U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

68–286 CC WASHINGTON : 2000

DEVELOPMENTS IN THE BALKANS

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

APRIL 11 AND JULY 19, 2000

Serial No. 106–169

Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/international—relations

(II)

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York, Chairman

WILLIAM F. GOODLING, Pennsylvania

JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa

HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois

DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey

DAN BURTON, Indiana

ELTON GALLEGLY, California

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida

CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina

DANA ROHRABACHER, California

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California

PETER T. KING, New York

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio

MARSHALL ‘‘MARK’’ SANFORD, South

Carolina

MATT SALMON, Arizona

AMO HOUGHTON, New York

TOM CAMPBELL, California

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York

KEVIN BRADY, Texas

RICHARD BURR, North Carolina

PAUL E. GILLMOR, Ohio

GEORGE RADANOVICH, California

JOHN COOKSEY, Louisiana

THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado

SAM GEJDENSON, Connecticut

TOM LANTOS, California

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American

Samoa

MATTHEW G. MARTINEZ, California

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey

SHERROD BROWN, Ohio

CYNTHIA A. MCKINNEY, Georgia

ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida

PAT DANNER, Missouri

EARL F. HILLIARD, Alabama

BRAD SHERMAN, California

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida

STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey

JIM DAVIS, Florida

EARL POMEROY, North Dakota

WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York

BARBARA LEE, California

JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York

JOSEPH M. HOEFFEL, Pennsylvania

RICHARD J. GARON, Chief of Staff

KATHLEEN BERTELSEN MOAZED, Democratic Chief of Staff

JOHN HERZBERG, Professional Staff Member and Counsel

JILL N. QUINN, Staff Associate

NICOLLE A. SESTRIC, Staff Associate

(III)

C O N T E N T S

WITNESSES

Page

TUESDAY, APRIL 11, 2000

Kosovo:

The Honorable James W. Pardew, Principal Deputy Special Advisor to the

President and Secretary of State for Kosovo and Dayton Implementation,

U.S. Department of State .................................................................................... 3

James W. Swigert, Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs and

Deputy Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State for Dayton

and Kosovo Implementation, U.S. Department of State ................................... 6

The Honorable Joseph J. DioGuardi, Volunteer President, The Albanian

American Civic League ........................................................................................ 25

Linda Dana, Institutional Contractor in Kosovo, International Organization

for Migration ......................................................................................................... 29

Bajram Rexhepi, M.D. Chairman of the Commune Mitrovice ............................. 31

Muhamet Mustafa, President, Reinvest Institute for Development Research ... 33

Ilir Zherka, Executive Director, National Albanian American Council .............. 35

WEDNESDAY, JULY 19, 2000

Crime and Corruption in Bosnia:

Harold J. Johnson, Associate Director, International Relations and Trade

Issues, National Security and International Affairs Division, U.S. General

Accounting Office accompanied by James Shafer, Assistant Director, International Relations and Trade Issues, National Security and International

Affairs Division, U.S. General Accounting Office .............................................. 45

David Bruno, Evaluator in Charge, U.S. General Accounting Office .................. 51

The Honorable James W. Pardew, Principal Deputy Special Advisor to the

President and Secretary of State for Democracy in the Balkans, U.S. Department of State ................................................................................................. 58

APPENDIX

TUESDAY, APRIL 11, 2000

Prepared statements:

The Honorable Benjamin A. Gilman, a Representative in Congress from New

York and Chairman, Committee on International Relations ........................... 68

Ambassador James W. Pardew ............................................................................... 71

James W. Swigert .................................................................................................... 74

The Honorable Joseph J. DioGuardi ...................................................................... 77

Linda Dana ............................................................................................................... 92

Dr. Barjam Rexhepi ................................................................................................. 95

Muhamet Mustafa ................................................................................................... 100

Ilir Zherka ................................................................................................................ 105

Page

IV

WEDNESDAY, JULY 19, 2000

Prepared statements:

The Honorable Benjamin A. Gilman, a Representative in Congress from New

York and Chairman, Committee on International Relations ........................... 107

Harold J. Johnson .................................................................................................... 110

Ambassador James W. Pardew ............................................................................... 130

Additional material for the record:

Statement of Esad Stavileci, Ph.D., Professor of Law, University of Prishtina,

Kosovo, and University of Tetova, Macedonia ................................................... 139

Chart from Dr. Rexhepi on the structural nature of the population before

the war .................................................................................................................. 143

Letter from Paul R. Williams, Washington College of Law, American University, commenting on the U.S. General Accounting Office report entitled

‘‘Bosnia Peace Operation: Crime and Corruption Impedes the Success of

the Dayton Peace Agreement’’ ............................................................................ 146

Report on USAID Anti-Corruption Efforts in Bosnia-Herzegovina ..................... 151

(1)

DEVELOPMENTS IN THE BALKANS: KOSOVO

TUESDAY, APRIL 11, 2000

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,

Washington, DC.

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:05 p.m. in room

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Benjamin A. Gilman

(Chairman of the Committee) presiding.

Chairman GILMAN. The Committee will come to order. We will

be joined by our Members shortly, as many of them can get away

from their other committees.

Today’s hearing is the first opportunity this year for Members of

our International Relations Committee to review the differences

and the effectiveness of our policy in Kosovo with Administration

officials. In view of last year’s NATO strikes against Serbia, the

current commitment of some 7,000 United States troops and the

expenditure of approximately $2 billion of U.S. taxpayers’ funds

since last June to aid Kosovo, I can think of few areas of greater

importance to our Nation’s foreign policy.

Nevertheless, reports indicate that things are not progressing

smoothly in Kosovo. The perception is we have won the war but we

are losing the peace. Recent visits by Members of the House and

our staff have revealed that achieving enduring peace and stability

will be much more difficult and costly than we did in winning the

air war over Serbia. Although we can and should be rightfully

proud of that achievement and other significant contributions of

our own men and women of our Armed Forces, we need also to be

realistic with regard to the nature of the commitment that our own

Nation has now entered into in yet another part of the Balkans.

Continuing ethnic violence plagues Kosovo. Reprisal attacks

against the Serbs and other minorities have received much attention in the press, as has the situation in the divided town of

Mitrovice where thousands of Albanian residents have not been

able to return to their homes in the Serb-controlled part of that

town. Difficulties in reestablishing public services such as water,

sanitation, electricity and medical care have undermined the morale of the long-suffering Kosovar people. These difficulties are attributable to the failure of international donors in Europe to fulfill

their pledges in a timely fashion.

The economy of Kosovo is also stagnant, prolonging unemployment among the large numbers of young people who, with no real

hope for a better future, could turn to crime and violence.

The recent outbreak of violence and instability in Serbia, the

heavily Albanian populated region just over the Kosovo boundary

2

and near our own forces, has also given rise to concern for the safety of our own troops. Will the conflict between Albanians and Serbs

resume? Could our troops be brought into an armed confrontation

with Serb forces in the next few weeks? These are serious questions that I hope we can try to answer this afternoon.

We will hear from several witnesses, including some from Kosovo

who I hope will enlighten us about the challenges to bringing about

a lasting peace in Kosovo.

Before turning to our first panel of witnesses, I would like to emphasize that although our hearing today is focused on Kosovo, we

are also looking closely at Montenegro, where the administration or

democratically elected President Djukanovic is being undermined

by forces loyal to Serbian dictator Slobodan Milosevic. The crisis in

Montenegro has the potential of threatening everything we are trying to accomplish in Montenegro.

The possibility of overthrow of President Djukanovic and the

threat of serious violence instigated by Milosevic in Montenegro are

matters of particular concern. I invite our witnesses to address that

problem as well as the events in Kosovo itself.

Our first panel will be Ambassador James Pardew and Mr.

James Swigert for the Department of State.

Ambassador Pardew has appeared before this Committee both in

open public sessions and for private briefings on a number of occasions, for which we are grateful. He served in both of our Departments of Defense and State and brings a long-term expertise in

Balkan affairs to our hearing this afternoon.

Mr. Swigert has also been involved in Yugoslav affairs for a

number of years. He served in several capacities in the Bureau of

European Affairs, actually wearing two hats, one as Deputy Adviser to the President and Secretary of State and one as Deputy

Assistant of State for European Affairs.

Let me note that it is regrettable that our request for an Administration witness on this important issue took so long to fulfill,

given this Committee’s responsibility for oversight of our Nation’s

foreign policy.

And I now ask if our Ranking Committee Member, Mr. Gejdenson from Connecticut, has an opening statement.

Mr. GEJDENSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be very brief.

I just want to say that I think you know we are in a very critical

stage here obviously in the sense that, unlike during the Cold War

when we undertook an engagement, the competitive nature and our

fear of Soviet expansion kept the United States focused and engaged, and so for over half a century we could keep and continue

to keep troops in Germany. For decades we could keep them in

South Korea, and there was generally a bipartisan consensus in

that manner.

Today, it is going to be much more difficult. The United States

and its citizens feel no great threat from any single power. As individuals who are presenting America’s policies, it is particularly important that you lay out for the Congress and the American people

the facts that indicate constantly why we are there, the benefits of

being there, the dangers of being there, the cost of being there and

also the cost of not being there.

3

So what you do here is terribly important because it is much

harder today than in the time of the Soviet empire to keep Americans focused and to keep Congress from giving you more headaches

than you are getting in the field.

Thank you very much.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Gejdenson.

Mr. Bereuter.

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding these

hearings.

In the middle of February, I took a delegation of about 12 Members into Kosovo. These were Members who participate in the

NATO Parliamentary Assembly, and who have been following with

considerable interest what happens in the former Yugoslavia. We

came away uniformly depressed by what we saw in Kosovo. Things

are not going well. They are going very badly there in many respects.

The commitments of international police are not being met by

the Europeans and others. Soldiers are doing things they are not

supposed to do in order to fill that gap. The violence against Serbian ethnics in Kosovo continues unabated. If we aren’t protecting

the Serbian ethnics 24 hours a day, they are killed. We were trying

to give the one Serbian Kosovar woman, left in the community of

some 3,000 or 4,000, 24-hour protection, but somebody got through

and slit her throat.

Across the border in Serbia, the reverse is happening—ethnic violence. It would appear, in fact, the KLA is condoning it in Kosovo.

Whether or not the KLA changes its name and its uniforms, it is

still not, of course, satisfied with autonomy. It never has been.

There is no rule of law.

Things are very bad and getting worse in Kosovo. We are in a

situation where it appears that, despite the best efforts of the men

and women we have serving in the armed services and many very

excellent military units from other NATO and non-NATO countries

side by side with us, we are simply in an unattainable,

unachievable kind of task in Kosovo. I think the situation is a very,

very serious problem that the American people need to be made

aware of. They need to know that things are going from bad to

worse.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Bereuter.

Any other Members seeking recognition? If not, we will now proceed with our witnesses.

Ambassador Pardew, please proceed.

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JAMES W. PARDEW, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY SPECIAL ADVISOR TO THE PRESIDENT AND

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR KOSOVO AND DAYTON IMPLEMENTATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. PARDEW. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks again for this

opportunity to update the Committee on the situation in Kosovo.

I wish to submit a formal statement for the record which reviews

our interests and objectives in Kosovo, areas of progress in civil administration and reconstruction, current challenges and what we

4

are doing to overcome those challenges and the burden sharing of

the international effort.

With your permission, I will submit a longer briefing for the

record.

Chairman GILMAN. Without objection, your full statement will be

made part of the record.

Mr. PARDEW. I would like to briefly summarize the formal statement, after which I will be followed by Deputy Assistant Secretary

Swigert, who will update the Committee on Montenegro.

Our continuing engagement in Kosovo relates directly to our national security interests. We know from history that a stable Europe is vital to American security and that Europe is not stable if

its southeastern corner is in turmoil. In the past 4 years, the

United States and our allies have successfully contained, then subdued, conflicts in Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo as the former Yugoslavia broke apart. But the area’s stability remains at risk from the

Milosevic regime and the fragility of States recovering from conflict. International military forces create a secure environment in

Kosovo. However, long-term peace and stability in the region requires robust civilian, political, economic and reconstruction programs backed by sufficient resources to make a difference.

Our immediate civil implementation objectives are two. The first

is to complete the establishment of an interim administration

under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy.

The second is to develop local provisional democratic, self-governing institutions to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal

life for all inhabitants of Kosovo.

One year ago, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was engaged in an intensive air campaign against the security forces of

Slobodan Milosevic. Their purpose was to halt the brutal repression

of the Serbian regime against the people of Kosovo and restore

order in the region. In 78 days, the air campaign, supplemented by

aggressive diplomacy, succeeded in driving Milosevic’s forces from

Kosovo. The military victory set the stage for the deployment to

Kosovo of allied security forces and an international civilian administration. The NATO-led Kosovo force, or KFOR, and the U.N. Mission in Kosovo, UNMIK, remain the heart of the international effort in Kosovo today.

All of us would welcome faster progress for civil implementation

in Kosovo—but remember the situation less than 1 year ago. The

conditions encountered by UNMIK as it deployed and began to organize in Kosovo were desperate. Over 1 million people were dislocated and traumatized by war. There was no economy; there was

no government; there was major destruction, including 120,000

homes damaged or destroyed. The civil infrastructure was either

destroyed or neglected, and all of this was overlaid by a Communist legacy.

Today, the situation on the ground in Kosovo is dramatically better and continues to improve gradually day by day. More than a

million refugees and internally displaced persons have returned to

their homes. The KLA has demilitarized, a growing international

police presence has been established, and training for local police

is well under way. Humanitarian agencies have met basic shelter,

5

food and medical requirements and pulled the population through

the winter.

Recently, we have made progress in restoring order in Mitrovice,

increasing civilian police deployments, increasing Kosovo Police

Service training, preparing the groundwork for municipal elections

later this year, and securing Serb participation in UNMIK governing structures. Further, public and independent media are regaining their voices.

UNMIK and KFOR continue to face tough challenges, but they

are not insurmountable. I would like to quickly run through programs that address these issues.

First, the strategic area of northern Kosovo around the city of

Mitrovice. KFOR and UNMIK have developed a comprehensive

strategy and have begun to implement that strategy. The United

Nations has appointed a strong civil administrator for the region

in American William Nash. The number of international civilian

police is still short, but the United Nations has made progress in

CIVPOL deployments recently with 2,757 regular police in-country—513 of those are Americans—out of an authorized 3,593. The

United Nations has also begun to fill the 1,100 positions for special

police units to help with crowd control.

In the area of local police, there are currently 451 Kosovo police

in classroom training and 341 in the field. The police school will

expand its capacity to 700 Kosovar students, up from 500 today, to

reach the goal of graduating 3,600 police officers by February of

next year.

The Kosovo Protection Corps [KPC], now has a total of 4,500

KPC candidates who have been selected for membership. And the

International Organization for Migration has begun training for

KPC field members in each of the six regional task organizations.

KFOR and UNMIK have established conditions with the KPC for

disciplining those who violate the law or deviate from established

norms for that organization.

Last, in the area of local government, last week moderate Kosovo

Serb leaders announced they would participate in UNMIK-sponsored governing structures, particularly the Interim Administrative

Council and Kosovo Transition Council.

We plan for local municipal elections later this year. Civil registration is to begin in April and to be completed by July in time

for these elections to be held this fall.

The judicial system is also moving forward. UNMIK has sworn

in 289 Kosovar judges and 42 prosecutors. Criminal trials have

been recently completed in district courts in Prishtina, Prizren, Pec

and Gnjilane; and to supplement these local judges UNMIK is assembling international judges for particularly sensitive areas such

as Mitrovice.

With some of our key allies, we are developing a strategy to support the UNMIK international police effort to counter organized

crime and to take effective action in that area.

And, finally, in the media sector, a variety of newspapers and

magazines have appeared in kiosks all over the major towns, and

public television and a number of radio stations are on the air, beginning to return the Albanian voice to the area.

6

On burden sharing, Mr. Chairman, the Europeans must lead the

international effort in Kosovo and bear the lion’s share of the assistance burden. Europe accepts this responsibility. Out of 45,000

KFOR troops in Kosovo, European Nations and Canada provide 72

percent of the forces. The U.S. contribution of troops comprises

about 13 percent of the total.

In terms of civil implementation, the current total for all donors in 2000 is just over $1.2 billion. The U.S. share of $168 million is

about 13.9 percent of the fiscal year 2000 spending on Kosovo revitalization. Our share of humanitarian assistance has been about 20

percent. Our cost for U.N. peacekeeping through UNMIK has been

at the 25 percent level mandated by U.S. law; and costs for the

U.S. share of peace activities through the Organization of Security

and Cooperation in Europe [OSCE] have ranged from 10 to 16 percent.

Mr. Chairman, the Administration does not support initiatives in

the Congress to place an arbitrary limit on U.S. spending for international efforts in Kosovo and the rest of southeast Europe. We believe that such legislation would be counterproductive. As Secretary Albright wrote in a recent New York Times op-ed piece, the

day may come when a Kosovo-scale operation may be managed

without the help of the United States, but it has not come yet. Proposals in the Congress to place a legal cap on U.S. expenditures

would decrease our flexibility and harm, not help, our partnership

with Europe in responding to future events.

Such limits do not take into account the European contributions

in our hemisphere. For example, the Europeans provided more

than 60 percent of the bilateral aid pledged in the wake of Hurricane Mitch, assumed 33 percent of the cost of establishing peace

in El Salvador, and 34 percent in Guatemala.

I have just returned from Kosovo, and I can tell you that the people there have emerged from a difficult winter and are preparing

to build a new future. Prishtina and the countryside are alive with

activity. These are tough and enduring people and they are grateful for our help, but they are not sitting back and waiting for us

to rebuild their homes and lives. They need some tools and they

need guidance from us to get started, but they are eager to get on

with the job.

I hope this gives you a clear idea of where we stand in Kosovo

right now, and I will be happy to go into more detail in the question and answer session.

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Pardew appears in the

appendix.]

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you.

We now turn to Deputy Assistant Secretary Jim Swigert.

STATEMENT OF JAMES W. SWIGERT, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR EUROPEAN AFFAIRS AND DEPUTY SPECIAL

ADVISOR TO THE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY OF STATE

FOR DAYTON AND KOSOVO IMPLEMENTATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. SWIGERT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to

update the Committee on Montenegro. I would like to briefly describe the current situation, outline our strategy for advancing U.S.

7

interests and update you on our assistance efforts. I have prepared

a written statement for the record which, with your permission, I

would submit and then just give a brief oral summary.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you. Without objection, your full statement is made a part of record. Please proceed.

Mr. SWIGERT. The prudent and forward-looking policies of the

democratically elected government of President Djukanovic have

made Montenegro a positive factor in the southeast European region. Montenegro opposed ethnic cleansing and supported a peaceful settlement in Kosovo. Montenegro pledged support for the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and has provided shelter and assistance to refugees and internally displaced

persons, no matter what their ethnic origin. The Djukanovic government has also increased efforts to counter smuggling and organized crime in the region and recently improved its police cooperation with Italy.

The Administration shares the concern of many Members of Congress about Milosevic regime’s efforts to pressure the democratic

reform government of President Djukanovic. The potential for aggression or serious violence provoked by Belgrade is real. An outbreak of violence in Montenegro could set back reform efforts

throughout the region, produce more suffering and more refugees,

and seriously jeopardize U.S. interests in the region. At the same

time, Milosevic knows that such action would pose serious risks for

his own regime.

Consequently, U.S. policy is focused on preventing a new Balkan

conflict from erupting and on providing the necessary assistance to

ensure Montenegro can continue to develop democracy in a market

economy, and continue its positive force in the region.

We have made strengthening the Djukanovic government a priority—as something good in itself—but also as a step that decreases the chances of conflict by raising the cost to Milosevic of

any aggression against a strong and popular leader. Milosevic is

fully aware of the priority that we place on the security of the region and of Western capabilities to respond to any destabilizing actions.

Administration officials, including Secretary Albright, have reiterated over the last year our strong interest in the security of the

region, including Montenegro; and NATO leaders have made clear

the alliance is following developments there closely.

The fundamental problem for Montenegro, as for its neighbors,

remains the lack of democracy in Serbia and the Milosevic regime.

As part of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia or the FRY, Montenegro is highly vulnerable to pressure from Milosevic, who is fundamentally hostile to the Djukanovic government and its democratic reform program. Promoting democracy in Belgrade is therefore a priority for the Administration, also, as part of its Montenegro policy. We believe that a democratic Serbia would enable the

two republics to found a new constructive partnership.

During this winter, Montenegro endured additional pressures

from Milosevic, including temporary closure of Montenegro’s airports by Belgrade and blockade of Montenegro’s trade with Serbia,

which is ongoing.

8

We have worked closely with the Djukanovic government to try

to mitigate these pressures. While tensions remain, the situation is

calmer now than a few weeks ago. Rather than falling into

Milosevic’s trap of confrontation, the Montenegrin government is

working with its Yugoslav army contacts to prevent security incidents and tensions from escalating. This prudent approach denies

Milosevic and his supporters a pretext for violence or intervention.

Still, tensions could quickly rise again. The situation is fragile.

Therefore, it is essential we maintain our support for the

Djukanovic government.

We will continue to demonstrate our political backing by maintaining regular and high-level contacts with President Djukanovic

and his government. President Djukanovic met twice with President Clinton this past year, Secretary Albright met with President

Djukanovic last month, and we are in daily contact with his government.

An essential element to our strategy is to back up this political

support with concrete economic assistance. After Montenegro took

steps last fall to protect itself from hyper-inflation exported by Belgrade and made the Deutsche Mark a legal currency, we sent economic advisers to Montenegro to help implement critical economic

reforms. In this fiscal year 2000 we are providing $26 million in

SEED and $11 million in ESF economic support funds, as well as

humanitarian and food aid to ease the pain of Belgrade’s embargo

against Montenegro; and last month we signed an OPIC agreement

with Montenegro to help stimulate private sector investment there.

However, we expect our monetary assistance for fiscal year 2000

will not suffice, given that Montenegro’s needs have risen due to

Belgrade’s trade embargo. Thus, we have requested an additional $34 million in SEED funding from the Congress in this fiscal year;

and we appreciate the House’s inclusion of this request in the supplemental bill passed on March 30 and hope the Senate will support it.

Western assistance serves four valuable purposes. First, it helps

to mitigate the destabilizing effects of Belgrade’s economic sanctions against Montenegro. Second, it allows President Djukanovic

to show that his policies deliver concrete results to the people of

Montenegro. Third, it reduces pressure from pro-independence

groups within Montenegro on Djukanovic to take risky steps. And,

fourth, it concretely demonstrates to Milosevic our strong interest

in Montenegro and to the Serbian people that our differences are

with Milosevic and his policies, not with Serbs or Montenegrins.

U.S. leadership and resources are essential, but we cannot meet

all of Montenegro’s needs alone nor should we do. Europe also has

a strong interest in the success of Montenegro’s reforms and an essential role to play, and the Administration has been working intensively at senior levels to encourage the European Union and

others to deliver greater resources to Montenegro and to speed the

delivery of those resources. The response has been encouraging recently.

This year, the European Commission doubled EU assistance to

Montenegro for 2000 from 10 to 20 million euros. The European

Council has directed the European Investment Bank to find ways

to finance projects in Montenegro, and this could be very signifiVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:46 Jan 08, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00012 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 68286.TXT HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1
9

cant. Last month, Stability Pact donors pledged funds toward a list

of ‘‘Quick Start’’ infrastructure projects, which included $15 million

of infrastructure projects in Montenegro; and EU members are

moving to boost their bilateral assistance as well. Germany recently granted 40 million Deutsche Marks in investment credits,

and the Netherlands has established a program of its own.

