About the Report

This report is based on interviews with senior police leaders, 

International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) members, 

international donors, and Afghan officials and civil society 

during 2013–14, completed just before April’s national 

elections. The report also draws on the author’s experience 

during 2009–12, when she served as senior Rule of Law 

adviser to three of the four major component commands 

within the ISAF coalition. Part of the United States Institute 

of Peace program is to promote peace and stability in 

Afghanistan. This report should be read in connection with 

USIP Special Report 322, “Police Transition in Afghanistan.” 

About the Author

Michelle Hughes is president and CEO of VALRAC Innovation, 

senior development adviser to Loyola University Chicago 

Law School’s LLM program in Rule of Law for Development, 

and a senior fellow with the National Defense University 

Joint Forces Staff College. A former senior executive in the 

Department of Defense, she has field experience in twelve 

conflict countries and is principal author of the Joint Force 

Commander’s Handbook on Military Support to Rule of Law 

and Security Sector Reform. 

2301 Constitution Ave., NW • Washington, DC 20037 • 202.457.1700 • fax 202.429.6063

Special Report 346 May 2014

© 2014 by the United States Institute of Peace. 

All rights reserved.

Contents

Background 2

Reinforcing the Minister’s Strategic Plan 4

Strengthening Institutional Functions within the MoI 5

Community Policing in the Afghan Context 6

Managing the Expanding Donor Map 7

U.S. Assistance Goals and Objectives 8

Conclusion 11

Policy Recommendations 12

Michelle Hughes

The Afghan National 

Police in 2015 and 

Beyond 

Summary

•	 The Afghan National Police (ANP) has made remarkable progress, but the challenges are 

urgent, and critical capabilities remain underdeveloped. Within the framework of the minister of interior’s own Strategic Vision, opportunities will arise to close some of the capacity 

gaps in the coming years.

•	 Helping the ANP shift from a wartime footing to a contextually appropriate community 

policing model, and advancing professionalism within the ministry and the operating 

forces, is critical to sustainability. If a national police force is going to succeed, the linkage between policing and governance must be recognized and strengthened.

•	 Managing the expanding array of ANP donors and their activities poses a unique challenge that has yet to be addressed. It is an executive challenge for the Ministry of 

Interior and a coordination challenge for the international community. For both, it will 

require a long-term approach.

•	 To facilitate effective evidence-based operations (EvBO) and strengthen the relationship 

between the ANP and the communities it serves, U.S.-funded activities that build capacity 

for justice and governance need to be more closely aligned with ANP development.

Introduction

Throughout the course of the war in Afghanistan, much has been written about the ANP. 

Since 2002, when Germany assumed the mantle as “lead nation” for developing the police, 

the international community has struggled with the problem of how best to facilitate the 

ANP’s growth and development.1 Technical approaches have been debated and amended, 

United States Institute of Peace www.usip.org

SPECIAL REPORT
2 USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 346

the “lead nation” approach gave way to more multilateral engagement, and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) became the de facto lead within the international 

community for developing policing, even as smaller bilateral missions continued their efforts 

and the European Police Mission (EUPOL) pursued its own mandate.2 The United States 

emerged as the largest police donor. And through the Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan (CSTC-A), the U.S. arm of NATO Training Mission – Afghanistan (NTM-A), 

the military assumed responsibility for most police training from the traditional civilian lead 

for policing assistance: the State Department Bureau of International Narcotics and Law 

Enforcement Affairs.3 None of these transitions happened without controversy. The military, 

in particular, has come under harsh criticism for its treatment of the ANP as a lightly armed 

element of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) rather than as a separate and distinct 

civilian institution of law enforcement professionals.4

This report does not replay the history or the arguments. Instead, it looks at the future 

of Afghanistan once security transition is complete at the end of 2014, with an eye toward 

where U.S. assistance can have the greatest strategic impact on the future of the ANP. The 

current level of progress would not have happened without the U.S. military’s tremendous 

drive, dedication, resources, and personal sacrifice in lives lost. At the same time, civilian 

contributions, although not as well publicized, have been critical to developing core ANP 

competencies.5 If progress is strategically reinforced, the combined civil-military effort will 

have laid a foundation for long-term success.

Background

As we look at policing in Afghanistan, we find hopeful indicators to build on. Afghan leaders 

have articulated a vision and are striving for self-determination and control. Human capital 

within the Ministry of Interior (MoI) is improving, and public trust and confidence in the 

ANP are at an all-time high.6 There is considerable momentum toward Afghan ownership of 

strengthening the ANP’s role in restoring and maintaining the rule of law. Success stories 

abound (though they seldom make the news), and the progress has created opportunities 

to support Afghan initiatives and ideas that didn’t exist even a year ago. But as the security 

transition concludes at the end of 2014, the international community’s continued inability 

to pursue a coherent, comprehensive approach to security sector reform limits external 

influence on progress and puts sustainability at risk.7

Throughout the course of international engagement, security force development, 

which includes the police, and judicial development have been on separate paths. The 

international community has generally acknowledged that law and order in Afghanistan 

would eventually be enforced by civilian police rather than by the Afghan National Army 

(ANA). But almost all police development efforts, including the establishment of operational policy, force structure, and standardized training and professionalization, were 

modeled on military rather than civilian police institutions. As recently as 2011, there 

was no vision for what the ANP would look like once the ISAF mission was complete. The 

Afghan government, however, had repeatedly refused to declare that an internal armed 

conflict existed, which had a direct impact on the extent to which ANSF could continue to 

detain insurgents and terrorists once the ISAF drawdown was complete. The international 

coalition’s operating assumption was that the Afghan authorities would eventually make 

the declaration so that the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) would apply to ANSF, just as 

it applied to ISAF forces. But the Afghans refused, leaving the ANP and elements of the 

National Directorate of Security (NDS) as the only ANSF that could detain insurgents under 

Afghan criminal law.8 “Professionalization”—which would be required for the ANP to be 

The views expressed in this report do not necessarily 

reflect the views of the United States Institute of Peace, 

which does not advocate specific policy positions.

To request permission to photocopy or reprint materials, 

e-mail: permissions@usip.org

About the Institute

The United States Institute of Peace is an independent, 

nonpartisan institution established and funded by Congress. 

Its goals are to help prevent and resolve violent conflicts, 

promote postconflict peacebuilding, and increase conflict 

management tools, capacity, and intellectual capital 

worldwide. The Institute does this by empowering others 

with knowledge, skills, and resources, as well as by its direct 

involvement in conflict zones around the globe.

