J-S07035-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

ERNEST REGINALD MORRIS 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

No. 1992 EDA 2022

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered July 19, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-46-CR-0005182-2005

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and KING, J.

MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.: FILED APRIL 24, 2023

Appellant, Ernest Reginald Morris, appeals pro se from the order entered 

in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, which denied his serial 

petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), at 42 

Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.

The PCRA court set forth the relevant facts and procedural history of 

this case as follows:

A jury found [Appellant] guilty of conspiracy, murder of the 

first degree, murder of an unborn child, two counts of 

murder of the second degree, kidnapping and related 

offenses stemming from the January 31, 2005, shooting 

deaths of Shawne Mims, Jennifer Pennington and 

Pennington’s unborn child. He received three consecutive 

terms of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, 

plus a consecutive term of incarceration of 43 to 90 years. 

The Superior Court affirmed his judgment of sentence on 

direct appeal [on November 1, 2010] and our Supreme 

Court denied allowance of appeal on December 29, 2011. 
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[Appellant] filed a PCRA petition in July 2012, which this 

court dismissed without an evidentiary hearing on August 

20, 2013. The Superior Court affirmed the dismissal[ on 

October 10, 2014, and our Supreme Court denied allowance 

of appeal on February 4, 2015]. Commonwealth v. 

Morris, 108 A.3d 110 (Pa.Super. [2014), appeal denied, 

631 Pa. 712, 109 A.3d 679 (2015)]. [Appellant] filed a pro 

se PCRA petition in June 2018, which this court dismissed 

as untimely on February 13, 2019.

[Appellant] filed the instant serial pro se PCRA on December 

14, 2021. He conceded the facial untimeliness of the 

petition, but alleged he met the governmental interference 

and newly discovered fact exceptions to the PCRA’s 

limitations period codified at 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i, ii). 

In particular, he claimed to have learned for the first time 

on August 21, 2020, from fellow inmate Thomas Drew that 

a trial witness against [Appellant], Wayne Caldwell, 

allegedly had a history of informing for, and receiving 

favorable treatment from, the government. [Appellant] 

claimed he then pursued and eventually received records on 

November 8, 2021, related to an open guilty plea involving 

Caldwell and his sentencing on January 14, 2010.

The court gave [Appellant] notice on March [2], 2022, of its 

intention to dismiss the serial petition without a hearing due 

to untimeliness. [Appellant] subsequently received an 

extension of 45 days in which to respond to the notice. 

Rather than respond to the substance of the notice, 

however, and without court permission, [Appellant] filed a 

supplemental petition on March 23, 2022.1 He reasserted 

the claims related to Caldwell and added similar claims 

related to trial witness Laverne Brewer. Again without court 

approval, [Appellant] filed a second supplemental petition 

on May 12, 2022, reiterating the claims related to Caldwell 

and Brewer and claiming governmental interference and 

new facts related to trial witnesses Kristen Holmes and 

Kathleen Somers-Wells.

1 [Appellant] also filed a separate petition seeking the 

recusal of the undersigned, which was denied on April 

14, 2022. 

This court dismissed the serial petition by Order dated July 
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19, 2022, for the reasons stated in the notice of intent to 

dismiss.2 [Appellant] appealed and subsequently produced 

a court-ordered Pa.R.[A].P. 1925(b) concise statement of 

errors.

2 In dismissing the petition, the court considered 

[Appellant’s] supplemental petition and second 

supplemental petition, which were filed without leave 

of court, only to the extent that they failed to respond 

to the substance of the notice of intent to dismiss.

(PCRA Court Opinion, filed September 27, 2022, at 1-3). 

Appellant raises the following issues for our review:

Did [Appellant] satisfy the governmental interference and 

new facts exceptions to excuse a late PCRA petition, where 

[Appellant] uncovered exculpatory evidence that was never 

provided by the Commonwealth in violation of Brady[1]? 

Did the Commonwealth violate [Appellant’s] due process 

rights and violate the mandate of Brady by: a) failing to 

disclose cooperation agreements with witnesses Wayne 

Caldwell, Laverne Brewer, and Kristin Holmes; b) failing to 

disclose Caldwell’s exceptionally long history and practice of 

informant work in exchange for leniency in his own cases; 

c) suppressing evidence of Caldwell’s extensive criminal 

history; d) not informing [Appellant] that Brewer and 

witness Kathleen Wells were ordered to have regular contact 

with a member of the prosecution team for a period of three 

years leading up to [Appellant’s] trial; e) never disclosing 

Holmes’ psychiatric reports where she suffered from severe 

mental illness?

