HomePress Briefings…Department Press Briefing – January 12, 2023

# 											Department Press Briefing – January 12, 2023									

Ned Price, Department Spokesperson

WASHINGTON, D.C.

January 12, 2023

## 										Article Index									

              - UGANDA
              - DEPARTMENT
              - AFGHANISTAN
              - LIBYA
              - RUSSIA
              - RUSSIA/UKRAINE
              - CHINA/JAPAN/SOUTH KOREA/NORTH KOREA
              - RUSSIA/UKRAINE
              - DEPARTMENT
              - TÜRKIYE/SYRIA
              - LEBANON
              - SYRIA
              - IRAN/RUSSIA
              - JAPAN/SOUTH KOREA
              - TÜRKIYE/SWEDEN/FINLAND
              - AFGHANISTAN/RUSSIA
              - DEPARTMENT
              - ARMENIA
              - YEMEN
              - SYRIA

2:24 p.m. EST

**MR PRICE:** Good afternoon.

**QUESTION:**Good afternoon.

**MR PRICE:** Remember on Monday when we started precisely at 2:00 p.m., and I said, “Remember this when we were a couple minutes late.”

**QUESTION:**Two minutes before.

**MR PRICE:** Two minutes before. Exactly. So this is where I’m going to ask for your forbearance and offer a reminder of better days.

 Let’s start with this. The United States welcomes the January 11th announcement by the Government of Uganda and the World Health Organization of the end of the Ebola epidemic in Uganda. We commend the Ugandan Government and our international partners on reaching this milestone. We celebrate with the survivors just as we express our condolences for those lives lost.

We support the Government of Uganda’s response and – response and minimize outbreak spread. The U.S. Government mobilized a comprehensive interagency response to the Ebola outbreak through the U.S. Embassy in Kampala. The State Department, the Department of Health and Human Services, including the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and the U.S. National Institutes of Health, the Department of Defense, and the Agency for International Development worked in coordination with the Government of Uganda and other key partners, such as the World Health Organization, to actively provide support in several areas vital to the response.

Every single outbreak reminds us that a health threat anywhere is a potential health threat to everyone in the world. The containment of this Ebola outbreak is just the most recent example of coordination and teamwork to keep all of us safe by preventing infectious disease threats from crossing borders.

Our work with countries around the world helps to not only prevent outbreaks and to detect them early but also to respond rapidly and effectively when they do occur. While we celebrate the end of this outbreak, we redouble our commitment to work with partners in Uganda and around the world to mitigate the risk of future disease outbreaks anywhere.

With that, Matt.

**QUESTION:**Right. I wasn’t actually going to ask about this, but since the Attorney General has just appointed a special counsel to look into the – these classified documents that apparently ended up at the Penn Biden Center and elsewhere, I’m just wondering if there’s been any contact. I realize it’s early days yet, or minutes, but has there been any contact, given the Secretary’s previous work there? Has there been any contact between the special counsel and this building?

**MR PRICE:** So, Matt, there’s not going to be much that I can say on a case like this for reasons that you well understand. You heard the President speak to this earlier in the week from Mexico City. Just as you heard from the President, the Secretary was surprised to learn that there were any government records taken to that office. As you know, as is now well known, there is a review of this matter, and so we’re going to let that review play out.

**QUESTION:**You mean to —

**QUESTION:**You say that the —

**QUESTION:**When you say that office, you mean the one that he was involved in, right?

**MR PRICE:** That’s correct. That’s correct.

**QUESTION:**And you said the Secretary was surprised to learn. When did he learn of that —

**MR PRICE:** I’m just not going to offer any additional detail. Just as the President was, he was surprised to learn that there were any government records taken to that location, had no knowledge of it at the time. But I am just not going to offer any additional detail.

**QUESTION:**But you can’t tell us when the Secretary learned that this was a matter being looked into by the White House?

**MR PRICE:** This matter is – this matter is under review, so we’re going to let that review proceed as it should.

**QUESTION:**And are there any State Department documents that are part of these documents that were found as part of —

**MR PRICE:** Of course that would not be anything I would know. It is not anything the Secretary would know. As we have heard from the White House, it is not something that the President knows. This is a matter that’s being investigated, being looked at by the Department of Justice. We’re going to let that proceed.

**QUESTION:**But certainly, if it has to do with work related to this department, you would hope to find that out, right?

**MR PRICE:** If there is a need for the Department of Justice to speak to the Department of State on an investigative matter, there are channels and procedures for them to do that. They are not channels or procedures that would involve me. They are not channels or procedures that would involve most people in this building. So if there is a need, there will be, as you would expect, full cooperation. But again, we’re going to let this review play out.

**QUESTION:**One more question, sorry. DOJ said that they – we have reported that they have interviewed officials as part of their investigation into this. Have they interviewed any State Department officials, as far as you know?

**MR PRICE:** Again, I am just not going to comment on this. This is a matter that is being pursued by the Department of Justice, and we’ll let them pursue it.

Nazira.

**QUESTION:**So thank you very much. I have three or four question. If you answer because today is my birthday, it will be my present.

**MR PRICE:** Yes, happy birthday. I heard that.

**QUESTION:**Thank you very much.

Okay, number one. The day before yesterday was big attack – actually yesterday morning in the ministry of foreign affairs. More than 21 young diplomat has been killed, and today ISIS or Daesh took the responsibility. And yesterday, I was at the White House. I expected that they should say something, but she was silent and didn’t say anything. That’s why I come today to ask this question.

And number two, Zamir Kabulov, Putin representative, went to Kabul, discussed with the Taliban although they did not recognize Taliban, and he announced their support to Taliban.

And the third question. So many Afghan refugee call me from Abu Dhabi. They’re still waiting to come to the United States. Any comment to expedite their procedure to come to the United States?

