APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the 

Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, 

Swine Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth 

Disease, and Rinderpest

Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service

Veterinary Services

2014
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APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine 

Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest

Table of Contents

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .............................................................................................. 4

HAZARD IDENTIFICATION AND BACKGROUND INFORMATION ................. 6

PATHWAYS ASSESSMENT FOR HAZARD ENTRY INTO CROATIA................ 8

ENTRY ASSESSMENT................................................................................................... 9

1. AUTHORITY, ORGANIZATION, AND INFRASTRUCTURE OF CROATIA’S VETERINARY 

SERVICES ......................................................................................................................... 9

2. CSF, FMD, SVD, AND RINDERPEST STATUS OF CROATIA........................................ 17

3. DISEASE STATUS OF ADJACENT REGIONS.................................................................... 18

4. ACTIVE DISEASE CONTROL PROGRAMS ..................................................................... 19

5. VACCINATION STATUS OF CROATIA........................................................................... 24

6. SEPARATION OF CROATIA FROM ADJACENT REGIONS................................................ 24

7. CROATIA’S MOVEMENT CONTROLS AND BIOSECURITY ............................................. 24

8. CROATIA’S LIVESTOCK DEMOGRAPHICS AND MARKETING PRACTICES .................... 39

9. CSF, FMD, AND SVD SURVEILLANCE IN CROATIA............................................... 57

10. CROATIA’S DIAGNOSTIC LABORATORY CAPACITY................................................ 69

11. CROATIA’S EMERGENCY RESPONSE CAPABILITY .................................................. 71

ENTRY ASSESSMENT CONCLUSIONS .............................................................................. 76

PATHWAY ANALYSIS- NATURAL MOVEMENT OF FERAL SWINE OR 

OTHER WILDLIFE INTO CROATIA........................................................................ 81

PATHWAY ANALYSIS- INCOMING VEHICLE OR PASSENGER TRAFFIC 

AND ANIMAL PRODUCTS FOR PERSONAL CONSUMPTION ......................... 81

PATHWAY ANALYSIS- IMPORT OR TRANSIT OF COMMERCIAL 

SHIPMENTS OF INFECTED LIVE ANIMALS OR CONTAMINATED ANIMAL 

PRODUCTS..................................................................................................................... 83

EXPOSURE ASSESSMENT ......................................................................................... 84

CONSEQUENCE ASSESSMENT................................................................................ 86

RISK ESTIMATION...................................................................................................... 86

APPENDIX 1: IMPORT DATA-- TOTAL, AND TOP 5 COUNTRIES-- FOR THE 

REPUBLIC OF CROATIA FOR AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES 

RELEVANT TO THIS EVALUATION, 2010-2012.................................................... 88

REFERENCES................................................................................................................ 90
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APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine 

Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest

Abbreviations

AHP Animal Health Protection (Sector)

APHIS Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service

AV/AVO Authorized veterinarian/Authorized veterinary organization

BiH Bosnia and Herzegovina 

BIP Border Inspection Post

BVIITS Border Veterinary Inspection and International Trade Service

C/D Cleaning and Disinfection

CAA Croatian Agricultural Agency

CFR Code of Federal Regulations

CLC Croatian Livestock Center

CP Contingency Plan

CSF/v Classical Swine Fever/virus

CVED Common Veterinary Entry Document

CVI Croatian Veterinary Institute

DFHWI Directorate of Forestry, Hunting, and Wood Industry

EC European Commission

EU European Union

FMD/v Foot-and-Mouth Disease/virus

FVO Food and Veterinary Office (of the EU)

HACCP Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point

MAFRD Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, and Rural Development

MS Member State (of the European Union)

OG Official Gazette (of the Republic of Croatia)

PBM Preventative biosecurity measures

RP/v Rinderpest/virus

RVID Regional Veterinary Inspection Department

S-M Sisak-Moslavina (county)

SVD/v Swine Vesicular Disease/virus

SVID State Veterinary Inspection Department

USDA United States Department of Agriculture

V-S Vukovar-Srijem (county)

VA Veterinary Act

VD Veterinary Directorate

VID Veterinary Inspection Directorate

VIS Veterinary Inspection Sector
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APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine 

Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest

Executive Summary

This animal health status evaluation qualitatively evaluates the risk of classical 

swine fever virus (CSFv), foot-and-mouth disease virus (FMDv), swine vesicular disease

virus (SVDv), or rinderpest virus (RPv) being introduced into the United States via the 

importation of swine and swine products into the United States from the Republic of 

Croatia. The information contained and analyzed in the risk assessment is based on 

information that Croatian animal health officials provided to APHIS, and other publically

available information. Its conclusions are largely based on the findings and 

determinations of a site visit conducted to Croatia in June 2012. 

On the site visit, APHIS officials clarified and verified the information provided 

by Croatian animal health officials on the organization and oversight of veterinary 

services in Croatia and the demographics, movement, and marketing of livestock in 

Croatia. APHIS confirmed the measures in place, including biosecurity measures, to 

reduce the risk of introduction into and spread throughout Croatia of contagious animal 

diseases; confirmed Croatia’s disease surveillance efforts; and verified other animal 

health matters and their associated risks for international trade. The APHIS site visit 

team visited central and regional offices of Croatia’s Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, 

and Rural Development (MAFRD) Veterinary Directorate (VD), the competent authority

for animal health and veterinary services in Croatia; the central laboratory of the Croatian 

Veterinary Institute (CVI); multiple border inspection posts (BIPs), including a maritime 

port; two swine breeding farms and one swine fattening farm; a rendering facility; a 

livestock market; a slaughterhouse; a hunting ground; and an authorized veterinary office.

APHIS found no evidence in any information submitted nor on the site visit of 

CSFv, FMDv, SVDv, or RPv currently existing in Croatian livestock populations, feral 

animals, or wildlife. However, there are certain counties in Croatia considered higher risk 

for classical swine fever (CSF) because of previous CSF outbreaks or inability to rule out 

with certainty the presence of CSFv in wild boar. Mitigations are in place, including 

active CSF surveillance, movement controls, and biosecurity measures, in the higher risk 

counties to prevent CSFv, should it be detected, from spreading to domestic swine within 

the three higher risk counties of Croatia, and throughout Croatia as a whole. 

APHIS considers the following pathways by which CSFv, FMDv, and/or SVDv 

could potentially be introduced into Croatia: imported live animals with undetected 

infection; imported animal products with undetected contamination; incoming vehicle or 

human traffic, including individuals carrying products for personal consumption; and the 

natural movement of infected wildlife or feral animals (e.g. swine). For one or more of 

these viruses to be subsequently introduced from Croatia into the United States in live 

animals or animal products would require infection of Croatia’s domestic livestock or 

contamination of animal products, followed by export of animals or animal products with 

undetected infection or contamination to the United States. APHIS considers the 

likelihood of CSFv, FMDv, and SVDv being transmitted from Croatia to the United 

States to be low, and the likelihood of RPv subsequently being transmitted from Croatia 

to the United States to be negligible. 
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APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine 

Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest

Figure 1. Map of the Republic of Croatia [1]. 
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APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine 

Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest

Hazard Identification and Background Information 

One of the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service’s (APHIS) primary

missions is to prevent the introduction of foreign animal diseases into the United States. 

As such, and per Title 9, Part 92, of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), APHIS 

conducts an animal health status evaluation addressing hazards of primary concern prior 

to initiating or resuming import of animal commodities. 

The World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) lists several highly contagious 

animal diseases that are considered primary hazards associated with trade of animals and 

animal products. APHIS considers classical swine fever virus (CSFv), foot and mouth 

disease virus (FMDv), swine vesicular disease virus (SVDv), and rinderpest virus (RPv) 

to be hazards associated with trade of live ruminants and swine, as well as certain 

products and by-products derived from these species. 

Croatia requested that APHIS evaluate its animal health status for classical swine 

fever (CSF), foot and mouth disease (FMD), swine vesicular disease (SVD), and 

rinderpest. Based on disease prevalence, recent history, and other risk factors outlined in 

the entry assessment, this evaluation focuses primarily on CSFv. The evaluation follows 

the OIE recommended format for import risk assessment. The evaluation is qualitative, 

and based on information provided to APHIS by Croatian animal health officials--

including information verified on a site visit conducted by APHIS to Croatia in June 

2012-- and other publicly available information. 

Previous APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluations of the European Union and 

Individual Member States

APHIS has previously evaluated the animal health infrastructure, oversight, 

legislation, and corresponding disease control programs and processes of the European 

Union (EU) and multiple individual Member States (MS) for CSF, FMD, SVD, and 

rinderpest. The evaluations assessed European Community-wide animal health measures; 

the ability of a MS to effectively transpose EU animal health regulations into their own 

veterinary infrastructure; and defined the administrative unit for each EU MS. Overall, 

APHIS has concluded that the animal health infrastructure, oversight, legislation, and 

corresponding disease control programs and processes are adequate at the EU-level.

This evaluation will briefly analyze and reference EU legislation and EU-level 

animal health controls, but will focus primarily on Croatia’s veterinary infrastructure, 

animal health legislation, and corresponding disease control processes, and assess

Croatia’s ability to transpose and implement EU-level animal health controls. 

The Administrative Unit in EU Member States

APHIS defines an administrative unit for EU MS animal health status evaluations 

as the smallest administrative jurisdictions in those countries that have effective oversight 

of animal movements into, out of, and within those jurisdictions, and that, in association 

with national authorities if necessary, have the responsibility for controlling animal 

disease locally [2, 3].

The smallest administrative unit at which Croatia’s Veterinary Directorate 

administers veterinary services is the municipality, which Croatia refers to as an 

“epizootological unit”. However, the county (larger than a municipality, and termed an 

“epizootological area”) is the jurisdictional level at which, if an outbreak of an animal 
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APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine 

Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest

disease were to occur, a local disease control center (LDCC) would be established. 

Croatian animal health officials and therefore APHIS consider the county the level to 

which Croatia would regionalize in the event of a disease outbreak. 
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APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine 

Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest

Pathways Assessment for Hazard Entry into Croatia 

The following assessment identifies four potential pathways by which CSFv, 

SVDv, FMDv, or RPV could be introduced into Croatia from other EU Member States or 

third countries: 

-via commercially imported live animals with undetected infection

-via commercially imported animal products with undetected contamination

-via incoming vehicular or passenger traffic, including individuals unknowingly 

or intentionally carrying prohibited animal products 

-via natural movements of infected wildlife, such as feral swine

For one or more of these hazards to be introduced from Croatia into the United States, a 

subsequent export event from Croatia to the United States of undetected infected live 

animals or undetected contaminated animal products or fomites must occur. These 

pathways are visually presented in Figure 2.

Figure 2. Simple pathways map by which hazards could be introduced into Croatia.

Incoming 

vehicular or 

human traffic

Natural 

movement of 

wildlife (feral 

swine)

Commercial 

import of 

infected animal 

product

Commercial 

import of 

infected live 

animals

Susceptible wild 

animal 

population

Meat, meat 

products

Infective virus 

on vehicles or 

clothing

Market 

distribution

Genetic material

Infective virus in 

meat or meat 

products for 

personal 

consumption

Infective virus in 

waste products

Susceptible 

domestic 

livestock 

population

Meat, meat 

products

Live animals

Genetic material

Virus-infected 

or viruscontaminated 

commodities to 

the U.S.

Hazard enters 

Croatia

Hazard enters the United States via 

undetected infected or contaminated 

commodities

Hazard enters Croatian domestic livestock via waste feeding, direct or indirect 

contact with infected wildlife, or direct on-farm exposure
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APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine 

Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest

Entry Assessment

This entry assessment qualitatively describes the modes by which CSF, FMD, 

SVD, or rinderpest could be introduced into the United States from Croatia; the 

likelihood of a disease incursion happening; and mitigations in place to prevent it. The

entry assessment is based on the OIE guidelines for risk analysis [4] and 9 CFR 92.2, 

which outlines APHIS’ process for evaluating the animal health status of a foreign 

region, and is formatted according to the version of 9 CFR 92.2. that was in place when 

Croatia requested these animal health status evaluations. 

1. Authority, Organization, and Infrastructure of Croatia’s Veterinary Services

The central competent authority for animal health and veterinary services in 

Croatia is the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, and Rural Development’s (MAFRD)

Veterinary Directorate (VD) [5]. An organizational diagram of MAFRD is provided in 

Figure 3.

Figure 3: Organizational diagram of Croatia’s Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, and 

Rural Development [6].

The VD is headed by the Chief Veterinary Officer (CVO) [5]. It has 327 

employees: 71 are in the central office, 52 are border veterinary inspectors, 204 are state 

veterinary inspectors and official veterinarians. The VD has 9 regional offices (map and 

discussion on p. 10) and one veterinary office in each of Croatia’s 20 counties, plus one 

in the City of Zagreb [6]. An organizational diagram of the VD is provided in Figure 4.
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10 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine 

Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest

Figure 4: Organizational diagram of MAFRD-VD [7]. 

The VD sets the overall animal health strategy for Croatia. This includes diseasespecific strategies for CSF, FMD, SVD, and rinderpest. The VD implements a robust 

animal health strategy for CSF given incidence and recent history of the disease (see 4. 

Active Disease Control Programs); the VD also sets strategy for FMD, SVD, and 

rinderpest, but at lesser and appropriate levels.

The VD is responsible for devising and implementing national veterinary

legislation. It also implements measures for the detection, control, monitoring, and 

investigation of animal disease outbreaks, including zoonoses, and notifies them to the 

EC, the OIE, to neighboring countries, and trading partners. The VD develops 

contingency plans for animal disease outbreaks; has oversight of veterinary inspections 

within and at the international borders of Croatia (see Veterinary Inspection Sector under 

7. Croatia’s Movement Controls and Biosecurity); is responsible for drafting the 

regulations for slaughterhouses and other guidelines for processing, preparing, and 

storing animal products and by-products, veterinary biologics and animal feed; and 

performs other tasks relating to veterinary public health and veterinary medical products. 

The VD also establishes the registry, database, and record-keeping requirements for 

farms and animals and contracts the maintenance thereof to the Croatian Agricultural 

Agency (CAA, see below), and interacts with the Croatian Veterinary Institute and 

affiliated laboratories (CVI; see 10. Croatia’s Diagnostic Laboratory Capacity) [5, 6, 8].

Administration of Veterinary Services in the Field

Veterinary services in the field, including disease-specific efforts for CSF, FMD, 

SVD, and rinderpest, are administered by a network of VD’s regional veterinary offices, 

authorized veterinary organizations (AVOs), and official control bodies. Regional 
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11 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine 

Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest

veterinary offices are staffed by direct employees (official veterinarians) of the VD who 

conduct specific tasks for the VD (official veterinary controls). AVOs and official control 

bodies are private veterinarians or private veterinary organizations authorized to conduct 

work for the VD [6, 9]. 

Regional Veterinary Offices

MAFRD’s regional veterinary offices are broadly distributed throughout Croatia, 

and are involved in most animal health matters in the field. A map of Croatia’s field 

veterinary offices is provided in Figure 5. Regional offices are staffed by state 

employees of the VD, who conduct work on its behalf. The work is largely conducted 

under two programs- 1) state veterinary inspection and 2) official controls of live animals 

and products of animal origin (referenced by Croatian animal health officials and termed 

in this document “official controls”). State veterinary inspectors and official veterinarians 

primarily visit farms and agricultural facilities as part of the official control plans. State 

veterinarians are also stationed at markets to monitor AVOs (see below), livestock 

market staff, and movement of animals. Other general tasks and duties include 

appraising animals and paying out of indemnity; providing training or educational 

materials to AVOs; and enforcing animal health regulations, e.g. the ban on feeding of 

waste to swine.

Figure 5. Map of Croatia’s Regional and Branch Offices* [5].

*Note: At the time this map was supplied, Croatia’s Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, and Rural 

Development was called the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Water Management (MAFWM). 

Accordingly, the offices listed above are geographically correct. In the map legend, “MAFWM-Veterinary 

Directorate” is equivalent to “MAFRD- Veterinary Directorate”, and “county vet office” is equivalent to 

“regional office”.
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12 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine 

Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest

Regional officials draft annual plans for work to be conducted in their 

jurisdictions, and submit those plans to central level VD officials for review and 

approval. The annual plan establishes, for example, the minimum number of farm

inspections, or percentage of farms to be inspected; the yearly disease sampling plan for 

the jurisdiction; and other animal health activities to be conducted. The annual plan for 

each regional office is based on an assessment largely predicated on current needs and 

previous inspections for that particular regional jurisdiction. The assessment would 

include, for example, information obtained from the previous year’s animal health status 

and veterinary activities, including biosecurity compliance. Once approved, regional and 

local offices then designate within their own jurisdiction the best way to implement the 

annual plan.

The bulk of the work in the regional offices comes from conducting official 

controls of live animals and products of animal origin, the system for which is outlined 

and regulated by the Food Act (OG 46/07, 55/11); the Veterinary Act (OG 41/07, 55/11); 

and the Ordinance on official controls (OG 99/07). However, Croatian law allows 

delegation of official controls by state employees to so-called “official control bodies”, 

and delegation of certain veterinary tasks to AVOs. The official control bodies are 

essentially AVOs that are accredited in accordance with the standard ISO/IEC 

17020:2005, and have a sufficient number of qualified, experienced, and impartial staff to 

conduct the work. When veterinary tasks are delegated to either AVOs or official control 

bodies, the regional office assumes an oversight role rather than conducting the work.

Authorized Veterinary Organizations (AVOs)

Authorized veterinary organizations are comprised of private veterinarians who 

are authorized to conduct certain tasks on behalf of the VD. Croatia has a total of 137 

authorized veterinary organizations, with 897 authorized veterinarians. Thirty-four of the 

AVOs (137 of the authorized veterinarians) are accredited as official control bodies. 

Requirements for and registration as an AV/AVO are set at the national level; oversight 

of and interaction with AVs/AVOs is largely conducted at the regional level [10]. 

Most veterinary activities—including CSF specific veterinary work-- in the field 

are performed by authorized veterinarians (AVs). Authorized activities include veterinary 

animal health and welfare examinations; disease control activities, including but not 

limited to collecting samples for diagnostic testing and administering preventative 

vaccinations; identification of animals; and other specific tasks as outlined in the 

Veterinary Act (OG 41/07, 55/11), specifically Article 95, and the Ordinance on the 

conditions to be met by veterinary organizations, veterinary practices and veterinary

services in the veterinary activities implementation system (OG 45/09, 80/10). The 

majority of field equipment and supplies are maintained by AVs/AVOs; this is a 

requirement for them to be and remain authorized. They visit all farms at least once per 

year for an annual veterinary check, and visit more often if called. Further, they must 

visit the farm no more than 30 days prior to movement of animals from the farm. AVOs 

collect samples from domestic and feral swine for CSF surveillance, and oversee 

livestock markets, ante- and post-mortem inspections at slaughterhouse, and other 

approved establishments [6, 9, 10]. 

The Veterinary Act (VA) stipulates the legal criteria for providing veterinary 

services in Croatia, and prescribes the requirements for private veterinarians. It also 
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13 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine 

Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest

outlines the criteria for veterinary offices, clinics, hospitals, pharmaceutical/biologics, 

and germplasm collection centers. The aforementioned all must be registered as 

companies in Croatia, in accordance with the requirements of the VA and the Croatian 

Veterinary Institute/Faculty of Veterinary Medicine. Veterinarians must practice under a 

license, which is issued by the Croatian Veterinary Institute for a period of five years [5].

Croatian Agricultural Agency

Another critical part of Croatia’s veterinary infrastructure is the CAA. By

delegation of and under contract to the VD, the CAA is the competent authority for 

animal identification (ID) and registration. As such, the CAA maintains and administers 

the registries of farms and domestic animals (Registry of Domestic Animals) and the 

Land Parcel Identification System (LPIS). The CAA is a non-profit state institution with 

380 employees, organized in 12 departments, with 27 county offices. It is the CAA 

employees in the field that collect data for entry into respective databases. AVOs are 

responsible for entering animal movement data into the database. The CAA is also 

involved in quality control and development of agricultural products, and administration 

of agricultural subsidy programs [11]. A detailed discussion of animal ID and registration 

is available in 8. Croatia’s Livestock Demographics and Marketing Practices.

Auditing and Oversight of Veterinary Organizations and Services

Generally, Croatia’s accession to the EU has served as an external auditing 

mechanism. Pre-accession negotiations included EU checks on the level to which Croatia 

had transposed EU legislation and animal health policies and programs into its national 

legislations, policies, and programs. This includes risk assessments of and site visits to 

Croatia conducted by the EU’s Food and Veterinary Office (FVO), the results of which 

supported an EU decision that allowed Croatia to export pig meat and pig meat products 

without restriction prior to joining the EU (Comm. Reg. 1036/2012). Commission 

Implementing decision 2013/340/EU further formalized the EU’s acceptance of Croatia’s 

animal health control measures relating to classical swine fever, and became effective 

upon Croatia’s accession to the EU. 

Specifically, for MAFRD employees and services, the Ministry has an Internal 

Audit Service (IAS). Started in 2005, it is independent of all other directorates and 

departments in MAFRD, and as such reports directly to the Minister [8]. The IAS has 

two departments in particular with areas relevant to this evaluation: Department for EU 

Pre-Accession Assistance, and Department for Audits in the Area of Veterinary Sector 

and Food Safety. IAS can audit components of veterinary service or food safety 

personnel or programs—including animal food and feed production, food safety, animal 

health and welfare-- and does so in compliance with internationally recognized standards, 

EC guidelines as transposed into Croatian legislation, and the relevant industry’s best 

practices. There are currently three staff members dedicated to auditing the veterinary 

sector and food safety; they are not involved with management or supervision of the 

systems they audit [8]. 

Discussion of the Organization of Croatia’s Veterinary Infrastructure

APHIS considers Croatia’s veterinary infrastructure to be well-organized. 

MAFRD’s structure of central level staff and regional offices appears to facilitate the 
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14 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine 

Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest

dissemination of a sound national animal health strategy that can be uniquely and 

adequately implemented at the local level. There appears to be adequate communication 

between national and regional staff. Further, there appears to be interlocking safeguards 

between animal health authorities and auditing mechanisms to detect failures therein. 

To better understand the structure of Croatia’s veterinary services and to confirm 

that it is effective, the APHIS site visit team visited field veterinary offices, including the 

Branch Veterinary Office in Vinkovci, Vukovar-Srijem County (Regional Office Osijek)

and Branch Veterinary Office, Karlovac (Regional Office Zagreb). Consistent with the 

information Croatian officials had previously provided, APHIS confirmed through 

interviews that the primary areas of responsibilities for these Veterinary Directorate field 

offices were administering animal health, public health, animal feed and by-products, 

animal welfare, environmental, and emergency response services, as prescribed in 

Croatia’s Veterinary Act. The offices oversee the AVs/AVOs in their respective 

jurisdictions, and were participants in VD-sponsored workshops and simulation 

exercises, and other trainings for veterinarians, farmers, hunters, and dealers.

Generally, the employees at these offices demonstrated competence and 

knowledge of operations, procedures, and legal requirements. They also seemed 

knowledgeable of livestock demographics and disease situations in their areas and 

adjacent regions. There appeared to be good communication between regional veterinary 

office and national VD staff, and between each regional veterinary office and the 

AVs/AVOs in its jurisdiction. Communication appeared to flow daily from the national 

level of the VD to the regional and branch offices, then on to AVOs and the field.

Specifically, the Vinkovci regional office, and the official in charge there, 

demonstrated a high awareness of risks related to CSF and other contagious animal 

diseases; the various pathways by which those diseases can spread; and knowledge of the 

emergency response necessary to control and eradicate disease. This was due largely to 

the proximity of the office to the 2007/2008 CSF outbreaks, and the major role it played 

in controlling and eradicating the disease (the official in charge served as the “incident 

commander” for CSF control/eradication efforts). Similarly, the Karlovac office seemed

to have knowledge of the special restrictions that apply to this county given its CSF risk 

factors (See details in 4. Active Disease Control Programs).

The APHIS site visit revealed the importance of AVs and official control bodies 

in Croatia: AVs serve as the primary on-farm veterinary presence, and official control 

bodies (which can include AVs, if the AV has been approved and registered as an official 

control body) conduct official controls at agricultural facilities. AVs and official controls 

are critical to the organization and administration of veterinary services in Croatia, 

including disease-specific control and surveillance measures for CSF, FMD, and SVD. 

To visit with local veterinarians responsible for administering veterinary servicesincluding CSF sampling- in the field, APHIS visited an AVO office. APHIS confirmed 

that the AVO operates under and per contract with the VD to implement official 

veterinary controls in accordance with annual orders on the protection of animal health. 

It conducts and APHIS reviewed documentation corresponding to annual veterinary 

checks on registered establishments that include checks of documentation, animal 

inventory, animal welfare, and biosecurity. Veterinarians from this office perform clinical 

examinations of animals prior to their movement and issue accompanying health 
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15 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine 

Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest

certificates. Other common activities for this AVO include sampling for various animal 

diseases and conducting other veterinary health consultations and examinations. 

APHIS found the AVO office to be clean, well-stocked, and well-maintained. 

Office staff seemed competent and knowledgeable of operations, procedures, and legal 

requirements. The AV was knowledgeable of animal health and production practices, 

livestock demographics, marketing practices, and disease risks for the local area and for 

Croatia as a whole; had an awareness of CSF, FMD, and SVD; and understood the 

significance and impact of highly contagious animal diseases. AVs in the office appeared

to communicate well internally, with farmers in their jurisdiction, and with the VD. The 

AV reported that farm visits are used to educate farmers about clinical signs of disease 

and reporting obligations, and other topics of special emphasis as determined by the VD. 

The AV indicated that farmers in this area, particularly on large farms, are highly aware 

of clinical signs of disease, and generally report them quickly. One AV from this office 

participated in an FMD simulation exercise in 2010.

Overall, APHIS has confidence from information Croatia provided and from the 

site visit that field veterinarians- official veterinarians employed by Croatia and private 

veterinarians working in AVOs- capably and effectively administer veterinary services at 

the local level, and appear able to sample for and differentially diagnose contagious 

animal diseases, including CSF, FMD, or SVD. There appears to be continuity in 

veterinary services strategy and in communication between national level animal health 

officials and those that administer field services. There appears to be sufficient span of 

control to adapt comprehensive plans at the national level, yet regions have the flexibility

to apply the national plan uniquely and appropriately as it relates to risk within their 

jurisdiction. These tenets of the organization structure are facilitated by annual plans for 

veterinary services being risk-based and drafted at the field level, lending itself to a 

bottom-up rather than a top-down approach to strategy and implementation of veterinary 

services within Croatia. 

The Veterinary Act 

The authorities and responsibilities of the VD are primarily laid out in the 

Veterinary Act. The VA regulates most aspects of protecting animal health and 

providing veterinary services, including authority to conduct veterinary inspections, 

control of animal and zoonotic diseases, and ensuring safe food animals and animalorigin products for human consumption [5]. 

To briefly summarize, the VA authorizes and outlines detection/surveillance, 

control, and eradication measures for animal diseases. The VA also prescribes measures 

for animal breeding (semen collection, ova and embryo transfer, etc), animal welfare, 

biosecurity, and veterinary biologics [9]. The VA establishes that the VD must report the 

occurence of mandatory international notifiable diseases to the European Commission 

and OIE; authorizes animal health statuses to be assigned to herds, flocks, holdings, 

compartments, regions, or countries; establishes the definitions for infected and 

endangered zones; and the implementation of any corresponding measures, including 

immediate quarantine of suspected infected premises [9].

The VA provides authority for vaccination; sampling and diagnostic testing; 

epidemiologic investigations; euthanasia/depopulation/stamping-out; surveillance 

programs; ban of swill feeding; grazing restrictions; feral animal surveillance and control; 
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16 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine 

Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest

biosecurity; veterinary inspections; quarantine; inspection of animals at fairs, markets, 

exhibitions, auctions, livestock markets, sporting competitions; AI/other breeding 

techniques; animal welfare during transport to market; inspection of slaughter 

establishments; collection/disposal of animal by-products; and animal identification [9].

Secondary Veterinary Legislation, Including Disease-Specific Ordinances 

Most of the authorities and responsibilities covered in the VA are supplemented 

by secondary veterinary legislation, including disease-specific ordinances. Croatia 

annually issues wide-ranging CSF-specific regulations as part of their active disease 

control programs. Generally, they include country-wide control measures, including 

updated restrictions on movement and breeding of swine; marketing of meat/products 

directly from the farm; requirements for cleaning/disinfection of marketing and assembly 

centers; reporting and sampling requirements; and restrictions on moving wild boar 

between hunting areas. The Orders typically also include specific restrictions for higher 

risk CSF areas; recently, those have applied to holdings and hunting areas in VukovarSrijem (V-S), Sisak-Moslavina (S-M), and/or Karlovac county [12]. Please see 4. Active 

Disease Control Programs for details about current legislation and corresponding 

requirements. Additionally, CSF requirements are also outlined in the CSF diagnostic 

manual and the CSF contingency plan.

The VD issues similar governance for FMD and SVD. Additionally, supplemental 

legislation applies to numerous other animal health topics, including but not limited to, 

veterinary inspection and international and domestic trade of animals and products; 

animal identification and registration; animal protection and welfare; and introduction 

into Croatia of personal consignments of products of animal origin. These topics are all 

discussed in greater detail later in this evaluation. 

Summary and Conclusions about the Authority, Organization, and Infrastructure of 

Croatia’s Veterinary Services

Overall, the information Croatia provided and the information obtained on the site 

visit indicate a strong veterinary infrastructure within the country. The infrastructure is 

comprised of central and regional competent authorities from the VD, including but not 

limited to Internal and Border Veterinary Inspection Services and the Croatian Veterinary 

Institute; employees of the CAA; private veterinarians and veterinary organizations; and 

Croatia’s farmers, producers, hunters, and other agricultural entities. 

Croatia’s animal health strategy and veterinary legislation, including CSF-, FMD-

, and SVD-specific approaches and directives, are aligned with international standards 

and EU-level animal health measures. Overall, APHIS considers the whole of Croatia’s 

veterinary legislation broad and thorough, so as to cover country-wide measures; flexible 

and risk-based, so as to apply uniquely to specific areas or animal disease issues in the 

country; relevant to the epidemiological situation at hand; and fully transposing EU-level 

animal health requirements.

Field veterinary services, including certain CSF-, FMD-, and SVD-specific tasks, 

are primarily conducted by private veterinarians operating in AVOs. The role of regional 

offices of the VD largely appears to be focused on oversight, administration, and 

organizational functions, including oversight of the AVOs within its jurisdiction. AVOs 

and regional officials demonstrated competence and knowledge regarding operations, 
17

17 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine 

Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest

procedures, and legal requirements for administering veterinary services in Croatia, and 

an awareness of CSF, FMD, and SVD. Communication and interaction between AVOs 

and VD’s regional offices appeared solid, as did communication between the regional 

and central level VD officials. 

APHIS considers the organizational structure and relationship between regional 

veterinary offices and AVs/AVOs satisfactory for administering field veterinary services

given what appears to be clear and timely communication from the national level to the 

AVOs, as mediated by regional offices. It appeared, from interviews conducted on the 

site visit, that animal health strategies and directives, including CSF-, FMD-, and SVDspecific information, are communicated well from the central level of the VD out to the 

regional level, then on to AVOs and official control bodies, then on to farmers, 

producers, hunters, and other agricultural entities. Further, individuals from all 

components of Croatia’s animal health network seemed knowledgeable not only of 

Croatian animal health regulations, but also of EU-level legislation, and how the tenets of 

the EU’s animal health system have been transposed into Croatia’s veterinary

infrastructure.