Did the PCRA court err by failing to conduct an evidentiary 

hearing? 

Did the PCRA court err by refusing to rule on [Appellant’s] 

Motion for Discovery, in light of “exceptional 

circumstances?” 

____________________________________________

1 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). 
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Did the PCRA court err by denying [Appellant’s] Motion to 

Recuse Judge Steven T. O’Neill? 

(Appellant’s Brief at 4).

In his first issue, Appellant argues that he filed the current PCRA petition 

within one year of obtaining the transcript of Caldwell’s guilty plea and 

sentencing hearing that disclosed an agreement in place for Caldwell’s 

cooperation, and that initiated Appellant’s investigation into Caldwell’s work 

as an informant. Appellant asserts that the Commonwealth failed to disclose 

that Caldwell received lenient treatment in his own case in exchange for his 

testimony against Appellant. Appellant claims Caldwell also had a history of 

being a state and federal government informant that remained undisclosed to 

Appellant and hidden by the Commonwealth for over a decade. Appellant 

maintains that Caldwell’s past cooperation included informant work for the FBI 

in up to 60 investigations, and he repeatedly received consideration for that 

cooperation in his own criminal cases. Appellant insists this information would 

have been vital to the defense because Caldwell was a key Commonwealth 

witness, and his testimony was the only evidence establishing Appellant’s 

motive. 

Prior to speaking with Thomas Drew in August 2020, Appellant contends 

he had no facts or proof to support his mere belief that Caldwell was 

cooperating with the government. Appellant posits that his mere belief could 

not have formed the basis for an earlier PCRA petition. Appellant submits that 

he did not have any information to establish a factual basis that an agreement 
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existed between Caldwell and the Commonwealth until Appellant acquired 

Caldwell’s transcripts on November 8, 2021. Appellant emphasizes that the 

transcripts were the material evidence which formed the basis for Appellant’s 

claims. 

Appellant further argues that he believed he attached a “request to 

amend” to his supplemental PCRA petitions. Appellant asserts that he 

ultimately discovered he did not file the request to amend. Nevertheless, 

Appellant claims the court should have permitted Appellant to correct the 

defect in the supplemental petitions by allowing Appellant to seek leave to 

amend. Appellant emphasizes that when he learned he had not attached the 

request for leave to amend to the supplemental petitions, he sought leave to 

amend, but the court failed to rule on that request.

Appellant claims that his current PCRA petition satisfies the 

governmental interference exception to the PCRA time-bar because the 

Commonwealth interfered with Appellant’s ability to raise the claim sooner 

because prosecutors suppressed exculpatory evidence demonstrating that 

Caldwell was engaged in the practice of informing on others to Caldwell’s own 

benefit. Appellant insists the Commonwealth further failed to disclose 

Caldwell’s crimen falsi convictions and his extensive criminal history. 

Appellant avers the Commonwealth failed to provide the following Brady

material: (1) Caldwell was a career criminal with crimen falsi convictions; (2) 

had an extensive history of informing on others, assisting in as many as 60 
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FBI investigations; (3) had reached an actual agreement with the 

Commonwealth where he was given a specific promise of leniency in exchange 

for testifying against Appellant; and (4) had been encouraged and permitted 

by the Commonwealth to give false testimony. 

Appellant maintains that he could not have discovered Caldwell’s 

transcripts earlier with the exercise of due diligence. Appellant notes that 

there is no longer a public record presumption, such that the court could have 

presumed that Appellant could have gained access to transcripts contained in 

Caldwell’s federal criminal case file. Appellant insists that he was entitled to 

rely upon the Commonwealth’s assertion that all exculpatory materials had 

been turned over; Appellant had no reason to believe that the Commonwealth 

violated Brady until he reviewed Caldwell’s transcripts. Based on these 

claims, Appellant suggests his PCRA petition also satisfies the “newlydiscovered facts” exception to the PCRA time-bar. Appellant concludes the 

PCRA court erred by dismissing his petition as untimely, and this Court must 

grant relief. We disagree.

The timeliness of a PCRA petition is a jurisdictional requisite. 

