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33–788 2008

[H.A.S.C. No. 109–19]

HEARING

ON

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT

FOR FISCAL YEAR 2006

AND

OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED

PROGRAMS

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

TERRORISM, UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS AND

CAPABILITIES SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING

ON

BUDGET REQUEST ON DESTRUCTION OF

THE U.S. CHEMICAL WEAPONS STOCKPILE-PROGRAM STATUS AND ISSUES

HEARING HELD

APRIL 6, 2005

(II)

TERRORISM, UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS AND CAPABILITIES

SUBCOMMITTEE

JIM SAXTON, New Jersey, Chairman

ROBIN HAYES, North Carolina

W. TODD AKIN, Missouri

JOE WILSON, South Carolina

JOHN KLINE, Minnesota

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania

GEOFF DAVIS, Kentucky

JOEL HEFLEY, Colorado

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas

JIM GIBBONS, Nevada

JEFF MILLER, Florida

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey

MARTY MEEHAN, Massachusetts

ADAM SMITH, Washington

MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina

ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California

ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island

RICK LARSEN, Washington

JIM COOPER, Tennessee

JIM MARSHALL, Georgia

CYNTHIA MCKINNEY, Georgia

THOMAS HAWLEY, Professional Staff Member

BILL NATTER, Professional Staff Member

CURTIS FLOOD, Staff Assistant

(III)

C O N T E N T S

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS

2005

Page

HEARING:

Wednesday, April 6, 2005, Fiscal Year 2006 National Defense Authorization

Act—Destruction of the U.S. Chemical Weapons Stockpile ............................. 1

APPENDIX:

Wednesday, April 6, 2005 ....................................................................................... 39

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 6, 2005

FISCAL YEAR 2006 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT—

DESTRUCTION OF THE U.S. CHEMICAL WEAPONS STOCKPILE

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Meehan, Hon. Marty, a Representative from Massachusetts, Ranking Member, Terrorism Unconventional Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee ....... 3

Saxton, Hon. Jim, a Representative from New Jersey, Chairman, Terrorism,

Unconventional Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee ................................. 1

WITNESSES

Bolton, Hon. Claude M., Jr., Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition,

Logistics and Technology, U.S. Army ................................................................. 6

Conklin, Craig, Chief, Nuclear and Chemical Hazards Branch, Department

of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency ................... 8

Klein, Dr. Dale, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense Programs ................................................................. 4

Sinks, Dr. Thomas, Acting Director, National Center for Environmental

Health, Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry, Centers for

Disease Control and Prevention, Department of Health and Human Services ......................................................................................................................... 10

APPENDIX

PREPARED STATEMENTS:

Bolton, Hon. Claude M., Jr. ............................................................................. 49

Conklin, Craig ................................................................................................... 56

Klein, Dr. Dale .................................................................................................. 43

Sinks, Dr. Thomas ............................................................................................ 64

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD:

Comments from the Department of Defense .................................................. 77

Report on Review of the U.S. Army Proposal for Off-Site Treatment

and Disposal of Caustic VX Hydrolysate from the Newport Chemical

Agent Disposal Facility, prepared by Department of Health and Human

Services, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention .............................. 79

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD:

[There were no Questions submitted.]

(1)

FISCAL YEAR 2006 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT—DESTRUCTION OF THE U.S. CHEMICAL

WEAPONS STOCKPILE

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, TERRORISM, UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS AND CAPABILITIES

SUBCOMMITTEE, Washington, DC, Wednesday, April 6, 2005.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 1:06 p.m., in room

2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Jim Saxton (chairman

of the subcommittee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JIM SAXTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM NEW JERSEY, CHAIRMAN, TERRORISM, UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS AND CAPABILITIES SUBCOMMITTEE

Mr. SAXTON. The subcommittee will come to order.

Today, the Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities

Subcommittee meets to review the Department of Defense program

for the destruction of the U.S. stockpile lethal chemical warfare

agents and munitions for the fiscal year 2006 budget request for

the program.

Several Members of Congress who have chemical stockpile storage sites in their districts and who are interested in the chemical

demil program are joining us in this hearing, and I would like to

welcome them at this point.

The U.S. chemical weapons stockpile originally consisted of approximately 31,000 tons of lethal chemical agents in a wide variety

of munitions located at Johnston Atoll in the Pacific, southwest of

Hawaii, and in eight sites in the continental United States.

The fiscal year 1986 Defense Authorization Act requires that the

destruction of the stockpile be carried out so as to ensure maximum protection of the environment, the general public and the

workers at the storage and demil sites.

Destruction of the stockpile began at Johnston Atoll in 1990, and

destruction of the entire U.S. stockpile is supposed to be completed

by April 29, 2007, in accordance with the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) Treaty to which the United States is a party.

Based on the current cost and schedule estimates, however, the

United States will not complete destruction of her stockpile by the

required date. The good news is that as of March 23, 2005, over

11,200 tons of lethal chemical agents—which amounts to almost 36

percent—of the total U.S. stockpile has been destroyed.

Chemical stockpiles at Johnston Atoll and Aberdeen Proving

Ground, Maryland, have been destroyed. The four baseline incinerators at Tooele, Utah; Anniston, Alabama; and Umatilla, Oregon;

2

in Pine Bluff, Arkansas, are all operational and are destroying

their stocks of lethal chemical agents and munitions.

Yesterday the Army advised Congress that within 30 days it

plans to begin a neutralization of VX nerve gas agent stockpile at

Newport, Indiana. Although the decision regarding the final disposal of the toxic wastewater byproducts of the neutralization is

still pending completion of a review of the disposal process at the

Center for Disease Control.

The bad news is that estimates of the cost and time required to

destroy the chemical weapon stockpile—which we noted in last

year’s hearing on the chemical demil program—continued to increase.

Current worst-case estimates of the total cost of destroying the

stockpile range from $26.8 billion to $37.3 billion, and estimates of

the dates for completion of destruction of the stockpile range from

2021 to 2030.

Because of the growth of the life cycle cost estimates and time

required to destroy the chemical weapons stockpiles at Pueblo, Colorado, and Bluegrass, Kentucky, using technologies developed in

the Assembled Chemical Weapons Alternatives program, the Under

Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, Michael Wynne, has essentially put the construction of the destruction plants at those sites on hold.

Secretary Wynne has also directed a number of actions to attempt to bring the program costs and scheduled increases under

control, focus the program on meeting the next Chemical Weapons

Convention milestone for destroying 45 percent of the stockpile by

December 2007 and assess alternative ways to achieve the treaty

deadline for 100 percent destruction of stockpile while optimizing

safety costs in the schedule.

Many of these alternatives, such as deferring construction of the

Pueblo and Bluegrass destruction plants, and studying the potential relocation of chemical agents and munitions for the destruction

at existing chemical demil facilities are contentious issues for the

communities that might be affected.

Our witnesses today are expected to address these and other

issues in their testimony, and I expect that the members present

will also address them in the question and answer period that follow.

To address the issues and the facilities for the fiscal year 2006

budget request for the program, our witnesses today include Dr.

Dale Klein, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical

and Biological Defense Programs; Mr. Patrick Wakefield, Deputy

Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Chemical De-mil and

Counterproliferation; the Honorable Claude M. Bolton, Assistant

Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics and Technology;

Mr. Michael Parker, Director of the U.S. Army Chemical Materials

Agency; Mr. Craig Conklin from the Emergency Preparedness and

Response Directorate of the Department of Homeland Security; and

Dr. Thomas Sinks, Acting Director of the National Center for Environmental Health, Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry Center for Disease Control.

Gentlemen, welcome. We look forward to your testimony.

3

At this time, I will turn to our ranking member for his opening

statement.

STATEMENT OF HON. MARTY MEEHAN, A REPRESENTATIVE

FROM MASSACHUSETTS, RANKING MEMBER, TERRORISM,

UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS AND CAPABILITIES SUBCOMMITTEE

Mr. MEEHAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I join you in welcoming

today’s witnesses.

I am in a hearing on the Patriot Act with the Attorney General

and the Judiciary Committee, so I am going back and forth. But

I do want to welcome today’s witnesses.

Mr. Chairman, as you mentioned, the huge cost estimates and

potential schedule delays of the chem demil program are mind-boggling. What began in 1986 as a projected $2 billion, 10-year-long

destruction program has become, based on current estimates, a $25

billion to $35 billion burden that will stretch beyond 2020.

Yet despite the programmatical and financial setbacks, we

should be most concerned with our credibility and standing in the

international community. We will almost certainly fail to meet obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention Treaty.

One waiver has already been granted, and predictions for the

program completion are now well past the 2012 target.

I understand past delays have been caused by modification destruction rates, new environmental regulations, worse-than-expected stockpile conditions and unanticipated emergency preparedness requirements.

But I also know that some of the delay has been self-imposed by

the department. There have been frequent turnovers in the program leadership team, bureaucratic roles and responsibilities were

often uncoordinated and left unclear, and a comprehensive programmatic strategy has been lacking.

Now, I recognize progress has been made; 35 percent stockpile

destruction is no small achievement.

But our nation’s interests are best served through the promotion

of laws and respect for international protocols. The failure to comply with Chemical Weapons Convention undermines our credibility

in the world. I would like to believe that we find ourselves at a

turning point in this effort.

I would also like to believe that the Administration is poised to

apply new-found commitment to the program.

I would also like to believe that today’s testimony will move us

down a clear and scientifically sound path toward treaty compliance.

This should be our goal, and I hope it will ultimately guide our

decisions.

And again, Mr. Chairman, I thank you and the panelists.

Mr. SAXTON. Let me just ask unanimous consent at this point

that the Members of Congress who are with us who are not part

of this panel be permitted to sit at the dais and take part in the

hearing.

Without objection, so ordered.

Dr. Klein, I understand that you and Secretary Bolton will offer

your statements for the Department of Defense and Department of

4

the Army, respectively, and that Mr. Wakefield and Mr. Parker

will be available to answer questions during the question period.

So, sir, if you would like to go ahead and offer your testimony

at this time.

Thank you.

STATEMENT OF DR. DALE KLEIN, ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR NUCLEAR AND CHEMICAL AND

BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE PROGRAMS

Dr. KLEIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and distinguished subcommittee members. Thank you for the opportunity to offer my

views concerning the Department of Defense chemical demilitarization program.

As you recall, I testified before you one year ago, and I look forward to continuing this dialogue on the matter of the destruction

of our chemical weapons stockpile.

I request to submit my written testimony for the record.

As indicated, I am Dale Klein, the Assistant Secretary of Defense

for Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Defense Programs. As I had

previously testified, in my current capacity I am the principal adviser to the Secretary and to the Deputy Secretary of Defense and

the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics for all matters concerning the formulation of policy and

plans for nuclear, chemical and biological programs.

And the most important topic that we have today is for the

chemical weapons demilitarization.

The Army has made good progress this past year. As soon as the

facility starts operation in Newport, Indiana, six out of our eight

chemical demilitarization sites will be operational.

I would like to make three points today during my briefing: safety and security, funding the President’s budget for chemical demilitarization, and the department’s recent acquisition decision for the

chemical demilitarization program.

First, I want to emphasize my commitment to safety and security

as a paramount consideration of chemical demilitarization program. I have championed this cause vigorously during the past four

years while focusing on destroying our aging stocks of chemical

weapons.