2. CSF, FMD, SVD, and Rinderpest Status of Croatia

The last reported case of CSF in domestic swine in Croatia was confirmed in 

March 2008 [5, 7, 13]. This case marked the end of an epidemic that occurred in 2007 

and 2008, during which 131 outbreaks were confirmed in 11 Croatian counties. Croatia’s 

wild boar surveillance program continues to detect seropositive wild boar in 3 counties 

(Karlovac, Sisak-Moslavina, and Vukovar-Srijem). The seroprevalence appears to be 

declining since 2009, and no virus has been detected since 2008 [7], but the surveillance 

data indicate that the presence of CSF virus in wild boar in these areas cannot be 

completely excluded. 

FMD was last reported in Croatia in 1978, and the OIE considers Croatia free 

without vaccination [5, 14, 15]. SVD has never been reported in Croatia [16], and 

rinderpest was last reported in Croatia in 1883 [17].

Discussion and Central Risk Issue

CSF, FMD, SVD, and rinderpest are notifiable diseases in Croatia [5, 8, 18-20].

APHIS found no evidence that CSFv is currently circulating in domestic swine. Since the 

2007/2008 CSF outbreaks, a risk-based surveillance program (described in 9. CSF, FMD,

and SVD Surveillance in Croatia) has uncovered no virological evidence of circulating 

virus in domestic swine [7].

APHIS found no evidence that FMD, SVD, or rinderpest currently exists in 

Croatia. APHIS also believes that Croatia’s animal health infrastructure, as described in 

this document, is adequate to detect vesicular diseases and conduct the epidemiological 

investigations necessary to accurately diagnose FMD, SVD, or rinderpest. 

The central risk issue is the fact that wild boar surveillance data indicates that the 

presence of CSF virus in wild boar cannot be completely ruled out. Therefore, there 

could be some risk of introduction of CSF virus into the domestic swine population from 

wild boar. Croatia has a number of measures in place—including enhanced biosecurity 

requirements for domestic swine located in the area where seropositive wild boars 
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18 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine 

Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest

continue to be found-- to mitigate these risks. These mitigations are discussed in 4. 

Active Disease Control Programs.

3. Disease status of adjacent regions

Croatia is bordered to the north and northwest by the EU member states Hungary

and Slovenia. Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) are neighbors to the east and 

southeast, respectively. The extreme southeastern tip of Croatia shares a very short border 

with Montenegro. The southwestern portion of Croatia borders the Adriatic Sea.

APHIS considers Hungary free of SVD and FMD. APHIS evaluated Hungary’s 

CSF status and concluded that the risk of infected live swine, pork, or pork products 

entering the United States from Hungary and exposing U.S. livestock given the 

mitigations specified in 9 CFR 94.24 and 98.38, to be very low, and has added Hungary 

to the APHIS-defined European CSF region. CSF is endemic in feral swine in Hungary in 

several counties on Hungary’s northern border with Slovakia [21, 22]. While the APHIS 

assessment found that Hungary sufficiently mitigates the risks posed to its domestic 

population by infected wild boar, wild boar can cross national borders and expose 

domestic livestock in neighboring countries. However, the risk of the infected wild boar 

in Hungary entering Croatia is low, since the affected area in Hungary is over 100 miles 

from the Croatian border and there is no evidence of disease spread in wild boar into 

more southern parts of Hungary.

APHIS recognizes Slovenia as free of SVD, FMD, and rinderpest, and low risk 

for CSF and thus part of the ‘APHIS-defined European CSF region’ in 9 CFR Part 

94.24. There has been no detection of CSF in wild boar in Slovenia since 2002 [23-25].

APHIS has not evaluated the CSF status of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and 

therefore does not include BiH in the list of regions considered free or low risk of CSF.

BiH submits regular reports to the OIE, and the last reported case of CSF in domestic 

swine was in December 2007, and in wild boar was in January 2002 [26, 27]. While CSF 

has not been reported since 2007, there is no evidence that it has been eradicated. The 

Croatian animal health authorities indicate that BiH has a compulsory preventive CSF 

vaccination program, though BiH does not include this control measure in its reports to 

the OIE. In response to the vaccination program, Croatia does not allow imports of swine 

or swine products from BiH [8].

APHIS has not evaluated the FMD or SVD status of BiH, and thus does not 

specifically list BiH in the list of regions free of FMD or SVD. APHIS does, however,

consider Yugoslavia free of SVD. BiH was part of Yugoslavia until 1992 [28], and 

Yugoslavia was added to the SVD free list prior to this split. Since that time, there has 

been no risk assessment or subsequent rulemaking to indicate that the BiH portion of 

Yugoslavia should have been removed from that list (search of the US Federal Register).

BiH last reported FMD to the OIE in 1968, and the OIE considers BiH free without 

vaccination. Additionally, BiH has never reported a case of SVD to the OIE [29]. 

APHIS has not evaluated the disease status of Serbia or Montenegro. Until 2007, 

Serbia and Montenegro were one nation and reported their animal health status to the OIE 

as such. Montenegro last reported CSF in domestic swine in 2007, when still reporting 

with Serbia. Serbia reported clinical CSF disease in domestic swine in November 2010 

through March 2011 [30, 31]. OIE reports from these outbreaks indicated that contact 

with wild swine may have been the source of the disease in at least one outbreak. Neither 
19

19 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine 

Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest

nation has recently reported diagnosed CSF in wild species to the OIE, but it is unclear 

how surveillance is conducted. Both Serbia and Montenegro report using vaccination for 

CSF control, and due to this, Croatia bans importations of swine and their products from 

these countries. The nations last reported FMD in 1996, and the OIE considers both free 

without vaccination. Like BiH, APHIS does not specifically list Serbia or Montenegro as 

SVD free, but these nations were part of the former nation of Yugoslavia at the time it 

was added to the SVD free list, and the territory that is now Serbia and Montenegro has 

never reported a case of SVD to the OIE [32].

In 2011, the OIE issued a declaration that rinderpest had been globally eradicated

[33]. Rinderpest has been eradicated from Europe since 1960 [34, 35]. Many European 

countries have never reported rinderpest, and all of the aforementioned countries that 

border Croatia last reported rinderpest in 1881 or 1883 [34]. 

Discussion and Key Risk Issue 

APHIS considers the key risk issue to be the entry of CSF or SVD into Croatia 

from adjacent regions of higher risk. This is due to the prevalence and incidence of CSF 

in wild boar in Europe overall, and the fact that Croatia is surrounded by countries which 

have an unknown or uncertain CSF status, which vaccinate for CSF, or which report CSF 

in wild boar. 

Potential entry pathways for CSF into Croatia are incoming vehicle or passenger 

traffic, including individuals unknowingly or intentionally carrying prohibited animal 

products, and the natural movement of feral swine. A potential entry pathway for SVD 

into Croatia is incoming vehicle or passenger traffic, including individuals unknowingly 

or intentionally carrying prohibited animal products.

The primary mitigations for contagious animal disease incursions into Croatia, 

including CSF, FMD, and SVD, are the man-made interdiction efforts of Croatia’s 

Border Veterinary Inspection and International Trade Service (BVIITS) and the Customs 

Administration of the Republic of Croatia (“Customs”). BVIITS and Customs provide 

robust border veterinary inspection services at all points of entry into the country. The 

APHIS site visit team specifically visited Border Inspection Points (BIPs) into Croatia for 

live animals and animal products, including a sea port, to verify that Croatia has in place 

mitigations to prevent the incursion of CSF, FMD, and SVD. These mitigations are 

discussed in detail in 7. Croatia’s Movement Controls and Biosecurity, Additionally, 

Croatia has a comprehensive active disease control program in place for CSF in wild boar 

and domestic swine that includes targeted surveillance conducted near borders, discussed 

in 9. CSF, FMD, and SVD Surveillance in Croatia.

4. Active Disease Control Programs

The primary swine disease control program currently conducted in Croatia is for 

CSF. It includes Croatia’s active CSF surveillance program for domestic and feral swine, 

which will be discussed at length in 9. CSF, FMD, and SVD Surveillance in Croatia.

Disease programs are in place for FMD and SVD but not for rinderpest; each program or 

lack thereof appears appropriate for the prevalence and incidence of FMD, SVD, and 

rinderpest in Croatia and other risk factors (e.g. the OIE declaration that rinderpest has 

been globally eradicated).
20

20 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine 

Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest

Current CSF Control Program Standards Throughout Croatia

The tenets of the CSF control program are outlined in the Order on Measures to 

Prevent the Appearance and Spread of Classical Swine Fever, and are summarized below. 

This ordinance, updated annually, lays down the general provisions of the CSF control 

program, which apply to the whole of Croatia, and include but are not limited to the ban 

of swill feeding; general grazing, movement, breeding, and marketing restrictions; and 

general biosecurity measures to avoid contact of domestic pigs with feral swine. The 

control program includes special restrictions for three Croatian counties—Karlovac,

Sisak-Moslavina, Vukovar-Srijem—that are considered higher risk for CSF because the 

circulation of CSFv in feral swine cannot be definitively excluded.

Country-wide CSF-related restrictions are lesser in scope and scale than the 

special provisions for the three higher risk counties. For live swine, general movement 

requirements such as animal identification, travel papers as appropriate, and a signed 

health certificate apply. Pigs can be marketed throughout Croatia provided that during 

the 30-day period prior to the dispatch of the pigs from the holding no domestic pigs were 

introduced into the holding from Karlovac, S-M, and V-S county holdings. If pigs from 

outside of Karlovac, S-M, and V-S counties are sold in and delivered to any of those 

three counties, the transport vehicles must be thoroughly disinfected prior to returning to 

other Croatian counties. There are no restrictions on selling fresh pig meat, meat 

preparations, or meat products consisting of or containing meat of pigs originating from 

holdings outside of the three higher risk counties. Semen originating from boars kept at 

approved semen collection centers outside of Karlovac, S-M, and V-S can be marketed 

with no restrictions. Ova and embryos from pigs from holdings outside Karlovac, S-M, 

and V-S marketed without CSF restrictions.

Additional CSF Control Program Standards for Karlovac, S-M, and V-S Counties

The additional restrictions applied to sales and marketing of pigs, meat, meat 

products, and semen and ova within and from Karlovac, S-M, and V-S counties build on 

the country-wide control measures, and the CSF control program essentially regionalizes 

these three higher risk counties as it relates to CSF risk. The CSF control program lays 

down the movement and marketability requirements for live swine and pork products 

WITHIN the three counties, and the movement and marketability requirements for live 

swine and pork products originating from these three counties but moving OUTSIDE of 

them. The additional measures, including but not limited to very specific biosecurity 

requirements such as cleaning and disinfection (C/D) of vehicles and equipment, are 

specifically designed to limit exposure to feral swine and mitigate the potential for virus 

to be transferred to domestic pigs in the event that that occurs. 

For live swine, restrictions apply to where pigs from within Karlovac, V-S, and SM can move, and the requirements they must meet to move there. Generally, domestic 

swine from holdings situated in the Karlovac, S-M, and V-S counties can be marketed 

within Croatia if they undergo clinical examination and sampling procedures prior to 

dispatch from holding of origin; and test negative by PCR for CSF within the 7 days prior 

to movement; and no pigs have been introduced to the holding within 30 days prior to 

movement. These requirements do not apply if the animals are going directly to 

slaughter. Also, animals must travel with a health certificate that includes the number of 

pigs, place of origin, date of clinical examination, and disease sampling and diagnostic 
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21 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine 

Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest

test results. Specifically, domestic swine originating from holdings within Karlovac, VS, and S-M cannot be sold or marketed elsewhere in the EU. Pigs that are pasture-grazed 

within Karlovac, V-S, and S-M cannot be sold or marketed outside of those three 

counties. 

Fresh meat, meat preparations, or meat products consisting of or containing meat 

of pigs originating from holdings in Karlovac, S-M, and V-S may be marketed and sold 

outside of the counties ONLY if no evidence of CSF has been recorded in the previous 12 

months in the holding, and the holding is located outside a protection or surveillance 

zone; and the pigs have been resident for at least 90 days on the holding, and no pigs 

have been introduced into the holding within the previous 30 days before dispatch to 

slaughter; and the holding has been inspected by an AV, including appropriate clinical 

examination and sampling of animals, twice per year; and, if moving directly to 

slaughter, animals are clinically examined and sampled by an AV, culminating in a 

signed health certificate; and any and all other parts of the Order for Detection, Control, 

and Eradication of CSF have been implemented, as confirmed by a veterinary inspector.

Semen, ova, and embryos from pigs from Karlovac, S-M, and V-S cannot be 

marketed outside those counties.

Current CSF Control Program Standards for Karlovac, V-S, and S-M

Live swine from holdings in Karlovac, S-M, and V-S counties can be marketed 

and sold within in these counties. If the pigs have been pasture-grazed, they must meet 

the same provisions as live swine marketed outside the counties (see above). Similarly, if 

pigs from Karlovac, V-S, and S-M counties are sent straight to slaughter within the 

counties, fresh meat, meat preparations and meat products containing such meat will be 

placed on the market outside Karlovac, S-M, and V-S counties also only under the 

previously mentioned provisions.

Vehicles used for transport for pigs originating in Karlovac, V-S, and S-M must 

be C/D immediately after transport. Pigs from Karlovac, S-M, and V-S going to other 

counties must be transported by registered transporters, exclusively on main roads, 

without stopping. The transporter must furnish proof of performed C/D to a veterinary 

inspector once per month.

Current CSF Control Program Standards for Feral Swine

The current CSF control program includes measures for feral swine; certain 

program details are discussed at greater length under 8. Croatia’s Livestock 

Demographics and Marketing Practices. Similar to the CSF control program for 

domestic swine, Croatia’s strategy for CSF in feral swine is to apply specific restrictions 

to the three higher risk counties. The primary effort is to restrict the movement of live 

feral swine from the three higher risk counties: transporting or moving feral swine from 

Karlovac, S-K, and V-S counties to other parts of Croatia is prohibited, as is the 

movement of live animals from one hunting ground, or part thereof, to another hunting 

ground, or part thereof, within the three counties. Additionally, carcasses of all harvested 

feral swine must be kept on the hunting grounds until negative results of diagnostic tests 

for CSF are obtained. The carcasses may not be moved outside the three high risk 

counties, nor can their meat be used in meat preparations and meat products that consist 

of or contain meat that are intended for market outside of Karlovac, S-M, and V-S 
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22 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine 

Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest

counties before negative results of diagnostic tests for CSF are obtained. If the hunting 

ground has no room to store the carcass, it must be safely disposed of. 

The program includes other technical restrictions on wild boar, most of which will 

be discussed under 8. Croatia’s Livestock Demographics and Marketing Practices. To 

briefly summarize, on hunting grounds under restriction by this program—those that have 

had CSFv seropositive feral swine-- the official veterinarian or the control body’s 

veterinarian must examine each feral pig shot or found dead and take samples for testing 

for CSF in accordance with the Ordinance on the Diagnostic Manual for CSF. Any feral 

pig that tests serologically and/or virologically positive for CSF, as well as feral swine

which have been in contact with positive feral pigs, must be safely disposed of. The offal 

and other parts of feral swine not intended for human consumption, and feral swine found 

dead and parts thereof, also must be safely disposed of. Last, the carcasses of harvested 

wild boar must be kept until negative CSF test results are obtained.

While animal health issues are the purview of MAFRD/VD, the oversight of 

government- and privately-owned hunting grounds falls to the Directorate of Forestry, 

Hunting, and Wood Industry. Many of the specific elements of the feral swine program 

then fall to individuals. Hunters and hunting grounds must notify the competent 

veterinary office and Hunting officials of the place and time of a hunt and the name and 

contact telephone number of the person responsible for hunting operations at least 48 

hours prior to the hunt. Hunting grounds must keep records of feral swine shot or found 

dead on the premises. If a hunter or anyone else finds a dead feral pig, they must act per 

the Surveillance Program for CSF in Feral Pigs. These and other details-- including the 

findings of a site visit conducted to a Croatian hunting ground-- are addressed in relevant 

parts of the risk assessment (e.g. 7. Croatia’s Movement Controls and Biosecurity, 8. 

Croatia’s Livestock Demographics and Marketing Practices).

Training, Outreach, and Awareness

Training and outreach can be considered important elements of an active disease 

control program. The VD frequently conducts and participates in training and outreach, 

particularly for CSF. Generally, these trainings aim to encourage awareness of CSF risks 

and control measures implemented at the national and regional level, as well as to 

promote outreach, awareness, and communication at the regional level. The target 

audience of most programs is hunters, veterinarians, official veterinarians, veterinary 

inspectors, and laboratory experts [8]. Similarly, multiple emergency response 

simulations have been conducted, largely aimed at the same audience. Numerous site 

visit interviewees (regional offices, AVOs, producers, etc.) were able to produce 

literature promoting CSF and other contagious animal disease awareness, and reported 

attending VD-sponsored training on these and other animal health issues. Similarly, 

appropriate signage was displayed at border inspection posts (BIPs) and ports; this topic 

will be discussed in 7. Croatia’s Movement Controls and Biosecurity.

Summary, Discussion, and Key Risk Issue

Croatia’s current veterinary infrastructure and field activities are designed to 

either actively or passively detect and/or control all of the hazards under concern in this 

evaluation, and there are overarching elements of a robust disease control program in 

place. In addition to active disease control programs, including active disease 
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23 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine 

Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest

surveillance, veterinary inspection and passive surveillance occur at border inspection 

posts, livestock markets, slaughterhouses, and other points of concentration. 

Collectively, these control programs are likely to detect the hazards under evaluation. 

APHIS acknowledges the evolution of Croatia’s previous CSF control programs, 

and considers them demonstrative of the VD’s ability to apply disease control programs, 

and utilize lessons learned from previous approaches to improve future ones. APHIS 

reviewed precursor CSF control programs, the epidemiological history of the country’s 

2007/2008 CSF outbreak and response measures, and the corresponding deficiencies and 

corrective actions, and generally found them to be appropriate for the situation at hand.

To summarize, Croatia implemented specific eradication steps in 2007/2008, 

including an Action Plan to control the outbreak that incorporated five main elements: a 

contingency plan, registration of pig holdings, diagnostic capacity, intensified control of 

illegal movements, and CSF surveillance in wild boar. Croatian officials attempted to 

capture and provide to APHIS the details of the exact impacts of each of those measures. 

Most importantly for this discussion and analysis, Croatian authorities report that the CSF 

situation improved dramatically following the implementation of this plan, and those five 

elements represent the foundation of the current CSF control program. 

For multiple reasons, including but not limited to disease history and incidence in 

the region, Croatia conducts lesser but nonetheless appropriate disease programs for 

FMD and SVD that are primarily a function of active and passive surveillance for those 

hazards, and Croatia does not conduct an active program for rinderpest. Nonetheless, 

APHIS considers Croatia’s veterinary infrastructure capable of detecting these diseases 

given the interlocking safeguards of the system, and its ability to detect vesicular disease.

For example, veterinary inspection procedures, including ante- and post-mortem 

inspection at slaughter, appear adequate to detect vesicular disease, the detection of 

which would trigger contingency plans and preventative measures, which would include 

diagnostic testing, which would likely detect FMDv or SVDv.

APHIS considers Croatia’s overall approach toward disease control to be 

thorough, flexible and relevant. The country’s veterinary infrastructure appears 

adequately and appropriately organized to implement active and passive measures to 

detect, control, and eradicate the hazards under consideration in this evaluation. 

Generally speaking, APHIS found disease-specific efforts to be acceptable, and 

appropriate for the level of risk for each hazard. 

The key risk issue as it relates to ongoing active disease control programs is CSF, 

specifically the three counties of higher risk as it relates to CSF because circulation of the 

virus in feral swine cannot be fully excluded. However, APHIS considers the CSF control 

program- comprised of movement controls, biosecurity programs, training and 

simulations, passive and active disease surveillance, etc. - to be relevant, and appropriate 

in scope and scale for the current swine health situation in Croatia. In essence, the CSF 

control program treats these three high risk counties of Croatia as a “region”, and assigns 

to them a distinctly different CSF risk categorization from the rest of the country. With 

that distinction comes corresponding special restrictions for CSF control that are more 

stringent than those that are applied country-wide, including restrictions for live animals, 

meat and meat products, wild boar and hunting grounds, and germplasm.
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24 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine 

Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest

5. Vaccination Status of Croatia

Vaccination for CSF and FMD is prohibited in Croatia [5, 18, 20], except under 

emergency circumstances, i.e. during a disease outbreak. Per the VA, the VD is the 

responsible authority for any emergency vaccination campaigns against CSF or FMD. 

The regulations, requirements, and procedures for emergency CSF and FMD vaccination, 

including the risk-based matrices on which vaccination decisions are based, are outlined 

in their respective veterinary legislation and contingency plans [9], which APHIS 

reviewed and found sufficient.

6. Separation of Croatia from Adjacent Regions

Croatia’s geographic boundaries include sections of the Dinaric Alps on the 

eastern border, and the Adriatic Sea on the western border. However, these geographic 

boundaries are not substantial: generally speaking, the Dinaric Alps are not severe in 

altitude, and Croatia shares plains borders with the same countries it shares mountainous 

borders. Croatia reports that feral swine in Vukovar-Srijem county have virtually 

unhindered contact with feral swine from Serbia, and parts of the county are known 

migratory routes of these animals [36]. As previously discussed, Serbia reported a CSF 

outbreak in domestic swine in 2010; the presumed source was contact with wild species.

The Adriatic coastline bordering the west obviously eliminates any disease risk 

associated with movement of terrestrial animals, but said coastline also supports a large 

maritime and port presence. This maritime presence includes a relatively extensive ferry 

system that includes daily trips between Croatia’s islands and mainland, as well as ferries 

to and from other EU Member States (Italy, Slovenia); international cruise ships; and 

domestic and international fishing boats and personal watercraft. Croatia’s coastline 

therefore presents an equivalent-- if not higher-- risk given the volume of passenger 

traffic and the potential that they legally or illegally transport prohibited animal products.

Discussion and Key Risk Issues

Overall, APHIS concludes that Croatia’s physical boundaries do not effectively

mitigate the risk of disease incursion via the entry pathways of incoming vehicular or 

passenger traffic, including individuals unknowingly or intentionally carrying prohibited 

animal products, and the natural movement of infected wildlife, such as feral swine. 

Portions of Croatia’s mountainous borders are non-severe, sparsely populated, and/or 

have shared grazing on pasture contiguous with neighboring countries. Croatia’s Adriatic 

coastline promotes extensive maritime traffic. 

The primary risk mitigation for adjacent regions therefore is the manmade 

prevention and interdiction measures of the BVIITS and Customs at Croatia’s borders, 

which will be discussed in the next section. The APHIS site visit team specifically visited 

Border Inspection Points (BIPs) into Croatia for live animals and animal products, 

including a sea port, to verify that Croatia has in place measures to reduce the risk of 

animal disease incursions. 

7. Croatia’s Movement Controls and Biosecurity

The primary mitigation for the incursion into and dissemination throughout 

Croatia of contagious animal diseases, including the hazards for this analysis, are the 

detection and interdiction methods of Croatia’s Veterinary Inspection Directorate (VID). 

The VID is responsible for conducting internal and border veterinary inspection, and 
25

25 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine 

Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest

implementing affiliated veterinary activities. The Veterinary Inspection Sector (VIS) is 

responsible for internal veterinary inspections and controls, and the Border Veterinary

Inspection and International Trade Sector is responsible for border veterinary inspections 

and controls conducted on imported or transiting products [5]. The Director of the VID 

reports directly to the CVO of the VD. An organizational diagram is provided in Figure 

6.

 

Figure 6: Organizational Diagram of Croatia’s VID[5]. 

(Internal) Veterinary Inspection Sector

The Veterinary Inspection Sector (VIS) is responsible for conducting internal 

veterinary inspections, and overseeing the production, health, and welfare of animals 

produced for trade, food, and feed. The VIS has a central office at VID headquarters (the 

State Veterinary Inspection Department, SVID), and has six Regional Veterinary 

Inspection Departments (RVID), located in Zagreb, Varaždin, Bjelovar, Osijek, Rijeka, 

and Split. The VIS largely constitutes Croatia’s government veterinary field force, and it 

is responsible for overseeing disease control programs and providing oversight for animal 

inspections and movements. These offices collectively coordinate and implement the 

veterinary activities- including inspections- in Croatia’s 20 counties and Zagreb via 65 

branch offices [5]. A map showing the location of county and branch offices is available 

in Figure 5 (p. 11).

Internal Movement of Animals and Animal Products

Trade and/or movement of livestock and animal products within Croatia is 

generally permitted insofar as a veterinary inspection is conducted at the place of 

dispatch. Croatian veterinary officials provided details regarding their system of on-farm 

inspection and movement controls, including a copy of the Ordinance on veterinary

checks of live animals in internal trade and certificate of health condition and place of 

origin of the animal (OG No 87/2008) [37], which outlines the regulations for veterinary
26

26 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine 

Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest

inspection of animal holdings and the requirements for placing animals on the domestic 

market. 

The primary purposes of veterinary inspection are to ensure identification and 

traceability of the animal or commodity, and to verify that the conditions of the certificate

are met. These inspections must be conducted by an authorized veterinarian, and must 

satisfy inspection criteria as stipulated by MAFRD. Consignments must be reported to an 

authorized veterinarian upon arrival at the place of destination, and may undergo another 

veterinary inspection as stipulated by MAFRD [9]. 

For live animals, a copy of the health certificate must travel with the live haul

vehicle, and be presented at the request of a veterinary inspector or official veterinarian. 

If paperwork is missing or it is determined that the load originates from an infected or 

endangered zone, the haul is stopped and the vehicle/commodities detained. Vehicles 

transporting animals or products may be stopped and inspected, including offload of 

animals if necessary. Transport vehicles must be cleaned and disinfected (C/D) by

authorized personnel after the animals are offloaded at the destination, and carry

documentation confirming that C/D took place. If animals are being shipped to, from, or 

in an infected or endangered zone, an approved veterinarian must supervise the C/D 

procedures [9].

For any animal movement that requires a certification, the veterinary inspection is 

conducted prior to movement from a holding or assembly center. The veterinary 

inspector confirms documentation and animal identity, and conducts the physical 

inspection, looking for visible clinical signs of disease on the animals being moved and 

on cohort animals from the herd or flock. There are derogations for the veterinary 

inspection for a movement certificate. For example, bovines shipped direct to slaughter: 

a movement certificate can be issued without veterinary inspection if the holding has had 

a veterinary inspection within the previous 30 days (unless the holding has a history of 

noncompliance, in which case they are not eligible for this derogation). Veterinary 

inspection at the holding of destination is not mandatory; however, arrivals of swine, 

cattle, sheep and goats must be reported to veterinary officials [37]. 

A veterinary inspector can stop the movement of animals or animal products if 

he/she determines that they have been moved or marketed out of compliance with any of 

the provisions of the Veterinary Act or originate from an infected zone or a suspected 

infected zone, or if animals show clinical signs of disease,. The veterinary inspector can 

order all animals to be unloaded and immediately quarantined or animal products be 

offloaded and stored in appropriate conditions, and be tested with the appropriate 

diagnostic test. If there is no suitable quarantine facility available, or if it is less 

expensive and there are no reasons to prevent slaughter, animals are sent to the nearest 

slaughterhouse. A veterinary inspector can also stop the movement of animals or animal 

products if animals do present clinical signs of disease, or if they originate from an 

infected area or a suspected infected area. The veterinary inspector can order euthanasia 

for live animals (and disposal of carcasses), or destruction and disposal of animal 

products [9]. 

Measures are in place at the regional level for VD officials to monitor animal 

movements, compliance with animal health regulations, and biosecurity. Namely, a riskbased process is used to generate inspection schedules for each year. Factors used to 

determine the inspection schedule include previous non-compliance with minimum 
27

27 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine 

Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest

biosecurity standards or other national programs, and proximity to high risk premises. 

Veterinary authorities are authorized to make unannounced spot inspections to ensure 

compliance.

The APHIS site visit team visited the Branch Veterinary Office in one of 

Croatia’s three high risk counties for CSF, Karlovac County. Karlovac veterinary

officials reported that the most common farm violations are related to perimeter fencing 

and failure to meet minimum biosecurity standards. However, they also reported that 

biosecurity violations in Karlovac County were primarily observed at livestock markets 

and fairs, which were all subsequently closed with the publication of the Order on 

measures to prevent the appearance and spread of classical swine fever (OG/135/2011). 

The office also reported violations for illegal cattle movements, including citations to a 

large bovine producer for ‘no vehicle disinfection’ and ‘incomplete data records’. 

Border Veterinary Inspection and International Trade Sector

A map of Croatia’s former and current border crossings is provided in Figure 7.

Prior to EU accession Croatia had EU-approved BIPs at Zagreb Airport; ports of Rijeka, 

Split, and Ploče; road BIPs to BiH at Ličko Petrovo Selo, Stara Gradišćka, Kamensko,

Vinjani Donji, Metković, Županja; road and railway BIPs to Serbia at Bajakovo and 

Tovarnik, respectively; a road BIP to Montenegro at Karasovići; and road BIPs to the EU 

at Bregana, Macelj, Rupa, Goričan, Duboševica. There are also two Customs-operated 

border crossing stations for the Neum Corridor, Kleck and Zaton-Doli, that process 

domestic movements between the non-contiguous parts of Croatia (see Neum Corridor

below) [8]. With Croatia’s accession to the EU, seven official EU-approved BIPs remain:

Zagreb airport, ports at Rijeka and Ploče, and road BIPs at Bajakovo, Stara Gradiška, 

Metković (Nova Sela), and Karasovići [8]. 

Figure 7. Current and former BIPs in Croatia [38].

Legend:

 Current BIP

Former BIP
28

28 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine 

Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest

Import or Transit of Animals or Animal Products

Import into or transit through Croatia of live animals, products of animal origin, 

feed of animal origin, hay and straw, and other products which could transmit infectious 

diseases is permitted only at BIPs. These commodities may not enter Croatia without 

undergoing veterinary inspection, as stipulated by MAFRD, excepting the noncommercial movement of pets, which can be inspected/cleared by Customs [5, 9, 37]. 

Inspection can include document check, identification check, or physical inspection. 

Customs is authorized to conduct document checks and collect user fees, but is not 

authorized to conduct veterinary inspections [5, 9, 37]. Import data for Croatia for 2010 -

2012, including data on the top 5 exporters to Croatia of relevant agricultural 

commodities, is available in Appendix 1.

Detection, Rejection, and Confiscation of Prohibited Materials

The confiscation of restricted commercial items presented for import or transit 

and restricted items contained in passenger luggage is performed by Customs officials, 

per the Ordinance on conditions for the introduction of personal consignments of 

products of animal origin (OG 56/09), which transposes EC 206/2009 on the introduction 

into the Community of personal consignments of products of animal origin [8].

Seized consignments of international origin must be collected and destroyed by

incineration, per the Ordinance on animal by-products not intended for human 

consumption (OG 87/2009), which transposes EC 1774/2002. To accomplish this, 

MAFRD VID provides Customs with 18 refrigerated containers and 40 non-refrigerated 

containers, all labeled Category 1, which contain the confiscated products until they can 

be incinerated [8].

