GAO

United States General Accounting Office

Report to Congressional Requesters

June 2000 AVIATION SECURITY

Long-Standing

Problems Impair

Airport Screeners’

Performance

GAO/RCED-00-75

Page 1 GAO/RCED-00-75 Airport Screeners

Contents

Letter 3

Executive Summary 6

Chapter 1

Introduction

14

Screening Passengers Is a Key Line of Defense 14

Passenger Screening Is a Shared Responsibility 18

Concerns Over the Effectiveness of Passenger Screening

Are Long-Standing 19

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 20

Chapter 2

Long-Standing

Problems and Program

Delays Hinder

Improvements in

Screeners’

Performance

23

Rapid Turnover and Human Factors Problems Reduce Screeners’

Effectiveness 23

Initiatives to Improve Screeners’ Performance Under Way,

but Key Aspects Are Behind Schedule 26

More Effective Use of Management Tools Can Help Improve

Screeners’ Performance 31

Conclusions 32

Recommendations 33

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 34

Chapter 3

Selected Foreign

Countries’ Screening

Practices, Turnover,

and Performance

35

Screening Practices in the United States and Five Other

Countries Differ 35

Turnover Is Lower in Five Countries, and Performance May

Be Better 40

Conclusions 41

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 42

Appendixes Appendix I: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments 44

Related GAO Products 45

Tables Table 1: Number of Firearms and Explosive Devices Detected

by Airport Screeners, Calendar Years 1990-99 17
Contents

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Table 2: Turnover Rates for Screeners at 19 Large airports,

May 1998-April 1999 24

Table 3: FAA’s Initiatives to Improve Screeners’ Performance 27

Figures Figure 1: Screeners Operating a Typical Security Checkpoint

at an Airport 16

Abbreviations

DOT Department of Transportation

FAA Federal Aviation Administration

GAO General Accounting Office
United States General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

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Resources, Community, and

Economic Development Division

B-282286 Letr

June 28, 2000

The Honorable John McCain

Chairman

The Honorable Ernest Hollings

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on Commerce, Science,

and Transportation

United States Senate

The Honorable Slade Gorton

Chairman

The Honorable John D. Rockefeller IV

Ranking Minority Member

Subcommittee on Aviation

Committee on Commerce, Science,

and Transportation

United States Senate

This report responds to your request that we study the performance of screeners at our nation’s

airports. The report includes recommendations to better implement the management and evaluation

of FAA’s efforts to improve screeners’ performance.

Unless you publicly announce its contents earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until

15 days after the date of this letter. At that time, we will send copies to the appropriate congressional

committees; the Honorable Rodney E. Slater, Secretary of Transportation; the Honorable Jane F.

Garvey, Administrator, Federal Aviation Administration; the Honorable Jacob J. Lew, Director, Office

of Management and Budget; and other interested parties. We will make copies available to others

upon request.
B-282286

Page 4 GAO/RCED-00-75 Airport Screeners

If you or your staff have any questions, please call me or John Schulze, Assistant Director, at (202)

512-2834. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix I.

Gerald L. Dillingham, Ph.D.

Associate Director, Transportation Issues
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Executive Summary

Purpose The threat of attacks on aircraft by terrorists or others remains a persistent

and growing concern for the United States. According to the Federal

Bureau of Investigation, the trend in terrorism against U.S. targets is

toward large-scale incidents designed for maximum destruction, terror, and

media impact—exactly what terrorists intended in a 1995 plot to blow up

12 U.S. airliners in a single day. That plot, uncovered by police in the

Philippines, focused on U.S. airliners operating in the Pacific region, but

concerns are growing about the potential for attacks within the United

States.

The United States and other countries have a number of safeguards in place

to prevent attacks against commercial aircraft. Among the most important

of these are the checkpoints at airports where passengers and their carryon items are screened for dangerous objects, such as guns, and explosives.

Historically, however, screeners who operate checkpoints in the United

States have had difficulty in detecting dangerous objects, missing as many

as 20 percent during tests, and numerous reports, including two by

presidential commissions, have detailed significant problems with

screeners’ performance. Concerned about the effectiveness of screening

checkpoints and of the efforts to improve them, the Senate Committee on

Commerce, Science, and Transportation and its Subcommittee on Aviation

requested that GAO examine (1) the causes of screeners’ problems in

detecting dangerous objects and the efforts of the Federal Aviation

Administration (FAA) to address these problems and (2) the screening

practices of selected foreign countries and the potential for using these

practices to help improve screeners’ performance in the United States.

Background FAA is responsible for overseeing the safety and security of the nation’s

civil aviation system. Since 1973, after a spate of hijackings, the agency has

required that air carriers maintain screening checkpoints to prevent or

deter passengers from carrying dangerous objects aboard aircraft. While

the airlines are responsible for screening activities, they generally contract

with security companies to manage the checkpoints and to provide

screeners, who check over 2 million passengers and their carry-on items

each day. The screeners scan individuals for weapons or other dangerous

objects by using metal detectors, and they examine carry-on baggage using

X-ray machines, explosive detection equipment, and physical searches.

As part of its regulatory oversight of the screening operations, FAA tests

screeners’ ability to locate test objects placed in carry-on baggage or
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hidden on an FAA agent’s person. The agents use standard test objects,

such as guns, during these compliance tests, and FAA can fine an airline if

an object is missed. FAA also tests screeners using more sophisticated

simulated bombs—called improvised explosive devices—that are more

difficult to detect; however, FAA views these tests as a training tool and

does not issue fines when screeners miss the test objects. Concerns have

long existed over screeners’ performance in these tests. In 1978, screeners

failed to detect 13 percent of the objects during compliance tests, and in

1987, screeners were missing 20 percent of the objects during the same

type of test. Since 1997, FAA has designated data on test results as

sensitive security information. Consequently, more recent data on test

results cannot be released publicly and are discussed in a separate, limiteddistribution report.1 Nevertheless, FAA acknowledges that screeners’

performance in detecting dangerous objects during its testing is not

satisfactory.

Aviation terrorism is a concern not only in the United States but also in

other countries, some of which have had more attacks than the United

States, and virtually all countries conduct preboard screening operations

before allowing passengers to board aircraft. Each country can—and often

does—conduct screening operations in a manner that differs from that of

the United States or of other countries.

Results in Brief Long-standing problems combine to reduce screeners’ effectiveness in

detecting dangerous objects, most notably (1) the rapid turnover of

screener personnel—often above 100 percent a year at large airports and,

in at least one recent instance, above 400 percent a year and (2) human

factors conditions that have for years affected screeners’ hiring, training,

and working environment. A key factor in the rapid turnover is the low

wages screeners receive. Screeners are often paid the minimum wage or

close to it and can often earn more at airport fast-food restaurants. FAA is

pursuing several initiatives to improve the hiring, training, and testing of

screeners; to increase their alertness and more closely monitor their

performance; and to certify the security companies that air carriers retain

to staff screening checkpoints; however, most of these efforts are behind

schedule. Furthermore, FAA has established performance improvement

goals for screeners, but it has not (1) completed an integrated plan to tie its

1

Aviation Security: Screeners Continue to Have Difficulty Detecting Dangerous Objects

(GAO/RCED-00-159, June 2000).
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various efforts to improve screeners’ performance to the achievement of its

goals and (2) adequately measured its progress in achieving its goals for

improving screeners’ performance. This report contains recommendations

to better implement the management and evaluation of FAA’s efforts to

improve screeners’ performance.

Passenger screening procedures in the countries GAO visited are similar to

those in the United States. Passengers walk through metal detectors at

airport checkpoints and have their carry-on baggage scanned by X-ray

machines or physically searched by screeners. But there are also some

differences: For example, in most countries, screeners must undergo more

extensive training; screeners receive higher wages and better benefits; and

screening responsibility rests with the government or the airport, not with

the air carriers as it does in the United States. Among the five countries

GAO visited—Belgium, Canada, France, the Netherlands, and the United

Kingdom—the turnover rate for screeners was lower—about 50 percent a

year or less—and in a joint test conducted by FAA and one of these

countries, screeners’ performance was higher. However, the feasibility of

applying these countries’ practices to screening operations in the United

States cannot be readily determined. Given this uncertainty and the fact

that FAA has already begun several efforts to improve screeners’

performance, GAO is not making recommendations to revise current

screening practices in the United States.