As the chemical demilitarization program moves forward, the department will balance resources to maximize the chemical weapons

destroyed while protecting our workers, the surrounding public and

the environment.

Second, I want to emphasize and respectfully request that you

fully fund the fiscal year 2006 President’s budget for the chemical

demilitarization program. This budget requests funds existing and

future chemical weapons destruction efforts. As of December 31,

2004, the U.S. has destroyed more chemical agent in accordance

with Chemical Weapons Convention than all other state parties

combined.

By May 2005, the department expects to be operating six chemical weapons destruction sites, and the U.S. remains on track to

meet the Chemical Weapons Convention extended 45 percent destruction deadline of December 31, 2007.

5

The U.S. continues to be a leader in the international community

regarding the destruction of chemical weapons, and now more than

ever, each and every dollar that we spend goes directly toward destroying our aging chemical weapons stockpile and maintaining our

commitments as outlined by the Chemical Weapons Convention.

Third, I will discuss the department’s recent acquisition decision.

The department is currently implementing the Acquisition Decision Memorandum, or the ADM, that was signed on December 21,

2004. The ADM directs the department to divide the program into

three major defense acquisition programs and prioritize the funding to support the operations at existing chemical demilitarization

facilities in order to ensure compliance with our extended deadline

of December 31, 2007, for the 45 percent CWC convention.

The ADM also directs the development of alternatives that are

safe, secure and cost effective to complete the stockpile destruction

within the existing resources by the Chemical Weapons Convention, extended 100 percent destruction deadline of April 2012.

If we do not manage physical resources, the projected life cycle

cost to destroy the U.S. chemical weapons stockpile could grow

from $26.8 billion in 2004 to as much as $40 billion in 2012. Therefore, the analysis of potential alternatives helps manage and fulfill

the department’s obligations of responsible resource management

to the U.S. taxpayer.

The department expects to complete this evaluation by April

2005, and I ask for your support as we continue the safe, secure,

cost effective and timely destruction of our chemical weapons.

In closing, the department is fully committed to destroying our

nation’s chemical weapons stockpile safely, securely and expeditiously.

To be fully effective, we ask for your assistance in fully funding

our budget requests and supporting us as we leverage all means

necessary to meet our commitments to the citizens and to the

world.

While we have our challenges, Mr. Claude Bolton, representing

the Army as executive agent for the chemical demilitarization program, has made significant progress over this last year and should

be complimented for his activities.

We are making the world a safer and more secure place by having destroyed over 11,000 tons of chemical agents as of March 23,

2005.

Mr. Chairman, I welcome any comments or questions you and

other members of the subcommittee have regarding the chemical

demilitarization program. I look forward to working with you as we

advance our common goal of safe, secure, cost effective, timely and

complete destruction of our nation’s chemical weapons stockpile.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Klein can be found in the Appendix on page 43.]

Mr. SAXTON. Thank you, Dr. Klein, very much for your testimony.

Secretary Bolton.

6

STATEMENT OF HON. CLAUDE M. BOLTON, JR., ASSISTANT

SECRETARY OF THE ARMY FOR ACQUISITION, LOGISTICS

AND TECHNOLOGY, U.S. ARMY

Secretary BOLTON. Chairman Saxton, Representative Meehan,

distinguished members of this committee, it is again my privilege

to appear before you as the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics and Technology and as the Army Acquisition

Executive to discuss the status of the chemical demilitarization

program.

I, too, respectfully request that my written statement be entered

into the record in its entirety.

Mr. SAXTON. Without objection. Thank you, sir.

Secretary BOLTON. I am joined today by Mr. Mike Parker, Director of the Chemical Materials Agency. And on behalf of Mr. Parker

and the men and women of that agency who perform the safe and

expeditious destruction of aging chemical agents and munitions for

the Army, I want to thank the committee, the committee members

and staff for their unwavering support of this important and difficult mission.

Your candid appraisals of this endeavor guide our paths and help

us achieve the tasks you have charged us to perform. Your dedication to this mission is recognized and much appreciated.

As the Army acquisition executive, I am responsible to the Secretary of the Army and to the Defense Acquisition Executive for all

aspects of the chemical demilitarization program, except for disposal efforts at Pueblo, Colorado and Bluegrass, Kentucky.

The Army’s paramount objective is to destroy the stockpiles of

chemical agent and munitions at disposal sites in Alabama, Arkansas, Indiana, Maryland, Oregon and Utah, as well as the nation’s

non-stockpile chemical warfare materiel, while ensuring the safety

and protection of the workforce, the general public and the environment.

I would like to outline my main three points today.

First I will illustrate the excellent progress the Army has made

over the past year; second, I will offer evidence that indicates we

are conducting the mission safely; and third, I will describe some

of the issues that affect the program’s cost and schedule.

I would like to point out that this has been and is a remarkable

time for the Army chemical demilitarization program. I am proud

to report that over 36 percent of the total stockpile has been destroyed, using two different chronologies, mainly chemical neutralization and incineration.

At our neutralization facility at Aberdeen, Maryland, we have

completely destroyed all agent drained from ton containers, making

it the first facility within the continental United States to completely eliminate the risk of agent exposure to nearby communities.

Our neutralization facility at Newport, Indiana, is expected to

begin agent destruction operations next month.

Our incineration facilities also are making tremendous progress.

I am pleased to report that all of our incineration facilities are operating. We have destroyed more than half of the Tooele, Utah,

stockpile, which originally constituted over 40 percent of the total

U.S. stockpile. Over 1 million munitions have been destroyed at

Tooele, including all the sarin-filled weapons and nearly all of the

7

VX munitions, which together represent 99 percent reduction in

the risks to their community there.

The employees at our facility at Anniston, Alabama, have destroyed all the sarin-filled rockets at that site, which represents a

33 percent reduction in risk to the surrounding communities.

Employees at the facility at Umatilla, Oregon, also are doing

their part to reduce the risk posed by continued storage. Since the

beginning of operations, since September 2004, they have safely

eliminated over 8,000 sarin-filled rockets. And last week, workers

at our facility at Pine Bluff, Arkansas, began destroying munitions

and reducing the risk to that community.

The international treaty requires the complete destruction of the

nation’s stockpile of chemical agents and munitions. But it also requires destruction of non-stockpiled chemical warfare material.

And I am pleased to report that over 80 percent of the former production facilities have already been destroyed. And we are on

schedule to meet the April 2007 non-stockpile treaty deadline.

Focusing on the second point, I would like to emphasize that we

are accomplishing all of these activities safely. The Army and its

contractors have achieved exceptional safety records. And by focusing our efforts on protecting the worker, who is turning a valve

during a plant operation, we protect the general public and the environment as well.

Our facilities have achieved an average annual reportable injury

rate that, according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, is somewhere between those of a credit union and a shoe store.

Our sites have logged millions and millions of hours without a

lost-time incident. Our facilities in Alabama, Arkansas and Oregon

have recently received prestigious safety awards from state government offices in recognition of their extraordinary achievements.

In addition, the Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness

Program, or CSEPP, the Army works closely with the Department

of Homeland Security’s Federal Emergency Management Agency

and with state and local governments to review emergency preparedness requirements as individual weapon storage sites reduce

risk to the communities through the destruction of their stockpiles.

All 10 CSEPP states have achieved full program benchmark compliance.

My third and final point is that a number of different issues have

the ability to impact the program’s cost and schedule. No one envisioned the peaceful destruction of these weapons when they were

first manufactured over 50 years ago. However, achieving a mission of this scope and magnitude, and one that holds the interest

of so many important stakeholders, poses unique challenges. These

challenges can be grouped generally into three categories: technical, external and internal.

As an example of the technical, we recently identified the presence of mercury in portions of the Tooele stockpile. The Tooele

plant must be modified to remain compliant with environmental

regulations and prevent the release of mercury in the environment.

External has been touched on, and that involves movement of hydrolysate, which is a caustic waste material, from our neutralization plant in Newport to another facility. The ongoing studies with

the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) and the Environmental ProVerDate 22-MAR-2001 14:27 Jul 25, 2008 Jkt 033788 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\109-19\096260.000 HAS2 PsN: HAS2
8

tection Agency (EPA) must be concluded and then determination

made as to whether or not that process is safe for the environment.

The internal was mentioned earlier by the ranking member, and

that deals with our own processes in the Army, within the agency

and within the building, and those are all being addressed.

I think to date, Mr. Chairman, we could see that the program

has achieved its major objective and that is to reduce the stockpile

safely to the surrounding communities, the workers who are involved and to the environment.

With your continued support and those of the staff, I am convinced that we will be able to reduce the threat, eliminate the

chemical weapons and munitions and eliminate this threat for our

communities and for the country.

That concludes my remarks. I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of Secretary Bolton can be found in the

Appendix on page 49.]

Mr. SAXTON. Secretary, thank you. And thank you for concentrating on the safety aspects of this.

It is interesting to note that we are one-third of the way through

the program, and according to the information that you have just

given us, we have been, from a safety of point of view, very, very

successful.

Secretary BOLTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. SAXTON. Thank you for that information.

Mr. Conklin.

STATEMENT OF CRAIG CONKLIN, CHIEF, NUCLEAR AND

CHEMICAL HAZARDS BRANCH, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND

SECURITY, FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY

Mr. CONKLIN. Yes, sir.

Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the subcommittee,

I am Craig Conklin, Chief of the Nuclear and Chemical Hazards

Branch located within the Department of Homeland Security’s Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).

I am pleased to provide this update on the progress of the Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program since my last testimony before this subcommittee on April 1, 2004.

I also respectfully request that my written statement be entered

into the record.

The CSEPP mission is an extension of the Department of Homeland Security mission to lead America to prepare for, prevent, respond to and recover from disasters. CSEPP’s mission is to enhance

existing local installation of tribal, state and Federal capabilities to

protect the health and safety of the public, workforce and the environment from the effects of a chemical accident or incident involving the U.S. Army chemical stockpile.

The CSEPP mission is successfully accomplished through effective partnerships with the Army, other Federal departments and

agencies in 52 state, tribal and local government organizations.

The current state of the program is a positive one. Due to the

effect of working partnerships, previously mentioned, all CSEPP

communities are capable of responding to incidents involving chemical warfare agents. In fact, CSEPP communities are better preVerDate 22-MAR-2001 14:27 Jul 25, 2008 Jkt 033788 PO 00000 Frm 00012 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\109-19\096260.000 HAS2 PsN: HAS2
9

pared to respond to natural and man-made hazards as a result of

their involvement in this program.

In addition, CSEPP is actively working to share its best practices

and experiences so they may be applied to other homeland security

needs.

We have undertaken several initiatives to ensure continued effective program implementation.

With the chemical stockpile at Aberdeen Proving Ground now

completely destroyed, FEMA is working with Maryland officials to

close out that community from the program. The closeout lessons

learned from Aberdeen are being captured by a national-level working group and will be used to develop policies and procedures for

closing out the other CSEPP sites when they have accomplished

their missions.

We have also initiated negotiations with our state and local partners to translate the benefits gained from risk reduction and to reduce program cost. We are committed to a collaborative process

that continues to produce community-specific preparedness programs that are commensurate with actual community risk.

FEMA will continue to ensure that baseline emergency preparedness capabilities are maintained at all sites until the chemical

stockpiles are completely destroyed.

