UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 13-4214

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

STEPHEN TUCCIARONE,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern

District of Virginia, at Richmond. John A. Gibney, Jr., 

District Judge. (3:05-cr-00085-JAG-1)

Submitted: October 25, 2013 Decided: May 22, 2014

Before NIEMEYER, WYNN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Michael S. Nachmanoff, Federal Public Defender, Robert J. 

Wagner, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Patrick L. Bryant, 

Appellate Attorney, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellant. Peter 

Sinclair Duffey, Assistant United States Attorney, Richmond, 

Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Stephen Tucciarone appeals the district court’s 

judgment revoking his supervised release and sentencing him to 

thirty-six months’ imprisonment. On appeal, counsel has filed a 

brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), 

stating that there are no meritorious issues for appeal but 

questioning whether the district court erred by imposing a 

thirty-six month sentence. We affirm.

We will affirm a sentence imposed after revocation of 

supervised release if it is within the applicable statutory 

range and not “plainly unreasonable.” United States v. Crudup, 

461 F.3d 433, 439-40 (4th Cir. 2006). “In determining whether a 

sentence is plainly unreasonable, we first decide whether the 

sentence is unreasonable[,] . . . follow[ing] generally the 

procedural and substantive considerations that we employ in our 

review of original sentences . . . .” Id. at 438. But we

“take[] a more deferential appellate posture concerning issues 

of fact and the exercise of discretion than reasonableness 

review for guidelines sentences.” United States v. Moulden, 478

F.3d 652, 656 (4th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks 

omitted).

A revocation sentence is procedurally reasonable if 

the district court properly calculates the U.S. Sentencing 

Guidelines Manual Chapter Seven advisory policy statement range 
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and explains the sentence adequately, after considering the 

policy statements and applicable 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006)

factors. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) (2006); Crudup, 461 F.3d at 439. 

We recently held that the “mere reference to [inapplicable § 

3553(a) factors] does not render a revocation sentence 

procedurally unreasonable when those factors are relevant to, 

and considered in conjunction with, the enumerated § 3553(a) 

factors.” United States v. Webb, 738 F.3d 638, 642 (4th Cir. 

2013). A revocation sentence is substantively reasonable if the 

district court states a proper basis for the sentence imposed, 

up to the statutory maximum. Crudup, 461 F.3d at 440. Only if 

we find a sentence unreasonable must we decide if it is plainly 

so. Moulden, 478 F.3d at 657.

Counsel does not claim that Tucciarone’s sentence is 

procedurally unreasonable. Rather, counsel questions its 

substantive reasonableness, citing the district court’s failure

to “appropriately weigh . . . Tucciarone’s history and 

characteristics” and its reliance on factors, including 

Tucciarone’s “lack of respect for the law” and the seriousness 

of the offenses, that are not specified in § 3583(e). See

Crudup, 461 F.3d at 439 (“[N]ot all the original sentencing 

factors of § 3553(a) can be considered [in imposing] a 

revocation sentence.”).
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We are not persuaded. Our review of the record before 

us confirms that the district court was primarily motivated to 

impose Tucciarone’s thirty-six month revocation sentence, which 

is above the policy statement range but within the statutory 

maximum, because Tucciarone breached the court’s trust. A 

defendant’s breach of trust is “a perfectly appropriate basis—

and, in fact, the principal basis on which the Guidelines 

encourage courts to ground revocation sentences.” United States 

v. Bennett, 698 F.3d 194, 202 (4th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 

S. Ct. 1506 (2013). Given the district court's broad discretion 

to revoke supervised release and impose a term of imprisonment 

up to the statutory maximum, we conclude that Tucciarone’s 

revocation sentence is not substantively unreasonable. Crudup, 

461 F.3d at 439.

In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire 

record in this case and have found no meritorious issues for 

appeal. We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment.

This court requires that counsel inform Tucciarone, in writing, 

of the right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States 

for further review. If Tucciarone requests that a petition be 

filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be 

frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for leave to 

withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that 

a copy thereof was served on Tucciarone.
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We dispense with oral argument because the facts and 

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 

before this court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process.

AFFIRMED