GAO provided a draft of this report to the Department of Transportation for

its review and comment. GAO met with FAA officials, who were

responding for the Department of Transportation. These officials generally

agreed with the facts presented in the draft report and acknowledged that

screeners’ performance needs to improve. The officials agreed with the

recommendation to promptly complete the agency’s integrated checkpoint

screening management plan. However, they disagreed with the need to

revise FAA’ s goal for reporting improvements in screeners’ performance

under the Government Performance and Results Act. GAO continues to

believe that its recommendation is appropriate and consequently did not

revise it. FAA officials also provided technical clarifications, which were

incorporated in the report as appropriate.
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Principal Findings

Long-Standing Problems

and Program Delays Impair

Improvements in Screeners’

Performance

Long-standing problems with screeners’ performance are attributable to a

number of causes. Foremost among these is the rapid turnover of

screeners. Because turnover occurs so often, few experienced screeners

staff the checkpoints. From May 1998 through April 1999, turnover among

screeners at 19 large airports averaged over 125 percent, and one airport

reported turnover of over 400 percent. According to FAA and the aviation

industry, this turnover is largely due to the low pay and few, if any, benefits

screeners receive, as well as the daily stress of the job. It is not unusual for

the starting wages at airport fast-food restaurants to be higher than the

wages screeners receive. For instance, at one airport GAO visited,

screeners’ wages started as low as $6.25 an hour, whereas the starting wage

at one of the airport’s fast-food restaurants was $7 an hour.

The human factors associated with screening—those work-related issues

that are influenced by human capabilities and constraints—have also been

noted by FAA as problems affecting performance for over 20 years.

Screening duties require repetitive tasks as well as intense monitoring for

the very rare moment when a dangerous object may be observed. Too little

attention has been given to factors such as (1) individuals’ aptitudes for

effectively performing screening duties, (2) the sufficiency of the training

provided to screeners and how well they comprehend it, and (3) the

monotony of the job and the distractions that reduce screeners’ vigilance.

As a result, screeners are being placed on the job without having the

abilities or knowledge required to perform the work effectively. Such

screeners then find their duties tedious and unstimulating.

FAA has several initiatives under way to address these problems and

improve screeners’ performance. These include

• improving the hiring and preparation of screeners through selection

tests, computer-based training, and competency tests;

• a system to keep screeners alert and monitor their performance by

periodically projecting images of dangerous objects onto the monitors

of the X-ray machines at checkpoints and recording the screeners’

responses; and

• a certification program to make screening companies, along with the air

carriers, accountable for the training and performance of the screeners

they employ.
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FAA believes these efforts will improve the quality of the personnel hired

for screening positions, provide them with better training, and give the

screening companies greater incentive to retain their best screeners longer

in order to meet FAA’s new performance standards for certification. Most

of these efforts, however, are behind schedule. For example, FAA is 2 years

behind schedule in issuing its regulation requiring the certification of

screening companies.

FAA has established annual goals, as required by the Government

Performance and Results Act, for improving screeners’ detection of test

objects. However, the agency has lacked an integrated plan that (1) details

how its efforts to improve screeners’ performance are related to achieving

its goals, (2) identifies and prioritizes problems with screeners’

performance that require resolving, and (3) provides budget and milestone

information for addressing these problems. FAA has been developing such

an integrated management plan to guide its checkpoint screening

improvement efforts, but although elements of the plan are being

implemented, it is not complete. Furthermore, FAA’s method for

calculating the achievement of one goal—the detection of dangerous

objects in carry-on bags—does not produce meaningful results. It

combined the results of two separate types of tests—for detecting standard

test objects and for detecting improvised explosive devices—both of which

were performed in fiscal year 1998 and again in fiscal year 1999. But during

1999, FAA increased the number of tests using the more easily detected

standard objects and decreased the number of tests using the more

difficult-to-detect explosive devices. Consequently, FAA showed progress

toward achieving its goal when, in fact, no progress had occurred.

Other Countries’ Preboard

Screening Practices,

Turnover, and Performance

GAO examined preboard passenger screening practices in Belgium,

Canada, France, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom—five countries

recommended by FAA and industry representatives. GAO found four areas

where screening operations differ from those in the United States: the

screeners’ qualifications; the screeners’ pay and benefits; the institutional

responsibility for screening; and the stringency of checkpoint screening

procedures.

• Most of the countries require that potential screeners undergo lengthier

training, be either citizens or long-term residents, and be individually

certified for screening work.

• In most of the countries, screeners receive higher salaries and more

benefits than do screeners in this country. For example, screeners in
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Belgium receive wages equivalent to about $14 per hour, and screeners

in the Netherlands receive what they regard as “middle income” wages.

In most countries, the screeners also receive health and/or vacation

benefits.

• The responsibility for screening rests with either the government or the

airport, not with air carriers, as it does in the United States. Although

security companies are commonly hired to staff screening checkpoints,

the companies report directly to the government or the airport authority.

• Some nations direct screeners to “pat down” passengers after metal

detectors go off or at random to increase the screeners’ effectiveness.

All five countries allow only ticketed passengers to pass through the

checkpoint, allowing the screeners to be more attentive to a smaller

number of people. Several countries also have a more visible police

presence near their checkpoints.

In addition, turnover for screeners is lower in all five countries than in the

United States. Among these countries, the highest reported turnover rate

was about 50 percent a year, and one country had an annual turnover rate

of less than 5 percent. Furthermore, although the countries did not make

data on the performance of their screeners available to GAO, the

performance of screeners in at least one country was better than in the

United States. Joint testing by FAA and this country, using consistent

procedures and test objects, demonstrated that the other country’s

screeners were able to detect the objects at better than twice the rate of

U.S. screeners.2 However, without specific performance data, GAO could

not determine whether any of the differences found in the other countries

improve screeners’ performance in those countries or would improve

screeners’ performance in the United States.

Recommendations So that FAA can better implement its efforts to improve screeners’

performance, GAO recommends that the Secretary of Transportation direct

the Administrator of FAA to do the following:

• Require that FAA’s integrated checkpoint screening management plan be

promptly completed, implemented, continuously monitored and

updated, and periodically evaluated for effectiveness.

2

The results of these tests and the identity of the participant country are sensitive security

information and cannot be released publicly.
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• For reporting under the Government Performance and Results Act,

establish separate goals for the detection of standard test objects and

improvised explosive devices concealed in carry-on baggage.

Agency Comments GAO provided the Department of Transportation with a draft of this report

for review and comment. GAO met with officials from FAA, including the

Associate Administrator for Civil Aviation Security, who were responding

for the Department of Transportation. These officials generally agreed

with the facts presented in the draft report and provided technical

clarifications, which were incorporated as appropriate.

FAA officials agreed that the performance of checkpoint screeners needs to

improve and that the agency’s integrated checkpoint screening

management plan is not complete. FAA officials agreed with the draft

report’s recommendation to promptly complete the plan but added that

other than the program cost data, it is essentially complete. FAA expects to

complete the cost data by the end of 2000. FAA, however, did not concur

with the draft report’s recommendation that, for reporting under the

Government Performance and Results Act, it establish separate goals for

the detection of standard test objects and improvised explosive devices

concealed in carry-on baggage. FAA commented that, although it agreed

with the intent of the recommendation, it nevertheless believes that it is

reasonable to aggregate the test results for use in assessing the agency’s

performance under the Government Performance and Results Act, since

the Department of Transportation tries to limit the number of goals

established under the act. While GAO agrees that efforts should be made to

limit the number of goals, the measurement information required by the

Results Act must nevertheless be meaningful and provide the agency with a

clear picture of its progress toward meeting its established goals. GAO

continues to believe that the progress shown in meeting FAA’s current goal

is not meaningful—since it can, and does, show improved performance

when in fact none exists—and that the goal needs to be revised.

FAA officials were also concerned that the draft report did not provide

FAA’s perspective on the role cultural and other concerns play in countries’

approaches to screening. They noted that what is acceptable to the public

elsewhere may not be acceptable in the United States. The officials said

that FAA must be aware of the need to protect civil liberties and privacy

when considering checkpoint procedures and equipment. The draft report

was revised to include their views. Additionally, these officials commented

that the numbers of airports and screeners in the countries GAO visited are
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Page 13 GAO/RCED-00-75 Airport Screeners

significantly lower than in the United States, but they provided no

information on how these facts affect screeners’ performance, turnover,

and human factors concerns.
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Chapter 1

Introduction Chapte1r

Although more than a decade has passed since the last bombing of a U.S.

airliner—the 1988 explosion on Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie,

Scotland, that killed 270 people—U.S. aircraft are still believed to be a

target for terrorist attacks. According to the Federal Bureau of

Investigation, trends in terrorism point toward large-scale incidents

designed for maximum destruction, terror, and media impact—exactly the

effect of attacks on aviation. Recent events show that concern about such

attacks is not unfounded. Philippine police uncovered a plot in 1995 to

blow up as many as 12 U.S. airliners in the Pacific region on a single day.

Equally ominous is the fact that terrorist activities are posing a threat

domestically. For example, a suspected terrorist was apprehended in

December 1999 while attempting to enter the country with bomb

components, including some small enough to be brought onto an aircraft.

