FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

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No. 1D18-4640

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ISIAH JOHNSON,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

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On appeal from the Circuit Court for Escambia County.

John L. Miller, Judge.

September 21, 2020

SALVADOR, TATIANA R., ASSOCIATE JUDGE.

Isiah Johnson appeals from a trial court order on his amended 

motion to withdraw plea, or in the alternative amended motion to 

correct sentencing error. The trial court concluded that it lacked 

jurisdiction over the motion to withdraw plea and denied the 

sentencing claims on the merits, after treating them as being filed 

pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a). We 

affirm this resolution of Mr. Johnson’s motion.1

1 We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 4(b)(1), Fla. Const.; Fla. R. 

App. P. 9.140(b)(1)(D).
2

I.

On July 16, 2009, Mr. Johnson entered a no-contest plea to 

armed burglary of a dwelling, aggravated battery on a person 65 

or older with great bodily harm, grand theft of an automobile, 

grand theft, and grand theft of a firearm. On September 18, 2009, 

the trial court sentenced him to 35 years’ incarceration followed by 

2 years of community control for the most serious count. Mr. 

Johnson was a minor at the time he committed the offenses.

On October 16, 2009, Mr. Johnson filed a motion to withdraw 

plea, asserting that the plea was involuntary. Subsequently, on 

March 9, 2010, the court held a hearing where newly appointed 

counsel advised the court that Mr. Johnson wished to withdraw his 

motion.

The court then engaged in a colloquy with Mr. Johnson and 

advised that the motion to withdraw was “well taken” and the 

court was likely to grant it. Mr. Johnson told the court that he 

understood this but nonetheless wished to withdraw his motion to 

withdraw plea. Mr. Johnson told the court that he did not want to 

go to trial “[b]ecause I feel like I will get myself deeper in trouble 

by going to trial.” After engaging in additional discussion with Mr. 

Johnson, the trial court allowed him to withdraw his motion to 

withdraw plea, finding that Mr. Johnson wanted to “maintain his 

plea” and that he “ha[d] a logical basis for his position.” The trial 

court entered no written order allowing Mr. Johnson to withdraw 

his motion to withdraw plea, but the court docket does contain a 

notation: “Defendant wishes to withdraw his motion to withdraw 

plea and maintain his plea and wishes to go back to state prison –

Granted.”

Over the next few years, Mr. Johnson filed a rule 3.850 motion 

and a rule 3.800(a) motion. Both were denied by the trial court and 

affirmed on appeal by this Court.

In 2017, Mr. Johnson filed an amended motion to withdraw 

plea or in the alternative amended motion to correct sentencing 

error under rule 3.800(b)(1) in the trial court. In it he asserted that 

his plea was involuntary and that his sentence was illegal under

Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010), and its progeny. He 

maintained that the court could hear the amended motion because
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the judgment and sentence never became final, as no written order 

was entered regarding his motion to withdraw plea from 2009.

The trial court rejected Mr. Johnson’s jurisdictional 

argument, concluding that the judgment and sentence had long 

been final and that he could not withdraw his plea at this late date. 

The court also denied the claim that his sentence was illegal, 

treating the motion as being properly brought under Florida Rule 

of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a).

II.

Mr. Johnson asserts that the court incorrectly concluded that 

it lacked jurisdiction over his amended motion to withdraw plea. 

He asserts that because no written order was entered addressing 

the 2009 motion to withdraw plea, the final judgment was never 

rendered, leaving jurisdiction in the trial court. We disagree and 

affirm.2

A rule 3.170(l) motion must be filed “within thirty days after 

rendition of the sentence.” Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.170(l). The judgment 

and sentence is rendered “when a signed, written order is filed 

with the clerk of the lower tribunal.” Fla. R. App. 9.020(h) (2009).3

However, the filing of a timely motion to withdraw plea tolls 

rendition of the final judgment and sentence. Fla. R. App. P. 

9.020(h) (2009). When the motion has “been filed, the final order 

shall not be deemed rendered . . . until the filing of a signed, 

written order disposing of all such motions between such parties.”

Fla. R. App. P. 9.020(h)(1) (2009); see also Smallwood v. State, 911 

So. 2d 849, 850 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005).