Commonwealth v. Ballance, 203 A.3d 1027 (Pa.Super. 2019), appeal 

denied, 654 Pa. 600, 216 A.3d 1044 (2019). A PCRA petition must be filed 

within one year of the date the underlying judgment becomes final. 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). A judgment is deemed final at the conclusion of direct 

review or at the expiration of time for seeking review. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 
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9545(b)(3). Generally, to obtain merits review of a PCRA petition filed more 

than one year after the judgment of sentence became final, the petitioner 

must allege and prove at least one of the three timeliness exceptions: 

(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result 

of interference by government officials with the presentation 

of the claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this 

Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United 

States; 

(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were 

unknown to the petitioner and could not have been 

ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; or 

(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was 

recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or 

the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period 

provided in this section and has been held by that court to 

apply retroactively. 

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). “Any petition invoking an exception 

provided in paragraph (1) shall be filed within one year of the date the claim 

could have been presented.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2). 

“Although a Brady violation may fall within the governmental 

interference exception, the petitioner must plead and prove the failure to raise 

the claim was the result of interference by government officials, and the 

information could not have been obtained earlier with the exercise of due 

diligence.” Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 596 Pa. 219, 227, 941 A.2d 

1263, 1268 (2008), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 916, 129 S.Ct. 271, 172 L.Ed.2d 

201 (2008).

To meet the “newly-discovered facts” timeliness exception set forth in 
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Section 9545(b)(1)(ii), a petitioner must demonstrate “he did not know the 

facts upon which he based his petition and could not have learned those facts 

earlier by the exercise of due diligence.” Commonwealth v. Brown, 111 

A.3d 171, 176 (Pa.Super. 2015). Due diligence demands that a PCRA 

petitioner take reasonable steps to protect his own interests. Id. 

Instantly, Appellant concedes that his current PCRA petition is facially 

untimely. In addressing whether Appellant satisfied a timeliness exception, 

the PCRA court reasoned:

Here, the petition filed on December 14, 2021, did not plead 

a basis for this court to determine that he could not have 

raised his claims related to Caldwell sooner. Indeed, while 

[Appellant] asserted that he did not know about Caldwell’s 

alleged history of testifying for the Commonwealth in 

exchange for leniency until speaking with fellow inmate 

Thomas Drew in August 2020, the affidavit from Drew that 

[Appellant] attached to his petition belies that assertion. 

Notably, Drew states in the affidavit that [Appellant] told 

him on August 21, 2020, that [Appellant] already suspected 

Caldwell had been given favorable treatment for his 

testimony against [Appellant]. See Petition for PostConviction Relief, filed 12/14/21, Exh. “A.” [Appellant] did 

not plead, however, an explanation for why he did not act 

on this prior suspicion with more diligence and in a more 

timely manner. He, therefore, failed to demonstrate 

through his own pleadings that he could not have discovered 

sooner the purported new facts and governmental 

interference allegedly related to Caldwell.

In addition, when advised in the notice of intent to dismiss 

that he did not meet the asserted exceptions to the PCRA’s 

limitations period, [Appellant] did not [seek] to address the 

defect; instead he filed a series of supplemental petitions 

without court permission, raising additional claims of 

governmental interference and new facts in connection with 

Brewer, Holmes and Somers-Wells. The failure to receive 

court permission before supplementing his petition is fatal 
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to those additional claims. See Commonwealth v. Porter, 

[613 Pa. 510, 523-24,] 35 A.3d 4, 12 ([2012]) (stating that 

amendment of a PCRA is permitted only by direction or leave 

of the court).4 This court, therefore, properly determined 

that it lacked jurisdiction to consider [Appellant’s] untimely 

claims.

4 Even had [Appellant’s] claims related to Brewer, 

Holmes and Somers-Wells been properly asserted, 

they fail for the same reasons as his claims related to 

Caldwell. Indeed, while [Appellant] alleged that he 

only learned of the claims related to Caldwell in 

August 2020, he did not plead an explanation as to 

why he could not have learned sooner of the claims 

related to Brewer, Holmes and Somers-Wells.

(PCRA Court Opinion at 5-6). The record supports the court’s decision that 

Appellant cannot satisfy a time-bar exception.