The knowledge and materials to build explosive devices that are difficult to

detect are readily available and, as a result, the potential for the destruction

of aircraft and great loss of life has increased.

Because of this threat to commercial aviation, the Federal Aviation

Administration (FAA), which is responsible for the safety and security of

civil aviation in the United States, requires various security measures be in

place at the nation’s airports. Over the past 25 years, FAA has directed that

air carriers and airports control access to airport buildings, facilities, and

aircraft; question passengers to better ensure that their baggage and its

contents have been solely under the passengers’ control; scan the checked

baggage of certain passengers; and in some cases, match the checked

baggage onboard aircraft with enplaning passengers. Of the various

security measures, one of the most crucial is the screening of passengers

and their carry-on baggage before the passengers board their flights.

Screening Passengers

Is a Key Line of

Defense

In 1973, to counteract the then-growing number of aircraft hijackings, FAA

directed that all passengers be screened, along with their carry-on baggage,

before they board an aircraft. Since that time, all passengers have been

screened at airport checkpoints, and today, screening personnel—termed

screeners—check over 2 million individuals and their bags each day for

weapons, explosives, and other dangerous articles that could pose a threat

to the safety of an aircraft and those aboard it.

Screeners are a key line of defense against the introduction of dangerous

items into the aviation system. All passengers and anyone else who seeks

to enter secure areas at the nation’s airports must pass through screening
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Introduction

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checkpoints and be cleared by screeners. At all commercial airports in the

United States, screeners

• examine carry-on baggage with X-ray machines to locate any dangerous

objects,

• scan passengers with metal detectors to identify any hidden metallic

objects, and

• conduct physical searches of items, including those that cannot be

scanned by X-ray machines—such as baby carriers or lead-shielded

containers—or bags that have been X-rayed and contain unidentifiable

objects that could be a threat.

In addition to the routine checkpoint process used for screening every

passenger, screeners select carry-on bags at random and search them or

use explosive detection equipment to determine if traces of explosives are

present on the baggage.1 After passing through a checkpoint, a person can

move about freely in the airport’s public secured areas. Figure 1 shows

screeners operating a typical checkpoint.

1

FAA had deployed this equipment, referred to as explosive trace detectors, to 84 domestic

airports as of April 2000, and it plans deployments to additional airports.
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Introduction

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Figure 1: Screeners Operating a Typical Security Checkpoint at an Airport

Source: FAA.
Chapter 1

Introduction

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Each year, the nation’s screeners detect thousands of dangerous objects

that individuals intentionally or inadvertently attempt to carry though

checkpoints. From 1990 through 1999, screeners located nearly 23,000

firearms and numerous explosive devices, resulting in over 9,400 arrests.

Table 1 shows the number of firearms and explosive devices detected each

year.

Table 1: Number of Firearms and Explosive Devices Detected by Airport Screeners,

Calendar Years 1990-99

a

FAA believes that the data for explosive devices may be misleading because these items have not

been consistently reported. The 1997 data are particularly unreliable because they include mace or

pepper spray canisters, fireworks, flares, and other items that, while dangerous on an aircraft, would

not likely be used to hijack or damage an airplane. Because of the inconsistencies and irregularities in

the data reported by airports, FAA no longer reports these data.

b

Not available.

Source: FAA.

Screeners do not have police powers and cannot make arrests when they

discover dangerous objects. At larger airports, officers are generally

stationed on the premises and, when summoned to a screening checkpoint,

make arrests as warranted. Smaller airports may not have law enforcement

officers present, but FAA’s regulations require that law enforcement

personnel be available to respond to any incidents.

Year

Number of firearms

detected

Number of explosive

devices detecteda

1990 2,853 15

1991 1,919 94

1992 2,608 167

1993 2,798 251

1994 2,994 505

1995 2,390 631

1996 2,155 353

1997 2,067 2,764

1998 1,515 b

1999 1,570 b

Total 22,869 4,780
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Introduction

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Passenger Screening Is

a Shared Responsibility

The responsibility for screening passengers and carry-on baggage is shared

by FAA and air carriers. FAA’s regulations requiring the screening of

passengers are contained in 14 C.F.R. part 108 and provide basic standards

for the equipment and procedures to be used. Additionally, the regulations

require each air carrier to have an FAA-approved security program that

provides detailed requirements and procedures for screening passengers

and their property. All U.S. carriers have adopted the Air Carrier Standard

Security Program that FAA developed in consultation with the airline

industry. Consequently, all carriers follow similar security procedures.

Furthermore, FAA’s regulations establish minimum employment and

training standards for screeners. Among other things, these standards

specify that screeners possess basic aptitudes and physical abilities,

including color perception, visual and aural acuity, physical coordination,

and motor skills; know how to read, write, and speak English; and

complete 12 hours of classroom training and 40 hours of on-the-job

training. Screeners do not need to be U.S. citizens or resident aliens, but if

they are not, they must have an authorization from the U.S. Immigration

and Naturalization Service to work in the United States. Screeners are

required to have completed high school, have an equivalency degree, or

have an adequate combination of education and experience.

Air carriers are responsible for conducting screening operations that meet

FAA’s requirements. An air carrier can use its own employees to screen

passengers or contract with another air carrier or a security company to do

the screening in accordance with the air carrier’s security program. Some

air carriers use their own employees to operate screening checkpoints.

Most, however, hire independent security firms to do the screening.

Currently, almost 100 security companies, employing an estimated 18,000

screeners, are operating at U.S. airports. At large airports, several different

screening companies usually operate checkpoints under contract with

various airlines. The air carriers are required by FAA to maintain oversight

of the checkpoint operations and ensure that all of FAA’s requirements are

met.
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Introduction

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FAA is responsible for overseeing and monitoring the effectiveness of

passenger screening and for enforcing compliance with its regulations. As

part of this responsibility, FAA inspects the operation of the checkpoints

and conducts tests of screeners’ ability to detect dangerous objects—called

compliance tests. FAA special agents pose as passengers and attempt to get

weapons and other dangerous objects though checkpoints by concealing

the items either in carry-on baggage or on their own bodies. FAA conducts

these tests without notice, using a standard set of test objects, such as

guns, or other objects called improvised explosive devices, that are more

difficult to detect.2 Any time a screener fails to detect a standard test object

or follow the approved procedures during its tests, FAA can issue a

violation to the air carrier responsible for the checkpoint and assess a fine

of up to $11,000. FAA regards improvised explosive devices as a tool for

training screeners to detect devices that mimic those used by terrorists and

does not impose any fines if screeners fail to detect them.

Concerns Over the

Effectiveness of

Passenger Screening

Are Long-Standing

Concerns have long existed over screeners’ ability to detect weapons and

other dangerous objects. In 1978, FAA’s tests indicated that 13 percent of

the test objects concealed in carry-on bags passed through X-ray

examination without being detected—a rate that was considered

“significant and alarming” by both FAA and the airline industry at that time.

An FAA-industry task force in 1979 attributed this level of missed objects to

personnel factors such as high employee turnover, low pay, and inadequate

training. In two 1987 reports, we pointed out that about 20 percent of test

objects were still not being identified during the screening process, in large

part because of the same personnel factors—turnover, pay, and training.3

According to additional studies conducted in the mid- to late 1990s by FAA,

the National Research Council, and university researchers, it is evident that

there is room for substantial improvement in airport screening. These

studies continued to point out concerns about screeners’ pay, turnover, and

training and the impact of these factors on screeners’ performance.

2

Improvised explosive devices consist of simulated explosives and various modular, off-theshelf components.

3

Aviation Security: FAA Preboard Passenger Screening Test Results (GAO/RCED-87-125FS,

Apr. 30, 1987) and Aviation Security: FAA Needs Preboard Passenger Screening

Performance Standards (GAO/RCED-87-182, July 24, 1987).
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Introduction

Page 20 GAO/RCED-00-75 Airport Screeners

Moreover, some of these studies indicated that screeners’ poor

performance was a principal weakness of the passenger screening system.

The Congress recognized the problems with screeners’ performance and

passed legislation in the 1990s to improve screening. Following the

bombing of Pan Am Flight 103, the Congress passed the Aviation Security

Improvement Act of 1990 to increase the effectiveness of the nation’s

aviation security system. The act mandated programmatic and

organizational changes to FAA’s security program, including more stringent

employment, education, and training standards for screeners and other

airport security personnel. Interest in aviation security was renewed in

1996 by the crash of TWA Flight 800. In response, the White House

Commission on Aviation Safety and Security was established and in its

initial and final reports, identified aviation security as a national issue and

made a number of recommendations to improve it. These

recommendations included the purchase and deployment of new screening

technologies and equipment and the development of uniform performance

standards for the training and testing of screeners and the certification of

screening companies. The Congress also enacted two other laws—the

Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996 and the Omnibus

Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997—which, among other things,

authorized and provided funding for implementing many of the security

recommendations contained in the Commission’s report.