Board of Directors

Stephen J. Hadley, (Chair), Principal, RiceHadleyGates, LLC, 

Washington, DC • George E. Moose (Vice Chair), Adjunct Professor of Practice, The George Washington University, Washington, DC • Judy Ansley, Former Assistant to the President and 

Deputy National Security Advisor under George W. Bush, Washington, DC • Eric Edelman, Hertog Distinguished Practitioner 

in Residence, Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International 

Studies, Washington, DC • Joseph Eldridge, University Chaplain and Senior Adjunct Professorial Lecturer, School of International Service, American University, Washington, DC • Kerry 

Kennedy, President, Robert F. Kennedy Center for Justice and 

Human Rights, Washington, DC • Ikram U. Khan, President, 

Quality Care Consultants, LLC., Las Vegas, NV • Stephen D. 

Krasner, Graham H. Stuart Professor of International Relations 

at Stanford University, Palo Alto, CA • John A. Lancaster, 

Former Executive Director, International Council on

Independent Living, Potsdam, NY • Jeremy A. Rabkin, 

Professor of Law, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA

• J. Robinson West, Chairman, PFC Energy, Washington, DC •

Nancy Zirkin, Executive Vice President, Leadership 

Conference on Civil and Human Rights, Washington, DC 

Members Ex Officio

John Kerry, Secretary of State • Chuck Hagel, Secretary of 

Defense • Gregg F. Martin, Major General, U.S. Army; 

President, National Defense University • Kristin Lord, 

Acting President, United States Institute of Peace (nonvoting)
USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 346	 3

able to assume the full scope of its responsibilities for EvBO—was not discussed without 

a caveat stating that it would occur only after targeted numbers of police were trained 

and equipped.9 Within the security ministries, few coalition advisers even tried to discuss 

civilian law enforcement with their Afghan principals. That all detention operations would 

eventually have to shift to the Afghan criminal justice system was acknowledged but not 

allowed to influence subsequent planning.10 

The challenge persists. The ISAF approach remains focused on growing the number of 

trained ANP to 157,000, and immediate security imperatives dominate the discussions.11

With the 2014 elections seen as at risk due to insecurity, any effort to further professionalize the force is seen as a distraction. Even the ongoing effort to “train” police officers who 

were assigned to the field without having completed the basic patrolman’s certification 

slowed as training slots were reallocated to meet the surging demand for more women to 

serve as female searchers in polling places. This reallocation has left a sizable gap—more 

than 8,000 untrained policemen remain on duty. While that number represents progress (a 

year ago, the number was estimated at 21,000), the fact that training was held in abeyance 

and viewed as nonessential in the near term is problematic. Once elections are complete, 

the new government will be faced with a significantly undertrained force, coinciding with a 

reduced security assistance presence.12

The overarching military train-and-equip approach has created another challenge for 

the transition by failing to ensure that the ANP is appropriately institutionalized within 

the larger framework of the Afghan political system. It is notable that the ISAF’s reports to 

Congress, as well as other strategic assessments, make no mention of the ANP’s enduring 

role as an essential component of government service.

Policing is a core governance function. Or, as the Afghan Constitution states, “defending independence, national sovereignty, territorial integrity and attaining the security and 

defense capability of the country shall be the fundamental duties of the state.” 13 The Police 

Law mandates that “the police shall perform their duties under the leadership of the Minister 

of Interior in the capital, and under the guidance of the governors and district chiefs in the provinces and districts respectively.” 14 The minister of interior’s own “Ten-Year Vision for the Afghan 

National Police” is filled with references to policing as an essential public service and to the 

responsibilities of the police to the people and their lawful representatives.15 In the words of 

the governor of Ghazni Province, “When my people see the police, they are seeing the mirror 

of me.” But ISAF strategies for ANP development, and the assessment frameworks used to 

measure progress, do not address the relationship of the police to the government as a metric 

for operational success. The NTM-A/CSTC-A development framework remains organized around 

the same five security-centric lines of effort that are used for the ANA.16

At the same time that ISAF is scaling back, Afghan officials are becoming the greatest 

proponents for the professionalization of the police as a law enforcement service. They 

are talking about it, issuing policy guidance designed to further it, and making political 

decisions based on an Afghan interpretation of Afghan law. This is not to say that they 

are always sincere or that they are operating under legal norms and standards that the 

international community accepts. But they are taking ownership of their own agenda and 

see the ANP as an essential component. This represents development progress and presents 

near-term opportunities that support successful security transition.

Unfortunately, the international donor community and ISAF have made little progress 

toward unified action that will take the ANP to the next level of professional competence. 

The effort continues to be ad hoc, disaggregated, and poorly defined. The absence of a 

continuous, holistic strategy that can guide horizontal and vertical integration across law 

enforcement actors is the most problematic characteristic of the international assistance 
4 USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 346

approach. It is too late now to “fix” the law enforcement assistance problem in Afghanistan. 

But steps can be taken that will strengthen Afghan initiatives; improve the effectiveness of 

important, internal security related niche capabilities; and increase the chance that we may 

yet have reasonably capable, reliable security partners within the ANP.

Reinforcing the Minister’s Strategic Plan

In 2010, with considerable drafting assistance from the international community, the minister of interior signed a comprehensive National Police Strategy (NPS).17 The strategy was 

followed soon thereafter by a derivative National Police Plan (NPP)—again, drafted largely 

by international advisers. The NPS reflected ISAF priorities and, while the minister and 

his deputies paid homage to it in all their public statements, there had been considerable 

NTM-A/CSTC-A effort behind the scenes to persuade the Afghans to take full ownership of 

its implementation, with mixed success. It was, after all, not the minister’s plan.

