T.F.S. No. 00000524 

Approved under EASA DOA No. 21J.056 Page 1/11 

 2009.05.13

This document is available on the internet: www.eurocopter.com/techpub 

EUROCOPTER 

DIRECTION TECHNIQUE SUPPORT

13725 MARIGNANE CEDEX FRANCE

EMERGENCY

ALERT SERVICE BULLETIN 

DAUPHIN NUMBER VERSIONS

Civil: N, N1 AS365 01.00.63 Military: F, Fi, Fs, K

SUBJECT: LIMITATIONS

 Limited fuel transfer between fuel tank groups

ATA: 28

REVISION NUMBER DATE OF APPROVAL DATE OF ISSUE

 

Revision 0 On: May 04, 2009 2009.05.05 

 

Revision 1 On: May 13, 2009 2009.05.13 
T.F.S. No. 00000524 

Approved under EASA DOA No. 21J.056 Page 2/11 

 2009.05.13

THE INFORMATION AND INSTRUCTIONS 

CONTAINED IN THIS ALERT SERVICE BULLETIN 

ARE INTENDED FOR MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL 

AND FLIGHT CREWS. 

1. PLANNING INFORMATION 

1.A. EFFECTIVITY 

1.A.1. Helicopters/installed equipment 

Helicopters that do not embody modification 0728B17 or kit 365A087690.00. 

NOTE 1

The embodiment of modification 0728B17 or kit 

365A087690.00 removes the two high level switches 

on helicopters equipped with a crossfeed between the 

fuel filler necks.

NOTE 2

Refer to the aircraft individual inspection record (MOD 

record), the equipment log cards (FMs) or the aircraft 

log book to identify the actual configuration of the 

helicopter. 

1.A.2. Non-installed equipment 

Not applicable. 

1.B. ASSOCIATED REQUIREMENTS 

Not applicable. 

1.C. REASON 

Revision 0: 

To preclude the risk of a short circuit on the high level switches and to limit the use of fuel transfer 

between the fuel tank groups. 

This ALERT SERVICE BULLETIN will form the subject of an EASA Airworthiness Directive. 

Revision 1: 

Correct the position of the high-level switches. 

Revision 1 does not affect revision 0 of this ALERT SERVICE BULLETIN. 

Revision 1 of this ALERT SERVICE BULLETIN will not affect EASA Airworthiness 

Directive 2009-0109-E that has been issued for the subject described in this ALERT SERVICE 

BULLETIN. 

CAUTION 
T.F.S. No. 00000524 

Approved under EASA DOA No. 21J.056 Page 3/11 

 2009.05.13

1.D. DESCRIPTION 

A customer noted that the high level switch probe unit, located in the rear auxiliary fuel tank (RH 

group) on an AS365 N helicopter, had separated. 

The separation had damaged the electrical wires which supply the high level indicator light on the fuel 

control panel during a fuel transfer. If bared, these electrical wires can cause a short circuit which can 

lead to untimely lighting of the indicator light (without the high fuel level actually being reached), or to 

explosion of the fuel tank with the presence of fuel vapor. 

Therefore, to prevent any explosion, this ALERT SERVICE BULLETIN makes it mandatory to 

disconnect the high level switches on helicopters which do not embody modification 0728B17 or 

kit 365A087690.00. 

Compliance with this ALERT SERVICE BULLETIN results in the high level indicating system being 

inhibited and therefore the crew will no longer be informed of the risk of fuel overflowing from the fuel 

tank vents when fuel is transferred between the fuel tank groups. 

Consequently, EUROCOPTER authorizes the pilots of the helicopters concerned by this ALERT 

SERVICE BULLETIN, to transfer fuel between the fuel tank groups only if the group receiving the fuel 

contains less than 300 liters (240 kg or 529 lb.), in order to prevent the risk of overflowing. 

1.E. COMPLIANCE 

EUROCOPTER renders compliance with this ALERT SERVICE BULLETIN mandatory. 

1.E.1. Compliance at the works 

1.E.1.a. On helicopters 

Not applicable. 

1.E.1.b. On non-installed equipment 

Not applicable. 
T.F.S. No. 00000524 

Approved under EASA DOA No. 21J.056 Page 4/11 

 2009.05.13

1.E.2. Compliance in service: By the operator 

1.E.2.a. On helicopters/installed equipment 

Comply with paragraph 2. of this ALERT SERVICE BULLETIN at the latest within 10 flying hours, 

without exceeding 30 days, following receipt of this ALERT SERVICE BULLETIN, issued on the 

date indicated at the foot of the page. 

1.E.2.b. On non-installed equipment 

Not applicable. 

1.F. APPROVAL 

Approval is limited to civil version helicopters subject to an Airworthiness Certificate. 

1.F.1. Approval of the modifications

Not applicable. 

1.F.2. Approval of the Service Bulletin 

The technical information contained in revision 0 of this ALERT SERVICE BULLETIN was approved 

on May 04, 2009 under the authority of EASA Design Organisation Approval No. 21J.056. 

The technical information contained in revision 1 of this ALERT SERVICE BULLETIN was approved 

on May 13, 2009 under the authority of EASA Design Organisation Approval No. 21J.056. 