We will keep working with our European partners to get Montenegro the assistance it urgently needs.

In closing, let me thank you for the chance to discuss the situation in Montenegro and our policy. We consider the Djukanovic

government’s reform program both a model and a stimulus for democratization across the FRY. Montenegro is now moving down a

road toward creating prosperity in cooperation with the international community that the people of Serbia could also travel

were there democratic government in Serbia.

We appreciate the strong support of this Committee and other

Members of Congress both for Montenegro and for the Administration’s efforts to help the government of Montenegro remain a model

for democratization.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Swigert appears in the appendix.]

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you very much, Assistant Secretary

Swigert and Ambassador Pardew, for your testimony which helps

us have a better insight on what is going on in that part of the

world. Just a few questions, and then I will turn to my colleagues.

There have been a number of claims and counterclaims concerning amounts paid to Kosovo provided on the one hand by the

United States and on the other by the European Union, including

both contributions by individual EU members and by the EC. Can

either one of you tell us how much respectively the United States

and EU have been providing to Kosovo for humanitarian assistance, economic reconstruction and the cost of the KFOR mission?

Mr. PARDEW. Mr. Chairman, we always get into these financial

discussions, and it is very easy to get off into apples and oranges.

I would like to stay with the data which I provided in my statement which discussed burden sharing. For civil implementation in

2000, the U.S. share is 13.9 percent. Europe is paying the bulk of

the remaining part of the $1.2 billion. Our share of humanitarian

cost——

Chairman GILMAN. Is that the total being provided, $1.2 billion

by everyone?

Mr. PARDEW. For civil implementation, sir?

Chairman GILMAN. By all parties?

Mr. PARDEW. Yes. This was committed at the donors conference

last fall.

Chairman GILMAN. And we are providing 13 percent?

Mr. PARDEW. 13.9 percent. Our share of humanitarian assistance

has been about 20 percent, and I don’t have a total number, but

I can get that for the Committee if you would like. Costs in the

peacekeeping account have been about 25 percent of the UNMIK

costs; and our OSCE share has ranged from 10 to 16.9 percent. The

Europeans have picked up the bulk of the remainder of those costs,

although there are non-European contributors as well, like Japan

10

and some others who have contributed, but the bulk of the burden

was paid by the Europeans.

Chairman GILMAN. All of those costs you have just recited is $1.6

billion; is that right?

Mr. PARDEW. No, it would go well above that because of the humanitarian costs.

Chairman GILMAN. What are the total costs that have been invested?

Mr. PARDEW. Just a minute, sir while I look at the figures. The

total cost for Kosovo—and I have civil costs here—$1.2 billion.

Chairman GILMAN. You mentioned before $1.6 billion. Does this

figure you are giving us now include all of the funds that we have

allocated for Kosovo?

Mr. PARDEW. The figure of funds that we have allocated for

Kosovo for civil implementation to include reconstruction in fiscal

year 2000 is $1.26 billion. Excuse me, that is in Bosnia. In Kosovo,

the total is $1.227 billion for fiscal years 1999 and 2000. That includes money for stabilization, humanitarian, the U.N. costs, OSCE

costs, and that is for fiscal years 1999 and 2000.

Chairman GILMAN. $1.27 billion?

Mr. PARDEW. For civilian assistance for fiscal year 1999 and

2000.

Chairman GILMAN. That leaves out the military costs?

Mr. PARDEW. That leaves out the military costs.

Chairman GILMAN. And how much are the military costs?

Mr. PARDEW. The figure I have is for Kosovo, both again 1999 and 2000, is $5.157 billion from the 050 Defense Department accounts.

Chairman GILMAN. $5.157 billion. So we are talking roughly $6

to $7 billion altogether, is that right, altogether our costs in

Kosovo?

Mr. PARDEW. That is correct. For fiscal year 1999 and 2000 our

total costs for Kosovo, military and civilian, are $6.384 billion from

the 150 Foreign Operations accounts and the 050 Defense accounts.

Chairman GILMAN. So we are paying in what percentage of all

those costs? What does our average contribution amount to?

Mr. PARDEW. It varies from program to program, whether it is

humanitarian, civil implementation or others.

Chairman GILMAN. You talked about 13 percent.

Mr. PARDEW. Thirteen percent of civil costs.

Chairman GILMAN. What about military?

Mr. PARDEW. I don’t have the total military cost of the entire operation.

Chairman GILMAN. Can you provide that for our Committee?

Mr. PARDEW. I can try.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you very much. We would welcome

having it.

Chairman GILMAN. Why have the United States and EU accepted

the de facto partition of Kosovska Mitrovice?

Mr. PARDEW. We have not accepted partition of Kosovo. In fact,

we strongly oppose any action which would promote partition or be

viewed as a partition of Kosovo.

Chairman GILMAN. What are we doing to allow displaced Albanians to return to their homes in safety in that area?

11

Mr. PARDEW. So far, in Mitrovice, there have been about 140 Albanians returned to their homes on the north side of the river. This

is not an acceptable level.

Chairman GILMAN. One hundred forty out of how many?

Mr. PARDEW. Out of probably 2,000 or 3,000 north of the river.

Chairman GILMAN. Only 140 have been able to return? What is

holding things up?

Mr. PARDEW. The situation in Mitrovice is extremely tense. The

Serbs have dominated the northern side of the river, the Albanians

the south. UNMIK had not established its authority firmly there.

Attempts to return Albanians across the river generated significant hostilities which KFOR had to deal with.

The United Nations and NATO have developed a comprehensive

strategy for Mitrovice, but this is not something that can be solved

immediately, Mr. Chairman. This is a very complex situation that

has to do with continued influence by Belgrade in the north of the

area. Extremists on both sides have exploited the situation there.

We have just put a strong civil administrator in Mitrovice to improve the civil administration there. So this is an ongoing process,

but it is not going to be solved immediately.

Chairman GILMAN. So, Ambassador Pardew, essentially until

that is clarified there is a de facto partition in Mitrovice.

Mr. PARDEW. There is an unacceptable separation in Mitrovice.

Chairman GILMAN. Did our Nation agree to the deletion of a provision requiring Serbia to return Kosovar Albanian detainees from

Kosovo by Serb forces for the military technical agreement negotiated with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia at the end of

NATO’s air campaign? Did our Nation agree to the deletion of a

provision that required them to return these detainees?

Mr. PARDEW. I am not aware of the details of the negotiation,

Mr. Chairman, but I don’t recall ever seeing anything agreeing that

detainees would not be returned. In fact, we have worked very

hard to pressure the regime in Belgrade to return Kosovars who

are held prisoner in Serbia, and there are quite a number of them,

probably up to 2,000. Some have been returned but not nearly

enough.

Chairman GILMAN. So Serbia is mandated to return these detainees that were taken from Kosovo by the Serb forces?

Mr. PARDEW. We certainly demand that the Serb return

Kosovars who were taken from Kosovo at the end of the conflict.

Chairman GILMAN. One last question. What is the status of the

Trepca mine? Have Albanian workers been permitted to resume

their work there and does Serbia receive any of the proceeds from

the operations of that mine at the present time?

Mr. PARDEW. The Trepca mine is a strategic issue associated

with Mitrovice in northern Kosovo. An international mining consortium is currently in negotiations with UNMIK to look at the potential to reopen that mine. The U.S. Agency for International Development has a team in Trepca as we speak looking at the environmental impact of the Trepca mine. The Trepca mine is part of the

strategic plan for northern Kosovo that UNMIK is working on. We

believe it should be reopened to the degree that it can become economically viable, and it should be staffed and operated by the people of Kosovo.

12

Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Ambassador, I understand that the workers would like to go back there. They are ready to go back to work

there. All they need to do is pump out some of the water that has

accumulated there and to assure safety of the workers; is that correct?

Mr. PARDEW. There is much more to it than that, Mr. Chairman.

The mine has been neglected. It was poorly run by the administration that ran it up to now. Parts of it are still under the control

of Belgrade.

Yes, certain parts of the mine are flooded, but other parts of the

mine are a serious ecological problem. We will know more about

how much of that mine can be reopened as soon as the USAID environmental team returns and when we have had a serious professional assessment of it.

Chairman GILMAN. I would hope that we could expedite that,

since several thousand workers could be returned and several millions of dollars could be earned by the Albanians.

Mr. Gejdenson.

Mr. GEJDENSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think what you are

sensing here is a number of crosswinds that are running through

the Congress, and part of it I kind of referenced at the beginning

is the post-Soviet-era impatience, and I think what you are going

to find is there are going to be attempts to restrict your discretion

to a greater and greater degree.

There is now legislation by the Chairman and Mr. Bereuter that

would limit expenditures by the United States in southeastern Europe to 15 percent of the share of the EU.

It was interesting, you stated that in our hemisphere the hurricane response saw the EU putting in about 30 some percent, but

I think there is no argument that the United States has historically paid the largest portion of many of these international operations. And I think what you are going to have to do is you are

going to have to find a way to convince Members of Congress and

the American public that this is, one, a solid investment that represents America’s best interests; and part of that you can, I think,

show from a historic perspective. I mean, obviously, if there had

been the time pressures for results at the end of the Reichstag and

the Nazis we would have probably been out of Germany sometime

in early 1951, not having succeeded at accomplishing all of our

goals and reconciliation in the area.

But I can tell you that between now and the election there is

going to be continued pressure, and I would suggest that you go

back and talk to the folks at the White House and State Department and say that you are going to need to help those of us who

supported the Administration with a demonstration that I think is

doable, that the Europeans are carrying their burden, and where

they are not, we ought to work together to get them to carry that

burden.

There is no question the United States rightly exercised the

major portion of the military operation during the war in Kosovo

because of our incredible ability, unmatched by any other country;

and for that reason, frankly, I am a supporter of the Europeans

having a European military strategy and a coordinated purchasing

of equipment so they can play a more equal role in endeavors that

13

the United States and Europe feels are important. I think that we

ought to enter a dialogue to make sure the Europeans pay their

part. I think it will be easier to get continued American support.

And, you know, the pressure is going to continue from the majority in this Congress, and I think that you have got to come forward

and help those of us who believe in what we are doing in Kosovo

with the information that lets us work something out that will

allow us to continue what I think is the best representation of

America’s involvement in foreign policy.

We are doing what is right. We are doing it for the right reasons.

We are not simply doing something simple, that looks good or doing

something like protecting an oil-producing country that represents

our need of foreign crude.

So I admire what you have done and how you have done it there,

and I think we need to make sure that we pull the information together that lets us come to a policy that will allow us to continue

to take this leadership role in the world. And I thank you gentlemen for your testimony.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Gejdenson.

Mr. Bereuter.

Mr. BEREUTER. Ambassador Pardew, Secretary Swigert, thank

you for your testimony. I am having a hard time understanding

how I am going to direct comments to you.

Ambassador Pardew, you have a very distinguished public service record as a civilian in DOD and as a military officer, and I

know you are in a difficult position. But I do think that what you

have presented here, in the way of written testimony and in your

comments, do not give an accurate impression to the American people of the difficulties we are facing there and the fact that we have

serious problems that are not being corrected. The situation is deteriorating.

Effectively, we have a partition in Bosnia. We are moving to a

partition in Serbia, and in that part of it that is Kosovo. You say

we have made progress in restoring order and then you go on to

list several areas. But progress from point zero is about what we

are talking about, so it is extremely slow. There is no confidence

or credibility in the people that will be managing the judicial positions nor is there likely to be.

You saw how many votes, I imagine, that the Warner burdensharing proposal, as advanced by a bipartisan group in the House,

received. I voted against that because I didn’t think it was a good

idea in the way they had framed it. But the United States did bear

a large majority of the costs for pursuit of the war over Kosovo—

in the backyard of the Europeans. Europeans should be expected

to do more. I think it is only fair, as a representative of the American people, that we need to expect them to come forth and share

the costs.

The figures we have, for example, in international police is far

less than requested in the first place, and the Europeans still

haven’t met what is now the downgraded number. I think it is reasonable to place not a dollar limit cap, but instead a percentage

gap.

Mr. Gejdenson referred to an element in the legislation that

Chairman Gilman has offered with the support of many of us, inVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:46 Jan 08, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00017 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 68286.TXT HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1
14

cluding myself, and in that legislation, at least we do make it a

percentage. It is at 15 percent, but I am quite willing to raise it

to 18 percent because there is reason that it ought to be 18 percent.

This is consistent with what the Administration has said at various

times, although they would like to back away from that number

now. Let us advance it from 15 percent to 18 percent. If the Europeans and the Canadians, since Canada is a NATO member, come

up with much more, then the amount we have to spend—which I

hope we would spend well—in the Balkans area will go up as well.

It is not a dollar cap. It is a percentage cap that we ought to expect, and it can be adjusted to see if, in fact, the forces meet their

goals from year to year by what, in fact, we are willing to spend

the next year.

Just a minor correction, it is not just what the EU is spending.

It is under our bill what the EU and NATO members are spending

as contrasted with the United States. You have, for example, six

European countries that are not members of the EU whose contributions would also be considered along with the 15 members of

the EU plus, of course, Canada. If they can’t come up with 82 percent of the costs in Kosovo today, then they are not pulling their

fair share. I think we need to assure the American people that

there is a limit on how much of the total amount we are going to

provide in the reconstruction of and in the attempt somehow to restore civil order to Kosovo and also, for that matter, to Bosnia.

I welcome any comments you have, Ambassador or Mr. Swigert.

Mr. PARDEW. Well, thank you very much, sir.

I don’t want to leave anyone with the impression that we have

had raging success in Kosovo yet or that we don’t have significant

problems ahead of us.

You mentioned the police. The police are a problem. The international community is doing something with police that they have

never done before. We have international police there with arrest

authority and carrying weapons. At the same time we are trying

to establish a judicial system. We are trying to establish a police

and judicial system, first of all, with internationals, and then with

locals.

I would go back to the point in my statement which reminds us

that we came into an area which was devastated. There was no

government. There were no police. Jails—there are no detention facilities. So I don’t want to leave with you a presentation that implies Kosovo is a rosy picture. But I will say it is far better than

anything that existed at the end of the bombing campaign. We

have a long, uphill way to go, but we think that we can overcome

all the items that are difficult today, and that we are making gradual progress. I do not believe, sir, that we are sliding backward.

Mr. SWIGERT. I might comment, if I could, on the question of European and Canadian and Japanese support. We certainly do see

this as a necessity and a priority, and we are working very hard

to ensure that Europeans follow through on their commitments and

deliver the assistance that they promised in a timely fashion. This

is an area in which we have had considerable discussion with the

Europeans, and they have recognized that there is an issue here.

At the latest meeting of the European Council in Lisbon, they undertook a number of steps to try and speed up the delivery of asVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:46 Jan 08, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00018 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 68286.TXT HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1
15

sistance. So I think this is an area where all of us can do more,

both in specific situations and with respect to Kosovo and also

across the board in southeast Europe.

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you. We will try to stiffen your backbone

by giving you some requirement that they will have a percentage

of it but no more than a percentage. We will see if they are going

to meet their commitment.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Bereuter.

Mr. Hastings.

Mr. HASTINGS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank

you for holding the hearing; and, gentlemen, thank you for your

testimony.

If I could begin, Secretary Swigert, with you and refer to your

testimony where you say we firmly believe the establishment of a

democratic government in Belgrade would make it possible for Serbia and Montenegro to establish a new constructive relationship in

which Montenegro could be a genuine partner with Serbia in a

democratic Yugoslavia. I firmly believe that, too, but how realistic

is the prospect of that happening?

Mr. SWIGERT. Well, you raise a very serious issue which is the

presence in Belgrade of an antidemocratic regime, and I think that

not just this Administration and the Congress but a number of

countries around the world, our European partners, are all united

in terms of working for democratization in Serbia. This is a priority

for us, and it is a priority for Europe. We would like to see this

happen sooner rather than later because of the drag that Serbia

represents within the region and because of the additional suffering that the perpetuation of the Milosevic regime is bringing on

the Serbian people.

We have been carrying out a very active policy along three tracks

of putting increasing pressure on the Milosevic regime through selective sanctions in conjunction with the European Union and others, through isolation of the Milosevic regime diplomatically and

through strong support for democratic forces in Serbia, as well as

support for the democratic government in Montenegro.

The Montenegrin government of President Djukanovic has made

clear that its priority is bringing about a different relationship with

Serbia, not a break with Serbia but rather a new partnership; and

in a number of the discussions we have had with representatives

of the Serbian opposition, they have expressed support for that. So

I believe that with democratic change in Serbia there can be a new

arrangement reached between democratic forces in both republics.

I think the question of when democratic change comes about in

Serbia is something that really depends upon the Serbian people

themselves. If you look at the opinion polls, Mr. Congressman, we

see that Milosevic is going down and the level of frustration is tremendous. The democratic opposition in Serbia will have a demonstration this week calling for free and fair elections at all levels.

It remains to be seen whether that will be a turning point. It will

be, I think, a struggle to put more pressure on Milosevic, and the

strategy that we are following I think is one that we need to stick

with. We have been encouraged that the European Union has

moved recently to strengthen its financial sanctions and expand

16

the visa list that is directed against Milosevic’s regime and his

principal supporters.

Mr. HASTINGS. Thank you very much.

If I could turn to you, please, Ambassador Pardew, you cited Secretary Albright’s recent New York Times op-ed in which she says,

from your testimony, the day may come when a Kosovo-scale operation can be managed without the help of the United States, but

it has not come yet. If I can share the frustration that I hear

among my colleagues with you and first preface that by suggesting

that, when I voted personally in favor of our intervention, I made

a floor statement in which I clearly made understood that I did not

expect this to be a limited operation by any stretch of the imagination. One can’t quantify very easily the amount of time when theorists are talking about an end game in something as complex as

the Balkans. To ask for that certainty is almost impossible.

At the very same time, when you hear my colleagues advancing

with a great deal of seriousness the notion of capping the activity

there, that comes about because we are feeling our pressure from

our constituents saying, you know, we are spending a lot of money

over there, you are telling us we don’t have any money here to do

certain things, and then we go home and face that. That said, is

there any way that, with all of the things that are on the ground,

that we can suggest to the American people that that day is going

to happen, and even if we said 30 years, it might be better than

leaving it to ambiguity all the time? Do I make myself clear?

Mr. PARDEW. Yes, Congressman, you do. And I would like to be

able to give a date, but we learned from Bosnia that we really cannot set firm deadlines because our strategy needs to be based on

the job that we have to do, and the missions that need to be accomplished. The answer to the length of our commitment in the Balkans is based on our interests; and, as I said in my statement, we

have very powerful security interests in stability in the Balkans.

And we have been engaged in this endeavor with our European allies much less overall than they have, but we have been involved

because it is in our security interests to be involved.

Our strategy for leaving is based on implementation of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1244 which stipulates the conditions required for a sustainable peace. When we leave Kosovo, we need to

leave it in a condition which is stable, which is oriented toward Europe, which is a partner among Europe democracies, with an economy that is integrated into the European system.

So I wish I could give a precise answer to a withdrawal date, but

I can’t. But I can say it is in our interests for us to be there, and

it is in our interests to stay the course until such time as we have

established the conditions for a long-lasting peace.

Mr. HASTINGS. Mr. Chairman, I recognize that my time has run,

but I am particularly interested, as a former jurist, in the development of the judicial system; and if you would please have someone

followup with me personally so that I can be briefed regarding

where we are in that regard. I would also be interested in further

elaboration of the demilitarization of the KLA, but at the very

same time I recognize that there are time constraints, and I want

to compliment you, Ambassador and Mr. Secretary, for your testimony here today.

17

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Judge Hastings.

Mr. Sherman.

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to echo and amplify what so many of our colleagues

have said, and that is, that when it comes to the burden sharing

in not only Kosovo but also Bosnia that our foreign policy establishment has really let down the American taxpayer.

A week ago, we heard from the State Department with regard to

Haiti, and I asked at that point, how are expenditures in the

former Yugoslavia compared to European expenditures in trying to

bring democracy, freedom and economic progress in Haiti? So far

we don’t have a response. I have always found that when people

want to give me a response they are very quick. The message is

very clear. When something goes wrong in Europe, the American

taxpayer pays. When something goes wrong in the Americas, the

European taxpayers pay virtually nothing.

We have heard testimony here that says the Europeans are doing

more than the United States. Along with several of my colleagues,

we saw what was going on during the war. Virtually all the effective fighting was done by the United States.

I don’t always agree with the Governor of Texas, but he has put

forward the theory that if the United States always has to be the

peacemaker, that others should assume the duty of being peacekeeper. And yet here we are with no end in sight, doing the European work for them, not only doing what they couldn’t do for themselves—in spite of their incredible wealth, in a population that is

larger than ours, they couldn’t deal with the military aspects of

peacemaking. But now they clearly are capable of doing everything

that needs to be done in Bosnia and Kosovo, and we are doing it

instead.

I think that the question really is, do the Europeans think that

Kosovo and Bosnia is important? And, if so, if we announce that

within 1 year we were leaving, would they come through with the

billions and billions of Euros necessary to assume this duty? Or

would they decide that the former Yugoslavia just isn’t worth very

much of their money?

Mr. PARDEW. Well, our participation, as I have said before, is

based on our interest, and we have interests there.

Mr. SHERMAN. Excuse me, I have a limited amount of time. I will

ask you to focus on the question: If we stopped, giving the Europeans 12 months notice, would they step up to the plate? Or would

they say, sorry, Kosovo and Bosnia are not very much in our interest, at least not enough to assume the full financial burden, and

if they are not in your interest, so be it? I am not asking you

whether Kosovo and Bosnia is in America’s interest. I am asking

you what would the Europeans do if we insisted they shouldered

the entire load?

Mr. PARDEW. The Europeans would probably make the best of it.

Mr. SHERMAN. We could pull out and the Europeans would handle the problem?

Mr. PARDEW. I said that they would probably do the best they

could with it. The question is, should we be there? The answer to

that is——

18

Mr. SHERMAN. With all due respect, I am given 5 minutes of time

where I am supposed to ask questions, and your response is to tell

me the question is. I am very sorry. I am supposed to ask the questions. I know that you would prefer to be asked different questions,

and perhaps one of my colleagues will come in and ask you the

questions that you would like to answer.

Mr. PARDEW. Congressman, you have asked a very important

and complex question. I would like to give you an adequate answer.

Mr. SHERMAN. If you could stick to the question I have asked, I

would appreciate it.

Mr. PARDEW. The United States is participating with our European partners in an issue that is of vital interest to the Europeans

and the United States. The question is not whether we should be

there but to what degree.

Mr. SHERMAN. Excuse me, Ambassador, I will reclaim my time

because, once again, you are saying what the question is. And it

could very well be that that will be the question asked you by one

of my colleagues, but I don’t think that the question is whether—

the degree to which we should be involved in the Balkans for 5

years, 10 years, 20 years. It looks very much as if we will be in

the former Yugoslavia for at least as long as we have been in

Korea. And, you know, Asia is a different circumstance, but here

you have all of the wealth and power of Europe, which apparently

is insufficient to deal with the problem in Europe, let alone grossly

inadequate European contributions to that problem in Korea or

East Timor or Columbia or Haiti.

So I realize that you would prefer that I ask you a different question, but, in fact, the question is whether we will show, as civilian

leaders, the same kind of courage that our men and women in uniform showed. They stood up to Milosevic. We now have to stand up

to Paris and to Berlin and say that European problems need to be

financed, the solutions to those problems need to be financed by

European taxpayers.