On October 16, 2012, shortly after General Ghulam Patang was appointed minister of 

interior, he announced a set of priorities, later codified with the help of the International 

Police Coordination Board (IPCB) as a “Ten-Year Vision,” during his remarks to a Provincial 

and District Chiefs of Police Conference that he convened in Kabul. As with a previous 

professionalization strategy that he crafted in May 2011 when he was director of the ANP 

Training General Command, he did not consult with international advisers beforehand. He 

did, however, ask the then head of the IPCB for her assistance, resulting in a corresponding 

set of two-year implementation plans.18

The minister’s Vision began with the following:

Within ten years the Afghan National Police (ANP) will become a unified, capable, and 

trustworthy civilian police service. Its primary responsibility will be to enforce the rule 

of law; maintain public order and security; detect and fight crimes; control borders; 

protect the rights, assets and freedoms of both Afghans and foreigners in Afghanistan 

according to national laws; and operate without ethnic, gender, language or religious 

discrimination. By pursuing the principles and objectives of the peace and reintegration 

program, which is based on the decisions of the 2–4 June 2010 Consultative Jirga, and 

creating a lawful society, the ANP will pave the way for sustainable peace and socioeconomic development of Afghanistan. It will be a unified and flexible force allowing 

personnel in the different police pillars of the ANP to transfer from one to the other 

when necessary, and winning public confidence by the use of community policing 

approaches to deliver policing services to the people of Afghanistan.19

The heavy emphasis on professionalization, civilianization, and community policing was 

a reflection of Minister Patang’s background as a career police officer, and it caught the 

international community off guard. As part of his implementation strategy, he proposed a 

series of two-year plans, which created an immediate disconnection with the NTM-A/CSTC-A 

supported NPS and NPP.20 ISAF is currently working with the MoI to develop an updated NPS 

and NPP, but the strategic planning framework is not yet completely reconciled.21

Upon assuming control of the ministry from Patang in September 2013, the current 

minister of interior, Mohammed Omer Daudzai, reaffirmed his commitment to the Vision, 

with the caveat that he intended to adjust priority-setting and implementation timelines as 

necessary to adapt to the security situation on the ground. During discussions with provincial governors as research for this study, it was clear that they also support the goals in the 

Vision and that it reflects their view of the ANP as essential to their own ability to govern.

Ultimately, ANP development needs to be based on agreed-upon goals and objectives 

that reflect a ministry’s institutional position rather than the personal agenda of a particular minister. And development will not be sustainable unless it is aligned behind a set of 

Afghan-generated two-year plans. Otherwise, consistent progress is unlikely, donor confidence and support will probably decrease, and the ISAF and other donors will continue to 

differ on how the police should develop.22

ANP development needs to be 

based on agreed-upon goals 

and objectives that reflect a 

ministry’s institutional position 

rather than the personal agenda 

of a particular minister.
USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 346	 5

Development of the vision is not the only indication that the Afghans are thinking strategically. While codifying national goals and objectives, the Afghans are also affirmatively 

demonstrating a growing capacity to plan and coordinate the way ahead. Election planning is a case in point. According to multiple accounts, the minister of interior, minister 

of defense, and director of the NDS began planning eighteen months in advance for how 

they would conduct election security, and they have been adamant that they would control the process.23 In northern Afghanistan, for example, when the German Police Project 

Team, which had been training, mentoring, and advising the ANP since 2002, reached out 

to provincial leaders to offer advice and assistance, they were rebuffed because Afghan 

regional leaders believed they had the planning process well in hand. International advisers have had concerns about the quality of some of the security assessments the Afghans 

have undertaken, but they were impressed by the progress in planning and cross-ministerial 

coordination compared with the capacity before the last major elections in 2009.

The MoI has demonstrated that it is furthering its own strategy and policy in other areas 

as well. In June 2013, in an effort to define future requirements, the minister conducted a 

conference to explore the question of what “community policing,” the central idea behind 

the Vision, means in the Afghan context. Minister Daudzai has formulated his own needsassessment frameworks and is trying to strengthen ties with provincial governors, district 

subgovernors, and community councils at both levels in order to build recruitment in underrepresented areas and improve the relationship between the ANP and the communities it 

serves. Finally, although some Western donors disapprove, the ministry is reaching out to 

other Islamic countries in an effort to forge what it sees as culturally compatible partnerships for training and professionalization.

These initiatives, and others too numerous to mention, represent serious intent, strategic thinking, and the political will to strengthen governance within the security sector. It 

is important to note that the minister has gotten help from a small group of young Afghan 

civil servants. He has also consulted high-ranking, experienced international civilian advisers who have the pull and the executive skills to help develop an enduring capacity to manage a complex bureaucracy that sits within an equally complex political environment. The 

resulting opportunities, if leveraged correctly, should inform future engagement and help 

mitigate the risks involved in the handover.

Strengthening Institutional Functions Within the MoI

The development of policing has focused mainly on recruiting, training, and equipping a 

force of police “soldiers” who could perform basic security functions in partnership with the 

ANA, as part of an ISAF strategy of “layered security.” 24 As a result, the ministry is staffed 

mainly by uniformed police officers who rotate between operational and administrative 

assignments and, in accordance with the minister’s Vision, between operational police pillars. This personnel turbulence within the ministry impedes continuity and the ability to 

advance a complicated set of policies from design through implementation. Also, it creates 

a perception at odds with the concept of a democratically controlled civilian police. When 

one walks into the MoI, the overall impression is of a military organization rather than a 

civilian bureaucracy.

Along with the problems of perception and turbulence, both the ministry and the ANP 

suffer from a lack of progress in the areas of human resources and personnel administration. 

NTM-A/CSTC-A efforts to introduce personnel management systems, with heavy emphasis 

on automation, have been less than successful. Basic elements, such as approved position 

descriptions, assignment policies, performance management, and merit-based qualification, 

are still largely nonexistent. At the end of 2013, the minister approved a bilateral proposal 
6 USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 346

for creating a Human Resource Management Unit that would have addressed the most 

critical gaps, but implementation was derailed earlier this year when the proposal did not 

conform to ISAF priorities.25 As a result, problems remain that are unlikely to be resolved 

before the end of 2014.

The other critical gap is in planning, programming, and budget execution. Despite progress in strategic planning from an operational perspective, no Afghan-led mechanisms are 

in place that link management of personnel, resources, and objectives. In the words of an 

experienced international adviser, “The number of personnel within the Ministry of Interior 

who understand the concept of program budgeting is in double digits. A ministerial team 

that can effectively take this issue forward is nonexistent.” The challenge is exacerbated by 

the number of funding streams, international advisers, and donors who are directly involved 

in the allocation of ANP resources and services in kind and by a lack of capacity in the 

Afghan Ministry of Finance.26 NTM-A/CSTC-A is aware of the problem and has significantly 

increased the number of advisers assigned to address the issues. But the capability gaps 

go beyond any one development effort and require an international response that hasn’t 

coalesced. The Law and Order Trust Fund Afghanistan (LOTFA), for example, which manages 

international funds used to pay the salaries of more than 140,000 police officers, does not 

yet have a course of action for how it will transfer funds management to Afghan ownership. 