Domestic and International Passenger Traffic (Key Risk Issue)

APHIS considers incoming vehicular or passenger traffic, including individuals 

unknowingly or intentionally carrying prohibited animal products, a potential entry

pathway into Croatia for the hazards under evaluation, and therefore a key risk issue in 

this analysis. Entry could be in the form of animals with undetected infection, fomites, 

or, more likely, contaminated animal products illegally transported—inadvertently or 

intentionally— into Croatia. This evaluation will not specifically address intentionally

smuggled goods, which can occur via any of the modes of travel described below, as 

limited data exists to either quantify or qualify smuggling of prohibited products into 

Croatia. The detection and interdiction methods discussed in this evaluation do apply to 

smuggled goods and are likely to deter intentional illegal entry of prohibited products. 

APHIS analyzed a 2007 report from the Republic of Croatia’s Ministry of the Sea, 

Tourism, Transport, and Development (MSTTD) [39]. Although the data is from 2006, it 

contained interesting information and trends that could be used as a barometer for current 

passenger traffic patterns. Overall in 2006, 69.58 million passengers entered Croatia 

through all modes of travel, of which 22.09 million were of Croatian nationality and 

47.49 million were foreign nationals. In 2006, 19.99 million passenger vehicles entered 

Croatia by road; two-thirds of the vehicles that entered were registered in other countries. 

Passenger vehicles hauled 66.1 million passengers, approximately ~95% of the total 

passengers that entered Croatia. The next most significant share of cross-border 

passengers was air (1.75 million, ~2.5%), then sea/coastal (1.07 million, ~1.5%), and 
29

29 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine 

Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest

finally rail (0.66 million, ~0.95%). Of these travel modes, all but rail (9% decrease) had 

increased through 2006. The map in Figure 8 demonstrates the domestic and international 

transportation modes and routes in Croatia.

Figure 8: Domestic and International Transportation in Croatia [40].

The primary mode of passenger travel in Croatia is road travel. It accounted for 

51% of all passenger AND freight travel in 2006. Railway was the next most significant 

(37%) passenger travel mode, while coastal/maritime portage (27%) was the next most 

significant freight travel mode. Of interest, overall railway usage, in terms of passengers 

travelling, generally increased through 2006, and international travelers represented 4.2% 

of the total rail passengers. 106 trains are used for international service, the most 

significant passenger services being: Zagreb to and from Vienna, Budapest, Munich, 

Venice, Zurich, Ljubljana, and Belgrade; and Rijeka to and from Budapest and Ljubljana. 

Also of interest is that of Croatia’s seven international airports (Zagreb, Dubrovnik, Split, 

Zadar, Pula, Rijeki, and Osijek; Croatia also has two small airports, Brač and Mali 

Lošinj, through which occasional international travel takes place), 90% of the 

approximately 4.5 million air passengers travelling in 2005 passed though the three 

biggest airports- Zagreb, Split, and Dubrovnik. 

Risk Mitigation- Site Visits to Road BIPs at Croatia’s Borders with Serbia and BiH

The APHIS site visit team visited BIP Bajakovo, a road BIP on the border of 

Croatia and Serbia, and BIP Metković, a road BIP on the border between Croatia and 

BiH, to verify and clarify information provided by Croatian authorities, and assess 

whether road BIPs mitigate the risk of disease incursion into Croatia. At each BIP, the 
30

30 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine 

Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest

site visit team interviewed the VD officials, border veterinary inspectors, and Customs 

officials.

Live animals presented for import or transit must be accompanied by the EU’s 

CVED and require 24 hour advance notice to the BIP. The veterinary inspection process, 

as outlined in Croatia’s Ordinance on transport of live animals (OG/7/2007), includes a 

health check for dead, non-ambulatory, or otherwise unhealthy animals. Additionally, 

border veterinary inspectors compare animal identification on approximately 10% of the 

animals to the accompanying health certificate, and perform a welfare check. If there are 

inconsistencies or discrepancies in the number or identification of animals, or animal 

welfare concerns, the consignment is rejected, and relevant authorities at the place of 

origin and the EU are notified. A consignment cannot be cleared through Customs until it 

passes veterinary inspection.

If for any reason a consignment of live animals arrives and disease is suspected, 

or if a dead animal arrives at the BIP, the consignment is refused entry, the animal(s) are 

sampled and euthanized as appropriate, and an epidemiological investigation is initiated. 

Dead or euthanized animals are collected and incinerated. APHIS officials were informed 

that C/D is only done at BIP Bajakovo when mandated by special restrictions, typically 

triggered by disease suspicion in a foreign country, and relayed to the BIP staff by central 

level VD. APHIS officials also confirmed that the BIP has no disinfection facilities, 

equipment, or supplies, on hand; those would be sourced from MAFRD in the event of 

control measures. 

Regarding animal products, commercial consignments of animal products do not 

require 24 hour advance notice to the BIP; rather, they must notify the BIP just prior to 

arrival. The inspection process for animal products includes a document and 

identification check and a physical inspection of the consignment, and can, if stipulated 

by an annual plan specific for each BIP, including sampling. As with live animals, 

commercial consignments of animal products must pass veterinary inspection prior to 

being cleared by Customs. Only lamb meat is imported through BIP Bajakovo, as no 

other meat or milk products from Serbia are allowed. Customs has confiscated prohibited 

meat, milk, and cheese products (including 70 kg of beef from a single vehicle), but only

from passenger traffic. Prohibited products are confiscated and securely stored until 

collection and incineration. 

Information obtained at BIP Metković was consistent with the information 

obtained at BIP Bajakovo. The BIP Metković is staffed by three border veterinary

inspectors. Live animal imports through BIP Metković are authorized, but do not occur 

(excepting bees and pets) given the ban on live animals from neighboring BiH. 

Approximately 20 consignments of animal products for human consumption, and animal 

by-products, are imported through BIP Metković per month. Each consignment 

undergoes a veterinary inspection that includes document and identification check and a 

physical inspection of the consignment. If stipulated by an annual plan specific for each 

BIP, consignments will also be sampled. Examples of animal products imported through 

BIP Metković include milk from Poland; ham from Italy; fish from Spain and Italy; pork 

and honey from Hungary; chicken meat from Brazil; and poultry from Netherlands. 

Similar to the “triggering events” described by BIP Bajakovo staff, BIP Metković 

officials reported that MAFRD personnel communicates to them positive test results for 
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31 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine 

Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest

animals and animal products reported in other countries, so as to put them on alert for 

animals or products from those points of origin. 

Discussion- Croatia’s Road BIPs and Preventing Disease Incursions 

The road BIPs at Bajakovo and Metković appeared to have a sufficient 

infrastructure. Physical resources appeared sufficient for needs and appropriate for the 

volume of traffic through the BIP. The veterinary inspection processes at both BIPs 

seemed appropriate relative to the volume of live animals and animal products they

process. BIP Metković, for example, had only a single road crossing with a single lane in 

each direction, and given the physical constraints posed by the layout of the facility and 

terrain, it appeared congested. However, there is not a high volume of commercial 

consignments of live animals or animal products through the BIP, so such space is not 

required. The EU’s Trade Control and Expert System (TRACES) - which monitors the 

movements of animals and products of animal origin within, and imported into, the EUis fully functional at both BIPs. Notices were posted at both BIPs advising travelers 

against importing prohibited animal products, and Customs inspectors at both BIPs were 

actively monitoring traffic, including document checks and random sampling of luggage 

and vehicles. Contingency plans and response procedures were available and seemed 

easily accessible. 

The BVIITS staff stationed at both BIPs seemed competent and knowledgeable of 

operations, procedures, and legal requirements; appeared to have good communication 

with central level VD staff; and appeared to communicate and collaborate well with 

Customs officials. Staffs at both BIPs spoke of receiving educational materials, including 

information on animal diseases, from MAFRD/VD. Further, BVIITS employees reported 

participating in quarterly training organized by MAFRD, and BIPs Bajakovo and 

Metković are actively involved in Croatia’s Integrated Border Management (IBM) 

system, a collaborative network of BVIITS, Police, and Customs that with shared 

strategies and resources for maintaining border integrity. Both BIPs referenced 

satisfactory working relationships with IBM personnel, and generally referenced 

conducting and participating in trainings to increasing awareness of the pathways of 

disease introduction into Croatia via imported animals or animal commodities, and 

passenger traffic. 

Further, both BIPs reported satisfactory working relationships with border 

officials from the neighboring country, and were clearly engaged in transboundary issues 

specific to their particular area. BIP Bajakovo officials, for example, described general 

collaboration with Serbia on transboundary animal health issues and cooperation on 

specific transboundary events like Serbia’s 2010 CSF outbreak in domestic swine. 

Similarly, BIP Metković officials reported satisfactory working relationships with border 

officials from BiH, but also specifically communicated good collaboration with Port 

Ploče and Klek-Neum 1, as border veterinary inspectors from BIP Metković assist with 

official duties at Port Ploče and confiscated goods at Klek-Neum 1 are redirected to BIP 

Metković. 

Records at both BIPs were easily located and well organized. The site visit team 

reviewed records of animal or animal product consignments. The records included 

country and farm of origin, type of animal, license plate number of transport vehicle, 

CVED number, and address of place of destination. The site visit team reviewed BIP 
32

32 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine 

Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest

monthly reports (internal documents sent monthly to central-level MAFRD officials 

monthly and biannually) in addition to log books for Monitoring and Inspection 

activities. Generally, record-review supported information collected pre-site visit and 

during the site visit interviews. Records are kept in hard copy and electronically, and 

maintained three years. Records of imports are entered into TRACES. Officials reported 

that BVIITS and Customs entry and exit data for transit consignments are reconciled.

Overall, APHIS considers the road BIPs to have measures in place to decrease the 

risk of illegal introduction of live animals or animal products (including introduction of 

improperly documented live animals or animal products), and to be a strong mitigating 

factor that is capable of preventing disease incursions into Croatia. Croatian border 

veterinary officials seemed knowledgeable of what to do in the event of disease suspicion 

or outbreak in an adjacent country or trading partner. Of slight concern, given the lack of 

disinfection supplies and equipment on site at the road BIPs, would be the time to ramp 

up C/D biosecurity measures and other border contingencies in the case of disease 

outbreak in a neighboring country or trading partner. It is possible that would be a lag 

time- a risk window- before certain control measures regarding cleaning and disinfection 

of vehicles could be fully implemented. However, this concern is not unique to Croatia 

and its borders or BIPs, as the notion of having “zero risk” of disease incursion through 

passenger traffic does not apply here, or in any other country. Further, the risk would be 

partially if not fully mitigated by the movement controls placed on animals and animal 

products in Croatia and the source country upon disease suspicion. 

Croatia’s Border with BiH- The Neum Corridor

One specific area related to Croatia’s border with BiH warrants further analysis 

and discussion. The Neum Corridor is a 9km stretch (26.3 km of coastline) of BiH which 

extends to the Adriatic Sea and divides Croatia into two non-contiguous parts. The areas 

of Croatia surrounding the Corridor are predominantly tourist destinations [8], leading to 

a high volume of passenger traffic. With only a few small farms in the surrounding areas 

of Croatia, animal and animal product movements through the Corridor are small and 

well-regulated (see below).

Although the Neum Corridor involves international boundaries, the movement of 

passengers and commercial shipments of animals and animal products between the noncontiguous parts of Croatia are de facto domestic movements: only animals and animal 

products moving from one part of Croatia to the other part of Croatia are eligible to 

transit the Neum Corridor. These movements are conducted and controlled via road 

border crossings Klek (Neum I, on the north) and Zaton Doli (Neum II, on the south).

Because the Neum Corridor border crossings process and convey traffic between 

non-contiguous parts of Croatia, they are not BIPs, and as such do not conduct BIPrelated animal health activities, including veterinary inspection. Import and transit of 

animals or animal products subject to veterinary regulation and inspection are not 

allowed through these border crossings. Rather, animals or animal products imported 

into or transiting Croatia must arrive at and be processed through a BIP. Conversely, the

Klek and Zaton Doli cannot serve as points of embarkation for export of animals or 

animal products from Croatia [8]. 

Customs therefore supervises, processes, and controls movement of passengers 

and goods through the Corridor by way of standard border control measures on persons 
33

33 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine 

Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest

and vehicles not in transit. Their methods at the Neum Corridor border crossings are 

consistent with other international borders, the primary method being random inspection 

of vehicles and passengers. Additionally, however, they monitor vehicle entry times into 

the Corridor on one side and exit back into Croatia on the other, and validate that against 

the approximate time needed to transit. There is a specific agreement in place with BiH 

formalizing the arrangement that BiH border police prevent consignments from leaving 

the highway route on BiH roads. Further, there are no decent connecting roads or 

alternative points of entry between Croatia and BiH in this area, which helps restrict 

unauthorized access of passengers and illegal products [8]. 

 

Key Risk Issue and Mitigation- Site Visit to Croatia/BiH Road Border Crossing at Klek

The Neum Corridor border crossings process and convey traffic and goods 

moving between non-contiguous parts of Croatia. APHIS officials visited the border 

crossing at Klek to confirm adequate regulation of vehicle and passenger traffic and the 

movement of goods and people. APHIS confirmed that the Klek (and Zaton-Doli) border 

crossings are Customs posts only: BVIITS does not have a permanent presence, and 

commercial consignments for import or transit into or through Croatia that are subject to 

veterinary controls must be processed through BIP Metković. The facility operates under 

an EU-aligned bilateral agreement with BiH. (Also operating under bilateral agreement 

is the movement of BiH goods from its port to mainland through the Neum Corridor. 

However, this movement of people and products does not require crossing the Croatian 

border; as such, these movements are only subject to BiH regulations.)

Between 250 and 600 commercial trucks and 2,000 buses and personal vehicles 

move through the Klek border crossing each day. Most of the traffic is domestic travelers 

or commercial haulers moving between the non-contiguous parts of Croatia. The current 

facility and road are constrained by physical restrictions: the facility is small, the road a 

single lane in each direction. Croatia is constructing a new road and facility that will 

have 5 lanes into and 5 lanes out of Croatia, and will separate passenger vehicles from 

commercial traffic.

Commercial consignments of domestic goods are inspected (documentation check 

and visual inspection) at either Klek or Zaton Doli; are sealed with a Customs seal; and 

are then checked at the border crossing on the opposite side of the Neum Corridor. If the 

seal is intact, no commingling or adulteration with BiH products is suspected, and the 

vehicle moves on. If the seal is not intact, the vehicle is held or returned. Entry and exit 

times to both border crossings are documented. Although stops in Bosnia are not 

prohibited, unusually long transit times can be cause for investigation.

During the APHIS visit to Klek, Customs officials were actively monitoring 

traffic, including checking traveler documentation and conducting random inspections of 

luggage and vehicles. Consistent with what the site visit team found at BIPs, Customs 

does not have a baseline requirement or minimum number of inspections required for 

passenger vehicles. Customs officials do, however, conduct de facto risk-based sampling, 

as they target and inspect frequent travelers and repeat offenders. Further, undercover 

Customs officials observe shopping areas in the Neum Corridor, and call ahead to the 

border crossings if they suspect potential smuggling attempts. Customs officials also 

arrange and implement, without advance notice to travelers, inspection campaigns 

targeted at tour buses. During these campaigns, all passengers and luggage are unloaded 
34

34 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine 

Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest

and inspected. The campaigns are usually conducted twice a week, and last 

approximately 8 hours per campaign. Customs officials reported on average 

approximately 10 violators per bus. Customs officials from Port Ploče assist during these 

campaigns. 

Notices were posted at Klek advising travelers against importing restricted animal 

products. If the passenger has not declared a prohibited animal product they are found to 

possess, they are issued a ticket and fine. The prohibited product is logged, confiscated, 

transported to BIP Metković, and securely stored until collection and incineration. This 

border crossing issued 236 misdemeanors in 2011 for prohibited animal products. 

Customs officials reported that the most common violations were for Albanian products, 

as they are not available for purchase in Croatia or other EU MS. They also reported, 

generally, that the price of goods is lower in BiH than in Croatia, and thus there tends to 

be a flow of goods towards Croatia.

Customs staff seemed competent and knowledgeable of operations, procedures, 

and legal requirements for maintaining Croatia’s border integrity, and seemed aware of 

the risks- including those risks related to illegal entry of prohibited animal productsassociated with a high volume of passenger and commercial traffic. Communication and 

collaboration between veterinary and Customs officials seemed good. Records were 

easily located and seemed well organized, although VD staff does not have direct access 

to the Customs database. It has been proposed to allow for such, but in the interim, 

Customs provides a summary report to the VD of confiscated prohibited animal products. 

Overall, APHIS found no specific or elevated risk as it relates to this section of 

Croatia’s international border with BiH. APHIS considers the key risk issue for this 

international boundary area to be similar to Croatia’s other border areas: the entry 

pathway of incoming vehicular or passenger traffic, including individuals unknowingly 

or intentionally carrying prohibited animal products. Overall, APHIS was able to 

establish that movements of passengers and products through the Neum Corridor are de 

facto domestic movements between Croatia’s noncontiguous parts. APHIS also 

concludes that the key risk issue of prohibited animals and animal products being 

transported into Croatia via passenger or vehicle traffic is equivalent at this section of 

Croatia’s international border as at the rest of it; that the same mitigations are in place in 

this area as in others; and those mitigations are implemented at somewhat the same level. 

Croatia’s Maritime Ports and Ferry System

Given Croatia’s extensive coastline and island system, and the proximity of 

nations surrounding the Adriatic Sea, APHIS includes maritime vessels and passengers in 

the entry pathway of incoming vehicular or passenger traffic, including individuals 

unknowingly or intentionally carrying prohibited animal products. Croatia has a 

relatively high number of ports and a relatively high volume of maritime vessel 

movements that contribute to this risk pathway, including commercial shipping lines; 

domestic and international commercial passenger vessels; and private vessels. Based on 

volume of passenger traffic and varying countries of embarkation, APHIS considers the

key risk issue to be international passenger traffic processed through Croatia’s maritime 

ports, including the ferry and cruise services they support. A primary risk associated with 

maritime passenger movements is illegal entry of prohibited animal products via 

traveler/passenger luggage. 
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35 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine 

Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest

Similar to previous discussions on vehicle/passenger movements, this evaluation 

of maritime traffic will not specifically address intentionally smuggled goods, as limited

data exists to either quantify or qualify smuggling of prohibited products into Croatia via 

maritime routes. However, it can be assumed that the detection and interdiction methods 

discussed in this evaluation do apply to goods smuggled via seagoing vessel and are 

likely to deter intentional illegal entry of prohibited products. 

To gain a better understanding of port processes, and to determine if risks 

associated with the maritime pathway were adequately mitigated, the APHIS site visit 

team visited the seaport at Ploče. Information obtained at that site visit, and analysis 

thereof, will be included in relevant sections below. While the information obtained at 

and the conclusions reached regarding Ploče are not intended to be fully transferrable to 

all other Croatian ports, Ploče was selected as representative because it receives a 

substantial number of commercial shipping vessels, domestic and international passenger 

vessels, and private seacraft. Thus, the information obtained there is important to 

confirm in general the information that Croatia submitted regarding its maritime ports 

and traffic, and risk mitigations in place for this entry pathway. 

Commercial Shipping Lines and Shipments, Including Animals and Animal Products

The port of Ploče receives between 500 and 600 commercial cargo vessels per 

year. The port primarily receives and processes dry and liquid bulk cargo. No live 

animals are imported or transit through the port, and it does not receive fresh or chilled 

animal products. The port receives commercial consignments of animal commodities 

only in the form of frozen products, including pork from the USA and Ireland; beef from 

Argentina, Brazil and New Zealand; and poultry meat (with the exception of a small 

volume of transiting skins and hides). The port has two warehouses, one for frozen meat 

and fish, to maintain cold chain requirements.

For processing and offload of commercial goods, all ships must notify Port 

Authorities 24 hours in advance of their arrival, and indicate their origin. Upon arrival 

and prior to moving inland, the cargo containers undergo document checks and 

physical/visual inspection, including counting of the containers and temperature checks 

to ensure appropriate cold chain requirements were met. Articles at the port cannot clear 

Customs without first being inspected and approved by the BVIITS. If BVIITS does not 

inspect cargo at the port itself, the official veterinarian at the final destination is notified 

to conduct the inspection, after which Customs clears the consignment. 

Passenger Ships, Including Domestic and International Cruise Lines and Ferries

As depicted in the high-altitude Google map in Figure 9 (p. 37), Croatia’s ferry

system operates with and through numerous large and small ports. Also depicted in 

Figure 9 are the Italian ports to or from which international ferries carry 

passengers/vehicles. 

The port of Ploče receives domestic and international cruise vessels and ferries. 

Between 10 and 12 international cruise ships arrival annually, primarily from Venice. 

Most arriving cruise vessels carry between 300 to 500 passengers, and 200 to 300 crew 

members. Per information received from Croatia [8], and as confirmed on the site visit to 

Ploče, Customs officials conduct offload and inspection of passengers and luggage. The

regulations in Croatia’s Rules for personal consignments of products of animal origin
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36 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine 

Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest

apply to passengers offloading from international maritime vessels, per which passengers 

are allowed to carry up to 10kg of animal products from other EU MS in their personal 

luggage. 

Figure 9: High-altitude Google map of Croatia’s ferry ports [41].

Offloading of Food Waste

The offloading of food waste is internationally regulated under the International 

Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL). Croatia also has 

national regulations establishing processes and prices for food waste offload at its ports 

that transpose EU regulations (EC/1774/2002) disposal requirements for animal byproducts not intended for human consumption [8]. 

Generally, in ports with approved BIPs, the BVIITS is responsible for 

international waste offloaded from vessels, and official veterinarians oversee waste 

offloaded at non-BIP ports [8]. APHIS confirmed waste offloading/removal processes at 

Ploče. All commercial vessels (cargo and cruise) arriving at Ploče must declare food 

waste. The amount of food waste is checked onboard the vessel by Port Authorities; they

compare the daily amount of food waste produced on the ship to the actual amount in the 

hold, and check the vessel’s capacity. If found, discrepancies or other violations are 

reported, and the ship can be held at port until the situation is corrected. If offloaded in 

Ploče, all waste- including kitchen waste, excepting hazardous waste- is placed in an 

open waste container and taken (by a contracted company) to a landfill. All waste, 

including kitchen waste, is marked, but kitchen waste does not currently need to be 

separated.

In practice, waste from international vessels is not commonly offloaded at 

Croatian ports because of the high prices for collection and incineration. According to 
37

37 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine 

Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest

Croatian officials, most vessels return their waste to the country of origin, or offload it in 

other countries where it is cheaper to do so. 

Personal Watercraft

Croatia’s coastline is host to domestic and international personal watercraft (e.g. 

yachts, pleasure boats, fishing boats, other private vessels). While APHIS recognizes this 

as a potential entry pathway, the data does not exist to fully categorize the risk associated 

with personal watercraft, as there is no way to qualify or quantify unregistered vessels 

and unregistered port entries. Negatively impacting the risk profile is the fact that the 

more stringent MARPOL regulations do not apply to personal watercraft, and Croatia’s 

BVIITS does not conduct veterinary inspection onboard those vessels. Mitigating the 

risk is Croatia’s requirement that all personal watercraft register with the port on arrival, 

and all international arrivals of personal watercraft are subject to all Customs processes. 

Further, what waste is offloaded from personal watercraft is regulated, including disposal 

to landfill by the third party contractor. Therefore Croatia’s key regulatory component at 

this border interface-- and the primary mitigation for this entry pathway-- is the IBM 

system, and the interdiction and enforcement efforts of Customs and BVIITS. 

Discussion about Port Ploče and Maritime Entry Pathways

Overall, APHIS considers Croatia’s coastal border to present an equivalent risk—

and be similarly mitigated-- as its terrestrial borders, particularly with regard to the 

pathway and likelihood that contaminated animal products would enter the Croatia via 

travelers and their luggage. In particular, imports of up to 10kg of animal products from 

other EU MS are allowed in personal luggage, and there is a relatively high volume of 

passenger traffic on international cruises and ferries from Italy

1

. Croatian officials clearly

stated that they prohibit animal products from Sardinia and Sicily, but the frequency of 

these movements contribute to the likelihood that contaminated products could enter 

Croatia via this pathway. A large number of cruise ships and ferries arrive from Italy;

Croatia regionalizes Italy for certain hazards and animals/products, including an entry

ban on live animals and animal products from Sicily and Sardinia, but regionalization 

does not apply to passenger traffic and personal luggage.

Clearly the primary mitigation is man-made interdiction and enforcement efforts 

of Croatia’s port officials, veterinary authorities and Customs staff. Port Ploče officials, 

veterinary authorities, and Customs staff seemed competent and knowledgeable of 

operations, procedures, and legal requirements governing maritime traffic and travel, and 

appeared to have a general understanding of the entry risks associated with maritime 

pathways. Further, they were transparent when discussing deficiencies in their systems: 

Croatian officials acknowledged poor communication between the Ministry of the Sea 

and the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, and Rural Development at the national level. 

Multiple times they specifically recommended better coordination between those 

 

1APHIS considers Italy free of FMD (with restrictions imposed under 9 CFR 92.11), and part of the 

APHIS-defined European CSF region. APHIS recently recognized the Italian regions of Lombardia, 

Emilio-Romagna, Veneto, and Piemonte and the autonomous provinces of Trento and Bolzano as free of 

SVD [26, 27]. However, because of its proximity to or trading relationships with SVD-affected regions, 

APHIS applies the restrictions of 9 CFR Sec. 94.13 to these Italian regions and autonomous provinces. 
38

38

APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine 

Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest

Ministries, and alluded to the fact that it would foster better collaboration between 

BVIITS and Port Authority at the local level. 

However, in addition to internal controls in the country or region of origin, 

mitigations are in place to reduce the risk associated with infected undetected products 

arriving via the pathways of international catering waste and passenger luggage. 

Mitigations include but are not limited to high awareness of contagious animal diseases 

from Customs and BVIITS, and random inspections of offloading passengers and 

luggage. Customs officials seemed aware of and had access to information related to 

contagious animal diseases, and appeared to understand the role that international 

passenger traffic plays as a potential pathway in the spread of contagious animal diseases. 

Overall, Customs jurisdiction, awareness of contagious animal diseases and potential 

pathways of transmission, and communication and collaboration with BVIITS was 

consistent with what the site visit team observed at other BIPs. Customs and BVIITS 

meet annually at the national level to exchange information and strategy. BVIITS 

organizes training on various topics, including personal luggage, and has trained key 

Customs officials in each region of Croatia. BVIS sends leaflets and other informational 

materials to the port. Customs reports to BVIS annually the type and volume of 

confiscations of prohibited animals and animal products.

The primary difference between maritime and terrestrial entry pathways is the 

maritime entry pathway of offloaded kitchen waste from international vessels containing 

contaminated products, which could in turn be deposited at a landfill and subsequently 

scavenged by feral swine or other susceptible species. Kitchen waste offloaded from 

international ships at Port Ploče, for example, is not separated from other waste: it is 

collected, transported in open containers to landfill, and disposed as part of “mixed 

waste”. It is possible therefore that infected undetected products could be discarded as 

kitchen waste and subsequently foraged at landfills by feral swine or other wildlife. 

For this entry pathway, mitigations include but are not limited to the international 

regulations of MARPOL, with which port officials indicated that 90% of their arriving 

vessels comply, and by which non-compliant vessels can be flagged and barred from port 

(Port Ploče can, and has, banned ships from entering the port based on MARPOL 

violations). Also mitigating this pathway are EU (and Croatian) regulations regarding 

Category 1 food waste, which Port Ploče largely meets: it had many EU-level procedures 

already in effect in advance of acceding to the EU, excepting the requirement that all 

animal products be inspected at the BIP. With accession to the EU, Croatia is now 

required to meet all EU regulations for Category 1 materials, which includes international 

catering waste. While facilities at Ploče are insufficient for performing detailed veterinary 

inspections on animal product consignments at the port-- inspections are currently 

performed at final destination—APHIS considers the volume of food waste offloaded (at 

Port Ploče) to be relatively low, and construction is underway on a new facility with 

sufficient space to perform checks at the BIP. Additionally, other ports in Croatia that 

handle higher volumes of live animals or animal product consignments, or international 

cruise ships, have more advanced measures in place. Port Rijeka and Zagreb International 

Airport, for example, do separate kitchen waste from other vessel waste when it is 

offloaded, and Croatian officials provided data from those ports on the volume of kitchen 

waste and total vessel waste. Another mitigation for this entry pathway is the interdiction 

and compliance efforts of port officials, BVIITS, and Customs. 
39

39 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine 

Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest

8. Croatia’s Livestock Demographics and Marketing Practices

This evaluation focuses on swine and swine products. As a result, the following 

discussion of Croatia’s livestock demographics and marketing practices focuses on 

domestic and feral swine.

Swine 

Croatia has approximately 1.4 million pigs, raised on 91,000 pig farms [7]. A map 

of Croatia showing the spatial distribution of pig farms is available in Figure 10. Swine 

farms are predominantly located in Croatia’s eastern plains and mountain regions, less so 

in the coastal areas. 

Figure 10: Spatial distribution of swine farms in Croatia [8].

Most pigs in Croatia are raised in small numbers on small farms, i.e. backyard or 

hobby production units [7, 42, 43], but Croatian officials reported that swine production 

is trending toward fewer but larger swine farms. Table 1 provides detailed demographics 

data for swine production in Croatia in 2013.

Table 1: Farm size and demographics, swine production, Croatia, May 2013 [44].

Number of pigs 

per holding

Number of pigs Percentage of 

pigs

Number of 

holdings

Percentage of 

holdings

1 3,360 0.2 3,360 3.7

2 -10 275,133 19.9 65,814 72.3

11 -50 382,115 27.6 19,871 21.8

51 -100 77,360 5.6 1,128 1.2

101 -200 53,271 3.9 374 0.4

201 -500 96,906 7.0 314 0.3

501 -1000 50,957 3.6 74 <0.01
40

40 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine 

Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest

1001 -2000 62,205 4.5 45 <0.01

2001 -5000 79,783 5.8 27 <0.01

5001 -10000 139,266 10.1 17 <0.01

>10000 162,836 11.8 10 <0.01

Total 1,383,192 100 91,034 100

Approximately half (48%) of the 1.4 million pigs in Croatia are raised on small 

farms. Of these small farms, 97% have 1 to 50 pigs and 76% have 1-10 pigs. Small 

backyard swine farms and hobby producers may have lower biosecurity measures and 

other husbandry standards, and tend to support a local or regional marketing network 

with a high volume of animal transfers that typically involve a lower number of pigs. 

Regarding large swine farms, approximately 47% have over 100 pigs, 

approximately 35% have over 500 pigs, and approximately 22% have over 5,000 pigs.

Large farms are likely to be commercial production systems, with high biosecurity 

measures and other husbandry standards; high control of on- and off-farm movements of 

animals, people, and fomites; and tend to support commercial industries with a low 

number of animal transfers that typically involve a larger number of pigs. 

Registration of Swine Farms

Swine farm registration requirements are established by Croatia’s Ordinance on 

the compulsory identification and registration of pigs. Swine farms that have more than 2 

pigs must be registered in the CAA’s Farm Register database, part of the Central Register 

of Domestic Animals. Applications are submitted to the CAA; approved farms are 

assigned a Unique Farm Identification Number (UFIN), consisting of a two-letter code 

for the country of origin (Croatia = HR) and a unique eight-digit number and allotted a 

Farm Identification Card (FIC), which must be kept at the farm location [8].

The Farm Register logs the UFIN, the address of the farm, keeper and owner 

information (both, if different), geographical coordinates, secondary locations and their 

coordinates, type of production, type and annual number and maximum capacity of 

animals kept on the farm, veterinary information, including the authorized veterinarian or 

veterinary organization associated with the farm. This information is maintained for a 

period of three years from which the last pigs are kept on the farm [8].