1.G. MANPOWER 

1.G.1. Qualification

Electrician. 

1.G.2. Time for the operations

20 minutes. 

1.G.3. Estimated helicopter grounding time 

Not applicable. 

1.H. WEIGHT AND BALANCE 

Not applicable. 

1.I. EFFECT ON ELECTRICAL LOADS 

Not applicable. 
T.F.S. No. 00000524 

Approved under EASA DOA No. 21J.056 Page 5/11 

 2009.05.13

1.J. SOFTWARE MODIFICATION EMBODIMENT RECORD 

Not applicable. 

1.K. REFERENCES 

Maintenance Manual (MET): 

Work Card 24.00.00.300. 

Standard Practices Manual (MTC): 

Work Card 20.07.03.406. 

1.L. OTHER DOCUMENTS AFFECTED 

Not applicable. 

1.M. TOOLING AFFECTED 

Not applicable. 

1.N. INTERCHANGEABILITY OR MIXABILITY OF PARTS 

Not applicable. 
T.F.S. No. 00000524 

Approved under EASA DOA No. 21J.056 Page 6/11 

 2009.05.13

2. ACCOMPLISHMENT INSTRUCTIONS 

2.A. GENERAL 

- Before doing any work, refer to the general safety instructions concerning the electrical power system 

as per MET Work Card 24.00.00.300. 

2.B. OPERATIONAL PROCEDURE 

2.B.1. Disconnection of the switches (Figure 1) 

Disconnect all electrical power supplies as per MTC Work Card 20.07.03.406. 

Remove the fairings under the bottom structure to gain access to connectors 8Q and 9Q of high level 

switches (b) and (a) located respectively on rear tank (c) of the RH group and center tank (d) of the LH 

group. 

Disconnect connector 9Q from high level switch (a) on the LH center tank. 

Protect, isolate and secure connector 9Q and the electrical harness. If necessary, use cable ties (1). 

Disconnect connector 8Q from high level switch (b) on the rear tank. 

Protect, isolate and secure connector 8Q and the electrical harness. If necessary, use cable ties (1). 

Install the fairings that were removed previously under the bottom structure. 

Connect all the electrical power supplies as per MTC Work Card 20.07.03.406. 

2.B.2. Limitations for crews of helicopter versions that are not equipped with a crossfeed between 

the fuel filler necks (Figures 2 and 3) 

NOTE 1

To check that there is a crossfeed between the fuel 

filler necks, open the fuel tank filler door and note the 

location of the overpressure valve (see Figure 3). 

NOTE 2

Version F is not concerned by the procedure below 

because the "crossfeed between fuel filler necks" 

installation exists on the basic helicopter.

Produce a locally-made label (2) in accordance with Figure 2 and in accordance with the units 

indicated by the fuel contents gage. 

Affix label (2) near of the fuel panel so that the limitations indicated on the label can be seen by the 

pilot and copilot. 
T.F.S. No. 00000524 

Approved under EASA DOA No. 21J.056 Page 7/11 

 2009.05.13

2.C. IDENTIFICATION 

Record first compliance with this ALERT SERVICE BULLETIN in the helicopter documents. 

2.D. OPERATING AND MAINTENANCE INSTRUCTIONS 

2.D.1. Operating instructions 

Not applicable. 

2.D.2. Scheduled maintenance instructions 

Not applicable. 

2.D.3. Unscheduled maintenance instructions 

Not applicable. 
T.F.S. No. 00000524 

Approved under EASA DOA No. 21J.056 Page 8/11 

 2009.05.13

Figure 1: High level switch installation and wiring

a 

b 

d 

c 

1 1 
T.F.S. No. 00000524 

Approved under EASA DOA No. 21J.056 Page 9/11 

 2009.05.13

Figure 2: Label

2 Fuel transfer authorized only to fuel tank containing less than 240 kg

Fuel transfer authorized only to fuel tank containing less than 529 lb.

Fuel transfer authorized only to fuel tank containing less than 300 l
T.F.S. No. 00000524 

Approved under EASA DOA No. 21J.056 Page 10/11 

 2009.05.13

Figure 3: "Overpressure valve" installation 

Location of the 

overpressure valve 
T.F.S. No. 00000524 

Approved under EASA DOA No. 21J.056 Page 11/11 

 2009.05.13

3. MATERIAL INFORMATION 

3.A. MATERIAL: PRICE AND AVAILABILITY 

3.A.1. Cost 

Not applicable. 

3.A.2. Availability 

Not applicable. 

3.B. INFORMATION CONCERNING INDUSTRIAL SUPPORT 

Not applicable. 

3.C. MATERIAL REQUIRED FOR EACH HELICOPTER/ENGINE/COMPONENT 

3.C.1. Kits or components to be ordered for one helicopter or one assembly 

Not applicable. 

3.C.2. Material to be ordered separately 

Material P/N Qty Item Key Word Instructions

MP/N SAP 

 

E0043-3C0 738945 AR 1 Cable tie

3.D. PROCUREMENT CONDITIONS 

Not applicable. 

4. APPENDIX 

Not applicable.