This is only one of the complex financial management functions the Afghans will have to 

assume, but there is no question that they are not yet ready to do so.27

If the ANP is to become an accountable, public service oriented institution while also meeting the challenge of a complex and dynamic security environment, the civil servants within the 

ministry must be capable, visible, and clearly in control of the major ministerial functions. More 

young civil servants like those currently adding strategic planning value need to be hired and 

encouraged. This requires that their career path be strengthened with the same emphasis on 

career development that is envisioned within the uniformed police. Human resources must be 

viewed as a mission-essential function. And program budgeting processes, and the personnel 

to execute them, have to become an enduring priority; they cannot be viewed as secondary to 

security. They are essential to the sustainability of the institution and to the future of the ANP.

Community Policing in the Afghan Context

The notion of community policing for Afghanistan has often been treated as a Western idea 

that is irrelevant in the current security environment. But nothing could be further from 

the truth. Without effective engagement throughout all levels of the community, the ANP 

lacks the ability to continuously gather information; prevent and discover crimes, including 

crimes against internal security; address causes of conflict before they escalate into fullscale factional and antigovernment grievances; and demonstrate that the government can 

regulate the community and keep public order. Given the ethnic and ideological fault lines 

that exist across the country, and the limited reach of the central government, it is essential 

that the ANP be an adaptive and culturally sensitive organization wherever it is present.28

Plans for the NATO post-2014 Resolute Support Mission anticipate that ANSF training 

and mentoring will continue throughout the coming years, albeit with significantly fewer 

instructors and less direct operational involvement.29 Given this reality, it is especially critical that mission-essential tasks that are trained and advised conform to the direction that 

the ministry is trying to take. Otherwise, the ministry will be hard-pressed to establish and 

enforce common standards of performance across Afghanistan. In particular, Security Force 

Assistance (SFA) tasks, conditions, and standards should follow those identified and certified through the ministry’s own nascent training development and certification processes.

Human resources must be viewed 

as a mission-essential function. 

And program budgeting processes, 

and the personnel to execute 

them, have to become an enduring 

priority; they cannot be viewed as 

secondary to security.
USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 346	 7

One of the recurring challenges in the past was the fact that different U.S. battlespace 

owners had their own notions of how SFA for the ANP should be conducted. As various 

military units deployed in and out of theater, each arrived with its own set of ideas and 

procedures and little awareness of the ANP’s own operational policies, procedures, and training intent. Inconsistencies became especially obvious as combined units of ANSF attempted 

to make the transition from military intelligence-led operations under LOAC, to police-led 

EvBO under Afghan criminal law. Provincial prosecutors and judges complained that units did 

not follow consistent procedures for evidence gathering, crime scene exploitation, arrests, 

and witness interviews. Efforts to standardize procedures at the national level between 

police and prosecutors were stymied by a lack of interministerial cooperation between the 

MoI and the attorney general’s office. At the subnational level, different tools, tactics, and 

procedures were taught depending on the interpretation of the coalition judge advocate 

who happened to be assigned to advise the SFA team assigned to a particular location at 

that particular time. The net effect was that hundreds of cases were not prosecuted or were 

thrown out because the evidence didn’t conform to Afghan law. Aside from the problem 

of EvBO, inconsistencies in training standards impeded the Afghans’ ability to implement 

consistent approaches and enforce common standards of performance.30 

Over the past two years, NTM-A/CSTC-A, the ISAF Joint Command, and the NATO Special 

Operations Component Command–Afghanistan made a concerted effort to standardize SFA 

throughout the country, which resulted in greater consistency and improved effectiveness 

overall. But the ISAF standards, codified in the ISAF SFA Guide, still do not represent Afghan 

perspectives or priorities because Afghan participation in developing the SFA Guide was 

minimal.31 Nor does the SFA Guide apply to the U.S. and international civilian police advisers who are expected to operate in the country after 2014 and who are not part of a NATO 

mission. As a result, the SFA Guide is not an enduring solution.

It is time to recognize that the Afghans must control their own standards of professionalization and performance. And if they are to do it successfully, future SFA trainers and 

mentors must conform to those standards, rather than the other way around. We can and 

should continue to help them develop institutional guidelines and programs of instruction. 

But the weight of the effort should be on reinforcing the instruction that the Afghans 

choose to institutionalize. Only then can they fully professionalize the force.

Managing the Expanding Donor Map

During the past twelve years, more than thirty-seven different international donors have 

been involved in supporting ANP development. Most of them are also contributing nations to 

NTM-A/CSTC-A, EUPOL, or both. To enable coherence, and in accordance with the Afghanistan 

Compact of 2006, the IPCB was established in 2007 to act as the main international body 

for coordinating police-related international organizations, in close cooperation with the 

Afghans.32 The degree to which the IPCB has succeeded has varied greatly depending on 

several factors, including the strength of the leadership assigned to its implementing arm, the 

IPCB Secretariat. As a practical matter, with NTM-A/CSTC-A’s 2009 assumption of the lead role 

in police development, the IPCB’s influence has been significantly reduced, and no one entity 

has yet stepped in to fill the void.

Meanwhile, the MoI has begun taking its own steps toward establishing bilateral police 

development relations. Minister Daudzai in particular, with the help of the IPCB, has sought 

to build relationships with the police institutions of other Islamic countries. In the past 

several months, he has strengthened ties to his counterparts in Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, and Iran, while increasing the number of ANP members sent to Turkey and Indonesia 

The Afghans must control 

their own standards of 

professionalization and 

performance. And if they are 

to do it successfully, future 

SFA trainers and mentors must 

conform to those standards, 

rather than the other way 

around.
8 USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 346

for training. He is working to solidify law enforcement cooperation with all of Afghanistan’s 

neighbors, including Russia, and the Afghan Border Police routinely participate in non-NATO, 

Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe facilitated training in Uzbekistan.33

These initiatives signal that the donor map in Afghanistan for development of policing 

after 2014 will become increasingly diverse, and the degree to which any one outside organization can significantly influence the direction that donors take will lessen significantly. 

To address this transition, the MoI will need to have the executive capacity to manage 

relationships and contributions in a way that supports the minister’s Vision, contributes 

to consistent professionalization across the ANP, and helps Afghanistan build enduring law 

enforcement partnerships. The international community will need an honest broker that 

can facilitate continuing dialogue across a broad range of donors with competing political 

agendas.

As the ISAF lessens its contributions and control, the IPCB is the logical donor platform 

for fulfilling this role and managing relationships. But without strong international commitment and support, its ability to do so is limited. Recent history is not promising in this 

regard. During the past several months, the IPCB Secretariat has struggled to maintain 

adequate staffing and perform its most basic functions. The search for qualified personnel 

who can act as effective facilitators is an ongoing challenge due to lack of donor support. 

