PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee, 

v. 

JOHN MIGUEL SWAN, 

 Defendant - Appellant. 

No. 22-6132 

_________________________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Western District of Oklahoma 

(D.C. No. 5:21-CR-00028-F-1)

_________________________________ 

Keith Bradley of Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP (Virginia L. Grady, Federal Public 

Defender; Leah D. Yaffe, Assistant Federal Public Defender, on the opening brief), 

Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant. 

Allison B. Christian, Assistant United States Attorney (Robert J. Troester, United States 

Attorney, and Jackie Hutzell, Assistant United States Attorney, with her on the brief), 

Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

_________________________________ 

Before MATHESON, BACHARACH, and MORITZ, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

MORITZ, Circuit Judge. 

_________________________________ 

John Swan appeals the district court’s denial of his presentence motion to 

withdraw his guilty plea. At the hearing on Swan’s motion, plea counsel testified that 

he told Swan, who is Black, that all minorities would be removed from his jury and 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

January 23, 2024

Christopher M. Wolpert 

Clerk of Court

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that his case would be tried before exclusively white jurors. This material 

misrepresentation about Swan’s right to an impartial jury selected through racially 

nondiscriminatory means occurred just before Swan told plea counsel that he wanted 

to plead guilty. What’s more, counsel’s misrepresentation was neither corrected 

during the district court’s plea colloquy nor negated by Swan’s prior experience in 

the criminal-justice system. Under these circumstances, Swan’s plea was unknowing 

and involuntary, and the district court abused its discretion in denying Swan’s motion 

to withdraw his guilty plea. We reverse and remand for the district court to allow 

Swan to withdraw his guilty plea and for further proceedings. 

Background 

While arresting Swan on a warrant stemming from state domestic-violence 

charges, Oklahoma police officers saw ammunition “f[a]ll from somewhere on . . . 

Swan’s person” and land on the ground. R. vol. 1, 96. The video of the arrest from 

the officers’ body cameras does not show the ammunition falling out of Swan’s 

pocket, but still images taken from the bodycam footage show ammunition on the 

ground near where Swan was taken down. Based on this incident, a grand jury 

indicted Swan for being a felon in possession of ammunition. See 18 U.S.C. 

§ 922(g)(1). Swan entered a guilty plea, which the district court accepted after 

conducting a plea colloquy. 

Five months later, the district court allowed Swan’s plea counsel to withdraw 

after finding a complete breakdown of effective communication and the absence of a 

workable attorney-client relationship. On the same day, it appointed new counsel for 

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Swan. 

Around two months later, Swan wrote a pro se letter to the district court 

asserting his factual innocence and indicating that plea counsel had “compelled” him 

to plead guilty. R. vol. 1, 38. The district court treated this letter as a motion to 

withdraw the plea and ordered additional briefing. Swan’s counsel then filed an 

expanded motion to withdraw the plea, arguing that Swan was factually innocent. 

Counsel also argued that Swan’s plea was unknowing and involuntary because Swan 

“believed, based on his discussions with [plea] counsel, that he had no choice but to 

plead guilty because it would be his word against the word of the police, and that he 

would necessarily be disbelieved by a jury.” Id. at 52. 

At the hearing on the motion to withdraw the plea, Swan testified that he was 

factually innocent and said that the complete video footage of his arrest showed that 

law enforcement had planted the ammunition after his arrest. He further testified that 

he “didn’t feel like [he] was going to be able to get a fair trial” and that the jury 

would believe the officers over him. R. vol. 3, 21. 

Testifying for the government, plea counsel explained that in his meetings 

with Swan, he showed Swan still images from the bodycam footage of the arrest, as 

well as a short clip of the footage, but not the entire video. He explained that 

although the video did not show the ammunition falling out of Swan’s pocket, the 

still images showed “Swan being placed on the ground, . . . being picked up, and then 

the clip being within close proximity of where he was placed facedown.” Id. at 48. 

Describing his final meeting with Swan, plea counsel said that he showed Swan the 

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video clips and still photos again and told “Swan that it would be his word against all 

of the officers that were present.” Id. 