And you can say that we have an interest in former Yugoslavia.

You could make an equal case that France or Britain or Germany

should be concerned with the freedom and development of Haiti,

and yet we are still waiting for those figures to come in. You can

certainly say that Italy and Spain should care about the democracy

and freedom of the people of South Korea, yet I am not aware of

any European contribution on a significant scale.

So it seems that where there is a European concern about something in the Americas or Asia, we have no money at all from the

Europeans. We may see a little bit of French help to Haiti, a

former colony, whose problems today are a direct result of colonial

exploitation by the French themselves, but we will see very little

German help for Haiti, very little Italian or Spanish financing of

the military in South Korea, an inadequate European response to

East Timor, and the fact that we would then do the European job

of convincing the American taxpayer that that is an acceptable circumstance that we contribute mightily to Europe and they do nothing outside of Europe is very frustrating.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Sherman.

Mr. Pomeroy. I am sorry, Mr. Rohrabacher just arrived.

19

Mr. Rohrabacher.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Yes, I just did. I apologize. As you know, we

have various hearings that we have responsibility to attend, and I

was the chairman of the last one, and again I apologize if we are

covering some ground—how much specifically have we spent in the

Balkans for the last 5 years?

Mr. PARDEW. Mr. Rohrabacher, I knew you were going to ask me,

and I have brought you an answer I hope will satisfy your question.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. All right.

Mr. PARDEW. The total cost to the United States since 1995 in

developmental, humanitarian and military costs is roughly $17.8

billion.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. That includes?

Mr. PARDEW. That is Bosnia and Kosovo. U.S. Military and foreign assistance in fiscal year 1996 to fiscal year 2000 is $11.366 billion from accounts—— and ——. That is Bosnia.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. OK. Now hold on. First one was—$17 billion

is the total?

Mr. PARDEW. $17.8 billion is the total.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. OK.

Mr. PARDEW. For Bosnia, that total is $11.366. That is fiscal year

1996 to 2000.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. OK.

Mr. PARDEW. And in Kosovo—that is fiscal years 1999 and

2000—the figure is $6.384 billion. Now, let me break down the $17.8 billion one other way. Military costs are $15.257 billion, civilian costs $2.5 billion. So what I am

saying is that the bulk of the U.S. funding has been military.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Now you are saying that our military operation that brought the Serbs to their knees so they would agree to

this peace plan in Kosovo cost us less than $15 billion, all this

bombing?

Mr. PARDEW. The military outlays for Kosovo, $5.157 billion.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. That includes that whole—— Mr. PARDEW. That is the air campaign.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. How long was the air campaign?

Mr. PARDEW. Seventy-eight days.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. You are saying it is under $6 billion for that

air campaign?

Mr. PARDEW. Right.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. That is phenomenal. I will just say that if I,

being someone who is asked to look at the figures, that figure

would jump out at me and say, look a little closer, that doesn’t

sound realistic.

Mr. PARDEW. Mr. Rohrabacher, unfortunately, I am not into the

details of military cost sufficiently to answer a lot of detailed questions about them. These are figures that we received today from

OMB and the Defense Department.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. OK. Well, you know, cost is something that

we are supposed to look at very closely here, and, of course—so $17

billion, you are suggesting that $17 billion is what the cost was— now, I don’t know what the cost to us would have been to the strategy which was our alternative, and one alternative was just to recVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:46 Jan 08, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00023 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 68286.TXT HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1
20

ognize that the Albanians and Kosovo had a right to their self-determination, recognizing them and maybe providing them with

some support so they could defend themselves. That was another

alternative that I was suggesting and that some others felt would

have been a moral alternative to direct military intervention.

Would you guesstimate the cost on something like that? Wouldn’t

that have been something like $2 or $3 billion at the most?

Mr. PARDEW. I couldn’t put a cost figure on that. I was involved

in looking at some of those options, and I can tell you what I believed at the time. I believe that there was no way that we could

adequately create an organization that could defend itself in the

short-run against the Serb army and police. That would have been

a long-term solution, but a lot more people would have died had we

gone down that trail.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Let us note that the Kosovars were here and

were asking not for American troops in the beginning but were asking instead for just our recognition of their human rights, to control

their own destiny and some support, some help so that they could

fight their own battle rather than having American military personnel there and having American military people put themselves

and their lives in danger and having over $17 billion expended in

Treasury, which is a considerable cost, even though I think that is

low balling it, frankly, once I take a closer look.

And how much is our European allies then?

Mr. PARDEW. I don’t have the total cost of the military campaign.

I have the U.S. cost, but I do not have the 1995 to 2000 total international costs for the Balkans.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. It would be of interest to us when analyzing

whether or not this is a cost-effective approach to foreign policy in

the future to see whether or not an expenditure in the tens of billions of dollars by the United States actually stimulated our European allies to get more involved or whether what happened was

what most of us on the other side suggested would happen, that

if we end up spending the money the European allies will be less

likely to commit their resources and less likely to buildup their own

military forces.

So these are very pertinent issues, and I wish you success, and

I yield back the balance of my time.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Rohrabacher.

Mr. Pomeroy.

Mr. POMEROY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I want to speak specifically to the cap proposal, and are we talking about the 15 percent cap, Mr. Chairman, or 18 percent cap?

Will it be amended?

Chairman GILMAN. It is going to be amended. Mr. Bereuter is

suggesting the possibility of increasing it to 18 percent.

Mr. POMEROY. I am familiar with the notion that over a longer

term project, longer meaning more than 1 year, there is going to

be an ebb and flow in terms of shifting costs. For example, as we

respond to what relief in Grand Forks, North Dakota, to build a

permanent flood protection device there, the local share is greater

at the first phase of the project, the Federal share greater in the

middle, local share greater at the end, to ultimately, over several

21

years, you have a 50/50 cost share, but that doesn’t mean at any

given point of time you have got a 50/50 cost share.

Now, my question, Mr. Ambassador, is whether the same might

be true here and, in fact, you have an ebb and flow in participation.

I am informed, for example, that one of the things the United

States does best is respond to emergencies, disaster assistance. We

might bear perhaps more of that cost than the countries in that

phase less when we are in the longer term restructuring phase.

I would like to show a couple of pictures that I personally took

when I toured Kosovo in December. This is a picture of a family

living in a warm, dry room. Tens of thousands of Kosovars spent

their winter in circumstances similar to this. Into a destroyed

structure they take this warm, dry room kit, tiny little stove there

for heating and then plastic sheeting on the ceiling and over the

windows. Wholly inadequate housing, dangerous for the health of

those living in here. They are not dying of exposure, but, obviously,

we have got an enormous task in terms of still emergency housing

reconstruction.

Another thing that I saw was extraordinary damage, I mean unbelievable damage to the countryside. I put this picture up because

it illustrates, I think, two things: devastation which was commonly

seen throughout the country in terms of structures as well as damage to the agricultural infrastructure. It destroyed every damn

tractor they could find and made the prospects of getting on with

the normal activities in a farming region very, very difficult to obtain.

Now, I use these photographs to point out perhaps it is not timely in any way to be talking caps yet because we are still very much

in more of an emergency portion, disaster portion of the response,

and what we see today isn’t necessarily reflective of the longer

term relationship that we will have with our European allies. By

golly, they ought to carry more than 50 percent. They ought to

carry way more of the costs of the long-term reconstruction than

what we have invested to date, but it just seems to me that hard

caps might interfere with the normal ebb and flow of things as you

work toward getting this structure, even if we are all agreeing that

18 percent is an appropriate figure to be at.

If the Ambassador would respond.

Mr. PARDEW. I agree completely, Congressman. We think that

any kind of cap limits our flexibility. It does not allow us to exploit

some advantages that we have in the temporary circumstances you

just described. In some cases, we can move a little quicker in meeting immediate humanitarian needs. In other places, such as reconstruction, the Europeans clearly should pay and, quite frankly, are

willing to pay the vast majority of the costs. So we think that a

hard cap absolutely limits our flexibility and sets up a precedent

with our European allies which would not be helpful to us in areas

where we might need their help.

Mr. POMEROY. The diplomatic dimension in terms of eliciting full

European response, do you think they would respond well to this

kind of activity out of Congress or might we actually set our own

cause back, the objective being getting full European participation,

reducing the U.S. participation, the 18 percent range? What is the

best way to pursue that objective?

22

Mr. PARDEW. First, the President, the Secretary of State, and

every senior Administration official I know who are involved in

Kosovo and the Balkans have been working with our European allies to ensure that the message from Congress—that Europe must

pay the lion’s share—is understood by them. Europe is moving forward in this regard, some not fast enough. We believe however,

that they accept their responsibility for the lion’s share of the costs,

and we believe that they accept responsibility for leadership.

Therefore, we are confident that our European allies will, in fact,

step up to the plate, as we say.

Now, as to their attitudes, I think it will damage our relationship

if this kind of hard ceiling is put on our spending flexibility. We

can expect to see some sort of reciprocal position from them. They

accept their responsibilities, they accept their position of leadership, and for us to make demands on some things that they can’t

fix is unfair.

For example, their fiscal year is different than ours. We start in

October. They start in January. So we have funding available in

January that they can’t match because they haven’t gotten into

their process. Those kinds of timing issues and technical issues

make this even more difficult. So there are technical reasons not

to set the cap. It will damage our relationship for sure, and I think

it will hurt us in some other areas where we need their help.

Mr. POMEROY. In all of that, in developed Western Nations, we

have got many—our relations with our allies are going to get

through that, but who gets hit in the crossfire are these Kosovars

again it seems to me.

And just for an example, this picture haunted me, haunted me

for weeks after, and I asked AID personnel to go back and see how

these little kids were doing, and they weren’t doing very well at all,

and they ended up being able to draw up on additional resources,

come in, get clothing, get a better housing put in place. They did

a lot of work in this particular situation here because I asked; and

they saved, in my opinion, those children.

It would seem to me we could be getting ourselves in a situation—I think that might be kind of an analogy for what we might

find—a situation that urgently required a response, but we are up

against our cap, sorry, wait till the next fiscal year, wait till some

headroom frees up and we will see what we can do.

These caps imposed here in town have got nothing to do with

real-life circumstances on the ground. The people that get hurt are

the most helpless folks that have already been totally devastated

through war they didn’t bring on but got brought upon them. We

have to think about these things.

Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.

Mr. ROHRABACHER [presiding]. Thank you very much.

Let me just note for the record that what H.R. 4053 suggests, not

only suggests but mandates, that in southeast Europe that the

United States not provide more than 15 percent of the costs of the

operations down there, humanitarian and military, starting next

year. That is starting next year, so that the current fiscal year

2000 is not included.

And I understand that there are people in need all over the

world, and those people are wonderful people that you just showed

23

us the picture of, and I certainly feel for them, but I will have to

say that it is about time that our European allies do their part.

And the more that they hear from Members of Congress who are

not willing to be tough and set the guidelines, they will not step

forward because they know that Uncle Sam is going to pick it up.

And that is the history, and that is the way it is, because that is

reality.

And I am sorry that our European allies, in fact as far as some

of us are concerned, our European allies, southern Europe is their

responsibility and not the responsibility of the United States, and

the money that we have poured in is a tremendous cost. Anyway,

the bill also says that the Secretary of State will certify to Congress that our goal of this cap of 15 percent is achieved and that

the Europeans are certainly cooperating, and that is what this bill

is all about.

Mr. POMEROY. Mr. Chairman, may I respond briefly?

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Wait one moment, and let me say I will be

going to Kosovo over the Easter break, and we have people—you

know, we have people down there that again for years came to us

asking that they be permitted to defend themselves, and instead

now we are deeply involved. And what I need to ask the Ambassador before I pay the courtesy of having my colleague answer

some of the things I just mentioned, do we now recognize that

Kosovo has a right to its own statehood or are we still—and if we

don’t, what is our exit policy? How are we ever going to get out of

this unless we at least recognize the people of Kosovo’s right to determine their own destiny?

Mr. PARDEW. As I have said, our exit strategy is based on implementation of those elements of U.N. Security Council Resolution

1244 which creates the conditions for a sustainable peace. The U.N.

Mission in Kosovo is the first step in building peace in Kosovo, and

the second is to establish elements of democratic self-government.

Our exit strategy is therefore predicated on implementation on

U.N. Security Council 1244 as a means of obtaining substantial

and sustainable autonomy. We do not support independence for

Kosovo.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I would suggest this, that if we do not support that, then this is all a facade. I mean, the fact is there will

never be a time when we can leave because we have not laid the

foundation and been honest with everybody that we are involved

and that our major goal is to protect these—these people have a

right to control their own destiny. They are not going to give up

on that. They are willing to live in horrible conditions like we have

just seen in order to achieve their right to control their own destiny, and that is what we see here, brave, courageous people willing to do that, and that is not going to change. They are going to

always demand that. And unless we have come down and been unambiguous about this, we are wasting everybody’s time and money.

And, in fact, my belief is—and I am sorry to be so up front about

this, but the fact is, that unless we are willing to be that demonstrable in our support, at least for the principle of self-determination, we shouldn’t have gotten involved in this again, and we

should—they came to us. That was their goal. They are willing to

sacrifice. They are willing to go through this suffering in order to

24

achieve, as other nations have done, in order to achieve their independence, and if we would just walk away without recognizing that

it won’t last, then everything we have spent will be for nothing.

So it is just a thought, and I know you aren’t making the policy

right now. You are trying to do it the best you can, and I appreciate that. And I hope that when I go down there in a couple

weeks—I know that you are doing your very best job in trying—

in a very bad circumstance.

I do think that my colleague from North Dakota certainly should

have a right to respond.

Mr. POMEROY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I was going to respond briefly by saying that I don’t think that,

vis-a-vis our European friends, our diplomatic ends are best pursued by a punch in the nose. I think that having voices like yours

in the debate are absolutely constructive and helpful. They ought

to know there is a growing discord in terms of impatience about

what is happening from the European participation side. I just

hope that the U.S. Congress is a little more measured, a little more

inclined to let the Secretary of State and the President advance the

foreign policy of this Nation, rather than always trying to lead the

President and the Administration, and that the debate is not about

the 18 percent figure, the debate is about the means to get there,

and that is why I have serious reservations about this legislation.

Thank you.

Chairman GILMAN [presiding]. We have two votes on the floor.

We will briefly recess the Committee for about 10 minutes. The

Committee is recessed.

I think we are finished with our panelists, and we thank you for

your patience and your willingness to supply us with information.

If you would provide the additional information we have requested.

The Committee is in recess.

[Recess.]

Chairman GILMAN. The Committee will come to order.

It is now my privilege to introduce a former colleague Joe DioGuardi. Former Congressman DioGuardi has been involved in educating the American public and the Congress about issues concerning the Albanian population in the Balkans for over a decade.

As founder and President of the Albanian American Civic League,

Joe DioGuardi has promoted involvement in public affairs of our

ethnic Albanian citizens from the northeast and throughout the

United States.

Joe and his good lady Shirley Cloyes have provided me and our

staff with invaluable insights into the conflict in Kosovo since it

flared up in 1998. In fairness to Joe, I should point out that he has

warned us that Kosovo would be a serious flashpoint in the former

Yugoslavia until justice was provided to its majority Albanian community. He first made that warning in 1989 soon after Milosevic

had taken a step to strip Kosovo of its autonomy under the Yugoslav constitution.

I hope that Joe’s prescience that he has demonstrated over the

years will help guide us today in this hearing. Clearly our present

policy has some significant problems, and we invite Joe now to help

enlighten us as to how we may best correct them.

25

You may submit, Mr. DioGuardi, your entire statement for the

record and summarize as you see fit without objection.

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JOSEPH DIO GUARDI, VOLUNTEER PRESIDENT, THE ALBANIAN AMERICAN CIVIC

LEAGUE

Mr. DIOGUARDI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you so much for all you have done in all these years. We

started I guess in 1986 when we put the first resolution on the

egregious human rights violations in Kosovo. I was a new Congressman back then and ethnic Albanians in my District came to

see me, and I was shocked by what I heard from them about what

was happening in the middle of Europe. And you and Tom Lantos

and so many other good Congressmen and later Dana Rohrabacher

joined with us.

You know, if it weren’t for the vigilance of this Committee and

the actions that it has taken since 1989, especially under your

chairmanship, Congressman Gilman, today Kosovo would be like

Chechnya, a wasteland with hundreds of thousands of bodies

strewn about and nobody would care. I really feel sorry for the poor

people of Chechnya who did not have a voice in this Congress, but

that is what Kosovo would have been had it not been for people

like you. And we really appreciate all that you and this Committee

have done, but the job is not over.

I know you have to leave. You can pass the baton to Dana, and

I will let you know the bottom line.

Chairman GILMAN. I sorely regret. I am being called to chair another meeting with the World Bank President. As you know, he is

being challenged this weekend here in Washington, all kinds of

demonstrations against the World Bank.

I am now going to ask Dana Rohrabacher, our distinguished senior Member of our Committee, to conduct this; and I will try to return as soon as we finish our other meeting. Thank you for being

here, Congressman, and thank Shirley Cloyes for her interventions.

Mr. Rohrabacher.

Mr. DIOGUARDI. What I would like to do Congressman, Mr.

Chairman, is to basically summarize what I think are the key

issues and the matrix we can use is, one, legal; two, economic,

practical; and three, political.

What I will do is submit for the record a statement prepared by

our Balkan Affairs Adviser Shirley Cloyes, my wife. She is a volunteer, by the way, as I am, and she prepared something that is probably the most complete analysis of what this body and the Administration has to do to win the peace. We know we won the war, but

it looks like, as you have suggested, we are losing the peace.

Mr. ROHRABACHER [presiding]. Your statement will be included

in the record.

Let me note that there will probably be another vote around 35

minutes from now, and if we could have your testimony and the

testimony of the next panel, that is the way it is going to get done.

Otherwise, somebody will get shortchanged. So if you could summarize your testimony and we get to the next panel, we will get

everything on the record.

26

Mr. DIOGUARDI. We look forward to the meeting with you tomorrow so that we can help you on your trip to Kosovo and meet the

fine people we have brought here, because it is important that you

get all the information possible to bring back to this body.

So what I would like to do is start with the legal issue, and we

have with us today one of the most prominent professors of international law in the Albanian world. He is a Professor of Law at the

Universities of Prishtina and Tetova, Prishtina in Kosovo and the

University of Tetova in Macedonia. He is Dr. Esad Stavileci. He is

not able to speak today, but he did prepare a statement that is in

English, and I would like to submit this for the record.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. The statement will be made a part of the

record. So ordered.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Stavileci appears in the appendix.]

Mr. DIOGUARDI. He has come to the same conclusion as Noel

Malcolm has, the English scholar, the gentleman from Oxford who

said that under international law Kosovo deserves its independence, as you have suggested. He has prepared a book on this. Dr.

Stavileci has summarized that book in his statement, and basically

the bottom line is that Yugoslavia is a confederation that is in the

process of disintegration.

It is not only Albanians that are saying that, Mr. Chairman. You

can turn to some well-known Slavs. One that I want to quote here

is the Croatian scholar, Branka Magas. She stated in a speech to

the Bosnian Institute in London on May 10, 1999: ‘‘Unless the process of dissolution of Yugoslavia is allowed to be completed and the

Former Republic of Yugoslavia dissolved into its component parts,

thus setting Kosovo on a path to independence, it will be impossible to build a peaceful and democratic state system in southeastern Europe.’’

Mr. DIOGUARDI. It can’t be said any better than that, and this

is not an Albanian speaking. It confirms what you said. What are

our choices here? Our choices are to stay there for a long period

of time or allow the Albanians to control their own destiny.

Let me go to the next phase, which is the economic and the practical. That is why we brought Dr. Muhamet Mustafa. He is an expert on the economy of Kosovo. He put together a group called the

Riinvest Institute for Development Research. He is the chairman.

He has many contacts in the United States. His papers have been

quoted here in the newspapers in Washington and the bottom line

is that Kosovo does have the resources to be economically independent. It has mines, the Trepca mines. It has many factories,

many that are being occupied by the bloated bureaucracy called

UNMIK right now, so that Albanians can’t even reclaim the factories so that they can return to their own jobs.

Kosovo does not want to be another Bosnia. It doesn’t want to

be a ward of the United States and of the rest of the world. Bosnia,

as you know, is an ethnically divided, carved-out enclave, totally

dependent and going nowhere. It is very important to hear Dr.

Mustafa’s message.

Let me go on to the third phase, the political. This is where the

rubber hits the road, Mr. Chairman. If we don’t understand that

it took a bold stroke by the United States to jump in and do what

27

we did—and it was costly, as you said. You should have asked your

old buddy, Joe DioGuardi, the only certified public accountant ever

elected to this body in 200-and-something years, and he could tell

you why the Kosovo military campaign was more expensive than

the figures indicate. But Ambassador Pardew couldn’t explain this

to you because government operatives don’t understand their own

accounting system. In effect, all the bombs that were dropped were

part of some other budget in years past. We are not on an accrual

system here. So every bomb, every plane they used, everything that

was destroyed was already written off. The government doesn’t

consider that a cost. If you are in business and you used that system, you would be indicted if you had a publicly traded company.

But that is the system we have here.

What you have to say to them is, wait, I want to know what we

used during this war, not what you just put into this year’s budget

because you had to replace something and drop it. What did you

use? And you will find out that the real cost is tens of billions of

dollars for sure.

The political solution for Kosovo is going to be a tough one. You

have the United Nations with a resolution that is bad law. We

have had bad laws in this country. Remember the Dred Scott decision that black Americans were just property. We had to get rid of

that law. It was bad. We had a Civil War over it.

U.N. Resolution 1244 is bad law. Let me tell you why. On the

one hand it asserts the sovereignty of Serbia over Kosovo, and on

the other hand it dismantles Serbia’s sovereignty. You have created

an ambiguity here that doesn’t allow the Kosovars any ability to

stand on their own feet. And you have got now a bureaucracy

called UNMIK and OSCE and several others that are trying to

work within this resolution.

The worst result is the situation in Mitrovice. That is why we

brought the mayor of Mitrovice, Bajram Rexhepi. Bajram Rexhepi

is a medical doctor. We also have here the former Albanian director

of the Trepca mines. He can tell you how to put those mines back

into service. They even have a pro forma where this year they can

make money if you allowed them to do that, but they can’t control

their own mine. The problem is the United Nations It is trying to

impose or trying to implement bad legislation, and we have got to

do something about it.

Now, I am going to give you my last comment and this is where

the conundrum is. How do you deal with it? If the United States

hadn’t taken the lead with NATO in stopping the genocide, there

would have been a tremendous conflagration. We know that Greece

and Turkey would have been at each other because of Macedonia

being right there. We did the right thing. It is still in our vital interest to do the right thing. By the way, the paper that was prepared by Shirley Cloyes was delivered to the White House 2 weeks

ago because we wanted the President to know. He has a chance to

be bold again, and he is being too cautious.

[The prepared statement of Mr. DioGuardi appears in the appendix.]

Mr. ROHRABACHER. What is the right thing?

Mr. DIOGUARDI. The right thing right now is to look at the real

villains. Villain one, Slobodan Milosevic, is still there doing damVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:46 Jan 08, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00031 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 68286.TXT HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1
28

age. I heard Congressman Bereuter complaining about how the Albanians are treating the Serbs so badly. He forgot what Slobodan

Milosevic did, to kill Albanians, including pregnant women, to rape

and torture them. Everything that we have seen in Nazi Germany

was repeated. He didn’t want to mention the resentment for some

reason.

The point is you have Slobodan Milosevic. He has got to be

picked up, just like we picked up Krajisnic last week or the week

before. We have to get the French out of the way and bring this

guy to justice. Without that, there will never be peace in the Balkans.

To get justice, you have two other problems. You have China and

Russia. This is where the United Nations is not the place for the

solution. As long as you look to the United Nations for the solution

of Kosovo, you will never have the solution. Why? Russia has lost

its influence all over the world. It is embarrassed now to retreat

because it wants to find some place where it has some influence.

Russians have their Serbian surrogates, their Serbian Communist

regime. They are going to stay in the Balkans until we tell them,

if you don’t move, we are not going to give you the World Bank

credits, the aid you need. So Mr. Putin, back off. We will work with

you in some other areas.

And China, my God, what did the Chinese just do? Another Com- munist regime. They gave $300 million to Slobodan Milosevic. Is

that kicking us in the head? They want us to give them Most Favored Nation status on a permanent basis, without conditions; but

yet they give a war criminal that is trying to reassert his dominance in this area, that will kill the peace in the Balkans and Europe, they give him $300 million.

What is Slobodan Milosevic going to do with this money? Create

jobs? No. He is going to pay his army and his police. So we have

to back China off, and we have the leverage to do this. I hear people asking what are we going to do? It is going to take too long.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Your solution is, No. 1, to make sure that

Slobodan Milosevic is arrested as a war criminal.

Mr. DIOGUARDI. Absolutely. You have to do something more than

just wish it.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. No. 2 is to get Russia and China out of the

way.

Mr. DIOGUARDI. They need our trade and our economy. They

need our aid, and we have to assert that.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Do you have another point to make? Otherwise, I think we need to get onto the panel.

Mr. DIOGUARDI. There is a reason to do it. This will prevent another Balkan war. If we don’t do this, you are heading for another

Balkan war. I know the Albanian people. They are certainly not

going to go back under Serbian sovereignty. So we need to find a

solution. I have pointed the way. You guys have to find a resolution.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. May we put the next panel up, because we

are going to have a vote in 20 minutes.

Mr. DIOGUARDI. Thank you for the hearing.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you. You are making sure that your

entre is used for righteous causes.

29

We are proceeding now with the second panel. We have Ms.

Linda Dana. She is from a town in the center of most of the heavy

fighting, and she is a former medical student and will testify about

her family’s and her own personal experiences during the war. I

am grateful to Mr. Pomeroy who has actually arranged for Ms.

Dana’s appearance here today. Would you like to say a few words

in introduction?

Mr. POMEROY. I met Linda Dana when I had my trip in December. She is in the United States at this point in time acting as a

medical interpreter for two children who are undergoing medical

procedures in Cleveland. So it was very fortunate, I believe, for us

that she happens to be in the country at the time of this important

hearing, and the Chairman was very kind to acquiesce to my request that she testify.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. If you have a written statement for the

record, if you can put that in the record. If you can summarize in

just a couple of minutes for your testimony, then we will have everyone summarize and come back for questions for everyone on the

panel. We want to make sure that everyone gets heard.

STATEMENT OF LINDA DANA, INSTITUTIONAL CONTRACTOR

IN KOSOVO, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR MIGRATION

Ms. DANA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, and Congressman Pomeroy. My name is Linda Dana. I am

from Gjakova in the western region of Kosovo. I am happy and

grateful to have the opportunity to speak with you today about

missing and imprisoned people, an issue that touches many Albanian families in Kosovo, including mine. It is estimated that 4,500

Kosovar Albanians are imprisoned in Serbia and are still unaccounted for. To date, Serb authorities have not been forthcoming

with any information. Until we know the fate of our family members and fellow citizens, the war will not be over for us. I am here

today to ask the U.S. Government to help us find out what happened to these people.

Today, I speak for the people of my city, prisoners and missing

persons. Before the war, I was a medical student. I was born and

grew up in Gjakova, the third largest municipality in Kosovo.

Gjakova was both a cultural and industrial center. The prewar population of the city and surrounding villages was approximately

141,000 residents; 2 percent were Serbs.

Kosovar Albanians were not free. At best we are second class

citizens. We could not hold jobs in state-supported enterprises, attend state secondary schools and universities, or travel freely. We

were forced to live in a parallel system, but we survived.

The war came to Dukagjini region in western Kosovo in the summer of 1998, long before NATO bombing. The city of Gjakova was

almost totally blockaded. Travel in and out of the city was dangerous if not impossible. There was continual heavy fighting in villages around Gjakova between Serb military forces, the KLA and

civilians. On March 24, 1999, Serb military and paramilitary forces

burned the historical sections of Gjakova to the ground in an act

of revenge. For 450 years Old Town was built, and after one night

it is gone. The burning of Old Town marked the beginning of terror

for us because it was a symbol of pride of this community.

30

During the next 21⁄2 months, many people were forced to leave

the city. Of the almost 60 percent that stayed, 1,500 people were

either killed or captured by Serb forces. Some are known prisoners,

but the fate of many other remains unknown.

In the city, paramilitary forces went from home to home, sometimes torturing, looting, or rounding up men and boys. There are

stories of people being killed who refused to open their doors to police. Civilians were forced to hide in their homes. As many as 30

people gathered in one house, posted lookouts and waited for Serb

police.

On the night of April 1, my neighborhood was in flames. I was

alone with my mother and father because my brothers had been on

the run for 5 days. I don’t know how we survived. On the morning

of April 2, we were forced to leave our home with thousands of people.

I left with my childhood memories, with my youth songs, but

without my brothers. In the hope that we would find my brothers

among the lines of people, we walked for 9 hours to get to the Albanian border and stood there for 2 rainy nights until we reached

Kukes.

But my brothers never came. They never passed the border of

hope; rather, they are forced to stay in the city of hell and be

threatened every minute with death.

After 72 long days the war was finished, but not my suffering

and the suffering of many Albanian families. I had lost my home,

and my second brother was missing in town, together with thousands of people all over from Kosovo.

Between May 7 and May 15, 300 people were taken from their

homes. At 8:30 a.m., on May 10, paramilitary forces entered the

street Asim Vokshi, at my uncles’s house where my brother was

staying. They separated men and boys from women. Then they beat

an old lady who refused to let go of her sons. They forced the other

women to leave the streets. According to eyewitness accounts, 30

men, including my brother and 9 members of my large family were

taken into the street where the police checked documents, beat

some of them and shot the others. The bodies were later removed.

Witnesses also claim that they saw some men forced into a police

van which was driven away. We don’t know who the men in the

van were.

My story is not unique. It is just one of the stories that people

have to tell. It just happens that I am here and telling the story.

It is hard to go back and to face your destroyed town and face your

friends and relatives. The story of my hometown remains painful

and unfinished. The drama continues. Every Friday people stop

working for an hour and they protest with photos of their loved

ones.

A citizens’ organization from Gjakova, the Office for Information

on Detainees and Missing People, has been working with national

and international organizations to gather information about missing, detained and imprisoned persons. It is known that when Serb

forces retreated, they transferred prisoners from Kosovo to Serbia.

According to the records, 370 people from the municipality of

Gjakova are in Serbian prisons; 703 people fate is still unknown.

Local organizations and the newly appointed Gjakova municipal

31

commission are working closely with the Kosovar Transition Council’s Commission on Prisoners and Detainees and the International

Committee of the Red Cross to bring this issue to the attention of

international community. They have called upon the former Republic of Yugoslavia and Serb authorities to provide a full accounting

of known dead and persons currently detained and imprisoned in

Serbia as well as immediate release and return of prisoners and

detainees. They have also requested that the Secretary General of

the United Nations appoint a special envoy to address the issue of

missing persons. On their behalf, I am asking the U.S. Government

to support these efforts.

I know that in the recent weeks representatives from the U.S.

Government and the governments of western Europe have expressed concern about incidents of ethnic violence directed at Serbs

and other minorities in Kosovo. We too want the violence to end

because until it does, the conflict in Kosovo will not be over. It is

also true that until we know what happened to the members of our

families, we will not be free to build a better future for all

Kosovars.

In closing, I want to say on behalf of all Albanian Kosovars, I

want to express our sincerest gratitude to the American people,

President Clinton, the Congress of the United States and all of the

NATO allies. It is because of you we are free, because of you we

are alive and we have human dignity back, and our eyes look forward to the future.

The task of rebuilding our lives and communities is well underway. I have seen firsthand the impact of the United States assistance to Kosovo as an employee of the USAID Office of Transition

Initiatives. I have worked in partnership with communities

throughout Kosovo to provide emergency relief, rebuild homes,

schools, and repair water and electrical networks. With continuing

support of the United States and the European allies, we will build

a better future. Please do not lose faith in us. I hope that my voice

has conveyed the clear message of gratitude and appreciation of all

Kosovar people and I thank you today.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much for your testimony.

Ms. DANA. Thank you for listening to me.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Dana appears in the appendix.]

Mr. ROHRABACHER. We appreciate your colleague from North Dakota to make sure your message got out. We will make sure that

whatever issues take place, that the issue of missing people will be

high on the list of priorities.

The next witness that I have down is Dr. Bajram Rexhepi. Dr.

Rexhepi is a medical doctor and he has been very actively involved

in Albania, and frankly he has focused attention of ethnic lines between northern and southern sectors.

You may proceed. I would suggest that when that bell goes off

for a vote, we have very little time left. We have 10–15 minutes

to get all of the testimony in, if you can summarize.

STATEMENT OF BAJRAM REXHEPI, M.D., CHAIRMAN OF THE

COMMUNE MITROVICE

Dr. REXHEPI. I am pleased, Mr. Chairman, that Mr. Gilman has

invited me to present testimony to your Committee regarding the

32

city of Mitrovice which has been illegally divided. I will focus on

the problems that are obstacles to resolving the Mitrovice issue and

that thereby prevent the establishment of peace and stability in

postwar Kosovo.

I want to begin with the roots of the problem. The following factors contribute greatly to the crisis in Mitrovice:

First, Milosevic has created a system of parallel Serbian institutions with Serbian agents from Belgrade acting in Mitrovice in an

unrestrained way.

Second, the Serbian regime has created executive councils in the

Serbian areas of Mitrovice to implement Serbian control in violation of U.N. Resolution 1244.

Third, undercover Serbian police masquerade as civilians, while

they in fact operate with sophisticated communications equipment

and weapons.

Fourth, parallel courts operate in a continuation of Serbian prewar trials.

Fifth, even local services, such as elementary schools, high

schools, the universities, and the hospitals, are provided by a parallel system of local institutions and communes.

The current reality in postwar Kosovo is that, Albanians have always been cooperative, with the aim of creating, as soon as possible, joint organs of local administration. The Serbian side has

been marked by a lack of cooperation, intentional obstruction of efforts to create a joint administration, and outright acts of violence.

This behavior belies the reality of what is happening inside the

Serbian population at the local level. Many Serbs are actually

ready and willing to cooperate, but they have been prevented from

doing so by extremists who have threatened them and their relatives with death.

I will try to be short. Serbia wants to divide Mitrovice and have

control of the Trepca mines. In order to keep the mineral wealth

of Trepca in his hands, Milosevic must dominate the political dynamics in the region. He is trying to create a geographical and ethnic connection between Serbia and the northwestern part of

Kosovo. The populations of Peposaviq and Zubinpotok, for example,

are now 90 percent Serbian and 10 percent Albanian. With the ethnic cleansing of the northern part of Mitrovice, the city is now divided by the Iber River between Serbians in the north and an Albanian majority in the southern part.

The northern sector is, as I stated earlier, a haven for Serbian

war criminals, gangs, and members of organized criminal syndicates. Their unrestrained movement between Serbia and Kosovo

and their stockpiling of weapons has been very visible. It is becoming increasingly apparent that Milosevic wants to control the

northwestern part of Kosovo as the first step in a strategy to destabilize or attack Montenegro, the Sandzak, and Kosovo. The principal source of provocation and new conflict is the continuing existence of Milosevic’s regime.

In order to prevent the permanent partitioning of Mitrovice, the

multinational KFOR forces must control the flow of arms and use

of covert communication devices on both sides of the city. The border between Serbia and Kosovo must be controlled. Under U.N.

33

Resolution 1244, Serbian troops and nonresidents of Kosovo must

remain 5 kilometers behind the border.

The U.N. police must play an active professional role in the life

of the city. The arrest of criminals and the removal of troublemakers will lower tensions and make it possible to begin the path

to peaceful coexistence between Albanians and Serbs. All residents

of Mitrovice should be assisted in returning to their homes and

buildings on both sides of the city. Schools that have been occupied

by Serbs must be released, so that students may return to their

classrooms. Steps must be taken to reactivate the economy with an

emphasis on the stimulation of small- and medium-sized businesses. This cannot happen unless joint institutions and a local administration are established immediately.

Regarding the latter, the existing measures set forth by the

Transitional Council of Kosovo to ensure freedom of movement

throughout Mitrovice, while not ideal, should nevertheless be implemented as soon as possible. There is a pressing need to increase

the efficiency of UNMIK’s civilian administration. This could be accomplished, in part, through closer and more complete collaboration between UNMIK, the police, and KFOR and greater engagement with the local population.

I want to close with a word of thanks. In spite of all of the problems that Mitrovice continues to face, the NATO intervention in

Kosovo stopped Milosevic from implementing full-scale genocide,

created the possibilities for the return of the Albanian population,

and provided a path that ultimately will enable us to create conditions for a normal life. Without this action by the West, especially

by the United States, with the constructive commitment of the

Congress, the world would have abandoned us and itself to barbarism.

Thank you.

I would like to present some documentation about the structural

nature of the population because before the war, it was 62 percent

Albanian, and there has been much ethnic cleansing.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. We are happy to put that into the record.

[The prepared statement and additional documentation of Dr.

Rexhepi appears in the appendix.]

Mr. ROHRABACHER. We are now joined by Congressman Engel

from New York who has been a real hero in this effort over the

years and we recognize not only his good heart, but his tremendous

energy that he has put out in this part of the world to try to save

people’s lives and bring about peace in that area.

We will have a couple more testimonies, and then questions and

answers. The next witness is Dr. Muhamet Mustafa, and he is from

an economic think tank that is focused on some of the requirements that are necessary for the Kosovar economy to become independent and for Kosovo to become a real and legitimate country,

and we are very interested in your analysis. You may proceed.

STATEMENT OF MUHAMET MUSTAFA, PRESIDENT, RIINVEST

INSTITUTE FOR DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH

Mr. MUSTAFA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, ladies and gentlemen, it is a great honor and unique priviVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:46 Jan 08, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00037 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 68286.TXT HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1
34

lege for me to have the opportunity to address you during these

challenging times for Kosovo.

I will stress only some points in my speech because we are behind schedule, it seems.

My organization has conducted several surveys to identify the

impact of the war on Kosovo, which I would like to share with you

today in order to illustrate our challenges. During the war, about

88 percent of the Albanian population was deported out of Kosovo

or displaced from their residences in Kosovo. Families’ incomes

were reduced by 70 percent; 70 to 80 percent of household goods

were destroyed or looted. The private housing stock was reduced by

40 percent.

In commercial life, 90 percent of private companies suffered some

form of damage. Livestock and farming equipment levels were reduced by 50 percent. The situation in our socially owned companies

and public companies was compounded by technical degeneration

from the last 10 years of rule by the Serbian regime. Our unemployment rate immediately prewar was 74 percent. When we consider the systematic destruction of the Milosevic regime in interethnic relations during the last 10 years and the terrible social and

psychological consequences of the war for thousands of families and

individuals in Kosovo, we have a more complete picture of the devastation in postwar Kosovo.

However, there is good news to share. We estimate that about 95

percent of the deported and displaced population have returned in

or near to their previous residences, and are showing their interest

in rebuilding their lives. Family businesses such as shops, restaurants, handicrafts, and services have been reactivated. Around

70 percent of small and medium enterprises have restarted and increased their turnover by 40 percent. Employment increased by 27

percent and salaries 64 percent compared to 1998. Farming and

land cultivation lags behind due to the large-scale devastation of

the villages.

Public services and utilities have been reactivated but with significant problems due to the consequences of the decade of neglect

and current inefficiencies in developing central and municipal administrative structures.

The U.N. administration has made significant efforts to establish

the basic legal framework for a market economy. However, the participation of Kosovars in this administration and the reconstruction

process needs to be advanced. There is a need for more direct

Kosovar input in a process that will bring a sense of ownership in

it and in policymaking. This is essential for public support and the

strengthening of the rule of law and a sustainable public finance

system.

There is a feeling that the U.N. administration is being built

more under the influence of the political spectrum rather than

working to include and strengthen civil society capacities and technical resources. Shifting from emergency to a sustainable phase of

reconstruction strategy should include building up economic independence with an open economy and regional and European integration. Kosovo’s advantages are human capital, entrepreneurial

spirit and energy, a positive attitude to transitional reforms, natVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:46 Jan 08, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00038 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 68286.TXT HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1
35

ural resources, optimism, and the people’s strong determination to

rebuild their country.

Kosovo is a post-colonial country with heavy war consequences.

When Kosovo had broad autonomy during the seventies, its economic viability substantially improved, and during 10 years of

peaceful resistance Kosovars survived within their own institutions. In today’s postwar environment, they are exhibiting an impressive readiness to rebuild their society. Technical and financial

assistance needs to capture this energy and should be focused on

increasing development capacities according to modern development concepts based on entrepreneurship rather than the creation

of yet another aid economy.

The quality of economic viability not only of Kosovo but also the

other countries in the region will depend on the outcome of the current efforts within the Stability Pact and other initiatives.

Mr. Chairman, the stance respectively of this House and the U.S.

Administration toward the Kosovar issue was essential for our

hope in the hard times that we have just passed through, and it

is of key importance not only from the perspective of building up

a democratic society in Kosovo, but for the transformation of the

Balkans into a region of cooperation free from the burdens of the

past and history. From their perspective, Kosovars believe in European values and they understand the importance of the role of the

European Union in the postwar period, but we believe also that the

role of the United States in Kosovo and in this whole, sensitive region is crucial. For it provides the most effective channel to overcome the historical burdens that plague the Balkans and to promote the values of openness in this new era of globalization.

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, let me express my

gratitude toward our [Riinvest] American partners, the Office for

International Private Enterprises, the National Endowment for Democracy, USAID, and Freedom House. These organizations have

assisted in the growth and development of Riinvest, the private

think tank in Kosovo that I represent, and who work closely with

us in enhancing Kosovar capacities for economic and social development and democracy. Also I thank very much the American Albanian Civic League for bringing here the reality of Kosovo. Thank

you very much.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. It is very good to hear that the National Endowment for Democracy has been investing in this type of longterm approach and analysis. We appreciate your testimony.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Mustafa appears in the appendix.]

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Next, if I pronounce it correctly, is Ilir

Zherka, Executive Director, National Albanian American Council,

which is a nonprofit organization which fosters a better understanding of Albanian issues and promoting peace, human rights

and development in the Balkans.

STATEMENT OF ILIR ZHERKA, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR,

NATIONAL ALBANIAN AMERICAN COUNCIL

Mr. ZHERKA. Thank you, very much, Mr. Chairman. I will submit

my full statement for the record. You know, I think that the international community has had a mixed record in postwar Kosovo.

36

There have been some successes and some failures. But the answer

to winning the peace is more U.S. leadership, not less. I think the

American people understand this. There was a poll conducted last

month that showed that two-thirds of the American people think

that the U.S. military should stay in Kosovo until we finish the job,

the transition to democracy and also protecting the people. That

poll, Mr. Chairman, you will be happy to know, also showed that

79 percent, close to 80 percent of the American people, support a

proposal to create a democratic, independent Kosovo.

Getting back to our involvement, I think that the American people support it and it is critical here, but in order for us to win the

peace, we have to maintain our flexibility and our focus, and I

think that H.R. 4053 unfortunately limits that flexibility and diverts some of our focus.

On the question of flexibility, we need to be in there, we need

to be doing the right thing. And, sure, the Europeans ought to be

paying the bulk of the expenses on reconstruction, and they are.

This policy is working and I think the Administration has gotten

the message, but I think a hard cap sends a bad message that we

are willing, if the Europeans reduce their spending by 50 percent,

to follow in suit, which a hard cap would result in. I think it also

would be very difficult to administer. You would have the Administration looking over its back to figure out where they are in relationship to the Europeans, and that is not what we want them to

do.

It would also take away one of our strengths in the postwar

Kosovo. Again, if you are having to look over your shoulder and figure out what you are spending in relationship to other people who

are pledging one thing today and delivering something else later,

I think it makes it difficult. That is the first issue.

The second is the question of our focus, and I think that another

thing that is unfortunate about the bill is not only that we set this

spending cap, but then we protect money to Montenegro, Macedonia and Serbia against a cap. Although this bill doesn’t limit aid

to Kosovo and Albania, I think the message is that Macedonia shall

be a priority for funding. The message is that these other places

are a priority and maybe Albania and Kosovo are not.

We haven’t won the peace in Kosovo, and we need to be more engaged, not less. We need to be focused on winning the peace there.

As all of us know, the Albanian people are staunch, pro-Americans.

They believe that they have a special relationship with this country

that started with Woodrow Wilson and continues on to today. We

should cultivate that relationship and finish the job in Kosovo and

we should have a regional approach to aid that emphasizes burden

sharing by the Europeans at a much larger level than ours but that

treats the region fairly and adequately.

And I think if we are going to have a priority in the region,

Kosovo ought to be it. It is the most dangerous place there, and it

continues to be the most dangerous place. I would say that this

bill—although I understand the intention of the sponsors of the

bill, I think it sends a mixed message to the region—would limit

the flexibility of the Administration and also would focus our energy, we believe, at the National American Albanian Council where

we ought not be going.

37

That is a summary of my testimony.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Zherka appears in the appendix.]

Mr. ZHERKA. I wanted to offer the results of the poll that I mentioned to add to the record.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Without objection, so ordered.

We appreciate your summarizing your testimony. It was forceful

and direct, and we thank you for that. I will now—let me just say

a couple of words and then I will turn it over to my colleagues.

About 8 years ago now, my attention was first drawn to the Balkans, and most Americans didn’t pay much attention to the Balkans until all of this happened. Let me just note that I don’t believe that what has happened there is something that was mandated by history and by the underlying animosities between races

and ethnic groups and religions which went on. I think the U.S.

Government, not just starting with this Administration but starting with the Bush Administration, blew a chance for peace in the

Balkans. I think our problem in the Balkans stems back to a

speech given by Secretary of State Jim Baker in Belgrade when he

gave the impression to Milosevic and his crew that stability was

America’s No. 1 goal in the Balkans and that they would be the

instrument for stability. Shortly after that, Milosevic sent his tanks

into the neighboring countries.

That was very sad because I think before that time if the stress

would have been on freedom and free trade and enterprise and opportunity and justice, which is what—frankly, which is what Ronald Reagan stressed compared to George Bush, his successor—a

free system could have been established in which people wouldn’t

have felt so threatened. If there would have been democracy in Serbia and a more democratic system there, people could have, I think,

cooperated.

It is one of the true tragedies of our time that what evolved

wasn’t a more peaceful evolution into a better world after the Cold

War ended in the Balkans but instead devolved into this mess. As

I say, I think the policy of the United States Government—when

you do not stand for freedom and you talk about stability, in the

end you don’t have stability or freedom. Needless to say, another

to way to put it, pragmatism just doesn’t work. And I know that

sounds rather ironic, but if one is trying to be pragmatic instead

of principle-based, it doesn’t work in the long run.

Nowhere was that brought home more to me than the fact that

Croatia has had—people say, who are the bad guys; they are all

bad guys. Well, I am afraid that is just not the case. Croatia has

had a democratic election, and in that democratic election, the

party that was in power has been removed and a new party has

been put in its place; and Croatia has a relatively free system now,

and Serbia still has the same old dictatorship and same old click,

and there is no more reason to think that the people of Kosovo

should be less free than the Croatians or Albanians or any of the

others. And yet our government still insists on calling Serbia Yugoslavia.

The basic problem I see is that we have not been willing to insist

that the fundamentals are spelled out and that we instead made

a principled stand. And the most important principled stand is that

ballots and not bullets should determine people’s future, and the

38

people of Kosovo have a right, just like everyone else, to have ballots determine their future rather than bullets, especially if those

are bullets are from guns from Serbians and people intent on forcing their control over a much larger population, as it is in Kosovo.

So I appreciate your testimony today. Let me just say we do have

a real hero. I tried to be helpful and Joe has been here working

over the years to draw our attention. One of the true heroes of your

effort has been Eliot who has just earned our respect. I would like

to ask if Eliot has some questions, and then we will go to Mr. Pomeroy.

Mr. POMEROY. I think it appropriate we yield to a hero and just

get back to a Member later.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you.

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you. Now that my colleagues have swelled my

head, I want to thank them both for their kind remarks. They are

both very kind because both of them have been stalwarts in the

fight for freedom, particularly in the Balkans. I know Mr. Rohrabacher is going to be there within the next couple of weeks, and

I know that he will come back and report on what he saw. He has

been one of the most engaged Members on the issue of Kosovo and

the Balkans and really believes in what he says in terms of freedom. We disagree very little regarding the way that things ought

to be in the Balkans.

Earl Pomeroy represents a district in the heartland of America,

and you would think that he wouldn’t be concerned with things

that happen overseas, and he is as concerned as anybody else.

Mr. Rexhepi, I saw you Sunday night in New York. It is good to

see you again.

Dr. Mustafa, we have had an opportunity to meet. Ms. Dana, we

met yesterday, and that was a pleasure. Mr. Zherka and I have

gone to Kosovo together numerous times and is a good personal

friend of mine.

Rather than ask questions, I want to emphasize a few things.

Dana, Mr. Rohrabacher, said it very well. The only solution, in my

estimation, long term for Kosovo is independence; self-determination. There is no other solution. It is ridiculous to think that the

Serbs could ever again run or control Kosovo or that Kosovo could

be autonomous within Serbia. It is ridiculous. Ten years ago, 12

years ago, sure, that would have been possible. It would have been

welcomed. Twelve years ago I would have thought a third republic

would have been a solution within Yugoslavia. It is not a solution

now. It is ludicrous.

What makes it difficult is that we entered this war, we won the

war, and now we have to win the peace. We seem to have adopted

conflicting goals. While we have driven the Serb army out of

Kosovo, oppressive force is not what the Serb population wants. I

believe everyone has a right to live in Kosovo. We have driven

Milosevic and his miserable people who practice apartheid and

genocide and ethnic cleansing out of Kosovo. They can never come

back in. And as Mr. Rohrabacher pointed out, people here who oppose Kosovo independence say it is not a good idea to have countries break up. If we allow each ethnic group to form their own

country, you would have hundreds and hundreds of ethnic groups

39

from all over the world breaking countries apart and forming their

own country.

Well, that might be true if Yugoslavia still existed, but Yugoslavia doesn’t exist anymore, as Mr. Rohrabacher pointed out. It is

just Serbia and Montenegro, and the Montenegrans want out, and

so it is ludicrous to call it Yugoslavia. The Bosnians and the Croats

and the Macedonians all had the right to self-determination and

independence, and all had the right to form their own nation, the

people of Kosovo have the same right, and the people of Montenegro have the same right as far as I can see.

Unless NATO or the United Nations or the West wants to make

Kosovo a protectorate forever, and I don’t think that is the solution,

then we ought to be looking at independence and looking at ways

to achieve that independence. I think the quickest way to achieve

that, and it is the best way, is to make sure that democracy establishes itself quickly in Kosovo, we should have elections even on

the municipal and local level as quickly as possible, and then on

the national level so that the people of Kosovo can run their own

nation and be a democratic nation.

Therefore, I think the logical conclusion for the world would be

that they deserve to have their independence. I think that is an

issue that I am going to keep fighting for. It is good for Kosovo and

it is good for the United States, freedom and democracy. It makes

the most sense.

As Mr. Zherka pointed out, nearly 80 percent of Americans support independence for Kosovo. We should not stay there any longer

than we have to, but we shouldn’t leave 1 day earlier than we have

to, and we shouldn’t leave until independence is solidified.

I wanted to also highlight the issue of the prisoners, at least

5,000 of them, Albanians who have been taken back to Belgrade

and Serbia when Milosevic and his people retreated. We must continue to urge the release of the Kosovars who are illegally imprisoned by Milosevic. We need to constantly raise that issue and constantly force that issue.

Those are really the statements that I wanted to make. I just

wanted to throw out to the panel what you see, if anyone would

care to comment, as the most important thing that can be done

right now. I tell all my friends back in Kosovo that it is really important to work together. Everyone in Kosovo agrees on the same

thing, and that is independence. There may be differences on how

best to achieve it, but everyone agrees that independence is the

only solution.

I would like to ask what we ought to be doing that we are not

doing in the United States. What do you think are the issues that

we ought to emphasize in meetings with Dr. Kouchner? He is very

frustrated that the European nations have not come forward with

the aid, the police or the things that are needed. What do you see

are the most important things, and what can we do right now in

the Congress to solidify that?

Mr. ENGEL. And, Mr. Mayor, let me just quickly—I talked too

long, but I want to just mention one other issue that is dear to your

heart, and that is the division of your city. We cannot, I believe,

continue to stand idly by and allow Mitrovice to be partitioned because the partitioning, the division of Mitrovice, is the effective

40

partition of Kosovo. We cannot allow the partition of Kosovo from

the bridge north through the mines and then up through Serbia.

So, I want to you to know that your struggle is our struggle because we must not allow that continued division of your city.

Dr. REXHEPI. Any kind of division of Mitrovice and partition of

Kosovo is unacceptable. I tried to say, very shortly, that I think the

best solution for stability in the Balkans is the independence of

Kosovo. I think Professor Stavileci gave in written form one project

about that, and it represents my way.

Mr. MUSTAFA. May I add something? I think that the most important thing is to channel the determination and energy of

Kosovars to fully participate in reconstruction and in building up

institutions, municipal elections, the parliamentary and other elections, and to assist Kosovars to inject this energy in building up a

democratic society. And that in economics, we just need an open

system of market economy. We need technical assistance to engage

our population, which is young and which is ready to accept new

technological challenge. So we need to stimulate private sector

small- and medium-size enterprises. We need to stimulate family

businesses and to urge them toward a market economy.

We need to avoid the confusion that was created about the ownership of socially-owned companies. The ownership of sociallyowned companies of Kosovo is the same as ownership of sociallyowned companies in Slovenia and in other parts of Europe. So

there is no necessity, there is no reason to make a confusion that

we do not need and that which doesn’t exist.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much.

Mr. MUSTAFA. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I am submitting several documents for the record.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. We will be very happy to put that in the

record.

Mr. Pomeroy.

Mr. POMEROY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank you for

your conduct of the hearing, letting all the witnesses go, and driving us right to the vote which has now been called. I think you

have facilitated a full discussion this afternoon. I appreciate it very

much and appreciate Eliot’s comments as well.

A couple of points. First, relative to the missing persons—clearly

Ms. Dana, you have made a compelling statement today—let us

know the personal impact as well as the importance really in terms

of the recovery of the region, and I think that you have certainly

refocused this Committee on the imperative of a full accounting of

missing persons and release of prisoners of war by Serbia, before

any sanctions can be lifted, as one of the utmost priorities with

which we hold the continuation of sanctions. We will need to continue to press as hard as we can on this question.

More broadly, I want to ask the panel about what might be the

Kosovar perception of the legislation under consideration to cap the

United States’ participation in the recovery. You have indicated, I

think each of you, the tremendous appreciation of the role, the

leadership role the United States has played in bringing things to

where they are to date. This isn’t aimed at you, it is aimed at our

European allies, and we want their full participation. But would

there be a perception of the people of Kosovo that we are walking

41

away, we are diminishing our role, and what would be the psychological dimensions that this bill would have for the people there?

Mr. ZHERKA. If I can start off, and then we can turn to the other

witnesses, I think there has already been a little bit of that signal.

And certainly people up here on the Hill are frustrated with the

responsiveness or the nonresponsiveness of our allies, but in the recent action here in the Congress, you had Administration requests

for supplemental spending for Kosovo drastically reduced. The request was for about $150-some-odd million. The allocation was for

12.5. Last week there was a vote in the House on the Kasich

amendment, and of course now there is this bill, not to compare

this bill to those actions certainly, but I think there is a message

that is coming from the Congress that there is frustration here and

I think that that is understood.

This bill represents yet another signal, I think, of people of getting the message. But we have on this bill supporters of the Albanian people who have been there, like the Chairman and others in

the past, and so I guess the message to our supporters who are on

this bill is that the cap puts a limit on flexibility where it probably

ought not—it doesn’t need to be there.

Mr. POMEROY. It seems to me, we have got to roll here, you

know; we have got these folks, they are facing unbelievably difficult

circumstances in the rebuilding. I have seen it. The devastation is

unbelievable. They are dealing with personal grief circumstances,

virtually everyone, in some measure, and it would seem to me that

if our frustration is the Europeans, this deals with the Europeans.

But for Congress to move this legislation is going to kick the very

people who are down and we don’t intend to kick at a time when

the United States has been there. We are the people that have

brought them freedom today. We are the people that are almost— that are very important to them in terms of a feeling of hope and

promise in the future. And without feeling that things are going to

get better tomorrow, I don’t know how in the world they can confront the terribly difficult rebuilding challenges that face them

right now.

And so I just think that this would have unintended consequences. No one on this Committee means to send that signal,

but I think it is inescapably drawn from this action.

Ms. Dana, do you have a comment on that?

Ms. DANA. Yeah. I would like to add here we have a big responsibility ourselves, too, on establishing a civil society, and we know

that. We still have to say that we have a great people, and which

half of them are youth. That is good to have, smart young people.

But what I was hearing these days is like we are a kid that just

started walking, and pushing a kid that has started walking not

to walk as fast as he needs to walk and he is willing to walk is

the same that is doing Kosovars today. Freedom has brought to us

a big energy. We know that, but we have a long way to walk. It

is going to be bumpy, it is going to be hard. We still need your support on that, and my words are words of ordinary people. I am facing these people every day in the field, and just saying to them

that I am an employee of USAID, which is a governmental organization, I see a big smile. I am defending that smile today here in

front of you. I wish I can do it and you can see it. Thank you.

42

Mr. POMEROY. Beautifully said.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much. I think we should

close on that. I appreciate all the hard work that Joe has put into

this and all of you. I appreciate you coming halfway around the

world here to talk to us. We are the United States of America. If

we don’t stand for freedom we don’t stand for anything, and we are

very proud that the people of Albania want to have democratic government and have the courage and strength to stand up to tyranny, and we are on your side. So God bless you, and this hearing

is now adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 6:10 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.]

(43)

DEVELOPMENTS IN THE BALKANS: CRIME

AND CORRUPTION IN BOSNIA

WEDNESDAY, JULY 19, 2000

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, Washington, DC.

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:13 a.m. in room

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Benjamin A. Gilman

(Chairman of the Committee) presiding.

Chairman GILMAN. The hearing will come to order. This morning’s hearing focuses on a distressing problem that threatens to undermine our accomplishments in Bosnia and perhaps elsewhere in

the Balkans. Pervasive crime and corruption has tainted all levels

of Bosnia’s society, particularly its political institutions and its

economy, and is now jeopardizing the basic peace framework that

was mandated by the Dayton Peace Accord.

This is a principal finding by our General Accounting Office pursuant to a study they conducted that was requested by our Ranking Democratic Member, Mr. Gejdenson; our Committee Vice

Chairman, Mr. Bereuter; and myself last September. Because this

finding has such profound implications for our goals in Bosnia and

perhaps lessons for our mission in Kosovo, I have convened this

hearing in order to allow our Members of our International Relations Committee to have the opportunity to review and question

the GAO authors of this report and also to hear our State Department’s response to the report.

I am informed that during a review of the GAO’s draft by all interested agencies in our government no one challenged the essential finding concerning the impact of endemic crime and corruption

in Bosnia. Given that fact, I am anxious to hear, as I am sure my

colleagues are, of just what we are doing to confront this important

issue. I am also informed that our good Ambassador, Tom Miller,

who has been in charge in Sarajevo since last August, has made

it his top priority to root out and resolve difficulties that have impeded the Bosnian economy.

Ambassador Miller is focused on the problem of privatization and

has withheld U.S. funds that would go to supporting the budgets

of our two main entities in Bosnia, the Federation and the

Republika Srpska, until the appropriate measures are put in place

by the local political leaders that will ensure a fair and effective

privatization of the publicly held assets in Bosnia.

To be fair to the Bosnian people and the situation itself, we

should note that Bosnia is not only a post- conflict situation where

a devastating war raged for nearly 4 years, forced nearly have of

44

Bosnia’s citizens to become refugees or internally displaced persons, killing thousands more in the massive distribution of problem, but is also a post-communist society which has not had the

benefit of functioning Democratic institutions nor the experience of

a free-market-based economy.

Our purpose today is not to be engaged in the blame game, but

to determine what needs to be done in order to salvage our policy

in Bosnia. We have spent a billion dollars in providing assistance

in Bosnia since 1995 and billions more for troops serving there as

part of the NATO peacekeeping mission.

Clearly, our investment is huge, and we can neither ignore this

problem or simply walk away from our effort. We hope that our

witnesses today, therefore, can provide us with some incites and

some suggestions as to what we need to do to make our Bosnian

policy a success.

We are joined today by Harold Johnson, who is the Associate Director of GAO’s International Relations and Trade Issues; Mr.

James Shafer, the Assistant Director of that office; and David

Bruno, who is the Evaluator in Charge of this study. Subsequently,

we will here from Ambassador James Pardew from the State Department, who is the principal Deputy Special Advisor to the President and the Secretary of State for Dayton implementation and

Kosovo.

I now would ask if our Ranking Minority Member of the Committee, the gentleman from Connecticut, Mr. Gejdenson, has any

opening statement. Mr. Gejdenson.

Mr. GEJDENSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and, I think, all of

us who believe in a dynamic American foreign policy have to be

vigilant when it comes to looking at what happens to American resources. And while the vast majority of American resources got to

where they were supposed to go and did apparently much better

than any of our allies, any time money is not achieving the targeted effect, it obviously is something we need to focus on. So I

think there is obviously good news here as well as some small

areas of major concern, I think, for many of our European allies.

One of the things that I have worked on this year is legislation

dealing with fighting corruption, and if we look at the crises

around the globe in many of the most impoverished nations, we can

often look to decades of corruption and thievery by the elected leaders. Clearly, in a case like Nigeria, the newly elected democratic

government faces a very daunting task as a result of the theft of

billions of dollars in what should be a very rich country.

So this is an important hearing, and I think that figuring out

ways to help establish practices that fight corruption and bribery

is something the United States ought to take a leadership role in.

I think we can commend the people involved in America’s AID program for generally doing a very good job, and we want to work

with them to make that even more successful. Thank you, Mr.

Chairman.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Gejdenson. If there are no

other Members seeking recognition, I now invite Harold Johnson.

Mr. Johnson has served as director of the International Relations

and Trade Issues at the General Accounting Office since 1996, and

prior to that he served in a number of senior positions at GAO, inVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:46 Jan 08, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00048 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 68286.TXT HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1
45

cluding director of international affairs issues, foreign economic-assistance issues, and military manpower issues. He has been a recipient of many awards during his career, such as the Distinguished Service Award.

Mr. Johnson is joined today by his deputy, James Shafer, who

has also served as assistant director of GAO’s European office, and

he has been the assistant director of acquisitions in the GAO’s

Army group and previously led numerous reviews of military and

international issues.

We are also pleased to have with us David Bruno, who is the

evaluator in charge of the report that is the subject of today’s hearing, and Mr. Bruno has participated in or directed evaluations of

United States and the United Nations’ foreign affairs and assistance programs for over 10 years, including U.S. agricultural-credit

programs for the Soviet Union, USAID business-development programs in Russia, child-survival programs in Africa, and

counterdrug assistance in Latin America.

Gentlemen, we welcome our entire panel. We appreciate your

good work on this report. Mr. Johnson, you may now proceed, and

you may summarize your statement, which will be entered in full

in the record, whichever you may deem appropriate. Please proceed.

STATEMENT OF HAROLD JOHNSON, ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR,

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND TRADE ISSUES, NATIONAL

SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS DIVISION, U.S.

GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. We are

pleased to be here today to discuss the report we completed at your

request and the request of Congressmen Gejdenson and Bereuter

on the impact of crime and corruption on the implementation of the

Dayton Agreements. The agreement, which was signed in December 1995, created the Bosnian National Government and recognized

two entities that were created during the war, the Bosnian-Croat

Federation and the Republika Srpska.

During the past 4 years, from 1996 through 1999, the international community has provided about $4 billion to finance the

civil aspects of the agreement. About $1 billion of that is from the

United States—slightly over $1 billion is from the United States.

More importantly, as of March this year, U.S. military costs to support the agreement have totaled over $10 billion.

The United States, NATO, and the Peace Implementation Council have developed conditions often called ‘‘benchmarks’’ to help determine when military forces can be withdrawn from Bosnia. Several of these conditions relate to reducing corruption.

Our report focused on three areas: First, how crime and publicsector corruption have affected implementation of the Dayton Peace

Agreement; second, what the international community has done to

improve Bosnia’s law enforcement and judicial systems; and, third,

how assistance resources are being safeguarded and whether such

assistance is being used in Bosnia in place of domestic revenues

lost to crime and corruption.

I would like to note at the outset that in doing our work we did

not conduct independent investigations of specific, corruption-reVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:46 Jan 08, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00049 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 68286.TXT HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1
46

lated cases. Instead, we examined studies, reports, and other documents published by NATO, the Department of State, the Agency

for International Development [USAID], the United Nations, and

many other international organizations. The evidence and conclusions presented in these documents are based on analysis and investigations of corruption in Bosnia.

We also interviewed an extensive list of more than 40 top officials, both governmental and nongovernmental, responsible for and

knowledgeable about programs and activities in Bosnia. We based

our conclusions and recommendations on this extensive documentation coupled with the first-hand experience and judgment of highlevel, international officials in Bosnia.

Very briefly, we found a near consensus opinion among officials

that we interviewed that crime and corruption in Bosnia is endemic

and that it is threatening the successful implementation of the

Dayton Peace Agreement and that until this situation is satisfactorily addressed, the conditions that would allow for the withdrawal of NATO-led forces cannot be met.

Although clearly some progress has been made and some of the

benchmark conditions have been met, progress in implementing the

conditions is not yet self-sustaining. Bosnia’s law-enforcement and

judicial systems are inadequate and institutionally incapable of

prosecuting cases of corruption or administering justice. Bosnian,

international, and U.S. efforts to correct weaknesses in these systems have achieved only limited success and have not measurably

reduced political influence over the judiciary or the economy.

We found that international assistance, including U.S. assistance, is generally not being lost to fraud and corruption and that

except for some budget support, such assistance has been protected

by numerous internal controls. However, we did find incidents of

corruption in the international-assistance effort.

More importantly, however, this assistance provided by the international community could supplant the hundreds of millions of dollars the Bosnian Government loses each year to customs fraud and

tax evasion. Moreover, the Bosnians spend a large percentage of

their revenues maintaining three competing militaries that are primarily designed to fight each other. According to the High Representative, the size and structure of these forces are incompatible

with the defense needs of Bosnia and are financially unsustainable.

The international community has provided about $407 million in

budget support to cover Bosnia’s budget deficits, and most of this

support has not been controlled or audited. The exception is the

support provided by the United States.

I would like to expand just briefly on each of the three points

that we looked at. Pervasive illegal activity is negatively affecting

the progress of reforming Bosnia’s legal, judicial, and economic systems; achieving U.S. policy objectives in Bosnia; and attaining the

Dayton Peace Agreement’s ultimate goal of self-sustaining peace.

Unless Bosnian officials make concerted efforts to address this

problem, the benchmarks that would allow for the withdrawal of

NATO-led forces cannot be met. According to U.S. and international organization officials, to date, Bosnian leaders have not

demonstrated sufficient political will to reform.

47

Bosnia’s nationalistic political parties continue to control all aspects of the government, the judiciary, and the economy. Thus,

they maintain the personal and financial power over their members

and authoritarian control over the country. We were told that Bosnian leaders from all ethnic groups may have little incentive to

combat corruption, since curbing corruption may reduce their ability to maintain control.

War-time, underground networks have turned into political/

criminal networks involving massive smuggling, tax evasion, and

trafficking in such things as women and stolen cars, and other

things. Investigations have shown that certain smuggling operations have been successful only with the participation of customs

officials.

According to the State Department, criminal elements involved

in narcotics trafficking have been credibly linked to public officials.

The proceeds of this narcotics trade are widely believed to support

illegal, parallel institutions maintained by ethnic extremists.

Numerous reports show, and international organization officials

confirm, that Bosnian law enforcement officers’ allegiance is often

to the ethnic, political parties rather than to the public. For example, police in some areas work for local party officials and protect

the business interests of the officials, intimidate citizens, and prevent return of refugees.

Similarly, political officials are involved at many stages in the judicial process. The selection of judges in Bosnia is a product of political patronage. Judges’ salaries are controlled by political-party

structures.

We were told that there are good and honest individuals

throughout the judicial system. However, criminal leaders, many of

whom are closely linked to ruling political parties, are ready to

threaten judges, prosecutors, police officers, lawyers, witnesses,

with violence, even death, to act in a particular way. Such influence over the courts often prevents cases involving organized crime

and corruption from being heard.

Bosnian, international, and U.S. anticorruption and judicial-reform efforts have been initiated over the past 4 years, but they

have achieved only limited success in reducing crime, corruption,

and political influence.

While international efforts could correct weaknesses in Bosnia’s

legal and judicial system and provide needed supporting structures

for the rule of law, Bosnian government efforts have primarily resulted in the creation of committees and commissions that have

failed to become operational or measurably reduce crime and corruption. The Office of the High Representative has developed a

strategy for coordinating international anticorruption efforts. However, the strategy essentially is a recitation of existing international efforts, and although the work of the international community is collegial, it is not truly coordinated.

Despite the lack of a truly coordinated effort, the international

organizations, including the European Commission, NATO, and the

United Nations, have implemented a number of anticorruption and

judicial-reform efforts. I will cite a few examples.

The European Commission’s Customs Assistance Office has established an anticorruption program that is considered the most

48

successful effort. The office has assisted in establishing customs

legislation and customs services at the entity level. Investigations

conducted and systems put in place by the office have identified incidents of corruption and illegal activities that have resulted in the

loss of millions of dollars in customs duties and tax revenues. In

addition, customs officials perpetrating illegal activities have been

exposed.

The NATO-led, Stabilization Force helped the entity armed

forces establish an office of inspector general to help eliminate

fraud and corruption in the entity armed forces. The office’s investigations have led to the removal, reassignment, or suspension of

noncompliant personnel.

Finally, the U.N.’s International Police Task Force, the IPTF, has

focused on restructuring, retraining, and democratizing local police.

The task force has established a certification process through which

each police officer is evaluated against specific criteria, including

whether they were involved in human-rights abuses during the

war.

In addition, the task force has created specialized units to train

Bosnian police in public-security issues such as organized crime,

drug-related activities, corruption, and terrorism. Some progress

has been made, but the linkages between the police and the political parties has not been broken.

The international community has implemented a number of efforts to make Bosnia’s weak and politically influenced judiciary

more independent and professional. The Office of the High Representative, for example, has imposed laws to expand the jurisdiction of the Federation Supreme Court and the Federation Prosecutor’s Office and provided special witness identity protection. In addition, the United Nations established the Judicial System Assessment Program in 1998 to monitor and assess the judicial system

in Bosnia. However, these and other efforts have had only minimal

impact on the problem, partly because high-level Bosnian officials

have not demonstrated a sufficient commitment to fighting crime

and corruption.

U.S. anticorruption efforts, led by the Agency for International

Development, seek to curtail corruption through the elimination of

the communist-era financial-control systems, primarily the payment bureaus, and by privatization of state-owned enterprises. Experience has shown that the best and possibly the only way to accelerate the establishment of a sound and competitive, commercial

banking system is to attract reputable foreign banks. Although efforts to establish a private banking system in Bosnia are progressing, the U.S. Government and the international community

have had little success in attracting prime-rated, international

banks to come to Bosnia.

Privatization has encountered problems, and corruption is a concern. According to the United Nations and other experts, the privatization process is another opportunity for government and party

officials to profit through corrupt activities. For example, officials

may solicit bribes from those interested in obtaining assets or sell

assets to themselves below value. Further privatization could legitimize political factions’ ownership of companies.

49

The documentation required to privatize Bosnian companies, including opening balance sheets and privatization plans, is being

provided by the enterprise managers who may themselves bid on

the companies, clearly a conflict of interest. Several officials told

the Agency for International Development that they were depressing the value of their firms so that they could purchase them for

less than their true value. Also, the Office of the High Representative publicly stated in April of this year that a majority of the already privatized companies now belong to the nationalist political

parties.

Finally, you asked about controls over international aid and

whether assistance supplants Bosnian funds. As I mentioned, the

United States and other international donors have established procedures for safeguarding assistance to Bosnia, and we found no evidence that assistance has been lost on a large scale because of

fraud or corruption.

Most of the $4 billion supported Bosnia’s physical reconstruction,

which has been largely successfully completed. However, we did

find instances of corruption within the international assistance effort. I will cite three examples.

The United States still has not recovered the approximately

$935,000 of U.S. Embassy operating funds and AID Business Development Program loan payments deposited in a bank that was

involved in corrupt activities and is now bankrupt, but the recovery

process is underway. In July 1998, AID’s Business Development

Program manager, a Foreign Service national, was terminated for

receiving payments for helping a loan applicant.

And the final example is about $340,000 in World Bank-provided

funds lost as a result of a procurement scheme perpetrated with

fraudulent documents. As of May, no arrests had occurred. There

may be other examples, but those are illustrative.

Despite the international community’s success at controlling the

use of assistance funds, such assistance has supplanted millions of

dollars the Bosnian governments lose every year to corrupt activities such as customs fraud and tax evasion. Determining the total

amount of revenue lost because of corrupt practices would be difficult, and the international community has not systematically attempted to make such a determination.

However, evidence gathered during successful customs investigations and a partial analysis by the Office of the High Representative showed that losses total hundreds of millions of dollars annually. For example, the Office of the High Representative concluded

that a moderate estimate of revenue lost to tax evasion in the

Republika Srpska is about $136 million, or 46 percent of the entity’s annual budget.

Due to shortfalls in revenue, partly because of corrupt practices

noted above, the entity governments incur budget deficits which

are then funded through direct budget support; that is, moneys

that are provided and not earmarked for a specific purpose. Most

of the $470 million committed by the international donor community for general budget support is not controlled or audited, although the $27 million committed by the United States has been

controlled and audited.

50

Meanwhile, the Federation and Republika Srpska budgeted

about 41 and 20 percent, respectively, of their average annual, domestic, financial revenues on military expenditures from 1997

through 2000, despite the High Representative’s opinion that sustaining three large, separate armies primarily designed to fight

each other, is not financially feasible.

If the Bosnian governments strengthened the rule of law and

identified ways to collect some or all of the hundreds of millions of

dollars lost annually as a result of widespread tax and customsduty evasion, the amount of budget support being provided might

not be needed.

Our report recommended that the Secretary of State take the

lead in a reassessment of U.S. strategy for assisting Bosnia. We believe that such a reassessment is necessary because without it the

United States and other donors may continue to fund initiatives

that have little hope of resulting in a self-sustaining, democratic

government and market economy based on the rule of law, and

thus allow for the withdrawal of NATO-led forces.

In particular, we believe State should consider whether supporting the provision of direct budget support is an appropriate

form of assistance in the current environment in Bosnia, and second, how it can support those political leaders in Bosnia whose

goals for addressing the corruption problem are consistent with the

goals of the United States and the rest of the international community.

We also suggested in our report that Congress may wish to require the State Department to certify that the Bosnian governments have taken concrete and measurable steps to implement

anticorruption programs and improve their ability to control smuggling and tax evasion. State disagreed with our recommendation.

According to the Department of State, by 1998, it had undertaken

a broad reassessment of the strategy for Bosnia, and it continually

reassesses assistance priorities in Bosnia. However, we found no

evidence that State’s reassessment or its current strategy addressed the underlying causes of corruption and the lack of reform,

namely, the continued obstructionist behavior of hard-line, nationalist, political leaders. Mr. Chairman, that concludes my prepared

statement.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Johnson appears in the appendix.]

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Johnson. Do your

colleagues wish to make any opening remarks? All right. We welcome having you here, and I am sure there may be some questions.

Mr. Johnson, you stated that the USAID-led anticorruption activity of reforming the political-party-based payment bureaus is one

of the more important, major actions taken by a U.S. entity.

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes.

Chairman GILMAN. Could you elaborate further on the specific

transfers of responsibility from the bureaus to other government

ministries and banks other than tax collection, and is the process

to eliminate the payment bureaus on track to be completed by December of the Year 2000?

Mr. JOHNSON. We were told that the process is on track. It is a

little difficult for us to accept that because they still do not have

51

a banking system in place that will accommodate the banking function that the payment bureaus currently perform. That is an essential element of the whole process and a key critical point.

I would like to ask Dave Bruno to elaborate on that a little bit

because he has looked into this in some detail.

Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Bruno.

STATEMENT OF DAVID BRUNO, EVALUATOR IN CHARGE, U.S.

GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE

Mr. BRUNO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GILMAN. Could you put the mike a little closer to you,

please?

Mr. BRUNO. Well, currently, as you alluded to, some of the functions of the payment bureaus are being moved to other ministries— tax collection, statistics, that type of thing. The key function of the

payments bureau is to facilitate payments between enterprises and

individuals. The bureau basically served as a bank under the

former socialist system in place in Yugoslavia. Until there is a

transparent banking system in Bosnia, the key functions of the

payment bureaus cannot be replaced.

There have been some laws passed or imposed which have allowed certain payment transactions to be made through banks,

banks currently in Bosnia, but until there is an open and transparent banking system to replace the payment bureaus, large-scale,

foreign investment is unlikely.

As we mentioned in our report, corruption is one of the main reasons why investments, foreign investment, and even domestic investment by private entrepreneurs, has not accelerated and, in

fact, taken the place of assistance. Until a banking system is in

place, the economy won’t be revived because there will be no investment.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you. According to the GAO and

USAID, the only way to establish a sound, competitive, commercial-banking system that fulfills key market functions is the entry

of reputable foreign banks. But as you maintained earlier, investment in Bosnia, post-1995, has been greatly deterred by the systemic corruption that takes place in the Bosnian economy.

That said, how can our nation persuade a strong financial institution to get involved with such risks being present? If ending corruption is contingent upon attracting foreign banks while investment is contingent upon ending corruption, don’t we have a case

of the chicken and the egg here?

Mr. JOHNSON. There is a bit of a catch–22 there, but that is not

from lack of trying to get international banks, a reputable international bank, to come in. It is our understanding that there have

been discussions with a Turkish bank, which is maybe not a Bank

of America or Citibank, but one that would probably be interested.

Chairman GILMAN. Does that look promising?

Mr. JOHNSON. From what we were told, there are discussions

under way. What the status of those discussions are, I am not sure.

Ambassador Pardew could probably respond to that better than I

can.

Chairman GILMAN. Aside from that interest, have any other

banks shown any?

52

Mr. JOHNSON. No.

Chairman GILMAN. Critics of the Dayton Peace Agreement point

out that because the DPA provides for only a very weak national

government, it is the DPA itself that limits the ability of the Bosnian government to forge the anticorruption institutions at the national level where they are most necessary, and it leaves it to the

leaders of the two entities, where nationalist pressures are most

easy to bring to bear. What is your response to that kind of criticism?

Mr. JOHNSON. The peace agreement did create a weak, national

government, and there are problems related to that, and one of the

problems that is probably most pronounced is that there is not

strong support for the departments and institutions already being

created at the national level. It leaves them in a rather weak position, but I do not want to imply that it is not workable.

I think it is the system that we have, and it needs to be pursued,

the system in place is apparently the best that could be gotten in

1995 when they negotiated the agreement, and so it is what we

have to live with.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you. Mr. Gejdenson.

Mr. GEJDENSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me first say any

money that is American taxpayer money that is lost is something

that troubles all of us. How much money do you think was lost as

a result of corruption here? We have seen numbers across the

board in the newspapers. What’s your estimate?

Mr. JOHNSON. U.S. money lost to corruption?

Mr. GEJDENSON. U.S. money.

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, the money that we know about is basically

the money that is involved with the BH Banka situation that you

are aware of.

Mr. GEJDENSON. And how much is that?

Mr. JOHNSON. And that is about $935,000.

Mr. GEJDENSON. So $900,000 out of how much?

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, over a billion dollars, a small percentage.

Mr. GEJDENSON. Over $1 billion.

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes.

Mr. GEJDENSON. And so that is 1 percent. Is that correct?

Mr. JOHNSON. About.

Mr. GEJDENSON. About 1 percent.

Mr. JOHNSON. Excuse me.

Mr. GEJDENSON. No. Go right ahead.

Mr. JOHNSON. I think it is important, the amount of U.S. money

that would be lost, but I think the more important issue is whether

or not the problem in Bosnia will unravel the entire process, and

that is what we tried to focus on. I think the international organizations have basically done a good job of trying to control the

money that we provide. There is not a debate about that.

Mr. GEJDENSON. And there is some pressure here in Congress to

try and press our allies to rapidly disperse their funds so that they

will meet certain targets, or they want us to pull out. Now, I guess

what I would say is, is there a mechanism in place that would

allow this to happen without actually just losing more money?

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, there has definitely been a criticism of our

allies throughout the Balkans, but in Bosnia in particular, about

53

the slow disbursement rate. And when we talk to Bosnian officials

or even AID officials, we hear this criticism that the European

Union is very slow in disbursal. They could be more rapid in disbursing money and still maintain the controls, is the general perception.

Mr. GEJDENSON. You know, it may be human nature, but you get

the sense that at the beginning of a crisis or the end of a war there

is this inclination in Congress, and the public that Congress reflects, to have a significant response. And so, in a sense, are we

front loading too much of the money? Is the money available only

at the beginning when oftentimes there are not the systems in

place, and would we be better off trying to get Congress to commit

the money over a longer period of time with some more flexibility

here?

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, I think as a general proposition, you are

probably correct. I think in the case of Bosnia the money was put

up front and was needed up front for reconstruction.

Mr. GEJDENSON. Uh-huh.

Mr. JOHNSON. I do not think there was unwarranted front loading in the case of Bosnia. That criticism, I think, is more applicable

to some other situations in Eastern Europe.

Mr. GEJDENSON. And, you know, money is fungible.

Mr. JOHNSON. Sure.

Mr. GEJDENSON. And so when you sit here and you are looking

at these factions having larger military-police units than they

ought to have, and, of course, the problem is always what do you

do with them if you disband them. These people need salaries. You

are creating political problems on the ground and what have you.

But how do you look at these situations and say, well, we are going

to take U.S. assistance and use it for good causes because the government is using its money for military forces they really do not

need.

Mr. JOHNSON. That certainly is a dilemma. The international

community does have some leverage, however, that it probably has

not used as much as it could. The High Representative has a lot

of authority to influence the Bosnian governments, both the Federation and the Republika Srpska, as to the size and function of

their military. And clearly, up to this point both of those entities

have received support from outside for their militaries. So that is

a problem that can be addressed probably more readily than it has

been.

Mr. GEJDENSON. Let me ask you one last question. What would

be the most important change you would desire that Congress

would execute in how we deal with these situations? What could

we do that is most helpful in changing the way we operate?

Mr. JOHNSON. I do not know that I would recommend necessarily

a change. I think that we have—over the past 4 or 5 years GAO

has looked at the program in Bosnia and evaluated the progress,

and we have generally been supportive of the program that has

been put in place. There are obviously glitches along the way.

I think the fact that this hearing is taking place, that light is

being focused on this problem, is a helpful thing. I think we need

to signal to the rest of the world that corruption is not something

that we can tolerate in programs that we are participating in, and

54

it is not just the money that we provide bilaterally. We spend a lot

of money on the IMF as well as the World Bank and have considerable resources at stake. So I think efforts like this to focus attention on the problem is a very helpful thing.

Mr. GEJDENSON. If I could indulge the Chairman just one more

question, and you do not have to give me the entire answer here

now, but on the issue of corruption, I have seen some progress in

recent years from our G–7, G–8 partners, but some of them still

allow for bribery to be a deductible tax expense. Is that correct?

Mr. JOHNSON. It is my understanding that this occurs, although

the OECD in Paris has reached an agreement—— Mr. GEJDENSON [continuing]. To end that.

Mr. JOHNSON [continuing]. To end that.

Mr. GEJDENSON. Well, it seems to me that that is terribly important because if the most important industrial nations in the world

accept bribery as a price of doing business, to turn around to these

fledgling nations and expect them to be policing themselves is a little bit unrealistic. And if European and other partners of ours

think it is OK to go in and bribe governments for contracts, it is

a little hard for us to then come back and say, ‘‘Gee, we want to

fight corruption.’’

So I certainly hope that you will give me any advice that we can

strengthen our fight against bribery and corruption because, I

think, when you look around the world at the failures we have had,

a lot of it ends up going back to that particular problem.

Mr. JOHNSON. That is right.

Mr. GEJDENSON. Thank you.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Gejdenson. Mr. Chabot.

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My understanding of

your statement here this morning is that the government is losing

a lot of their own resources to crime and corruption and many

other things, which obviously should not be going on. You are saying the resource that we are directly losing, our aid, is somewhat

minimal. But our resources going to them are relieving perhaps the

necessity for them to seriously confront the reforms that they need

to carry out, such as cutting down the corruption and actually collecting the taxes they are owed, and things of that nature. Is that

correct?

Mr. JOHNSON. That is correct. Yes.

Mr. CHABOT. And I guess the logical followup is that some portion of our aid there is counterproductive, that we are essentially

subsidizing behavior that over the long term may actually hurt the

government and the people that we are trying to help. Is that correct?

Mr. JOHNSON. I do not know if I would characterize it as counterproductive necessarily, but there is a contradiction there that we

need to address, and the Bosnian government needs to address,

and that is one of the reasons we made the recommendation to the

State Department that it reassess the strategy because that is

something that needs to be looked at by the people who run a program, whether or not there is a way to squeeze on that.

Now, the United States does not provide very much budget support, so the amount of leverage, direct leverage, that the United

States has is minimal, but the United States, through the World

55

Bank, does provide a substantial amount of budget support, and

working through the executive director’s office at the bank, that

problem could be addressed, we believe, in a more forthright way.

Mr. CHABOT. Using taxes as an example, I think your testimony

was that they have a pretty ineffective way of collecting taxes.

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes. And their tax law is so convoluted that people

just cannot pay.

Mr. CHABOT. Right. I would argue that our tax system is pretty

convoluted as well, but nonetheless it is relatively effective. I think

our government is pretty good at collecting what it is owed, or pretty bad, however you want to put it. We collect a whole lot of money

here very effectively, and we are shifting some of those resources

over to countries which have not gotten their act together and are

not collecting their taxes. I would argue from the American taxpayer’s point of view, that this is not a very good deal, but let me

move on.

As far as how long we are in Bosnia, many of us were very skeptical of the President when he suggested early on that we would

be there a year and that our cost would be ball-park $2 billion.

That year obviously has extended far beyond that. It has been 4

or 5 years and we have spent, in your testimony I think, over $10

billion, so we are way over what we were told in length and in cost.

But how long we are in Bosnia, to some degree, depends upon how

quickly they get their act together, how quickly they have an independent judiciary, a workable government, a system of collecting

taxes.

But since we are subsidizing by giving them money, we are making it so that they do not reach the crisis that sometimes you have

to reach before you actually take action. We are dragging the day

of reckoning out even further. Therefore, we may be there a heck

of a lot longer even than the President might suggest that we be

there. So I just wonder whether our policy makes much sense at

all.

One final point. Mr. Gejdenson mentioned the one case of the

bank where, I think, we know $935,000 was lost——

Mr. JOHNSON. We are still negotiating to get some of that back,

and I think they will get a large share of it back.

Mr. CHABOT. OK. I think, Mr. Gejdenson said important words

when he said that is a million dollars or so out of a billion. I mean,

that is that we know of. And as far as how many dollars have been

directly lost, we really do not know, but the fact is we are spending

an awful lot of money over there. The thing that concerns me is

that we may be subsidizing dependency and irresponsible behavior

and putting off the actual reforms that need to take place. I thank

you for your testimony here this morning.

Mr. JOHNSON. I think you have expressed a legitimate concern.

One of the things that we tried to keep in mind when we did this

work was exactly what you have talked about. The peacekeeping

operation in Cyprus has been there for many years, and the situation in Bosnia—I think it would not be in our interest to have a

peacekeeping mission in Bosnia for the length of time that we have

had the U.N. peacekeeping operation in Cyprus.

56

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much. I certainly share that point

of view. I would hope that the Bosnia peacekeeping mission would

be much, much shorter than Cyprus. Thank you.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chabot. Mr. Sherman.

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you. I would simply observe that I do not

see any facts in play now that would cause our peacekeeping operation in Bosnia to be shorter than that in Cyprus.

Mr. JOHNSON. That is right.

Mr. SHERMAN. Certainly, the level of ethnic opposition and tension is at least as high as in Cyprus, and one cannot point to any

trends that would make peacekeeping there unnecessary.

Mr. JOHNSON. You are right.

Mr. SHERMAN. Our decision to insist that Bosnia be a multi-ethnic state made up of ethnicities who have shown a tendency to kill

each other over the last several hundred years ensures that there

will be a multi-ethnic state of people with a tendency to kill each

other, and that we will have to be there for a long time preventing

those deaths.

I want to pick up on Mr. Gejdenson’s remarks about the deductibility of bribery, and I realize that is a little step or two away from

the purpose of these hearings, but I am picking up on the Ranking

Member’s comments. We have the largest trade deficit this month,

or rather last month—the report just came out today—the largest

monthly trade deficit in the history of human kind, period, largest

ever in a month. And it is relatively nonremarkable because the

month before that we also set a record, and we have been setting

records each month.

I do not think there is any way to quantify how much of that

trade deficit is due to the fact that our competitors pay bribes and

we do not. There was a declaration several years ago by the other

OECD countries that they would embrace a concept similar to the

Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. Perhaps you gentlemen could indicate whether that has gone beyond the principle stage.

Mr. JOHNSON. I would hesitate to comment on that at this point.

I am not quite up to date on where they stand on that, but I can

get that information to you.

Mr. SHERMAN. I can only assume that in those countries where

bribes are tax deductible they are not illegal, and I realize you may

not have come here prepared to focus on that, but Mr. Gejdenson

at least pointed that out. Do any of the other panelists have a further comment on that?

Mr. SHAFER. No.

Mr. SHERMAN. The other thing I would like to point out is there

is only one reason we are in Bosnia—Bosnia is in Europe. I mean,

the human rights violations there were terrible, but not nearly as

bad as what had happened in several places in Africa and what is

happening today in Sudan.

So we were told Bosnia is different because it is in Europe, and

Europe is vital because Europe is rich, powerful, and technological.

That is why I have got to wonder why for a problem in Europe,

America does the lion’s share of the fighting, pays the lion’s share

of the defense cost, provides the lion’s share of the strategic

backup. When I say ‘‘Bosnia,’’ I am including Kosovo. They are two

very related problems here. And at the same time, when there are

57

problems in this hemisphere, Europe does almost nothing with regard to solving many of the problems in this hemisphere—a little

contribution toward Colombia, a little contribution toward Haiti.

I think, while we can and have lost money due to theft, and you do point out the $900,000 at issue that is the focus of these hearings, that we lose an awful lot more because we decide that where

something is important to the Europeans, it means we have to pay

the lion’s share of the cost, and that is not just $900,000. So thank

you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Tancredo. Thank you, Mr. Sherman.

Mr. TANCREDO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just one quick question, because I was late, and I apologize. I just wonder if you would

agree with the feeling that I have gotten from your presentation,

certainly among many other things, that the problems in the area

are systemic. The problems with corruption are systemic and are

not necessarily personality driven. That is to say that even if we

were able to incarcerate people, Krajisnic and others, that would

not change the situation all that much because the problem is, in

fact, systemic.

Mr. JOHNSON. The problem is systemic. You are absolutely right.

In fact, when you look at who is involved in the corrupt activities

and the linkages between those involved in corrupt activities, the

judiciary, and government officials, you see linkages.

I guess a good way to look at the problem is that corrupt activities are being pursued in Bosnia as another means to continue the

war aims that the parties had throughout the period of the war.

They want to continue separation. They want to continue having

ethnically pure entities, ethnically pure cantons, within the Federation part of the country, and a lot of the corrupt activities support

those war aims. So it is a very systemic problem and not one easily

fixed. This is not garden-variety corruption that is taking place in

Bosnia.

Mr. TANCREDO. Thanks very much. I have nothing else, Mr.

Chairman.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Tancredo. I have just one

more question for our panel. How do you assess the anticorruption

efforts of the Office of the High Representative? Do you agree with

the critics who maintain that that office actually is preventing

more effective programs initiated by the United States and the

World Bank?

Mr. JOHNSON. I do not know about preventing. I would like to

turn to Mr. Shafer to respond to that.

Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Shafer.

Mr. SHAFER. I would not characterize the Office of the High Representative’s efforts as preventing progress in this area. As Mr.

Johnson has pointed out, this is an extremely difficult problem that

is not easily solvable by any one person or series of actions. In fact,

recently, the Office of the High Representative has gotten much

more active, for example, in eliminating key cantonal officials and

ministers for various corrupt activities, and that is a positive step

in and of itself. They have established a number of efforts to bring

together the international community, and it is going to take a long

time, I think, before we can see any results from the antifraud unit

within the Office of the High Representative.

58

Chairman GILMAN. Any other comments by the panelists before

we conclude? Mr. Bruno.

Mr. BRUNO. I would like to elaborate on that a little bit. Although there are a lot of individual efforts conducted by or somewhat coordinated by the Office of the High Representative, there

are some other nuts-and-bolts types of things that have not been

done by the High Representative, the World Bank, or others. As we

point out in our report, there has been no analysis of the revenue

loss, no systematic analysis. There are some estimates but no systematic analysis.

There has been no audit of expenditures of the entity governments to see where our budget support is going, ‘‘ours’’ meaning

the international community, and how those funds may support illegal parallel institutions or the political parties. There has also

not been a review of the actions taken by the financial police to see

exactly what they are doing to fight corruption and what they need

in terms of assistance.

And as my colleague stated, the High Representative has removed officials, high-level officials, but removing them does not always remove their power, and it is not enough to remove them. It

would be better if there was an example made of those individuals.

If they have abused their power and it is an infraction of the law,

then an investigation should follow and not simply just the removal

of that official.

Chairman GILMAN. Well, I want to thank our GAO representatives for being here today and for your extensive report, which is

most helpful to us, and we will be passing it on to some of the

other people who will be doing some work in that part of the world.

We appreciate your time and your effort. Thank you, gentlemen.

ALL. Thank you.

Chairman GILMAN. We will now move on to our second panel.

Ambassador Jim Pardew is no stranger to our Committee. He has

appeared both in open and public sessions and private briefings

with us on a number of occasions. He has served in both our Departments of Defense and State, brings to us a long period of expertise in Balkan affairs, and we welcome you to our hearing this

morning. In a sense, Ambassador Pardew has become the institutional memory for our Balkan policy due to his long-term involvement in U.S. policy in that region during the past decade.

We are grateful for your willingness, Ambassador, to appear

today, and we welcome your testimony, which you may summarize

without objection. Your full statement will be entered into the

record. Please proceed, Mr. Ambassador.

STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR JAMES W. PARDEW, PRINCIPAL

DEPUTY SPECIAL ADVISOR TO THE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEMOCRACY IN THE BALKANS, U.S.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. PARDEW. Mr. Chairman, I welcome the opportunity to again

appear before the Committee to discuss our programs and strategies for addressing crime and corruption in Bosnia, and I take note

of the new technical developments of the Committee since I was

here last. The next time I appear before the Committee I would

59

like to use the new capability to perhaps make my presentation a

little better.

I will update the Committee this morning on the nature of corruption in Bosnia and our strategy for dealing with it. I will also

respond to the specific points raised in the GAO report. With your

permission, I will summarize a more detailed statement, which I

submit for the record.

The problem of corruption and crime in Bosnia should be considered in the context of what has been achieved there since the war.

Great strides have been made in security, reconstruction, refugee

return, and other critical elements of Dayton implementation. That

said, we agree with the basic thrust of the GAO report, that corruption and crime are endemic problems in Bosnia. Crime and corruption seriously inhibit Dayton implementation and economic and

political development.

The political environment in Bosnia is a direct legacy of the war

and the communist political past in which transparency and accountability were of no concern. The inclination of the current political leadership is to continue to do business as usual. There are,

however, democratic, reform-minded leaders in Bosnia, and we

want to work with them.

And our message to the people of Bosnia in the run up to the

parliamentary elections this November is that they often deserve

better leadership and should use the elections in November as an

opportunity for change.

Let me briefly review our investment in Bosnia and how the

focus of our assistance program has shifted. We pledged and disbursed $1.007 billion from 1996 to 1999, primarily for critical, postwar requirements. This represented 18.5 percent of the $5.4 billion

total, international, civil program for Bosnia. Beginning with a reassessment in 1998, our focus shifted to helping Bosnia begin to reform itself as a stable, peaceful, free-market democracy that can

function without heavy engagement of the international community.

This year, we are spending $100 million in SEED, or Support to

European Democracy, funding and about $40 million in peacekeeping-operations funding in Bosnia.

Fighting corruption and crime requires action in two general

areas. The first is reform of the political and economic structure.

The second is establishing the rule of law with effective enforcement. Bosnia must achieve major progress in both of these areas

if it is to counter current levels of corruption and crime.

I would point out that USAID has been a leader in the

anticorruption effort in Bosnia, and I would like to submit for our

record a summary of their anticorruption program.

Chairman GILMAN. Without objection, it will be made part of the

record.

Mr. PARDEW. I have already mentioned upcoming elections as a

potential road to political reform. Successful reform also requires a

new and transparent legal and structural framework. The international community has identified over a dozen pieces of specific

legislation and administrative actions to restructure the Bosnian

government, many of its functions, and the economy.

60

The most important of these laws and actions will accomplish the

following: Formation of an adequately paid, well-trained, professional civil service; the establishment of modern, effective, impartial, and professional law enforcement and judicial bodies; the establishment of a strong, central treasury. Within a year we expect

to see the state treasury established and significant progress on

overhauling the civil service and judicial and law- enforcement bodies. Judicial and law-enforcement reform is already under way.

Other high-priority tasks include the following: The abolition of

the payments bureaus, which were discussed earlier this morning.

These are a major source of funding for the nationalist parties, and

the process is on schedule for closure of these bureaus by the end

of the year. Next is the creation of strong, central, regulatory authorities for the financial, telecom, and power sectors. Progress is

underway in establishing an effective banking supervisory agency

and regulatory framework for the financial sector. We expect movement soon on establishing an effective, central-regulatory body for

the energy sector.

Privatization of key industries is another major area of reform.

This is intended to break control of key businesses by the nationalist parties. The United States is leading the effort to move quickly on large-scale privatization of over 100 key business entities.

Another area is the establishment of effective auditing organizations to search out and deal with fraud and corruption. We are providing $1.3 million in funding for auditors and specialists to support this effort.

The second part of our anticorruption strategy is the enforcement

framework, which I subdivide into police enforcement and judicial

reform. Until recently, the police lacked even the most basic lawenforcement tools for policing in a democracy. We are helping restructure, downsize, train, and equip the Bosnian police to give

them the basic tools to function. We are also working with them

on more complex challenges such as fighting organized crime.

Let me quickly cover our new initiatives. The International Police Task Force recently established a joint task force operating in

both entities that can monitor high-profile investigations. It has

handled approximately 30 cases in 1999. It is currently overseeing

120 cases, and has assisted INTERPOL with an additional 50

cases. We have provided two FBI agents to assist the Bosnians in

several high-profile investigations and help them further their antiorganized-crime capacities. Later this year, we will give specialized

training for the Bosnian police in major case management, public

corruption, and transnational money laundering. We also are funding an organized-crime adviser to begin duties later this year.

We are working with police in both entities to establish professional-standards units that both conduct internal investigations

and promulgate codes of ethics. So far, these units have investigated over 380 cases of misconduct by the police, and these have

resulted in dismissals of several policemen.

We also support the work of the IPTF’s noncompliance unit,

which audits the practices of local police organizations and investigates reports of misconduct or anti-Dayton actions by local police.

We recently donated $1.95 million to aid and development of multiethnic border service, which began initial operations in the SaraVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:46 Jan 08, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00064 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 68286.TXT HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1
61

jevo Airport last month. The border police is the first armed, joint

institution in Bosnia and will greatly increase the ability of the

Bosnian government to secure its own borders and will help prevent the trade in illegal goods and disrupt trafficking of persons. This month, we transferred $1 million to expand operations of

the antifraud unit in the Office of the High Representative. With

the antifraud unit’s increased activity, our funding will be used to

hire additional investigators and prosecutors.

Bosnia’s judicial system needs a major overhaul. Through the

American Bar Association’s Central and East European Legal Initiative and others, we are working with Bosnia to establish a politically independent, professional, and effective legal system. Primary

activity includes vetting and training judges in establishing the security of courts, the court police, and other measures.

In July last year, the Office of the High Representative produced

a comprehensive, judicial-reform strategy that includes specific action plans to effect reforms. A judicial-reform law will be adopted

shortly that will replace current party controls over the appointment of judges. In May, we approved a $1.75 million Department of Justice allocation for expanded programs to strengthen prosecutors’ offices and

begin ground work for establishing a vetted investigative strike

force.

Turning to the GAO report, it made three specific recommendations to combat crime and corruption: that we use more conditionality, that we end direct budget support, and that we reassess our

assistance program.

We agree with serious conditionality, although we need to make

sure that conditionality supports our objectives. Our aid is increasingly focused on supporting minority returns and forcing the pace

of judicial structural reforms. The threat of denial of such aid is not

an effective lever.

The most effective form of conditionality currently is through the

international financial institutions, which continue to provide significant amounts of investment project credits and budget-adjustment lending. We are working closely with the World Bank, the

IMF, and the EBRD to strengthen conditionality.

We coordinate closely with the international community and

OHR to supply as much leverage as possible to overcome resistance

by the Bosnian leadership to implement the change necessary to

undercut corruption.

We also agree with moving away from direct budgetary support.

We have already terminated such support bilaterally, and we do

not envision resuming bilateral budget support. We continue to believe, however, that such support should be provided by the international financial institutions based on strict conditionality. IFI adjustment lending provides an important incentive for structural

and economic reform and reinforces our anticorruption program by

requiring greater budget transparency, improved expenditure control, and government-audit requirements.

On the third recommendation, we do not see the need to reassess

our assistance programs at this time. We made a fundamental shift

in 1998 based on the completion of the most urgent funding needs.

We are fully on track with our reform priorities, including stemVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:46 Jan 08, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00065 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 68286.TXT HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1
62

ming corruption and crime problems. As we implement our programs, we are continuously fine tuning our strategy and tactics

based on developments on the ground.

In closing, Mr. Chairman, the program to reduce crime and corruption in Bosnia is very ambitious. It cuts across all elements of

Dayton implementation, and we need to be in it for the long term

if we expect to help bring democracy and prosperity to Bosnia.

Unfortunately, attacking crime and corruption is not a shortterm problem. It is a never-ending struggle even in advanced democracies, but in Bosnia there is good news as well. The international community is in agreement on the high priority of stemming corruption and crime. They are now the very high priority of

the Office of the High Representative, and we are starting to make

headway in all of them. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Pardew and USAID Anti-Corruption Efforts appear in the appendix.]

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. The GAO has

recommended that the Congress condition further aid on Bosnian

political leaders taking specific steps to demonstrate their commitment to the anticorruption effort.

Mr. Ambassador, what is your view of that recommendation, and

how much of United States-provided assistance to Bosnia would be

appropriate to use as leverage for this issue?

Mr. PARDEW. Mr. Chairman, we will always gladly take a look

at the specific recommendations of the Congress, and I would have

to do that before I would make a final determination on how we

might view a particular proposal. But I pointed out previously that

anticorruption and anticrime are major initiatives of the Administration and of the High Representative. And so before the Congress

acts, I think we should very carefully review the programs that we

have in place and avoid unnecessary restrictions.

Chairman GILMAN. Should we condition our assistance on their

cleaning up the corruption?

Mr. PARDEW. We are conditioning our assistance on cleaning up

corruption. Everything that we are providing right now has some

type of conditionality on it, and crime and corruption are very high

on our agenda. I do not think at this point it is necessary for the

Congress to assist, but we will certainly take a careful look at anything you might propose.

Chairman GILMAN. And what is our nation doing to bring together the EU and other donors to work with us to confront this

problem that we have?

Mr. PARDEW. This problem was a discussion topic at the recent

Peace Implementation Council ministerial. It is always on the

agenda of the Peace Implementation Steering Group. We use all forums that oversee the international effort, and we also stress this

bilaterally. It is a very high-priority program at this time.

Chairman GILMAN. And, Mr. Ambassador, how difficult would it

be to revise and modify the Dayton framework so as to strengthen

the national government to better enable it to confront crime and

corruption throughout Bosnia?

Mr. PARDEW. Mr. Chairman, as I have testified before, the issue

of strengthening central institutions, first of all, it is a high-priority

issue and needs to be done. It is largely a matter of the will of the

63

leadership. I do not think we need to reopen the Dayton Agreement

in order to strengthen the national government.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you very much. Mr. Gejdenson.

Mr. GEJDENSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You paint a pretty

rosy picture here. You think it is going to be that good, huh?

Mr. PARDEW. I think we are doing a lot, Congressman. I do not

want to overdramatize success. As I have said, this is a major problem, and it does hinder our overall efforts in Bosnia. I think corruption and crime have to be looked at in the context of what has

been done since the Dayton Agreement was signed. I can point to

improvements of the security situation and the reconstruction that

have been dramatic. We are gaining ground in the return of refugees, the Brcko, creation of central institutions, and I can go on

and on. The point is that crime and corruption must be put in the

context of a number of good things that have happened.

Mr. GEJDENSON. It is good to get an optimistic note. Our colleagues on the other side of the aisle here are constantly seeing the

end of the world approaching.

Let me ask you a couple of questions here. With the end of these

Soviet-era payment bureaus, are the private banks going to come

in on their own? Is there a sense that somebody is going to step

up to the plate and see an opportunity to make money here and

not get shaken down, or is there something else that is going to

need to happen? Are we going to need, like, an OPIC guarantee

system, or will it happen without us?

Mr. PARDEW. Closing the payments bureau is one of the most

critical structural reforms that needs to take place. Closing them

is on track to end this year, and that will be a major step toward

creating a banking system. There is already a functioning central

bank in Bosnia, and it is working very well under international

leadership.

Creating a banking system in Bosnia has been a long, uphill

struggle. The situation is not as bad as was presented earlier, in

my view. At least one Austrian full-service bank is, I believe, about

to open for business. A Turkish bank is there operating already.

We have encouraged U.S. banks to go there as well, but, quite

frankly, Bosnia is a small market for some of the big, international

banks.

In addition, the Office of the High Representative [OHR] has a

banking agency. That banking agency is trying to clean up the local

banks. There are over 12 banks now being closed to try to clean

up and make economically viable the existing banking system as

we try to bring in international banks.

Mr. GEJDENSON. And you mentioned the refugee return and the

increased numbers of refugees that are returning. They have come

from western countries in many instances. They have got to be a

pressure point for change as well, and it seems to me an almost

good news/bad news scenario in a number of these places around

the world that as information is spread through society about the

alternatives out there, there is going to be a heightened demand

for improvements in people’s, situations. And are these governments going to be able to deliver a better standard of living, improvements in the people’s living situations, sense of security economically?

64

Mr. PARDEW. Bosnia must change. As you point out, there are

refugees who are returning, and they are returning from more advanced western democracies in some cases, and they have high expectations about the economic structure. They are simply not going

to accept on a long term this old communist economic system.

I think young people are another factor. If Bosnia wants to keep

their young people in Bosnia, they must have to have economic opportunities for them, and those opportunities must be based on a

conventional, western, transparent, market economy.

Mr. GEJDENSON. Well, thank you very much. I hope you keep us

informed.

I think an important part of this is a dialogue with the Congress

because often our colleagues are left with bits and pieces of information, headlines that leave a misimpression. Many of our colleagues do not fully understand the magnitude of the European

participation, and we always jump to the conclusion that we are

providing the most troops, the most money. In almost every category that seems to be not case. Could you just, in my final moment here, run through again what portion we are paying and

what portion the Europeans are providing in this?

Mr. PARDEW. In Bosnia our total funding on the civil side is

about 18 percent. The Europeans have paid most of the rest, although there are some non-European donors. I think U.S. troop

levels are about 20 percent. The bulk of the troops are being provided by the Europeans.

Mr. GEJDENSON. That is really an astounding situation, when

you take a look at the historic portion that America has given in

almost any other effort, that the idea that the United States is participating at about a fifth or less is a real statement that the Europeans are stepping forward, as they ought to. And we want to

thank you for the work you are doing, and stay in communication

with us. Thank you very much.

Mr. TANCREDO [presiding]. Thank you, Mr. Gejdenson. I just

have a couple of things, in a way a followup on the question I posed

to the panel before, and that is with regard to what hope there can

be that we can take from the possibility of incarcerating some of

the people there with higher visibility I suppose, and what hope do

we have that something like that, if we were able to, incorporate

Mr. Krajisnic or others that we would oftentimes like to see incarcerated, and which we certainly do now want to see incarcerated,

what hope do we have that that would actually change the situation, especially with regard to corruption in Bosnia?

Mr. PARDEW. The war criminal issue has a powerful, symbolic effect. First of all, we have made significant progress over time on

bringing indictees to justice. We started, obviously, with zero. We

are now 49 of the people who have been indicted by the ICTY have

gone to The Hague. However, the two most significant indictees,

Krajisnic and Milosevic, are not there yet. They have simply

evaded capture, either by the local police or SFOR.

It would be a tremendous psychological boost to the whole area,

if these prominent war criminals were brought to justice. The arrest of Mr. Krajisnik, who was head of the Parliament was significant. He was a corrupt official, and bringing him to justice also

helps create an atmosphere that corruption will not be tolerated.

65

Mr. GEJDENSON. You heard the testimony of the panel before

you, and one of the individuals indicated that beyond just removing

people from office some other action has to be taken. Do you agree

with that, and what specific action would you propose?

Mr. PARDEW. Absolutely. People who are found to be in violation

of the anticorruption or other laws need to be brought to justice.

We have to do many things at once, though. We have to strengthen

the judicial system, and many of the other things I addressed in

my testimony. In some cases, I am not sure they are ready for

some of the more sophisticated anti-crime activities, but we are

working on them.

But those who violate the laws need to be brought to justice, and

officials in Bosnia need to be held accountable for their actions.

This is the structural changing that I was talking about. In the old

system, leaders were not accountable, and the current situation is

a carry over from the old days. We have to change the structure

as well as take the proper measures against individuals.

Mr. TANCREDO. Yes. Well, changing the structure is certainly an

enormous undertaking that one can, I guess, understand, or we can

rationalize in the amount of time that we have spent and that we

probably will be spending there, but it is nonetheless quite frustrating for Members of Congress and, I am sure, members of the

general public, when you really can never see an end to the tunnel.

Let me ask you, can the goals of the Dayton Agreement be

achieved in the near future, and with such emphasis on aiding the

economy of Bosnia, are prospects dimmed by the fact that in a time

of great economic prosperity in the world little progress has been

actually realized? Somewhat of the same vein, same question.

Mr. PARDEW. I think the goals of Dayton implementation can be

achieved, but it certainly has not been, nor will it be, easy, and I

cannot put a specific timeframe on it. We have a set of benchmarks

which we are working toward. We have made progress in a number

of those benchmarks.

The benchmarks have been sent to the Congress along with our

report on their status, but implementation is difficult, and it is long

term. I think we have some tough sledding ahead of us to make

these fundamental changes that we were seeking.

Mr. TANCREDO. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. I appreciate your

testimony.

Mr. PARDEW. Mr. Chairman.

Mr. TANCREDO. Yes.

Mr. PARDEW. Could I make one point for the record.

Mr. TANCREDO. Of course.

Mr. PARDEW . In the earlier testimony today they talked about

the United States loss of money in this BH Banka. I would like to

set the record straight on that, if I could?

First of all, we are very heartened by the GAO’s report that recognizes that the United States and international donors have established procedures for safeguarding assistance to Bosnia and that

there is no evidence that that assistance is being lost. The BH

Banka case, there is $900 million—— Mr. TANCREDO. $900 million?

Mr. PARDEW [continuing]. $900,000—I am sorry. Did I say $900

million? I do not want to set that record today. I just increased the

66

problem significantly. We have not given up on that money. That

money is not lost. We are working with the Office of the High Representative and the Federation to get the $900,000. We will take

whatever legal measures are necessary to ensure that our money

is recovered. So we do not consider that money lost, and we will

stay on this.

Mr. TANCREDO. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. We appreciate your

testimony here today, and the Committee is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 11:37 a.m., the Committee was adjourned to reconvene subject to the call of the Chair.]

(67)

A P P E N D I X

APRIL 11 AND JULY 19, 2000

68

69

70

71

PREPARED STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR JAMES W. PARDEW, JR., PRINCIPAL DEPUTY

SPECIAL ADVISOR TO THE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY OF STATE FOR KOSOVO AND

DAYTON IMPLEMENTATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE BEFORE THE HOUSE COM- MITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

APRIL 11, 2000

Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to update the Committee on the situation in Kosovo. This presentation will review our interests and objectives, areas

of progress in civil administration and reconstruction, current challenges, what we

are doing to overcome them, and sharing the burden of the international effort.

Our continuing engagement in Kosovo relates directly to our national security interests. We know from history that a stable Europe is vital to American security,

and that Europe is not stable if its southeastern corner is in turmoil. In the past

four years, the U.S. and our allies have successfully contained, then subdued, conflicts in Croatia, Bosnia, and Kosovo as the former Yugoslavia broke apart. But the

area’s stability remains at risk from the Milosevic regime and the fragility of states

recovering from conflict. International military forces are critical to creating a secure environment in Kosovo. However, sustaining the peace and establishing the

conditions for long-term stability in the region require robust political, economic,

and reconstruction programs backed by sufficient resources to make a difference.

There are two immediate civil implementation objectives in Kosovo. The first is

to complete the establishment of an interim international administration under

which the people can enjoy substantial autonomy. The second is to develop local,

provisional, democratic, self-governing institutions to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants of Kosovo.

One year ago, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was engaged in an intensive air campaign to halt Milosevic’s brutal repression of the people of Kosovo and

restore order in the region. In 78 days the air campaign, supplemented by intensive

diplomacy, succeeded in driving Milosevic’s forces from Kosovo. The success of the

NATO campaign set the stage for the deployment to Kosovo of the international security force and the international civilian administration organization. The NATOled Kosovo Force (KFOR) and the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) remain the heart

of the international effort in Kosovo today.

All of us would welcome faster progress for civilian implementation in Kosovo, but

remember the situation ten months ago when Serb forces began withdrawing from

Kosovo. The conditions encountered by UNMIK as it deployed and began to organize

in Kosovo were desperate:

•Over one million people dislocated and traumatized by war.

•No economy; no government.

•Major destruction, including 120,000 homes damaged or destroyed.

•Infrastructure either destroyed or neglected.

•A communist legacy.

Today, the situation on the ground in Kosovo is dramatically better and continues

to improve gradually day by day. International efforts have returned more than one

million refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) to their homes, demilitarized the KLA, established a growing international police presence, and begun

training local police. Humanitarian agencies have met basic shelter, food and medical requirements and pulled the population through the winter. Recently, UNMIK

and KFOR have made progress in restoring order in Mitrovica, increasing CIVPOL

deployment, increasing Kosovo Police Service training, preparing the groundwork

for municipal elections this year, and securing Serb participation in UNMIK governing structures. Further, public and independent media are regaining their voices.

As NATO Secretary General Robertson pointed out recently, any Kosovar child

can tell you how life has improved since the arrival of UNMIK and KFOR. Children

have begun to attend school again, even if in tents. Many ethnic Albanians are

studying in their own language for the first time in 10 years.

UNMIK, we must remember, has been on the ground for only about 10 months.

The International Community’s post-conflict task of repairing years of damage

wrought by the Milosevic regime is extremely complex; many challenges remain.

Ethnic tensions continue at an unacceptable level. The chronic problems in the divided city of Mitrovica will resume without an aggressive, sustained effort on the

part of UNMIK and KFOR. FRY forces and ethnic Albanian insurgents confront

each other in the Presevo Valley region of southern Serbia, where we face a tough

challenge in preventing potential violence there from destabilizing the situation in

Kosovo. The economy needs to be rebuilt and organized crime suppressed. UNMIK

and KFOR must continue to improve security for Serb and other minority refugees

and displaced persons so that they can return to their homes. In addition, we conVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:46 Jan 08, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00075 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 68286.TXT HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1
72

tinue to see the need for countries to provide police up to the higher authorized

level, an improved judicial system, and more complete staffing of UNMIK.

