Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1339 | March 20, 2024 Page 1 of 8

I N T H E

Court of Appeals of Indiana

Osama Shibli,

Appellant-Defendant

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff

March 20, 2024

Court of Appeals Case No.

23A-CR-1339

Interlocutory Appeal from the Hamilton Superior Court

The Honorable Stephenie K. Gookins, Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

29D06-2211-F6-7716

Opinion by Judge Bradford

Chief Judge Altice and Judge Felix concur. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1339 | March 20, 2024 Page 2 of 8

Bradford, Judge.

Case Summary

[1] After Osama Shibli moved back to Indiana, the State charged him with two 

counts of Level 6 felony failure to register as a sex or violent offender based on 

a prior conviction for child molesting in Indiana. Shibli moved to dismiss the 

charges, which motion the trial court denied. Shibli petitioned for interlocutory 

appeal, which the trial court granted and over which we accepted jurisdiction. 

Shibli argues that the sex-offender registration requirement, as applied to him, 

violates the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Indiana Constitution. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] In 1998, Shibli was convicted of two counts of Class C felony child molesting in 

Indiana, for which the trial court sentenced him to eight years of incarceration. 

Shibli was released to parole and advised of his obligation to register as a sex 

offender under the Indiana Sex Offender Registration Act (the “SORA”). At 

the time of his conviction, Shibli was required by Indiana law to register as a 

sex offender for ten years. 

[3] In January of 2003, Shibli transferred his parole to Florida. Florida law 

required that Shibli register as a sex offender for life. In 2007, Shibli moved to 

Syria; however, prior to moving, he had signed a “Florida Department of Law 

Enforcement Predator/Offender Registration” form, in which he acknowledged 

that if he gained employment in another state, or became a resident of another 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1339 | March 20, 2024 Page 3 of 8

state, he would also be required to register as a sex offender in that state. 

Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 12. 

[4] In 2021, Shibli and his wife purchased a home in Fishers and Shibli obtained 

employment in Indianapolis. At this time, Shibli did not register as a sex 

offender. In November of 2022, the State charged Shibli with two counts of 

Level 6 felony failure to register as a sex or violent offender. On January 9, 

2023, Shibli moved to dismiss the charges. On March 16, 2023, the trial court 

conducted a hearing, after which it denied Shibli’s motion to dismiss. 

Discussion and Decision

[5] Shibli argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss because 

the sex-offender registration requirement, as applied to him, violates Indiana’s 

Ex Post Facto Clause. A defendant must prove, by a preponderance of the 

evidence, all of the facts necessary to support his motion to dismiss. Ackerman 

v. State, 51 N.E.3d 171, 177 (Ind. 2016). Because Shibli is appealing from the 

denial of a motion to dismiss, he is appealing from a negative judgment, which 

“we will reverse only if the evidence is without conflict and leads inescapably to 

the conclusion that [Shibli] is entitled to a dismissal.” Barnett v. State, 867 

N.E.2d 184, 186 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). 

[6] We review whether the SORA violates Indiana’s ex post facto provision de 

novo, State v. Zerbe, 50 N.E.3d 368, 369 (Ind. 2016), which it does “if it 

substantially disadvantages a defendant because it increases his punishment, 
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changes the elements of or ultimate facts necessary to prove the offense, or 

deprives a defendant of some defense or lesser punishment that was available at 

the time of the crime.” Lemmon v. Harris, 949 N.E.2d 803, 809 (Ind. 2011)

(cleaned up). The purpose of our prohibition against ex post facto laws “is to 

give effect to the fundamental principle that persons have a right to fair warning 

of that conduct which will give rise to criminal penalties.” Wallace v. State, 905 

N.E.2d 371, 377 (Ind. 2009).

[7] Shibli acknowledges that, after he had been convicted in 1998, Indiana law had 

required him to register as a sex offender in Indiana for ten years and that 

Florida law had required him to register for life. However, Shibli takes issue 

with the 2007 amendment to the SORA, which provides: “A person who is 

required to register as a sex or violent offender in any jurisdiction shall register 

[in Indiana] for the period required by the other jurisdiction.” Ind. Code § 11-8-

8-19(f). Specifically, Shibli argues that this reciprocal-registration requirement, 

as applied to him, is an ex post facto punishment. We disagree.