Plea counsel further testified that he told Swan, during this final meeting, that 

the jury “would be [composed] of no one of minority color.” Id. More than that, plea 

counsel also agreed on cross-examination that he had told Swan the jury “would be 

culled of any minorities.” Id. at 64. According to plea counsel, Swan paused after 

receiving this information and then said “that he was going to go ahead and enter a 

plea of guilty.” Id. at 49. Plea counsel testified that he told Swan he would not let 

Swan plead guilty if the ammunition was not Swan’s. Then, plea counsel stated, 

Swan “disclosed . . . that it was his.” Id. 

The parties then offered closing arguments, with the government contending 

that Swan’s assertion of factual innocence was not credible, that his plea was 

knowing and voluntary, and that he had close assistance of counsel. Swan’s counsel 

argued to the contrary on each point. In so doing, Swan’s counsel twice emphasized 

that plea counsel’s statement about the all-white jury contributed to Swan being 

compelled to enter a guilty plea. 

Ruling from the bench, the district court devoted most of its discussion to 

concluding that Swan’s assertion of factual innocence was “not credible” because 

Swan merely “had a change of heart after he saw the full videos in terms of his 

evaluation of his odds” and “offered nothing other than his speculation that these 

officers would have been motivated to, would have been willing to, and did, in fact, 

plant the [ammunition].” Id. at 92–93. The district court also briefly concluded that 

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Swan had close assistance of counsel and that his plea was knowing and voluntary. 

On the latter point, it did not mention plea counsel’s commentary about the selection 

and makeup of Swan’s potential jury and instead reasoned that because Swan had 

prior experience with the criminal-justice system, he understood what it meant to 

plead guilty. Overall, the district court concluded that Swan failed to show a fair and 

just reason to withdraw his plea and thus denied the motion.1

 

At sentencing, the district court imposed the statutory maximum of ten years in 

prison,2

 followed by three years of supervised release.3 Swan appeals. 

Analysis 

Swan argues that the district court erred in refusing to allow him to withdraw 

his plea. Reviewing that decision, we would typically ask whether the district court 

abused its discretion in assessing, under this circuit’s applicable seven-factor test, 

whether Swan “‘establish[ed] a fair and just reason’ for his request” to withdraw his 

1

 About two months after the district court’s ruling, the Supreme Court decided 

New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022). The next 

month, Swan filed a pro se motion to reconsider the ruling on his motion to withdraw 

his plea. The district court permitted argument on the reconsideration motion prior to 

sentencing, and there Swan’s counsel also argued that Swan should be entitled to 

withdraw his plea on grounds of legal innocence because the felon-in-possession 

statute was unconstitutional under Bruen. The district court rejected the Bruen 

argument and denied the motion for reconsideration. 

2

 The statutory maximum for this crime has since increased to 15 years. See

Bipartisan Safer Communities Act, Pub. L. 117-159, sec. 12004(c), 136 Stat. 1313, 

1329 (2022) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2), (8)). 

3

 Swan’s sentencing range under the United States Sentencing Guidelines was 

57 to 71 months, based on a total offense level of 18 and a criminal-history category 

of VI. The district court imposed a longer sentence based primarily on concerns 

about Swan’s lengthy criminal history, noting that prior sentences had not deterred 

him and that he needed to be incapacitated. 

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plea. United States v. Dominguez, 998 F.3d 1094, 1103–04 (10th Cir. 2021) (quoting 

United States v. Marceleno, 819 F.3d 1267, 1272 (10th Cir. 2016)); see also Fed. R. 

Crim. P. 11(d)(2)(B) (allowing withdrawal of plea before sentencing if “defendant 

can show a fair and just reason for requesting the withdrawal”). But one of those 

seven factors, and one that Swan raises on appeal, is whether the plea was knowing 

and voluntary. See Dominguez, 998 F.3d at 1103–04. The requirement that a plea be 

knowing and voluntary stems from the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 

Amendment and is a legal issue that we review de novo. United States v. McIntosh, 

29 F.4th 648, 655 (10th Cir. 2022); see also id. at 655 n.1 (explaining that district 

court necessarily “abuses its discretion if it denies a motion to withdraw a plea that 

was not knowingly and voluntarily entered”). We therefore begin—and ultimately 

end—our assessment of Swan’s overall withdrawal argument with his position that 

his plea was not knowing and voluntary. 

