imposes a "blanket ban on the government's 

use of [nontestifying] accomplice statements 

that incriminate a defendant." Rather, it 

simply means that the Government must 

satisfy the second prong of the Ohio v. 

Roberts[, 448 U.S. 56 (1980),] test in order 

to introduce such statements. 

119 S. Ct. at 1899 n.5. 

3 Justice Stevens' plurality opinion states: 

It is highly unlikely that the presumptive 

unreliability that attaches to accomplices' 

confessions that shift or spread blame can 

be effectively rebutted when the statements 

are given under conditions that implicate 

the core concerns of the old ex parte

affidavit practice – that is, when the 

government is involved in the statements' 

production, and when the statements describe 

past events and have not been subjected to 

adversarial testing. 

Lilly, 119 S. Ct. at 1900. 
- 9 - 

that surround the making of the statement and that render the 

declarant particularly worthy of belief." Idaho v. Wright, 497 

U.S. 805, 820 (1990). Evidence admitted based upon the 

existence of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness must 

be so trustworthy that adversarial testing would add little to 

its reliability. See id. at 821. 

Circumstances surrounding an accomplice's confession that 

weigh in favor of finding reliability include: (1) lack of 

knowledge on the part of the accomplice that he or she has 

already been implicated in a crime by a codefendant, (2) making 

the confession to authorities who were not aware of the 

confessor's role in the crime confessed, and (3) the exercise of 

any contemporaneous cross-examination by counsel or its 

equivalent. See Lee, 476 U.S. at 544. 

In Wright, the Supreme Court held that evidence which 

corroborates the truth of an accomplice's confession is 

irrelevant to the determination of the confession's reliability. 

See 497 U.S. at 822 ("To be admissible under the Confrontation 

Clause, hearsay evidence used to convict a defendant must 

possess indicia of reliability by virtue of its inherent 

trustworthiness, not by reference to other evidence at trial."). 

The use of corroborating evidence to establish a statement's 

reliability is "no substitute for cross-examination of the 

declarant at trial" and would allow the admission of 
- 10 - 

presumptively unreliable statements by bootstrapping on the 

trustworthiness of other evidence admitted at trial. Wright, 

497 U.S. at 822-23. However, the Supreme Court in Wright did 

not reject the use of the interlocking character of codefendant 

confessions as probative of their reliability, but merely 

"declined to rely on corroborative physical evidence" in 

applying Lee's analysis. Id. at 824 (emphasis added); see

Washington v. Rice, 844 P.2d 416, 427 n.5 (Wash. 1993) (en banc) 

(observing that Wright rejected only physical evidence as 

corroborative of a codefendant's "interlocking" confession, not 

the interlocking nature of the confessions themselves). Thus, 

under the Supreme Court's reasoning in Lee and Wright, where 

codefendants' statements "are identical in all material 

respects," such evidence may be considered because "the 

likelihood that they are accurate is significantly increased." 

476 U.S. at 545. Such statements are considered to 

substantially "interlock," in that they "recite[ ] essentially 

the same facts as those of . . . nontestifying codefendants." 

Cruz v. New York, 481 U.S. 186, 190-91 (1987). 

The degree to which such confessions must "interlock" to be 

admissible was defined in Lee as follows: 

If those portions of the codefendant's 

purportedly "interlocking" statement which 

bear to any significant degree on the 

defendant's participation in the crime are 

not thoroughly substantiated by the 

defendant's own confession, the admission of 
- 11 - 

the statement poses too serious a threat to 

the accuracy of the verdict to be 

countenanced by the Sixth Amendment. In 

other words, when the discrepancies between 

the statements are not insignificant, the 

codefendant's confession may not be 

admitted. 

476 U.S. at 545 (emphasis added). Conversely, an accomplice's 

statement that does not "interlock" with the defendant's 

statement may be admitted against the defendant if the areas of 

disagreement are irrelevant or trivial. See id. at 545. Before 

an accomplice's confession may be admitted, the court must be 

able to conclude that the declarant's truthfulness is so clear 

from the surrounding circumstances that cross-examination would 

be of "marginal utility." Wright, 497 U.S. at 823. 

Finally, although a violation of the Confrontation Clause 

results when a court admits against a defendant an accomplice's 

interlocking confession that differs in substantial ways from 

the defendant's confession, if the admission of the accomplice's 

statement is found harmless beyond a reasonable doubt the error 

does not require reversal of the conviction. See Cruz, 481 U.S. 

at 193-94. In examining the record for harmless error, 

corroborating physical evidence may be considered, although it 

is an improper basis upon which to determine the reliability of 

the accomplice's statement. See Wright, 497 U.S. at 823-24. 