At the outset, Appellant’s proffered time-bar claim is more properly 

construed as one under the “newly-discovered facts” exception. Although 

Appellant also cites the “governmental interference” exception, Appellant does 

not explain how government officials interfered with his ability to present his 

claim sooner by somehow prohibiting Appellant from accessing Caldwell’s 

transcripts. Rather, Appellant seeks to argue that the transcripts from 

Caldwell’s guilty plea and sentencing proceedings constitute “new facts” 

because they allegedly show that Caldwell received a lenient sentence in 

exchange for his testimony against Appellant, that Caldwell had a significant 

previous criminal history and history as an informant, and these facts were 

not disclosed to Appellant at the time of his trial constituting a violation of 

Brady. 
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Nevertheless, our review of the guilty plea and sentencing transcripts 

from Caldwell’s proceedings makes clear that no deal was in place regarding 

Caldwell’s testimony against Appellant. To be sure, Caldwell’s guilty plea 

hearing transcript confirms that Caldwell entered an open guilty plea on 

August 21, 2009, to access device fraud and related offenses, and there was 

no agreement or promises made in exchange for Caldwell’s guilty plea. The 

judge expressly stated that what the court would sentence Caldwell to had

“absolutely nothing to do with [Caldwell] being a witness in [Appellant’s] case 

and what [the court] would give [as a sentence] in [Caldwell’s] case.” (N.T. 

Caldwell’s Plea Hearing, 8/21/09, at 17, attached to Appellant’s PCRA Petition,

filed 12/14/21). The court went on to say that “even though I happen to be 

presiding on [Appellant’s] case, I have nothing—I never knew anything about 

this, this case just happens to be—so no expectation between you and I[.]” 

(Id.) Following Caldwell’s guilty plea, the court deferred sentencing pending 

a pre-sentence investigation report.

Following the plea, Caldwell testified against Appellant on September 

17, 2009. Caldwell proceeded to sentencing on January 14, 2010, in his own 

case. At that time, Caldwell’s counsel sought leniency based on Caldwell’s 

testimony against Appellant. Specifically, Caldwell’s counsel noted that 

Caldwell was in fear for his life that Appellant or others would seek to exact 

revenge on Caldwell. The Commonwealth then confirmed that when Caldwell 

pled guilty there were no deals in place and the court would be fashioning 
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Caldwell’s sentence. (See N.T. Caldwell’s Sentencing Hearing, 1/14/10, at 

29, attached to Appellant’s PCRA Petition, filed 12/14/21). Nevertheless, the 

Commonwealth acknowledged that Caldwell put his safety at risk by testifying 

against Appellant, so the Commonwealth declined to seek a specific sentence. 

(See id. at 31). In fashioning Caldwell’s sentence, the court noted the 

dangers of being a “snitch” and the actual violence that might befall Caldwell 

based on his testimony against Appellant. The court said it would impose a 

mitigated sentence, by a few months, so that the court could keep Caldwell in 

county jail instead of a state correctional institution for Caldwell’s own safety. 

Thus, the court imposed concurrent terms of 111⁄2 to 23 months’ imprisonment 

for Caldwell’s convictions plus a lengthy probationary tail. The court warned 

Caldwell that if he violated his probation, the court would not afford Caldwell 

the same leniency again. (Id. at 37). 

On this record, we cannot agree with Appellant that he has uncovered 

any “new fact” based on Caldwell’s “deal” with the Commonwealth in exchange 

for Caldwell’s testimony, to satisfy the first prong of the time-bar exception. 

To the contrary, the transcripts from Caldwell’s guilty plea and sentencing 

proceedings are consistent with Caldwell’s testimony at Appellant’s trial that 

he merely hoped for leniency in his own case. In this respect, the transcripts 

are merely a new source for previously known information (that Caldwell 

hoped for leniency in his own sentence) and offer no “new facts.” See Brown, 

supra (explaining that focus on exception set forth under Section 
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9545(b)(1)(ii) is on newly discovered facts, not on newly discovered or newly 

willing source for previously known facts). Appellant’s interpretation of the 

transcripts as demonstrating a deal in place between Caldwell and the 

Commonwealth in exchange for Caldwell’s testimony is simply a misreading 

of the transcripts or plucking sentences from those transcripts without proper 

context. 

Regarding Appellant’s remaining claims pertaining to Caldwell’s prior 

criminal record and history of being an informant, we agree with the PCRA 

court that Appellant has failed to show that he could not have uncovered the 

transcripts in Caldwell’s case sooner by the exercise of due diligence. On this 

point, Appellant makes much of our Supreme Court’s decision in 

Commonwealth v. Small, 662 Pa. 309, 238 A.3d 1267 (2020). In Small, 

our Supreme Court made clear there is no longer a “public record 

presumption” pursuant to which a court may find that information available to 

the public is not a fact that was previously “unknown” to the petitioner. 