A knowing and voluntary plea “must be ‘deliberate and intelligent and chosen 

from available alternatives.’” Id. at 655 (quoting United States v. Libretti, 38 F.3d 

523, 529 (10th Cir. 1994), aff’d, 516 U.S. 29 (1995)). Stated differently, “[t]o enter a 

plea that is knowing and voluntary, the defendant must have ‘a full understanding of 

what the plea connotes and of its consequence.’” Marceleno, 819 F.3d at 1276 

(quoting United States v. Hurlich, 293 F.3d 1223, 1230 (10th Cir. 2002)). Thus, and 

as relevant here, “[a] plea may be involuntary when an attorney materially 

misinforms the defendant of the consequences of the plea.” Fields v. Gibson, 277 

F.3d 1203, 1213 (10th Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v. Rhodes, 913 F.2d 839, 

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843 (10th Cir. 1990)). In that instance, “the defendant must show the plea was a 

product of [the] material misrepresentation[],” meaning that he or she “relied” on the 

misrepresentation or that the misrepresentation impacted the decision to plead. 

United States v. Williams, 919 F.2d 1451, 1456 (10th Cir. 1990). 

Swan contends that his plea was not knowing or voluntary “because he was 

informed that one of the rights he was waiving by pleading guilty—his right to an 

impartial jury trial—was effectively nonexistent.” Aplt. Br. 18. In support, he relies 

on plea counsel’s testimony that the jury “would be [composed] of no one of minority 

color” and that Swan “wasn’t going to get a very good jury because it would be 

culled of any minorities.” R. vol. 3, 48, 64. Swan contends this statement materially 

misrepresented the nature of his right to an impartial jury, and he asserts that this 

misrepresentation impacted his decision to enter his plea. 

To its credit, the government does not dispute that plea counsel’s commentary 

on the selection process for and racial makeup of Swan’s hypothetical jury 

fundamentally and materially misrepresented the constitutional guarantees of being 

tried by a jury of one’s peers that is selected without racial discrimination.4

 As the 

Supreme Court has long held, “[p]urposeful racial discrimination in selection of the 

venire violates a defendant’s right to equal protection because it denies him the 

4

 The government also does not argue that Swan forfeited this argument by 

failing to make it below and waived it on appeal by failing to argue for plain error. 

The government has therefore waived any such argument. See United States v. 

Heckenliable, 446 F.3d 1048, 1049 n.3 (10th Cir. 2006) (holding that government 

“waived the waiver” where it did “not argue [d]efendant waived his present 

challenge”). 

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protection that a trial by jury is intended to secure.” Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 

86 (1986); see also Flowers v. Mississippi, 139 S. Ct. 2228, 2243 (2019) (“Equal 

justice under law requires a criminal trial free of racial discrimination in the 

jury[-]selection process.”). Thus, as the government does not dispute, plea counsel’s 

statement to Swan was a material misrepresentation about one of the rights Swan was 

sacrificing by pleading guilty. 

The government nevertheless argues that this material misrepresentation did 

not render Swan’s plea unknowing and involuntary. It first seeks to elevate the 

applicable standard that Swan must meet from showing a material misrepresentation 

that rendered his plea unknowing and involuntary to establishing a claim for 

ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 

(1984). For support, it relies on habeas cases involving claims of plea-stage 

ineffective assistance of counsel for the proposition that “[w]hen an involuntariness 

claim rests on the faulty legal decisions or predictions of defense counsel, the plea 

will be deemed constitutionally involuntary only when the attorney is held to have 

been constitutionally ineffective.” Worthen v. Meachum, 842 F.2d 1179, 1184 (10th 

Cir. 1988) (emphasis added), overruled on other grounds by Coleman v. Thompson, 

501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991); see also Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56 (1985) (“Where, 

as here, a defendant is represented by counsel during the plea process and enters his 

plea upon the advice of counsel, the voluntariness of the plea depends on whether 

counsel’s advice ‘was within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in 

criminal cases.’” (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970))). 