It is clear that the failure to dispose of a pending motion to 

withdraw plea with a written order will delay rendition of the final 

order, even for years. This Court has previously found a final 

2 As to his other arguments, we affirm without further 

comment.

3 We use the 2009 version of this rule that was in effect when 

Appellant filed his motion to withdraw plea. Rule 9.020 has since 

been reorganized, but in ways that are immaterial to our decision.
4

judgment’s rendition was delayed from 2002 until 2009 based on a 

pending motion to withdraw plea. See Douglas v. State, 41 So. 3d 

428 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010). 

However, here, there was no such pending motion to withdraw 

plea. The trial court clearly ruled on the record that Mr. Johnson 

was permitted to withdraw his motion to withdraw plea. The court 

docket likewise contains a notation to that effect. There was no 

requirement that the court enter a written order on the motion to 

withdraw the motion to withdraw plea. And because the motion 

was withdrawn, and there was no pending motion for the court to 

address, rule 9.020(h)(1) did not further toll rendition of the final 

judgment.

We have not failed to consider Mr. Johnson’s reliance on

Iriarte v. State, 119 So. 3d 528 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013). But we find this 

case readily distinguishable. In Iriarte, the court reversed a 

summary denial of a postconviction motion, where the trial court 

had ruled that the motion was untimely. Id. at 528. The Second 

District noted that the appellant’s filing of a motion to withdraw 

plea tolled rendition of the final judgment. Id. The court then held 

that, notwithstanding the appellant’s admission to voluntarily 

dismissing his motion to withdraw plea, it was unclear when the 

motion was dismissed and accordingly, “the date his judgment and 

sentence became final cannot be determined from the record, and 

the timeliness of his current rule 3.850 motion remains unclear.”

Id. Thus, contrary to Mr. Johnson’s argument, the Second District 

did not hold that a written order is required even when a motion 

to withdraw plea is voluntarily withdrawn. Rather, the court ruled 

that it could not tell when the judgment and sentence became final, 

based on the record and the trial court’s attachments to the order 

denying rule 3.850 relief. Thus, a summary denial in that instance 

was reversed.

As such, Iriarte is inapplicable on the facts of this case. The 

record before us is clear that that the motion to withdraw plea was 

withdrawn on March 9, 2010. The final judgment became final 30 

days later. And the trial court correctly concluded that it lacked 

jurisdiction over the amended motion to withdraw plea, filed in 

2017. See Gafford v. State, 783 So. 2d 1191, 1192 (Fla. 1st DCA 

2001) (“[T]he 30-day limit under 3.170(l) is also jurisdictional; 
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therefore, the trial court did not have the authority to consider 

Gafford’s motion . . . .”).

III.

Mr. Johnson received a 35-year incarcerative sentence for 

felonies he committed when he was 13. He contends that he is 

entitled to resentencing and retroactive application of the sentence 

review procedures under section 921.1402, Florida Statutes. Based 

on our precedent, the trial court correctly denied Mr. Johnson 

relief.

The Florida Supreme Court has “narrowly defined the class of 

offenders entitled to resentencing under the new juvenile 

resentencing laws; specifically, those defendants who originally 

received life sentences and who were resentenced after their 

sentences were vacated pursuant to Graham but before the July 1, 

2014 effective date of the new juvenile sentencing laws.” Hart v. 

State, 255 So. 3d 921, 927 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018). Because Mr. 

Johnson never received a life sentence and never had his sentence 

vacated under Graham, he is not entitled to sentencing review 

after 25 years. See id. at 927. Nor is he entitled to resentencing 

under Graham. His 35-year incarcerative sentence is not a de facto 

life sentence. See id. (“Consistent with the requirements of 

Graham, Hart’s fifty-year sentence affords him a meaningful 

opportunity for release during his natural life.”). Thus, the trial 

court did not err in denying Mr. Johnson relief under rule 3.800(a).

IV.

Accordingly, we AFFIRM the order of the trial court.

KELSEY and NORDBY, JJ., concur.

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Not final until disposition of any timely and 

authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 

9.331.

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Michael Ufferman of Michael Ufferman Law Firm, P.A., 

Tallahassee; Shalini Goel Agarwal of Southern Poverty Law 

Center, Tallahassee, for Appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Benjamin L. Hoffman, 

Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.