[Cite as State v. Cuffie , 2020-Ohio-4844.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT CLARK COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO Plaintiff-Appellee

v. ELIJAH A. CUFFIE Defendant-Appellant : : : : : : : : : : Appellate Case No. 2019-CA-8

Trial Court Case No. 2018-CR-700 (Criminal Appeal from Common Pleas Court)

. . . . . . . . . . . O P I N I O N Rendered on the 9th day of October, 2020.

. . . . . . . . . . . JOHN M. LINTZ, Atty. Reg. No. 0097715, Assistant Prosecuting At torney, Clark County Prosecutor’s Office, 50 East Columbia Street, Suite 449, Spring field, Ohio 45502 Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee CHRISTOPHER EPLEY, Atty. Reg. No. 0070981, 10 West Second Stree t, Suite 2400, Dayton, Ohio 45402 Attorney for Defendant-Appellant

. . . . . . . . . . . . . TUCKER, P.J.-2- {¶ 1} Appellant, Elijah A. Cuffie, asserts that the Clark County Cour t of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division (“the juvenile court”) abused its disc retion when it transferred juvenile criminal charges pending against him to the general di vision for adult adjudication. Finding no abuse of discretion, the juvenile cou rt’s order will be affirmed. Facts and Procedural History {¶ 2} As a result of conduct occurring on July 12, 2018, four juvenil e criminal charges were filed against Cuffie: (1) having weapons while und er disability; (2) carrying a concealed weapon; (3) improper handling of a firearm in a mot or vehicle; and (4) obstructing official business. Cuffie was 16 years old when th e conduct occurred. {¶ 3} The State filed a motion to transfer the case to the general di vision to allow Cuffie’s prosecution as an adult. In response to the State’s m otion, the juvenile court conducted a probable cause hearing and, following the hearing, the court filed a judgment entry finding that, “based upon the unrefuted testimony and evi dence[,] * * * there is sufficient evidence * * * establishing a reasonable belief that * * * Cuffie committed the felony acts that are alleged.” Thus, probable cause was establ ished. Since the transfer to the general division was discretionary, the juvenile court o rdered an amenability evaluation and noted that an amenability hearing would be sched uled. {¶ 4} The amenability hearing was conducted and resulted in the juven ile court’s issuing a judgment entry which concluded that Cuffie was “not a menable to rehabilitation within the juvenile system, and the safety of the community req uire[d] that he be transferred for prosecution as an adult.” {¶ 5} The transfer to the general division resulted in a three-count indictment charging Cuffie with having weapons under disability, carrying a concealed weapon , and-3- improper handling of a firearm in a motor vehicle. Cuffie file d a motion to suppress the firearm at issue, but the trial court overruled the motion. Cu ffie then entered a no contest plea to the weapons under disabilit y and improper handling of a firearm in a motor vehicle counts, and the carrying a concealed weapon count was dismissed . The trial court sentenced Cuffie concurrently to 30 months on the weapons under disability count and 17 months on the improper handling of a firearm in a motor vehi cle count. This appeal

followed. Analysis {¶ 6} Cuffie’s sole assignment of error is as follows:

THE JUVENILE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT

TRANSFERRED JURISDICTION TO THE GENERAL DIVISION. {¶ 7} The discretionary transfer of a juvenile offender’s criminal ca se from the juvenile division of the common pleas court to the court’s gene ral division is governed by Juv.R. 30(C) and (G) and R.C. 2152.12(B), (C), (D), (E), and (I ). Juv.R. 30(C) and (G) state in pertinent part as follows: (C) In any proceeding in which transfer of a case for criminal prosecution is permitted, but not required, by statute, and in which probable cause is found at the preliminary hearing, the court shall continue the procee ding for full investigation. The investigation shall include a mental examin ation of the child by a public or private agency or by a person qualified to make the examination. When the investigation is completed, an amenabili ty hearing shall be held to determine whether to transfer jurisdiction. T he criteria for transfer shall be provided by statute.-4- * * * (G) The order of transfer shall state the reasons for transfer. {¶ 8} R.C. 2152.12(B), (C), (D), (E), and (I) state in pertinent part as follows: (B) Except as provided in division (A) of this section, 1 after a complaint has been filed alleging that a child is a delinquent child for comm itting an act that would be a felony if committed by an adult, the juvenile c ourt at a hearing may transfer the case if the court finds all of the fol lowing: (1) The child was fourteen years of age or older at the time of the act charged. (2) There is probable cause to believe that the child committed the act charged. (3) The child is not amenable to care or rehabilitation within the juvenile system, and the safety of the community may require that the ch ild be subject to adult sanctions. In making its decision under this division, the court shall consider whether the applicable factors under divis ion (D) of this section indicating that the case should be transferred outweigh the applicable factors under division (E) of this section indicatin g that the case should not be transferred. The record shall indicate the speci fic factors that were applicable and that the court weighed. (C) Before considering a transfer under division (B) of this se ction, the juvenile court shall order an investigation into the child’s so cial history,

