Recapitalizing Nuclear Weapons

Problem.

Beginning with the development of the nuclear bomb in 1945, the US has maintained a leadership role in nuclear weapons

design. However, since the end of the Cold War, the nuclear weapons complex (NWC) (created to design, manufacture,

maintain, test and ultimately dismantle nuclear weapons and their components) has consolidated and been insufficiently

maintained. The Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, Douglas Feith, summarized the NWC status in Congressional

testimony, “For example, the United States today is the only nuclear weapons state that cannot remanufacture

replacements or produce new nuclear weapons.” The US must reverse this trend.

Discussion.

The US has not developed and fielded a new nuclear warhead in 10+ years. The existing stockpile was designed when the

primary threat was the former Soviet Union, and Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) was the US policy. In 1968,

Robert McNamara explained this policy: “The cornerstone of our strategic policy continues to be to deter deliberate

nuclear attack upon the United States or its allies. We do this by maintaining a highly reliable ability to inflict

unacceptable damage upon any single aggressor or combination of aggressors at any time during the course of a strategic

nuclear exchange, even after absorbing a surprise first strike.” This policy was basically maintained until the 2001

Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), and it drove the size, design and overall composition of the US nuclear stockpile. Nuclear

weapons in the stockpile were optimized to maximize the destructive yield while minimizing the size and weight of the

warhead. This allowed the warheads to be deployed on various delivery systems (leading to the ability to have multiple

reentry vehicles on a single missile). The result - highly optimized designs manufactured with exotic and complex

materials and processes with little regard for cost, ease of manufacture or long term sustainability. Today many of the

materials and processes are no longer available due to stricter environmental regulations. Linton Brooks, Administrator of

the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), summarized the stockpile when he said, “Although nuclear

weapons issues are usually contentious, I believe that most would agree that if we were starting to build the stockpile from

scratch today we would take a much different approach than we took during the Cold War.”

At the end of the Cold War, the US nuclear warheads were placed in a “maintenance” mode, ensuring their safety and

reliability, but not modifying the overall capabilities of existing warheads (the one exception is the B61-11). As the threat

posed by the Soviet Union receded, funding for nuclear weapons activities decreased dramatically. Parts of the NWC

(Mound, Pinellas and Rocky Flats) were closed and the remaining funds were allocated to sustaining the stockpile. As a

result, the remaining elements of the nuclear weapons infrastructure atrophied, jeopardizing the nation’s ability to

remanufacture replacements or produce new weapons.

The decision to halt US nuclear underground testing in 1992 resulted in a second impact to the NWC. Before 1992,

nuclear weapons testing, along with a range of experimental activities, provided confidence that a weapon would perform

as expected. Without underground testing, a different method needed to be identified to provide confidence in the

Nation’s nuclear deterrent. DOE convened a conference of laboratory, plant and federal personnel and designed what

Congress would authorize in the FY 1994 National Defense Authorization Act as the stockpile stewardship program

(SSP). The SSP focuses on four key elements: 1) science based understanding of the behaviors of warheads throughout

Air Education and Training Command — “Develop America’s Airmen Today . . . for Tomorrow”

Air University (AU) Quick Looks are written by the faculty, staff, and students assigned to Air University on topics of interest to the larger national

security community. These Quick Looks are available electronically at the AU Research Web Site (https://research.maxwell.af.mil) or

(http://research.airuniv.edu). Comments are encouraged. Send to: CADRE/AR, Director, Airpower Research Institute, 401 Chennault Circle, Maxwell AFB

AL 36112-6428 or e-mail: cadre/arr@maxwell.af.mil

CADRE Quick Look 06-09
their life cycles, 2) careful surveillance of the stockpile, 3) no new nuclear testing, and 4) life extension programs (LEPs)

for warhead refurbishment. The SSP has successfully maintained the US nuclear stockpile for the past 10 years, but there

is a growing concern that the LEP approach is not financially sustainable long-term.

Alternative 1 - Maintain Status Quo (or Smaller Status Quo): A logical case can be made for maintaining the status

quo. Following the underground testing ban, the nuclear weapons stockpile has been annually assessed by the DOE and

DOD using the tools of the SSP. While acknowledging concerns with aging, the existing processes and programs appear

to be sufficient to maintain a safe and reliable nuclear deterrent capability. Supporters of this alternative assert that there

is no “crisis” that requires a significant change in the overall US policy. Development of a new weapon to address the

current threat environment (to include rogue states and terrorists) is not worth the cost. Finally, if nuclear weapons are

useful only as a deterrent, that deterrent can be maintained with a smaller stockpile. Assuming future constrained budgets,

an increased investment in nuclear weapons is not warranted.

Alternative 2 - Begin to Recapitalize the US Nuclear Warheads: A combination of factors increases the imperative to

begin the recapitalization of the nation’s nuclear weapons as soon as possible. First, as the US maintains the existing

stockpile through life extension programs, the life-extended weapons are incrementally moving away from “tested”

systems as aging components are repaired and replaced. In the future, a decision point could be reached where a nuclear

test could be required for certification to the confidence level desired by key decision makers. Second, the future threat

environment cannot be adequately predicted. MAD is no longer a valid strategy for “rogue” nations and terrorists. The

US must have a responsive capability to respond to future threat environments. The 2001 NPR recognized the changing

security environment and added responsive infrastructure to the new nuclear triad. Third, many scientists and engineers

with nuclear test experience are approaching retirement age, and their experience needs to be passed to the next generation

of designers. If the effort to transform and revitalize the nuclear weapons infrastructure does not begin soon, the nation

risks losing its ability to produce nuclear weapons in the future.

Way Ahead.

Douglas Feith said, “Nuclear weapons will continue to be essential, particularly for assuring allies and friends of US

security commitments, dissuading arms competition, deterring hostile leaders who are willing to accept great risk and cost

to further their evil ends, and for holding at risk highly threatening targets that cannot be addressed by other means.”

Using a phased, spiral approach, a forcing function for recapitalization such as the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW)

should be pursued. The RRW feasibility study is on-going to design a more robust, reliable warhead with improved safety

and security measures as a replacement for an existing warhead. RRW would drive the transformation of the

infrastructure while demonstrating the ability of the NWC to design, manufacture and certify a warhead without nuclear

testing. Assuming success, approval could be granted to start producing a limited number of RRWs. This effort will

exercise the manufacturing and production facilities, identify design and production issues, and provide a means to make

informed decisions on if/when RRWs should enter the stockpile. Future enhancements could be incrementally added

(spiraled) to RRWs, enabling the US ability to tailor the warheads for specific capabilities, and ensuring continued

diversity of warheads in the stockpile. As long as other countries possess nuclear weapons, the US must also possess

nuclear weapons.

Lt Col Edgar M. Vaughan

College of Aerospace Doctrine, Research and Education (CADRE)

Disclaimer: Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent

the views of the Air Force Fellows, CADRE, the United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any other US Government agency. Cleared for

public release: distribution unlimited.

CADRE Quick Look 06-09