COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Elder, Kelsey and McClanahan Argued at Richmond, Virginia

SUSANNA B. HICKMAN MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY v. Record No. 0723-06-2 JUDGE LARRY G. ELDER MAY 15, 2007 MARGARET CUTHBERT BROADDUS

FROM THE CIRCUIT C OURT OF HANOVER COUNTY John Richard Alderman, Judge Matthew N. Ott (Matthew N. Ott, P.C., on briefs), for appellant. Edward D. Barnes (Ann Brakke Campfield; Brandy M. Poss; The Barnes Law Firm, P.C., on brief), for appellee.
Susanna B. Hickman appeals from an order ruling that, in a suit between her parents, Margaret Cuthbert Broaddus and David Tilghm an Broaddus, concerning the enforcement of a property settlement agreement incorporated in to the Broadduses’ ea rlier divorce decree, Hickman lacked standing to seek enforcement of the agreement. We hold the interlocutory order from which Ms. Hickman noted her appeal was not an appealable order, and we dismiss the appeal without prejudice. 1

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opin ion is not designated for publication.

1 Ms. Broaddus has moved to dismiss the a ppeal, claiming Ms. Hickman failed on appeal to serve various necessary parties. Because we dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction, we do not rule on Ms. Broaddus’s motions to dismiss.- 2 - I. BACKGROUND In 1997, after more than thirty years of marriage, Mr. and Ms. Broaddus divorced. In the course of that divorce, they entered into a property settleme nt agreement (PSA), which was incorporated into the final decree. The PSA in cluded a provision that the parties would divide certain real estate, which they intended to pres erve for their adult child ren; that each would establish a limited liability compa ny to take ownership of that part y’s share of the real estate; and that “[t]he partners of each LLC shall be lim ited to the direct descendants of [Mr. and Ms. Broaddus].” In 2004, Ms. Broaddus moved the court to rein state the divorce proceeding on the docket, asking the court to require Mr. Broaddus to show cause as to why he should not be held in contempt for failing to establish th e real estate LLC in his name pursuant to the parties’ PSA. Mr. Broaddus responded that the PSA was void fo r vagueness and argued in the alternative that Ms. Broaddus had unclean hands because she, too, had failed to perform under the PSA. Ms. Hickman moved the court for leave to in tervene as a party pur suant to Rule 2:15, alleging her belief that Ms. Broaddus’s LLC vi olated the PSA because it had not named Ms. Hickman as a member. The court “allowed [Hic kman] to intervene . . . for the purpose of interpretation of the [PSA].” The court later allowed the remaining th ree Broaddus children to intervene “limited to the same terms” that Hickman “came in on.” Thereafter, the court held a dditional hearings and received memoranda from the original parties and the intervenors. Ms. Hickman, in her memorandum, not only addressed the validity and interpretation of the PSA but also requested enforcement of her own claimed rights under the PSA as a third-party beneficiary. On May 3, 2005, the trial court issued a letter opinion ruling that the PSA was a valid contract , and it gave Mr. Broaddus ninety days to perform as required- 3 - by the PSA. As to Ms. Hickman’s argument, the court noted it allowed her to intervene “limited to the issue of the existence of a valid contract between Mr. a nd Ms. Broaddus and its terms” and that she could seek to enforce her claimed “ri ghts, if any,” only in a “separate proceeding.” By motion filed October 19, 2005, Ms. Hickman f iled a petition in support of a rule to show cause, seeking the same relief under the PSA’s LLC provisions that she had earlier requested and been denied. Ms. Hickman’s pe tition, like the original divorce action and Ms. Broaddus’s petition seeking a ru le requiring Mr. Broaddus to s how cause, was styled as Mr. Broaddus against Ms. Broaddus and bore the same circuit court docket number as the underlying divorce action. In a hearing on the motion, the court held again that Ms. Hickman lacked standing and entered an order to that effect on February 23, 2006. After Ms. Hickman filed her petition for a rule to show cause on October 19, 2005, and before the trial court issued the order denyi ng that petition on February 23, 2006, Ms. Broaddus filed additional motions relating to the underl ying proceeding against Mr. Broaddus. Ms. Broaddus also moved the court for an award of attorney’s fees to be paid by Ms. Hickman. On March 17, 2006, before the court had had an opportunity to rule on the filings of Ms. Broaddus directed against Mr. Broa ddus or Ms. Broaddus’s request for attorney’s fees from Ms. Hickman, Ms. Hickman filed a notice of appeal of the February 23, 2006 order denying her petition for a rule to show cause.
II. ANALYSIS “‘The Court of Appeals of Virginia is a court of limited jurisdiction.’ Canova Elec. Contracting, Inc. v. LMI Ins. Co , 22 Va. App. 595, 599, 471 S.E.2d 827, 829 (1996). Unless a statute confers subject matter juri sdiction to that court over a class of appeal s, [it] is without authority to review an appeal.” Lewis v. Lewis , 271 Va. 520, 524-25, 628 S.E.2d 314, 316-17- 4 - (2006). Pursuant to Code § 17.1-405(4), the Cour t of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction over final decrees of a circuit cour t in domestic relations matters arising under Titles 16.1 or 20, and any interlocutory decree or order in such ma tters involving the granti ng, dissolving, or denying of an injunction or “adjudicating th e principles of a cause.” See Erikson v. Erikson , 19 Va. App. 389, 390, 451 S.E.2d 711, 712 (1994). In Alliance to Save the Mattaponi v. Virginia Marine Resources Commission , 43 Va. App. 724, 726, 601 S.E.2d 684, 685 (2004), we held that a circuit court’s order denying a request for permissive intervention is neither a final order nor an a ppealable interlocutory order. Thus, we concluded that we lacked au thority to consider the appeal. Id. , cited with approval in Lewis , 271 Va. at 528 n.5, 628 S.E.2d at 319 n.5 (recogn izing adverse interl ocutory adjudication may be subject of appeal from final adjudication). Likewise, here, we lack authority to exercise appellate jurisdiction over Ms. Hi ckman’s appeal of what amounts to the trial court’s denial of her petition to intervene as a third party benefici ary in order to enforce her parents’ PSA. The trial court record makes clear that the underlyi ng litigation involving he r parents’ respective complaints about the other parent’s purported fa ilure to comply with th e terms of the PSA had not been fully resolved, as illustrated by the pende ncy of at least two additional motions filed by Ms. Broaddus against Mr. Broaddus but not yet ruled upon by the trial court at the time Ms. Hickman noted her appeal. See also Lewis , 271 Va. at 527-28, 628 S.E.2d at 318 (in divorce action, holding rejection on merits of cross-bill for annulment wa s not appealable interlocutory order and could be challenged only via appeal following entry of final decree of divorce). Thus, we conclude that we lack jurisdic tion to consider Ms. Hi ckman’s interlocutory appeal.- 5 - III. For these reasons, we dismiss Ms. Hickman’ s appeal without prej udice as outside our interlocutory jurisdictio n under Code § 17.1-405(4). Dismissed.