Despite these efforts, concerns over screeners’ ability to detect dangerous

objects remain. Each year, instances occur in which passengers pass

through checkpoints at one airport and are subsequently found to have

loaded guns at screening checkpoints prior to boarding connecting flights

at another airport. Furthermore, screeners’ performance in detecting

dangerous objects during FAA tests is still not adequate. Since 1997, data

on FAA’s test results have been designated as sensitive security information

and cannot be released publicly; consequently, information on screeners’

current performance cannot be discussed in this report. Nevertheless, FAA

has acknowledged that screeners’ detection of dangerous objects during its

testing is unsatisfactory and needs improvement.

Objectives, Scope, and

Methodology

Because of the long-standing problems with screeners’ performance and

congressional interest in effecting lasting improvements in this

performance, the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member of the Senate

Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation and the Chairman

and Ranking Minority Member of its Subcommittee on Aviation requested
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Introduction

Page 21 GAO/RCED-00-75 Airport Screeners

that we review the performance of screening personnel and the efforts

being made to improve their performance. We specifically agreed to

address the following key questions:

• Since 1990, how accurately have screeners been detecting test objects?

• What are the causes of screeners’ performance problems and what

efforts is FAA making to address them?

• How do selected foreign countries handle screening operations and do

they use practices that could help improve screeners’ performance in

the United States?

The first question involves sensitive security information that cannot be

released publicly. Accordingly, our response was published in a separate

limited-distribution report.4 Our response to the two remaining questions

appear in this report.

To obtain an overall perspective on screeners’ performance, we reviewed

relevant literature focusing on the causes of performance problems, efforts

to increase screeners’ proficiency, and approaches to improving

checkpoint operations. We also reviewed our past reports on aviation

security and reports by the Department of Transportation’s Office of

Inspector General.

To determine the causes of screeners’ performance problems and the

status of FAA’s initiatives to improve their performance, we obtained and

reviewed FAA documents that described screening equipment research,

development, and deployment efforts; the relationship of human factors to

screeners’ problems; and the development and implementation of FAA

initiatives, including those establishing (1) criteria for selecting screeners,

(2) better testing and training practices, and (3) a program for certifying

screening companies. We also reviewed FAA’s goals for improving

screeners’ performance and discussed the rationale for these goals and the

plans for measuring progress in achieving them with cognizant FAA

officials. We also met with FAA officials in Washington, D.C., and at FAA’s

Technical Center in Atlantic City, New Jersey, to obtain information on the

efforts being undertaken to identify causes of performance problems and

to implement solutions.

4

Aviation Security: Screeners Continue to Have Difficulty Detecting Dangerous Objects

(GAO/RCED-00-159, June 2000).
Chapter 1

Introduction

Page 22 GAO/RCED-00-75 Airport Screeners

Additionally, we met with representatives of five air carriers, seven security

companies, two screening equipment manufacturers, and two aviation

industry associations to obtain their perspectives on the performance of

screeners and the actions being taken to improve performance. We visited

five large airports—Hartsfield Atlanta International Airport; Dallas/Fort

Worth International Airport; Los Angeles International Airport; John F.

Kennedy International Airport; and Seattle/Tacoma International Airport—

to meet with screeners and to discuss screening with air carrier and

security company officials. At each location, we also met with local FAA

field office staff and the airport’s FAA Federal Security Manager.

To determine how screening operations are handled in other countries, we

visited Belgium, Canada, France, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom.

We selected these countries for a variety of reasons, such as

recommendations of FAA and aviation industry officials, the active role

these countries have in international aviation security organizations, and

the generally high level of concern for aviation security in these countries.

In each country we visited, we met with government and airport officials to

discuss the overall institutional framework for passenger screening; the

procedures for conducting screening; the requirements for training and

certifying screeners; and the compensation, benefits, and career

opportunities provided to screeners. We toured major airports in each of

these countries and observed screening checkpoints in operation. In

Canada and the Netherlands, we also met with screeners to learn about the

positive and negative aspects of their jobs. Because of the sensitive nature

of security information, we were unable to obtain data on screeners’

performance from these countries.

We conducted our work from April 1999 through June 2000 in accordance

with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Page 23 GAO/RCED-00-75 Airport Screeners

Chapter 2

Long-Standing Problems and Program Delays

Hinder Improvements in Screeners’

Performance Chapte2r

No single problem causes checkpoint screeners to fail to detect dangerous

objects in carry-on bags or on passengers’ bodies. Several long-standing

and long-recognized problems combine to reduce the screeners’

effectiveness, most notably

• the rapid turnover among screeners that leaves few experienced

personnel at the checkpoints and

• inattention to “human factors” issues, such as the repetitive tasks and

stress involved in the work, individuals’ aptitudes for the work, and the

need for adequate training in spotting concealed objects that may be

dangerous.

FAA has several interrelated initiatives under way to improve checkpoint

screeners’ performance, including improvements in procedures for

selecting and training screeners, better monitoring and testing of screeners,

and a certification program for screening companies. Although the

initiatives hold promise, they have not been fully implemented and are

behind schedule. Furthermore, FAA has established goals for improving

screeners’ performance, but it (1) has yet to complete an integrated

management plan to tie its initiatives to achieving its goals and (2) has not

adequately measured its progress in achieving one of its goals.

Rapid Turnover and

Human Factors

Problems Reduce

Screeners’

Effectiveness

Because the screening equipment at airport checkpoints does not

automatically detect dangerous objects, the effectiveness of the screeners

operating the equipment is vital to maintaining the security of the aviation

system. It is the screeners who must determine whether an image on an Xray screen or the triggering of a metal detector’s alarm indicates a security

concern and, if so, what action should be taken to resolve the concern.

FAA, the aviation industry, and others have long recognized that

checkpoint screeners are not more successful in their detection of

dangerous objects for several reasons. Two of the primary reasons are the

rapid turnover among screeners and human factors issues.
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The rapid turnover among screeners has been a long-standing problem that

affects performance. Turnover was cited as a concern in studies as early as

1979. The studies have found that the high turnover rate means that

checkpoints are rarely staffed by screeners with much experience. For

instance, one study found that about 90 percent of all screeners at any

given checkpoint had less than 6 months’ experience.1 At one airport we

visited, we found that, during a 3-month period in 1999, 114 of the 167

screeners (68 percent) hired had quit their jobs. Furthermore, of the 993

screeners trained at this airport over about a 1-year period, only 142 (14

percent) were still employed at the end of that year.

Not only has turnover been an historical problem, but it is worse today than

it was in the past. In 1987, we reported that turnover among screeners at

some airports was about 100 percent in a 12-month period;2 by 1994, FAA

was reporting that the turnover at some airports was 100 percent in a 10-

month period.3 For the 12 months from May 1998 through April 1999,

turnover averaged 126 percent among screeners at 19 large airports,

according to data the airports reported to FAA. Five of the airports

reported turnover of 200 percent or more, with one reporting turnover of

416 percent. Table 2 lists the turnover rates for screeners at 19 large

airports during this period.

Table 2: Turnover Rates for Screeners at 19 Large airports, May 1998-April 1999

1

Development of Decision-Centered Interventions for Airport Security Checkpoints

(DOT/FAA/CT-94/27, Aug. 1994); Review of the Literature Related to Screening Airline

Passenger Baggage (DOT/FAA/CT/94/108, Oct. 1994).

2

Aviation Security: FAA Needs Preboard Passenger Screening Performance Standards

(GAO/RCED-87-182, July 24, 1987).

3

DOT/FAA/CT94/108.

City (airport )

Annual

turnover

rate (percentage)

Atlanta (Hartsfield Atlanta International) 375

Baltimore (Baltimore-Washington International) 155

Boston (Logan International) 207

Chicago (Chicago-O’Hare International) 200
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Source: FAA.

Both FAA and the aviation industry attribute the high turnover to the low

wages screeners receive, the minimal benefits, and the daily stress of the

job. Generally, screeners get paid at or near the minimum wage. We found

that some of the screening companies at many of the nation’s largest

airports paid screeners a starting salary of $6 an hour or less, and at some

airports, the starting salary was the minimum wage—$5.15 an hour. It is

common for the starting wages at airport fast-food restaurants to be higher

than the wages screeners receive. For instance, at one airport we visited,

the screeners’ wages started as low as $6.25 an hour, whereas the starting

wage at one of the airport’s fast-food restaurants was $7 an hour.

