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43–480 2008

[H.A.S.C. No. 110–142]

HEARING

ON

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT

FOR FISCAL YEAR 2009

AND

OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED

PROGRAMS

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

AIR AND LAND FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING

ON

BUDGET REQUEST ON ARMY NATIONAL

GUARD AND ARMY RESERVE EQUIPMENT

HEARING HELD

APRIL 3, 2008

(II)

AIR AND LAND FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE

NEIL ABERCROMBIE, Hawaii, Chairman

JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina

SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas

SILVESTRE REYES, Texas

ADAM SMITH, Washington

MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina

ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California

ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania

JIM MARSHALL, Georgia

DAN BOREN, Oklahoma

HANK JOHNSON, Georgia

JOE SESTAK, Pennsylvania

GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona

KENDRICK B. MEEK, Florida

KATHY CASTOR, Florida

JIM SAXTON, New Jersey

HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, California

JEFF MILLER, Florida

JOE WILSON, South Carolina

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey

TOM COLE, Oklahoma

ROB BISHOP, Utah

MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio

PHIL GINGREY, Georgia

CATHY MCMORRIS RODGERS, Washington

GEOFF DAVIS, Kentucky

W. TODD AKIN, Missouri

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado

DOUG BUSH, Professional Staff Member

JESSE TOLLESON, Professional Staff Member

JOHN WASON, Professional Staff Member

BEN GLERUM, Staff Assistant

(III)

C O N T E N T S

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS

2008

Page

HEARING:

Thursday, April 3 2008, Fiscal Year 2009 National Defense Authorization

Act—Budget Request on Army National Guard and Army Reserve Equipment ...................................................................................................................... 1

APPENDIX:

Thursday, April 3, 2008 .......................................................................................... 35

THURSDAY, APRIL 3, 2008

FISCAL YEAR 2009 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT—BUDGET REQUEST ON ARMY NATIONAL GUARD AND ARMY RESERVE

EQUIPMENT

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Abercrombie, Hon. Neil, a Representative from Hawaii, Chairman, Air and

Land Forces Subcommittee ................................................................................. 1

Saxton, Hon. Jim., a Representative from New Jersey, Ranking Member,

Air and Land Forces Subcommittee ................................................................... 3

WITNESSES

Stultz, Lt. Gen. Jack C., Chief, U.S. Army Reserve, U.S. Army ......................... 9

Vaughn, Lt. Gen. Clyde A., Director, Army National Guard, U.S. Army ........... 5

APPENDIX

PREPARED STATEMENTS:

Stultz, Lt. Gen. Jack C. .................................................................................... 42

Vaughn, Lt. Gen. Clyde A. ............................................................................... 39

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD:

[There were no Documents submitted.]

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD:

Mr. Abercrombie ............................................................................................... 77

Mr. Spratt ......................................................................................................... 79

Mr. Wilson ......................................................................................................... 80

(1)

FISCAL YEAR 2009 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT—BUDGET REQUEST ON ARMY NATIONAL

GUARD AND ARMY RESERVE EQUIPMENT

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, AIR AND LAND FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE, Washington, DC, Thursday, April 3, 2008.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:07 p.m. in room

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Neil Abercrombie

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. NEIL ABERCROMBIE, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM HAWAII, CHAIRMAN, AIR AND LAND

FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Aloha, everybody. Thank you so much for

coming today. I have an opening statement that I would like to

read for purposes of the record before I turn to my good friend and

mentor Mr. Saxton.

The Air and Land Forces Subcommittee meets today to receive

testimony on the equipment status and ground requirements of the

Army National Guard (ANG) and the Army Reserve. The panel includes Lieutenant General Clyde Vaughn, Director of the Army National Guard—aloha, General Vaughn, thank you for being here—

and Lieutenant General Jack Stultz, Chief of the Army Reserve.

General, aloha to you.

The purpose of today’s hearing is to get a straightforward assessment as opposed to an elliptical, tangential assessment of the

equipment needs of the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve. The witnesses have been asked to clearly lay out what equipment levels their organizations are required to have, how those requirements have changed, as well as what equipment levels they

actually have on hand.

They have also been asked to provide their views on the adequacy of the fiscal year 2009 budget request for equipping their elements of the Army.

While the most important element of the Army is its people, obviously, equipment comes in a very close second. There are many

elements the military considers when it judges a unit, and I quote,

combat ready, unquote. One of those elements is the unit’s equipment.

Compared to other measures of readiness, equipment readiness

is fairly straightforward. Either you have the equipment you need,

or you don’t. Without the right type and amounts of equipment,

even the most dedicated and experienced soldier cannot train for

combat or help when there is a domestic emergency.

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However, for a variety of reasons that today’s hearing will explore, the number of units in the Army National Guard and the

Army Reserve that can report the highest level of equipment readiness has declined significantly since 2001. While most guard and

reserve units deployed overseas have all of the equipment they require, many of those units do not get that equipment until just before and in some cases after they deploy, which makes training to

deploy very difficult.

In addition, a large percentage of nondeployed guard and reserve

units are far below Army standards for equipment on hand.

If this situation persists, in our judgment, it could lead to National Guard units that, while very dedicated and willing, are simply not able to adequately respond to domestic emergencies, let

alone train for combat.

No amount of desire or willpower, however noble, can overcome

a lack of transportation, communication and construction equipment when a National Guard unit is trying to help people hit by

a tornado or a hurricane.

If this situation persists, it could lead to Army Reserve units that

cannot train for their combat missions, which would disrupt deployment timeliness were an emergency Army deployment situation to

occur in South Korea or anywhere else.

The Army Reserve units play a critical logistics role in all Army

overseas deployments, so if large numbers of them are not able to

train to standards that deploy on time, it can imperil the lives of

countless other soldiers.

The increasing number of units that do not have their required

equipment is even more significant today, given the ongoing use of

the guard and reserves, as I again quote, operational reserve

forces, unquote, that are routinely now called up for service, in

comparison to Cold War strategic reserve, and again I quote, models that assume very few mobilizations. This is a substantial difference that I am not sure is entirely appreciated by the American

public.

This change to an operational reserve has greatly increased the

amount of the equipment guard and reserve units are required to

have, yet it appears that the Army’s ability to actually provide the

equipment to meet these new and appropriately higher standards

has lagged.

Thankfully, Congress has not sat idle. This is the self-serving

part of the statement. Congress has not sat idle while the equipment readiness in many Army National Guard and Army Reserve

units has deteriorated. That is to say I believe this particular subcommittee recognizes it and wants to do something about it in conjunction with your recommendations and experience.

Since 2003, the Congress has provided $10.7 billion in additional

funding for guard and reserve equipment above that which was in

the President’s budget request—and I doubt there was going to be

much in the way of testimony from either of you today that this

constitutes pork-barrel spending because it wasn’t in the President’s budget request.

Perhaps some of those who shoot their mouths off in the press

about what constitutes a Member initiative with respect to the

strategic interests of this country will take another look at whether

3

this President or any President, regardless of his or her party, has

requested, or whether or not—in that context, whether or not the

judgment of the Congress might be as good or better than the

President, whoever that may be.

This funding has enjoyed sustained bipartisan support, I would

venture to say nonpartisan support—I don’t think it is an issue of

parties in any respect—both on this subcommittee, on the committee as a whole, and throughout Congress.

A major issue I hope to see some light shed upon today is where did all this money go, the $10.7 billion? How much of it was used

to provide additional equipment intended for the guard and reserve? Has any of it been siphoned off by the Army or the Department of Defense (DOD) for other needs that were deemed more

pressing at the time? That may very well have been the case, and

it may have been justified, but we need to know in order to see

whether we need to alter our funding precepts as we present this

budget.

Why do deployment readiness rates continue to remain very low

for many nondeployed units despite what, by any measure, is a

massive infusion of additional funds?

For the 2009 budget, what more needs to be done by Congress;

by this subcommittee to begin with, and by the Congress by extension? What more needs to be done to continue to address this problem, either through legislation or funding? We are counting on you

for information and perspective in that regard.

Before we begin, and before I begin formally with the hearing,

and before I turn to Mr. Saxton, I would like to comment briefly

on another subject; that is to say media reports on a recent Department of Defense Inspector General report on the Army and the Marine Corps body armor procurement process.

Previously we have found that media coverage of the Pentagon

force protection equipment procurement does not always tell the

whole story by any stretch of the imagination. We will sit down

with both the Army and the Department of Defense Inspector General in the immediate future and seek to establish all the facts.

Our Army acquisition hearing is next week, and we will address

the issue at that time. So to the degree or extent either of you may

have had your testimony or your thoughts impacted by this latest

media foray into something they don’t know anything about but

want to tell the rest of us, you needn’t concern yourself with it

today unless you want to touch on it by extension.

That said, I would now like to turn to my good friend and colleague from New Jersey, the Honorable James Saxton.

STATEMENT OF HON. JIM SAXTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM

NEW JERSEY, RANKING MEMBER, AIR AND LAND FORCES

SUBCOMMITTEE

Mr. SAXTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Vaughn and General Stultz, thank you both for your

great service to the country.

Recently General George Casey, the 36th Chief of Staff of the

United States Army, has testified in public hearings and spoken

privately with many Members of Congress about the Army being

out of balance.

4

According to General Casey, ‘‘Balance is a state of continual

readiness that provides strategic flexibility and depth while sustaining the all-volunteer force and simultaneously meeting the current and future demands of the national security strategy in an era

of persistent conflict.’’ Obviously a critical piece of the readiness

equation that General Casey talks about is the availability of

equipment.

While I have often said that all of the services are out of balance,

nowhere is it more evident than in the equipment status of the

Army National Guard and the Army Reserve.

The Reserve component has faced many additional challenges because it started this long war postured, as we all know, as a strategic force. For decades we postured the National guard and reserve

with the Cold War mindset. We believed we could accept risk in

equipping and training the Reserve component because we thought

there would be a clear, unambiguous signal to get us ready. We

also believed there would also be sufficient time to field the equipment and get them trained before they would need to be on the

battlefield.

The need for a ready, well-equipped and integrated Reserve component is now clear; however, the shortfalls in equipment, or, as

previously put, the holes in the yard, prior to 2001, make the Reserve component transition to be a modernized, operational, ready

Reserve particularly challenging today.

Although substantial progress has been made, there is much more to be done. In 2001, the Army had a $56 billion shortfall in

major weapons systems and modernization funding. The Army is

now on a path to reduce that to $17.4 billion by 2013. The Reserve

component was a large part of that number and will benefit greatly

from investments being made to modernize and equip the Armed

Forces.

I believe that if Congress is really serious about properly equipping our Reserve components, then the prudent path forward is to

increase the Army budget. Strong national security doesn’t come

without a price tag. I have said many times that our top line is too

low. The President’s fiscal year 2009 budget request for $515.4 billion in defense spending is a step in the right direction.

The relative cost is not as overwhelming as one would think. National spending on defense as a percentage of our gross domestic

product is relatively low. This year’s base budget request equals 3.4

percent of GDP. To put this in perspective, the National Retail

Federation estimated holiday sales in 2007 was also at 3.4 percent

of GDP.

Let’s not recite the conditions of the 1990’s, which are particularly responsible—which are partly responsible for putting the

Army and the Reserve components out of balance in the first place.

I look forward to hearing from each of our witnesses today, Mr.

Chairman, on the equipment challenges and the tools they need to

get the job done for our Nation. Thank you again for being with

us today.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you very much, Mr. Saxton.

We will proceed to the panel’s testimony, then go into questions.

Without objection, gentlemen, your prepared statements are included in the hearing record. What we would ask is you give a

5

summary. As I hope you have been informed, I do not want large—

I try to avoid large panels anyway, if I can, because I think we get

lost in the weeds.

You are not going to be restricted to five minutes in your opening

statement. I leave it to you to be as succinct as possible so we can

get to the questions. When we do, we will proceed in reverse order

of seniority during this hearing, reverse order. That means you are

up and Mr. Wilson. It is easy to do it today, to figure out who is

going to do what.

We will start with General Vaughn.

STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. CLYDE A. VAUGHN, DIRECTOR, ARMY

NATIONAL GUARD, U.S. ARMY

General VAUGHN. Thank you, Chairman Abercrombie, Congressman Saxton and distinguished Members.

As you have said, I have asked that my statement be read into

the record, and I would just like to talk off the cuff and kind of synopsize, I think, basically what is in there.

As you talk to the strategic versus the operational reserve, what

a great question, you know, as we look backwards at that and

where we were in 2001 or 2000 or 1999, or you just pick a date.

But I would ask you what we really expected that strategic reserve to do, because, you know, when everything was said and

done, there were a couple of great myths out there, and one of

them dealt with the equipment. For the Reserve components, Jack

and I sitting here, that meant we took what we had, and we reported to the main operations base (MOB) station, and from someplace this magic wand of equipment was going to appear and equip

our force.

Everyone knew that we were in terrible shape in Reserve components as far as modernization. It was a legacy force. Most of what

we have been given for many, many years, if it wasn’t for Congress

adding on, especially in the national guard and reserve equipment

account, over all of those years, we wouldn’t have had anything

modernized. That is just a fact. So we found ourselves in the aftermath of 2001 before the big conflict started that we were maybe

at 70 percent.

We can go into and we will go into how we measure equipment,

but if we were at 70 percent—and Jack and I would talk about

sometimes the Army Guard was the largest holder of all of these

antique M–35 trucks which we found out weren’t deployable. We

have lots and lots of equipment, as you well know, that weren’t

deployable.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Excuse me, General, just so we are absolutely

clear, when you are talking about percentages of equipment, you

are going to differentiate; are you not? Because you could have 70

percent of equipment and counting computers and garbage cans,

right? That is not what we are talking about.

General VAUGHN. I am going to differentiate, sir, and I will get

into it, sir.

Jack, as I said, my friend to the left here, has got one that says,

yes, we have got 96 percent of a GP medium, 10—all right, we have

got 96 percent of the 10 stakes, ropes and poles, but we don’t have

the tent. So, you know, in a lot of instances, if you get into the

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piece that you are talking about, that is how you end up comparing

the aegis across the force.

But say we were by some measure at 70 percent. By the time we

deployed what little bit of modernized equipment we had forward,

and then, by the way, it was left in country, when we came back

to home station, what we had wasn’t fit to train on because it

wasn’t interoperable with the stuff that was downrange, and we

were told at that time, don’t deploy this, this, this and this.

Now, if you start from that point and come forward, and we had

a couple of activities happening in 2005—one of them being

Katrina and Rita. And with Katrina and Rita, you know, we deployed all of that equipment all the way across the United States

down there rather rapidly. One of the things that we were concerned about was what did the states really have back that they

could respond to a hurricane disaster, a terrorist activity? What

was really back here?

So we took our staff and said, look, let’s get the States involved

in this. And by the way, what I am taking you through is the genesis of the 342. We drove that. We brought the states in and said

what—what is it that is common with all the equipment that is out

there that we should have first dibs on if there was any question

as to whether something should come from the active force and be

left downrange or come from the guard force and be left

downrange?

By the way, we need to be able to go back and tell the G3 of the

Army just how spectacular this is when you make that kind of a

decision to leave that downrange and how that affects the States.

So all of us want every soldier, sailor, airman or marine to have

the right kind of equipment, but what we wanted to point out, if

there was a choice to make, we ought to bring some of this equipment back that has a purpose.

So the number 342, which you heard many times, there are 342

various kinds of line items which were settled out at. Is that the

right number? Probably isn’t because you can’t be perfect on it.

From my standpoint, after looking at it for some time probably, I

wouldn’t have included personal weapons on all the personal gear

these soldiers have in there because it sways it artificially. As you

well know, the large major end items count for the same as one

rifle.

So probably the view is that every soldier—you know, we owe it

to every soldier to have all of this personnel equipment, and we

look at that again and figure out what that is. So when we come

up with the 342, the next piece was—and we work this—at that

time we worked it and transitioned it with the Army staff—worked

it pretty close, by the way, with the Army staff. What we did was

we took the average of all those lines, of all those 342s. If we were

100 percent of all weapons all the way down, we averaged each one

of those out, added them all up, and come up with an average, because you know what they wanted right away: How does this affect

every State? Well, the bigger issue was how does it affect a national fleet percentage on how well you are doing, which is where

you are going in your opening statement, where you went.

Okay, so we arrived at a percentage, which was an average of—

averages of all those line items all the way down. That brought a

7

lot of the attention to something, and that was the fact that, exactly like you stated, we didn’t have much left, and, oh, by the way,

what was modernized, we had to take to the training stations, you

know, to help mobilize and train our soldiers.

We didn’t have a lot of equipment left. We didn’t have any equipment left, virtually, at home station to do the premobilization side

of that.

So, as we started putting that percentage down, it got a lot of

attention, as you well know. When we looked at where we were—

and I think the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) testified on this.

He says it fell to about 40 percent in 2006. We took all the subs

out of that number, substitute items.

The reason I say substitute items—and one of the big ones were

the deuce-and-a-halves that averaged 35 years of age. One of the

problems with those deuce-and-a-halves we included as a strategic

reserve, there is no maintenance expenditure level on most of the

deuce-and-a-halves. You are not even authorized to change the tire

because the percentage is zero.

So I ask you, when you go back and look at what we had as the

strategic reserve, if we were going to deploy all of this force at one

time, it was a joke. We couldn’t have done that; that was a joke.

We couldn’t have done that.

The only reason we kept up to what we are doing now is because

we are deploying that force incrementally and giving everybody the

right equipment at the right time just before we go over the berm,

as you well know and you have heard folks testify. We have heard

that probably, up to tonight, up to 2007. Again, the Secretary of

Defense testified 49 percent. That is probably about right. But

there has never been a fleet-managed percentage across the Army

that says here is the figure and here is what it is.

Now, I have to tell you that we kind of like the idea of taking

dollar averages because it kind of tells you how much equipment

is left out there and what the price of it is. But it kind of changes

the figure, you know, midstream. So when the new Secretary or the

Chief of Staff of the Army coming in said, you know, we need to

be by regulation here, what is the closest thing we have to regulation, which is 220–1 here, you are all very well aware of that. So

we went back to reporting it by 220–1, which really still does not

help you get that fleet percentage.

I say all of this because, you know, we put a lot of money up

against this. Chief of Staff of the Army, and Secretary of the Army,

Vice Chief of Staff of the Army came over in 2006, had the $56 billion discussion about the holes in the yard. That was the first time

that the requirements for the Army National Guard and, I think,

the Army Reserve had ever gotten out fully in public. And we had

been hammered by folks, and, you know, the guy that I work closely with, guy named Steve Blum, are not exactly bashful about this.

When are we going to get the whole requirement out there? They

did that. I think we owe them a lot over a long period of time to

be able to bring that up here on the Hill and look at it and say

this is exactly what we have got to have.

Now, as we measure where we are at today in equipment, we

have made great progress. The Army has put out requirements,

total requirements, into the base, and there are some in the supp.

8

I know the lecture, you know, on the supplemental piece. I agree,

I hate to see any of it in the supplemental except that piece that

was on left-behind equipment early on in the conflict. If we stay on track with this Army plan, by 2013, of that $17 bil- lion that is out there, $10 billion of that is the Guard, and it is

mostly trucks. When I boil this thing down really to it and look at

what we are going to be short when we get to 2010, we will be

chasing trucks.

My concern is that through the truck line right now and the contracts, and I think I heard the Chief of Staff of the Army testify

on this on Tuesday, some concern about the ability to execute the

contracts that are out there this year for the Family of Manned

Tactical Vehicles. That is our primary shortfall, when everything is

said and done.

Our issue inside the Army family is going to be able to come over

here and tell you by appropriation in what year that money was

spent on, and did it go into this particular State for that particular

piece of equipment.

The buy wave is significant right now. As you know, it really

takes two years to see it start showing up, the big money that

started to flow in 2006, and there is approximately $5 billion worth

of resources every year through 2013 on average to make that happen, with the big years being 2008 and 2009. We desperately need

that, and we have got to maintain the ramp that we are on this

equipment, or we are going to find ourselves right back in the same

shape to start with. Modularity increased the requirements in a

dramatic way. The modularity was also the right thing to do because it created the plug-and-play formation across all of our

forces.

So the requirements at the end of the day have gone up. We are

doing what called an EOH, an equipment on hand look at how

much equipment we have got. It is a major effort to account for all

of that. We account for it very well, as you know, because we have

the United States property and physical officers. We had that property accountability capability that is really new to the Guard, but

this is about a 3.8 million-item issue spread across all 50 states,

commonwealth, two territories and D.C.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Before we move to General Stultz, then, your

testimony is that in terms of being able to account for what you

had, what you lost, what you need and what you can repair and

use for both deployment and training, you say you are on top of

that?

General VAUGHN. We are on top of that.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Okay.

General VAUGHN. The piece that we are not on top of, and that

General Blum and I, either one, are going to have trouble testifying

to, is what year and what appropriation did this come out of, tying

it back to exactly where it came from. We see, as that equipment

hits our motor pools, and we rack it up every 30 days, we can show

you the difference in numbers, and that is how we are doing it.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. You are way ahead of a whole hell of a lot of

the rest of the DOD if you can do that.

General VAUGHN. Sir, we have 54 United States property physical officers, some of the highest-trained soldiers and airmen that

9

we have in there, the people in the States, that account for this

equipment. It is not us.

Our pipelines are good, and we take that information directly off

of that. When that has been audited before—we have been audited

several times about our capability to do this, and the property book

systems that we run are good.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. That is maybe one of the most important—not

only the most important testimony, but if you can give us that

foundation, it might be the most important thing coming up for us,

because I intend to recommend to this subcommittee and to the

committee as a whole those things that we know we can spend

money on that we are going to get value received.

For the rest of the DOD, a lot of that is in the ether. I am sick

of—speaking as one Member—sick of just pumping money in there

and hoping someday somehow it actually comes back as having

gone to where it should have.

General VAUGHN. We are making progress. I think the significant piece is the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) told

basically that General Blum’s report on whether or not that money

was actually delivered to the right piece of equipment. So we will

have to put that kind of capability into the rest of the system. Now,

that is very, very important.

I am not saying that the Guard should ever have different appropriations to do all of that. I mean, we were the Army, we are inside

of the Army system. We just need to make sure that the trust is

there between all components. If you don’t have the transparency

on where the money came from and where it was supposed to go

to, we will never get over this trust.

I will tell you one thing. I will trust you that the Army has built

a program, and I trust that Congress has put the money in the

right places, and I know that you want to see it shown. And the

tags are telling me right now we have got a lot of equipment showing up, and we are making progress on the percentage is what I

leave with you with.

That is all I have, sir.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of General Vaughn can be found in the

Appendix on page 39.]

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. General Stultz.

STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. JACK C. STULTZ, CHIEF, U.S. ARMY

RESERVE, U.S. ARMY

General STULTZ. Thank you.

Mr. Chairman, Congressman Saxton and other Members, thanks

for the opportunity to come and testify about the equipment needs

of the Army Reserve. We have got a lot of great heroes that are

stepping up, willing to join our ranks, willing to serve their Nation,

and they deserve to have the best equipment to train on back here

and best equipment going forward.

I prepared somewhat of a briefing, but I am not going to go

through and brief; I am just going to refer to a few slides as we

go through.

But you talked about operationalizing the Reserve components,

and there are two pieces to that operationalizing. One is we have

10

got to get the structure right with the right capabilities to be an

operational force. We were structured as a legacy strategic force.

We had a lot of admin overhead, those kinds of things. So we are

changing the structure of the Army Reserve into an operational

force, more capability in areas like engineers, medical, transportation, civil affairs, military police, those types of capabilities that

this Nation needs both here at home and abroad.

With that, that generates additional equipment requirements. As

we generate more capability, there are more requirements.

If you refer to slide five in this packet, it is the Army force generation model. I know most of you have seen that before. But the

reason I wanted to refer to that, part of the operationalizing of the

force has been to array our force across a five-year model, meaning

that you are deployed for one year; you come back and you have

four years of dwell time back here before you are expected to be

available to deploy again. That would lead one to say, okay, then

we don’t need to have your equipment until you are ready to go.