**MR PRICE:** So, Nazira, on your first question, we condemn in the strongest terms the terrorist attack that took place in Kabul. We’ve seen the claim of responsibility from ISIS-K. This, if ISIS-K was indeed behind this, is just the latest horrific example of a brutal group taking out, perpetrating senseless violence on the people of Afghanistan.

We send our deepest condolences to the loved ones, to the family members, of those who were killed in this senseless attack. We stand against and condemn terrorism everywhere, and of course that is the case in Afghanistan as well.

When it comes to the Russian official that you mentioned, I would need to refer you to the Russian Government for any comment they might have on their approach to the Taliban. Our approach is well known; we have made no secret of the fact that the Taliban’s actions are inconsistent and at odds with what they have pledged to the international community, but more importantly what they have committed to the Afghan people.

We are always going to stand on the side of the Afghan people. We are going to continue to condemn the actions that they take that are inconsistent with the rights, with the liberties, with the freedoms, with the opportunities that should belong to the people of Afghanistan. And in doing so, we have any number of countries at our side. Just after the Taliban announced the restrictions on international NGOs, the United States, our fellow members of the so-called Group of Seven, other countries, issued a strong statement condemning this.

You have since heard other statements condemning this from countries around the world. Just today there was a strong statement from the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, a confederation of Muslim-majority countries that were vocal, were vociferous in their condemnation of what the Taliban is perpetrating on the women, the girls, the minorities, the people of Afghanistan.

We are going to continue to speak out with much of the rest of the world. We are going to continue to hold the Taliban to account for what they are perpetrating on the people of Afghanistan.

Yes, (inaudible).

**QUESTION:** Can I move on to Libya, if I may?

**MR PRICE:** Sure.

**QUESTION:** The CIA chief is or was in Libya today, and this comes a month after – more or less a month after the extradition of the Lockerbie suspect in the United States. The Tripoli government got a lot of backlash for that. What kind of reassurances, or was he there to give reassurances to that – to the Libyan Government?

And then second, still related to Libya, there are reports there’s a meeting of special envoys from France, Germany, the UK, and the U.S. of course, on how potentially to stage elections in Libya with the two factions have not agreed. Can you give us any details on this meeting and what your expectations are and if the U.S. is optimistic at all that there can be an agreement to have elections in Libya?

**MR PRICE:** First the easy question: I am just not going to comment on any purported travel on the part of the CIA director, would need to refer you to the CIA to speak to any potential travel the director may be undertaking.

On the second part of your question, the report that you mentioned is not accurate. The reports of a meeting in Washington scheduled for tomorrow is erroneous. We take part in periodic consultations with key international stakeholders on how best to support the special representative of the secretary-general, SRSG Bathily, in setting the stage for elections in Libya and supporting the people of Libya. We look forward to hosting a future discussion as we have in the past, but we haven’t confirmed any dates at this time.

We continue to be engaged with political leaders in Libya and international partners on that very way forward in Libya. That includes a political track to establish a timeframe for elections as quickly as possible. We strongly support the special representative of the secretary-general, the call for national consensus in Libya on establishing a clear timeline for elections. We believe there is no other way to secure stability and long-term peace.

We share the desire of all Libyans to see Libyan leaders adopt the necessary measures as quickly as possible to set that electoral process in motion.

Humeyra.

**QUESTION:** Ned, what can you say about this U.S. Navy veteran who was released in Poland and former Governor Richardson was apparently instrumental in securing his release? Can you guys confirm and provide some details on what happened there?

**MR PRICE:** Unfortunately, there is little that I can say for reasons that you all know well, but I can make a few points.

First, we’re aware of reports that a U.S. citizen was deported after having been in Russian custody. I’m not in a position to discuss the particulars of this case due to privacy considerations that so often limit what we can say publicly. But as we always do, I want to emphasize that this department, the Department of State, has no higher priority than the safety and security of U.S. citizens overseas.

As a general matter, and when a U.S. citizen is deported from anywhere around the world – and of course this would include Russia – the department may provide assistance to help facilitate the return of that citizen to the United States. And as always, we stand ready to provide appropriate assistance to all U.S. citizens overseas.

To the second part of your question regarding the Richardson Center, I – of course, I would refer you there. We’re likewise aware of the Richardson Center’s travel, which they have announced, but not going to comment on their travel or activity in this case, again owing to those privacy considerations.

**QUESTION:** Staying – staying on this. Did you want to —

**QUESTION:** No, go for it. Yeah, go for it. I was going to —

**QUESTION:** Well, just on this. I mean, right, you’re aware of reports. The statement from Governor Richardson himself names two U.S. embassy employees – one from Warsaw and one from Russia.

**MR PRICE:** Matt —

**QUESTION:** Are you saying that —

**MR PRICE:** — I know this is —

**QUESTION:** Yeah, no. I think you need to go back to the lawyers in CA and say that this is getting to the point of absolute ridiculousness. You can either confirm that this guy has been turned over and that there was an embassy official there, or you can say that it’s not true. But saying that you don’t have a Privacy Act waiver to this when it has been announced by the governor himself and the names of a diplomat in Moscow and a diplomat in Warsaw are out there for everyone to see.

**MR PRICE:** So, Matt, I know this is a —

**QUESTION:** It is completely disingenuous for you to say that you’re aware of reports.

**MR PRICE:** Matt, it is not disingenuous. I know this is a bugaboo of yours. We are not going to find resolution to this longstanding irritant of yours today. What I can tell you, and what you seem to be disregarding, is the fact that Governor Richardson is a private citizen. Private citizens can say whatever they would like without any restriction imposed by pesky things like the Privacy Act waiver. The Privacy Act waiver applies to us; it does not apply to private citizens. It, in some cases, doesn’t even apply to other entities within the Executive Branch. So to say it is disingenuous, Matt – our attempt to stay within the bounds of the policies to which we are – to which we adhere, that I think is —

**QUESTION:** I don’t see how it impacts the Privacy Act at all for you to say, yes, we can confirm that an American citizen was deported and we took custody or we were part of a team that took custody of him or —

**MR PRICE:** And there are many cases in which we have said – made analogous statements like that, because we’ve been a position to do so, because of various Privacy Act waivers. When we don’t make statements like that, we’re not doing that because we want to be obtuse. We’re not doing that because we want to stonewall you. Believe me, my job would be a lot easier if I could share every single detail of this case. We’re doing it to be consistent with policies that apply to us.

