_______________________________ 

Michigan Supreme Court 

Lansing, Michigan 48909 

Chief Justice Justices 

Maura D. Corrigan Michael F. Cavanagh 

Elizabeth A. Weaver 

Marilyn Kelly 

Clifford W. Taylor Opinion Robert P. Young, Jr. 

Stephen J. Markman 

FILED APRIL 14, 2004 

HIGHLAND-HOWELL DEVELOPMENT CO, LLC, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v No. 122843 

TOWNSHIP OF MARION, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH 

CAVANAGH, J. 

The Tax Tribunal Act, MCL 205.701 et seq., defines the 

exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Michigan Tax 

Tribunal as review of a final decision “of an agency 

relating to assessment, valuation, rates, special 

assessments, allocation, or equalization under property tax 

laws.” MCL 205.731(a). Plaintiff’s complaint contained a 

count alleging that defendant breached a promise to 

construct a sewer line through plaintiff’s property. The 

issue before us is whether the circuit court has 
jurisdiction to hear this claim or whether it lies within 

the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tax Tribunal. We affirm 

the Court of Appeals holding that plaintiff’s claim for 

breach of promise falls outside the exclusive jurisdiction 

of the Tax Tribunal. 

I. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS 

Count I of plaintiff’s first amended complaint sought 

damages for an alleged breach of promise and for the 

adoption of “a special assessment roll which allocated a 

disproportionate share of the cost of the sewer 

improvements to Plaintiff’s property.” Plaintiff’s 

complaint alleged that defendant promised to construct a 

sewer line through certain property and plaintiff relied on 

that promise in making several decisions, including 

purchasing the property and declining sewer service from 

the city of Howell. Count II of the complaint challenged 

the validity of the special assessment. 

Defendant’s motion for summary disposition argued that 

plaintiff’s claim should be dismissed pursuant to MCR 

2.116(C)(4) because it was within the exclusive 

jurisdiction of the Michigan Tax Tribunal, as well as under 

MCR 2.116(C)(8) because count I failed to state a claim 

upon which relief could be granted. The trial court 

granted defendant’s C(4) motion and dismissed both counts. 

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Plaintiff appealed the dismissal of count I. The 

Court of Appeals considered the scope of the Tax Tribunal’s 

exclusive jurisdiction and concluded that because count I 

of plaintiff’s complaint fell outside the Tax Tribunal’s 

jurisdiction, the trial court’s grant of summary 

disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(4) was premature.1 

Defendant sought leave to appeal, claiming that the Court 

of Appeals erred.2 We granted defendant’s application for 

leave.3 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

The trial court granted defendant’s motion for summary 

disposition on the basis of its interpretation of the 

jurisdictional provisions of the Tax Tribunal Act, MCL 

205.731. The issue of subject-matter jurisdiction in this 

case turns on the interpretation of the provisions of a 

statute. Issues of statutory interpretation are reviewed 

1 Unpublished opinion per curiam issued November 19,

2002 (Docket No. 231937). 

2

 The trial court did not rule on defendant’s MCR 

2.116(C)(8) motion, having instead ruled in favor of 

defendant on its C(4) motion. However, the Court of

Appeals examined defendant’s C(8) motion because it 

“present[ed] an alternate basis for affirming the trial

court’s decision.” Slip op at 3. The Court of Appeals

held that summary disposition pursuant to defendant’s C(8)

motion likewise would have been premature, but defendant 

did not appeal that decision to this Court. Defendant only

appealed the C(4) jurisdictional issue. 

3

 468 Mich 942 (2003). 

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de novo. American Federation of State, Co & Municipal 

Employees v Detroit, 468 Mich 388, 398; 662 NW2d 695 

(2003). Likewise, this Court reviews the grant or denial 

of summary disposition de novo. Id. 

III. ANALYSIS 

We must determine whether plaintiff’s claim for 

damages resulting from defendant’s alleged breached promise 

to construct a sewer line is within the original and 

exclusive jurisdiction of the Tax Tribunal, as delineated 

in the Tax Tribunal Act, MCL 205.731. We follow the 

analysis employed by the Court of Appeals to determine the 

scope of the Tax Tribunal’s exclusive jurisdiction. 

