NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

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No. 19-3589

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WILLIAM L. RODGERS,

Appellant

v.

LINCOLN BENEFIT LIFE COMPANY; ROBERT MARTINI; MARTINI 

FINANCIAL SERVICES, LLC

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On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Civ. No. 2-19-cv-00350)

District Judge: Honorable Marilyn J. Horan

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Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)

October 19, 2020

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Before: GREENAWAY, JR., COWEN, and FUENTES, Circuit Judges.

(Opinion Filed: February 5, 2021)

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OPINION*

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GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge.

In this case, we must decide whether the District Court erred in granting summary 

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, does not 

constitute binding precedent.
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judgment on the ground that Plaintiff William Rodgers failed to file suit within 

Pennsylvania’s statute of limitations period. For the reasons set forth below, we will 

affirm. 

I. BACKGROUND

In November 1999, pro se Plaintiff-Appellant William L. Rodgers (“Rodgers”)

purchased a life insurance policy with a face amount of $500,000 issued by Lincoln 

Benefit Life Company (“Lincoln Benefit”) from Robert Martini (“Martini”), Rodgers’s 

friend and financial advisor. At Martini’s recommendation, Rodgers paid $20,000 to 

Lincoln Benefit so that the return on his investment would pay for his life insurance 

policy. However, in October 2004, Lincoln Benefit requested an additional premium 

payment of $40,000. Martini informed Rodgers that Lincoln Benefit had requested this 

payment because the stock market had not produced enough return on his initial 

investment to pay for the policy. He also informed Rodgers that Rodgers could pay $600 

per month to keep his policy in effect. Rodgers agreed and started making monthly 

payments of $600 to Lincoln Benefit. 

In April 2016, Rodgers received another payment request from Lincoln Benefit in 

the amount of $4,072.14. Martini informed Rodgers that he would now have to pay 

$1,241.50 per month to keep the policy in effect and that the cost of the policy would 

keep going up. After additional correspondence about Rodgers’s options, Rodgers 

elected to stop making payments. On July 6, 2016, Lincoln Benefit informed Rodgers

that his policy would terminate unless he paid $3,958.96. 

On February 28, 2019, Rodgers sued Defendants-Appellees Lincoln Benefit, 
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Martini, and Martini Financial Services, LLC (collectively, “Defendants”) for negligent 

misrepresentation and violation of the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and 

Consumer Protection Law (the “UTPCPL”). Rodgers initially filed suit in state court, 

and Defendants removed to the District Court. In his complaint, Rodgers contended that 

Defendants provided him with incorrect information about the “actual nature of the 

Policy and misrepresented its terms and conditions before Rodgers purchased the Policy.” 

Suppl. App. 36. Specifically, he claimed that Defendants first falsely informed him that 

his initial $20,000 payment would cover the policy and then falsely informed him that the

monthly $600 payments would be sufficient. He also alleged that Defendants failed to 

inform him that the premiums would increase in the future. 

Defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 12(c) on the ground that Rodgers’s claims were barred by the applicable

statutes of limitations. Rodgers then submitted an affidavit and moved to convert 

Defendants’ motions to motions for summary judgment. The District Court then granted 

Rodgers’s motion to convert and granted Defendants’ motions. This appeal followed. 

II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. We have 

jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We conduct a plenary review of a district 

court’s grant of summary judgment. Goldenstein v. Repossessors Inc., 815 F.3d 142, 146 

(3d Cir. 2016). “The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there 

is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a 

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). We draw all reasonable inferences from the record 
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in favor of the nonmoving party. MBIA Ins. Corp. v. Royal Indem. Co., 426 F.3d 204, 

209 (3d Cir. 2005). 

III. DISCUSSION

Defendants argue that we should affirm the District Court’s grant of summary 

judgment because Rodgers’s claims are barred by the applicable statutes of limitations. 

We agree. 

Under Pennsylvania law, a two-year statute of limitations applies to a negligent 

misrepresentation claim. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5524(7). A six-year statute of 

limitations applies to a UTPCPL claim. Morse v. Fisher Asset Mgmt., LLC, 206 A.3d 

521, 526 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2019). “[T]he statute of limitations begins to run as soon as the 

right to institute and maintain a suit arises.” Fine v. Checcio, 870 A.2d 850, 857 (Pa. 

