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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA :

:

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

v. :

:

JUSTIN SCOTT DIGNARD, : No. 1629 WDA 2017

:

 Appellant :

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence, August 9, 2016,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Venango County

Criminal Division at No. CP-61-CR-0000143-2016

BEFORE: OLSON, J., MURRAY, J., AND FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E. 

MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED JUNE 6, 2018

Appellant, Justin Scott Dignard, appeals from the August 9, 20161

judgment of sentence following his convictions for robbery—threat of serious 

bodily injury and robbery (felony 2).2 Matthew C. Parson, Esq. 

(“Attorney Parson”), has filed an application to withdraw, alleging that the 

 

1 Appellant’s trial counsel did not appeal the August 9, 2016 judgment of 

sentence. Appellant’s appeal rights were reinstated in a Post Conviction 

Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546, proceeding. Appellant’s 

appellate counsel mistakenly stated that he appealed to this court from the 

order of October 2, 2017, which granted the PCRA petition. Appellant’s 

appeal properly lies from the judgment of sentence, dated August 9, 2016. 

The caption originally stated that the appeal was from the PCRA order. We 

have amended the caption accordingly.

2 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3701(a)(1)(ii) and 3701(a)(1)(v), respectively.
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appeal is frivolous, accompanied by an Anders brief.3 Upon review, we 

deny counsel’s application to withdraw and remand for either a compliant 

Anders/Santiago brief or an advocate’s brief.

The relevant factual background and procedural history as found by 

the trial court is as follows:

The above-captioned cases arise out of two armed 

robberies of businesses located in Oil City, 

Pennsylvania, occurring on December 30, 2011 and 

June 1, 2012, respectively. [Appellant] eluded 

authorities for a lengthy period of time, but was 

eventually arrested . . . .

[Appellant] signed a plea agreement dated June 2, 

2016, in which he pled guilty to Count 2, RobberyThreat of Serious Bodily Injury (Felony 1) at 

CR No. 143-2016, and Count 1, Robbery (Felony 2) 

at CR No. 142-2016. The Commonwealth 

recommended [appellant] serve standard range 

sentences at both counts and that they be served 

concurrently.

Prior to sentencing, [appellant] underwent a 

pre-sentence investigation and his prior record score 

was calculated as being a three (3). The guidelines 

called for a sentence of fifteen (15) to 

twenty-one (21) months, and the statutory minimum 

and maximum sentences were sixty (60) to one 

hundred and twenty (120) months at Count 1, 

Felony 2 Robbery. The guidelines called for a 

sentence of forty-two (42) to fifty-four (54) months, 

and the statutory minimum and maximum sentences 

were one hundred and twenty (120) to two hundred 

and forty [240] months at Count 2, Felony 1 

Robbery-Threat of Serious Bodily Injury.

 

3 See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and Commonwealth v. 

Santiago, 978 A.2d 349 (Pa. 2009).
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On August 9, 2016, [appellant] was sentenced by 

this Court at CR No. 142-2016 on Count 1, Felony 2

Robbery as follows:

pay the costs of prosecution, all other 

costs, pay a fine $0 in order to facilitate 

restitution, make restitution payable to 

the Clerk of Court[s] of Venango County, 

in the sum of $900, for the use of Leroy 

and Elizabeth George, said restitution 

shall be paid in ten (10) years and is a 

condition of sentence, and undergo an 

imprisonment in a STATE INSTITUTION 

OF THE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS 

for a minimum of which shall be 

twenty-one (21) months, the maximum 

of which shall be ten (10) years.

Judge Boyer’s August 9, 2016 Amended Sentence 

Order (emphasis in original). In the same sentence 

order, [appellant] was sentenced by this Court at 

CR No. 143-2016 on Count 2, Felony 1 RobberyThreat of Serious Bodily Injury as follows:

pay the costs of prosecution, all other 

costs, pay a fine $0 in order to facilitate 

restitution, make restitution payable to 

the Clerk of Court[s] of Venango County, 

in the sum of $6,130, for the use of 

Thorne’s Market, 809 Grandview Road, 

Oil City, Pennsylvania, 16301 (Said 

Restitution shall be joint and several with 

codefendant, Adrian Dignard at 

C.R. No. 78-2016.) said restitution shall 

be paid with [sic] ten (10) years and is a 

condition of sentence, and undergo an 

imprisonment in a STATE INSTITUTION 

OF THE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS 

for a minimum of which shall be 

forty-two (42) months, the maximum of 

which shall be twenty (20) years.

Id. (emphasis in original). The Court stated that the 

sentences imposed at CR No. 142-2016 and 
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CR No. 143-2016 were to be served concurrently. 

Id.

[Appellant] filed a timely notice of appeal, and 

[appellant] filed the instant Concise Statement on

November 17, 2017.[

4]

Trial court opinion, 12/8/175 at 1-3.

Appellant raises the following issue for this court’s review: “Whether 

the Sentencing Court erred as a matter of law or abused its discretion when 

the Sentencing Court ordered a Sentence to the maximum of the statute for 

the sole basis of ensuring restitution was paid in full[?]” (Appellant’s brief 

at 5.)