**QUESTION:** I’m not even asking for any details. I’m not even asking for a confirmation of the name, but just to say you’re aware of reports that an American was deported. I mean, that’s – you’re aware of more than reports that an American was deported, and saying only that is disingenuous.

**QUESTION:** Are you able to – sort of are you able to talk at all about his ordeal, like these nine months, and like the kinds of conversations you guys have had with the Russians and when the State Department became aware of his detention by the Russians? Are you able to talk about any of that?

**MR PRICE:** Unfortunately, I am not. I can talk in generalities. Anytime we learn that an American citizen is incarcerated, is detained, is in the custody of a foreign government, we work to protect and to promote the interests of that individual. Oftentimes we do learn of such cases from interaction with the family. That is really what our Bureau of Consular Affairs – that is the bread and butter element of their job is to work with American citizens, to work with their representatives, to work with families to devise how we can best protect and to promote the interests of Americans overseas. That is the core priority of the work we do around the world. But we also want to respect the privacy of private American citizens, however frustrating that might be.

**QUESTION:** They posted pictures on Twitter, but sure.

**QUESTION:** I mean —

**QUESTION:** But Ned, the treatment between previous cases and this one – obviously different cases, of course, but very different. And your speech is not at all the same, right? You don’t have any problem with the Privacy Act regarding certain people that were freed recently, and in this case you do. So how do you explain that?

**MR PRICE:** That’s absolutely right, Leon, because there is something called the Privacy Act. There is something called the Privacy Act waiver. If we’re in a position to say more, we will; if we’re not, we can’t.

Yes.

**QUESTION:** On that, one more thing. I mean, outside groups are referring to this as a wrongful detention. Is that a characterization that the United States Government would use? Or is that a mischaracterization?

**MR PRICE:** We have been open and transparent because we have been in a position to do so regarding cases of wrongful detention inside of Russia. We had spoken of three cases. Two of those cases had been resolved with Trevor Reed and Brittney Griner now back in the United States, reunited with their loved ones. There is one case of wrongful detention in Russia at the moment, and that of course is the case of Paul Whelan. I say that with the very important caveat that we are always assessing the circumstances of the detention of each and every American around the world to determine if a particular case may meet the criteria that’s spelled out in policy, that’s spelled out in the Levinson Act to determine if those criteria are met. And when that determination is made, we will make the formal declaration that someone is wrongfully detained.

Yes.

**QUESTION:** Thank you. May I stay in the region, on Ukraine? What’s your sense of the latest situation in Soledar, and also the fact that Wagner Group is increasingly becoming the face of the war? Is there any concern inside the administration that you might be too cautious or lagging behind in terms of designating Wagner Group?

**MR PRICE:** Sorry, any concern that we might be —

**QUESTION:** Behind – too cautious or lagging behind, because some other countries have already taken those steps.

**MR PRICE:** So first a couple of things. And you know we don’t tend to get into battlefield dynamics or tactical assessments from here. Some of this may be best directed to the Department of Defense. But a couple broad points.

Number one, the reason why the pitched battle over a town like Soledar – a town of some 10,000 residents, at least before the war – is making headlines is because of the possibility, and it’s not confirmed, but the possibility that the Russians are achieving or at least claiming incremental gains at heavy costs. And the fact that the Russians are in a position to at least claim incremental gains, despite these heavy costs, is not something that we’ve heard from Russian forces in quite some time. The Ukrainian forces, with their counteroffensive that started last year, have been extraordinarily effective at halting Russian advances, pushing Russian forces back, recapturing thousands of miles of – thousands of square miles of territory, and the fact that certain Russian elements are claiming they have made some incremental progress I think speaks to the lack of the Russian ability to make such claims in quite some time.

We have been clear in our own assessments that fighting remains intense in the Donbas; it remains intense in the east where this battle is – has been waged. We expect that to continue. There will continue to be incremental gains and losses, we expect, by both sides. But any incremental Russian gain, even one that comes at such heavy cost in terms of casualties and personnel and equipment, will never be able to change this tide of war. No tactical advance will be able to shift the strategic failure that President Putin and his forces have encountered from the earliest days of this war, and a strategic failure that has only intensified with the effective counteroffensive that Russia – excuse me, that Ukraine has mounted.

On the question of the Wagner Group, we’ve seen reports – and in fact, senior Wagner officials are making pronouncements from the front lines, which only underscore – underscores the heavy investment on the part of Wagner forces in the effort to make some incremental advances in the town of Soledar. Of course, we’ve been very vocal about – in condemning the involvement of Wagner, a group that has conscripted, or in some cases offered pardons to, hardened criminals, convicts, those convicted of violent crimes, who have been taken from Russian prisons and labor camps and who have offered quite literally their lives in order for the chance, however small that might be, to secure freedom at the risk – profound risk that they could lose their own life or risk significant injury.

We’ve seen reports of tens of thousands of Wagner forces active on the battlefield, but just as partial mobilizations, just as additional calls for regular Russian forces have not been able to change the tide of battle, there is no doubt in our mind that the introduction of Wagner forces, even tens of thousands of Wagner forces, that there is no doubt in our mind that these efforts will meet the same fate that other Russian efforts have met in the face of the Ukrainian counteroffensive.