Nevertheless, the Court clarified, “that [Appellant] is relieved of the public 

record presumption does not mean that [Appellant] prevails.... The textual 

requirements of the time-bar exception remain.” Id. at 340, 238 A.3d at 

1286. Therefore, “although Small eliminates the public record presumption, 

it does not abrogate the requirement that petitioners perform due diligence to 

discover the facts upon which their claim is predicated.” Commonwealth v. 

Keener, No. 1165 WDA 2021, 2022 WL 2359373, at *4 (Pa.Super. June 30, 
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2022) (unpublished memorandum).2

Here, Thomas Drew’s affidavit attached to Appellant’s current PCRA 

petition states that Appellant had suspicions about Caldwell’s cooperation with 

the government. Appellant provides no explanation for why he could not have 

accessed Caldwell’s criminal docket and transcripts in the decade between 

Appellant’s trial and the filing of his current PCRA petition in an effort to 

confirm or dispel his suspicions. See id. Had Appellant exercised due 

diligence in accessing the criminal docket and transcripts for Caldwell’s case 

sooner, he would have obtained the information on which his current claims 

are predicated. 

Regarding the other Commonwealth witnesses Brewer, Holmes, and 

Somers-Wells, Appellant raised claims concerning those witnesses for the first 

time in supplemental PCRA petitions filed without leave of court. The PCRA 

court accurately observed that an “amendment [to a PCRA petition] is 

permitted only by direction or leave of the PCRA court.” Porter, supra at 

523-24, 35 A.3d at 12. Nevertheless, the record shows that Appellant filed a 

motion on May 5, 2022, seeking an extension of time to supplement his PCRA 

petition. Appellant filed another motion on July 8, 2022, seeking leave to 

supplement or amend his PCRA petition. The PCRA court did not rule on these 

motions. Because “[a]mendment[s to a PCRA petition] shall be freely allowed 

____________________________________________

2 See Pa.R.A.P. 126(b) (stating we may rely on non-precedential decisions 

from this Court filed after May 1, 2019, for persuasive value).
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to achieve substantial justice,” (see Pa.R.Crim.P. 905(A)), we will not 

disregard Appellant’s supplemental petitions. 

Significantly, however, Appellant provides no analysis on appeal of a 

time-bar exception concerning the information related to Brewer, Holmes, and 

Somers-Wells. (See Appellant’s Brief at 12-18). Instead, Appellant dedicates 

his argument concerning the proffered time-bar exceptions to the information 

involving Caldwell. Appellant merely indicates that his investigation into 

Caldwell “motivated him to learn more about the circumstances surrounding 

the testimony of” Brewer, Somers-Wells and Holmes. (See Appellant’s Reply 

Brief at 4). This statement is insufficient to constitute a developed argument 

concerning a time-bar exception for the claims related to Brewer, SomersWells and Holmes. Therefore, Appellant has not satisfied a time-bar exception 

and Appellant’s current PCRA petition remains untimely.3

In his fifth issue, Appellant argues that the PCRA judge was the same 

jurist who sentenced Caldwell. Appellant claims the PCRA court “inadvertently 

____________________________________________

3 Based on our disposition that Appellant’s current petition is untimely and the 

PCRA court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the merits of the underlying 

Brady claims, we need not address Appellant’s second issue on appeal. 

Likewise, we need not address Appellant’s third or fourth issues, seeking 

discovery and an evidentiary hearing. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 902(E) (stating 

discovery is not permitted during PCRA proceedings in non-capital cases, 

absent showing of exceptional circumstances. See also Commonwealth v. 

Maddrey, 205 A.3d 323 (Pa.Super. 2019), appeal denied, 655 Pa. 398, 218 

A.3d 380 (2019) (stating PCRA court is not required to hold evidentiary 

hearing where court is able to determine from record that relief is 

unavailable). 
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became a witness of the Commonwealth’s concealment of exculpatory

evidence that was never disclosed to [Appellant].” (Appellant’s Brief at 34). 

Further, Appellant insists the PCRA court has shown hostility toward Appellant 

at various times over the life of his case, including in pre-trial hearings.4 

Appellant concludes the court erred by denying his recusal motion, and this 

Court must vacate the order denying PCRA relief, and remand for an 

evidentiary hearing before a new jurist. We disagree.

With respect to Appellant’s recusal motion, our scope and standard of 

review are as follows:

The standards for recusal are well established. It is the 

burden of the party requesting recusal to produce evidence 

establishing bias, prejudice or unfairness which raises a 

substantial doubt as to the jurist’s ability to preside 

impartially.