Applying these principles to the issue before us, we find 

Bass met his burden to show that the trial court's decision was 
- 12 - 

erroneous. See Fore v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 1007, 1010, 265 

S.E.2d 729, 731, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1017 (1980). 

We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

Commonwealth, the party prevailing below. See Williams v. 

Commonwealth, 30 Va. App. 378, 381, 517 S.E.2d 246, 248 (1999). 

All three defendants gave tape-recorded confessions to the 

police in response to questioning. The accomplices' statements 

admitted against Bass came into evidence through the testimony 

of Officer Rilee. They were unsworn and were not subject to 

cross-examination. See Lee, 476 U.S. at 544. Furthermore, 

Sirls and Scott were aware at the time they made the statements 

that they were facing charges of robbery, and the police were 

aware of the declarants' roles in the crime under investigation. 

See id. at 544, cited in Wright, 497 U.S. at 821. 

Finally, the confessions of the three defendants were not 

substantially interlocking. Sirls and Scott both said in their 

confessions that Bass was present during the robbery of the two 

victims. Sirls offered an indicator of Bass' proximity, stating 

that while he held a gun to the chin of Robert Randolph, Bass 

stood close enough that Sirls "could have reached and touched 

him, that's how close he was." Bass disagreed on this point. 

While admitting that he was close enough to see the "tears in 

the eyes" of the female victim, Jacqueline James, Bass described 

his location relative to the robbery as being "away from the 
- 13 - 

scene . . . at the end of the street," but close enough to see 

Sirls and Scott committing the robbery in the parking lot. He 

replied to Sirls' invitation to participate in the robbery in 

the parking lot by saying, "Naw, uh-uh, I'm leaving. . . ." 

When police asked Bass why he thought his companions were armed, 

he replied, "Because I guess they was going in to do a robbery." 

(Emphasis added). 

Under Lee, the defendant's confession must "thoroughly 

substantiate[ ]" those portions of his accomplices' confessions 

which bear upon the defendant's guilt to render their statements 

admissible against him. See 476 U.S. at 545. Here, the 

confessions do not thoroughly substantiate each other. In his 

statement, Bass denied having participated in the robbery, 

claimed he was not in the parking lot when it occurred, and 

further stated he "was leaving" when Sirls and Scott made clear 

their plans to rob the two victims. Sirls and Scott, however, 

placed Bass immediately at the scene, close enough that Sirls 

"could have . . . touched him." This discrepancy is neither 

"irrelevant" nor "trivial," see Lee, 476 U.S. at 545, because 

the statements go to whether Bass' conduct was such that it 

supports his conviction as a principal in the second degree or 

as an accessory before the fact. See Jones v. Commonwealth, 15 

Va. App. 384, 387, 424 S.E.2d 563, 565 (1992) (an accused's mere 

presence and consent to the crime will not suffice to convict as 
- 14 - 

an accomplice (citing Underwood v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 1045, 

1048, 243 S.E.2d 231, 233 (1978))). Furthermore, because Bass' 

statement did not thoroughly substantiate those of Sirls and 

Scott, and because the discrepancies in the confessions taken 

from Sirls and Scott gave rise to the need for probative 

cross-examination, we cannot say that cross-examination of the 

declarants would have been only marginally useful. See Wright, 

497 U.S. at 823. 

For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the trial court 

erroneously admitted the statements of Sirls and Scott into 

evidence against Bass. We now examine whether this error was 

harmless or whether it requires reversal of Bass' convictions. 

HARMLESS ERROR ANALYSIS

Where constitutional error occurs, the court must assess 

whether the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See

Lilly, 119 S. Ct. at 1901 (citing Chapman v. California, 386 

U.S. 18, 24 (1967)). Confrontation Clause error is a federal 

constitutional error subject to harmless error analysis. See

Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 684 (1986). "'[B]efore a 

federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court 

must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a 

reasonable doubt.'" Lilly v. Commonwealth, 258 Va. 548, 551, 

___ S.E.2d ___, ___ (1999) (quoting Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24). 

"This standard requires a determination of 'whether there is a 
- 15 - 

reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might 

have contributed to the conviction.'" Id. at 551, ___ S.E.2d at 

___ (quoting Chapman, 386 U.S. at 23). 

In making [a] determination [of such 

reasonable possibility], the reviewing court 

is to consider a host of factors, including 

the importance of the tainted evidence in 

the prosecution's case, whether that 

evidence was cumulative, the presence or 

absence of evidence corroborating or 

contradicting the tainted evidence on 

material points, and the overall strength of 

the prosecution's case. 

Id. at 551, ___ S.E.2d at ___. 

In determining whether an erroneously admitted codefendant 

statement incriminating a defendant constituted harmless error, 

the interlocking nature of the codefendant's and defendant's 

statements may also be considered in assessing whether the error 

contributed to the defendant's conviction. See Cruz, 481 U.S. 

at 190-91 (citing Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 253 

(1969)); Preston v. Florida, 641 So.2d 169, 171 n.7 (Fla. 1994) 

(observing Cruz noted that interlocking confessions may be 

considered for purposes other than reliability of the 

statements, including harmlessness of error). Where the 

defendant makes no attempt to disclaim his own confession which 

closely interlocks with the confession of non-testifying 

accomplices, the error may be deemed harmless. See Cruz, 481 

U.S. at 193-94. 
- 16 - 

It is well established that an accused cannot be convicted 

solely on his or her uncorroborated extrajudicial confession. 

See Phillips v. Commonwealth, 202 Va. 207, 210-11, 116 S.E.2d 

282, 284-85 (1960). Rather, the corpus delicti of an offense 

must be established by such substantial corroborative 

circumstances as will, when taken in connection with the 

confession, establish the corpus delicti beyond a reasonable 

doubt. See id. at 211, 116 S.E.2d at 285. The corpus delicti

of an offense is the fact that the crime charged has been 

actually perpetrated, meaning "'objective proof or substantial 

fact that a crime has been committed.'" Claxton v. City of 

Lynchburg, 15 Va. App. 152, 154, 421 S.E.2d 891, 893 (1992) 

(citation omitted). 

"To show an accused guilty of a crime as a principal in the 

second degree, the Commonwealth must show that the accused was 

present, aiding and abetting, and intended his or her words, 

gestures, signals, or actions to in some way encourage, advise, 

urge, or in some way help the person committing the crime to 

commit it." McGill v. Commonwealth, 24 Va. App. 728, 733, 485 

S.E.2d 173, 175 (1997) (citing Ramsey v. Commonwealth, 2 

Va. App. 265, 269, 343 S.E.2d 465, 468 (1986)). A person 

accused as an accomplice is accountable for all crimes committed 

by his or her confederates in furtherance of the criminal 

enterprise, even though the accomplice may never have intended 
- 17 - 

that a particular crime would be committed. See Jones, 15 

Va. App. at 387, 424 S.E.2d at 565 (citing Boggs v. 

Commonwealth, 153 Va. 828, 836, 149 S.E. 445, 447 (1929)) 

(additional citation omitted). 

"[E]vidence [that] establishes that the accomplice was 

. . . present . . . at a convenient distance" is sufficient to 

establish the accomplice's presence at the crime scene. McGhee 

v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 422, 425 n.2, 270 S.E.2d 729, 731 n.2 

(1980). However, the accused's mere presence and consent to the 

crime will not suffice to convict as an accomplice. See Jones, 

15 Va. App. at 387, 424 S.E.2d at 565 (citing Underwood v. 

Commonwealth, 218 Va. 1045, 1048, 243 S.E.2d 231, 233 (1978)). 

The accused "'must share the criminal intent of the party who 

actually committed the [crime] or be guilty of some overt act in 

furtherance thereof.'" Jones, 15 Va. App. at 387, 424 S.E.2d at 

565 (quoting Augustine v. Commonwealth, 226 Va. 120, 124, 306 

S.E.2d 886, 889 (1983)). 

Applying the law to the facts of this case, we find the 

trial court's error in admitting the accomplices' statements to 

be harmless. Bass' statement to the police admitted that he 

accompanied Sirls and Scott to the Food Lion store on the 

evening in question and that he drove them there knowing that 

they were armed and intended to commit a robbery. He stated 

that he and his cohorts walked around in the store until they 
- 18 - 

saw Randolph and James and that he exited the store with Sirls 

and Scott when they identified Randolph and James as their 

victims. He further admitted that, despite declining Sirls' 

invitation to assist in the robbery, he stood close by until his 

cohorts completed their crime, then fled with them, helping 

Sirls and Scott effect their escape by driving them from the 

scene. He also accurately described the clothes worn by Sirls 

and Scott on the evening in question. The only significant 

difference between his account and that of Sirls was in respect 

to Bass' proximity to the robbery. 