**QUESTION:** Is there any reason out there that prevents you from designating this group, even given the fact that this group is illegal even by Russian laws?

**MR PRICE:** And Wagner is designated under a number of authorities. Its leader, Mr. Prigozhin, is designated under a number of authorities. The point remains that we are looking for every appropriate and relevant authority we can to hold accountable those actors and entities that are responsible for this brutal war on the Ukrainian people. If there are additional authorities that would be permissible and appropriate and effective to wield against the Wagner Group or Prigozhin, we will evaluate that and we will implement those as we are able.

**QUESTION:** Just to get the record straight, the U.S. has not recognized Wagner Group as a terrorist organization; that’s what I mean.

**MR PRICE:** As a foreign terrorist organization, as an FTO?

**QUESTION:** Right.

**MR PRICE:** We have not.

**QUESTION:** We have not.

**MR PRICE:** But there are a number of authorities that we have already wielded against Wagner, and we’ll continue to look for other mechanisms to hold the group to account.

Yes, Cindy.

**QUESTION:** Hi. Can I turn to U.S.-Japan-China?

**MR PRICE:** Sure.

**QUESTION:** Would you agree with what Defense Secretary – excuse me – Austin said, that he doubts that a Chinese invasion of Taiwan is imminent? We had a rear admiral naval intelligence official today saying that the stakes have gone up and the danger level is something we need to take very seriously.

**MR PRICE:** I think both things can certainly be true, and this was the point Secretary Austin was making yesterday. Of course, we don’t have any formal assessments to share, but both Secretary Blinken and Secretary Austin spoke to the challenge that we’ve seen not over the course of recent months, but over the course of recent years: assertiveness on the part of the PRC, assertiveness that, in our estimation, is an attempt to undermine the longstanding cross-strait status quo – the very status quo that has maintained peace, security, stability across the Taiwan Strait for decades.

Just as the PRC is attempting to chip away at the status quo with these aggressive maneuvers, with these provocations, with these implicit threats against Taiwan, we, on the other hand – working hand-in-glove with our Japanese allies, with other allies in the Indo-Pacific – seek only to bolster the status quo, to maintain, to preserve the status quo and the peace and stability that it has brought to the Taiwan Strait over the course of decades now.

We oppose unilateral change in the status quo by either side. We will continue just as we have with calm, resolute steps to uphold peace and security, to – resolute steps to uphold peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait. Part and parcel of that is the U.S.-Japan alliance. It is the cornerstone of peace, of security, of prosperity in the Indo-Pacific. And of course, that includes in the region we’re talking about now.

The very steps that Secretary Blinken, Secretary Austin referred to yesterday – the steps that will enhance our alliance, that will make it more effective, that will seek to adapt it to the challenges and the opportunities, for that matter, that we face now – those are crucial elements to our efforts to advance our vision for a free and open Indo-Pacific, and as part of that to maintain peace and stability and to maintain the status quo across the Taiwan Strait.

**QUESTION:** Could you also talk a little bit about how the closer cooperation directly affects the threat from North Korea?

**MR PRICE:** Well, of course the DPRK poses a threat to Americans on the peninsula, to our allies in the region – of course, to our treaty allies, Japan and the ROK – and potentially beyond. So it is a threat that we and our Japanese allies take seriously; it is a threat that we and our South Korean allies take seriously. It is a threat that trilaterally, as partners, the United States, Japan, and South Korea take extraordinarily seriously.

Yesterday, you’ve heard from Secretary Blinken and Secretary Austin and their Japanese counterparts of our determination to maintain readiness, to maintain the effectiveness of our alliance, and to be in a position to deter and, as necessary, confront the threats that we face together as an alliance. One of those threats – perhaps the most challenging threat to regional peace and security we face at the moment – is that from the DPRK, namely its nuclear weapons program, its ballistic missile program as well.

We discussed these issues, alliance effectiveness and readiness, with our Japanese allies. We discussed them with our South Korean allies. But we are also very focused on the trilateral relationship because we know that, with the trilateral relationship, in some ways the sum is greater than its constituent parts. And we want to be prepared as allies – the United States, Japan, and South Korea – for the challenges, for the threats, and yes, for the opportunities as well that arise in the region.

President Biden I think demonstrated our commitment to trilateral cooperation in Cambodia late last year when, for the first time in some five years, brought together the leaders of Japan, of South Korea. Secretary Blinken has on several occasions now brought together his counterparts from the ROK and from Japan as well. Deputy Sherman has done that. Sung Kim, our special envoy for the DPRK, routinely does that. We see it as a critical element when it comes to our effort to confront the challenges to the vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific that the DPRK poses.

Yes.

**QUESTION:** So a follow-up on this. Yesterday we heard Secretary Austin specifically mentioning Article V of the security treaty between the U.S. and Japan. Why he needed to express it, because historically the article is – had been there for decades? And what will – how will this statement implicate itself differently other than up-to-date the historical implications of that article?

**MR PRICE:** So Secretary Austin and Secretary Blinken were referring to Article V of the Japan-U.S. mutual defense treaty yesterday, specifically in the domain of space. The Secretary and foreign minister will sign a framework agreement tomorrow at NASA, in fact, on space cooperation between the United States and Japan. This agreement has been more than a decade in the making. It covers a range of civilian space coordination from research collaboration to working together to land the first woman and person of color on the moon.

And they also made reference to the fact for the first time that, as allies, we have decided that certain attacks in or from space may constitute – may invoke Article V. Those are issues that we will look at as allies on a case-by-case basis, but again, it’s all part and parcel of our effort to modernize the alliance, to ensure that the alliance is strong, effective, ready across all the domains – land, sea, air, cyberspace, outer space.