2005). “It is the duty of the party asserting a cause of action to use all reasonable 

diligence to properly inform him-[ ]or herself of the facts and circumstances upon which 

the right of recovery is based and to institute suit within the prescribed period.” Gleason 

v. Borough of Moosic, 15 A.3d 479, 484 (Pa. 2011). Pennsylvania law favors “the strict 

application of statutes of limitation.” Booher v. Olczak, 797 A.2d 342, 345 (Pa. Super. 

Ct. 2002). 

Rodgers purchased his life insurance policy in 1999. Lincoln Benefit’s request for 

an additional $40,000 premium payment and Martini’s explanation that the initial 

investment was insufficient to maintain the policy put Rodgers on notice that his initial 

understanding that his $20,000 payment would fund the policy was incorrect and that 

subsequent payments would be required. Thus, it was in 2004 that Rodgers first became
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aware of the alleged misrepresentations regarding the payments he would have to make 

to keep his policy in effect. It was also in 2004 that Rodgers first had the right to institute 

and maintain a suit against Defendants. Rodgers, however, did not file suit against

Defendants until February 28, 2019, approximately fifteen years later. Rodgers therefore 

did not bring suit within the applicable limitations period. 

Rodgers argues that his claims are not time-barred based on the application of

Pennsylvania’s discovery rule. He avers that he did not bring suit because he “took 

Martini at his word” due to their personal relationship. Opening Br. 9. He admits that he 

did not read his insurance policy and “saw no reason to investigate further” when Martini 

explained that the market was not performing well enough to cover the operating cost of 

his policy payments. Id. at 11-12. Rodgers contends that it was only when he was 

conducting legal research for a separate case in 2018 that he learned he had a claim

against Defendants. 

The discovery rule tolls the statute of limitations where the injured party is unable, 

“despite the exercise of due diligence, to know of the injury or its cause.” Pocono Int’l 

Raceway, Inc. v. Pocono Produce, Inc., 468 A.2d 468, 471 (Pa. 1983) (emphasis 

omitted). However, “[m]istake, misunderstanding, or lack of knowledge in themselves 

do not toll the running of the statute.” Fine, 870 A.2d at 857. Pennsylvania law requires 

“reasonable diligence . . . from a party who has been given reason to inform himself of 

the facts upon which his right to recovery is premised.” Id. at 858. Reasonable diligence 

is an objective test, and “a party’s actions are evaluated to determine whether he 

exhibited ‘those qualities of attention, knowledge, intelligence and judgment which 
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society requires of its members for the protection of their own interest and the interest of 

others.’” Id. (quoting Crouse v. Cyclops Indus., 745 A.2d 606, 611 (Pa. 2000)).

Rodgers’s lack of legal knowledge and lack of reasonable diligence in reviewing 

his insurance policy do not mean that his injury was “neither known nor reasonably 

knowable” before 2018. Id. at 859. To the contrary, it is undisputed that Rodgers learned

of his injury in 2004. As soon as he learned that the initial information provided by 

Martini was inaccurate, as confirmed by Martini’s explanation that the initial $20,000 

was insufficient to pay for the cost of the policy, Rodgers had reason to investigate 

further. The fact that in 2018 he came across legal research suggesting he had a viable 

claim does not mean that he was unable to learn of his injury and its cause at an earlier 

date. 

Rodgers has not alleged that Defendants took any action to prevent him from 

learning about the terms of his insurance policy; he has conceded that he simply did not 

read it. Nor has Rodgers provided any other persuasive reason for his lack of reasonable 

diligence. Rodgers, who graduated from law school, is a sophisticated party who was 

able to further investigate at any time. For these reasons, “no two reasonable minds 

could differ” that through the exercise of reasonable diligence, Rodgers “knew or should 

have known of his . . . injury and its cause during the limitations period.” Gleason, 15 

A.3d at 487. The District Court, therefore, did not err in granting summary judgment to 

Defendants because the statute of limitations had run before Rodgers filed suit in 2019. 

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm the District Court’s order.