FEMA and the Army have also published a joint strategic plan

for the CSEPP that codifies our system of national benchmarks as

official program goals and defines objectives for meeting them.

While the CSEPP has made significant strides forward, it still

faces several challenges.

As the disposal schedule is extended, program costs increase.

These costs increase can be significant because many major infrastructure systems, such as answer-operable communications and

outdoor siren systems, have a finite lifespan and may require replacement during the program’s life cycle. These system replacements were not originally budgeted because stockpile destruction

was planned before system obsolescence.

Although off-post preparedness comprises only six percent of the

total overall chemical demilitarization budget, FEMA and Army

personnel are working closely with our state, tribal and county

partners to sustain community preparedness in the most efficient

manner possible.

FEMA is also working to reduce its cost. Personnel levels at

FEMA headquarters and in several FEMA regions have been reduced through attrition. Staffing needs will be continually evaluated to ensure that FEMA staffing is appropriate to fulfill our preparedness mission.

Two appropriations issues also create challenges for program

management.

The loss of two-year availability for operations and maintenance

funding and the imposition of fenced appropriations for on-post and

off-post preparedness funding reduces the amount of time that our

state and local partners have to implement major projects and

eliminates the flexibility of the Army and FEMA to employ Federal

funds where they provide the greatest public protection.

In closing, although the CSEPP has significantly enhanced the

ability of the state, tribal and local officials to respond to a chemiVerDate 22-MAR-2001 14:27 Jul 25, 2008 Jkt 033788 PO 00000 Frm 00013 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\109-19\096260.000 HAS2 PsN: HAS2
10

cal incident at the Army’s installations, FEMA will not rest on this

accomplishment. I would like to emphatically state that until all

chemical weapons stockpiles are destroyed, the Department of

Homeland Security, working through FEMA, will continue to work

with our state, tribal and county partners to ensure that they are

prepared to respond to an event.

I will gladly respond to any questions that you may have.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Conklin can be found in the Appendix on page 56.]

Mr. SAXTON. Thank you, sir.

Dr. Sinks.

STATEMENT OF DR. THOMAS SINKS, ACTING DIRECTOR, NATIONAL CENTER FOR ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH, AGENCY

FOR TOXIC SUBSTANCES AND DISEASE REGISTRY, CENTERS

FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, DEPARTMENT

OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES

Dr. SINKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee.

My name is Tom Sinks, and I am the Acting Director at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s National Center for Environmental Health and the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry, both within the Department of Health and Human

Services.

I would like to thank the subcommittee for inviting me here

today. We share with you and the Department of Defense (DOD)

the obligation and desire to safely destroy and dispose of our nation’s chemical weapons stockpile.

My testimony will focus on CDC’s involvement with the Newport

chemical agent disposal facility.

CDC and other oversight organizations have worked with the

Army and achieved several notable successes in safe destruction of

chemical weapons at Johnston Atoll; Tooele, Utah; Anniston, Alabama; and Aberdeen, Maryland. We look forward to continuing this

notable record for safety and accomplishment.

CDC’s oversight function primarily involves reviewing the Army’s

plans at each facility and focusing on provisions and procedures to

protect the workforce and surrounding communities. CDC conducts

periodic on-site reviews and consults with the Department of Defense and contractors on an ongoing basis for the purpose of ensuring safety.

Today our challenges involve different non-incineration technologies, such as the technology at Newport, Indiana, and those

proposed for Pueblo, Colorado, and Bluegrass, Kentucky.

CDC has reviewed the Newport facility operations and plans.

CDC believes the facility is prepared to begin processing a portion

of the VX stockpile.

CDC will continue to review the status of the Newport facility on

an ongoing basis.

Congress has requested that CDC conduct an independent review

and report on the DuPont and DOD plan for the handling, transport and disposal of caustic VX hydrolysate waste.

11

CDC used internal and external experts to review the DuPontDOD report, including those from the Agency for Toxic Substances

and Disease Registry, the Department of Transportation,

Carmagen Engineering and EPA.

CDC sought extensive documentation from both the Army and

DuPont. CDC reviewed several thousand pages of studies and background information.

To ensure technical accuracy of CDC’s findings, the entire report

was peer reviewed by subject matter experts outside the government and the Department of Defense. The report was sent yesterday to the subcommittee and Members of Congress who requested

it.

Our summary findings were, first, caustic VX hydrolysate is

highly corrosive, requiring appropriate personal protective equipment during handling and transportation. The hydrolysate is consistent with other caustic products and can be dealt with by proper

training and ensuring that responders understand the proper

equipment for an emergency response.

Second, CDC believes that the Newport facility can begin effectively destroying approximately half of the VX stockpile. However,

insufficient information has been provided to determine the efficacy

of neutralization of the remaining VX stabilized with a different

chemical additive.

In addition, studies provided CDC to date support destroying

smaller portions of VX per batch than was originally designed—8

percent versus 32 percent—which will increase both the processing

time and the volume of hydrolysate waste generated. We understand that the Army is conducting additional testing to see if it can

resolve these two issues.

Third, risks associated with transporting the hydrolysate from

Newport to the DuPont facility in New Jersey are limited to its corrosive properties. The hydrolysate waste can be transported utilizing precautions and equipment similar to other caustic materials

currently being conveyed on our highways.

Fourth, insufficient data were provided to the EPA reviewers to

ensure that the disposal of hydrolysate waste into the Delaware

River is acceptable. Because EPA found the assessments were not

acceptable, CDC cannot recommend proceeding with the disposal

plan until EPA’s concerns are adequately addressed.

In October of 2004, CDC received a second congressional request

to review a revised Army-DuPont plan for further phosphonate reduction at DuPont. CDC received the Army-DuPont report on phosphonate treatability last month. CDC recently began to review this

information and hopes to have a review complete as soon as possible.

In summary, CDC will diligently continue the evaluation of existing chemical demilitarization facilities for safety, monitoring and

medical programs, and work in partnership with the Army on this

important program of the U.S. Government.

CDC has had a long and successful working relationship with the

Army’s Chemical Materials Agency. Together with the Department

of Defense we hope to report continued successes of this program

to the subcommittee.

12

Again, I appreciate the subcommittee’s interest and attention to

this important project and the opportunity to protect the health of

the people of the United States.

Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, this concludes

my testimony. I have provided more detailed testimony in writing.

I would be happy to answer any questions.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Sinks can be found in the Appendix on page 64.]

Mr. SAXTON. Dr. Sinks, thank you very much. And thank you for

your comments on the CDC report.

I would like to say at this point that I have a copy of the report,

which is entitled, ‘‘A Review of the U.S. Army Proposal for Off-Site

Treatment and Disposal of Caustic VX Hydrolysate From the Newport Chemical Agent Disposal Factory.’’

I would like to ask unanimous consent at this point that the report be made part of the record of this hearing, as well as the comments of the Department of Defense that were sent to CDC.

So that will be made part of the record, without objection.

Let me also say at this point that the ranking member—who is

also a member of the Judiciary Committee, which is in session, considering reauthorization of the Patriot Act—and so I am going to

yield first to the ranking member, Mr. Meehan, and then I will ask

my questions.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on

page 77, 79.]

Mr. MEEHAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Klein and Mr. Wakefield, I understand that the current

chemical weapons demilitarization program will not complete

stockpile destruction until 2020 or 2021, which is at least eight to

nine years beyond the extended deadline provided by the Chemical

Weapons Convention.

If not addressed, doesn’t this undermine our ability to press

other countries to adhere to the convention’s deadlines. And are we

prepared to give up that leverage?

It seems to me that the United States’ failure to eliminate our

chemical weapons stockpile in a timely fashion could give Russia,

for example, an excuse to provide less than good-faith cooperation

under the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program.

And what implications does our delay have for the Cooperative

Threat Reduction Program?

I am concerned that a slow rate of demilitarization on the Russian side, where stockpiles are less secure, is a very serious threat

to national security.

So the question is: How do you suggest that the United States—

you know, a country committed to ridding other countries of weapons of mass destruction and stockpiles—explain to the world our

failure to eliminate the chemical weapons stockpiles as required by

the international treaty?

Dr. KLEIN. Mr. Congressman, if you look, for example, where we

are to date, we have our six—hopefully soon—six out of the eight

sites operational. So we are making good progress, and we do believe that we will have 45 percent of our chemical agents destroyed

by December 2007.

13

On the current schedule that we are operating on, we believe

that we will have at least 90 percent of our chemical agents destroyed by 2012, if not more.

The last two sites that are, as we say, the long pole in the tent

are the sites at Pueblo and Bluegrass. Pueblo is about eight percent of our stockpile; Bluegrass is about two percent of the stockpile.

So the bottom line is, we do not know those end dates, because

we currently have studies that will be ongoing that will have more

information hopefully by the end of this month, and we will make

decisions this year on a better definitive schedule for those last two

remaining sites.

I would say that we are going to make every effort to make 2012.

We have not given up on that. It is going to be difficult. Everyday

that we operate the plant safely and securely, we have reduced the

risk to not only our citizens but to the world. And we do believe

we are making progress.

We would like to do it quicker. We would like to do it with less

cost. But we also want to make sure we do it safely and also protect the environment. So we want to take prudent action.

Clearly, we are making better progress than Russia. Russia has

about two percent of their agents destroyed to date. The Cooperative Threat Reduction Program also is under my office, and we are

working with the Russians to make sure they safely and securely

destroy theirs as well.

They, in all likelihood, will not even come close to 2012.

Mr. MEEHAN. Dr. Klein, we repeatedly state that weapons of

mass destruction, getting them out of the terrorist hands, is a top

priority. The Army maintains that public safety is its top consideration.

Numerous studies have shown that the continued storage of

chemical weapons is the highest-risk option.

I am trying to determine how we can justify the delay of construction that you mentioned at Bluegrass and Pueblo. What is

really preventing the destruction of these stockpiles in a timely

manner?

In testimony before the Senate Budget Committee in March,

Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz said that we are reexamining what is going on in Colorado and Kentucky, and he said,

‘‘My gravest concern is that projects be cost effective.’’

So are you telling us that there has been a shift in priority from

public safety/national security to cost? And what did Secretary

Wolfowitz mean by that?

Dr. KLEIN. Well, I would certainly not want to interpret what the

Deputy Secretary stated.

What I will say is that the department is committed to the safe

and timely destruction of these chemical weapons. We would like

to do this as expeditiously as we can.

In terms of the plants at Pueblo and Bluegrass, these are the

last two sites. We did not decide the technique that those two sites

would utilize until 2002.

We certified to Congress in 2003 what the cost of those facilities

would be. In Pueblo it was $1.5 billion, in 2002 dollars.

14

When we were getting some of the designs back, the cost in- creased to $2.6 billion, and that was a significant increase in cost.

So we are now looking at alternatives to that, whether we could

stage the destruction in a different way, where we would remove

energetics and then look at destroying the mustard gas, in the case

of Pueblo, so that we can do it safely.

So we are looking at a lot of options in order to do this in a more

safe and timely manner.

So I would say that the department has not shifted its focus at

all. But we are responsible to the taxpayers, and we want to do

this in the best way that we can to balance cost, performance and

schedule.

I would say that the materials are safely stored in all of our

eight sites. But we would like to get rid of these as soon as we can.