**QUESTION:**And also another question. We have seen that – defense minister of Russia, Shoigu, appointed Gerasimov to oversee the operations in Ukraine. What do you expect will be the implications of – do you expect an escalation after Gerasimov took over the command of the Russian military operation in Ukraine?

**MR PRICE:**That’s really a better question for the Russian Federation, what potential leadership changes may portend. From our perspective, I’m reminded of one of the definitions of insanity – namely, doing the same thing over and over and over again and expecting a different result. We’ve seen Russia appoint various commanders of its forces inside Ukraine numerous times now, each time reaching for someone more senior, more seasoned, purportedly more effective, only to find precisely the same result, only to find a Ukrainian wall of self-defense – able, committed, dedicated Ukrainian defenders that are determined to defend their country.

Russia may be trying to change the dynamic once again with a new commander of Russian forces inside Ukraine, but the broader dynamic, the underlying dynamic is not going to change. That very dynamic is one in which Ukrainians are fighting for their territory. They are fighting for their country; they’re fighting for their democracy; they’re fighting for their freedom. And Russian forces are fighting a war of territorial conquest. This is not their land; this does not belong to them. Russian forces in many cases know that as well as Ukrainians do. And so that underlying dynamic is not going to change, and we are confident that the broader dynamic of this conflict – Ukrainians demonstrating their effectiveness on their battlefield, defending their territory, defending their country – that’s not going to change either.

**QUESTION:**Hey, Ned, on the NASA agreement that they’re going to sign tomorrow, do you have any other or any additional details on what’s going to be in – what’s going to be in that? And then – and I apologize if I’m being obtuse or insensitive on this, but when you talk about landing the first woman and first person of color on the moon, are – and this is a deal with the Japanese – are you talking about a Japanese woman and a Japanese person of color? Or does it – does that – is it not that specific?

**MR PRICE:**So this is – these are in some cases better questions for NASA, and you will hear more about this at NASA tomorrow. The Secretary and others will deliver remarks there. I don’t want to get ahead of what they’ll have to say at NASA tomorrow.

Let me move around. Yeah, go ahead.

**QUESTION:**We saw the Secretary met yesterday with Congressman McCaul, who will be the chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. I’m wondering if you could just give us a readout of that meeting and the expectations that the Secretary has for working with Republicans who are in the majority now in the House.

**MR PRICE:**So there’s not much I’m in a position to say about that meeting yesterday, and really I should call it a day yesterday, because Chairman McCaul did have an opportunity to meet with a number of senior officials here in the building yesterday – of course, not only the Secretary, but others. He was able to tour various facilities, including our China House. He was able to receive briefings on topics that are of particular interest to the new Congress but also of particular priority to us and of interest to the American people.

The Secretary believes deeply in the imperative of iterative and consistent engagement with Congress, with both houses, on a bipartisan basis. We have demonstrated that in the 117th Congress. According to records that have been put together by our Bureau of Legislative Affairs, we had more engagements with the 117th Congress last year than we had in any other recorded time in State Department history.

Now, that is just one metric, and of course metrics alone don’t capture quality, they don’t capture other intangible aspects of it. But this Secretary is committed to engagement with this Congress. We deeply believe, truly believe, that our foreign policy will be more effective, it will convey more legitimacy when the Congress understands what it is that we are doing, why are we seeking to do it, and optimally if it has bipartisan support. Yesterday’s engagement with Chairman McCaul was the start of that engagement with the 118th Congress, but we expect a lot more to come.

**QUESTION:**And did you guys invite him or did he request the meetings? And then in terms of their investigation into the Afghanistan withdrawal, will this department be providing documents and interviews in a timely manner upon their request?

**MR PRICE:** So as to how the meeting came about, of course we were eager to host Chairman McCaul. I will leave it to him and his office to characterize his level of interest. But again, it was a truly constructive – at least from our vantage point – successful engagement with the chairman yesterday.

On the various topics and regions of oversight, we are going to continue with the approach that we have exercised with the prior Congress, with the 117th Congress, with the 118th Congress. Congress has important functions: authorization function, appropriation function, and an oversight function. We believe in the utility, in the necessity of each of those functions, and we look forward to continuing our engagement with this Congress on those areas that are of interest to them and that most importantly are of priority to the American people.

Yes, go ahead.

**QUESTION:**Yes, the foreign minister – the Türkish foreign minister said today he will be meeting with his Syrian counterpart pretty soon in February. And as I understood, he will be visiting town, visiting Washington, in the next two days; is that right?

**MR PRICE:** We will likely have more details on this before too long. We regularly do have an opportunity to engage with our Türkish allies given the important work that we seek to accomplish together as NATO Allies, as stalwart partners across any number of challenges and opportunities. The Secretary often does have an opportunity to speak to Minister Çavuşoğlu. He sees him quite regularly at various gatherings, and I would expect they’ll have an opportunity to see one another before too long in person.

Yes.

**QUESTION:**You said repeatedly last week that you do not support normalization and you made everything – you made your position known by all – implicitly like Türkiye. Are you going to reconsider if the guy comes to Washington and make his case?

**MR PRICE:** So the position we’ve put forward when it comes to potential normalization with the Assad regime is not a position that is particular or unique to any single country. It applies across the board. We have made clear that we will not normalize and we do not support other countries normalizing with the Assad regime.

We have made that point repeatedly because we have not seen that this regime in Damascus has done anything that would merit normalization or merit improved relations. And we make that statement after 12 years of a brutal civil war in which the Syrian people have borne the brunt of that in many cases. In most cases, they have borne the toll of that war because of the very actions of the Assad regime.

We continue to support a Syrian-led political resolution in line with UN Security Council Resolution 2254, and we remain firm. Anyone engaging with the regime should ask how that engagement is benefiting the Syrian people – again, a people that have borne the vicious brunt of what their own government has inflicted upon them – and how that engagement might contribute or, quite the opposite, to the fulfillment of UN Security Council Resolution 2254.

To the subtext of your question, I think it’s important that our messages are consistent. What we say in public is consistent with what we say in private; what we say in the abstract is consistent with what we say in specific circumstances. So again, if our partners, if our allies, ask us our thoughts on engagement with the regime, that will consistently be our answer.

**QUESTION:**So why this contrast between you and your allies? The UAE foreign minister visited last week Damascus, and the Türkish foreign minister – he will meet his counterpart. So how do you explain this contrast between you and your ally over Syria?

**MR PRICE:** I can only speak for the United States of America. This is our position. This is our belief. It is predicated on the interests and the values that we have and that, by the way, we do happen to share with many of our partners and many of our allies. It’s no secret that we sometimes do have disagreements with partners, with allies. When we do have those divergences of opinion, we talk about those. We use the predicate of deep and longstanding relations to share candid views, and this is one area where we have had some candid discussions with partners and with allies.

**QUESTION:** Ned, can I —

**MR PRICE:** Let me move around to people who haven’t – yes.

**QUESTION:** A follow-up on that?

**MR PRICE:** Yes.

**QUESTION:** If the administration is concerned by normalization, why hasn’t it made better use of the Caesar Act, which is designed at least in part to isolate the Syrian Government?

**MR PRICE:** We remain focused on putting pressure on the Assad regime and those around him by working with the international community to hold the brutal dictator and his regime to account for the atrocities that they have perpetrated on their own people. Some of these atrocities amount to war crimes. Some of these atrocities amount to crimes against humanity as well.

All of our sanctions, including under the Caesar Act, remain fully in force. They’re an important tool to press the case for accountability for the Assad regime. And just to the point I was making earlier, we are always looking for additional ways we can promote accountability through, in this case, the Caesar Act or other tools or authorities under or at our disposal.

If and when we find appropriate avenues to levy those consequences, we have not hesitated to do so and we will not hesitate to do so.

**QUESTION:** Since you are – you are in the region, do you have any comment on the Iranian foreign minister three days visit to Beirut starting today?

**MR PRICE:** I don’t. I would refer you to the Lebanese Government or the Iranian Government.

**QUESTION:** Second, on the presidential elections, is the U.S. playing any role with France or others to press the leaders there to elect a new president?

**MR PRICE:** This is a question that is best addressed to the Lebanese parliament. It is up to the Lebanese parliament to determine the next president in accordance with the Lebanese constitution and importantly the demands of the Lebanese people who continue to face multiple crises that are not of their own making. We call on Lebanon’s leaders to quickly select a president and to subsequently form a government. The Lebanese people deserve political leadership willing to put the interests of the country first and a government able to implement long-overdue reforms that are critical to unlocking crucial international support.

**QUESTION:** I have one more on Syria. Is the U.S. playing any role in the reconciliation between SDF and the Syrian opposition?

**MR PRICE:** Again, I wouldn’t want to weigh in on what would constitute a hypothetical, but broadly speaking we seek to promote an inclusive political dialogue that advances the will of the Syrian people and that’s in line with UN Security Council Resolution 2254.

Let me – yes, I haven’t taken your question. Yes.

**QUESTION:** Islamic Republic of Iran is sending warships to Panama Canal. Do you have any reactions to that? Do you find it provocative?

**MR PRICE:** We are aware of this claim by Iran’s navy. We continue to monitor Iran’s attempts or at least its statements of its intent to develop a military presence in the Western Hemisphere.

**QUESTION:** And also one more about exporting arms to Russia. There are reports that Iran has delayed the delivery of arms to Russia, including ballistic missiles and launchers. Are you aware of these delays and these reports, and what’s your assessment?

**MR PRICE:** Our overarching assessment has not changed. Iran is and remains Russia’s most important source of security assistance. This is a burgeoning partnership between Russia and Iran that has deepened in recent months but even over the longer time horizon. We’ve released significant detail regarding the provision of UAV technology from Iran to Russia. We have also detailed our concerns that Russia may also seek ballistic missiles, ballistic missile technology, that Iran has.

We are watching very carefully. We continue to speak out against the provision of these wares, knowing that this technology, despite what we might hear from Tehran or from Moscow, is intended to do one thing: it is intended to kill Ukrainians; it is intended to inflict damage on the country of Ukraine, targeting in many cases civilian infrastructure.

Yes, I haven’t taken your question. Yes.

**QUESTION:** On the U.S.-Japan 2+2 meeting yesterday. At the joint press conference, Secretary Blinken said that they had first formal dialogue on extended deterrence in 2+2 format. Does it mean from now on U.S. and Japan will regularly discuss about extended deterrence not only in working-level meetings but also in ministerial level?

**MR PRICE:** We are committed to extended deterrence. It is a solemn commitment we have to our treaty allies in the Indo-Pacific. We are committed to it in the case of Japan. We are committed to it in the case of our ROK allies as well. There was a discussion of it yesterday, the critical role it plays in preserving peace and stability in the region, of reinforcing the rules-based international order. And I would expect there will be additional discussions of extended deterrence at multiple levels going forward with our Japanese allies.

Go ahead.

**QUESTION:** Just a follow-up on when you talk about the invocation of Article V, do you have anything to exemplify on what kind of attack could lead to the invocation? Could it be the attack on satellite operated by Japan in the space or in —

**MR PRICE:** So the understanding that was announced yesterday was an understanding with Japan on how attacks to, from, or through space could be covered by Article V of the Japan-U.S. mutual defense treaty. In the instance of such an attack, this will be a topic of consultation and discussion with our Japanese allies to determine the applicability under Article V of the U.S.-Japan mutual defense treaty and to respond appropriately.

Yes.

**QUESTION:** Ned, just want to ask about what’s been happening between Türkiye and Sweden over the past couple of days. And today specifically, Swedish ambassador was summoned after there was this demonstration with that puppet of Erdoğan being hanged by the city wall in Stockholm. So does this kind of – these kinds of developments, does this give you guys additional concern that the already delayed membership of Sweden and Finland will be further delayed? What is the timeline that you’re looking at right now?

**MR PRICE:** The timeline that we are looking is as soon as possible. And —

**QUESTION:** It’s not – I mean, sorry to interrupt you, but it’s just not realistic, and I think you guys know that as well. So I mean, are you more concerned over this latest incident – and let’s say you guys are now angling for after Türkiye’s elections?

**MR PRICE:** So as soon as possible is, in fact, realistic. That’s what we’re aiming for. Of course, we know the steps that have to be taken. This is an admission that can only take place with consensus on the part of the 30 current NATO Allies. But we’ve made the point consistently that Finland and Sweden are ready to be NATO allies. They are members of Partnership for Peace, other NATO structures. Their militaries already work seamlessly with our military. And we are – and we remain very confident that NATO will formally welcome Finland and Sweden at the first opportunity.

We believe that the time is right to finalize their accession process and to welcome them as full members, and we say that knowing that it will enhance their security as NATO allies, as well as that of the Euro-Atlantic region. And we say that not as a disinterested party. It’s very much in our national security interest as well. We are and will remain committed to their accession. You can see the strength of our support for their NATO membership in the overwhelmingly – in the overwhelming bipartisan vote that took place last year in the U.S. Senate just weeks after their application was first submitted.

In all of this, we’ve acknowledged the very legitimate security concerns on the part of Türkiye. We appreciate the tangible actions Finland and Sweden have already taken to address those concerns, as committed to under the trilateral memorandum of understanding that Türkiye signed on the margins of the NATO Summit in Madrid in June with Finland and Sweden, including substantially strengthening their bilateral cooperation with Türkiye on key security concerns.

**QUESTION:** When you say the time is now and as soon as possible, does that also mean that it is the U.S. assessment that Sweden and Finland has so far fulfilled what they need to do under that memorandum that’s signed in Madrid?

**MR PRICE:** That memorandum that was signed in Madrid was signed between Türkiye, Finland, and Sweden.

**QUESTION:** Sure. But the U.S. can have an assessment on whether or not the conditions there are fulfilled. You can have an assessment on that.

**MR PRICE:** And we very much appreciate the tangible actions that both countries have already taken to address those concerns. Ultimately, this was a roadmap for Türkiye, Finland, and Sweden to reach the point of accession, and this will be a question for those three countries, even as the United States continues to be very clear that we support their accession as soon as possible. They are ready to be NATO Allies, and we look forward to soon welcoming them as NATO Allies.

Yes, Dylan.

**QUESTION:** Yeah, back on Japan for one second. I want to go back to something the Secretary said a few weeks ago in this room, actually. He made a comment that if the U.S. were still in Afghanistan the way it was before, providing all the assistance it has to Ukraine would be, in his words, “much more complicated.” So in meetings like yesterday’s with your Japanese allies, how are you explaining, given that sentiment, that the U.S. can handle issues like Ukraine at the same time as a potential conflict over Taiwan or other Chinese aggression in the region.

**MR PRICE:** The Secretary was making the broad point, as we do firmly believe, that the investment that the American people, that the United States, and, as was predominately the case, the U.S. military made in Afghanistan over the course of 20 years was a significant drain on national resources. And you can measure those resources in any number of ways. You can measure it in the thousands of lives lost, the tens of thousands who were injured over the course of that 20-year military engagement. You can measure it in terms of the hundreds of billions of dollars that the United States expended in Afghanistan over the years. You can measure it in terms of what NATO committed and what NATO ultimately sacrificed in the course of that 20-year mission in Afghanistan.

So the point is that these are not typically either/or decisions. The point is that NATO now is more – is better resourced, it is stronger, it is more purposeful than it has been since any time since the end of the Cold War. The transatlantic community is more resolute, more determined, more united than at any time since the end of the Cold War. The resources that the U.S. military, the resources in terms of personnel and funding that NATO and ISAF were expending on Afghanistan – those are now able to be redirected to the challenges and the opportunities that we face today.

We say all of that knowing that the totality of our mission, of course, never ended in Afghanistan. We have a commitment to those with whom we served over the course of that 20-year engagement with Afghanistan, in Afghanistan. We have a broader commitment to the Afghan people. We can continue to do everything that we can to protect and to promote their interests, to mitigate the dire humanitarian circumstances that have been inflicted upon them, just as we are better able to take on the challenge that Russia presents and challenges – but also opportunities – that have emerged, that may emerge, whether that’s in Europe, whether that’s in the Indo-Pacific, whether that’s anywhere in between.

**QUESTION:** So you’re telling Japan, for instance, that the resource drain of having a few thousand troops in Afghanistan would be prohibitive, potentially, to aiding Ukraine as much as you would like, but the resource drain of a conflict in Taiwan or something like that is not?

**MR PRICE:** That’s not our message. We can take apart the – each element of that argument, but Dylan, what we were talking about was really a binary option when it came to Afghanistan: an open-ended, accelerated military engagement in Afghanistan that would not have constituted 2,500 troops. The point that you heard from this administration and from outside experts was the fact that the status quo in Afghanistan, as this administration inherited it in January of 2021, with the fewest number of troops in Afghanistan since the earliest days of the war, was not sustainable. The question was withdrawal or deeper engagement – and by deeper engagement, more forces, more potentially American blood, more American treasure.

President Biden, as three successors – excuse me, three predecessors – before him had, came to the determination that it was time for American forces to withdraw militarily from Afghanistan. President Biden uniquely was in a position to follow through with that commitment. So again, this is not a question of either-or. The United States of America, the American military, is capable of doing extraordinary feats, taking on extraordinary missions, oftentimes simultaneously – plan for that, exercise for that, develop all sorts of contingencies for that.