The point being with this slide is in each of those years, starting

with the reset year one all the way through the available year,

their equipment needs, if you are back in the reset phase, while we

are resetting the unit, and in a lot of cases we also have Title 10

homeland missions, and somewhere we are augmenting the National Guard in their hurricane relief missions and other missions

like that, we still have equipment needs that we deploy soldiers to.

But more importantly, as we progress in our readiness, and we

get into ready year one, that is when we are training those forces

getting ready to deploy in a year or two into theater, they have got

to have the right equipment to train on back here.

Right now we have engineer units that we are sending into combat; that is, route clearance units. We are fielding the latest and

greatest equipment for them in theater with the Huskies and the

Buffalos and those types of equipment, but we have got to have

those same pieces of equipment back here for them to train on before they hit theater. It is not good enough to say the first time you

are going to get it is when you get into theater.

Same dilemma we have with the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicles (MRAPs). We are pushing as much MRAPs as we

can into the theater because we want to protect every one of our

soldiers, but we still got to have some equipment back here to train

them on before we get back into theater with that equipment.

So the point of this slide is just to say across this entire model

it is not a tiered readiness model, as some might say. You don’t

have to be as ready in year one, two, three, four as you do in year

four or five. You have to have your equipment because you got

homeland missions and you got training missions.

Now, the next piece, slide six, was just to illustrate what General

Vaughn has already said. If you look at the equipment we have,

it is outdated equipment.

You can see, as he would have related to, the 2–1/2-ton trucks,

the economic usage life of a 2–1/2 ton truck is 20 years. The average age of the 2–1/2-ton trucks in my formation are 37 years old,

and they are not deployable because we don’t operate that kind of

equipment in theater. Yet in a lot of cases we are trying to count

that as an authorized substitute.

11

The point being, in 2002, the Army Reserve had 78 percent of its

authorized equipment, including authorized substitutes. We had 22

percent of the right equipment, modern equipment. As of this year,

we only have 66 percent of our authorized equipment because we

have left equipment in theater, and the equipment we took to theater was our good equipment. So the modern equipment was left in

theater, what we have got back here, so now I am down to 20 percent of the right equipment in my formations.

Now, does that mean we are broken and falling apart? No, because back here we can still use some of that authorizing equipment for homeland support, but we have got to get our equipment

modernized. We have got to get the equipment that is short into

our formations for our soldiers. As General Vaughn said, you know,

there has been much progress made.

In the current 813 pond, we have got a substantial amount of

dollars that are being programmed for equipment shortages in the

Army Reserve to the tune of almost $8 billion over that period of

time. We have got additional——

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Are you on number seven now?

General STULTZ. Sir, yes, sir. If you look at slide seven, as we

currently sit here—I will put it in the best frames, it doesn’t show

it exactly on the slide—my total cost of equipment in the Army Reserve right now that I am authorized is $22 billion. If I filled up

all of my formations with the right equipment right now, it costs

$22 billion. I have got $4 billion of that on hand, the modern equipment, 20 percent.

Now, over the pond, the 813, including supplementals and including some of the 1225–1, which is the repayment for the equipment we left in theater, we are reprogrammed to get $17.5 billion.

So we are programmed by year 2013 to get to that 70 percent of

what we are authorized. It still leaves us short about $6 billionplus out there, but we are programmed to get there.

The problem I have got is I am trying to recruit and retain a

force and train a force right now, not wait until 2013 to do it. So

we need—the emphasis—we appreciate the emphasis Congress has

given us, but we have got to get that equipment flowing. We have

got to get the dollars flowing so that we get the production lines

going so that we get the equipment being delivered, because, as

General Vaughn said, it takes a couple of years for that cycle before the equipment starts to show up.

I am concerned, just as you said in your opening statement, we

are in competition for our equipment with other priorities that are

out there. Every time some other priority comes up, we seem to

lose.

The best example I can give you is I will tell you just a couple

of facts and figures that I brought with me. I am not sure if I am

supposed to—none of this is classified. But from the 1998 to 2007

timeframe, we were funded to get about $800 million for Family of

Medium Tactical Vehicles (FMTVs). We got 128 in terms of what

equipment we actually received. So we should have gotten about

3,500 to 4,000 trucks; we got about 600, because dollars went other

places.

12

We were programmed for our 915 fleet, our line haul fleet, to get about $51 million for vehicles. We ended up not getting any vehicles during that time.

For our armored support vehicles, ASVs, we were programmed to get about $111 million, and we got about zero.

So I understand there is competition, there are needs in theatre,

there is replacement of vehicles that are being battle damaged and

lost in battle. I am not saying that we shouldn’t replace those and

other things, I am just saying we are competing with other priorities for the equipment.

We have got to get the emphasis both for the Guard and the Reserve and say we have got to get put priority where we need it. If

we are going to be the operational force, and if you are going to

expect me to be able to train and sustain that force, I have got to

have the equipment for them.

[The prepared statement of General Stultz can be found in the

Appendix on page 42.]

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Are you both agreed, then, before we go to

Mr. Reyes, that this operational force concept is no longer a concept, it is an operating principle that you have to abide by?

General STULTZ. Yes, sir.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. So the old definitions that might have applied

in the mid–1990’s with regard to the Reserve and the Guard in

terms of what is expected of the mission has significantly changed

and probably, at least for the foreseeable future, changed permanently?

General STULTZ. Yes, sir. The example I would use, as we

downsized the force in the 1990’s, and we drew the Active Army

down, some would call it the peace dividend. We made a conscious

decision to shift a lot of the combat support, service support, into

the Reserve components, because we said we don’t need that on an

everyday basis, and we really need our combat formations training

on a daily basis because it is harder to train up to a state of readiness. What we said is if we engaged in a conflict, we are going to

be dependent on the Reservers to provide that combat service support for us.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. So the equipment component then becomes

even more crucial?

General STULTZ. Yes, sir.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Mr. Reyes.

Mr. REYES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General, thanks for being here. We appreciate the information

and certainly appreciate your service.

General Stultz, on this slide number 7 that you talked about in

terms of getting up to 70 percent by 2013, I think you said——

General STULTZ. Yes, sir.

Mr. REYES. Did I understand you correctly that you said you

would get there providing the funding remained constant, including

supplementals?

General STULTZ. If we get the money that we are currently pro- grammed to get into base, the 813 base, which is about $7 billion,

plus the supplementals that we had programmed for the 2007 and

the 2008 supp, plus some of the national guard and reserve Equipment Account (NGREA) money, plus some of the 1225–1, which is

13

the repayment of the equipment we have left in theater, all of that

comes to fruition, yes, sir, it will take us to about 70 percent.

Mr. REYES. But you are not counting on supplementals providing

funding through 2013.

General STULTZ. No, sir. The funding I was saying is the 2007–

2008 supplementals which have already been submitted, plus what

we have got in base.

Mr. REYES. I am going to assume that there is a way that the

money in the 2007 and 2008 supplementals is being tracked so that

it goes to you?

General STULTZ. That is the difficult part, sir. That is exactly

what General Vaughn and I were talking. We know the money goes

into the supplementals. We don’t really have a way of tracking

when that money is being spent for us. What we do is we track

when we get the piece of equipment that we were told we need

3,000 trucks, and when we start seeing the trucks show up because

the money was in the supplemental for that, then we know that

money is being applied against us.

When it is being spent by the Army, they put up a production

line and say, we are going to produce 1,000 trucks. I have to wait

and see how many get distributed to me when they come off that

line. That is when we start competing, because I am supposed to

get 500, and I only get 200 because somebody else said it was more

important to send 300 somewhere else.

Mr. REYES. So at what point will you be able to let us know that

the money that was appropriated to you in the 2007 and 2008 supplemental never got to you?

General STULTZ. The best way I can do it—I will let General

Vaughn speak for the guard—is what I was referring to later when

I can go back and look at how much was programmed and what

I actually ended up getting at the end of that period of time.

Mr. REYES. Mr. Chairman, are we asking the Army to provide us

some kind of a systemic report on the things they spend the money

for——

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. That is one of the things that is going to grow

out of this hearing, whether we need to do that, or whether we

need to make more specific in the language that we wrote in conjunction with appropriations as to where the money is going to go

and in a sense to require it.

Now, that said, in order to answer your question properly, obviously the Army or any other branch of the service has to deal with

immediate contingencies. If there is a strike required of some kind

that requires equipment that has not been programmed into the

budget considerations or the defense bill itself, all you can do is

provide for contingencies. That is to say the flexibility of making

decisions is where equipment should go at any given point.

But saving that particular instance in which a—I won’t even say

a diversion, but an assignment of equipment is made in order to

meet the imperatives of the moment, that aside, we should be able

to, perhaps need to be able to, deal with more specificity in the defense bill and in the appropriation bill accompanying it as to where

the funds are going to go and insist that that be accounted for.

Otherwise, as it stands right now, my information is that we make

the authorization, do the appropriation; in this instance the Army,

14

has really extraordinarily broad authority to put the money pretty

much where they please.

General STULTZ. Yes, sir.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Is that a correct statement?

General STULTZ. Yes, sir. The money does not get appropriated

to us. It gets appropriated to the Army. Then the Army, as you say,

can—now, with the NGREA funds——

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. I am not saying that they do—provide the

equipment which was ordered, but what happens in the distribution of that equipment is then——

Mr. REYES. It is prioritized.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Yes, it is highly discretionary, I think is the

best way to put it.

General STULTZ. That is one reason we like the use of the

NGREA funds, because the NGREA funds are appropriated for the

National Guard or the Reserves.

Mr. REYES. While I think all of us on the committee understand

that there is a need for prioritization, for instance, into theater, because we want our troops in harm’s way to be as well equipped as

possible, the concern that I have—and I don’t know if you had a

chance to read the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) yet.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. I did.

Mr. REYES. So we just got a new NIE on Iraq that while we can’t

reference the information that is in there, the concern that I have

is in the foreseeable future, we don’t anticipate that there is going

to be any opportunity for the Reserves or the National Guard to be

less busy than they have been to—in fact, if the last 5 years has

been an indication, you are probably going to pick up 40 percent

of the load for the foreseeable future.

As that NIE indicated, there is no—at least they don’t see at this

point any possibility that there would be any drawdown because of

the fragility of the stability in Iraq and Afghanistan.

So it is a real concern, because while we understand the priority,

we certainly have to, through our oversight capability, provide the

flexibility to you gentlemen so that, as you said, you need that kind

of equipment to train on so that soldiers don’t go into theater and

train on equipment that they have never seen before.

General STULTZ. Yes, sir.

Mr. REYES. So it is a real challenge.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, gentlemen.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. I will go to Mr. Wilson now.

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to point out that I am wearing a jacket today in honor

of the heritage of our Chairman. He has a Scottish background,

and so it is the shared heritage that we have. I knew I would be

dressing appropriately for the Chairman.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. That is right. The Scots have to take the

blame.

Mr. WILSON. No, this is good.

Generals, thank you very much for being here today. I particularly appreciate your service. I have been in both of your commands. I was 3 years in the Army Reserves and 28 years in the

Army National Guard. I am really grateful that I have four sons

15

serving in the military. The reason they are serving in the military

is that everywhere I went, I would run into persons that I served

with in the guard and reserves, and there was immediately a bond

that they noticed of persons of all walks of life. And they noticed

that the people that I thought were the most capable, competent,

patriotic were indeed members of the guard and reserve. That is

why I am confident all four of them joined the military. Three, in

fact, are in the Army National Guard. One son is a bit off track.

He is a doctor in the Navy, but we still will accept him.

I also want to let you know that as I have had the opportunity

to visit with our troops in Iraq nine times, six times with our

troops in Afghanistan, every time I go, I am so impressed by the

persons serving in the guard and reserves, particularly my former

unit, the 218th Brigade, which is concluding its year of service in

Afghanistan, General Bob Livingston. What a great job they have

performed.

Indeed, as we discussed, the equipment in the summer of 2000—

I was on a rotation at the national training center at Fort Irwin,

California, and the equipment that we had then was quite limited.

I point out that the equipment that we had then was actually in

a museum today. I want to thank you for your leadership in fighting for the best equipment to protect our troops.

I am concerned, though, as I look at the report from General

Blum as to a readiness level of 61 percent and, indeed, we want

your input on how we can assist the guard and reserve in having

proper equipment, and, indeed, a specific question I have relates to

unfunded requirements.

With the situation of unfunded requirements, General Casey pro- vided a letter of $3.9 billion. What is the status on the unfunded

requirements, and is there any way that they could be included in

the budget so that in the current issues that we have relative to

earmarks, that the funding can proceed?

General VAUGHN. Congressman, you are asking us what we could do. In our instance, I think it was right at $4 billion. We appreciated him making the case for that because it was aimed at the

critical dual-use 342.

I don’t know—you know, I think in spirit that he was asked for—

again, the bad word being supplemental, I think that is what—I

think that is essentially what he was asked for. If there were extra

monies out there, you know, where would it be? I don’t mean extra.

If we don’t receive that at someplace—and the helpful piece about

that, it would pay down the $10 billion hole-in-the-yard piece out

of that 17- that was remaining. But as far as where it could be,

you know, I take it in the very spirit that he put it back in, and

as you all alluded to earlier. Maybe if you are talking about the

total gross domestic product (GDP) and whatever that percentage

is, maybe it is part of that discussion, but it is for the Director the

Army Guard to turn around and say, we need to put another $4

billion in the base, and that would come at the expense of some of

the priorities that Jack has talked about.

I think probably it wouldn’t be the right thing for me to do. We

need the $4 billion. There is no question about it.

Again, we certainly appreciate and applaud the fact that he did

that. In fact, he did it, taking our list, without even talking to GenVerDate 22-MAR-2001 14:15 Sep 04, 2008 Jkt 043480 PO 00000 Frm 00019 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\110-142\094250.000 HNS1 PsN: HNS1
16

eral Blum and I. We turned around and said, would you look at

this? The Chief of Staff in the Army has turned around and got the

message. So I hope that is enough of an answer that I can give you

now.

I don’t know how we—I don’t know where we put it without identifying a billpayer to come off of someplace. But we simply appreciate everything that this committee does. Again, the amount of resources that is up against this—will tell you the primary issue is

the one you just attacked, and how do we see this from back over

here on one side, you know, from the checkbook all the way

through to where we got it?

If there is a higher priority by the Army to move that some other

place, then we simply need to have an IOU on this. But unfunded

requests (UFRs)—and we are going to have UFRs, and there is

going to be differences in our force structure between now and

2013. We would hope—hope not being a good option, as General

Sullivan used to say—we would hope that that would go down a

bit. I really don’t see how, because with everything that we are

looking at now and the use of our guard—what we committed to

the Army was 60,000 Army Guard soldiers a year mobilized. You

know, we did this around when we had a big bubble in the middle

with 100,000 a year mobilized. You know, we did this in the middle

when we had the bubble. We had nearly 100,000 nearly mobilized

at one time in 2005 where we modernized the force, and we had

so much combat force downrange, we are trying to flat-line that out

for the future where it is 60,000 all the way across.

But we are going to be very receptive to anyone trying to help

us with what we have got out there in the future. But I can’t tell

you where we would take it at, Congressman.

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, and I look forward to working with the

committee.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you, Mr. Wilson.

Mr. Spratt followed by Mr. Saxton.

Mr. SPRATT. I didn’t have the benefit of hearing your testimony,

but I have just been reading it and trying to do my homework as

you were talking.

I have two basic questions, and it is a question I put to the Secretary of Defense and Joint Chiefs when they were here a couple

of years ago. This year’s budget appears to be the last one programmed in the Future Year Defense Plan (FYDP) in which a real

increase in spending dollars is provided in the near future. The

budget as projected in the President’s submission declines in real

dollars for the Army and all the services and the DOD generally

after next year, after 2009. We know there are inaccuracies in the

outyear budget if DOD is programming for decreasing real-dollar

spending over the next five years. It appears to me—just from a

quick perusal, it looks to me like you are asking for large increases

in the Army, which I can understand, and the Army Guard and the

Army Reserve procurement budget over the next 10 years. I understand the Army Guard has stated a need for $24 billion, which

would fund you to the 80 percent level, and the Army Reserves indicated a need for $8 billion for tactical vehicles alone.

So this is a question. Looking at these numbers, and looking at

your enormous requirements in the near term, does the FYDP as

17

it is presently stated support your equipment purchases to maintain your goals, equipping the forces by 2015 and 2019? Particularly, do either of your figures starting in 2010 reflect your equipment purchase needs, or are you looking for more money? Will you

need more money over and above, substantially over and above,

than the FYDP now states? How much longer do you think you can

go without receiving the equipment—equipment funding in a supplemental appropriations bill?

General STULTZ. Yes, sir. As alluded to earlier before you came

in, we have got—and one of the charts I provided shows that currently programmed in the 813 budget, FYDP budget, plus the

supplementals that were there for 2007 and have been asked for

2008, plus some other funds that the Army owes us for equipment

that was left in theater, that will get us to 70 percent of our equipment needs by 2013. That still leaves short about $6.8 billion worth

of equipment that the Army Reserve needs above and beyond that

2013 figure to get us to 100 percent.

Mr. SPRATT. By way of comparison, do you know what the number would have been, shortfall would have been say in 2002, 2003,

some 5 years ago, on the threshold of the Iraqi war?

General STULTZ. Yes, sir. It is a little bit hard to say. As I said

earlier, in 2002, I had 78 percent of my equipment but only 22 percent of what was authorized to modern equipment. So I was already—we were a legacy strategic reserve back then. We still had

the M–35s. We still had the old, in some cases M–16 A1 rifles, we

had some of the 800 series 5-ton trucks. So, in 2002, we were at

78 percent, but really only 22 percent modernized. Today, I am at

66 percent. I have got $1.2 billion worth of equipment that is left

in theater that has been added to that bill because—and I am at

20 percent modernized, because a lot of the equipment I left in theater was my modern equipment. I took my M–915 A4s, the semi

trucks, and took them to theater. My M–915 A 1s, the old ones, I

left back here because I wanted the troops going to war to take the

best. So now I have left that in theater, so now I have got 50 percent of my M–915 fleet, but it is the modern fleet, that is in Iraq,

and it is the old fleet that is back here. So it is kind of hard to

quantify exactly because we have had some changes in structure,

we have had some changes in terms of our capabilities. But I would

submit to you that the figures are probably somewhere close in

terms of what we have accumulated between 2002 and now. But

what we have lost in terms of either aging equipment or equipment

that has been left in theater, if we are at a break-even point, we

are lucky.

Mr. SPRATT. Could you give us an idea of how much over and

above the FYDP it will take to get you up to your preferred equipment levels?

General STULTZ. It is about $6.8 billion, sir.

Mr. SPRATT. $6.8 billion?

General STULTZ. Yes, sir.

Mr. SPRATT. That is in 2010? Is that the whole period of time?

General STULTZ. That would be from 2013 to 2019 is when that

is projected.

Mr. SPRATT. Okay. Thank you, sir.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Mr. Saxton.

18

Mr. SAXTON. Thank you very much.

In General Vaughn’s concluding sentence of his testimony, he

said we are making progress on the percentage, meaning percentage of equipment. And I have here a chart which I am going to ask

our great helper John to provide to both of you so that you can see

what I am talking about. I have a chart here which says, ‘‘America’s Army, the Strength of the Nation, Army National Guard Funding and Systems Growth.’’ And I just wanted to point out why I

think General Vaughn made that statement and why I think it is

correct. On this chart, which we all have in our packet by the way,

there is a category of equipment called ‘‘Family Medium Tactical

Vehicles,’’ which General Stultz referred to as FMTVs a little while

ago. Before 9/11, we had a stated requirement on this chart of

about 4,722 units in that category. And in fiscal year 2001, we had

just 6 percent of them on hand. In fiscal year 2008, we have a stated requirement not of 4,722 but of 22,266, and we have, either on

hand or pending deliveries, 42 percent of that. So we seem to have

moved from a 6 percent rate of having what we need to 42 percent.

That is progress.

Another line item there, line haul trucks, a stated requirement

in 2001 of 1,752; we were at 71 percent of the requirement. In fiscal year 2008, a requirement of 2,372, and we are at 108 percent

of the requirement on this chart. So I look down this list, and I

thought this is pretty encouraging that we are actually moving in

the right direction on most of these items. And even where the percentages have fallen, the number of items on hand has increased

because the requirement has increased. So am I being overly optimistic about the path we are on to meet the requirement that we

all agree we need to have, or is there something that I am missing?

General VAUGHN. Congressman, I think you can be optimistic. I

would repeat something one time that Congressman McHugh said

in one of our deals with him. In the future he would like to come

back as an out year because everything is rosy in the out years.

A lot of what we have got hooked up here, you know, is in the out

years, and it is going to take a lot of heavy hauling to get there.

But you are exactly right. We are making progress. And because

there are additional requirements on here, you see that the requirements out in 2013 and beyond that grow substantially. It is

a much more capable force. So when we look at the heavy line haul

capability, if we take some of the trucks that make up the difference that Jack was talking about that are actually legacy trucks,

some of those are pretty good. And we are committed to stay with

some of those trucks for a while. We are not committed to stay with

M–35s. We would like to roll the 800s out. And we will make up

some difference here in heavy haul with our heavy expanded mobility tactical trucks (HEMTTs) and our heavy tactical vehicles

(HTVs) that we are getting. But overall this is an Army chart. I

imagine it came out of the G8 of the Army. And we agree with

what this Army chart is showing you. Through 2008—and you

would be disappointed, having put the effort in, if it was any other

way I would think. But that is what is going on right now. We are

on track, our percentages aren’t near what we want them to be,

and to get this force like it has got to be out there in the future

for the United States it has to continue that track.

19

Mr. SAXTON. Let me ask you both, and let me start with General

Stultz, from an equipment perspective relative to the supplemental

for 2008, how important is that to you in terms of continuing the

progress that we see here in this chart? And can you give specific

examples of equipment that you need that is in the 2008 supplemental?

General STULTZ. Yes, sir. It is critical. And to refer to the first

question you asked, I don’t want to paint a totally dismal picture.

We are getting record resourcing in terms of dollars that are being

applied against us. And it is in that column you talked about on

this one chart of pending delivery or scheduled to be delivered. It

is that cycle that takes to replace that to get the industrial base

going to produce it. An example would be, in normal years, if I got

$500 million in equipment dollars, I was feeling really good. For

2007 to 2009, it is like $2.5 billion; $1.8 billion of that is in the supplemental. I had $1.8 billion in the 2008 supplemental and about

$1.3 billion, I think it was or somewhere around that, in the 2007

supplemental for equipment. So record levels of resourcing for us.

But it is going it take a few years before that equipment is going

to start showing up in our formations. And these percentages will

start growing immediately. To the immediate point, when you talk

to FMTVs, I have got 15 percent of my authorized FMTVs on hand

right now. The rest of them are the authorized substitutes. So if

we don’t get that supplemental, the dollars going in there, part of

those FMTVs will never increase because that is where some of

those dollars are going. A lot of those dollars are going into things

like communications equipment that my soldiers back here need to

be able to train on back here and be equipped back here before

they go into theater so they can communicate on the battlefield

properly, as well as communicate back here if they are responding

to some homeland—attack on the homeland or some kind of natural disaster. So if we don’t get the money that is in the supplemental, we will suffer in terms of FMTVs, we will suffer in terms

of some of the night vision equipment we need, we will suffer in

terms of communications equipment. Because $1.8 billion of that

supplemental is supposed to be for our equipment.

General VAUGHN. Congressman, much the same, we have a detailed list of what is in that fiscal year 2008 supplemental that we

depend on. There are a couple things, though. The Warrior Information Network-Tactical, WIN-T is what they call it, as opposed to

Joint Network Node (JNN), we are really, really looking and counting on $1.2 billion for that. Because that is a capability for our tactical formations, larger formations that we can’t even deploy them

unless we got it. And the Army, mother Army has run through all

the systems that they have. In fact, we moved money over last year

to make sure they could acquire this. And we are looking on the

payback side of that. And that is just part of what is in the supplemental. We have a complete list on that, though. Thank you.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Mr. Saxton, would you yield to Mr. Spratt for

one moment as a follow-up on that, and then we will go back to

you?

Mr. SAXTON. Thank you.

Mr. SPRATT. I am just curious about the equipment that is being

left in the field, or at least is in the field today. Do you have an

20

inventory of it to show where it is, number one, whose control or

possession it is? And number two, how much it will cost to—or

whether or not they have a plan, do you have a plan for repatriating it, bringing it back home? And if so, is there a budget provision

for the transportation costs?

General STULTZ. The equipment that is considered TPE, TheaterProvided Equipment, or used to be SBE, Stay-Behind Equipment,

because I happened to be over there during the time that we made

the decision to leave the equipment behind, and I had to make

some of the decisions on the trucks; whose trucks do we leave in

theater? And we tried to be equitable across the force and said, we

will leave some Guard trucks, some Reserve trucks and some active

trucks so everybody shares in this. And one, it makes it easier

when Guard or Reserve units come in, they can fall in on like component equipment. We made that decision back in 2004. And at

that time, the equipment remained on our property books, and we

had to track it, and it was in theater. Then the decision was made

that that equipment is not—we can’t continue to keep it on our

property books because we don’t know when it is going to come

home. At that point, it was transferred to the theater. It becomes

theater property now, taken off of our books. And that is the—I use

the term 1225–1, that is the statute that says the Army, should

they take equipment away from the Reserve or Guard, has a certain amount of time in which they have to repay or replenish that

equipment. So currently, the Stay-Behind Equipment that is in

theater is not on our property books. That is part of that shortage

when I talked about my on-hand equipment went down is because

that was taken off my books, remained in theater, and now it is

the Army’s property. Some of that equipment, you know, I am not

at the level to know what they are going to do with that equipment, but I will tell you, having been over there with it, some of

the miles that are on those trucks and everything, it is going to require extensive refurbishment to bring them back up to a level

where they can be used back here in the States if we make that

decision. So technically it is not on my books anymore, so I don’t

have the responsibility to try to look at the cost of bringing it back

or the cost of refurbishing it. That becomes an Army cost now.

What I did have to do is make sure I had good accountability so

that I could hand the Army the bill and say, $1.2 billion of that

equipment over there is mine that you now have to pay me back

for.

Mr. SPRATT. Is a lot of the equipment likely to be left in theater

for the host country?

General STULTZ. Sir, I don’t know. I am not at that level where

they are making those decisions. I think some of it could be, just

me personally, could be put——

Mr. SPRATT. We hear the plusses and minuses of the Iraqi forces.

One of the shortcomings listed, cited frequently, is logistics.

General STULTZ. Yes, sir.

Mr. SPRATT. So it would strike me that if you have got lots of

vehicles there in country, they may be asserting some sort of need

for those vehicles before they are shipped back home.

General STULTZ. Yes, sir. Again, sir, I am not in that decision

loop.

21

Mr. SPRATT. Not in your pay grade. Thank you, sir.

General VAUGHN. Congressman, we had $3.2 billion left in thea- ter, $3.2 billion of equipment left there. And as you might imagine,

we knew what it was. There was $1.7 billion of that in the fiscal

year 2007 bridge supp. There was $647 million in this requested

fiscal year 2008 GWOT request. And the remainder is supposed to

be from future supps or a reset, a cost of war. As you said, we probably didn’t want it back anyway at this particular point in time,

but the hole is there. It is part of a hole that is created because,

even with the 2007 stuff, if it takes 2 years in the procurement

process to see it, we won’t see some of that until 2009. And so I

hope that answers in the same fashion. The 1225.6 piece that Jack

talks about is the Department of Defense instruction that says, if

you are going to take stuff from Reserve component, then you need

to have a payback plan. And Jack and I both went to battle with

the G8, and they did a wonderful job on this. We are not complaining, except we left it, and we don’t have it back in our units to

train on. And that is just the price of doing business. We do think

that this is not taken care of. We think that the bogeys out there

to pay it back, though.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. So the answer at this stage then, before we

go back to Mr. Saxton, is that you do know what went out there.

You know how much it was worth. You got a payback figure. You

understand what you need. You even have a timetable for it if you

can get it, but the question becomes then, is it going to happen?

General VAUGHN. Chairman, that is exactly right.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Fair summary?

General VAUGHN. That is fair.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Okay.

General VAUGHN. And it is not a whine, because——

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. I didn’t say that.

General VAUGHN [continuing]. There may be higher priorities.

We just want a payback plan if it is moved out to the right so we

can see it.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. I am just making an observation, not a characterization. Thank you.

Mr. Saxton, thank you for your patience.

Mr. SAXTON. It is a pleasure. Mr. Chairman, just let me drill

down, if I may, on this concept of where we were, where we are,

and where we need be to. The significance of going from a strategic

force to an operational force has been discussed here several times

today. And that increased requirements. And as a result of those

increased requirements, dollars have been made available, and

there is stuff in the pipeline that is going to help solve that problem. We also moved from a divisional structure to modular units,

the new brigade structure, which I believe also increased your authorizations for equipment, trucks and radios and what have you.

Looking back from an equipment perspective now, how would you

rate your ability to do your missions today as compared to prior to

9/11, which is when we—is the date that kind of triggered all these

changes?

General VAUGHN. Congressman, in the United States of America,

with the—in lieu of equipment that is out there that is not

deployable and subs, if that particular equipment is good enough

22

for Americans, and we like to say it is never good enough—you

know, I mean, we have been told this several times, that you can

get by with M–35s. Oh, by the way, if you break the M–35s on the

way down with an engineer unit from Missouri to Louisiana and

you don’t get there with that capability, and you have heard some

of those stories, I mean, what does that cost us in total of—in

terms of suffering? Our capability is pretty good in the United

States because of what we have done with our personnel and our

force structure pieces of this. As we discussed earlier, how good we

are is framed by equipment on one side, you know, a tremendous

book end, and you can’t do it unless you got it. Full-time support,

you know, on the other side. It all stands on the base of people.

And we are stronger right now than we have ever been in people.

I mean, because they have stepped forward to do what the Nation

is asking them to do. And we have got a lot of veterans and a lot

of talent out there right now. Then we need the training dollars,

you know, in the middle. For the old Continental United States

(CONUS) fight overseas, as long as we are incrementally getting

into this thing, we are getting better. But if we have to put a whole

bunch of folks somewhere all at one time, without going into the

readiness implications of that, as I discussed earlier when we were

talking about a strategic Reserve, that is kind of what you got left

is you have got a strategic edge with a lot of old equipment back

here in the United States, you know, backing up the active force.

That is what you got. Our capability here in the United States to

go to the fight with old stuff, about like it was, you know, to start

with except our manpower is better, sir.

General STULTZ. Yes, sir. I would just add, echo on what General

Vaughn said, one, from the Army Reserves perspective, I think we

have the most capable force we have ever had because I have the

most combat veterans we have ever had in our force, great young

Americans who are willing to go forward whenever called upon.

And we send them into battle with the best equipped, best trained.

We don’t have to train quite as hard because they have already

been there, done that, so they know how to do their job. The challenge we have got is, one, getting them trained on the latest equipment that we are using in theater because the enemy has a vote.

And so when the enemy goes to a different tactic and we change

the type of equipment, whether it is some type of counter-IED

interdiction equipment or whether it is some of the IED-detection

equipment, some of the Huskies and those, as I mentioned earlier,

we have got to have that same equipment back here. Now, we have

to be very diligent because, as we said before, there are priorities

out there. The enemy gets a vote. And we got to put the best equipment in the hands of the soldiers. So if you give me a truck or a

company full of Huskies back here, I am not going to give them the

one unit. I am going to spread them out over multiple units because I want everybody to get a piece of them so they can train

with them. Or I am going to put a piece of them in some of the

training centers so they can go there and train on them. So I have

got to be diligent also. I can’t be selfish and say I want it all. But

we have got to do better of getting more of the equipment, which

is—that is why we are dependent upon Congress to provide us the

funds. And we appreciate what you are doing at records levels for

23

us. And then we have to use our own diligence to make sure we

get it in the right place so that those soldiers back here can train

on it before they go back into the theater.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. I am going to go to a couple of questions myself then, and then we will go to a second round. Just one thing

before I do.

General Vaughn, I want to make sure that I fully understood

your last statement. When you were out kind of going through the

continuum of outlining the equipment in relation to personnel and

so on in a kind of comparison of previous time and now, you didn’t

mention prepositioned equipment. And I am citing that not as a

flaw, but it really is an inquiry. Am I correct that your formula—

I shouldn’t say your formula—your continuum that you were citing,

starting say pre–2001, we had—prepositioned equipment is very,

very important in terms of being able to take up the training that

you are talking about here. So if you already have that equipment

out there, you are training on it here, you go there, you can pick

it up. Now it seems to me we have changed that because the

prepositioned equipment, at least my understanding is that most of

it or all of it is essentially gone, been used in theater as you say,

and not coming back. It is certainly not going to show up down at

Corpus Christi or something like that for refurbishing. If you are

behind in equipment, doesn’t it also mean you don’t have equipment that you can leave prepositioned? So, in effect, are you not

in a situation where you are kind of working like maps in navigation, where the railroad car comes with the container just in time

to get on the ship that goes out to the Pacific Command or out to

Hawaii, let’s say, and that is just in time delivery. So now aren’t

you now in a situation where instead of soldiers coming to

prepositioned equipment, they are coming to a situation where you

are hoping you can have the equipment they are going to use arrive just in time for the deployment?

General VAUGHN. Chairman, right on the money. You know,

when I talked to you about the myth associated with the way we

mobilized and what we were supposed to do on personnel, we were

supposed to bring our 80 percent, and we would get rounded out

from the active force and the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) and

so forth, same thing on equipment. That prepositioned equipment

stockage—and in the old days, you remember growing up with the

Europe kind of plans and what not, you think about that, the first

wave moves out, the way it was explained to us as a young soldier,

because I have often asked this question, where does the stuff come

from? Well, first wave moves out, our AC formations fall in, and

you take their equipment. So when the time came, you know, for

that to happen, that wasn’t possible. That is not what happened.

We didn’t have the stuff prepo’d to start with, and again, don’t

want to get into the details of all of it, and I know that you all see

all this all the time. Here is the question. How much prepo stuff

is built back someplace in the world? And oh, by the way, does that

compete with the requirements that we have got back here on this

side? We cross-leveled hundreds of thousands of pieces of equipment from state to state, from unit to unit, you know, back and

forth to do exactly what you said. And now we don’t have the luxVerDate 22-MAR-2001 14:15 Sep 04, 2008 Jkt 043480 PO 00000 Frm 00027 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\110-142\094250.000 HNS1 PsN: HNS1
24

ury of that because we really need to be doing this in pre-mode

training fashion.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Fine. Thank you. The reason that I asked

that is that in my calculations in terms of what I am going to recommend, I want to take into account in order to get your equipment here to be able to train on and have the equipment there, I

think we also have to include prepositioning equipment as part of

the dollar equation. You don’t disagree with that?

General VAUGHN. No.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. And you may say—I imagine people in the

Pentagon now, some of the budget people, like Mr. Spratt here are

saying, Jesus, don’t add in another factor, you know, on top of it.

But I don’t see any other way to do it if you are going to do it right.

Otherwise we are kind of kidding ourselves. If you are going to be

in for the dime, you are probably going to have to get in for the

dollar if part of the dime is prepositioning that dime. So when you

give me figures now, and I am going to go to my questions, you

don’t have to give me the exact figures now, but you will see from

the questions, I would like you to include the full spectrum of what

equipment refurbishment, resetting means in terms of the doctrine

that you would like to follow or you think you should follow or

what your mission directs you to follow. Am I making sense to you?

Do you understand what I am going to be looking for?

General VAUGHN. Chairman, I think so.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. We are looking for numbers in equipment and

what you need. I don’t want to leave things like prepositioning out

simply because right now it seems like too far a reach.

General VAUGHN. Chairman, the only thing about the

prepositioning piece is it is probably not the right question for General Stultz or myself, because that—the pre-po stocks become

strictly a big Army piece.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. No, I understand that. What I am saying is

I am assuming—what I need to have, not necessarily from you per

se, but what I need to have is your figures based on what you expect the Army to be providing as well. See, because if the

prepositioning isn’t there, that affects what your equipment, the

kind of equipment that you can anticipate having at home to train

on is.

General STULTZ. Yes, sir because.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Because we can’t continue sending deployments out there, I hope you agree on this, we can’t continue to

keep sending multiple deployments out there, particularly of guard

and reserve, if at some time in the future you don’t count on having equipment already there.

General STULTZ. Yes, sir.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Or in the process of where we preposition this

stuff, at some point that has got to be replaced and the Army has

to take that into account. It can’t just keep coming to the guard

and reserve and saying, we want you here and don’t worry, we will

get you the equipment sometime, somehow, somewhere.

General STULTZ. Yes, sir. That is one of the reasons that it concerns me a lot of times when we are talking about authorized substitute equipment.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Yes.

25

General STULTZ. And we are counting that in our numbers, because that authorized substitute equipment assumes that there is

going to be other equipment where we go to——

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Yes.

General STULTZ [continuing]. That is the right equipment.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. So General Stultz, let me start with you. And

some of this we have already talked about and you have already

answered, but for purposes of the record I want to take this down

in order. And some of this is just yes and no, and some will require

you to actually get stuff to us. Okay?

General STULTZ. Yes.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. So the lack of equipment, is it not correct the

lack of equipment in some Army Reserve units makes it more difficult to train for combat?

General STULTZ. Yes.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. And then is my understanding correct the

Army has formally committed, the Army now has formally committed to equip all Army Reserve units to a 100 percent?

General STULTZ. Yes.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. If so—and that is, yes. When is that projected

to happen by the Army?

General STULTZ. The current projections that I have been getting

is 2019.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Okay. Now, as you have indicated, Congress

has provided billions in additional funds for the Army Reserve

equipment in these last few years. Is it correct that you can account for all of those funds? That is to say either you, General

Vaughn, and/or the Army can account for those funds? Or your portion? Can you account for your portion of those funds?

General STULTZ. I can account for the equipment that I have received that those funds were spent on.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Okay. So the answer is that while you can account for the equipment, how the money was spent requires further

inquiry from us.

General STULTZ. Yes, sir.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. As to the mechanism or the logistics, if you

will, of accounting.

General STULTZ. Yes, sir.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. With the Army itself. Okay. Did you get the

equipment and, by extension, the funding that you required or that

you think was allocated to you by way of what the intention of

Congress was?

General STULTZ. I guess, sir, the way I would answer that is it

goes back to we have been given an equipment distribution plan

from the Army that says, you will get the equipment, and we have

been given a dollar program that says, this is the dollars that are

going to be given to you.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Yes.

General STULTZ. I don’t have the equipment in hand.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. That said, the dollars I am going to say you

have referred to previously, I forget the exact name of the fund,

what is it?

General STULTZ. NGREA?

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Yes.

26

General STULTZ. Yes, sir. With the NGREA funds we have been

given in past years——

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. What is the correct name again?

General STULTZ. It is the National Guard Reserve Equipment Account.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Yes. In the National Guard Reserve Equipment Account is the funding and the equipment accounted for?

General STULTZ. Yes, sir.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Did you receive that funding, and did you receive that equipment?

General STULTZ. Yes, sir. That we can account for.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Okay. Because what I am thinking here is

maybe we have to direct more funds—and so this is what, at least

ten years old, right? I think something along those lines?

General STULTZ. Yes, sir.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. And has that worked for ten years?

General STULTZ. Yes, sir.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. If I went back ten years and asked you to go

back for ten years, you could account for the funding and equipment in that fund?

General STULTZ. Yes, sir.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Because what I am thinking about is possibly

directing more funds into that.

General STULTZ. Yes, sir.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Not to take revenge on the Army or get into

a fight with the Army or anything like that, but for purposes of us

being able to keep control and track of what is going on. I am not

trying to take money away from the Army or anything of that nature. I am talking about accountability for us and for you, and most

important to the serving soldier in the field who needs to have the

equipment. I am trying to figure out what is the most efficient way

of making this happen so you have confidence in that funding process and in the equipment which follows from that.

General STULTZ. Yes, sir.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Okay. What would you say to the idea of getting a series of reports to the Congress on Army Reserve equipment, including combat equipment and equipment needed for domestic emergency response? What I mean by reports is not to burden you with anything, but a kind of—rather than having hearings

like we are having, you know, after the fact in point of fact, but

something where you could kind of keep us updated? And by the

same token—because you must be doing this internally anyway.

General STULTZ. Yes, sir.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. So I am thinking about some idea of maybe

every 90 days sharing with us where you are and what it is, not

as a way of chasing you or looking over your shoulder like you were

bad boys and girls.

General STULTZ. Yes, sir.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. But rather that we stay in the loop a little

more on this.

General STULTZ. Yes, sir.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. And I will tell you the reason why I am thinking about doing that. Again, it is not to put a burden on you, but

we keep getting hit with this supplemental budget stuff. And I

27

think you guys have watched me long enough; I am not the only

one. I get very exercised about this supplemental budget, because

I think it allows us to get sloppy. It allows us to say, well, we will

take that up later on, particularly where equipment is concerned.

And once you start mixing up the regular order of budget process,

as Mr. Spratt no doubt can attest to, and you start sloughing stuff

off into the supplemental budgets; you don’t know when a supplemental budget is going to be presented. You don’t know when it is

going to pass. You don’t have any clear idea of what is going to be

in it. You don’t know what kind of competition for dollars is going

to be in that. It can get lost in all kinds of political activity that

has nothing to do with the Defense budget as such or appropriations. You get what I mean? You get dependent on a supplemental

process; you are also dependent on the politics of it. And that puts

you in a very, very I think precarious situation in terms of precise

understanding of what you are going to be able to provide for your

soldiers. Now I am not asking you to agree with that. I am making

an observation. But I think you would be hard pressed to disagree

that the supplemental process dependency gets you in very shaky

territory very quickly.

General STULTZ. The timeliness and the certainty of funding also

has a huge impact on the industrial base of us getting those lines

started to get those trucks flowing.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. I thank you. I agree with that, too. So that

is the reason—the reason I am thinking about this report series is

because we have stumbled into this supplementary budget process;

we will be able to deal a lot more rationally with that supplemental

process if we have a kind of ongoing report mechanism to know

what things we should stick into the supplemental if we stumbled

on the regular budget process. So I am thinking of that. And if you

want to comment further on it in writing you can. But I take it

from your answer right now you don’t necessarily object to sharing

that kind of information with us on a regular basis.

General STULTZ. No, sir.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Okay. Now, will Army Reserve units that are

not set to deploy continue to have to give equipment up to ensure

deploying units have what they need? Think about this. Have I

stated it clearly?

General STULTZ. Yes, sir. It gets back to what General Vaughn

was talking earlier about, where we have cross-leveled equipment

to get the right equipment into the units that need that equipment.

My intent is to stop that process. As we get this Army force generation process laid out, as we get these units going through the cycle,

we should be able to stop having to shift equipment between units.

And as the equipment flows, as I was saying earlier, as we start

to get this equipment coming out of the resourcing that we are getting now, then my priority would be, one, get the newest equipment to the units that are next to deploy and move down to the

next to the next to deploy and field it that way.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. I understand that. Maybe I should make it a

little clearer. When will that cross-leveling of equipment end? For

the foreseeable future, unless we are able to either get more money

to you and a manufacturing timeline that delivers equipment to

you that you know is going to come as a result of that funding, am

28

I correct that you are going to have to give equipment up from

units that are not deployed in order to equip those that are being

deployed?

General STULTZ. Some, but very small.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Okay.

General STULTZ. One of the reasons for that is the theater provided equipment now keeps us from having to cross-level a lot of

that equipment.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. All right. So that is not as big an issue as I

might think it is?

General STULTZ. It is not as big an issue for the Army Reserve

at this moment. I am not saying it is not an issue, but it is not

as big an issue.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. All right. That is helpful. And finally, I know

you have mentioned 2019 and so on, but in comparison to the projected budgets, what additional—and this may be something you

will have to give me in writing——

General STULTZ. Yes, sir.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE [continuing]. What additional funding requirements for the Army Reserve equipment do you see in fiscal year

2009 and beyond, and how much of this funding could the Reserve

actually spend in 2009?

General STULTZ. Yes, sir. Let me submit that in writing.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 77.]

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. You get what I am trying to get at?

General STULTZ. Yes, sir.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Because we want to do this thing, there is

going to be more money, I think we are going to try and do that,

we are going to do the best we can within our budget allocations

and so on, I don’t want to get into something where there is even

a couple of hundred million dollars more than what you need for—

I shouldn’t say what you, need what you can actually spend.

General STULTZ. Yes, sir.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Because we are going to try to put this where

everybody can actually spend it.

General STULTZ. Yes, sir.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. It doesn’t do any good to put something on

paper for you if you don’t end up go getting it, right?

General STULTZ. Exactly right.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. In fact, it can end up hurting you. Because

people then say, well, you had all this money then. Oh, yeah, well,

gee, we didn’t actually spend that or we didn’t get it.

General STULTZ. Yes, sir.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. So what I need to know, in comparison to the

projected budgets, what additional funding requirements you see

for equipment in 2009 and how much you can actually spend.

General STULTZ. Yes, sir.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Okay? Now, General Vaughn, again I am

going to ask some questions in the same vein, if that is all right

with you, even though you have essentially answered some of this

stuff. But for the record and to get it in order, I take it that the

lack of equipment in some Army National Guard units does make

29

it more difficult for them to train for combat and provide support

in an emergency situation?

General VAUGHN. Yes, Chairman.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Okay. And is it your understanding that the

Army has formally committed to equip all National Guard units to

100 percent?

General VAUGHN. Yes, Chairman, that is true.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. When is that predicted to happen?

General VAUGHN. For our brigade combat teams for the tactical

force that is fiscal year 2015.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Okay.

General VAUGHN. And for our support formations is same with

General Stultz, fiscal year 2019.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Okay. Again, as you have already indicated,

we have provided buildings—billions, some buildings, too—in additional funds for the National Guard equipment. And what is your

answer with respect to how you determine where the money has

gone, whether you got the equipment, and whether it was siphoned

off? Siphoned off is probably the wrong word. But whether it has

been allocated elsewhere?

General VAUGHN. My answer, Chairman, is the same as General

Stultz. We have exactly the same issue on that.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Okay. Then you have indicated the deployment plans, and as has General Stultz and his chart, deployment

plans require five Army National Guard brigades to deploy next

year. Are you confident those units will have all the equipment

they need before they deploy so that they can properly train?

General VAUGHN. Chairman, they are——

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Five brigades is the number, is it not?

General VAUGHN. Yes, it is. It is four plus one; four, and one into

Afghanistan that takes the place of the 218th. And they will deploy

with all the equipment that they need. Now, the issue being they

didn’t have it long enough before to substantially reduce the postmobilization training time and increase boats on the ground. If you

follow me through that.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. All right. Would you support this series of reports or regular reports that I mentioned to General Stultz, which

again from your testimony I think you are doing anyway? And because of the supplemental report activity that we seem to have gotten in with some degree of regularity, at least while the present

hostilities are under way, I hope you agree that that would be helpful to us in trying to come up with realistic numbers in these

supplementals that would actually direct something to you rather

than just going off into something which essentially we have no—

we don’t engage in any oversight and we are just throwing numbers in the air.

General VAUGHN. Chairman, I agree with that. As you have said,

we compound it anyway. We just need to go ahead and report it.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Okay. And then, finally, Army National

Guard units that are not set to deploy, will they have to continue

to give up equipment to ensure deploying units have what they

need?

General VAUGHN. A great question. They are going to have to

cross-level for some time in the future. Now, how far that is I don’t

30

really have worked out in my mind yet, nor have I done the work.

There is going to be a point in time where this crosses. And it may

be because we have two great big years of eight and nine. Ten, we

may be pretty close to not having to cross-level for training.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Okay. But if you can give us something along

those lines. And I understand this is an educated guess. I am not

going to, you know, hold you to the 99 versus 101, that kind of

thing. But we need that because it will help us, particularly when

it comes to talking to Mr. Spratt or talking to Mr. Murtha and so

on, putting together something where we are coordinated here.