Dallas-Ft. Worth (Dallas/Ft. Worth International) 156

Denver (Denver International) 193

Detroit (Detroit Metro Wayne County) 79

Honolulu (Honolulu International) 37

Houston (Houston Intercontinental) 237

Los Angeles (Los Angeles International) 88

Miami (Miami International) 64

New York (John F. Kennedy International) 53

Orlando (Orlando International) 100

San Francisco (San Francisco International) 110

San Juan (Luis Munoz Marin International) 70

Seattle (Seattle-Tacoma International) 140

St. Louis (Lambert St. Louis International) 416

Washington (Washington-Dulles International) 90

Washington (Ronald Reagan Washington National) 47

Average turnover 126

(Continued From Previous Page)

City (airport )

Annual

turnover

rate (percentage)
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“Human factors” refers to the demands a job places on the capabilities of,

and the constraints it imposes on, the people doing it. For screeners, the

human factors issues cited in past studies include the repetitive tasks

screeners perform, the close and constant monitoring required to spot the

rare appearances of dangerous objects, and the stress involved in dealing

with the public, who may dislike being screened or demand faster action to

avoid missing their flights.4 FAA’s research has found that too little

attention has been paid to (1) individuals’ aptitudes for effectively

performing screening duties, (2) the sufficiency of the training provided to

screeners and how well they comprehended it, and (3) the monotony of the

job and the distractions that reduce screeners’ vigilance.

As a result, according to FAA research officials, screeners are placed on the

job who do not have the necessary knowledge, skills, or abilities to perform

the work effectively and who then find the duties tedious and

unstimulating. The President’s Commission on Aviation Security and

Terrorism and the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and

Security both concluded that better selection, training, and testing of

screeners could improve their performance. The 1999 National Research

Council’s report assessing explosive detection equipment also found that

FAA needed to improve the training, testing, and qualification procedures

for the screeners operating the equipment.

Initiatives to Improve

Screeners’

Performance Under

Way, but Key Aspects

Are Behind Schedule

FAA has undertaken several separate initiatives that are designed to

address the rapid turnover and human factors problems affecting screeners

and thus improve their performance. These initiatives include

• improving the hiring and preparation of screeners through selection

tests, computer-based training, and competency tests;

• a system to keep screeners alert and monitor their performance by

periodically projecting images of dangerous objects onto the monitors

of the X-ray machines at checkpoints and recording the screeners’

responses; and

4

Reports on the human factors involved in checkpoint screening go back 20 years; among

the most recent are those of the President’s Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism,

1990; the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security, 1997; and the National

Academy of Sciences Assessment of Technologies Deployed to Improve Aviation Security,

1999.
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• a certification program to make screening companies, along with the air

carriers, accountable for the training and performance of the screeners

they employ.

Table 3 summarizes these initiatives and the improvements FAA expects to

result. FAA is making progress with these initiatives, although delays have

occurred.

Table 3: FAA’s Initiatives to Improve Screeners’ Performance

Improving the Hiring and

Preparation of Screeners

Through separate initiatives, FAA is attempting to improve the selection of

candidates for screening positions, improve their training, and ensure their

readiness to perform their duties. First, FAA is developing standardized

selection tests to help screening companies identify applicants who have

natural aptitudes for checkpoint screening tasks. FAA’s research has shown

that new screeners who lack certain aptitudes are more likely to quit and

that an effective selection process could result in improved performance,

maximum benefit from training resources, greater job satisfaction, and

reduced turnover. The selection tests will assess applicants’ spatial

memory and visual perception, among other things. After validating one or

more selection tests, FAA will offer them to air carriers and screening

companies for their use. According to FAA officials, these tests should be

helpful to screening companies, and although they will not be required,

FAA officials are hopeful that screening companies will adopt and use

them.

Expected improvement

FAA initiative

Select candidate with

screener potential

Ensure screener is

trained and ready to

perform

Ensure screener is

alert and monitored

Increase pay, and

reduce turnover

Hiring and preparation of

screeners:

Selection testing X X

Computer-based training X

Competency testing X

Threat image projection

system

X X

Certification of screening

companies

XX X
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Second, to improve the quality and consistency of screeners’ training, FAA

has been deploying computer-based training systems at the nation’s

airports. These systems instruct trainees in all aspects of checkpoint

screening, including how to interpret X-ray images of carry-on baggage and

how to screen passengers. FAA believes computer-based training has

advantages because (1) screeners can learn at their own pace and have

better opportunities to develop detection skills, (2) training is more

consistent, and (3) overall training time can be reduced. An FAA study

determined that screeners who had computer-based training detected

dangerous objects more accurately than screeners who had traditional

classroom instruction.

FAA is behind schedule in deploying the training systems, however, and

those in place are not being fully used. As of March 2000, FAA had the

systems in place at only 36 of the 79 airports it had expected to equip by the

end of the previous fiscal year. The agency attributes the delay to funding

problems and to a decision to replace 30 of the deployed systems with a

different computer system preferred by the airlines. FAA plans to deploy

systems to another 31 airports by the end of fiscal year 2001. Meanwhile,

the systems already deployed are not being fully used at some airports

because the equipment is located in one screening company’s area and

other screening companies do not want to send their personnel to a

competitor’s area. We reported on this situation in April 1998,5 and it

continues to exist. An FAA official whose office is responsible for

deploying equipment said that the agency plans, where possible, to deploy

future systems to multiple locations within airports to minimize this

problem.

Third, FAA is developing three tests to measure screeners’ mastery of

critical job elements. Screeners will be required to take (1) a readiness test

after their initial training and before they begin on-the-job training, (2) a

training test after they complete 40 hours of on-the-job training, and (3) a

review test after they complete required recurrent training. These tests will

help ensure that screeners have the knowledge and skills to perform their

jobs effectively and can perform at a prescribed level. FAA expects the

tests, which will be computer-based, will impose more control and

consistency in training. The agency is developing specific requirements and

guidelines for the tests, but it will not require them until it begins certifying

5

Aviation Security: Implementation of Recommendations Is Under Way, but Completion Will

Take Several Years (GAO/RCED-98-102, Apr. 24, 1998).
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Page 29 GAO/RCED-00-75 Airport Screeners

screening companies in 2002. Thus, it will be several years before any

benefits can be expected from these tests.

Keeping Screeners Alert and

Monitoring Their

Performance

Because screeners check thousands of passengers and their baggage yet

rarely see dangerous objects being brought through airport checkpoints,

remaining vigilant is difficult. To help screeners remain alert, train them to

become more adept at detecting harder-to-spot objects such as improvised

explosive devices, and continuously measure their performance, FAA is

deploying a threat image projection system. This automated system is an

enhancement to the X-ray machines used at checkpoints. As checkpoint

personnel routinely scan passengers’ carry-on bags, the system

occasionally projects images of dangerous objects, including guns and

explosives, on the X-ray machines’ screens. Screeners are expected to

identify the generated images as dangerous objects. The system records the

screeners’ responses to the projected images, providing a measure of their

performance while keeping them more alert. By frequently exposing

screeners to a variety of images of dangerous objects on the X-ray screens,

the system provides continuous on-the-job training.

Furthermore, the threat image projection system and analyses of its data

are critical to a number of FAA’s efforts to improve screeners’ performance.

The data will be used to analyze performance—by individual screener,

screening company, airport, air carrier, or dangerous object—to determine

areas of weakness. The data will also be used to assess and validate the

results of FAA’s efforts to improve screeners’ performance, such as by

allowing the agency to compare the results of screener selection tests or

computer-based training with on-the-job performance. The data from the

system can also be used to tailor recurrent training to meet individual

screeners’ needs. In addition, the system’s data are critical to FAA’s efforts

to establish the performance standards that screening companies will be

expected to meet in order to be certified.

Deployment of the threat image projection system, however, is behind

schedule. FAA had planned to begin installing 284 units on existing X-ray

machines at 19 large airports in April 1998, but because of hardware and

software problems, FAA changed its plans and decided to purchase new Xray machines already equipped with the threat image projection system. As

of March 2000, FAA had deployed 30 of these machines at six large airports

for testing, and beginning in mid-2000, it will begin purchasing and

deploying another 1,380 such machines. FAA expects to have the system in

place at the largest airports by the end of fiscal year 2001 and at all airports
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by the end of fiscal 2003. Unfortunately, these delays in the system’s

deployment have already impeded another key initiative to improve

screeners’ performance—the certification of screening companies.

Certifying Screening

Companies

In response to a mandate in the Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act of

1996 and a recommendation from the 1997 report of the White House

Commission on Aviation Safety and Security, FAA is creating a program to

certify the companies that staff screening checkpoints. As currently

proposed, the certification program will establish performance

standards—an action we recommended in 19876

—that the screening

companies will have to meet to earn and retain certification; require that all

screeners pass computer-based tests after initial, on-the-job, and recurrent

training; and require that all air carriers have the threat image projection

system on the X-ray machines at their checkpoints so that screeners’

performance can be measured to ensure that FAA’s standards are met. FAA

believes that the need to meet certification standards will give the

screening companies a greater incentive to raise screeners’ wages and

improve training in order to obtain better screeners and keep them longer.