Section 31 of the Tax Tribunal Act provides: 

The tribunal’s exclusive and original

jurisdiction shall be: 

(a) A proceeding for direct review of a

final decision, finding, ruling, determination,

or order of an agency relating to assessment,

valuation, rates, special assessments,

allocation, or equalization, under property tax

laws. 

(b) A proceeding for refund or 

redetermination of a tax under the property tax

laws. 

The language of the statute limits the Tax Tribunal’s 

exclusive jurisdiction to matters “relating to assessment, 

valuation, rates, special assessments, allocation, or 

equalization, under property tax laws.” Plaintiff’s claims 

for breaches of promise or contract are not within the 

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scope of the statutory provision, and therefore are within 

the circuit court’s jurisdiction.4 

In 1982, this Court examined the scope of the Tax 

Tribunal’s exclusive jurisdiction in two cases: Wikman v 

Novi, 413 Mich 617; 322 NW2d 103 (1982), and Romulus City 

Treasurer v Wayne Co Drain Comm’r, 413 Mich 728; 322 NW2d 

152 (1982). 

In Wikman, the plaintiffs sought injunctive relief in 

the circuit court, alleging that the special assessments 

imposed on them had been determined in an arbitrary and 

capricious manner. This Court ruled, inter alia, that the 

challenge to the special assessments was within the 

exclusive jurisdiction of the Tax Tribunal because the 

action was one “seeking direct review of the governmental 

unit’s decision concerning a special assessment for a 

public improvement.” Wikman at 626. 

Unlike the direct challenge to the special assessment 

in Wikman, the plaintiffs in Romulus City Treasurer filed a 

constructive fraud claim in the circuit court, challenging 

the drain commissioner’s use of funds collected through 

special assessments. This Court held that the circuit 

4

 Paragraph 9 of plaintiff’s first amended complaint

alleges that the special assessment roll allocated a 

“disproportionate” share of the cost of improvements to

plaintiff’s property. This allegation is within the Tax

Tribunal’s exclusive and original jurisdiction pursuant to

Wikman v Novi, 413 Mich 617; 322 NW2d 103 (1982).

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court had jurisdiction to hear the case because the 

question was whether the drain commissioner could pay 

administrative costs with special assessment funds and, 

therefore, this question was outside the exclusive 

jurisdiction of the Tax Tribunal. 

In reaching the decision in Romulus City Treasurer, 

this Court noted that MCL 205.721 designates the Tax 

Tribunal as a “’quasi-judicial agency’” comprised of seven 

members; only two must be attorneys with experience either 

in property tax matters or in the discharge of a judicial 

or quasi-judicial office. Romulus City Treasurer at 737. 

In addition, 

[o]ne member must be a certified assessor; one,

an experienced professional real estate 

appraiser; and one, a certified public accountant

with experience in state-local tax matters. Not 

more than three of the seven members are to be 

members of any one professional discipline and

persons who are not members of any of the 

enumerated disciplines are required to have 

experience in state or local tax matters. 

The expertise of the tribunal members can be

seen to relate primarily to questions concerning

the factual underpinnings of taxes. [Id.] 

This Court also noted that the Tax Tribunal’s membership is 

qualified to resolve disputes concerning assessments, 

valuations, rates, allocation, and equalization, as well as 

to determine whether special assessments are levied 

according to the benefits received. Id. 

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While the Tax Tribunal’s membership is particularly 

competent to resolve disputes related to the basis for and 

amounts of taxes, its membership is not qualified to 

resolve common-law tort or contract claims. Clearly, this 

supports our conclusion that the Legislature did not intend 

the Tax Tribunal’s exclusive jurisdiction to encompass 

matters outside the realm of those tax matters specified in 

the statute. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

While we express no opinion on whether plaintiff’s 

claim can withstand a summary disposition motion on the 

basis of MCR 2.116(C)(8), we do find that, except for the 

allegations contained in paragraph 9, count I of 

plaintiff’s first amended complaint alleged issues of law 

outside the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tax Tribunal. 

Common-law tort and contract claims are not within the 

exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Tax Tribunal, as 

defined by MCL 205.731. We affirm the ruling of the Court 

of Appeals and remand this case to the circuit court. 

Michael F. Cavanagh

Maura D. Corrigan

Elizabeth A. Weaver 

Marilyn Kelly

Clifford W. Taylor

Robert P. Young, Jr.

Stephen J. Markman 

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