Security concerns have increasingly limited the Secretariat’s ability to maintain a consistent 

presence in the MoI, and relations with the Afghans have suffered as a result. The Secretariat’s effort to map donors’ activities were met with indifference and delay. Regularly scheduled coordination meetings have been canceled because no donor was willing to host them.

Ultimately, the long-term solution lies within the ministry itself, which must be aided 

by a committed international response. International policing assistance must help build 

a structure within the ministry to manage donor relations, synchronized with the deputy 

ministers for strategy and policy, support and logistics, counternarcotics, and operations. 

Advisers must be carefully selected to ensure that they have the appropriate seniority and 

experience. They will need to understand the framework that drives international assistance 

beyond 2014.34 The IPCB Secretariat, in turn, should be strengthened with clear diplomatic 

support and manned with qualified senior executive level civilian professionals who have 

experience in international law enforcement cooperation and development. Neither of these 

activities requires major resourcing, but both require commitment and continuity if they are 

to have an enduring effect. Individuals who are assigned to such tasks need to have the 

right experience and should be perceived as politically neutral, technically competent, and 

motivated to advance the minister’s Vision for the future of the ANP.

U.S. Assistance Goals and Objectives 

The stated goal of U.S. engagement in Afghanistan is to ensure that the Afghan government 

can control its territory in order to prevent terrorism, transnational criminal activity, and 

the anarchy that allowed the Taliban to assume power in 1996.35 The importance of the ANP 

in achieving this objective should be obvious. Throughout the course of this study, Afghan 

leaders in the security sector and throughout government emphasized repeatedly that 

the police are the face of the government and that the ANP as an institution has primary 

responsibility for everything from community security to border interdiction. The ministry’s 

former chief of intelligence and counterterrorism was even more explicit. In his words, “The 

most important thing for the future of policing in Afghanistan is the mind of the police; they 

must understand the people of the country and the values of the country. The problem arises 
USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 346	 9

when we just put a uniform on anybody—so they are appearing like police but not acting 

like police. This creates a gap between the people and the government.” 36

Afghan leaders also share an ongoing frustration over the judicial system’s inability to 

carry a policing-generated investigation through to successful adjudication. The transition 

from military operations conducted under the LOAC to EvBO has been problematic at best 

and is still unresolved.37 To address these concerns, operational progress within the ANP 

will depend heavily on the United States’ ability to establish clear development goals that 

strengthen the linkage between the ANP and governance and to improve the ANP’s prevention and detection of criminal activity that enables terrorism and transnational crime.

This requires a U.S. strategy explicitly connecting interrelated U.S.-funded programs that 

contribute to policing success. But the current U.S strategy is hampered by the same divide 

between policing and judicial development that has impeded the international community’s 

approach.38 In its most recent iteration, the U.S. Civil-Military Strategic Framework identified 

policing development as part of the Security Pillar, distinct from the Pillars for Governance and 

Rule of Law. We might logically assume that because these are parts of a coordinated plan, 

their objectives synchronize. But this is not always the case. In fact, no governance or Rule 

of Law objectives are explicitly tied to policing development. As a result, key development 

activities remain disconnected, so that even in those areas where the Afghans are fielding 

mature security forces capable of conducting EvBO, necessary Afghan governance and judicial processes don’t match up in a way that enables security forces to achieve a (lawful) law 

enforcement effect.

The United States can positively affect the future of the ANP in the direction of meeting 

U.S. national security objectives by putting the weight of its efforts behind activities that 

create unity of effort regarding the police. This includes targeted support for law enforcement and security sector governance related programs, goals, and activities that the Afghan 

security ministries have specifically identified as crucial to accomplishing the ministries’ 

vision and mission.

The State Department Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs 

(State/INL) manages six major programs directly related to policing success.39 The Justice 

Development Program provides advisers to a number of Afghan ministries, including the 

Office of the Attorney General, the Ministry of Justice, and the Ministry of Women’s Affairs. 

Its capstone program activity has been a multiyear effort to institutionalize an automated 

case-management system across the country. The Justice Training Transition Program provides direct training and train-the-trainer services to justice actors across the legal spectrum. The Gender Justice Program addresses problems of gender equality, domestic violence, 

and access to justice for Afghan women. The Legal Education Program trains and educates 

Afghan judges and lawyers, and the Access to Justice Program supports defense attorneys 

and educates citizens on their legal rights. Finally, the Major Crimes Program, conducted in 

partnership with the U.S. Department of Justice, provides advisory and operational assistance to the Counternarcotics Justice Center, the Judicial Security Unit, and specialized 

national security and anticorruption sections within the Attorney General’s Office. It also 

supports the investigation of high-profile organized crime, kidnapping, and corruption cases 

by providing secure office space for the Afghan-led Major Crimes Task Force.

Each of these programs contributes to police professionalization and accountability and 

successful performance of law enforcement operations. But partly because they are managed 

by the U.S. embassy rather than the ISAF, the degree to which they are linked with or leveraged by military-led policing development has varied widely. Responsibility for measuring 

the impact on ANP institutional capacity has rested with ISAF. The net result is that the 

The United States can positively 

affect the future of the ANP in 

the direction of meeting U.S. 

national security objectives by 

putting the weight of its efforts 

behind activities that create 

unity of effort regarding the 

police.
10 USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 346

impact of U.S. embassy programs on policing development is not being measured.

In 2015 and beyond, disconnections between the various Pillars’ priorities and objectives need to be resolved, and the gaps impeding successful EvBO should be closed. Even if 

the military and the international community remain in the lead for training, advising, and 

equipping the police, the State Department should consider assuming a more robust role in 

monitoring and assessing police performance to ensure coherence among interrelated law 

enforcement functions across the entire justice spectrum. Doing so will require reevaluating program assessment frameworks currently in place. It will also require adding specific 

objectives to justice sector development to measure impact of the non-ANP development 

programs on the ANP’s ability to perform its role as law enforcement first responders, as key 

components in making a successful criminal case, and as providers of essential public safety 

services and emergency response.

If this is accomplished, State/INL-funded nongovernmental organizations and implementing partners will no longer have the option not to engage with law enforcement advisers and Afghan law enforcement authorities. Follow-on U.S. SFA would have to fit within the 

State Department framework. Only then will unified action become a program deliverable, on 

par with the delivery of technical skills. Unified programming and assessment frameworks 

would also bring about greater tactical understanding of the strategic effects that all U.S. 

assistance is trying to achieve and would begin to close the persistent gap between security 

and justice development. With these adjustments made, assessments will go beyond mere 

measurement of sector-specific performance to measure effectiveness of the system as a 

whole. This, in turn, will increase accountability, minimize duplication, and facilitate a more 

coordinated response if things should go wrong.