1 Division (A) sets forth the criteria for mandatory transfers fr om the juvenile court to the general division.-5- education, family situation, and any other factor bearing on wh ether the child is amenable to juvenile rehabilitation, including a menta l examination of the child by a public or private agency or a person qualifie d to make the

examination. * * * (D) In considering whether to transfer a child under division ( B) of this section, the juvenile court shall consider the following releva nt factors, and any other relevant factors, in favor of a transfer under that d ivision: (1) The victim of the act charged suffered physical or psycholo gical harm, or serious economic harm, as a result of the alleged act. (2) The physical or psychological harm suffered by the victim d ue to the alleged act of the child was exacerbated because of the physica l or psychological vulnerability or the age of the victim. (3) The child’s relationship with the victim facilitated the ac t charged. (4) The child allegedly committed the act charged for hire or a s a part of a gang or other organized criminal activity. (5) The child had a firearm on or about the child’s person or u nder the child’s control at the time of the act charged, the act charged is not a violation of section 2923.12 of the Revised Code, and the child, during the commission of the act charged, allegedly used or displayed the firearm, or indicated that the child possessed a firearm. (6) At the time of the act charged, the child was awaiting adju dication or disposition as a delinquent child, was under a community contro l sanction, or was on parole for a prior delinquent child adjudication or c onviction.-6- (7) The results of any previous juvenile sanctions and programs indicates

that rehabilitation of the ch ild will not occur in the juvenile system. (8) The child is emotionally, physically, or psychologically ma ture enough

for the transfer. (9) There is not sufficient time to rehabilitate the child with in the juvenile system. (E) In considering whether to transfer a child under division ( B) of this section, the juvenile court shall consider the following releva nt factors, and any other relevant factors, against a transfer under that divis ion: (1) The victim induced or facilitated the act charged. (2) The child acted under provocation in allegedly committing t he act charged. (3) The child was not the principal actor in the act charged, o r, at the time of the act charged, the child was under the negative influence or coercion of another person. (4) The child did not cause physical harm to any person or prop erty, or have

reasonable cause to believe that harm of that nature would occu r, in allegedly committing the act charged. (5) The child previously has not been adjudicated a delinquent child. (6) The child is not emotionally, physically, or psychologicall y mature enough for the transfer. (7) The child has a mental illness or intellectual disability. (8) There is sufficient time to rehabilitate the child within t he juvenile system-7- and the level of security available in the juvenile system prov ides reasonable assurance of public safety.

* * * (I) Upon transfer of a case under division (A) or (B) of this s ection, the juvenile court shall state the reasons for the transfer * * *. {¶ 9} In Cuffie’s case, there was no dispute that the age and probabl e cause bindover criteria were present. Further, there was no dispute that Daniel Davis, a qualified Ph.D. psychologist, conducted a forensic psychologica l evaluation which included a review of Cuffie’s social history, education, and fa mily situation. The parties stipulated to Davis’s evaluation and it was admitted at the ame nability hearing as Exhibit 6. Thus, the only issue was the juvenile court’s negative amen ability determination. {¶ 10} A juvenile court’s amenability determination is reviewed under an abuse of

discretion standard. State v. Howard , 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 27198, 2018-Ohio-1863, ¶ 14, citing In re M.P. , 124 Ohio St.3d 445, 2010-Ohio-599, 923 N.E.2d 584, ¶ 14; State

v. Watson , 47 Ohio St.3d 93, 95, 547 N.E.2d 1181 (1989). As often state d, “a trial court

abuses its discretion when it makes a decision that is unreason able, unconscionable, or arbitrary.” State v. Darmond , 135 Ohio St.3d 343, 2013-Ohio-966, 986 N.E.2d 971, ¶ 34. Given this standard, “as long as the [juvenile] court considers the appropriate statutory factors and there is some rational basis in the record to suppo rt the court’s findings when applying these factors, [an appellate court] cannot conclude th at the trial court abused its discretion in deciding whether to transfer jurisdiction. Howard at ¶ 15, quoting State v.

West , 167 Ohio App.3d 598, 2006-Ohio-3518, 856 N.E.2d 285, ¶ 10 (4t h Dist.).