The accounts given by Sirls and Scott match Bass' statement 

in their material respects. All three individuals agreed that 

they went to the Food Lion store together, that Bass drove them 

in Scott's mother's car, and that discussion of the robbery took 

place on the way. The three accounts were also consistent 

concerning the manner in which Sirls and Scott were armed, in 

reporting that Bass was unarmed, and in describing how Sirls 

robbed Randolph while Scott held a gun on James and checked her 

pockets for cash. Sirls and Bass also accurately described the 

clothes worn by each codefendant, though no statement by Scott 

was offered into evidence on this point. The only material 

respect in which Sirls' account differed from Bass' was in 

Sirls' assertion that Bass stood so close to him during the 

robbery that Sirls could have touched him. Scott's statement 
- 19 - 

differed from Bass' only in his statement that once the three 

returned to the car, he, Bass and Sirls ate some of the 

groceries taken from James. In short, the only respects in 

which the accounts of Sirls and Scott differ from that of Bass 

are Bass' proximity to the robbery as it occurred, and whether 

Bass ate any of the groceries taken from James. 

Although the confessions were not sufficiently interlocking 

to permit their admission under the principles of Lee, 476 U.S. 

at 545-46, their substantially interlocking nature, when 

considered together with the other evidence in the case, 

establishes the foundation for finding harmless error. Bass' 

own statement, taken in conjunction with the testimony of the 

two crime victims, beyond any reasonable doubt places him at the 

scene of the robbery in question, aiding and abetting Sirls and 

Scott and acting in furtherance of their crime. The testimony 

of the two victims established they were robbed, and they 

identified all three codefendants as being present at the Food 

Lion store just prior to the robbery. Randolph also identified 

Sirls and Scott as the robbers, and stated that Bass was present 

while Sirls and Scott committed the crime. More importantly, 

Bass admitted that he drove Sirls and Scott to the Food Lion 

store on the evening in question, that he knew of the plan to 

commit a robbery, that he knew his confederates were armed, and 

that he knew they brought their weapons into the store in order 
- 20 - 

to commit a robbery. Although Bass stated he declined to 

participate directly in the robbery of the two victims when 

invited to do so, he admitted that while Sirls and Scott robbed 

the two victims, he waited at a distance close enough to the 

crime scene to see the female victim crying. Bass further 

admitted that after the robbery was completed, he fled with 

Sirls and Scott, and that he drove them away from the scene of 

the robbery. The evidence thus establishes that Bass aided 

Sirls and Scott in a criminal enterprise, by driving them to the 

Food Lion store, knowing their intent to commit a robbery, and 

by helping them escape after the robbery was completed. These 

admissions evidence his participation in a common criminal 

enterprise with Sirls and Scott, and fully support his 

conviction of robbery as a principal in the second degree. See

Jones, 15 Va. App. at 387, 424 S.E.2d at 565. 

According the accomplices' statements their full 

prejudicial value, see Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427, 432 

(1972), we find that the accounts of Sirls and Scott add nothing 

significant to the other evidence in the case, particularly the 

picture painted by Bass' own statement depicting himself as a 

principal in the second degree. Under the accomplice theory 

which underlies his conviction, it matters not whether Bass 

stood shoulder to shoulder with Sirls as the latter held a gun 

to Randolph or whether he ate any of the stolen groceries 
- 21 - 

afterward. The evidence provided by Bass himself unquestionably 

revealed that he was aware of his companions' criminal purpose 

and that he acted in furtherance of that purpose by driving them 

to the store, waiting while they perpetrated the robbery, and 

driving them from the scene. Thus, even viewing the erroneously 

admitted accomplice confessions with an eye toward their full 

damaging potential to Bass' defense, the remaining evidence of 

Bass' guilt is overwhelming, see id., and establishes no 

"'reasonable possibility that the [improperly admitted] evidence 

. . . contributed to the conviction,'" or that a different 

verdict might have been reached but for the admission of the 

accomplice statements. Lilly, 258 Va. at 551, ___ S.E.2d at ___ 

(quoting Chapman, 386 U.S. at 23); see Schneble, 405 U.S. at 432 

(whether improperly admitted testimony required reversal of 

conviction depended upon whether the evidence was sufficiently 

prejudicial to defendant; if there was no "reasonable 

possibility" that the evidence contributed to the conviction, 

reversal was not required); Harrington, 395 U.S. at 254. It is 

thus clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the admission of the 

accomplice confessions was harmless error. See Schneble, 405 

U.S. at 432; Lilly, 258 Va. at 551, ___ S.E.2d at ___. 
- 22 - 

Because we find that the admission of Sirls' and Scott's 

statements inculpating Bass was harmless error, we affirm the 

judgment of the trial court. 

 Affirmed.