Farms that have one pig are exempt from farm registration requirements; 

however, these farms must report pig purchases and to the competent veterinary

organization when the pig is delivered to the farm. The information is recorded in the 

Central Register of Pigs, where the farm is identified by name, Personal Identification 

Number, and address. If the pig is moved from the holding (i.e. not slaughtered for 

personal consumption), the holding must then obtain a UFIN and be updated into the 

Farm Registry [8].

Swine Identification and Registration

Croatia’s swine identification requirements are outlined in the VA, which aligns 

with EU Directive 92/102/EEC (identification and registration of animals) and 

64/432/EEC (intra-community trade of swine and bovines, as amended by 15/2000/EC); 

and EC Decision 2000/678 rules for registration of holdings in national databases for 

porcine animals [8]. The VD is the competent authority for the identification and 
41

41 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine 

Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest

registration of animals, but contracts those services to the CAA. The CAA maintains the 

Central Register of Livestock, which is the database associated with animal ID. The 

Central Register of Livestock includes the Central Register of Pigs [8]. 

Pigs are identified by holder/owner, AVOs, or the CAA using an eartag or tattoo

[9, 11, 45, 46]. The holder/owner is responsible for ensuring that animals are properly 

identified and registered. Holders must also keep the required records to ensure the 

traceability of animals in the event of their movement, and ensure that proper 

identification and paperwork is with the animals when they move. The animal holder is 

also responsible for the cost of identifying animals [9]. Compliance with animal 

identification and registration requirements, including movement of animals, is 

investigated and enforced by the VIS [8]. 

On-Farm Veterinary Presence at Swine Holdings

On-premise veterinary inspections are mandatory for swine farms except those 

with only a single pig. Veterinary inspections are conducted by authorized veterinarians 

within their own administrative/epizootological unit with the goal of confirming that the 

inspected farm complies to national program standards, animal health and welfare 

requirements, including minimum biosecurity standards, and Croatia’s registration and 

recordkeeping requirements. Inventory is taken at each farm on its annual inspection.

Farm inspection reports are completed and filed at the corresponding regional veterinary 

office. The methods and frequency of inspections is set yearly by the VD [37].

APHIS Site Visits to Swine Farms in Croatia

To observe representative commercial swine farms first-hand and to confirm onfarm processes, the APHIS site visit team visited three swine farms in Croatia: a fattening 

farm and a breeding farm for a large, vertically integrated producer2that currently exports 

swine products to other EU MS, and a family-operated commercial farm. The APHIS site 

visit team did not visit backyard or hobby swine farms due to the high variability in farm 

size, facilities, and husbandry practices between backyard producers. It is difficult to 

extrapolate from representative backyard or hobby swine farms any conclusions that 

could be categorically applied to other backyard farms.

Commercial Fattening Farm in Koprivnica-Križevci County

The APHIS site visit team visited a commercial fattening farm of a large 

vertically integrated agricultural producer. The site visit team conducted interviews with 

the farm’s owner/operator, the company veterinarian, state veterinary inspectors, and 

AVs focused on operating procedures. The site visit team also reviewed farm 

documentation, including the farm registry, treatment book (for vaccinations, etc.),

disinfectant log (for footbaths and wheel washes), feed delivery log, pest control plan, 

and the farmer’s personal logbook. There were no CSF testing records to review, as this 

farm is only subject to random selection for CSF testing based on size, type, and location

(see 9. CSF, FMD, and SVD Surveillance in Croatia) and had not yet been selected for 

CSF testing (the farm has only been in operation since 2010). The farm was in 

 

2 Vertically integrated (swine) production combines different stages of production (e.g. breeding, 

farrowing, nursery and finishing) under a common management structure. It can also include supply and 

processing chains.
42

42 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine 

Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest

compliance with record keeping requirements, and records were well-organized and 

maintained. 

The fattening farm is highly contained, with access restrictions for animals, 

people, and supplies. Farm visitors must shower and don personal protective equipment 

prior to entering the core of the premises, and shower when they depart. All piglets for 

fattening are supplied by the company’s commercial breeding farm (see next section) and 

are moved onto the farm and off the farm to slaughter in a single transfer (“all-in/allout”). The farm is stocked 2 to 3 times per year, with between 500 and 700 piglets. 

These animals are tattooed at the breeding farm prior to transport to the fattening farm. 

Swine are transported in company-owned trucks to this fattening farm and other company

grow-out farms where they are fattened for approximately 3.5 months before going

directly to slaughter. Ninety percent (90%) of the swine sent to slaughter go to Croatia’s 

largest meat producer; the other ten (10%) are sourced to Croatia’s other meat producers. 

Feed is delivered to the farm and manure is dried and used as fertilizer on local fields. 

Carcasses are stored in a shed near the entrance to the farm and collection is contracted to 

an AVO.

Biosecurity procedures exceeded the minimum standards for biosecurity as 

established by the VD, and compliance appeared to be acceptable. The farm entrance was 

gated and the entire perimeter fenced. The entrance to the farm had footbaths, a hand 

sanitizer and a wheel washing vat for on- and off-farm human and vehicle movement.

Personal protective clothing was required prior to entering the farm. Per company 

protocol, no meat can be brought onto the premises. Any fomites entering the premises 

must be disinfected (Virkon-S) or ultra-violet irradiated for 45 minutes. Employees are 

not permitted to own swine nor have contact with other swine, including wild boar on

hunting grounds, within 72 hours of arrival on the farm, and must attest to meeting these 

requirements prior to entering the premises. 

The VA recommends that C/D and pest-, rodent-, and/or insect-control programs 

be conducted in all facilities on all premises where animals temporarily or permanently 

reside, and on all affiliated transport vehicles and equipment. The VA also vests MAFRD 

veterinary inspectors with the legal authority to mandate disinfection and pest control for 

a premises, if necessary. If disinfection or pest control programs are mandated, program 

measures must be conducted by an AVO. Otherwise, animal owners or farm employees 

can implement disinfection and pest control measures, or the farm can contract them out, 

as is the case with this farm. This farm also contracts out the C/D of empty swine housing 

rooms (i.e. rooms between stocking cycles) [9].

The company veterinarian visits the farm every 2 weeks on average or when 

called to administer veterinary care. The AV for this farm visits regularly to issue health 

certificates and movement documents. All veterinarians must follow the 72 hour 

restriction for contact with other swine. 

Overall, APHIS observed this commercial fattening farm to be an intensive, high 

biosecurity operation with veterinary measures implemented on the farm sufficient to 

detect contagious animal diseases such as CSF, FMD, and SVD. The company and this 

individual farm receive educational information distributed by the MAFRD and that 

company officials have attended VD-sponsored swine disease symposia. Based on 

interviews the farm owner/operator’s swine disease awareness appeared primarily to 

regard changes to production parameters (e.g. morbidity, mortality, weight gain, etc.) that 
43

43 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine 

Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest

would accompany a disease outbreak rather than clinical signs of CSF or vesicular 

disease. Otherwise, the owner/operator seemed knowledgeable of farm operations,

company procedures, and company and Croatian veterinary/legal requirements. There 

appeared to be good communication and collaboration between the farm owner, the 

company veterinarian, the AV, and Croatian veterinary officials. 

Commercial Breeding Farm in Vukovar-Srijem County

APHIS also visited a commercial breeding farm of a large vertically integrated 

agricultural producer. The breeding operation is an intensive, high biosecurity, restricted 

access, shower-in/shower-out facility. The farm is ISO:9001 (Quality) and ISO:18001 

(Safety) certified, and is also Good Agricultural Practices certified. The site visit team 

interviewed the farm manager, the company’s Head of Public Relations, and 

veterinarians affiliated with the farm. The site visit team reviewed health certificates, 

movement documents, and other farm records including documentation of CSF testing 

and clinical inspection. All CSF test results were negative.

APHIS found evidence of on- and off-farm movement controls and affiliated 

records for animals, people, and supplies. The company owns a feed mill and feed trucks, 

collects on-farm daily mortality in their own transport vehicles, and owns a registered 

disinfection station. Fomites carried on to the farm must be dipped in disinfectant or 

ultra-violet irradiated. Employee uniforms are laundered on farm, except for their 

coveralls, which are laundered by a contract company. Employees are even restricted 

from bringing food, including pork products, onto the farm; instead, the company 

provides call on-site meals. This farm, like other company farms, has its own water 

system. Manure produced by the farm is collected in a covered lagoon, dried, and applied 

as fertilizer. This farm is scheduled to begin biogas collection from manure waste. 

APHIS also found evidence of animal disease traceability. The farm has 1200 

breeding sows that wean approximately 26 piglets per sow per year. The piglets are kept 

from farrow to wean and then contracted out to individual growers. This farm is the 

single stocker source for contract growers (including the commercial fattening farm 

discussed in the previous section). No outside animals or semen are purchased in the 

company’s breeding program. All sows on the farm have 2 tattoos and an ear tag, and all 

piglets are tattooed by day 3.

Biosecurity procedures at this farm greatly exceed the minimum standards for 

biosecurity as established by the VD and compliance appears to be very high. The farm is 

remotely located with perimeter fencing, gated access, footbaths for personnel entering or 

exiting the facility, and wheelwash for vehicles entering or exiting the farm (with a truck 

sprayer available). Company policy stipulates no contact with pigs within the previous 24 

hours prior to entering the facility. Employees cannot hunt nor raise and slaughter their 

own pigs, and are restricted from commingling with those who have. Fomites carried on

to the farm must be disinfected or ultra-violet irradiated for 40 minutes per side. 

Regarding on-farm veterinary presence, the company veterinarian visits this 

facility a minimum of once per week. He schedules his visits to the company’s fattening 

farms to accommodate the biosecurity requirements that “two nights pass” between the 

veterinarian’s last contact with live swine and his visit to the commercial breeding farm. 

The company veterinarian oversees the general health and productivity of the animals. 

This includes review of production statistics in the company database; 
44

44 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine 

Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest

administering/overseeing disease monitoring programs (e.g. leptospirosis, brucellosis, 

mycoplasmosis, porcine reproductive and respiratory syndrome); supervising the farm’s 

veterinary technicians; and identifying and correcting any problems as they arise. 

The farm is also assigned an AV, who is responsible for CSF sampling. Pigs 

must be clinically examined and serologically tested prior to movement. The number of 

pigs tested is based on a percentage of the total number moved: 5% of the total moved are 

serologically tested and 10% of the total moved are clinically examined for fattening 

pigs; 5% of the total moved are clinically examined for sows or boars direct to slaughter. 

Overall, this commercial breeding farm implemented the advanced swine 

production and husbandry practices of a vertically integrated commercial operation. Farm 

staff and the Director of Public Relations seemed extremely knowledgeable of company 

operations, procedures, and legal requirements; seemed aware of Croatian and EU animal 

health regulations; seemed extremely knowledgeable of contagious diseases of swine, 

and the implications of a disease outbreak; and appeared to be highly aware of the 

sources of risk, including the pathways by which contagious animal disease could be 

transmitted. 

Family-Operated Breeding Farm in Karlovac County

APHIS visited a family-owned and -operated swine breeding farm. The farm 

almost exclusively sells weaned piglets to individuals within Karlovac County for further 

fattening or consumption. The site visit team was hosted by the owner-operators, state 

veterinary inspectors, and AVs. 

The site visit team reviewed the Register of Pigs on the Farm, which records onfarm (born, purchased) and off-farm (sales, death, other) swine movements, as well as the 

Health Status and Treatment Records, which included type, identification number, and 

treatment of animals (including manufacturer of product, and disposal of excess product). 

Educational materials (pamphlets) on CSF, swine breeding, and wild boar were easily 

located and readily available. The farm has internet access by which employees/personnel 

can access additional educational information online. The farmers reported attending VDsponsored training. 

The farm has approximately 350 animals: 64 sows, 40 gilts, 2 boars, the 

remainder are piglets. Piglets are tattooed at birth. The farm produces most of its feed

with occasional deliveries of feed additives. The farm’s pest control program and carcass 

removal services are contracted. Wastewater is collected underground; manure is dried 

and used as fertilizer. 

Piglets are not sold through a livestock market; rather, they are sold and delivered, 

in groups of 1 to 10, farm-to-farm or farm-to-household. The farm transports animals 

using their own vehicle (tractor and trailer), of which no special registration is required 

because they do not deliver beyond a 60km radius. The farmers reported that vehicles are 

cleaned and disinfected after each offload. The farm occasionally purchases piglets from 

a neighboring farm to supplement their supply and meet market demand, but they do not 

bring those pigs back to the farm. A few animals are sold direct to slaughter, at the 

request of the individual buyer; the farm also has a catering service offering rotisseried 

whole hogs. 

Regarding on-farm veterinary presence, records indicated that the AV visited 

every two weeks for routine veterinary issues. The AV must also perform a clinical 
45

45 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine 

Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest

examination and issue a health certificate and travel document prior to swine movements 

off the farm. If the animals move out of Karlovac County, the AV must conduct a 

clinical examination and take samples for CSF diagnostic testing. Records are kept of all 

visits by AVs. Records also confirmed visits for pest control twice in the past year. Farm 

owners and veterinary officials were responsive to site visit team questions; seemed 

competent and knowledgeable of operations, procedures, and legal requirements; seemed 

knowledgeable of swine health and production practices; seemed knowledgeable of 

livestock demographics and marketing practice; and appeared to be aware of contagious 

animal disease risks in their area. 

Overall, the farm had satisfactory biosecurity, husbandry, and operational 

standards. The farm was clean and generally well maintained, with a fenced perimeter, 

and swine were bred and raised in a core facility on the farm that was further restricted by 

another fence and a disinfectant barrier. The farm controlled and catalogued on- and offfarm movements of animals, people, and supplies, and satisfied animal disease 

traceability requirements. 

Analysis of Representative Swine Farms: Conclusions and Key Risk Issues 

The commercial fattening and breeding farms represent a high intensity, high 

biosecurity, vertically integrated production and marketing system. The movement of 

animals, people, and fomites on, off, and between farms are highly controlled, and each 

premises maintains very high biosecurity standards. APHIS considers the likelihood of 

CSFv, FMDv, or SVDv entering this production chain to be low. Further, because of 

advanced swine husbandry standards, farm monitoring by company veterinarians, swine

disease awareness and sampling, and data collection for most swine production 

parameters, APHIS considers it highly likely that a swine disease would be quickly

detected and contained should it infiltrate this production system. Overall, the site visit 

team gained confidence in Croatia’s vertically-integrated swine sector, the affiliated 

production and marketing systems, and Croatia’s oversight thereof. APHIS considers this 

production system to be the most likely source of pork or pork products for export to the 

United States, and considers the risk of undetected CSFv-, FMDv-, or SVDvcontaminated products being sourced from this production chain to be low.

APHIS considers the risk associated with the family-operated breeding farm to be

slightly different than that of the vertically integrated commercial swine production 

sector. The representative family-operated breeding farm was adequately biosecure, 

meeting the minimum biosecurity standards of the VD (but not matching the standards of 

the vertically integrated commercial facilities). However, it conducts a medium to high 

number of off-farm animal movements, supplying local holdings with pigs for fattening 

for the winter/Christmas season. Although the farmers reported that they rarely visit more 

than one farm per day, and although animals undergo veterinary inspection and disease 

testing prior to moving off-farm, there are no restrictions on the number of farms or 

holdings they can visit per day, and these animal movements, albeit monitored by annual 

inventory reports and the Registry of Domestic Animals, could be generally categorized 

as more frequent and less traceable. APHIS considers it likely that, should a contagious 

swine disease occur, this distribution pattern could contribute significantly to disease 

spread.
46

46 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine 

Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest

Finally, there are also risk implications for small, family-operated, “backyard” 

farms, including farms with a single pig. It is difficult to draw substantial conclusions 

about backyard farms given the variability of farm size, facilities, and husbandry 

practices, but farms with a single pig are exempt from most of Croatia’s premises and 

animal registration requirements. This presents a gap in animal disease traceability. 

Generally, backyard farms may also present a biosecurity gap as some implement only

minimal biosecurity measures. Backyard farmer may not always conduct animal disease 

sampling or collect, analyze, and respond to changes in production data. 

However, these risks are mitigated by the fact that although these farms are 

exempt from entry in the Farm Register, they must report to the competent veterinary

organization, at the time of delivery, the purchase of the pig. Further, the pig is most 

likely fed and fattened for personal consumption, so APHIS considers it unlikely that a 

pig or pigs would be moved off of a single- or double-pig backyard farm. Further, any 

animals that do move off of a small farm require a movement permit and corresponding 

health certificate, and would most likely enter the local livestock market, where market 

rules would be enforced (see related discussion below). 

Cattle, Sheep, and Goats

In 2012, Croatia had approximately 496,000 cattle, distributed on 40,000 farms; 

551,000 sheep raised on 14,000 farms; 47,000 goats raised on 2,000 farms, and 1,000 

mixed ovine and caprine farms raising another 84,000 sheep and goats [7]. Maps of 

Croatia showing the spatial distribution of cattle, sheep, and goat farms in Croatia are

available in Figures 11 - 13. Ruminant farms are primarily located in Croatia’s eastern 

plains and mountain regions.

Figure 11: Spatial distribution of cattle farms in Croatia [8].

 

 
47

47 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine 

Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest

 Figure 12: Spatial distribution of sheep farms in Croatia [8].

 

 

Figure 13: Spatial distribution of goat farms in Croatia [8].

 

Registration of Bovine, Ovine, and Caprine Holdings, and On-Farm Presence

Registration requirements for cattle, sheep, and goat farms are similar to those for 

swine farms. According to the Veterinary Act, any farm with more than 1 cow, sheep, or 

goat must be registered in the CAA’s Farms Register, which is part of the Central 

Register of Domestic Animals. Farms of biungulates and solipeds exceeding 20 animals, 

and breeding farms of wild game, must also be registered [8, 9].

Animal Identification and Registration for Cattle, Sheep, and Goats

The Veterinary Directorate is the competent authority for the identification and 

registration of cattle, sheep, and goats, via contract with the CAA. The CAA keeps and 

maintains the database associated with animal ID, the Central Register of Livestock, 

which includes the Central Register of Bovine Animals and the Central Register of Sheep 

and Goats [8]. 

Cattle, sheep, and goats are all subject to identification requirements laid out in 

the Veterinary Act. The requirements for bovine animals were updated in 2007 by

amending the Veterinary Act and then by updating implementation measures to comply 

with EC requirements for bovine identification and registration (EC Regulations 

1760/2000, 494/98, 1082/2003, 499/2004, and 911/2004) [8]. To summarize, cattle have 
48

48 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine 

Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest

a unique ID marked by 2 eartags, require an individual passport for movement, and are 

identified to date of birth, sex, breed, mother, and keeper [9, 11, 45, 47]. If an official 

veterinarian identifies non-compliance in bovine identification, per the VA the official 

veterinarian can prohibit the movement of all animals from the holding; prohibit the 

introduction of animals onto the holding; order depopulation of the animals, and disposal 

of the carcasses [9].

Ordinances outlining the mandatory requirement of identification of sheep and 

goats, as well as the implementing measures for the sheep/goat ID system, were 

published in 2007. These ordinances transpose EC regulations for identification and 

registration of ovine and caprine animals (EC Regulations 21/2004 and 1505/2006) [8]. 

Sheep and goats are identified and registered similar to cattle, requiring eartags, ruminal 

boluses, and movement passports [9, 45, 48].

On-farm Presence at Bovine, Ovine, and Caprine holdings

Similar to swine holdings, veterinary inspections are mandatory for farms on 

which cattle, sheep, and goats are raised. Veterinary inspections can be conducted by

authorized veterinarians within their own administrative/epizootological unit. Inspections 

include an annual inventory and assessments of animal health and welfare status, 

adherence to national program standards, and recordkeeping. Inspection results are 

reported and filed at the corresponding veterinary office. The methods and frequency of 

inspections is set yearly by the VD [37].

Animal Markets and Livestock Assembly Centers

Croatia’s domestic livestock trade is primarily conducted via animal markets

(Croatia also has livestock fairs and auctions). Livestock for export are assembled at 

livestock assembly centers. Animal markets and livestock assembly centers must be 

approved and registered in the Registry of Approved Markets and Registry of Approved 

Assembly Centers [9]. Each registered animal market and livestock assembly center 

operates under the supervision of the veterinary inspectors of the county in which it is 

located (as does a livestock fair or auction) [5][9]. Markets and assembly centers must 

satisfy animal health conditions laid out by animal health officials; affiliated animal 

traders and animal haulers must be approved and registered, and must comply with 

conditions stipulated by MAFRD [9]. Figures 14 and 15 (p. 49) depict maps of Croatia’s 

registered animal markets and livestock assembly centers. 
49

49 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine 

Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest

Figure 14: Animal Markets in Croatia [8].

Figure 15: Livestock Assembly Centers in Croatia [8].
50

50 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine 

Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest

Livestock for Export

Animals or animal products destined for export must be inspected, as stipulated 

by MAFRD, by an official veterinarian and issued a health certificate prior to export. 

The veterinary inspection must determine that the animals or products meet the import 

requirements of the country of destination, after which a health certificate attesting the 

requirements are met can be issued (see section below on “Health Certificates”) [9]. 

Moving Livestock 

MAFRD regulates the commercial and non-commercial movement of cattle, 

swine, sheep, and goats. As commercial livestock movements typically involve large 

numbers of animals and include import and export of animals and animal products, they 

are the focus of this risk assessment. 

Livestock can be moved within, into, or out of a county if they are accompanied 

by the appropriate movement documents, a passport, and an animal health certificate (see 

below). Croatia’s VD has the legal authority to restrict animal movements at the 

individual animal level, at the group or farm level, at the regional level, or at the country 

level, and would do so during a disease outbreak or other sanitary restriction, or in order 

to obtain a certain animal disease status [9]. 

Each animal movement must be reported to an authorized veterinarian, who 

conducts a veterinary inspection, provides the necessary documentation, and records the 

movement in the database [8]. Swine, for example, require a health certificate to be 

moved off-premises, but only ‘arrival to’ premises is reported and uploaded to the 

database for swine [9]. When swine are moved to a market, the market becomes the 

legally responsible “animal keeper”. Swine can be kept at a market no more than 12 

hours. If swine are not sold within 12 hours, the original owner must take it back to their 

farm [6]. Of note for cattle, ‘departure from’ and ‘arrival to’ premises are reported and 

uploaded in the database [9]. Cattle being shipped directly to slaughter can be issued a 

movement certificate without a veterinary check [37]. 

Health Certificates

Croatia uses a health certificate to document that animal inspection and/or disease 

testing occurred at the holding of origin prior to animals being moved off the premises, 

and that all conditions listed in the health certificate have been fulfilled, the requirements 

of which can be found in the Ordinance on veterinary checks of live animals in internal 

trade and certificate of health condition and place of origin of the animal.

All cattle, swine, sheep, and goats traded within Croatia must be moved under a 

domestic health certificate. Domestic health certificates are procured, by fee, from an 

authorized veterinarian. MAFRD regulates the form and content of domestic health 

certificates, including traceability requirements, length of time health certificates must be 

retained on file, associated fees, and any exceptions to the requirement for a domestic 

certificate. Internal certificates may not be issued if an infectious or parasitic disease that 

can be transmitted by the species to be traded is present on the place of origin [9]. 

All animals and animal products exported from Croatia must be accompanied by

an international health certificate [9]. Under requirements of the VA, veterinarians may

not attest to or confirm on the health certificate any certification statements of which they

are not certain, and they may not sign a blank or incomplete certificate. Veterinarians 
51

51 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine 

Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest

may sign health certificates based on affidavits or third party information so long as the 

supporting documentation is presented prior to signing the certificate, or the information 

supplied by the third party can be verified [9].

APHIS Site Visit to an Animal Market in Vrbovec

To confirm information Croatia submitted regarding animal identification, 

movements, and traceability, APHIS officials visited a livestock market. This livestock 

market and others like it are the primary avenues for local livestock trade, with most 

buyers and sellers from the local area. Livestock sold at these markets are sourced from 

small commercial farms and hobby producers; Croatian regulations allow livestock 

owners to transport animals within a 65km (40 mile) radius without registering as a 

transporter.

At its weekly sale, this market almost exclusively (90%) sells piglets intended for 

further fattening. It occasionally sells calves, but does not sell sheep or goats. The market 

falls under the jurisdiction of the Zagreb county veterinary office, and AVO veterinary

station Vrbovec. The site visit team visited with State veterinary inspectors, authorized 

veterinarians, and company personnel. 

 Each animal consignment arriving to the market must be accompanied by a

veterinary health certificate, issued within 30 days prior to movement, indicating 

veterinary inspection was performed prior to the animal(s) leaving the farm, as well as a 

travel document indicating that the transport vehicle underwent C/D. Transport vehicles 

park on the street outside the market, but it is prohibited to exchange animals there. The 

official exchange of animals takes place on the market premises, which requires vehicles 

to cross a disinfection barrier and then offload and exchange animals. Day of sale 

paperwork is done by hand and transactions must be uploaded to the Unique Register of 

Domestic Animals database within 3 days. While animals are on site, the market is 

designated as the animal keeper. If animals do not sell, keeper designation is transferred 

back to the original owner. 

Although contagious animal diseases have not been reported at this market,

market officials and affiliated veterinarians were knowledgeable of swine diseases and 

appeared prepared to handle an animal disease event. If sick animals were to arrive at the 

market, officials reported that the animals would be quarantined, examined by the AV, 

and sampled. The AV would then inform the regional office of VD, and the market 

would be placed under surveillance. If clinical disease is confirmed by disease testing, 

animals would be traced back to the farm of origin, upon which animal health officials 

would implement sampling and control measures. This conforms with Croatian 

regulations, which, in the event of a disease suspicion or outbreak, subject livestock 

markets to additional control measures including closure if necessary. During the CSF 

outbreaks of 2007 and 2008, for example, all livestock markets in Croatia, including the 

one visited by the site visit team, were closed. Currently, three counties under CSFrelated restrictions due to CSF serological activity in wild boar have restrictions on 

livestock markets (see 4. Active Disease Control Programs).

Discussion of Animal Markets, Including Key Risk Issues

The animal market that APHIS visited was small, open-air (i.e. lacking a sale 

barn), situated in town, and its perimeter was only partially fenced. The site team 
52

52 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine 

Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest

observed biosecurity measures consisting of a disinfection wheelbath for vehicles, a 

disinfection footbath for people, and the requirement that employees don personal 

protective clothing prior to entering the sale and transfer part of the market. 

Biosecurity at this animal market and others like it is particularly important 

because these markets serve as points of concentration and dissemination for a potentially

large number of livestock. If an animal with undetected infection was received into this

market or another like it there is the potential for animal disease transmission and spread

within the local area and market chain. However, because livestock for export must be 

assembled at approved assembly centers, it is highly unlikely that an animal market

would be the source for live animals for export with undetected infection.

The risk associated with an infected animal arriving to an animal market is 

mitigated by veterinary inspection and correspondinng documentation prior to animals 

moving to the market, and the requirement that transport vehicles be disinfected. The risk 

associated with disease spread is mitigated by the vehicle disinfection requirement, and 

other control measures that can be implemented in the event that a contagious animal 

disease is suspected or confirmed. To the latter, animal disease awareness educational 

pamphlets and contingency plans were on display in the market office, and this market 

has participated in disease outbreak simulation exercises.

Overall, animal market staff and responsible veterinarians were knowledgeable of 

the legal requirements for operating the facility and for affiliated processes (e.g. animal 

movement controls). Communication between market staff and local veterinary officials, 

and between local veterinary officials and the Veterinary Directorate, seemed good. 

There appeared to be an effective flow of education and outreach materials from central 

VD officials to their regional offices to livestock market officials (including its assigned 

AV). APHIS determined it likely that veterinarians overseeing the market are aware of 

contagious animal diseases, and could detect clinical signs of disease in animals 

presented to the market. APHIS also determined that veterinary officials have the 

authority to control animal movements into and out of the livestock market, and 

surrounding area, and the authority and ability to implement contingency procedures in 

the event of an animal disease outbreak. 

Hides and Skins

Facilities that collect, process, preserve, or store raw hides and skins must be 

approved and registered by MAFRD, and demonstrate compliance with MAFRD 

regulations for hides and skins. To summarize, facilities must mark the hides and skins, 

and retain records regarding the origin of purchased skins and furs. Facilities that trade, 

preserve, treat, process, or store hides and skins must store skins of ungulates and 

solipeds slaughtered without veterinary inspection and raw skins of dead ungulates and 

solipeds for which the cause of death has not been confirmed in separate premises [9].

Meat, Products, By-Products, Food of Animal Origin, Animal Origin Waste

Croatia’s food safety regulations are laid out in the Veterinary Act and the Food 

Act [9]. The primary oversight mechanism for food safety and hygiene are official 

control programs of affiliated products and establishments. 

Official control programs for food safety and hygiene, including facility 

inspections, are conducted by state veterinary inspectors; authorized veterinarians 
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53 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine 

Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest

approved to conduct official control programs; and by “official control bodies”, which 

are veterinary organizations approved and accredited by MAFRD only for the purpose of 

administering official control programs for food safety or hygiene. Official control bodies 

must be accredited, usually serve for a period of 5 years, and can have their accreditation 

terminated if not appropriately conducting the tasks assigned [9].

All establishments involved in production, processing, or storage of food of 

animal origin must be registered with MAFRD. Official controls can be implemented in 

all phases of production, processing, storage, and distribution of food of animal origin, 

animal products, or animal by-products. Official control bodies oversee business 

operators and operations; sources, materials, and ingredients; processes, activities and 

procedures; and transport. Official control bodies conduct unannounced inspections in 

addition to annual and multiannual inspections and program reviews [9].

Animal carcasses and by-products not intended for human consumption must be 

incinerated or further processed by rendering. Facilities that treat, process, or store 

processed or unprocessed animal by-products not intended for human consumption are 

regulated by MAFRD; approved facilities are maintained in a registry. The fees and 

conditions for collection and transport of processed or unprocessed animal by-products 

are also regulated by MAFRD [9]. 

Site Visit to Croatian Rendering Facility

To assess the risks regarding animal byproducts and animal waste, the APHIS site 

visit team visited Croatia’s only renderer of animal byproducts not intended for human 

consumption. The facility processes Category 1 and 2 materials, which are higher risk for 

animal diseases and include, but are not limited to, specified risk materials (e.g. brain and 

spinal cord); fallen stock; some wild animals; pet, zoo, circus, and experimental animals; 

and international catering waste from outside the EU. The facility also separately 

processes Category 3 materials, which are lower risk for animal diseases and include, but 

are not limited to, animal by-products not fit for human consumption, including 

slaughterhouse waste (e.g. hides, hair, feathers, bones); industrial food waste; food waste 

from retailers (e.g. butchers and supermarkets); and catering waste, including domestic 

kitchen waste. Company protocol stipulates that separate trucks and separate collection 

containers be used for each waste Category.

The rendering facility is ISO 9001:2008 certified and operates under a Hazard 

Analysis and Critical Control Point (HACCP) program and under the veterinary oversight 

of state veterinary inspectors and official veterinarians. The company is registered as a 

transporter and a processor and collects animal origin waste throughout Croatia using a 

fleet of 35 vehicles and 75 collection containers. There are other registered transporters in 

Croatia who deliver animal origin waste for rendering to this facility, but only this 

company is authorized to transport slaughterhouse waste. The other registered 

transporters collect only carcasses and hunted wild boar hides and waste, which are 

securely stored until collection, transport, and processing. (Not including the innards of 

harvested wild boar, which are permitted by regulation to be buried.)

When waste arrives, it is weighed and inspected. If the waste includes animal 

carcasses, the type, number, and weight of carcasses is confirmed against the 

accompanying documentation. If any bovine carcasses are received, the ear tags are

removed. If the bovine carcass is not tagged the official veterinarian is notified, and 
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54 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine 

Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest

investigative measures are taken. The waste is unloaded and then processed at 133°C for 

20 minutes at 3 bars of pressure. The meat and bone meal end product is exported to 

Asia. The technical animal fat end product is exported to other EU MS for biodiesel. The 

maximum capacity for both plants is approximately 24 tons of raw material per hour; the

facilities on average operate at approximately 55 to 60 percent capacity, meaning a surge 

capacity is available in the event of a disease outbreak. 

Overall, the site visit team found the facility to be clean and well-maintained, with 

good biosecurity and thorough veterinary oversight provided by state veterinary 

inspectors and official veterinarians, who are responsible for official controls. Resources 

seemed sufficient for needs. Record reviews confirmed that received consignments 

indicate number and type of animals, weight, animal and farm ID, and other species 

specific animal descriptions such as age or gender (for cattle). 

Disease transmission by the collectors and transporters of animal origin waste is a

risk concern. The company’s trucks, for example, go farm-to-farm for carcass collection. 

However, to reduce the risk of disease transmission, carcasses are typically securely 

stored in an easily accessible location near a gate at the periphery of the farms. This 

reduces the number of premises the trucks enter. Additionally, the requirement for all 

registered transport vehicles, including those from other companies, to undergo C/D prior 

to leaving the processing facility further mitigates the risk of disease transmission. Trucks 

are washed and disinfected using a virocidal agent by this company’s personnel, who 

document the C/D occurred.

Further, in the event of a disease suspicion or confirmation, the company has 

contingency measures in place. Officials reported that their farm-to-farm movements 

would be restricted, and that they would increase the strength and concentration of 

disinfectants, extend disinfectant exposure time on vehicles and equipment, and 

implement additional biosecurity measures for C/D that restrict drivers from exiting their 

truck (a separate crew unloads the waste and performs C/D on the transport vehicle).

Overall, APHIS concludes that Croatia has processes in place for effective animal 

origin waste collection and treatment, including biosecurity measures to prevent disease 

transmission and spread by way of animal origin waste collection or treatment. In the 

event that an animal disease is suspected or an animal disease outbreak occurs, the 

rendering company participates in contingency measures to mitigate the risk of disease 

spread, and has a surge capacity to handle the increased volume of heat processing of 

animal origin waste.

Feral Swine, Wild Boar, and Croatia’s Hunting Grounds

Croatia does have feral swine, which can be epidemiologically relevant in CSF 

transmission and spread. Croatia’s feral swine density per municipality is shown in 

Figure 16 (p. 55). Croatian animal health officials structure veterinary regulations and 

control measures to minimize the contact between feral and domestic swine, which 

reduces the likelihood that contagious animal disease would spread from feral to 

domestic swine populations. Details about Croatia’s current CSF control program and 

regulatory approach for feral swine are available in 4. Active Disease Control Programs.

Wild boars are hunted for meat and sport in Croatia on approximately 1,000 Stateowned, privately-owned, or hunting association-owned hunting grounds. All hunting of 

wild boar takes place on hunting grounds, as wild boar cannot be harvested from private 
55

55 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine 

Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest

land. MAFRD’s Directorate of Forestry, Hunting, and Wood Industry (DFHWI) is the 

competent authority for most aspects of wildlife and hunting, including authority and 

oversight of State-owned hunting grounds [6]. 

Figure 16: Population Density of Feral Swine in Croatia [8].

APHIS Site Visit to a Hunting Ground in Sisak-Moslavina County

To confirm knowledge, awareness, and oversight of feral swine and wild boar 

issues as they relate to CSF, and to verify the related elements of Croatia’s CSF control 

program, APHIS officials visited a hunting ground in Sisak-Moslavina County. This 

hunting ground is 14,000 unfenced acres that includes a game processing plant. Game 

management and property management, including oversight of the processing plant, are

the responsibility of MAFRD’s DFHWI. The site visit team was hosted by the state 

veterinary inspectors, AVs, and DFHWI officials responsible for the facility. 

This hunting ground has approximately 60-70 reindeer, 30 fallow deer (bucks), 

200 fallow deer (does), and 400 wild boar. Approximately 50 hunters enter the grounds 

per year and harvest approximately 200 wild boar, 10 reindeer, 10 fallow deer (bucks), 

and 50 does per year. The yearly combined volume of visitors is approximately 100 

people, as there is other human traffic onto the hunting ground to manage farming (row 

crops) and timber production. 

Hunters must notify state veterinary inspectors 48 hours in advance of their hunt. 

At the conclusion of the hunt, each harvested animal is tagged with a plastic tag (each 

game type has its own color) containing a unique identification number and the unique ID 

number for the hunting ground. The animals are field-dressed at the site of kill, the 

innards are buried, and the hunter or a Forestry official collects blood and tonsils for CSF 
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56 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine 

Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest

testing. Every wild boar killed is sampled; if multiple wild boar are harvested, CSF 

samples are not pooled. They may, however, be sent to the laboratory as a batch. 

The carcass is then taken to the processing plant. The carcass is hung, weighed, 

skinned, and tagged, under a HACCP program, in an outdoor area that is cleaned and 

disinfected after each use. An AV conducts a post-mortem examination, equivalent to 

what would be conducted at a slaughterhouse but primarily focused on changes to the 

carcass or meat that would indicate parasites or rot, and samples the carcass for 

Trichinella. The AV also transports the CSF samples to the CVI in Zagreb for testing (at 

hunting grounds further away from the CVI, samples are shipped). The carcass remains at 

the cutting plant under refrigeration until laboratory results are obtained (usually 2 – 3 

days for CSF test results) after which, assuming all tests are negative, it is moved to deep 

freezer, processed, and sold as meat by the DFHWI. The hunter does not take the meat 

with them at the time of harvest and processing. They can purchase the meat, but not 

until negative CSF test results are obtained. Hides are also held until negative CSF test 

results are obtained, after which they are sent for rendering. If a carcass tests positive for 

CSF, the carcass is destroyed, MAFRD is notified, and an epidemiological investigation 

(and other appropriate contingency efforts, if necessary) is launched. 

Discussion and Key Risk Issues 

The key risk issue with feral swine and hunting and harvest of wild boar in 

Croatia is the potential role that these animals have in CSF transmission and spread, and 

the risk of spillover of contagious animal diseases from feral to domestic swine. 

The site visit team observed a high level of veterinary control and oversight at the

State-owned hunting ground. The hunting and harvest of animals is well monitored by

species and by number, as is the placing of carcasses into and out of the processing 

facility. Carcasses are appropriately segregated based on their disease testing status. The 

processing facility was clean and well maintained, and had the layout and resources 

necessary to adequately conduct all steps in harvesting feral swine and processing and 

selling meat. The staff seemed competent and knowledgeable of operations, procedures, 

and legal requirements. There appeared to be close cooperation among DFHWI officials, 

state veterinary inspectors, and AVs. 

All documentation was easily accessible, in good order, and demonstrated that 

harvested feral swine could be traced from tagging to disease testing and results to 

processing and sale. The site visit team reviewed the following documentation: 

Trichinella log, animal log, confiscation/waste log, meat sales log, and the CSF testing 

log. The CSF testing log included date, type and number of animals, origin/owner, 

sample type, testing lab, laboratory submission number, and test results. All serological 

and virological CSF test results were all negative. 

Overall, APHIS concludes that Croatian officials adequately oversee State-owned 

hunting grounds and effectively monitor the animal health status of their feral swine. 

APHIS considers the carcass tagging and testing procedures demonstrated at the Stateowned grounds capable of detecting CSF should it exist in feral swine subpopulations

and capable of preventing disease spread by effectively controlling the movement of 

potentially infected animal products. Although Croatian officials acknowledged a lack of 

equivalent oversight at private-owned or hunter association-owned hunting grounds, the 

same carcass tagging and testing procedures are required there.
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57 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine 

Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest

9. CSF, FMD, and SVD Surveillance in Croatia

Disease surveillance in Croatia is primarily a function of animal owners/keepers

and the AVs assigned to their premises. While surveillance planning and oversight come 

from the VD’s national level to the field through the VD’s regional offices, it is the AVs 

who work with swine owners to encourage disease reporting, collect surveillance 

samples, and transport them to the laboratory. 

Current CSF Surveillance Strategy and Components

The specific objectives of Croatia’s current CSF surveillance program are to 

detect CSF infection as early as possible, to minimize the number of infected farms, to 

detect illegal vaccination against CSF, and to promote awareness among swine keepers 

and veterinarians about CSF risks and prevention. The current CSF control program 

defines a CSF case as “the presence of the CSF virus as demonstrated directly by virus 

isolation, the detection of virus antigen or virus nucleic acid, or indirectly by 

seroconversion which is not the result of vaccination” [49].

The current CSF plan includes serological testing, virological testing, and official 

controls on the implementation of Preventative Biosecurity Measures (PBM), the latter 

assessed by Questionnaire/Response, per the Order on measures to protect animals from 

infectious and parasitic diseases. Serological testing is primarily used to detect illegal 

vaccination of pigs against CSF, and for baseline testing for subclinical disease. 

Virological testing is used on all herds and premises where clinical signs associated with 

CSF are observed, on animals at slaughterhouses that present clinical signs associated 

with CSF during ante-mortem or post-mortem examination, and on holdings where 

antibacterial treatment of swine fails to improve their health status. Virological testing is 

used to confirm or rule out CSF infection, as bovine viral diarrhea virus and border 

disease virus antibodies can cross-react with CSF antigen during CSF serological testing

[49]. 

Current CSF Surveillance in Domestic Pigs- Serological Testing

Croatia currently conducts active CSF serosurveillance using baseline random 

sampling and targeted risk-based sampling. The random sampling plan and the targeted 

risk-based sampling plan are based on the VD’s risk categorization of swine farms in 

Croatia. The VD’s risk categorization of swine farms is based on risk factors identified 

during Croatia’s 2007-2008 CSF epidemics that have been adjusted over time to 

Croatia’s updated epidemiological circumstances. The risk factors are biosecurity 

standards on small farms (preventative biosecurity measures, PBM, as stipulated in Order 

on measures to protect animals from infectious and parasitic diseases, and based on 

veterinary check of the holding from 2012), current movement patterns of pigs, recent 

occurrence of CSF in wild boar, and recent CSF epidemics in neighboring countries [49]. 

Croatia currently considers the following categories of farms as high-risk for new 

introduction of CSFv: 

1. Commercial farms with > 100 fattening pigs found non-compliant regarding PBMs

2. Farms with > 5 breeding pigs found non-compliant regarding PBMs.

3. Mixed herds with > 10 pigs found non-compliant regarding PBMs.

4. Pigs in V-S, S-M, and Karlovac county located near hunting grounds; pigs in 

localities where pasture raising of domestic pigs on pasture is not practiced in accordance 
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58 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine 

Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest

with the affiliated regulation (Official Gazette No 135/2011); and pigs in localities 

bordering on the countries in which CSF in domestic pigs have been confirmed in the last 

three years, and where the CSF status of wild boar is either unfavorable or not 

sufficiently known [49].

The 2013 random sampling plan for farms from categories 1, 2, and 3 was 

designed to allow for detection of at least 1 seropositive holding (with 95% confidence,

and assuming perfect tests at a herd level) if the prevalence of seropositives is at least 

1%. The number of animals to be sampled per holding will allow for detection of: 20% 

seroconversion with 95% confidence in category 1; and 10% seroconversion, with 95% 

confidence, in categories 2 and 3. Based on that design, samples will be taken once 

annually from holding included in the study as follows: 

1. 141 farms, 14 pigs per farm. (Expected samples: 1974)

2. 289 farms, 28 pigs per farm. (Expected samples: 8092)

3. 297 farms, 14 pigs per farm. (Expected samples: 4158).

Random serological sampling will include approximately 13,600 pig holdings and 

300,000 animals [49]. 

Farms in category 4 are not randomly sampled. Rather, they are targeted for 

surveillance based on the previously described risk factors: previous non-compliance 

with PBMs, current movement patterns of pigs, recent CSF occurrences in wild boar, and 

recent CSF epidemics in neighboring countries. For category 4, 15 farms in 60 towns in 

V-S, S-M and Karlovac County will be selected for sampling. The farms will have 5-50 

pigs, and an average of 8 pigs (greater than 4 months old) per farm will be sampled twice 

annually, for a total expected sampling of 14,400 pigs. The number of animals sampled 

per holding will allow for detection of at least 1 seropositive animal if prevalence of 

those seropositives is at least 10% (with 95% confidence) [49].

CSF Surveillance in Domestic Pigs- Virological Testing

Croatia has used virological testing in recent years for CSF confirmation or rule 

out of CSF suspect cases and to test animals (and occasionally pork or pork products) 

prior to their movement to other parts of Croatia from V-S, S-M, and Karlovac counties. 

Updating that strategy, virological testing in 2013 was scheduled for blood and tissue 

samples taken from pigs (on-farm, presented for import or transit, or at ante- or postmortem inspection) showing clinical signs of CSF, for tissue samples taken from pigs that 

died or were killed for diagnostic purposes, and for blood samples taken from swine 

when antibacterial treatment fails to or only temporarily improves their health status.

All farms in Croatia are eligible for virological testing since Croatian animal 

health authorities retain legal authority to conduct virological testing on all farms. 

However, virological testing is used most often to test animals from farms in categories 1, 

2 and 3 located in northern Croatia, where Croatia’s commercial pig production is 

primarily situated. This does not include virologically tested animals from farms in 

category 4, which are located in V-S, S-M and Karlovac county [49].

Recent CSF Serological and Virological Testing Results in Domestic Pigs

Recent CSF serological and virological surveillance results are presented in 

Tables 2 and 3 (p. 59). 
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59 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine 

Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest

Table 2: Summary results of Croatia’s CSF surveillance in domestic pigs from 2007-

2011 [49, 50].

Number tested, Number positive

Year 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

Test Test Pos Test Pos Test Pos Test Pos Test Pos

Ab-ELISA 105,784 1,719 41,454 229 12,013 23 40,123 91 7,484 --

Ag-ELISA 12,101 603 483 7 253 0 408 0 151 0

Virus isolation 289 154 15 2 0 0 81 0 0 0

RT-PCR 679 162 4 1 2 0 75 0 52 0

Q-RT-PCR 895 280 475 21 196 0 1,181 0 16,670 0

Total 119,748 42,431 12,464 41,868 24,357

Table 3: Croatia’s CSF laboratory activities for 2011 [50].

AgELISAAbELISA VNT*RTPCR

RealTime 

PCR

Virus 

Isolation Total

Domestic Swine 151 7,484 182 52 16,670 0 24,539

Wild boar 1 12,885 72 0 10,965 0 23,923

Quarantine 0 256 0 0 0 0 256

ILCT** 22 22 44 22 22 22 154

Total 174 20,647 298 74 27,657 22 48,872

*Virus neutralization test

**Inter-laboratory comparison tests, organized and administered by EU Reference Laboratories

In 2012, there were over 26,000 serological samples tested for antibodies by 

ELISA. A single test was positive. By the farm categorization that was in place at the 

time:

Category 1: 658 farms were randomly selected for CSF serologic testing, with 

7,649 pigs tested. All tests were negative. 

Category 2: 16,892 pigs from 116 villages and 1,868 farms in high risk areas 

(predominantly V-S and S-M counties), were tested. 1 sample, from S-M County, was 

seropositive. 

Category 3: CSF serological tests were conducted on pigs from 37 premises 

where CSF was suspected or needed to be ruled out. The disease was ruled out in all 

instances. 

Category 4: 11,958 pigs, from 583 farms, were tested for CSF prior to the pigs

being moved out of V-S, S-M, or Karlovac counties. All tests were negative. The bulk of 

this testing (427 farms, 8,951 pigs) was conducted in V-S County. (Clinical examination 

of pigs prior to movement from V-S, S-M, and Karlovac counties is a subset of Category

4 testing. A total of 20,416 pigs from 1321 farms underwent clinical examination prior to 

movement from V-S, S-M, and Karlovac counties. The bulk of this surveillance-- 1,221 

farms, 19,459 pigs-- was also conducted in V-S County.)

Also conducted in 2012 were a total of 12,060 virological tests (Q-RT-PCR). There were 

no positive test results [44]. 

These data reflect that Croatia’s CSF surveillance generally aligns with its 

epidemiological situation. As CSF outbreaks in 2007 and 2008 were detected, controlled 
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60 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine 

Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest

and eradicated, the sampling strategy and sampling frequency changed accordingly. From 

2007 to 2011-- excepting a spike in the number of samples taken and number of 

seropositives in 2010-- there was a reduction in the number of CSF samples taken, the 

number of CSF seropositive samples, and the number of CSF virological positive 

samples. 2012 surveillance activities were conducted at a level similar to 2011. These

data demonstrate that CSF was being detected, controlled, and eventually eradicated in 

domestic swine, and, as a result, Croatia gradually scaled back its CSF surveillance. The 

data confirms that CSF has not been detected in domestic swine since 2008.

Tables 4 and 5 demonstrate the coverage of the surveillance plans for domestic 

herds and pigs, respectively.

Table 4. CSF sampling: coverage of domestic herds [49].

Total 

Herds

Herds 

under 

the 

program

Herds 

tested

Positive 

herds

New 

positive 

herds

% herds 

covered

% positive 

herds (herd 

prevalence)

% new 

positive 

herds 

(herd 

incidence)

2007 105,000 13,074 13,074 128 128 100 0.979 0.979

2008 105,000 4,500 3,117 3 3 69 0.096 0.096

2009 104,000 2,700 1,327 0 - 49 - -

2010 95,000 2,700 1,779 0 - 66 - -

2011 95,000 3,850 2,875 0 - 75 - -

Table 5. CSF Sampling: coverage of domestic pigs [49].

Total pigs Pigs to be 

tested under 

the program

Pigs tested Positive 

pigs

% coverage 

at animal 

level

% positive 

animals 

(animal 

prevalence)

2007 1,600,000 106,815 106,815 1,719 100 1.61

2008 1,550,000 45,000 41,454 229 92 0.55

2009 1,500,000 35,000 12,013 23 34 0.19

2010 1,500,000 35,000 41,518 91 119 0.22

2011 1,500,000 35,000 25,562 24 73 0.09

These data confirm the gradual reduction in the number of seropositive herds, the 

number of seropositive pigs, and the CSF prevalence in Croatia, except for the spike in 

2010. Herd-level and animal-level coverage fluctuated from 2007 to 2011, and overall

has dipped slightly. Of note, the herd prevalence of 0 in recent years contrasts to an 

animal prevalence of > 0. This could be the result of a) test-positive animals coming from 

holdings that do not qualify as a herd; b) test-positive animals being detected at slaughter 

and not traced back to a herd; c) the herd prevalence actually reflecting the “program 

herd prevalence” (in other words, positive animals came from herds not under a particular

program); or d) the prevalence could have been factored after an infected herd was 

depopulated.
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61 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine 

Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest

Conclusions- CSF Surveillance in Domestic Swine

Croatia’s CSF surveillance program for domestic swine is rooted on the CSF 

epidemic in 2007-2008 but has been tailored in recent years to the specific CSF 

epidemiologic situation at hand. Data from 2007 to 2012 confirms that appropriate

surveillance programs remained in place, that the surveillance programs were 

successfully detecting serological positive animals; that virological testing could 

successfully confirm CSF in swine, and that CSF has not been confirmed in domestic 

swine in Croatia by virological testing since 2008. Overall, APHIS considers Croatia’s 

CSF surveillance programs from 2007 – 2012, and their planned surveillance for 2013, to 

be appropriate for the epidemiological situation in those years, and a major contributor to 

Croatia’s success in eradicating CSF. APHIS considers Croatia’s current CSF 

surveillance plan well developed, well defined, and capable of quickly and accurately 

detecting CSF in domestic swine should it occur.

CSF Surveillance Strategy for Feral Swine

Serological and virological surveillance is routinely conducted in feral swine

populations in Croatia using a risk-based approach that targets hunting grounds in 

Vukovar-Srijem, Sisak-Moslavina, and Karlovac counties. This strategy is based on the 

recent history of CSF in Croatia and the current epidemiological situation in these 

counties, and the fact that CSF infection in feral swine in those counties has not been 

completely ruled out [51, 52]. Figure 17 depicts this zoned approach to CSF surveillance 

in feral swine. 

Figure 17. CSF surveillance strategy in Croatia for 2012 [7].

Additionally, and as depicted in Figure 18 (p. 62), Croatia plans to conduct in 

2013 targeted CSF surveillance in feral swine along the border with Serbia and BiH.
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62 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine 

Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest

Figure 18. Zoned approach for CSF Surveillance in feral swine for 2013 [49].

Recent CSF Surveillance Results for Feral Swine

Recent CSF testing results for feral swine are presented in Table 6 (p. 62). 

Table 6. CSF Testing in Feral Swine [49].

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

Tested Pos Tested Pos Tested Pos Tested Pos Tested Pos

Ab-ELISA 2,189 13 5,457 118 6,177 64 8,560 75 12,238 23

Ag-ELISA 1,523 0 398 0 68 0 56 0 - -

Q-RT-PCR 60 2 5,278 4 6,964 0 8,797 0 11,965 0

RT-PCR 645 2 265 0 - - - - - -

Total 4,417 11,398 13,209 17,413 24,203

In 2012, 12,862 CSF serological tests (Ab-ELISA) were conducted on samples 

collected from feral swine. 14 of the tests returned positive results. 7,436 samples were 

virologically tested using Q-RT-PCR; none (0) were positive. Data was also available for 

the 2012-2013 hunting season, which ran from April 1 2012 to March 31, 2013 (Table 7, 

p. 63). During that time, 10,800 wild boar were serologically tested for CSF. 13 of the 

wild boar were seropositive. All of the 13 seropositive wild boar were from V-S, S-M, 

and Karlovac counties; 12 of the 13 were from V-S and S-M counties. As expected, these 

three counties were also where the bulk of the testing took place: 1,198 samples (11% of 

the total) were taken in V-S County; 3,866 samples (36% of the total) were taken in S-M 

County; and 1,471 samples (14% of the total) were taken in Karlovac County. All 

seropositive wild boar were greater than 6 months old, and 9 of the 13 (70%) were 

greater than 2 years old [44]. 
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63 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine 

Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest

Table 7. Summary of CSF serological testing in wild boar for the 2012-2013 hunting 

season (April 1, 2012 – March 31, 2013) [44].

As demonstrated by the data in Table 8 (p. 64), virological testing found no 

evidence of the virus in wild boar during the 2012-2013 hunting season. Similar to 

serologic testing, virological testing was focused on V-S, S-M, and Karlovac counties: 

6020 of 6663 total samples, or 90%, were taken from those three counties. 
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64 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine 

Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest

Table 8. Summary of CSF virological testing of tonsils, spleen, or kidney samples from 

wild boar during the 2012-2013 hunting season [44]. 

Overall, these data trend opposite the CSF surveillance data for domestic swine. 

CSF serological surveillance and virological confirmatory testing in feral swine has

generally increased from 2007 to 2011, and then dropped off in 2012. Testing levels 

remain approximately the same as 2012 for 2013, as the 2013 CSF surveillance plan calls 

for 12,180 Ab-ELISA serological and 4,650 virological samples to be taken and tested, 

for a total of 16,830 samples taken and tested. It can be extrapolated from feral swine 

spatial density maps and from recent CSF seropositive findings in wild boar (Figure 18, 

p. 65), that Croatia’s feral swine CSF surveillance is being conducted on appropriately 

targeted animals at or near high risk hunting grounds, or Croatia’s international borders.
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65 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine 

Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest

Figure 18: Spatial density of feral swine sampled in the 2011 and 2012 hunting season, 

and distribution of CSF seropositives [7].

Discussion and Conclusions- CSF Surveillance in Feral Swine

APHIS concludes that Croatia is actively conducting CSF surveillance in feral 

swine using serological and virological testing. Surveillance data and spatial density 

maps suggest that targeted, risk-based CSF surveillance in feral swine is being conducted 

in well-devised zones, at appropriate levels. APHIS notes that, between 2007 and 2011,

Croatia’s CSF surveillance in feral swine increased. Surveillance activities in 2012 and 

planned surveillance activities for 2013 have leveled off. This appears appropriate for the 

given epidemiological conditions in Croatia, and demonstrates the ability of animal 

health officials to effectively tailor their surveillance programs. Virological testing did 

not confirm CSF virus in feral swine for 2012, or through March 31, 2013.

Although V-S, S-M, and Karlovac counties have not had CSF confirmed in wild 

boar since November 2008 (in S-M county), these counties are considered high risk 

because the presence of virus cannot be ruled out. These counties represent the bulk of 

seropositive feral swine, which occur with reasonable frequency and in pigs of expected 

ages. Therefore, the emphasis of CSF surveillance on these high risk counties seems 

appropriate. Similarly, as Croatia has eradicated CSF in domestic swine, and contained it 

in feral swine to the three high risk counties, shifting the focus of their CSF surveillance 

in feral swine to areas of international border with Serbia and BiH also seems 

appropriate. 

APHIS recognizes the additional risk mitigation measures that MAFRD has 

placed on V-S, S-M, or Karlovac counties should CSF be detected in feral swine. Planned 

surveillance for CSF in feral swine in these counties is immediately supplemented by 

additional surveillance activities if feral swine test seropositive for CSF, or CSF is 

suspected for other reasons. A detailed description and analysis of Croatia’s 
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66 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine 

Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest

epidemiological investigation, differential diagnosis, and emergency response framework 

is available in Section 11: Croatia’s Emergency Response Capability. 

Overall, APHIS concludes that Croatia’s CSF surveillance program in feral swine 

is capable of detecting the disease, accurately and early; and that emphasis on detecting 

CSF in feral swine is appropriate Croatia’s current epidemiological conditions.

CSF Surveillance- Discussion and Conclusions

Croatia’s surveillance plan emphasizes early detection of CSF infection, detecting 

illegal vaccination or clinically inapparent infections, and promoting awareness amongst 

swine holders and veterinarians. Overall, Croatia’s CSF serosurveillance program 

appears sufficient. MAFRD officials at the national and regional level and AVs in the 

field demonstrated an awareness of CSF control program elements, sampling strategies, 

risk factors for CSF, and the importance of contributing to and maintaining a robust CSF 

surveillance program. AVs appear to raise awareness with swine owners about CSF. 

Croatia conducts active surveillance in domestic and feral swine using a 

combination of baseline random sampling and targeted risk-based sampling. Targeted 

risk-based surveillance is focused on high risk premises in Croatia’s high risk counties, 

and on areas in close proximity to Croatia’s international borders. Generally, the 

estimated prevalence and confidence levels applied to the surveillance plan are 

reasonable. The number of farms tested appears to meet the goals of the sampling design. 

Coverage of Croatia’s farms and swine seems reasonable.

Based on the actions taken to eliminate the 2006-2008 CSF outbreak, including 

post-outbreak surveillance, the current CSF surveillance program, and the absence of 

confirmed cases of CSF in domestic or feral swine since 2008, APHIS concludes that 

Croatia is currently free of CSF in domestic swine. However, APHIS further concludes 

that the presence of CSF in wild boar cannot be fully ruled out, particularly in the three 

high risk counties. APHIS considers Croatia’s risk-based sampling strategy for CSF in 

wild boar likely to detect and confirm CSF rapidly in wild boar.

Active FMD, SVD, and Rinderpest Surveillance, and Recent Test Results

Croatia conducts active surveillance for FMDv and SVDv, but at a much lower 

level than CSF. In 2011, the Laboratory for Serological Diagnostics of Viral Diseases 

(part of the CVI) tested 659 bovine serum samples and 279 milk samples for FMD and 

SVD, respectively. It also tested 186 and 129 bovine and swine blood samples on 

quarantined animals for FMD and SVD, respectively [50]. In 2012 the laboratory tested 

207 cattle, 5 sheep, 725 domestic swine, and 58 wild boar for FMD, and tested 819

domestic swine and 58 wild boar for SVD, using Ab-ELISA. All test results were 

negative [53]. Croatia’s level of surveillance for FMDv and SVDv reflect the current 

epidemiological conditions, and that SVD has never been reported in Croatia and FMD 

has not been reported in Croatia since 1978.

Croatia does not actively conduct rinderpest surveillance. This also reflects the 

current epidemiological conditions, as rinderpest was last reported in Croatia in 1883, has 

been eradicated in Europe since 1960, and was declared globally eradicated in 2011. 
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67 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine 

Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest

Ante- and Post-Mortem Veterinary Inspection, Ability to Detect Vesicular Disease 

Croatia conducts ante- and post-mortem veterinary inspection on most animals 

presented for slaughter. This is an important surveillance tool for CSF, FMD, SVD, and 

rinderpest, particularly for detecting FMD, as active serologic and virologic surveillance 

for this virus has decreased in recent years. NOTE: Veterinary inspections are also 

conducted on live animals presented for import or transit at Croatia’s borders, and on live 

animals prior to domestic movement. Please see 7. Croatia’s Movement Controls and 

Biosecurity.

The requirements and basic procedures for ante- and post-mortem veterinary 

inspection at slaughter are outlined in the VA. To summarize, most animals for slaughter 

must undergo ante- and post—mortem veterinary inspection. There are exceptions to this 

requirement, including small quantities of animals slaughtered by family-owned 

agricultural businesses to produce traditional meat and dairy products. Also excepted are 

healthy animals, excluding cattle, slaughtered for household consumption. Cattle 

slaughtered for household consumption are not excepted, and must be inspected. 

Products of animal origin may be sold only if they meet corresponding food safety 

standards, and the VA and supporting regulations also cover animal welfare and residues. 

Any sick animal, regardless of how it will be marketed or consumed, must undergo 

veterinary inspection prior to slaughter. CSF, FMD, SVD, and rinderpest are notifiable 

disease in Croatia; under an official control program, AVs or inspectors conducting 

veterinary inspection are required to officially report any clinical signs of these diseases.

Detection of clinical signs of vesicular disease on ante- or post-mortem slaughter 

inspection triggers sample collection and submission to the laboratory for diagnostic 

testing, and confirmation or rule out of disease. 

Site Visit to a Slaughterhouse

To confirm ante- and post-mortem veterinary inspection processes, and to 

ascertain MAFRD’s ability to detect and accurately diagnose CSF, FMD, and SVD, 

APHIS officials visited a slaughterhouse. The site visit team was hosted by the 

slaughterhouse owner, manager, and staff, and the state veterinary inspectors and AVs 

assigned to the facility. 

Under a HACCP program, the facility slaughters and processes cattle and sheep, 

and processes purchased whole hog halves to chilled products. The facility runs 3 or 4 

days per week and slaughters weekly 30-35 heifers, 70 calves, and 20-30 lambs. Its 

maximum capacity is 50 cattle per day, which indicates scale-up potential. Seasonally, 

and for two weeks only, the facility does slaughter piglets. The heifers, lambs, and piglets 

slaughtered during the Christmas season are all sourced from Croatia; the calves are 

imported from Hungary and Poland. 

An AV is present at every slaughter, and at every offloading of imported animals 

to be slaughtered. The facility is also inspected weekly for official controls for 

biosecurity, food safety, and HACCP-related compliance, as required by the official 

control plan that is established by the regional office, and once annually by a state 

veterinary inspector.

Animals for slaughter are offloaded in the back of the slaughterhouse and penned 

until slaughter (within 1 – 2 days of arrival). The emptied live-haul truck is cleaned and 
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68 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine 

Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest

disinfected on the premises, in the presence of an AV, who issues a certificate attesting 

that the vehicle was cleaned and disinfected. 

When scheduled for slaughter, animals undergo ante-mortem veterinary

inspection, which includes confirmation of animal identification and physical 

examination; enter the slaughterhouse and are stunned by captive bolt; undergo postmortem inspection (including inspection of the head, BSE sampling and removal of 

specified risk materials for cattle older than 30 months); and are bled, skinned, halved, 

and processed into chilled products (which are held for cattle older than 30 months until a 

negative BSE test result is obtained). 

Slaughterhouse waste is cold-stored in special containers until removed by a

registered transporter (see analysis below) and taken to Croatia’s waste collection and 

processing center. The slaughterhouse is then cleaned and disinfected. 

Discussion of Slaughterhouse and Veterinary Inspection Procedures

Overall, the slaughter facility had excellent biosecurity. The property was fenced 

and gated. Live animals arrive at the rear of the facility, are slaughtered and processed, 

and chilled processed products are stored and shipped or stored and sold over the counter 

from the front of the facility. The interior of the slaughterhouse was clean, wellmaintained, and fully automated, with contracted C/D and pest control procedures as 

outlined in the HACCP plan. Every surface is bleached, and all equipment is pressurewashed and disinfected. The site visit team reviewed slaughterhouse documentation, and 

was easily able to trace the flow of live animals to carcasses to products.

Facility staff and veterinary officials seemed competent and knowledgeable of 

operations, procedures, and legal requirements. Veterinary officials demonstrated 

adequate knowledge of ante- and post-mortem inspection procedures; demonstrated 

awareness of the clinical signs associated with CSF, FMD, and SVD; and demonstrated 

participation in VD-sponsored training and simulation exercises on highly contagious 

diseases, including vesicular diseases.

Ante- or post-mortem inspection resulting in suspicion of CSF, FMD, SVD, or 

other highly contagious animal diseases, would prompt appropriate action to be taken. 

Live animals on the property are quarantined; the slaughter line is stopped; no animal 

products can leave the premises; and no employees are permitted to leave or enter the 

premises. The state veterinary inspector would be notified and report the incident up to 

the central level of the VD, which would trigger the appropriate of Croatia’s national 

contingency plans for CSF and FMD. Although Croatia does not have a national SVD 

contingency plan, APHIS considers it likely that SVD or rinderpest would be accurately 

diagnosed or ruled out if vesicular disease is suspected. Please see 11. Croatia’s 

Emergency Response Capability.

This facility only slaughters small swine for local and seasonal markets, but does 

regularly slaughter and process large and small ruminants. Overall, APHIS was confident

that animals slaughtered in this or a like facility would be subject to clinical examination 

and disease testing requirements prior to moving to slaughter, and undergo ante- and 

post-mortem inspection at the slaughter facility. APHIS concludes that, collectively, 

these measures would likely detect contagious animal diseases like CSF, FMD, or SVD

and trigger an appropriate emergency response if one of these hazards was suspected or 

confirmed. This includes quarantine of potentially infected animals or contaminated 
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69 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine 

Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest

animal products, which reduces the likelihood of CSFv-, FMDv-, or SVDv-contaminated 

animals or animal products could be presented for export to the United States. 

10. Croatia’s Diagnostic Laboratory Capacity

Croatian Veterinary Institute

Animal disease and food safety testing in Croatia, including testing for CSF, 

FMD, and SVD, is conducted by the Croatian Veterinary Institute (CVI). The CVI 

consists of the national laboratory facility in Zagreb and 5 branch laboratories: Veterinary

Institute Split, Veterinary Institute Rijeka, Veterinary Institute Križevci, Veterinary 

Institute Vinkovci, and the Center for Poultry Farming in Zagreb [6, 50]. 

The main activities of the CVI are diagnosis of infectious animal diseases; 

laboratory involvement in other matters of veterinary public health; scientific research 

and activities; and laboratory services to support Croatia’s industries (e.g. bacteriology

and mycology testing for slaughterhouses, the food service industry, and small animal 

practices) [6]. CVI staff serve as members of MAFRD’s expert groups and other advisory 

committees on animal diseases; play a critical role in educational outreach, conducting 

workshops covering various disease diagnostic topics, including but not limited to CSF 

sampling and surveillance; and participate in international laboratory testing exercises 

and training for CSF, FMD, and SVD [6, 50]. 

The CVI has 246 employees; 46 have PhDs and 10 have MSc. degrees. Currently,

the CVI and branch laboratories are ISO/IEC 17025 certified for 132 methods. The CVI’s 

funding is primarily supplied by MAFRD (65%) and user fees (28%): animal owners pay 

for diagnostic testing (although the state budget can but does not always cover the cost of 

certain veterinary services, including sampling/diagnostic services) [6, 9]. A small 

portion of funds (7%) are supplied by the Ministry of Science, Education and Sports [6].

CSF Diagnostic Testing

The central laboratory of the CVI is the National Reference Laboratory for 

Diagnostics of CSF in Croatia [50], and it is the primary site for CSF testing. Testing is 

conducted per the Ordinance on the diagnostic manual for CSF, which aligns with 

Commission Decision 2002/106/EC [8]. The primary serological test is a commercially 

available antibody enzyme linked immunosorbent assay (AB-ELISA) that detects CSF 

antibodies specific for the E2 CSF viral glycoprotein (gp). The primary virological test is 

quantitative real time reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction (qrt-RT-PCR). Both 

methods have been validated and their specificity and sensitivity is 98/99% and 

100/100%, respectively [49].

Serologic testing (Ab-ELISA) for CSFv is conducted at the central laboratory in 

Zagreb and regional laboratories in Križevci and Vinkovci; the latter can only test CSF 

samples taken from domestic swine. Collectively, the CVI labs are accredited for running 

Ab-ELISA tests, to ISO 17025:2005 standards, and can collectively run a maximum of 

1200 samples daily [6]. The central laboratory conducts training courses for the branch 

laboratories for CSF Ab-ELISA [50].

All virological testing (qrt-RT-PCR) is conducted at the central laboratory in 

Zagreb. The central laboratory in Zagreb also runs Ag-ELISAs, with a daily maximum 
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APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine 

Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest

capacity of 900 samples [6, 8, 50], and, in 2011, introduced the virus neutralization test 

(VNT) for CSFv [50]. 

Since 1999 and 2006 the CVI has participated in proficiency testing for 

serological testing (Ab-ELISA) and virological testing (qrt-RT-PCR), respectively, with 

the European Community Reference Laboratory for CSF, the Institute of Virology in 

Hannover, Germany [6]. 

FMD and SVD Diagnostic Testing

The CVI’s Laboratory for Serological Diagnosis of Viral Diseases is the National 

Reference Laboratory for Diagnostics of FMD and SVD in Croatia. It is the only 

laboratory in Croatia that conducts FMD and SVD testing; no FMD or SVD testing is 

conducted at the regional laboratories [6]. 

Only serological tests are routinely conducted for FMD and SVD, using 

PrioCheck’s commercial kits. The testing method for each are accredited to 

ISO17025:2007 standards, and the laboratory has a maximum daily capacity of 210 

samples for FMD and 180 samples for SVD [6, 8, 50]. In 2010 the CVI introduced PCR 

testing for FMD and SVD; in 2011, it introduced RT-PCR testing for FMD [6, 50].

Since 2008, the CVI has participated in proficiency testing with the European 

Community Reference Laboratory for FMD and SVD, the Institute for Animal Health in 

Pirbright, UK [6, 50]. 

Discussion and Risk Factors Related to Croatia’s Laboratory Capabilities

APHIS personnel toured the CVI’s central laboratory in Zagreb, and identified no 

specific risks. The laboratory was small, but well-stocked with state of the art equipment. 

Biosecurity measures, including restricted access to certain areas of the laboratories and 

pass-throughs at appropriate places, established a clean/dirty line.

Detailed operating procedures are in place for testing and associated activities, 

including contingencies for abnormal circumstances (e.g. procedures for re-sampling in 

the rare event that improper or unusable samples are received). The laboratory staff 

seemed knowledgeable of requirements for sample processing and testing procedures. 

Laboratory managers and subject matter experts were very confident that CSFv and 

FMDv serological test results are reported to the VD and to local veterinary authorities 

within 24 hours of sample receipt at the laboratory, and this was was generally confirmed 

in the APHIS review of epidemiological investigation files. 

Overall, the risks associated with diagnostic testing and laboratory capacity is 

mitigated by the CVI’s ISO standards, good laboratory practices, and appropriate quality 

control standards. APHIS considers Croatia’s laboratory system capable of quickly and 

accurately receiving, processing, and completing diagnostic tests on samples received; 

able to accurately diagnose CSF, FMD, and SVD, and accurately distinguish them from 

their differential diagnoses; and capable of quickly and efficiently communicating test 

results to the VD and back to the field. Although the volume of samples required to be 

processed during a CSF, FMD, or SVD outbreak would be high, and would likely stress 

the CVI’s human resources, Croatia’s laboratory system is capable of handling the 

volume of samples processed during an emergency response, as demonstrated during the 

2007 and 2008 CSF outbreaks.
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71 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine 

Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest

11. Croatia’s Emergency Response Capability

If any contagious animal disease is suspected in Croatia, including CSF, FMD, 

SVD, or rinderpest, the animal holder should immediately notify veterinary authorities, 

the facility is placed under quarantine, and an epidemiologic investigation is initiated. 

The European Commission and the OIE are alerted if the suspected disease has 

mandatory international notification requirements [9]. 

Further Surveillance Events Triggered by CSF Disease Suspicion

Immediately upon notification of suspected disease, an AV conducts a clinical 

examination of the suspected pigs(s) and any other sick or recovering animals; any pigs 

introduced to the holding from areas where CSF was confirmed, or from areas of suspect 

or unknown CSF status; any pigs kept in other production units that were visited by

persons who had contact with the CSF-suspect pigs; and any pigs with previous 

serological results that might be indicative of CSF. The AV records all examination 

results, and shares a written report with the state veterinary inspector.

Any pigs found dead and suspected to have CSF, or euthanized due to suspicion 

of the disease, are sampled for CSF, as are other pigs on the same premises. The 

veterinarian samples and submits for diagnostic testing at the CVI at a minimum the 

tonsils, spleen, or kidneys from up to 5 pigs on the farm. These samples are tested for 

viral antigen in accordance with the CSF diagnostic manual. If the tissue samples test 

negative for CSF, the AV is required to take blood samples from 6 to 10 sick pigs for 

virological testing, including CSF virus isolation. If the problem persists- i.e. sick pigs do 

not improve within 5 days when administered antibiotics, or their improvement is only

temporary- the AV again submits 6 to 10 blood samples from sick pigs for antigenELISA testing, and, if possible, submits tissue samples for virus isolation [54].

Epidemiologic Investigations

Epidemiologic investigations are conducted for vesicular diseases. The details for 

an epidemiological investigation and confirmation/rule out of CSF, FMD and SVD are 

outlined in the respective Croatian Ordinance(s) for each disease [8]. 

If CSF, FMD, SVD or other infectious disease is suspected, veterinary authorities 

are notified, the premises is quarantined, and samples are taken and submitted for 

diagnostic testing [9]. An epidemiological investigation is conducted using a standardized 

questionnaire, prepared within the framework of the contingency plans, to ascertain and 

analyze the following general information: length of time the virus may have existed on 

the holding prior to disease suspicion/notification; possible origin of the disease, and the 

identification of other holdings in which animals may have become infected or 

contaminated; any movement of people, vehicles, animals, carcasses, semen, meat or any 

other materials which could have transported virus to or from any the holdings in 

question; and additional information on the farm, including size, location, proximity to 

other farms, number/category of animals, husbandry practices, description/prevalence of 

clinical signs of disease, and date signs were observed [8]. 

Disease Confirmation

When a disease has been confirmed, control measures are implemented, including 

but not limited to: quarantine/isolation of animals; suspension of the marketing of 
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72 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine 

Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest

suspected animals and their products; suspension of livestock markets, fairs, livestock 

sporting events, other exhibitions, and trade; restrictions on movement of people and 

fomites; emergency vaccination; and other measures not stipulated in the VA but deemed 

necessary to prevent disease spread. If the scale of the disease outbreak warrants, 

Croatia’s Ministry of Defense is alerted, and Armed Forces can be activated. If the 

disease is zoonotic, the competent authority for human health services is also notified [9]. 

Contingency Plans for CSF and FMD

Should an emergency response for CSF or FMD be necessary, it is legally 

established by the VA and conducted under the framework Croatia’s contingency plans 

(CP) for CSF and FMD. The CSF CP, aligned with Council Directive 2001/89/EC, was 

last revised February 2010; the FMD CP, aligned with EC Council Directive 2003/85/EC, 

was last revised November 2009 [8]. 

The CSF and FMD contingency plans conform closely to the provisions of EC 

requirements and clearly outline emergency response chain of command, including 

formation of the National Disease Control Center (NDCC), Local Disease Control Center 

(LDCC), and affiliated expert groups. The plans provide, in detail, the list of tasks and 

duties for veterinarians, including stamping out procedures (depopulation and disposal), 

indemnity for livestock depopulation and equipment or resources destroyed, surveillance 

schemes and sampling methods, appropriate laboratory diagnostic testing, biosecurity

measures, proper establishing and maintenance of protection and surveillance zones (3 

and 10km, respectively), emergency vaccination procedures, and cleaning and 

disinfection procedures. The contingency plans also contain templates of notices to the 

public, and forms to be used when the plan is in effect. 

Croatia does not have a specific contingency plan for SVD. However, SVD has 

never been reported in Croatia, and should vesicular lesions be detected it is likely that 

Croatia’s CSF or FMD contingency plan would be triggered. Croatia’s contingency plans 

for CSF and FMD are thorough, and the CSF contingency plan has been demonstrated to 

be effective, so it very likely that following either the CSF or the FMD contingency plan 

would lead to accurate SVD diagnosis or ruleout. It is likely that Croatia would then 

implement specific contingencies and an overall emergency response against SVD. 

Croatia’s Emergency Response Framework for Animal Diseases

Croatia’s animal disease emergency response framework is consistent with and 

transposes the EU-accepted emergency response framework found in other MS. It is a 

structure in which emergency response oversight cascades from the National level out to 

the field, and emergency response implementation and information flow in reverse from 

the field back to the National level. The framework utilizes disease control centers at the 

national and local level, expert groups, authorized veterinarians, and the laboratory

system. A diagram of Croatia’s emergency response framework is provided in Figure 19

(p. 73). Funds to support this emergency response framework are secured in the state 

budget [9].
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73 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine 

Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest

Figure 19: Croatia’s Emergency Response Framework [5]. 

In the case of a rapidly spreading infectious disease or a large scale outbreak, 

MAFRD can request intervention by local police/law enforcement and/or the Ministry of 

Defense/Croatia’s Armed Forces to restrict the movement of people/animals within a 

region (including national borders); prevent trade and marketing of animals; and to assist 

in implementing other control/eradication measures [9].

Protection and Surveillance Zones

The EU-accepted emergency response framework, which Croatia implements, is 

predicated on establishing and maintaining a 3km-radius infected (protection) zone and a 

10km-radius endangered (surveillance) zone. To summarize, upon confirmation of a

contagious animal disease outbreak, an infected and endangered zone must be established 

and applicable measures instituted within each zone. Measures in the infected zone may 

include daily clinical exam of susceptible species; sampling for laboratory testing; closed 

stabling or other confinement of animals; no movement of animals out of the infected 

zone, and movement restrictions of feed and bedding; disinfection stations for vehicle 

traffic; prohibition of assembly centers, fairs, markets, exhibitions; slaughter of feral 

animals, and indoor housing of pets; mandatory cleaning and disinfection at 

slaughterhouses; rendering of slaughter by-products; restrictions on hunting, fishing, and 

other outdoor recreation; and prohibition of breeding practices, including natural mating, 

artificial insemination (AI), and embryo transfer. In the endangered zone, control 

MAFRD (Minister)

Veterinary Directorate 

(CVO)

AVOs

Local Crisis Subunit

Croatian 

Veterinary

National Crisis Center Institute

Expert 

Group

Local Crisis Center

(Local Veterinary Offices)
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74 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine 

Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest

measures may include clinical exam of susceptible species every 3 days (up to 9 days); 

movement restrictions for live animals, excluding animals sent straight to slaughter; 

restrictions on movement of animal products, including raw materials, waste, and feed; 

prohibition of assembly centers, markets, fairs, or exhibitions; and restrictions on 

hunting, fishing, and other outdoor activities. 

The zoned approach outlined above satisfies internationally accepted practices for 

emergency response. The principles above are outlined in Croatia’s VA, its CSF and 

FMD contingency plans, and affiliated legislation [9, 55]. These measures, if followed, 

should be effective at minimizing the spread of highly contagious animal diseases. 

APHIS considers it likely that central- and field-level MAFRD personnel, AVs, and 

private veterinary practitioners and animal handlers (particularly those affiliated with 

intensive industries) are familiar with provisions of the emergency response framework 

and affiliated contingency plans and can effectively implement control measures. 

Depopulation, Indemnity, Cleaning, Disinfection, Repopulation

The VA and the CSF (and FMD) contingency plans authorize Croatian animal 

health officials to depopulate and indemnify animals during an outbreak scenario [9, 54, 

55]. Details on stamping-out procedures—from depopulation to carcass disposal to 

indemnification—are provided in those respective documents. APHIS reviewed those 

documents and overall found Croatia’s framework and processes associated with an 

animal health emergency response, and their legal authority to implement them, 

satisfactory relative to internationally accepted practices.

The contagious animal disease is considered eradicated when, after slaughter or 

death of the last infected animal and cleaning and disinfection of the premises, the 

maximum incubation period for the disease agent has elapsed [9]. To repopulate a farm 

post-outbreak and cleaning/disinfection, sentinel animals can be placed. If so, they are 

randomly sampled (blood) for serological testing sufficient to detect 10% seroprevalence 

with 95% confidence in each sub-unit/house on the repopulated holding. Croatian 

regulations also allow for the farm to be fully restocked, in which case animals must be 

randomly sampled for serological serological testing sufficient to detect 20% 

seroprevalence with 95% confidence in each sub-unit/house on the repopulated holding. 

In both of these repopulation scenarios, the competent veterinary inspector is responsible 

for monitoring animals for clinical signs of disease, and if observed, sampling the 

animals for relevant disease(s) [9, 54, 55]. 

The VA authorizes the emergency depopulation of infected or suspected animals 

as necessary to prevent disease spread, including situations where other control measures 

are not economically feasible. For animals killed, slaughtered, or otherwise dead due to 

control measures, and for any objects damaged or destroyed by control measures, the 

animal holder or owner is entitled to compensation in the amount of the market value on 

the day that the control measure(s) was implemented. Assessments to determine market 

value are carried out by a commission appointed by the VD. Indemnity decisions must 

be made within 60 days, and indemnity payouts made within 90 days, of implementing 

the control measure(s) [9].

Croatian animal owners or holders forfeit their right to indemnity if they fail to 

immediately report disease; did not treat the animal(s) as stipulated; failed to implement 

control measure(s); transferred the animal from an uninfected area to an infected or 
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75 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine 

Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest

endangered zone or vice versa; traded the animal, if the animal disease occurred during

import or during a post-entry quarantine period; or if they have violated grazing 

restrictions [9].

Simulation Exercises and Training Scenarios

Croatia has on multiple occasions tested its emergency response capabilities via 

simulation exercises, with multiple simulation exercises specific for CSF and at least one 

simulation exercise specific for FMD. Generally, the simulation exercises have a target 

audience of official veterinarians, veterinary inspectors, veterinary epidemiologists, and 

representatives of producer groups.

The overall goal of the CSF exercises was to increase awareness and knowledge 

of risks from CSF in wild boar. Training topics included the CSF situation in wild boar 

in Eastern Europe overall, and in Croatia; Croatia’s CSF surveillance program for wild 

boar; proper sampling of harvested wild boar, and submission of samples to the 

laboratory; methods to reduce the lag time between CSF suspicion and official 

notification/subsequent implementation of control measures; and ways to reduce CSFv 

transmission and spread, including biosecurity measures. The second day of each 

workshop simulated an outbreak of CSF in wild boar, with specific topics including 

measures to assess the CSF situation in an affected hunting ground; measures to prevent 

the spread of CSF out of the hunting ground; measures to prevent introduction of CSF 

virus into domestic swine; and movement control measures to be implemented on 

proximate swine farms [8]. 

The FMD simulation exercise focused on reviewing and assessing the FMD 

Contingency Plan and Operations Manual, and increasing stakeholder awareness and 

knowledge. Tabletop exercises regarding primary and secondary outbreak mitigation 

measures were conducted, and training was provided on risk analysis and trade [8].

Site Visits to Evaluate Epidemiological Investigation Procedures

APHIS evaluated the effectiveness of Croatia’s epidemiological investigation 

procedures on the site visit through review of epidemiologic investigation records

conducted at a branch veterinary office in an area previously impacted by CSF, and at an 

AVO. Records at the VD branch office clearly demonstrated that the actions taken in 

epidemiologic investigations conducted by this office were reasonable, followed a logical 

progression, and were well-documented. The actions and timeframes typically consisted

of a Day 1 first visit, with sample collection and necessary movement restrictions 

imposed; a Day 2 return visit, with additional sampling as necessary and test results as 

available; a Day 3 visit, if necessary, for culling, depopulation, and more sampling; and a 

Day 5 visit, incorporating test results to determine next step(s). Record reviews at an 

AVO (see below) supported the same general conclusion: that epidemiological 

investigations to rule out CSF were conducted in a timely and accurate manner [6].

Discussion of Croatia’s Emergency Response Capacity

APHIS has identified no key risk issues or specific concerns related to Croatia’s 

emergency response capacity. The emergency response framework is consistent with 

internationally accepted standards for emergency response, and transposes the EUaccepted emergency response framework found in other MS. APHIS considers this 
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76 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine 

Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest

emergency response framework sufficient for small-scale outbreaks and capable of being 

ramped-up to deal with outbreaks on a national scale. There is clear evidence from the 

2007/2008 CSF outbreaks that Croatia can respond to, control, and eradicate a highly 

contagious swine disease from its domestic herd. APHIS is confident that MAFRD and 

its partners in Croatia’s emergency response infrastructure have the capability to ensure

appropriate response measures are taken to control and eradicate highly contagious 

animal diseases when they occur. 

Entry Assessment Conclusions

APHIS evaluated the CSF, FMD, SVD, and rinderpest status of Croatia based on the 

version of 9 CFR 92.2 that was in place when Croatia requested these animal health 

status evaluations. APHIS concludes that:

1. Croatia has sufficient legal authority to and a veterinary infrastructure capable of 

providing efficient veterinary services, including surveillance, control, and, if 

necessary, eradication programs for CSF, FMD, SVD, and rinderpest. 

a. The central competent authority for animal health in Croatia, the 

Veterinary Directorate, retains national legal authority over veterinary 

services and effectively administers field veterinary services via a regional 

staff, authorized veterinary organizations, and official control bodies.

b. Croatia’s CSF, FMD, SVD, and rinderpest strategies and corresponding 

legal and technical framework are aligned with international standards and 

EU-level animal health measures.

c. Animal health strategies and directives, including CSF-, FMD-, and SVDspecific information, are outlined in the Veterinary Act and secondary 

legislation, and are communicated well from the central level of the VD to 

Croatia’s network of animal health partners, including but not limited to 

the Croatian Agricultural Agency, the Croatian Veterinary Institute, other 

State institutions, private veterinarians, livestock producers, and affiliated

industries.

d. Veterinary services in the field are primarily conducted by authorized 

veterinarians or official control bodies.

2. The last reported case of CSF in domestic swine in Croatia was confirmed in March 

2008. While there are intermittent CSF serological incidents in Croatia’s feral swine 

and wild boars, there has been no recent virological confirmation of CSF. Croatia last 

reported FMD in 1978; has never reported SVD; and last reported rinderpest in 1883.

a. CSF in wild boar is the central risk issue related to Croatia’s current 

disease status, as the presence of CSFv in feral swine cannot be 

completely ruled out. 

b. Croatia has in place a number of measures in place to mitigate this risk.

(See 4. Active Disease Control Programs, and other sections)

3. Croatia is bordered by EU Member States Hungary and Slovenia, by Serbia, by

Bosnia and Herzegovina, and shares a very short border with Montenegro. These are 
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77 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine 

Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest

countries which APHIS has not evaluated for CSF, which vaccinate against CSF, or 

which report CSF in wild boar. Croatia is bounded on the west by the Adriatic Sea. 

a. Croatia’s physical boundaries do not significantly mitigate the likelihood 

of disease incursions from adjacent regions of risk. 

b. A potential pathway for CSFv, FMDv, and SVDv introduction into 

Croatia is incoming passenger traffic and individuals unknowingly or 

intentionally transporting contaminated animal products.

i. This pathway includes daily domestic and international travelers 

using Croatia’s ferry system.

ii. This pathway applies to rinderpest, but at a much lower likelihood 

given the global eradication of that disease.

c. The primary risk mitigations for disease introduction into Croatia via this 

pathway are the interdictions of the Border Veterinary Inspection and 

International Trade Service and Customs personnel (See 7. Croatia’s 

Movement Controls and Biosecurity), who appear to capably monitor 

Croatia’s land and sea borders against disease introduction. 

4. Croatia’s current disease control programs, particularly the control program for CSF, 

are appropriately designed and implemented to prevent, control, or eradicate the 

hazards of concern for this evaluation. 

a. Croatia actively surveys for CSFv in domestic and feral swine using 

baseline random sampling and risk-based sampling. 

i. Previous CSF control programs were appropriate for Croatia’s CSF 

status at the time.

ii. There are three Croatian counties considered high risk for CSF, in 

which Croatia implements higher CSF control program standards.

b. Croatia actively surveys for FMDv and SVDv.

i. The level of surveillance for FMDv and SVDv are appropriate 

given Croatia’s current and historical status, and the current risk 

factors, for these two viruses.

c. Croatia does not conduct active surveillance for RPv. This is appropriate, 

given that rinderpest last occurred in Croatia in 1883, and the global 

eradication of the disease.

d. Croatia passively surveys for contagious animal diseases through

veterinary inspection at import, slaughter, livestock markets, and other 

points of commingle.

i. This surveillance stream would detect rinderpest virus.

e. Croatia implements appropriate epidemiological investigations when 

disease is suspected. 

5. Vaccination against CSFv, FMDv, SVDv, or RPv is prohibited, except for emergency

purposes. 

a. When vaccination is authorized for emergency purposes, Croatia’s 

emergency response framework contains proper guidelines for control and 

disposal of unused vaccine doses.
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78 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine 

Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest

6. Croatia’s physical boundaries do not provide a substantial natural barrier. A potential 

pathway of entry for animal disease into Croatia is therefore the natural movement of 

feral animals from adjacent areas of risk. 

a. While this pathway includes natural migration of domestic animals in 

areas where there is shared pasture with neighboring countries, the 

primary risk consideration is natural movements of feral swine, which 

could be infected with CSF. 

b. Mitigations include targeted surveillance in feral swine along international 

borders with countries that have CSF in their feral swine, or have an 

undetermined CSF status, particularly in areas of high feral swine density, 

and cross-border collaboration between animal health authorities in 

Croatia and neighboring countries.

7. Croatia’s physical boundaries do not provide a substantial natural barrier, nor do they

significantly mitigate the likelihood of disease incursions from adjacent regions of 

risk. The primary risk mitigation for disease introduction into Croatia is therefore the 

interdictions of the Border Veterinary Inspection and International Trade Service and 

Customs personnel.

a. Croatia is a net importer of swine and cattle and sheep and goats, and 

imports certain animal products. 

b. An entry pathway of commercial import or transit of live animals or 

animal products therefore exists.

c. Croatia’s import policies, aligned with EU-level trade requirements, are 

appropriately restrictive.

i. Also mitigating risk of disease incursion into Croatia are the export 

requirements in the country of origin, including testing 

requirements for contagious animal diseases, pre-export 

quarantine, and health certificate endorsement.

d. BVIITS and Customs international border interdiction efforts and 

biosecurity measures are sufficient to mitigate the risk of CSFv, FMDv, 

SVDv, and RPv entry into Croatia via the pathway of commercial 

consignments of live animals or animal products. 

e. Additionally, Croatia has stringent internal movement restrictions for 

domestic animals, including the requirements for animal identification, 

movement documents, etc., with the legal authority to implement an 

emergency response framework to control and eradicate disease 

incursions, should they occur. 

8. Fattening hogs, from which the animal products most likely to be exported to the 

United States would most likely originate, would most likely be sourced from 

commercial breeding farms and finished, slaughtered, and processed in Croatia’s high 

intensity, vertically integrated agricultural sector. 

a. An APHIS team visited 2 swine farms (1 fattening farm, 1 breeding farm) 

in Croatia’s high intensity, vertically integrated swine production sector. 

i. APHIS confirmed a very high level of biosecurity, husbandry, 

oversight, and record-keeping of production parameters, including 
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79 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine 

Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest

specific information for the hazards under evaluation and general 

indicators of animal health. 

ii. APHIS considers it unlikely that CSF, SVD, or FMD would enter 

the commercial swine sector, and likely that if one of these 

diseases did enter, it would be quickly detected, contained, and 

eradicated. 

b. APHIS visited 1 family-operated breeding farm. The farm is 

predominantly a farrow-to-wean operation, supplying small batches of 

small pigs to local buyers for fattening. The farm demonstrated 

satisfactory biosecurity. 

c. APHIS visited a livestock market, which demonstrated minimal 

biosecurity standards. The livestock market is predominantly a marketing 

avenue for local livestock trade. 

d. APHIS did not visit a backyard swine holding, given the variability 

between farms with only 1 or 2 pigs. APHIS considers these farms likely 

to be terminal points, as single pigs raised on a personal farm are most 

often slaughtered for personal consumption.

i. Croatia does have feral swine, and APHIS considers transmission 

of CSFv to domestic backyard swine from feral swine a potential 

disease pathway. 

1. Mitigations include minimum biosecurity standards for and 

targeted CSF surveillance of swine holdings in close 

proximity to hunting grounds or feral swine in Croatia’s 

three high risk counties.

e. Croatia’s animal identification system and movement controls facilitate 

trace-forward and trace-back in the event of a disease outbreak.

i. Compliance is high in the commercial swine industry, and on

semi-intensive farms. 

ii. Swine operations with less than two pigs are exempt from animal 

identification requirements.

9. Active disease surveillance for CSFv, FMDv, and SVDv are conducted at appropriate 

levels in Croatia. Active disease surveillance for RPv is not conducted.

a. Croatia’s current CSF surveillance strategy evolved from historical 

program elements and aims to detect CSFv as early as possible; to detect 

illegal vaccination against CSF; and to maintain CSF awareness by swine 

owners, keepers, and veterinarians. 

b. Croatia actively conducts baseline random sampling and targeted, riskbased sampling for CSFv in domestic swine. 

c. Croatian animal health officials consider as high risk, and target 

surveillance accordingly, any commercial farm with 100 or more fattening 

pigs or breeding farm with 5 or more pigs or mixed herd with 10 or more 

pigs that has previous reported biosecurity noncompliances; and farms in 

Vukovar-Srjiem, Sisak-Moslavina, or Karlovac county located near 

hunting grounds or other areas of higher risk for CSF. 
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80 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine 

Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest

d. Croatia actively samples feral swine for CSFv, including hunter harvested 

and road-killed wild boar.

i. This includes a risk-based sampling zone on border areas with 

countries that have reported CSFv in feral swine.

e. Croatia conducts active surveillance for FMDv and SVDv at an 

appropriate level given the past and current epidemiological conditions for 

these hazards. 

f. Passive surveillance for vesicular diseases, including CSF, FMD, and 

SVD, occurs via ante- and post-mortem veterinary inspection at slaughter. 

i. An APHIS team visited a slaughterhouse; ante-and post-mortem 

inspection procedures appear capable of detecting vesicular disease 

in large and small ruminants and swine presented for slaughter.

g. Serological detection of any of the identified hazards triggers appropriate 

additional testing and epidemiological investigations.

10. Sampling, testing, and diagnostic laboratory procedures for CSFv, FMDv, and SVDv, 

are conducted in accord with international guidelines, and Croatia’s laboratory system 

appears capable of detecting and confirming cases of CSF, FMD, or SVD. 

a. An APHIS team visited Croatia’s national laboratory (CVI) and confirmed 

that samples are properly received, processed, stored, and tested, and that 

results are reported to the VD and back to the field in a timely manner. 

b. Croatia’s laboratories collaborate internally and with international 

reference laboratories for the hazards of concern. 

11. Should an outbreak of CSF, FMD, SVD, or rinderpest occur, Croatia can implement 

effective disease control and eradication measures. 

a. Croatia has in place thorough contingency plans for CSF and FMD.

b. Croatia does not have in place a contingency plan for SVD. 

i. Ante- and post-mortem inspection would trigger an 

epidemiological investigation if vesicular disease was observed, 

which would activate the CSF and/or FMD contingency plans, 

either or both of which would lead to epidemiologic investigations 

capable of identifying SVD and implementing appropriate control 

and eradication measures. 

c. Epidemiological investigations procedures are thorough, reasonable, 

follow a logical progression, and are well-documented.

d. Croatia’s emergency response framework meets EU-level criteria, and 

includes effective communication and information flow from central-level 

VD staff to regional VD officials and AVs in the field.

i. This includes transparent and effective communication with the 

OIE and trading partners.
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81 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine 

Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest

Pathway Analysis- Natural Movement of Feral Swine or other Wildlife into Croatia

A potential pathway for CSFv introduction, and to a lesser extent SVDv

introduction, into Croatia is the migration of infected feral swine or other wildlife from 

neighboring countries. Feral swine of unknown CSF status or CSF-infected status exist in 

neighboring regions, and natural barriers do not fully prevent movement of CSFsusceptible or CSF-infected feral swine into Croatia.

Figure 20. Pathway for disease introduction via migration of wildlife (feral swine).

APHIS considers the risk of introducing CSFv into Croatia’s domestic swine herd

via migration of feral swine to be low. The risk is primarily mitigated by EC and Croatian

control measures for CSFv in feral swine. Additional mitigations, particularly for 

Croatia’s intensive swine farms such as breeding farms, semen collection centers, are 

swine management and biosecurity practices that, if effectively implemented, prevent 

direct or indirect contact of Croatia’s domestic swine with feral swine. Croatia’s current 

surveillance programs for domestic swine and feral swine appear capable of detecting 

CSFv, and its emergency response programs capable of eradicating it, should CSF occur. 

Overall, these mitigations substantially reduce the risk that CSFv, and to a lesser extent 

SVDv, would be introduced into domestic swine in Croatia and into the United States via 

a subsequent export event. 

Pathway Analysis- Incoming Vehicle or Passenger Traffic and Animal Products for 

Personal Consumption

A potential pathway for CSFv introduction, and to a lesser extent FMDv, SVDv, 

and RPv introduction, into Croatia is by way of incoming non-commercial vehicular or 

passenger traffic, including legally or illegally imported animal products for personal 

consumption. Virus could be introduced directly to susceptible animals in Croatia by

undetected contaminated animal products that are carried from affected regions for 

personal consumption, or by infective virus on vehicles or clothing, or indirectly

introduced to susceptible animals in Croatia if contaminated animal products are fed as 

waste to swine. 

Infected feral swine

in source country

Susceptible animal in 

Croatia

Susceptible domestic

swine in Croatia
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82 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine 

Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest

Figure 21. Pathway for disease introduction via (non-commercial) vehicular and 

passenger traffic, including animal products for personal consumption.

Incoming 

vehicular or 

human traffic

Susceptible wild 

animal 

population

Infective virus 

on vehicles or 

clothing

Infective virus in 

meat or meat 

products for 

personal 

consumption

Infective virus in 

waste products

Susceptible 

domestic 

livestock 

population

The risk of CSFv, FMDv, or SVDv being directly introduced to susceptible 

animals via infective virus on incoming (non-commercial) vehicles or clothing is low. 

However, meat or meat products carried into Croatia by human traffic for 

personal consumption present a relatively higher likelihood of introducing CSFv, SVDv, 

or FMDv into Croatia, as such products may be unknowingly conveyed into the country

and simply missed during Customs inspections at border crossings3and CSFv, FMDv, 

and SVDv can survive in meat or meat products. CSFv is readily inactivated by cooking, 

but it can survive months in refrigerated meat and years in frozen meat, and survive in 

meat during salt curing and smoking for 17 to >180 days, depending on the process used

[56]. SVDv and FMDv are preserved by refrigeration and freezing [57, 58]; SVDv is

resistant to fermentation and smoking processes, and may remain in hams for 180 days, 

dried sausages for over a year and in processed intestinal casings for over two years [57]. 

FMDv is progressively inactivated by temperatures above 50°C, and heating animal 

products to a minimum core temperature of 70°C for at least 30 minutes will inactivate 

the virus [58]. 

Although EC legislation allows individuals to carry personal consignments of 

products that could transmit CSFv, SVDv, or FMDv from potentially affected countries, 

the risk of disease introduction into Croatia via this pathway is mitigated by effectively 

implementing EU-level and Croatian national policies regarding commodities for 

personal consumption from those regions, and the interdiction efforts of BVIITS and 

Customs, including inspection, confiscation, and disposal practices at the point of entry. 

CSFv-, FMDv-, or SVDv-infected undetected agricultural commodities for 

personal consumption could result in indirect exposure of susceptible feral swine or 

domestic swine populations to infective virus via illegal waste feeding. Noncompliance 

with the waste-feeding ban and exposure of domestic swine to infected wild boar are 

most likely to occur on small swine holdings, which may not have effective biosecurity 

measures to prevent disease exposure, nor rapid disease detection methodologies. 

 

3

Infected meat or meat products may also be intentionally smuggled into Croatia. Please reference the 

Entry Assessment for assumptions and discussion regarding intentionally smuggled goods.
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83 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine 

Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest

However, these farms are less likely to contribute animals or animal products into the 

export chain. The risk of CSFv, FMDv, or SVDv transmission to Croatia’s commercial 

herd, and to the United States via a subsequent export event, is low. 

Pathway Analysis- Import or Transit of Commercial Shipments of Infected Live 

Animals or Contaminated Animal Products

A potential pathway for CSFv, FMDv, or SVDv introduction, and to a lesser 

extent RPv introduction, is by way of undetected infected commercial shipments of live 

ruminants or swine, or contaminated swine or bovine commercial products such as fresh 

meat, meat products, semen, embryos, or ova. 

Figure 22. Pathways for disease introduction via commercial imports of live animals or 

animal products.

The likelihood of entry of CSFv, FMDv, SVDv, or RPV into Croatia via 

commercial shipments of live animals, commercial shipments of animal products, and 

genetic material is mitigated by effectively implementing EU-level and Croatian national 

border protection measures and import and transit practices, including but not limited to 

strict enforcement of disease reporting requirements in the country of origin; proper 

veterinary controls in the country of origin, including diagnostic testing, pre-export 

veterinary inspection and quarantine, and corresponding export permit and health 

certificate; and Croatia’s effective border veterinary inspection of imported or transiting 

live animals or animal products. 

In the event that infected undetected commercial shipments of meat and meat 

products do enter the country, the likelihood of indirect exposure of feral or domestic 

swine in Croatia to the identified hazards via illegally fed waste is mitigated by Croatia’s 

waste feeding ban and the concentrated effort of Croatia’s swine health programs. 
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84 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine 

Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest

Although noncompliance with the waste-feeding ban is most likely to occur on small 

swine holdings, these farms are less likely to contribute animals or animal products into 

the export chain. 

The overall likelihood of illegal entry of undetected infected commercial 

shipments of live ruminants or swine, or contaminated swine or bovine commercial 

products such as fresh meat, meat products, semen, embryos, or ova; followed by disease 

transmission to Croatia’s domestic swine; and then a subsequent export event to the 

United States is low. 

Exposure Assessment

An exposure assessment, as defined by the OIE, describes the biological 

pathway(s) necessary for exposure of animals and humans in an importing country to the 

hazards released from a given risk source, and estimates the probability of the 

exposure(s) occurring [4]. This exposure assessment focuses on exposure pathways 

associated with the introduction of the identified hazards to domestic and feral swine in 

the United States, and APHIS mitigations against foreign animal disease incursions into 

the United States.

Waste feeding

A likely exposure pathway of domestic livestock to CSFv and SVDv is the 

feeding of contaminated food waste—specifically pork or pork products-- to swine. 

APHIS analyzed this exposure pathway in 1995 and estimated the likelihood of exposing 

swine to infected waste via exposure associated with legal imports [59]. With 95% 

confidence, APHIS estimated that < 0.023% of plate and manufacturing waste would be 

inadequately processed prior to feeding to swine. Based on this fraction, less than 1 part 

in 4,300 (reciprocal of 0.023%) of imported meat is likely to be fed to swine as 

inadequately cooked waste.

APHIS also conducted a survey in 2001 of the U.S. swine waste-feeding sector 

and estimated that the proportion of plate and manufacturing waste fed to swine 

diminished by about 50% between 1994 and 2001 due to a significant decrease in the 

number of waste-feeding premises [60]. The 2001 study also found that the number of 

waste-feeding premises in the continental United States decreased by 40.5% from 1994-

2001, and in Hawaii and Puerto Rico decreased by 37.5% and 52.3%, respectively; and 

that institutions and restaurants provide nearly 90% of all plate waste fed to swine.

Currently, 22 U.S. States prohibit or regulate the feeding of food waste to swine [61].

Waste-feeder operations must be licensed and regularly inspected by U.S. Department of 

Agriculture inspectors (9 CFR 166). The licensing process requires that producers 

adequately cook the waste fed to swine using methods designed to destroy foreign animal 

disease agents. APHIS considers waste feeding restrictions or regulations on the feeding 

of plate waste to swine to reduce the likelihood that unprocessed waste is fed to swine. 

Based on estimate that a very small proportion of food waste is inadequately 

processed prior to feeding to swine, and the substantial reduction in waste-feeding 

operations in recent years, APHIS concludes that the likelihood of exposure of 

susceptible swine to CSF or SVD viruses through inadequately processed food waste is 

low. Given the low likelihood that infected undetected meat or meat products would be 

imported or conveyed into the US from Croatia, APHIS can further conclude that the 
85

85 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine 

Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest

probability of exposure of susceptible swine to these viruses through inadequately cooked 

infected meat or meat products imported or conveyed into the US from Croatia and then 

fed as waste to US swine is very low.

Imported live animals

The likelihood of exposure of susceptible species to infected live swine was 

evaluated by reviewing virus persistence and shedding in live swine, as well as U.S. 

import requirements for this species. The incubation period for CSFv in live swine is 2-

14 days; virulence of disease and corresponding clinical symptoms are related to strain of 

virus isolate, age of pig and immune status of herd. The virus is highly contagious, and 

congenitally infected piglets may shed the virus for 6-12 months before dying [56]. 

FMDv has a wide host range, including swine, and is highly contagious and transmitted 

by various modes. However, it usually elicits overt clinical symptoms in swine, 

particularly in young animals, including pyrexia, severe foot lesions and lameness, 

vesicular lesions on the snout and limbs, and high mortality in piglets [58]. For SVDv, 

most virus is produced in the first 7 days after infection; virus excretion from the nose 

and mouth normally stops within 2 weeks, and shedding in the feces stops at around 3 

months [57]. However, SVDv also causes subclinical disease, so SVDv may remain 

undetected without diagnostic testing prior to export. Per the OIE, movement of 

subclinically infected animals is the most common means of transferring the disease [57]. 

Consequently, APHIS considers this a potential pathway for disease introduction into the 

United States. 

This risk is partially mitigated by interlocking safeguards in the current U.S. 

regulations, if effectively implemented. Subpart E (“Swine”) of 9 CFR 93 establishes a 

number of regulatory requirements for importing live swine4. These mitigations 

specifically increase the probability of disease detection in imported live swine, and 

generally reduce the risk of disease introduction via imported live swine through 

interlocking safeguards. 9 CFR 93.510, for example, requires a minimum quarantine 

period of 15 days for all imported swine. 9 CFR 94.24 (“Restrictions on the importation 

of pork, pork products, and swine from the APHIS-defined European CSF region”) 

further restricts the sourcing of swine for export from the APHIS-defined European CSF 

region (which Croatia could become part of) to the United States. Given that APHIS 

considers the likelihood of release of CSF or SVD virus via live swine exported from 

Croatia to be low, and the mitigations listed above reducing the likelihood of exposure of 

U.S. domestic swine to CSF or SVD from imported live animals, APHIS concludes that 

the overall likelihood of entry of CSF and SVD virus via infected swine from the Croatia, 

and subsequent exposure to US swine, is very low.

Imported genetic material

Genetic material has been implicated in the introduction of foreign animal 

diseases into susceptible populations, as well as the spread of established disease 

epidemics over considerable distances [62]. CSFv survival in semen has been estimated 

in experimental studies to be 12-72 hours at 20°C but ranges from 1 month to several 

years at 4°C or below [63]. APHIS therefore considers the likelihood of exposure of 

domestic swine to CSFv in infected semen to be high. CSFv survival in embryos and ova 

 

4

Import regulations similar in scope exist for Cattle, Sheep, and Goats in 9 CFR 93 Subpart D- Ruminants.
86

86 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine 

Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest

is unknown [63, 64]. SVDv survival in genetic material is possible but not considered a 

primary mode of transmission [57].

US regulations in 9 CFR 98.38 (“Restrictions on the importation of swine semen 

from the APHIS-defined European CSF region”), if effectively implemented, reduce the 

likelihood of exposure of susceptible swine to CSFv or SVDv via infected semen from 

the APHIS-defined European CSF region, which Croatia could become part of. Given 

these exposure mitigations, and the findings of the entry assessment, APHIS considers 

the likelihood of release of contaminated undetected semen, embryos, or ova from 

Croatia, and subsequent exposure to US swine, to be very low. 

Consequence Assessment

APHIS considers the risk of release of CSFv, FMDv, SVDv, or RPv from Croatia 

to the United States and the exposure of these hazards to the US domestic herd to be low.

APHIS recognizes that an outbreak of any of these four diseases in the US would have

significant negative impacts. These include, but are not limited to, direct and indirect 

financial impact to individual producers, their affiliates, and the overall swine and/or 

ruminant industry from loss of production associated with highly contagious animal 

diseases; direct costs and consequences associated with control and eradication measures, 

including indemnity, depopulation, and movement restrictions; and loss of international 

trading markets.

Risk Estimation

APHIS concludes from the information Croatia submitted, from publically 

available information, and from the site visit that Croatia is free of FMDv, SVDv, and 

RPv. In reviewing the same information, APHIS cannot conclude with certainty that 

CSFv does not remain in Croatia’s feral swine population, or in feral swine in 

neighboring countries that could move naturally into Croatia. APHIS therefore considers 

Croatia to be low risk for CSF and equivalent in risk profile with respect to CSF to the 

APHIS-defined European CSF region. 

APHIS considers the risk of CSFv, FMDv, or SVD being introduced into 

Croatia’s domestic swine herd to be low, and the risk of RPv being introduced to be 

negligible. APHIS considers the likelihood that Croatia’s surveillance system would 

quickly and accurately detect CSF, FMD, SVD, or rinderpest should they be introduced 

into Croatia to be high, and Croatia’s emergency response system capable of swiftly and 

aggressively eradicating these diseases. APHIS considers the requirements of Parts 92, 

93, 94, and 98 of Subchapter D- Exportation and Importation of Animals and Animal 

Products, and Part 166 and 167 of Subchapter L- Swine Health Protection of Title 9 of 

the Code of Federal Regulations, if effectively implemented, to further mitigate the risk 

of CSFv, FMDv, SVDv, and RPv being introduced into the United States via a 

subsequent export event from Croatia. 

Given that Croatia is equivalent in risk profile with respect to CSF to the APHISdefined European CSF region, Croatia is eligible to be added to the APHIS-defined 

European CSF region. Croatia can also be added to the lists of regions that APHIS 

considers free of FMD, SVD, and rinderpest. The APHIS-defined European CSF region 

is subject to the conditions in 9 CFR 94.24 for pork, pork products, and swine; and 9 CFR 
87

87 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine 

Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest

98.38 for swine semen5. The provisions of 9 CFR 94.11 for import conditions for meat or 

meat products from ruminants or swine from FMD-free regions of 9 CFR 94.13 for 

import conditions for pork or pork products from SVD-free regions should also be 

applied to Croatia. 

 

5

CFR mitigations include (1) restricting the sourcing of swine and ruminants for live export or slaughter to 

regions free of the pertinent diseases; (2) prohibiting commingling of live animals, meat, or meat products 

for export with such commodities from regions not considered free of these diseases; (3) restricting the use 

of transportation equipment for live swine; and (4) requiring exporting slaughter establishments to be 

approved by the U.S. Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS). An official veterinarian of the exporting 

country must certify that these conditions have been met. The CFR provisions do not directly address the 

risk of exporting infected live animals or animal commodities during the period between virus incursion 

and outbreak detection. However, 9 CFR 94.24 and 98.38 substantially mitigate this risk by prohibiting 

sourcing of swine from a restricted zone established because of detection of CSF in wild boar or a CSF 

outbreak in domestic swine, as well as for the 6 months following depopulation, cleaning, and disinfection 

of the last infected premises in the zone. In addition, swine semen centers must be approved by the national 

government of the exporting country, which provides substantial risk mitigation under EC legislation. 
88

88 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine 

Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest

Appendix 1: Import Data-- Total, and Top 5 Countries-- for the Republic of Croatia

for Agricultural Commodities Relevant to this Evaluation, 2010-2012 [65].

A. Live bovines (head)

2010 2011 2012

Total 140,123 151,900 120,056

Romania 57,822 71,465 68,564

Poland 24,728 28,624 20,817

Czech Republic 23,886 22,921 14,340

Slovakia 10,728 12,146 7,333

Hungary 16,032 5,535 6,116

B. Live Swine (head)

2010 2011 2012

Total 626,126 610,886 557,680

Netherlands 252,012 305,248 300,286

Germany 302,919 248,337 209,122

Hungary 28,674 28,033 30,734

Denmark 0 403 9,380

Belgium 0 4,109 3,480

C. Live sheep and goats (head)

2010 2011 2012

Total 56,278 18,372 6,974

Romania 40,680 13,777 3,902

Hungary 15,568 4,374 2,727

France 0 0 265

Germany 0 4 45

Czech Republic 0 0 29

D. Beef, fresh or chilled (kg)

2010 2011 2012

Total 5,259,189 5,074,516 6,454,808

Netherlands 4,049,810 4,651,396 5,413,709

Poland 715,450 227,332 515,671

Italy 20 159,384 194,842

Germany 12,734 8,687 128,042

Serbia 0 0 101,650

E. Beef, frozen (kg)

2010 2011 2012

Total 3,122,105 2,563,656 2,622,712

Austria 842,938 794,528 947,995

Uruguay 762,094 374,084 448,657

Brazil 188,026 200,049 447,570
89

89 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine 

Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest

Poland 133,223 143,649 310,562

New Zealand 31,810 38,979 148,541

F. Pork, fresh, chilled, or frozen (kg)

2010 2011 2012

Total 39,718,845 41,692,298 46,617,252

Germany 10,792,342 15,218,657 17,507,865

Netherlands 9,988,106 8,034,124 8,794,522

Spain 2,601,878 5,434,471 6,275,875

Austria 4,250,494 4,833,635 4,686,567

Hungary 1,776,295 2,330,031 3,220,798

G. Sheep and goat meat, fresh, chilled, or frozen

2010 2011 2012

Total 1,542,330 1,362,754 1,340,725

Bulgaria 498,445 413,001 536,871

Macedonia 306,514 480,544 502,684

Romania 629,889 364,065 277,040

New Zealand 100,245 85,939 23,114

Italy 0 874 888
90

90 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine 

Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest

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95 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine 

Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest

ANNEX	1:	Hazard	identifications	for	CSF,	FMD,	SVD,	and	rinderpest

Hazard	Identification—CSF	

The World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) lists several animal diseases that are considered 

primary hazards associated with trade of animals and animal products. APHIS regulations 

mitigate the risk of introduction of these foreign animal diseases in to the United States. As 

such, APHIS conducts an import risk analysis addressing hazards of primary concern prior to 

initiating or resuming trade of animal commodities. APHIS considers classical swine fever (CSF) 

virus to be a potential hazard associated with trade of live swine and swine products. CSF was 

eradicated from the United States in 1976.

Causative	agent	

Classical swine fever, also known as hog cholera, is a highly contagious disease of swine caused 

by a Pestivirus of the family Flaviviridae [1]. Only one serotype has been found. 

Host	range	

Natural hosts of CSF virus are members of the Suidae family, including domestic and wild swine 

[2]. Infected swine are the only reservoir of virus [3]. The role of wild boar as a virus reservoir 

and source of infection for domestic swine is well known and epidemiological links between CSF 

infection in wild boar and domestic swine have been reported repeatedly in recent years [4, 5].

Incubation	period	

The incubation period for CSF is 2-14 days [3, 6]. 

Morbidity	and	mortality	

Four distinct clinical forms of CSF have been described: acute, chronic, congenital, and mild [7-

9]. The acute form is characterized by high fever, anorexia, lethargy, and hemorrhagic lesions 

and cyanosis of the skin. Death occurs 5-25 days after onset of the illness; mortality in young 

pigs can approach 100 percent. The chronic form, seen primarily with less virulent CSF virus 

strains or in partially immune herds, presents as fever, dullness, growth retardation, and 

diarrhea for up to 1 month. Pigs often appear to recover only to relapse and die within about 3 

months. Depending on the virulence of the virus strain and the stage of gestation, the 

congenital form can present at fetal death, resorption, mummification, or abortion. If a live 

birth, the piglet may exhibit congenital tremor, weakness, and/or poor growth leading to death. 

Conversely, piglets may be born clinically normal but persistently viremic with intermittent virus 

shedding (no antibody response). The mild form, which usually occurs in older animals, is 

characterized by transient fever and loss of appetite with recovery. Infected sows may show no 

overt clinical signs but continuously shed virus to their young and to other swine they contact. 

Sources	of	virus	and	transmission	

Blood and all tissues, secretions, and excretions of sick and dead animals are sources of virus [6]. 

CSF virus has been recovered from muscle and lymph nodes of infected pigs, and high titers of 
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96 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine 

Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest

CSF virus have been isolated from bone marrow [10]. The virus may also be present in semen

[9].

Transmission is generally directly from pig to pig, but products including fresh, frozen, or cured 

pork can infect other pigs via the oral route [11]. Imported pig products are frequently 

implicated in the introduction of CSF virus into previously free regions, primarily through the 

practice of swill feeding [12]. Dahle and Liess (1992) demonstrated that the oral infectious dose 

of CSF virus is very low [13]. Indirect transmission may occur via movement of people, wild 

animals, and inanimate objects such as live-haul trucks [14].

In countries that are free of CSF in domestic swine, epidemics in wild boar are often started by 

feeding of infected human food waste. Abnormal mortality and sometimes obviously sick 

animals are the first indicators of CSF introduction into a wild boar population [15].

Inactivation	and	survival

The CSF virus is quite hardy, being stable between pH 4 and 10 [16] and also stable at low 

temperatures [17]. The virus can survive for long periods in cool, moist, and protein-rich 

environments such as stored meat: survival times of more than 4 years in frozen pork and at 

least 85 days in fresh, chilled pork have been reported [11]. CSF virus would likely remain viable 

in fresh meat even after carcass maturation and is unlikely to be destroyed by transport or cold 

storage. Survival times in cured or smoked meat ranging from 17 days to more than a year have 

been reported. 

The CSF virus is readily inactivated by detergents, lipid solvents, proteases, and common 

disinfectants, as well as pasteurization and cooking, although sensitivity to heat can vary among 

strains. The virus can be inactivated by a variety of time/temperatures combinations as well as 

curing and drying through various processes [18]. CSF virus is moderately fragile in the 

environment, but can remain infectious for months in refrigerated meat and years in frozen 

meat [3]. 

Vaccination		

Vaccines against CSF virus are available in some areas. Vaccination can protect animals from 

clinical disease but does not prevent infection. Currently available live attenuated vaccines are 

effective in limiting clinical disease but allow the CSF virus to circulate subclinically. Vaccination 

is therefore considered inappropriate in regions where a stamping out policy exists and where 

the entire swine population is susceptible due to the standard practice of non-vaccination [19]. 

In areas where CSF is endemic, well-administered vaccination programs can eventually eliminate 

the infection from herds [3].

Laboratory	Diagnosis	

Laboratory confirmation of infection, essential during an outbreak situation, is complicated by 

the close antigenic relationship of the CSF virus with bovine viral diarrhea virus and border 

disease virus (also pestiviruses) [1]. Identification of the virus, its nucleic acid, or associated 
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97 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine 

Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest

antibodies confirms the diagnosis. The OIE recommends detection of CSF antigen via direct 

fluorescent antibody test on cryostat sections of organs from infected pigs [20]. A panel of 

monoclonal antibodies is then used to differentiate from other Pestivirus antigens. Virus 

isolation techniques and polymerase chain reaction may also be used. Antigen-capture enzymelinked immunosorbent assays (ELISAs) are useful for herd screening, but should not be used on a 

single animal basis.

Detection of virus-specific antibodies is particularly useful in herds suspected of being infected 

at least 21 days previously with CSF virus [20]. Serological methods are essential if a country 

wishes to be internationally recognized as being free from the disease in the absence of 

vaccination. Screening tests must be followed by confirmatory tests that are specific to the CSF 

virus. Certain ELISAs are relatively CSF specific, but the definitive method for differentiation is 

the comparative neutralization test, which compares the level of antibodies to different 

Pestivirus species.

References

1. Wengler, G., Bradley, D. W., et al. Flaviviridae. in 6th Report of the International 

Committee on Taxomonmy of viruses. 1995.

2. Moennig, V., Introduction to classical swine fever: virus, disease and control policy. Vet 

Microbiol, 2000. 73(2-3): p. 93-102.

3. Spickler, A.R. and J. Roth, A., eds. Emerging and Exotic Diseases of Animals. 3rd Edition 

ed. 2006, Iow State University Press.

4. Biagetti, M., Greiser-Wilke, I., et al, Molecular epidemiology of classical swine fever in 

Italy. Vet Microbiol, 2001. 83(3): p. 205-215.

5. Laddomada, A., Patta, C. et al, Epidemiology of classical swine fever in Sardinia: a 

serological survey of wild boar and comparison with African swine fever. Vet Rec., 1994. 

134(8): p. 183-187.

6. World Organization for Animal Health (OIE). Classical swine fever technical disease card. 

2009; Available from: 

http://www.oie.int/fileadmin/Home/eng/Animal_Health_in_the_World/docs/pdf/CLAS

SICAL_SWINE_FEVER_FINAL.pdf.

7. Moennig, V., Floegel-Niesmann, G., et al, Clinical signs and epidemiology of classical 

swine fever: a review of new knowledge. Vet Journal, 2003. 165: p. 11-210.

8. Paton, D.J. and I. Greiser-Wilke, Classical swine fever-an update. Res Vet Sci, 2003. 75(3): 

p. 169-178.

9. Elber, A.R., Stegeman, A., et al, The classical swine fever epidemic 1997-1998 in The 

Netherlands: descriptive epidemiology. Prev Vet Med, 1999. 42(3-4): p. 157-184.

10. Wood, L., Brockman, S., et al, Classical swine fever: virulence and tissue distribution of a 

1986 isolate in pigs. Vet Record, 1988. 122: p. 391-394.

11. Edwards, S., Survival and inactivation of classical swine fever virus. Vet Microbiology, 

2000. 73(2-3): p. 175-181.

12. Fritzemeier, J., Teuffert, J., et al, Epidemiology of classical swine fever in Germany in the 

1990's. Vet Microbiology, 2000. 77(1-2): p. 29-41.

13. Dahle, J.a.L., B., A review of classical swine fever infections in pigs: epizootiology, clinical 

disease and pathology. Comp Immun Micro, 1992. 20: p. 261-274.
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98 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine 

Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest

14. Elbers, A.R., Stegeman, J.A., et al, Factors associated with the introduction of classical 

swine fever virus into pig herds in the central area of the 1997-1998 epidemic in The 

Netherlands. Vet Rec., 2001. 149(13): p. 377-382.

15. European Commission, S.C. Classical swine fever in wild boar. in European Commission, 

1999. 1999. Brussels.

16. Depner, K., Bauer, T., et al, Thermal and pH stability of pestiviruses. Rev Sci Tech OIE 11, 

1992: p. 885-893.

17. Harkness, J.W., Classical swine fever and its diagnosis: a current view. Vet Record, 1985. 

116: p. 288-293.

18. Williams, S., Persistance of Disease Agents in Carcasses and Animal Products, L. Scott 

Williams Consulting Pty, Editor 2003.

19. Merck and Company, ed. The Merck Veterinary Manual. 8th Edition ed. 1998, Merck and 

Company.

20. World Organization for Animal Health, Chapter 2.8.3. Classical Swine Fever, in Manual of 

Diagnostic Tests and Vaccines for Terrestrial Animals 2011: Available from: 

http://www.oie.int/international-standard-setting/terrestrial-manual/access-online/.
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99 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine 

Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest

Hazard	identification—FMD	

The World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) lists several animal diseases that are considered 

primary hazards associated with trade of animals and animal products. APHIS regulations 

mitigate the risk of introduction of these foreign animal diseases in to the United States. As 

such, APHIS conducts an import risk analysis addressing hazards of primary concern prior to 

initiating or resuming trade of animal commodities. APHIS considers foot and mouth disease 

(FMD) virus to be a potential hazard associated with trade of live ruminants and swine, as well 

as certain products and by-products derived from these species. FMD virus was eradicated from 

the United States in 1929. 

Causative	agent

FMD is a highly communicable disease caused by an Aphthovirus of the family Picornaviridae. 

FMD has seven immunologically distinct serotypes—O, A, C, SAT1, SAT2, SAT3, and Asia 1—

which do not confer cross immunity [1]. FMD virus serotype O (PanAsia strain) is the most 

prevalent and widely distributed, causing outbreaks in many parts of Africa, Asia, South 

America, and Europe since 1998 [2-4].