Synchronizing post-2014 ANP development with State/INL’s activities is not the only area 

where greater coherence can reinforce the ANP. The U.S. Agency for International Development’s (USAID’s) importance as an enabler of police professionalization, accountability, 

and sustainability cannot be overstated, yet it is generally overlooked. As an institution, 

USAID has legal limitations on the degree to which it can directly engage with the SFA, 

and it rarely interacts with policing development programs. But USAID’s work to develop 

capacity in key Afghan government institutions—including the Supreme Court, the Ministry 

of Finance, the Independent Directorate for Local Governance (IDLG), and the Civil Service 

Commission—and its development of Afghan civil-society and media organizations are critical to the future of the ANP.

All the institutions and actors that USAID engages with are important, though indirect, 

components of the Afghan security system.40 The Civil Service Commission is a key entity 

that the MoI must engage with to professionalize its bureaucracy. Other actors, such as the 

IDLG, shape the relationship between the ANP and the communities it serves. Also, civil 

society and the media are powerful tools for exerting external accountability and oversight 

on policing performance. If properly prepared, civil society and the media can identify community security requirements and capability gaps.41 They can also facilitate more effective 

dialogue between community leaders and police commanders and maintain pressure on ANP 

leaders to be more responsive to community needs. At the same time, they can be especially 

effective in educating the public on its rights and expectations regarding the police.42

More than State/INL’s programs, USAID’s programs suffer from a lack of specificity on 

the role they play in strengthening sustainable ANP performance. Engagement between 

USAID officials, their implementing partners, and their counterparts in policing assistance 

is largely ad hoc and personality dependent. USAID programs do not articulate security or 

law enforcement impact in a way that leads to obvious connections, and there is no requirement to engage. If continued ANP development remains a U.S. priority in Afghanistan, this 
USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 346	 11

should be reexamined, with specific language inserted into USAID programming to explain 

the relationship, within the Afghan political and security system, between the sectors and 

activities where USAID is active, and related policing development and security sector 

governance objectives.

Post-2014 USAID programs should be reviewed to ensure that law enforcement dependencies, as well as cross-ministerial coordination that strengthens or depends on the MoI, 

are addressed in other ministerial assistance programs. Regulatory schemes that are put into 

place in institutions such as the Ministry of Mines, Trade, or Finance, for example, should all 

be reviewed for law enforcement impact and subsequently coordinated with U.S. and international assistance efforts within the MoI to ensure that the necessary law enforcement 

capacity is accounted for in ANP planning, training, and resource allocation.43 As with the 

State/INL recommendations, making the linkages explicit within the programs themselves 

will help close the assistance gap and lead to greater coherence and sustainability. This 

will facilitate a more effective whole-of-government approach that strengthens policing in 

Afghanistan as a public service and as a partner in governance.

Conclusion

It is easy to criticize the ANP. Accounts of corruption, incompetence, abuse of power, and 

pervasive illiteracy abound. Human capital is limited. The political environment has made 

the relationship between the ANP and its coalition partners difficult and, at times, contentious. Afghan priorities do not always nest neatly within U.S. interests, and media reporting 

has created the perception that twelve years of assistance has achieved little progress and 

even less sustainability. Nothing could be further from the truth. In fact, there are many 

instances where the Afghans have shown initiative, commitment, and a keen understanding of what they need to meet their own security challenges. In one particularly poignant 

example, members of the Counter Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) cell within the ISAF 

Joint Command related how, when they set out to inventory personal IED-detection equipment they had issued to the ANP, one of the units could not produce the devices. The 

coalition team immediately concluded that the equipment had been misappropriated and 

possibly sold on the black market. As it turned out, the Afghans knew where every device 

had gone. They had reallocated the devices to local government officials, prosecutors, and 

judges. These individuals, ANP leaders explained, were under threat. By giving up some of 

their own protective gear, the police were able to ensure that core justice and governance 

would continue to function. They knew what was important.

To sustain the ANP, reinforce progress, and achieve strategic objectives under a reduced 

mandate and resource constraints, the United States will have to make adjustments in 2015 

and beyond.

Focusing on institution building and core bureaucratic functions, such as personnel, 

strategy, and budgeting, will strengthen the ministry’s ability to manage a complex organization and an equally complex security environment. Harmonizing assistance efforts in 

a way that connects police to the population will increase accountability, oversight, and 

performance. Investing in literacy and human capital will improve professionalization. 

Realigning nonpolice law enforcement assistance will improve Afghanistan’s ability to criminalize the insurgency, protect its sovereignty, and make the transition from war. Finally, it is 

important to remember that institution building is a generational undertaking and that the 

United States is part of a massive international effort aimed at building the institution of 

the ANP. Unity of effort, nested within a framework of Afghan national objectives, can have 

long-lasting effects and will maximize limited resources in the years to come.
12 USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 346

Policy Recommendations

•	 Reinforce the minister’s Strategic Vision. Build on success by supporting Afghan-led 

strategic planning, cross-ministerial coordination, and policy development while shifting 

resources to strengthen the core institutional functions within the MoI that are essential 

for professionalization, resource management, and personnel administration.

•	 Facilitate the transition to an Afghan-appropriate community policing model. Community 

policing is essential to the ANP’s ability to engage with the population in a way that 

detects insurgent activity, protects sovereignty, and supports legitimate, effective governance. Community policing cannot be relegated to afterthought status; it is an essential 

component of sustainable security transition.

•	 Ensure that post-2014 international assistance supports Afghan programs. International 

aid should be nested within the ministry’s own training development and certification 

processes and should support the minister’s path to professionalization. Donors should 

continue to invest in human capital, including literacy training for patrolmen and higher 

education for officers.

•	 Expand the role of the International Police Coordination Board; strengthen MOI’s capacity 

to deal with international donors. This requires strong support for the IPCB Secretariat and 

a sophisticated cadre of international civilian police advisers who can help the ministry 

manage an increasingly complex donor map in a way that supports the minister’s Strategic 

Vision.

•	 Harmonize U.S. development activities to increase ANP sustainability and operational 

effectiveness. This requires that we rethink the relationship between State/INL programs 

that facilitate transition from LOAC to EvBO and USAID activities that strengthen the 

relationship between the government, civil society, the media, and the police. Functional 

dependencies and organization linkages should be explicit so that all U.S. actors clearly 

understand and consciously collaborate toward a common set of governance and security 

objectives.
USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 346	 13

Notes

1. UN Security Council and General Assembly, Report of the Secretary-General, “The Situation in Afghanistan and Its 

Implications for International Peace and Security,” A/57/762-S/2003/333, Mar. 18, 2003, 10.