Mr. MEEHAN. The reason I ask—and maybe Secretary Bolton can

comment on it—the Administration’s fiscal 2005 budget slashed

funding for the plant facilities in Pueblo and Bluegrass. In the

budget projections for fiscal year 2006 to fiscal year 2011, the estimated request remains extremely low, about $31 million per year

to be shared by both sites.

The chemical weapons destruction technology plan for Pueblo

and Bluegrass is a water neutralization technology, an alternative

to incineration developed through years of negotiation between the

Army, local officials and citizens.

Why has this pilot destruction process been singled out for budget cuts? And what does this say about the Army’s commitment to

developing alternative destruction methods that are less harmful to

the environment and more acceptable to the local communities?

Dr. KLEIN. Let me start to answer that question.

These two plants in Pueblo and Bluegrass are using a neutralization technique similar to that that was used in Aberdeen and will

be used in Newport.

We learned a lot in the operation of the plants at Aberdeen. It

took a year longer than we had expected. There were a lot of operational issues that caused it to take a lot longer than we had initially expected.

And I think the fact that we understand the science of how to

do this is sometimes easier than the operational side of doing it.

And so we had some material incompatibilities that took longer

than we expected.

The numbers that you refer to in the delay of Pueblo and Bluegrass are basically our program objective memorandum (POM)

budget within our existing physical resources. That does not mean

that is the schedule that we will stay on. That is the five-year

budget projection.

I believe that when we operate Newport, we will learn from that

and be able to design the plant at Bluegrass better. We learned a

lot from Aberdeen that will help us on the Pueblo plant.

So there is no less focus on getting rid of these in a safe and

timely manner.

What we did do when Mike Wynne made his decision in December, he did make the decision to concentrate on those plants that

are operating so that we could more likely increase and meet our

45 percent deadline that we have for December of 2007.

15

So it does not mean that we are diminishing the importance of

Pueblo nor that in Bluegrass. It just means that we wanted to concentrate and keep the plants that are running, running, and to

meet that 45 percent deadline.

Secretary BOLTON. Congressman Meehan, as I stated in my

opening comments, these two sites are not directly under my management purview. But I feel I have a moral obligation to Dr. Klein

and to Mr. Wynne to offer whatever expertise they think they

need—they work on that.

So obviously, whether it is Aberdeen that is now closing down,

or Newport that is starting up, whatever we learn from those sites

we pass on to them.

But it is not under my purview to look at the cost and schedule

of those two sites.

Mr. MEEHAN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SAXTON. Gentlemen, it seems like you bring us good news

and bad news. The good news part of the story is that this has

been a remarkable effort in terms of not harming people or the environment. The good news, on the safety side, is that we have done

a pretty good job here, it seems.

On the other hand, there are two other parts of this issue that

are obviously troublesome. One is the length of the period of time

that this job is taking.

When this program was conceived in the 1980’s, I believe it was

hoped that we would be able to move through the entire destruction of these agents in 8 years and at the cost projected at the time

of $2.1 billion. This is not new information to you, because you told

me this.

Of course, we did not make the 1994 deadline, and here we are

in 2005, and this year’s projection is $26.8 billion. And Dr. Klein

using his ruler, has built this little chart that I have in front of me

that says that by something around 2014 or 2015, the cost could

be as high as $40.2 billion.

So in terms of—and would not be completed until 2030, Gene

tells me.

So the good news is that we have done this in a safe way; the

bad news is that is taken many times longer than we expected it

would at the beginning and at a cost many multiples in excess of

what it was originally projected to take.

So here is my question: Being as brutally frank as you can, tell

us what happened to the cost projections and the time projections

and what the Department of Defense did in the past—which it may

do differently in the future—and what role also Congress may have

had to play in slowing this program down and perhaps making it

more expensive than it should be.

Dr. KLEIN. I will start, Mr. Chairman, and then pass it to the

Honorable Claude Bolton to add his comments as well.

I think a lot of factors happened in the cost and schedule, and

that has been one of the most frustrating parts. As you indicated,

we have good news and bad news. The good news is we are doing

it safely. We have not injured people and it is doing it in an environmentally sound manner.

16

I think a lot of things happened. As Mr. Bolton indicated, we do

get some technical surprises along the way. For example, when we

sampled some of the ton containers in Tooele, we found that they

had mercury in them. And the environmental laws and regulations

that we have on the books today for the release of mercury into the

environment is much different than that that was projected in

1985.

So there have been environmental changes. There have been

technological surprises.

One of the frustrating parts, I believe, is that we have not gotten

the through-put of the plants as we had expected. And, again, we

will have surprises where there is material incompatibility, changing environmental regulations—a lot of things have resulted in not

meeting the schedules.

So we probably have a variety of factors. There is no single one

cause to do that.

But it has been optimistic schedules that have not come to pass.

It has been the plants that have not been meeting their target objectives.

So what we have done, when I was confirmed in my position in

late 2001, November of 2001 and coming into 2002, was when we

were wrestling with a $9 billion increase. I was new to the Pentagon, and it was gut-wrenching. We had a $9 billion increase. We

went from roughly $15 billion to $24 billion. And that was not a

pleasant time to be there to make those decisions.

What we did for that activity is that Claude and I meet often,

we review schedules, we challenge the people that are monitoring

the plants that have their plans.

In terms of the recent decisions that we are taking on Pueblo and

Bluegrass is, we are going to look at various stages being competitive. We want to look at incentives for the contractors with no compromise to safety. We want to look at right-sizing the plants, smaller footprints.

So we are taking a lot of actions to hold cost and also to hold

schedules.

Secretary BOLTON. Mr. Chairman, I agree with what Dr. Klein

has just said.

I think when we started this program, we obviously looked at

things a bit differently in those days, both from a national standpoint, certainly from an environmental standpoint.

A lot of rules, laws at all levels—local, state and federal—have

changed in the interim, and I think for the right reasons: to protect

us, to protect the public and protect the environment. Those were

not envisioned at the time.

CSEPP was not envisioned at the time when we started this, and

that is to protect the local communities, and that is all added in

terms of adding requirements and adding costs.

We have been very, very tough on ourselves when it comes to

safety. There is absolutely no reason to hurt anybody when we are

trying to dispose of these types of weapons. And so we have been

very, very cautious, and I would say not too cautious.

And we have learned. Now that we have a number of sites up

and running, now is the time to take those lessons learned—and

17

we are, but those are across various plants—and see if there is a

way we can get more efficient.

It is interesting to note that once we get a plant up and running

that it runs fairly well. And we see that at Aberdeen, we just started Pine Bluff, and they are moving along very, very well.

You asked us to be brutally frank and honest. This is before my

watch—and Dr. Klein will tell you that when I came here, I was

not involved with this program. It was not under my purview at

all, the chem demil.

And quite frankly, I did not want it. There were just too many

moving parts here, and rightfully so. But if you want to do something on a time line, you have to be able to control certain things,

and we did not have that.

Well, after about a year of brow-beating I was finally asked to

take over six of these. And I noted that as I got into the programs,

I said, ‘‘Well, you have eight sites. Why am I only getting six?’’ And

then I was told about the Assembled Chemical Weapons Alternatives (ACWA) and what was going on there.

And I knew from the get-go this is going to be problematic, because I have a burning desire to get things done as a package, because we can learn across that. I can put an organization together

that can do the whole thing.

I can certainly respond to the desires and wishes of Congress,

both Houses, and get the job done. But if you separate it, it will

take longer.

And I think, as I mentioned in my last comment, I have done the

best I can in supporting Mr. Wynne and Dale Klein, but I cannot

tell you how many times I have bit my lip knowing that I would

do things a little bit differently if we had the entire program.

So separation of the programs has been, at least in my mind,

problematic and has caused problems in cost and schedule delays.

I mentioned in my opening comments that delays break down in

three areas—Dr. Klein has already touched on those: technical, internal and external.

The external I just talked on, in terms of rules, regulations, separation of the programs and projects.

Internal basically boils down to how you organize to get the work

done. We are improving that. We did that by setting up this Chemical Materials Agency (CMA) a couple of years ago.

And the technical, the technical sometimes will surprise us. Take

the mercury in the ton containers and so forth, we have gone out

to the other sites and we are looking to see if that is going to be

a problem there.

But if you really want to get this down—I think we understand

what the communities expect from us in terms of the environmental and wanting to do things safely. I think we know how to

do that. We have demonstrated that.

Now it is a matter of bringing these things together and getting

on with the job and keeping the community well aware of what we

are doing.

Mr. SAXTON. Thank you.

Help me look ahead a little bit.

Based on what we know, at the end of last year we had—well,

let me go back and say that when we started this program back

18

in the early 1990’s, when demil actually started, we had no or almost no demil plants—is that right?—very limited capability.

And at the end of 2004, we had a plant operating Umatilla, Oregon; in Tooele, Utah; in Anniston, Alabama; and in Aberdeen,

Maryland. So at the end of last year we had four plants up and

running.

Earlier this year Pine Bluff, Arkansas, came on line, and in a few

months a plant at Newport, Indiana, will come on line. So we can

essentially look at six out of eight plants in operation or soon to

be in operation.

What does this mean for the future? We have been able to demil

roughly a third of the capacity—of the product that we have to

demil over these many years that have passed, and now we have

six plants up and running. What does this mean in terms of cost

in the future and schedule in the future?

Secretary BOLTON. Well, obviously we are going to be reviewing

this with Dr. Klein and Mr. Wynne here shortly, looking at our revised estimates and so forth.

We are challenged by the Office of Secretary of Defense as we

look at the Cost Analysis Improvement Group (CAIG) numbers.

Their numbers are a bit higher than mine, so we are looking at all

of that. We may all gravitate together here eventually.

But what it means to me to have the six plants is that I can stabilize operations across those plants, get some experience under

our belts how to do this, and then start driving the time down in

terms of how long it is going to take to do the destruction at those

plants.

So having everything up and working, we can start to focusing

on the day-to-day operations of all plants, sharing those lessons

learned and then finding ways that we can actually bring that

schedule back.

Mr. SAXTON. Can you predict how many tons you will be able to

process a year with the six plants up?

Secretary BOLTON. Mike, do you want to take that?

While Mike is getting up, I will tell you that we have an obligation to have 45 percent—go from the 36 where we are now to 45

in 2 years. But I think we can beat that.

Mr. PARKER. Yes, sir.

We are in a process of rebaselining across the program as we

speak and have that ready to come up by the end of May time

frame.

But I think if we look back on where we are at—this is the first

time I think that we have had the operational history with Johnston Island, Tooele, seeing multiple plant startups at Anniston,

Umatilla and now Pine Bluff, where we really have had the statistical base and the confidence in our operating history to do a good

solid forecast.

This rebaselining effort that we are going through now I think

will produce something which we will be able to bring up through

the Army chain to the Office of the Secretary of Defense and over

to the Congress and basically to the American people with a very

high confidence cost and schedule.

From that we have also been able to identify, based on this operating data, many opportunities to accelerate the program—as we

19

call it, pull it back to the left in our schedule terms—which will not

only accelerate the program but also be able to address some of the

cost issues which we find challenging.

We do have that operational data now. We know where to go

after, in an engineering context, to improve performance.

As Dr. Klein touched on, the biggest thing on the plant side is

that the plants have only been operating at about half of the designed efficiency that we had forecasted.

The factors, while they are a consideration, involving environmental requirements—and totally new requirements, such as

Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness, the non-stockpile

chemical demil program—add to the cost.