[8] We conclude that Ammons v. State, 50 N.E.3d 143 (Ind. 2016) controls. In that 

case, Ammons had been convicted of child molesting in 1989, prior to the 

passage of the SORA. Id. at 144. In 2009, after being released and completing 

parole, Ammons moved to Iowa, where he was required to register as a sex 

offender for ten years. Id. In 2013, Ammons returned to Indiana and the State 

informed him that he was required to register as a sex offender. Id. Ammons 

sought removal from the registry, which motion the trial court denied. Id. The 

Indiana Supreme Court concluded that there was no ex post facto violation and
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“statutes requiring an Indiana resident to register were non-punitive in intent 

and effects when applied to an offender already required to register in another 

jurisdiction.” Id. (citing Zerbe, 50 N.E.3d at 369–71). The Court reasoned that 

when Ammons had moved back to Indiana in 2013, “Indiana law required [...] 

that offenders who are under a registration obligation in another state must 

register when they move to Indiana[,]” so requiring registration in Indiana 

imposed no additional punishment. Id. at 144.

[9] Shibli attempts to distinguish Ammons from his case. In doing so, Shibli argues 

that Ammons had been charged with another crime in Iowa—namely, failing to 

register—whereas Shibli has never been convicted of any other offense requiring 

registration outside of his Indiana conviction. Shibli also notes that, unlike 

Ammons, he had moved out of Indiana before the reciprocal-registration 

amendment had been enacted and that Florida, unlike Iowa, imposed a 

lifetime-registration requirement. Additionally, Shibli points out that he did not 

simply move from state to state, but out of the country and back. These unique 

facts, Shibli argues, differentiate his case from Ammons and necessitate an 

intent-effects test analysis. 

[10] We fail to see how any of these factual distinctions remove this case from 

Ammons’s holding that “statutes requiring an Indiana resident to register were 

non-punitive in intent and effects when applied to an offender already required 

to register in another jurisdiction.” Ammons, 50 N.E.3d at 144 (citing Zerbe, 50 

N.E.3d at 369–71). Shibli, like Ammons, had been required to register in a 

different state based on his Indiana conviction for child molesting. Both 
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Shibli’s and Ammons’s requirements to register in Indiana ultimately were 

based on their Indiana convictions, not additional child-molesting convictions 

in other states. Florida law, moreover, required Shibli to register for life and, 

while Shibli had moved out of Indiana before the reciprocal-registration 

amendment was enacted, he is presumed to have known upon his return to 

Indiana that Indiana law would require him to register. Cain v. State, 36 Ind. 

App. 51, 51, 74 N.E. 1102, 1104 (1905) (“All residents and citizens of the state

are presumed to know its law, both civil and criminal.”). Shibli’s moving from 

Florida to Syria before returning to Indiana did not undercut his obligation to 

register. 

[11] Moreover, Shibli argues that his registration requirement is “based solely on 

Florida law, and not on any additional registerable offense.” Appellant’s Br. p. 

12. However, it “is immaterial to the analysis whether Indiana law is 

maintaining, extending, or modifying its own duties or those of another state. 

Likewise, it is irrelevant where or when the conviction occurred, as long as 

another state imposed a lawful registration obligation on the offender[.]” Hope 

v. Comm’r of Ind. Dep’t of Corr., 9 F.4th 513, 523 (7th Cir. 2021). The Indiana 

Supreme Court has also held that “[m]aintaining a registry requirement across 

state lines does not amount to a punitive burden.” Tyson v. State, 51 N.E.3d 88, 

90 (Ind. 2016); see also Jensen v. State, 905 N.E.2d 384, 392 (Ind. 2009)

(concluding there was no “greater burden on Jensen” in extending his

registration requirement where the burden of registering had already been 

imposed). Consequently, we cannot say that requiring Shibli to register based 
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on his Florida obligation imposes an additional criminal penalty in violation of 

Indiana’s Ex Post Facto Clause. 

[12] In any event, Shibli signed a “Florida Department of Law Enforcement 

Predator/Offender Registration” form, in which he acknowledged that if he 

gained employment in another state, or became a resident of another state, 

including Indiana, he must also register as a sex offender in that state. 

Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 12. This strikes us as “contractual in nature,” 

similar to a plea agreement, “binding the defendant, the state, and the trial 

court.” Lee v. State, 816 N.E.2d 35, 38 (Ind. 2004) (noting the contractual 

nature of plea agreements). Because Florida law had already required Shibli to 

register for life, and he had signed an agreement with the State of Florida 

agreeing to register in any other state if he became a resident of another state, 

we conclude that Indiana’s reciprocal-registration requirement does not result in 

additional punishment on Shibli, there is no ex post facto violation, and we 

need not proceed with an analysis of the SORA under the intent-effects test.

[13] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Altice, C.J., and Felix, J., concur. 

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Amanda C. Price

Baldwin Perry & Wiley, P.C.

Franklin, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1339 | March 20, 2024 Page 8 of 8

Theodore E. Rokita

Attorney General of Indiana

George P. Sherman

Supervising Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana