FILED: January 14, 2011

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 04-4487

(CR-03-141)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

QUANTAS LEE HOWARD,

Defendant - Appellant.

O R D E R

Upon consideration of the submissions filed relative to the 

motion to amend the opinion, the Court grants the motion. The 

opinion filed March 28, 2005, is modified by replacing the name 

of the driver of the vehicle mentioned in the opinion with her

initials.

For the Court – By Direction

/s/ Patricia S. Connor

 Clerk
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

_______________

No. 04-4487

_______________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

QUANTAS LEE HOWARD,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western 

District of Virginia, at Roanoke. James C. Turk, Senior 

District Judge. (CR-03-141)

_______________

Submitted: February 18, 2005 Decided: March 28, 2005 

_______________

Before LUTTIG and MOTZ, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior 

Circuit Judge.

_______________

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

_______________

Gary L. Lumsden, Rhonda Lee Overstreet, LUMSDEN, OVERSTREET & 

HANSEN, Roanoke, Virginia, for Appellant. John L. Brownlee, 

United States Attorney, R. Andrew Bassford, Assistant United 

States Attorney, Roanoke, Virginia, for Appellee.

_______________

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 

See Local Rule 36(c).
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PER CURIAM:

Quantas Lee Howard appeals the denial of a motion to 

suppress evidence obtained in a search of a vehicle in which he 

was a passenger. Finding no error, we affirm. 

I.

On September 19, 2003, government agents and local 

police were conducting an interdiction operation at the Roanoke 

City bus terminal. During this operation, officers observed a 

car driven by J.Y., in which Howard was a passenger, enter the 

parking area of the bus terminal. The car pulled alongside a 

red minivan while the occupants of both cars engaged in 

conversation. One individual gestured toward the police and 

then both cars prepared to leave. At this time, an individual, 

later identified as Shawn Collins, was seen exiting the van and 

walking away from the bus terminal with his luggage. The 

officers thought this behavior was suspicious so they pursued 

him and eventually found a concealed weapon in Collins=s 

possession. Howard, who was also observed exiting J.Y.=s car and 

walking away from the station, approached the area of Collins=s 

detention. Howard stood next to a plain clothes officer, Agent 

Bonaventura, and appeared interested in Collins=s detention and 

nervous. Howard admitted to Bonaventura that he and Collins 
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were friends. When Collins=s weapon was discovered, Howard 

expressed surprise, stating AOh, damn!,@ and then began walking 

away. 

At this time, Bonaventura identified himself as a DEA 

agent and asked to speak with Howard. Howard denied having any 

identification and reported his name to be AGregory Omar Thomas.@

He then produced a school transcript bearing that same name. 

However, the social security number Howard told police did not 

match the number listed on the transcript.* Both Bonaventura and 

another officer reported that Howard appeared nervous and had a 

change in breathing rate while talking to the officers. 

Bonaventura concluded that Howard was trying to conceal his 

identity and proceeded to pat him down for weapons. Bonaventura 

felt a hard object in Howard=s front pants pocket. The item 

turned out to be a marijuana pipe. At this point, Bonaventura 

turned Howard over to the local police, who transported him to 

 

*Howard further asserts that the Government=s evidence 

regarding the identifying information Howard allegedly gave to 

police and how it appeared suspicious is in conflict. He 

appears to be attacking the credibility of the officers for 

giving conflicting testimony. However, the court specifically 

stated that its determination of reasonable suspicion was based 

on Bonaventura=s testimony. A review of the testimony offered at 

the suppression hearing does not support a conclusion that the 

district court=s credibility finding was clearly erroneous.
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the police station. While at the station, the police determined 

Howard=s actual identity and that he was a convicted felon wanted 

on state probation violation warrants. 

While agents were dealing with Howard, ATF Agent 

Whorley observed J.Y.=s car parked across the street from the bus 

terminal. He approached J.Y. and asked for permission to search 

her car. J.Y. consented. When Whorley asked about the luggage 

and book bag in the back seat, J.Y. indicated that the items 

belonged to Howard. Whorley then proceeded to search the book 

bag and found a handgun and notebook inside. The notebook 

contained Howard=s actual name. 

Howard was subsequently indicted for one count of 

possession of a firearm by a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

' 922(g)(1) (2000). Howard moved unsuccessfully to suppress the 

gun both on the grounds that police lacked reasonable suspicion 

to stop Howard originally and that the search of his book bag 

was unconstitutional. The court ruled that Howard was properly 

seized and searched because Bonaventura had articulable 

reasonable suspicion to believe that Howard was involved in 

criminal activity. The court further held that Howard did not 

have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his book bag, which 

was left in J.Y.=s car, and therefore had no standing to 
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challenge the search. Following the denial of his motion to 

suppress, Howard entered a conditional plea of guilty to 

possession of a firearm by a felon and was sentenced to fortysix months incarceration. 

II. 

Howard first argues that the district court erred in 

ruling that his initial detention by Bonaventura was 

constitutionally permissible. We disagree.

A police officer may stop and briefly detain a person 

for investigative purposes provided that there is reasonable 

suspicion, based on articulable facts and in light of his 

experience, that criminal activity may be afoot. Terry v. Ohio, 

392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968). In reviewing rulings on suppression 

motions, we review fact findings, including credibility 

determinations, for clear error and the application of the law 

to those facts de novo. See Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 

690, 699 (1996); United States v. Simons, 206 F.3d 392, 398 (4th 

Cir. 2000). 

In challenging the determination of the district court 

that there was reasonable suspicion, Howard argues that his 

behavior prior to his detention was insufficient to create a 

reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Various officers 
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testified that the following behaviors were suspicious: (1) 

driving into a bus terminal and exiting quickly once uniformed 

police were spotted; (2) nervous concern for Collins; (3) 

Howard=s exclamation when the police found Collins=s gun; (4) 

walking away from the bus station at which he had just arrived; 

and (5) Howard=s inability to confirm elements of his own 

identity. The district court found these facts to be true based 

on the credibility of Bonaventura. It is the role of the fact 

finder to observe witnesses and weigh their credibility during a 

pretrial motion to suppress, and this court accords great 

deference to those findings. United States v. Murray, 65 F.3d 

1161, 1169 (4th Cir. 1995). A thorough review of the testimony 

offered at the suppression hearing does not support a conclusion 

that the district court=s credibility finding was clearly 

erroneous. Furthermore, we find that the behavior described in 

these circumstances is sufficient to meet the reasonable 

suspicion standard. Accordingly, we find that Howard=s initial 

seizure and search were proper.

III.

Howard next contends that the search of his book bag, 

located in J.Y.=s car, was unconstitutional because he had a 

reasonable expectation of privacy in his belongings. We 
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disagree. The privacy interest that must be established to 

support standing is an interest in the area searched, not just 

an interest in the items found. United States v. Manbeck, 744 

F.2d 360, 374 (4th Cir. 1984). Ownership of the seized items is 

by itself insufficient to confer a privacy interest in the area 

searched. Id.

In challenging the determination of the district court 

that there was no privacy interest, Howard relies on this court=s 

holdings in United States v. Rusher, 966 F.2d 868 (4th Cir. 

1992) and United States v. Block, 590 F.2d 535 (4th Cir. 1978). 

Howard asserts that under Rusher, an individual can have a 

reasonable expectation of privacy in goods found in a vehicle if 

he asserts a right of ownership to those goods. However, in 

Rusher, only the driver, who presumably had legitimate 

possession of the vehicle, was found to have a privacy interest 

in the goods found in the vehicle. Id. at 877. We held that the 

passengers in the vehicle did not have a reasonable expectation 

of privacy in the vehicle or its contents. Id. Furthermore, an 

ownership or possessory interest in seized goods is not 

dispositive as to whether there is a reasonable expectation of 

privacy. Id. The privacy interest that must be established to 

support standing is an interest in the area searched, not just 
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an interest in the items found. Manbeck, 744 F.2d at 374. This 

court has held that a Aperson who cannot assert a legitimate 

claim to a vehicle cannot reasonably expect that the vehicle is 

a private repository for his personal effects, whether or not 

they are enclosed in some sort of a container . . . .@ United 

States v. Hargrove, 647 F.2d 411, 412 (4th Cir. 1981). We find 

that Howard, as a passenger in J.Y.’s car, cannot assert a 

legitimate claim to the vehicle. Therefore, we find that Howard 

did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his 

belongings left behind in J.Y.=s car. Accordingly, the search 

and seizure was proper.

IV. 

In sum, we affirm the district court order denying 

suppression of the evidence recovered because (1) Howard=s 

initial detention was permissible; and (2) Howard lacks standing 

to challenge the search of goods found in J.Y.=s car. We 

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the 

court and argument would not aid the decisional process. 

AFFIRMED