2. EUPOL Afghanistan, “Council Joint Action 2007/369/CFSP of 30 May 2007 on Establishment of the European 

Union Police Mission in Afghanistan,” www.eupol-afg.eu/?q=keyDocuments#sthash.pnRA6q1c.dpuf.

3. GAO, “Afghanistan Security: Department of Defense Effort to Train Afghan Police Relies on Contractor Personnel to 

Fill Skill and Resource Gaps,” GAO-12-293R, Feb. 23, 2012, www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-293R.

4. See Robert Perito and Donald Planty, “Police Transition in Afghanistan,” USIP Special Report no. 322, February 

2013, www.usip.org/files/resources/SR322.pdf; Robert Perito, “Afghanistan’s Civil Order Police,” USIP Special 

Report no. 307, May 2012, www.usip.org/files/resources/SR307.pdf; Robert Perito, “Afghanistan’s Police: The 

Weak Link in Security Sector Reform,” USIP Special Report no. 227, August 2009, www.usip.org/files/resources/

afghanistan_police.pdf.

5. The U.S. Marshals Service has run a highly effective program to establish Judicial Security Units, which the 

Afghans have fully embraced and are seeking to expand; the Drug Enforcement Administration’s multiyear effort 

to develop counternarcotics capacity has resulted in forces fully capable of conducting joint operations with 

international partners; specialized police units for crisis response, trained and mentored by U.S. and Coalition 

Special Operations Forces, operate at a very high level; and the Afghan Local Police, while controversial, has 

provided substantial support to Afghan Uniformed Police operations in contested areas and has succeeded in 

connecting recruiting and performance to district governance structures.

6. Keith Shawe, “Afghanistan in 2013: A Survey of the Afghan People,” Asia Foundation, 2013, http://asiafoundation.

org/country/afghanistan/2013-poll.php.

7. Security Sector Reform (SSR) is one of the objectives in the 2006 Afghanistan Compact. The Organization for 

Economic Co-operation and Development–Development Assistance Committee defines SSR as “seeking to increase 

partner countries’ ability to meet the range of security needs within their societies in a manner consistent with 

democratic norms and sound principles of governance, transparency and the rule of law. SSR includes, but extends 

well beyond, the narrower focus of more traditional security assistance on defense, intelligence and policing.” 

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, “Security System Reform and Governance,” 2005, 3, 

www.oecd.org/development/incaf/31785288.pdf.

8. “ANSF,” as used by ISAF and as reflected in the U.S. embassy’s Civ-Mil plans, refers to the ANA, ANP, and NDS.

9. “Professionalization,” as used by NTM-A, was never defined but is generally recognized as including training 

beyond the basic eight-week patrolman’s course, which taught security and survivability skills. The extended 

training beyond the eight-week course would also include community policing, investigative techniques, and 

other civilian police competencies. “Professionalization” was also often used by both Afghans and international 

civilian police experts to refer to the length of training and education required under the Afghan National Police 

Inherent Law.

10. In September 2010, I was asked to help NTM-A/DCOM-P plan a strategy linking security force development, 

particularly ANP, “to the rest of the rule of law.” Later, in January 2011, the commander, NTM-A, and Commander, 

JFC-Brunssum, hosted a symposium in Europe, specifically designed to start a conversation within ISAF and the 

EUPOL Mission about the enduring vision for the ANP. In late 2012, in a strategic Rule of Law mission analysis 

for the commander of the NATO Special Operations Component Command–Afghanistan, I concluded that the 

aforementioned development disconnections remained. Field research conducted in January 2014 showed no real 

progress in closing the gap.

11. “Trained,” in the context of the ANP, means very different things to different constituencies. Under ISAF programs, 

it means that an ANP patrolman has completed the NTM-A/CSTC-A designed eight-week patrolman’s course, which 

is devoted largely to training in military skills.

12. Author’s conclusions based on interviews with members of the international community, bilateral missions, and 

ISAF component commands, Jan. 14–21, 2014. The numbers of untrained policemen are estimates provided by 

multiple sources within ISAF Joint Command and the International Police Coordination Board. Exact numbers are 

unknown.

13. Constitution of Afghanistan, art. 5.

14. Police Law, ch. 2, art. 4 (Afghanistan) (emphasis added).

15. Ministry of Interior Affairs, “Ten-Year Vision for the Afghan National Police: 1392-1402,” http://moi.gov.af/en/

page/5718/5729.

16. The five areas within the CSTC-A development framework are (1) Complete Assigned Mission, (2) Command and 

Control, (3) Leadership, (4) Sustainment, and (5) Training. None of these areas cite integration with governance 

structures as a core competency or essential task. U.S. Department of Defense, “Report on Progress toward Security 

and Stability in Afghanistan,” annex A (Nov. 2013), www.defense.gov/pubs/October_1230_Report_Master_Nov7.

pdf.

17. Islamic Government of Afghanistan Ministry of Interior Affairs, National Police Strategy (Mar. 2010). 

18. The IPCB is the mechanism that the international community established to coordinate donor assistance to the 

ANP. Further discussion of the IPCB’s role appears later in this report. The narrative of events described in this 

paragraph was derived from interviews with IPCB and U.S. embassy officials and from author interviews with 

Minister Patang in November 2012.

19. Ministry of Interior Affairs, “Ten-Year Vision for the Afghan National Police.”

20. International Police Coordination Board documents, still in draft as of this writing, reflect a convoluted line-andblock graph showing the minister’s Ten-Year Vision with its derivative two-year implementation plans in a vertical 

display. The NPS and NPP are on a horizontal line below. But the content of the NPS and the NPP do not reflect the 

priorities in the Vision, nor do they comport with the structure of the two-year plans. Interviews with international 

actors involved in ANP development revealed much confusion about how these documents could be made to fit 

together, and a general perception that the persistence of the NPS was driven by the coalition, not by the Ministry 

of Interior itself. Author’s interview notes, Jan. 14–21, 2014, Kabul.

21. Although the author’s research could not identify specific published legislation, both Afghan and IPCB leaders 

positively stated that Afghan law requires the production of an NPS and NPP to guide ANP development.

22. Author interviews with senior IPCB and non-U.S. embassy officials, Jan. 14–19, 2014.
14 USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 346

23. The NDS is the main Afghan government intelligence service. But it also has law enforcement responsibilities 

because it has primary jurisdiction over cases dealing with internal security, including certain financial crimes and 

terrorism. Thus, a cooperative relationship between the MoI and the NDS is essential to Afghanistan’s ability to 

criminalize the insurgency and secure national borders.