Most of the air carrier, screening company, and airport representatives we

contacted said they believe certification has the potential to improve

screeners’ performance.

FAA plans to issue a regulation establishing the certification program by

May 2001, over 41⁄2 years after the passage of the Reauthorization Act and

more than 2 years later than its earlier estimated issuance date of March

1999. Moreover, before FAA can begin certifying screening companies, it

must (1) complete the installation of the threat image projection system

needed to set standards and measure screeners’ performance, (2) review

and approve the screening companies’ security programs, and (3) establish

a staff to handle the certification program. Because the threat image

projection system will not be completely installed before the end of fiscal

year 2003, FAA is exploring other ways to set standards and is considering

using the results from its compliance tests in conjunction with available

data from the threat image projection system. According to FAA, the first

certifications of screening companies will not take place until 2002.

6

GAO/RCED-87-182, July 24, 1987.
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More Effective Use of

Management Tools Can

Help Improve

Screeners’

Performance

The Government Performance and Results Act (Results Act) requires each

federal agency to set multiyear strategic goals and strategies for reaching

them, as well as measure performance toward achieving the goals. The

measurement information is to give the agency and others a clear picture of

its progress toward meeting the established goals. In accordance with this

requirement, FAA included in its 1998 strategic plan goals for measuring its

progress in improving screeners’ performance.7 Using the results of its

screener compliance tests as a performance measure, the agency

established goals for increasing the detection of dangerous objects carried

by FAA agents in carry-on baggage and on the body through metal

detectors.

In addition to establishing goals, FAA began in early 1999 to develop an

integrated checkpoint screening management plan to help it meet its

improvement goals and better focus its efforts to improve screeners’

performance. According to FAA officials, the plan will (1) incorporate

FAA’s screener improvement goals and detail how its efforts relate to the

goals’ achievement; (2) identify and prioritize checkpoint and human

factors problems that need to be resolved; and (3) provide measures for

addressing the performance problems, including related milestone and

budget information. Such a plan is needed to provide management with the

information it needs to guide its various planning, research and

development, and equipment deployment efforts; integrate those efforts

toward common achievable goals; and prioritize funding needs. An

integrated plan is also essential to help FAA track the status of its various

initiatives to improve screeners’ performance and to take actions to help

keep the agency on schedule.

However, the plan has yet to be completed. During our review, FAA

security officials told us several times that the plan would be completed

shortly, and they provided various completion dates, but the completion

dates were not met. FAA officials told us that elements of the plan are

nevertheless being implemented. For example, FAA consolidated the

responsibility for screening checkpoint improvements under a single

program manager responsible for overseeing the development of the plan

and for coordinating screener improvement efforts at FAA headquarters,

7

FAA views specific data relating to these goals, as well as other information relating to

screeners’ detection rates, to be sensitive security information that cannot be publicly

released.
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FAA field locations, and the agency’s Technical Center in Atlantic City, New

Jersey. In addition, quarterly briefings are provided to the Associate

Administrator for Civil Aviation Security on the status of the initiatives

covered in the plan. Nevertheless, these officials stated that cost data for

the plan must still be developed and they do not expect these data until the

end of the year.

FAA acknowledges that it did not approach its Results Act goal for

improving the detection of dangerous objects carried on the body through

metal detectors. It did, however, report almost meeting its goal for

improving the detection of dangerous objects in carry-on baggage.

Nevertheless, our analysis shows that FAA did not use a methodology that

provides a consistent measure of progress toward this goal. Although FAA

measured screeners’ detection rates for both standard test objects and

explosive devices in carry-on baggage for both fiscal year 1998 and fiscal

year 1999 and then calculated a combined detection rate for each fiscal

year, it modified its testing in fiscal year 1999. In that year, FAA conducted

proportionally fewer tests using the harder-to-spot improvised explosive

devices and more tests using the more readily spotted standard test objects

than it conducted the year before. As a result, the combined detection rate

for fiscal year 1999 was higher than for fiscal year 1998, even though the

detection rates for improvised explosive devices and for standard test

objects each declined during fiscal year 1999. Had FAA conducted both

tests in the same proportions during both fiscal years, the detection rate for

fiscal 1999 would have been lower than it was for fiscal year 1998.

FAA security officials said that the choice of objects used during

compliance testing is up to the agents conducting the tests. They also said

security officials had not been aware that proportionally fewer tests would

be done with improvised explosive devices and they had not considered the

impact of this difference. They also said that, when they established the

goals, the agency anticipated a wider deployment of some screener

improvement initiatives, such as the threat image projection and computerbased training systems. Consequently, FAA officials said they will likely

revise the goals to reflect the improvements in screeners’ performance that

they now believe can be attained during the next 3 years. They do not plan

to revise the methodology that aggregates the test results for carry-on

baggage.

Conclusions Despite concerns about checkpoint screeners’ ability to detect and prevent

weapons and explosives from being taken aboard aircraft, long-standing—
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and long-recognized—problems affecting screeners’ performance, such as

rapid turnover and inadequate attention to human factors, remain. FAA’s

initiatives to address these problems may, in the long run, help

considerably; however, the continuing delays in implementing the agency’s

two key initiatives—the threat image projection system and the screening

company certification program—are prolonging the time before the public

can have greater assurance that dangerous objects are prevented from

being brought aboard aircraft.

We are encouraged that FAA is taking actions to improve the management

of its screener initiatives. These actions—adopting performance goals to

measure its progress, developing and implementing an integrated plan to

better focus and manage its checkpoint screening improvement initiatives,

and consolidating these initiatives under a single program manager—will

be crucial to guiding the implementation of FAA’s initiatives. However, FAA

has operated far too long without a complete integrated plan, and its

method for calculating progress toward improving detection rates does not

produce meaningful results that present a clear picture of progress.

Finalizing the integrated plan would provide a document that FAA

management could use to track the agency’s progress in implementing

efforts to improve screeners’ performance. Establishing separate goals for

the detection of standard test objects and improvised explosive devices in

carry-on baggage would provide a more meaningful measure of FAA’s

progress toward improving screeners’ performance.

Recommendations To better implement FAA’s efforts to improve screeners’ performance and

to provide a valid basis for evaluating FAA’s progress in achieving its

performance goals for screeners, we recommend that the Secretary of

Transportation direct the Administrator, FAA, to take the following actions:

• Require that FAA’s integrated checkpoint screening management plan,

which ties together the various initiatives for improving screeners’

performance, be promptly completed, implemented, continuously

monitored and updated, and evaluated for effectiveness.

• For reporting under the Government Performance and Results Act,

establish separate goals for the detection of standard test objects and

improvised explosive devices concealed in carry-on baggage.
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Agency Comments and

Our Evaluation

FAA officials generally concurred with the facts presented in our draft

report and agreed that the performance of checkpoint screeners needs to

improve. FAA officials also agreed with our recommendation to promptly

complete the agency’s integrated checkpoint screening management plan.

FAA pointed out that the plan is now essentially complete except for cost

data, and that these data are expected to be completed by the end of 2000.

However, they added that the plan is an iterative working document that

changes as projects and activities are added or finished, and in that sense

the plan, when completed, will never be finalized. FAA officials stated that

the latest iteration of the plan is reviewed and approved quarterly at

program meetings with the Associate Administrator for Civil Aviation

Security.

FAA, however, did not concur with the draft report’s recommendation that,

for reporting under the Government Performance and Results Act, it

establish separate goals for the detection of standard test objects and

improvised explosive devices concealed in carry-on baggage. FAA

commented that, although it agreed with the intent of the recommendation,

it nevertheless believes that it is reasonable to aggregate the test results for

assessments under the Results Act, since the Department of

Transportation, as the reporting agency, tries to limit the number of goals

established under the act. While GAO agrees that efforts should be made to

limit the number of goals, measurement information required by the

Results Act must nevertheless be meaningful and provide the agency with a

clear picture of its progress toward meeting its established goals. GAO

continues to believe that the progress shown in meeting FAA’s current goal

is not meaningful—since it can, and does, show improved performance

when in fact none exists—and that the goal needs to be revised.
Page 35 GAO/RCED-00-75 Airport Screeners

Chapter 3

Selected Foreign Countries’ Screening

Practices, Turnover, and Performance Chapte3r

Aviation security is a problem that the United States does not face alone; it

is a worldwide concern. In fact, far more incidents of aviation terrorism

have occurred in other parts of the world than in the United States. For

instance, during the one-year period ending December 1999, 13 hijackings

of aircraft occurred; none of these incidents took place in the United States

or involved a U.S. airline.

Because of their concern about aviation security, most nations have

procedures for screening passengers and their bags before allowing them

aboard commercial airliners. In visits to five countries, we found that

although passengers are screened there much as they are in the United

States, some practices and policies differ. For example, in most of these

countries we found

• more extensive qualifications and training for screeners,

• higher pay for screeners,

• screening responsibilities assigned to the airport or government, and

• more stringent checkpoint operations, such as routine “pat down”

searches of passengers.