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But Strickland doesn’t apply here. Swan’s argument is not that plea counsel 

ineffectively made a “faulty legal decision or prediction,” Worthen, 842 F.2d at 

1184—his argument is that plea counsel materially misrepresented the nature of his 

right to a jury trial and rendered his waiver of that right unknowing and involuntary 

because he did not know what he was surrendering. In other words, Swan does not 

take issue with the quality of his representation as it pertains to plea counsel’s legal 

guidance specific to his case; rather, he states that he did not understand one of the 

rights he was giving up because plea counsel materially mischaracterized that right. 

Cf. Worthen, 842 F.2d at 1183–84 (applying Strickland to claims that plea counsel 

misrepresented when defendant would be paroled, that defendant would receive 

immunity on other charges, and that counsel would represent defendant in other 

matters). Indeed, we have often separately examined claims of attorney 

misrepresentation in the knowing-and-voluntary context outside of Strickland. See 

Laycock v. New Mexico, 880 F.2d 1184, 1186–87 (10th Cir. 1989) (assessing 

voluntariness of plea in light of attorney’s alleged material misstatements about 

potential for suspended sentence separately from five ineffectiveness claims subject 

to Strickland); United States v. Rhodes, 913 F.2d 839, 842–44 (10th Cir. 1990) 

(assessing voluntariness of plea in light of attorney’s alleged material misstatements 

about likely length of sentence and then reviewing ineffectiveness claim separately, 

under Strickland); United States v. Carr, 80 F.3d 413, 416–19 (10th Cir. 1996) 

(analyzing voluntariness of plea under three arguments, only one of which also 

constituted ineffectiveness claim). We take the same path here and review Swan’s 

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claim as he presents it: a claim that his plea was not knowing and voluntary. 

Under that standard, Swan must show the material misrepresentation impacted 

his decision to plead guilty. See Williams, 919 F.2d at 1456. The record here 

establishes just that. Plea counsel recalled concluding his final meeting with Swan by 

“inform[ing] . . . Swan that it would be [Swan’s] word against all of the officers that 

were present, the body[-]cam footage, and jurors that would be [composed] of no one 

of minority color.” R. vol. 3, 48. And on cross-examination, plea counsel agreed that 

he in fact told Swan all minorities would be removed from the jury. The government 

then asked plea counsel what Swan decided to do; plea counsel replied that “Swan at 

that point paused” and “then [said] that he was going to go ahead and enter a plea of 

guilty.” Id. at 49. This testimony and timeline establishes that Swan relied, at least in 

part, on plea counsel’s material misrepresentation.5

 

The government asserts that Swan cannot show reliance because his motions to 

withdraw his plea did not mention plea counsel’s misrepresentation and instead 

focused on factual innocence. But when those motions were filed, Swan did not yet 

know he had been materially misinformed about his jury-trial right, and thus neither 

did his counsel. Moreover, the pro se motion mentioned that plea counsel’s 

5

 To be sure, plea counsel later indicated that “the still photos and the clip of 

the video” are what “changed” Swan’s assertions of innocence into a desire to plead 

guilty. R. vol. 3, 71. And the district court noted “that [Swan’s] decision to plead 

guilty was driven by the facts and by [his] realistic assessment of his chances at 

trial.” Id. at 88. But Swan viewed the photos and video clip during the same 

conversation in which plea counsel materially misrepresented the jury-trial right, and 

we cannot separate the two—particularly in light of plea counsel’s description of 

precisely when, during their final conversation, Swan decided to plead. 

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statements “compelled” him to plead, and Swan’s counseled motion asserted that 

Swan thought he would be “disbelieved” by a jury: both concerns would reasonably 

flow from being told that the jury would be culled of all minorities. R. vol. 1, 38, 52. 