On February 18, 2018, Attorney Parson filed in this court a motion to 

withdraw as counsel, because he found the appeal to be “wholly frivolous,” 

and an Anders brief. (Petition for leave to withdraw as counsel, 2/16/18 

at 1, ¶ 4 (emphasis in original).)

A request by appointed counsel to withdraw pursuant 

to Anders and Santiago gives rise to certain 

requirements and obligations, for both appointed 

counsel and this Court. Commonwealth v. 

Flowers, 113 A.3d 1246, 1247-1248 (Pa.Super. 

2015).

 

4 Appellant filed for reinstatement of his appeal rights due to ineffective 

assistance of counsel under the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 

42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. On October 2, 2017, the trial court granted the 

PCRA petition and ordered Attorney Parson, appellant’s PCRA counsel, to file 

a direct appeal on behalf of appellant from the judgment of sentence. 

Attorney Parson filed the notice of appeal on October 26, 2017. 

5 The trial court filed an opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) on 

December 8, 2017.
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These requirements and the significant 

protection they provide to an Anders

appellant arise because a criminal 

defendant has a constitutional right to a 

direct appeal and to counsel on that 

appeal. Commonwealth v. Woods, 

939 A.2d 896, 898 (Pa.Super. 2007). 

This Court has summarized these 

requirements as follows:

Direct appeal counsel seeking 

to withdraw under Anders

must file a petition averring 

that, after a conscientious 

examination of the record, 

counsel finds the appeal to 

be wholly frivolous. Counsel

must also file an Anders

brief setting forth issues that 

might arguably support the 

appeal along with any other 

issues necessary for the 

effective appellate 

presentation thereof.

Anders counsel must also 

provide a copy of the Anders

petition and brief to the 

appellant, advising the 

appellant of the right to 

retain new counsel, proceed 

pro se or raise additional 

points worthy of the Court’s 

attention.

Woods, 939 A.2d at 898 (citations 

omitted).

There are also requirements as to the 

precise requirements of an Anders brief:

[T]he Anders brief that 

accompanies court-appointed 

counsel’s petition to 
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withdraw . . . must: 

(1) provide a summary of the 

procedural history and facts, 

with citations to the record; 

(2) refer to anything in the 

record that counsel believes 

arguably supports the 

appeal; (3) set forth 

counsel’s conclusion that the 

appeal is frivolous; and 

(4) state counsel’s reasons 

for concluding that appeal is 

frivolous. Counsel should 

articulate the relevant facts 

of record, controlling case 

law, and/or statutes on point 

that have led to the 

conclusion that the appeal is 

frivolous.

Santiago, 978 A.2d at 361.

Id. at 1248. If this Court determines that appointed 

counsel has met these obligations, it is then our 

responsibility “to make a full examination of the 

proceedings and make an independent judgment to 

decide whether the appeal is in fact wholly frivolous.” 

Id. at 1248. In so doing, we review not only the 

issues identified by appointed counsel in the Anders

brief, but examine all of the proceedings to “make 

certain that appointed counsel has not overlooked 

the existence of potentially non-frivolous issues.” 

Id.

Commonwealth v. Hankerson, 118 A.3d 415, 419-420 (Pa.Super. 2015).

Regarding the requirements of Anders, Attorney Parson has filed a 

petition that avers that, after a conscientious examination of the record, he 

finds the appeal to be wholly frivolous. He has also filed a brief which 

attempts to set forth the issues that might arguably support the appeal. 
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However, while he identifies the issue in the statement of questions involved 

in the brief as “Whether the Sentencing Court erred as a matter of law or 

abused its discretion when the Sentencing Court ordered a Sentence to the 

maximum of the statute for the sole basis of ensuring restitution was paid in 

full” (Anders brief at 5), the corresponding heading in the argument section 

of his brief states, “Whether the Sentencing Court erred as a matter of law 

or abused its discretion when the Sentencing Court failed to run [appellant’s] 

two Venango County sentences and the Clarion County sentence 

concurrently.” (Anders brief at 7.) The body of the argument section of the 

brief does address the issue contained in the statement of questions 

involved, so the issue set forth in the brief is in compliance with Anders. A 

review of the record reveals that Attorney Parson complied with the 

requirements of Anders concerning notification to appellant.

With respect to the requirements of Santiago, Attorney Parson has 

provided a summary of the procedural history and facts, although technically 

he does not comply with this requirement, as there are no citations to the 

record, and he has referred to the trial court’s statement at sentencing that 

the length of sentence was because appellant also had to pay restitution. 

However, Attorney Parson has failed to comply with the third and fourth 

requirements of Santiago. Attorney Parson has not set forth in his brief the 

conclusion that the appeal is frivolous, and he has not stated his reasons for 

concluding that the appeal is frivolous.
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Due to Attorney Parson’s failure to comply with Santiago, we deny 

Attorney Parson’s petition to withdraw as counsel. We remand this case with 

instruction to counsel to file either a compliant Anders/Santiago brief or an 

advocate’s brief. Counsel is directed to comply with this directive within 

30 days of the date of this memorandum. Appellant and the Commonwealth 

may respond within 30 days of counsel’s filing of his brief.

Application to withdraw as counsel denied. Case remanded. 

Jurisdiction retained.