24. U.S. Department of Defense, “Report on Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan,” 16.

25. The Human Resource Management Unit was developed as part of the collaboration between the UK and the 

minister of interior. At the minister’s request, the UK had placed a special adviser of ambassadorial rank in the 

minister’s office to help him align his Vision with the requirements of institutional development and to facilitate 

long-term donor support and sustainable security transition. The current ISAF leadership did not support the 

position because it conflicted with ISAF and NTM-A priorities.

26. The bulk of the Afghan budget is financed by international assistance, but the Ministry of Finance, as the 

responsible body for public finance and expenditure, is increasing its role in coordinating and managing 

international financial assistance across the Afghan government. The Ministry of Finance works directly with the 

other line ministries, including the MoI, and is attempting to take an increasingly prominent role in the allocation 

of donor funding. Thus, the MoI’s relationship with the Ministry of Finance, and its ability to participate fully 

and competently in Afghan national budget processes, will become increasingly important for the success of the 

policing mission as the Afghans assume greater control over resource allocation.

27. The conclusions in this paragraph derive from unreleased IPCB briefings and work papers and from numerous 

interviews during January 14–21, 2014, with senior international advisers in the MoI and senior officials in the 

UN Mission in Afghanistan who are directly involved in the administration of LOTFA.

28. In every interview I conducted during field research in January 2014, this imperative was the first issue raised 

by the Afghans, regardless of their position or political affiliation. Several interviewees stated that without it, a 

national police force cannot succeed.

29. “Resolute Support” refers to the planned NATO post-2014 “train, advise, and assist” mission to address gaps in the 

capabilities necessary for the ANSF to become self-sustaining. Senate Armed Services Committee, “Statement of 

General Joseph F. Dunford, Commander U.S. Forces Afghanistan Before the Senate Armed Services Committee on 

the Situation in Afghanistan,” Mar. 12, 2014, www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Dunford_03-12-14.

pdf. The analysis in this section assumes that a bilateral support agreement between the U.S. and Afghan 

governments, which is a condition to Resolute Support, will be signed before the end of 2014.

30. The conclusions in this paragraph are based on my personal observations and interviews while serving as 

senior Rule of Law adviser to NTM-A and later as special Rule of Law adviser to the commander, NATO Special 

Operations Component Command Afghanistan, confirmed during field research in January 2014. As of this 

writing, the international community has no clear data on the number of cases actually coming before provincial 

courts on internal security related charges or their disposition. Anecdotal reporting indicates that this lack of 

consistent approaches and common performance standards for site exploitation, evidence handling, and criminal 

investigation continues to be a widespread national problem.

31. The SFA Guide states, “This guide is the result of an extensive collaborative effort within ISAF, led by the CAAT 

[Commander’s Advisory Assistance Team], focusing stakeholders on the functionally based SFA framework.” ISAF 

Security Force Assistance Guide 2.0, Jan. 1, 2014.

32. IPCB Omnibus Agreement and Mandate, art. 1; art. 2.1, http://ipcbafghanistan.com/.

33. Author interviews with representatives from the IPCB, UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, and various 

embassies, including the U.S. embassy in Kabul, Jan. 14–21, 2014.

34. During interviews conducted in January 2014, what was most striking was the number of advisers who had no 

knowledge or understanding of strategic frameworks that influence international assistance, including the Tokyo 

Mutual Accountability Framework, the EUPOL and IPCB mandates, and applicable national priority plans.

35. U.S. State Department, “U.S. Civil-Military Strategic Framework for Afghanistan” (rev. 2), Aug. 2013, 2, http://

publicintelligence.net/us-civil-military-afghan-framework/.

36. Interviews with senior Afghan officials at their homes in Kabul, Jan. 16, 2014.

37. ISAF issued its first formal guidance in the form of a fragmentary order on transition to EvBO in February 2012. 

Implementation has been problematic, and as of this writing, many issues remain unresolved. Following the 

disestablishment of the NATO Rule of Law Field Support Mission in September 2013, there has been no clear 

delineation of responsibility within ISAF for coordination with other law enforcement related capacity-building 

efforts necessary for EvBO to succeed and no readily identifiable partner for the transition from military to civilian 

lead. Multiple interviews in Kabul, Oct.–Nov. 2012 and Jan. 2014.

38. U.S. State Department, “U.S. Civil-Military Strategic Framework for Afghanistan,” 6–8.

39. “U.S. Department of State Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs Fact Sheet,” Sept. 2013.

40. See Presidential Policy Directive/PPD-23, “Security Sector Assistance,” Apr. 5, 2013, 10. This directive defines 

security sector assistance and the sectors within security systems and assigns responsibility to USAID for security 

sector governance, media and civil society development, and other functions as falling within USAID core 

competency.

41. Ibid.

42. Ibid.

43. This type of cross-ministerial programming and assessment is not as uncommon as it may seem at first glance. As 

part of Plan Colombia, for example, the requirement for specialized capabilities to protect critical infrastructure and 

economic development in the areas of electrical production, mining, oil, and gas led to a focused advisory effort 

within the Colombian military and the Colombian National Police. This was accompanied by related nonsecurity 

force assistance efforts to ensure external accountability and oversight of the security forces performing those 

missions.
United States 

Institute of Peace

2301 Constitution Ave., NW

Washington, DC 20037

www.usip.org

eISBN: 978-1-60127-225-6

An online edition of this and related 

reports can be found on our Web site 

(www.usip.org), together with additional 

information on the subject.

Of Related Interest

•	 Counterinsurgency, Local Militias, and Statebuilding in Afghanistan by Jonathan Goodhand and 

Aziz Hakimi (Special Report, December 2013)

•	 Armed Groups Maintaining Law and Order: Dealing with Reality by Bruce Oswald (Peace Brief, May 

2013)

•	 Police Transition in Afghanistan by Donald J. Planty and Robert M. Perito (Special Report, February 2013)

•	 Lessons from Afghanistan’s History for the Current Transition and Beyond by William Byrd (Special 

Report, September 2012)

•	 Afghanistan’s Civil Order Police by Robert M. Perito (Special Report, May 2012)

•	 Myths and Misconceptions in the Afghan Transition by Shahmahmood Miakhel and Noah Coburn

(Peace Brief, April 2012)

•	 Afghanistan’s Police by Robert M. Perito (Special Report, August 2009)