Thank you very much.

How about a next round?

Joe? Ready? Joe? Mr. Reyes defers to you.

Mr. WILSON. Thank, Mr. Chairman, and thank you Congressman

Reyes, too. Indeed, my interest in the equipment is as a member

of the Armed Services Committee, as a veteran who served in the

guard and reserves but also as a parent. I had one of my sons serve

for a year in Iraq in the Army National Guard; another son served

in Egypt. And I am just very concerned, on behalf of family members, as to the adequacy of equipment, the latest equipment. In

fact, at one time there was a delay that many of us expressed concern about for the body armor, the Small Arms Protective Inserts

(SAPI) plates. And that has been fully addressed. And I would like

a verification indeed that that has been fully addressed and that

the equipment is in place.

General STULTZ. Yes, sir. From my units that I have in theater

currently—and I keep about 24, 25,000 Army Reserve soldiers mobilized between the CONUS and about 18 different countries—and

with my frequent visits to theater, both Afghanistan and Iraq and

the Horn of Africa, I can say that the soldiers that are on the battlefield over there have the equipment they need, and they have

the latest equipment that is available to us.

Mr. WILSON. Another concern that I had, we went through a period with the Humvees and up-arming of Humvees, and now the

providing of MRAPs. Last month when I had the opportunity to

visit with our units in Afghanistan, and we went by MRAP through

Asadabad, I was really impressed by the MRAPs. But I am concerned there have been reports of delay in delivery. But what is the

status on MRAPs in theater?

General STULTZ. That I can’t give you an exact figure. I know

that they are coming into theater on an accelerated basis. I was

over there myself and drove one of them around Balad. How we are

meeting the time schedule for that and how the distribution is

going, I don’t have that information with me.

Mr. WILSON. And indeed as a parent, a veteran, a Member of

Congress, I certainly would like to get an update, Mr. Chairman,

on the providing of the MRAPs. Another issue.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 80.]

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Noted, Mr. Wilson, and we will take care of

it.

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And also on Monday, I

had the privilege of being with Congresswoman Susan Davis and

Congressman John McHugh to visit the recruiting and retention

31

school at Fort Jackson. And I was very happy to hear the success

and the environment that you have created of successful recruiting

and retention, meeting the goals, providing for young people extraordinary opportunity of education, travel, making lifelong

friends, which has really benefitted my family, me. I just appreciate it so much. I want to give you, though, a suggestion. The retirement age for the guard and reserve, currently it is 60. We did

make an effort, successfully, to provide that credit for deployed

time from the time of the last Defense Appropriations bill, but indeed many of us who are so pleased at the seamless nature of the

active duty, Guard, Reserve, would like to have the retirement system equally seamless, like at age 55. And indeed we have been

pushing for 55, for a two-for-one credit, or—and where, for every

2 years, you get 1 year of credit to reduce to 55 over the service

period of 20 years. Again, we did make progress last year with deployed time. And I have introduced a bill that would provide from

9/11 that you would have the deployment credit. And I feel like this

would help with recruiting and retention. Do you have any comments that you would like to make about the retirement age?

General STULTZ. Yes, sir. I wholeheartedly agree with you. I

think one of the things, I revert back to my days of civilian life

when I worked for Procter & Gamble. And at Procter & Gamble,

we had a simple illustration we call a value equation. What does

a box of Tide cost, and what do you get for it? And if you are going

to increase the price of Tide, you better deliver something new and

improved. Well, the value equation we had with the Army Reserve

was one weekend a month, two weeks in the summer. That is all

we asked. And here is what you get in turn. You get so many dollars a month for your drill pay, you get 20 years and you can draw

that retirement at 60. We changed the equation. We said now you

are an operational force. Now every four to five years we are going

to ask you to leave your family, leave your employer, and risk your

life. And the great news, just like you said, soldiers are willing to

do that. But we got to balance that equation. And that equation

gets balanced with some pay, some incentives. But one of the

things I think we have got to balance it with is the retirement. And

if we say every four or five years we are going to ask you to go risk

your life and suffer and sacrifice, then we ought to reduce that retirement age as an incentive and say we are going to knock some

type time off of that. We are going to recognize your sacrifice for

that. Likewise, I can tell you two years ago I was up at Fort

McCoy, Wisconsin, visiting a medical hole unit with some wounded

soldiers. One was a young staff sergeant from the National Guard.

He was an 88 mike truck driver. He had served with me in Iraq.

And I said, what are you going to do when you get home? And he

said, I am getting out. And I said, why? And he said, the Army

doesn’t want me. I said, how can you say that? You are a combat

veteran. You are a truck driver, one of our most critical commodities, and you are a noncommissioned officer (NCO), the backbone

of the Army. How can you say we don’t want you? And he said, sir,

they offer me nothing to stay in. I have got my 20 years. I got 22

years. So I get no reenlistment bonus. I get nothing to stay in. Like

he said, I love the Army, but I got to face my wife. And if I tell

her I am reenlisting, first thing she is going to say is, what are you

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getting? And when I say nothing, she is going to chase me out of

the house. And I said, what if we could knock off, to your point,

6 months for every year you stay beyond 20? So if you I stayed 24

years, you could retire, draw your retirement at 58? If you stayed

30, you could draw it at 55? And he looked me in the eye and said,

I can sell that. I can sell that. You know. So I think just simply

as a retention tool. Because, in our system, once they get 20 years

of credit, what is the incentive to stay? Now, some would say we

can’t afford that, we can’t afford to pay retirement pay five years

earlier for a National Guard soldier. I would submit to you, what

is it going to cost us to replace that NCO with 22 years of service

and experience of a combat veteran? How much have we already

invested in him in terms of enlistment and reenlistment incentives

and training and schools and everything? But also, what is it going

to take us to grow that experience? I don’t think we can afford not

to. So I support it wholeheartedly.

Mr. WILSON. Thank you very, very much for your testimonial.

Thank you.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you, Mr. Wilson.

I am going to yield, if it is okay, Mr. Reyes, to Mr. Spratt for a

point of personal privilege.

Mr. SPRATT. General Stultz, it has been four years since I saw

you. You have come a long way since then. We are mighty proud

of you. He is not only my constituent, coming from Dillon, South

Carolina, the same small town that gave us Ben Bernanke, but he

is a graduate of Davidson College. So that speaks to the wisdom,

that is the background of all the wisdom you heard enunciated

from him. Good to see you.

General STULTZ. Two points away from being in the Final Four,

sir.

Mr. SPRATT. I am not going to let you off so easy. I have got some

clarification I would like to get. I will submit it for the record.

General STULTZ. Yes, sir.

Mr. SPRATT. Thank you very much indeed.

General STULTZ. Thank you, sir.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Would you like to explain your retirement

plan to Mr. Bernanke? He seems to have his hands full today.

Maybe he should have gone to Davidson, too. For what it is worth,

I was pulling for them.

General STULTZ. Yes, sir.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Mr. Reyes.

Mr. REYES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have just got a couple

of questions. One of them follows the same vein as you were just

talking about, but I want to switch it to recruitment. What kind

of issues or what kind of problems are we having in recruiting for

both the National Guard and the Reserves?

General STULTZ. Well, I will lead off, and then I will turn it over

to my partner here in Clyde, but one, the good news is we are

meeting our recruiting goals. That is the good news story. In the

Army Reserve, this time last year we were at about 188,000 end

strength. Today we are at almost 195. We have grown 7,000 in

terms of the force. We have turned the trend around. We have

learned from the National Guard how to do that. That is the key.

I think the biggest challenge we have got right now, twofold, one,

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and it is an indictment on America, of the target age group that

we target for recruiting in the Army, 17- to 24-year-old males, only

3 out of 10 Americans qualify; 40 percent can’t meet the educational qualifications. Another percentage can’t meet the moral.

Another percentage can’t meet the physical. So from there, one of

the biggest challenges we have got right now in recruiting is finding soldiers that meet the qualifications. Now we are doing something about that. We are going after, in some cases, those soldiers

that are outside that 17- to 24-year window. And we are finding

there are a lot of older Americans—and I don’t mean aged like

me—but older Americans who want to serve their country. They

are farther along in their careers, and they see this desire to serve

their country, and they see the Guard or Reserve as an avenue to

do that.

But one is we have got to improve—and I am going to let Clyde

talk to you about what the Guard is doing. It is a great program

to improve the education of our soldiers. I think the other one is

we have got to build a partnership with employers. Because one of

the questions that any young man looks at, he says, can I join the

Guard or Reserve and still have a job with the operational tempo?

What we are doing there from the Army Reserve’s perspective is

we are partnering with a lot of the employers of America who have

the same challenge we have. When the American Truckers Association are looking for truck drivers and they are trying to find someone who is drug free, who has got a certain physical fitness about

them, who can pass an aptitude test where they can read and write

and drive a truck and navigate and who can pass a background

screening that they don’t have anything in their records that would

preclude them from being trustworthy; they are struggling just like

we are to find those individuals. What I am telling the American

Truckers Association, what I am telling the National Sheriffs Association, what I am telling others is, let me be a recruiter for you.

If they are in my formation, they have already met the criteria. I

am going to train them how to drive a truck also. I am going to

train them in some law enforcement techniques if they are a military policeman. I am going to train them how to be an x-ray technologist in a hospital. So why wouldn’t you let me recruit for your

needs while I am recruiting for my ranks? And we have got some

partnerships going. And I think that is going to be key, because

now a young man coming out of high school looks at us and says

there is an enabler to getting a job by joining the military.

General VAUGHN. Congressman, we have had spectacular success. We turned it around in July of 2005. At that time, we were

some 20,000—you may remember the debates—we were some

20,000 under strength. Today we are at 357,000. We have gained

27,000 in net growth in less than 3 years. We just set a record this

month. We hit our highest month of the year, and we went over

it. We did several things. We changed the culture of our recruiting

organization. And we took advantage of what we do best, and that

is incentivize soldiers to recruit out of their communities and build

their teams. And so we put a program called G-RAP into place that

has just had spectacular success. It has also led to the highest

quality force that we have ever had. We have our high school graduates are well over the 90 percent target for DOD. I will tell you

34

that one of the things, though, that really helps us and that has

helped enormously is the way the soldiers and their units are welcomed when they come back home. They are held up as heroes. The

small communities of this country, and we are in 3,300 communities, and they have welcomed them home, opened their arms to

them and cared about them while they have been gone. And that

has done a lot. In other words, the value proposition is probably

as great today than it has ever been for service to the country and

the Army National Guard. We are very proud of that. And I think

that as long as, again, the value proposition is similar to the active

force and they feel like the communities appreciate and the Nation

appreciates their service, if we keep the resources turned on, we

will be able to recruit to whatever we are asked to and retain

whatever we are asked to at whatever strength we are asked to be

at in the Army National Guard.

Mr. REYES. Great. That is good news.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Gentlemen, thank you very much. Unless

there are further inquiries, questions or observations, I think we

will bring the hearing to a close. I think Mr. Spratt has something

for you, General Stultz, that he wants to pass on in writing.

General STULTZ. Yes, sir.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. And if any of the other questions, if you feel

it would be pertinent for you to comment a little bit further in writing, we would be appreciative of receiving it. And we will take it

into account when we make our recommendations.

General STULTZ. Yes, sir.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you very much. Aloha.

[Whereupon, at 3:59 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

A P P E N D I X

APRIL 3, 2008

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

APRIL 3, 2008

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QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE

RECORD

APRIL 3, 2008

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ABERCROMBIE

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. I know you have mentioned 2019 and so on, but in comparison

to the projected budgets, what additional funding requirements for the Army Reserve equipment do you see in fiscal year 2009 and beyond, and how much of this

funding could the Reserve actually spend in 2009?

General STULTZ. In FY09, the Army Reserve is projected to receive $1.4B in the Army base budget & request of $.5B in the supplemental. We need what’s currently

programmed in the base budget and supplemental. The additional funding requirements are approximately $414M to cover the Top 10 critical equipment items on our

FY09 1–N List. We would obligate all of this funding in FY09.