But the biggest single factor is the operation of the plants.

We have solid data, and I think we will be able to come back to

you in the summer time frame and lay out a schedule which will

answer your questions as to what we believe we can do with a very

high confidence number.

Mr. SAXTON. Well, we look forward to seeing that information,

and we appreciate your efforts in that regard.

I am extremely interested in the disposal of the VX gas at the

DuPont plant on the Delaware River. However, I think I have overstayed my welcome here in terms of using time. There are two

other Members of Congress who are on this panel who are also interested in this subject. So here is what I suggest we do: We are

going to Mr. Hefley, he is next, and then we will come back to Mr.

Andrews and Mr. LoBiondo, who are——

Mr. ANDREWS. Mr. Chairman, I would be willing to go after Mr.

LoBiondo.

Mr. SAXTON. Okay, we will do it that way.

We will go from Mr. Hefley, then, and then Mr. LoBiondo and

Mr. Andrews.

Mr. HEFLEY. Well, you know, I came in here today, I wanted to

know what the heck is happening in Pueblo. And with the questions that have been asked by our chairman and ranking member

and by your testimony, you have given us a little idea of that.

But I am still very concerned about Pueblo. Is mustard gas not

as important as some of these other things? It is fallen down on

the priority list.

The thing that concerns me is the fits and starts we have had

there, that we think we have the thing going, we think a decision

has been made—I was out there just a few months ago—last fall,

John, or some time? It is actually in John’s district, and I refer to

him for most of the questioning in this.

But here the contractor was in a big, new temporary building,

but it was big and new. And they took me outside, and they

showed me where they had staked out for the new plant, and they

had this system and they explained that in great detail to me, and

it had all been agreed upon.

And it seemed like no time after that I go home, and I read

somewhere that this has been put on hold, that we are not going

to do this after all.

Now, is that because of the cost? Or is that because we are still

looking at the idea of moving it to Utah to destroy it?

20

I remember Jim Hansen, when he was here, that was always his

dream, that we would move it to Utah and not have to build another plant.

If that is what you are thinking about doing, tell us about that.

But the thing I think that frustrates the community of Pueblo is

that they get all excited that we are actually going to move forward, and then it is changed, everything changed and we are not

moving forward at all.

So any light you can shed on that, I would appreciate.

Dr. KLEIN. Mr. Congressman, it has been a challenge. And when

we were seeing—when we had certified the cost and schedule in

roughly 2003 and it came back a lot higher than we had expected,

we started looking at alternatives.

We believe that at the end of this month we will have some alternatives that we will examine. I will be meeting with the Colorado

delegation later this month. I met with individuals, the Colorado

community group, in Denver a few weeks, and we try to keep them

informed.

The difficulty is if you ask us right now, do we have a decision

exactly how we are going to proceed, we do not. We are trying to

get the plant right-sized into a smaller footprint. We are trying to

do it within reasonable cost and schedule.

We have talked to the contractors involved. They believe they

have some creative and innovative ways that they can do it within

a reasonable time period and a reasonable cost. They just had not

looked at all the options that we now are asking them to look at.

So I definitely understand the frustration. We have it, too, so it

is not just from Colorado’s perspective.

We do hope, though, within the end of this month to have some

definitive numbers that we can look at. And as soon as we have

it planned for, we will pass those on to you and to the community

and certainly to Congressman Salazar as well since it is in his

area.

But we definitely are trying to look at both cost and schedule in

terms of—and certainly safety.

Mr. HEFLEY. Well, I would appreciate it if you would keep us in

the circle. I do not like reading about it in the newspapers after

I thought I had a thorough briefing. It makes me look a little silly

when I say, ‘‘Oh, no, I just talked to them and they said we were

going to do it this way,’’ and obviously that is not the case.

Mr. Chairman, I have to go chair the Readiness Committee, and

I apologize, because I would like to stay for the rest of this, but I

have a very able colleague here that I am sure will not let you off

easy. [Laughter.]

Mr. SAXTON. Thank you, Mr. Hefley.

Mr. LoBiondo.

Mr. LOBIONDO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I thank our distinguished panel for being here today.

This is very informative and we are getting a lot of information,

but as Chairman Saxton said, Mr. Saxton, Mr. Andrews and myself

have many, many, many unanswered questions.

And I know that the questions that are raised are leading us to

say that you, Dr. Sinks, need additional information by the EPA

before you can conclude what the ecological risks are, the long-term

21

risks, and where we may go from this particular treatment at DuPont.

I have also been made aware that DuPont made some recent upgrades to their disposal process, and I am told it involves some new

techniques that some are saying would significantly remove a couple of additional agents from the wastewater, and that these results were shared with the CDC, but that these upgrades were not

included in the current report.

So my question is: Is the information concerning these upgrades

being considered by the CDC? And if so, will a supplemental report

be issued encompassing this information and any other additional

information that the EPA requires?

And what kind of time line are we talking about? Soon? Fast?

Where do we go from here?

Dr. SINKS. Thank you, Congressman. Let me try to address your

questions.

First, in terms of CDC’s review of the data from DuPont and the

Department of Defense on the phosphonate treatability, the revised

treatability plan of DuPont.

We became aware of this when it was announced in the media

of November. I believe Congress became aware of it at that point

of time.

We just received a technical report itself to look at. It is about

400 pages long. We received it in March. We will proceed to go

ahead and review that as quickly as we can with the people and

resources we have available.

We know this is an urgent issue, and we certainly want to address it in a timely manner and hope to have that done as quick

as possible. But we have not had the time to review it yet in a scientifically rigorous manner. And we did not, for that reason, did

not include it in the report that we released today.

In terms of what the EPA needs, the EPA is not providing us

data. They are asking for more information I believe from DuPont

and the Department of Defense to fill in some of the questions they

had in order to determine whether or not they felt that DuPont

could dispose of this material into the Delaware River.

Mr. LOBIONDO. The entire program is enormously important to

the nation, but I venture to say not a lot of people were paying attention other than those areas where the site is located.

Congressmen Saxton and Andrews and I, we share this district

to DuPont, and these are the very issues that will crank people up

as quickly or as tightly as discussion about releasing to the Delaware River of an unknown, in their view.

So there is going to be a lot of interest that is generated from

this particular hearing, and I know we are anxious to get accurate

information. But can you give us any idea of how much time we

are talking about here?

I know we want to do it accurately and we want to do it thoroughly, but I know what the first question I am going to get back

home is: Are we talking about a month? Six months? Six years?

What are we talking about here?

Dr. SINKS. Well, I would hope we are talking in the terms of

months rather than years, for sure.

22

I do want to emphasize that this is a very small program in our

center. It is approximately four individuals, full time, who are

working on responding to requests from Congress as well as oversight with all of these facilities.

Our individuals travel to these facilities, work alongside of Department of Defense and contractors to assure the safety in these

plants and the safety for the public.

So we have many different tasks in front of us to achieve. We

understand the urgency of this matter. We certainly make it a very

high priority, and we will proceed as quickly as we can.

And as I said, I would hope it would be in the matter of months.

I will say that one of the reasons why we took a little longer with

the first report than we expected to take was our decision to go

ahead and have our report externally peer reviewed and to ask the

Department of Defense to give us technical advice on the report.

After all, we had used information from the Department of Defense

in developing the report. We wanted to assure that we were giving

you the best science and the most credible report we could.

It is a very challenging, complex issue. It is a very important

issue. We wanted to make sure we are giving you the best report

we could, and we hope to do that with the follow-up.

Mr. LOBIONDO. Mr. Chairman, do I have time for one more question?

Mr. SAXTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. LOBIONDO. I would like to ask either Dr. Klein or Secretary

Bolton: Can you comment or do you choose to comment on what alternatives to off-site disposal there may be, depending on what is

concluded here?

Secretary BOLTON. Well, as noted earlier, there is a notification

here to Congress about starting Newport after the 30-day notification period is ended, and we will have storage on site there at Newport, and we will use that until we make a determination as to

which way we are going to go with the hydrolysate.

Mr. LOBIONDO. So your idea is to wait on this information from

this report, start the process in Indiana, and then make a decision

based on the data that is revealed at that time.

Secretary BOLTON. Well, the data here, and EPA is also doing

some work, sir.

Mr. LOBIONDO. Thank you very much.

Yes?

Dr. KLEIN. That material will be stored in robust containers on

site in a safe, secure manner.

And one thing I would like to comment on is that while we do

not have the final disposition of the hydrolysate determined, it is

a lot more safer to the citizens of Indiana and the Nation to have

it transferred from the VX to the hydrolysate. So we think it is a

right decision to start the process, then store on site until we do

the final disposition.

Mr. LOBIONDO. So it is safe to assume they are happy about

this?

Secretary BOLTON. Oh, yes, sir. We have been talking to the community there.

Mr. LOBIONDO. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

23

Mr. SAXTON. Thank you, Mr. LoBiondo.

Mr. Andrews.

Mr. ANDREWS. Thank you.

I want to begin by thanking the witnesses for their preparation.

I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman and Mr. LoBiondo, for the

work that you have done on this issue of great concern to our region in procuring this CDC report and language in last year’s authorization bill which made this report very meaningful. It is truly

appreciated.

I also want to say to Dr. Sinks: Your agency I think did a very,

very good job. And I hope you would convey to the people who work

with you that we appreciate their professionalism and thoroughness.

And we appreciate you interrupting a family vacation, as I understand it, to be here to testify today. I think each one of us can

relate to that risk.

To Dr. Klein, Secretary Wakefield: I know that in these kinds of

cases you are confronted with members who do not want things

done in their district. It is a way of life around here.

I have looked at this issue very carefully, and as far as I am concerned, this is more than just a matter of not wanting this process

to take place in the Delaware River. I do not. And I think the report points out many of the reasons why.

But I also understand we have a responsibility to work with you

to solve a very important problem that the country has and to meet

a very important obligation the country has.

So I look at this and here is what I see: I see our fellow citizens

in Indiana, who have a very serious problem, they are sitting next

to a chemical weapons supply, and they very much want those

chemical weapons neutralized or done away with in some way. And

I think that should be our first priority, to meet the concerns of the

people in Indiana.

The second thing that I see is language in the CDC report which

doubts whether the neutralization process that you are talking

about doing will deal with half the supply at all.

Page seven of Dr. Sinks testimony says, ‘‘As a result of the chemical stabilizers added to the VX to maintain its potency, CDC is

concerned about the effectiveness of the current neutralization

technology to destroy the other approximately half of the stockpile.’’

So there is some real doubt as to whether the method you have

chosen is going to even address half of the problem.

By the way, I assume that the other point that is made is that

they are calling on the—I will use an amateur term—but they are

calling upon the ‘‘concentration’’ of the hydrolysate to be much

lower than you had originally contemplated. Instead of 32 percent

concentration in the fluid, they are now talking about 8 percent,

which I think means you have a lot more stuff to handle, process,

transport, dispose of than you thought you did, which leads to a

concern about cost.

I have asked repeatedly for the last year about the difference in

cost between the neutralization method you are proposing here and

the cost of supercritical water oxidation, which is one of the methods recommended above this method by the National Academy of

Sciences. And I have yet to get a straight answer what that cost

24

differential is. And I think that the fact that you have this new factor adds in.