We also found that turnover is not as significant a problem in these other

countries as it is in the United States. Furthermore, while data for other

countries screeners’ performance in detecting dangerous objects were not

available, a test conducted jointly by FAA and one of the countries showed

that the other country’s screeners detected over twice as many test objects

as did U.S. screeners. However, there are no other such tests or other

performance data available to us and without specific performance data,

we could not determine whether any of the differences found in the other

countries improve screeners’ performance in those countries or would

improve screeners’ performance in the United States.

Screening Practices in

the United States and

Five Other Countries

Differ

FAA security officials and industry representatives familiar with foreign

countries’ security operations identified a number of countries that screen

passengers effectively. From among these countries, we selected five—

Belgium, Canada, France, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom—to

determine if their screening practices differ from those in the United

States.

We visited these five countries to observe their screening practices. In

general, much of what these countries do to screen passengers is similar to

what is done in the United States. All five countries examine the contents
Chapter 3

Selected Foreign Countries’ Screening

Practices, Turnover, and Performance

Page 36 GAO/RCED-00-75 Airport Screeners

of carry-on bags by using X-ray machines or physical searches and scan

passengers by using metal detectors. But important differences exist in (1)

screeners’ qualifications, (2) the pay and benefits screeners receive, (3) the

assignment of responsibility for screening, and (4) the operation of

screening checkpoints.

Screeners’ Qualifications

Are More Extensive

Most of the countries we visited had more stringent requirements for hiring

and training individuals to become screeners. In the United States, FAA

requires that to be hired as a screener, a person must have a high school

education or a combination of adequate education and experience; pass a

background check; and be able to read, write, and speak English. A

screener is not required to be a citizen or to have established residency.

Most of the countries we visited had similar education and background

check requirements; however, in some countries, a screener must either be

a citizen of the country or have resided in the country for a specific length

of time. Belgium requires screeners to be citizens and to be fluent in both

French and Dutch. The Netherlands requires screeners to have resided in

the country for at least 5 years and to be fluent in both Dutch and English.

France requires screener candidates to be citizens of a European Union

country; because of the close cooperation among police within the

European Union, French officials believe this requirement provides

assurance that they can obtain adequate background checks. Canada’s

requirements are similar to those in the United States. Canada requires

screeners to be citizens or permanent residents with valid employment

authorization documents, and screeners must be able to read, write, and

speak either French or English.

The training required to become a screener is more extensive in four of the

five countries. FAA requires that screeners in the United States receive 12

hours of classroom training, followed by at least 40 hours of on-the-job

training. In contrast, other countries generally require more training. The

Netherlands requires candidates for screening positions to train first and

become certified as general security officers and then take specialized

training to be certified as checkpoint screeners. In the Netherlands, the 40

hours of specialized training for screeners includes classroom work,

computer-based training, and role-playing. This is followed by 2 months of

on-the-job training and 24 hours of additional training each year for

screeners to maintain certification. In Belgium, the basic training for

certification as checkpoint screeners includes 40 hours of training on

aviation issues. In addition, Belgium requires training in various aviation

security topics, such as operating X-ray machines, ranging from 4 to 64
Chapter 3

Selected Foreign Countries’ Screening

Practices, Turnover, and Performance

Page 37 GAO/RCED-00-75 Airport Screeners

hours. Canada requires 20 hours of classroom training in addition to 40

hours of on-the-job training. After completing the training, Canadian

screeners are certified by the government. Once certified, screeners must

pass written and practical tests every 2 years to be recertified. In France,

screeners must complete 60 hours of training followed by 20 hours of onthe-job training, coupled with tasks such as checking tickets or doing guard

duty. These assignments give the screening company opportunities to

observe and evaluate new staff and provide additional training if necessary.

After completing on-the-job training, new screeners must pass tests

administered by the French government.

Pay and Benefits Are Better

for Screeners

Another major difference between the United States and most of the other

countries we visited is the level of compensation screeners receive. As

discussed in chapter 2, screeners in the United States are generally paid at

or only slightly above the minimum wage of $5.15 an hour and receive

minimal benefits. In the European countries we visited, screeners’ pay and

benefits are higher. For example, Belgian officials said screeners are paid

the equivalent of about $14 to $15 per hour and they receive benefits, such

as health care, as required by Belgian law. In the Netherlands, screeners

receive a minimum salary, based on a collective labor agreement, that is

equivalent to about $7.50 per hour, which Dutch screeners said is at least 25

percent higher than what fast-food restaurants pay and is sufficient to

support a middle-income lifestyle. In addition, they receive health care,

retirement, and vacation benefits. At one screening company in France

screeners earn a starting salary equivalent to about $5.80 per hour with an

extra month salary for staying 1 year. In the United Kingdom screeners earn

the equivalent of about $8 per hour. Governments in both nations also

provide health benefits. In Canada, the starting wage for a screener is the

equal to about $5.34 per hour in U.S. funds, more than the starting salary at

an airport fast-food restaurant. All Canadian screeners receive health

benefits from their provincial governments, and many employers offer

additional subsidized health insurance plans. The Canadian government

requires that all employers provide paid vacations and paid holidays.

Air Carriers Are Not

Responsible for Screening

Operations

Most of the five countries we visited do not make air carriers responsible

for screening passengers as the United States does and so have more

centralized screening operations. At some major U.S. airports, such as John

F. Kennedy International and Los Angeles International, airlines may

employ four or five different screening companies to operate the

checkpoints in their areas of the airport. By contrast, most of the countries
Chapter 3

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Practices, Turnover, and Performance

Page 38 GAO/RCED-00-75 Airport Screeners

we visited assigned the responsibility for screening to the government or to

the airport authority, putting one entity in charge of screening for an entire

airport. In Belgium, France, and the United Kingdom, the airports are

responsible for screening. In Belgium, the airport authority, once a

government entity and now private, is responsible for hiring and managing

screeners. In France, an airport authority can hire one or more security

companies approved by the Ministry of the Interior. The police and

customs officials supervise the security companies and their screeners,

examining turnover rates and wages, analyzing incident reports, and testing

screeners. In the United Kingdom, the airport company itself may contract

the screening operations to one or more security companies or choose, as

the two largest airports near London have done, to hire screeners directly

and manage their work.

In the Netherlands, the government is currently responsible for passenger

screening. It employs a security company to conduct the screening

operations, and the Dutch Royal Marechaussee—a national police force—

oversees the operations. However, the Netherlands is preparing legislation

under which the responsibility for implementing checkpoint screening will

be transferred to the airport. In Canada, screening responsibility is vested

in the air carriers, just as it is in the United States.

According to officials in some of these countries, assigning the

responsibility for screening passengers to organizations other than airlines

makes a significant difference. They said that air carriers have economic

pressures that airports and governments face to a lesser degree. As a result,

they said, airports or governments can provide better training and pay

better wages than air carriers can. According to officials in the United

Kingdom, when an airport hires screeners directly, the screeners can be

given a range of security duties beyond staffing the checkpoints and have a

greater opportunity for career development. British officials noted that the

varied duties and career opportunities improve motivation and

performance. Some foreign government and airport officials also pointed

out that when several air carriers and security companies are handling

screening within one airport, as is the case in the United States,

responsibility is fragmented, uniformity is lacking, and competition among

the security companies to be the low bidder for the air carriers’ screening

business puts downward pressure on screeners’ wages, making it difficult

to attract and retain good screeners.
Chapter 3

Selected Foreign Countries’ Screening

Practices, Turnover, and Performance

Page 39 GAO/RCED-00-75 Airport Screeners

Checkpoint Operations Are

More Stringent

We observed three differences in procedures that made screening more

stringent at airports in the countries we visited. First, to help determine if

dangerous items are present, screeners in some countries physically search

passengers if they set off metal detector alarms. In the United States,

screeners use hand-held metal detectors to identify potentially dangerous

objects but generally avoid physically touching the passengers. In contrast,

screeners in three countries—Belgium, the Netherlands, and the United

Kingdom—routinely “pat down” passengers when the alarms on walkthrough metal detectors go off. Officials in these countries told us that if an

alarm goes off as a passenger walks through a metal detector, screeners are

required to physically search the passenger immediately to determine if a

dangerous object is present. Officials from these countries said screeners

there do not routinely use hand-held metal detectors because, if not used

properly, they can fail to detect metal objects. Dutch officials added that a

hand-held metal detector can leave the impression that an item such as a

belt buckle has caused the alarm, whereas a weapon could be hidden

behind the buckle and not be detected by a screener unless touched.