The Army Reserve has 66% of its authorized equipment on-hand. The Army has

programmed $1.4B in the FY09 base budget and $502M in the FY09 Supplemental

request for new equipment procurement for the Army Reserve. With current equipment dollar value on-hand and projected programmed funding of $7.9B in the FY08

to FY13 POM and the $7.25B in other equipment procurement programs

(Supplementals/GWOT Funding, Cong Adds, NGREA, etc . . .) the Army Reserve

is currently short approximately $6.85B in new equipment procurement. The Department of Army projects for the Army Reserve a $2.2B for Critical Unfunded Requirement by the end of FY2013. At current projected funding levels and if funding

for new equipment procurement averages approximately $1.3B per year and the

Army does not decrement or divert funding, the Army Reserve is projected to be at

100% equipment on-hand in FY2019.

The Army has never distributed a 100% of its new equipment procurement funding to the Army Reserve. Historically, new equipment procurement funding for the

Army Reserve is used as bill payers for the Active component. Therefore, it is not

feasible to expect the Army Reserve will be at 100% equipment on-hand by FY2019.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. The average non deployed unit has about 61% of its authorized

equipment needed to conduct training, participate in future deployments and respond to domestic missions. The Department of the Army has a plan to adequately

address the equipping shortfall but not until 2019. Is this timeline sufficient and

what risks are inherited in this plan of resolving this most critical issue so late?

General VAUGHN. In order to train effectively, support the current warfight, surge

when called upon, and provide a robust domestic response—in other words, to fully

support the National Military Strategy—it is absolutely critical that the ARNG be

equipped to 100% of its requirement. Until full equipping and modernization levels

are reached, the Nation will continue to assume risks such as 1) decreased readiness, 2) inadequate training of units until arrival at a mobilization station (which

results in reduced Boots-on-the-Ground time and increased quantity and frequency

of deployments), 3) limits our ability to effectively surge to support operations in

Iraq, Afghanistan, or elsewhere, 4) longer response timelines for domestic missions,

and 5) costly and disruptive cross-leveling of equipment between and among ARNG

units. The Army’s goal is to fully equip all Brigade Combat Teams by 2015 and the

remainder of the force by 2019. Although the industrial base is capable of equipping

the force much sooner, these goals were established based on current and anticipated financial constraints.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. What mechanisms are in place to ensure that when Congress

provides additional funding for Army National Guard and Army Reserve equipment

that the Army actually follows through on executing the funding and providing the

equipment? Are additional tracking mechanisms necessary to provide proper oversight?

General VAUGHN. The Army leadership is fully committed to equipping the entire

force to include the Army National Guard (ARNG) and has demonstrated this commitment by fencing ARNG funding through FY13. As a result, the ARNG is currently receiving equipment at an unprecedented rate. However, Army procurement

and distribution processes and associated automation systems do not currently allow

delivered equipment to be traced back to its funding source. Therefore, while we are

seeing significant improvement in ARNG equipment inventory levels over time, we

cannot with any accuracy determine whether the ARNG is receiving all the equipment intended for it by Congress.

78

Understandably, the Army has in some cases redirected equipment intended for

the ARNG to support other priorities such as deployed or deploying units. There is

an established process for staffing such actions among the stakeholders and for documenting associated payback plans. The problem is that, due to lack of transparency, it is possible for equipment to be redirected, intentionally or unintentionally, without the knowledge of all stakeholders.

Ideally, Department of the Army (DA) processes and systems would be modified

to allow full transparency and visibility of funding and procured equipment to all

stakeholders. The DA G–8 has made great progress toward this goal in recent years,

but additional work is needed to integrate G–8 systems with those of the Army

Budget Office and the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics,

and Technology. The use of the National Guard and Reserve Equipment Appropriation (NGREA) has afforded ARNG full control, visibility, and accountability of appropriated funds for equipment. This mechanism eliminates the need for any additional oversight until DA processes and automation systems can be improved.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. How does the Guard distribute equipment for units? Are there

state or regional priorities? If so, what are they and what is the process for determining these priorities?

General VAUGHN. The Army National Guard (ARNG) G–3 establishes the ARNG

equipment distribution priorities based on guidance from the Director, Army National Guard. These priorities are similar to those outlined in the Army’s Resources

Prioritization List or ‘‘ARPL’’ and are summarized as follows: 1) Units expected to

deploy in the near term, 2) Hurricane States, 3) Units expected to deploy in the far

term, and 4) all other units. This list is currently being reviewed to determine if

units in Reset should be identified as a separate category and included as such.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Lieutenant General Stultz and Lieutenant General Vaughn,

what percentage of your equipping budget is funded through supplemental and what

percentage is funded through base appropriations?

General VAUGHN. In FY05, the Army National Guard (ARNG) began to receive

Supplemental funding for equipment procurement. During the FY05 to FY08 period,

total supplemental funding was $11.7 Billion and accounted for 50% of the total

ARNG equipment budget. Meanwhile, the base budget included $7.9 Billion and accounted for 34% of the total. A combination of Grow-The-Army (GTA) and National

Guard and Reserve Appropriation (NGREA) funding comprised the remaining 16%.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Lieutenant General Stultz and Lieutenant General Vaughn,

what percentage of your equipping budget is funded through supplementals and

what percentage is funded through base appropriations?

General STULTZ. [See information below.]

FY07: Base: 50%, Supplemental: 50%

FY08: Base: 38%, Supplemental: 62%

FY09: Base: 0%, Supplemental: 100%

Source

FY07 FY08 FY09

Funds ($K) Percent of

Total Budget Funds ($K) Percent ofTotal Budget Funds ($K) Percent ofTotal Budget

Base Budget $1,702 50% $1,007 38% $1,355 100%

Supplemental

Funding $1,678 50% $1,624 62% $0 0%

USAR Total $3,380 100% $2,631 100% $1,355 100%

*Projected funds based on PBR 09–13 and FY09 supplemental request which has

yet to be submitted to Congress.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Lieutenant General Stultz and Lieutenant General Vaughn,

when a reserve component (RC) unit is mobilized and assumes title 10 responsibilities, the service’s active component (AC) is responsible for providing resources to

the RC unit. DOD Directive 1225.6 requires the active component to payback all RC

equipment that was permanently transferred or loaned to the active component to

fill an AC equipment requirement. What is the status of payback requirements?

General STULTZ. As of May 2008, Headquarters, Department of the Army has

validated 23,227 items of equipment for DoDD 1225.6 Payback to the Army Reserve.

To date, over 45% of those items have been paid back. An additional 40% will be

paid back by January 2010. The remaining 15% of the equipment will have payback

plans developed at Army Equipping and Re-Use Conference in July 2008.

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Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Lieutenant General Stultz and Lieutenant General Vaughn,

when a reserve component (RC) unit is mobilized and assumes title 10 responsibilities, the service’s active component (AC) is responsible for providing resources to

the RC unit. DOD Directive 1225.6 requires the active component to payback all RC

equipment that was permanently transferred or loaned to the active component to

fill an AC equipment requirement. What is the status of payback requirements?

General VAUGHN. Equipment diversions have been necessary to support the global

war on terror and have provided the impetus for the Army to adjust its equipping

strategy for the Army National Guard (ARNG) as an operational force. When equipping a deploying unit, a State/Territory will cross-level within the State and then

the ARNG will direct State-to-State transfers. Since the start of the war, over

130,000 items have been directed to be cross-leveled between States/Territories for

the ARNG.

Equipment diversions from the ARNG to another component occurred primarily

at the beginning of the war. The ARNG is working with the Army to maintain accountability of ARNG equipment that has become SBE (Stay Behind Equipment)/

TPE (Theater Provided Equipment) and to develop return or replacement plans in

accordance with DOD Directive 1225.6.

Since the SBE/TPE directives began for Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation

Enduring Freedom, the ARNG has been directed to leave over $3.0 billion worth of

equipment. States and Territories reported battle losses and washouts valued at another $329 million. To date the Army has approved the replacement of equipment

valued at $310 million and is working on replacement plans for equipment valued

at another $467 million. Congress has funded an additional $1.7 billion for Reserve

Component equipment replacement under the FY07 Supplemental. Meanwhile,

equipment diversions from the ARNG to another component have been reduced significantly in the past year and additional payback requirements are not being generated.

The result of SBE/TPE and cross leveling has been a reduction of equipment on

hand, primarily in trucks, radios, crew-served weapons and night vision devices.

This cross-leveling to meet mobilization requirements has readiness implications

and presents a challenge for the ARNG.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SPRATT

Mr. SPRATT. Lieutenant General Stultz and Lieutenant General Vaughn, Lieutenant General Stultz testified that the Army Reserve would require approximately

$6.8 billion from FY2013 through FY2017 to address equipment shortfalls and improve readiness levels. Lieutenant General Speakes, the Army’s G–8, has reportedly

recognized that $2.4 billion will be necessary to fund major end use equipment for

the Army Reserve during that period. Lieutenant General Speakes also reportedly

identified $7.9 billion in major end use equipment funding will be needed for the

Army National Guard from FY2013 through FY2017. What would the corresponding

full equipment funding requirement be for the Army National Guard during that

period? What assumptions were made in identifying each of these projected funding

requirements?

General STULTZ. For the period FY2013 through FY2017, the Army G–8 has identified a $9.9 billion . requirement to equip the Army National Guard (ARNG) to 100

percent of their Modified Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE) requirements. The $7.9 billion identified represents the required funding to bring the

ARNG to 100 percent on Critical Dual-Use (CDU) equipment. The $7.9 billion CDU

requirement is a subset of the $9.9 Billion MTOE requirement. These figures assume full support of the President’s Budget Request for FY2009-2013 and FY2008/

2009 global war on terror requests. However, we also recognize that the requirements will continue to change due to organizational changes in force structure and

modernization of equipment.

Mr. SPRATT. Lieutenant General Stultz and Lieutenant General Vaughn, Lieutenant General Stultz testified that the Army Reserve would require approximately

$6.8 billion from FY2013 through FY2017 to address equipment shortfalls and improve readiness levels. Lieutenant General Speakes, the Army’s G–8, has reportedly

recognized that $2.4 billion will be necessary to fund major end use equipment for

the Army Reserve during that period. Lieutenant General Speakes also reportedly

identified $7.9 billion in major end use equipment funding will be needed for the

Army National Guard from FY2013 through FY2017. What would the corresponding

full equipment funding requirement be for the Army National Guard during that

period? What assumptions were made in identifying each of these projected funding

requirements?

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General VAUGHN. With regard to Army National Guard (ARNG) equipment, it is

our understanding that LTG Speakes, Army G8, is actually tracking both a $7.9 Billion and a $9.9 Billion figure. The former represents the post-FY 2013 funding that

would be required to bring the ARNG’s Critical Dual-Use equipment to 100% and

the latter represents the post-FY 2013 funding required to bring ARNG equipping

levels to 100% for all equipment items. The $7.9 Billion and $9.9 Billion figures assume no growth in projected requirements, no additional force structure changes,

no battle losses, and no further obsolescence of the current force.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WILSON

Mr. WILSON. Another concern that I had, we went through a period with the

Humvees and up-arming of Humvees, and now the providing of MRAPs. Last month

when I had the opportunity to visit with our units in Afghanistan, and we went by

MRAP through Asadabad, I was really impressed by the MRAPs. But I am concerned there have been reports of delay in delivery. But what is the status on

MRAPs in theater?

General STULTZ. The MRAP program is one of the highest priorities of the Department of Defense acquisition program. To meet the demand, the government accelerated production to maximum capacity by adding additional vehicle variants (there

are several producers) to meet CENTCOM requirements faster.

The Army’s interim Joint Requirement Oversight Council (JROC) validated requirement (although not documented) is twelve thousands vehicles. The Bulk of

MRAP vehicles have been fielded in Iraq and a few in Afghanistan and a CONUS

mobile training capability to support deploying units.

MRAP is a theater provided asset (not authorized on any MTOE structure). Distribution to Army forces (regardless of component) is based on mission and location.

It is expected due to its capability that deployed Army Reserve units will be recipients’ in theater for some of the MRAPs.

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