These are tough challenges, but they are not insurmountable. I would like to update you on programs to address these issues. Let me start with one of the most

difficult problems—Mitrovica. Despite significant opposition from extremists opposed to the International Community’s efforts, KFOR and UNMIK have developed

a comprehensive strategy addressing the issues of Mitrovica. The UN has appointed

a strong administrator for the region in American William Nash. KFOR and

UNMIK have already returned more than 140 displaced Albanians to homes north

of the Ibar River and KFOR has established and expanded ‘‘Zones of Confidence’’ in key problem areas around two bridges and one neighborhood. An international

judge and an international prosecutor are in place in Mitrovica, and several more

are planned. Economic development in the area is another factor of the strategy.

The UN remains short of civilian police, but it has made recent progress in

CIVPOL deployments, with 2,757 regular police in country (513 Americans), out of

an authorized 3,593. The UN has also begun to fill the 1,125 positions for special

police units, which will assist in riot and crowd control. So far, 129 personnel have

deployed, including a 114-member unit from Pakistan that will be assigned to

Mitrovica. UNMIK is expecting two Jordanian units totaling 230 officers to arrive

around April 18, and is working with other nations, including Spain and India, on

further special police deployments in the near future.

The development of the Kosovo Police Service (KPS) is also progressing. There are

currently 451 KPS in classroom training, with the fourth class having started March

27, and 341 in field training. The police academy director just verified that the

school in Vucitrn can now accommodate as many as 700 Kosovar students, up from

the previous limit of 500, in two classes with staggered semesters. This will prove

to be a cost-effective way to reach the goal of graduating 3,600 officers by February

2001, toward a total KPS force of 4,000.

The Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) is also progressing as an organization. A total

of 4,500 KPC candidates have been selected, out of a ceiling of 5,000. The International Organization for Migration has begun training for field members in each

of the six Regional Task Groups. The KPC is the most important element of a broad

program to provide employment for KLA veterans. During this development phase,

we are urging NGOs in Kosovo to utilize KPC for public works projects during periods when KPC members are not otherwise occupied.

We are keenly aware of the possibility that some demobilized members of the

former KLA, including those who have joined the KPC, may act inappropriately.

KFOR retains high standards for participation in the organization and are enforcing

a zero tolerance policy regarding illicit activities. On March 1, KFOR and UNMIK

put into force the KPC Disciplinary Code (DC), which constitutes the formal mechanism for enforcement of the rules for compliance and disciplinary action against offenders. The DC applies to all KPC members and provides the legal basis for the

commander of the KPC to take disciplinary action against non-compliant members.

On March 17, UNMIK and KFOR signed the Compliance Enforcement Framework

Document, which assigns responsibility for investigating criminal actions to

UNMIK, administrative discipline to KPC, and compliance violations to KFOR.

UNMIK has made progress in the creation of interim governing structures. On

April 2, moderate Kosovo Serb leaders announced that they would participate in

UNMIK-sponsored governing structures, particularly the Interim Administrative

Council (IAC) and Kosovo Transitional Council. This was a direct result of Secretary

Albright’s dialogue with Bishop Artemije, who led this politically courageous change

of policy. The Serbs will attend meetings as observers at first, but we hope and expect that this will quickly lead to full participation. Serb involvement in these joint

institutions is vital to UNMIK’s mission and it affirms the right of all Kosovo residents to play a meaningful role in their own governance.

Elections will be the next major step in the process of establishing provisional

self-government in Kosovo. Civil registration, the key to developing a voter registry,

is set to begin in April and be completed in July, in time for municipal elections

to be held this fall. UNMIK is reportedly close to issuing the regulation creating

the Central Election Commission, which will be responsible for setting election

rules, overseeing the conduct and supervision of the election, and certifying the results.

As I noted earlier, Mitrovica and southern Serbia continue to be potential

flashpoints. Ethnic Albanian insurgents in the Presevo region had pledged to reject

the use of violence and seek a political solution, but we know that their insurgency

actions continue. We will continue to warn extremists on both sides of the border

that provocation and violence will not be tolerated. Additionally, KFOR and UNMIK

are monitoring the situation carefully.

73

We are concerned that UNMIK does not have enough administrators and staff

with specialized technical skills. We are working with the UN Headquarters and

UNMIK to identify specific personnel needs and will work with allies to further increase the numbers and skills of the UNMIK staff.

An effective judicial system is a critical requirement in Kosovo. UNMIK has

sworn in 289 Kosovar judges and 42 prosecutors. Criminal trials have recently

begun in the district courts of Pristina, Prizren, Pec, and Gnjilane. The OSCE-established Kosovo Judicial Institute has begun training sessions for the newly appointed

judiciary. However, qualifications, low pay, and intimidation remain significant obstacles to a working judiciary. A U.S. interagency judicial assessment team recently

reviewed the state of the judicial system procedures and physical infrastructure. Its

findings and recommendations will provide the basis to press for international support to rebuild the judicial system. We continue to work to further increase the

number of judicial personnel and provide the basic equipment the court system

needs.

Another focus area is the suppression of organized crime, which as in any postconflict environment is a problem for re-establishing the rule of law and as a potential security threat. The exact magnitude of the problem is not known, but it seems

clear that opportunists and professional criminals from both inside and outside

Kosovo are operating in the province and could be using it as a transshipment point

for illicit goods. Together with some of our key allies, we are developing a strategy

to support the UNMIK International Police efforts to identify and take action

against organized criminal elements. We were disappointed to see that funding for

this effort was not included in the supplemental passed by the House.

The Kosovo media, which had been essentially silenced by Milosevic, has made

a remarkable recovery following the cessation of hostilities in mid-June. Albanianlanguage newspapers and magazines are in Kiosks all over the major towns and a

number of radio and TV stations have come on the air.

The U.S. has major interests in Kosovo and therefore participates significantly in

the international effort there. However, the Europeans must lead the international

effort and bear the lion’s share of the assistance burden. Europe accepts this responsibility. Out of about 45,000 KFOR troops in Kosovo, European nations and Canada

provide about 72 percent of KFOR forces (80 percent if you include Russia.) The

U.S. contribution of troops comprises about 13 percent of the total.

In terms of civil implementation, the current total for all donors in fiscal year

2000 is just over $1.2 billion. The U.S. share of $168 million is thus estimated at

13.9 percent of FY 2000 spending on Kosovo revitalization. Our share of humanitarian assistance has been about 20 percent. Our costs for UN peacekeeping through

UNMIK have been at the 25 percent level mandated by U.S. law, and costs for the

U.S. share of peacekeeping through the Organization for Security and Cooperation

in Europe have ranged from 10.1 percent (FY 99) to 16.9 percent (FY 00).

There are initiatives in Congress that propose an arbitrary limit on U.S. spending

to support the international effort in Kosovo and the rest of southeast Europe. We

believe that such legislation would be counterproductive. As Secretary Albright

wrote in a recent New York Times op-ed piece, the day may come when a Kosovoscale operation can be managed without the help of the United States, but it has

not come yet. Proposals in the Congress to place a legal cap on U.S. expenditures

would decrease our flexibility and harm, not help, our partnership with Europe in

responding to future events. Such limits also do not take into account European contributions in our hemisphere. For example, the Europeans provided more than 60

percent of the bilateral aid pledged in the wake of Hurricane Mitch, assumed 33

per cent of the cost of establishing peace in El Salvador, and 34 percent in Guatemala.

Having just returned from Kosovo, I can tell you that the people there have

emerged from a difficult winter and are preparing to build a new future. Pristina

and the countryside are alive with activity. Everywhere you look you see examples

of construction and commercial activity that represent the height of human perseverance and ingenuity. These are tough, resourceful people. They are grateful for

our help, but they are not sitting back and waiting for us to rebuild their homes

and lives. They need some tools and guidance from us to get started, but they are

eager and able to do the job.

I hope this gives you a clearer idea of where we stand in Kosovo right now. I

would be happy to answer any questions you might have. Thank you.

74

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JAMES W. SWIGERT, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR

EUROPEAN AFFAIRS AND DEPUTY SPECIAL ADVISOR TO THE PRESIDENT AND SEC- RETARY OF STATE FOR DAYTON AND KOSOVO IMPLEMENTATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT

OF STATE BEFORE THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

APRIL 11, 2000

Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to testify on U.S. policy toward

Montenegro. I will begin by describing our view of the current situation, outline our

strategy for advancing U.S. interests, and update you on our efforts to assist the

reform government of Montenegro.

President Djukanovic’s prudent and forward-looking policies have made Montenegro a positive factor in the region. Montenegro opposed ethnic cleansing and supported a peaceful settlement in Kosovo; pledged support for the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY); and has provided shelter and assistance to refugees and internally displaced persons. The Djukanovic government has

also increased efforts to counter smuggling and organized crime and recently improved its police cooperation with Italy.

We share the concern of many Members of Congress about the situation in Montenegro and in particular, the efforts of the Milosevic regime in Belgrade to pressure

the pro-democracy government of President Djukanovic. The potential for aggression

or serious violence provoked by Belgrade is real. An outbreak of violence in Montenegro could set back reform efforts in the region, produce more suffering and more

refugees, and seriously jeopardize U.S. interests in the region. At the same time,

Milosevic is aware that such action carries serious risks for his own regime.

Consequently, U.S. policy is focused on preventing a new conflict from erupting

and on providing the necessary assistance to ensure Montenegro can continue to develop democracy and a market economy. We have made strengthening the

Djukanovic government, its base of support, and its ability to govern a priority— something good in itself—but we also see it as a proactive measure to decrease the

chances of conflict by raising the costs to Milosevic of aggression against

Montenegro’s democratic movement.

We and our allies have made it abundantly clear to Milosevic that we are watching the situation in Montenegro and Serbia very closely. Secretary Albright has reiterated over the last year, most recently in Sarajevo last month, our strong interest

in the security of Southeast Europe, including Montenegro. SACEUR General Clark

has repeatedly stated, most recently in March, that NATO is watching the situation

very closely. Last October NATO Secretary General Robertson assured President

Djukanovic of the continued support of the Allies for his government and its efforts

to promote political and economic reforms. A year ago NATO Heads of State and

Government reaffirmed their strong support for the democratically-elected government of Montenegro. In December NATO Ministers stated they were concerned

about continued tensions between Belgrade and the democratically-elected government of Montenegro and called on both sides to resolve their differences in a peaceful and pragmatic way. NATO ministers have also repeatedly called on both sides

to refrain from any destabilizing measures. By now, Milosevic is fully aware of the

priority we place on the security of the region and of Western capabilities to respond

to any destabilizing actions.

The fundamental problem for Montenegro, as for its neighbors, remains the lack

of democracy in Serbia. Because of its status as sister republic to Serbia in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), Montenegro is particularly vulnerable to pressure from Milosevic, who is fundamentally hostile to the Djukanovic government

and its reform program. The Milosevic regime has routinely ignored or trampled on

Montenegro’s rights under the Yugoslav constitution.

During this winter, Montenegro was subjected to additional pressures:

•The temporary closure of the civilian airport in Tivat and the civilian-military

airport near Podgorica.

•A build-up of Yugoslav Army presence at and interference with newly-opened

border crossing points.

•The initiation of illegal television broadcasts of Milosevic propaganda from

Yugoslav Army installations in Montenegro.

•An embargo slapped on by Belgrade to block trade with its fellow Yugoslav republic.

We have worked closely with the Djukanovic government to help it overcome

these pressures. While tensions remain, and the embargo has raised costs to Montenegro of basic goods and medicines—also depriving Serbia of natural markets—the

situation is calmer now than it was a few weeks ago. Rather than falling into

Milosevic’s trap of confrontation, the Montenegrin government is working with its

75

Yugoslav Army contacts to prevent security incidents from escalating. The prudent

approach taken by the Djukanovic government denies Milosevic and his supporters

any pretext for violence or intervention.

At the same time, we recognize that tensions could spike upward again and do

so quickly, given Milosevic’s hostility to Podgorica. Therefore, it is essential we

maintain our support for the Djukanovic government and continue to actively promote a democratic transformation in Serbia. We firmly believe the establishment of

a democratic government in Belgrade would make it possible for Serbia and Montenegro to establish a new, constructive relationship in which Montenegro could be

a genuine partner with Serbia in a democratic Yugoslavia.

The reform program of the Djukanovic government is already acting as a model

and a stimulus for democratization throughout Yugoslavia. Today, Montenegro is

moving down a road toward greater prosperity that the people of Serbia could also

travel, were their government democratic and willing to cooperate with the International Community. The Montenegrin government has worked actively with us and

the EU in our dialogue with the Serbian opposition on promoting democratization

throughout the FRY.

President Djukanovic has kept Montenegro on the path of peace and reform. His

government, a multi-ethnic coalition of three democratic parties, has committed

itself to building democracy and a market economy. Montenegro has progressed,

thanks in large part to the strong, pragmatic leadership President Djukanovic has

provided. His careful and steady approach has enabled Montenegro to provide a

more tolerant and prosperous society, despite tremendous pressure from the

Milosevic regime to fall in line.

Recognizing the constructive approach the new Montenegro government was taking, the U.S., and increasingly, the European Union, have supported the Government of Montenegro politically and with economic assistance.

Western assistance serves four valuable purposes. First, it helps to mitigate the

destabilizing effects of Belgrade’s economic sanctions against Montenegro. Second,

it allows Djukanovic to show that his policies deliver concrete benefits to the people

of Montenegro. Third, it reduces pressure from pro-independence groups on

Djukanovic to take risky steps. Fourth, it concretely demonstrates to Milosevic our

strong interest in Montenegro and to the Serbian people that our differences are

with Milosevic and his policies, not with Serbs or Montenegrins.

The U.S. has become and continues to be the Djukanovic government’s leading

supporter and most vocal advocate:

•We exempted Montenegro from sanctions against the FRY—including the

flight ban, the oil ban, and the financial sanctions—and persuaded the EU to

follow suit.

•We worked with our NATO allies to minimize the impact on Montenegro of air

strikes against FRY and Serbian forces to avoid inadvertently weakening support for President Djukanovic and his reform policies.

•We demonstrated political support through high-level contacts: President Clinton met twice with President Djukanovic; Secretary Albright hosted President

Djukanovic in Washington last fall and met him in Sarajevo last month; and

we have remained in close daily contact with key Montenegrin officials despite

the inability to maintain a permanent presence in Montenegro.

•Following Montenegro’s adoption of the Deutsche Mark as a parallel currency,

we sent a team of economic advisors to assist in developing and implementing

urgently needed reforms of Montenegro’s macrofinancial policies, budgeting

processes, tax system, banking sector, and payment systems. The EU is also

providing advisors in coordinated efforts.

•Last month, we signed an OPIC investment incentive agreement with Montenegro to help stimulate private sector investment, which is essential to building

a vibrant economy. The agreement allows OPIC to offer political risk insurance

and financing to U.S. firms for projects in Montenegro. It also allows OPICsponsored investment funds to invest in U.S. and non-U.S. projects in Montenegro.

Furthermore, an essential element of our strategy has been to back up our political support with concrete economic assistance. In fiscal year 1999, we provided $26

million in SEED funds for programs and budget support, $15 million in economic

support funds (ESF), and a substantial amount of humanitarian and food aid to help

them cope with the sudden influx of tens of thousands of Kosovar Albanians. In fiscal year 2000, we are providing another $26 million in SEED for program and budget support and $11 in ESF while continuing to provide considerable humanitarian

and food aid to alleviate the impact of Belgrade’s economic sanctions against Montenegro.

76

However, we expect that the amount of monetary assistance for fiscal year 2000

will not be adequate to meet Montenegro’s needs, which have increased due to Belgrade’s intensified economic sanctions against Montenegro. Consequently, we have

submitted to Congress a supplemental request for an additional $34 million in

SEED funding. We appreciate the House’s inclusion of this request in the supplemental bill passed on March 30 and hope the Senate will also support it.

While U.S. leadership and resources have been and remain essential, the U.S.

alone cannot provide sufficient support for Montenegro, nor should we do so. Europe

too has a strong interest in the success of Montenegro’s reform efforts and an essential role to play. Thus, we have been working intensively at senior levels to encourage the EU to commit greater resources to Montenegro, and speed their delivery,

bearing in mind the importance of strengthening the Djukanovic government at this

particular moment. The response has been encouraging. This year:

(1) The European Commission doubled EU assistance to Montenegro for 2000

from 10 to 20 million Euros.

(2) The European Council tasked the European Investment Bank (EIB) with developing a plan for financing projects in Montenegro.

(3) In Brussels on March 30, Stability Pact donors pledged funds against a list

of ‘‘Quick Start’’ infrastructure projects, which included $15 million of projects

in Montenegro. We have submitted for congressional notification the intended

U.S. share of this effort, which will leverage far larger European sums.

(4) EU members are looking for ways to increase their bilateral assistance to

Montenegro. Germany has granted DM 40 million in investment credits and the

Netherlands has also offered significant new assistance.

We will keep working with our European partners to get Montenegro the assistance it urgently needs.

For the Montenegrin government, keeping the economy stable and showing that

relations with the West pay dividends are critical in the run-up to the June 11 municipal elections in Podgorica and Herceg Novi. About one quarter of Montenegro’s

electorate will be eligible to vote in these elections, which are expected to gauge popular support for the Djukanovic government’s policies of democracy and economic reform. Currently, the economy surpasses relations with Serbia as the issue of greatest concern to voters.

Popular support for independence has grown considerably over the last few years,

but the Montenegrin people remain sharply divided over the question. A substantial

portion of the population, perhaps a third or more, remains strongly opposed to

independence. Given Milosevic’s support for Serb loyalists in Croatia, Bosnia, and

Kosovo, we believe a unilateral move toward independence by the Montenegrins

would provoke Belgrade to respond with force.

Absent Milosevic’s threats, we would still be convinced that the best future for

Montenegro is to remain with Serbia in a democratic, prosperous, and reformed

Yugoslavia. Such a relationship would preserve the traditional ties between the peoples of each republic and facilitate their economic development. Clearly, a democratic Montenegro can be a model and stimulus for democratization throughout the

FRY.

In closing, let me thank the members of the committee for this opportunity to discuss the situation in Montenegro and our policy there. We appreciate the strong

support of this committee and other members of Congress both for Montenegro and

for the Administration*s efforts to help the government of Montenegro remain a

model for democratization in the FRY.

77

78

79

80

81

82

83

84

85

86

87

88

89

90

91

92

93

94

95

96

97

98

99

100

101

102

103

104

105

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ILIR ZHERKA, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, NATIONAL ALBANIAN

AMERICAN COUNCIL BEFORE THE HOUSE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS COMMITTEE

APRIL 11, 2000

Mr. Chairman, thank you for inviting me to join you today to discuss the situation

in Kosova and your bill, H.R. 4053, the ‘‘United States Southeastern Europe Democratization and Burdensharing Act of 2000.’’

As we all know, last year at this time Serb forces were on a murderous rampage

in Kosova. In their effort to rid the country of its indigenous, Albanian population,

Serbs committed horrific acts of violence. In the village of Kline, 11 children, including a two-year old, were shot at close range by Serb forces. In Gjakova, Valbona

Vejca together with her three children, including a 3-month old baby boy, were murdered at a pool hall where they sought shelter. In Izbicaj, nearly 50 elderly men

were beaten by Serbs, their faces smashed in, before being shot at close range. And

throughout Kosova, young girls were raped, some in front of their families, as an

instrument of war.

At the end of this killing spree, nearly ten thousand were dead, a million forced

out of their homes, a whole nation traumatized. The war in Kosova was the central

part of Milosevic’s final solution to the Albanian question. Whatever history will say

about the post-war situation in Kosova, the fact is that the United States of America

led the military effort that put an end to the Serb campaign of murder, rape, and

brutality against the Albanians. For this, Albanians will be forever grateful and indebted to this great nation, and all Americans should be proud of our actions in

Kosova.

We should also be proud and thankful that the United States broke the chains

of repression in Kosova. For the first time in history, the people of Kosova are free—

free to express themselves, free to realize their individual potential, and, fairly soon,

free to elect their own leaders and decide their own fate.

But, while the international community was successful in war, it has had a mixed

record in peace. The international community has been unable to tackle some of the

fundamental problems in Kosova, such as the inadequate supply of water and electricity, the division of Mitrovica, and the lack of law enforcement.

Part of the solution to the problems that plague the international mission in

Kosova is for the United States to assert greater leadership, not less.

The American people understand what we have accomplished in Kosova and they

support the need for continued American leadership. A poll conducted last month

by Penn, Schoen, and Berland, showed that a majority of Americans supported the

air campaign against Serbia. More importantly, a full two-thirds of the American

people say they support the decision to put Kosova under NATO and U.N. control,

and two-thirds believe that the U.S. military should stay in Kosova to help the transition to democracy, protect the people, and finish the job we began.

As a side note, the poll also revealed that nearly 80 percent of Americans support

the creation of a democratic, independent Kosova.

After the United States incurred the bulk of the costs of the military campaign

against Serbia, we support the idea that Europeans ought to pay for the bulk of the

costs of peacekeeping and institution building in Kosova. But, at the same time, the

United States must maintain flexibility to make the strategic investments needed

throughout the region to ensure that stability and democracy firmly take hold in

the Balkans.

Unfortunately, the assistance cap in H.R. 4053 does not provide enough flexibility.

Instead, the bill would tie our aid to the levels provided by the international community. Under this bill, if European contributions dropped by 50 percent, we would

be forced to do the same even if we thought it very unwise. Also, the 15 percent

cap would be difficult to calculate and negatively effect our ability to deliver aid to

Kosova. Today, we are able to get aid much more quickly to Kosova than the Europeans. Under the cap, however, the Administration would be forced to constantly

reevaluate its efforts, causing delays. Additionally, the cap in H.R. 4053 would tie

us to an arbitrary number, 15 percent, again limiting our flexibility in the region.

Beyond the problems presented by the funding cap, H.R. 4053 shields Montenegro

and Macedonia from potential funding cuts, but not Albania and Kosova.

Although assistance to Albania and Kosova is not necessarily restricted in H.R.

4053, the language of the bill seems to suggest that these two countries are less

of a priority for the United States.

We firmly believe that helping to create a strong, stable, and democratic Albania

is essential to maintaining peace in the Balkans. Moreover, we have yet to win the

peace in Kosova. Congress should consider doing more, not less to help establish

long lasting institutions there. After all, we are spending billions of dollars to keep

106

our military in Kosova. We should also be willingly to leverage that money with

adequate sums to rebuild the economy and establish democratic institutions.

The people of both Albania and Kosova are staunchly pro-American. In fact, Albanians throughout the world believe that they have a special relationship with the

United States. That affinity began when Woodrow Wilson helped protect Albania’s

independence and continues through today with the U.S.-led NATO air campaign

against Serbia. We should try to cultivate that special relationship and work to ensure that a spirit of democracy and respect for human rights prevails in Albania

and Kosova.

We also believe that, as we provide aid to Montenegro and Macedonia, we should

continue to press those countries to work harder to provide equal rights and equal

opportunities to their Albanian population.

With the emergence of the Stability Pact, the United States and the international

community is taking a regional approach to the Balkans. Congress should continue

that approach by removing in H.R. 4053 the cap on our assistance and by adopting

funding principles and goals for the entire region.

Again, I thank you for inviting me to address this Committee. I look forward to

answering any questions you may have.

107

108

109

110

111

112

113

114

115

116

117

118

119

120

121

122

123

124

125

126

127

128

129

130

131

132

133

134

135

136

137

138

139

140

141

142

143

144

145

146

147

148

149

150

151

152

153