But if the question was should we subject hundreds or thousands more American forces and millions or billions of additional American dollars each and every year to Afghanistan, a theater where our – the goals the United States went in with and the goals the international community went in with in October of 2001, where those goals had been met – again, due in no small part to the U.S. military, to our diplomatic engagement, to our government, to our partners within the U.S. Government, but also to our partners in NATO and partners around the world – if the question was do we deepen that investment or do we finally affect that withdrawal after having completed the mission that the international community went in to pursue, President Biden made the determination – the right determination, we are confident – that it was time finally to end that mission.

Yes, Alex.

**QUESTION:** And the (inaudible) initiative Without Just Cause, I’m just trying to figure out how is it going to differ from what recently that you have already been doing. According to the readout, the initiative will include diplomatic engagement and public diplomacy. I’m just wondering if naming and shaming or quote/unquote “engagement” will be prioritized. And who’s going to run the show – DRL, or?

**MR PRICE:** So the answer to your first question is a little bit of both. This is an effort to shine a bright light, to shine a spotlight on a challenge that we face around the world of political prisoners, people who are held without just cause, people who are held because of their beliefs, because of their protected activities, because in the eyes of a government or a regime they pose a threat. To us that’s unacceptable, and the Without Just Cause campaign is one tactic.

The individuals who are highlighted as part of that campaign, of course and unfortunately, are not the totality of political prisoners around the world. Those number in the thousands. What we’re talking about here is a small microcosm of the challenge of political prisoners. That is an effort that DRL in this case is running to put a spotlight on that, to raise public awareness, and to emphasize to countries around the world that this is a challenge that the United States will do everything we can to address and, on a case-by-case basis, resolve.

**QUESTION:** Giving a timeline until, let’s say, next year you want those individuals to be released?

**MR PRICE:** We want those individuals to be released today. We want those individuals to be released tomorrow. We are going to continue working, as we consistently have, to see all of those individuals, but political prisoners around the world, to see to it that they are not held without just cause.

**QUESTION:** Thank you. And lastly, a separate topic. Armenia has refused to host Russia-led military drills. Previously, also we heard Armenian officials were talking about how Russia is trying to lure them into Belarus-Russia coalition. Is it what your impression that Russia is trying to do in the South Caucasus? I’ve heard similar arguments in Azerbaijan as well.

**MR PRICE:** I would refer you to the Government of Armenia to speak to their position on this.

**QUESTION:** Ned, do you guys have any reaction or response to this Oxfam report that came out yesterday about the U.S. and UK weapons being used by the Saudis to – well, killing civilians in Yemen?

**MR PRICE:** Yes. Yeah. So on that report, Oxfam’s recent report covered a period predating the UN-mediated truce in Yemen that began in April of last year, and for which the major elements remain in place. The dramatic reduction of violence since April of last year, enabled by U.S. diplomacy, has saved countless lives and helped avert a famine. International humanitarian law, including rules related to the protection of civilians, must always be respected in armed conflict. We will continue to support improvements to our partners’ abilities to mitigate and respond to civilian harm, including through pressing for accountability when that is appropriate.

The United States is committed to seeking a mandate in the UN Human Rights Council to advance accountability, justice, and redress for the human rights abuses and violations that have occurred during the conflict in Yemen.

**QUESTION:** So you don’t think that this has continued on after the truce began?

**MR PRICE:** Well, the simple fact is that with the introduction of the truce in April of 2022, there was a dramatic reduction in violence. Much of the activity that is cited in the report – activity that according to this report is alleged to have resulted in some cases in civilian harm – much of that activity either was reduced or came to an end entirely.

Yes, final question.

**QUESTION:** Thanks. So on Assad, normalizing relations with Assad, we have – you mentioned values, sanctions, actions of the United States. Could you tell us to any of this over the course of 11 years have changed Assad’s course of action in a minimal way even?

**MR PRICE:** So counterfactuals are always impossible to entertain. I won’t try to entertain this one except to make the broad point that Assad has perpetrated atrocities against his own people. He has – his forces have conducted crimes against humanity. They have conducted war crimes as well. We of course don’t know what the Assad regime might have done would it not have been for the accountability measures that have been imposed on him. We do not know what the Assad regime might have done had it not been for the actions on the part of the United States and countries around the world to confiscate and destroy Syria’s chemical weapons stockpiles in the aftermath of 2014. All of that is unknowable.

What we know is that we are going to continue to promote accountability for the Assad regime. We are going to continue to discourage partners around the world from normalizing or improving relations with the Assad regime. And we’re going to continue espousing the principles that are at the heart of UN Security Council Resolution 2254. We continue to believe that it forms the most appropriate basis for bringing the civil war to an end in a way that is durable, in a way that respects and promotes the aspirations of the Syrian people.

**QUESTION:** But the question – the question is it doesn’t – none of this changed the course of the war, and United States is not for – does not have a policy of regime change in Syria. Atrocities continue. People are suffering. What is the way out?

**MR PRICE:** The way out, as we see it, is through UN Security Council Resolution 2254. I don’t want to give you the impression that anyone is complacent or anyone is satisfied with the course of the past 12 years of the civil war in Syria. Quite the opposite. It is an absolute tragedy, it is a manmade tragedy, a tragedy that’s been inflicted on the people of Syria by Bashar al-Assad, by his regime.

Now, I can’t speak to what might have transpired had the United States and the international community not taken the steps we have to hold the Assad regime to account. But what I can say is we will continue to take steps to promote that vision that’s put forward in UN Security Council Resolution 2254.

Thank you all very much.

**QUESTION:** Thank you.

(The briefing was concluded at 3:29 p.m.)

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