The third thing that I see is in the EPA’s letter, which is an appendage of the CDC report, the EPA makes—this is Walter

Mugden’s letter—makes the following point: In addition to their

concerns about the discharge of the hydrolysate, they say there are

several additional issues that need to be addressed before treatment and discharge of this treated hydrolysate can occur, including

whole effluent toxicity tests procedure, the potential for the presence of VX nerve agent.

In other words, the EPA believes that the data you have assembled, the data that DuPont assembled, do not rule out the possibility that trace elements of the active VX nerve agent could still be

in the hydrolysate.

If you take these problems altogether and you take the comment

you just made about the ability to start on half that stockpile and

store the hydrolysate on site, I would just ask the question: Why

don’t you start doing that and then look for an on-site disposal

method for the hydrolysate that could be more cost effective and efficient?

I mean, why are we thinking about trucking stuff 800 miles

across the country when we have all these questions?

Dr. KLEIN. Let me start and answer some of your questions, and

then I will defer to Mike Parker, who has a lot more of the technical details.

The decision to use the neutralization technique in general was

made quite some time ago. The National Academy of Sciences said

that it was safe and well understood. So the chemistry——

Mr. ANDREWS. But didn’t they rank it eighth out of eight preferred methods, number eight of the eight methods they looked at?

Dr. KLEIN. In terms of the neutralization or compared to incineration?

Mr. ANDREWS. In terms of efficacy, did not they rank it number

eight out of eight?

Mr. PARKER. Not as the primary treatment method, which is

what we are talking about.

Dr. KLEIN. I am not familiar with that ranking. It is my understanding that the neutralization technique is well understood and

recommended as safe and well understood. So I am not sure what

the ranking that you might be referring to.

Let me just say that, again, the Army has spent a lot of time

looking at how to best dispose of the hydrolysate. And Mr. Parker

can tell you some of the decisions along that.

I think we should keep in mind that the DuPont facility has a

great track record. It has been operated safely, and it will continue

to operate safely. And the amount of material, the hydrolysate,

that goes in there is a very small part of their typical operation.

However, we do want to make sure that the questions that individuals have, and certainly the regulatory bodies, that these questions are answered so that it is safely.

I think Mr. Parker can go through and talk about some of the

reasons we went with the eight percent and what the measurement

will be to ensure that there is no live VX agent in that hydrolysate.

25

Mr. ANDREWS. Well, with all respect, I have read some of the

things that I think he is going to say.

The question I would ask is: What does that do to the cost? If

you have to go to the 8 percent instead of the 32, what does this

do to the cost of this neutralization, then?

Mr. PARKER. Let me address that by answering your question

first on the effect of the stabilizer.

Since the point where CDC had to cut off data submission for the

purposes of analyzing and producing the report, we had continued

work with both stabilizers and a mixture of the two and have been

able to confirm that the reaction at both 8-weight percent and 16-

weight percent is effective in neutralizing the VX, and the analytical procedures that are necessary to confirm that meet the EPA

criteria.

The 16-weight percent is what we look at as an optimal level to

run the plant and also address some of the issues with shipping.

As both efficiency and the flammability of the product, if it is

more concentrated, then about 20 percent shifts to a different circumstance.

The chronic effect that you cite that was noted by EPA, DuPont

has been in contact with EPA to identify the additional aquatic

species that EPA believes need to be looked at from a chronic

standpoint. DuPont’s estimate is something on the order of a

month. They have identified those species and they think EPA is

in agreement. They are going to proceed with those studies and

then would provide the information through CDC to EPA.

The last factor, on cost, the original concept was for on-site treatment by supercritical water oxidation (SCWO). To revert back to

that, a government-built and-operated supercritical water oxidation

facility would add something in excess of $300 million and a couple

more years to the operating cost.

So it is a very expensive alternative to one that I think once we

fully address all of the concerns in the report, which I believe we

now have the data. The only outstanding element I believe at this

point in time is the aquatic toxicity, which DuPont is in the process

of addressing.

We have both a procedure and a process on both ends, at Newport and at DuPont, Deepwater, which meets the mandate of maximum protection of the public.

Mr. ANDREWS. The question that I asked you was: What difference in the cost of this neutralization procedure do we get by

going from 32 percent down to 8? What difference does it make in

your cost projections with respect to the neutralization process you

have chosen?

Mr. PARKER. Sir, the 32 percent, which was the original concept,

was based on an on-site treatment by supercritical water oxidation.

The 32-weight percent product would have been diluted down to

about somewhere between 5 and 10 percent before it was processed

into SCWO.

So we have a real apples and oranges. This is comparing an onsite treatment approach to an off-site treatment approach with a

much different standard of protecting the public.

26

Mr. ANDREWS. Which assumption were you making when you did

your original cost projection? And has that changed as a result of

this CDC report?

Mr. PARKER. The original cost projection, as I said, was based on

a 32-weight percent neutralization and a significantly diluted product treated by supercritical water oxidation.

Once we made the decision to change the fundamental approach—after 9/11 and the considerable concern about the threat

that this material presents to the neat VX, or the pure VX presents

to that community—and moved to a much more accelerated program, we have been consistently looking at the same fundamental

approach.

Mr. ANDREWS. I have more than exhausted my time, but I will

just make this one point: Are you testifying that with the CDC saying that they doubt whether your process will deal with half the

stockpile at all, that the cost is not going to go up above what you

originally estimated?

Mr. PARKER. Sir, I do not believe that is what the CDC report

said. The CDC report said——

Mr. ANDREWS. Would you like to read it?

Mr. PARKER [continuing]. Before we proceed we need to resolve

those issues. We have done that and we provided the data, and the

data is in line with what is necessary to protect the workforce and

the public.

Mr. ANDREWS. The report says that CDC is concerned about the

effectiveness of the current neutralization technology to destroy the

other approximately half of the stockpile. That is what it says.

And if they are right and you have to do something else other

than what you contemplated with half of what is there, is it not

going to make the cost go up?

Mr. PARKER. Sir, we provided——

Secretary BOLTON. Well, the cost would go up——

Mr. ANDREWS. How much?

Secretary BOLTON. I do not know, because I do not believe the

report and we do not——

Mr. ANDREWS. You do not believe the report.

Secretary BOLTON. We do not believe the report because, as Mike

pointed out, CDC only had a certain amount of data. They do not

have the rest of the data that addressed the entire stockpile there.

I think once they have the data, that statement will go away.

Mr. ANDREWS. Well, Mr. Chairman, I am sure we would like to

see the CDC continue to do its independent, professional work on

this.

I would simply say from my perspective, the first time I heard

about this proposal, which is to discharge something into the drinking water of the people I represent, was in the newspaper, in a

legal notice. Not from you, not from the other people involved.

Now, I must say, with all due respect, that the credibility of

those of you involved in managing this program took a bit of a hit

in our area as a result of that, which is why we asked the CDC

to become involved.

Now, if you think that their work product is deficient in some

way, I think you should put your points on the record. But we have

a great deal of confidence in their work product.

27

Mr. PARKER. I do not believe he said——

Secretary BOLTON. As do I. And that is why we work very closely

with the CDC——

Mr. ANDREWS. But you just said you thought the report was

wrong.

Secretary BOLTON. No, that is what you said, Congressman; that

is not what I said.

Mr. ANDREWS. What did you say?

Secretary BOLTON. I said——

Mr. ANDREWS. You said you do not believe their report?

Secretary BOLTON. I said that they had incomplete data——

Mr. ANDREWS. You said you do not believe their report.

Secretary BOLTON [continuing]. Which is what Mr. Parker said,

that they cut-off date——

Mr. ANDREWS. You said you do not believe their report. Is that

not what we you said?

Secretary BOLTON. I do not believe I said that.

Mr. ANDREWS. Well, I think the transcript will reflect that is

what you said.

Secretary BOLTON. If that is what I said, then I apologize. However, the truth of the matter is, the CDC, like any organization,

had a cut-off date. We continued doing our analysis, which I think

when they see this data, these data, which say that this is a safe

process for the entire stockpile, we are going to provide that data.

And to get back to your point: None of us were here 50 years ago

when this country decided to build these munitions. Most of us

were not here when this country decided to sign a piece of paper

to the rest of the world saying we will get rid of this.

It is true that we are talking about the state of Indiana and the

people there. It is true I am trying to go ahead and make sure we

reduce the immediate threat to them.

But this nation has an obligation to get rid of this stuff. If it

costs more money, it will cost more money and everybody in this

country will have to pay for it. My job is to do it safely and to try

to do that within the constraints that you give me. That is all I am

trying to do.

Mr. ANDREWS. One of your other obligations is to advise representatives of the people when you are going to make a decision

that would affect those representatives, and you did not do that in

this case. We were notified about this through the public media at

the last minute. And it has created a serious credibility problem.

Mr. SAXTON. Is the gentleman finished?

Mr. ANDREWS. Yes.

Mr. SAXTON. Thank you.

We are going to go to Mr. Davis next, but before we do, just let

me ask a couple of questions.

Can you describe the nature of the substance that will be transferred to the DuPont site on the Delaware River for disposal, Dr.

Klein—or one of you?

Secretary BOLTON. A hydrolysate is a caustic water substance,

not unlike leach, and it has a 4 percent concentration caustic material. On our highways today we have similar materials that have

a concentration up to 50 percent. We have been transporting to

28

Deepwater similar materials from Aberdeen very safely—not one

accident, no incident.

Given the amount that is processed at DuPont, we represent

something like a percent or two of their daily intake.

Mr. PARKER. As Secretary Bolton indicated, the predominant

safety risk associated with the hydrolysate is the sorting hydroxide,

the caustic content, which is around 4-weight percent. There is another small fraction of organic materials, which in addition which

are present, those breakdown products which were noted by CDC

and EPA as items that need to be addressed in the DuPont procedure before the material can be discharged into the river.

Mr. SAXTON. Dr. Sinks, can you add anything that would be enlightening for those of us who are not scientists?

Dr. SINKS. Thank you.

Let me just say, and to be perfectly clear, that our report was

based on information provided to us by the Department of Defense

and DuPont. We do not run our own scientific experiments on this

material, nor could we. And we based our conclusions on the information that was provided to us.

We have not excluded the possibility or the feasibility that the

Department of Defense can treat I believe it is the

dicychlohexylcarbodiimide (DCC)-stabilized VX. We just have not

seen the data to demonstrate that they can.

We have not excluded the possibility that they can treat at higher loads than eight percent, but we felt that the information provided to us was insufficient for us to draw the conclusion that they

could.

Mr. SAXTON. Mr. Secretary, do you have that information? And

are you going to provide it to CDC?

Secretary BOLTON. We will be providing that information.

Mr. SAXTON. Thank you.

Mr. Secretary, either you or Mr. Parker mentioned that this is

a relatively small percentage of the work—or would be a relatively

small percentage of the work that goes on at DuPont.

Can this material in any way be considered more harmful, less

harmful, than other materials that are treated at DuPont?

Mr. PARKER. Sir, it is comparable to many materials that DuPont

treats in the family of caustic-type waste products. DuPont treats

materials which are substantially more toxic than inherent in this

product and more difficult in the sense of their chemical processes

and the controls that they have to mandate in order to meet their

discharge permit and to have a product that is safe to discharge

to the river.

So this is well within DuPont’s demonstrated capability of over

35 years of operating this facility.

Mr. SAXTON. Where does the material that DuPont treats originate, other than the proposed VX derivative?

Mr. PARKER. I believe in a broad sense, DuPont established the

facility, as I understand it, initially to treat products from their

own manufacturing operation. And given the capacity of the facility, they accept waste from New Jersey, Pennsylvania, New York,

Delaware and other places across the United States that they have

the capability of treating—12 million to 15 million gallons a day of

material that is treated in the facility.

29

We would be asking DuPont to treat 5,000 to 10,000 gallons a

day through the facility.

They have, as I mentioned, a 35-year history of compliance, and

I think being an excellent neighbor and a steward of the river.

They do treat beyond the industrial waste, which is their profit

center. They also treat for adjoining municipalities, their municipal

waste, to take that capital burden off those communities.

And they treat a large volume of storm water through the facility

that would go into the river untreated if it was not for the availability of the facility.

So they clean up that water that is contaminated from surface

contamination and clean it up and actually improve significantly

the discharge into the river.

Mr. SAXTON. You mentioned New Jersey, Pennsylvania,

Delaware——

Mr. PARKER. New York.

Mr. SAXTON [continuing]. New York. Is there any way to describe

the nature of the material that comes from those locations, that is

treated at the DuPont plant?

Mr. PARKER. I think that is best answered by DuPont. They are

permitted, under the Delaware River Basin Commission, to treat

waste of a specific nature of which our hydrolysate falls well within

the capabilities. But they are treating significantly more hazardous

materials through the facility safely and have a long demonstrated

capability.

Mr. SAXTON. You mentioned a minute ago that this is a permitted process. By whom is it permitted?

Mr. PARKER. There are two direct regulatory elements, as I understand, the state of New Jersey’s Department of Natural Resources and Environmental——

Mr. SAXTON. Department of Environmental——

Mr. PARKER [continuing]. Commission oversees the operation of

the facility and permits it.

The discharge product into the river is regulated by the Delaware River Basin Commission, which is a consortium of state oversight elements from New York, Pennsylvania, Delaware, New Jersey and the Corps of Engineers who regulate not only DuPont but

other facilities that discharge into the Delaware River.

Mr. SAXTON. Mr. LoBiondo has indicated he has a question.

Mr. LOBIONDO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Just along these lines that the Chairman is pursuing, am I to

understand, then, that the state of New Jersey, through the Department of Environmental Protection, licensed this, and if they

feel, for whatever reason, they are not satisfied, that the state of

New Jersey has a major say in this?

Mr. PARKER. Yes, sir. DuPont’s facility is currently going under

a renewal, and that pre-draft is in its final stage of comments and

will return, as I understand, to the two regulatory bodies—the

state and the river commission.

Until that is fully resolved and the permit is updated, DuPont

will continue to operate under their existing permit. I believe the

existing permit has a provision in it which would preclude the ability to treat and discharge this material in the river subject to full

30

resolution of all of the concerns by the state regulatory body in

New Jersey.

Mr. LOBIONDO. So the state of New Jersey, through the commission of DuPont (DP), really has to be satisfied before this can ultimately moved totally forward.

Mr. PARKER. Yes, sir.

Mr. LOBIONDO. And do you have any time line on their review

process?

Mr. PARKER. It is basically tied to resolving the CDC comments

and——

Mr. LOBIONDO. Okay.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SAXTON. We from New Jersey are particularly sensitive to

these kinds of issues. As you know, we have a number of hazardous

waste facilities, hazard waste dumps that are in the process of

being cleaned up.

And we have had, particularly in my district, in Toms River, we

have had a high rate of childhood brain cancer, brain stem cancer,

and it is suspected that there may be some chemical causes for

that.

So we thank you for bearing with us. We understand that you

have a job to do, and we understand that it is a tough one. But

at the same time, we represent a couple of million people among

us, so we are going to continue to have these concerns until we resolve this issue.

So thank you.

Mr. Davis.

Mr. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to shift the discussion, if we could, from the Ohio

Valley into the Bluegrass for a moment where Congressman Chandler and I are from, sharing the Bluegrass depot.

As Congressman Andrews and Congressman Hefley I think very

aptly pointed out—I could speak as a former project manager myself—we have the practicalities of executing the project, accomplishing management objectives, but at the same time is the perception of your customer, the public in this case.

I am really concerned that, you know, we set expectations for our

communities. All of us in here who have facilities in our areas get

questions about this all the time. And certainly the credibility of

not only of your agencies but also the perception of the government’s reliability in general is the ability to meet these.

And I feel like in some ways we have had some shifting plans

and priorities—the direction where my questions are going to be

going—in the fiscal year 2005 military construction budget. I think,

for example, in the case of Bluegrass we had about $30 million that

were released for neutral site improvements. In the 2006 fiscal

year budget, we did not have any funds for construction at Bluegrass, or Pueblo for that matter, in the request.

My first question is: What is the basis for that reduction in construction funding for the Assembled Chemical Weapons Alternatives program, dealing with, you know, what is a very serious

issue in our area. It kind of came out as the red-headed children,

if you will, of eight facilities that were going to be addressed.

31

Dr. KLEIN. What we are doing on the ACWA program is—unfortunately, as new information comes, we have to evaluate that and

make decisions the best that we can.

The Under Secretary of Defense looked at some of the cost projections and schedules in December of 2004, and we believe that we

can do better on schedule and on cost by looking at some alternatives.

As you probably know, Mike Parker is dual-headed. He has the

responsibility both for the CMA program and the ACWA program.

So a lot of this work is done by some of the same Army individuals

within Mr. Bolton’s purview, the same professional staff.

What we looked at in 2004 when we started seeing both schedule

slippages and cost increases and we wanted to look at some alternatives to make sure that we are doing it not only safely but for

a cost, schedule and performance balance, and that is what we are

looking at right now.

The unfortunate thing is I know what you would like to know,

and I am sure that Representative Chandler and Representative

Salazar both would like to have an answer right now on what we

are going to do. And unfortunately, we just do not have that.

We are getting information in, we will have the end of this

month, we will evaluate that information and we will be making

decisions. And as soon as we do, you will not read about it in the

press; we will let you know personally.

But right now we do not have information to really tell you exactly how we going to proceeding with those.

Under Secretary Mike Wynne wanted to lay all of the options on

the table. We want to look at all of those options. We want to provide that information to the Congress and certainly to the—that

you have an interest in your communities—to make the best decision we can, to do this safely and balance cost, schedule and performance, but safety number one.

Mr. DAVIS. Would all that distill down to you did not have

enough money to execute it? Or was it a question over the technical

means by which you were going to gain treaty compliance?

Dr. KLEIN. There is 2004 and 2005 money that it is still held

both for Pueblo and for Bluegrass. And so there are funds that are

still available once we make the decision.

We believe that for 2005 and 2006, once we make the decision,

there are funds available to implement those decisions.

Mr. DAVIS. One question on the delay, particularly for two facilities that have not had a lot of attention paid to them yet: What

is an alternative? Is it reasonable to simply move from a—if it is

a capital investment or infrastructure issue at Bluegrass, is it oversimplifying matters to say that these chemicals could be moved to

a like facility with a similar destruction capability and have them

neutralized there?

Dr. KLEIN. We are certainly aware of a law that says we cannot

move them. So if we do move materials, then we certainly will need

to come back to Congress to make some modifications.

In the case of Bluegrass, Bluegrass is a challenge because it has

about 1.7 percent of the stockpile, but it has a lot of variety. And

so what we want to look at is how can we best get rid of that small

but complicated mixture in the best way.

32

We do want to look at the cost of moving them to another facility

as one of our decision-choices.

So we wanted to look at all options.

Mr. DAVIS. Well, I think if it is going to save the taxpayers a lot

of money and it gets that stuff out of our region, that would be acceptable, based on the safety and security that could be provided.

And if it is a matter of—without an infrastructure, I would encourage you to look at alternatives that could take an advantage

of an economy of scale, and if it requires a regulatory or a legal

amendment, then I am sure we would be glad to discuss that.

But back to the original point: Not only is this a practical matter

from a standpoint of science and engineering and effective budgeting, but I am very concerned about being able to clearly and consistently communicate one message from the Congress and from

your agencies to our people who have a wide variety of perceptions

about this.

I do not want fear to reign. I would like it to be a true bipartisan

win for your agencies, for the government, where we could set an

expectation, clearly have it met on time, on budget and move from

there.

I yield back.

Dr. KLEIN. One of the challenges that we have, if you look at just

the cost alone and you look at the cost at the last two sites, Pueblo

and Bluegrass, and you look at the cost that it takes per ton of that

material, it is high, because you have a smaller volume of material,

but in the case of Bluegrass, a lot of complicated devices.

Mr. DAVIS. Thank you.

Mr. SAXTON. Mr. Langevin.

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And, gentlemen, thank you for your testimony today.

If I could, I would like to just follow up on the line of questioning

that Mr. Andrews had raised with respect to the National Academy

of Sciences report, which cited that your destruction technique that

you have chosen ranks eighth out of eight. You said that you are

not familiar with that ranking or that report, if I am understanding that correctly.

So my question is: If that is true, then why are not you familiar

with that report and that ranking?

Second, then what criteria and techniques did you compare—the

kind of technique that you chose, what did you compare that

against? And where does the technique that you have chosen,

where does your technique fall in that ranking?

Dr. KLEIN. I think Mr. Parker can probably answer the technical

decisions.

But in terms of the technique that was selected, we essentially

have two fundamental choices: incineration or we can have a neutralization technique. I believe that both are safe, both have proven

technologies.

We do have more experience on the incineration plants in terms

of their operational characteristics.

The National Academy of Sciences has basically responded that

both techniques are appropriate.

And I am just not familiar with this particular ranking that you

are referring to. Mike might have some information.

33

Mr. PARKER. I believe the report that was referenced addressed

treating what we call secondary waste, and that is the hydrolysis

product, versus the primary agent. The National Research Council

(NRC) found the, as Dr. Klein summarized, the treatment either by

incineration or neutralization to be equally effective for the purposes of destroying the primary agent.

There are a variety of techniques available to treat the secondary

waste. They were ranked—the bio treatment of the VX product is

more difficult because the phosphonate does not bio-treat as well.

Therefore that is why DuPont chose to supplement their bio treatment with a chemical pre-treatment—actually two chemical pretreatments—before doing the bio treatment.

The end point effectiveness is still attained. It is met——

Mr. LANGEVIN. So where does that rank in terms of its effectiveness?

Mr. PARKER. I think if the NRC——

Mr. LANGEVIN. It sounds like to me that you just chose a technique and you went ahead and picked it because it works, but it

may not necessarily be the best. I am trying to get to where does

it fall in the ranking in comparison to other techniques?

Mr. PARKER. Well, I think it is a mistake to take the final treatment out of context of the broader issues that were address at the

point of 9/11, where we had to take a step back and look at what

we could do to accelerate the disposal of chemical weapons to get

that threat out of communities. And one of those techniques was

on-site primary treatment of agent followed by fully permitted

treatment facilities in the commercial sector. And that is a considerably faster way of doing business than building on-site 100 percent capabilities.

And in the context of ‘‘best,’’ I believe to the American public, of

removing the risk, that that is best.

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you for that, but could you answer my

question: Where does it rank?