Additionally, in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, screeners will

randomly select passengers to be physically searched even though they did

not set off alarms. The random searches are conducted because

nonmetallic objects can pose a substantial threat to the security of an

aircraft; the searches may not only turn up specific items but also deter

passengers from attempting to carry these items onto an aircraft.

The second difference in checkpoint operations we observed is that only

ticketed passengers are screened and allowed to proceed beyond the

checkpoints in all five countries. At most U.S. airports, nonpassengers as

well as passengers are allowed though checkpoints and into the secure

areas of airports. Officials from some other countries gave a number of

reasons for limiting access to checkpoints. Most significant, limiting access

to passengers reduces the number of people entering secure areas and

consequently reduces the risk that a dangerous object will be brought onto

an aircraft. Officials in some countries pointed out that a terrorist could

have unticketed accomplices carry components of a bomb through a

checkpoint and then assemble the pieces once inside the secure area.

These officials also noted that limiting the number of people passing

through the checkpoints reduces the burden on screeners, allowing them

to be more thorough and minimizing screening costs.

The third difference in how checkpoints are operated is the more visible

presence of police and military security personnel. At large airports in the

United States, a police presence is required to respond to alerts from
Chapter 3

Selected Foreign Countries’ Screening

Practices, Turnover, and Performance

Page 40 GAO/RCED-00-75 Airport Screeners

checkpoints within 5 minutes. But although uniformed police are stationed

in the larger U.S. airport complexes, they are generally not posted at the

screening checkpoints. At large airports in the countries we visited, police

or military personnel are either at the checkpoints or posted visibly nearby.

For example, at Belgium’s main airport, police maintain a constant

presence in one of two glass-enclosed rooms directly behind the

checkpoints. In France and the United Kingdom, armed security forces—

often carrying automatic weapons—patrol at or near the checkpoints. In

the Netherlands, armed security forces are posted at screening checkpoints

for flights that are deemed high risk—a category that includes flights to the

United States.

Turnover Is Lower in

Five Countries, and

Performance May Be

Better

Besides the differences in checkpoint operations, other major differences

distinguishing screening in the countries we visited and the United States

are turnover rates and perhaps performance. While officials were reluctant

to give us detailed data on turnover rates for screeners, they did say that

the rates were significantly lower there than in the United States.

According to officials from these countries, their annual screener turnover

rates were about 50 percent or less. The lowest turnover rate was in

Belgium, where officials at the country’s main airport said that it was less

than 4 percent last year. In contrast, turnover rates in the United States

averaged 126 percent annually at 19 large airports.

Additionally, screeners in these countries may perform better in detecting

dangerous objects. Because of security concerns, foreign country officials

would not provide performance data during our visits. Consequently, little

information is available to compare the effectiveness of the five countries’

screening operations with those in the United States. However, we did find

that in 1998, FAA and one of the countries we visited jointly tested

screeners’ performance using the same objects and procedures at one or

more airports in each country. In these tests the detection rate for

screeners in the other country was more than twice as high as the rate for

screeners in the United States.

FAA has recognized that other countries have different screening practices

that may lead to better performance by screeners. In its 1999 proposed rule

for the certification of screening companies, FAA noted that experience in

other countries seems to indicate that higher compensation and more

training may result in lower turnover rates and more effective

performance. FAA also noted that the United States can strengthen its

screening practices in many areas, several of which—including
Chapter 3

Selected Foreign Countries’ Screening

Practices, Turnover, and Performance

Page 41 GAO/RCED-00-75 Airport Screeners

performance and screeners’ work environment—are addressed in its

proposed screener certification program. Finally, FAA pointed out that U.S.

air carriers and screening companies may want to pursue factors such as

more training, higher pay, and more experience to achieve higher

performance.

Some Members of Congress have also recognized that the practices of

other countries, particularly their training of screeners, may improve

screeners’ performance. Consequently, legislation was recently proposed

to increase screeners’ training requirements. Under this proposal (S.2440),

introduced in April 2000, screeners would be required to have 40 hours of

classroom instruction, plus 40 hours of practical training, before being

qualified to provide screening services. As of May 2000, the Senate was still

considering this legislation.

At this time, FAA is not considering any changes in U.S. screening practices

based on the experiences of other countries. FAA looked at one of the

differences we identified—the assignment of responsibility for conducting

screening operations—and considered shifting it away from air carriers.

However, FAA concluded in a 1999 report to the Congress that there was a

lack of consensus in the civil aviation community on any changes in the

current system of shared security responsibilities and therefore no change

should be made. In other areas, FAA expects to conduct research and

examine operational data, both domestically and in conjunction with

foreign governments, to determine how various factors affect screeners’

performance and retention.

FAA officials noted that some of the screening practices of other countries

reflect cultural and other differences between these countries and the

United States. In their view, such practices would not be acceptable in this

country. They pointed in particular to the routine and frequent patting

down of passengers, which they believe the American public would not

tolerate. The FAA officials said that protecting an individual’s civil liberties

and taking into account the American public’s low tolerance for what may

be perceived as invasions of privacy are high priorities when considering

checkpoint procedures and equipment.

Conclusions Although insufficient information is available to make broad statements on

key measures of performance in detecting dangerous objects, other

countries may have better approaches to conducting screening activities.

The root causes of screeners’ problems in this country—frequent turnover
Page 42 GAO/RCED-00-75 Airport Screeners

and inadequate attention to human factors concerns such as training—do

not appear to be as prevalent in some other countries. Furthermore, as

indicated in the one instance of joint testing between the United States and

another country, the detection of dangerous objects may also be better in

other countries. What is not clear, however, is the extent to which each of

the different practices identified limits turnover and human factors

concerns and improves screeners’ performance. Although certain

practices, such as higher pay and benefits, can be assumed to reduce

turnover and improve job satisfaction, there are no data to determine the

impact on turnover and performance of practices such as physical searches

of passengers, limitations on access to checkpoints, or the assignment of

screening responsibility to airports.

In light of the (1) limited data on the impact of other countries’ screening

practices on screeners’ turnover and performance, (2) FAA’s ongoing

efforts to improve screeners’ performance, and (3) legislation proposed to

increase screeners’ training requirements, we do not believe it is necessary

to add or revise other screening practices at this time. FAA’s initiatives,

such as the screening company certification program and the

implementation of performance standards for screeners, may improve

screeners’ performance. However, if these initiatives do not bring about

satisfactory improvements or if progress is too slow, it may be necessary to

consider pursuing some of the strategies and practices other countries use

to operate screening checkpoints.

Agency Comments and

Our Evaluation

FAA officials said that the draft report did not provide their perspective on

the role of cultural and other concerns in countries’ screening practices

and the public’s acceptance of these practices. They noted that what is

acceptable to the public elsewhere may not be acceptable in the United

States. The officials said that FAA must be aware of the need to protect

civil liberties and privacy when considering checkpoint procedures and

equipment. We revised the draft report to include their views. They added

that there are fewer airports and screeners in these countries than there are

in the United States. However, they provided no information on how these

factors affect screeners’ performance and turnover or on how they

influence human factors concerns.
Page 43 GAO/RCED-00-75 Airport Screeners
Page 44 GAO/RCED-00-75 Airport Screeners

Appendix I

GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments ApApenednxidexiIs

GAO Contacts Gerald L. Dillingham, Ph.D. (202) 512-2834

John R. Schulze (202) 512-2834

Staff

Acknowledgments

In addition to those named above, Leslie D. Albin, J. Michael Bollinger, A.

Donald Cowan, Elizabeth R. Eisenstadt, Curtis L. Groves, David K. Hooper,

Barry R. Kime, and Daniel J. Semick made key contributions to this report.
Page 45 GAO/RCED-00-75 Airport Screeners

Related GAO Products

Aviation Security: Vulnerabilities Still Exist in the Aviation Security System

(GAO/T-RCED-AIMD-00-142, Apr. 6, 2000).

Aviation Security: Slow Progress in Addressing Long-Standing Screener

Performance Problems (GAO/T-RCED-00-125, Mar. 16, 2000).

Aviation Security: FAA’s Actions to Study Responsibilities and Funding for

Airport Security and to Certify Screening Companies (GAO/RCED-99-53,

Feb. 25, 1999).

Aviation Security: FAA’s Deployments of Equipment to Detect Traces of

Explosives (GAO/RCED-99-32R, Nov. 13, 1998).

Aviation Security: Progress Being Made, but Long-Term Attention Is

Needed (GAO/T-RCED-98-190, May 14, 1998).

Aviation Security: Implementation of Recommendations Is Underway, but

Completion Will Take Several Years (GAO/RCED-98-102, Apr. 24, 1998).

Aviation Security: FAA Needs Preboard Passenger Screening Performance

Standards (GAO/RCED-87-182, July 24, 1987).

Aviation Security: FAA Preboard Passenger Screening Test Results

(GAO/RCED-87-125FS, Apr. 30, 1987).

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