{¶ 11} As noted, Cuffie asserts the juvenile court abused its discreti on when it-8- found that he was no longer amenable to care and rehabilitation in the juvenile system and that community safety required the transfer. We disagree. {¶ 12} The amenability hearing included te stimony from Joe Hunter, the director of the Clark County Juvenile Detention Center, Kyle Dickinson, a p arole officer who supervised Cuffie, Springfield Detective Ronald Jordan, and Kam aria Amadou Asufu, Cuffie’s mother. Additionally, the juvenile court had the bene fit of Dr. Davis’s comprehensive evaluation. Davis discussed the relevant R.C. 21 52.12(D) factors that suggested Cuffie was not amenable to rehabilitation within the juvenile system and the relevant R.C. 2152.12(E) factors which suggested that Cuffie wa s amenable to such

rehabilitation. Davis’s forensic psychological conclusions wer e in relevant part as

follows: 1. [Cuffie] is mentally ill with a diagnosis of Disruptive Mood Dysregulation Disorder and an Unspecified Trauma Related Disorder and Attenti on Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder, by history. He is also diagnosed with Conduct Disorder, Childhood Onset Type, Severe, which is generally not considered

to be a mental illness. 2. He is not Intellectually Disabled. 3. When the factors listed in my report are taken into consider ation, it is my opinion that this youth has at [sic] a low probability , from a psychological standpoint only, of positively responding to treatment within t he juvenile justice system. 4. Accordingly, it is my opinion that the psychological factors against amenability outweigh those against amenability [sic] (the ultimate opinion,-9- of course, being that of the Trier of Fact).

* * * (Emphasis in original.) {¶ 13} The juvenile court’s judgment summarized the testimony. Of par ticular importance to the juvenile court was the testimony of Amadou As ufu. The juvenile court noted that although Amadou Asufu disputed a few of Davis’s find ings, her testimony confirmed that Cuffie had “failed to respond to any interventio ns over the past six years[,] 2 and her overall testimony aligned with [Davis’s] report with re spect to [Cuffie’s] lengthy history of court involvement and failure to respond to rehabili tative interventions.” {¶ 14} The judgment then discussed the pertinent R.C. 2152.12(D) facto rs favoring transfer to the general division. The juvenile court concluded this discussion by stating: “[G]iven the high level of crimi nogenic thinking displayed by C uffie at this point, there is not sufficient time to continue with juvenile rehabilitative me thods.” The judgment next discussed the relevant R.C. 2152.12(E) factors weighing against a transfer to the general division. The discussion recognized that Davis determined that Cuffie had diagnosed mental illness, but that the mental illness did not change Davi s’s recommendation that, from a psychological standpoint, “Cuffie was not amenable to co ntinued juvenile

2 The six year reference reflects that Cuffie became involved in the juvenile justice system at age ten. Davis’s report documented that during Cuffie’s six -year involvement in the juvenile system, he was adjudicated delinquent for committing a number of offenses including assault, vandalism, and burglary. Davis’s report add itionally documented two commitments to the Ohio Department of Youth Services and a numb er of probation and parole violations. The record reflects that the conduct which prompted the State’s request for adult adjudication began as a traffic stop. After the stop, Cuffie, who had an active parole violation warrant, attempted to flee on foot from the police. After Cuffie’s apprehension, a search of the stopped vehicle resulted in the d iscovery of a Glock .357 handgun.-10- interventions.” {¶ 15} The juvenile court reached the following conclusions:

* * * [The] Court is in agreement with Dr. Davis’s conclusions. The lengthy history that [Cuffie] has with this court and with various juve nile rehabilitation centers is evident. Moreover, virtually none of these interven tions has proven successful, and he continues to display behavior that is criminal. After six years of attempts to redirect his behavior and provid e him with the tools he needs to be a law-abiding citizen, it is apparent that he is not interested in such a lifestyle. The safety of the community de mands that he be transferred for criminal prosecution. {¶ 16} The record reveals that the juvenile court carefully considered the R.C. 2921.12(D) and (E) factors weighing for and against transfer of Cuffie’s case to the general division for adult adjudication. Further, the record, in particular Davis’s evaluation, supported the juvenile court’s conclusions regardin g the relevant R.C. 2921.12(D) and (E) factors and also the court’s ultimate conclu sion to transfer Cuffie’s case to the general division for adult adjudication. On this r ecord, we cannot conclude that the juvenile court abused its discretion by ordering the b indover of Cuffie’s case to the general division. Thus, Cuffie’s assignment of error is ov erruled. {¶ 17} For the indicated reasons, the juvenile court’s judgment is aff irmed.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . HALL, J. and WELBAUM, J., concur.-11-

Copies sent to:

John M. Lintz Christopher Epley Elijah A. Cuffie Hon. Richard J. O’Neill