The government also argues that Swan’s prior experience with the judicial 

system proves that plea counsel’s misrepresentation did not make a difference to his 

decision to plead guilty because Swan necessarily knew how jury trials work.6

 But as 

Swan replies, the record contains nothing about the nature of his prior experiences in 

criminal court. Indeed, although the government notes that Swan cited his prior 

criminal-court experience as one of the reasons he was entering a guilty plea, such 

fact does not assist the government—for all we know, he had an all-white jury in that 

prior case, which would only reinforce the material misrepresentation at issue here. 

In short, that Swan has prior experience in criminal court does not mean he could not 

have relied on plea counsel’s material misrepresentation in this case. 

Last, the government invokes the thoroughness of the district court’s colloquy 

under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 at the change-of-plea hearing. But the 

Rule 11 colloquy is not the source of the misrepresentation at issue here, so the 

government’s argument puts the cart before the horse. Cf. Williams, 919 F.2d at 1456 

(“Both the attorneys and the court have a duty to apprise the defendant of the 

consequences of the plea and ensure that it is voluntary.”). Even if “[n]othing in Rule 

11 requires a court to advise a defendant that he is giving up his right to a fair, 

6

 Recall that Swan’s prior experience in the criminal-justice system was also 

the basis for the district court’s knowing-and-voluntary ruling. 

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impartial, or unbiased jury,” Aplee. Br. 13, the more relevant question here is 

whether anything in the Rule 11 colloquy negated or overcame plea counsel’s 

material misrepresentation about Swan’s jury-trial rights. See Dominguez, 998 F.3d at 

1106 (noting that defendant did “not contest the sufficiency of the court’s Rule 11 

colloquy” but addressing other circumstances that could have rendered plea 

unknowing or unintelligent). And there is no dispute here that the district court did 

not delve into the right to an impartial jury selected without racial bias, effectively 

(although certainly unintentionally) allowing plea counsel’s misrepresentation to 

stand uncorrected. Thus, we reject the government’s Rule 11 argument. 

In sum, because plea counsel advised Swan that his jury would be culled of all 

minorities—suggesting implicitly “that [Swan] would not receive a fair trial because 

of race”—Swan was materially misinformed about the nature of one of the rights he 

was sacrificing by pleading guilty: his right to a jury trial, which includes the right to 

a jury of his peers selected via nondiscriminatory means. Aplt. Br. 13. And plea 

counsel’s testimony established that Swan relied on this misrepresentation when 

deciding to plead guilty. Nothing in the Rule 11 colloquy corrected the 

misrepresentation; nor, on this record, did Swan’s prior experience with the criminaljustice system. We therefore hold that Swan’s plea was not knowing and voluntary 

and that the district court accordingly abused its discretion in denying Swan’s motion 

to withdraw his plea.7 See McIntosh, 29 F.4th at 655 n.1 (“[A] district court abuses its 

7

 We reach this conclusion based solely on the knowing-and-voluntary 

requirement and thus need not consider Swan’s arguments on other plea-withdrawal 

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discretion if it denies a motion to withdraw a plea that was not knowingly and 

voluntarily entered.”). 

Conclusion 

Swan’s plea was not knowing and voluntary because, during the conversation 

in which he decided to plead guilty, his plea counsel materially misrepresented his 

right to an impartial jury selected through racially nondiscriminatory means. We 

therefore reverse the district court’s denial of Swan’s motion to withdraw his guilty 

plea and remand for the district court to allow Swan to withdraw his plea and for 

further proceedings. 

factors, including factual and legal innocence. But we pause to note that to the extent 

that Swan’s legal-innocence argument seeks broader relief than simply withdrawing 

his plea (he asserts that his statute of conviction is unconstitutional), we are bound to 

follow our recent decision in Vincent v. Garland, 80 F.4th 1197 (10th Cir. 2023). See 

United States v. Lira-Ramirez, 951 F.3d 1258, 1260–61 (10th Cir. 2020) (“We must 

generally follow our precedents absent en banc consideration.”). As Swan 

acknowledges, Vincent forecloses his position that the felon-in-possession statute is 

unconstitutional under Bruen, and he now maintains that argument solely for 

preservation purposes. 

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