Mr. PARKER. I do not think we compared it in that manner. And

the NRC comparison——

Mr. LANGEVIN. So you looked at nothing else. You chose that

technique, for whatever reason, and you compared it to nothing.

Mr. PARKER. I did not say that.

We looked at, through our prime contractor, the Parsons company, a number of commercial-permitted facilities: incinerators,

deep-well injection, bio treatment and additional chemical treatment. Those were looked at, and proposals were solicited from

those industries, and we made a judgment that bio treatment was

a viable technique—chemical plus bio treatment was a viable technique, it was cost effective, and it met the time lines we were looking for.

Mr. LANGEVIN. What I am hearing, then, is that you have no

idea where this ranks. It is a technique that works, but it could the

best or it could be the worst, you have no idea.

Mr. PARKER. I believe I said within what the commercial industry proposed in permitted facilities, this was, we found, to be the

best-value technique.

Mr. LANGEVIN. Where does it rank in the National Academy of

Sciences list, then?

34

Mr. PARKER. The particular procedure that is being applied at

DuPont, the heavy chemical treatment followed by bio treatment,

is something that evolved after the National Academy did their

preliminary work. So I believe it would be a very poor fit for me

to have to jam in to what the NRC did what the current state of

DuPont’s technology is.

Mr. LANGEVIN. Mr. Parker, your answer disturbs me. And I

would ask that you respond to the committee, respond to my question in writing a more detailed answer as to where this falls in the

ranking in comparison to techniques that you have looked at.

And I encourage you also to review the National Academy of

Sciences report so that you are more informed. Because that answer you gave me is unacceptable.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SAXTON. Thank you.

Mr. Chandler.

Mr. CHANDLER. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for the invitation today. I appreciate that. I appreciate the opportunity to discuss this issue.

Gentlemen, thank you for being here today.

I must tell you, though, that I come here with some frustration.

I know that many of you are frustrated as well. But I can assure

you that the people that I represent in Central Kentucky are extremely frustrated.

As you may know—well, I am sure you know, we have been

wrangling over this issue at the Bluegrass Army Depot for in excess of 20 years. I suspect that no one on this panel has been dealing with this issue for all 20-plus years. And I have only been in

Congress for one year, but I have been dealing with this issue off

and on, or been familiar with it, as a citizen of Central Kentucky

for all of that time.

It is a very, very critical issue in our area.

During those years, those 20-plus years, we have seen analysis

after analysis done by the Department of the Army, often reviewed

and concurred with by the National Research Council. These analyses have unequivocally determined that to continue to store chemical weapons in communities is indeed the highest-risk option. We

know that.

Now, specifically, Bluegrass in Kentucky has the most dangerous

weapons and agents in the entire U.S. arsenal. That is my understanding.

For example, the M55 GB rockets that are stored there have

been identified as having the highest risk of any in the entire

stockpile. Yet in the latest schedule provided to members on January 18, 2005, the two storage sites of Pueblo, Colorado, and Bluegrass in Kentucky are designed ‘‘caretaker status’’ between the

years of 2005 and 2010, with no significant action in those years

taken toward disposal.

Additionally, according to an April 2002 Army study, the Bluegrass storage site will have the highest terrorism risk of all of the

stockpiles beginning in 2007. Yet according to the most recent

schedule, Bluegrass does not even begin the destruction of these

weapons until 2017 or 2018.

35

Now, Dr. Klein or Mr. Wakefield or whoever would like to tackle

this question, how do I—or better yet, how do you all explain to

my constituents that such established risks that exist, both of storage and potentially of terrorism, why those risks should take a

backseat to other department funding priorities?

Dr. KLEIN. Well, I think when we go through and do funding priorities, getting rid of our chemical weapons is very high on the list.

I can tell you that Mr. Bolton and I spent a lot of time dealing with

the safe destruction of the chemical weapons.

What we will do in April of 2005, when we have alternatives before us, we hope to make some decisions on the path forward, and

we would like to do that as expeditiously as we can. So we will not

be waiting until the 2017 to make a decision. We will be working

with our budget officials to put the proper funds to those, both

Pueblo and Bluegrass plants, once we evaluate some alternatives

later this month.

You know, during 2005 we will be making some decisions to

move both these facilities forward. So these are not sites that we

are just going to sit on.

I think some of the data you may be referring to is the artificial

result of the way that DOD does their five-year budgeting——

Mr. CHANDLER. So that is inaccurate? The time line that I have

been given is inaccurate and you intend to actually bring it forward

from that time line?

Dr. KLEIN. My goal is to bring it forward from that time line.

As I often tell people, some of our budgeting processes are accurate but incorrect.

Mr. CHANDLER. Okay, I will think about that.

Dr. KLEIN. It is part of the way we have to do our budgets within

the fiscal constraints that we do.

But I can assure that no one in the department, no one in the

Army wants to sit on these weapons any longer than we have to.

Mr. CHANDLER. Well, the Department of Defense, as you well

know, has frozen several hundred million dollars, I think about

$300 million, give or take, for these two projects: Pueblo and Bluegrass. I assume you are waiting to make a decision to utilize that

money. I hope that is the case. There is no plan to divert that

money to another project, is there?

Dr. KLEIN. We will be making those plans—hopefully we will get

those alternatives at the end of this month, and then we will be

making plans and moving forward.

Mr. CHANDLER. Will that money be diverted to other projects?

Dr. KLEIN. The short answer is in the——

Mr. CHANDLER. ‘‘No’’ I hope is the short answer. [Laughter.]

Dr. KLEIN. The short answer is, I hope not.

Mike Wynne made the decision, within the fiscal constraints,

that we will concentrate on the operating plants, but that does

mean that we are going to sit on these plants and not take action

until 2017.

Mr. WAKEFIELD. Mr. Chandler, it is necessary when we develop

the budget, as Dr. Klein points out, where we have to put the cost

and a schedule together, this schedule represents what the current

budget was. But as Dr. Klein points out, we bring these analyses

forward, we seek the approval of leadership of the department,

36

these schedules will change commensurate with budgets in their

future.

Mr. CHANDLER. Change in a favorable manner toward getting

this done more quickly, you believe?

Mr. WAKEFIELD. Indeed, as Dr. Klein had indicated, yes.

Mr. CHANDLER. I would like to just for a second pursue this issue

of transportation.

I think I understood, in response to Congressman Davis’s questions, that transportation is an option that you are in fact considering? Is that true?

Dr. KLEIN. We want to look at what the cost and schedule would

be for transportation. Whether we implement——

Mr. CHANDLER. So the answer is yes, you are considering that or

you would not look at it, I would assume.

Dr. KLEIN. We are looking at all options, and then once we get

the information, we will evaluate that and make a recommendation.

Mr. CHANDLER. You would not be looking at an option that you

are not considering, though, I would assume.

Dr. KLEIN. That is correct.

Mr. CHANDLER. So the answer is yes, you are considering transporting these materials if your study determines that that is the

preferable option?

Dr. KLEIN. If the results indicate that that is preferable—and

preferable would mean cost, schedule, safety and all of those activities—we will obviously be involved in a lot of discussions, and

hopefully that would be implemented.

Mr. CHANDLER. Well, I can assure you—that is a very mild way

of putting it, ‘‘a lot of discussions’’—the agitation will be something

that—well, you will be surprised I think at the amount of agitation

that you will see.

Dr. KLEIN. My background is in the nuclear field and the transportation of spent nuclear fuel——

Mr. CHANDLER. Well, you will probably see a nuclear response

from the citizens of our district if that effort is attempted. [Laughter.]

I just want you to understand that we believe—myself, as the

representative of the people of Central Kentucky, and contrary I

think actually to what Mr. Davis said, if I understood him correctly—transportation is not an option to us, just very simply.

Dr. KLEIN. Got it.

Mr. CHANDLER. Thank you, sir.

Mr. SAXTON. Mr. Salazar, please.

Mr. SALAZAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate you inviting us to your committee today.

I really appreciate Dr. Klein and Mr. Wakefield being out in

Pueblo to visit with the folks at Pueblo.

I think our Congressman Hefley put it quite clearly, that it is important for us that represent the public to be able know what is

coming down the pike before things are made public.

And I reiterate what Congressman Chandler stated about the

possibility of moving these weapons across state lines. I think in

Colorado, as you know, it is very difficult to get the environmental

37

community and local communities involved to be able to come together and agree on a process.

I am hearing you say that now other alternatives, such as incineration, might even be considered in Pueblo. Is that correct?

Dr. KLEIN. No. I do not believe of the options that we are looking

at includes incineration in Pueblo.

Mr. SALAZAR. But the possibility of transporting these weapons

across state lines to another facility. Correct?

Dr. KLEIN. We will look at the cost to do that, yes.

Mr. SALAZAR. Just for the record I would like to clarify: I believe

that what you stated was that the cost is now being projected at

$2.6 billion for the facility in Pueblo. This was based on a project

that was actually supposed to be an accelerated type of project

which had three line facilities, I believe.

Would you be willing to say right now that if the cost would come

down to $1.6 billion for a down-scaled project that you would okay

that?

Dr. KLEIN. The probability that if—and in fact we have talked

to some of the contractors—that if the cost comes down to $1.6 billion, which was the cost we certified to Congress, I believe that

that would be the favored alternative.

Mr. SALAZAR. Okay.

Mr. Klein, also I think I hear what everyone here is saying is

that it is important for all of us Congressmen to know ahead of

time what is coming down the pike. You are telling us that you will

be making a decision basically in April, the latter part of April, I

believe?

Dr. KLEIN. We should be getting the information the end of April

and make the decision as soon as we can. And we will make sure

we notify you so you do not read it in the paper.

Mr. SALAZAR. Thank you.

Mr. WAKEFIELD. Mr. Salazar, if I may interject here, one of the

things that we have instituted with your staff and others is, we do

indeed have monthly meetings with all of your staff to keep them

informed. We bring to them the information that is forthcoming out

of the department early on. We do this each and every month. We

package that, provide them a briefing.

I would tell you the recent decision of Mr. Wynne was briefed to

them just the other day, prior to its even release in a public manner, so that they had a heads-up information on this.

So we are making every effort to try to keep you as well informed

as we possibly can.

Mr. SALAZAR. Well, I do appreciate that.

And I just have one final comment.

I think that what I am hearing from most of you is that once you

initiate a project, like the project that you did in Aberdeen, you

found out that you were actually more efficient than what you

thought, and you were able to reach the time lines ahead of schedule, or actually destructed the weapons ahead of schedule. Correct?

Dr. KLEIN. No, it was a year later than we expected.

Mr. SALAZAR. Oh, it was a year later?

Dr. KLEIN. Yes.

Mr. SALAZAR. Okay, thank you very much.

38

Mr. SAXTON. Well, I am sure you will be happy to know, or unhappy—you will be disappointed that we do not have more members here. [Laughter.]

Thank you for being here. We appreciate it very much.

We have identified a number of unanswered questions, in particular regarding Newport, Pueblo and Bluegrass, issues that have

to do with processes, time, costs, et cetera. So we will be sending

you some additional questions, if that is permissible, for the record.

And we look forward to answers to those questions, as this is an

important process from many perspectives. It is important to the

country, it is important to the communities in which your facilities

are located or where your activities take place, and of course it is

important from a budgetary point of view.

So we thank you for your cooperation and for being here today.

And we look forward to working with you as we move forward together.

Thank you.

[Whereupon, at 3:06 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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