Host	range

The range of domestic hosts includes all cloven-hoofed animals such as cattle, swine, sheep, 

goats, water buffalo, and yaks [2-5]. All cloven-hoofed wild animals are also susceptible, 

including buffalo, deer, impala, and gazelles; hedgehogs, armadillos, nutrias, elephants, rats, and 

mice are also susceptible. Camels may be affected by some FMD strains whereas llamas, 

alpacas, and vicuñas have low susceptibility [5]. 

Incubation	period

The incubation period of the FMD virus is 2 to 14 days in cattle, depending on the viral strain 

and dose and the level of susceptibility of the animal [6]. The incubation period in pigs also 

varies with the strain, dose, and route of infection [7]. Serotype O—highly virulent in pigs—can 

produce clinical signs within 18 to 24 hours, while pigs with low-level exposures may take up to 

11 days to develop clinical signs.

Morbidity	and	mortality

Clinical signs in cattle during acute infection include fever, profuse salivation, and mucopurulent 

nasal discharge [6]. The disease is characterized by development of vesicles on the tongue, hard 

palate, dental pad, lips, muzzle, gum, coronary band, and interdigital spaces. Vesicles may 

develop on the teats. Affected animals lose condition rapidly, and there is a dramatic loss of milk 

production. The animal usually recovers by 14 days post infection provided no secondary 

infections occur [8]. Morbidity in unvaccinated herds can be high, but mortality usually does not 

exceed 5 percent. If an outbreak occurs during the calving season, calf mortality can be 
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100 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine 

Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest

considerable [9]. Young calves may even die before the development of clinical signs usually 

because the virus attacks the heart muscles [6].

The most consistent clinical signs in pigs are lesions around the coronary bands and lameness; 

fever may be inconsistent [7, 10]. Pigs may develop vesicles on the tongue and snout, but these 

may be less conspicuous than lesions seen in ruminants. The severity of clinical disease depends 

on the age of the infected pig. Adult swine may recover or become chronically lame while 

younger pigs, especially those less than 8 weeks of age, may die from acute myocarditis without 

developing other clinical signs. 

FMD infection in sheep and goats is often subclinical or produces only mild clinical signs that 

may go unrecognized [11]. Reduced milk production may be seen in milking animals and death 

of young stock may occur without clinical signs. 

Sources	of	virus	and	transmission

Sources of FMD virus include (1) incubating and clinically affected animals; (2) breath, saliva, 

feces, and urine; (3) milk and semen (up to 4 days before clinical signs); and (4) meat and byproducts in which pH has remained above 6.0 [11, 12]. Transmission occurs by direct or indirect 

contact or by aerosol. Fomites such as feed, drinking water, equipment, animal products, as well 

as human clothing, transportation vehicles, rodents, stray dogs, wild animals, and birds can 

transmit FMD over long distances. The five main elements that influence the extent of FMD 

spread are: 

(1) The quantity of virus released; 

(2) The means by which the virus enters the environment; 

(3) The ability of the agent to survive outside the animal body; 

(4) The quantities of virus required to initiate infection at primary infection sites; and 

(5) The period of time the virus remains undetected [13, 14]. 

The respiratory tract is the usual route of infection, particularly in environments that are heavily 

contaminated with FMD virus. Infection can also occur through abrasions of the skin or mucous 

membranes. Pigs may become infected through ingestion of FMD virus-contaminated products 

[7, 11]. 

In cattle and sheep, the earliest sites of virus infection and possibly replication appear to be in 

the mucosa and the lymphoid tissues of the pharynx [8, 15-17]. Following initial replication in 

the pharynx, the virus enters the bloodstream. Viremia in cattle lasts for 3 to 5 days, during 

which the virus spreads throughout the body and establishes sites of secondary infection, 

localizing in various organs, tissues, body fluids, bone marrow, and lymph nodes. 

Viral replication in cattle may reach peak levels as early as 2 to 3 days after exposure [15, 16]. 

Recent data indicate that the most viral amplification occurs in the epithelia of the skin and 

mouth, including the tongue [18, 19]. Although some viral replication also occurs in the epithelia 

of the pharynx, the amount of virus produced there is apparently much less than the amount 

produced in the skin and mouth during the acute phase of the disease. By comparison, the 
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101 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine 

Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest

amount of virus (if any) produced in other organs like salivary glands, kidneys, liver, and lymph 

nodes is negligible. 

Immunity to FMD is primarily mediated by circulating antibodies [17]. The host reaction, 

including antibody production, occurs from 3 to 4 days after exposure. In infected pigs, the virus 

is cleared in less than 3 to 4 weeks. In contrast, around 50 percent or more of cattle will develop 

a low-level persistent infection, localized to the pharynx [10, 20, 21]. 

Inactivation	and	survival

FMD virus is a relatively resilient virus. It can survive up to 15 weeks in feed, 4 weeks on cattle 

hair, and up to 103 days in wastewater. The survival of the virus in animal tissues is closely 

associated with the acidity of that tissue [22, 23]. For example, in muscular tissues the acidity of 

rigor mortis, which occurs naturally, inactivates the virus. The production of lactic acid in these 

tissues during maturation is considered the primary factor for inactivation. An acid environment 

where the pH is less than 6.0 will destroy the virus quickly. Several studies showed that in 

tissues where no acidification occurs (e.g., lymph nodes, bone marrow, fat, and blood), the virus 

may survive for extended times in cured, uncured, and frozen meat [16, 22-25]. Heating at 50° C 

[26] and up to 155° F [27] will inactivate the virus. 

Vaccination	

Inactivated virus vaccines of varying composition are available commercially [12]. Many FMD 

vaccines are multivalent to provide protection against the different serotypes likely to be 

encountered in a given field situation. The finished vaccine must be shown to be free from 

residual live virus. Live attenuated vaccines are not suitable due to danger of reversion to 

virulence.

Inactivated FMD vaccines may be classified as either standard potency (commercial vaccines) or 

higher potency (emergency vaccines) [12]. Standard potency vaccines are formulated with 

sufficient antigen to have a minimum potency level of 3 PD50 and provide 6 months of immunity 

after two initial vaccinations given 1-month apart. Higher potency vaccines are formulated with 

sufficient antigen to have a minimum potency level of 6 PD50 to provide for more rapid onset 

and a wider spectrum of immunity against relevant field viruses. 

Laboratory	diagnostics

Field diagnosis of FMD relies heavily on recognition of clinical signs, which are similar to those 

seen in other vesicular diseases such as vesicular stomatitis, mucosal disease of cattle, 

bluetongue, and rinderpest. Virus isolation or demonstration of FMD viral antigen or nucleic acid 

in samples of tissue or fluid is therefore necessary for confirmatory diagnosis. 

Enzyme-linked immunosorbent assays (ELISA) can be used to detect FMD viral antigens and for 

serotyping [12, 14]. Lateral flow devices can also be used to detect FMD viral antigens. The ELISA 

has replaced complement fixation in most laboratories as it is more specific and sensitive; in 

addition, it is not affected by pro- or anti-complement factors. If the sample is inadequate or the 
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102 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine 

Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest

diagnosis remains uncertain, sample materials can be tested by reverse transcription 

polymerase chain reaction and/or virus isolation.

Demonstration of specific antibodies to structural proteins in non-vaccinated animals is 

indicative of prior infection with FMD virus [12, 14]. Virus neutralization tests (VNTs) and ELISAs 

for antibodies to structural proteins are used as serotype-specific serological tests. Tests for 

antibodies to some nonstructural proteins (NSPs) of FMD virus are useful in providing evidence 

of previous or current viral replication in the host, irrespective of vaccination status. Unlike 

structural proteins, NSPs are highly conserved and therefore are not serotype specific, so 

detection of antibodies to NSPs is not serotype restricted.

References

1. Kitching, R., et al, Development of foot-and-mouth disease virus strain characterization -

a review. Trop An Health Prod, 1989. 21: p. 153-166.

2. Knowles, N.J., et al., Pandemic strain of foot-and-mouth disease virus serotype O.

Emerging Infectious Diseases, 2005. 21(12): p. 1887-1893.

3. Knowles, N.J. and A.R. Samuel, Molecular epidemiology of foot-and-mouth disease virus.

Virus Research, 2003. 91: p. 65-80.

4. Sakamoto, K. and K. Yoshida, Recent outbreaks of foot and mouth disease in countries of 

East Asia. Rev Sci Tech, 2002. 21(3): p. 459-463.

5. Torres, A., Foot and mouth disease, in Foreign Animal Diseases, 7th edition, C. Brown 

and A. Torres, Editors. 2008, Committee on Foreign and Emerging Diseases of the United 

States Animal Health Association. Boca Publications Group, Inc: Boca Raton, Florida. p. 

261-276.

6. Kitching, R.P., Clinical variation in foot and mouth disease; cattle. Rev Sci Tech, 2002. 

21(3): p. 499-504.

7. Kitching, R.P. and S. Alexandersen, Clinical variation in foot and mouth disease; pigs. Rev 

Sci Tech, 2002. 21(3): p. 513-518.

8. Woodbury, E.L., A review of the possible mechanisms for the persistence of foot-andmouth disease virus. Epidemiol Infect, 1995. 114(1): p. 1-13.

9. Seifert, H., Foot-and-mouth disease, in Tropical Animal Health1996, Kluwer Academic 

Publishers: London, Massachusetts. p. 418-431.

10. Kitching, R.P., Identification of foot and mouth disease virus carrier and subclinically 

infected animals and differentiation from vaccinated animals. Rev Sci Tech, 2002. 21(3): 

p. 531-538.

11. Alexandersen, S., et al., The pathogenesis and diagnosis of foot-and-mouth disease. J 

Comp Pathol, 2003. 129: p. 1-36.

12. World Organization for Animal Health (OIE), Chapter 2.1.5 Foot and mouth disease, in 

Manual of Diagnostic Tests and Vaccines for Terrestrial Animals 2011: Available from 

:http://www.oie.int/international-standard-setting/terrestrial-manual/access-online/.

13. Mann, J. and R.F. Sellers, Foot and mouth disease, in Virus Infections of Vertebrates, Z. 

Dinter and B. Morein, Editors. 1990, Elsevier. p. 903-912.

14. Thomson, G., Foot-and-mouth disease, in Infectious Diseases of Livestock, Coetzer, 

Thomson, and Tustin, Editors. 1994, Oxford University Press: Cape Town, South Africa. 

p. 825-852.

15. Sellers, R.F., Quantitative aspects of the spread of foot-and-mouth disease. Vet Bull, 

1971. 41(6): p. 431-439.
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103 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine 

Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest

16. Cottral, G.E., Persistence of foot-and-mouth disease virus in animals, their products and 

the environment. Bull Off Int Epizoot, 1969. 70(3): p. 549-568.

17. Alexandersen, S., Z. Zhang, and A.I. Donaldson, Aspects of the persistence of foot-andmouth disease virus in animals; the carrier problem. Microbes Infect, 2002. 4(10): p. 

1099-1110.

18. Alexandersen, S., M.B. Oleksiewicz, and A.I. Donaldson, The early pathogenesis of footand-mouth disease in pigs infected by contact; a quantitative time-course study using 

TaqMan RT-PCR. J Gen Virol, 2001. 82(4): p. 747-755.

19. Oleksiewicz, M.B., A.I. Donaldson, and S. Alexandersen, Development of a novel realtime RT-PCR assay for quantitation of foot-and-mouth disease virus in diverse porcine 

tissues. J Virol Methods, 2001. 92(1): p. 23-35.

20. Salt, J.S., The carrier state in foot and mouth disease; an immunological review. Br Vet, 

1993. 149(3): p. 207-223.

21. Zhang, Z. and R.P. Kitching, The localization of persistent foot and mouth disease virus in 

the epithelial cells of the soft palate and pharynx. J Comp Pathol, 2001. 124: p. 89-94.

22. Cottral, G.E., B.F. Cox, and D.E. Baldwin, The survival of foot-and-mouth disease virus in 

cured and uncured meat. Am J Vet Res, 1960. 21: p. 288-97.

23. Henderson, W.M. and J.B. Broodsby, The survival of foot and mouth disease virus in 

meat and offal. J Hyg (Lond), 1948. 46(4): p. 394-402.

24. Cox, B.F., G.E. Cottral, and D.E. Baldwin, Further studies on the survival of foot and 

mouth disease virus in meat. Am J Vet Res, 1961. 22: p. 224-226.

25. Lasta, R., et al, Combined treatment of heat, irradiation, and pH effects on the infectivity 

of foot-and-mouth disease virus in bovine tissues. J Food Sci, 1992. 57(1): p. 36-39.

26. Green, W. and J.L. Grannis, Economic impact of alternative management strategies for 

regulating Canadian ruminant/product imports. 2003: p. Unpublished report, Center for 

Epidemiology and Animal Health.

27. Heidelbaugh, N. and J. Graves, Effects of some techniques applicable in food processing 

on the infectivity of foot and mouth disease virus. Food Tech, 1968. 22: p. 120.
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104 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine 

Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest

Hazard	identification-SVD

The OIE lists several animal diseases that are considered primary hazards associated with trade 

of animals and animal products. APHIS regulations mitigate the risk of introduction of these 

foreign animal diseases in to the United States. As such, APHIS conducts an import risk analysis 

addressing hazards of primary concern prior to initiating or resuming trade of animal 

commodities. APHIS considers swine vesicular disease (SVD) virus to be a potential hazard 

associated with trade of live swine and swine products. SVD was once endemic in much of 

Europe, but its distribution is currently limited to southern Italy. It has also been diagnosed in 

parts of Asia, and is still thought to be endemic in some areas [1].

Causative	agent

SVD virus is a member of the viral family Picornoviridae, genus Enterovirus. One serotype and 

several strains have been identified [1, 2]. SVD virus isolates from Europe and Japan have been 

classified into at least four distinct groups, with two groups containing older isolates, and two 

groups containing more recent European isolates [1, 3, 4]. The different groups may represent 

distinct SVD virus introductions into Europe from Asia [3, 5]

Host	range

Swine are the only natural hosts of SVD virus [2, 6]. Infections have been reported in humans 

working with SVD virus in the laboratory and in experimental mice, but these species are not 

significant in the epidemiology of the disease [1, 6-8].

Morbidity	and	mortality

The primary significance of SVD is its clinical similarity to foot and mouth disease[1, 6]. Clinical 

signs include fever, sudden lameness, and vesicles with subsequent erosions along the snout, 

feet, and teats [2, 6]. Signs can range from absent to mild to severe, depending on virus strain, 

route of infection, age of the animal, and husbandry. Morbidity rates may be low throughout an 

entire herd, but high in certain pens. Clinical recovery usually occurs with 2 to 3 weeks, though 

a dark horizontal line may persist on the hooves due to a temporary disruption in growth [1, 2, 

6, 7]. Production losses are not severe, and SVD causes essentially no mortality [1, 2, 9].

Persistence of SVD virus infection is rare [7, 10]. Some strains of SVD virus produce only mild 

clinical symptoms or are asymptomatic and detected only through laboratory surveillance[6, 7]. 

For example, a 2002 outbreak of SVD in Italy involved subclinical infection in all but one of 

10,312 affected pigs [11]. 

Incubation	period

The incubation period for SVD is generally 2 to 7 days [2, 6]. Large amounts of virus can be 

present in nasal and oral secretions and feces up to 2 days prior to the appearance of clinical 

signs [1, 2]. 
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105 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine 

Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest

Sources	of	virus	and	transmission

Blood and feces of sick animals, as well as epithelium from vesicles and vesicular fluid, are good 

sources of SVD virus. The period of highest shedding occurs during the first week after infection 

[1, 2]. The virus can be detected in the blood 2 days after exposure and subsequently in most 

other tissues and semen [2, 3, 12, 13]. Although SVD virus does not appear to have a tropism for 

skeletal muscle cells, it is viable and infectious in meat for long periods of time [1, 2, 14]. 

Persistent infection is rare, but persistence of some strains in tissue for up to 100 days and fecal 

shedding for more than 4 months has been reported [2, 3, 7, 10]

SVD may be introduced into a herd by feeding garbage containing infected meat scraps, by 

introducing infected animals, or by fomites (such as an improperly cleaned livestock truck). High 

environmental stability is a key feature in the epidemiology of SVD. The SVD virus enters the 

body via broken skin, mucus membranes, or ingestion. After initial introduction into a herd, the 

disease spreads due to contact of susceptible pigs with infected pigs and feces [1-3, 7, 14]. 

Inactivation	and	survival

SVD virus is very stable in the environment. It is highly resistant to desiccation and freezing, and 

can survive for up to 11 months at -20°C to 12°C [3]. It is stable at pH2.5-12 [1-3], and is 

therefore unlikely to be destroyed by the post-mortem decrease in muscle pH that accompanies 

carcass maturation. SVD virus is also resistant to fermentation and smoking processes, and may 

remain in ham for 180 days, dried sausage for more than a year, and processed intestinal 

casings for more than 2 years [2]. The virus is resistant to many common disinfectants [3]. 

Inactivation can be achieved by heating at 60°C for 10 minutes [3].

Vaccination	

No vaccine against SVD is available[6].

Laboratory	Diagnostics

Serologic (antibody detection) tests can be used to confirm clinical cases of SVD and detect 

subclinical infections. Since many cases of SVD are subclinical, the disease is often first 

suspected based on positive results on serologic tests performed for surveillance or export 

certification. The virus neutralization test is the OIE prescribed test for use in international 

trade. Enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA) tests are also used: they can be performed 

more quickly than the virus neutralization test and IgM/IgG isotype specific ELISA’s are useful for 

determining the time of infection. An animal that is positive on ELISA and negative on follow-up 

virus neutralization can be considered uninfected. A small proportion of normal, uninfected pigs 

will display a positive result on serological tests for SVD, often presenting as the single positive 

animal in a herd that has no clinical signs or exposure history. These “singleton reactors” can be 

differentiated by retesting the positive animal and its herd mates [3, 6].

Polymerase chain reaction (PCR) and ELISA are appropriate screening tests for SVD antigen 

detection, while virus isolation is the reference antigen detection test and should be used for 

confirmation. In the presence of clinical signs, demonstration of virus in lesion material or 
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106 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine 

Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest

vesicular fluid via ELISA is sufficient to make a diagnosis of SVD. Testing of fecal samples from 

pen floors via PCR or virus isolation is used to detect subclinical infection [6].

References

1. The Center for Food Security and Public Health: Iowa State University. Swine vesicular 

disease. 2007; Available from: 

http://www.cfsph.iastate.edu/Factsheets/pdfs/swine_vesicular_disease.pdf.

2. World Organization for Animal Health (OIE). Swine vesicular disease technical disease 

card. 2009; Available from: 

http://www.oie.int/fileadmin/Home/eng/Animal_Health_in_the_World/docs/pdf/SWIN

E_VESICULAR_DISEASE_FINAL.pdf.

3. Escribano-Romero, E., M.A. Jimenez-Clavero, and V. Ley, Swine vesicular disease virus. 

Pathology of the disease and the molecular characteristics of the virion. Anim Health Res 

Rev, 2000. 1(2): p. 119-126.

4. Brocchi, E., et al., Molecular epidemiology of recent outbreaks of swine vesicular disease: 

two genteically and anitgenically distinct variants in Europe, 1987--4. Epidemiol. Infect., 

1997. 118: p. 51-61.

5. Zhang, G., et al., Molecular evolution of swine vesicular disease virus. J Gen Virol, 1999. 

80: p. 639-651.

6. World Organization for Animal Health (OIE), Chapter 2.8.9. Swine Vesicular Disease, in 

Manual of Diagnostic Vaccines and Tests for Terrestrial Animals 2011: Available from: 

http://www.oie.int/international-standard-setting/terrestrial-manual/access-online/.

7. Lin, F. and R.P. Kitching, Swine Vesicular Disease: An Overview. Vet J, 2000. 160: p. 192-

201.

8. Brown, F., D. Goodridge, and R. Burrows, Infection of man by swine vesicular disease 

virus. J Comp Pathol, 1976. 86(3): p. 409-414.

9. Bellini, S., et al., Swine vesicular disease in northern Italy; diffusion through densely 

populated pig areas. Rev. sci. tech, 2010. 29(3): p. 639-648.

10. Lin, F., et al., Persistent infection is a rare sequel following infection of pigs with swine 

vesicular disease virus. Epidemiol Infect, 2001. 127: p. 135-145.

11. Brocchi, E., et al. Swine Vesicular Disease in Italy during 2002: epidemiological and 

diagnostic aspects. in 2002 Session of the Research Group of the Standing Techinical 

Committee of EuFMD. 2002. Cesme, Izmir, Turkey.

12. Guerin, B. and N. Pozzi, Viruses in boar semen: detection and clinical as well as 

epidemiological consequences regarding disease transmission by artificial inseminiation.

Theriogenology, 2005. 63: p. 556-572.

13. Maes, D., et al., Diseases in swine transmitted by artificial insemination. Theriogenology, 

2008. 70: p. 1337-1345.

14. Mackay, D.K.J., Swine Vesicular Disease, in Infectious Diseases of Livestock, J. Coetzer 

and T. Tunstin, Editors. 2004, Oxford University Press: Cape Town, South Africa. p. 1313-

1318.
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107 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine 

Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest

Hazard	identification—Rinderpest	

The World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) lists several animal diseases that are considered 

primary hazards associated with trade of animals and animal products. APHIS regulations 

mitigate the risk of introduction of these foreign animal diseases in to the United States. As 

such, APHIS conducts an import risk analysis addressing hazards of primary concern prior to 

initiating or resuming trade of animal commodities. APHIS considers rinderpest (RP) virus to be a 

potential hazard associated with trade of ruminants, small ruminants, swine, and their products. 

Rinderpest has never been reported in the United States.

Causative	agent

RP virus, a Morbillivirus, exists as a single serotype [1]. The virus is molecularly grouped into 

three distinct lineages (African lineage 1, African lineage 2, and Asian lineage 3) based on 

evolutionary divergence [1, 2] .

Host	range

Although cattle are the primary reservoir, RP virus causes severe disease in many species of 

wildlife [1]. The acute form of disease has been observed in cloven-hoofed animals such as the 

buffalo, eland, giraffe, lesser kudu, and warthog [3]. However, there is no evidence that wildlife 

serve as a reservoir for the virus. Rather, it is believed that cattle are the maintenance hosts, 

and if the virus is not present in cattle, it will die out in wildlife [4]. 

The incidence of rinderpest has declined significantly over the course of the last 20 years and its 

geographic distribution has been confined over the last decade. In May 2011, based on the 

conclusion that rinderpest has ceased to circulate in animals, the OIE announced its recognition 

of global rinderpest freedom [5].

Morbidity	and	mortality

Rinderpest typically presents as an acute disease with overt signs including fever, oculonasal 

discharges, mucosal necrosis and erosions, and ulcerations in the digestive and upper 

respiratory tracts [6]. It is characterized by fever, necrotic stomatitis, gastroenteritis, profuse 

diarrhea, and dehydration [6, 7]. The acute form can result in 80-90 percent mortality in cattle, 

buffalo, yaks, and many wildlife ungulate species [4, 8, 9].

A mild form of rinderpest, with wide variations in disease frequency and intensity, has been 

observed. Morbidity and mortality rates vary, both ranging from 0-10 percent, and classical 

clinical or epidemiological features may be lacking [6], which poses a challenge for disease 

detection. The mild form of rinderpest is most clearly demonstrated in lineage 2 viruses from 

East Africa [10], but has been observed with all three RP virus lineages [1]. Outbreaks of the mild 

form of rinderpest have occurred in Egypt (African lineage 1), Kenya (African lineage 1), northern 

Iraq (Asian lineage 3), and the Somali pastoral ecosystem (African lineage 2) [1]. 
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108 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine 

Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest

The mild form of rinderpest has been observed in highly endemic areas and in populations with 

some inherited resistance [6]. When rinderpest first occurs in a naïve population, its virulence 

increases, and when the virus becomes endemic, its virulence decreases [8]. Accordingly, the 

selection pressure for rinderpest virulence is affected by the disease situation and immune 

status of potential hosts in an area, with populations of naïve cattle presenting a selection 

pressure for virulence, and populations of partially immune cattle presenting a selection 

pressure for attenuation [8].

Incubation	period

RP virus has an infectious period of 1-2 weeks; for international trade purposes, the incubation 

period is assumed to be 21 days [7]. RP virus has no latency period and does not result in 

persistent infection [11], nor does infection induce a carrier state [1].

Sources	of	virus	and	transmission

During periods of clinical disease, RP virus can be found in expired air, nasal and ocular

discharges, saliva, feces, semen, vaginal discharges, urine and milk [7]. Shedding of small 

amounts of virus in tears, nasal secretions, saliva, urine, feces and milk begins 1–2 days before 

pyrexia and subsequent onset of clinical signs; similarly, blood and tissues are infectious before 

the appearance of clinical signs. 

Close contact is required for viral spread; the most common means of introduction of rinderpest 

virus into free areas is by way of infected animals [7]. The virus is not vertically transmitted and 

there are no arthropod vectors [4]. A single incident in which pigs were fed meat scraps from 

infected animals and contracted the disease has been documented [1]; however, animal 

products are not a common source of infection [12]. 

Inactivation	and	survival

Rinderpest virus is not very stable and probably does not survived in dried secretions, 

excretions, or carcasses for more than a few days [12]. It is relatively heat sensitive, with a halflife of 5 minutes in cattle blood, spleen, or lymph node at 56°C. The virus is inactivated at 

temperatures above 70°C [13]. Only small amounts of virus resist 56°C for 60 minutes or 60°C 

for 30 minutes [4, 7] . 

Rinderpest virus strains vary in their pH stability. At 4°C, RP virus is most stable at pH 7.2-7.9, 

with a half-life of 3.7 days [14]. Generally, the virus is stable between ph 4.0 and 10.0 [7], and 

rapidly inactivated (10 minutes) at pH 2 and 12 [15]. Maurer reported in 1946 pH 7.0 as the 

optimal value for RP virus survival [16].

The length of persistence of RP virus in the meat of infected animals is a subject of controversy. 

One report suggests that RP virus-infected carcasses are rendered safe relatively quickly [17], 

whereas another report indicates that RP virus survives more than 9 days in chilled meat and 

could persist 33 days or even 18 weeks [18]
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109 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine 

Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest

Rinderpest virus is rapidly inactivated by heat, light, ultraviolet radiation, and drying, but does 

remain viable for long periods in chilled or frozen tissues [4, 7, 18]

Vaccination	

A full description of vaccination techniques is available from the OIE’s Manual of Diagnostic 

Tests and Vaccines for Terrestrial Animals. Generally, vaccination against RP virus yields lifelong 

immunity. However, in conjunction with the OIE’s drive for global eradication of rinderpest, 

vaccination in recent years was considerably curtailed and replaced by active and passive clinical 

and serological surveillance [3]. 

Laboratory	Diagnostics

A full description of applied laboratory techniques is available from the OIE’s Manual of 

Diagnostic Tests and Vaccines for Terrestrial Animals. Generally, laboratory confirmation is 

based the presence of the virus, virus-specific RNA or precipitating antigens in samples from the 

spleen, lymph nodes, or ocular or nasal secretions. To accomplish this, the OIE describes virus 

neutralization, reverse-transcription polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR), agar gel 

immunodiffusion (AGID), and direct and indirect enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA) 

techniques. Virus neutralization is considered the ‘gold standard’; a competitive ELISA is the 

prescribed test for international trade [3]. 

References

1. Roeder, P.L., and Taylor, W.P., Rinderpest. Vet Clin Food Anim, 2002. 18: p. 515-547.

2. Chamberlain, R.W., Wamwayi, H.M., Hockley, E., Shaila, M.S., Goatley, L., Knowles, N.J., 

Barrett, T., Evidence for different lineages of rinderpest virus reflecting their geographic 

isolation. J Gen Virol, 1993. 74(12): p. 2775-2780.

3. World Organization for Animal Health (OIE). Manual of Diagnostic Tests and Vaccines for 

Terrestrial Animals 2011, Chapter 2.1.15., Rinderpest. Available from: 

http://www.oie.int/eng/normes/mmanual/2008/pdf/2.01.15_RINDERPEST.pdf.

4. Saliki J and Wholstein P, Rinderpest in Foreign Animal Diseases, 7th EditionRevised 2008, 

Committee on Foreign and Emerging Diseases of the United States Animal Health 

Association. Boca Publications Group, Inc: Boca Raton, FL.

5. World Organization for Animal Health (OIE). Resolution No. 18, 'Declaration of Global 

Eradication of Rinderpest and Implementation of Follow-up Measures to Maintain World 

Freedom from Rinderpest'. Available from: 

http://www.oie.int/fileadmin/Home/eng/Media_Center/docs/pdf/RESO_18_EN.pdf.

6. Wohlsein, P., and Saliki, J., Rinderpest and Peste des Petits Ruminants- The Diseases: 

Clincal Signs and Pathology, in Rinderpest and Peste des Petits Ruminants: Virus Plagues 

of Large and Small Ruminants2006, Thomas Barrett, Paul-Pierre Pastoret, and William P. 

Taylor, eds. Elsevier: New York, NY.

7. World Organization for Animal Health (OIE). Rinderpest- Animal Diseases Data -

Technical Disease Card. Available from: 

http://www.oie.int/fileadmin/Home/eng/Animal_Health_in_the_World/docs/pdf/RIND

ERPEST_FINAL.pdf.
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110 APHIS Animal Health Status Evaluation of the Republic of Croatia for Classical Swine Fever, Swine 

Vesicular Disease, Foot and Mouth Disease, and Rinderpest

8. Scott, G.R., Rinderpest. Adv Vet Sci, 1964. 9: p. 113-124.

9. Rossiter, P.B., Hussain, M., Raja, R.H., Moghul, W., Khan, Z., and Broadbent, D.W., Cattle 

Plague in Shangri-La: Observations on a Severe Outbreak of Rinderpest in Northern 

Pakistan 1994 - 1995. Vet Rec, 1998. 143(2): p. 39-42.

10. Mariner, J.C., and Roeder, P.L., Use of participatory epidemiology studies of the 

persistence of lineage 2 rinderpest virus in East Africa. Vet Record, 2003. 152: p. 641-

647.

11. Rweyemamu, M.M., Roeder, P.L., and Taylor, W.P., Towards the Global Eradication of 

Rinderpest, in Rinderpest and Peste des Petits Ruminants: Virus Plagues of Large and 

Small Ruminants2006, Thomas Barrett, Paul-Pierre Pastoret, and William Taylor, eds. 

Elsevier: New York, NY.

12. Geering, W.A., Forman, A.J., et al, Exotic diseases of animals: a field guide for Austrlaian 

veterinarians, 1995, Australian Government Publishing Service: Canberra. p. 445 pp.

13. De Boer CJ and Barber TL, pH and thermal stability of rinderpest virus. Arch Gesamte 

Virusforsch, 1964. 15: p. 98-108.

14. Plowright, W., Rinderpest virus. Virology Monographs No. 3. Springer-Verlag, Vienna and 

New York, 1968: p. 25-110.

15. Iowa State University. Rinderpest Factsheet. College of Veterinary Medicine, Center for 

Food Security and Public Health; Available from: 

http://www.cfsph.iastate.edu/Factsheets/pdfs/rinderpest.pdf.

16. Maurer FD, Rinderpest. XI. The survival of rinderpest in various mediums. Amer. J. Vet. 

Res., 1946. 7: p. 193-5.

17. Anderson, J., Barrett, T, and Scott, G., Manual on the Diagnosis of Rinderpest (FAO 

Animal Health Manual- 1), 1996, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United 

Nations.

18. Drieux, H., Persistence of viruses in porducts of animal origina (translation). Commission 

of European Communities Internal Information on Agriculture, Editor 1975. p. 305 pp.