In considering a recusal request, the jurist must first 

make a conscientious determination of his or her 

ability to assess the case in an impartial manner, free 

of personal bias or interest in the outcome. The jurist 

must then consider whether his or her continued 

involvement in the case creates an appearance of 

impropriety and/or would tend to undermine public 

confidence in the judiciary. This is a personal and 

unreviewable decision that only the jurist can make. 

Where a jurist rules that he or she can hear and 

dispose of a case fairly and without prejudice, that 

decision will not be overruled on appeal but for an 

abuse of discretion. In reviewing a denial of a 

disqualification motion, we recognize that our judges 

____________________________________________

4 Appellant did not make this particular claim in his recusal motion filed March 

23, 2022. As Appellant raises this claim for the first time on appeal, it is 

waived and we will give it no further attention. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (stating 

issues raised for first time on appeal are waived).
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are honorable, fair and competent.

Commonwealth v. Dip, 221 A.3d 201, 206 (Pa.Super. 2019), appeal denied, 

658 Pa. 542, 229 A.3d 567 (2020) (internal citations omitted). 

Further, a recusal request must be timely made. Commonwealth v. 

Blount, 207 A.3d 925, 930 (Pa.Super. 2019), appeal denied, 655 Pa. 583, 

218 A.3d 1198 (2019). “[A] party must seek recusal of a jurist at the earliest 

possible moment, i.e., when the party knows of the facts that form the basis 

for a motion to recuse. If the party fails to present a motion to recuse at that 

time, then the party’s recusal issue is time-barred and waived.” Id. at 930-

31. 

Instantly, the court addressed Appellant’s claim for recusal as follows:

[Appellant] claimed in a motion to recuse...that the 

undersigned had a duty to recuse himself because he 

presided over an open guilty plea and sentencing involving 

Caldwell in 2010. As an initial matter, the motion is 

untimely. [Appellant] alleged in his petition, filed on 

December 14, 2021, that Caldwell had received leniency in 

exchange for his testimony against [Appellant], but he did 

not move for the undersigned’s recusal until March 23, 

2022, after issuance of the notice of intent to dismiss on 

March 2, 2022. The motion, therefore, raises the...troubling 

concern...where a defendant moves for recusal after 

receiving an adverse ruling.

Additionally, the undersigned made a conscientious 

determination that recusal was not warranted because the 

undersigned was able to adjudicate the petition in an 

impartial manner and the undersigned’s continued 

involvement would create neither an appearance of 

impropriety nor tend to undermine public confidence in the 

judiciary. [Appellant], therefore, is not entitled to relief on 

this final claim. 
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(PCRA Court Opinion at 9) (emphasis in original).

Initially, Appellant’s recusal issue is arguably moot, as he seems to claim

the PCRA judge should recuse himself if further proceedings continue upon 

remand. (See Appellant’s Brief at 33). As we are not remanding for an 

evidentiary hearing, there are no further proceedings that will occur. To the 

extent Appellant argues that the court should not have ruled on Appellant’s 

PCRA petition because it had previously presided over matters involving 

Caldwell, we observe that Appellant attached the guilty plea and sentencing 

transcripts involving Caldwell to his current PCRA petition. Those transcripts 

make clear that the PCRA judge involved in Appellant’s case (who also 

presided over Appellant’s jury trial) presided over Caldwell’s proceedings. 

Thus, Appellant could have moved for recusal at that time. Instead, Appellant 

did not seek recusal until after the court issued Rule 907 notice. Under these 

circumstances, we agree with the PCRA court that the recusal motion was 

untimely. See Blount, supra. 

Moreover, as discussed above, the transcripts from Caldwell’s 

proceedings belie Appellant’s contention that the Commonwealth made 

Caldwell any deal in exchange for his testimony against Appellant. Thus, even 

if Appellant’s recusal motion was timely, we would see no abuse of discretion 

in the court’s denial of the motion, as there was no appearance of impropriety 
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in this case.5 See Dip, supra. Accordingly, we affirm the order denying PCRA 

relief.

Order affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 4/24/2023

____________________________________________

5 Appellant has filed two applications for relief in this Court, alleging that 

during the pendency of this appeal he has uncovered additional evidence of 

Brady violations. Appellant asked us to remand to the PCRA court so that he 

can further pursue these claims. Based on our disposition, we deny 

Appellant’s requests for remand. Appellant is free to raise his new claims in 

a serial PCRA petition, where he must first plead and prove the court’s 

jurisdiction to consider same.